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RUSSIA SINCE STALIN: OLD TRENDS AND NEW PROBLEMS

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FOREWORD

Rarely has there been a more intense interest in any subject—or a wider range of speculation—than in Soviet developments since Stalin's death in March 1953. As the old dictator's power grew in range and intensity, he had tended more and more both to concentrate the exercise of power in his own hands and to project even minor preferences and prejudices of his own into the shaping of Soviet policy.

At first cautiously, then with greater assurance, Stalin's successors undertook to revise some of his policies and to modify some of his methods. For Moscow bureaucrats, the change of working hours must have been a portent of greater changes to come. For several decades the upper ranks of the bureaucracy had remained at their posts into the early morning hours, since Stalin worked at night and there was no knowing when he would demand their presence. By the end of 1953 normal working hours, from nine to six, were instituted.

To the Soviet population at large the new leaders' promises of more food, clothing, and housing must have had a familiar ring, but it also received some slight evidence of their partial fulfillment. The presence, after long years of exclusion, of non-Communist tourists from outside the Soviet bloc also strengthened their belief that a new war, with even greater potential for destruction, was perhaps not so imminent as they had believed.

To the world outside the Soviet bloc the new leadership, though selected and trained by Stalin for high responsibilities, began to show a somewhat different demeanor. Without relaxing its insistence on Communist purity and consistency of dogma at home, it seemed better able than at any time since the war to distinguish the real alignments of forces in the outside world. It abandoned some of the mistaken claims of Stalin's last years while stubbornly maintaining its essential "positions of strength," as in the case of Eastern Germany and the satellites.

What has been the meaning of these trends? Has the Soviet regime turned into a national state, responsive to the aspirations of its own people for a better life and for peace? Has the revolutionary belief in the world-wide triumph of the Communist system given way to a willingness to "coexist" indefinitely with other political systems? Are world politics going to move in calmer channels?

No single or simple answer to these crucial questions can be given by the conscientious student of Soviet affairs, for Soviet life and actions are themselves full of contradictions, despite the strenuous attempt to measure all life by one dogma. Careful analysts of Soviet developments are constantly examining and re-examining the available data, which are now more abundant than they were in Stalin's last years, and criticizing their own and others' estimates. Since World War II the resources of trained personnel available in the United States for the study of Soviet affairs have grown a great deal, and large bodies of specialized, even highly technical, analyses are being produced at great effort. In some respects, in this as in other fields of research, the gap between the scientific literature and the newspaper headline tends to grow wider. One of the purposes of this special issue of THE ANNALS is to enable the intelligent reader to "catch up" with a large part of the findings of the specialized research projects in this field, and to see how these findings bear on one of the most crucial questions of our time, Whither Russia?

The volume opens with an appraisal of the basic trends in Soviet society and ideology. A fresh examination of the role of the party and the state is followed by a searching analysis of the factors favoring and limiting Russia's remarkable drive toward industrial power, by a review of the problems which afflict its collectivized agriculture, and by a survey of changing Soviet economic policies in world affairs. The study of old and new trends in literature, music, and the fine arts is particularly important because of the directive role assigned to them by the party. Philosophy has, in the Soviet view, an integrative and guiding function, and this makes it essential to look closely at trends in social thought. Science occupies a central place in Soviet strength and policies; the current trends in Soviet science have been treated in an authoritative review. The final section is devoted to surveying Soviet foreign policy in the principal areas of the world. Because of limitations of space some important topics have necessarily been neglected or slurred over.

In each case, the studies presented here rest on a great body of data and on many years of experience and painstaking research. The authors have, needless to say, been entirely independent in the development of their topics and in the presentation of their conclusions. Although the volume is issued in January 1956, practically all articles composing it were, of necessity, prepared in substantially final form by mid-September 1955.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

The Outlook

By BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.*

AMONG the variety of perspectives offered by various scholars concerning possible future developments in the Soviet Union three major theses stand out. It will be our purpose in this essay to make a preliminary assessment of these views. Enough time has elapsed since the death of Stalin to make such an attempt worth while. To what extent have subsequent events shown these perspectives to be adequate or inadequate or suggested new and better ones? Though it might be wiser to have such an assessment from the pen of an author who has no intellectual investment in any of the available interpretations,[1] the facts upon which any such appraisal must be based are equally available to all independent scholars and will be discussed from differing points of view by other contributors to this volume. The reader will therefore be able to form his own judgment in answer to this query.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS—THREE THESES

One thesis holds that by the time of Stalin's death the Soviet regime had reached a point of equilibrium beyond which no fundamental changes were likely, short of violent destruction, presumably produced by some external agency. This view is expressed in the concluding sentences of Professor Fainsod's detailed and penetrating study: "The governing formula of Soviet totalitarianism rests on a moving equilibrium of alternating phases of repression and relaxation, but its essential contours remain unchanged. The totalitarian regime does not shed its police-state characteristics; it dies when power is wrenched from its hands."[2] Though Professor Fainsod does not say so explicitly, such an argument rests, I would suggest, on two pillars. One of these is of course the strength and effectiveness of the control system inherited by Stalin's successors. The other may be indicated in the following terms: modern totalitarianism perpetuates itself as a political system very largely through the repeated destruction of the human beings who at any one time make up the system. Thus the insecurity of both the masses and the bureaucratic instruments of the central authority constitutes not a source of weakness but one of strength to the regime.[3] The point of view set forth by Professor Fainsod may be labeled the "no change" thesis. It remains perhaps the dominant one in most American discussions of Soviet affairs.

In sharp contrast is the argument that the instability and personal character of the chief executive in a totalitarian dictatorship render the system liable to disintegration from the top downward, as contestants in the struggle for power reach back into the society for support. In this fashion the latent discontents in a totalitarian system help to break it

* I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Russian Research Center at Harvard University.

[1] Dr. L. P. Haimson of the Russian Research Center is preparing one for publication in the near future.

[2] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 500.

[3] See *ibid.*, Chaps. 12 and 13, especially pp. 373–76, where Professor Fainsod's position appears to me at least consistent with the above formulation.

apart instead of binding it together.[4] Let us label this thesis "potential disintegration."

The third thesis, that the Soviet Union may undergo a transformation in the direction of constitutionalism, has many varieties and requires somewhat fuller discussion. As a minor or major point it occurs in all of the discussions, including the preceding ones. Rostow anticipates it as a possible consequence of attempts by higher-level administrators to put forth their own ideas on major questions of policy and to win greater autonomy for their bureaucratic bailiwicks.[5] With considerable skepticism Fainsod outlines briefly a similar possibility.[6] As is well known, Isaac Deutscher has made the most of the constitutional point. By creating modern industry and the basis for an adequate supply of material goods, the Stalinist dictatorship, Deutscher argues, has undermined its own basis and created the necessary conditions for a free society, thus fulfilling the Marxist hope for the eventual liberation of man.[7]

Soviet Society

The preceding writers emphasize the political aspects of totalitarianism, though by no means to the exclusion of everything else. In a recent study I have tried to outline some of the ways in which the society as a whole might develop, by observing the criteria of "good" and "bad" behavior that already exist in Soviet society and drawing deductions about what would happen if the emphasis on one criterion increased at the expense of another.[8]

[4] W. W. Rostow, *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* (New York, 1952), Chap. 15, especially p. 256.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 191–92, 253–54.

[6] *Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), pp. 499–500.

[7] *Russia: What Next?* (New York, 1953), *passim*.

[8] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Terror and Progress USSR* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 224–25.

The two major possibilities envisaged may be grouped under the constitutional rubric. One of them is technical rationalism, where the criterion is rationality in the rather narrow and technical sense that many engineers apply. If this element came to the fore, the rapid pace of economic growth would continue, but in a different direction. Though the power of the central authority would remain very great, enforced conformity to an objective code of law would replace frequent administrative shake-ups as the main device through which power and authority are exercised. By the same token the importance of organized terror would decline, though some aspects would unquestionably remain to enforce acceptance among the population of materialist and technical values held by the rulers. Some increase in the personal security of officials might be anticipated, since conformity with objective rules and the demonstration of skill and results would be the main basis for tenure in office. Social mobility would remain at a high level, as moving up or down the social scale came to depend on sheer technical abilities. The family unit would remain small in comparison with preindustrial societies. The moral code might be described as one of "No Smoking—Fire Hazard," in that rules of conduct would be based upon a judgment of results rather than upon an absolute ethical or religious standard.

The second possibility is labeled traditionalist, a term that is in some respects unfortunate, since it might apply to the stabilization of any form of society.[9] The main criterion for appraising human actions, if this element became prominent, would be the extent to which they corresponded with the way people had done things in the past. Essentially this development would mean that Soviet society had lost its dynamism and acquired a constitution in the sense of a set of rules—or, more accurately, precedents—limiting the arbitrary power of the dictator. A rule of precedent would also imply some decentralization, since the dictator would no longer be able to reach down through the bureaucracy, skipping over intervening links in the characteristic Stalinist manner, to make his power felt in farm and factory. Personal connections rather than objective capacity would become the basis of what achievement was possible in such a society—an achievement which we might anticipate would be fairly limited as the society settled into a somewhat rigid order of estates, resembling an oriental despotism rather than European feudal society.[10]

[9] In Max Weber, from whom the term is borrowed with some modification, "traditionalist" has a specific and limited meaning. See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947), pp. 341–58.

World Politics

These three theses—no change, potential disintegration, and various forms of constitutionalism—suffer from a common defect. This defect, I would suggest, is the lack of sufficient explicit attention to the international situation. International politics confronts the political leaders of a country with a world they never made and over which their control is much more limited than over domestic affairs. The choice of policy made in one sphere conditions and limits the range of meaningful choices in the other. Let us begin therefore by an examination of Soviet foreign policy and the conditions to which it is a response.

Tension between the Soviet Union and its major allies, the United States and Great Britain, was never absent during World War II. As victory approached, the disagreements became more severe and soon turned into outright hostility, which mounted steadily until some time after the entry of the Chinese into the Korean War. The sources of the hostility lay partly in the structure of international politics itself. The acrimonious breakup of a victorious coalition is no unique historical event. In the case of the allies in World War II this breakup produced a situation in which two giants glowered at each other across the globe. The hostility lay partly in a conflict between two social systems and their respective ideologies. The conflict has had the ironic effect of helping to stabilize and even to freeze both political systems and their official doctrines. For the USSR the cold war provided an obvious reason for continued industrialization under totalitarian auspices. For the United States it served, perhaps along with other factors, to create a booming economy stimulated by war industry.

The polarization of world politics and the hostility associated with it may have reached its height during the Korean conflict. Then it was possible to speak of the United Nations vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc as "a grand alliance opposing another grand alliance."[11] Since then two contrary trends have become more prominent. Germany and Japan have gained greater freedom of action. Important groups in these and other countries, notably France and India, have sought to disengage their countries from the East-West conflict. In other cases,

[10] A third possibility, the continuation and intensification of totalitarian trends, is rejected as incompatible with the continued operation of a highly industrialized society. See Moore, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), p. 223 and Chap. 7.

[11] See Hans F. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (2d ed.; New York, 1954), pp. 459–65.

such as Germany and Yugoslavia, there is a visible attempt to move from the passive to the active stage—to utilize the conflict for their own national purposes. Quite possibly this aspect of the change could increase the danger of full-scale war rather than diminish it. The other change is a shift in Soviet foreign policy itself toward a reduction of its foreign commitments and a less iron grip upon its satellite allies.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The latter change is foreshadowed in Stalin's last public statement, *Economic Problems of Socialism*, where the dictator anticipated more conflict within the capitalist camp, and less between this camp and its socialist rival. Possibly the new policy was under consideration for some time before Stalin's death. Its major highlights include the liquidation of the Korean War and the war in Indochina, the signature of a peace treaty with Austria, and the rather clumsy version of the bear hug and "let bygones be bygones"—shown in Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1955. No insignificant aspect of the change has been the willingness of top Soviet leaders to leave the Soviet capital for direct diplomatic negotiations. The visits have included not only Yugoslavia but also China, and more recently the meeting at Geneva in July 1955.

It is easy enough to dismiss the Geneva conference as one at which there was a synthetic appearance of good will without agreement on substantial issues. Nevertheless the new tone to the disagreement may conceivably turn out to be more significant than the positions and counterpositions put forth by the exalted delegates. One might interpret the conference as demonstrating that both the Western and the Eastern powers prefer the status quo to any visible alternative, and particularly to one that would allow a reunited Germany to stir up trouble between them. By the early autumn of 1955 political leaders on both sides were apparently searching for an arrangement that would simultaneously produce both a *détente* and some advantage for their own side. Since these two objectives are largely contradictory, there are grounds for skepticism about the outcome.

The change in Soviet foreign policy far exceeds the substitution of minor concessions for minor pinpricks with which the policy began. The main drift of the policy appears to be toward a reduction of international tension to free the Soviets for concentration on urgent domestic problems. It may be reversed if it does not succeed in inducing the United States to relax its pressure. For the Soviets the crucial test will be whether this policy can produce a further delay in the rearmament of Germany. If it fails in this objective, we may anticipate a reversion to some features of latter-day Stalinism both in domestic and foreign policy.

AGRICULTURE

In Soviet domestic affairs the most pressing problem is undoubtedly agriculture. On the one hand the government has embarked on a highly publicized campaign to grow more corn and to increase the total area of cultivation. On the other hand it has made some concessions to the collectivized peasantry to increase incentives. Most significant among these were the measures taken in 1953 to make work on the private plot more attractive. If the Soviets had continued to move in this direction, they could have undermined the entire system of centralized control over the production and distribution of agricultural products. By the time Malenkov had resigned the premiership, it became perfectly clear that this path would not be followed to its logical conclusion. A decree of March 9, 1955, shows that the system of assigned quotas for planting crops, and of obligatory deliveries to the government by the collective farms at harvest time, remains essentially unchanged. The decree merely gives the collective farm managers explicit authority to determine how they will meet the plan by making their own decisions as to the kinds of livestock raised and the areas sown to different crops. The party Central Committee also decided, according to *Pravda*, April 5, 1955, to strengthen the management of the farms by sending out thirty thousand "volunteer" managers, to be chosen primarily from among experienced administrative and technical officials. This mixture of the infusion of new administrative blood, partial concessions, and a campaign atmosphere is fully reminiscent of the Stalin era.

INDUSTRY

In industry a similar pattern of concessions and subsequent tightening up is apparent. Malenkov's original proposals for increasing the output of consumers' goods are well known. Less attention has been paid to some of their doctrinal justifications. These became public through D. T. Shepilov's attack on the views of otherwise little known economists in *Pravda*, January 24, 1955. No Soviet economist would be likely to submit such views for publication unless he had previously had clues that they would be acceptable to very high party officials. Thus these opinions constitute significant evidence about "advanced" thinking under Malenkov.

The essence of such views is that under socialism production should eventually serve the purpose of consumption. Both capitalism and socialism had to restrict consumption to create an adequate industrial base. This base has now been created in the USSR. While capitalism, because of the profit motive, necessarily continues to restrict consumption, socialism need do so no longer. Instead it can advance to higher levels of welfare for all.

This line of thought requires, for its execution, a marked reduction in the temperature of the cold war. It implies a policy of peaceful coexistence and the transformation of the international political contest between the two systems into an economic race. Though the supporting arguments have been officially rejected, it appears that the conclusions have been at least temporarily adopted. Thus Khrushchev was reported by the Soviet papers as early as May 19, 1955, to have said, "The fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy is the possibility of and the necessity for the peaceful coexistence of different social systems."[12] As indicated by this statement, and by the continuity of Soviet foreign policy after Malenkov's resignation, this assessment probably remains just below the surface as an influential element in current Soviet policy. Though the full story remains unknown, this would not be the first time that a Soviet leader has emerged victorious from bureaucratic rivalries and taken over important planks from the platform of a defeated opponent.

Except for the foregoing controversy, resolved in favor of heavy industry, there is little to be gleaned from an examination of this aspect of Soviet life. The old problems of a highly centralized economy evidently remain, and are met in the same way. The drive for industrial expansion still comes from the party high command, and still encounters strong resistance from below in the form of attempts by those actively engaged in production to cling to traditional routines. A reorganization to

[12] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 7, No. 20 (June 29, 1955), p. 7.

separate long-range planning from day-to-day controls appears to be the one new measure adopted so far with this problem in mind.[13] Without continued pressure from the party high command Russia's industrial expansion might slow down markedly.[14] In turn this change would have vital consequences throughout the rest of Soviet society.

INTELLECTUALS

It is to the intellectuals that we must turn to find the most definite changes in Soviet life since the death of Stalin. Shortly after this event, and presumably at the nod of high party officials, certain writers and musicians began to praise the virtues of artistic independence and to poke fun at the made-to-order optimism and cardboard heroes of "socialist realism." This brief experiment was brought to a close by the Writers' Congress toward the end of 1954. For the natural scientists the change was equally marked, though less highly publicized. Shortly before Stalin's death restrictions in science had gone so far as to place a political ban on the quantum theory. There had also been attacks on probability theory in mathematics,[15] besides the party's well-known intervention in genetics. The superiority of Soviet and even Czarist Russian science over that of the decadent bourgeois West formed a constant theme in the Soviet press.

After Stalin's death all these features suddenly disappeared. Possibly the Soviet leaders decided that they needed the best technical science they could get without worrying too much about the political implications of scientific discoveries. Perhaps they also felt that they were in a position to control these implications anyway. Still another consideration may have been that modern natural scientists are generally tame animals, raised in a bureaucratic hothouse, whose ideas no longer constitute a serious threat to the ruling powers.

FAMILY AND CLASS

The institutions of the family, formal education, and social class may be treated simultaneously as agencies through which Soviet society trains the oncoming generation and allocates its members among different occupations and social tasks. Much has been made in the past of an apparent increase in the rigidity of class barriers in the Soviet Union and of the supposed abandonment of early equalitarian ideals. But we must not forget that the socialist revolution took place in a backward agrarian country. With an extreme shortage of the necessary skills, including even literacy, the Bolsheviks had to retain and reward many members of the former ruling classes who had these skills. They also found it necessary to create their own group of administrators and technical specialists and to reward them highly. Now this situation has greatly changed as a consequence of industrialization and the spread of education. The Nineteenth Party Congress envisaged the extension of limited technical education through much of the Soviet Union in the course of the next decade. To the extent that both the structure of modern industry and the educational system make for a society of interchangeable parts, the possibility of a very great increase in equality of opportunity becomes real.

Complete equality cannot be achieved as long as the family remains the basic social cell, as it is not only in the Soviet Union but in all known human societies. The son or daughter of a successful man gains important advantages in social and cultural skills, as well as formal education, merely from being brought up in such a home. In this way advantages are transmitted from one generation to the next.[16]

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

We do not know whether the Soviets would be disturbed by the barriers to full social equality that arise in this way. But we do know that since Stalin's death they have shown increasing concern over the opposite side of the coin—the creation of a class of juvenile delinquents from wealthy homes.[17] Some of the behavior of this group resembles that of spoiled rich children elsewhere: riding around in flashy cars, drinking heavily, night clubbing, and amusing themselves with intermittent seductions. Other aspects are more serious and include armed robbery, beatings up, and even murder.

There is no way of telling how widespread and serious juvenile delinquency is, beyond the fact that Soviet authorities now think it is bad enough to require systematic exposure in the press. It is noteworthy that the reports practically always refer to children from wealthy families. In Soviet discussions[18] one can detect an undertone of anxiety lest this behavior become a model for youth in all strata.

It is likely that the Soviets have here run up against an insoluble problem. By the mid-thirties it was clear that they definitely decided to rely primarily on the family as the agency for inculcating the moral standards needed to keep their society going, though it was to be supplemented by the school, the Pioneers, and the Komsomol. This commitment to the family has been reinforced by one to personal private property, including real estate.[19]

In the light of these commitments it is difficult to see how the Soviets can avoid the consequence of a certain proportion of spoiled children. Some parents are bound to discipline their children inadequately and spare the younger generation from facing harsh realities. Whether the attitude that work and rules of behavior are something made for the "lower orders" will gradually sap the vigor and intelligence of the ruling strata is an intriguing question to which future history may some day provide an answer. Past experience suggests that such an outcome is far from improbable.

PARTY HIGH COMMAND

Developments in the party high command and in the government have been left to the last of this discussion, since it is there that all pressures in Soviet society find their focal point. Those who have argued the instability of the executive under totalitarian dictatorship can find support for at least some of their views in the dramatic events since Stalin's death. The arrest and execu-

[13] See Bulganin's speech, which stresses these traditionalist pressures and briefly describes the planning reorganization, in the metropolitan press May 17, 1955, and *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 7, No. 20 (June 29, 1955), pp. 3–4, 6.

[14] For a fuller development of this argument see Moore, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), Chap. 2.

[15] Moore, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), pp. 139–43. See also Arnold Buchholz, *Ideologie und Forschung in der sowjetischen Naturwissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1953), for a fuller treatment of the relationship between Marxist doctrine and Soviet science. The author's discussion, however, is limited to certain aspects of the content of scientific work and devotes almost no attention to the workings of the control system.

[16] Cf. R. Feldmesser, "Aspects of Social Mobility in the Soviet Union," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, June 1955.

[17] See Mark G. Field, "Social Disorganization in Soviet Russia—Drunkenness and Crime," *Problems of Communism*, No. 3 (May–June 1955), pp. 29–38.

[18] Many are available in recent issues of *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*.

[19] Probably no society has been more savage in the defense of property, both private and social (*i.e.*, state property), than the Soviet dictatorship.

tion of Beria and Malenkov's unprecedented resignation from the premiership are only the highest points in a series of little known events. It would be astonishing if no further surprises were in store, possibly before this paper becomes public print. At the present writing no individual has emerged in command of the main levers of control in Soviet society: the party, the police, the military forces, and the industrial ministries. In this connection it is well to recall that these agencies do not constitute distinct interest groupings, as they still largely do in Western society. Instead the party and the police, which is now apparently clearly subordinate to the party, permeate all sections of the bureaucracy, rendering independent action very difficult if not impossible.

At the same time this permeation by the party means that its members become the channel through which the requirements of different elements in the bureaucracy find their way to the high command, the policy-making nucleus for the whole society. Party members, even high ones, often wear two hats, one as a party member and another as a key administrative official. Thus they become sensitive to the inchoate and half-formulated wishes of various sectors in the society, including even the peasantry. This is not to say that the party necessarily responds to these wishes in the way the people concerned might wish. Often the very opposite is the case. The Politburo and its successor, the party Presidium, have not been parliamentary forums where competing interest groups reach a compromise. Nothing could be further from the Bolshevik ethic of active comprehension and control of political life. Nevertheless pressures emanating from within Soviet society and the outside world form the basis for the formulation of issues by the highest party leaders.

As the discussion preceding Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism* and the Shepilov editorial on industrialism both demonstrate, the formulation of views that may be rejected subsequently is at times very full and explicit. Again we cannot draw the conclusion that the party leaders always sit down to discuss two or more well-argued and opposing theses before reaching a conclusion. Probably the process is more similar to what happens in our own society, where an official may sense a change in the bureaucratic atmosphere and come up with a carefully worked-out proposal. Even if the alternative is rejected and never becomes a topic of public discussion, its contents and general line of thought become known to a series of influential people.

"Consciousness" Versus "Spontaneity"

On the basis of these considerations and the very brief review of Soviet society and its relations with the rest of the world is it possible to formulate the issues now pending in Soviet society and some of the alternative courses of action that may be under consideration? I think that the attempt at least deserves to be made. Many journalistic prognoses have been cast in terms of a "soft" or a "hard" policy. More appropriate might be the terms "consciousness" versus "spontaneity," terms familiar to readers of early Russian Marxist discourse.[20] The first implies a policy of deliberate and ruthless control over the course of human events to make them yield a predetermined result. The second, closer to German revisionist Marxism, implies a policy of "letting nature take its course," since events supposedly show an inevitable trend that is in itself desirable. "Consciousness" has received the main emphasis in Soviet policy from Lenin's day onward. But we have seen that "spontaneity" lies not far beneath the surface of important contemporary thinking in the USSR and was to some extent allowed to come to the fore in policy under Malenkov. After the success of the industrialization program by the method of consciousness, which of the two will become the dominant theme in the future probably depends on developments in international politics.

[20] Cf. L. P. Haimson, *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*. Cambridge, Mass., 1955.

Should the efforts to achieve a period of peaceful coexistence succeed, spontaneity might become the dominant theme. But in the light of Bolshevik tradition it is unlikely to become the sole one. More probable is a partial fusion of the two traditions along the following lines: The terror would be relaxed and kept in the background as a reserve weapon—"put in moth balls," as Alex Inkeles once expressed it. With a higher level of material goods it would be possible to manipulate the incentives and over-all situation confronting Soviet citizens so that the overwhelming majority of them would behave in the way desired by the central government. They would have the illusion of freedom without its substance. It might even be possible to permit free elections, since the citizens could be counted on to choose the "right" leaders, who would continue to manipulate the society in the "right" way. Totalitarian democracy would become a reality. Capitalism could be allowed to rot on the vine, through its alleged inherent contradictions, instead of being given a shot in the arm through a rearmament program, with its accompanying risk of mutual destruction for both social systems.

If, on the other hand, the attempts at peaceful coexistence bring forth dubious results—perhaps the more probable alternative—we may expect old-fashioned Stalinist totalitarianism to persist, with some reduction in its most arbitrary and terrorist features.

Perspectives Reviewed

We may close with a few remarks about the perspectives mentioned at the beginning of this essay. As already suggested, the major weakness in all of them comes from inadequate attention to foreign affairs. Some of the chief determinants of the future of Soviet society lie outside that society in the larger system of world politics. Among the specific interpretations the "no change" thesis appears to have the best of the argument so far, at least from a strictly factual standpoint. The Stalinist edifice in its major features still stands. But there are, I think, important changes, particularly in foreign policy and in controls over the life of professional intellectuals. The theory that stresses the instability of the chief executive has turned out to be correct in regard to this specific fact. So far, however, this instability has not had any serious consequences for the system as a whole.

As for the "constitutionalist" theories, Deutscher's optimistic hopes have not been justified by subsequent events. The USSR today appears to be just about as far from a democratic version of socialism as it ever was. Likewise the traditionalist model does not appear to be coming to the surface. Some people might be inclined to discard the traditionalist model altogether, as incompatible with the dynamic characteristics of industrial society. By the second half of the twentieth century, on the other hand, the impetus for change in industrial societies generally may no longer lie in the economy or in technology as such. Now the impetus for technical advance comes in very large measure from military requirements. Should this source of change decline in

importance, industrial societies might conceivably turn out to be rather static affairs.

TOWARD TECHNICAL RATIONALISM

To my mind the changes that have occurred since Stalin's death point in the direction of technical rationalism at the expense of old-fashioned Stalinist totalitarianism. The liquidation of the "doctors' plot," the increased incentives for agriculture, the grant of slightly greater freedom to lower officials in both industry and agriculture to make decisions on their own, the elimination of the more extreme restrictions upon scientific theorizing, the educational program, and the developments in foreign policy all can be taken as pointing toward a society that is more rational in a rather limited material and technical sense.

Further rationalization of Soviet society probably depends upon the extent to which international tensions can be reduced. Without a solution to international problems, any thoroughgoing rationalization—one that would involve a transition from destructive to creative ends for social life generally—remains impossible. But this generalization applies as much to American society as it does to the Soviet scene. Developments in the two systems cannot be understood as isolated trends independent of each other.

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Should American-Russian relations remain fundamentally unchanged over the next decade, both societies may be expected to develop increasingly similar structural characteristics despite differences in their proclaimed ideologies. These characteristics would almost certainly be much closer to those of a garrison state, though with a high standard of living and quite possibly a contented population, than to those of liberal democracy. Disagreeable though they may be, these prospects furnish no justification for an American policy of unlimited concessions to Soviet demands. Such a policy would simply lead to the same results by another route. The problem of statesmanship on both sides of the Iron Curtain, a problem far easier to formulate than to solve, is to find sufficient areas of mutually advantageous compromise to stabilize the present situation. Such stabilization might in turn permit the emergence of trends more favorable to the growth of a free society.

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Governmental Developments in the USSR Since Stalin

By JOHN N. HAZARD

THE Soviet leadership's anticipation of panic in the population following Stalin's death in March 1953 seems to have passed. Measures designed, apparently, to cope with the expected danger of mass unrest have been modified. Soviet administrative and judicial policies have resumed many of the characteristics familiar to those who followed their course before Stalin died.

Two primary measures designed to save the state through political manipulation became evident immediately after Stalin's death. One step lay in the direction of reducing the circle of those with power, including those with administrative authority. The other lay in the direction of quieting the people by promising relaxation of severity in the administration of criminal law. Parallel trends within the Communist party can also be discerned, and they form the subject of a companion study in this volume. This paper has to do only with the progress of events on the governmental side of the Soviet bifurcated apparatus of power.

IMMEDIATE POST-STALIN MEASURES

Reduction in the size of the circle of those within the state apparatus holding power was achieved by combining existing ministries to establish a smaller Council of Ministers of the USSR and by creating an inner cabinet of five men. Prior to Stalin's death there had been fifty-one ministries.[1] The post-mortem decree effected a reorganization from which only twenty-five ministries emerged.[2] Prior to Stalin's death there were unofficially reported to have existed a steering committee of ten men in the Council of Ministers and an executive committee limited to four or five, above the steering committee.[3] After Stalin's death the ten-man steering committee was eliminated to leave the executive committee standing alone with five members.[4]

The promise of relaxation of severity in the administration of the criminal law took two forms: an amnesty, and an order to the Ministry of Justice to redraft the criminal code with a view to replacing prison terms by administrative penalties for the less dangerous categories of crime.[5] Under the amnesty all persons serving prison terms under court sentence up to five years in length, regardless of the offense, were to be released from prison.

Persons with terms longer than five years were also to be released under the amnesty when they were women if they

[1] This total is obtained by analyzing decrees for 1950, 1951, and 1952 as published in *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta*, No. 15 (630), July 29, 1950; *ibid.*, No. 5 (662), March 21, 1951; *ibid.*, No. 6 (713), March 16, 1952.

[2] Law of March 15, 1953; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 3 (775), March 20, 1953.

[3] See Anatole F. Mazour, *Russia, Past and Present* (New York, 1951), chart section.

[4] Decree of March 6, 1953; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 2 (774), March 8, 1953. Nothing was said of the inner cabinet when the Supreme Soviet adopted its law on reorganization on March 15, 1953 (*op. cit.* note 2 *supra*). It is presumed that the decision adopted immediately after Stalin's death by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers reflected the actual state of affairs in the Council of Ministers.

[5] Decree of March 27, 1953; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 4 (776), March 28, 1953.

were pregnant or over the age of fifty or with children up to ten years of age. Men over the age of fifty-five were to be released regardless of their offense. Persons of any age or duration of sentence were to be released if they had been convicted of crimes classified under the criminal code as "official" or "economic." Persons with terms longer than five years who did not fall within the categories of those to be released were to have their sentences reduced by one-half. The decree was silent on those serving terms in concentration camps as the result of an order of one of the "special boards" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

The policy of reduction in size of the Council of Ministers underwent a change within five months after Stalin's death. When the reduction was announced in March 1953 the new chairman of the Council of Ministers, Malenkov, had declared that the reduction was not caused by Stalin's death but had been prepared long before to increase efficiency.[6] It is hard to believe this explanation in light of the reversal of policy on August 24, 1953, with the creation of a new Ministry of the Food Industry.[7] The reversal was accompanied by an explanation that the new ministry was required to increase food production and to improve its quality. The new ministry took jurisdiction over the food-processing plants, which had been transferred at the time of Stalin's death to the Ministry of Light Industry.

Other changes on the same day were to remove from the Ministry of Light Industry another of its branches to create a new Ministry of Industrial Goods in Wide Demand; to divide the Ministry of Foreign and Domestic Trade into its two components, so that commerce would again be handled as it had been prior to Stalin's death; and to separate the central administrations for state and collective farms, which had been separate before Stalin's death.[8]

In subsequent months the process of resplitting the amalgamated ministries into the same units that had constituted separate ministries prior to March 1953 gained momentum. When the Supreme Soviet met in annual session, in April 1954, it confirmed actions of its Presidium between August 24, 1953, and April 23, 1954, establishing sufficient new ministries to raise the total to forty-six. The State Bank was also removed from its position of subordination to the Ministry of Finance and restored to its seat on the Council of Ministers, from which it had been removed at the time of Stalin's death.[9] There were also added to the Council of Ministers two new "committees," one to co-ordinate construction and the other to co-ordinate internal security measures.

Although the number of ministries had reached by April 1954 almost the number existing at the time of Stalin's death, the process of fragmentation was to continue. On August 4, 1954, two new ministries were added, for the construction of means of transportation and for city and village construction. When the Supreme Soviet met at its annual session in February 1955, a new law amending the constitution to introduce new ministries brought the total to fifty-one.[10]

The process of expansion had not been completed, however, even though the total number of ministries had returned to the peak of the period prior to March 1953, for at its meeting of April 2, 1955, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet added two more ministries, to make a total of fifty-three.[11] Within a month even the long-established State Planning Committee was split into its two parts to create one committee for long-range planning and another for current plans.[12]

Reorganization

With the increase in the number of ministries there occurred what appears to have been a return to the two-tiered inner cabinet of steering committee and executive committee which had directed the affairs of the Council of Ministers during Stalin's declining years. The metamorphosis took thirteen months. In the reorganization following Stalin's death only one Deputy Chairman (Mikoyan) had been left as a relic of the pre-Malenkov steering committee of ten. The pre-Malenkov executive committee had become the sole directing group, with five members, comprising the Chairman and four First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers (Beria, Bulganin, Kaganovich, and Molotov). On Beria's ouster on July 10, 1953, this inner cabinet was reduced to four.[13]

The return to the system of the Stalin era began when the single Deputy Chairman was joined by five new Deputy Chairmen under a decree of the Supreme Soviet enacted at its regular session on April 27, 1954.[14] There was thus restored to the administrative hierarchy a body resembling the steering committee of ten reputed to have existed during the Stalin era. The new group of Deputy Chairmen was subordinate to the inner group of First Deputy Chairmen, and the conclusion is inescapable that the inner group was an executive committee for a larger steering committee, whose members assumed responsibility for specific areas of activity within the Council of Ministers. This two-level inner cabinet has been continued to the present, although there have been changes of personalities.

Malenkov's demotion, which was announced to the Supreme Soviet on February 8, 1955,[15] was the signal for a reorganization. One of the First Deputy Chairmen, Bulganin, was promoted to fill Malenkov's place,[16] and Malenkov was dropped back to the position of a Deputy Chairman.[17] Nothing further was done at the time to rearrange the administrative hierarchy, but three weeks later three of the then Deputy Chairmen were advanced to the rank of First Deputy Chairmen (Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin),[18] and their seats as Deputy Chairmen were filled by three new men (Kucherenko, Lobanov, Khrunichev).[19] On the same day a separate decree added another name (Zaveniagin) to the group of Deputy Chairmen.[20] The changes brought the number of First Deputy Chairmen to five and the number of Deputy Chairmen to eight.

DECENTRALIZATION OF MINISTRIES

The post-Stalin era has introduced a reversal of the trend toward centralization of state administration which had been a marked feature of the declining years of Stalin's power. The reversal began on April 19, 1954, with the crea-

[6] *Izvestiia,* March 16, 1953.

[7] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.,* No. 11 (783), September 18, 1953.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] The Presidium had taken this action on April 23, 1954; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.,* No. 9 (803), item 187 (1954).

[10] Law of February 7, 1955; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.,* No. 2 (820), item 38, February 25, 1955.

[11] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.,* No. 6 (824), items 133 and 136, April 29, 1955.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Decree of August 8, 1953; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.,* No. 7 (779), August 15, 1953.

[14] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.,* No. 10 (804), item 218, May 12, 1954.

[15] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.,* No. 2 (820), item 47, February 25, 1955.

[16] *Ibid.,* item 48.

[17] *Ibid.,* item 53.

[18] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.,* No. 3 (821), item 68, March 11, 1955.

[19] *Ibid.,* item 69.

[20] *Ibid.,* item 70.

tion of a Ministry of Coal Production in the Ukrainian Republic.[21] The previously existing All-Union Ministry of Coal Production in the federal government was transformed at the same time into a Ministry of the Union-Republic type. For those familiar with Soviet administrative terms the character of the change will be apparent immediately, for there have existed ever since the creation of the federation in December 1922 differing types of ministries. The All-Union type is highly centralized, in that the federal government's administrative apparatus has both planning and operating functions. There are no powers reserved to the republics in this type of organization. The Union-Republic type of ministry places only planning functions in the federal government and reserves operating functions to the republics. A third type of ministry, called the Republic type, places both planning and operating functions in the Union Republics.

The decree on the Ministry of Coal Production incorporated within its technical terminology a change in attitude toward the principal coal-producing republic. While the Union-Republic type of ministry had been a much-used form for the administration of the consumers' goods industries under Stalin's regime, it had not been adopted for the heavy industries, with the possible exception of the timber industry, which might be considered a heavy industry. With the post-Stalin decree on the coal industry a halfway position was taken, in that one major republic was permitted to operate its own mines subject to policy direction from the federal government. The position was only a halfway position because, unlike the pattern of the usual Union-Republic type of ministry, there was to be no scheme of ministries in all producing republics and only the one ministry was to be established in the Ukraine. The Russian Republic, with its large fields in Karaganda and its lesser fields in Eastern Siberia, was to have its coal mines operated by the ministry in the federal government.

The same halfway position was taken with the petroleum industry on May 18, 1954,[22] when a decree established a Ministry of the Petroleum Industry in the Azerbaidjan Republic, and transformed the former All-Union type of ministry in the federal government into a Union-Republic type. Again, the largest single producing republic was given operating authority, but the Russian Republic with its lesser oil fields along the middle Volga was given no corresponding ministry. These fields were to be operated, as in the past, by the federal government's ministry.

The program of decentralization was advanced considerably in the last days of 1954 with the creation of Ministries of Communications in all sixteen republics under a Union-Republic type of ministry in the federal government.[23] Previously all communications had been operated directly by Moscow through branches responsible solely to Moscow and beyond the influence of governments in the republics. On the following day the Ministry of Higher Education was reorganized to give the Ukrainian Republic a ministry in this field,[24] but all other republics were to have their higher educational institutions operated by the federal government's ministry.

Education

In the early days of the federation, education was left entirely to the republics, and no Ministry of Education was created in the federal government. By degrees the federal government assumed authority, first by adopting general schemes for the teaching program and then by creating a committee on higher education under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This committee had been transformed into a Union-Republic type of ministry of a special character by decree of April 10, 1946,[25] in that it was authorized to operate directly a list of key institutions of higher learning and to guide the republics in operating the rest.

In the reorganization following Stalin's death the Union-Republic Ministry of Higher Education had been combined with the Committees on Art and on Radio Information, the Administration for the Publication of Political Literature, and the Ministry of Labor Reserves, in a Ministry of Culture of the Union-Republic type.[26] From this amalgamation it emerged as a new ministry of All-Union rather than Union-Republic type on March 9, 1954.[27] In this form it represented the triumph of complete centralization of operations as well as planning of the higher school system.

In light of the steady trend toward centralization of the higher school system evidenced by the decrees indicated, the new creation, in December 1954, of a Union-Republic type of Ministry of Higher Education indicated that the leaders were taking a cautious step in reversal of policy. The caution is suggested by the fact that a ministry for operating purposes was created only in the Ukrainian Republic. All other republics were to have their higher schools run by the federal government's ministry, although they maintained operating control over their elementary schools through their long existing Ministries of Education.[28]

THE SUPREME SOVIET

By the time of Stalin's death the annual session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for 1953 had not yet been called, and only one issue of the official gazette, in which decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and laws of the Supreme Soviet itself are published, had appeared, in contrast to three issues in 1951 and five issues in 1952. Affairs of state seem to have been moving at a slow pace in early 1953, giving some credence to the rumors that Stalin was not available for consultation during February 1953.

Within forty-eight hours after the announced time of Stalin's death, the Central Committee of the Communist Party joined with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers to issue a joint decision to reorganize the government, and as a final paragraph to the decision there appeared a call to the annual meeting of the Supreme Soviet on March 14, 1953.[29] On the designated date the deputies assembled and adopted all points of the suggested reorganization in the customary unanimous fashion. Shvernik, who had gained his reputation as head of the trade unions and had been made President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1946 on the death of the long-time President Kal-

[21] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 9 (803), item 185, May 10, 1954.

[22] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 11 (805), item 221, May 30, 1954.

[23] Decree of December 28, 1954; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 1 (819), item 1, January 23, 1955.

[24] Decree of December 29, 1954; *ibid.*, item 3.

[25] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 12 (1946); also published in *Sbornik Zakonov SSSR i Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1945–1946 gg.*, p. 23.

[26] Law of March 15, 1953; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No 3 (775), March 20, 1953.

[27] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 5 (799), March 20, 1954.

[28] Evidence of the continuing existence of these Ministries of Education is to be found in Art. 53 of the constitution of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic, published as a brochure in 1954.

[29] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 2 (774), March 8, 1953.

inin, was relieved of his duties.[30] Voroshilov replaced him, perhaps to indicate that Stalin's closest friend was to remain and influence the top leaders.[31]

No discussion of the budget occurred at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, although the budget is the usual item of principal business. The deputies went home as soon as they had taken the steps required by the constitution to form a new Council of Ministers. Presumably the new government felt it necessary to revise the plans which had probably been in preparation well before Stalin's death so as to take into account the changed circumstances.

The presumption that a new plan was being formulated in the light of the need for quieting the people was proved correct when the Supreme Soviet was called into session again on August 5, 1953.[32] This was the first time that the Supreme Soviet had met twice in one year since the schedule of a single meeting each year had been inaugurated in 1947, in violation of Article 46 of the constitution, which requires two meetings a year.

The August session of the Supreme Soviet was conducted in familiar style.[33] A budget for 1953 was adopted. Decrees of the Presidium promulgated since the previous session were approved. The constitution was amended to record the change in name of the Communist party, a change which had been adopted at the Nineteenth Party Congress, held prior to Stalin's death. A new agricultural tax was enacted, and personnel changes were made, including the appointment of a Prosecutor General of the USSR, of three new judges of the Supreme Court of the USSR, and of a few ministers. Having completed its work on August 8, 1953, in the usual brief session, the Supreme Soviet was disbanded to await elections for deputies to the next Supreme Soviet, in accordance with the constitutional requirement for holding elections once every four years.

Election of 1954

Preparations for the new elections began with the appearance in the press of the listing of new electoral districts. The decree of January 11, 1954,[34] listed 700 districts for the Soviet of the Union, indicating a population of 210 million, and 631 districts for the Soviet of Nationalities. These figures showed a growth in population since 1950, when 671 districts had been designated for the elections to the Soviet of the Union; there was no change in the number of ethnic units.

The pattern of election returns following the balloting of March 14, 1954, showed no change over the Stalin era.[35] As usual, the voting was reported as being nearly total, for 99.98 per cent of those eligible were said to have voted. One wonders whether it was a coincidence that exactly the same percentage had been reported in 1950.[36]

Expression of opposition to the regime had become nearly impossible during Stalin's tenure, even though a printed ballot had been established by the constitutional innovation of 1936 and the ballot had to be secret. Stalin had maintained the practice of placing only one candidate on the ballot. The new government made no change in procedure, for the 1954 elections likewise gave the voters no choice. What little opportunity there might have been under the Stalin regime to scratch the name of the single candidate for each post seems to have been reduced by a post-Stalin practice of encouraging citizens to fold their ballot in public without entering a booth. Under this procedure, reported by foreign correspondents, withdrawal into a booth could be interpreted as evidence of hostility to the regime, and the secrecy provided by law could mean nothing.

Official returns on votes against the single candidates showed a marked reduction over the opposition registered in 1950: 247,897 persons were reported as having voted against the candidate in their district for the Soviet of the Union, while 187,357 had voted against the candidates for the Soviet of Nationalities. In 1950 the scratches numbered 300,146 and 306,382 respectively.[37] The new government seems either to have been more popular or to have frightened more dissenters or to have wanted to appear more popular than Stalin. It is noteworthy that the usual greater number of scratches of candidates for the Soviet of Nationalities than for candidates for the Soviet of the Union was reversed in 1954.

Eight deputies to represent the Soviet armed forces abroad were added to the totals in each chamber on election day. Under a constitutional amendment of October 14, 1945,[38] there had been established representation of troops abroad at the rate of one deputy per hundred thousand troops. The 1954 returns indicated eight hundred thousand troops abroad compared with seven hundred thousand at the time of the 1950 elections.[39]

Meetings of Supreme Soviet, 1954

The usual functions were performed by the newly elected Supreme Soviet when it met on April 20, 1954, in response to a call of March 24, 1954.[40] The budget was debated and adopted. The Presidium's actions were ratified. The constitution was amended to reflect changes in the list of ministries. A Presidium and the usual committees were named. Once again the budget was introduced by the Minister of Finance, only to be changed by the budget committee of the Supreme Soviet. Once again was raised the meaning of a procedure which must be staged, since the Communist party as the director of all policy cannot have approved a draft budget only to be surprised at the Supreme Soviet by its amendment.

The second session of the Supreme Soviet elected in 1954 was held on February 3, 1955, after a call dated January 22, 1955.[41] It performed its familiar duties and then provided a surprise. Malenkov's resignation was announced. The event marked no upheaval as between Communist party and the state, for it was indicated that the resignation had been arranged at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party held a few days previously. The Supreme Soviet was not establishing within itself a procedure for effecting a change of government beyond the reach of the Communist party.

A declaration issued by the Supreme Soviet to the parliaments of the world indicated that for the Soviet leaders the

[30] Law of March 15, 1953; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 3 (775), March 20, 1953.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 6 (778), June 28, 1953.

[33] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 7 (779), August 15, 1953.

[34] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 2 (796), item 23, January 25, 1954.

[35] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 2 (617), January 15, 1950.

[36] For 1950 report of Central Electoral Commission, see *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 10 (625), March 22, 1950; for 1954 report see *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 6 (800), March 25, 1954, pp. 195–233.

[37] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 10 (625), March 22, 1950.

[38] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 73 (400), October 18, 1945.

[39] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 10 (625), March 22, 1950.

[40] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 7 (801), item 123 (1954).

[41] *Ved. Verkh. Soc.*, No. 2 (820), February 25, 1955.

Supreme Soviet played a role which was important not only in satisfying the desires of the Soviet peoples for participation in government but also in furthering the aims of Soviet foreign policy among the peoples of the world. The declaration called upon other parliaments to adopt what amounted to a program similar to that espoused by Soviet delegates in their speeches before the agencies of the United Nations.[42]

Foreign policy

Four other important steps concerning foreign policy were taken by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet after the deputies had returned to their homes. Two were the denunciation of the treaties of alliance with England and France, another was the approval of a treaty with Iran, and a fourth was the pardoning of Austrian prisoners of war convicted by Soviet courts of war crimes. In each instance the foreign policy matter was made the subject of a joint meeting of the foreign policy committees of the new chambers of the Supreme Soviet.[43] In the reports emanating from these joint meetings the deputies are said to have voiced their support of the government's proposal as presented to them by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Molotov.

The Iranian treaty involved the cession of a part of the territory of two Soviet republics in rectification of the frontier and in consideration of recognition by Iran of certain territory as being indisputably a part of the USSR. The Azerbaidjan deputy reported that his republic was agreeing "in the interest of strengthening good neighborly relations between the USSR and Iran." The Turkmen deputy said the same thing.

The steps taken by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and its committees suggest that Soviet leadership has found it valuable in terms of its relations with the peoples of the USSR to implement foreign policy through that agency. Except to gain formal approval of the policy adopted at the meeting at the "summit" in Geneva in the summer of 1955, it has not thought it necessary, however, to call the entire Supreme Soviet into session as it did in 1939 when the alliance with Germany was made the subject of a resolution approving the government's foreign policy and western Ukraine and western Byelorussia were incorporated within the territory of the two neighboring republics of the USSR.[44]

REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

In the amnesty decree [45] issued three weeks after Stalin's death the Ministry of Justice was ordered within one month to prepare proposals for a revision of the criminal code. The policy of relaxation of severity was established by the decree, presumably to quiet the people, who had been subjected to increasingly severe criminal laws during Stalin's declining years.

A general revision of the code has not yet appeared in the public press. There have been only amendments to individual articles, and only a few of these have represented any relaxation of severity. The first change after Stalin's death increased penalties by establishing the death penalty for murder under aggravating circumstances.[46] While murder for political reasons, for example, assassination of a state official, has long been punished by death as an anti-state act, the criminal code, up to the 1954 decree, had established a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment for murder without political motives.

Over the years the courts have occasionally ordered the death penalty when the circumstances of a murder were particularly brutal or sadistic. This was done under the "analogy article" of the criminal code, by finding a brutal murder analogous to banditry, for which the death penalty was prescribed. The new amendment has regularized this practice and has given notice that brutal or sadistic murder will be subjected to the death penalty.

Cases reported since enactment of the amendment indicate that it is being applied as follows: murder by using an iron bar and strangling followed by disposal of the body in a ravine; murder of a war invalid on a train; stabbing of a young girl in the stomach while trying to abduct her at night from a skating rink; murder of a victim during robbery, followed by wounding of a clerk during an attempted holdup; murder of a wife with five knife wounds after protracted persecution; and another murder of a wife.[47]

UN Genocide Convention

The United Nations Genocide Convention was ratified by the USSR on March 18, 1954, subject to the reservation that the USSR would not deem the International Court of Justice to have jurisdiction over a dispute concerning interpretation of the convention unless both parties agreed to such jurisdiction.[48] No amendment of the Soviet criminal code making reference to the implementation of the convention has been adopted, perhaps because a Soviet court could apply articles of the present code, by analogy where necessary, if it desired to punish as a crime acts forbidden by the convention.

The first relaxation of severity of penalties in accordance with the mandate of the amnesty decree occurred only on August 5, 1954. The criminal penalty previously existing for women who committed abortion upon themselves was removed.[49]

Penalties for crop damage

An increase in severity followed on January 11, 1955, when a schedule of fines was established for those who allowed their cattle or birds to damage the newly sown crops of a collective farm, a state farm, or a state or public organization.[50] Higher fines applied to those who drove a wagon or tractor, truck, combine, or other machine over crops. If the offense was committed intentionally and serious damage resulted, the penalty was to range from required work under special assignment but without guard for a period of from six months to a year, with deduction from wages, to imprisonment for a period of from one to two years.

No such precise definition of the crime of crop damage had previously existed, although it had been possible to prescribe penalties ranging up to one year for those who intentionally damaged state or co-operative property.[51] In serious cases of intention to harm

[42] Declaration of February 9, 1955; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 2 (820), item 51, February 25, 1955.

[43] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 6 (824), April 29, 1955, pp. 185–91, and *ibid.*, No. 7 (825), May 20, 1955, pp. 195–97.

[44] *Vneocherednaia Piataia Sessiia Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Stenograficheskii Otchet*, 1939.

[45] March 27, 1953; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 4 (776), March 28, 1953.

[46] Decree of April 30, 1954; *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 11 (805), item 221, May 30, 1954.

[47] Cases selected from various local newspapers dated in March and April 1955, and translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 7, No. 15, pp. 29–30, May 25, 1955.

[48] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 12 (806), item 244, June 22, 1954.

[49] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 15 (809), item 334, August 17, 1954.

[50] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 1 (819), item 4, January 23, 1955.

[51] *Criminal Code, RSFSR*, Art. 79.

the regime the courts might in the past and may still apply one of the general articles on state crimes to provide long prison terms, but such types of activity seem not to have been contemplated by the new decree. Presumably, the acts which it proposed to punish would previously have gone unpunished when committed without specific intention to cause harm.

Changes toward leniency

The first decree to reflect the attitude of the amnesty appeared only on March 11, 1955.[52] It reversed a policy established on April 9, 1941,[53] punishing unauthorized riding of freight trains. The 1955 decree abolished all criminal responsibility for the offense and created a fine up to one hundred rubles to be levied through administrative channels, presumably by the railway police. Persons serving sentences under the 1941 law were to be released.

The second decree to reflect the attitud of the amnesty appeared on May 13, 1955.[54] It eliminated the existing criminal penalties for sale by managers of state enterprises of goods found by them to be surplus. New regulations to increase authority to sell surplus goods were ordered prepared.

While very few changes toward leniency have appeared in the statutes since Stalin's death, there has been much talk of change. Suggestions for a new criminal code run generally in the direction of the amnesty, namely for a reduction in penalties for nonpolitical offenses, restoration of the suspended sentence, increase in the age of responsibility for juvenile delinquents, and abolition of the analogy article or at least its restriction to unusual circumstances.[55]

REVISION OF COURT JURISDICTION

Decentralization of the "post-audit" jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, under which a criminal sentence or civil judgment which has already become final may be reopened for review, has also occurred since Stalin's death. Under decree of August 14, 1954,[56] there were established within the Supreme Courts of the Union and Autonomous Republics, as well as within the provincial courts (which are courts of appeal from the people's courts), new institutions called *presidia*. These new agencies are to have the right to make a "post-audit" of decisions which have become final, to determine whether a new trial should be held because of error or injury to what the court interprets to be state interests.

The new *presidia* or review benches include the president of the court, the deputy presidents, and two rank-and-file members of the court, as named by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic concerned or by the executive committee of the provincial soviet having jurisdiction over a provincial court. Cases are to be brought to the attention of the *presidia* by the Prosecutor General of the USSR or of the republic concerned or by the President of the Supreme Court of the USSR or of the Supreme Court of the republic concerned or any of their deputies. The provincial courts will be called to action by their presidents or by the provincial prosecutor.

Any decision following such a "post-audit" is subject to further review by the next higher court on protest of the next higher prosecutor or of the president of the next higher court. Rules of procedure for the newly adopted system were published on April 25, 1955.[57]

A "post-audit" procedure of this character had existed prior to the judiciary act of 1938, but at the time there was recognition of the extensive delays possible within a system in which a case might be reopened at several levels, and the "post-audit" procedure was limited to the Supreme Courts of the republics and to the Supreme Court of the USSR.[58] The provincial courts were deprived of their previously existing authority.

The 1954 change restores the pre-1938 system. In doing so it decentralizes the burden of "post-audit," but unless prosecutors and presidents of courts are willing to let the audits by the provincial courts stand, there will be added new delays to the completion of a case. An American student of the subject has already expressed his opinion that the bad results of the past will return.[59]

A second indication of decentralization was offered by a decree of April 30, 1955, placing in the administrator of the Ministry of Justice of a Union Republic attached to a provincial soviet, in those republics which are divided into provinces, the authority to appoint court marshals on the nomination of people's courts. Where there are no provincial divisions within a Union Republic, and in all Autonomous Republics, the authority to appoint rests with the Ministry of Justice of the republic concerned.

The 1938 Judiciary Act had placed the appointing authority for court marshals, even in republics divided into provinces, in the Ministry of Justice and had said nothing of the nominating procedure.[60] Since court marshals come very close to the people by virtue of their duty to enforce civil judgments, collect fines, and see to the execution of sentences, the manner of their nomination is important. The new decree may have been inspired to bring their selection a little closer to the people among whom they perform their functions.

Placing of nominating authority in the people's courts does not, however, signify that the general public has much influence, for the people's judges are still elected on a ballot bearing only one name. Elections were held in most of the republics for people's judges on December 12, 1954, and in the rest a few days later.[61] Those elected in Moscow were 54.1 per cent members or candidates for membership in the Communist party. None of the candidates proposed failed of election. The post-Stalin government seems not yet to have found the time opportune for a trial of multi-candidate elections even at this relatively nonpolitical level, if, indeed, it has ever been thought that a step in the direction of choice between candidates was desirable.

CONCLUSION

Steps taken since Stalin's death suggest that his heirs overestimated the degree of danger to the regime lurking among the rank and file when they issued their first program of reorganization. The state structure has now reverted to the pattern existing before Stalin's death. The criminal laws have been modified only slightly to reduce

[52] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 5 (823), item 114, April 2, 1955.

[53] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 16 (1941), printed as annotation to *Criminal Code, RSFSR* (ed. 1952), p. 79.

[54] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 8 (826), item 193, June 8, 1955.

[55] For a review of the Soviet literature, see John N. Hazard, "Soviet Commentators Re-evaluate the Policies of Criminal Law," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 55 (June 1955), pp. 771–94.

[56] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 17 (881), item 360, August 27, 1954.

[57] *Ved. Verkh. Sov.*, No. 7 (825), item 166, May 20, 1955.

[58] *Judiciary Act.*, 1938, §§ 51 and 75.

[59] See Vladimir Gsovski, *USSR Reform of Appellate Procedure, Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe* (Library of Congress, February–March 1955), Vol. 3, p. 41.

[60] § 79.

[61] For English translation of accounts in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 6, No. 50 (1954), p. 21.

severity. Even the limited modification has been offset by a few increases in severity.

The apparent desire to reduce administrative burdens on central headquarters as represented by changes in the structure of ministries has extended in limited degree to the court structure. While this measure of decentralization might suggest that the general public had acquired the opportunity to exert more direct influence on the conduct of affairs than it had enjoyed previously, the preservation of the one-candidate system of elections and of limitations on the matters subject to review permits the conclusion that there has been very little lessening of centralization in the interest of public participation in the making of decisions.

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The Communist Party Since Stalin

By MERLE FAINSOD

TO understand the role of the Communist party in post-Stalinist Russia it is essential to recall the transformations which it underwent during the Stalinist era. From a party with a mere 350,000 members and 122,000 candidates on January 1, 1924, just prior to Lenin's death, it expanded to more than six million members and 868,000 candidates on the eve of the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952. From a party which prided itself on the preference which it accorded candidates of proletarian origin and occupation, it increasingly based its recruitment policies on the assimilation of the new managerial, administrative, and technical intelligentsia into leading party posts. From a party whose Congresses still debated fundamental issues of statecraft under Lenin, it became a disciplined body of functionaries swearing unswerving allegiance to Stalin and treating his every command as Holy Writ. The apparatus dominated the party, and Stalin dominated the apparatus.

STALIN'S SYSTEM OF RULE

Under Stalin the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party served as the primary instrument of rule. Through it Stalin controlled all important appointments in the party, the police, the armed forces, and the administration. A network of party and police controls pervaded Soviet society, but command of this interpenetrating network converged ultimately in Stalin's hands. Stalin parceled out responsibilities among his colleagues in the Politburo, but he reserved his ultimate authority by permitting no concentration of effective power short of himself. During the Stalinist era the police greatly expanded its jurisdiction and multiplied in numbers, but Stalin jealously guarded its loyalty, and it remained a creature of his will. The armed forces, too, bulked larger on the Soviet scene, but through a highly elaborate system of party and police penetration, safeguards were provided to hold Bonapartist aspirations in check. The complex task of managing a society in process of rapid industrialization enforced increased dependence on the technically trained, but at the same time Stalin also sought to ensure that the new technocracy would be suffused with a party outlook and hedged in by party controls. Behind the totalitarian façade new social forces struggled for recognition, but as long as Stalin was alive, they remained in uneasy equilibrium, held in the pattern of Stalin's system of rule.

The death of Stalin left the institutional machinery of party controls intact, but the question remained whether it could continue to function effectively in the absence of its prime mover. Would Beria and the police be content to play a subordinate role with their master gone, or would they strike out to assert supremacy over the party functionaries? Would the officer corps seek to liberate itself from party and police controls and claim a dominant position in state councils? Would the aspirations of the new managerial élite to greater autonomy and recognition contribute to a weakening of party leadership and a shift toward greater power for the bureaucracy? The issue of the succession involved more than personalities; at stake was the fate of the en-

tire structure of authority and influence which Stalin had fathered and successfully manipulated.

Even before Stalin's demise, there were some indications that he was concerned over the problem of the succession and that he was prepared to take at least a few tentative steps to strengthen the position of Malenkov and the party apparatus in the race for power. The choice of Malenkov to deliver the political report of the Central Committee at the Nineteenth Party Congress in the fall of 1952 and the relegation of Molotov and Beria to subsidiary roles in the Congress deliberations provided one index of Stalin's design. The reorganization of the party high command after the Congress also appeared to reinforce the position of Malenkov and the party officials. Of the fifteen new personalities admitted to full membership in the Presidium, successor to the Politburo, ten were party functionaries, four were state administrators, and one, S. D. Ignatiev, was a party functionary whose appointment as Minister of State Security could be interpreted as an effort to tighten party control of the political police. The weight of numbers was clearly on the side of the party apparatus. Aside from S. D. Ignatiev, there was a striking absence of top military and police officials among the newly promoted members of the Presidium. Its composition suggested that Stalin was determined to subordinate both the armed forces and the police to the top party command.

The events of the post-Congress period pointed toward a further effort to undermine the position of the political police. The announcement on January 13, 1953, of the arrest of the Kremlin doctors, who were alleged to have cut short the lives of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov and to have sought to destroy the health of leading Soviet military personnel, was accompanied by a statement that "the agencies of state security did not discover the doctors' wrecking, terrorist organization in time."[1] This rebuke was followed by a reminder that the security agencies should have been "particularly vigilant" in view of the earlier "doctors' plot" during the Great Purge, a plot in which Yagoda, the head of the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), was alleged to have been involved and for which he was executed. The grim overtones of this reference seemed to augur poorly for Beria's future.

Death of Stalin and Reorganization of the Party Command

The sudden death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, precipitated a reorganization of the top structure of party and governmental authority. It would be fascinating to be able to record the maneuvers and negotiations which attended the disposition of party and governmental offices, but that knowledge is denied to us. Two facts soon became apparent: first, that no one of Stalin's colleagues was in a position to assume the position of undisputed leadership which Stalin commanded and, second, that all of them were at least temporarily agreed on the necessity of presenting a united front to the nation and to the world. Within twenty-four hours after the release of the news of Stalin's death, a whole series of arrangements and appointments was announced as a "decision" of a joint meeting of the party Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The party Presidium was reduced in size to ten members and four alternates. Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria was named Minister of Internal Affairs, Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulganin, Minister of Defense,

[1] *Pravda*, January 13, 1953.

and the last three, together with Kaganovich, became First Deputy Ministers of the Council of Ministers. Voroshilov was designated Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, while Mikoyan became Minister of Internal and External Trade as well as a Deputy Minister of the Council of Ministers. Khrushchev received no official governmental post, but retained his position as Secretary of the Central Committee while yielding his duties as head of the Moscow party organization to N. A. Mikhailov. The two remaining full members of the Presidium were successful economic administrators—M. Z. Saburov, who was designated Minister of Machine Building, and M. G. Pervukhin, who became Minister of Electric Power Stations and of the Electrical Industry. Named as alternates were N. M. Shvernik, who returned to head the Soviet trade-union apparatus which he had led from 1930 to 1946, P. K. Ponomarenko, the new Minister of Culture, L. G. Mel'nikov, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian party organization, and M. D. Bagirov, the First Secretary of the Azerbaidjan party organization.

During the first week of the new regime there were indications that Malenkov was seeking to consolidate his position as *primus inter pares*. He remained senior party Secretary as well as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. *Pravda* gave him special prominence. He was pictured addressing the Nineteenth Party Congress with Stalin looking on benevolently in the background. He was moved to the center of the stage with Stalin and Mao in a doctored photograph from which all other Presidium figures were excluded. But these none-too-subtle efforts to suggest that Malenkov was the heir apparent soon ceased, and on March 21, 1953, *Pravda* carried an announcement that a plenary session of the party Central Committee had voted on March 14 "to grant the request . . . of Malenkov to be released from the duties of Secretary of the party Central Committee."[2] Meanwhile, there was a renewed emphasis on collegial leadership in which the triumvirate of Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov were featured as the leading figures of the new regime. The maneuvers of the early days suggested a determined and successful effort to circumscribe Malenkov's powers and to prevent him from donning Stalin's mantle.

The Beria Affair

If later official pronouncements are to be taken at face value, the next stage in the struggle for the succession involved a strenuous effort by Beria to expand his authority. On April 3, 1953, Beria's MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) announced that the Kremlin "doctors' plot" had been a hoax, that M. D. Riumin, the former Deputy Minister of State Security in charge of the investigation, had been arrested for fabricating evidence and that S. D. Ignatiev, the former Minister of State Security, had "displayed political blindness and carelessness."[3] On April 7 *Pravda* revealed that Ignatiev had been "released" from his duties as Secretary of the party Central Committee. In mid-April came the dramatic announcement of a thoroughgoing purge of the Georgian party and governmental organization and the reinstatement of a number of Beria's henchmen who had been the victims of an earlier purge of the Georgian party. Beria's hand in the purge was frankly acknowledged in a speech to the Georgian Supreme Soviet by V. M. Bakhradze, the new Chairman of the Georgian Council of Ministers.[4] In this case, as in the Kremlin doctors' plot,

[2] March 21, 1953.
[3] *Pravda*, April 3, 1953.
[4] *Zaria Vostoka*, April 16, 1953.

the reinstated officials were declared to have been the victims of "a provocational 'case,' falsified from beginning to end, concerning a nonexistent nationalism. . . ." [5]

The evidence at hand makes it impossible to plot Beria's machinations in detail, if indeed there were such machinations. Nor do we know whether the countermeasures which his enemies were able to invoke represented a response to imminent peril or were prophylactic in character. In any case on July 10, 1953, the Soviet press announced that Beria had been removed from his governmental and party posts and expelled from the party as an enemy of the people. According to *Pravda*, "Beria's evil scheming to seize power began with trying to set the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the party and government and to employ the agencies of the MVD, both in the center and locally, against the party and its leadership, against the government of the USSR. . . ." [6] Beria was also accused of undermining the collective farms and creating "difficulties in the country's food supply," of seeking "to sow friction among the peoples of the USSR and to activize bourgeois national elements in the Union Republics," of "illegality and highhandedness," and of having long been "an agent of international imperialism" who sought to destroy the Communist party and restore capitalism.

In this curious mélange of accusations the one which carried conviction was that Beria had sought to utilize his base in the MVD to strike out for a position of leadership. The arrest of Beria was followed by a purge of his supporters in Georgia and by the removal of his old associate, M. D. Bagirov, from the posts of Chairman of the Azerbaidjan Republic Council of Ministers and party First Secretary.[7] Party organizations were instructed to tighten control over the MVD at all levels, and the elimination of Beria's entourage in the MVD extended down to the regional and district organizations.

Execution of Beria, Riumin, and Abakumov

The final chapter of the Beria story unfolded on December 24, 1953, when the Soviet press announced that Beria and six associates had been executed by a firing squad after a secret trial.[8] Two grim postscripts remained to be added. In July 1954 the news was released that Riumin, the responsible investigator in the original doctors' plot, had been shot, an action which may well have been inspired by the desire to remove an inconvenient witness who also offered an obvious scapegoat to symbolize the new regime's repudiation of past MVD brutality.[9] On December 24, 1954, came the announcement that V. S. Abakumov, former Minister of State Security, had been tried and executed for carrying out "enemy assignments for Beria against the Communist party and the Soviet government." [10] At the same time three of his associates in the ministry were shot while two others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in corrective labor camps. The indictment charged Abakumov and his associates with fabricating the so-called "Leningrad case," in which "many party and state officials were arrested without grounds and falsely accused of very grave state crimes." The Abakumov affair, timed exactly a year after the shooting of Beria, served as a reminder that the road to supreme power in the Soviet system lay elsewhere than through exclusive reliance on control of the police apparatus.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] July 10, 1953.

[7] *Zaria Vostoka*, July 11 and 15, 1953; *Pravda*, July 19, 1953.

[8] Accompanying Beria to his doom were V. N. Merkulov, former USSR Minister of State Security and later Minister of State Control; V. G. Dekanozov, Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs; S. A. Goglidze, former head of the Georgian MVD and one-time director of the network of forced labor camps in the Soviet Far East; B. Z. Kobulov, former USSR Deputy Minister of State Security and subsequently one of Beria's deputies in the MVD; P. Y. Meshik, head of the MVD in the Ukraine; and L. E. Vlodzimirskii, former head of the Investigation Department "for particularly important matters" in the MVD. *Pravda*, December 24, 1953.

[9] *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, July 23, 1954.

[10] *Pravda*, December 24, 1954.

Malenkov's renewed prestige

The liquidation of Beria eliminated one of the chief contenders for supremacy, but it left a field of battle in which other contestants could still maneuver while proclaiming their continued loyalty to the principle of collective leadership. In the aftermath of the Beria purge Malenkov seemed to emerge with renewed prestige. The Soviet press reported that it was Malenkov who spoke for the Presidium at the plenary session of the Central Committee at which Beria was condemned.[11] It was Malenkov again who claimed the spotlight at the August 1953 session of the Supreme Soviet with a wide-ranging speech which covered the gamut of domestic and foreign affairs. But the events of the next months were to show that Malenkov's title to leadership had a fatal flaw. The fateful Central Committee decision of March 14, 1953, which had compelled him to abandon his party secretaryship, contained the seeds of his undoing. In the first struggle for the succession after Lenin's incapacitating illness, Stalin had demonstrated that control of the party apparatus was crucial to victory. It was certainly a lesson of which Malenkov was well aware. One can only surmise that he yielded the position reluctantly in the face of a superior combination of power and that he hoped perhaps to preserve his influence in the apparatus at one remove through the many patronage connections which bound its leading figures to him.

[11] *Pravda*, July 10, 1953.

RISE OF KHRUSHCHEV AND DEMOTION OF MALENKOV

The departure of Malenkov from the Secretariat left Khrushchev as the senior party Secretary. During the first six months after Stalin's death, Khrushchev remained in the shade. His activities in the Secretariat during this period are not a matter of record. Whatever they may have been, it can be surmised that they were calculated not to alarm his colleagues in the Presidium and not to lead them to fear an enlargement of his jurisdiction. Beginning in September 1953 his star began to rise publicly. On September 13 *Pravda* revealed that Khrushchev had been elected First Secretary of the party Central Committee. His September 3 report to the Central Committee on agricultural policy was widely reprinted and inaugurated a sweeping series of agricultural reform measures. Changes in the party apparatus became the order of the day. The reconstruction of the Georgian party organization and the purge of Bagirov in Azerbaidjan, which occurred in the wake of the Beria affair, were followed by the firing of G. A. Arutiunov as First Secretary of the Armenian party. On November 28, 1953, V. M. Andrianov, party chief in Leningrad, was removed at a meeting presided over by Khrushchev.[12] Mikhailov gave way to Kapitanov as First Secretary of the Moscow organization. Similar changes took place in Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tula, Smolensk, and many other re-

[12] *Pravda*, November 29, 1953.

gions and districts. The purge of party secretaries was open to the interpretation that Khrushchev was installing his own supporters in key positions and that a new and formidable party machine was in the making.

Signs of Khrushchev's increasing prominence mounted rapidly as the year 1954 wore on. His report of February 23, 1954, at the plenary session of the party Central Committee,[13] which unveiled a grandiose program to solve the problem of Soviet grain supply by opening up vast tracts of new land, could be construed as an implied rebuke to Malenkov, who had stated at the Nineteenth Party Congress that "the grain problem . . . has been solved, solved definitely and finally."[14] At the April session of the Supreme Soviet it was no longer Malenkov who dominated the proceedings. Both Khrushchev and Malenkov spoke on the same day, but it was Khrushchev who addressed the Council of the Union while Malenkov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, directed his remarks to the Council of Nationalities.[15]

By the spring of 1954 it was also clear that Khrushchev was expanding his contacts with the satellite parties. He led the Soviet delegation which attended the Second Congress of the Polish United Workers party at Warsaw in March. In June he appeared at the Tenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist party and delivered a fiery speech boasting of Soviet leadership in developing the hydrogen bomb.

On September 29 *Pravda* announced the departure of a Soviet delegation to participate in the celebration of the establishment of the Communist regime in China and to negotiate a new agreement with its leaders. Again it was Khrushchev who headed the delegation, and it was perhaps not without significance that Khrushchev was accompanied by Bulganin, while both Malenkov and Molotov were left at home. The return journey was replete with stops along the way and meetings with republic and regional party leaders at which, it may be presumed, fences were mended and relations cemented.

[13] Reprinted in *Pravda*, March 21, 1954.
[14] *Ibid.*, October 6, 1952.
[15] *Ibid.*, April 27, 1954.

Personal leadership?

By the early winter of 1954, the publicity accorded Khrushchev in the Soviet press began to suggest an image of personal leadership, in striking contrast with the theory of collective rule which continued to be sedulously professed. The Central Committee decree of November 10, 1954, on "Errors in Conducting Scientific-Atheist Propaganda Among the Public," was signed by Khrushchev personally.[16] His September interview on agricultural policy with the British scientist Bernal was published in full in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* on December 24, 1954. His speech to construction workers on building and agriculture received similar treatment on December 28. The complete text of his Moscow speech to the young settlers who were setting off to the new lands was reported on January 8, 1955. Perhaps not altogether coincidentally, the build-up of Khrushchev was accompanied by a resurrection of tributes to Stalin. His birthday, which was allowed to pass virtually unnoticed in 1953, became the occasion for leading articles in the press on December 21, 1954. Although the lavish adulation which had characterized Stalin worship at its height was decidedly tempered, and the restoration of Stalin to the Pantheon of top Communist heroes was accompanied by a reassertion of "the Leninist principle of collective leadership," there were many who were not apt to forget that the cult of Stalinism itself began with a glorification of Lenin and the principle of collective leadership which he theoretically espoused.

[16] *Pravda*, November 11, 1954.

Heavy industry vs. consumers' goods

While Khrushchev was increasingly articulate and vocal, Malenkov was strangely silent. Rumors of differences of view between them circulated freely, but if differences existed they were not readily documented. In the Soviet system conflicts of policy rarely rise to full visibility until the issue has been resolved, but a curious pair of editorials in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* on December 21, 1954, suggested a difference of outlook within the leadership group on the priority to be accorded the consumers' goods campaign as against renewed emphasis on heavy industry. The differences were differences of shading, but the shading was unmistakable. *Izvestiia*, the presumed organ of the government, emphasized the increased production of consumers' goods; *Pravda*, the party organ, called "on the Soviet people to direct their main attention to fulfilling plans for the further growth of heavy industry." Khrushchev's speech to the plenary session of the Central Committee on January 25, 1955, gave even sharper expression to these differences. "In connection with the measures lately taken for increasing output of consumers' goods," said Khrushchev, "some comrades have confused the question of the pace of development of heavy and light industry in our country. . . . These pseudo theoreticians try to claim that at some stage of socialist construction the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task and that light industry can and should overtake all other branches of industry. This is profoundly incorrect reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism—nothing but slander of our party. This is a belching of the rightist deviation, a regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views which Rykov, Bukharin, and their ilk once preached."[17]

At no point was Malenkov publicly charged with holding these views, but at least one sentence in his letter of resignation from the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers on February 8, 1955, carried overtones of recantation. After acknowledging his administrative "inexperience" and his past "guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture," Malenkov paid tribute to the new agricultural reforms sponsored by the party, which, he declared, were "based upon the only correct foundation—the further all-round development of heavy industry—and only the realization of this program will provide the necessary conditions for a real increase in the production of all necessary consumer goods."[18] To the initiated, this devious Aesopian language suggested a capitulation which closed the debate.

Retention of Malenkov

Despite expectations abroad that Malenkov would follow Beria to the grave, the treatment of Malenkov followed a very different course from that of Beria. He was made the scapegoat for agricultural failures, but there was no suggestion of treason or espionage. Although demoted to the position of Minister of Power Stations and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he remained a member of the party Presidium. His survival seemed to indicate that, unlike Beria, he posed no real threat to his colleagues in the Presidium. His retention, moreover, served the useful function of signifying to the outside world that the leadership, in Malenkov's words, remained "monolithic in its unity and singleness of purpose."

[17] *Pravda*, February 3, 1955.
[18] *Pravda*, February 9, 1955.

Reconstruction of top leadership

The demotion of Malenkov opened the way to a reconstruction of the top leadership. Bulganin replaced Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and at the same time yielded his post as Minister of Defense to Marshal Zhukov.[19] Khrushchev seemed to emerge from the affair with greatly heightened prestige. He led the delegation of high governmental and party dignitaries at the session of the Supreme Soviet at which Malenkov's resignation was announced, and he moved the nomination of Bulganin as Malenkov's replacement. The ovation which he was accorded by the deputies suggested an awareness of his leading role which at least raised the question as to whether the principle of collective leadership was as "unquestionably inviolate" as Bulganin was later to affirm.[20] In their respective interviews with the American journalists W. R. Hearst, Kingsbury Smith, and F. Connif, Khrushchev spoke with a degree of freedom that was missing from Bulganin's more cautious remarks.[21] On the visit to Yugoslavia it was Khrushchev who took the lead, and on the return trip through Sofia and Bucharest it was Khrushchev again who spoke for the Soviet delegation and was invariably listed first. Whether Khrushchev was more than first among equals was still not clear. Shrewd diplomatic observers who had occasion to meet members of the Presidium and watch them in action were persuaded that junta rule continued to prevail. The powers vested in the office of First Secretary pointed toward a consolidation of Khrushchev's influence, but what forces operated below the surface only those privy to the secrets of the party Presidium could tell.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] See Bulganin's interview with W. R. Hearst, Kingsbury Smith, and F. Connif, February 12, 1955, *For a Lasting Peace,* February 18, 1955.

[21] *Ibid.*

RECONSTRUCTION OF PRESIDIUM AND SECRETARIAT

By mid-summer of 1955 the party Presidium consisted of eleven full members. Khrushchev, as First Secretary of the Central Committee, and Bulganin, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, occupied the most prominent posts. Another group of five, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, and Pervukhin, served as First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Voroshilov, the eldest member of the group, discharged the protocol functions of head of state. Malenkov was consigned to an inferior status as a mere Deputy Chairman, a position which put him on a par with seven other ministers outside the Presidium circle. At the July 1955 session of the Central Committee two new Presidium members were elected, A. I. Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Ukrainian party, and M. A. Suslov, one of the Central Committee Secretaries.[22]

A comparison of the present Presidium with the Stalinist Politburo provides interesting material for reflection. Of the eleven members of the Presidium in mid-1955, seven were carry-overs from the Politburo under Stalin. Within this group of veterans some marked shifts in status were evident. Khrushchev and Bulganin, who had been somewhat secondary figures in Stalin's entourage, had now clearly moved into senior positions. Malenkov had obviously suffered a serious setback. The position of the others—Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Voroshilov—was more enigmatic. In terms of Politburo seniority, they were the elders of the Presidium. Whether they exercised corresponding influence was less clear. Saburov and Pervukhin, the two new

[22] *Pravda,* July 13, 1955.

members admitted in the reconstruction of the Presidium after Stalin's death, represented the new generation of engineer-administrators. Their inclusion in the inner circle presumably reflected a need to broaden the knowledge and experience of the ruling group in order to cope with the burdensome administrative responsibilities which rapid industrialization imposed. The addition of Kirichenko and Suslov to the Presidium marked a reversion to a more familiar type. Both were experienced party functionaries whose career lines represented advancement on the party ladder.

The exclusions from the Presidium were perhaps even more significant than the inclusions. With the elimination of Beria, the police were deprived of direct representation in the ruling group. Kruglov, who succeeded Beria as head of the MVD, and Colonel General Serov, who was placed in charge of the newly organized Committee on State Security in the spring of 1954, were police functionaries rather than party leaders of the first rank. The new rulers appeared determined to keep the police in a subordinate position. Despite the apparent marked increase in the prestige of the armed forces and the designation of Marshal Zhukov as Minister of Defense, no new military figures were co-opted into the Presidium. Party supremacy remained the watchword, and the composition of the inner circle reflected the traditional subordination of the military professionals to the party leadership.

Central Committee Secretariat

The reconstruction of the party Presidium was also accompanied by changes in the Central Committee Secretariat. In the reshuffle of responsibilities after Stalin's death the number of party Secretaries was reduced from ten to five. Khrushchev as senior Secretary was assisted by M. A. Suslov, one-time head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee and a former *Pravda* editor, P. N. Pospelov, also a former *Pravda* editor and head of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, N. N. Shatalin, earlier a member of the Orgburo and a high party functionary in the Cadres Section of the Central Committee Secretariat, and S. D. Ignatiev, former Minister of State Security. Ignatiev's career as party Secretary was short-lived; on April 7, 1953, *Pravda* announced his removal for his alleged role in concocting a false case against the Kremlin doctors accused of plotting the death of Soviet leaders.[23] After the Supreme Soviet session at which Malenkov was demoted, Shatalin's name ceased to appear in the list of top party dignitaries occasionally mentioned in the Soviet press. Whether he has also been deprived of his position of party Secretary was not disclosed.

At the July 1955 session of the Central Committee, three new Secretaries were elected. They were D. T. Shepilov, editor of *Pravda,* A. B. Aristov, the party chief of Khabarovsk Province, and N. I. Beliaev, the veteran First Secretary of the Altai Province.[24] Shepilov accompanied Khrushchev on his trips to China and Yugoslavia and has been closely associated with him during the last year. The elevation of Aristov and Beliaev to Central Committee secretaryships brings to the Kremlin two men who possess an intimate knowledge of the problems of Soviet Asia, and who possibly also owe their promotion to the center to Khrushchev. The effect of the recent reconstruction of the Secretariat may well be to strengthen Khrushchev's control of this important fortress of power.

Aside from personnel shifts, there were

[23] Ignatiev subsequently reappeared as First Secretary of the Bashkir party organization; see *Pravda,* February 26, 1954.

[24] *Pravda,* July 13, 1955.

no announcements of major changes in the structure of the Central Committee Secretariat. The most important reform revealed by Khrushchev in his speech of January 25, 1955, provided for the creation in the Secretariat of a separate Section of Party Organs for the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic) as well as an Agricultural Section.[25] The devolution of co-ordinating functions in these areas to the newly established Russian Sections pointed toward a possible congestion of decision making at the center; whether it also foreshadowed the emergence of a separate central party apparatus for the RSFSR remained to be revealed.

REORGANIZATION OF THE RURAL PARTY STRUCTURE

By far the most significant changes in party organization took place in rural areas, as an accompaniment of the ambitious series of agricultural reforms initiated in the fall of 1953. The new program involved a drastic reorganization of the district party apparatus, which was designed to bring party leadership closer to the grass roots and to make party control more effective.[26] Under Stalin the bulk of the rural party functionaries had tended to be concentrated in the *raion*, or district, centers; from these points they had supervised the collective farms, state farms, and MTS (machine-tractor stations) in their districts. Each MTS had an assistant director for political affairs, and most, but not all, collective and state farms had party organizations. Under the Khrushchev program the fulcrum of intensive control was shifted to the MTS. The post of assistant director for political affairs was abolished. Instead each *raion* was divided into zones—one for each MTS in the *raion*—and a district party secretary was assigned to each zone with headquarters at the MTS. A staff of full-time party instructors was placed at his disposal, with each instructor responsible for one or at most two collective farms.

The party apparatus at the *raion* centers was also reorganized. The Departments of Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol organs were replaced by Organization Departments which were entrusted with the tasks of regulating party membership and admissions, choosing personnel, and supervising the work of primary party organizations in the district. The post of third secretary was abolished, and the second secretary of the *raion* was made responsible for the work of the new Organization Department as well as for the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.

At the same time thousands of Communists were mobilized from the cities to strengthen the rural party apparatus. Prior to the reorganization, the agricultural sections of the district committee employed around eleven thousand full-time party workers.[27] By May 1955 more than thirty thousand party functionaries had been assigned to the instructor groups attached to the MTS.[28] This was presumably in addition to the 3,747 full-time party secretaries in the larger collective farms which had been authorized by the party Central Committee up to the fall of 1953.[29]

At the same time the party asserted a more centralized control over the selection of collective farm executive personnel. The fiction of election by the collective farmers themselves was virtually abandoned. The Central Committee decree on "Virgin and Idle Lands" of March 2, 1954, provided that collective farm chairmanships be included

[25] *Pravda*, February 3, 1955.
[26] *Pravda*, September 13 and 15, 1953; March 6 and 21, 1954.
[27] Ya. Storozhev, "Some Questions on the Work of Rural District Committees," *Partiinaia Zhizn'* [Party Life], No. 9 (May 1955), p. 13.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Pravda*, September 15, 1953.

"among those offices to which appointments are subject to confirmation by oblast and krai committees *and* Union Republic Party Central Committees" and that "the posts of vice-chairman, brigade leader, and livestock section manager . . . be subject to confirmation of district party committees." [30]

Collective farm leaders

This decree was followed by a decision to mobilize urban "volunteers" for work as collective farm leaders. In the words of *Pravda*, "The party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have decided to select 30,000 experienced officials of party and Soviet organizations, enterprises, research institutes, and establishments who are capable of guaranteeing the guidance of collective farms and to recommend them for the posts of chairmen of collective farms, primarily of backward farms." [31] Although *Pravda* warned party leaders that "castoffs" from enterprises would not be tolerated, by the late spring of 1955 it was evident that at least some of the "volunteers" belonged to that category.[32]

In some respects at least the recruitment of urban cadres to lead the new agricultural program was reminiscent of the mobilization of "advanced workers" which had played a prominent part in the first phase of the collectivization program, in 1929–34. The Soviet press reported that more than 120,000 agronomists and zootechnicians had been shifted from office assignments to the MTS. In the year and a half following the September 1953 agricultural decrees, some 16,000 Communists and 200,000 Komsomols were sent to work in animal husbandry.[33] In 1954 more than 100,000 young men and women were recruited to develop the virgin lands. For 1955 another 112,000 were being called upon to enlist for similar service.[34] But there were also indications that the enthusiasm of the crusade had a somewhat synthetic flavor. The Soviet press of the period contained numerous references to party members who attempted to wriggle out of rural assignments, and even Khrushchev was forced to remind an audience of Moscow "volunteers" that ". . . we are sending you off with honor, but we will take you back without pleasure. . . . Yes, and without honor!" [35]

[30] *Pravda*, March 6, 1954.
[31] April 18, 1955.
[32] For examples see *ibid.*, May 31, 1955.
[33] *Partiinaia Zhizn'*, No. 9 (May 1955), p. 17.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP

The dependence of the party leadership on its urban contingents reflected the relative weakness of the party in rural areas. In his speech to the February 1954 session of the Central Committee, Khrushchev disclosed that only 16,620 collective farmers had been taken into the party in 1953. Three-quarters of the primary party units on collective farms and 585 rural district committees failed to admit a single collective farmer into the party during all of 1953. His report revealed the breakdown of rural party membership given in the accompanying table: [36]

PARTY MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES IN RURAL DISTRICTS

Location	Percentage of Rural Membership	Numbers
In institutions belonging to district organizations	30.0	900,000
In industrial enterprises	20.0	600,000
In collective farms	31.0	930,000
In MTS	8.0	240,000
On state farms	4.3	129,000
Other	6.7	201,000
Total	100	3,000,000

[34] *Pravda*, February 25, 1955.
[35] *Ibid.*, January 8, 1955.
[36] *Pravda*, March 21, 1954.

Although these figures indicate a substantial increase in collective farm party membership as compared with the prewar period, they also make clear that the average collective farm in 1953 had approximately twelve party members and candidates, a total which is largely accounted for by the executive personnel of the farm. In Khrushchev's words, "Many district committees take absolutely no interest in admitting collective farmers into the party. Of course, in recent years the party has pursued a policy of restricting admissions, but this does not mean that admitting the foremost collective farmers into the party must be discontinued altogether." [37] It is also worth noting that the rural membership of the Komsomol remained low. Out of a total Komsomol membership of 18,825,327 on March 1, 1954, only two million were in collective farms, 297,000 in MTS, and 200,000 in state farms.[38]

Since the announcement at the Nineteenth Party Congress that the party on October 1, 1952, had 6,013,259 members and 868,846 candidates, no comparably precise figures have been released. From occasional general references in the Soviet press it would appear that the over-all party membership is presently stabilized around the seven-million level, but more precise breakdowns will probably not become available until the convocation of the Twentieth Congress of the party in February 1956. The emphasis of the party is still on the recruitment of "leading" personnel; as a governing party it seeks to ensure its control of all the important power positions in Soviet society. As might be expected, the armed forces remain one of the most sensitive areas and receive special attention in the party's recruitment drives. As Molotov put it in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on February 8, 1955, ". . . seventy-seven out of every hundred men in our army are Communists or members of the Young Communist League. Both Communists and members of the Young Communist League know particularly well how to defend the gains of Communism against the aggressors." [39]

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, March 20, 1954.

Party Trends Since Stalin's Death

While it is too soon to venture any definitive appraisal of party developments since the death of Stalin, some tentative observations may be hazarded. Up to this point, at least, Stalin's lieutenants have managed a remarkably smooth transition. The struggle for the succession has been contained within the inner circle; the elimination of Beria and the demotion of Malenkov have been achieved with no society-wide repercussions. Despite many visible signs of Khrushchev's rising status and the perspectives which the first secretaryship opens up to him, there is as yet no hard evidence to indicate that he has attained a position of indisputable primacy, and the reiterated references to collective leadership point toward a situation in which power continues to be shared in greater or lesser degree. In the absence of direct testimony, it is impossible to do more than speculate on the equilibrium of forces which operates within the Soviet high command; the historic experience of Stalinism does, however, suggest that control of the party apparatus is likely to play a key role in any struggle for supremacy which ensues. Although efforts to bring the armed forces or the police into action in such a struggle can never be altogether excluded, the lessons of Soviet history would also seem to indicate that such efforts are rarely made, or, if made, are unlikely to be successful. A Bonapartist coup d'état requires a degree of conspiratorial secrecy and *esprit de corps* in officer ranks which the whole pattern of party and police controls in the armed forces is calculated to discourage. As long as party discipline remains paramount, the purely military dictator is unlikely to make his appearance on the Soviet scene.

[39] *Pravda*, February 9, 1955.

The supremacy of the party continues to be the alpha and omega of Soviet rule. The reassertion of party leadership in the MVD after the arrest of Beria made this explicit. All efforts to weaken party controls in any sector of Soviet life have been sternly rebuffed. The recent rebuke administered to party officials in the Ministry of Construction who violated the party decree prohibiting the acceptance of payments or bonuses from economic organizations furnished a striking example.[40] *Pravda* seized the occasion to re-emphasize the independence of the party hierarchy and to indicate that party officials who allowed themselves to become "tools in the hands of administrative organizations" would be severely disciplined. The call for *partiinost'*, or devotion to party interests, at the Second Writers' Congress symbolized the same drive. In this respect, at least, Stalin's heirs tenants have remained true to their Stalinist origins.

Personalized leadership

In other respects their style in leadership marks a decisive break with that of their predecessor. In the period since Stalin's death the new party leaders have traveled the country, visited collective farms and factories, participated in meetings of primary party units, made numerous appearances at foreign embassies, and sought to establish a direct contact with their problems and their constituents which contrasts notably with the remoteness of Stalin. Khruschev in particular has been volubly articulate, airing difficulties with apparent frankness, putting in public appearances in every part of the Soviet Union, and conducting a tireless one-man agitational campaign on behalf of the new agricultural program without recent parallel in Soviet history. Whatever the motives which have inspired this activity, the result has been to project an image of personalized and humanized leadership which suggests a sharp change from the past.

[40] See *Partiinaia Zhizn'*, No. 3 (May 1954), pp. 47–50.

Policy

In the realm of policy the record has been more ambiguous. Such measures of the first post-Stalinist year as the amnesty decree, the price cuts, the halving of the state loan, the consumer goods campaign, the improved agricultural incentives, and the easing of restraints on intellectual creativity seemed to imply a repudiation of the Stalinist legacy. They could be explained by the desire of the new leaders to court popularity and entrench themselves in power, but at a deeper level they expressed the grievances and strains of the Stalinist epoch with which his successors had to reckon. The decision to seek a *détente* in both domestic and foreign policy was an obvious response to the problems which the new regime inherited. But the choices open to the leadership also involved risks and dangers. Any really large-scale expansion of the output of consumers' goods meant a probable cutback in military expenditures and a slowing up in the rate of growth of heavy industry. Faced with this choice, the party leaders reasserted the priority of heavy industry. But having selected the Stalinist path, they raised the specter of old dilemmas and new sacrifices; it remained to be seen whether they could transcend the difficulties which their decision imposed on them.

Each generation of leadership has its

own commitments and its own choices to make. The commitments which the new leaders inherit from the past include a vested interest in a system of party leadership which will preserve their own power, a determination to make the Soviet fortress militarily and economically impregnable, and a belief in the ultimate triumph of world communism. But the new ruling group also has its own world to build, and it must build with the material which time and history place at its disposal. It must determine whether it can stabilize its relations with the outside world and steer a course which will avoid atomic obliteration. It must decide whether it dare come to terms with the aspirations of its own people for peace, security, freedom, and a better life. What the future choices of the new rulers will be no man can know. But no one who has studied the party in which they have been schooled will lightly assume that the convictions instilled by a lifetime of conditioning are easily discarded.

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Recent Trends in the Soviet Economy*

By JOSEPH A. KERSHAW

IT is now a decade since World War II came to a conclusion. That conflict inflicted great punishment on the Soviet economy. The valuable industrial and agricultural areas of the west and southwest were laid waste once by the Soviet armies retreating eastward, and again by the German armies retreating westward. This destruction, coupled with the intensive use of capital during the war and the failure to replace a good deal of it, could not help weakening the economy seriously.

It is true that by the end of the war reconstruction had already begun in a serious way. Nonetheless, the economy in 1945 was considerably smaller by almost any measure than it had been five years earlier. Casualties had been high, the people were tired, farms were depleted of their best manpower, and the nonagricultural labor force had been reduced by the operation of the draft. With the possible exception of Germany and Poland, the Soviet economy enjoyed the dubious distinction of having suffered more than any other as a result of the war.

The details of economic development following the conclusion of the war are not well known to Western scholars. The broad outlines, however, are unmistakable, and there is rather general agreement that the recovery has been little short of remarkable. The Soviet economy is now the world's second mightiest, and the scars of the war that ended just one short decade ago have all but disappeared.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine some recent trends in the Soviet economy, especially from the viewpoint of their influence on Soviet rates of growth. To do this, we shall have to look at the growth rates in effect before Stalin's death in order to evaluate the influence of the post-Stalin changes. We shall also want to speculate on future developments in the economy with particular emphasis on the probabilities that rates of growth in the future will or will not vary significantly from those that have characterized the past.

DIMENSIONS OF SOVIET GROWTH

While there is general agreement that Soviet growth since the end of the war has been rapid, there is some disagreement as to just how rapid it has been. This disagreement stems in part from the fact that there are serious conceptual difficulties in describing the growth of an economy; in the case of the Soviet Union there is the added difficulty that the Soviet authorities have restricted the amount of data made available to Western and, perhaps, Soviet scholars. The Iron Curtain has not been able to impose a blackout, since a centrally directed economy requires the existence of considerable amounts of data for the implementation of its own instructions; many of these data cannot be kept from the eyes of the West, but quantitatively and qualitatively the statistical dim-out has been impressive.

The Russians have published data on Soviet national income for some time, but those who have studied the data and the concepts and practices of Soviet na-

* This article leans heavily on research, both finished and in process, which The RAND Corporation has sponsored in the recent past. In addition several of my colleagues have commented on the article. I want to thank Abram Bergson, Oleg Hoeffding, Norman Kaplan, and Nancy Nimitz in particular.

tional income statistics find it impossible to accept the rates of increase implied by these data.[1] There has been as yet no definitive Western study indicating the rate of growth of the Soviet economy as a whole. We are not able, therefore, to describe the dimensions of Soviet growth with either exactness or confidence. But we do have estimates that are plausible.

Several years ago, at a conference of economists who are students of the USSR, Professor Gregory Grossman set forth an estimate of the growth of the Soviet economy which may be taken as of the right order of magnitude, at least pending the completion of more definitive studies. Professor Grossman found that the annual rate of growth of the Soviet economy before World War II was 6.5 to 7 per cent.[2] In the postwar period, but with the exception of the immediate postwar years when reconstruction obviously meant a rapid rate of growth, the annual rate of growth of national income seems to have been about the same. There is some discernible tendency for this rate to slacken off, but more will be said on the subject on a later page.

To some, this sort of percentage rate of increase sounds fairly modest. It is, however, large by any standards of Western experience. It may be well to keep in mind that such a rate implies a doubling in size every eleven years. Perhaps more germane is a comparison of rates of increase of the United States economy. Most American economists, when they think about the future of the United States economy, think in terms of growth rates on the order of 2.5 to 3 per cent a year. This, for example, is the range used by President Truman's Materials Policy Commission and by Gerhard Colm in a recent publication of the National Planning Association.[3] There have been occasions when the United States growth rate has been higher than 3 per cent, but there have seldom if ever been occasions when, over a prolonged period of time, the growth rate in this country has approximated that which has apparently been maintained in the Soviet Union since 1928, with the exception, of course, of the war years.[4]

But there is a real question as to whether a growth rate for the Soviet economy as a whole is the significant figure to look for. For one thing, the total economy is made up of many sectors which grow at very disparate rates. This creates serious statistical problems, and casts real doubt on the significance of a single growth rate. Moreover, when comparisons are made between two economies with rather different structures, there is a serious question as to the meaning of over-all rates of increase.

Significance of industry and agriculture in total economy

This leads to the desirability of examining separate sectors of the economy separately. Among those which might be examined, two sectors industry and agriculture—are of particular interest in themselves, because of their importance in the total economy, and because of economic relationships between them. The output of industry, or rather its relative size and rate of increase, is the magnitude of greatest interest to us when we attempt to assess the degree and rate of industrialization. Furthermore, industrial strength determines economic strength, at least in the short run when capability to make war (cold or hot) is the central issue. It is the output of the basic industries like coal, machinery, electric power, steel, and petroleum that we are really interested in when we are thinking of the comparative size of the Soviet economy and economies of the West.

On the other hand, the ability of an economy to satisfy its people becomes important in the longer run. And here, though industry too supplies consumer goods, the success of industry in this respect rests, in a virtually closed economy like the USSR, on success in agriculture. Furthermore, in a developing economy, it is agriculture which supplies an important part of the growing industrial labor force and which, to do so, requires an increasing amount of machinery.

Thus, we are led to examine the industrial and agricultural sectors of the Soviet economy. Perhaps the most important characteristic of these sectors is that they are growing at vastly different rates. To some extent this is a result of deliberate policy, but in a very important sense it is not. In any case, the difficulties of talking about growth of the total economy are perhaps best illustrated by pointing qut that the total economy is made up, among other things, of a sector (industrial output) which has grown at a very rapid rate for twenty-five years, and another sector (agriculture) which has grown at a very modest rate.

Industry

Turning first to the industrial sector, we find rates of increase that are consistently and outstandingly high. The most careful study of this sector has been that by Professor Donald Hodgman.[5] He has accumulated indices of physical output for as many industrial commodities as he could find, and has combined these indices with an approximation to value-added weights, to get an over-all index of physical production. His index is a good deal more comprehensive for the years before World War II than for the period since the end of the war. Nonetheless, it shows that industrial production (again with the exception, of course, of the war years) increased during the prewar period at a rate of approximately 15 per cent per year,[6] and for the postwar years, until the death of Stalin, at a rate of 10 per cent. As in the case of national income, these are rates of increase that are rarely if ever known in Western economies.[7]

For the postwar period the Hodgman index probably understates the annual growth rates. This is because the commodities he is able to include are mostly basic ones; very few of the more fabricated items like machinery appear, and it is these which have grown most. It is not clear, therefore, that Hodgman's

[1] Paul Studenski and Julius Wyler, "National Income Estimates of Soviet Russia—Their Distinguishing Characteristics and Problems," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 37, No 2 (May 1947), pp. 595–610.

[2] A. Bergson (Editor), *Soviet Economic Growth* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1953), p. 9.

[3] G. Colm, *The American Economy in 1960* (National Planning Association, 1952), p. 19.

[4] See, for example, Simon Kuznets, *National Product Since 1869* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1946), p. 119; also see the Grossman chapter in A. Bergson (Editor), *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 12.

[5] Donald Hodgman, *Soviet Industrial Production 1928–51*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.

[6] Hodgman's index is for large-scale industry only. Since small-scale industry grew less rapidly, Hodgman's index overstates growth of total industry before the war, perhaps by two or three percentage points. Incidentally, the cited rate applies to the 1928–37 period. In the three years before the war the rate fell rapidly as the economy began to mobilize. One other study may be cited here. Professor Gerschenkron, using 1939 dollar price weights, computed an index of heavy industrial production (more specifically machinery, iron and steel, coal, petroleum products, and electric power) for the period 1928/29 to 1937. His index increases at an annual rate of 17.8 per cent. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (May 1955), p. 126.

[7] It is possible that Japan, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, may have enjoyed comparable growth rates.

postwar 10 per cent is really lower than his prewar 15 per cent.

What *is* clear is that the rates are still high. Six years ago THE ANNALS devoted an issue to the Soviet Union. The article on the Soviet economy contained a table showing physical outputs for a selected list of commodities. When one compares these with the 1954 output, one finds that the increases imply annual growth rates of between 10 and 20 per cent in almost every case.[8] Rapid growth in industry has been and is unmistakable.

Agriculture

The situation in agriculture is quite different. Agriculture has been much in the news of late, and most of the leaders of the USSR have been clearly anxious about the general agricultural situation. In brief, the increase in output of most agricultural commodities in the last twenty-five years has scarcely kept pace with the increase in population, so that agricultural output per capita is no greater than it was before the period of the Five Year Plans began.

Two major items of agricultural output are grain and livestock. The Russians have put great emphasis on the need to increase the output of both these items, but with marked lack of success. Grain output for 1954 was less than in 1937, much less on a per capita basis;[9] and in the mid-1950's per capita grain output was below even the 1928 level. The livestock situation was no better. In no year since 1950 has the stock of cattle been as large as it was in 1928 and, while there have been some recent successes in increasing the number of hogs, it is clear that the output of meat and dairy products per capita is not as large as it was in 1928.[10] All in all, the Soviet diet has unquestionably deteriorated.[11]

The subject of agriculture and its problems is being treated in much more detail by Professor Grossman in another article in this issue of THE ANNALS. Since it is a key element in the general problem of growth, however, it deserves comment here. One should note that the lack of real progress in agriculture has come about not because the sector has been starved by the planners, for in one sense at least agriculture has been favored. There has been a consistent policy of directing appreciable proportions of total Soviet investment into agriculture. There has been a good deal of discussion about the need to mechanize, and a good deal of bragging about the extent of mechanization on the farm. Indeed, the primitive agriculture of the late 1920's has been very substantially transformed through the investment program that has been a central part of all of the Five Year Plans.

In one sense, agriculture has made a real contribution. One output of Soviet agriculture is labor. In good part, the investment in agriculture which has looked toward mechanization has had as its main purpose the release of labor from the land. We shall discuss this at a later point, but it may be noted here that the Soviet countryside constituted and perhaps still constitutes a large reservoir of labor for the rapidly expanding Soviet industry. Soviet agriculture in this regard has succeeded in supplying large quantities of labor. Most of the productivity increases have resulted in freeing labor from the land rather than in increasing output on the land. To a certain extent, this is a choice that the planners have made, although it will be pointed out later that they are faced with serious constraints in their exercise of choice.

[8] The 1948 data came from Abram Bergson, James Horton Blackman, and Alexander Erlich, "Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Development in the U.S.S.R.," THE ANNALS, Vol. 263 (May 1949), p. 56. The 1954 data were compiled by Nancy Nimitz from scattered Soviet sources.

[9] These developments have to be interpreted with care, since there is less current use of grain in feeding horses now that tractors have replaced so many horses. But even so, more grain is urgently needed, as is indicated by the 1960 planned output, which is a third larger than 1950.

[10] Two RAND "RM" studies, one published and one forthcoming, bear on these difficulties. Both are by Nancy Nimitz. "Statistics of Soviet Agriculture," RM-1250, has been published.

[11] The loss in calories has been made up to a considerable extent (perhaps completely) by the rapid growth in output of potatoes and vegetables. But the change in diet has been quite involuntary.

EXPLANATION OF HIGH RATE OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

The consistently high rate of industrial growth in the USSR is something which has a quite plausible explanation. Part of this lies in the distinction between the institutions of a centrally planned economy and a market economy. In a market economy such as the United States or the United Kingdom, there is a rather effective way in which the people as consumers, savers, and investors determine the overall allocation of resources. This mechanism is by no means perfect, and it is of course seriously interrupted in times of war and major depression but, by and large, the people through the marketplace determine the way in which the society allocates its resources. In their performance of this function, the people are guided by their own efforts to derive the greatest possible utility from the fruits of their own labor. In other words, the important thing is the preferences of the people themselves.

In a centrally directed economy, the situation is very different. The dictator decides how he wants the resources of the economy allocated, and then proceeds to do so by direction. In the case of the USSR, the planners decide that they are more interested in the production of heavy industrial goods than in the production of consumer goods. They are able to implement this decision by various techniques: by subsidies on industrial goods, for example, or by high taxes on consumer goods. So long as they exercise effective control over the people, they can continue to allocate the resources of the economy in a way at variance with what the people themselves would decide if they had any real choice in the matter.

It is clear from the statements of the Soviet leaders that they consciously set out in 1928, through the device of the Five Year Plans, to build up the heavy industrial sector of the economy at the expense of the consumer. A recent *Pravda* editorial puts it this way: "Heavy industry has always been and continues to be the basis of the constant development of our national economy. The Communist party has always considered rapid development of heavy industry its main task."[12] In other words, the emphasis on heavy industry has been a deliberate policy for a long period of time. The driving force has been an unswerving desire to "catch up with the West." In a perverse sort of way, the basest villain of them all, the United States, has been the ideal.

In pursuing these goals, the USSR has had a number of advantages. For one thing, he who starts late can copy. It is clear that the Russians have practiced emulation, either by importing engineering skill and exploiting it, or by the cruder technique of purchasing equipment from abroad and imitating it. Whatever form it took, emulation has made it easier to take initial strides more rapidly than the pioneer, who had to learn as he progressed.

A second important factor has been

[12] *Pravda*, March 7, p. 1. Translated by *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, April 13, 1955, p. 19.


the vast reservoir of labor on the countryside. The process of industrial growth in any country is accomplished by a rapid shift of labor from agriculture to industry, and the Soviet Union has been no exception. The only peculiar feature of the Soviet experience is that there still exists a very large agricultural labor force in spite of the large industrial advances that have already been made. At the present time the Soviet regime still has around half of its total labor force in agriculture; the corresponding figure in the United States is about 10 per cent. Millions of people have already moved from the farm and, if solutions to the basic agricultural problems are found, the flow of labor from the farm to the city can remain high. This flow is of course in addition to the increase that results from the growth in population.

Much should also be made of the absence of the business cycle in the USSR. Prolonged periods of depression such as that in the 1930's in the United States can and do interrupt industrial progress. In the Soviet Union, the institutional arrangements are such that periods of this sort have not occurred and will not occur in the future. To be sure, Soviet society has its disadvantages, some of them coming about for the same reason that business cycles do not, but from this one difficulty, at least, it is free.

Soviet investment policy

But the most important determinant of the high rate of industrial growth is certainly to be found in Soviet investment policy. There are two things about this investment policy that are deserving of emphasis. Both are the results of conscious decisions of the economic planners.

The first is that the rate of investment (that is, the ratio of gross investment to gross national product) has been consistently high. More specifically, for the last twenty-five years, with the exception of the war years, the Soviet government has, year after year, allocated 20 per cent or more of the economy's total resources to investment. This is a percentage which the United States and other Western countries



TYPICAL POSTWAR DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT BY SECTORS, U.S.A. AND USSR

equal on occasion, when economic activity is at very high levels. The difference is that in the USSR it happens every year, and no Western economy has had this experience.

The second feature regarding Soviet investment is equally important. Of the resources that are invested, a far larger proportion than is true in our case goes into heavy industry. For each unit of total investment, therefore, the payoff in terms of continued high rates of increase of industrial output is high. Whereas in the United States a good proportion of investment goes into things like luxury hotels, laundry facilities, and the like, the Russians devote every possible kopeck of their investment to electric power, steel, chemicals, and so forth. The accompanying pie chart contrasts the postwar Soviet and American practices.

The effect of these two peculiar features of Soviet investment is a continuous plowing back of resources into those areas which in turn create more resources which can be plowed back. This reflects itself in the rate of increase of industrial production, and largely accounts for its being high. It may be noted that there is no real reason why both the rate and the direction of investment should not be continued in the future as they have been in the past for an indefinite period. That is to say, there is nothing inherent in what is going on which says that there must be a change at any foreseeable date. It is possible, of course, that the policy which has dictated the nature of investment may be changed.

THE ECONOMY AT STALIN'S DEATH

It may be appropriate to summarize the situation in 1953 which had resulted from the general trends that have been thus far described. Several features stand out.

In the first place, the Russians had managed to build up a very strong industrial base. In most of the important commodities, they were second only to the United States. In spite of the terrible devastation of the war, they had managed by 1948 or so to recover their prewar position, and then had pushed ahead so that by 1953 they had passed England, France, Germany, and all others except the United States.

Secondly, and paradoxically, in spite of all this, the Soviet economy in a very real sense was still an agricultural economy. In many ways, the proportion of an economy's labor force engaged in agriculture is a measure of its stage of development, and it is noteworthy that this proportion in the USSR was still around half in 1953.

In 1953 the Soviet people were still experiencing a very low standard of living. The emphasis on heavy industry, which has been discussed, had as a natural result a standard of living which was bound to be very low. Actually, it appeared for many years as though the Five Year Plans regarded consumption as the residual claimant, while the planners determined the rate of investment that they wanted largely in terms of what they could get away with in denying consumption to the people.

In the two or three years before 1953, the standard of living had been permitted to turn rather sharply upward. It is interesting to speculate on why this should have been done, and even more interesting to wonder whether the trend will continue. To be sure, it may be that some of the increase is illusory, since about this time stories of queuing up and bare shelves began to creep into the press.

Real wage comparisons with the West are, of course, extremely difficult. Nonetheless, it may be interesting to point to some research under way at the RAND Corporation, which compares the ruble prices of a substantial number of con-

sumer goods and service items with dollar prices in the United States of the same or comparable items. When this is done, a 1950 ruble-dollar price ratio for consumer goods, including food, services, and manufactured goods, comes out to 20 to 1 when United States weights are used, and 15½ to 1 when Soviet weights are used. In 1950 the average wage in the USSR was something like 7,500 rubles, in the United States about $3,000. The Soviet worker's real wage in 1950, then, was some one-sixth to one-eighth that of the American, depending on the weighting system used.[13]

Finally, we may note that the Soviet economy at the time of Stalin's death was supporting a substantial military establishment. Some four million men were reputed to be in uniform, and the Korean experience had indicated a modern military technology to be characteristic of Soviet military equipment. The Russians had exploded their first A-bomb three and a half years previously, and were soon to begin talking about their prowess in the manufacture of H-bombs.

As nearly as we can calculate, the proportion of total resources in the USSR going into the military establishment in 1953 was around 15 per cent. It is important to understand the meaning of this, since there has apparently been a good deal of uninformed speculation about it recently. It should be clear that resources spent for the military, unlike those devoted to capital goods, are not productive. A blast furnace can be used to produce something else, a military tank cannot.[14] To this extent, therefore, the Soviet economy like any other is penalized by the resources it allocates to the military. The military is competing for resources with other sectors of the economy. It does not follow, however, that the drain is necessarily serious, so long as the total is rising and the military sector does not rise more than proportionately. Indeed there is no reason to assume that the Soviet leaders could not go on indefinitely devoting a given percentage of their total resources to the military or spending resources equal in amount to those they were spending in 1953. To repeat, what is spent on the military cannot be spent on investment or for consumers, but there is nothing to indicate that the drain represented by the military program at the stated level threatens to bring about economic collapse in any sense.

MALENKOV-KHRUSHCHEV CHANGES

The end of an era occurred in March 1953 with the death of Stalin. There followed two years during which Malenkov was at least nominally in charge. Then in February 1955 Malenkov was succeeded by Bulganin or Khrushchev or both. When Malenkov's economic program began to emerge, it appeared to constitute a real break with the immediate past. Its main outlines were as follows. There was to be a sharp shift in the distribution of investment, away from heavy and toward light industry and trade. Much more of the fruits of the economy were to be distributed to the people. In fact, promises to the consumer were lavish and, to some of us, seemed surprisingly specific. Finally, the ever-present problem of agricultural output was given even more emphasis, and price and tax policies were altered to improve the earnings of farmers and to give them incentive to produce more.

[13] For trends in real wages, see Janet Chapman, "Real Wages in the Soviet Union, 1928–1952," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May 1954), pp. 134–56.

[14] It does produce "national security." There is no intent to imply that military production is necessarily wasteful. The point is that military end items, unlike capital goods, do not produce additional economic goods.

It was not apparent in 1953, and still is not, how much of all this was propagandistic and how much was substantive. A great deal was made of the fact that aircraft factories had been instructed to begin turning out aluminum pots and pans. Indeed, extremely large percentage increases in things like television sets and other durables were enthusiastically reported in the press. Large percentage increases in many of these things were in fact achieved, but since the base figures from which these percentage outputs were measured were in most cases extremely small, these "triumphs" are not to be taken very seriously.

It is not easy to determine what really did happen during this period, but the data at hand point toward the tentative conclusion that changes in the structure of the economy were minor and unimportant. The revolution, if it was ever really intended, failed to come off.

If we look at the official Soviet indices of gross industrial output in the 1950's, we find that the ratio of increases in the producers' goods area to those in the consumers' goods area remained practically constant from 1951 through 1954. It is true that the latter half of 1953 indicates that the increase in consumers' goods was a bit higher than it had been earlier; but by 1954, the year in which these changes should have been reflected in the statistics, there is a decline in this rate. It is possible that the time required for true structural shifts was more than Malenkov had at his disposal. Whatever the cause, the shift did not take place, and there was, therefore, no appreciable interruption to the economic trends we have been discussing.

Although there is little evidence of such structural shifts, Malenkov was more successful in keeping his promise to improve the lot of the consumer. This appears to have been done in two ways. In the first place, there was apparently a significant drawing down of state reserves of various sorts. In the second place, there was an increase in the volume of imports that took place, beginning in the middle of 1953, and a simultaneous and substantial increase in the proportion of total imports made up of foods and consumers' goods.[15]

With the ascendancy of Bulganin and Khrushchev in 1955, Malenkov's agricultural reforms were intensified, but other parts of his program were repudiated. Bulganin reproached Malenkov specifically for what he termed errors in policy inherent in using the state reserves for current consumption.[16] The much-publicized charges of having corrupted true party ideology by asserting that the time had come to let light industry expand at a faster rate than heavy industry were explicitly directed at political unknowns, but undoubtedly were aimed at Malenkov, and whoever were his major henchmen in the intended reversal of economic policy. The announcement by Bulganin of the annual 1955 Plan targets for industry left no doubt that heavy industry was to continue to receive favored treatment, and the rate of increase for consumer goods was planned at only about half what had actually been achieved in this field in 1954. We may summarize the experience of the Malenkov interregnum by hazarding the opinion that the changes that took place were much less important, at least in areas other than agriculture, than we thought might be the case, and in fact had a minor impact on the course of economic development.

[15] Cf. the article by O. Hoeffding in this issue of THE ANNALS.

[16] *Pravda*, February 10, 1955, p. 1.

Change in economic policy?

By way of pure speculation, it may be said that a genuine change in economic policy is not completely unlikely in the future. The current soft international policy seems to have a logical counterpart in an economic policy favoring the consumer, and there are some who are expecting the change to take place if the current softness in international dealings continues. It may be interesting to consider briefly what might happen if this consumer goods reorientation should appear. A successful program would certainly have interesting propagandistic effects throughout the world. We may ask, then, what would be the result of a sincere and prolonged attempt on the part of the Soviet economic planners to move their economy away from the heavy industrial economy toward one that emphasized the output of consumer goods. It seems fairly clear that rather startling improvements in the standard of living in the near future could be achieved. Among other reasons, this could be expected because most of the small amount of consumers' goods capital in the USSR is obsolete, worn out, and inefficient. As a result, its replacement by new equipment would bring about very substantial increases in the productivity of these industries. In the economist's lingo, the marginal productivity of capital in the consumers' goods industries must be regarded as very high.

The probability is that the resulting rapid increases in the standard of living could be expected to continue for some years. Following this, however, there would be an inevitable slowdown in the rate of increase. One reason for this is that a great deal of consumer capital is very costly. All of the capital for consumer services in cities, for instance, is costly to install, and has little immediate payoff. Streets, transportation facilities, sewers, and so on are of this sort. The construction of housing in the USSR before the war did not keep pace with the growth of the urban population, and yet the improvement of housing facilities is essential to a balanced increase in the standard of living. A housing program designed to obtain accommodations merely approaching the decency level would require a tremendous investment effort in the USSR.[17]

There is another factor which would tend to bring a slowdown in due course. De-emphasis of heavy industry would mean that a larger proportion of the output of industry would be consumed. When output is consumed it cannot be used to make more output, except of course insofar as it increases the productivity of labor. The output of capital goods industries, on the other hand, is used directly to make more goods. One type of industrial output therefore produces satisfaction for consumers, whereas the other produces measurable outputs for statistical series. Paradoxically, consumers' goods production is analogous to military production. Both are consumed directly and add nothing in direct ways to the future output of the economy. Last but not least, the hypothesized policy would presuppose genuine success in expanding agricultural production, to supply more food and raw materials for consumer goods. Reliance on imports is an unlikely alternative, as we suggest below.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the course of action just described in general terms. It is also difficult to say what the propagandistic effects of a rather rapidly and continually increasing standard of living would be. It would seem, however, that they should

[17] For a summary of the housing situation, see Timothy Sosnovy, *The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union*. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954.

be considerable, particularly in countries like France and Italy, where the standard of living is not high and is not increasing rapidly. And they ought to be very substantial in many of the Asian countries, where freedom means a good deal less than it does in the West and where the competition of the Communistic versus the capitalistic societies is being closely watched. Indeed, it does not appear at all clear that an economic course of this sort, perhaps coupled with a substantial decline in the military claims on the economy, would be less dangerous to the West than the piling up of impressive growth rates in steel, electric power, machinery, and chemicals.

POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH

We turn now to a look into the future, and an attempt to assess the probability of continued future growth. We assume, of course, that hot war does not break out. We also assume that the Soviet leaders have debated the matters referred to in the immediately preceding paragraphs and have decided to retain the present policy of building up the industrial base as rapidly as is consistent with political stability.

The first thing to say is that at some time in the future, if the time has not already arrived, a modest decline in the *rate* of industrial growth may be expected to take place. The chief reason for this expectation is that there has to be a time when the rate of release of labor from agriculture to industry must decline. This is true if only because there will always have to be some agricultural labor on the farm, and the withdrawal, therefore—and the curve indicating withdrawal—will level out in asymptotic fashion. The flow of labor from agriculture to industry can be expected to continue, therefore, but beyond some point at a diminishing rate.

Actually, the data seem to indicate that a decline in the rate of growth of nonagricultural labor has already set in. Between 1928 and 1937 the annual rate of increase of workers and employees was about 10 per cent. In the 1950's it is only about half that. Much the same changes have been taking place in the number of industrial wage earners, which means workers in manufacturing, mining, and electric power production.

Recent Soviet statements have stressed that the cities cannot in the future count on an influx of peasant labor at the rate which formerly prevailed. The decline has created a considerable campaign in recent years for a more rapid increase in labor productivity, in particular through the introduction of new techniques. The campaign has not been wholly successful; the official statistics indicate that the labor productivity goals will not be met by 1955. This has been partly compensated for by an overfulfillment of the nonagricultural labor force goal. This type of compensation cannot continue indefinitely, of course. As a consequence we can expect to see the beginnings of a reduction in the rate of increase of industrial output.

In spite of this, there is reason to believe that the rate of increase can remain above that in the West almost indefinitely. It may be noted, parenthetically, that this does not mean greater absolute increases, at least not necessarily so for some period of time. But the investment policy, in terms of both rate and direction of investment, should be sufficient to maintain rates of growth in industry which are higher than those that prevail in Western nations. And unless the Soviets run into a genuine bottleneck, this inequality can remain indefinitely.

Bottlenecks

We turn now to the bottleneck possibility. There is a good deal of loose

thinking on this matter. At various times we are told that the Soviet economy is in danger of imminent collapse because the military burden is excessive, or because the transportation situation is acutely critical, or because it lacks crude oil—and there are many other culprits. It is important to recognize that in any society which is proceeding at forced draft, there will always be one or more bottlenecks operating somewhere. It is not easy to plan the detailed growth process of a large and complex economy. The planner who seeks to maximize the rate of growth has as his ideal a situation where everything in the economy is equally critical at any given moment. If his plan results in surpluses in any parts of the economy, this is a sign to him that he is not planning well. If everything is in equally short supply, this means that he is using to the fullest everything that is being produced.

Now it is clear that no planner can be efficient enough to maintain a situation of this sort at all times. What actually happens, therefore, is that on occasion the economy seems to be held up by a shortage of freight cars or locomotives. There will be other years when rolling stock cannot move because of lack of petroleum; there will be shortages of skilled labor in certain industries where the needs have not been foreseen sufficiently far in advance; and so on. To a considerable extent, the Russians could overcome some of these difficulties, at modest cost, by maintaining fairly substantial inventories, although there is little evidence of what their practices are. But to become true bottlenecks, these difficulties would have to be more than temporary, and there seems to be almost no difficulty that, given time, cannot be alleviated by a reallocation of effort. One needs, therefore, to place in proper perspective the continual minor crises that are likely to occur and not regard them as evidences of imminent breakdown.

Agriculture a real difficulty

There is one sector which is different from others and which, because of this difference, may turn out to constitute a genuine brake on economic development. We refer to agriculture. This will be treated at greater length in Professor Grossman's article in this issue; we will confine ourselves to a few specific comments which will relate the agricultural sector to the problem of economic growth.

The great thing that sets off agriculture from other parts of the economy is its dependence upon natural factors. There is scarcely any limit to the production of most industrial commodities if the planners devote enough effort to it. There is a very real limit to the production of agricultural commodities. Man can, it is true, alter nature to some extent, but it is hard to get around the fact that the endowment by nature of agricultural resources in the USSR is very poor. The latitudinal position of the great bulk of Soviet land is such that the growing season is very much shorter than it is, for example, in United States agricultural areas. There are very few agricultural areas in the USSR where the average annual rainfall is as high as twenty inches. Also, the quality of the land itself in Soviet Russia is poor. All this means that the best agricultural lands in the USSR more nearly resemble North Dakota than Iowa.

This niggardliness of nature goes far to explain the dramatic efforts that have been made in recent years to reclaim vast quantities of land, to institute very large programs of reforestation for wind sheltering, to create the huge irrigation projects of which we have heard so much, and so on. All of these things will certainly help, but they are all expensive and the payoffs are limited. The niggardliness of nature likewise helps explain why the Russians still have half of their labor force in agriculture. One Russian farmer feeds himself and three other Russians. One American farmer feeds himself and twenty other Americans, and he embarrasses his government by insisting on producing "too much." The disposal of agricultural surpluses is a problem with which the Soviet planners would love to be faced.

To an undetermined extent, the organization of Soviet agriculture contributes to its inefficiency. The state and collective farm system is such that it is very difficult for any farmer to relate the income he receives and the effort he puts into the farm. Incentives toward hard work are so indirect as to be virtually nonoperative; the government has not helped by its practice of procuring at very low prices and under compulsion a good proportion of total output. There is no simple solution to this problem.

The population in the USSR is increasing at a rate of about 1.5 per cent per year. Soviet agricultural output, therefore, has to increase this much simply to maintain per capita consumption at its current low levels. But this is not enough. If the Soviet economy is to continue to grow, output must increase even more in order to produce surpluses. Furthermore, this must be done with less manpower than is now available, since the growth of industry requires a continuous flow of labor from the countryside. The experience of Soviet agriculture raises serious question as to whether the planners are going to be able to solve the problems that are becoming increasingly critical. If they do not solve these problems, it seems clear that the rate of growth of the economy as a whole, and of the industrial sector, must slow down. This is why we must watch with such interest the outcome of the efforts described in Professor Grossman's article.

There is, of course, one obvious method of solving agricultural problems. The British pointed the way in 1846 when it had become clear that British farmers were unable to feed the British people. In that year the Corn Laws were repealed; and the British changed their policy from one of self-sufficiency to one of ever increasing reliance on international trade. This avenue is open to the Russians. There is no reason, for example, why they should not import their cotton, and use the land in the USSR devoted to raising cotton for raising food. There is no reason why they should not go farther and import their grain or their beef in trade for manufactured goods. The probability of their doing so, of course, is very low, since it is a cardinal sin according to their ideology to make themselves dependent upon outsiders. Nevertheless, the possibility is there, and one cannot but watch with fascination for signs that international trade is increasing on a substantial scale.

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Soviet Iron and Steel Industry: Recent Developments and Prospects

By M. Gardner Clark *

WHAT are the principal conclusions that can drawn from an analysis of material published in the USSR about recent developments in the Soviet iron and steel industry? [1] In this article we shall first call attention to some of the more important trends in the output of pig iron, ingot steel, and rolled products, as well as in the productivity of iron and steel furnaces, that have taken place since 1945. The second section will discuss current problems and future prospects based on what we know about trends in the immediate past.

Summaries are bound to underestimate many important aspects and to overlook others. Attempts to divine the future are bold indeed, particularly when we are dealing with one sector of the Soviet economy, since the development of any one sector depends as much on considerations of broad economic and political policy as on mechanics inherent in its own development. Our speculation about future prospects, therefore, will be offered merely as a basis for discussion, in the hope that we can single out possibilities deserving further consideration and attention.

Output and Productivity Since 1945

Table 1 presents the basic annual data on total production since 1940. The figures (expressed in metric tons) speak for themselves. Recovering rapidly from the destruction of World War II, output reached the prewar level by 1948, and it has continued steadily upward at the absolute rate of three or four million tons a year. The annual percentage rate of growth of all three products, as calculated from Table 1, has fallen steadily from about 25 per cent in 1948 to below 10 per cent in 1954. This decline in the percentage rate of growth can be explained as an arithmetic reflection of the steady increase in absolute production, and has not been the cause for Soviet alarm. However, the absolute growth of pig iron production has been unsatisfactory in the two years since the death of Stalin, dropping from 3.1 million tons in 1952 to 2.3 and 2.5 million tons in 1953 and 1954. Since, for lack of scrap, the production of finished steel in the USSR is tied closely to that of pig iron (see below), this drop has given the Soviet leadership cause for serious concern, and in its report on the performance of the national economy in 1954 the government singled out pig iron as the first example cited for failure to meet its annual plan. This failure, although certainly not overwhelming, was indicative of some basic problems of the Soviet iron and steel industry, about which we shall have more to say.

The first half of 1955, with its shift of emphasis from consumers' goods back again to heavy industry, has reportedly shown some improvement. Basing his forecast on the performance of the first six months, Premier Bulganin [2] forecast that over 33 million tons of pig iron and about 45 million tons of steel would be turned out in 1955. This would represent an increase over 1954 of more than three million tons of pig iron and four million tons of steel. These absolute increases would be bigger than those of 1953 and 1954, but not big enough to meet the 1955 plan goal for pig iron.

Fortunately for our purposes, the Soviet administrators utilize precise measures of productivity for the major types of iron and steel mill equipment. These measures for blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces are presented in Table 2. From these data we can see that by 1946 the national productivity averages had recovered to almost their prewar levels. Nevertheless, the 1946 averages were well below what had been attained in the good years 1936–1937, and were low enough so that the subsequent years of the fourth Five Year Plan were bound to show substantial improvement. The Soviet planners, however, failed to anticipate how very substantially productivity was going to improve in the postwar period. In the eight years from 1946 to 1954 the national average blast furnace productivity increased 45 per cent and open-hearth productivity 61 per cent. There is nothing mysterious or even wholly new about the postwar productivity drive that gave such substantial results. It followed the familiar patterns established in the 1920's and 1930's. First the Soviet managers adopted the major technical improvements previously developed in the capitalist countries, particularly in the United States, and made a number of minor improvements of their own. Then they encouraged their widespread installation by a series of "socialist competitions" on the Stakhanov pattern. No facet was neglected, including wage incentives, publicity, technical training, heavy emphasis on interplant and intraplant team competition, and the liberal grant of fabulous Stalin Prizes for inventors, innovators, and leaders in "socialist competition." [3]

TABLE 1—Production of Pig Iron, Steel, and Rolled Products, 1940–54

(in thousands of metric tons)

Year	Pig Iron	Ingot Steel	Rolled Metal
1940	14,902	18,300	13,100
1941 Plan	18,000	22,400	15,800
1942	4,800	—[a]	—[a]
1943	5,600	8,500	5,600
1944	7,400	10,600	7,200
1945	8,900	12,300	8,400
1946	10,000	13,400	9,600
1947	11,300	14,600	11,000
1948	13,900	18,600	14,100
1949	16,500	23,300	17,900
1950	19,300	27,300	20,800
1951	22,000	31,400	23,900
1952	25,100	34,500	26,800
1953	27,400	38,000	29,500
1954	29,900	41,000	32,200
1955 Plan	34,000	44,000	34,000
1960 Plan	50,000	60,000	—[a]

[a] Not available.

For sources see Clark, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*) Chap. I, Table 1.

TABLE 2—Productivity of Blast Furnaces and Open-Hearth Furnaces, USSR Daily Averages, 1946–54

Year	Blast Furnace Productivity In tons per cubic meter of useful capacity	Open-Hearth Productivity In tons per square meter of furnace floor
1940	0.84	4.37
1946	0.84	4.09
1947 Plan	0.93	4.60
1948	0.95	4.88
1949	1.00	5.42
1950	1.02	5.70
1951	1.09	5.90
1952	1.15	6.10
1953	1.18	6.40
1954	1.22	6.60

For sources see Clark, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), Chap. XV, Table 53.

[3] See Clark, *op. cit* (note 1 *supra*), Chapter XV.

* The writer is grateful to Robert Campbell for reading the manuscript and making several helpful suggestions.

[1] This article is based on my forthcoming book, *Economics of Soviet Steel*, to be published in the spring of 1956 by the Harvard University Press under the auspices of the Harvard Russian Research Center.

[2] As reported in *Pravda*, July 17, 1955.

By American standards the productivity of Soviet iron- and steelworkers is generally quite low. Soviet leadership is concerned and attempts with apparent success to raise the productivity of its labor force. The Russians, however, think first and foremost about the productivity of capital equipment, and for good reason. Compared with the United States the Soviet Union has a large supply of labor and a small supply of capital. Therefore, any attempt on their part to raise Soviet labor productivity to the level of our own would be irrational.[4]

TWO QUESTIONS

The balance of this article deals with two interrelated questions. The first concerns the latest shift in Soviet economic policy. In view of the remarkable increase in production and productivity that we have just outlined, one wonders why Khrushchev and Bulganin felt it necessary to bring the iron and steel industry back to the center of the public stage after its relegation to the wings by Malenkov. Why are they again so interested in speeding up the expansion of iron and steel? Second is our evaluation of the prospects for growth in the next ten or twenty years.

URGENT NEED OF STEEL

The answer to the first question is twofold. The Soviet Union has urgent uses for all the steel it can produce, and at the same time it faces increasing difficulties in expanding production to meet these growing demands. The principal demands for steel may be thought of as coming from five directions: heavy industry, agriculture, the needs of Soviet satellite nations, consumers' goods, and armament. Since 1928 the lion's share of Soviet steel has been fed into the maw of heavy industry. Construction of the new hydroelectric project at Kuibyshev, for example, requires about 700,000 tons of iron and steel.[5] With the demotion of Malenkov, industrial requirements such as these retain their high priority in the thoughts and plans of Soviet leaders. Until quite recently investments in the agricultural sector have been niggardly, but Khrushchev's new program of expanding agricultural production by opening up millions of hectares of virgin land suddenly imposes strenuous new demands on the steel industry. Of course nobody knows just how much steel the various facets of this program will require, but one Soviet authority claims that the working up of each hectare of land in the new farm program consumes about one ton of metal in the form of tractors and other agricultural equipment alone.[6]

The Soviet government may be primarily concerned with the needs of its own industry and agriculture, but it cannot afford to ignore the requirements of its satellite nations. The European satellites are engaged on ambitious programs of expanding their iron and steel industries. This expansion, however, is being imposed on an inadequate raw material base. The Soviet Union, therefore, has been obliged to furnish its satellites not only iron and steel mill equipment for the new plants but also iron ore to keep the plants in operation. Satellite steel production depends heavily on scrap, and there is little prospect of substantially increasing their already high levels of scrap collections. It would appear, therefore, that the Soviet Union will have to supply sharply increasing amounts of iron ore or pig iron to its European allies if the latter are to meet their ambitious goals for steel production.[7] In the last few years the USSR has assumed a measure of responsibility for the industrialization of Red China. It requires little imagination to see that China could easily become a bottomless pit for Soviet steel. At the very least, China can use whatever semifinished steel and machinery the Soviet Union feels willing and able to spare.

Further down on the priority list we find the steel requirements of Soviet consumers' goods industries. Throughout one Five Year Plan after another the Soviet consumer has found himself cut short when, as usual, it turns out that there is not enough steel to go around. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Malenkov regime seriously attempted to meet the needs of domestic consumption indicates that the satisfaction of these needs is politically desirable.

Steel and munitions industries

Soviet leaders profess a desire to reduce their military establishment in order to meet nonmilitary demands for goods and services. Armament production has undergone sharp fluctuations in the last twenty-five years, and the Soviet government apparently wants to reduce once again its steel commitments to the military. Steel consumption by the Soviet munitions industry increased sharply during the late 1930's with the approach of World War II. Steel consumed by the munitions industry for the purpose of building munitions plants increased from 136,000 tons in 1933 to 880,000 tons in 1938.[8] This increase in defense construction came at the expense of nondefense construction, so that by 1938 the munitions industry was getting 94 per cent of steel construction material allocated to all types of machine buildings. In other words, by 1938, munitions plants were getting so much of the available steel that construction virtually ceased in all other machine-building industries, including heavy machinery, machine tools, automobiles and trucks, tractors, farm machinery, electrical machinery, railroad locomotives and equipment, and shipbuilding. At the same time, by 1938 munitions industries were getting more steel for fabrication (as distinguished from steel for construction) than all the other machinery manufacturers put together. Following the German invasion the Soviet economy was, of course, converted all out to war production. The share of rolled steel going directly into war production jumped to over two-thirds of the total in 1942.

For the postwar period we have been unable to find any figures on the consumption of steel by munitions industries, but indirect evidence indicates that the share has continued to fluctuate with changes in the international situation and in the imperative needs of the Soviet economy. The Soviet managers divide their iron and steel products into two broad categories, which they call ordinary and quality steel. The bulk of ordinary steel is consumed by heavy industry, railroads, and construction, whereas quality steel is devoted almost

[4] Soviet definitions of labor productivity in the iron and steel industry are so vague that they mean very little to foreign observers. All we can safely say is that productivity of the Soviet steelworker is much lower than that of his American counterpart, but that Soviet output per man is increasing substantially with improvements in technology and organization. See Walter Galenson, *Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 108–37.

[5] L. Roitburd, "Ways of Raising Labor Productivity in the Iron and Steel Industry of the USSR," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1954, No. 11, p. 40.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] See my article on iron and steel in *Industrial Russia the New Competitor*, Studies in Business Economics, Number 44 (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1954), pp. 34–35.

[8] For information on steel consumption for the construction of defense plants and the manufacture of munitions see Clark, *Economics of Soviet Steel* (note 1 *supra*), Chap. I and Appendixes C and D.

entirely to the manufacture of machinery and munitions. This being the case we should naturally expect that the share of quality steel in total steel production would fluctuate with the process of conversion to and reconversion from a war-oriented economy, and in fact its share rose and fell in a symmetrical curve, as Table 3 indicates:

TABLE 3—PERCENTAGES OF QUALITY STEEL AND ALLOY STEEL ROLLED IN TOTAL ROLLED PRODUCTION, 1940–43, 1945–47

YEAR	PERCENTAGE OF QUALITY ROLLED IN TOTAL ROLLED PRODUCTION	PERCENTAGE OF ALLOY ROLLED IN TOTAL ROLLED PRODUCTION
1940....	24	6
1941....	37	12
1942....	63	17
1943....	62	21
1945....	48	16
1946....	22	7
1947....	21	8

For analogous reasons the share of alloyed rolled steel fluctuated with the production of munitions during and after the war.

Unfortunately, after 1947 the Soviet government stopped publishing this data on a nationwide basis. Therefore, we have to rely on a few scattered figures to indicate the extent of Soviet conversion during the cold war. The Kuznetsk Combine in Western Siberia, representing a small cross section of the Soviet iron and steel industry, can be considered representative. Kuznetsk has boasted that during World War II it made enough shell steel for 100 million shells and enough tank steel for 50,000 heavy tanks. In 1940, 12 per cent of the plant's rolled output was quality steel. By 1944, at the height of the war, the share had risen to 73 per cent. War damage to the economy was so tremendous, however, that the rehabilitation of railroads, highways, housing, and industrial plants could have been expected to consume all the ordinary rolled steel the Soviet Union could possibly have produced in the immediate postwar period. That is why *Pravda* reported in 1945 that a large proportion of the output of the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Combine was henceforth to consist of railroad rails and structural steel. Six years later the Kuznetsk director reported a different story. The production of quality rolled metal had increased in 1950 almost one and one-half times over 1946, and in the first half of 1951 it increased by another 35.6 per cent. Apparently, by 1950 51 Kuznetsk was again devoting its major effort to the production of quality steel, an essential factor in military output.

PROBLEMS OF EXPANDED PRODUCTION

Soviet leaders may read wistfully in the American press that Americans can enjoy the double luxury of more guns and more butter, but they do not have to read *Pravda* to learn that their own military and nonmilitary demands for steel are directly competitive. This being the case, they may welcome the opportunity to repeat the experience of 1945–47, and to reduce the share of munitions in total steel consumption. This conclusion gains further support when we consider the problems they will face in the next decade or two if they try to maintain the present rate of expansion to meet these increasing and competitive demands. To do this we shall focus our attention on three broad factors: labor supply, technical progress, and the natural resource base. Throughout we shall note that the availability of capital investment plays a key role in permitting the exploitation of labor and natural resources to produce Soviet iron and steel.

LABOR SUPPLY

The rapid growth of the industrial labor force in recent years and tentative projections of this growth by American scholars[9] indicate that the Soviet leaders can rely on a steadily increasing supply of labor. How much of the total increase finds its way into the iron and steel industry depends primarily on government policy. At the present time, for example, there may be a net shift of labor into agriculture, rather than the customary large outflow from the villages. Nevertheless, the iron and steel industry has always managed to get the unskilled labor it needs to carry out essential tasks. Soviet management has not needed to worry about total labor supplies, but it has been and still is seriously concerned about training semiskilled and skilled workers for the industry. Managerial and educational leaders cannot afford to let industrial training slide. On the other hand, they are fully aware of the problem and have now acquired a depth of experience and a well-organized and extensive system of industrial education both inside and outside the industry.[10] Furthermore, compared to the requirements of other industries, the steel industry requires a relatively small nucleus of highly skilled operators. Therefore, it is not likely that labor shortages will constitute a serious bottleneck in the future expansion of Soviet steel.

TECHNICAL PROGRESS

We have noted the remarkable and continuing improvements in the productivity of Soviet capital equipment. Much of the increase in productivity of both labor and equipment is dependent upon the development, adoption, and installation of new techniques. A few of these techniques are of enough current interest to be mentioned here.[11] The development probably most important in its total effect on productivity has been the conversion of blast and open-hearth furnaces and rolling mills to automatically controlled operation. The Soviet managers claim, for example, that automatic control of the heat of these furnaces has increased their productivity 7 to 10 per cent and has cut fuel consumption by 2 to 6 per cent.

The use of oxygen in open-hearth furnaces has developed rapidly since 1946, and the 1955 plan calls for further widespread adoption. The injection of pure oxygen cuts the total heat time as much as 40 per cent without worsening the quality of the steel. Like automatic control, the use of oxygen in open hearths has been developing apace in American practice, and Soviet engineers have been kept informed by abstracts and translations published in their own technical journals. But the Russians overcame before we did one big objection to the use of oxygen in metallurgy, namely its very high cost. On the eve of World War II their famous physicist, P. L. Kapitsa, invented a revolutionary method of producing cheap oxygen.[12] With cheap oxygen available, Soviet authorities have tried hard to use it in blast furnace operations as well as in open hearths, but so far they seem not to have overcome the damaging effects of excessively high temperatures which accompany the use of oxygen in blast furnaces.

During and after World War II, Arthur D. Little, Inc., and the Republic Steel Corporation jointly developed a startling new technique known as high top-pressure blast furnace operation.

[9] For example, Warren Eason and Frank Lorimer in Abram Bergson (Editor), *Soviet Economic Growth* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1953), pp. 100–125.

[10] An excellent article by Walter Galenson on industrial training in the Soviet Union will be published in a forthcoming issue of the *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*.

[11] For details, see Clark, *op. cit* (note 1 *supra*), Chap. XV.

[12] See Gerald Oster, "Scientific Research in the U.S.S.R.," THE ANNALS, Vol. 263 (May 1949), p. 138.

Opinions differ as to the economic feasibility of this process in the American milieu, but there is no doubt that it significantly increases output per furnace and cuts coke and ore consumption per ton of pig iron. As early as 1945 sharp-eyed Soviet engineers picked up references to this innovation in American journals and have avidly followed subsequent reports as they appeared. Nevertheless, Soviet adoption of it was held back a few years until the dramatic initiative of the director of Magnitogorsk cut through the inertia of central authorities.[13] The new method was first introduced successfully in Furnace No. 6 at Magnitogorsk and very quickly thereafter was widely adopted throughout Soviet blast furnace plants. Furnace No. 6 markedly improved its performance under high top-pressure operation and during the month of June 1955 reported a record productivity of 1.69 metric tons per cubic meter of capacity. This means that the Magnitogorsk furnace turned out a daily average during the month of some 2,420 short tons, which comfortably exceeds the "world's record" of 1,981 short tons reported for Bethlehem Steel Corporation Blast Furnace J for the month of May 1954.

Without going into further details, we can say that the spectacular technical progress of the Soviet iron and steel industry in recent years has been almost exclusively in the realm of adoption, modification, and improvement of inventions and innovations pioneered by the Western world, particularly the United States. However, the time lag between invention in the West and adoption in Russia has been steadily shortening, and the next twenty years might even witness some major original contributions by the Russians to the technology of iron and steel. In any case they will always be able to stand on the broad shoulders of the capitalist world. Technical progress can be counted, along with an expanding labor force, as a positive element in Soviet prospects.[14]

[13] For a description of the introduction of this and other innovations see my article, "Development of Large-Scale Organization: The Soviet Steel Industry," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1952), pp. 396–410.

NATURAL RESOURCE BASE

Against these positive elements we have to weigh the very serious limitations of the Soviet iron and steel industry's natural resource base.[15] The most important raw materials consumed in the manufacture of iron and steel are limestone, manganese, coal, iron ore, and scrap metal. Limestone deposits are plentiful and widespread, and the USSR has three-quarters of the world's known supplies of manganese, a factor which encourages the Russians to use more of it than is normally used by Western nations in the production of iron and steel. The Soviet steel industry ordinarily consumes relatively little scrap metal. This is because, industrially speaking, the USSR is a young nation, lacking a large supply of obsolete capital equipment, which, in a country like the United States, provides about one-half of the

[14] From the Russian point of view the most attractive feature is the capital-saving nature of the increase in productivity. By means of a few calculations it can be shown that the unexpected increase in productivity—that is, the increase in excess of the planned—achieved during the fourth Five Year Plan alone (1946–50) permitted the saving of capital investment in blast furnaces equivalent to the capacity of the entire industry in 1913 or 1929. In my opinion, however, such spectacular capital savings are a thing of the past. Productivity will continue to improve, but the Russians have already pushed their existing equipment to the point where further improvements will require more substantial investments than they have heretofore.

[15] This discussion of raw materials is based on Clark, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), Chaps. VII–X.

scrap consumed by our steel industry. In the Soviet Union the corresponding share is closer to one-fifth. The United States, England, and Germany have approximately four times as big a scrap fund, in relation to the demand for it, as does the USSR.

World War II, of course, provided the exception to the rule and greatly increased the role of scrap in Soviet steel production. As the supply of war scrap from World War II began to dry up in 1950, collections were given a shot in the arm by intensive scrap drives associated with the Korean War. In 1939 scrap made up only 25 to 30 per cent of the open-hearth mix, but thanks to a tremendous increase in scrap collections, by 1951 Soviet open-hearth furnaces were consuming about the same share of scrap as is customary in an industrially advanced country such as the United States. Such collections could not long continue to be scraped from the bottom of the Soviet barrel. In each of the succeeding years, 1952, 1953, and 1954, the scrap-collecting administration was taken to task for failure to fulfill its assignments, and the ratio of steel to pig iron production fell off.

Coking coal

The paucity of scrap forces the Russians to rely on pig iron for the manufacture of steel, and the basic ingredients for the smelting of pig iron are coking coal and iron ore. The economic importance of any coal basin depends not only on the quantity of its coal reserves, but also on the quality of the coke obtainable from the coal. The most important coking coal basin is the Donbass in the Ukraine. Donets coal has been for a long time the most sulphurous of any of the world's well-known metallurgical cokes. Furthermore, it contains more ash than coke from Durham, the Ruhr, Silesia, and Pennsylvania. Another big drawback of Donets coal is its unfavorable deposition, which results in a steady increase in the cost of mining. In spite of these disadvantages, the relatively favorable location of the Donets Basin has resulted in its continued expansion under the Soviet regime. Rapid exploitation has dug deeply into Donbass reserves of coking coal, which were small to begin with. The Soviet leadership was aware of the increasing shortage of the better grades of coking coal, but it was not until after World War II that the problem was really faced. There is now a difference of opinion among Soviet scientists and technicians on how to solve it. One school believes that the use of low-grade Donets coal for coking will suffice, while another sees no satisfactory solution and resigns itself to a further shifting of the center of gravity of pig iron production to the east.

The Kuznetsk Basin in Western Siberia is, next to the Appalachians in the United States, the second richest coal region in the world. Tremendous supplies are concentrated in a compact area. Coals of the Kuzbass yield good-quality, low-sulphur coke (their principal drawback is friability). Not only is the quality of Kuzbass better than Donbass coke, but also its very favorable deposition makes it much more economical to mine. The reserves of the Kuzbass at first glance appear to be practically unlimited. Not until after World War II did we learn of a real shortage of Kuznetsk coking coal. We then discovered that the good-quality coking coals make up only a very small share of total coal supplies and that the better coals had been seriously depleted during the war. The only way out of the impasse has been to resort to more low-grade Kuznetsk coals, over the objections of blast furnace operators.

The third most important coking coal basin is Karaganda in Kazakhstan, which was opened up in the 1930's as a substi-

tute for Kuzbass coal, which involved an even longer haul to Magnitogorsk. The main problems of using Karaganda coal for coking are concerned with its extremely low quality, not with any apparent lack of quantity. Although not so bad as the Donbass, Karaganda coal is very high in sulphur. But the main disadvantage of Karaganda coal is its very high ash content, which makes impossible the use of straight Karaganda coke in a blast furnace. In spite of its disadvantages and the great distance of Karanganda from the Urals, the fact that the Kuzbass is even further away has favored the steady increase in the share of Karaganda coal in the Magnitogorsk coke ovens, reaching the technical upper limit of 40 per cent.

The Kizel' coal basin lies on the western slope of the Urals. As the best coking coals of the basin average 25 per cent ash and 6.5 per cent sulphur, even the faintest possibility of using coke made from straight Kizel' coals in blast furnaces is precluded. Nevertheless, the supplying of coal from outside sources to the Urals, particularly the northern Urals, is so expensive that continual efforts are made to use Kizel' coal as one component of the mix for Urals' metallurgical coke. The results have been disheartening.

The inability to use large amounts of either Kizel' or Karaganda coal in the coke mix of the Urals' iron and steel plants has not only great economic but also strategic significance. If the Urals were to be cut off from their distant source of coking coal in the Kuznetsk basin of Western Siberia, there would be little possibility of producing the high-quality sulphur-free pig iron required in modern machinery and armaments. This consideration underlines the necessity for developing a new source of good coking coal for the Urals. The best possibility is the Pechora Basin, which lies above the Arctic Circle. The deposition of Pechora coal is more favorable than that of the Donbass. Sulphur content is high, but not prohibitive. Great difficulties, however, arise from the high content of ash and from the arctic climate, which makes reduction of the ash very difficult. Pechora is connected with the Leningrad area by railroad and has been selected as the coal base for the new Northwest Works being built at Cherepovets, near Leningrad. The potential expansion of this works, however, is quite limited. Pechora has a much greater potential as a coking coal base for use with the iron ore of the Urals. Construction of a railroad between points three hundred miles distant by air, under extremely harsh climatic and topographical conditions, appears to be the main deterrent. We are convinced, nevertheless, that any sizable expansion of the Soviet iron and steel industry clearly requires the smelting of Ural's ore with Pechora coking coal.

Total coal supplies in the outlying regions of Eastern Siberia and the Far East are tremendous, but their poor quality has defeated attempts to use them for metallurgical coke, and offers little encouragement for the future. Anything more than token development of iron smelting in either Transcaucasia or Central Asia seems to be ruled out by both the limited quantity and atrocious quality of their coking coal supplies.

As might be expected, the Soviet leaders have turned to beneficiation to alleviate their growing shortage of good coking coal. Beneficiation involves the elimination of waste and harmful impurities and makes it easier to utilize lower-grade coals for coking, a shift which is absolutely essential for the continued operation and growth of the Soviet iron and steel industry. Until the latter part of the fourth Five Year Plan the Soviet Union was rather backward in the extent of its beneficiation, compared to the Western world. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made in recent years. The share of coal enriched jumped from 19 per cent in 1940 to about 40 per cent in 1949 and has continued to increase in recent years.

Iron ore

The influence of iron ore on industrial location and development has to be examined with an eye to both the chemical and physical characteristics of some seventy-five deposits. The importance of a handful of these deposits, however, overshadows the rest. In 1940, 63 per cent of the iron ore produced in Soviet Russia came from the mines of Krivoi Rog in the eastern Ukraine, which provide the basic ore supply for the south and supplementary supplies for the central region as well as for satellite mills in Eastern Europe. The iron content of Krivoi Rog ore is still high by European standards and reserves are very large, but the rapid expansion of production since 1928 has forced the industry to resort to steadily lower-quality ores. In fact, Krivoi Rog ores are so fine and powdery that they need to have specially high ore content to be practicable for blast furnace smelting. The progressive worsening of the quality of Krivoi Rog ore has been a compelling reason to prospect and develop new iron and steel centers outside the south. Nevertheless, Krivoi Rog remains a bulwark of the Soviet iron and steel industry. Restoration work began as soon as the German army was driven out of the basin, and by September 1952 average daily production had risen to almost 50 per cent above the prewar level.

For almost half a century another southern deposit on the Kerch peninsula of the Crimea has supplied approximately 3 per cent of the Russian iron ore output. Reserves are enormous, but their iron content is low, averaging about 31 per cent iron, and they are full of harmful impurities, particularly arsenic. In physical composition Kerch ore is practically pure powder. The disadvantages of Kerch iron ore make it cost 40 per cent more to produce pig iron than it costs using Krivoi Rog ore. The Russians continue to use Kerch ore chiefly because they are running out of high-grade iron ore.

The basic ore mass of the Urals, second in importance to Krivoi Rog among all Soviet deposits, is Magnitogorsk, which in 1937–38 produced one-quarter of the USSR total. When the giant steel works began operations in 1932, the impression was widely held that it could depend on a practically unlimited supply of some of the world's best iron ore. Our present calculations now indicate, however, that at current rates of consumption the deposit will be exhausted by about 1978. This prediction is optimistic, because it would be difficult to utilize all of the remaining ore. Recognition of this situation has resulted in attempts to develop poor and distant deposits to take the place of the Magnitogorsk's original supply.

The 1950 Plan called for 21 per cent of the nation's iron ore to be produced from Urals deposits other than Magnitogorsk. Not one of these deposits is large enough to be described in this summary. Their generally small size precludes large-scale and continued exploitation, but their large number and relatively high quality make them the best prospects in the Soviet Union for meeting the needs of an expanding pig iron production in the near future.

In recent years, local ores have been increasingly substituted for Magnitogorsk ore at the Kuznetsk works in Western Siberia. The supplies of Western Siberian ore are meager, low in iron content, and high in harmful impurities.

By Soviet admission they will last only a few more years, and the zinc content is too high for efficient operations without significant additions of Magnitogorsk ore. It appears likely that Kuznetsk will eventually turn to low-grade ores located several hundred kilometers away in the Minusinsk Basin. The only other Soviet deposits which now furnish significant supplies of ore are found near Tula and Lipetsk, south of Moscow. Their iron content averages 37–40 per cent, and they are very expensive to mine. In 1950 they were to provide less than 3 per cent of national output, mostly for smelting high-silica foundry iron. In the Leningrad region scattered low-grade deposits may not even meet the requirements of the Northwest Iron and Steel Plant, now under construction.

Other than those we have described, all of the nation's deposits taken together were scheduled to produce less than 3 per cent of Soviet requirements in 1950. For a multitude of reasons, peculiar to each deposit, none of these other deposits is likely to provide much help in meeting the growing needs for ore in the foreseeable future. The exception to this rule may prove to be the ores of the Angara River basin. In spite of their poor quality, limited quantity, and great distance from good coking coal, consumer markets, and transport facilities, the extreme shortage of preferable iron ores in the whole area from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean may force development of the Angara supplies.

Faced with the necessity of utilizing ores of lower grade, the Russians have found a partial solution to the economic and technical problems involved by preparation of the ores preliminary to charging them into blast furnaces. In 1913 practically 100 per cent of Russian ore was charged into the blast furnaces in a raw state, but by 1946 over four-fifths of the ore was treated in one way or another. Since 25 per cent of Magnitogorsk, 50 per cent of Krivoi Rog, and 100 per cent of Kerch ores consist of fines below ten millimeters in diameter, the Russians have put heavy emphasis in recent years on agglomeration. In this process, sometimes called sintering, the powdery material is baked into usable lumps.

Possible alleviations

Shortages of high-grade ore and good coking coal impose serious limitations on the expansion of the Soviet iron and steel industry, but, of course, these are not absolute limitations. They can be alleviated to some extent by massive investments in beneficiation and transportation facilities. Fortunately the United States is much better supplied than the USSR with good coking coal, and we are to a large extent meeting our shortage of good Lake Superior iron ore by importing high-grade foreign ores. But we are also attempting to utilize our low-grade domestic ores. The tremendous sums we are investing in facilities for the beneficiation of Minnesota taconite ores will give us an inkling of the much more serious task facing the Russians.

On the basis of our brief consideration of certain key economic factors we conclude that continued expansion of Soviet steel production at the current rate of three or four million tons a year is possible only at the expense of immense capital investments.[16] At the same time a cut in the consumption of steel by armaments would help the Russians avoid some of the technical and investment problems associated with further expansion. We have a strong suspicion that the leaders responsible for the expansion of the Soviet iron and steel industry would welcome such a reprieve.

[16] The Russians are well aware that the expansion of ingot steel production by the simple addition of scrap metal to the open-hearth charge requires relatively little capital investment. Unfortunately for them their lack of scrap metal forces them to invest in blast furnace plants and transportation facilities, as well as in iron and coal mines, in order to expand steel production. Furthermore, all of these investments must be greater because of the worsening quality of the coke and ore.

WHAT OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE?

The precise manner in which the Russians spend their precious capital and natural resources to expand steel production may give us a clue to their real long-run intentions for peaceful coexistence with their satellites and with the Western world. The Russians publicly proclaim that they want to develop the whole Communist bloc of nations into an integrated economic unit, but they contradict their professed policy by building high-cost steel plants within the USSR that can be justified only in terms of a policy of economic autarky. They admit, for example, that their long-delayed Northwest Works near Leningrad will be a high-cost operation. We wonder, therefore, why they have not diverted the machinery and building funds from the Northwest Works to further expansion of low-cost blast furnace plants in Poland, using Polish coal and either Russian or Swedish iron ore. If this were to be done, the Poles could supply pig iron to Leningrad machinery and munition plants.[17] Likewise it would be much more economical for the Russians to give up the fifteen-year attempt to smelt pig iron in the Soviet Far East from grossly inadequate local iron ores and poor coking coal, and to rely instead on their "trusted allies" to supply cheap pig iron from Manchuria and North Korea.

In the city of Zhdanov on the shores of the Sea of Azov are two Soviet blast furnace plants, one of them part of a completely new and integrated tidewater steel mill. These mills are struggling at a very high cost to utilize low-grade, high-arsenic, and powdery ores from the Crimea. The plant managers would certainly be delighted to sweeten their blast furnace mix with a share of some of the world's best-quality iron ore from Turkish mines on the other side of the Black Sea. If the Soviet leadership is looking forward to a long period of peaceful coexistence, they should be glad to rely for an essential raw material on their good neighbors, the Turks. In other words, both comparative economic advantage and professed Soviet political policy would favor integration of the Soviet iron and steel industry with the resources of Soviet satellites and the Western world. If the Russians, nevertheless, take no serious steps in the direction of industrial integration, we may conclude that they have serious political reservations about long-run prospects for peaceful coexistence.

[17] By now the construction of the Northwest Works may be so far along that it cannot be curtailed. Even if this is the case, the Russians still face a choice in deciding how to meet expanding future needs of the Northwest Region.

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Soviet Agriculture Since Stalin

By Gregory Grossman *

THE collective farm system, now a quarter of a century old, has played a crucial role in Soviet industrialization by assuring a steady supply of manpower and "marketable" produce for the needs of the state. But it has failed so far to keep food production abreast of the rapidly growing population, and through its repressions has incurred the hostility of the peasantry.[1]

Any system of farming on the territory of the USSR would have to contend with the unfavorable ratio of population to resources, as the enormous area belies the country's agricultural potential. The poor correspondence between moisture, soil quality, and warmth is particularly marked. But in the short run, nature would represent a much less formidable constraint were it not for a series of interacting economic, institutional, and psychological factors. Despite great strides in mechanization, Soviet agriculture is far from amply supplied with draft power and other forms of capital,[2] nor has the capital been always wisely allocated or well employed. Shortages of shelter, fertilizer, spare parts, and various essential supplies are perennial themes of complaint.

By 1953, livestock numbers (Table 2), as well as average productivity per animal, were still at or below the precollectivization (1928) levels, owing primarily to chronic shortages of feed, poor care given by the kolkhozy to their herds, and inadequate resources of private owners.

Although centralized control affords certain advantages even in agriculture, Soviet planning has been extremely overcentralized, authoritarian, and often inept and perverse. (Recent reforms in this respect are discussed below.) Having had virtually no leeway with regard to production, and very little with regard to disposition of product, and having been in effect penalized (through higher delivery quotas) for larger output, the kolkhozy have often responded by forgoing initiative, avoiding undue effort, and practicing deceit.

Because the state takes much out of a small output and gives little in return, the "dividends" from the kolkhoz to an individual member have been low in relation to time expended, and the peasant has tended to shirk kolkhoz work in favor of his own plot. Because, under the prevailing production conditions, reward is often not commensurate with effort, the quality of kolkhoz work has been poor. Pilferage and neglect of property abound. Labor-intensive tasks (such as livestock care) and long-range improvements suffer most.

Low labor incentives, inflated clerical staffs, wasteful methods, and inadequate capital go far to explain the paradox of an apparent labor shortage in the kolkhozy when nearly one-half of the population is still on the soil. The dearth of adult males has been especially serious. War losses, migration to towns and construction sites, withdrawals to the armed forces and to penal camps, have so drained the Soviet village of adult men that the bulk of kolkhoz labor in recent years has been done by women and youngsters.

Production Record to 1953

As Table 1 shows, the gross output of agriculture per capita has not risen significantly since 1928, if at all.[3] However, nonedible crops (mainly cotton), as well as nonfood uses of edible crops, have grown in relative importance; while grain crops have barely kept up with population growth since 1928 (Table 1) —or for that matter since the 1890's. The output of edible livestock products per capita, by Jasny's estimate, was "at least 30 per cent lower in 1952 than in 1928."[4] These and other data lead to the conclusion that per capita food supply for the country as a whole was substantially lower in the early fifties than in 1928, especially in terms of nutritional value. In this regard, the urban population has fared better over time than the peasants. However, wage-price studies, and the data on "marketings" of farm produce (adduced by Khrushchev as evidence of the success of socialized agriculture),[5] indicate that even in the urban sector average food consumption in 1952–53 was at best near the 1926–28 level.

During the latter years of the Stalin era considerable improvement in urban consumption levels took place, though largely by dint of increasingly heavier pressure on the village to deliver produce out of a stable or only moderately rising total output. Major reliance for the expansion of agricultural production was placed on a series of heroic and for the most part long-term programs, such as the introduction of complex crop rotation on a vast scale, mergers of the kolkhozy to a little over one-third the former number, the shelter-belt program "to transform nature," grandiose irrigation schemes, and an ambitious (and unsuccessful) three-year plan to increase livestock numbers. Simultaneously, the ownership of productive livestock was being rapidly shifted from individual households to the kolkhozy by exerting economic and administrative pressure on the former. The fifth Five Year Plan (1951–55; announced in August 1952) called for something like a 50 per cent rise in agricultural output over the quinquennium, to be attained primarily by raising sharply yields per hectare and productivity per animal. But having rallied from the very low wartime and early postwar levels, by the early fifties total agricultural output seemingly reached its immediate limits of expansion, and even showed signs of incipient decline in some sectors.

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[1] At present, the bulk (say, four-fifths) of Soviet agricultural output is produced by the collective farms (kolkhozy) and on the tiny private plots of their members. Most of the remainder is produced by state farms (sovkhozy), employing wage labor. Uncollectivized peasant farming has by now declined to a negligible level.

The kolkhoz is nominally a co-operative, but actually functions under very close control by the authorities. (On the structure and problems of the kolkhoz see: Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR* [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1949]; and Lazar Volin, *A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture* [Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1951].) It averages nearly 5,000 acres of arable land and a labor force of several hundred. Nine such farms, on the average, are serviced by the equipment pool of a state-owned machine-tractor station (MTS).

[2] In part due to the large loss of horses during collectivization and again during the war, tractor and animal draft power per acre of sown area was still about one fifth less in 1952 than in 1928, when it was none too adequate. (Cf. Table 1; this estimate does not take into account the high rate of standstill of Soviet tractors.)

[3] It must be noted that the dates in Table 1 are not representative in this regard, as they straddle two deep troughs: the collectivization crisis of the early thirties and World War II.

[4] "Prospects for Soviet Farm Output and Labor," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May 1954), p. 212.

[5] *Pravda*, September 15, 1953.

TABLE 1—Soviet Agriculture: Selected Statistics

(Data refer to boundaries of the respective years)

	1928	1938	1940[a]	1950	1952	1953	1954
Population, end of year, million	154.1	170.3	198.4	204.5	209.4	211.5	214.0
Ditto, 1928 = 100	100	111	129	133	136	137	139
Urban population, per cent of total	18	32	32	....[b]	....[b]	38	....[b]
Gross output of agriculture, index (after Jasny)	100	112	137	130–156[c]	125–151[c]	....[b]	....[b]
Ditto, per capita	100	101	106	98–118[c]	92–111[c]	....[b]	....[b]
Sown area, all crops, million hectares	113	137	150	146	156	157	166
Grains: Sown area, million hectares	92.2	102.4	110.5	102.9	107.3	106.7	112.0
Yield, quintals per hectare ("barn" basis)[d]	7.9	7.4	8.7	9.0–9.5	9.1–9.6	"Near 1952"	8.7–9.2
Crop, million metric tons ("barn" basis)[d]	73.3	75.9	96	93–98	98–103		98–103
Ditto, per capita, 1928 = 100	100	93	102	96–101	99–104		96–101
Cotton, unginned, "barn" crop, million metric tons	0.82	2.48					
"Biological" crop, million metric tons			2.7	3.75	3.95	4.07	4.1
Horses, midyear count, million	33.5	17.5			15.7[e]	16.2[f]	
Tractor power, beginning of year, million of drawbar horsepower	0.4	8.4	9.7		15.0[e]		18.9

[a] Enlarged boundaries, but precise territory not always certain.

[b] Not available.

[c] Higher figure links 1950 with 1940 by means of Soviet index (see also note 6 in text); lower figure links 1950 with 1940 by means of Jasny's index; 1952 linked to 1950 by means of Soviet index.

[d] Estimates for 1950–54 are on "factual" crop basis, which may not be entirely comparable with the "barn" crop basis.

[e] Estimated; see below, Sources.

[f] October 1.

Sources: Population—1928–1954, V. Marchenko, "Novye dannye o naselenii SSSR," *Vestnik instituta po izucheniiu istorii i kul'tury SSSR*, 1955, No. 1 (14), pp. 18–19. Urban population—derived from Soviet sources and total population data. *Gross output of agriculture*—estimates by Naum Jasny at 1926–27 prices (*The Soviet Economy During the Plan Era* [Stanford, Calif., 1951], p. 17, and "A Close-up of the Soviet Fourth Five-Year Plan," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 66, No. 2 [May 1952], p. 165) and Soviet indices for 1950 (*Pravda*, September 15, 1953) and 1952 (*Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1953, No. 8, p. 55). Sown area, all crops—from Soviet sources (cf. Nancy Nimitz, "Statistics of Soviet Agriculture," Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1954 [duplicated]). Grains—1928 and 1938, Jasny *Socialized Agriculture* . . . (note 1 *supra*), p. 793 (1928 figures are official); 1940–1954, Sown area, Soviet sources (cf. Nimitz, *op. cit.*); Yield, computed from crop and sown area; Crop, 1940, Jasny, "Soviet Grain Crops and Their Distribution," *International Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 1952), p. 459; 1954, Benediktov's statement to the American farm delegation that the crop was "above 6 billion pud [pood]" (*New York Times*, August 21, 1955), which is taken to mean 6–6.3 billion pood; 1950–1953, from Soviet statements on the sizes of the grain crop in these years in relation to each other and to 1954. Cotton—1928–1950 and 1953 are official figures (cf. Jasny, *Socialized Agriculture* . . . [note 1 *supra*], p. 795, Nimitz, *op. cit.*, and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954* [Geneva, 1955], p. 79); 1952 and 1954, estimates cited in *New York Times*, August 21, 1955. Horses—official data (cf. Nimitz, *op. cit.*), except for 1952, which is the average of beginning and end of year figures raised upward by 5 per cent for seasonal adjustment. Tractor power—official data (cf. Nimitz, *op. cit.*, p. 49), except that 1952 figure has been projected back from October to January on the basis of current deliveries; 1954, *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 1955, No. 3, p. 18.

The New Course in Agriculture

Thus, when Stalin's successors drew back the official façade of relentless progress and informed the world that all was not well with Soviet agriculture, the novelty lay less in the fact than in its frank and full admission.[6] The situation must be seen in relation to the rapid rates of growth of the total population (1.5 per cent per annum) and especially of the urban population (4.5 per cent per annum) with its higher consumption standards; the expanding claims of industry for agricultural raw materials; the difficulties experienced in other countries of the Soviet orbit with regard to agriculture; and, overhanging all these, the uncertainty implicit in the Korean crisis. Not only were higher living standards in jeopardy and military security at stake, but a Malthusian retrogression was drifting into sight. This was the problem inherited by the successor regime, a problem which the very act of succession, with its need for a gesture in the direction of the consumer's aspirations, aggravated before beginning to resolve it.

Malenkov's speech before the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, formally announced the concerted drive toward a solution in agriculture, going so far as to throw out the incautious slogan of "abundance of food for the population and of raw materials for light industry in two to three years." (Shortly thereafter the phrase "a sharp rise" superseded "abundance" in the formulation.) A month later the first of Khrushchev's reports on the agricultural situation was delivered before the Central Committee of the party,[7] and the matter seems to have resided in his hands since then. Both spokesmen attempted to explain the lag of agriculture (and light industry) behind the rest of the economy by the historical necessity to develop heavy industry first, yet they have freely admitted that misplanning, improper incentives, de-emphasis of the private plots, and other functional ills have played no less a role than the lack of investment funds. Throughout the fall of 1953 a series of higher targets for consumers' goods production and sales were announced, though commodities dependent on agricultural raw materials underwent only moderate revision. The new targets hardly spelled "abundance"; but, more significantly, they did constitute a clear commitment to better the consumer's lot, largely through higher productivity in agriculture.[8]

Far from transforming the basic institutional framework of Soviet agriculture, the measures taken since 1953 clearly aim at strengthening it, largely by manipulating the established range of incentives and tightening some of the traditional controls over the peasantry. The revisions in planning are less fundamental than they might appear at first glance, since the authoritarian centralism that characterized planning in the Stalin era seems only to have changed its focus without losing much in its force.

Livestock products

It is hardly surprising in view of what has been said above that animal husbandry received major attention from

[6] However, the black picture now painted should also not be accepted uncritically. In part, malperformance may be exaggerated in the official records as a result of concealment of produce and income by the peasants; in part, the dark tones may be intentionally overpainted to spur the "campaign."

[7] Published in *Pravda* on September 15, 1953; the Central Committee resolution thereon was published on September 13.

[8] On this set of measures see Lazar Volin, "The Malenkov-Khrushchev New Economic Policy," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (June 1954), pp. 187–209.

TABLE 2—PRODUCTIVE LIVESTOCK IN THE USSR
(In millions; data refer to postwar boundaries)

	January 1 Counts					October 1 Counts		
	1916	1928	1938	1941	1953	1953	1954 Plan	1954 Actual
Cattle	58.4	66.8	50.4	54.5	56.6	63	65.9	64.9
Cows	28.8	33.2	[a]	27.8	21.3	26	29.2	27.5
Kolkhoz-owned	—	[b]	4.2	5.6	8.5	9.2	11.5	10.3
Sheep and goats	96.3	114.6	73.6	91.6	109.9	135.8	144.1	[a]
Sheep						114.9	127.4	117.5
Hogs	23.0	27.7	32.2	27.5	28.5	47.6	54.5	51.0

[a] Not available.
[b] Negligible.

Sources: All rows except "Kolkhoz-owned cows"—January 1 Counts, 1916, 1928, 1941 and 1953, *Pravda*, September 15, 1953; October 1 Counts, 1953, *Pravda*, January 31, 1954, and January 21, 1955; 1954 Plan, *Pravda*, September 26, 1953; 1954 Actual, *Pravda*, January 21, 1955. Kolkhoz-owned cows—1938, official data (cf. Nimitz, *op. cit.* [Table 1, Sources], p. 43); 1941, *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, volume on the USSR (1947), p. 923; January 1, 1953, computed from Khrushchev's data in *Pravda*, February 15, 1953; October 1, 1953, and 1954 Actual, computed from data in *Pravda*, January 21 and February 2, 1955; 1954 Plan, *Pravda*, September 26, 1953.

NOTE: October counts are normally higher than January counts. Soviet livestock data, especially after 1928, may not be very accurate.

the start. The pronouncements of September 1953 [9] called for a considerable increase in total livestock herds by October 1, 1954 (Table 2). These targets were later advanced to an unspecified extent, probably to allow for the original serious underestimate of actual hog numbers.[10] Though additional incentives were held out to promote private ownership of livestock (especially cows), emphasis was to remain on the "socialized" herds.

Productivity per animal was to rise even faster than numbers, chiefly by improving the feed situation. Thus, the average milk yield per cow in the kolkhozy, which had shown no tendency to rise for over a decade, was to increase by one-third over the next twelve months. The quest for "marketable" output was evident in these measures; thus, the high goal for state procurement of meat (a planned 37 per cent increase between 1952 and 1954) seemed to jeopardize the program of building up herds.[11]

[9] See *Pravda*, September 13, 15, and 26, 1953.

[10] *Pravda*, January 31, 1954.

The new lands

In February 1954 [12] the decision was taken to bring under the plow vast areas of "virgin and idle land" along the arid southeastern margin of cultivation, primarily for grain. In 1954, 13 million hectares (32 million acres) were to be plowed, and 2.3 million hectares were to be sown. These goals were exceeded

[11] The specific measures aimed at increasing the output and delivery of various field crops (potatoes, vegetables, cotton, flax, and hemp), published between September 1953 and May 1954, cannot be discussed here for lack of space.

[12] Published in *Pravda* on March 6 and 21, 1954.

and, by a supplementary decision, in 1956 the sown area in the new lands is to reach 28 to 30 million hectares (69 to 74 million acres).[13] Originally, an average (barn?) yield of 14 to 15 quintals per hectare was expected from the new lands, but after a year's experience Khrushchev spoke of 10 quintals per hectare "as a minimum." [14] Thus by 1956 the new lands are expected to provide a (barn?) crop of 28 to 30 million tons, or roughly 30 per cent as much as the total (favorable) 1952 grain harvest.

The action is conducted as a major campaign on the internal front, with relentless propaganda pressure and attempts to enlist widespread popular cooperation. It is notable on several other scores. It completely reverses the earlier policy, embodied in the fifth Five Year Plan, of expanding grain production by raising yields per acre rapidly and with minimal extension of sown area. It attempts to create a new granary in an area of fertile soil but very little and highly inconstant precipitation (for the most part, 10 to 16 inches per year), short growing season, and other natural handicaps. Population is sparse and the labor force must be brought in from the outside; large outlay on housing, transport facilities, and so forth, is required. On the plus side (apart from increasing the total grain crop) it brings cultivation closer to major food-deficit areas in the east and south and removes it farther from strategically vulnerable locations.[15]

[13] *Pravda*, August 17, 1954; by 1960 the scheme is to embrace even more, as some land will revert to fallow or be sown to other crops (*Pravda*, February 3, 1955).

[14] *Pravda*, December 24, 1954, and February 3, 1955. In terms of wheat, 10 q./ha. are about 15 bu./acre.

[15] For a general analysis see Lazar Volin, "The New Battle for Grain in Soviet Russia," *Foreign Agriculture*, Vol. 18, No. 11 (November 1954), pp. 194–99.

The corn-livestock program

The disappointments with the progress of the initial measures were probably the main reason for a fresh approach to the livestock problem adopted in late January 1955.[16] Its goals were set for 1960, the terminal year of the next (sixth) Five Year Plan, but only a few months later Khrushchev forecast their attainment in three to four years (that is, by the end of 1957 or 1958).[17] The central goal of the new program is a grain crop (presumably in "barn" terms) of 164 million metric tons, of which "over" 65 million tons are to be diverted for animal feed. It necessitates an increase of 60 to 70 per cent over the "barn crop" levels of 1950–54, and although the implicit "barn" yield per acre is more modest than in earlier plans, it still must rise some 20 to 40 per cent over the yields in recent years. Much stress is placed on reducing the high harvesting losses.

The fodder aspect of the scheme in large part depends on extending corn planting to "no less than" 28 million hectares (69 million acres), or eight times the 1953 area. The corn program has become the subject of a new campaign—the peg on which the main hopes for livestock products are currently hung. It is now claimed that corn can be usefully grown far outside its traditional bounds (southern European Russia), even where the ears will not ripen, because of the silage yield and because grain in the "milk stage" is of equal feed value with ripe grain.[18]

[16] Published in *Pravda*, February 2 and 3, 1955.

[17] *Pravda*, May 19, 1955.

[18] The last point is contrary to American experience, which also indicates that silage yields increase with approach to maturity (D. Gale Johnson, "Analysis of Khrushchev's Report on Livestock Produce" [March 15, 1955], unpublished).

Along with corn very large increases in the supply of other fodder (potatoes, root crops, and so forth) by 1960 are expected.

In accord with the new planning method, discussed below, no targets for livestock numbers are now indicated. Milk yield per cow in the kolkhozy is to rise to 1,700 kilograms, that is, by about one-half over the six (or 3–4?) years. Output of the main livestock products is planned to increase between 1954 and 1960 (or 1957–58?) in the following proportions: meat and fat, twofold; milk, twofold; eggs, 2.2-fold; wool (all types), 1.8-fold.[19]

What steps have been taken to bring these programs to realization?

MATERIAL RESOURCES

Draft power received early attention. From 1954 to mid-1957 the average annual rate of tractor shipments to agriculture (in terms of horsepower) is to be about one and one-half times as much as was delivered during 1953, almost the whole increase in shipments to be in row-crop tractors, of which there has been a marked shortage so far.[20] In 1954 over half the shipments of tractor power and nearly half the shipments of combines went to the new lands, very likely to the detriment of replacement and expansion in the old areas of cultivation.

Intentions to increase deliveries of other types of equipment have also been announced, with particular attention to the mechanization of hitherto largely neglected labor-intensive tasks, especially in animal husbandry and feed production. The stress on raising labor productivity in agriculture by means of expensive machinery tends to corroborate the hypothesis of labor shortage on the farms. The supply of artificial fertilizer is planned to increase nearly threefold from 1953 to 1959, and nearly fivefold by 1964, but failure to mention earlier targets strongly suggests little immediate improvement in this scarce item.

LABOR

The poverty of the village doubtless contributed to the large-scale flow of the peasant population to towns in postwar years; nine million are said to have migrated "in the last five years" (1950–54?) alone.[21] Even tractor drivers, the economic elite of the kolkhoz, left in large numbers. No wonder then that the "intelligentsia" likewise shunned the village. It was said in September 1953 that of the 350,000 trained specialists in agricultural work, only 18,500 worked in kolkhozy, and 50,000 in the MTS. The measures announced in that month called for a large redeployment of skilled and professional personnel to the village. By early 1955, about 120,000 agronomists and livestock specialists were said to be at the MTS serving the kolkhozy, and over 20,000 engineers and mechanics were added to MTS personnel. In addition, 1,250,000 tractor drivers were transferred from the kolkhozy to permanent MTS employment, with consequent increase in earnings, in order to improve their performance.

The new-lands program carried this planned reverse migration to an unprecedented extent, though one must distinguish between peasants moving from overpopulated western regions to kolkhozy in the east, and townsfolk going to staff the new sovkhozy and MTS on the virgin lands. The latter are mostly urban youths recruited through the Komsomol and places of employment. Considerable financial (and even marital) incentives are offered to the migrants; but the harsh and primitive conditions of life on this "front" are a deterrent, as the Soviet press admits. Nominally, all migrants are volunteers, though the authorities undoubtedly exert pressure. In a few months after the summons, 150,000 persons from other industries are said to have arrived in the new sovkhozy and MTS; the number of kolkhozniki who have also moved has not been revealed. Eventually the new lands will undoubtedly require millions of settlers.

[19] *Pravda*, February 2 and 3, 1955.

[20] See *Izvestiia*, May 11, 1954, for sharp criticism of past emphasis on heavy all-purpose tractors.

[21] Khrushchev in *Pravda*, February 3, 1955; it is not clear whether return flow has been deducted from this figure or not. There are no reliable data on the size of the agricultural labor force for the postwar years.

INCENTIVES

The problem of incentives has been attacked on several fronts.

1. The gross money incomes of both the kolkhozy and the individual households have been increased by the twofold device of raising the prices paid by the state for obligatory deliveries and contractual purchases and simultaneously reducing or eliminating the obligatory delivery quotas for a number of important commodities. However, it seems that the contractual purchases have been transformed into a kind of obligatory delivery at higher prices, an arrangement which tends to explain the fact that sales on the open market have hardly increased at all since the "New Course" was launched.[22] Thus, to the extent that the combined gross money receipts of households and kolkhozy have risen, they have done so almost entirely on account of the larger money payments by the state,[23] that is, by an estimated 15 per cent in 1953 and again by as much in 1954.

2. The money tax paid by the households (though not that paid by the kolkhozy) was to be reduced by "over" 60 per cent (or by about 6 billion rubles) by 1954; arrears of this tax were canceled.[24] The annual bond drive (affecting peasants as well as others) was halved in 1953 but was restored to the previous level in 1955.

3. The disincentive effects of the various progressively graduated levies and fees were recognized, and remedies were introduced. Thus, the tax on households mentioned above, which had varied with the use made of the private plot, was now to be strictly proportional to the land area of the plot, though with considerable differentiation geographically and even as between individual villages. The local officials who, in their zeal to meet their own plans, had transformed the nominally fixed obligatory delivery quotas (for kolkhozy and households) into de facto highly progressive ones were now enjoined to refrain from the practice. Lastly, the fees in kind paid by the kolkhozy to the MTS, which had been on a "sharecropping" basis to stimulate the latter to better performance (but seemingly with limited success), were now made independent of yields. These reforms appear sensible and may have a positive effect on kolkhoz production, if, of course, they are properly observed by the authorities on all levels.[25]

4. Specific incentives were also reexamined. Prices and delivery quotas

[22] Sales on kolkhoz markets in 251 cities were 3 per cent greater (presumably in value terms) in 1954 than in 1953 (*Sovetskaia torgovlia*, 1955, No. 4, p. 3); this very likely means a decline in the volume of sales because of higher market prices in 1954. It was anticipated that in 1955 sales value would remain at approximately the same level (inferred from data in *ibid.*, 1955, No. 7, p. 21).

[23] These increased by 12 billion rubles in 1953, and by another 13 billion rules in 1954 (*Pravda*, February 3, 1955).

[24] See *Pravda*, August 6 and 10, 1953.

[25] Apparently the injunction against flexible delivery quotas was not successful in ending the practice; cf. Khrushchev in *Pravda*, February 3, 1955, p. 4. Moreover, the contractual purchases may now be similarly abused.

have been readjusted to bring higher returns for commodities lagging in output, such as livestock products, potatoes, flaxseed, and so forth. Remuneration schedules for peasants and MTS workers engaged in the production of these commodities have been raised; bonus provisions have been greatly expanded. The typically Soviet system of contingent counterdeliveries of consumers' and producers' goods to the peasantry has been further elaborated. But it is difficult to appraise these measures fully because of their complexity.

5. Lastly, it should be remembered that the program of "sharply rising" consumers' goods supply, announced in the fall of 1953, not only was based on rising agricultural production but was also clearly designed to stimulate it by way of material incentives to the peasants. The return of emphasis to heavy industry in early 1955—not that it had strayed very far in the direction of light industry before—may thus be of direct import to the agricultural picture as well.

CONTROLS

Controls over the peasantry have been tightened simultaneously.

1. The labor contribution required of every kolkhoznik was raised in mid-1954.[26] Earlier, in October 1953, enforcement of the requirement by criminal proceedings was abandoned, probably because of the conspicuous failure to bring about full compliance by this method.[27] Reliance is now placed (apart from administrative measures) on a special surcharge of 50 (and in some cases 75) per cent on the household tax in the event that *any* member of the household fails to meet his or her minimum labor requirement, and obligatory deliveries of meat by kolkhoz households are also raised 50 per cent in the same event. Other measures to elicit better labor participation in the kolkhoz include new attempts to bring individual effort and reward into closer relationship, a more liberal system of advances against *trudodeи* credit before the end of the year, and—in reversal of recent policy—a shift toward the smaller work team (*zveno*), as against the larger "brigade." Presumably, the higher money earnings of the kolkhozy are in part transmitted as "dividends" to individual kolkhozniki, an arrangement which may also improve "labor discipline."

2. The position of the machine-tractor station as the regime's "stronghold" in the countryside has been considerably reinforced; it is now virtually the administrative superior of the kolkhoz. Correspondingly, its responsibility for kolkhoz performance, both in production and in deliveries, has also been enhanced. Tens of thousands of technical experts, recently removed from desk jobs, are being concentrated in the MTS. Moreover, each MTS now contains a team of party "instructors," headed by the district party chairman, who are "actively to intervene in kolkhoz life," to supervise it daily, to initiate action where necessary, but somehow "not to supplant the chairman of the kolkhoz."[28] This is one way in which the party is to penetrate deeper into the village, where it had been greatly underrepresented heretofore. It must in-

[26] The new minimum requirements, to be set by each kolkhoz, must be above the minima in effect in 1953 and are subject to confirmation by district authorities (*Kommunist*, 1954, No. 15, p. 66). It seems that approximately a doubling of the previous minima, enacted in 1942, was aimed at.

[27] Interestingly, the change has not been publicized, and is known from a passing reference in *Partiinaia Zhizn'*, 1955, No. 2, p. 15. I am indebted to Mrs. Luba Richter of Washington, D. C., and to Mr. John Grosberg of Munich for aid in locating the reference.

[28] Cf. *Partiinaia rabota v MTS* (Moscow, 1954), *passim*, especially pp. 36–37.

spire and supervise, and perform the *managerial function* as well. A case in which party vigilance saved seed potatoes from rotting is held up as an example.[29]

In April 1955 it was announced that 30,000 "experienced" functionaries, party members and others, were to take over as kolkhoz chairmen. One in every three kolkhozy was thus affected. The experience in question is probably other than farming, but this matters little—the chairman's production decisions are narrowly circumscribed—so long as the newcomers identify themselves more with the regime than with the peasants.

3. In January 1955 Khrushchev proposed that local authorities be permitted to keep 50 to 70 per cent of produce above fixed procurement quotas for local distribution, in order to stimulate their efforts to raise agricultural output and deliveries.[30] Presumably the scheme has since been put into effect. One may wonder whether, in accord with previous Soviet practice, it will not tend merely to reinforce the efforts of these authorities to secure lower procurement quotas.

PLANNING

Criticism of agricultural planning, expressed from the start of the "New Course," has been aimed largely at three related aspects: (1) Excessive detail and inflexibility in the tasks assigned to individual farms and MTS. (2) Employment of improper categories (for example, "biological" instead of "barn" crops) and wrong census dates (for example, for livestock, now moved from January 1 to October 1); and the planning of intermediate goals (for example, livestock numbers and sown areas) rather than final results, with nominal achievement of the former to the detriment of the latter. (3) Arrogant incompetence at the center in forcing the introduction of crops, rotation systems, and types of livestock where they are unsuitable.

After some minor steps,[31] a decree "On the Reform in the Practice of Agricultural Planning" was published on March 11, 1955, of which the avowed and reiterated purpose is to liberate initiative at the farm level. The planning process now is to begin with the drawing up of a detailed agricultural *procurement* plan by the government in which every kolkhoz is eventually assigned its share. On this basis the kolkhoz, in conjunction with the MTS, drafts a *production* plan, which must maximize the output of crops and animal products per unit land area. After approval by the district authorities, such plans are consolidated regionally and are submitted to the central government for confirmation. The sources do not indicate what happens if a kolkhoz and an MTS cannot agree, or if a higher level rejects a plan.

It is difficult to believe that the new planning system will release local initiative to the extent desired. The MTS and higher state organs retain their veto power over the plans of the kolkhozy, while remaining subject to overriding pressures themselves.[32] Suffice it to mention that the favored projects of the moment—corn growing, the Mal'tsev method of plowing, square-cluster planting—are being introduced with the same determination from above that marked the now condemned plans of yesteryear.

RESULTS AND PROSPECTS

Two of the "two to three years" invoked for the initial stage of the agricultural program have just elapsed as

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

[30] *Pravda*, February 3, 1955, p. 4.

[31] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 1954, No. 5, pp. 81–83.

[32] The Soviet press has already begun complaining of indifference and pseudo compliance on the part of the peasantry, and of the persistence of authoritarian methods on the part of lower officials.

these lines are written. It would be hardly pertinent to observe that "abundance" has not yet been attained. Such gains as are discernible are modest and uncertain. Grain crops remained until 1954 substantially at the 1952 level, although the 1955 harvest seems to promise better. As regards livestock, according to the Soviet press, shortage of feed, inadequate care, and high mortality continue; the October 1954 targets were not met by substantial margins (Table 2), with the exception of hogs, for the "statistical" reason indicated.

Milk yield per cow in the kolkhozy rose during the "livestock year" ending October 1, 1954, by 7 per cent; in the sovkhozy by less than 1 per cent. Industrial output of "milk products"—an indication of procurements—increased by 23 per cent between 1952 and 1954, as against the planned 43 per cent rise in state procurements of milk. The drought which in 1954 affected the southern European area of the USSR and the western part of Kazakhstan seems to have been detrimental to dairy output.[33] However, by mid-1955 more definite improvement began to be claimed, although it is noteworthy that the situation in some of the major dairying regions (the Baltic states and certain central provinces) continues to deteriorate.

State procurements of meat (as measured by slaughterhouse output) increased 20 to 25 per cent between 1952 and 1954, as against a planned rise of 37 per cent. Although the drought may have played a positive role in this instance, procurements were still seriously lagging in the first half of 1955.[34]

[33] *Osteuropa*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1955), pp. 220–21; on the extent of the drought see *ibid.*, No. 2 (April 1955), pp. 145–46.

[34] *Pravda*, June 6, 1955.

New-lands program

Substantial improvement in the supply of these and other livestock products has been pegged on the success of the two-pronged offensive on the "grain front": the new-lands program and corn growing. Large gains were claimed for the former during its first year: 17.6 million hectares (43.5 million acres) plowed and 3.6 million hectares (8.9 million acres) sown, instead of the planned 13 and 2.3 million hectares, respectively—this despite the very brief notice and the slow arrival of equipment and materials (especially housing). As with other Soviet "campaigns," quantity seems to have been achieved in part at the expense of quality.[35]

Nature was kind to the new lands in their first year of production, except in the western portion; the effects of the drought in southern European USSR on grain were thus offset. But despite very favorable precipitation as well as accumulated moisture in the soil, in 1954 the new lands as a whole hardly provided better than the 10 quintals per hectare to which Khrushchev later reduced the long-term prospect.[36] Yet even this long-run outlook for these marginal lands is questionable. It would exceed the yield (for all grains) in the country as a whole in recent years and would surpass by nearly 20 per cent the yield on state farms in the comparable Volga region during the *favorable* year 1952.[37] While some improvement in techniques of cultivation after the hectic first year may be expected, the eightfold extension of the

[35] Cf. *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 1954, No. 12, pp. 73–74.

[36] Yield estimates for specific provinces may be found in *Osteuropa*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (pp. 147–49); see also above.

[37] *Pravda*, March 21, 1954.

harvest area of the new lands by 1956 will take them into drier zones, especially in Kazakhstan, moisture accumulation in the soil will be depleted, and, last but not least, severe droughts must be expected every few years.

Indeed, a drought struck the area in 1955, when 19.7 million hectares (48.6 million acres) of the new lands were already sown, largely ruining the grain crop and raising prospects of a huge "dust bowl," although these losses were apparently more than offset by unusually favorable conditions in the Ukraine and elsewhere in the southwest of the USSR.[38]

Corn-growing program

The first year (1955) of the corn-growing program was apparently also marked by some success. Sown area reached 16.8 million hectares (41.5 million acres—nearly five times the previous year's area and 60 per cent of the ultimate goal), and silo construction has made progress.[39] The weather has been favorable in many areas, although at this point the actual harvest is not yet known. The press has voiced complaints of resistance to the new crop; the initial achievements were doubtless largely due to strong pressure from above. This is important, as corn (especially for silage) is a highly labor- and capital-intensive crop,[40] thus involving two of the major weaknesses of the kolkhoz economy. Hence, unless incentives are greatly increased attainment and maintenance of the desired corn acreage may depend on continued pressure from above. Furthermore, judging from the instances cited by Khrushchev, the expected yield per acre (in grain and silage) may be overly optimistic.[41] Lastly, the targets for other types of fodder (root crops, potatoes, etc.) seem at least as optimistic when added to those of the grain and silage programs.[42]

Thus the outlook with regard to fodder alone places achievement of the 1960 goals for livestock products, let alone their updating to 1957–58, in serious doubt. Besides, animal husbandry under Soviet conditions is unduly labor-intensive, and any large expansion therein would tend to aggravate the labor problem of the kolkhozy. Whether mechanization can substantially alleviate this strain in the near future remains to be seen.

Possibilities of improved food supply

This is not to say that agricultural output and food production, even on a per capita basis, might not increase in the near future thanks to determined efforts in this direction. *Some* increment to gross output should be expected from the additional resources, now even including manpower, channeled into agriculture—however efficient their utilization or wise the choice. Any consequent slackening of the rate of urbanization in itself would ease the race against time. The new incentives and controls might help, though these may in part be mutually corrosive.

Deliberate restraint of the rate of population growth is still ostentatiously

[38] *New York Times*, August 16, 20, 21, and October 31, 1955.

[39] *Pravda*, June 26, 1955; D. Gale Johnson, "Corn, Commissars and Collectives, *New York Times Magazine*, September 4, 1955.

[40] Johnson, "Analysis of Khrushchev's Report" (note 18 *supra*), pp. 16–17. Professor Johnson guesses that "the corn expansion program would have labor requirements equal to from 60 to 96 million ha. of virgin land seeded to small grains *even if all the corn increase were obtained by displacing small grains* [his emphasis])." The labor requirements of the corn crop are recognized by Soviet writers; cf. V. Nemchinov in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 1955, No. 2, p. 26.

[41] Johnson, *op. cit.* (note 18 *supra*), pp. 7–9, 21–22.

[42] *Pravda*, February 2 and 3, 1955; *Osteuropa*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1955), p. 140.

rejected; indeed the opposite is urged.[43] Substantial improvement in the food situation must therefore be sought in rapidly increasing the supply. If the present measures fail to produce it, other means (short of a radical change in institutions and incentives, a change, that is, in the nature of the regime) are still available. "Easy" solutions might be further sought in science and technology, the traditional Soviet hunting ground for panaceas. ("Easy" in this context primarily refers to bypassing the weak links of the kolkhoz system.) Another approach would be to direct considerably larger material and human resources into agriculture than is now done. A third approach would be to raise the producers' returns from farming, that is, increase the supply of manufactured and other consumers' goods for peasant consumption, in order to attain much higher levels of performance in the kolkhozy.

Political implications

The last two policies go counter to the traditional emphasis on the rapid expansion of heavy industry, maintenance of military prowess, and autarky, and the displacement of Malenkov by Khrushchev in February 1955 has reasserted the primacy of heavy industry. However, Soviet moves toward a lessening of international tension, which were launched soon thereafter, can well be interpreted, if not explained, with reference to internal economic constraints. Liberation of a large portion of the resources and manpower now committed to military end use could contribute, directly and indirectly, to a substantial advance on the agricultural front. In any event, 1953 marks a turning point in Soviet economic development: from an industrial growth largely dependent on lavish drafts of rural manpower to one of dearth of even unskilled manpower and to primary emphasis on labor-saving equipment in both industry and agriculture.

In a sense, therefore, the Soviets are right in rejecting Malthus, for their own dilemma bears less relation to his model than to the historical dynamics of Marx and Lenin. The means to provide subsistence, and even better nourishment, to the growing population are basically there. Yet if they are to be used, advance along the chosen path may have to be retarded to the point where victory in the historical race, as the Soviet leaders understand it, is placed in serious jeopardy.

[43] See Khrushchev's speech in *Pravda*, January 8, 1955.

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Recent Trends in Soviet Foreign Trade

By OLEG HOEFFDING

SOVIET foreign trade moves in two different spheres. Most of it is confined to the Soviet bloc; only one-fifth crosses bloc boundaries to become East-West trade. Even before the war, Stalin had led the USSR into a condition of near-autarky. The postwar decline of East-West trade has made it a marginal matter, quantitatively at least, for the USSR, and a negligible one for the free world. The gross national product of the USSR is believed to be more than one-third that of the United States, but in 1954 the value of Soviet foreign trade with the free world was one twenty-fifth that of United States foreign trade. In the same year, trade with the USSR constituted less than 1.5 per cent of total free-world trade.

Nevertheless, the present paper focuses on the Soviet record in East-West trade since 1953, and we deal more briefly with salient developments in trade with the Soviet bloc. A detailed scrutiny of Soviet performance in trade with the free world will help to evaluate Soviet claims—insistently repeated since Geneva—that the USSR wants more trade as a natural adjunct of peaceful coexistence and relaxed tension. We address ourselves mainly to the question whether the USSR has lately shown evidence of genuinely greater trade-mindedness than it displayed under Stalin. Admittedly, the post-Stalin record is short, and the quantities of trade under observation are minute. Hence, a microscopic study of the record cannot lead to firm conclusions as to the correspondence between Soviet words and actions. Yet it seems worth undertaking, as powerful optics are needed to penetrate the myths and misunderstandings which seem to surround the subject of East-West trade.

EAST-WEST TRADE: SOVIET IMPORTS BEFORE AND AFTER STALIN

The impact of Stalin's life and death on East-West trade is depicted by the indexes of Soviet bloc imports from the free world in Table I. In the first quarter of 1953, when Stalin died, Soviet imports were at their lowest ebb in postwar history. Bloc imports as a whole had steadily declined since 1947, when they had reached an unimpressive postwar peak at about half their prewar volume. In 1952 they were nearly 30 per cent below the 1948 level. This trend seemed to promise gradual realization, at least on one point, of Stalin's weird prognosis on the trade of Soviet bloc countries with the West, written a year before his death:

> . . . it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist countries, but will themselves feel the necessity of finding an outside market for their surplus products.[1]

This forecast was strikingly out of keeping with the Soviet assurances of desire to expand two-way trade with the West made to the Moscow "International Economic Conference" two months after Stalin had written it. While Soviet diplomacy and propaganda continued to play the tune of that conference during Stalin's last year of life, the actual course of Soviet foreign trade was determined by his autarkic views. Soviet imports from the free world were re-

[1] J. V. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (New York: International Publishers, 1952), p. 27.

TABLE 1—VOLUME INDEX OF SOVIET BLOC IMPORTS FROM FREE WORLD
(1948 = 100)

Importer	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
USSR	97	100	86	65	69	88	81	114
European satellites	103	100	108	101	89	73	76	98
Soviet bloc[a]	111	100	90	90	81	71	72	90

Quarterly, 1952–54

Importer	1952				1953				1954			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
USSR	100	89	75	84	59	60	75	127	133	137	71	111
European satellites	74	69	67	80	73	67	71	93	89	101	98	102
Soviet bloc[a]	68	71	67	74	69	62	64	91	93	96	79	94

[a] Includes China.

Sources: Calculated from United States Department of Commerce data on free-world exports to Soviet bloc at current prices in Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, Sixth Report to Congress, Second Half of 1954, *Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Free World* (Washington, D. C., 1955), Tables 1, 2; unit value index of world exports in *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (United Nations, Statistical Office), August 1955, pp. xxiv–xxv.

duced by 40 per cent between the first quarter of 1952 and the quarter of Stalin's death.

However, with the advent of Malenkov's "new look," Soviet imports registered a striking increase. Satellite imports also expanded, as they followed the leader into a spell of eased austerity. Between July 1953 and June 1954, Soviet import volume exceeded that of the preceding twelve months by 70 per cent, and the 1948 peak was exceeded for the year as a whole. This import expansion was distinctly geared to Malenkov's attempt to raise consumption standards in the Soviet Union, in anticipation of hoped-for output increases in Soviet agriculture. His "new look" at home also imparted a new and peaceful look to the Soviet import structure: there was, literally, more butter now instead of what had been, figuratively, guns or their wherewithal. The sudden increase in Soviet imports of foodstuffs, textile fibers, and other commodities destined for consumption provided ironic refutation of Stalin's prognosis. It showed that the USSR and its satellites were far from having (as another autarky-minded ruler had put it in the eighteenth century) "no need for the produce of outer barbarians," and from exporting "in order that everyone share in our superfluous riches."[2] On the contrary, when Malenkov reached out for "abundance," an urgent demand for agricultural products had to be met by expanded imports. Soviet propaganda was quick to make a virtue of necessity, and Mikoyan asserted that, "having become wealthier," the USSR could now afford to import foodstuffs and other consumer goods.[3] The Malenkov import drive was also exploited as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's willingness to do business with capitalism, and

[2] From a letter by the Emperor of China to George III, 1783. Quoted by Robert L. Gulick, Jr., "Imports—the Gain from Trade," in *Studies in World Trade and Employment* (New York, 1947), p. 212.

[3] *Pravda*, October 25, 1953.

of the West's silliness in insisting on strategic controls of exports to the USSR, when the latter's *import demand* had turned to clearly nonstrategic goods.

Yet even while these assertions continued, the USSR had already embarked on a retreat from the import offensive. Our index shows Soviet imports in the third quarter of 1954 at little more than half their rate of the first two quarters.

The recovery of imports late in 1954 suggests that the retreat was originally intended to be temporary. But the domestic-policy background of Soviet foreign trade changed drastically in February 1955. Malenkov's policy of favoring the consumer, which had supplied the main impetus to the 1953–54 import drive, was repudiated by Khrushchev and Bulganin, and Stalinist austerity was reaffirmed.

PEACEFUL LOOK OF SOVIET TRADE

It is important to note the extent to which the moderate revival of Soviet trade since Stalin depended on what has proved an ephemeral phase of domestic economic policy. This emerges most clearly from the change in the commodity structure of Soviet imports in 1953–54. In 1951, foodstuffs and beverages had accounted for 15 per cent of total Soviet imports from the free world; in 1953 their share increased to 23 per cent. Consumer goods, and materials primarily for their manufacture, increased from 20 to 38 per cent. Conversely, the share of metals, metal products, machinery, and ships fell from 38 to 32 per cent, and that of rubber, spectacularly, from 21 to 4 per cent.[4]

This shift, apparently, was even more pronounced in 1954, when the USSR, almost overnight, became the world's third largest importer of meat and second largest buyer of butter.[5] Soviet data on imports from Western Europe supplied to the Economic Commission for Europe in October 1954 (the first detailed statistics on foreign trade released since before the war) showed an increase in the share of "peaceful" imports—foodstuffs, consumer goods and consumer raw materials—from 45 per cent in 1953 to 54 per cent in the first half of 1954.[6] In 1950—before the tightening of Western strategic controls—the same commodity groups had represented only 16 per cent of total Soviet imports from Western Europe.[7]

No full data on Soviet trade in 1955 are available at this writing. Malenkov's downfall, however, has clearly had prompt repercussions on trade policy. Large orders placed in Britain in 1954 for consumer goods and equipment for their manufacture were canceled by the Soviet government in March 1955.[8] Trade with Western Europe appears to have been maintained at roughly the late 1954 level, but Soviet purchasing overseas has reflected the switch back to emphasis on heavy industry. The spectacular meat and dairy product pur-

[4] Calculated from data on free-world exports to USSR in Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, Sixth Report to Congress, Second Half of 1954, *Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Free World* (Washington, D. C., 1955), Table 10 A. (This publication cited hereafter as "Sixth Report.")

[5] Sixth Report, p. 21. A considerable portion of Soviet butter imports appears to have been re-exported to satellites in Eastern Europe.

[6] Economic Commission for Europe (UN), *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954* (Geneva, 1955), Table L. Wood and prefabricated houses (a large item in Soviet trade with Finland) are included.

[7] Calculated from *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (prepared by the Secretariat of UN Economic Commission for Europe), Second Quarter, 1952, Table B, p. 59. The 1950 data are not fully comparable with the Soviet data for 1953–54, mainly because the commodity breakdown of the latter is incomplete. Unspecified commodities account for 13 per cent of the 1953 total and 22 per cent of the first half of the 1954 total.

[8] *The Economist* (London), March 26, 1955, p. 1078.

chases of 1953–54 have not been repeated, but rubber imports, heavily throttled in 1953–54, have been stepped up.

One should not expect Soviet import demand fully to revert to the pattern of the Stalin era. Even the new leadership may continue some food imports. That it is reluctant to impose actual reductions in food supply on Soviet consumers spoiled by the Malenkov flush is suggested by the heavy 1955 purchases of sugar by the USSR, normally a sugar exporter, undertaken after a poor sugar-beet crop in 1954.[9] Foreign-policy considerations may also induce food imports, as instanced by recent large rice purchases in Burma, and a symbolic deal in United States surplus food would be a fitting commercial consummation of the Geneva honeymoon.

One may expect, however, that imports for the consumer will henceforth be undertaken only as a matter of economic or diplomatic expediency and not as a systematic major adjunct of domestic policy. Probably every effort will be made to eliminate imports of staple foodstuffs as and when successes are scored by the Khrushchev program for greater food production at home.

Retreat from the Import Drive

Another feature of post-Stalin trade policy also justifies doubts whether the USSR has become genuinely more trade-minded since the dictator's death. This is the nature of the Soviet reaction to what may be termed the Malenkov sterling gap of 1954. Major Soviet gold sales were an interesting concomitant of the import drive. Some 150 million dollars of gold were marketed between October 1953 and February 1954, mostly in London. The sales were curtailed as suddenly as they had appeared, and no unusually large new transactions have been reported, at least as of a few months ago.[10] The sales caused much speculation. Had the world's second largest gold producer at last decided to use its bullion systematically to pay for trade deficits, instead of hoarding it and balancing imports with merchandise exports? Or were the gold sales a stopgap, pending an export expansion sufficient to pay for the larger volume of imports? These were the main alternatives discussed, but actual Soviet behavior in 1954 bore out neither expectation.

The explanation of the gold sales is readily found in the movement of the Soviet trade balance with the West.[11] In 1952, following a pattern characteristic of postwar years, the USSR achieved a small export surplus in its trade with the West (exclusive of trade with Finland, where a large Soviet deficit is handled by special payments arrangements). It used the proceeds of large net exports to the United Kingdom to pay for heavy net imports from non-European overseas suppliers of primary products. Trade with continental Western Europe was broadly in balance.

[9] *New York Times*, February 19 and May 15, 1955.

[10] *Financial Times* (London), March 9, 1955.

[11] The trade-balance data which follow below are derived from "World Exports by Origin and Destination," *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (United Nations, Statistical Office), August 1955, pp. viii–xix, and February 1955, pp. x–xiii. They represent the difference between imports from and exports to the USSR by free-world countries, as reported in their trade statistics. The latter data have been converted into U. S. dollars, and into free-on-board values for both exports and imports, by the UN source.

It may be noted that Soviet trade does result in import or export balances, in spite of the Soviet's preference for bilaterally balanced trade. USSR trade agreements with Western countries are typically clearing and not "barter" agreements, and they allow for, or result in, net exports in one or the other direction. Much of Soviet trade, moreover, is conducted by direct purchases and sales in commodity markets, not tied to any agreement for reciprocal deliveries.

Even in 1953, despite the start of the import spree, the USSR still managed nearly to balance its trade account with the West (again, except Finland), but only by what amounted to extraordinary foreign-exchange economy measures. Drastic curtailment of imports from Britain (from 105 million dollars in 1952 to 34 million dollars in 1953) yielded an exceptionally large sterling surplus. More than 80 million dollars were saved by cutting rubber imports.[12] Finally, the exceptionally low level of Soviet imports in the first half of 1953 helped to balance trade for the year, while Soviet exports more than doubled between the first and second semesters.

In the first half of 1954, however, a continued high rate of imports and a slackening of exports caused a mounting trade deficit. Soviet net imports from nondollar areas outside Europe increased fivefold compared to January–June 1953. The sterling surplus earned in Britain, although well maintained by continued Soviet import restriction, could not offset this increase, and the USSR ended the half-year with an overall deficit of 100 million dollars, excluding the deficit with Finland. It was clearly in anticipation of this deficit that the USSR decided to bolster its sterling balances in London by selling gold.

The second half of 1954 completed the Soviet reaction to its sterling gap problem, in rather surprising fashion. Gold sales did prove a stopgap, not to be followed, however, by an expansion of exports to meet a larger import volume. Instead, the USSR proceeded with a severely restrictionist solution of its payments problem. Overseas purchases were heavily slashed, especially in the sterling area, where they dwindled from 67 million dollars in January–June to 8 million dollars in July–December. Imports from nonsterling overseas sources were better maintained, thanks largely to deliveries by Argentina (with rather little by way of Soviet counterdeliveries).[13] Even so, they were curtailed by more than one-third, and imports from continental Western Europe by one-fifth. Soviet exports increased in the second half of the year, but on balance the USSR relied heavily on import restriction to turn its deficit of early 1954 into a sizable surplus in the second half-year, which made further gold sales unnecessary. Of a total improvement of 137 million dollars in its trade balance with the West (except Finland), export expansion had accounted for 32 million dollars and import contraction for 105 million dollars.

These Soviet tactics of retreat from the Malenkov import offensive amounted to a demonstration of the kind of trade restrictionism which the free-world trading community has tried to do away with in recent years. They appear to justify doubts of the sincerity of the recently displayed Soviet interest in joining bodies dedicated mainly to the liberalization of trade, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the new Organization for Trade Cooperation.[14]

Why Not Sell Gold?

The reaction to the 1954 trade deficit suggests that the traditional mercantilist Soviet attitude to gold has not been modified since the Stalin era. By Western standards, there was nothing unusual about the gold sales of 1953–54. It would be quite normal for a gold-producing country to use gold in pay-

[12] Sixth Report (cited note 4 *supra*), Table 10 A.

[13] Argentine exports to the USSR in January 1953–July 1954 amounted to 58.5 million dollars and its imports from the USSR to 10.3 million dollars. Sixth Report, Table 3.

[14] *The Economist* (London), July 23, 1955, p. 302. Soviet interest is reported to have extended even to the stillborn International Trade Organization.

ment for net commodity imports, and quite probably the USSR did not have to dip into its large gold reserve to cover its 1954 trade deficit.[15] However, Soviet doctrine regards gold as an export commodity of last resort only, and strongly prefers to balance, or more than balance, imports with merchandise exports. This position was reaffirmed in a recent textbook on foreign trade, which went to press in April 1954. Its authors declare that ". . . the socialist state aims at balancing imports with exports, since only such balance can, in the long run, provide a healthy basis for international trade." They stress that the USSR, surrounded by "capitalist hostility," has to maintain a favorable balance of trade, and a gold and foreign exchange reserve "against various unexpected contingencies." [16]

The same book may shed some light on the place of the import drive and gold sales in the controversy which led to Malenkov's resignation. Gold and foreign-exchange reserves, the authors observe:

> like other kinds of reserves in the socialist economy, may be used to overcome disproportions revealed in the execution of national economic plans. In the past, gold and foreign-exchange reserves have sometimes been used if the need arose for urgent imports of certain commodities, and if export commodity resources could not be mobilized fast enough to pay for such imports.[17]

[15] Reliable information on Soviet gold output and reserves is totally lacking, but the USSR is generally believed to rank second in gold production—after South Africa, which produced 463 million dollars in 1954, and before Canada, whose 1954 output was 153 million dollars (*International Financial Statistics* [International Monetary Fund], July 1955, p. 19).

[16] A. M. Smirnov and N. N. Liubimov (Editors), *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR* [Foreign Trade of the USSR] (Moscow, 1954), pp. 18, 99–100.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

This reference may have been to action taken in a very recent past. It will be recalled that Malenkov, when launching his "new look," had criticized lopsided emphasis on heavy industry in the Stalin era as a "disproportion" in planning. But when Stalinist orthodoxy triumphed in February 1955, it was denied that there had been one, and Bulganin castigated the "unforgivable mistake" of "solving special, current tasks at the expense of state reserves." [18] Malenkov's gold sales probably did not encroach on the gold reserve at all, but his opponents may have regarded them as a raid on the sacrosanct "state reserves."

WHAT TO SELL IF NOT GOLD?

Doctrinal inhibitions may not prevent the Soviets in the future from using gold, now and then, to settle for moderate import surpluses. They make it seem unlikely, however, that the USSR will resort to gold financing on a large and permanent scale. This raises the problem of Soviet ability to augment merchandise exports sufficiently to balance a significantly expanded import volume. The structure of Soviet exports to the West is still dominated by the same products of agriculture and forestry which were the traditional export staples of Russia long before the revolution. Agricultural products, lumber, and furs accounted for 82 per cent of 1952 exports to the free world; grain and grain products alone for 53 per cent. Minerals, or lightly processed products of mineral origin, made up most of the balance, while the share of manufactured goods was virtually negligible.

Grain exports have declined strikingly since 1952. Nearly 2.5 million tons were exported to the West from the good 1952 harvest, but in the poor crop

[18] *Pravda*, February 10, 1955.

year of 1953–54 exports shrank to less than one million tons. Recent large purchases of grain in Canada by Poland and Czechoslovakia suggest that currently the USSR is unable even to meet satellite deficits. When launching his grain program in 1954, Khrushchev cited the provision of greater surpluses for export as one of the reasons which called for more output. However, Soviet and satellite demands probably will have a prior claim on any gains in output, before East-West trade gets its share. In the meantime, the USSR will have to substitute nonagricultural export commodities for grain and other products of its ailing agriculture if it wants to maintain its imports. Its experience in 1953 illustrates the difficulty of this task: compared to 1952, the value of grain exports to the free world declined by 127 million dollars, or 52 per cent, and the increase in other exports offset only a minor portion of the impact of this decline on total exports, which fell by 89 million dollars. Since 1953, the USSR has made a determined effort to expand sales abroad of petroleum, ores, coal, and other minerals, and of metals and metal manufactures. Some gains have been made. However, to break the dependence of Soviet exports on agriculture will be an uphill struggle, especially in Western Europe, which absorbed 90 per cent of total Soviet exports to the West in 1954.

APPEAL TO UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

This need to increase exports of manufactured goods and to find markets for them where the USSR will not have to compete with established domestic industries is one major motive of current Soviet emphasis, displayed since 1952, on fostering trade with underdeveloped countries. Moreover, the Soviet export surplus with Britain, which has paid for imports from overseas, has been predicated upon agricultural exports, and there is thus a special incentive now for the USSR to cultivate bilateral trade with non-European countries. As usual, foreign-trade tactics dictated by domestic expediency are well co-ordinated with the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. The new role of a supplier of advanced technology to backward countries not only promises gains in prestige but, where it is coupled with technical assistance by Soviet personnel or technical training in the Soviet Union, also opens new channels for political and cultural influence.

Current Soviet activity in trade negotiations, at trade fairs, and at regional economic conferences tends to obscure the fact that the effort to promote trade with underdeveloped countries was launched from an extremely slender base of actual trade and had made little real progress through 1954. Soviet exports to destinations outside Europe and North America in 1954 were less than 40 million dollars, compared to 54 million dollars in 1952 and 59 million dollars in 1948. The share of these areas in Soviet exports has steadily declined, from 14 per cent in 1950 to 6 per cent in 1954.[19]

The Malenkov import drive raised the share of Soviet imports from non-European sources from 20 per cent in 1952 to 30 per cent in 1954. However, most of the increase was due to imports for consumption, whose future is now uncertain, and most of it benefited developed economies like New Zealand and Australia. As a purchaser of primary products exported by underdeveloped countries the USSR, and even the Soviet bloc as a whole, still plays a negligible part besides the industrial economies of the West.

These facts must be borne in mind in appraising the recent Soviet agreements with Asiatic and Latin American coun-

[19] From data in *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, August 1955, pp. viii ff.

tries, which have been publicized as major break-throughs into markets hitherto reserved for the industrial countries of the West. Most notice was attracted by the Soviet undertaking of February 1955 to build a million-ton steel mill in India, on price and credit terms which apparently compared well to other bids received by India.[20] Soviet equipment to be supplied for the mill over four to five years is valued at some 90 million dollars, compared to total Soviet exports to India in 1954 of 1 million dollars. Soviet machinery and equipment are to pay also for the 150,000 to 200,000 tons of rice to be bought annually by the USSR under a three-year agreement concluded with Burma in July 1955.[21] It may result in Soviet-Burmese trade of some 30 to 40 million dollars each way annually, in an area where this trade previously had been nonexistent.

In other words, given the very low level of Soviet trade outside Europe now, the appearance of capital equipment among Soviet exports may help to bring large increases in trade in a short time. It is hard, however, to visualize the USSR as a major factor in extra-bloc trade in machinery and equipment. Within the bloc, it still appears to be a net importer of producers' durables, and the European satellites and China will continue to absorb the bulk of Soviet exports. It is hard to accept a recent Soviet statement that renewed emphasis on heavy industry will enable the USSR to supply capital equipment to underdeveloped areas, as well as bloc countries, as more than an effort to gather honey from the weeds of a policy change which, on balance, will probably further foster bloc autarky.[22]

[20] *The Eastern Economist* (Delhi), February 11, 1955.

[21] *International Financial News Survey*, July 22, 1955.

[22] E. Frolov in *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 3, p. 35.

Political purposes

As of 1954, the USSR exported less machinery to the free world in a year than the United States did in a week, and its propaganda will have to go on working hard at making mountains out of what, as yet, are isolated molehills. However, it has shown skill in maximizing the political effects obtained from its slender trade with underdeveloped countries, by focusing its effort where trade lends most support to foreign policy. The USSR underbid Western competitors for the Indian steel mill when cultivation of Nehru's neutralism was a major policy objective. In Burma it stepped into a distress situation caused by the present rice glut in Southeast Asia (a glut assisted by Communist China's rice exports to Ceylon). Earlier, it had used a similar distress situation in Iran to offer large barter agreements when Iranian foreign trade was all but extinct during the oil crisis.

Soviet assertions that its exports of capital equipment can release underdeveloped countries from their alleged bondage to capitalist monopolies are matched by claims that the planned markets of the bloc provide an alluring alternative to dependence on the vagaries of unstable capitalism. This appeal was well timed in 1952–53, when primary-product exporters were hard hit by the collapse of the Korea commodity boom. It is hard, however, to detect any marked degree of stability in Soviet primary-product purchases during this period. Thus, Soviet imports of rubber, cotton, and wool (which together accounted for 26 per cent of Soviet extrabloc imports in 1951–53), measured in 1951 prices, were more than doubled in 1952 over 1951, only to be halved again in 1953.[23] There

[23] The combined value of free-world exports to the USSR of crude rubber, raw wool, and raw cotton, at 1951 prices and 1951 = 100, was 235 in 1952 and 120 in 1953. Calculated from current-price data in *Sixth Report* (cited note 4 *supra*), Table 10 A, and price data in *International Financial Statistics*, July 1955, pp. 32 ff.

was also some conflict between Soviet import policy in 1954 and the "stability" appeal addressed to primary producer countries. It was this group of countries that bore the brunt of Soviet import restrictions: comparing the second half of 1954 to the first, imports from Western Europe were cut by 24 million dollars, those from non-European sources by 80 million dollars.

FUTURE OF STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS

Intensive efforts have also been made by Soviet propaganda to exploit the problems raised by East-West trade elsewhere, notably in Western Europe. Since 1951 the Western system of control of strategic exports to the Soviet bloc has provided the USSR with a convenient scapegoat. It could assert, in the face of ample evidence to the contrary, that United States–instigated "discrimination" was at the root of all the troubles of East-West trade. There seems a possibility now that strategic controls, already relaxed in 1954, will melt away in the Geneva thaw. This, doubtless, would prompt the Soviets to proclaim that, at last, the West has seen reason and has mended its ways, in response to patient Soviet persuasion, just as they hailed Geneva itself as a victory for the Moscow-sponsored "peace campaign." With this possibility in mind, one may briefly examine two questions: Have trade controls been the crucial obstacle to East-West trade? Would their removal release an upsurge in East-West trade?

Undoubtedly, controls have prevented some purchases by the USSR and its satellites from the West. However, they left them also with large opportunities for using East-West trade for "strengthening and further developing the socialist economy," which is the avowed purpose of Soviet trade with capitalism.[24] During the Korean War, the USSR was able to import an annual 250 million dollars worth of machines, metals, and rubber. Conversely, controls left wide opportunities for Soviet purchases of unrestricted goods, which the USSR failed to utilize until the Malenkov shopping spree. It is a curious and little-known fact that, since imposition of controls, total exports to the USSR of the eleven European countries cooperating in controls have been increasing (except for a drop in 1953 fully attributable to Soviet restriction of permitted imports from Britain), while the exports of Sweden and Switzerland, which do not participate, have declined.[25] There is much other evidence to show that the volume of East-West trade has predominantly depended on Soviet buying decisions, and on Soviet decisions to offer Western countries the goods they wanted, at reasonable price and in acceptable quality.

A limited test of the effect of an abolition of controls was provided by their easing in July 1954. No increased purchases of decontrolled items appear to have resulted. Possibly, the USSR refrained from them for political reasons. One must bear in mind, however, that during the control period the USSR has systematically expanded, at home and in satellite countries, production of embargoed products or substitutes. The embargo may well have stimulated progress toward Soviet bloc autarky, and it seems unlikely that gains in this direction would be sacrificed after its lifting. Moreover, most of the embargoed items

[24] Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of Economics, *Politicheskaia Ekonomika* [Political Economy] (Moscow, 1954), pp. 517–18.

[25] Sixth Report (cited note 4 *supra*), Tables 3, 6.

are of a kind which would not result in a large volume of unrestricted trade. All in all, it seems quite doubtful that abolition of controls would significantly stimulate trade. However, although there are weighty objections to an abolition, it would at least deprive the Soviet bloc of a convenient smoke screen and force it to show its true intentions on East-West trade.

SOVIET INTRABLOC TRADE

When Stalin discussed the "disintegration of the world economy" into the two "parallel markets" in his 1952 pamphlet, he came much nearer the truth when pointing to the rapid growth of trade in what he called the "world market of the socialist camp" than in his forecast on East-West trade, which we quoted above. The countries of the Soviet bloc, which engaged in little mutual trade before and immediately after World War II, are believed to have exported over 6 billion dollars worth of goods to each other in 1953.[26] For an area comprising one-third of the world population, this was modest compared to the 70 billion dollars worth of exports which moved in free-world trade, but it represented a fourfold expansion of bloc trade since 1948.

About four-fifths of Soviet foreign trade is now conducted within the bloc, and the USSR can now claim that its total trade volume, as officially stated in rubles and converted at the arbitrary official rate of four rubles to one dollar, makes it the sixth largest trading nation of the world. However, although intrabloc trade is much more important to the Soviet Union than its East-West trade, the USSR has remained a relatively self-contained economy even within its orbit. ECE estimates suggest that Soviet intrabloc exports and imports in 1953 amounted to some $20 per head of the population, compared to about $100 of trade per capita for Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany.[27] Yet, the USSR is by far the leading trading unit within the bloc. It accounts for more than one-third of total intrabloc trade, and its trade volume is more than twice that of China, whose trade has grown rapidly in recent years.

Nearly two-thirds of Soviet intrabloc trade in 1953 was with the European satellites. East Germany, after a spectacular trade expansion since 1950, has displaced Czechoslovakia as the Soviet Union's biggest trade partner in the European bloc. These two countries and Poland absorb more than 70 per cent of Soviet trade with European satellites. Trade with China accounts for most of the balance of Soviet intrabloc trade.

[26] All dollar values for intrabloc trade are quoted here from Economic Commission for Europe, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 109 ff. ECE cautions the reader that they should be regarded as "indicative of orders of magnitude rather than as precise statistics," and prefaces its estimates with other qualifications (p. 108). There is some doubt in this writer's mind whether ECE's cautions go far enough, and the estimates are used here as the only data available to convey some impression of the rough magnitudes involved in intrabloc trade. The ECE estimates rest, *inter alia*, on the assumption that the so-called official exchange rate of the ruble, 4 rubles to a dollar, can be used to convert ruble data on Soviet intrabloc trade into meaningful dollar values. There is no information on foreign-trade ruble prices within the bloc, and this writer knows of no reason why the official exchange rate should produce an even approximately correct dollar equivalent of trade values. One might note that even Soviet data on extrabloc trade, stated in rubles and converted at the official 4:1 rate, result in large and unexplained discrepancies with corresponding data derived from the statistics of countries trading with the USSR. Thus, the Soviet figure for extrabloc trade "turnover" (imports plus exports) in 1954 is 5.5 billion rubles (*Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'*, 1955, No. 7, p. 103) or 1.4 billion dollars. Preliminary data for 1954 based on Western trade statistics place turnover at 1.055 billion dollars (Sixth Report, Table I). Similar discrepancies in the same direction occur for 1952 and 1953. They appear too large to be explained by the fact that the Soviet turnover figure, presumably, is the sum of imports valued cost, insurance, and freight and exports valued free on board, while the valuation is generally reversed in the Western data.

[27] For comparison, foreign trade per capita in 1953 was about $170 for the United States, $160 for Western Germany, $180 for France.

COMMODITY STRUCTURE

Soviet accounts of the structure of its trade with the bloc tend to place prime emphasis on the role of the USSR as supplier of capital equipment for the satellite and Chinese industrialization programs. While this function is important, it is by no means a unilateral one. In fact, ECE places Soviet 1953 exports of machinery and equipment to the bloc at 550 to 600 million dollars, in what may be regarded as a generous estimate, and its imports from the bloc at about 620 to 700 million dollars.[28]

According to the same source, the Soviet Union is not only a net importer but also the largest importer of capital equipment within the bloc, and absorbs nearly half the capital equipment exported by its satellites. Soviet exports in this category, however, were exceeded in 1953 by those of Eastern Germany, and the other European satellites combined exported as much as the USSR. This role of Eastern Germany in bloc trade must significantly influence the Soviet attitude toward German unification.

Machinery and equipment do, apparently, account for about one-fifth of total Soviet exports to the bloc, but their bulk is made up of raw materials, fuels, and food. Raw materials for the heavy industries developed by the satellites play a particularly important part. Thus, Soviet iron ore meets more than half the total ore requirements of the Eastern European steel industries.[29] However, the satellite countries have increasingly turned to the USSR also for raw materials for consumers' goods industries, especially cotton. We have noted above the role played by the USSR in supplying grain to Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany and lately to Poland, and the difficulties recently encountered in this respect.

We have seen that machinery and equipment play quite an important part in Soviet imports from the bloc. ECE places their share in 1953 at 26 to 28 per cent of the total value of these imports, and its estimates imply that they account for more than two-fifths of Soviet imports from Eastern Europe.

The composition of exports from Eastern Europe to the USSR differs greatly from country to country. Capital equipment predominates in the exports of Eastern Germany and probably Czechoslovakia, while other satellites concentrate on metals and ores, fuels, and foodstuffs. Manufactured consumers' goods, which appear to be almost absent from Soviet exports to the satellites, figure prominently in Czechoslovak and East German exports to the USSR. Agricultural products, notably oilseeds,

[28] ECE, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), Table 67, as corrected in *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (May 1955), p. 61. The history of this estimate is an interesting illustration of the difficulties involved in reconstructing intrabloc trade statistics from fragmentary official data. Originally (in *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*, Table 67), ECE had estimated Soviet machinery and equipment exports to the bloc at a minimum of 200 million dollars, on the basis of published Soviet statements which gave 800 million rubles as the value of all or most of these exports. At the ECE meeting in April 1955, the Soviet delegate claimed that the figure of 200 million dollars was three times too small, and he is said to have "brushed aside the Secretariat's answer that their figure was contained in an official statement by Mr. Mikoian" (*The Economist*, April 2, 1955, p. 41). On the basis of this undocumented objection, the ECE Secretariat published the corrigendum cited above.

[29] ECE, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 119.

account for the bulk of Soviet imports from China.

MASTER PLAN AROUND THE CORNER?

Until a few years ago, in spite of Soviet and other assertions to the contrary, it was difficult to detect the existence of a central, Soviet-directed "master plan" behind the visible trends in bloc economic development and trade. Industrialization appeared to proceed in each satellite country according to relatively self-contained and similar national plans, and the Soviet Union showed little initiative in promoting division of labor and economic interdependence within the bloc, beyond what was required to support satellite industrial programs and to harness selected satellite industrial or natural resources to the Soviet plan.[30] There was little indication that the long-term trade agreements that were being arranged between the USSR and its satellites resulted from genuine co-ordination of national economic plans, and there was no sign of activity by the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, a body supposedly created to direct economic integration within the Soviet sphere.

Since 1953 there have been signs of progress towards more bloc integration and concerted planning. The ECE Survey for 1954 has noted

> extension of industrial coordination, notably in the field of consumer goods, and the announcement of intentions to work out a more thorough-going coordination of national economies under long-term arrangements, to become effective with the start of the next Soviet Five-Year Plan at the beginning of 1956, with which the plans of the Eastern European countries are to coincide.[31]

One may speculate that several recent developments have prompted the USSR to move more energetically in this direction. Measures for co-ordination in the field of consumers' goods emerged late in 1953, as an adjunct to the "New Course" policies and may not now retain the high priority apparently accorded them at that time. Other stimuli promise to have more enduring effects. First, the ending of East German reparations, which channeled to the USSR a large supply of particularly desirable goods, should have evoked Soviet interest in perpetuating this supply through normal channels of bloc trade. Second, the relinquishing by the USSR of its shares in most of the mixed companies set up in Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and China, and the return to East Germany of Soviet-owned companies, may have weakened its direct control of industrial sectors which it regarded as important to its own economy, and may again have heightened its interest in improving the trade system of the bloc. Third, the USSR has taken on a formidable commitment in support of China's industrialization plans, and greater attention to bloc-wide planning of trade would help it to devolve a portion of this commitment onto Eastern Europe. Finally, the agricultural bottleneck is a bloc-wide phenomenon and may well call for concerted countermeasures. Some effort will be made, presumably, to respond to all these stimuli in the Soviet sixth Five Year Plan and the new synchronized satellite plans.

The ECE survey also notes the appearance of "theoretical writings" in satellite sources, and a single Soviet statement by Anastas Mikoyan, which, perhaps too hopefully, it regards as evidence of "increased attention to foreign trade problems" and of "emphasis on the need for greater international specialization and for closer attention to comparative costs of production at home and abroad."[32]

[30] For an account of these trends up to 1951, see the author's "Soviet Economic Relations with the Orbit," in Abram Bergson (Editor), *Soviet Economic Growth* (Evanston, Ill., 1953), pp. 320–37.

[31] ECE, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 109.

MULTILATERALISM ALSO AROUND THE CORNER?

However, the Survey also finds that indications are "still slight" of progress towards removing what it rightly regards as a feature of intrabloc trade "detrimental to specialization."[33] This is the practice of conducting trade under bilaterally balanced trade agreements. In recent years, the bilateral clearing accounts associated with these agreements have been kept in rubles, and all intrabloc trade has been priced in rubles. However, there has been no provision for multilateral clearing of these ruble accounts, that is, the proceeds of net exports by, say, Poland to the USSR could not be used to pay for Polish net imports from, say, Rumania. Any temporary imbalance on the bilateral accounts had to be settled by the debtor partner through additional goods delivered to the creditor.

Until recently, the only exceptions to this rigid bilateralism were a number of triangular agreements involving Finland, the USSR, and the major European satellites, arranged in order to enable the USSR to settle its chronic heavy trade deficit with Finland by additional exports to satellite countries which were net exporters to Finland.[34] The first multilateral clearing agreement confined to the bloc appears to have been concluded in 1954 between Eastern Germany and Bulgaria. It enables the latter to use its export proceeds for buying in a "third country."[35] That an extension of this practice is in progress may be suggested by a Soviet statement which claims that it is now possible for a debtor under a bilateral agreement to clear its account by exports to "some other country" in the bloc.[36]

The interest of the Soviet government in multilateralism may well have been stimulated by difficulties met in balancing bilaterally its imports from Eastern Europe, and particularly Eastern Germany, after the end of reparations, the easing of German occupation costs, and the liquidation of mixed and Soviet-owned companies. These changes occurred at a time when the USSR had to reduce food exports to Eastern Europe, and it seems likely that the re-exports to satellites of foodstuffs imported by the USSR from the West in 1953–54, and Soviet gold credits to satellites, were an initial adjustment to this problem. It may now be seeking a more permanent solution—which would also help to preserve the near-autarky of the bloc—by fostering multilateral settlements with and among the satellites.

SUMMARY

A modest revival in Soviet trade with the West in 1953–54 resulted mainly from a short-lived change in domestic policy. There was retrenchment even before the new policy had been abandoned. Trade has remained somewhat greater than at Stalin's death, but the gain is small. There are signs that the USSR, reluctant to part with its gold,

[32] ECE, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 109. Cf. extensive excerpts from these writings, pp. 125–35.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[34] As of 1954, there were five such agreements, involving Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Eastern Germany (*Vneshniaia torgovlia,* 1954, No. 11, p. 13). They may not have performed their declared function any too effectively, as indicated by the fact that the USSR extended gold and foreign exchange loans to Finland in 1954 and 1955, and has undertaken to pay in gold and foreign exchange for a portion of the annual trade deficits provided for by the Finno-Soviet trade agreement for 1956–60 signed in July 1955 (*Ibid.*, No. 8, pp. 2–3).

[35] ECE, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 129.

[36] *Vneshniaia torgovlia,* 1954, No. 11, p. 13.

finds it difficult to pay with other exports even for its small volume of free-world imports. It has to substitute nonagricultural goods for foodstuffs, the traditional mainstay of its export trade. Prospects of success in this direction appear problematic in Western Europe, but sales of Soviet capital equipment to underdeveloped countries may foreshadow expansion of trade with areas singled out for special attention by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. However, it is doubtful that the USSR is ready to appear as large-scale exporter of capital equipment to free-world markets. Large claims on such exports are being made by China and Eastern Europe, and on balance the USSR is still an importer of equipment, even within the bloc. In its intrabloc trade, too, the end of reparations and other unrequited imports appears to confront the USSR with a problem of finding enough exports to pay for wanted imports, which it is trying to meet by improving trade planning and instituting more flexible trading arrangements.

Needless to say, the apparent difficulty of finding goods for export to the West is a political phenomenon and not an economic one. A large and diversified economy like the USSR, and one whose foreign-trade methods can divorce export prices from domestic prices, could well enjoy more of the advantages of foreign trade, if only it wanted to do so. In the early 1930's the USSR managed large grain exports in the face of famine at home, when imports deemed essential for the first Five Year Plan had to be paid for. These, however, were conceived as imports to end imports, and the USSR has made vast strides since then towards its doctrinal ideal of economic isolation from capitalism. This ideal appears to have survived Stalin, who contributed so much to its formulation and realization. What may appear as an inability to divert goods for export is actually a reluctance to let imports rise so as to require increased allocation of resources to production for export and thus to jeopardize the Stalinist heritage of Soviet autarky. As long as there is no change in this basically hostile attitude toward trade with capitalism—and we can perceive none in 1953–55—East-West trade promises to remain the trickle that it is today.

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Soviet Literature, 1950–1955

By ERNEST J. SIMMONS

A PRAVDA editorial,[1] "For High Ideological Standards and Craftsmanship," touched off a celebration of the fourth anniversary of the decree[2] of the Central Committee of the Communist Party which had prepared the way for the new postwar "line" in Soviet literature. The writer declared, among other things, that the period since 1946 had been marked "by great progress in Soviet literature owing to the guidance and daily care of the party." Whatever one may think of the veracity of this statement, the succeeding five-year period represents an astonishing rejection by many writers and critics of this claim of "great progress in Soviet literature" since 1946, and at least a covert protest against the "guidance and daily care of the party" in belles-lettres. Stalin's death in 1953 certainly intensified, if it did not exactly initiate, this widespread protest.

Though Marxian aestheticians attempt to justify the development of literature as a superstructural reflection of the socialist base in the Soviet Union, the only deterministic element in evidence is the determination of party leaders that literature shall serve the propaganda and educational purposes of the state. In fact, so importantly is literature regarded as an instrument for the presentation of an official version of Soviet life, in which the Communist party is portrayed as the main source of all character building and the inspiration of all human achievement, that very little is left to artistic chance and the vagaries of individual creative ability in an activity which in a single year (1953) resulted in the publication, in fiction alone, of 222,800,000 copies of 4,700 titles (including reprints).[3]

UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS

The production of belles-lettres is tightly organized under the direction of the Union of Soviet Writers, which has existed since 1934. As of 1954 it had 3,695 members.[4] Membership is voluntary, requiring one or more published works of artistic merit, but it would obviously be hard to enjoy a successful literary career without being a member of the union. The exact percentage of Communists in the Union is difficult to ascertain, but it must run well over fifty per cent (at the Second All-Union Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers, in December 1954, 72.5 per cent of the 738 delegates were party members).[5] A board, elected by the Congress, elects in turn a presidium and a secretariat which direct current activities, and these forty-two individuals, including the best-known names in Soviet letters, are nearly all Communists. It is they who carry out the behests of the party summit and effectively control the intricate operations of literature, manipulating the many branches of the union that exist throughout the whole of the USSR.

The leading literary publications are controlled by the union, including its official newspaper, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, which appears thrice weekly, and the

[1] August 14, 1950.

[2] "O zhurnalakh *Zvezda* i *Leningrad*." Iz postanovleniia Tsk VKP(b) ot 14 avgusta 1946 g., *Gospolitizdat*, 1951, pp. 3–8.

[3] "Publication of Fiction in the U.S.S.R.," *Soviet Literature*, 1954, No. 11, pp. 204–14.

[4] L. Nikulin, "Doklad mandatnoi kommissii," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, December 18, 1954, p. 2.

[5] *Ibid.*

important so-called "thick" monthlies *Novyi mir, Oktiabr', Zvezda, Znamia, Neva,* and *Teatr,* in which the best plays and novels initially appear. And the union also has its own book publishing firm, Sovetskii pisatel', and its own school for the training of writers, the Gor'kii Literary Institute. Any examination of the editorial boards and directors of these various publications and institutions reveals a system of "interlocking directorates." That is, they are made up largely of the leadership of the union, and in nearly every case at least two or three members of the editorial boards of each magazine sit also on the highly important presidium of the union, which, of course, appoints these editorial boards.

Union privileges

Everything possible is done by the union to achieve status and special privileges for writers and to aid them in material ways. For example, it has a literary fund with a yearly budget of 37 million rubles (1953), supported by membership dues, 6 per cent of the net returns of publishing houses and magazines, and 2.5 per cent of the gross receipts of theatrical entertainments, as well as by contributions from various establishments of the union. The fund defrays the travel and living expenses of writers who go to distant parts of the Soviet Union to collect material for their works; gives loans or outright gifts to enable hard-pressed authors to complete a work; establishes "writing centers" in quiet country surroundings where authors can work undisturbed, and in addition controls a large number of cottages in picturesque spots and sanatoriums where writers can go for vacations. The fund also provides kindergartens and summer camps for the children of union members, runs its own medical clinics, supports the sick, and secures pensions from the government for totally disabled or aged members.

Writers, in short, are a privileged caste in the Soviet Union, and it is through privilege, as well as self-interest, that the party-controlled union begins its educational work of enforcing ideological conformity. Young writers are sought out and are given scholarships to attend the union's Gor'kii Literary Institute. Special lecture courses and seminars are arranged for them to study Marxian political theory. National conferences are held for them, in which their first writing efforts receive the careful criticism of famous authors. Their early manuscripts are placed in union publications, and finally they are admitted to the union, which obliges them to subscribe to its statutes, among them the credo of "socialist realism" and the union's objective, "the production of works of high artistic excellence expressing the spirit of the heroic struggle of the international proletariat and the greatness of the victory of socialism and reflecting the far-seeing wisdom and heroism of the Communist Party." [6]

Union controls

The union, however, has it in its power to replace the silken chains of privilege with iron controls and a large element of fear. Most authors feel it necessary to abide by the customary practice of submitting their works in progress to the appropriate commission (fiction, drama, poetry, etc.) of a branch of the union. There it is subjected to a grueling criticism, largely on ideological grounds. After satisfactory revisions, the work will often require the approval of a union official to ensure its consideration by a magazine or book publisher. At this stage the work again receives a stern ideological inspection from the union-controlled editorial board. All this amounts to a form of precensorship before the work is submitted for the approval of the regular government censorship, and if published the fate of the work—and sometimes the author's future—depends upon favorable reviews in the official publications of the union. Finally, standing over all, is the Central Committee or even the Presidium of the party, which may reverse—and sometimes does—the official opinion of the union on a novel or play through the medium of a thundering editorial or article in *Pravda.* It is against this brief background sketch of the party's relation to belles-lettres and of the control and manipulation of writers and their works by the union that one must view developments in Soviet literature over the last five years.

[6] "The Union of Soviet Writers," *Soviet Literature,* 1953, No. 8, p. 142.

ZHDANOVISM

By 1950 "Zhdanovism" in Soviet literature, ushered in by the 1946 party decree of the Central Committee and interpreted in a public speech shortly thereafter by the "culture" specialist of the Politburo, the late Andrei Zhdanov, was firmly established. However, the earlier concentration on war fiction had been officially frowned upon, and by now the prevailing demand, in terms of Zhdanov's speech, was for literature that would "further the fulfillment of construction and rehabilitation plans and . . . promote the development of our country's national economy," [7] but written in accordance with the Leninist principle of *partiinost'* ("party spirit" or "conformity to party dictates").

THE NOVEL

These demands were obediently met in the wealth of fiction that appeared over the next four years. In general, the formula involved a collective farm, a factory, an industry, or some construction site after the war. The mission of the hero or heroine, who is nearly always a Communist, is to rehabilitate the farm, run down during the war, or introduce some innovation in farm, factory, industry, or construction that will result in overfulfilling norms of production. The conflict is usually between the fresh ideas and efforts of the positive hero and the backwardness or "bourgeois survivals" of a negative character or characters. In the resolution of the struggle the *deus ex machina* is often the district party secretary who in crucial situations brings the wisdom and aid of the party to the assistance of the faltering hero. Any character development that exists is ordinarily concentrated on the Communist hero. The perfect, white-marble radiance of his party virtues usually has an ideological flaw—an overweening pride, a tendency to try to do everything himself, an inability to work with the collective, or an incorrect motivation in his conception of socialist labor. Through harsh experience and the practical advice or example of the party secretary, such flaws are corrected in the course of the novel or short story. Contrary to the prevailing image of the hero type in Western fiction, who is a lonely man, alienated from society, insisting upon his individuality in opposition to the encroachments of the crowd upon his freedom, the Soviet hero fulfills his personality only by completely identifying himself with society in the joy of collective labor. In many respects, labor may be regarded as the hero of all this Soviet fiction, and a major emphasis is constantly placed upon the happiness achieved through collective striving for the sake of the socialist well-being of the country. It is largely though not entirely an idealized life that is portrayed in this fiction, for "socialist realism" justifies a presentation of life in the Soviet Union not as

[7] A. A. Zhdanov, *On Literature, Music and Philosophy* (London, 1950), pp. 38, 41.

it is but as it should be or must be—the life of the hoped-for socialist future.

Collective-farm fiction

Space permits the mention of only the most successful of the many novels from 1950 on which illustrate this predominant pattern of fiction. Galina Nikolaeva's[8] *The Harvest* (1950; Stalin Prize) is the story of how Vasilii Bortnikov, chairman of the First of May Collective Farm, transforms it from one of the worst into one of the best in the area, aided eventually by the enthusiastic support of the collective and by the district party secretary who stands as a model for Vasilii and corrects his faults. Into this framework are woven the activities of backward elements, such as the hero's father and his second wife, and also Vasilii's personal relations with his wife, Avdotia. He had returned from the war to find her married to another, as she had been led to believe him dead. After a long emotional struggle, they find their way back to each other in the common task of improving the collective farm. This particular theme is well handled and —in the given circumstances—is psychologically satisfying, perhaps because Vasilii and Avdotia live more convincingly in the emotion of love than in the heroics of collective-farm labor. (It is an interesting fact that postwar Soviet women novelists pay more attention to the theme of love in their fiction than male novelists, and, with some few exceptions, are more convincing in their treatment of it than the men.)

Another example of collective-farm fiction is Semen Babaevskii's *Light over the Land,* Part II (1950; Stalin Prize), in which the author continues the fortunes of his incredible hero, Sergei Tutarinov.[9] Sergei no longer needs the wise guidance of that helpful animal of a party secretary, Kondriat'ev, the *deus ex machina* of the preceding part of the novel. He himself has been made chairman of the executive committee of the district soviet, and, having already introduced electricity into the collective-farm villages in this region of the Kuban after the war (a surprisingly late "innovation," it would seem!), he continues his gallant efforts, despite the familiar opposition of backward elements, to build a new life, new human relations, and a new morality among the old-fashioned peasantry in the Kuban. Though the reviews in the publications of the Union of Soviet Writers acclaimed the several parts of this novel when they first appeared, the Soviet life portrayed in them, and especially the characterization of the hero, were later to come in for some harsh second thoughts on the part of the critics.

Lutonin, the hero of Aleksei Kozhevnikov's *Life-giving Water* (1950; Stalin Prize),[10] after demobilization is assigned by the party to a remote district in Khakassia. There he is given the choice of managing one of several farms. As a good Communist, he selects the worst one, a stud farm, and soon works out a striking plan for improvement which involves irrigation and afforestation. For his pains he is fired by the head of the Regional Stud Farm Trust, who represents the opponents of innovation. In desperation Lutonin goes to work as a common laborer on the farm and wins over his fellow workers and the new manager to his plan. When a crisis develops in the building of a dam for the irrigation, both the district and regional party committees rather belatedly hold a meeting, denounce the backward elements, and support Lutonin's plan. When the plan is put into operation, we are led to believe that miraculous results are achieved and Lutonin becomes famous as one of the men who acted upon the wisdom of the resolution of the Central Committee on agriculture. At best, the novel does not rise above the level of superior newspaper reporting, and its chief interest for the reader is in the unfamiliar details of native life in this remote region. In fact, the large number of novels dealing with little-known corners and peoples of the USSR has been one of the more significant trends in postwar literature.

Another Stalin Prize novel, Vitalii Zakrutkin's *The Floating Stanitsa* (1950),[11] shifts the theme from the collective-farm village to a village of collective fishermen on the Don, but the characters are poured from the same mold and the propaganda purpose is the same. The positive hero, Vasilii Zubov, an inspector of fisheries, struggles to win over the collective to scientific ideas in fish breeding. A few old-fashioned members oppose him but, largely with the help of young, forward-looking Komsomols, he wins another victory for socialism in the end.

Portrayals of industrial life

The pattern is somewhat varied in *Home* (1950; Stalin Prize), the last novel of a trilogy[12] devoted to a study of factory workers, by the older and distinguished novelist, Anna Karavaeva. In the first two novels she had told the story of an industrial plant in South Russia evacuated during the war and joined with a plant in the Urals. In *Home* she continues the history of the plant by telling of its return to the original site and the rebuilding of the destroyed factory in the war-ravaged region in 1943 against almost insuperable obstacles, which a group of devoted workers surmount in their efforts to turn out badly needed collective-farm machinery by the end of the war. The picture is varied and the details of life in the Soviet rear during the war are often interesting, but the leading characters, and especially the heroine, Sonia Chelshcheva, turn out to be the usual Soviet supermen and superwomen.

Within this period perhaps the most widely acclaimed and officially acceptable novel dealing with the working class was Vsevolod Kochetov's[13] *The Zhurbins* (1952). The obvious purpose of the novelist is to reveal the new way of life of the Soviet proletariat by concentrating on the depiction of a single family of workers—the Zhurbins—in the shipbuilding industry. Yet the everyday life of this family, its private loves and public activities, is inevitably subordinated to the prescribed formula of success in fiction. In this case the shipbuilding collective is ordered to change over from its customary task of constructing small boats to building

[8] After working as a schoolteacher in Western Siberia, Nikolaeva took to writing poetry which received some attention during the war. But her first real literary success was *The Harvest.*

[9] Babaevskii had introduced Tutarinov in his first successful novel, *Cavalier of the Gold Star* (1947; Stalin Prize), and had followed up the characterization in the sequel, *Light over the Land,* Part I (1949).

[10] Kozhevnikov began to write in 1924 and produced his first novel, *Golden Host,* in 1927. Other works followed, and in 1939 he began a series on the builders of socialist Siberia with *Brother of the Ocean. Life-giving Water* is a second volume in this series.

[11] Zakrutkin, like so many of the postwar novelists, began as a newspaper correspondent, serving in this capacity during the war. His first novel, *By the Sea of Azov,* was followed by *The Floating Stanitsa,* which won him popular acclaim.

[12] Karavaeva began writing in the 1920's. She spent seven years on her trilogy. The first novel, *Lights* (1943), was followed by *Getting Under Way* (1948).

[13] Kochetov drew upon his own experience for this novel, for he has worked in shipyards. He began writing as a journalist; published his first story, *On the Neva Plains,* in 1946; and won a wide audience in 1951 with his novel, *Under the Skies of the Motherland.*

ocean liners. The shipyard is in a turmoil; many workers will have to acquire new skills, and the oldtimers among them tend to oppose these demands. But the older members of the Zhurbin family set an example by readily going to school to learn the new techniques, and thus the crisis is overcome. The reality of this unusual family is hardly enhanced by the romantic love of its members for sheer labor.

Of the other novels concentrating on the industrial theme over these years, mention ought to be made of Boris Gorbatov's [14] *The Donets Basin* (1951) and Vera Ketlinskaia's [15] *Days of Our Life* (1952). The first deals with the introduction of new machinery and work competition in a colliery, and the second with efforts to mechanize certain operations in the manufacture of turbines in a Leningrad plant. Both novels include the familiar negative characters opposing the new, the beneficent influence of the collective on worker morale, and the glorification of labor. Like the collective-farm novels in the matter of the science of agronomy, these industrial novels unhesitatingly sacrifice human-interest elements to a staggering accumulation of boring details on work techniques and the manufacture and uses of machinery.

University and student life

Though the collective farm and industry claimed the attention of most novelists over these years, other themes were treated in fiction. But no matter what the theme, the depiction of stereotyped negative and positive characters, the struggle between the old and the new, and the pervasive emphasis upon *partiinost'* as the essential guiding influence in all life's activities and emotions persist as monotonous, wearying features. Thus the treatment of teacher and student life in higher institutions of learning, which had begun a few years before (for example, Vladimir Dobrovol'skii's *Three in Greatcoats* [1948] and Grigorii Konovalov's *The University* [1949]), was continued in the period under discussion. Yet these treatments in turn are carefully designed to illustrate the cogency of Zhdanov's remarks at a conference of philosophers, in which he fulminated against the "objectivism" of some Soviet scholars and scientists and their kowtowing to the West.[16] For example, Dobrovol'skii's novel, *Zhenia Maslova* (1950), exposes Professor Bakeev, who favors the discoveries of bourgeois scientists and "unintentionally" remains silent on the priority of Russian and Soviet scientific workers. Bakeev is reformed by the example of the collective of the students and professors. But the antisocial, negative character of Professor Yakhontov curiously remains unreconstructed in the end, and he is fired. He opposes the thesis subject of the heroine, Zhenia, because Western experiments had already revealed its futility; he insists on objectivity in the sphere of science and plainly indicates his dislike of party interference in it. "The theory of dialectical materialism," he declares, "cannot take the place of my gnosiological views." [17]

Though an antisocial professor, who has no interest in Soviet literature, is also exposed in Yurii Trifonov's widely popular first novel, *Students* (1950; Stalin Prize), the essential story is that of student life in a Moscow pedagogical institute. But interest is centered on how the good example and efforts of the hero, Vadim Belov, and of the student collective, guided by party principles and actions, finally reform the negative character, Sergei Palavin, who is antisocial, self-centered, and morally deficient. In this case, however, the "pot of message" does not swamp an otherwise fresh and interesting account of Moscow student life or prevent the creation of two or three ordinary and hence believable characters.

Historical themes

Though the official demand after 1946 had been to eschew war literature in favor of themes dealing with the reconstruction of the country, and though Zhdanov himself had declared against a "one-sided interest in historical subjects," [18] fiction in both these fields continued to appear after 1950, but with diminishing emphasis. Novels depicting the past of Russia figured prominently in the Stalin Prize awards of 1951: Stepan Zlobin's *Stepan Razin* treats the social core of the famous seventeenth-century uprising of Cossacks and peasants against the boyars; Lev Nikulin's *Russia's Loyal Sons* is a historical novel on the defeat of the French invaders in 1813–14; Nikolai Zadnovo's *Towards the Ocean* (the concluding novel of a trilogy) is concerned with Russian expansion and settlement in Siberia in the nineteenth century; and Georgii Markov's *The Strogovs* also concerns Siberia—the history of a village there, as seen through the lives of three generations of a single family. Another novel that has a "historical" aspect is Nikolai Nikitin's *Northern Aurora* (1950), one of the many contributions to the post-1946 Soviet anti-Western and anti-American literature—it is the story of the struggle of Communist-directed peasants and workers against British, French, and American interventionists in Northern Russia in 1918–20.

War novels

Of the fiction dealing with war, mention should be made of the continuation of Mikhail Bubennov's *The White Birch* (1952)—the first volume, a Stalin Prize winner, had appeared in 1947—which takes the story to the latter part of 1941, when the Soviet forces repelled the Nazis before Moscow; and of Konstantin Simonov's *Comrades in Arms* (1952) which relates the struggle of Soviet forces against the Japanese in Mongolia in the undeclared war of 1939. Il'ia Ehrenburg's *The Ninth Wave* (1952) is a sequel to his widely heralded war novel, *The Storm* (1947). Some of the leading characters of *The Storm* (Mado Lancier, Professor Dumas) reappear in the new novel, but they are now engaged in the contemporary struggle between the forces of peace and those of war, the latter symbolized by a nefarious American agent, Colonel Roberts. Vasilii Grossman's war novel, *For the Just Cause* (1952), on the siege of Stalingrad, aroused bitter critical denunciation in meetings of the Union of Soviet Writers because the author had strayed from the ideals of *partiinost'*. "He distorted life," declared Alexander Fadeev, "by making this largely philistine family (the Shaposhnikovs) the center of the novel." [19] And certain other characters were condemned because they possessed an idealist philosophy, a trait which the critics were prompt to attribute to the hapless author.

[14] Gorbatov's war novel, *The Unvanquished* (1944), brought him much fame. *The Donets Basin,* the story of which begins in the 1930's, is only the first part of a novel which Gorbatov intended to bring up to date in a second volume. He died in January 1954, leaving behind him only a section of the continuation of his novel.

[15] *Courage* (1938) and *The Siege* (1947) were two earlier novels of Vera Ketlinskaia which were favorably noticed by the critics.

[16] Cf. A. A. Zhdanov, "Doklad: konferentsii filosofov," *Voprosy filosofii,* 1947, No. 1, p. 262.

[17] Vladimir Dobrovol'skii, "Zhenia Maslova," *Novyi mir,* 1950, No. 1, p. 140.

[18] Zhdanov, *op. cit.* (note 7 *supra*), p. 32.

[19] *Literaturnaia gazeta,* March 28, 1953, p. 3.

Leonid Leonov

The baleful effects of the rigid postwar party control of literature began to reach their peak in 1953–54. Apparently so pronounced was the discouragement among authors that they repeatedly failed to appear at the meetings of the several commissions of the Union of Soviet Writers to discuss works in progress or published works.[20] Only about three novels in 1953 and one in 1954 won a wide reading public and both the plaudits and the brickbats of the critics. The outstanding performance certainly was Leonid Leonov's *Russian Forest* (1953), the first novel in a number of years of this outstanding Soviet writer. The plot is intricate and the time sequence complicated by flashbacks, but the central story is that of the unusual career of Professor Vikhrov, an expert on forestry, whose advanced theories of forest preservation, as well as a stubborn nature, have resulted in the estrangement of his wife and daughter and the enmity of scientific colleagues, which is furthered by a mysterious Professor Gratsianskii, a subversive figure in Vikhrov's past. The experience of the war, however, tempers and strengthens the characters of the good people, bringing Vikhrov and his wife and daughter together, and exposes the wickedness of the evil elements. There is a psychological density in the development of the main characters and a brilliance of language rarely found in Soviet novelists. But, more so than in any of his previous novels, the *Russian Forest* reveals Leonov in full sympathy with the ideological line of the party, which no doubt accounts for the unusually sympathetic reaction of the official critics.

[20] Cf. Stepan Zlobin, "O rabote tvorcheskikh sektsii," *Literaturnaia gazeta,* November 12, 1953, p. 3.

Official disapproval of Panferov and Panova

The official reception of the other three novels was negative, and in two cases rather violently so. *Mother Volga* (1953) by Fedor Panferov, author of the celebrated early collective-farm novel *Bruski,* narrates the confusing events that take place in a Volga farming district from the autumn of 1951 to the spring of 1952. It is a sprawling, inept novel with many characters and events, but the main intention seems to be one familiar in this period—to show how Communist ingenuity, fortitude, and discipline overcome the hostile forces of nature in agriculture. Unfortunately for Panferov, however, a good deal of the narrative centers in the activities of the district party committee, and as his picture of important Communists in action, especially of the hero, Akim Morev, shows them as something less than a hundred per cent perfect, the ire of official critics was aroused.

When it first appeared, Vera Panova's[21] novel *Seasons of the Year* was enthusiastically received. In picturing the life of an industrial town, the work seemed almost to be a deliberate attempt to avoid the postwar stereotypes of the "industrial novel" and to portray everyday typical family life with its joys and sorrow, its successes and failures. The story is concentrated on two families—the Kuprianovs and the Bortasheviches—which are intended by the author to illustrate a commonplace social contradiction. Although Dorofeia Kuprianova, who has come up the hard way and is a highly respected Soviet citizen, lavishes care and affection on her son, Gennadii, he turns into an evil, worthless person; on the other hand, the children of Stepan Bortashevich, a crook and an "enemy of the people," are models of socialist rectitude. On the whole, it is an interesting, well-told story, with a minimum of the embellishment of Soviet life so common in postwar fiction. After the initial and perhaps incautious favorable reception, however, the literary politicians, no doubt upon a command from above, swarmed all over the novel, roundly denouncing it as an atypical picture of Soviet life and people, lacking in the high seriousness and ideological direction of *partiinost'*. Obviously, Panova had not taken seriously enough Malenkov's assertion in his report to the Nineteenth Party Congress, in October 1952, that the typical character in literature can never be divorced from politics, that is to say, from *partiinost'*.

[21] Vera Panova's star rose in the postwar period as the author of three successive Stalin Prize novels—*Companions* (1946); *Kruzhilikha* (1947); *Bright Shore* (1949).

In Ehrenburg's short novel, *The Thaw* (1954), there can be no doubt of his deliberate intention to oppose the party formula in fiction and at the same time to criticize the controls which had obstructed the artist since the war, perhaps more than in any other period of Soviet literary development with the possible exception of the period of the first Five Year Plan (1929–32). *The Thaw* is a series of sketches of ordinary people who live in a Volga town. There is no plot in the real sense of the word, but a certain unity is achieved through the interrelations, often rather casual, of these people. Here are no positive heroes or heroines in the Soviet sense, no romantically conceived and fulfilled feats of labor, and no all-wise party secretary. In fact, the party seems to be a passive symbol rather than an active force in the lives of these people. It is perhaps indicative that the only ideal Communist is the old retired teacher, Pukhov, who, his son remarks, "grew up in another age—a revolutionary romantic."[22] The rest are not very happy, and their dissatisfaction seems somehow connected with the realities of Soviet life today. The arts and artists in the Soviet Union are harshly criticized for their conformity to stereotyped patterns of performance. The exception is the talented but starving painter Saburov, whose nonconformist and highly imaginative canvases are scorned by the critics. His model is Raphael, but the commercially successful painter Volodia Pukhov cynically declares: "Now they would not accept Raphael in the Union of Artists."[23] Most of these characters resemble, however faintly, the lonely individualists of contemporary Western fiction, that is, men and women alienated from Soviet society. And in the frustrated artist Volodia Pukhov there is much of Ehrenburg himself, perhaps nostalgically longing for those wonderful days of 1921 when, in his brilliant *Julio Jurenito,* he could have a character freely question the very possibility of art serving propaganda without murdering the creative spirit. Though the title of the novel has its point in the action of the story, it may well have been intended symbolically in 1954: the hoped-for "thaw," after Stalin's death, of the party icecap that had congealed the free spirit and imagination of the creative artist. And there seemed some point in the symbolism, for the fierce criticism of the novel, led by official denunciations in *Komsomol'skaia pravda* and *Literaturnaia gazeta,* was not unmixed with a few begrudging admissions of the reality of the Soviet life that Ehrenburg described.

[22] Il'ia Ehrenburg, "Ottepel'," *Znamia,* 1954, No. 5, p. 31.

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 28.

SHORT STORIES AND NOVELLE

Over this period the short story and the novella, in which Russian authors

specialize, have flourished and nearly all the novelists mentioned above, as well as many others, have contributed to these genres. In 1951, a three-volume collection of short stories appeared which contains some of the best recent examples of this form. And occasionally an author will bring out a volume of his short stories, such as *Our Contemporaries* (1952) by the well-known writer Boris Polevoi,[24] all the tales of which, in the characteristic vein of this author, are based on heroic incidents in the lives of people he met on the Volga-Don canal construction. In general, these numerous short stories and novelle do not diverge from the thematic and ideological scheme which we have observed in the novel.

Two writers, however, deserve some mention not only for their exceptional talent but also because of their relative independence in revealing the realities of one slice of Soviet life. Both Sergei Antonov and Valentin Ovechkin have concentrated on collective-farm characters and incidents. Antonov's collection *Lorries on the Road* (1950; Stalin Prize) and especially his *Poddubki Rhymer* (1951) contain stories that strike a lyrical note, almost Chekhovian in its frequent understatement. Ovechkin is an older and more practised writer than Antonov, but he did not achieve prominence until his series of stories, especially *The Daily Round*, which he wrote between 1952 and 1953, for they seemed to be a response to Khrushchev's startling revelation of the hardships, inequities, and skulduggery on the collective farms, mentioned in the report to the Central Committee in September 1953. In uncompromising language Ovechkin lifts the veil on some of these abuses, striking contrasts to the idealized pictures of collective-farm life by many of the postwar novelists. Needless to say, however, Ovechkin does not attempt to get at the root cause of the abuses he describes in his sketches and stories.

[24] Polevoi is the celebrated author of the Stalin Prize war novel, *The Story of a Real Man* (1946). Previous to this he had published the novel *Hot Shop* (1939). Another volume of short stories, *We Are the Soviet People* (1948), also won a Stalin Prize.

POETRY

With some few exceptions, the output of poetry since 1950 reveals more starkly than fictional prose the blight of the creative imagination under the severe postwar controls. Much verse has been published, both lyric and narrative, but themes and treatment are dominated by the topicality of postwar "social commands" and the directed "inspiration" of *partiinost'*. Thus Semen Kirsanov's narrative poem, *Makar Mazai* (1950; Stalin Prize), elevates labor to hero worship in telling the life story of the famed Stakhanovite steelworker Mazai, who was killed by the Nazis. Similarly, the hero of V. Zamiatin's long poem, *Green Shelter Belt* (1951; Stalin Prize), encourages the people of his community to erect shelter belts to protect the orchards and fields from the fierce wind, whereas Vera Inber dedicates her *New Poems* (1951) to the collective farmers and irrigation workers of Uzbekistan who labor to harness the waters of a river. Then there is Stepan Shchipachev's *Pavlik Morozov* (1951; Stalin Prize), the tale of a young Pioneer who perished at the hands of a kulak "bandit." More typical of many hundreds of short poems is Alexander Yashin's collection, *The Soviet Man*, in which most of the poems are concerned with the feats of workers on the construction site of the Kuibyshev hydroelectric power plant. By way of variation, scores and scores of lyrics and short poems have as their subject "peace"—the determination of the Soviet leadership to achieve it and of the "imperialistic warmongers" to destroy it. Aleksei Surkov has a whole volume on this general theme, *Peace for the World* (1950; Stalin Prize), and the fine poet Nikolai Tikhonov has also put out a cycle of poems, entitled *At the Second World Peace Congress* (1951). Perhaps superior to any of these in poetic integrity and emotional intensity is Ol'ga Berggol'ts' collection, *On Stalingrad Soil* (1952); many of these poems are filled with memories of the heroic siege. And Alexander Tvardovskii's *Space Beyond Space* (1953–54) reveals his superior poetic talents in many poems inspired by his observations of life on a journey to the Soviet east. But in one of the early poems of this cycle Tvardovskii shows his courage by making a less than veiled attack on literary regimentation.

Mention ought to be made of other well-known poets, such as Margarita Aliger, Alexander Prokof'ev, Evgenii Dolmatovskii, Mikhail Isakovskii, and Nikolai Gribachev, all of whom have published verse over this period, but the themes vary little from those mentioned above. No doubt this stifling conformity was behind a rather cautious discussion in the literary press during 1953–54 on the broad problem of the poet's right to self-expression. The position of the party critics was to dismiss the whole controversy as a terminological difficulty, but it was also made clear that the proponents of self-expression too often identified it with the philosophy of subjective idealism, and there the argument ended. Nevertheless, in a two-day meeting (January 5–6, 1954) of the presidium of the Union of Soviet Writers devoted to poetry, it was frankly asserted that the readers' interest in poetry was waning, that the poems sounded all alike, that the themes were dull and unoriginal, and that the language was depersonalized. Yet as remedies, these pundits demanded more civic poetry and complained that the theme of labor had not found its proper place in Soviet lyrics![25]

LITERARY CRITICISM

In criticism we find a public confession of the failure of postwar literature, as well as a reflection of the curious manipulations of the party and of its agent the Union of Soviet Writers in their efforts to improve literary affairs at a time of internal struggle among the leaders of the party. One of the immediate aims of Zhdanovism in literature—in which no doubt Stalin had fully concurred—was to compel artistic as well as intellectual subservience to the dictates of the party. Propaganda, controls, and fear were the instruments. The various postwar decrees of the Central Committee on the arts and on fields of learning, the anticosmopolitan campaign, and the public denunciations of artists and scholars, and even their removal from their posts, were methods used to achieve this end, perhaps justified by the party because of the postwar internal condition of the country and the dangerous international situation.

We have already observed the state into which literature quickly fell in this atmosphere of controls and fear. The party and the union tackled the problem by inspiring critical articles, especially in *Pravda* and *Literaturnaia gazeta*. The authors were blamed for sundry faults—not adhering to the truth of life, embellishing Soviet reality, relying on schematic plots, and creating wooden positive and negative stereotypes for characters. Of course the only thing that was not criticized was the real cause of the debacle—the party's postwar line in literature and the rigid controls that enforced it.

Fear at first prevented the writers

[25] Cf. *Literaturnaia gazeta*, January 12, 1954, p. 3.

from attempting any answers to these charges. Even the famous authors, whose lofty position enabled them to exhibit more courage in these matters, preferred to keep silent. After Zhdanov's death (1948), however, one observes some willingness on the part of writers to indulge in a certain degree of realistic criticism. It may be conjectured with some plausibility that they found a cautious friend in high party circles in Malenkov, who appears to have had no reason to admire the author of Zhdanovism in literature. For example, the party now urged forthright criticism. An editorial in *Literaturnaia gazeta* [26] declared: "Readers in the past found critical articles in newspapers and magazines by L. Leonov, F. Panferov, K. Fedin, and other well-known writers. Why do they not publish critical articles now?"

New critical boldness, 1950–52

Under this stimulation many highly critical articles did appear. Significantly, the main objects of attack (perhaps at a hint from party officials) were the editors of magazines and publishing firms and the equally repressive censorship tactics of the Committee on Art, which had drama under its control. (These agents, of course, were merely carrying out the orders of the party, and if they exercised their functions with excessive severity, it was through fear of committing ideological errors of their own.) Over the remainder of the summer of 1950 through the early months of 1952 many candid articles appeared, often by well-known writers and critics—especially in *Literaturnaia gazeta,* which complained of the low point reached by Soviet literature and for the most part tended to place the blame on the editorial branch of publications. Playwriting in particular was attacked, perhaps because the nearly empty theaters publicly dramatized the failure of numerous ideologically perfect plays written according to a theory of "nonconflict," which arose no doubt as much out of a sense of fear as from the conviction that a classless socialist society created no basic human conflicts. This line of criticism reached its height in an unusually bold article, "Let Us Speak Frankly," by the successful playwright Nikolai Virta, in March 1952. He excoriated the Committee on Art for compelling dramatists to rewrite their plays in order to conform to a dull, official formula which the Committee believed would escape party condemnation. Those who pass on the publication and production of plays, wrote Virta, were guided "by a wild, rabbit fear of taking any risk or responsibility for risk." Drama would get ahead, he declared, only "if the creative energies of writers are freed from the fetters forged in bureaucratic nooks and crannies by indifferent officials who preach the idea of conflictless, speak-softly, speak-gently, be-pious writing." [27]

Critical revolt after Stalin's death

After Stalin's death in March 1953 this mounting criticism was very noticeably accelerated and struck a new and significant note in demanding that literature be humanized; that love and family life and not the need of crop rotation or the technical problems of introducing the Bessemer steel process should become the themes of novels, plays, and poems; in short, that real Soviet life and real men and women, and not an imaginary society peopled with supermen, should become the concern of literary artists. In October 1953 an outstanding article by Ehrenburg considered with remarkable frankness the causes of the postwar decline of Soviet literature. After developing at

[26] August 17, 1950.

[27] Nikolai Virta, *Sovetskoe iskusstvo,* March 29, 1952.

length the obvious point that it is the business of experts in industry and agronomy to write about manufacturing and agriculture, whereas the novelist's task is to portray the living life of the people who work in factories and on collective farms, he fearlessly declares:

> The writer is not an apparatus that mechanically registers events. . . . A writer writes a book because it is necessary for him to say something of his own to people.

Then, admitting that the writer in a socialist society is sometimes called upon to fulfill a social command, he counters:

> However, the word "social" has run away with certain editors and critics; it has become a business. But the word "command" is hardly suitable in the work of a writer. In prerevolutionary times, writers did not find it easy to live, and in Chekhov's letters one may observe indications of how an editor of a newspaper ordered a short story from him. Yet even the most unthinking editor never attempted to suggest to Chekhov the theme of a story. Can one imagine commanding Tolstoy to do *Anna Karenina* or commanding Gor'kii to do *Mother?* Is it possible that there exists a writer so impersonal and so indifferent to everything that one must tell him what to write about? [28]

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To be sure, Ehrenburg does not challenge the ultimate authority of the party in things literary, nor did Vladimir Pomerantsev, who published another extraordinarily revealing article two months later, "On Sincerity in Literature," but both critics were by implication striking at party controls and the havoc they caused to the creative imagination of the literary artist. By insisting that the real artistic test of a work of literature was its sincerity, Pomerantsev was, in effect, questioning the prescribed tests of ideological purity and *partiinost'* and thus, by implication, condemning the whole corpus of postwar literature which had subscribed to these tests. Finally, after a lengthy exposé of the artistic insincerity that writers are forced into because they believe their creative activity to be under constant surveillance, Pomerantsev concludes by counseling the author: "Don't think about prosecution. Don't feel compelled to set down your conclusions, but don't let yourself write a single line that you do not feel. Be independent." [29]

Many similar articles, though perhaps not always so forthright, appeared over the winter of 1953 and much of 1954, including two by the famous composers, Khachaturian [30] and Shostakovich,[31] in which they forcefully asserted the artist's right to "independence, boldness, and originality," and a whole series of very critical articles in the important periodical, *Novyi mir,*[32] which condemned a number of postwar novels often for the very reasons for which they had previously been praised by the official critics. And no doubt some of the literary works deviating from the stultified postwar pattern, such as Panova's *Seasons of the Year* and Ehrenburg's *The Thaw,* reflect the new spirit of creative freedom which was espoused over this whole period after Stalin's death, for the connection between these numerous and outspoken demands for a change in literature with the so-called "soft" policy associated with Malenkov's rise to power after Stalin's death seems reasonably certain.

[28] Il'ia Ehrenburg, "O rabote pisatelia," *Znamia,* October 1953, pp. 165–66.

[29] V. Pomerantsev, "Ob iskrennosti v literature," *Novyi mir,* December 1953, p. 228.

[30] See A. Khachaturian, "O tvorcheskoi smelosti i vdokhnovenii," *Sovetskaia Muzyka,* 1953, No. 11, pp. 7–13.

[31] See D. Shostakovich, "Radost' tvorcheskikh iskanii," *Sovetskaia Muzyka,* 1954, No. 1, pp. 40–42.

[32] Cf. M. Lifshits, "Dnevnik Marietty Shaginian," *Novyi mir,* 1954, No. 2, pp. 206–31; F. Abramov, "Liudi kolkhoznoi derevni v poslevoennoi proze," *ibid.,* No. 4, pp. 210–31; M. Shcheglov, "*Russkii les* Leonida Leonova," *ibid.,* No. 5, pp. 220–41.

Reprimands and recantations

On the other hand, it is tempting to use the determination of the party to quell this promising "revolt" in literature as evidence of the dating of the beginning of a change in the power position of Malenkov. Chronological certainty is difficult to ascertain, for throughout all this "soft" period the critical views and literary works of the dissenters, and especially of Pomerantsev, continued to be attacked in *Pravda* and in the organs of the Union of Soviet Writers, an ambiguous situation that may well have reflected Malenkov's own uncertain position at the time and in turn a struggle between his adherents and opponents in the party leadership of the union.

However this may be, a meeting of the presidium of the Union of Soviet Writers on August 11, 1954, brought to an end the widespread demand in the press for sincerity and freedom in literary creation. Nearly all the authors active in the movement were reprimanded, and members of the editorial board of the offending *Novyi mir* recanted. Resolutions were passed ordering the dismissal of the distinguished poet, Tvardovskii, managing editor of *Novyi mir,* and the appointment of the prominent literary politician, Simonov, in his place, and in general the secretariat was ordered to clean house in the magazines controlled by the union.[33] If Malenkov's policy had served as a protection of the movement up to this point, which seems likely, it ceased to do so thereafter.

SECOND ALL-UNION CONGRESS OF SOVIET WRITERS

Meanwhile, the Second All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers—the first such gathering in twenty years had been announced for September 1954. Literally hundreds of articles and editorials appeared in the periodical press, often criticizing the recent dissenters, but all obviously striving to create an atmosphere of sweet reasonableness and "unanimity" of views and voting, in preparation for this important meeting. Perhaps the fact that the Congress had to be postponed several times and did not actually convene until December 15 is some indication of the difficulties encountered in whipping the dissenters back into line. Yet this effort was not entirely successful.

The formal reports (the introductory report by Surkov, Simonov on prose, Vurgun on poetry, Korneichuk on drama) at the Congress, which lasted ten days and was attended by 738 official delegates, persistently reaffirmed all the postwar party-line clichés on what Soviet literature should be. And the directives of the Central Committee of the party to the Congress, scores of speeches from the delegates, and the final statement of the Congress to the Central Committee of the party all gave little hope that the future course of Soviet literature would change radically from that which had been announced by Zhdanov in 1946.

Actually, however, the extensive protest against this course, which seemed to have been effectively silenced before the Congress, resounded again in sharp and often significant statements by some of the leading writers among the delegates. In the speeches of Ehrenburg, Sholokhov, Ovechkin, Yashin, Berggol'ts, Kaverin, and Antonov,[34] one may observe all over again the same discontent with the course of Soviet literature which had been voiced so boldly after Stalin's death. No one of these writers questioned the final authority of the party in literature. In this respect each of them would probably take his stand, with how much sincerity cannot be determined, with Sholokhov's declaration: "Evil-intentioned enemies abroad say of us Soviet authors that we write according to the dictates of the party. The matter stands somewhat differently: each of us writes according to the dictates of his heart, but our hearts belong to the party. . . ." [35] Their main criticism is directed against by-products of party controls—against the bossism, cliquishness, and literary politics of the leadership of the Union of Soviet Writers, and the vast power it has to make or break authors and to form and control literary taste. They demand that the union be democratically run by its members, that it respect the individuality of the creative artist and cease trying to foist themes upon him. "I repeat," said Ol'ga Berggol'ts at the Congress, "the time has come to have as careful an attitude as possible towards the individuality and identity of the poets, towards what the poet himself wants to say 'about the times and about himself.'" [36] Though a spirit of faithfulness to the ideology of the party breathes throughout all these statements, a kind of anguished plea is made for the right of the artist to express himself as he sees fit in these matters. Or, as Ol'ga Berggol'ts put it in her speech:

> . . . from time to time we ourselves seem to betray art, to depart from its great laws. And art ceases to be a part of life the moment it stops being art. With a kind of timidity inspired by the yelps of the critics, we still do not appraise our work and the state of literature by the criterion of artistry, yet without artistry neither ideological content nor *partiinost'* exists in art.[37]

NEW DEAL IN LITERATURE?

Available literary production and criticism in 1955 so far offers no basis for deciding definitely that this spirit of dissent continues. Two recent unconnected reports, however, may be regarded as harbingers of a change. In the past the Soviet leadership has been unrelenting in its condemnation of Dostoevsky as a writer whose views were utterly inimical to communism. Now a national celebration is being planned to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of his death, February 9, 1957, and his collected works will be published.[38] It has also been announced that a two-volume edition, the first since 1926, of the works of Sergei Yesenin, the talented but banned "hooligan" poet of the early revolutionary years, will soon appear.[39] These items are mere straws in the wind, but they may indicate that it is blowing in the direction of a "new deal" in literature, in keeping with the momentous changes which are only beginning to make themselves apparent in post-Stalin society in the Soviet Union.

[33] Cf. "Za vysokuiu ideinost' nashei literatury," *Literaturnaia gazeta,* August 17, 1954, p. 3.

[34] For these and other speeches at the Congress, see the various issues of *Literaturnaia gazeta,* December 16–27, 1954.

[35] "Rech' M. Sholokhova," *Literaturnaia gazeta,* December 26, 1954, p. 2.

[36] "Rech' O. Berggol'ts," *ibid.,* December 24, 1954, p. 2.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] "Dostoyevski Back in Soviet Favor," *Herald Tribune* (New York), June 20, 1955.

[39] "Literaturnoe nasledstvo S. Yesenina," *Trud,* March 17, 1955, p. 3.

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Soviet Art and Architecture: Recent Developments

By Arthur Voyce

A STUDY of the post-Stalin aesthetic trends does not reveal any deviation from the Marxist philosophy of art. The doctrine of "socialist realism" in painting and sculpture remains valid, and any suggestion of the modern abstract tendency is still avoided. In architecture, there is evidence of a new approach to style, but "modernism"—as based on Constructivism, New Functionalism, or any other manifestation of the Western "Technocratic" movement—is still considered foreign to the Russian aesthetic ideal.

On the practical side, a survey of building activities discloses several significant facts: (1) the enormous amount of work which has been done and is being done; (2) the vast scale and boldness of the work; (3) the care being bestowed on the restoration and preservation of historical monuments; and (4) the launching of a huge program of standardization, prefabrication, and mechanization in the building industry, bringing in its wake discernible signs of a new aesthetic.

Soviet Architecture: Revolutionary and Conservative

Contemplating the recent quantitative achievements in the field of construction and reconstruction, one realizes that such a program could only have been conceived and sustained on the basis of a constantly expanding building industry, requiring vast investments in mass-producing plant and equipment. Indeed, from the facts and figures, published in the Soviet architectural press and supported by foreign eyewitnesses,[1] it is evident that in this field the Soviet Union is very far advanced.

The Western architect, schooled in the aesthetics of the modern movement, finds it difficult to understand the double image of Soviet Russia—revolutionary and conservative at once; he cannot reconcile the apparent contradictions in her architecture. On the one hand there is the ultramodern, highly mechanized building technique; on the other, the antiquated mode of expression pervading almost every type of building and evidenced in many forms, from the most imaginative reproductions of post-Palladianism to naïve, if sometimes poetic, recreations of the seventeenth-century Russian national style. He is puzzled by the seeming absence of any experimentation with advanced art forms.

However, there is plentiful evidence that the experimental approach did exist in the past, and the present indications are that there is a growing demand for a re-examination of creative attitudes. A great deal of discussion of principles and deep questioning has been going on in architectural circles. The authority of established reputations has been challenged; a number of "cliques" have had to disband, and there have been important changes in leadership.[2]

[1] The reports of British architects' delegation to Russia, *Anglo-Soviet Journal*, Winter 1953–54 and Autumn 1954; *New York Times*, April 3, 1955; reports of various recent visitors to Russia.

[2] The recent shakeup in the presidium of the Academy of Architecture and in various architectural offices was foreshadowed by a flood of critical editorials and articles in the Russian architectural periodicals. See for example, "Protiv formalizma v arkhitekturnoi praktike i nauke," *Arkhitektura SSSR* (cited hereafter as *Arkh. SSSR*), October 1954, pp. 37–40; editorial in *Arkhitektura i Stroitel'stvo Moskvy* (cited hereafter as *A. S. Moskvy*), December 1954, pp. 1–3. For the new presidium members, see notice of elections to the presidium of the Academy of Architecture, *ibid.*, June 1955, p. 30.

To appreciate the situation, and understand the Russian assessment of ideological values in architecture, it is necessary to go back a little in time and review the major aesthetic theories that have been instrumental in molding the character of recent Soviet architecture.

Search for New Architectural Ideals

The innovators of the years immediately following the Revolution were very seldom practicing architects, but rather painters, sculptors, and artists in the cinema and theater who tried to advance some particular "ism." Prominent were Malevich, the proponent of Suprematism,[3] Tatlin,[4] Lisitsky, Rodchenko, and Altman and Gabo, representatives of Constructivism.

The "left" currents in painting—Cubism, Futurism, and Expressionism—exercised a considerable influence on the architecture of the 1920's. The principles of dynamic distortion in the representation of objects, the dissociation method of composition, and other methods cultivated at that time in the various painters' and sculptors' studios were carried over into the methods of architectural composition for the purpose of enhancing the emotional force of design.

The essential characteristics of the Russian phases of Formalism, Constructivism, and Functionalism—the basic patterns of architectural thought long the subject of heated and acrimonious discussion and still branded as the fatal disease of Western *avant-garde* art to be guarded against—must be considered somewhat at length.

Formalism

Formalism as an aesthetic theory is, of course, not a product of the Bolshevist Revolution. Its influence on Russian art dates back to the pre-Revolutionary period. Essentially, the theory is based on the doctrine that the laws governing all art are "objective" and "absolute," that is, independent of social, political, and economic factors. Art, as the Formalist conceives it, is creative of "self-contained, self-sufficing, pure" abstract forms; to him it is the form (how something is expressed) and not the content (what is expressed) of a work of art that influences our reactions.

This "idealistic" interpretation of art philosophy was reinterpreted by the proponents of the movement to fit the Marxist materialistic art thesis. The fundamental mission of architecture, they asserted, is to serve the highest technical needs of man to orientate himself in space; and architecture can best fulfill that mission through the use of expressive forms. It is not enough that "form should follow function" in a merely passive way. On the contrary, form should be made to evoke aesthetic enjoyment; it should be used as a means for training the perceptive faculties of the masses, for arousing their enthusiasm, thus heightening their revolutionary fervor.

The analytical work of this school—its investigation into the study of scale and modulism, its exploration of the potentialities of various forms—intrigued many a mature professional and cast a spell upon many a beginner. But Soviet theorists claim that Formalism de-

[3] For an illustration of Suprematism in architecture, see Suprematicheskii "arkhitekton," a drawing of 1923, by K. S. Malevich, *Arkh. SSSR*, May 1936, No. 5, p. 8.

[4] Tatlin, designer of the "Monument to the Third International," used the spiral as a symbol of revolution. For illustration see Arthur Voyce, *Russian Architecture: Trends in Nationalism and Modernism* (New York, 1948), Pl. LXX.

generated into studies of psychotechnical processes, abstract spatial logic, and exercises in metaphysics. It has been bitterly attacked as "paper" architecture far removed from reality and devoid of the sociological aims of Soviet architecture.[5]

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND FUNCTIONALISM

Constructivism, on its theoretical side, was a reflex from the Cubist, Futurist, and post-Expressionist vogue in Russia, Italy, France, and Germany; practically, its emergence during the militant period of communism, as a program for an organized group, was the result of an insurrection within the ranks of Russia's archradicals in the arts—the Cubo-Futurists.

Having grown tired of experimenting with the vague revelations and the abstractions of ultramodern "bourgeois" art, the Cubo-Futurists transferred their creative efforts from the field of the studio "easel arts" and abstract aesthetics to the practical field—to the making and "constructions" of real objects and useful things.

They proceeded to throw out of art its idealism, emotionalism, and subjectivism, and to curb and harness the anarchical spirit of Cubo-Futurism. Retaining only the positive constructive values and the freer art forms developed by the movement, they built up an elaborate philosophy and terminology of their own, but at heart they professed a fairly simple creed: a belief in the functional, the utilitarian, and the comprehensible.[6]

Constructivism thus split into two factions, each championing conflicting concepts of architectural aesthetics. One faction claimed that Constructivism was essentially an aesthetic movement, that the material and utilitarian principles underlying the theory were but the physical means for a new emotional expression of a rational approach to art. The other faction, which became known as the Functionalistic Group (the SASS),[7] attempted to build up an aesthetic whose working principles were to be based on the organic and rational functions of the given structure. Architecture as a fine art did not interest them; its power of enticing the masses by forms was belittled. What did attract them was the functional and cultural organization of life in architecture. And so they replaced "content" with "function," "formalistic" methods with "mechanistic," and made fitness and utility the real foundation of design. They busied themselves with the study of European and American techniques and adopted the principles of Functionalism as taught by the West European modernists.

While much of the work in architectural design done under the influence of this school was for the sake of improving the functional organization of specific building types, the main effort was concentrated on communicating some special, if not always appreciated, "message." Architecture became self-conscious about the "functional" look, with the result that much of the construction was of the packing-box or slab variety—drab and monotonous. Moreover, the attractiveness of functional architecture depends greatly on precise details in first-class materials, which Russia of those days could not provide. As a result, after a few months' exposure to weather, the "modern" buildings began to age badly—the stucco disintegrated only too quickly, the colors faded, and the sweeping expanses of glass made the buildings too cold in the winter and too hot in the summer.

[5] For a fuller discussion of Formalism, see L. Rempel and T. Vainer, "O teoreticheskikh korniakh formalizma v arkhitekture," *Arkh. SSSR*, May 1936, pp. 8–13; L. Rudnev, "O formalizme i klassike," *ibid.*, November 1954. For an example of modified Formalism, see Central Red Army Theater by K. S. Alabyan and V. N. Simbirtsev (Voyce, *op. cit.* [note 4 *supra*], Pls. LXXXVI, XCVII–XCIX).

[6] For some interesting examples of Constructivist architectural projects showing the pictorial possibilities of the style, see the drawings of Ia. Chernikhov, *Sovetskaia Arkhitektura* (cited hereafter as *Sov. Arkh.*), 1933, No. 3, pp. 14–16.

[7] For an account of the architectural groups, see Voyce, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), pp. 134–37.

REJECTION OF MODERNISM

The aesthetic uncertainty of early Soviet architecture was perhaps best reflected in the projects submitted in the international competition, and in the closed competitions[8] for the Palace of the Soviets (1931–33). Many of the projects by foreign and native architects were examples of Constructivism and Functionalism. Significantly, and prophetically, those submitted by a number of Russians contained designs in a re-created classic idiom—a synthesis of neoclassical grandeur and twentieth-century form—suggesting new potentialities for the development of Soviet architecture.

The projects were exhibited and discussed with representatives of nonprofessional groups. The popular reaction was overwhelmingly in favor of the classic designs; it became clear that ultramodern Functionalism was "strange fruit" to the people and that the dramatization of the ideals of the new life could be best expressed by an architecture based on native traditions of classical forms.

Experimentation with the modern idiom continued for some time into the 1930's, but it did not meet with any degree of success. Perhaps the chief handicap to further development of modernism was that the fashion of symbolizing the machine as dominating the forms of Soviet architecture was not received with enthusiasm by the men at the summit—those in power to shape the program. Lenin himself had no sympathy for extreme modernism.[9] He and a number of his latter-day disciples apparently sensed that Constructivist architecture caters not to the common man but rather to a coterie of like-minded Constructivists, and that modernism—as appreciated by a few snobs in the rarified atmosphere of pure aesthetics—was incomprehensible to the masses, whose tastes were conditioned by native architecture and by the examples of the Russified Baroque and Empire styles all around them.

REVIVAL OF CLASSICISM AND NATIONALISM

The spirit of classicism was invoked because it was felt to be closer to the indigenous expression of the Russian ideal in architecture and could be considered as a continuation of the national tradition for public buildings. The champions of classicism have been careful to point out that they do not want the set forms of early periods, but rather an appreciative attitude to the spirit and the methods of composition with the help of which the Russian masters of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were able to re-create the classic models in Russian terms.

With the growth of Russian nationalist sentiment in the late 1930's a perceptible shift toward the expression of nationalism in architecture could be noticed. The emphasis on national heritage was intensified in the early 1940's.

[8] For a fuller account of this competition, see Voyce, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), pp. 145–48, 264, 265, Pls. CLXIII–CLXXVI; for the third and fourth stages of this competition, see *Sov. Arkh.*, 1933, Nos. 4, 5.

[9] See Clara Zetkin, "Lenin on Culture," *Reminiscences of Lenin* (New York, 1934), pp. 12, 13; A. V. Lunacharsky, "Lenin and Art," *International Literature*, May 1935, pp. 66–71; *idem*, "Sotsialisticheskii arkhitekturnyi monument," *Stroitel'stvo Moskvy*, May–June 1933, p. 4.

Thus in 1944, the academician A. Mordvinov wrote:

> National forms offer colorful variety. The humanism expressed in classical forms serves to unify the architecture of all the national republics, while yet allowing them to preserve traits peculiarly their own.
>
> In selecting the architectural type for public buildings we must make critical studies both of the monumental styles prevalent in our national republic and of the classical heritage. . . . However, in turning to our national heritage we must try to find and use the more progressive of its forms. . . .[10]

Somewhat later, elaborating on the same theme, one of the leading Russian architects, D. Arkin, wrote:

> The greatest traditions of the past will live on not as historical reminiscences but in an organic new creation on a national soil—national in its fullest reference to the people. . . . The creative task of the modern architect is to give architectural expression to the people's, the locality's, the city's individuality, and not hide this individuality behind a simplified screen of reinforced concrete, glass and metal.[11]

The insistence on preserving and recapturing the native idiom was instrumental in developing a diversity of architectural expression in the Soviet Union.[12] An extensive use of national forms in contemporary architecture was made at the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow (1939–40), where the pavilions of Uzbekistan, Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine were among the most attractive. The originality of form and richness of ornament reflected the architectural traditions as well as the folk arts of those republics. The same interest in derived forms is manifest in the current All-Union Agricultural Exhibition, where the pavilions representing every one of the republics are built in the characteristic native idiom.[13]

There are architects of many tastes and various abilities in Russia, and their work in the classic and national styles has varied accordingly - from the commonplace and pedestrian to the inspired and dynamic. In Moscow, the "classic" expression seems to lean towards orthodoxy; in Leningrad, it has assumed a freer, more modernized look, while in Kiev, Minsk, and other cities of the various republics, it is tinged with local traditions. On the whole, its qualities are those of an architecture in search of forms to express the idea of socialist realism in art—the needs and endeavors of the new society.

Design and City Planning

The enthusiasm for classicism and for national tradition was as intense as the experimentation with modernism which had preceded it. But though the classical trend has continued strong, there are signs that it is departing from the rigid orthodoxy of the late 1930's and the nostalgic romanticism of the 1940's. There has been a definite attempt on the part of the Russian architects to introduce and integrate into their designs some of the features—the neatness and efficiency, the sweep of wall surface, relation of story heights, and other architectural and decorative devices—usually associated with the modern age.

In city planning, as in building, the earlier tendencies deriving from the modern style of city layout have given way to a less rigid mode of design closer to the Russian tradition. This tradition is at its best in the art of the ensemble on a grand scale—integrating building complexes and adjoining open spaces into an architectural whole, blending silhouette and landsape and informing them with emotional appeal. The Russian pattern of city planning today is based on freely designed superblocks, with generous garden courts, lawns, and islands of trees. In great civic centers like those created in Moscow, or memorial schemes like that designed for the river front of Stalingrad, monumentality and dimensions of great magnitude often appear. Whatever one may feel about the stylistic qualities of one or another individual building, one cannot but be impressed by the technical competence and the boldness of scale and monumentality of the compositions.

Construction Activities

Leaving aside the architectural features of the great engineering works, the dams, hydroelectric stations, and canals which are "transforming nature," and confining our attention to civil architecture, we find that in the last few years many apartment houses, schools, theaters, hospitals, office buildings, and sports stadiums have been built throughout the Soviet Union.

According to the party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev:

> During postwar years a total of more than 200,000,000 square meters of housing space[14] has been built in cities and settlements, and in rural areas about 4,500,000 dwellings.
>
> In 1954 the volume of construction work has increased to more than 2.5 times that in 1946. In 1954 alone expenditures on capital construction equal the total expenditures for this purpose during the entire second Five Year Plan. . . .
>
> In 1954 there will be built in the cities more than 30,000,000 square meters of living space, and in rural localities about 400,000 dwellings.[15]

Progress in building is not adequately described by the rise in figures of square meters or expenditure, for a steep qualitative rise has accompanied this advance, demonstrated in better construction and more conveniences and comforts for the occupants.

Reconstruction and Development in Moscow

The development of Moscow beyond its ancient rings has been spectacular. The new regional plan shows the city spreading for tens of miles. Its new districts or sectors are centering mainly about the traces of the old arterial highways that radiate from the center of the city, leaving large spaces for parks and

[10] Mordvinov, "Reconstruction of Towns and Art Problems Confronting Soviet Architecture," *VOKS Bulletin*, 1944, No. 9–10.

[11] Arkin, "Some Thoughts on Reconstruction," *Architectural Review*, May 1947, p. 178.

[12] For illustrations of a number of recent buildings in Azerbaidjan, Georgia, and Armenia, see *Arkh. SSSR*, August 1954, pp. 18–24.

[13] A good example of nationalism in art, expressed in terms of regional folk traditions, was the pavilion of the Uzbek Republic designed in the vernacular of Uzbekistan (see Voyce, *op. cit.*, Pls. CLXXVII–CLXXXIX). For a richly illustrated account of the current Agricultural Exhibition, see V. Stupin, "Ob arkhitekture vsesoiuznoi sel'skokhoziaistvennoi vystavki" *Arkh. SSSR*, September 1954, pp. 1–17; see also Iu. Iaralov, "Natsional'nye cherty v arkhitekture VSKhV," *A. S. Moskvy*, August 1954, pp. 4–11.

[14] One square meter = 10.76 square feet. In this connection it should be noted that the Soviet concept of "housing space" differs from that of "floor area" applied in American housing, as Soviet "housing space" excludes all auxiliary space, such as kitchens, bathrooms, corridors, or landings. For an extensive account of Soviet housing, see Alexander Block, "Soviet Housing," *Soviet Studies* (Oxford), January 1954, pp. 246–77. For statistics of development in housing construction, see article by B. Sokolov, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1954, No. 9, pp. 19–30.

[15] See Khrushchev's speech on "Building and Architecture," *Pravda*, December 28, 1954. For statistics of present and planned construction see editorial in *Izvestiia*, April 8, 1955, p. 1; report of Deputy Iasnov, chairman of the Moscow City Executive Committee, on the plan for the development of Moscow's economy for 1955, delivered at the session of the Moscow City Soviet on April 8, 1955, *Izvestiia*, April 9, 1955, p. 1; and editorial in *A. S. Moskvy*, December 1954, pp. 1–3. See also Timothy Sosnovy, *The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1954.

green belts, as provided by the Moscow Planning Commission.

Blocks of new apartment houses have sprung up both in the center and in the outskirts; the city has been enriched with great squares, wide avenues, and boulevards. The Moskva River was walled in by granite blocks, and the new bridges, the subway, the Moskva-Volga canal, and the great water reservoirs have all been built under this plan.

Eight tall buildings—from twenty to thirty-two stories—were located so that their height and bulk would affect the skyline over a distance of miles.

The construction of these multistoried buildings introduced vital changes in the general contours of the city. Located as they are in different districts, nearly all confined within the Sadovoe Ring, they either form part of the older architectural ensembles or create new ones. Their distribution softens the distinction between the center of the city and its outskirts. Only one of these ensembles—the Lomonosov (Moscow) University, on the summit of the Lenin Hills—is located beyond the old limits of the central part of the city. But while the University complex is the dominating element in the southwestern district, it was conceived as an integral unit in the metropolitan system of multistoried complexes.

The main building, whose central tower reaches a height of thirty-two stories, is flanked to the right and left by two eighteen-story wings containing hostels for students and flats for professors. They form a kind of transition from the high to the low elements of the ensemble. The exterior is finished in fawn-colored ceramics. The colonnade to the main entrance is almost pure classic, while the connecting wings to the right and left of the main building have an English Renaissance flavor. The design of the entrance hall, vestibules, and staircases is reminiscent of the interiors of the imperial palaces with their classical columns, rich marbles, and mosaics, producing an impression of grandeur and opulence.[16]

The principle of tier structure, which is a prominent motif of Russian seventeenth-century architecture, is incorporated in these skyscrapers; their silhouettes grow naturally, rising as it were from among the buildings around them. Their tall needlelike spires recall some of the Kremlin "tent" towers and especially the "needles" of the Peter and Paul Fortress and the Admiralty in Leningrad.[17]

THE MOSCOW METRO

The Metro (subway)—its surface stations and underground concourses—offers perhaps the best illustration of the difference between Russia and the West in approach to the role of architecture. The spaciousness and airiness of these concourses, the costly marbles, mosaics, monumental frescoes, bas-reliefs, and sculpture in the round have caused many a gasp of wonderment and astonishment, but have also caused many an eyebrow to be raised.

The question asked by Western observers is: Why lavish so much on a subway when there is still a shortage of houses? Would it not be better to

[16] For vital statistics concerning the University's physical plant, see A. Vlasov, *Moscow's Multi-storey Buildings* (Moscow, 1954); for plans and models, see *Arkhitektura i Stroitel'stvo,* June 1954, pp. 4–6. The University was designed by L. Rudnev in collaboration with S. Chernyshev, P. Abrosimov, and A. Khriakov.

[17] For the location and an informative illustrated account of these buildings in the finished project stage, see *ibid.,* June 1949; B. Rubanenko, "Ideino-Khudozhestvennye osnovy arkhitektury vysotnykh zdanii stolitsy," *Sov. Arkh.,* 1953, No. 4. For an analysis of the principal characteristics of these ensembles relating to national traditions, see A. Opochinskaia, "Ansambl' vysotnykh zdanii Moskvy i natsional'nye traditsii russkikh zodchikh," *ibid.,* 1954, No. 5.

have a utilitarian subway and spend the money on housing? The Russian answer is that architecture, even if it is for utilitarian purposes, is a form of education—aesthetic, political, and social—and that is why the Metro, like the towers, locks, and stations of the Moskva-Volga and the Volga-Don canals, has been conceived not only as a means of transport but also as a source of inspiration, as a symbol of a finer culture and a promise of a happier and more abundant life to come.

Recent additions to the ever expanding Metro system are the stations of the Great Circle (*Bol'shoe Kol'tso*), and the Arbat Line (*Arbatskii Radius*). Each one of these stations was designed, on a competitive basis, to illustrate some definite social, political, national, or historical theme.

The stations of the Great Circle—for example, the Kursk, the Komsomol'skaia, and the Kaluga, all built after the war and using the freer classical forms—reflect the theme of victory. The Arbat station re-creates the architectural features of the Kremlin palaces (near which it is located) and develops the theme of national heritage. The Kiev and Byelorussian stations with their frescoes, decorative panels, and sculpture reflect the economy and culture of Ukraine and Byelorussia. So of the other stations, each one illustrates some past or recent achievement, some social, artistic, or cultural activity.[18]

[18] For illustrations of the Metro stations, concourses, and many details, some in color, see *Moskovskii Metropoliten* (Moscow, 1953); for an illustrated discussion of the architecture of some recent stations, see M. Tosunov, "Arkhitekturnyi obraz stantsii Moskovskogo metropolitena," *Sov. Arkh.,* 1952, No. 3, pp. 8–22, and *Arkh. SSSR,* May 1954, pp. 23–28. For names of the architects, and the participating painters, sculptors, and decorators, see above references. For the plan and illustrations of the first section stations, see Voyce, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), pp. 198–201, Pls. CXI–CXXVI.

IMPACT OF MODERN TECHNIQUE

An analysis of the work projected during the life of Stalin and finished after his death shows no evidence of any significant stylistic changes. The general trend towards greater and greater monumentality and lavish decoration initiated by his regime continues unabated. But in more recent times, architecture has tended to split up into autonomous components—technology, with its functional problems of planning, organization, and construction on the one hand, and aesthetics on the other.

Designs for buildings of every type are being reviewed and revised. This redesigning campaign was initiated by the government with a view to industrializing and standardizing the building industry completely. The construction corps of the country was assigned to the task of developing assembly-line methods of building.

Building elements are manufactured to specifications of the various government departments concerned in accordance with a universal system of dimensional co-ordination, and thus can be standardized for the whole country and made interchangeable.[19] Standardization, prefabrication of both components and complete buildings, and the high degree of mechanization of site work [20] are thus transforming Soviet building technique.

The impact of a highly organized and efficient technique upon architecture as

[19] For an illustrated account of typical prefabricated building elements see F. Movchan, "Eksponaty Moskovskoi vystavki novoi stroitel'noi tekhniki," *A. S. Moskvy,* August 1954, pp. 15–22.

[20] For methods of construction on the building site, see N. Pashchenko, "O nekotorykh nasushchnykh voprosakh stroitel'stva v Moskve," *ibid.,* October 1954, pp. 5–12.

an art is creating many problems and complications. Faced with the advanced technique of the engineer and demands of the administrator and planner, the Russian architect is forced more and more into the position of a mere compiler and decorator of predetermined elements supplied by industry in prefabricated form.

ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF BUILDERS AND ARCHITECTS

The All-Union Conference of Builders and Architects, held in December 1954, brought into sharp relief the ever latent tensions between the industry's technicians and the architects, focusing attention upon their basically different approaches to building. The deliberations and reports of its various panels are significant for the fact that they reveal the attitude of the new heads of government to a number of architectural issues which have been considered above. It will undoubtedly have important repercussions on the future of post-Stalin architectural orientation.

The most far-reaching declaration on the general attitude of the party authorities towards the Russian Academy of Architecture and the Union of Architects can be found in the speeches of Nikita Khrushchev and a number of the building-industry administrators. Especially significant was Khrushchev's attack on the architectural training system as fostered by the Academy and on the reckless disregard by Soviet architects of the factor of practical economics in building, and his caustic denunciation of their preoccupation with pseudo aesthetics, the decoration and ornamentation of their buildings with sham detail. Here are some of the highlights of his speech:

> Architects are more concerned with beautiful silhouettes than with living quarters. . . . Modern apartment houses must not be transformed into a replica of a church or museum. . . . Some leading architects refuse to adapt their work to the new materials by referring to the need of combatting constructivism. . . . Such architects should probably be called constructivists in reverse, since they themselves are lapsing into aesthetic admiration of form divorced from content.[21]

The general tenor of the criticism and self-criticism voiced by a number of the conferees was that the current architecture does not accord with the needs of the age. "A tendency has been widespread in the practice of recent years which inclines towards a florid architecture of past periods, giving little consideration to utility and technical appropriateness," said A. Mordvinov, the then president of the Academy of Architecture.[22] Architect Gradov deplored the creeping Formalism in architecture by pointing out that buildings are often designed on the basis of a one-sided aesthetic and are clothed in the archaic forms of mixed styles—huge cornices, fancy obelisks, towers and columns that are not in accord with the functions of the buildings or with modern technology.[23] In fact, it was argued, building with the new materials demands a new aesthetic, an engineer's approach to building.

[21] Speech delivered on December 7, 1954, at the All-Union Conference of Builders, Architects, and Workers in Building Materials Industry, in Construction Machinery and Road Machine Building, and in Design and Research Organizations. Translated by *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, February 9, 1955. In this connection, it should be noted that Khrushchev is not a stranger to building. He worked on the construction of the first section of the Moscow Metro under the direction of L. Kaganovich.

[22] *Izvestiia*, December 2, 1954. Mordvinov has since been replaced as president of the Academy by A. Vlasov.

[23] G. A. Gradov, *Pravda*, December 2, 1954; for an elaboration of his theme, see his article, "Sovetskuiu arkhitekturu na uroven' novykh zadach," *Arkh. SSSR*, 1955, No. 2, pp. 4–8.

> High quality standards of architectural parts and units must be worked out, bearing in mind that standardization and mass production do not contradict but assist the creation of a majestic and gay architecture for our age.[24]

At the meetings of the architects' panel of the conference, modernistic architecture and pseudoclassical "perfumed" decoration and pretentiousness were both condemned, but no definite views were expressed at the conference on what is to replace them. Architect Borisovskii came perhaps closest to the heart of the matter when he declared that "what is needed is not a compromise between modernism and classicism in architecture but a thorough re-examination of creative attitudes."[25] It remains to be seen how this difficult reappraisal of long-esteemed values will be attempted, and what will be its results.

PAINTING AND SCULPTURE: REACTION AGAINST THE NONOBJECTIVE

The "puerilities" of the Expressionists, Cubists, and Futurists, the nonobjective painters and sculptors of the 1920's—their professed indifference to subject matter and their hostility to popular ideas—soon proved to be their undoing, thus changing the course of Soviet art. Even more important for the future of Soviet art was, as pointed out, Lenin's dislike of the involved aesthetics—"the cake and sugar"—of modernism.

> I have the courage to show myself a barbarian [he said]. I cannot value the works of expressionism, futurism, cubism and other such "isms" as the highest manifestations of artistic genius. I do not understand them. . . . Art belongs to the people. It must grow deep roots in the very midst of the broad mass of workers. It must be understood and loved by them. It must unite the feelings, thoughts, and will of the masses and inspire them.[26]

SOCIALIST REALISM

Lenin's comment became the guiding principle for Soviet art and was embodied in a program of measures aimed at democratization and humanization of art. The "left, degenerate" art groups were dissolved, and their conflicting aesthetic ideologies were replaced with the doctrine of "socialist realism." Art was to be realistic enough to be comprehensible to the people without being a mere copy of external reality—an art socially useful and educational. Consequently, socialist realism demanded of the artist active participation in the daily activities and emotions of the community; he must identify himself with the new era and draw his material and inspiration from the life of society and nature.[27]

This view of the substance of art implies thematic painting and sculpture, but also implies that art is a part of the socialist dynamic. The artist, therefore, must not dwell on the negative, static characteristics of society but must portray the positive, progressive side of socialist life by representing the inner world and deeds of its outstanding

[24] P. A. Iudin, *Stroitel'naia Gazeta*, December 3, 1954.

[25] Borisovskii, *ibid.* For excerpts from some of the main speeches, see *Pravda*, December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, 1954.

[26] See Zetkin, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*). For a discussion of early developments in Soviet art, see D. D. Egbert (Editor), *Socialism and American Life* (Princeton, 1952), pp. 669–705.

[27] The historical sources and precursors of socialist realism are the writings of N. G. Chernyshevskii and N. A. Dobroliubov, and the works of nineteenth-century artists like Daumier, Courbet, or the Russian *Peredvizhniki*. The active role in the formulation of the doctrine was played by Maxim Gor'kii; it was introduced by him in a speech before the First Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers held in 1934; shortly afterwards it spread to all the other arts.

workers[28] and leaders; by "bringing into salient relief a deliberately magnified image of the 'typical,' that is, the essence of a given social-historical phenomenon,"[29] of a synthesis of human passions.

The concept of socialist realism, Soviet theorists insist, does not imply a definition of styles or forms. It permits of a variety of stylistic methods and freedom of development for creative individualities, rejecting only the kind of form that does not give an objective idea of the object portrayed.

An outstanding part in the development of Soviet art was played by Lenin's "plan for monuments," whose purpose was to honor the memory of the great revolutionists, the men of science, art, and literature, by monuments, paintings, and statues. The number of such "ideal" monuments and memorials is prodigious and has been constantly on the increase. In these paintings and sculptures, the personages appear either singly or surrounded by groups of disciples and collaborators, all represented in heroized attitudes.

Aside from portraying great leaders, the artist is urged to select his subject matter from the drama of daily life and toil of the country, stressing the theme of the "new Soviet man."[30] As a result, many canvasses and sculptures were produced depicting scientific and industrial workers and farmers, singly or in groups, at labor or at rest, in homely realism but often tinged with imagination.

A striking feature of this aesthetic trend is the scope it has given to monumental art works in which sculptors and painters collaborate with the architect. Hundreds of artists associated with different genres contributed to the decoration of the new buildings: the concourses of the Moscow Metro, the halls and auditoriums of Moscow University, the pavilions of the Agricultural Exposition, and the various memorial and public buildings throughout the country, tying in the substance of genre activities with the architecture of the structure.[31]

Many of the large buildings are adorned with sculptured figures in dramatically enthusiastic attitudes, replete with expressions of socialist endeavor. This sculpture has the qualities of exuberance and romantic heroics, relying on scale, gesture, and symbolic forms rather than texture and technique to achieve impressiveness.

It can be said that socialist realism implies a continuity of Russia's artistic heritage –a return to the more or less classic forms of the pre-Revolutionary tradition in painting and sculpture. These forms now, however, are tinged with modern experience to suggest the forward-looking spirit of the new society. Thus by means of indigenous and foreign elements Soviet Russia is seeking to achieve an art which can express a socialist content, but infused with nationalism.

[28] A classic example of socialist realism is the sculptured stainless-steel group entitled "Worker and Woman Collective Farmer," by the late Vera Mukhina, which surmounted the Russian pavilion at the World's Fair held in Paris during 1937. It was intended to reflect the new society on the move. Here an industrial worker and a kolkhoz farmerette are depicted advancing side by side, straining forward as though propelled by some powerful force symbolizing the achievements and unity of interests of industrial worker and peasant. For later examples of this genre, see the bronze statues of the "Young Transformers of Nature," in front of the Moscow University by Mukhina and collaborators, *Iskusstvo,* November–December 1953, p. 19.

[29] See G. M. Malenkov, "Otchetnyi doklad XIX s'ezdu partii o rabote TSK VKP(b)," *Gospolitizdat,* 1952, p. 73.

[30] See "The Steelworker in the Sickle and Hammer Factory" by G. Gorelov, reproduced in *Iskusstvo,* September–October 1950, p. 34; "After the Meeting" by M. Klionskii, reproduced *ibid.,* January–February 1954, p. 19; "Embroidering" by A. Laktionov, *ibid.,* January–February 1955, p. 15.

[31] See the mosaics on historical themes in the Moscow Metro concourses of the Komsomol'skaia Station and the colored glass panels in the Novoslobodskaia Station by P. D. Korin; the bas-reliefs of G. I. Motovilov, on the theme of glorification of labor in the concourse of the Botanical Gardens Station; and references in notes 13, 16, and 18 *supra.* For a discussion and illustrations of the University's monumental sculpture, see I. Ivanov, "Monumental'naia skul'ptura v ansamble novogo zdaniia Moskovskogo Universiteta," *Iskusstvo,* November–December 1953, pp. 15–20.

THE NEW APPROACH

Stalin's death ushered in a more liberal approach. The first signs of liberation were already discernible in 1953, when the field of the arts was slowly broadening under the impact of the new government policies. The pressure of the "tutelage system," imposed from above by a few arbiters of taste, was relaxed, and there was manifested likewise a trend toward what might be called "cultural liberalism," restoring to the artist his freedom of initiative.

An indication to this effect can be seen in Malenkov's reinterpretation of socialist realism, declaring that critical realism is a healthy and necessary ingredient of socialist art and that henceforward the theme of "conflict," which was previously frowned upon, is to be developed in the arts. He expressed the need for satire to "burn out all that is negative, decaying, and moribund," and asserted that art "must boldly portray life's contradictions and conflicts . . . employ the weapon of criticism as a means of education."[32]

Socialist realism is only now in process of evolution. Many stimulating elements and influences are taking part in its development. The evolution of the style is in the hands of relatively young men: the painters P. Gorin (monumental frescoes and mosaics), S. Grigoriev and F. Reshetnikov (children and adolescents), I. Pimenov (urban scenes), S. Chuikov and L. Zevin (portraits and landscapes), S. Gerasimov (nature scenes), G. Nisskii (industrial landscapes), and the sculptors G. Motovilov, N. Tomskii, E. Vuchetich, Iu. Neroda, and S. Lebedeva. Their work[33] reveals that art in the Soviet Union has by no means been frozen into static uniformity. There is every indication that these artists are moving along newly opened paths and are looking for new interpretations of modern experience.

[32] G. M. Malenkov, "Otchetnyi doklad XIX s'ezdu partii o rabote TSK VKP(b)," *Gospolitizdat,* 1952, p. 73. For a discussion of the problem of "conflict" in art, see E. Polishchuk, "Problema konflikta v Sovetskoi siuzhetnoi kartine," *Iskusstvo,* January–February 1954, pp. 26–30.

[33] Reproductions of their paintings and sculptures can be found in recent (1950–55) numbers of *Iskusstvo.*

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Soviet Music Since the Death of Stalin

By Robert M. Slusser

CONTEMPORARY Soviet policy in music found its fullest and clearest expression in a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party dated February 10, 1948, entitled "On the Opera 'The Great Friendship' by Vano Muradeli." [1] The resolution, part of Andrei Zhdanov's postwar campaign to restore ideological purity and combat Western influence in Soviet intellectual life, used a mildly modernist work by a party-member composer as the pretext for a frontal attack on such alleged Western influences on Soviet music as "formalism," atonalism, dissonance, and similar "antipopular" trends. In reality, however, the resolution was directed primarily against the Western concept of music as an art independent of politics, one of the absolute forms of expression of the human spirit—a concept which had struck deep roots in prerevolutionary Russia and which has exerted a powerful influence on several leading Soviet composers.

The resolution called on Soviet composers to write music with an explicit program or text, based on easily recognizable melody, the compositional and harmonic principles of Russian folk music, and the aesthetic tradition of the nineteenth-century Russian "classical" composers; music, in other words, which could be made to serve the political ends of the Communist party. Composers were warned to avoid such "abstract" musical forms as the programless symphony and instrumental chamber music, and to concentrate instead on the writing of operas, oratorios, and cantatas.

In the five years between 1948 and the death of Stalin the world of Soviet music underwent a profound transformation in accordance with the policy dictated by the 1948 resolution. Those composers whom the resolution attacked by name, including Sergei Prokofiev, Dmitrii Shostakovich, Aram Khachaturian, and Vano Muradeli, hastened to make their peace with the party by writing compositions conforming to the party's requirements, while a host of critics and musicologists worked out the theoretical implications of the resolution in relation to Soviet and non-Soviet music.

In enforcing the resolution, the party and its organs of control limited themselves in general to stern warnings for backsliders and rewards for those who showed signs of improvement. Acutely conscious of the prestige which accrues to Soviet art abroad from the work of such composers as Prokofiev and Shostakovich, as well as of the importance of music as an adjunct to its internal propaganda, the party relied on its well-tried combination of threats and rewards to prod Soviet musicians along the path marked out for them.[2]

While Stalin lived, however, there was

[1] "Ob opere 'Velikaia Druzhba' V. Muradeli," *Sovetskaia Muzyka* [Soviet Music], Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1948), pp. 3–8.

[2] Thus the composer Vano Muradeli, whose opera was the immediate target of the 1948 resolution, was awarded a Stalin Prize in 1951 for a group of songs and an international peace prize in 1953 for his compositions "The Party, Our Rudder" and "Song of Youth." See "Muradeli, Vano Il'ich," in *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* [Large Soviet Encyclopedia] (2d ed.; Moscow, 1954), Vol. 28, pp. 564–65.

no modification of the policy defined in the 1948 resolution. On the very eve of Stalin's death the appointed leaders of Soviet music reaffirmed the validity of the resolution at the Sixth Plenum of the Board of the Union of Soviet Composers. As the "first-priority task" assigned by the party to Soviet composers the Plenum named "the creation of highly artistic realistic operas on contemporary themes," while the secretariat of the union was directed to "take all necessary measures for the appearance in the immediate future of new highly artistic operatic productions." [3] Nothing was said about the need for new compositions in other forms, including the symphony.

Reorganization After Stalin's Death

In the reorganization of the Soviet government which followed Stalin's death, responsibility for music and the other arts was assigned to a new Ministry of Culture, formed from the previous Ministries of Higher Education and Cinematography and the Committees on Art (which had previously administered music), Radio Information, and Polygraphic Arts.[4] A party stalwart, Pantaleimon K. Ponomarenko, was named Minister of Culture.[5] Ponomarenko's tenure lasted only until the party needed him for a more urgent task; in February 1954 he was reassigned as First Secretary of the Communist party Central Committee of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, an area in need of a strong hand from the center.[6]

To succeed Ponomarenko the Malenkov regime in March 1954 named a man whose work had been one of the principal targets in Andrei Zhdanov's postwar ideological campaigns, Georgii F. Aleksandrov.[7] One year later Aleksandrov was dismissed in disgrace, to be succeeded by the former Soviet ambassador to Poland, N. A. Mikhailov.[8]

Organizationally, therefore, and to some extent ideologically as well, the post-Stalin development of Soviet culture, including music, falls into three phases, marked by the tenures of the successive Ministers of Culture.

First Post-Stalin Phase (March 1953 to March 1954)

The initial reaction of the world of Soviet music to Stalin's death was a prudent continuation of the fulsome praise for the dictator which had been customary during his lifetime, adroitly coupled with publicity for the ideas of the new "collective leadership," particularly Malenkov.[9] Leading Soviet composers, headed by Shostakovich, wrote panegyrics to the dead leader, praising him for his "wise and fatherly guidance" to Soviet composers.[10]

Within a few months, when the time came to commemorate the fiftieth an-

[3] "Postanovlenie shestogo plenuma pravleniia soiuza kompozitorov SSSR" [Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Board of the Union of Soviet Composers], *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, Vol. 17, No. 5 (May 1953), pp. 59–60.

[4] *Pravda*, March 16, 1953.

[5] On Ponomarenko, see *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, Vol. II (Moscow, 1954), p. 702, and Bo[ris Meissner?], "Ponomarenko—Parteisekretär," *Osteuropa*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1952), pp. 111–12.

[6] *New York Times*, February 8, 1954, p. 1.

[7] *Ibid.*, March 16, 1954, p. 3.

[8] *Sovetskaia kul'tura* [Soviet Culture], No. 38 (272) (March 22, 1955), p. 2.

[9] "Vdokhnovliaiushchie idei velikogo Stalina" [Inspiring Ideas of the Great Stalin], *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (April 1953), pp. 3–9.

[10] "Bessmertnoe imia Stalina vsegda budet zhit' v serdtsakh sovetskogo naroda i vsego progressivnogo chelovechestva" [The Immortal Name of Stalin Will Always Live in the Hearts of the Soviet People and All Progressive Humanity], *ibid.*, pp. 10–15, with contributions by Dmitrii Shostakovich, Tikhon Khrennikov, Aram Khachaturian, Dmitrii Kabalevskii, Yurii Shaporin, and Vatslav Dobiash.

niversary of the Second Party Congress, the situation had so far changed that praise of Stalin could safely be greatly reduced or even omitted entirely.[11] The partial repudiation of the Stalinist system evident in other areas of Soviet life was gathering momentum in Soviet music as well. The official formulation of the new line, a task of considerable delicacy, since it required the ability to give the appearance of freedom from strict party controls while still implicitly recognizing their validity, was assigned to the Soviet Armenian composer Aram Khachaturian, who had assumed since Prokofiev's death a position in Soviet music second only to that of Shostakovich, and who has been used increasingly by the party as its mouthpiece in matters of music policy.

Khachaturian's contribution to the enunciation of policy took the form of an article in *Soviet Music* entitled "On Creative Boldness and Inspiration" in which he appeared to be calling for a lessening of political controls in the interest of stimulating creative originality.[12]

Outside the Soviet Union, however, the article was widely interpreted as an expression of revolt against the restrictions imposed on Soviet composers under Stalin. Khachaturian therefore wrote another article, designed particularly for readers abroad, "correcting" the unfortunate impression created by the first article.[13]

Thus far the developments in post-Stalin Soviet music presented no novelty: the party leaders had decided on a minor shift in the party line, and the "transmission belts" were passing it on to the appropriate receivers. At this point, however, an event occurred which constituted a real rarity in Soviet cultural life—the appearance of a genuine and apparently spontaneous manifestation of creative originality in music. Since this event, by a curious coincidence, took place at nearly the same time that the party, through Khachaturian, was making its carefully hedged call for increased creative originality, the leaders of Soviet cultural policy were faced with a novel situation. Instead of the token gesture they no doubt expected in answer to their new line, they were presented with a major work which they had not solicited, one moreover which violated nearly all the canons which had been established for Soviet music. Their reaction to this situation constitutes the major theme of the second post-Stalinist phase in Soviet music, under the ministry of G. F. Aleksandrov. First, however, it is necessary to consider in some detail the work itself.

SHOSTAKOVICH'S TENTH SYMPHONY: GENESIS AND CHARACTER

In the eulogy written by Shostakovich for Stalin's death there is a statement of particular interest concerning his plans for future work. Following the policy reaffirmed at the Sixth Plenum of giving first priority to the writing of operas on Soviet themes, Shostakovich wrote,

> Soviet composers are greatly in the people's debt. We have not yet responded fully to the just demands of the party and the people for the creation of Soviet operatic classics.
>
> I consider my most immediate and first-priority creative task to be work on an opera in which the great struggle of our people for the construction of communism will find reflection. I shall strive to sing worthily of the people of our heroic Stalinist epoch.[14]

Nevertheless, shortly after writing this statement Shostakovich turned to an entirely different creative task, one moreover for which there was no call from the party or the people (insofar as the latter had an independent voice in the matter): the writing of a new symphony, his first in seven years. The composer has stated,

> I worked on the *Tenth Symphony* through the summer of 1953, finishing it in the autumn. Like my other works I wrote it quickly . . . [concerning my intention in the symphony] let me say only this: In this work I tried to communicate human emotions and passions.[15]

An American correspondent who interviewed Shostakovich in Vienna in June 1953 reports that the composer told him that "like each of his other works, the *Tenth* will have a central theme, but he didn't want to discuss it until it was completed."[16] In fact, the composer has remained noncommittal on the real subject of the symphony, if any, beyond the cautious statement that in it he "tried to communicate human emotions and passions."

For an elucidation of the symphony's meaning, therefore, one is limited to the music itself and to the statements or articles written by the composer during its genesis. In character the *Tenth Symphony* is tragic, a point on which nearly all commentators, whether hostile or friendly, are agreed, a point moreover susceptible to independent verification from the score or recording available here. The tragedy expressed in the *Tenth*, however, is not of the lyric and subjective kind familiar from some of Shostakovich's earlier works, for example, the first movement of the *Sixth Symphony;* the work's tragic conflicts are imbued with an energy which suggests anger and scorn rather than personal grief. Neither is the tragic mood in any way elegiac; it has not occurred to anyone to suggest that the symphony represents a memorial either to Stalin or to Shostakovich's revered elder colleague Sergei Prokofiev, who died in the same month as Stalin.

Worst of all, from the party standpoint, the tragic conflict which dominates the *Tenth Symphony* is not resolved in the final movement in accordance with the formula officially approved for Soviet symphonies; the most the composer has offered those listeners who call for a "happy ending" is a subdued lyric passage in the final movement which can be construed as optimistic only with the greatest difficulty.[17]

To go beyond a characterization of the music in its own terms is hazardous, but the attempt is worth making, for the work speaks with an urgency which demands elucidation. It is to be noted, first of all, that the *Tenth Symphony* was written on a sudden impulse during

[11] "Um, chest' i sovest' nashei epokhi" [The Mind, Honor and Conscience of Our Epoch], *Sovetskaia Muzyka,* Vol. 17, No. 9 (September 1953), pp. 3–6, followed by statements by Reinhold Glière, Dmitrii Shostakovich, Aram Khachaturian, Maksim Mikhailov, Vano Muradeli, and Marian Koval' (*ibid.,* pp. 7–10).

[12] "O tvorcheskoi smelosti i vdokhnovenii," *Sovetskaia Muzyka,* Vol. 17, No. 11 (November 1953), pp. 7–13.

[13] "The Truth About Soviet Music and Soviet Composers," *News* (Moscow), No. 5 (64) (March 1, 1954), pp. 17–19.

[14] Dmitrii Shostakovich, "Sledovat' mudrym ukazaniiam partii Lenina-Stalina" [Follow the Wise Counsels of the Party of Lenin-Stalin], *Sovetskaia Muzyka,* Vol. 17, No. 4 (April 1953), p. 11.

[15] "Znachitel'noe iavlenie sovetskoi muzyki" [A Significant Event in Soviet Music], *Sovetskaia Muzyka,* Vol. 18, No. 6 (June 1954), p. 120.

[16] Joseph Wechsberg, "Letter from Vienna," *New Yorker,* Vol. 29, No. 34 (October 10, 1953), p. 143.

[17] For a critical discussion by a party musicologist of a Soviet symphony which does meet the party's requirements (the *First Symphony* of the Soviet Georgian composer O. Taktakishvili), see the article by G. Vanslov, "O nekotorykh voprosakh razvitiia sovetskogo simfonizma" [On Some Problems of the Development of Soviet Symphonism], in *Sovetskaia Muzyka: Teoreticheskie i kriticheskie stat'i* [Soviet Music: Theoretical and Critical Articles] (Moscow, 1954), pp. 573–75.

the period immediately following Stalin's death. Shostakovich has not publicly made any statement which could be directly interepreted as a criticism of Stalinism, but one feels an implied criticism in the striking discrepancy between the abject praise of Stalin in the statement he wrote on Stalin's death and the complete absence of any reference to him in the similar statement for the anniversary of the Second Party Congress.

One other curious circumstance: in the June 1953 issue of *Soviet Music* an article by Shostakovich appeared in which he discusses the work and prison songs of Negroes in the southern United States. Entitled "Songs of Anger and Struggle," the article combines a sensitive analysis of the songs with a crude propaganda attack on American "dollar democracy" for its alleged system of slave prison labor.[18] One is struck by the irrelevance of the article from the point of view of Soviet propaganda as a whole—the effort to offset criticism of the Soviet forced labor system by a counterattack on American practices was not a major propaganda campaign at that time. Could Shostakovich have been using the American subject matter to hint at a similar evil which lay closer to home? The supposition may be overly bold, but it is to be noted nevertheless that in the period immediately preceding the writing of the *Tenth Symphony* Shostakovich was studying "songs of anger and struggle" by victims of a system of forced prison labor.

Taking into account the admittedly slender evidence of an implied repudiation by Shostakovich of certain aspects of Stalinism, as provided by the two articles he contributed to *Soviet Music* for official occasions, and remembering the time and circumstances under which the symphony was written, one is tempted to frame the hypothesis that the real subject of the *Tenth Symphony* bears some relation to the human suffering inflicted on the Soviet people under Stalin.[19]

The real meaning of the *Tenth Symphony*—and it is difficult for the listener to doubt that it has one—can be elucidated only in the light of Shostakovich's work as a whole; perhaps it will never be fully defined in the absence of authentic information on the composer's real intentions. Meanwhile, however, the symphony will continue to make its enigmatic but forceful commentary on the period in which the composer lived.

CRITICAL RECEPTION OF THE TENTH SYMPHONY

The official première of the *Tenth Symphony* took place on December 17, 1953, in a performance by the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra under the direction of Yevgenii Mravinskii.[20] Performances in Moscow soon followed.

The controversial nature of the work was at once apparent and a heated discussion broke out, in which admirers of Shostakovich's art and proponents of greater freedom for Soviet composers were ranged against those who dislike the composer or his music and dogmatic defenders of the orthodox party line in music. The situation presented

[18] "Pesni gneva i bor'by," *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, Vol. 17, No. 6 (June 1953), pp. 33–36.

[19] Some Soviet commentators have suggested that in the *Tenth* Shostakovich is concerned with the struggle of evil against the forces of progress (that is, communism) in the non-Communist countries. The composer has not, however, lent any support to this interpretation, and it has not been accepted in the Soviet Union. At least one Soviet critic has boldly affirmed that the *Tenth* reflects Soviet realities. See M. Tarakonov, "Problema konflikta v simfonicheskoi muzyke" [The Problem of Conflict in Symphonic Music], *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, Vol. 18, No. 10 (October 1954), pp. 18–25.

[20] Malcolm Rayment, "Shostakovich," *London Musical Events*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (April 1955), p. 22.

an unexpected problem to the framers of Soviet cultural policy: were they to risk exposing the hollowness of their call for increased creative originality by damning the first major work which had appeared as if in answer to that call, or were they instead to take the risks associated with approving a work which defied the rules laid down for Soviet music?

In the face of this dilemma the first reaction of the directors of Soviet music policy was to temporize. While the controversy grew, the official journal *Soviet Music* maintained an uneasy silence; even a mention of the first performance of the *Tenth Symphony* was omitted from its chronicle section.[21]

By the time Ponomarenko had been released from his duties as Minister of Culture in February 1954, a compromise decision had been reached. Without in any way committing the party to an approval of the work, an opportunity was to be provided for a relatively open discussion of the *Tenth Symphony* in the pages of *Soviet Music*. In opening the discussion, the editors of *Soviet Music* said:

> [We] invite composers and musicologists to express themselves on the questions discussed. The development of a bold, principled criticism and self-criticism in a free discussion will assist in the successful solution of the creative problems of the development of Soviet music.[22]

ALEKSANDROV PERIOD IN SOVIET MUSIC

On March 16, 1954, the Malenkov regime announced the appointment of G. F. Aleksandrov as Minister of Culture, to fill the position left vacant by Ponomarenko's reassignment. The intention of the regime to modify the course of Soviet cultural policy could hardly have been announced more plainly than by the appointment of a man whose work had been attacked in a major ideological resolution by the party Central Committee, and who had remained in disfavor almost up to Stalin's death.[23] The new minister's policy in the field of music was soon manifested in a concrete form: a "creative discussion" of Shostakovich's *Tenth Symphony* was convened by the Union of Soviet Composers on March 29 and 30 and April 5. The discussion, as reported in *Soviet Music*, provides a revealing insight into the inner tensions and conflicts of the world of Soviet music.[24] The great admiration felt for Shostakovich and his music by most of his fellow composers was evidenced by their nearly unanimous approval of the symphony; only Shostakovich's disgruntled rival and onetime protégé, the composer Ivan Dzerzhinskii, expressed hostility.[25] The music critics were divided. Yurii Kremlev, a Leningrad musicologist, attacked

[21] *Soviet Music* did, however, note the performance of the work by the composer and a colleague in a piano transcription in a closed audition for the Union of Soviet Composers before the official première: see *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1954), p. 155.

[22] *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (March 1954), p. 23.

[23] In 1947, the same year in which his *History of Western European Philosophy* was officially condemned for ideological errors, Aleksandrov was appointed Director of the Philosophy Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. See *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, Vol. I (Moscow, 1953), p. 50. His name was not included in the appropriate volume (II) of the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, an indication that at that time (1950) he was still in disfavor. By October 1952, however, he had been sufficiently rehabilitated to achieve appointment as a candidate (alternate) for membership in the Central Committee of the party. See Leo Gruliow (Editor), *Current Soviet Policies* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), p. 240.

[24] "Znachitel'noe iavlenie . . . ," *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*). Translation of selected extracts in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 6, No. 25 (August 4, 1954), pp. 8–12.

[25] "Znachitel'noe iavlenie . . . ," *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 124.

the work as "unrealistic," lacking in genuine themes, and not concerned with contemporary problems,[26] while his Moscow colleague V. Vanslov, although finding the content of the symphony to be "gloomy [and] deeply pessimistic," noted the "extreme sincerity, the high mastery, and the beauty of execution" of the work.[27]

Throughout the remainder of 1954 the debate continued in the pages of *Soviet Music*[28] and no doubt in the committee rooms and concert halls and wherever the Soviet musical public meets. No explicit final verdict in the debate was rendered, but an implicit recognition of the victory which Shostakovich and his supporters had won can be seen in the announcement, in December 1954, that the next regular plenary session of the Board of the Union of Soviet Composers would be devoted to consideration of the problem of the Soviet symphony.[29] To realize what a change in policy this announcement signified it is necessary to remember that ever since the 1948 resolution—and even earlier—the programless symphony had been almost a proscribed form in Soviet music.

EIGHTH PLENUM OF THE BOARD OF THE UNION OF SOVIET COMPOSERS

The leading article in the December 1954 issue of *Soviet Music* announcing the forthcoming plenum on the symphony marks the farthest point which the proponents of a relaxation of controls in Soviet music were able to attain. Avoiding a definite stand on Shostakovich's *Tenth Symphony*, the article characterized the debate about it as "useful for both composers and critics" and called on the secretariat of the Union of Soviet Composers to hold similar "broad creative discussions" in the future.[30]

Although it advocated renewed attention to the symphonic form, the editorial was forced to acknowledge the weakness of recent Soviet work in this field (but without reference, of course, to the obvious reason for this situation, the official disapproval of programless symphonic music).

> The lagging behind of Soviet symphonic writing [the article stated] is noticeable also in the recent period. After the *Tenth* of D. Shostakovich we have not so far heard any pure new Russian symphony. There are also very few new symphonic program compositions. No new symphonic works are forthcoming from A. Khachaturian, T. Khrennikov, V. Muradeli, G. Popov, and others.[31]

Despite its explicit announcement of a modification in the party line on music, however, the article avoided openly breaking with the earlier policy. In a spirit of caution which was typical of the half-hearted gestures towards increased liberalism made by the Malenkov regime in other fields, the article praised the 1948 decree as "historic" and stated that it had opened "the broadest perspectives for the great new upsurge of Soviet music."[32]

With such an indecisive lead, it is no wonder that the new policy made little headway. Malenkov's resignation as premier in early February 1955 was a clear signal to the wary that the era of cautious relaxation was about to end.

The Eighth Plenum was duly held as scheduled, from March 7 to 18 in Moscow, but it can scarcely be considered a success. Among the forty-odd new compositions presented, not one was found to merit general discussion. None of the more prominent Soviet composers followed Shostakovich's lead in writing a new symphony; except for the *Tenth*, the works performed at the Plenum were chiefly by young and little-known composers.

The official commentaries and speeches delivered at the Plenum treated the symphonic genre entirely in the spirit of the 1948 decree. Two major demands on the composers of Soviet symphonies were formulated: to write symphonies expressing "the heroic optimism characteristic of the epoch of the victorious building of Communist society," and to write symphonic program music, the "most democratic, clear, concretely figurative symphonic genre."[33] As a guide to what Soviet symphonic composers could choose as subjects for their works, the following list was provided:

> . . . our great deeds during the years of the Great Patriotic War [World War II], such as the victory at Stalingrad, the capture of Berlin which demonstrated to the entire world the might of our Motherland, the unforgettable Soviet patriotism of the people and their Armed Forces.[34]

FALL OF ALEKSANDROV

The decision to replace G. F. Aleksandrov as Minister of Culture was evidently taken during the period when the Eighth Plenum was meeting in Moscow. It seems likely that the failure of the Plenum contributed to his fall; the announcement that he had been dismissed in disgrace followed immediately after its close.

The new minister, N. A. Mikhailov, presented a striking contrast to Aleksandrov. Light on the policies to be expected under him is cast by his earlier career. From the post of first secretary of the Komsomol he had advanced to that of party secretary in the Moscow oblast. In March 1954 he was appointed Soviet ambassador to Poland, a post he held until his appointment as Minister of Culture.[35] Of particular interest is the fact that in December 1953 he was a member of the court which tried and condemned L. P. Beria.[36]

From such a background one would expect great organizing ability and energy, combined with uncompromising party orthodoxy. Mikhailov's first move in the field of music gave evidence of both these characteristics.

TOWARDS THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIET COMPOSERS

In the same issue of *Soviet Culture* which carried the report of Mikhailov's appointment it was announced that the Eighth Plenum had resolved to call a Second All-Union Congress of Soviet

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[28] The following are the most significant articles on the subject which appeared in *Soviet Music* during 1954: Aram Khachaturian, "Desiataia simfoniia D. Shostakovicha" [The Tenth Symphony of D. Shostakovich], Vol. 18, No. 3 (March 1954), pp. 23–26; P. Apostolov, "K voprosu o voploshchenii otritsatel'nogo obraza v muzyke" [On the Question of the Personification of the Negative Image in Music], *ibid.*, pp. 27–40; A. Volkonskii, "Optimicheskaia tragediia" [An Optimistic Tragedy], Vol. 18, No. 4 (April 1954), pp. 25–28; L. Danilevich, "Ob orkestrovom masterstve" [On Orchestral Mastery], Vol. 18, No. 5 (May 1954), pp. 18–25; G. Orlov, "Obogashchenie zhanra (o sovetskoi liriko-dramaticheskoi simfonii)" [Enrichment of a Genre (On the Soviet Lyrico-dramatic Symphony)], Vol. 18, No. 11 (November 1954), pp. 10–15; and M. Sokol'skii, "Novoe ispolnenie desiatoi simfonii D. Shostakovicha" [A New Performance of the Tenth Symphony of D. Shostakovich], Vol. 18, No. 12 (December 1954), pp. 86–87 (concerning the attempt by the conductor A. Gauk to stress the optimistic and heroic elements in the symphony).

[29] "K novym uspekham sovetskogo simfonizma" [Towards New Successes of Soviet Symphonism], *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, Vol. 18, No. 12 (December 1954), pp. 3–11.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[33] "K novym uspekham sovetskoi simfonicheskoi muzyki" [Towards New Successes of Soviet Symphonic Music], *Sovetskaia kul'tura* [Soviet Culture], No. 32 (266) (March 8, 1955), p. 1.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] *New York Times*, March 28, 1954.

[36] *Ibid.*

Composers, to be held in April 1956.[37] The timing of the announcement, as well as its content, made it clear that the decision to convoke the congress was the first move in the music policy of the Mikhailov ministry rather than the final one in that of Aleksandrov. No one had forgotten the First Congress of Soviet Composers; it was at that gathering that the policy formulated in the 1948 resolution on music had been laid down.

The impression of abruptness created by the manner in which the plans for the congress were announced was strengthened a short time later when a new plenum of the Board of the Union of Soviet Composers, the Ninth, was called to draw up plans for the congress.[38]

Functions

Under plans so far announced the congress is to combine two principal functions: first, to serve as an impressive demonstration of the "successes of Soviet musical culture," [39] and, second, to redefine the party's policy in music.[40] Preceding the congress, from October 1954 to March 1956, there are to be "creative plenary sessions" and congresses in all republic and provincial composers' organizations. Just before the congress, in March and April 1956, a "great festival of Soviet music" is to be held in Moscow, accompanied by similar festivals in other cities throughout the Soviet Union.[41]

The indications so far vouchsafed by party spokesmen of the policies which the congress will enunciate point strongly towards a return to those of the era 1948–53. Once again the emphasis is to be on the writing of operas on contemporary Soviet themes; the "extensive use of song forms" in opera is recommended, with the work of such dependable but uninspired party hacks as Tikhon Khrennikov and Ivan Dzerzhinskii held up as models.[42] The would-be writers of symphonies are warned that their work so far "does not give an adequate picture of the heroism of our days" and that the genre of symphonic program music is "poorly developed." [43]

Nevertheless, indications are not lacking that if there is to be a return to the policies of the 1948 resolution, it will be a skillfully masked return, in which the reimposition of stricter controls is combined with the appearance of a continuation of the more relaxed policies pursued in the first two years after Stalin's death. In terms of the dialectic, the signs point towards a policy in which the thesis represented by the 1948 resolution and its antithesis in the milder post-Stalin policy are deliberately combined into a synthesis for the greater good of the party.

One such indication is the official statement made by Khachaturian concerning the congress. Called on once again to serve as spokesman for the party to the professional world of music, Khachaturian fully justified the party's trust in him by a statement which adroitly combined acceptance of the party's "wise instructions" with a cautious appeal for a more flexible application of those "instructions." [44]

Another indication of the probable direction of policy was the startling report that Shostakovich is now engaged in reworking his opera, *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk*.[45] When it is recalled that it was this work which provoked one of the first and most brutal attacks by the party on creative originality in Soviet music,[46] and that the work has lain under an absolute ban ever since that time, one's first reaction is to wonder whether full creative freedom has not indeed been restored to Soviet music. But sober second thoughts point in the opposite direction: if the party leaders wished to make an ostentatious demonstration, for external propaganda, of the alleged freedom of Soviet composers to write as they please, what better means could they find than the announcement that Shostakovich had resumed work on his banned opera? That he received official instructions to do so cannot be doubted by anyone who has studied the operation of the Communist system of control in the arts. The opera no longer represents in any way a living creative problem for Shostakovich; the musical phase it represents has long since been consigned to history, both by the composer and by the world of music in general. One suspects that the framers of party cultural policy, faced with the irrefutable evidence of the *Tenth Symphony* that Shostakovich will never fully submit to their controls, have resolved to use him instead as a propaganda showpiece to demonstrate the freedom under which Soviet composers work.

CONCLUSION

After a brief period of indecisive flirtation with a relaxation of party controls in music, the direction of Soviet music and cultural policy generally is now firmly in the hands of energetic and dogmatic party leaders who are skilled in the use of Soviet culture as an auxiliary weapon in the battle for control of world public opinion. The forthcoming Second Congress of Soviet Composers is likely to prove a highly potent contribution to the Communist cause in that battle.

[37] "O vtorom Vsesoiuznom s'yezde sovetskikh kompozitorov" [On the Second All-Union Congress of Soviet Composers], *Sovetskaia kul'tura,* No. 38 (272) (March 22, 1955), p. 1.

[38] "Deiatel'no gotovit'sia k s'yezdu" [Actively Prepare for the Congress], *Sovetskaia Muzyka,* Vol. 19, No. 7 (July 1955), pp. 3–6. Plenums of the Board are normally held at intervals of approximately one year.

[39] "Shire dorogu sovetskoi muzyke!" [Broaden the Path for Soviet Music!], *Sovetskaia kul'tura,* No. 85 (318), July 9, 1955, p. 1.

[40] *Sovetskaia kul'tura,* No. 38 (272) (March 22, 1955), p. 1.

[41] *Ibid.,* July 9, 1955, p. 1.

[42] *Ibid.,* No. 38 (272) (March 22, 1955), p. 1.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Aram Khachaturian, "Volnuiushchie problemy" [Stirring Problems], *Sovetskaya Muzyka,* Vol. 19, No. 7 (July 1955), pp. 7–14.

[45] *New York Times,* September 28, 1955, p. 70.

[46] "Sumbur vmesto muzyki" [Confusion Instead of Music], *Pravda,* January 28, 1936, p. 1.

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Recent Soviet Philosophy

By George L. Kline

In philosophy, as in other areas of theoretical knowledge, the Soviet Union since Stalin would appear prima facie to have entered upon a period of relative freedom of discussion and increased latitude toward differences of opinion. Two recent editorial statements may be taken as typical:

> The solution of important scientific problems cannot be achieved by administrative action, by the harsh imposition of "authoritative" points of view upon those who think differently, by the forbidding of a free exchange of views. The path of development of scientific thought is a path of discussion and dispute, in the course of which obsolete conceptions are revised, new ideas arise, and new theories are elaborated.[1]

And, in the party theoretical organ:

> The conflict of opinions, creative disputes . . . are becoming more and more the norm of life in the scientific collectives. In institutes, departments, and scholarly councils one hears, with increasing frequency, lively discussions of manuscripts, dissertations, published books and articles, specific scientific problems.[2]

These statements are wholly consonant with Stalin's much-glossed declaration of 1950 (in *Marxism and Questions of Linguistics*) concerning the need for freedom of criticism and the clash of opinions in science. Unfortunately, however, two circumstances make it clear that, at least in the case of philosophy, the current pronouncements are quite as empty as was Stalin's. The first is the drastic restriction of such freedom by Soviet spokesmen themselves. The last-quoted editorial, for instance, contains the following stiff proviso:

> From time to time an attempt is made, under the flag of conflict of opinions, to revise root theses of Marxism-Leninism. . . . It cannot be permitted that individuals should use the freedom of conflict of opinions and criticism for the revision of fundamental principles of Marxism.[3]

In this case the example offered is from economic policy; the "revisionists" singled out for rebuke are those who ventured a theoretical defense of the "Malenkov policy" of developing consumers' goods production at the temporary expense of heavy industry.

Flatly repudiating philosopher M. T. Iovchuk's suggestion that various trends or tendencies might be admitted within the framework of a general Marxist world view, the editors of *Kommunist* exclaim: "Marxism-Leninism rests upon a single theoretical foundation—dialectical and historical materialism; hence there cannot be any question of different ideological trends within the framework of a Marxist world view."[4] This restriction is made even more explicit in another authoritative statement. After asserting that all Soviet science rests upon the "granite foundation of Marxism-Leninism," *Kommunist* goes on to stipulate that all discussion must proceed "upon a firm base of Marxism: all 'theories' which contradict Marxism must be *branded* as such, and not made subjects of discussion."[5] Many other statements might be quoted which stress, in various contexts, the "struggle for the purity and firmness of the principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy."[6]

Any revision of Marxism-Leninism, it is clear, must come from the top. A Lenin or Stalin may with impunity discard "obsolete Marxist theses," replacing them with new ones as called for by "new historical conditions."[7] But the ordinary Soviet theorist dare not so much as scratch the monolithic surface of these unshakable blocks of granite!

The second kind of evidence of the hollowness of recent Soviet talk about freedom of discussion is provided, in superfluity, by the published writings of Soviet philosophers, which exhibit not the least tendency toward modification or creative development of Marxism-Leninism. There has been a toning down of certain Stalinist emphases, as we shall see, but this has amounted to a hardening of doctrinal positions, a kind of theoretical arteriosclerosis, following upon Stalin's deviation from orthodox Marxism-Leninism toward a more flexible common-sense view, which reached its height between 1950 and 1953. The only area in which there has been a significant broadening of permitted subject matter is the history of philosophy (see below), and even here the liberalization is thus far chiefly a matter of programmatic declaration.

Scope and Function of Philosophy

A fact which has long been evident to students of Soviet intellectual history has, in recent months, come to the murky surface of Soviet *kritika* and *samokritika*, namely, that those Soviet individuals, organizations, and activities grouped under the rubric "philosophy" are very little concerned with philosophy in the strict sense—not merely the traditional Western sense, but even the Marxist-Leninist sense. Any reader of *Voprosy filosofii* (the one official organ of Soviet "philosophic" thought), or of the various monographs, brochures, and pamphlets listed by the Soviet press as philosophical publications, will recognize that they contain a very high proportion of purely propangandistic, political, socioeconomic, topical, and even military material, which could not by any stretch of usage be termed "philosophic." For example, among Soviet *philosophy* dissertations defended in 1953–54 we find the following: D. V. Ermolenko, "Cosmopolitanism as an Ideological Weapon of American Imperialism in Its Struggle for World Domination"; A. A. Svinarenko, "Soviet Patriotism as the Source of the Might and Power of the Soviet Army"; V. A. Sergeev, "Military Questions in the Works of N. G. Chernyshevskii"! Countless philosophy dissertations, brochures and articles are devoted to the role of the Communist party in the building of socialism, "Soviet patriotism as the highest expression of proletarian internationalism," and similar topics. Perhaps the climax of philosophic irrelevance occurs in a recent *Voprosy filosofii* article:

> In his report to the February–March Plenum of the Central Committee of the

[1] "K itogam diskussii po teorii otnositel'nosti" [Summing up the Discussion on Relativity Theory], *Voprosy filosofii* [Problems of Philosophy] (hereafter abbreviated as *VF*), 1955, No. 1, p. 138. It should be noted that in the Soviet Union philosophy is classed as a "science" [*nauka*]; hence the expressions "scientific problem" and "scientific thought" apply fully to the philosophic disciplines.

[2] "O diskussiiakh v nauchnykh zhurnalakh" [On the Discussions in Scientific Journals], *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 7, pp. 117–18.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 123. Iovchuk's statement appears in *VF*, 1955, No. 1, p. 8.

[5] *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 5, pp. 22, 23. Italics added.

[6] See, for example, "K itogam koordinatsionnogo soveshchaniia po filosofskim problemam" [The Outcome of the Coordinating Conference on Philosophical Problems], *VF*, 1955, No. 2, p. 233.

[7] See, for example, Iu. Gaidukov, "Rol' praktiki v protsesse poznaniia" [The Role of Practice in the Cognitive Process], *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 3, p. 108.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N. S. Khrushchev made special mention of the indubitably great importance of *fertilizers:* "Who does not know that there is no more rapid and effective means for increasing yield than *fertilizers* . . . ?" [8]

Who indeed, unless perhaps some poor sequestered philosopher who has neglected his plowing in favor of Plato!

Admittedly, this is an extreme example. But the "substitution of questions of current politics for philosophical questions" of which a recent Soviet writer complains [9] is highly typical of Soviet practice. An authoritative critique of Soviet philosophy dissertations includes the (perfectly just) charge that many such dissertations exhibit "an extremely remote connection with philosophy." [10] The same source charges that in many cases Soviet authors construe history of philosophy so broadly that they transform it in effect into general history of ideology. Works on Marxist-Leninist philosophy, we are told, "dissolve the history of philosophy in the history of Marxism-Leninism, failing to exhibit the process of development of specifically philosophic questions." [11] The same point is made by *Kommunist:* "In works on the history of philosophy, however strange that may seem, it is precisely philosophy which sometimes gets away." [12]

The reasons for such a situation are not far to seek: it is obviously much simpler, as well as politically safer, for Soviet philosophers to discuss general ideological questions, repeating current propagandistic exhortations and denunciations, à la *Pravda,* than to enter into independent analyses of philosophic issues and distinctions which might easily lead them beyond the secure and shallow waters of received Marxist-Leninist "truths"—this from the point of view of the individual writer (who, by the way, is incessantly hounded to publish more in his field). From the point of view of editorial boards, whether of scholarly journals or of publishing houses, the quest for something to break the monotony of "philosophic" works, each as much like the last as "two drops of water" (in the Russian expression), must exert a pressure for inclusion of material that has little if any relevance to philosophy. Some such reasoning would appear to have underlain the decision of the editors of *Voprosy filosofii* to print the Oparin-Takács discussion on the physicochemical origins of life and the Fesenkov-Tikhov dispute concerning the presence of vegetation on Mars.[13] Though none of these four papers has much to do with philosophy, Marxist or otherwise, they represent relatively bright spots in an otherwise gray mediocrity. Part of the reason, beyond the intrinsic interest of the questions raised, is that all the papers are virtually free from citations of the "classics" of Marxism-Leninism.[14]

[8] G. S. Davtian, "Sovetskaia agrokhimiia i nekotorye ee zadachi" [Soviet Agrochemistry and Some of its Tasks], *VF,* 1955, No. 1, p. 85. Italics added.

[9] S. P. Dudel', in a review of V. Kozlovskii, *Antagonisticheskie i neantagonisticheskie protivorechiia* [Antagonistic and Nonantagonistic Contradictions] (Moscow, 1954), *VF,* 1955, No. 3, p. 178.

[10] *VF,* 1955, No. 3, p. 194.

[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 13, 195.

[12] "Nasushchnye voprosy filosofskoi nauki" [Urgent Problems of Philosophic Science], *Kommunist,* 1955, No. 5, p. 17.

[13] For the former see *VF,* 1953, No. 1, pp. 138–42 and 1955, No. 3, pp. 147–50. For the latter see *VF,* 1954, No. 3, pp. 106–24 and 1955, No. 1, pp. 92–102.

[14] It may be noted in passing that, while the number of quotations from Stalin's writings has greatly declined in philosophic works published since mid-1953, such quotations have by no means disappeared. Quotations from Lenin are more ubiquitous than ever. Marx is rarely quoted in philosophic works as a doctrinal authority, although he is occasionally cited as an example of the application of Marxist-Leninist dialectic. Engels is a close runner-up to Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung has been quoted on occasion when some other "classic" would have served doctrinal purposes equally well. It may be worth mentioning that until March 1953 *Voprosy filosofii* printed footnotes at the bottoms of pages, so that it was easy to determine the frequency of quotations from a given author. Now references are given in parentheses in the text—a change doubtless motivated both by considerations of economy and "popularity" and by the desire to render less obvious the abrupt decrease in the frequency of Stalin quotations.

In addition, the authors are not themselves philosophers, but, respectively, biochemists, an astrophysicist, and an "astrobiologist" (a Soviet specialist who studies the forms of life—if any—on other planets). Soviet *émigrés* confirm the impression which one gains from a comparison of Soviet publications in philosophy with those in the special sciences, namely, that professors of dialectical materialism (*diamatchiki,* as they are somewhat contemptuously dubbed) are among the least competent and least respected members of the Soviet scientific and academic community. There is no evidence from the postwar or post-Stalinist period to indicate any change in this situation.

Inconsistently enough, in the same breath in which they criticize philosophers for systematic irrelevancy, Soviet authorities go on to urge tasks upon them which are far from philosophical. A *Kommunist* editorial states that philosophers must be militant materialists, "assisting the party in every way to educate the workers in the spirit of communism, Communist morality, . . . tirelessly propagandizing the masses with a scientific, materialistic, atheistic world view." [15] Philosophers must make plain the decisive role of the masses in the shaping of history, and this "in indissoluble connection with the root questions of party politics, strategy, and tactics. . . ." Soviet philosophers are castigated for "failing to exhibit the scientific foundations of party policy." [16]

[15] "Nasushchnye voprosy . . . ," *Kommunist,* 1955, No. 5, pp. 12, 13.

PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNALS—U. S. AND USSR

This unphilosophical character of much Soviet "philosophy" tends to cut the ground from beneath Soviet claims to preserve the dignity and autonomy of philosophy vis-à-vis the special sciences and politics—in alleged contrast to the subservient status of philosophy in "bourgeois" countries. The Soviet claim, in my view, is also taken too seriously by such otherwise highly perceptive critics of Soviet philosophy as Bocheński [17] and Wetter.[18] This situation also takes the edge from the Soviet assertion that the small circulation of American philosophical journals is evidence of a decline of philosophy in the United States.[19] Besides the fact that at least eight such journals are published in the United States, many American philosophers regularly follow and contribute to English, Australian, and Continental journals. The fifty thousand subscribers to *Voprosy filosofii,* the *only* Soviet philosophical journal, seem less impressive when we recall how little philosophy it contains (aside from the question of the *quality* of this strictly philosophical residuum) in comparison with American and West European journals, which are devoted almost exclusively to philosophy in the strict sense.

[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 15, 16.

[17] I. M. Bocheński, "On Soviet Philosophy," *Review of Politics,* July 1951—an article based on Bocheński's admirable little book, *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (Berne, 1950).

[18] Gustav A. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus; seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion* (Vienna, 1952). An English translation of this work is to be published by Routledge & Kegan Paul in London and Praeger in New York.

[19] Cf. *VF,* 1955, No. 2, p. 243.

FORMAL LOGIC AND DIALECTIC

It is not the intent of the present paper to offer a survey or summary of the body of current Soviet philosophical doctrine.[20] Instead, certain recent developments in logic, philosophy of science, theory of knowledge, ethical and social theory, and history of philosophy will be singled out for comment.

The dramatic shift in policy toward formal logic, marked by the Central Committee decision of November 1946 to reintroduce logic courses into secondary (and higher) education—after a quarter-century of violent attacks upon formal logic as static, metaphysical, and "bourgeois"—has been widely discussed.[21] But until early 1955, when the editors of *Voprosy filosofii* printed an open letter from two Soviet logicians, it was not known in the West how hollow the apparent "triumph" of formal logic in the Soviet academic system had been. It had been known that a series of textbooks prepared after 1946 for secondary school logic courses were, one after another, condemned as unsuitable; but it had not been known that the search for a satisfactory text was effectively discontinued in 1954. Nor had it been known that logic was excluded from the list of subjects required for the "certificate of maturity"—along with singing, drawing, and physical education. Furthermore, we now learn that in secondary schools "in recent years" teachers of logic have not been permitted to assign written work—a restriction which would sharply reduce the effectiveness of their teaching. Various officials of the Ministry of Education have made it clear that logic is soon to be dropped from the secondary school curriculum. And the training of logic teachers in Soviet teachers colleges was discontinued as of 1954, despite the continuing shortage of trained personnel in this field.[22]

Presumably these measures have not, as yet, affected the teaching of logic at the university level; nevertheless, the threatened elimination of logic from the secondary school curriculum, if carried out, would constitute a sharp reversal for Soviet defenders of formal logic.

It is not difficult to agree with N. Z. Chavchavadze's characterization of the discussion on the relation of formal logic to dialectic which was carried on in the pages of *Voprosy filosofii* during 1950 and 1951. He calls it "badly handled, clarifying nothing," adding that the editorial article "summing up" the discussion "failed to resolve the controversial questions."[23] What appeared at the time as a qualified victory for the defenders of formal logic now dwindles to something much less solid. The present focus of attack is that group of Soviet logicians, headed by Bakradze and Kondakov, who defend the autonomy and importance of formal logic (in its traditional Aristotelian form) and allegedly "belittle" the role of Marxist-Leninist dialectic. Thus M. B. Mitin, long an authoritative spokesman for Soviet philosophers, currently deplores the "wide acceptance among us during recent years of incorrect, harmful views on the question of the relation between formal and dialectical-materialist logic."[24]

A long editorial statement in the latest issue of *Voprosy filosofii* to reach this country[25] attacks Soviet "vulgarizers" who want to do away with dialectical logic altogether, and who allegedly became even more impudent in their "revisionism" after the official termination of the discussion of the relation of logic to dialectic in 1951. The editors accuse G. F. Aleksandrov, who headed the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences—the leading philosophical institution in the country—between 1947 and 1954, of supporting these erring philosophers by wholly neglecting theoretical problems of dialectical logic. After a detailed critique of the logic texts of both Bakradze (1951) and Kondakov (1954), the editors conclude:

> The rejection of dialectical logic, the replacement of dialectical logic by formal logic, leads to the crudest and most harmful vulgarization of the philosophical foundations of Marxism-Leninism and the politics of the Marxist Party.[26]

This "nihilistic" movement involves

> . . . a whole system of views in logic, views clearly deviant from Marxism. What might in the beginning have been considered—with some straining—as a conflict of opinions within the limits of Marxism has now quite openly gone beyond those limits. . . . We must put a decisive end to this erroneous tendency.[27]

Judging from the incoherent analyses and strained distinctions which characterize the latest works on the subject, the future of philosophical writing on logic in the Soviet Union is not bright.[28] The trend toward a genuine rehabilitation of formal logic, which began in 1946–47 and gained considerable momentum after Stalin's linguistics statements of 1950, would appear to have been definitely reversed.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF MATHEMATICIANS

It should be noted, however, that while Soviet *philosophers* have wholly neglected the important developments of mathematical logic during the past half century, Soviet *mathematicians,* writing in technical mathematical journals, have continued, throughout this and earlier periods, to make significant contributions to the development of this specialized field. Examples are the recent work of P. S. Novikov on logical paradoxes; B. A. Trakhtenbrot on the decision problem for finite classes; A. A. Markov on the impossibility of certain algorithms for associative systems; and A. A. Zykov on the spectrum problem in the second-order functional calculus.[29]

Soviet mathematicians have also done pioneer work in the development of probability theory, a discipline culti-

[20] The best brief accounts are those of Bocheński, *op. cit.* (note 17 *supra*). The exhaustive account is Wetter's, *op. cit.* (note 18 *supra*). An excellent critical study, thus far available only in Russian, is B. Petrov (Vysheslavtsev), *Filosofskaya nishcheta marksizma* [The Philosophic Poverty of Marxism] (Frankfurt am Main, 1952). I have discussed this work in detail in the *Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 9 (1955), pp. 90–105.

[21] Cf. A. Philipov, *Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1952); Wetter, *op. cit.* (note 18 *supra*), Part II, Chap. X. I have surveyed recent Soviet developments in this field in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic,* Vol. 17 (1952), pp. 124–28; Vol. 18 (1953), pp. 83–86, and Vol. 19 (1954), p. 149.

[22] P. V. Tavanets and V. M. Boguslavskii, "O prepodavanii logiki v srednei shkole" [On the Teaching of Logic in the Secondary School], *VF,* 1955, No. 1, pp. 220, 221.

[23] "K itogam . . . problemam," *VF,* 1955, No. 2, p. 233.

[24] M. B. Mitin, "V. I. Lenin—velikii materialist-dialektik" [V. I. Lenin—a Great Materialist Dialectician], *Kommunist,* 1955, No. 7, p. 21.

[25] "Protiv putanitsy i vulgarizatsii v voprosakh logiki" [Against Confusion and Vulgarization in Questions of Logic], *VF,* 1955, No. 3, pp. 158–71.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 163.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 171.

[28] After 1950 all Soviet logicians agreed that formal logic itself (though not *interpretations* of it) was above class distinctions, common to all classes, hence not a weapon of ideological warfare. But now we find logic characterized—in the aggressive tone of pre-1950 statements—as "a militant sector in the struggle against the ideology of imperialist reaction" ("Nasushchnye voprosy . . . ," *Kommunist,* 1955, No. 5, p. 17).

[29] My translation of Zykov's paper is being published in the American Mathematical Society Translations, Series 2, Vol. 3 (1956), pp. 1–14.

vated in the West by philosophers as well as mathematicians (as a part of the theory of inductive inference and scientific methodology). The major names are S. N. Bernstein, A. Ia. Khinchin, and A. N. Kolmogorov. Academician Kolmogorov has made major contributions both to the working out of a theory of probable and statistical inference on a foundation of set theory and to the special extension of this theory to what he calls "ramified contingencies." Soviet *philosophers,* in contrast, have contributed nothing to this field.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE; PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Theory of knowledge has long been one of the most barren "sectors" of the Soviet philosophical "front." With the single exception of M. A. Markov's interesting essay of 1947 on the role played by instruments in the cognition of microphenomena [30]—which was promptly denounced as Machian, Kantian, and a resurrection of Plekhanov's discredited theory of hieroglyphs—Soviet epistemologists have limited themselves to quoting, paraphrasing, and rhapsodizing over Engels' and Lenin's bleak and naïve "theory of reflection." In summing up a discussion on the role of practice in cognition, the editors of *Voprosy filosofii* admitted that it had not been very fruitful, since all the questions under discussion had "long since been settled by Marxist-Leninist doctrine." They added, however, that it had cleared up the "confusions" existing in the minds of some comrades on points of epistemology.[31]

In the area of philosophy of science, especially philosophy of physics, the picture is somewhat less depressing, in part at least because most of the discussion has been carried on by physicists rather than philosophers. That the gap between the two professions is sharp, if not unbridgeable, is evidenced by numerous Soviet statements. Thus, Professor B. M. Kedrov, a philosopher, urges philosophers to study the natural sciences, and scientists to study philosophy.[32] The editors of *Kommunist* complain that "discussions in the natural sciences proceed without the active participation of philosophers. . . . There has been a certain weakening of the relations between philosophers and natural scientists. . . ." At the present time, "philosophers help natural scientists very little" because they are not sufficiently familiar with contemporary scientific developments. And scientists still do not see the need for philosophy in their own work.[33]

An example of a reasonably fruitful discussion was that on relativity theory—both because of the active participation of physicists and because much of the discussion was not strictly philosophical at all (hence not Marxist-Leninist), but concerned with the broader aspects of physical theory—interpretation, terminology, and so forth. The official summing up states that the "overwhelming majority of the discussants prize relativity theory as one of the major achievements of physics." [34] A. A. Maksimov, who, while accepting the mathematical apparatus of relativity theory, rejected its physical consequences, was repudiated as a "vulgarizing" "subjectivist." [35] Several physicists felt that the *title* of Einstein's theory was inappropriate; one suggestion was that the general theory of relativity be renamed the "theory of gravitational warping of the spatiotemporal metric." [36] The proposed title is somewhat inelegant, but it does accurately convey a major emphasis of the general theory of relativity.

Of interest in this connection is Leopold Infeld's article on relativity theory (a translation from the Polish) [37] and his polemical exchange with Soviet academician V. A. Fok.[38] The dispute between G. F. Drukarev and M. E. Omelianski on Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty in quantum mechanics is carried on at a high level of technical competence.[39] (Both men are physicists.) It is worth noting that Heisenberg's *Philosophical Problems of Nuclear Science* was published in Russian translation late in 1953, presaging a new policy toward the publication of works of non-Marxist, indeed "idealist," foreign scientists. In a long introduction to the Russian edition Soviet readers are warned that while Heisenberg's theoretical contributions to quantum mechanics are sound and important, his own *interpretations* of them are idealistic, Machian, and generally anathema to good Marxist-Leninists. Omelianski re-emphasizes this point in an article published in *Voprosy filosofii.*[40] To date, however, the Heisenberg translation is a unique phenomenon. Comparable works of Schrödinger and Oppenheimer, for example, which might be of equal interest to Soviet readers, have not been translated.[41]

SOCIAL AND ETHICAL THEORY

Stalin's statements on linguistics concerning the relative autonomy of certain superstructural elements and the "creative role" of the superstructure vis-à-vis the economic base of society were widely applied between 1950 and 1953 by a large number of Soviet writers, in fields as diverse as jurisprudence, economics, linguistics, philosophy, and the natural sciences. Their chief application in philosophy (in addition to that in logic, which we have just considered) was to social theory. Countless Soviet statements of the period stressed that, in socialist society, the relations and forces of production are not uniquely independent variables (as classical Marxism held), but that ideological factors—law, the state, political institutions, as well as philosophy, science, and art—can reciprocally influence the economic base. Taking one text almost at random, we find Kareva emphasizing the "enormous creative role" of Soviet law and the Soviet state, "their great influence in transforming the economic base of society." [42]

Since 1954, however, there has been a significant retreat from this position toward a more orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Aleksandrov's book on Stalin's linguistics statements and dialectical materialism is now criticized for "slurring

[30] M. A. Markov, "O prirode fizicheskogo znaniia" [On the Nature of Physical Knowledge], *VF,* 1947, No. 2, pp. 140–76. For a summary of Markov's argument see Wetter, *op. cit.* (note 18 *supra*), pp. 361–65. Markov himself is a physicist rather than a philosopher.

[31] "Ot redaktsii" [From the Editors], *VF,* 1955, No. 1, p. 145. Cf. also "O diskussiiakh v nauchnykh zhurnalakh" [On the Discussions in Scientific Journals], *Kommunist,* 1955, No. 7, p. 120.

[32] "K itogam . . . problemam," *VF,* 1955, No. 2, p. 230.

[33] "Nasushchnye voprosy . . . ," *Kommunist,* 1955, No. 5, pp. 19–20.

[34] "K itogam . . . otnositel'nosti," *VF,* 1955, No. 1, p. 135.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 136.

[36] I. B. Novik, "O sootnoshenii prostranstva, vremeni i materii" [On the Interrelations of Space, Time, and Matter], *VF,* 1955, No. 3, p. 143.

[37] "Neskol'ko zamechanii o teorii otnositel'nosti" [Some Remarks on Relativity Theory], *VF,* 1954, No. 5, pp. 173–78.

[38] *VF,* 1955, No. 3, pp. 155–57.

[39] *Ibid.,* pp. 151–54.

[40] 1955, No. 1, pp. 189–95.

[41] I. Kuznetsov, reviewing Max Laue's *Geschichte der Physik* in *Kommunist,* 1955, No. 12, suggests the publication of a Russian translation. It is too early to say whether this suggestion will be followed.

[42] M. P. Kareva, *Pravo i nravstvennost' v sotsialisticheskom obschestve* [Law and Morality in Socialist Society] (Moscow, 1951), pp. 21–22. For translations of typical statements, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. 2 (1950), No. 35, p. 5, and No. 37, p. 11.

over the determining role of the base and exaggerating the role of the superstructure."[43] More generally, we read, "In the recent past certain books and articles have exhibited errors of a voluntaristic character in the interpretation of economic laws and the role of the state in socialist society."[44] In other words, the unilateral causal determinism of the economic base of society is here reasserted against those authors who, in the spirit of Stalin's utterances of 1950, had questioned this determinism, putting forward an alternative "interventionist" or "voluntaristic" view of the dynamics of social change. It must be said that, if one is going to talk about social structure and historical dynamics in terms of base and superstructure, the 1950–53 position, with its admission of reciprocal influences, seems much sounder than that which is now being asserted against it. However, because of the misleading metaphorical character and dubious explanatory power of the base-superstructure image it would be better to dispense with it altogether. This drastic step, unfortunately, has not been suggested by *any* Soviet writer.

There have been no comparable doctrinal shifts in the post-Stalinist (or postwar) period with respect to ethical theory. Lenin's Machiavellian view of morality remains canonical: whatever furthers the cause of communism is "moral"; whatever obstructs or impedes that cause is "immoral." In a current Soviet formulation: "The only scientific criterion of morality is the defense of the interests of the victory of communism. . . ."[45] Another writer puts the point more bluntly: "In our time only what furthers the destruction of capitalism and the victory of communism is moral."[46] Again: "The highest criterion of Communist morality is . . . self-sacrificing struggle for communism."[47]

Current Soviet works in "ethical theory" are chiefly exhortations aimed at making the Soviet citizen meet his "moral obligations," so defined—subordinating his individual interests to collective, sociopolitical interests in all cases of conflict between the two. This general obligation entails such specific obligations as "respect for social property"; Soviet patriotism—sharply distinguished (but it seems to be a distinction without a difference) from "bourgeois chauvinism"; socialist internationalism, also sharply distinguished from "bourgeois cosmopolitanism." All of these "principles" are variations on the central theme of the individual's absolute subordination, loyalty, and devotion to the "collective." In general, Soviet writings on "ethics," besides being exhaustingly repetitious, contain vanishingly little ethical theory in the strict sense.

Of more interest is the polemic and criticism—some of it quite relevant and philosophically sophisticated—directed by Soviet writers against contemporary pragmatic, positivistic, and existentialist ethics. A good example is to be found in P. A. Shariia's *O nekotorykh voprosakh kommunisticheskoi morali* [On Certain Problems of Communist Morality],[48] a work which also contains the most literate discussion in postwar Soviet philosophy of the problem of determinism and freedom.[49] However,

[43] "Nasushchnye voprosy . . . ," *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 5, p. 15.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[45] "Nravstvennost' kommunisticheskaia" [Communist Morality], *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, 2d ed., Vol. 30 (1954), p. 207.

[46] M. Z. Selektor, "Politika i moral'" [Politics and Morals], *VF*, 1951, No. 4, p. 67.

[47] O. Tselikova, in a review of A. F. Shishkin, *Osnovy kommunisticheskoi morali* [Foundations of Communist Morality] (Moscow, 1955), *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 10, pp. 103–7.

[48] Moscow, 1951.

[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 42–52.

Shariia's own position—for which, with some straining of texts, he attempts to adduce Lenin's support—involving as it does a mitigation of strict determinism and an assertion of the "relative freedom of choice" between objectively existing possibilities, has received no support from other Soviet authors. And Shariia himself has published nothing since 1951.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

That there has been a certain mellowing in the Soviet attitude toward the study of the history of Western philosophy, including contemporary "bourgeois" philosophy, is indicated by three related bits of evidence. First, translations have begun to appear of certain foreign works which had not hitherto been issued under Soviet auspices, for example, Bacon's *New Atlantis* and Montaigne's *Essays* (both published in Moscow during 1954). To be sure, neither of these thinkers is of a philosophical persuasion sharply opposed to that of the Soviet authorities; but neither of them could accurately be called either atheistic or materialistic. Also, 1954 saw the publication of a Russian translation of S. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta's *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, an event difficult to imagine in the Stalinist period.

Second, Soviet journals, especially *Voprosy filosofii* and *Kommunist*, have, since 1953, reviewed a number of Western studies in Russian philosophy and intellectual history which had previously received the "silent treatment." Zenkovskii's *History of Russian Philosophy*, first published in Paris in 1948 and 1950 (in Russian), and Losskii's *History of Russian Philosophy*, published in New York in 1951, remained unnoticed in the Soviet press until mid-1955. Then, in a single issue of *Voprosy filosofii* an editorial described this situation as "intolerable" and a long review article was devoted to the Zenkovskii and Losskii volumes. A similar review article later appeared in *Kommunist*.[50] The reviews, of course, are critical; but Zenkovskii's point of view, in the Tarakanov review, is quite fairly represented, with some recourse to direct quotation of the author. The spasmodic attacks interspersed between paragraphs of quite calm analysis have the disconnected air of editorial afterthoughts.

In the third place, a series of relatively "objective" expository and critical articles on thinkers long neglected by Soviet philosophers has recently appeared: Locke, Kant, Spinoza (the last named had been much discussed during the late 1920's and early 1930's, but not since the war); German "classical philosophy," especially Hegel; and Montesquieu, the bicentennial of whose death was widely celebrated in the Soviet Union during 1955.

At the same time, there has been a certain liberalizing of the attitude toward earlier Russian thinkers. For example, Skovoroda, long neglected or curtly dismissed with the epithet "mystic and idealist," is the subject of a recent brochure.[51] M. I. Karinskii, a Russian Orthodox priest and a highly competent and original logician of the late nineteenth century, has recently received a certain amount of favorable at-

[50] N. G. Tarakanov, "Fal'sifikatory istorii russkoi filosofskoi mysli" [Falsifiers of the History of Russian Philosophic Thought], *VF*, 1955, No. 3, pp. 73–85; V. Malinin, N. Tarakanov, and I. Shchipanov, "Protiv sovremennykh burzhuaznykh fal'sifikatorov istorii russkoi filosofii" [Against Contemporary Bourgeois Falsifiers of the History of Russian Philosophy], *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 10, pp. 62–76. A very brief article is devoted to Losskii in the second edition of the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. 25 (1954).

[51] T. A. Bilych, *G. S. Skovoroda—vydaiushchisia ukrainskii filosof XVIII veka* [G. S. Skovoroda—an Outstanding Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Philosopher], Kiev, 1953.

tention; he rates an article and portrait in Volume 20 (1953) of the second edition of the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*. The complete works of Alexander Herzen, not published in the Soviet Union since the early 1920's (although selected works have been reprinted), are now being issued in thirty volumes, of which the first four are available. Most recently, a complete edition of Dostoevsky's novels and short stories (in ten volumes) has been announced for publication, beginning in 1956.

Recent Soviet statements insist upon the necessity of studying—and, of course, refuting—Russian *idealists*, not simply materialists, as had hitherto been the practice.[52] The importance of this shift will become evident when it is recalled that in Soviet parlance "idealist" is a blanket term applied indiscriminately to such very diverse thinkers as Bakunin, Lavrov, Mikhailovskii, Kropotkin, Leontiev, Soloviev, and Berdiaev. Among Western philosophers Soviet writers class Dewey, Santayana, Whitehead, Maritain, Jaspers, and Carnap as "idealists"!

An editorial in *Voprosy filosofii*, calling upon philosophers to "raise the theoretical and ideological level of studies in the history of philosophy,"[53] complains that "on the whole the elaboration of the history of philosophy is still in a very poor state."[54] The editorial goes on to comment that "not long ago" (namely, during the 1920's and early 1930's) Soviet historians undervalued Russian history and culture. But "most recently there has been a certain spreading of an equally erroneous, nihilistic attitude toward the achievements of foreign culture and science, and, related to this, the history of philosophic thought in the West."[55] G. F. Aleksandrov is explicitly accused of such nihilism—an opposite extreme from his earlier "error" (for which Zhdanov had chastised him) of "liberal-vegetarian praise" of Western European thinkers. The collectively written *History of Philosophy* (two volumes), of which he was in charge from 1947 until late 1953, is described as offensively nihilistic toward foreign philosophy. It is now undergoing a thorough revision.[56] The previous minimizing (in this text and others) of Western influences upon Belinskii, Chernyshevskii, Dobroliubov, and others is now repudiated as erroneous.

Elsewhere complaints are registered that too little work has been done on American social and philosophic thought;[57] that the works of Hegel, Feuerbach, and other pre-Marxist philosophers have not been republished for many years; that the printings of translations of the works of contemporary foreign scholars and scientists are much too small.[58] "The matter of publication of the works of outstanding foreign philosophers during the last few years has been neglected—which is absolutely intolerable."[59] And again: "We must get rid of the prejudice still held by certain Soviet scientists and scholars that in capitalist countries science is incapable of creating anything of value."[60]

[52] Cf. Tarakanov, *op. cit.* (note 50 *supra*), p. 83.

[53] "Povyshat' ideino-teoreticheskii uroven' issledovanii po istorii filosofii," *VF*, 1955, No. 3, pp. 3–16.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

[56] Aleksandrov's star has recently fallen very low. He was elevated by Malenkov from his position as head of the Institute of Philosophy to that of Minister of Culture of the USSR (March 16, 1954), was dismissed in disgrace a year later, and has not been heard from since. Cf. *Pravda*, March 22, 1955, p. 2.

[57] *VF*, 1955, No. 3, p. 195.

[58] "Neotlozhnye zadachi izdatel'stv" [Immediate Tasks of the Publishing Houses], *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 4, p. 48.

[59] *VF*, 1955, No. 3, p. 16.

[60] "Nasushchnye voprosy . . . ," *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 5, p. 21.

As yet, however, these are bare programmatic statements. Only time will tell whether Soviet philosophers are to be permitted to study and discuss in detail hitherto forbidden thinkers, whether Western or Russian.

Kritika AND *Samokritika* IN PHILOSOPHY

The low quality of philosophy teaching, research, dissertation writing, and general publication has recently been the object of searching criticism by official Soviet organs. Of the thousand-odd philosophy dissertations defended during the decade 1945–55 (fifty being doctoral dissertations and nine hundred and fifty "candidate's" dissertations), only about one hundred were good enough to publish. There is much duplication of subjects; many dissertations are unoriginal compilations, marred by "quotology" (*"tsitatnichestvo"*), schematism, and dogmatism.[61] As for the dissertation defense, it still is "too much like a dress parade, a jubilee celebration at which people pay each other compliments."[62] The system of guidance for graduate students in philosophy needs to be overhauled; professors should be held responsible for the quality of their students' preparation, not just for the number of hours they spend in "consultation" with them, as at present.

Of the thousand-odd graduate philosophers in the Soviet Union, only about one hundred publish regularly; the other nine hundred are "resting on their laurels." Many philosophers do not work very hard; they prefer a quiet life:

> Their philosophical swords are covered with rust . . . , bleak "quotology" has become their stock in trade. . . . They are capable of making a deal with their conscience, praising a book to the skies today and just as readily tearing it to pieces tomorrow. . . . We must put an end to such depravity.[63]

It would presumably be of no avail for ordinary Soviet philosophers to remind their critics that book-review policy is dictated from above!

As for philosophic discussion, it is said to be at a low theoretical level, often merely verbal, scholastic, incoherent, and a general waste of time. There is too much labeling of one's opponents, without grounds, as "metaphysicians," "idealists," "subjectivists," or "objectivists."[64] Published articles are found to exhibit all the defects attributed to philosophy dissertations and also to be marked by occasional outright plagiarisms from other Soviet sources.[65] *Voprosy filosofii*, in a spasm of self-criticism, deplores the low theoretical level of its articles; its secretary, M. I. Sidorov, reports, rather lamely, in partial extenuation, that a large number of even worse articles were *not* printed.[66] *Kommunist* finds that the editors of *Voprosy filosofii* fail to print articles on a number of important philosophical problems and its "summing up" articles which conclude discussions are sometimes obscure and incoherent—for example, that on philosophical problems of psychology in Number 4 of 1954.[67]

One can only say to all this—as to so much *kritika* and *samokritika*—tha[t]

[61] These charges, originally made in *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 5, p. 24, were later expanded in *VF*, 1955, No. 3, pp. 12, 193–96. We have already seen that many philosophy dissertations are written on subjects remote from philosophy.

[62] *VF*, 1955, No. 3, p. 196.

[63] "Nasushchnye voprosy . . . ," *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 5, p. 22.

[64] "O diskussiiakh . . . ," *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 7, p. 122.

[65] *VF*, 1955, No. 3, p. 176.

[66] "K itogam . . . problemam," *VF*, 1955, No. 2, p. 233.

[67] "O diskussiiakh . . . ," *Kommunist*, 1955, No. 7, pp. 124, 127.

the Soviet critics have taken the words right out of one's mouth!

CONCLUSION

Of the three significant shifts in Soviet philosophical theory and practice since the death of Stalin, two—those concerning formal logic and the theory of superstructures—represent retreats from Stalin's "revisionist" position to a more rigidly orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The third, the only hopeful sign on the philosophical horizon, is expressed in a slightly increased hospitality toward the ideas of non-Marxist-Leninist thinkers. But this at present is little more than a program and promise for future action. There is no sign at all of any slackening of the generally authoritarian and dogmatic character of Soviet philosophy and no indication, despite misleading verbal claims to the contrary, of any genuine freedom of philosophic reflection, discussion, or criticism.

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Soviet Science in the Post-Stalin Era

By JOHN TURKEVICH

IN this age when science and technology are dominant factors in the might of a nation, an assessment of Soviet science is particularly timely. Recent years have shown marked advances in many areas of Soviet science and technology and an increasing conformity with the principles of world-wide science.

Science of any nation has both international and national characteristics. In its international aspects, science moves along a broad front with scientists of many nations contributing to its progress. The atomic age was ushered into the twentieth century by Planck, Heisenberg, Hahn, and Einstein, Germans; by Bohr, a Dane; by Rutherford and Aston, Britons; by Fermi, an Italian; by Curie and Joliot from France; by Lawrence, Urey, and Rabi, Americans. Ease and freedom of communication—an assurance of cross-fertilization of ideas—has been associated with science ever since it freed itself from the mumbo jumbo of the witch doctors and the obscure jargon of the alchemical adepts. Western science of the last three centuries has been characterized by widespread and rapid exchange of information on new discoveries and advances. Exchanges of visits to laboratories have been commonplace. Formal training of advanced students is often supplemented by further study under distinguished foreign scholars. Finally, it is a principle universally recognized in the West that science brooks no interference, political or ideological, in its search for truth. It is a firm tenet in the faith of a scientist that scientific truths are based on experiments; that valid experiments can be reproduced in any country irrespective of race, nationality, or ideological outlook; and that dogmatic deductions from religious belief, neat philosophical formulations, or social-economic ideology have no place, as such, in the structure of scientific knowledge.

On the other hand science has its national characteristics. Through his knowledge and skills a scientist discharges his primary responsibility—the defense of his country. Through their inventiveness and perseverance, scientists and engineers are bolstering up the economic strength of their countries and guaranteeing an increase in the standard of living. Science and technology are part of a national life. As such, in common with other national institutions, they have a tradition, organization, capital goods, budget, training of personnel, personalities, and interaction with other groups of society. These various components have a strong national coloring differing from one country to another. They give character to the scientific activity of a given country.

The character of Soviet science is Russian. Characteristics commonly associated with Soviet politics, economics, and intellectual activity can be recognized in science. During the last few decades, crawling within the shell of its national existence, Russian science has lost considerable strength through its isolation from the co-operation and helpful criticism of world science. During the postwar period, its domination by Marxist and Stalinist ideology re-

sulted in a distortion of scientific truths, a convulsive re-examination of scientific tenets, disappearance of important branches of science, and strained relationships with the scientists of other lands. Soviet science not only lost prestige, it lost strength—it had tampered with the recognized principles of obtaining scientific truths, replacing the authority of an experimental result by the authority of an ideological principle.

The last three years have seen a change in Soviet science. The truculent attitude has disappeared; the isolation of Russian scholars is being lifted. Science is being discussed in the Soviet Union not as an expression of a Communist ideology but as a science having its own principles, traditions, and universality.

In the following pages an attempt will be made to point out the significant events that have taken place in recent years in Soviet science.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

Soviet science, like most of the other government activities in the Soviet state, is a highly organized structure. Scientific research is carried out at institutes under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences, at the universities under the Ministry of Higher Education, and at plant laboratories under various specific government ministries. During the last decade there has been no change in the general pattern of the organization. The Academy still represents the "élite guard" organization; its presidium, the general staff of Soviet Science. Its president, A. N. Nesmeianov, occupies a position of prestige and power in the Soviet Union unlike that of any other scientist in any other country. The Academy has been brought to its full strength by the election on October 23, 1953, of 51 academicians and 148 corresponding members. This was the first election in seven years, and it introduced new blood into the Academy.

During the last two years the following new institutes have been established: the Institute of Biophysics, the Institute of Nuclear Problems, the Institute of Electronic and Radio Engineering, the Institute of Acoustics, the Institute of Organometallic Compounds (for substances such as tetraethyl lead, insecticides, etc.), and the Institute of Automotive Engineering. A Mathematical Computer Center has been organized. The Institute of Mathematics and that of Metallurgy have received new buildings, while the Physics Institute received an addition to its laboratory in Moscow. The Institute of Energetics and that of Plastics have been expanded.

The budget of the Academy rose from 59.2 million rubles in 1952, to 75 million rubles in 1953, and to 116.4 million rubles in 1954.

The academies of Union Republics (for example, Ukraine and Byelorussia) also carry out research associated with the scientific and technological problems of their particular region. Their work is co-ordinated with that of the USSR Academy through a co-ordinating committee and an interlocking leadership, whereby a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is also the president of the academy of a Union Republic.

The presidium of the Academy—the president, the secretary-general, and the secretaries of the individual divisions—passes annually on all research proposals, authorizes funds and personnel, and evaluates the results obtained. Over and above this detailed direction, the presidium is guided by two principles. The first is the search for "key problems"—those research problems whose solution will open the maximum number of paths for future scientific development. The second is the ever insistent plea to apply scientific discoveries for the betterment of the state, for "science in the service of the people." Use of slogans as special incentives to fruitful research has been recently abandoned. Such psychological rallying points as "re-examination of science in the light of the decision of the 1948 Agricultural Congress" (the genetics controversy), "science helping to build dams and hydroelectric stations," "science as an aid to agriculture," have been replaced by a small number of more specific objectives. The tasks chosen for 1955 are high-power electronics, rapid digital calculating machines, semiconductors and their technical applications, scientific basis for catalysis, basic biological functions of proteins, material exchange of bacteria, high-temperature alloys, reliability of electronic devices, key problems in theoretical physics, automatic control of production, and the scientific basis for power exploitation in the USSR.

SCIENTIFIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS

If a well-trained science administrator examines the research scene from astronomy to zoology, he can recognize what programs are fruitful, what theoretical and experimental developments will ensure a steady expansion of scientific knowledge. For a country to be a major power it must have a full spectrum of such activity: it must have research going on in every major field. Such a program ensures the proper appreciation of new scientific discoveries for technical development of a nation even when the discovery is not made in the native country. It also maximizes the possibilities of unexpected scientific discoveries, "the breaks in the game" that give a country leadership in the race for scientific knowledge. Only a few countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, and, before World War II, Germany—could muster sufficient strength to be active at all frontiers of every science. Now, ten years after World War II, the Soviet Union has joined the ranks of the major scientific powers. As one scans the Soviet scientific scene one sees ambitious plans, tremendous organization, and an expanding plant. The Soviet government is trying hard to excel in all fields of science and to recoup the losses it suffered through the idiosyncrasies of the Stalin regime.

MATHEMATICS

Mathematics, the queen of the sciences, still dominates the scientific scene. Many branches in both pure and applied sciences are frustrated in their development because present-day mathematical thinking does not give an accurate solution to some key problems. Proper application of mathematical methods guarantees a complete formulation of a complex physical phenomenon and a consistent analysis of its implications. The general theory of relativity had to be formulated in terms of tensor analysis. Modern quantum mechanics required the solution of equations previously buried in mathematical treatises. It necessitated the widespread utilization of geometrical concepts previously considered highly sophisticated. The field of mathematics has been traditionally strong in the Soviet Union. Algebra, geometry, probability theory, have received a steady contribution from older mathematicians such as S. N. Bernstein, A. Ia. Khinchin, A. N. Kolmogorov, A. A. Markov, L. S. Potriagin, and I. M. Vinogradov. At the October 1953 session of the USSR Academy of Sciences D. S. Aleksandrov and N. N. Bogoliubov, both mathematicians of world-wide reputation, were elected to the Academy. In the field of mathematical physics the Soviet Union can boast of the achievements of L. D. Landau, V. A. Fok, D. I. Ivanenko, I. Ia. Pomeranchuk, and I. E. Tamm.

In addition to these mathematicians with world reputations, a large number of younger men are making monthly contributions to the world pool of mathematical knowledge. The following were singled out for recognition by election as corresponding members of the Academy: I. M. Gel'faud, Iu. V. Linnik, A. L. Mal'tsev, M. A. Markov, D. E. Men'shov, and S. N. Mergelian.

The middle decades of the twentieth century have seen the growing development of giant electronic computing machines for solving the complex problems of modern science and technology. Hundreds, thousands, of radio tubes, crystal amplifiers, rectifiers, resistors, condensers, electronic memory devices, are compounded into a single complex mechanism. Such machines rapidly solve problems that would otherwise require thousands of man-years for problems previously considered impossible. Their variety and complexity have created a new art, used for tracing trajectories of projectiles, the propagation of radio waves, the determination of the stability of machines, and the control of automatic factories.

Electronic calculators are essential weapons in the heavy scientific armament of any nation that considers itself a world power. The Soviet Academy has paid great attention in recent years to such calculating machines. The presidium of the Academy announced last year the operation of a giant computer and the organization of a Computer Center of the Academy for the theoretical and technical development of computing machines. This center is undertaking a systematic survey of fields of science and technology where such machines will give fruitful solutions to "key problems" and is training personnel for this new field of "applied mathematics." During the elections of October 1953 the Academy elected two specialists in this field to its rank: S. A. Lebedev as academician and P. S. Novikov as corresponding member.

ASTRONOMY

Soviet astronomy suffered a severe setback during World War II when the famous Pulkovo observatory near Leningrad and the Crimean observatory were completely destroyed. Within the last two years the reconstruction of both of these observatories has been completed and astronomical observations are actively pursued in diverse branches of the subject: on diffuse nebulae by G. A. Shain, on the polarization of stellar radiation by V. A. Dombrovskii, and on the behavior of stellar associations in an attempt to solve the problem of whether stellar creation is still taking place. A military development in England during the war led to the unexpected discovery that celestial bodies emit radiation similar to radar. Astronomers have found that a study of this phenomenon elucidates diverse astronomical processes. Soviet scientists have been active in this field, particularly in the study of the radar waves given off by the sun. President A. N. Nesmeianov, in his address before the election of new members to the Academy in October 1953, pointed out that astrophysics and astronomy give significant insight into thermonuclear processes, and this opinion was implemented by the Academy in the election of the leading astrophysicist, B. A. Ambartsumian, as academician, and of three astronomers, M. S. Zverev, E. R. Mustel', and P. P. Parengo, as corresponding members.

PHYSICS

Modern physics has three very active branches—nuclear physics, low temperature physics, and the physics of the solid state. Soviet scientists have been active in all these fields. In the summer of 1954 a five thousand kilowatt

atom power station was put into operation and in the summer of 1955 at the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy the details of its construction were revealed and freely discussed. Soviet sources have also stated that many industrial atomic power stations of the same type but of greater power, fifty to one hundred megawatts, are being constructed in Russia. Early in 1955 there appeared in the *Doklady* (Reports) of the USSR Academy of Sciences the first scientific papers describing the results obtained with the 600 million volt proton synchrotron at Moscow. The largest high voltage machines of this type in the United States are of only 400 million electron volts. However, we have at the Brookhaven National Laboratory an accelerator of another type, a cosmotron of 3,600 million electron volts, and at the Radiation Laboratory in California, a bevatron of 6,000 million electron volts. The Soviet scientists are meeting this challenge, for they announced at the Geneva Atomic Energy Conference that they expect to complete a high voltage machine of 10,000 million or 10 billion electron volts. Less dramatic but very extensive and thorough work is being carried out by Soviet scientists in the many subdivisions of nuclear physics: interaction of neutrons with fissionable materials, details of the structure of radioative nuclei, and the effect of radiation of solids. At the October 1953 election the following Soviet atom scientists were elected as academicians: L. A. Artsimovich, I. E. Tamm, Iu. B. Khariton, and A. D. Sakharov.

Soviet investigation on cosmic rays, that penetration radiation of tremendous energy which bathes the earth, from unknown extraterrestrial sources, is of lower caliber than the Soviet work in other nuclear fields, no doubt as a result of the unfortunate claim made some years ago by the Soviet physicists Alikhanov and Alikhanian on the detection in the cosmic radiation of "varitrons," elementary particles of varying mass. This claim was questioned in the West and attacked by a group of Soviet physicists, with a subsequent bitter polemic in the Soviet physics journals. The controversy has never been settled officially, and Soviet cosmic ray research has suffered a lack of prestige.

Extremely low temperatures—that of liquid hydrogen and helium, hundreds of degrees below room temperature—have been of primary scientific interest to scientists of many countries, for at these temperatures many complex properties of solids become simple and susceptible to a formulation in terms of atomic structure. On the other hand, liquids such as helium show unusual and unexpected properties that baffle theoreticians. Furthermore, study of properties of matter at low temperatures leads to the development of efficient and economical methods for production of the cheap oxygen so necessary in the manufacture of gasoline from coal and natural gas and so desirable in metallurgical processes. Soviet physics has had great strength in this field, with world-famous institutes at Kharkov in the Ukraine and in Moscow. Peter L. Kapitsa, one of the leading Soviet physicists, has been prominent in this field both during his researches in England, at Cambridge University, and during his subsequent stay in Moscow. Early this year Kapitsa was named director of the Institute of Physical Problems. Soviet work in the field of low temperature has been characterized by strong theoretical insight, imagination, and experimental elegance.

Electronics is at present undergoing a revolution. Physicists and chemists have found that the fragile radio tubes, photocells, and even television tubes

can be replaced by carefully purified solids. These devices, small in size, mechanically stable, and long of life, are gradually replacing ordinary vacuum tubes. Many everyday electronic devices contain such transistors and photoelements. The solar battery has them as a component. Behind this important technological development there are decades of intensive scientific work in many countries of the world. Russian scientists have made and are still making important contributions, both theoretical and experimental, in the fields of luminescent substances, photoelectric devices, and new electric and magnetic materials. Attention is also paid to the electric and mechanical properties of plastics. Two Soviet physicists were honored by election as academicians in the general field of the solid state: A. P. Aleksandrov in plastics and I. K. Kikoin for his work on magnetic materials. At the same session of the Academy sixteen younger physicists were elected corresponding members of the Academy.

CHEMISTRY

Literally hundreds of papers are published yearly in Russian journals describing the results of chemical research in all branches of the science, inorganic, organic, physical, biochemical, analytical, and colloidal. The nature of the subject of chemistry is such that it requires detailed and painstaking work to support modern chemical industry. In general, Soviet chemistry follows the main lines of the development of the subject in other countries. One can, however, point out the following as notable points of Soviet interest: extensive use of radioactive isotopes for the study of details of chemical reactions, investigation of the chemistry of "man-made elements" such as plutonium, and the use of nuclear radiation for acceleration or activation of chemical processes. The photochemist V. A. Kondrat'ev and the geochemist A. P. Vinogradov were elected academicians in 1953, and both took part in the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. The significant achievements in the field of organic chemistry are the production of new types of plastics, a new synthetic rubber, the manufacture of chemicals and soaps from petroleum, and the synthesis of new insecticides and morphinelike drugs. The chemists who were elected to the Academy for leadership in these fields are B. A. Arbusov, I. L. Knuniants, V. A. Kargin, and I. N. Nazarov.

GEOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Geological studies in the Soviet Union cover the whole gamut of internationally recognized interests. Expeditions have been sent by the Academy to the polar section of the Urals, to Kazakhstan, and to the Altai territory. An investigation has been carried out to determine whether cotton cultivation is possible through irrigating the Tuva Autonomous Region in Middle Asia. Explorations are continually carried out for coal, petroleum, iron, and rare metals. A very extensive study of the northwestern Pacific Ocean has disclosed the existence of a suboceanic mountain range extending from the Hawaiian Islands northward to the Komandorskii Islands and dividing the northern part of the Pacific into two basins. Continued study is devoted to the Russian perennial headache—the permanently frozen lands of northern Siberia. During the October 1953 session of the Academy, ten prominent geologists, geophysicists, and geographers were elected academicians. In addition twenty-three other geologists were added to the Academy as corresponding members.

BIOLOGY

Biology, the science that suffered so deeply from the genetics controversy, has turned during the last few years to biochemistry. Radioactive tracer atoms are being used to study animals, the chemical processes of material exchange in the brain tissues, liver, and muscles (in animals and in plants) and the formation of sugars and nicotine. Photosynthesis, the process of converting abundant carbon dioxide and water into starch by means of the solar radiation, is investigated by isotopic atom methods. The solution of this "key problem" will permit the synthetic production of food. Nuclear radiation is applied to the cold sterilization of food.

Zoologists continue their publications on the fauna of the USSR, and the botanists are making similar studies of the flora. The biology section of the Academy has also dealt with practical problems. It has organized the production of the antianemia vitamin B_{12} and used radioactive phosphorus to investigate the uptake of phosphorus fertilizer from the soil by plants. The latter study permits determination of the best phosphorus compound to use as a fertilizer and the best time for phosphorus application.

The science of genetics is dead in the Soviet Union. Publications on what Western science would call genetics are nonexistent. The last few years have seen, however, the decline of the influence of Lysenko, the prophet of Soviet Marxist genetics. His voice is not heard in scientific pronouncements, though he is still active administratively in biological sections of the Academy and dominates the Soviet Agricultural Academy. The wounds of the genetics controversy have not healed. Recently there has been an attack on Lysenko's ideas by several Soviet botanists and a very polemical defense by one of his supporters. The presidium of the Academy took the biology section to task for permitting the controversy to go on.

The following biologists were elected to the Academy: A. L. Kursanov, in plant physiology, V. N. Shaposhnikov in industrial bacteriology, V. A. Engel'gardt in biochemistry, and I. V. Turin in soil science.

ENGINEERING SCIENCES

The field of engineering has shown marked activity during the last few years. Development of an atomic energy power plant, the production of a high octane gasoline, subterranean gasification of coal, study of gas dynamics, and various phases of electronics received particular attention. Soviet engineers and scientists have been particularly intrigued with the possibility of automatic control of production in factories.

At the October 1953 meeting, the following leading Soviet engineers were elected to membership in the Academy: the airplane designer A. N. Tupolev, the motor and jet engineers V. Ia. Klimov and L. I. Sedov, the famous hydroelectric power specialist S. Ia. Zhuk, the machine designer V. I. Dikushin, the marine architect Iu. A. Shimanskii, the metallurgists M. M. Karnaukov and G. V. Kurdiumov, the electronic engineers M. P. Kostenko, V. A. Kotel'nikov, A. N. Shchukin, and S. A. Vekshinskii; and the combustion engineers B. S. Stechkin and M. A. Mikheev. In addition forty-four engineers were elected as corresponding members.

INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS

A recent important aspect of Soviet science is the increase in the international contacts of Russian scientists. Before 1952 the presence of a Soviet delegation at an international scientific conference was a rare event. Since that time there has been a marked rise

in the number of delegations attending foreign scientific meetings: fourteen in 1952, thirty in 1953, and sixty-five in 1954. In August 1955 the Soviet Union sent to the Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva a delegation of over one hundred scientists, engineers, and technicians. The Soviet representatives were of high technical ability, presented 74 papers on various phases of atomic energy (the United States presented 166, the United Kingdom 64, and France 27 papers) and participated freely in scientific discussions. The Soviet exhibit on atomic energy, at the same time, was impressive. In the last three years the number of visits to the Soviet Union by foreign scientists has also been significant. In 1952 ten groups, in 1953 fourteen, and in 1954 eight groups were shown Soviet institutes and laboratories. In 1955 there has been a continuing stream of groups from various countries visiting the Academy institutions. Representatives of seventeen countries attended the opening of the reconstructed Pulkovo observatory. On July 1 to 5, 1955, just before the United Nations Conference in Geneva, the Soviet Academy held its own conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, at which twenty-one papers were presented on nuclear physics, eighteen on chemistry, twenty on biology, and twenty-one on various applications of atomic energy.

International exchanges of journals and books, curtailed three years ago by the Soviets, is again widespread, and in 1954 the USSR Academy of Sciences sent abroad 350,000 books.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERSONNEL

The training of scientific personnel represents a long-time investment. In modern society equipment can be built in several weeks, laboratories in months. Training of scientists and engineers requires years. The number of such men in a given country is determined not only by the availability of schools and teachers but also by the desire of youth to enter these professions. Social mores, family background, and financial remuneration all play a role in the youth's decision. Soviet leaders have publicly recognized the importance of science for the development of the security of their country and for its military and economic potential. Russian scientists and engineers enjoy the full care of their government and the respect and admiration of the populace. They are well paid. At the same time the Soviet educational system is geared for training in science—in the primary schools, in secondary education, and particularly in universities and graduate instruction.

In the four-year primary school, normally entered at seven, the Soviet youngsters spend 30 per cent of their time on science. The secondary school system in the USSR consists of a general secondary school and vocational training schools. The general secondary school requires three or six years and the same curriculum is given to *all* students. Science teaching constitutes 46 per cent of the instruction. In 1953 there were 4,600,000 pupils in the USSR secondary schools, and 700,000 of them graduated that year. Vocational schools are either short courses for apprentices given in factories or three to four year *tekhnikum*'s which train technicians or master craftsmen. In 1953 these schools graduated 50,000 technicians. There is no analogue to the *tekhnikum* in the United States educational system. In 1953 the American secondary school system had 7,266,000 students, many of whom received a very inadequate training in science.

The Soviet higher educational system (VUZ) consists of thirty-three universities, which give general education

TABLE 1.—NUMBER OF GRADUATES FROM SOVIET INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION, 1952–55

(*In thousands*)

TYPE OF INSTITUTION	1952	1953	1954	1955
Engineering	30	40	53	63
Agriculture	15	17	18	21
Health	17	16	24	25
Economics	8	9	10	11
Universities	18	18	17	18
Teacher training and art	69	65	53	47
Total	157	165	175	185

and produce most of the scientists, and some eight hundred specialized schools, for medicine (74), teacher training (320), engineering (154), agriculture (61), arts (55), economics (38), veterinary science (38), and so forth. Table 1 gives the number of graduates of each type of institution in units of a thousand.

The total number of graduates from higher educational institutions is lower in the USSR than in the United States, for in 1952 there were 333,000 new college graduates in the United States, compared to a figure of 157,000 in the USSR; in 1955 the figures are 281,000 and 185,000, respectively. However, it must be pointed out that many of the graduates of American colleges receive not professional training, but a liberal education, while all graduates from the Soviet higher educational institutions are given training in engineering, teaching, science, and so forth. A particularly important trend must be noted in the number of graduates in engineering: in the Soviet Union their number rose from 30,000 in 1952 to 63,000 in 1955, while in the United States it *decreased* from 30,000 in 1952 to 23,000 in 1955. In agriculture the number of graduates in 1952 was the same in both countries—15,000—while in 1955 the number declined in the United States to 12,000 and increased in the Soviet Union to 21,000. In the health sciences there has been a marked rise in the USSR over the four-year period, to be contrasted with the constant number of 28,000 graduates in the United States.

The importance of scientific training in higher education in the Soviet Union was underlined by the opening on September 1, 1953, of the new building of Moscow University on the outskirts of the capital. The main, thirty-two story building has a volume of 48.3 million cubic feet and contains the geology-geography departments, the science library, the mechanics department, the mathematics department, an auditorium seating 1,500 students, and the administrative and social rooms for the University. The adjoining buildings, each of a capacity of 9.4 million cubic feet, house the physics and chemistry departments. In all, the University consists of a complex of twenty-seven basic buildings and ten service buildings. These contain 1,693 laboratories, 21 auditoriums with seating capacities of 160 to 600, and 141 recitation rooms. There are 6,000 rooms available as living quarters for undergraduate and graduate students and 184 apartments for instructors and professors. The University has a library of 1,200,000 volumes. A faculty of 2,300 (of whom 30 are academicians, 59 corresponding members, 486 doctors, 846 *Kandidats*,

TABLE 2—NUMBER OF PH.D. DEGREES GRANTED IN U. S. AND KANDIDAT DEGREES IN USSR, 1952–55

(In thousands)

DEGREES	1952	1953	1954	1955
United States Ph.D.	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.4
Soviet *Kandidat*	5.9	7.3	7.8	8.4

407 professors, and 498 docents) teach 18,200 university students and 1,600 aspirants (graduate students). This impressive complex of buildings, which dominates the Moscow skyline, was built solely for the training of scientists.

GRADUATE WORK

Graduate work in the Soviet Union leads to two degrees, that of the *Kandidat* and that of Doctor of Science. The *Kandidat* degree is of a slightly lower standard than the American Ph.D. but definitely more advanced than our M.Sci. The requirements for the *Kandidat* degree are completion of a series of courses in an institution of higher education, successful solution of a research problem, and presentation and public defense of a *Kandidat* dissertation. Table 2 gives a comparison of the number of *Kandidat* degrees and Ph.D. degrees given in recent years in units of a thousand.

The doctor's degree in the Soviet Union is different from that given in Western Europe and the United States. In the Soviet Union the Doctor of Science is awarded for mature, independent research which normally requires a maximum of four years' work. It is formalized in a dissertation and is subjected to a public examination. Before this degree is awarded, the dissertation must also be reviewed by a board of experts designated by the Supreme Accrediting Committee (VKA), which finally grants the degree in the name of the government. It thus represents Soviet Union recognition of a mature scientist. About five hundred Doctor of Science degrees are granted annually.

The numbers of personnel professionally trained in science in the Soviet Union and the United States are given in Tables 3 and 4; the figures there show definitely that the pool of scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union is comparable to that in the United States. Scientists employed in research and teaching in the USSR number 165,000; in the United States, 250,000.

SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS

An important feature of science is the dissemination of scientific information. It is through scientific journals that scientists keep abreast of recent developments not only in foreign countries but also in their own country. Information so obtained is used either to modify their research programs to avoid duplication or to stimulate approaches new to research. Soviet science has not neglected this feature of scientific activity. The publication program of the Academy is prodigious. Fifty journals appear weekly, monthly, or bimonthly, ranging from *Priroda* ("Nature"), a monthly popular science magazine, and the *Doklady* ("Reports") of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which give four-page communications on the latest scientific developments in the Soviet Union, to numerous journals devoted to specific sciences. In physics alone over five hundred articles are published every year.

TABLE 3—NUMBER OF UNIVERSITY GRADUATES EMPLOYED IN SCIENCE, USSR AND U. S.

	USSR	U. S.
Living university graduates, all fields	2,680,000	6,040,000
Graduates employed in science	1,140,000	1,150,000
Physical sciences and engineering	625,000	545,000
Health	310,000	445,000
Agriculture	205,000	160,000

TABLE 4—NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS HOLDING ADVANCED DEGREES IN SCIENCE IN USSR (*Kandidat*) AND U. S. (PH.D.)

	USSR	U. S.
All scientific fields	64,000	51,000
Physical sciences	33,000	32,000
Health	19,000	8,000
Agriculture	12,000	11,000

Soviet science, isolated as it is from the Western world where most of the discoveries are made, uses three methods for following scientific developments in the West: review journals, translations of foreign treatises, and a journal of abstracts. Review journals are periodicals which give a detailed survey of subjects of current scientific interest; in the Soviet Union there are separate journals of this type for mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. The articles in them are well written and are ideally suited to keeping a reader informed on developments in a critical scientific field. It has also been the policy of the Academy during the last three decades to translate and publish in the Soviet Union all important English, American, French, and German scientific treatises. The Soviet Union's own books on the physical sciences are excellent—well compiled and on a par with their Western counterparts. They are published in large numbers and sell for a very low price.

The classification, systematization, and indexing of the tremendous number of scientific articles are carried out by the journals of abstracts. These periodicals, of which the most extensive is the *American Chemical Abstracts,* condense articles to short abstracts, which are then printed in sections arranged by subject matter and thoroughly indexed according to subject, formula, and author. Availability of such abstract journals is indispensable for scientific work, for they minimize the possibility of duplication and guide the research worker through the forest of scientific facts. In chemistry there are about a million compounds; by using an abstract journal and its indices a research worker can compile a bibliography on any one of them in a matter of several minutes. Publishing an abstract journal is a very expensive enterprise, carried out for chemistry and biology in the United States, and for physics in England.

Two years ago the USSR Academy of Sciences embarked on the publication of an abstract journal *Referaty,* which will cover *all* fields of science. In 1953 seven branches of science were reviewed in three thousand manuscript pages. The journals scanned for material were

both Soviet and foreign. In 1954 the number of manuscript pages rose to 18,574, containing 102,000 individual abstracts—the equivalent of thirty-five volumes of an encyclopedia. In 1955 the Academy planned to expand the abstract journal to 25,000 manuscript pages. The abstracts are of high quality and testify to the large number of people in the Soviet Union who have received an advanced education in science. A special Institute of Scientific Information has been created for the purpose of organizing the distribution of scientific knowledge in the country. The *Referaty* may be the most ambitious and comprehensive scheme in existence for extracting the essence of scientific results, sorting it according to subject, and making an index to the information so obtained.

IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET SCIENCE

Before the advent of totalitarianism there were no ideological distinctions in science. The laws of nature were invariable, unaffected by changing national scene. The methods of science were the same throughout the world, the validity of experimental fact being based on the reproducibility of experimental results by any scientist skilled in the art of experimentation. The usefulness of generalization and the fruitfulness of theories were subjected to free criticism untarnished by attacks on personalities and by appeals to authority. During the period of totalitarian regimes, and particularly after World War II, a new type of science arose—a "Marxist science." In this form of "science," conformity with the "dialectic materialism of Marxism" was established as the new and crucial criterion of truth. The struggle in the USSR between Soviet Marxist science and supporters of Western bourgeois science culminated in 1948 in the famous genetics controversy. In this heated polemic as to whether effects caused by environment can be passed on to progeny, scientific reasoning was abandoned and scientific decision was reached not by scientists but by an ex cathedra pronouncement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In forcing their decision on the genetics discussion the Central Committee interfered with due process for establishing scientific truths. The result was the death of genetics as a science in the Soviet Union and the disappearance from active scientific work of a number of prominent Soviet scholars. Furthermore, the decision of the Central Committee had its repercussions in other branches of Soviet science. In chemistry, a number of scientists were taken to task for espousing the "ideological resonance theory of the structure of organic molecules"; in physics the controversy centered on relativity, quantum mechanics, indeterminancy principle, definition of force; in physiology on the methods of Pavlov physiology. Many public discussions were held on these subjects; many scientists were publicly rebuked for what appeared to us in the West a trivial deviation from a weakly delineated party line.

In the last three years a calm has settled over Soviet science. No violent polemics shake its structure. Although there has been no public renunciation of the views of Lysenko's Marxist genetics, the Academy does not appeal to the principles of Marxism for the development of Russian science.

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in this paper to present some of the salient features of the large and complicated national activity encompassed by the phrase "Soviet science." As the world moves into the nuclear age, it should be apparent to all who consider the Soviet scene that Soviet science represents a tremendous potential for scientific and technological progress, that some of this potential has been translated into success, and that the Soviet leadership is making a conscious, well-planned attempt to assume the scientific leadership of the world.

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Soviet Policies in Eastern Europe

By Paul E. Zinner

THE policies of the new Soviet leadership toward the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe—including Finland, the "People's Democracies," Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey—have to a large measure reflected the changing climate in East-West relations. To be sure, not all the countries have been equally affected by modifications and adjustments in Soviet policies, nor have they responded in the same way to Soviet approaches. In general, however, the Kremlin has appeared to be intent on easing tensions, international or internal as the case may be, in an area in which it has long maintained a special interest and to be seeking to further its long-range objectives through this new approach.

Wooing of Yugoslavia

Of the policies initiated by the Kremlin, the gradual but persistent rapprochement with Yugoslavia has been by all odds the most spectacular and significant.

In March 1953, when Stalin died, hostility between the Cominform bloc (including the Soviet Union and its East European minions) and Yugoslavia was at a high pitch. Frequent border skirmishes (increasing in intensity as well as in their rate of incidence throughout 1952) and vitriolic propaganda exchanges marked a relentless war of nerves on the part of the Cominform, to which Yugoslavia responded in kind.

Soviet advances

Less than two months later the Soviet Union made an opening gambit to reduce tensions. The May Day slogans of the USSR, released well in advance of the actual event itself, for the first time in five years failed to mention the "heroic struggles" of the Yugoslav people against Tito and his capitalist masters. On April 29 Molotov received the Yugoslav chargé d'affaires. At whose request the audience was granted is not known. But the subject under consideration—the re-establishment of normal diplomatic ties—suggests that it was the Russians who took the initiative. In any event, in May a new Soviet chargé was appointed to Belgrade. In July an exchange of ambassadors was agreed on and Vasilii Val'kov was immediately dispatched to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs, moving more circumspectly, waited until September before sending their appointee, Dobrivoje Vidić, to his post in Moscow. With this move, the first phase in the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations was to all intents and purposes completed.

Meanwhile the situation along Yugoslavia's frontiers had shown a definite improvement. The frequency of incidents decreased and before the year was out a series of agreements designed to forestall border clashes and regulate matters of common interest had been negotiated with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania, setting the stage for the resumption of Belgrade's diplomatic ties with these countries. Yugoslavia could now feel reasonably secure from armed harassment on the part of the Cominform countries. It was, however, still subject to hostile propaganda and it remained economically isolated from its former trading partners of the Soviet

bloc. Additional progress toward closer and more amicable contacts was registered only in the second half of 1954.

In September 1954 the conclusion of a barter agreement with Russia marked the end of the Cominform's economic blockade. At about the same time the Soviet bloc ceased jamming Yugoslav broadcasts to Eastern Europe and halted the operations of Radio Free Yugoslavia and of other anti-Tito propaganda media.

A Russian campaign to erase the remaining traces of hostility and "normalize" relations now appeared to be in full swing. It received added and dramatic impetus in October, coincidentally with the return of Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan from their visit to Peking, which was followed by a major reappraisal of Soviet policies.

The tenth anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade from the Germans was noted with unusual warmth in Soviet propaganda media, which, in striking contrast with past utterances, acclaimed the role played by the Yugoslavs in freeing themselves, recalled the historic friendship of the Yugoslav and Soviet peoples, and paid homage to the "best sons" of both countries, who had shed their blood jointly on Yugoslav soil. Of equal if not greater significance was the acquiescence by the USSR in the settlement of the Trieste issue on terms which the Russians had in the past consistently denounced.

On November 6, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Maxim Saburov, the official speaker for the day, went out of his way to urge "complete normalization" of relations between Moscow and Belgrade and expressed the hope that Russian efforts to renew "ancient bonds of friendship" would be duly reciprocated by Yugoslavia. He intimated that recent quarrels between the two nations had only benefited the "enemies of peace," who are ipso facto the enemies of both Russia and Yugoslavia.

Saburov's bold overture was followed up by other extraordinary approaches, many of them within the context of social occasions which began to assume importance as a vehicle of Soviet diplomacy. The Yugoslav ambassador, Vidić, found himself buttonholed by Khrushchev and Malenkov, who engaged him in lengthy and animated conversations. On November 28, at a reception given by the Yugoslav Embassy, Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Molotov toasted the health of "Comrade Tito."[1] Khrushchev was also reported to have made what seemed then an almost unbelievable statement to the effect that, since both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, there was no reason why differences in view between them should persist.

If this represented a complete *volte-face* in the Soviet position on the ideological aspects of the controversy with Tito, it bespoke continuing preoccupation with ideological considerations as they affected the regulation of relations with Yugoslavia and foreshadowed the tack the Russians would henceforth take on this issue.

Yugoslavian resistance

The ostentatious display of amiability by the Soviet leaders did not bear fruit immediately. While they were apparently ready to let bygones be bygones and to resume relations where they left off in 1948, the Yugoslavs showed a justifiable wariness and insisted on a clarification of the terms of rapprochement. As a result, months of hard bargaining ensued, during which the Russians found themselves cast in the role of ardent pursuers, whereas Tito ex-

[1] See G. L., "The Russo-Yugoslav Detente," *The World Today*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1955), pp. 10–19.

ploited to the hilt his position as the aggrieved party. While most of the discussions were cloaked in secrecy, an occasional public statement by one side or the other afforded some insight into the issues that marred agreement.

Although the Russians showed considerable forbearance in catering to Tito's sensitivities, they could not refrain from implying (probably for domestic propaganda purposes) that a rapprochement had been made possible, at least in part, by certain changes in Yugoslavia's policies, changes which were tantamount to an admission of "past errors." Tito most emphatically rejected all such insinuations. He denied that Yugoslavia had altered its policies after Stalin's death and disclaimed the need for any change, since, in his view, no errors had been committed by his party.[2] The blame for the rift and its unpleasant consequences, he asserted, rested squarely on the shoulders of the USSR and demanded a full apology as a precondition to the re-establishing of "normal" relations. This the Russians were apparently prepared to make.

The ideological issue

A more vexing problem was raised by Moscow's obvious intention to put "normalization" on the basis of party ideology. For it, interpretations and explanations of the past were not the principal point; rather, the practical circumstances of Yugoslavia's future relations not only with the Soviet bloc but with the West were at stake.

Whatever the underlying reasons for the Soviet approach may have been, and they were admittedly not easy to fathom, Tito steadfastly refused to accept an ideological platform as a suitable basis for rapprochement. He could not disregard the probable repercussions which a reconciliation between his party and his one-time Cominform comrades within a Marxist-Leninist framework might have on his relations with the West. If his new-found Western friends abandoned him or came to distrust him intensely, he would be deprived of the backing that imparted a large measure of strength to his bargaining position with the Russians. To avoid alarming his Western friends and thus to preserve his maneuvering ability, Tito reiterated time and again that a return to the type of Soviet-Yugoslav relations that had existed prior to 1948 was unthinkable. Instead, he suggested a formula for "active coexistence" between sovereign states with different social systems, on the basis of mutual respect and noninterference in one another's internal affairs. He foresaw fruitful cultural and economic exchange with the Soviet Union, but carefully eschewed the question of party ties.

To placate Tito's fears the Russians assured him that the restoration of normal relations with the Soviet Union "in no way implies, and cannot imply, a deterioration of Yugoslavia's relations with other countries" and repeated Soviet willingness to improve relations "along the lines of state policy." But the final emphasis was on ideological matters, from which the Russians refused to depart.[3]

Belgrade meeting

Despite a standoff on the ideological issue, a sufficient area of agreement seemed to have been reached at some time during the spring of 1955 to permit arranging a meeting between the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders. A communiqué, announcing that the two governments, inspired by their common desire "for a further improvement of relations . . .

[2] See "Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), Vol. 5, No. 119 (March 15, 1955), p. 5.

[3] See R. L., "Yugoslavia Between Independence and Orthodoxy," *The World Today*, Vol. 11, No. 8 (August 1955), pp. 322–34.

and for the consolidation of peace" had agreed to arrange a meeting "at the highest level," was dramatically issued on May 14. On that same day the Soviet government and its satellites signed the Warsaw Pact establishing a unified military command for the Soviet bloc in Europe.

Belgrade was announced as the place of meeting—clearly a victory for Tito, for it cast the affair in the light of a pilgrimage of penance on the part of the Soviet leaders.

The meetings opened on May 27, 1955. The Soviet delegation, headed by Khrushchev, also included Bulganin, Mikoyan, Shepilov, Kumykin (a Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade), and Gromyko. Molotov, who had been directly involved in the conflict of 1948, was ostentatiously omitted. The fact that Khrushchev led the delegation and that it also included Shepilov, the editor of *Pravda*, indicated an intention to raise party issues. Indeed, Khrushchev's opening speech, delivered upon arrival at Zemun airport, left no doubt of this intent. It contained a forceful appeal for the resumption of full party relations on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

This appeal was coupled with a most abject but ridiculous apology for the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. It laid all the blame on the machinations of "enemies of the people, Beria, Abakumov and others who have been unmasked" and pretended that, otherwise, no differences at all had existed between the two parties. Even so, it failed to get the negotiations off to a propitious beginning. Nevertheless, after six days of discussions, interrupted by sightseeing and relaxation, a document suggesting a broad identity of views on major issues of international relations was produced. The joint statement set forth the principles that were to govern the "mutual relations" of the two countries in terms eminently satisfactory to the Yugoslavs, emphasizing the "interstate" nature of these relations and putting economic and cultural co-operation ahead of other considerations. Khrushchev's bid for an exclusive party relationship was apparently unsuccessful. The joint declaration merely took note, as the last point of the agreement, that "the two Governments have agreed to assist and facilitate co-operation among the social organizations of the two countries through the establishing of contacts, the exchange of Socialist experiences and a free exchange of opinions."[4]

This did not mean that the Russians had given up pursuing party objectives. While they hailed with great satisfaction the improvement in relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia as a "new contribution to the easing of international tension and the strengthening of peace," they also continued to plump for the "re-establishment of contact and a rapprochement between the C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles,"[5] implying that along this line much was left to be done.

Economic relations

One of the results of the Belgrade meeting was a sharp increase in the number of "contacts" between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. These included reciprocal visits by parliamentary delegations, technical groups, teachers and journalists, a lengthy visit in Moscow of a Yugoslav economic mission and a surprising sojourn of Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan, a member of

[4] "Declaration of the Governments of the FPRY [Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia] and the USSR," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), Vol. 6, No. 124 (June 1, 1955), pp. 1, 2.

[5] *Pravda*, July 16, 1955; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 7, No. 26 (August 10, 1955), p. 3.

the original Khrushchev delegation, in Yugoslavia, ostensibly to take his annual vacation there. To date these contacts have yielded one major tangible agreement, regulating the economic relations between the two countries. An agreement signed in Moscow on September 1, 1955, calls for (1) an increase in annual trade turnover from nearly 40 million dollars to 70 million dollars in each direction over the next three years; (2) a Russian credit of 54 million dollars for the purchase of Russian raw materials, as well as additional credits for certain Yugoslav industrial projects, and (3) a Russian loan to Yugoslavia, in foreign currency or gold, of 30 million dollars, both the loan and credit to be repaid over ten years at 2 per cent interest. What is more significant, however, the Russians offered to assist the Yugoslavs in the development of nuclear energy facilities for peaceful purposes.[6] The Yugoslavs in turn, by agreeing to supply Russia with bauxite, lead, and other raw materials, have departed from their voluntary acceptance of the Western ban on the sale of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc.

The achievements of the Soviet's new line toward Yugoslavia are at this stage still difficult to assess. Rather substantial progress in restoring clogged trade channels does not necessarily represent a Soviet advance. On the contrary, it is likely to be of advantage to the Yugoslavs, who were severely pinched by the Cominform's economic blockade; they have always felt uneasy about being completely dependent on Western economic and financial assistance and find themselves currently in a tight economic situation.

A relaxation in tension, though not necessarily an unambiguous blessing, has so far benefited the Yugoslavs. It has afforded them a much needed breathing spell and has enhanced their prestige. Yet any rapprochement with the East could easily impair relations with the West, where Tito is still regarded with suspicion by many people. While no serious deterioration in these relations has taken place, dealings between Yugoslavia and the Western countries subsequent to the Belgrade meeting have been marked by a few jittery episodes. The Balkan Alliance, in turn, which promised to develop into an effective anchor of NATO's extended lines in an area of traditional military weakness, has in the meantime seriously disintegrated. The recession of an imminent threat of war has substantially cooled Tito's enthusiasm for this undertaking, which, by virtue of its close tie-in with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would, in fact, have been incompatible with Yugoslavia's avowed desire to eschew military blocs.

[6] See *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 7, No. 35 (October 12, 1955), p. 11.

Orthodoxy or independence?

Internally, Tito has stood his ground well. He has mastered what in 1954 appeared to be an incipient ground swell of sentiment in favor of a return to "orthodoxy" and has done so without undermining the solidarity of the Communist League.

Nevertheless, it would be unwise to overlook the motives underlying Soviet blandishments or to underestimate their potential effects on Yugoslavia's foreign relations and its internal political balance. The most disturbing aspect of the Kremlin's attitude has been the dogged insistence on casting the problem of rapprochement in ideological terms, despite the Yugoslavs' vigorous opposition to this. This does not mean that Soviet policy makers, given their present mood, may not be content to accept for what it is worth a *détente* or normalization of relations on an "interstate" basis, as a milestone toward real co-operation, or that they may not be prepared to show considerable patience in their dealings with Tito. What it tends to reveal is that the Kremlin's ultimate objective is not simply to normalize its relations but to reabsorb Yugoslavia in the Communist camp. To be sure, the terms on which Tito is now being lured back are those which were denied him in 1948.

This represents real progress in the Soviet position, which was not necessarily achieved without difficulty. In the meantime, however, Tito's position has also evolved. In 1948 he would have been glad to be granted autonomy within the Communist camp. He now seeks independence from it. Although he claims to be a Communist, he sees himself in a role more closely resembling Nehru than Mao. The Russians, for their part, are making it abundantly clear that they do not regard Yugoslavia—a Communist country—in the same light as, say, Finland or Austria or India, non-Communist countries with which the Soviet Union can develop a set of relations which can set a broadly applicable pattern of coexistence.

As matters now stand, the Russians face an uphill struggle in their bid for party-ideological ties. But their underlying hope may be that the liquidation of the conflict and the resumption of a variety of contacts will initiate a process inside the Yugoslav Communist League which will gradually force its leaders to return to a policy of Communist solidarity even if this is not their intention now.

The struggle between Tito and the Kremlin is far from over. It has been tamed to a tug of war, but the stakes are still very high. The supreme test determining the viability of Tito's communism still lies ahead. Until then the Yugoslav regime will walk a precarious tightrope between independence and orthodoxy, and the Russians can be relied on to try to bring it down on their side.

THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES

The changing climate of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has given rise to speculation that the status of the satellites might also be modified. The Kremlin's attitude toward its East European minions has, in fact, undergone certain modifications. These were most clearly reflected in a *Pravda* editorial of July 1955:

> Relations between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies are built upon the granite foundation of socialist internationalism. The Communist Party has always willingly shared and still shares its wealth of experience with all fraternal parties, and at the same time Soviet Communists are called on to study assiduously and imitate all that is advanced to be found in the people's democracies in the sphere of management of the national economy, achievements of science, technology and so on.[7]

That this statement was made in conjunction with an appraisal of Soviet-Yugoslav relations hardly mattered. It implied a greater tolerance on the part of the Russians of institutional differences and of variations in the "rate of socialist transformation" and the acceptance of a degree of give-and-take between Soviet and satellite Communists. It was a far cry from the demands of strict subordination and the imposition of a rigid pattern of uniformity on the satellites, but its practical consequences remained to be tested.

This is not to say that the actual relations between the Soviet Union and the satellite countries have not undergone some evolution since Stalin's death. The lighter touch with which the new leadership in the Kremlin ruled in Russia made itself felt throughout the satellites as well. The more vulgar and of-

[7] *Loc. cit.*, note 5 *supra*.

fensive features of Stalinist rule gradually disappeared, and the new rulers showed both flexibility and adaptability in meeting local situations. Internal tensions, which were very high in all the People's Democracies, were reduced, and an impression of greater freedom was created. None of this, however, impaired the substance of Soviet control. The People's Democracies remained as dependent on Moscow as they had been under Stalin's rule.

Conditions before Stalin's death

When Stalin died in March 1953, all Communist regimes showed the strain of the pace at which they had been driven for some time: the machinery of state (and of the Communist party) was cracking, and well it might have. Their evolution since 1948—a sharp turning point in their history—had taken them far afield from what the vast majority of the people and perhaps even many Communists had expected.

Although the ruthlessness of the Communist parties, backed by Soviet power, in annihilating political opposition and capturing a monopoly of power left few illusions, the notion of "national exclusiveness," which the Communists themselves had skillfully fostered prior to 1948, had wide currency. Its implication was that each country would evolve toward "socialism" in its own particular way, suited to local conditions and requirements, and that in this manner at least some of the more brutal aspects of the history of the Soviet Russian regime would be avoided.

In the autumn of 1948, however, shortly after Tito's expulsion from the Cominform and not long after Czechoslovakia had been firmly bolted in place in the Soviet sphere, a new doctrine of "people's democracy" was announced in the Kremlin. It made short shrift of any notion that the pattern of development of the satellites could vary from that of the Soviet Union. It held that the preservation of differences would be "dangerous dogmatism . . . and criminal stupidity . . . leading to the denial and overturn of the very substance of people's democracy and restoration of capitalism." Conversely it was asserted that "ever greater utilization of Soviet experiences and thus ever closer approximation to the Soviet example . . . was . . . one of the main laws of development of the People's Democracies." [8]

The stultifying impact of this doctrine on national individuality hardly needs explaining. In practice, and it was rigidly implemented, it meant transforming the East European countries in the image of the Soviet Union, destroying their indigenous political, social, and economic institutions, replacing them with Soviet prototypes, and extirpating traditional values, substituting in their place new concepts extolling the superiority of Soviet values and of "Soviet man."

As part of the Soviet bloc, the East European countries were forced to submerge their special interests in those of the whole, as determined by the Soviet leadership. Local needs went unattended in favor of the industrial and military power requirement of the "bloc." The forced pace of industrialization, with emphasis on producer goods, in conjunction with the other burdens of "socialist transformation," imposed hardships not only on the peoples but also on the local Communist parties, whose capacities to cope with the manifold tasks for which they were responsible were heavily overloaded. For one thing, "purifying" the strain of the leadership, a cardinal principle of Communist practice, had cut deeply into the none-too-numerous leading cadres of the various parties. For another, the performance of lower echelons of the army

[8] *Rudé Právo* (Prague), January 22, 1953.

of officials, on whom the success or failure of policy ultimately hinges, left much to be desired.

Hastily recruited after World War II, the overwhelming majority of Communist functionaries had scant ideological training and no solid allegiance to the party's cause. Their motives for joining and serving were often questionable. There were some who grossly abused their positions of power and unduly alienated the people under them without commensurately advancing Communist aims. A far greater number of functionaries, whose unpleasant task it was to transmit the party's wishes to the people and to extract compliance at the grass-root level, were reluctant to expose themselves. They succumbed in varying degrees to pressures "from below," and performed inefficiently. Forging a smoothly working apparatus under these conditions was not easy.

At the turn of the year, in 1953, Czechoslovakia, the last country to come under full Communist domination and the slowest to adapt itself to the expected norm of behavior, was just emerging from the convulsions of the bloodiest Communist purge trials since the 1930's. The Slánský trial in November 1952, at which twelve of the fourteen defendants were condemned to death, marked the culmination of a year of widespread purges in the party and a simultaneous tightening of the vise around the people. If Czechoslovakia seemed in the throes of the most serious crisis, the other countries were not appreciably better off. At this point Stalin died.

Early reactions

The demise of the old despot did not result in immediate policy shifts. The leaders throughout the Soviet orbit remained attuned to the vibrations emanating from Moscow in the wake of the transfer of power. For example, an amnesty in the USSR was followed by similar measures in the satellites. Czechoslovakia, however, continued the comprehensive program of tightening which had been launched in the fall of 1951. In April 1953 it thoroughly overhauled its educational system, bringing it in line with Soviet practice, and on June 1 the government decreed a currency reform, the most severe of all such reforms which had been carried out in the Soviet sphere since 1945. At one stroke, savings were wiped out and purchasing power was sharply curtailed. The reform constituted the most drastic step yet taken by the Czech authorities to compel the workers to work harder and to remedy a chronically unhealthy balance between labor productivity and production costs. The other countries, meanwhile, seemed to be traveling more on the momentum of their previous efforts than under new steam.

The embittered reaction of the Czech workers to the currency reform sparked the first and, to date, the most serious public demonstration against any of the Communist regimes. (The East German riots are exempted from this category because of the special status of East Germany behind the Iron Curtain.) For the better part of a day, the enraged workers of the famous Škoda Works (now Lenin Works) at Plzeň held the local authorities at bay.

This unprecedented example of defiance, combined with widespread grumbling elsewhere, was optimistically interpreted in the West as evidence of the precarious hold of the Communist regimes. The modification of harsh economic and political policies throughout the Soviet sphere which followed shortly after the riots, in turn, was greeted as an unmistakable sign that the Communist rulers were acting under the necessity of making concessions to their peoples. The difficulties of the Communist regimes in implementing the new policies

in 1953 and 1954 were read as indications of growing popular initiative and of incipient trends toward greater independence from Moscow's domination.

The "New Course"

The policies identified collectively under the name of the "New Course" began to take shape in the summer of 1953.[9] Their main features were identical in all the satellite countries. To make amends for overzealous industrialization, which had resulted in lopsided economic growth, the consumers' goods and agricultural sectors of the economy were promised increased investments and greater attention. The drive for collectivization tapered off. Incentives, including forgiveness of back taxes and of arrears in compulsory deliveries which the government could never hope to collect anyhow, were held out to the peasantry as a means of raising farm productivity. Price cuts were decreed to help the consumer.

While economic measures held the limelight, a relaxation in political pressure also became discernible. Throughout 1954, the regimes were to some degree engaged in "fence mending." Elections were held, and rigged as they were with the usual return of 95 per cent plus for the regime, they were intended to serve as a means of reviving public interest in the activities of the governments. To the same end, to "activate the masses," as the Communists say, attempts were made to revive moribund National Fronts which at an earlier time had demonstrated their usefulness as instruments for manipulating non-Communist political parties and public opinion.

Despite the general uniformity of the pattern, the intensity with which past mistakes were excoriated and the scope of projected and actual changes varied from country to country. In both respects, Hungary went farthest. It alone permitted peasants to leave collective farms in large numbers and made a serious effort to refurbish the somnolescent "Independent People's Front" under a new name and with new personnel which included some prominent "Titoists" only recently released from prison. But in several countries, including Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, cautious groping for a somewhat greater freedom of expression, for a less doctrinaire adherence to rigid Stalinism, and perhaps even for the assertion of national individuality was discernible. In Poland, for example, attempts were made to rectify the distortions in the principal mission of education caused by an excessive emphasis upon party ideology. New discussions of the role of literature got under way, and the problems of creative artists in striving to adhere closely to the tenets of "socialist realism" were reviewed. Discussions of this nature were quite lively in Poland and in Hungary, and more muted in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, ever cautious, showed little propensity for straying from a safe, established pattern. The Poles and Hungarians, traditionally more robust in giving vent to their feelings, struck out more boldly.

The very fact that the responses of individual countries to new situations could vary bespoke a welcome change in atmosphere as compared with the dreary uniformity of the Stalinist period. Hopeful expectations of real improvement, however, were quickly disappointed. Even in Hungary the implications of the "New Course" were not unequivocal. No definite pattern of softer policies crystallized. No clear-cut trends toward greater freedom from Moscow developed momentum. Local party zealots, and when necessary Moscow itself (as in the case of Polish writers), intervened to suppress and check any trend toward "liberalization" that threatened to get out of hand.

Communist parties

With the exception of Hungary, where the drama of a power struggle between contending Communist factions, divided over policy issues as well, unfolded in bolder relief—none of the satellite Communist or Worker's parties showed signicant stirrings toward greater independence from Moscow or toward self-assertion. While it would be interesting to know why the Hungarian Communists were so different in behavior, no explanation, other than a traditional propensity of the Hungarians for precisely that sort of thing, comes to mind. The parties paid homage to the principles of collective leadership then in vogue in Moscow and emulated Soviet examples with respect to structural changes in the party. One of the more important changes, the separation of powers between premier and first secretary of the Communist party, was carried out in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1953 and elsewhere in the spring of 1954, when party Congresses were held throughout the orbit with the single exception of Rumania. The Rumanian Congress was postponed twice. Economic problems and intraparty friction (including perhaps the unresolved question of the disposition of Ana Pauker who had been deposed in 1952 but had not been tried) were said to be responsible for the delay. A Congress is now scheduled in Rumania for the end of 1955.

Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist party, attended the Polish and Czech Congresses, lending them added "glamor." The significance of his presence was not immediately apparent. For the rest, the Congresses were uninformative. They seemed to be in the nature of housekeeping meetings, to take stock of post-Stalin policies and adjust party organization and personnel to the new conditions.

Satellite leaders

The separation of functions between premier and first secretary gave no solid clues to the rising or waning star of any particular leader and except in Hungary, where Mátyás Rákosi was forced to share the limelight with Imre Nagy, it did not reveal incipient power or policy conflicts. In some countries, as in Poland and Albania, the "strong man" of the Communist regimes, Boleslaw Bierut and Enver Hoxha respectively, relinquished the premiership and took over the top party position. In Bulgaria and Rumania, on the other hand, Vulko Chervenkov and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the leading Communists, retained the premiership while another, lesser known, figure was appointed as first secretary of the party. Gheorghiu-Dej has since been returned to a party post. Finally, in Czechoslovakia the division of functions actually dated back to March 1953 when Klement Gottwald died and power seemed to be divided among three men, Antonin Zápotocký as President of the Republic, Viliam Široký as Premier, and Antonin Novotný as the leading Secretary of the party.

The men in charge of the satellite Communist regimes had distinguished themselves by their ability to survive successive purges and navigate the haz-

[9] For more detailed information concerning developments in the satellites since Stalin's death the reader may consult the following articles: Hugh Seton-Watson, "Eastern Europe Since Stalin," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 3, No. 2 (March–April 1954), pp. 10–17; Ivo Duchaček, "Czechoslovakia: New Course or No Course?" *ibid.,* Vol. 4, No. 1 (January–February 1955), pp. 12–19; Jean Malara, "Poland After the Death of Stalin," *ibid.,* Vol. 4, No. 2 (March–April 1955), pp. 12–19; Daniel Norman, "'New Course' in Rumanian Agriculture," *ibid.,* Vol. 4, No. 4 (July–August 1955), pp. 35–43; F. F., "The 'New Line' in Hungary," *The World Today,* Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1955), pp. 27–40.

ardous course of the tough years of sovietization of their countries without serious mishap. Their survival could not have been due to a lack of sympathy with Stalinist policies, and there seemed to be little danger of their wanting to embark on some sort of "Titoist" venture. So long as they remained at the helm of their respective parties and governments, the People's Democracies were likely to hew close to the Soviet line.

Malenkov's downfall

The downfall of Georgii Malenkov as Soviet Premier in February 1955, and the changes it entailed in Soviet economic policies, reverberated most sharply in Hungary, whose premier, Imre Nagy, had been an ardent exponent of the "New Course." Less than a month after Malenkov's resignation, Nagy also "resigned" the premiership. Subsequently he found himself under attack for "rightist deviationist, anti-Marxist, opportunistic attitudes" and together with some of his followers (notably Mihály Farkas, the Minister of Defense) was stripped of his party functions as a member of the Politburo and Central Committee as well. Elsewhere in the satellites the repercussions of the personnel and policy shifts that had taken place in the Kremlin were not so severe. In fact, the Communist hierarchies seemed hardly at all affected. The "New Course," however, was definitely at an end.

Harsher economic policies, stressing once more the need for expanding the heavy industrial base of "socialist economies" and for collectivizing the land, were reintroduced, although neither the pace of industrial growth nor the tempo of collectivization was as rapid as in Stalin's time. If hopes for improvement in the material well-being of the people were thwarted by the abandonment of the "New Course," at least the oppressive atmosphere of intense police terror was not restored. The satellite regimes, following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, seemed to be intent on maintaining a domestic *détente*, on creating an atmosphere of greater internal stability, and a feeling of increased security from persecution on the part of the people. This intent found expression in diverse ways such as a relatively mild policy toward the church. The church-state struggle has been at a virtual standstill for well over a year; Cardinal Mindszenty has been released from prison, though he is still confined to his living quarters, and the Poles have hinted that they might release Cardinal Wyszynski. There have been amnesties for political prisoners and more recently an intensive campaign to induce political exiles to return home—not so much, of course, to show that refugees can now return without fear of punishment as to discredit the credibility of Western propaganda beamed at the satellites and to create among the captive peoples a mood of greater receptivity to Communist propaganda and indoctrination.

Communist control unrelaxed

The conditions of the day-to-day existence of the masses behind the Iron Curtain have undoubtedly shown improvement. But although the burdens they must bear are somewhat lighter, their hopes of ridding themselves of their Communist rulers have grown considerably dimmer. For one thing, the Soviet Union has given not the slightest intimation that it would be willing to give up control over the People's Democracies. For another thing, the easing of international tensions has wiped out whatever slight hope there was of being liberated against the will of the Russians.

In diplomatic conferences the Russians have made it clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that they do not consider the satellites "expendable." They have simply refused to discuss any proposal that would tend to promote a change in the Communist-imposed regimes. In direct relations with the satellite countries the Soviet Union has also shown a continuing desire to integrate them ever more tightly into a solid Communist bloc. Even while the heavy hand of Moscow has made itself less conspicuous, though not necessarily less effective, in the internal affairs of the People's Democracies, steps have been taken to tighten the bonds that tie these countries to the USSR.

For example, "co-operation" in the realm of broadcasting was greatly expanded in 1953 through program exchanges which vastly increased the amount of Soviet material transmitted in Russian directly over the satellite networks. The volume of trade among the Communist countries has continued to mount steadily, as has their economic interdependence. Closer integration and a more "rational" allocation of economic functions among the Communist countries were foreshadowed when Hungary and Czechoslovakia deliberately postponed the beginning of their Five Year Plans so that they might coincide and be co-ordinated with the next Russian plan. The Soviet Union has not withdrawn its troops from Hungary and Rumania as it should have in accordance with the terms of the Austrian peace treaty. On the contrary it has proceeded to create a unified military command to include all the European Communist states. The command, headed by Soviet Marshal Konev, was proclaimed as an answer to NATO, to be used for bargaining purposes in pressing for the dismantling of the Western security structure. There is no doubt, however, that the Soviet Union will make good use of military unification to consolidate its hold over the satellites even more thoroughly.[10]

The easing of international tensions in turn has strengthened rather than weakened the hold of the Communist regimes. Whereas at the outset of the "New Course" expectations were high that one or another of the regimes might falter and possibly be dislodged, such expectations have been voiced much less frequently since the Geneva meeting of the four "heads of state." The Communist parties have largely overcome the difficulties with which they were beset during the earlier phases of the "New Course." These difficulties stemmed from a variety of sources, such as the lesser abilities of the parties to execute deftly the tactical twists and turns which were required of them, the propensity of a large number of local officials to succumb to pressures from below, and, finally, the nervousness and confusion engendered by the uncertainties of a transitional period in which the policies of the Kremlin had not jelled and power relations at the summit were in flux. As a result of the apparent stabilization of conditions in the Soviet Union and a relaxation in international tensions, however, the satellite Communist parties seemed to have gained new confidence. To be sure, many old problems remain to be solved. But the Communists can look back with satisfaction on the past three years, during which they survived many an uncertainty and hazard and have substantially consolidated their power.

FINLAND

Finland has enjoyed a unique status as a neighbor of the Soviet Union ever

[10] The text of the Warsaw Treaty, as the Soviet bloc military pact is called, and all the accompanying statements of the Communist officials will be found in a separate supplement to *New Times*, No. 21 (May 21, 1955).

since 1945. Not a satellite, yet far from being independent in its choice of a foreign policy, Finland has led a precariously balanced existence, in part meeting Soviet demands and in part fiercely defying Communist encroachments in its internal institutions and political life. By virtue of its special status, Finland has afforded an excellent opportunity for the new leadership in the Kremlin to demonstrate its "peaceful intentions" and its "real" desire for seeking an international *détente*.

Using trade and economic incentives as a point of departure for "improving relations," the Soviet Union offered a substantial loan ($10,000,000) to Finland in February 1954. Later that year the Soviet Union agreed to compensate Finland for a portion of its trade balance with Russia (also amounting to $10,000,000) in convertible currency. The offer was patently designed to induce the Finns to raise substantially the annual volume of trade carried on with their eastern neighbor.

The most significant and dramatic move, however, was made by the Soviet Union shortly after the Geneva meeting "at the summit" in July 1955. Quite of its own accord, without any prodding by the Finns, the Soviet Union offered to return to Finland the Porkkala naval base, a Soviet-held enclave on Finnish territory, which had been leased to Russia for fifty years under the terms of the peace treaty of 1947. The implications of the move were transparent enough. The Soviet leadership was anxious to set a precedent for "liquidating bases on foreign soil" so that it could then prod the United States to do likewise. Indeed, Soviet propaganda media did not hesitate to make this point.

Simultaneously with the return of the Porkkala base, the Soviet Union and Finland also extended their Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance for another twenty years, and the Russians reportedly hinted informally that they might permit the Finns to use the Saimaa Canal, a waterway which was ceded to the Russians after the war, but which at one time had been the main artery for the shipment of Finnish wood and pulp. These extraordinary blandishments tendered to the Finns were hailed by the Soviet press as a worthy example of how to regulate relations between a "Great Power and a small nation." [11]

But the Finns had good cause to wonder what price they would have to pay for the Russians' generosity. For in returning the Porkkala base or offering the use of the Saimaa Canal the Russians were giving up very little. At the same time evidence began to mount that the Soviet Union would step up its propaganda activities within Finland and, still worse, that it would probably press the Finns to abandon their strict neutrality in foreign affairs and to hew closer to the Soviet bloc.

GREECE AND TURKEY

Soviet efforts to normalize relations with Greece and Turkey met with a notable lack of success. Although some measure of relaxation in tension with these countries was achieved, both Greece and Turkey remained essentially wary of Soviet motives and cool to Soviet overtures. The Russians in turn did not seem to press matters too hard where they ran into serious obstacles.

Perhaps the most important single move made by the Russians was the abandonment of their postwar claims against Turkey. Less than four months after Stalin died, the Soviet Union renounced its claims to Turkish territory, which it had been demanding ever since 1945 as a token of "friendship." At the same time it abandoned its demands

[11] *New Times*, No. 39 (September 22, 1955), p. 3.

for joint control of sea and air bases in and around the Straits.[12] The renunciation of these claims did not necessarily improve relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, for the Russians let it be known that they continued to be interested in arriving at some sort of agreement with the Turks on the question of the control of the Straits and kept raising this issue from time to time. Soviet activity in the Near East, especially in Afghanistan, could not but disquiet the Turks, and what had looked like an auspicious beginning for closer and friendlier contact, right after Stalin's death, failed to develop.

The situation with Greece was somewhat different, for here Greece's neighbors, the Soviet Union's satellites, carried the brunt of the burden of rapprochement. Some tangible results were actually achieved, for Bulgaria resumed normal ties with Greece after a hiatus of many years, border issues were settled, and, finally, the question of repatriation of Greeks whom the Communists had been holding in various satellite countries ever since the Civil War of 1946–49 was also resolved. But the Greek government showed little inclination to participate in the amenities which the Soviet Union has come to regard as indicative of improved relations. For example, in May 1955 it rejected a Soviet bid for an exchange of visits by parliamentary delegations on the grounds that differences in constitution and parliamentary systems between Greece and the Soviet Union would make such an exchange meaningless.

Despite Greek resistance to Soviet blandishments, the Cyprus crisis and Greece's bad economic condition might yet provide the Russians with an entering wedge in an area where their efforts to date have not yielded satisfactory results.

[12] See Philip E. Mosely, "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy Since Stalin," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (October 1953), pp. 20–33.

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Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe Since Stalin

By Robert F. Byrnes

STALIN'S successors inherited a policy which was global and which reflected Stalin's personal ambitions, the accumulated baggage of Russian history and of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist philosophy, domestic problems and pressures, and critical situations around the world, such as stalled armistice negotiations in Korea, a new administration in Washington which talked of liberation, and a divided France wrestling with the problems posed by Western German economic recovery and with plans for bringing Western Germany into the Western community. Both Stalin and his successors considered Western Europe their primary political target, but they defined Soviet policy toward this crucial area with other world problems in mind. Moreover, Stalin's successors must have been at least as impressed as some Western observers by the magnitude of the succession problem and by the growing demands of the new Soviet élite.

Stages of Soviet Policy

The history of Soviet foreign policy has been marked by extraordinary tactical switches, most notably by the sudden reversal in policy toward Nazi Germany in August 1939. This history and the great vacuum left by the charismatic Stalin have naturally increased the attentiveness with which Western observers have searched for sharp changes. Fundamentally, there has been no great change in Soviet policy toward Western Europe since Stalin's death. There has been little change in Soviet tactics, although the apparent variations have been numerous and sometimes spectacular. However, in its general emphasis, Soviet policy toward Western Europe has increasingly favored the carrot more and the stick less. In addition, the general line has been softer, subtler, and more persuasive than it was under Stalin.

During the twenty-three months in which Malenkov was Premier, there were no concessions to the West, although the tone of the Soviet Union was more mild than it had been under Stalin. The Korean armistice negotiations were finally concluded on July 27, 1953, reducing the divisive issues affecting relations between the United States and its European allies, but these conflicts were soon replaced by problems deriving from Indochina and Formosa. The Berlin and Geneva conferences early in 1954 demonstrated that Molotov still deserved his reputation and his nickname.

With the demotion of Malenkov, in February 1955, some Western observers, who had been impressed by his apparent reasonableness and occasional civilities, feared that the "final" opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet Union had been lost. However, the regime led by Khrushchev and Bulganin has maintained the principal lines of Soviet foreign policy as well as the little amenities. The most coarse anti-American propaganda has disappeared, and Soviet policy toward the West has been more flexible, moderate, and skillful. The Soviet Union in the spring of 1955 finally accepted the Austrian State Treaty, and the Soviet leaders in June

1955 made a sensational pilgrimage to a Yugoslav Canossa to admit error in past Soviet policy toward Tito. At the Geneva conference, in July 1955, they exuded friendliness and good fellowship in a meeting designed to take advantage of and to extend the new "atmosphere" so that negotiations on the basic issues might be undertaken in a friendly spirit. In September 1955, after a Soviet initiative, diplomatic relations were opened between Moscow and Bonn, which the Russians had previously denounced as a Nazi stooge of the United States.

The recent changes do emphasize the eternal problem: Is there now a genuine shift in Soviet policy toward Western Europe? Do the recent reversals on details conceal a genuine change on matters of substance or are they merely skillful tactical maneuvers? Are we at least witnessing a gradual trend which will ultimately produce a basic modification? Available evidence suggests that there has been no basic change in Soviet policy or goals, although the tactics used are now different. The Soviet rulers are simply adjusting to life without Stalin and to a new phase in post-war relations, one which assumes a temporary political and military stalemate, avoidance of war between the great powers, and continuation of the cold war by political and economic means which do not involve increasing the likelihood of general war.

Soviet Goals

The primary aim of Soviet policy, of course, is the defense of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet empire. With regard to Western Europe, the unspoken Soviet goal is Soviet control, which would swing the world balance of power clearly to the advantage of the Soviet Union. To attain this goal, the Soviet leaders seek to oust United States forces and bases and to destroy all the organizations and institutions established to promote Western unity. They seek to destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to dissolve the ties between Western Germany and its allies, and to incorporate Western Germany into a unified Germany under Soviet rule, which would enable the Soviet Union to control all of Europe. The Soviet leaders have a keen appreciation of the crucial significance of Germany and of the role of Western Germany in the Western European Union. They also have understood more clearly than most Western Europeans the political importance of the European Defense Community and of the European Political Community as means of damping and extinguishing the Franco-German conflict, directing the spiritual, economic, and military forces of Western Europe into new channels, and creating a political unity which could resist Soviet influence, pull Britain, Canada, and the United States more firmly into European affairs, and serve as a magnet to draw satellite Europe from the Soviet grip.

Bases of Soviet Policy

The principal Soviet means to attain these great goals are sometimes not noticed and usually not mentioned, because at the same time they constitute the bases of Soviet power. The basic Soviet weapon is the industrial and military power of the Soviet Union, which Stalin's successors have been just as assiduous as he to strengthen. The Soviet rulers denounce others for seeking to negotiate from a "position of force," but Soviet industrial and military power provides the base from which Soviet policy operates. The impressive growth of the Soviet economy has had a noticeable impact upon the underdeveloped countries, some of which consider the Soviet rise to power a model. However, its effect has been just as

powerful upon the governments and peoples of Western Europe, which has lost to the United States and the Soviet Union its role as world leader and which in its relative weakness and decline feels naked and defenseless before growing Soviet power and Soviet ruthlessness in the use of that power. Indeed, if the Soviet economic program is successful, within a generation or so Western Europe may be forced "irrevocably into a position of complete dependence" upon either the Soviet or the American industrial and power complex.[1]

Since the death of Stalin, several waves of Soviet speeches and decrees have signaled an apparent reversal of established policy and a heavy increase in capital investment for the production of consumers' goods. However, the industries producing capital goods and military equipment have retained their priority and still receive the lion's share of capital investment. Indeed, in the budget announced on February 3, 1955, by Minister of Finance Zverev, the funds allotted to heavy industry were more than double those assigned to agriculture and light industry combined. Expenditures for defense in 1955 were increased by almost 12 per cent over those of 1954, and the Soviet military capability continues to grow. The hearty but false emphasis on consumers' goods was designed to ease the transition from Stalin to the new regime, to placate the Soviet upper classes, and to persuade the non-Communist world, especially Western Europe, of the peaceful intentions of the Soviet rulers.

Soviet control over East-Central Europe and the gradual but inexorable reshaping of this critical area along Soviet lines constitute the second fixed base for Soviet policy toward Western Europe. The brutal division of Europe and the presence of Soviet and satellite forces at the waist of Europe have placed Western Europe in jeopardy and form the core of the threat under which it lives. Moreover, Soviet control of Eastern Germany and Soviet ability to prevent the unification of Germany block the Western program for unity and grant the Soviet Union a disruptive weapon of enormous power in Germany and in all of Western Europe.

The third established base of Soviet power is the international Communist movement, which controls hundreds of thousands of Communists and which leads millions of dupes around the world in support of Soviet policies. Every government in Western Europe, particularly the weak and unstable governments of France and Italy, is sensitive to the various forms of pressure which the Soviet government generates through its network of organizations and its vast propaganda system. These also exploit the philosophical vacuums which exist in many parts of the world by peddling the Soviet philosophy, one of the Soviet Union's most potent weapons. The Soviet rulers almost certainly believe that the road to Paris lies through Hanoi and that the channel to power in Western Europe runs through the Sea of Confusion and Despair. Consequently, the international Communist movement exerts pressures in manifold ways, from colonial revolution to incessant propaganda for "peace," and its instruments include civil war in Indochina and Malaya, the World Peace Council, Soviet Friendship Societies, the French Communist party, and the World Federation of Trade Unions.

[1] Philip E. Mosely, "Can Moscow Match Us Industrially?" *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 33 (1955), p. 103.

General Relaxation of Tension

Western success in rebuilding the economic, political, and military power and unity of Western Europe and the containment of Soviet expansion in Western Europe have forced the Soviet Union to revise its tactics. Even before Stalin's death, greater emphasis was being placed upon political warfare in all its forms and upon softening resistance to expansion. The new Soviet leaders emphasize those actions in Soviet domestic policy which may help persuade the Western observer in particular that the Soviet system is thawing. At the same time, in their policies toward foreign governments and peoples, they have introduced civilities and amenities to obtain a relaxation of Western vigilance.

Domestic policy

Within the Soviet Union, these steps have been restricted to a major amnesty shortly after Stalin's death, another amnesty in September 1955, occasional emphasis upon the rights of Soviet citizens, a small, gradual increase in the production of consumers' goods, and increased access to the products of foreign culture. This approach became most marked in the summer of 1955, when tourist traffic into and out of the Soviet Union widened to a trickle. All of these steps, plus the so-called "New Course" in East-Central Europe, were designed to convince Western Europeans that the Soviet menace had evaporated and that the Western program for military strength and unity should be abandoned.

The amenities

With regard to Soviet policy toward Western Europe itself, the steps taken have generally been small. Indeed, most of them have been simple conciliatory gestures and have merely included allowing Russian wives of foreigners to leave the Soviet Union to join their husbands, allowing Swedish and Danish trawlers to fish within twelve miles of the Baltic states coast, and returning some prisoners of war. The Soviet Union "interceded" with its Far Eastern allies on behalf of civilian prisoners, and it helped to make possible the conclusion of the Korean truce. On May 30, 1953, in a note published July 19, 1953, the Soviet Union renounced its claims to Turkish territory and to special privileges in the Dardanelles. It has also resumed "normal" diplomatic relations with Greece, Israel, and Yugoslavia. The norm of Soviet practice and the eagerness with which the West hopes for change were both illustrated by the wild flurry of speculation concerning Soviet policy when Malenkov, in August 1954, picked a bouquet of flowers for a member of a visiting British Labor delegation. As someone remarked, Western observers often seem to believe that the appearance of *petits pois à la française* on a Kremlin menu marks a new policy toward France.

Current Soviet tactics are well illustrated by the action of the Supreme Soviet during the last year or so in encouraging representatives of various parliamentary bodies to exchange visits with "the Soviet parliament." In February 1955, it voted to join the Interparliamentary Union, and delegates of the Supreme Soviet attended the forty-fourth annual conference of the Union at Helsinki in August. Official delegations of the parliaments of Britain, Finland, Sweden, India, Syria, Yugoslavia, and Japan have already visited Moscow, and the parliaments of Belgium, France, Austria, Italy, and Canada have accepted invitations. While this procedure exposes some of the Soviet élite to the wholesome influence of Western parliamentary tradition, it also opens up an important new propaganda avenue for the Soviet Union. Above all, it enables the Supreme Soviet to pose as a genuine parliament, thus helping to persuade Western Europeans that the

Soviet Union is governed by law and that there is no Soviet menace.

Peace campaign

This approach is a fundamental part of the Soviet campaign for "peace" and for "peaceful coexistence." The Soviet rulers remember clearly the immense advantage Lenin obtained in 1917 by his campaign for immediate peace, and they appreciate that an opponent of this campaign is easily labeled a warmonger. Moreover, their approach to "all men of good will" for peace and "friendship among nations," their emphasis upon noble emotions and high principles, and their attacks upon Western alliances and bases and upon alleged barbarous American practices have a strong appeal in this nuclear age not only to neutralists, but even to strong anti-Communists affected by fear of nuclear war. The Soviet demands for immediate prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons, for a reduction in conventional arms and effectives to agreed levels, and for control machinery to be created at a later date have had little effect upon *informed* opinion throughout the world but have been important propaganda weapons for weakening *popular* resistance to Soviet policy. As such, the spurious Soviet "peace" campaign constitutes a deadly threat to Western unity and vigilance.

Trade

In its efforts to convince the world that it wants peace and wishes to strengthen peaceful relationships, the Soviet Union has sought to break Western controls over the export of strategic goods, to persuade Western Europeans that the Soviet empire constitutes a vast untapped market, and to create divisions within Western Europe over trade policy. This Soviet program has been waged on several levels—the completion of short-term bilateral trade agreements, political campaigning within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and general propaganda. For example, the trade agreement signed with France in July 1953 was negotiated more quickly than the one signed with Italy in November of that year, and the Soviet Union purchased some items from France rather than Italy because France and the French vote on the European Defense Community were important Soviet political targets.

The Soviet Union has been especially skillful in dangling lucrative orders before Western businessmen. For example, Kabanov, the Minister of Foreign Trade, in February 1954 told a group of British businessmen visiting Moscow that the Soviet Union was prepared to place orders in Britain for more than a billion dollars between 1955 and 1957. About half of the goods he listed were under strategic controls, but this appeal for "normalization of Anglo-Soviet trade" stimulated British industrial and commercial appetites and strengthened criticism of Western controls. Moreover, such promises created a sensation in Western Germany, where fear is strong that Britain may gain a lead in Soviet trade. Dangling the same lure before West Germans, especially after the visit of Adenauer to Moscow, will worry the British and increase competition for Soviet markets.

The Russians had shown an interest in ECE even before Stalin's death, and on January 30, 1953, the ECE announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to participate in a conference on East-West trade, although in September 1952 it had refused a similar invitation. In the various ECE conferences the Soviet representatives have given especial priority to "removal of obstacles to foreign trade" and to denunciation of the United States as the power responsible for the COCOM (Consultative Group Co-ordinating Committee) strategic controls.

This theme has been a favorite one for Soviet political warriors, and they have declared Western strategic controls responsible for the decline after 1949 in trade between Western Europe and the Soviet empire. This campaign ignores the facts of this trade, which had declined before strategic controls were established. The Soviet Union has reorganized the economic structures of the countries of East-Central Europe and has tied their trade strings to Moscow. Moreover, these states now lack supplies of grain and timber for export to the West. Indeed, on balance the Soviet Union and its satellite states even imported foodstuffs in 1954. In addition, while the COCOM states pruned the strategic list in August 1954, exports from the Soviet empire remain under complete control. Finally, Soviet abrogation of trade with Yugoslavia in 1948 and with Australia in 1954 demonstrated that Soviet trade controls are used for political reasons in a way which is not possible in the West.

Western Communist parties

Western Communist parties as instruments of the Soviet Union are used to support the impression that the Soviet Union is not a threat and that each national Communist party is just another political party. Thus, in 1953 the French party abandoned the forceful program which had led to incidents such as the Ridgeway riots in May 1952, and began to work for a "patriotic national front." Jacques Duclos on October 22, 1953, indicated that the party was prepared to join with any other Frenchmen in a national campaign to end the war in Indochina, to prevent German rearmament, and to hasten general disarmament. The Communists have co-operated closely with the Radical Socialists and the Gaullists, especially against EDC. On June 8, 1954, Thorez proclaimed that it was "orthodox Communist doctrine" to accept allies wherever they could be found, and persistent efforts have been made for a united front with the Socialists or a popular front with other political groups. The Communist effort to infiltrate political, religious, educational, and labor organizations in particular has been quite successful, especially in France, where the use of *la douce parole* works as effectively for the Communists as it did for Philip the Fair centuries ago.

International organizations

The new Soviet leaders use international organizations to carry political warfare against Western Europe. The primary forum since 1945 has been the United Nations. In addition, the Soviet Union joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in April 1954. In July 1955 it announced it would resume active participation in the World Health Organization, from which it had withdrawn in 1949, that it would become a member of the International Bureau of Education, and that it would contribute two million rubles in kind and services to the United Nations Children's Fund. These steps, and the participation of the Soviet Union and some of its satellites in the International Labor Organization, not only provide new forums but also help convince other states and peoples that the Soviet Union is a normal state seeking to attain its goals in normal ways.

DIPLOMACY: AUSTRIA

The principal Soviet weapon against Western Europe during the past thirty months has been Soviet diplomacy, which has been generally used with great effectiveness to attain Soviet goals

or to prevent the United States and the Western European states from attaining their aims. This can be seen most clearly in the long Western struggle to obtain freedom and independence for Austria and unification for Germany. In the case of Austria, the Soviet Union in the spring of 1955 finally yielded, at a high price and in return for other advantages which it estimated then outweighed the benefits to be derived from continuing to block the treaty.

At the close of the Moscow Conference on November 1, 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had issued a joint declaration pledging the re-establishment of "a free and independent Austria." All but five articles of the Austrian State Treaty had been agreed to by 1949. However, Austria was not freed until the spring of 1955, even though the foreign ministers dealt with the Austrian State Treaty in six conferences between 1947 and 1953 while over the same years their deputies had held more than 260 meetings. The Soviet policy was clearly based on the desire to retain troops in Austria, to prevent Austria from joining the West, to obtain economic profit from the Soviet zone, and to use Austria as a bargaining counter on the German and other issues.

The long period of Soviet recalcitrance reached its depths at the Berlin conference of the foreign ministers, in February 1954, when Molotov proposed that the Austrian treaty be linked to an agreement on German unification and that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Austria be postponed until a peace treaty with Germany had been concluded. He even refused to sign the Austrian State Treaty when the three Western powers agreed to accept the Soviet version of the five articles which had been in dispute since 1949.

The Berlin conference of 1954 was preceded and followed by minor concessions to the Austrian government, such as the note on June 30, 1953, announcing that the Soviet Union would assume all Soviet occupation costs as of September 1. However, the pressures on Austrian government and police officials remained sharp and strong, and the Soviet Union refused to discuss reducing its heavy claims upon the Austrian economy.

Signature of Austrian treaty

However, the Soviet policy toward Austria was suddenly reversed in March 1955, when Molotov announced that the Austrian treaty was not dependent upon a German treaty. He also proposed preliminary negotiations between Austria and the Soviet Union on the basis of withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austria and an Austrian undertaking not to join any military alliance or to allow military bases on Austrian territory. With this Soviet reversal, the way was opened to the signature of the Austrian treaty, on May 15, 1955. This treaty gave Austria its freedom and independence; prohibited *Anschluss* with Germany, foreign alliances, and foreign bases; provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops within ninety days of ratification; and provided for substantial payments by Austria to the Soviet Union as the price of its freedom. These payments include delivery of $150,000,000 in Austrian goods over six years, in return for handing back the ex-German assets seized by the Soviet Union; the delivery of 1,000,000 tons of crude oil a year for ten years for the oil fields and refineries of eastern Austria; and purchase of the Soviet-controlled Danube Shipping Company for $2,000,000.

Signature of the Austrian State Treaty removed the Soviet grip from Austria and marks a step backward for the Soviet forces in Central Europe. However, Western troops have also left Austria, and Austria has now been neutralized. The Soviet Union added to its laurels as a peacemaker, since the final initiative came from Molotov and the treaty was concluded after a visit of Chancellor Raab to Moscow. Moreover, Austria will remain in economic bondage to Moscow for a full decade. The Kremlin obviously hopes to draw Austria into its orbit through trade bonds and to make of Austria a kind of Central European Finland. Finally, the Soviet leaders obviously hope that this will serve as a precedent for achieving a united neutralized Germany and for forcing the withdrawal of American troops from Europe.

Diplomacy: Germany

The Soviet leaders recognize Germany as the key to Europe, and they intend in one way or another, sooner or later, to bring all of Germany under Soviet control. In this, they are simply continuing a policy which Stalin set in motion. Soviet control over Eastern Germany has given the Soviet Union the power to veto any program for the unification of Germany which it does not find acceptable. It has been clear since the end of World War II, and the Soviet leaders made it brutally plain to Adenauer and the West in Moscow in September 1955, that the Soviet Union intends to retain control over Eastern Germany and to force Western Germany and the West ultimately to sue for unification on Soviet terms. To attain this great goal, the Soviet Union has used both pressure and guile, varying its tactics and its themes as circumstances required but always keeping the main goal in view and utilizing simultaneously every type of technique.

The extraordinary reconstruction and economic recovery of Western Germany, since 1949 in particular, its rapid rise to political respectability, and the program for a European Defense Community incorporating Western Germany led the Soviet Union until September 6, 1953, to concentrate upon defeating Adenauer. After his victory in the election, the Soviet Union concentrated until late summer 1954 upon influencing the French vote on EDC. The French failure to ratify EDC was only a brief victory, because the London and Paris agreements provided a substitute which was weaker, but still too strong from the Soviet point of view, in the form of Western European Union, West German sovereignty, and West German membership in NATO. After these agreements had been ratified, the Soviet leaders again shifted gears, widened their smiles, opened diplomatic relations with the West German government, and inaugurated another period in Soviet European policy.

Eastern Germany

Eastern Germany is an important pawn in Soviet policy toward Western Europe, and the Soviet leaders like to believe that the existence of a "socialist" state in Eastern Germany exerts a magnetic influence upon Western Germany. However, Soviet control, the vast economic and political contrasts between Eastern and Western Germany, and the fraudulent elections, especially those of October 17, 1954, handicap the Soviet Union. The steady flow of refugees from Eastern Germany—over two million have "voted with their feet" by fleeing to West Berlin and Western Germany—daily indicts Soviet rule and cripples the Soviet effort to make Eastern Germany a magnet.

In the spring of 1953, following the decision of the Soviet leaders that the puppet state needed more attractive window dressing, the Pankow government announced a series of minor reform measures, such as returning confiscated waste land to farmers, increasing the production of consumers' goods, reduc-

ing labor controls, relaxing the drive for collectivization, and correcting tax collection methods. This program was upset by the June riots, which weakened the Soviet line for the September elections in Western Germany and which underlined the basic Soviet dilemma. The June riots in the East and the continued economic and political progress in Western Germany have led the Soviet leaders to increase their efforts to reward, strengthen, and dignify the German Democratic Republic. Thus, during the last few months of 1953 the Soviet Union returned about 10,000 prisoners of war to Eastern Germany. As of January 1, 1954, reparations payments to the Soviet Union ceased, firms taken over by the Soviet Union were returned to German control, and occupation costs were limited to not more than 5 per cent of the East German national income. On March 25, 1954, the Soviet government announced that it would henceforth treat Eastern Germany as a sovereign state, with "freedom to make decisions according to its own views in domestic and foreign affairs." Following the Adenauer trip to Moscow and the opening of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Bonn, the Soviet government, on September 20, 1955, granted full sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic, including control of civilian traffic between West Germany and West Berlin and the right to rearm and to play a full role in the Warsaw Pact.

As the campaign to whitewash and dignify the government of the German Democratic Republic progressed, Eastern Germany began to play a more prominent role in the Soviet plan. Its leaders frequently appealed to the French government and to groups of Frenchmen to defeat EDC and WEU. Intensive efforts were made to increase the range of contacts with West German technicians and officials on matters concerning trade, transport, sport, and cultural affairs. The program for "all Germans around one table" sought to bring workers, churchmen, athletes, newsmen, women, and above all elected representatives together for friendly discussions. Threats to force West German officials and representatives to meet with Communists were also used, most notably in the spring of 1955, when the German Democratic Republic levied enormous increases in dues on West German vehicles using Soviet-zone roads.

France

Soviet policy toward Western Germany and the Soviet design for neutralizing Western Europe are generally defined with one eye on France. Soviet policy toward France has emphasized both Soviet economic and military power and Soviet "peace" proposals. At the same time, the Soviet Union has exerted pressure on France through Indochina. It has appealed to the traditional French fear of Germany and to the old French policy of co-operating with Germany's eastern neighbors to prevent German revival and expansion.

Thus, Soviet propaganda in France through all of its outlets emphasized the dangers courted by Western policy toward Germany and the great virtues of the Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance of 1944. Great efforts were made to improve relations between France and the Communist governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia. For example, just before the final debate on EDC, Poland offered France a treaty of alliance and mutual asssitance. The legislatures of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany in December 1954 appealed to the French National Assembly not to ratify the Paris agreement on West German rearmament. At the same time, the Soviet government several times warned both France and the United Kingdom that the London and Paris agreements flagrantly violated the Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet treaties and that ratification would lead the Soviet Union to annul the treaties. When this threat did not succeed, the treaties were annulled by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on May 7, 1955. Only one month later, the carrot reappeared, when Molotov at a luncheon in Paris referred to the need to forget the past, expressed a wish for more frequent and direct contact with French leaders, and invited Pinay and Faure to Moscow.

German unification

The Western powers have sought to rebuild Western economic and political strength and to create a new unity to resist Soviet pressure and to lead toward a stable and peaceful future. General Western success and the recovery of Western Germany have thus raised to a new level questions concerning German unification and the position of a united Germany in Europe. The Western states propose free elections throughout Germany under a law drafted and promulgated by the four occupying powers and supervised by them; the convocation of a national assembly; the drafting of a constitution and the preparation of peace treaty negotiations by this assembly; the adoption of the constitution and the formation of an all-German government; and the signature and entry into force of the peace treaty. The heart of the Western position lies in free elections. As Bidault pointed out to Molotov at Berlin, "From a democratic point of view, it seems obvious that it is elections which create governments and not governments which create elections."

To counter the Western program, the Soviet Union has stood fast behind a policy which seeks controlled elections and Communist control over all of Germany. This position has been stated quite clearly a number of times, notably in a Soviet note to France, Britain, and the United States on August 16, 1953, again at the Berlin conference in January and February 1954, and during and after the Geneva conference in July 1955. Fundamentally, although this is always concealed and denied, the Soviet Union has no intention of accepting free elections. Soviet policy on German unification emphasizes the following: representatives of the governments of both Eastern and Western Germany should participate in any conference discussing German unification and a German peace treaty; an all-German provisional government, created by the parliaments of the two Germanies with the co-operation of "democratic parties and organizations," should draft an electoral law and prepare "free and secret elections" for a national assembly and should help prepare and sign a German peace treaty; all occupation forces should leave Germany after the signature of the peace treaty; German armed forces should be limited to those required for internal security and frontier patrol; and no foreign bases should be allowed. The heart of the Soviet position lies in the precedence granted to the formation of a German government over elections, which would be rigged by the government.

European "security"

The bald Soviet program for controlled elections leading to German unity under communism has been both sweetened and concealed by Soviet proposals for the withdrawal of all occupation forces and for the establishment of a European "security" system. Soviet suggestions that occupation forces be withdrawn are frequently reiterated, but this campaign for a neutralized Germany and an exposed Europe has generally had little effect.

The proposal for a European "security" system first appeared in Janu-

ary 1953, but it was presented in more elaborate form at the Berlin conference early in 1954 and has since become a standard Soviet prop. Fundamentally, this proposal is a device for removing American influence and power from Europe and for providing an ostensible substitute to NATO. In effect, it constitutes a system of "Europe for the Europeans," with the Soviet Union of course counted as a European state and with the United States belatedly recognized as one also. The pact is open to all European states "without regard to their social systems," to both German governments, and later to a reunified Germany. It specifically binds its members "not to enter any coalition or alliance." When these proposals were rejected as a plan to divide Germany for fifty years and to neutralize Western Europe, Molotov on March 31, 1954, proposed that the Soviet Union and "other European countries" join NATO to give it "a really defensive character" and to preclude Germany's being drawn into military groupings.

Soviet policy since WEU

During the past nine months or so, Soviet policy has paid particular attention to four simultaneous lines. The first of these has emphasized Soviet power and resolution and the consequences of Western refusal to abandon NATO and WEU. The Soviet Union has not threatened war—indeed, it has prated of peace—but it has reiterated that ratification of WEU would lead to the annulment of the Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet treaties, to the creation of an Eastern European parallel to NATO, and to the "permanent" division of Germany. When the threats failed, the treaties were annulled. The Soviet Union and its satellites, in May 1955 at Warsaw, then "formed" a military organization under Soviet command. Finally, the opening of diplomatic relations with Western Germany and the grant of full "sovereignty" to Eastern Germany in September underlined that the West had reached a stone wall on German unification, unless it surrendered to Soviet terms.

The second emphasis has been upon the proposed Soviet European "security" system. This is offered as a substitute for NATO and WEU, as a device for bringing the two Germanies into one organization, and as a means of obtaining Western recognition of the Soviet position in East-Central Europe. It has little appeal, except to Communists, but there is some danger that it will be confused with Western plans being developed to win Soviet approval to German unity within Western union.

The third accent, and currently the most noticeable one, is upon the general relaxation of tensions. While the Soviet leaders have not concealed their goals, they have at the same time adopted a friendly, cheerful, benevolent pose to lull their opponents into carelessness and slumber. This tactic was most marked at the Geneva "summit" conference, where all of the ideas came from the West and where the Soviet leaders concentrated upon spreading an atmosphere of cordiality and friendliness.

Finally, Soviet policy stresses relations with Western Germany. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Bonn was foreshadowed by a Moscow radio broadcast on January 15, 1955. It sent a shiver of fear through the West, which remembers August 1939, which notes with apprehension the age and importance of Adenauer, and which worries over the power of German nationalism as unification is delayed and as the two Germanies are driven into closer relationships with each other.

In other words, with regard to Germany, the Soviet leaders apparently have settled down for the long haul. While exuding good cheer and cordiality, broadcasting the virtues of peaceful coexistence, and buying apparent virtue at little price through ceding their Porkkala base to Finland, they will seek to isolate and overthrow Adenauer or to wait until his death or retirement creates a new political situation in Western Germany. In the meantime, they will strive in every way to push the two Germanies into closer contact. As these relationships improve, the structure of the East German state will probably be revised along ostensibly federal lines, and Soviet policy will concentrate upon weakening the center parties in Western Germany, strengthening the left-wing Socialists, the neo-Nazis, and the nationalists, and working for a National Front in both Germanies. In short, the Soviet leaders will probably rely upon this approach, as well as on increased trade between Western Germany and the Soviet empire under a new Rapallo, a Western economic and political crisis, the desire for "peace," and the carelessness or impatience of the West, to bring about German unification on Soviet terms.

OUTLOOK

Soviet policy toward Western Europe since the death of Stalin has been marked by the same failures which attended Stalin's efforts. The Communists have failed to prevent or even seriously to hinder the economic and political recovery of Western Europe from the depths of 1945 and 1947. NATO continues to thrive, though its foundations seem perilously military and fragile and though it is wracked by occasional conflicts between members and by growing reluctance to meet its high annual costs. The Western European Union has been established, with Western Germany a member. Above all, the United States has maintained its forces and its commitments, in Western Europe.

While the Soviet leaders have failed to attain their goals, they have achieved some successes and they have made some progress toward undermining Western unity and resolution. The Soviet Union contributed heavily to the French refusal to ratify EDC through its skillful political warfare in France and through the continuing influence of the French Communist party. While the size of the Communist parties and of Communist-controlled organizations in Western Europe has continued to decline steadily, neutralism, pacifism, and nationalism, stimulated by the Communists, have grown, undermining the foundations of Western resolution and strength. The skillful Soviet effort to persuade Western Europe that the Soviet Union is not a threat and that the high costs of defense are not necessary has softened the Western program and made the great alliance hesitate. The Geneva conference in particular has influenced popular opinion, and the smiles and bouquests of Khrushchev and Bulganin are weakening Western persistence far more than did the arrogance and ruthlessness of Stalin. In this general approach toward relaxation, the Soviet leaders have clearly inherited Stalin's great ability to create a success out of a series of failures.

Problems on both sides

Both Western Europe and the Soviet Union face serious problems. The West suffers now from its own achievements, and its prosperity and security seem so solid that vigilance slackens. Western stability and unity depend to a large degree on the solidity of economic foundations, and the economies of several of the key states and of the area in general are somewhat vulnerable. In addition, Western recovery depends to a great degree upon the survival of democracy in Western Germany, still naturally a suspect neighbor. Finally,

in its present moods, Western Europe is increasingly vulnerable to the current Soviet political warfare tune. There is some danger that the populace in one of the links which make up Western Europe will succumb to the lure of neutralism or even to a Soviet European "security" pact which would relax the vigilance of the West, lead to a serious reduction in forces, and divide the allies as they were divided during the 1930's by the Nazis. Indeed, there is some likelihood that those who stand for strength and vigilance will be hounded as was Churchill in the 1930's.

In other words, the West provides vulnerabilities and opportunities to the Soviet leaders for exploitation. However, at the same time Soviet policy must continue to operate under serious handicaps. To begin with, the Soviet record cannot be erased. In addition, while Soviet control over Eastern Europe provides a great addition to Soviet power, a strategic area of great value, and a prime source of Soviet political influence in Western Europe, at the same time it constitutes a disadvantage. This is particularly so in the case of Eastern Germany, whose true status is exposed daily by a flood of refugees and which falls ever further behind Western Germany in every index.

Moreover, while the Soviet Union can play one tune in France and another in Germany, it cannot forever be all things to all people without paying a penalty. Finally, while the current policy of smiles and co-operation helps to undermine Western vigilance, at the same time it corrodes the vitals of Communist political power. A system which is based on conflict and war requires tension and feeds on struggle. No system is more vulnerable to relaxation than a totalitarian state.

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Soviet Policy in Asia Since Stalin

By HAROLD H. FISHER

SOVIET policy in Asia has changed in the two and one-half years since Stalin's death. The aims of Soviet policy, however, remained unchanged. The Soviet Communists and all who take their orders or follow their example still hope to prevail upon the peoples of Asia to follow the Communist lead and use Communist methods to achieve peace, progress, and equality. The degree to which the Soviet Union has changed its policies to gain this end depends on the extent to which one interprets the policies of the local Asian Communist parties as actually policies ordered, suggested, or approved by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who direct all Soviet policy. For example, what about the decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist party of India at Madurai, December 27, 1953 to January 3, 1954? At this meeting the veteran British Communist, Harry Pollitt, attempted, in the name of Moscow and the international Communist movement, to persuade the Congress to accept an anti-American and pro-British line. Or take the purges of 1954–55 carried out by the Chinese Communists against the ex-Manchurian boss Kao Kang, the Marxist writer Hu Feng, and many others. Were these Soviet-directed policies or policies of the Communist party of China adopted in imitation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? Was Chou En-lai carrying out a Soviet policy in Asia when he took part in the Bandung Conference in April 1955 and announced that the Chinese People's Government wanted peace with the United States and was willing to negotiate?

The relations of Communist parties in power or seeking power to the CPSU and to each other are in many respects secret; in some respect they are open but complex. It is not easy to tell just where to draw the line between policies that have been ordered by the Kremlin and those that Asian Communists have adopted in the belief that such policies were in harmony with the international line of the CPSU. The purpose of this paper is not to explore the murky and treacherous area of Communist inter-party relations but to take note of some of the actions of Communist governments and parties in Asia that are of enough importance to justify the belief that they were approved or ordered by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and so in some measure reflect Soviet policies.

RECENT CHANGES ENUMERATED

The changes that have been most striking in respect to Asia during the two and a half years are briefly these:

In Asia as elsewhere, the Soviet government and the Communist parties have emphasized the aim of peaceful coexistence between regimes based on different political and ideological systems, the development of trade and the export of technical assistance in international affairs instead of wars of liberation and other forms of the international class war. In domestic affairs the Communist parties have advocated "united fronts" against imperialism combined with peaceful and legal competi-

tion with the nationalist parties instead of guerrilla wars, civil wars, sabotage, and other openly illegal activities. Before Malenkov's demotion in February 1955, the Communists continued the virulence of their attacks on the United States. The "thaw" in the attitude toward the West introduced by Khrushchev and Bulganin in Europe was felt also in Asia but the temperature there did not climb as fast or as high as at the summit conference in Geneva.

In Korea, where the Communists had used the most irritating and offensive devices to stall the armistice negotiations for two years, on July 27, 1953, six months after Mao Tse-tung had said the war would be waged for years if necessary, they suddenly agreed to conditions that differed but little from what had been offered time and time again during the embittered negotiations.

At Geneva on July 21, 1954, after their sensational Vietminh victory at Dienbienphu, May 7, the Communists signed three agreements bringing to an end a war that had been waged in Indochina for seven years and seven months, a war which the Communists seemed to be winning.

In the Formosa Strait the Communists continued until the spring of 1955 to threaten to "liberate" the great and beautiful island and its offshore neighbors by force. They underscored the seriousness of these threats by intermittent bombardment of the Quemoy and Matsu islands and by troop movements and the building of air installations on the mainland opposite the strait. Tension in the Formosa Strait area was intense during the winter of 1954–55. The Tachens were evacuated by the Nationalists in February and an informal "cease-fire" status had almost been reached by the time of the Bandung Conference (April 18–24, 1955). There the Communist Premier, Chou En-lai, declared that the Chinese people did not want a war with the United States and that his government was willing to negotiate on the question of relaxing the tension in the Formosa Strait. As a sequel to these declarations and the backstage negotiations that had preceded them, a conference began in Geneva on August 1, 1955, between Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson of the United States and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan of the People's Government.

The principal Communist parties seeking power in South and Southeast Asia and Japan made significant changes in tactics. These changes did not follow the same pattern in every country, but they reflected the same general swing again from the "left," "hard" policies of civil and guerilla war, sabotage, terror, and intensified class struggle toward the "right" or "soft" policies of peaceful coexistence between classes as well as between nations. Instead of fighting the nationalist parties, which governed the newly independent states, the Communists, at different times in different places, tried to make peace with the nationalists and draw them into "people's democracy fronts" consisting of all democratic, "antifeudal," anti-imperialist forces.

The violent period had followed, in most cases, the founding of the Cominform in 1947, the development of the "Zhdanovshchina" in the USSR, and the mounting successes of the Chinese Communists spreading out from their territorial base in North China.

Indonesia and India

In Indonesia in September 1948, where the situation of the new Indonesian republic was desperate, the Communists tried to establish a territorial base by seizing the city of Madiun, the third largest in the republic. The people did not follow the Communists, and the revolt was a bloody, costly failure. In 1952 the Indonesian Communist party switched from attacking the nationalists to trying to join them in a national front. The Communist party gained sufficient strength to help bring down one ministry and to give essential aid to Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo's nationalist ministry from 1953 to 1955. This "united front from above" tactic has increased the prestige and influence of the Communists, who made a strikingly impressive showing (about 22 per cent of the votes) in the first elections of the Republic of Indonesia in late September 1955.

The fortunes of the Communist party of India have followed a curve similar to that of their Indonesian comrades. Like the Indonesians, the Indian Communists made terror and civil war their official policy in 1948 at the Second Party Congress, which followed a Communist-inspired conference sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students in Calcutta in February. Having seized the leadership of a peasant uprising in the Telengana district, the Indian Communists had, for a time, a territorial base, but they were unable to expand its area as the Chinese had done at Yenan. The Indian government forces liquidated the Telengana base, and in 1950 the Communists were told by Moscow that in trying to follow the "Chinese path" they had gone astray. They were directed to postpone armed rebellion and guerrilla war and to compete for popular support with the Indian Congress and Socialist parties by organizing legally a broad united front like the Chinese coalition of four classes. In the first Indian general election at the end of 1952, the Communists elected twenty-three deputies to the national Parliament, becoming the second largest party after the Congress party, which elected 362.

The surprising strength shown by the Communists in the general elections of 1952 did not prove that the new tactics were irresistible, for in February 1955 the Communists were decisively defeated in elections in Andhra, a new state in which the party was believed to be exceptionally strong.[1]

Soviet Communist policy in Indonesia and India and also in Burma has been to divert the local Communist parties not only away from armed revolt but also away from out-and-out attacks against the nationalist parties in power, parties that are believed to be neutralist. The chief political enemies of the Communists are the Socialist parties and those parties such as the Masjumi in Indonesia which have a religious background or are suspected of a willingness to regard the United States as a friend rather than as the leader of a new imperialism.

Philippines and Malaya

In the Philippines and Malaya the Communists had launched a guerrilla war when Moscow gave them the signal in 1948. These guerrilla wars were costly, but the Communists kept them going after they had changed their tactics elsewhere. The guerrilla wars never grew into civil wars. In May 1954, Luis Taruc, the leader of the Hukbalahaps, surrendered, and on June 23, 1955, the leaders of the Malay People's Liberation Army sued for peace. The British rejected this proposal of an armistice and offered amnesty to those Communists who gave themselves up. The Communist party of Malaya made a new peace offer on September 24, 1955, to end the eight-year war or, as it is

[1] The history of the Communist party of India has been well told by M. R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India: A Short History* (New York, 1954) and analyzed by John H. Kautsky, "Indian Communist Party Strategy Since 1947," *Pacific Affairs,* June 1955, and by Marshall Windmiller, "Indian Communism Today," *Far Eastern Survey,* April 1954.

called in Malaya, "the emergency." Tengku Abdul Rahman, the chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya, with the approval of the British High Commissioner, agreed to meet the Communist leader, Chin Peng.

Burma and Ceylon

Burma, Ceylon, and Japan have had legal Communist parties—Burma has had the dubious distinction of having two competing Communist groups and Ceylon three. In Ceylon and Burma the Communist movement has been too much divided and too badly led to be as useful an instrument of Soviet policy as in India and Indonesia. It has perhaps also been hampered by the opposition of the Buddhist faith. In Burma the orthodox Communist party followed the "Calcutta line" after 1948, engaging in guerrilla warfare and other kinds of violence while trying to follow the "Chinese path." As elsewhere, these tactics failed and as in the neighboring states, the Communist party of Burma began to change its tactics. A pro-Soviet Burma Workers' and Peasants' party was set up to carry on legal united-front political activity. This was in line with the revised Soviet policy before and after Stalin's death. As with India and Indonesia the Soviet Union prefers to cultivate the good will of the Burmese government as a member of the "peace area" rather than to encourage the local Communists to try to destroy that government.

Japanese Communist party

In Japan, Soviet Communist policy has followed a different timetable. The Communist party of Japan, organized in 1922 and suppressed in 1934, was reborn in 1945 during the American occupation, when SCAP restored "political, civic, and religious freedoms" and encouraged the revival of political parties. From the return from Yenan of the veteran leader, Sanzo Nosaka, in January 1946, to January 1950, the party followed the line of peaceful, democratic activity, trying to appear as "the lovable Communist party." In 1949 the party elected thirty-five members of the national Diet and launched a drive to "acquire a million Bolsheviks." Encouraged by Communist victories in China and by directives from Moscow, and perhaps in anticipation of the approaching crisis in Korea, the Communists in 1950 changed their tactics and launched a series of strikes and acts of violence and sabotage. Nosaka's peaceful revolution formula was denounced by the Cominform. Especially violent demonstrations took place in 1952. In the face of official retaliation and public resentment the Communists failed to elect a single deputy to the Diet in the elections of October 1952.

A year later, seven months after Stalin's death, the Japanese Communists again changed their tactics in accordance with the policies laid down by Moscow for the other Asian parties. The new program called for a united front based on the slogans "anti-America, anti-Yoshida, and antirearmament" and for repudiation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and other agreements with the United States. The program also included opposition to foreign military bases, withdrawal of foreign troops, restoration of normal and friendly political and trade relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China, freedom of travel, speech, assembly, and association (not permitted in Communist countries), and opposition to the Pacific military alliances (such as existed or were proposed between the United States and various Pacific nations including Japan). In Japan, as in India and Indonesia, the new policy does not mean that the Communist parties have abandoned and destroyed their underground and military apparatus.[2]

Soviet-Japanese relations

Along with Communist party activities the Soviet Union has used diplomacy and propaganda to persuade the Japanese that economic survival, political independence, and national security depend on eliminating American military establishments in Japan and Okinawa, the re-establishment of normal trade and diplomatic relations with the Chinese mainland and the Soviet Union, the realization of Japanese neutrality outside the orbit of the American imperialists and alongside the "peace area" that the Peking government, with Soviet support, is working with Premier Nehru to create in Asia. The USSR has used more tangible inducements, including the possibilities of much needed raw materials, the repatriation of war prisoners, a new fishing agreement that would extend Japanese fishing grounds, the possible return of the Habomai and Shikotan Islands between Hokkaido and the Kuriles, and the possible support of Japan's admission to the United Nations. Behind these agreeable possibilities are less agreeable ones—the nearness of Russian air and naval bases, which the Japanese are never allowed to forget.

Soviet-Japanese peace treaty negotiations began in London in June 1955 and after four months were suspended. The Soviet conditions for the restoration of normal relations appear to have been little affected by the changes at the Soviet summit since 1953. They were the same as those presented at the San Francisco conference in 1951. The Soviet negotiators required Japan: (1) to recognize Soviet sovereignty over southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles; (2) to take no part in a military pact aimed at countries opposed to Japan in the Pacific war, that is, to annul the Japanese-American Security Treaty; (3) to demilitarize the straits of Tsugaru, Soya, Nemuro, and Tseushima; (4) to agree to extended cultural relations; (5) to agree not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs; and (6) to waive reparations claims.

NEW TACTICS OR NEW STRATEGY?

Does this important tactical change mean merely that the Communists have concluded that more flies can be caught with sugar than with vinegar? Or does it mean that the Communists in the last decade have worked out a new strategy? Professor John H. Kautsky makes the interesting suggestion[3] that Mao Tse-tung has combined the best features of the two traditional Communist strategies: the "left" or "hard" tactics advocating "united front from below" and the "right" or "soft" based on "united front from above." According to this formula, the Communist party is not only the party dedicated to the leadership of the toiling and exploited masses in their struggle against the bourgeoisie but also the party dedicated to the leadership of the bourgeoisie against foreign imperialists. Mr. Kautsky sums it up this way: "Indeed if the 'left' strategy was the strategy of anti-capitalism and the 'right' strategy that of anti-fascism, the new strategy is the strategy of anti-Americanism."[4]

There is no doubt that after Stalin's death and until about the time of the Bandung Conference, the Communists tried to persuade the Asians that the worst enemies of peace and progress

[2] Cf. Rodger Swearingen, "The Communist Line in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, April 1954.

[3] "The New Strategy of International Communism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. XLIX, 2 (June 1955), pp. 478–86.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 484.

were not the native middle-class nationalists but the American "colonizers" who, *Pravda* charged,[5] had promoted a terrorist organization, the name of this terrorist band being the Salvation Army! Later, particularly after Khrushchev and Bulganin became their chief Soviet spokesmen, anti-Americanism became less virulent. Peking got in step with Moscow—lagging a bit—and began to talk more about "peaceful liberation," and the virtues of trade and less about germ warfare and other atrocities.

Time will tell whether the acceleration of this tendency since Stalin's death means, as Mr. Kautsky believes, that "the class struggle has been replaced by the cold war" as the basic Communist strategy or whether, as it appears to me, this is a significant change in tactics rather than in basic strategy, a change designed to fit present conditions in, and aspirations of, underdeveloped countries. It does not appear to me to mean the abandonment of the strategy based on the Marxist theory of the class struggle, the Leninist theory of imperialism, and the Stalinist theory of the general crisis of capitalism. Under the banner of "proletarian internationalism," the encouragement of class consciousness and class struggle, the promotion of the allegedly inevitable divisions, rivalries, and conflicts between non-Communist nations, and co-ordination and mutual aid between Communist parties of all countries are still basic features of the strategy of the world Communist movement. The new tactics greatly lessen the danger of a new total war; they make possible the gradual transformation of a cold-war coexistence into a competitive coexistence. There is always the possibility that such a coexistence may continue indefinitely and that the competition of political and economic systems will lead to the modification of both rather than to their mutual destruction.

[5] September 22, 1953.

Post-Stalin Events

Stalin's death did not appear to have any important effect on Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese Communists paid the expected tribute to the departed and accepted the principle of collective leadership for the Soviet Union and the world Communist movement without, however, adopting it for China. Mao Tse-tung became the most eminent of living Communists after Stalin's death, but China's needs and dependence on the Soviet Union were too great to allow Mao to claim the prerogatives of his pre-eminence even if he had any inclination to do so. China continued "leaning to one side," seemingly undisturbed by the fact that Beria, one of the collective leaders, was accused of treason by his comrades, condemned, and shot and that another collective leader, Malenkov, the first among the equals, confessed his inadequacy, was demoted, but was allowed to live. Behind the Chinese Communists' prompt and dutiful acceptance of these changes, the fact remained that three years after Stalin's death the prestige of the Russian leadership had fallen in Asia as that of the Chinese leaders, particularly Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, had risen. It is possible that the warmth with which Khrushchev promoted peaceful coexistence may have been the result of the desire to regain for the Communist fatherland the prestige and policy initiative among the Communists that had been seriously compromised by the loss of Stalin, the Beria scandal, and Malenkov's failure to keep the power he had inherited.

Korean armistice

The Korean armistice and exchange of war prisoners showed several things of which the Kremlin was forced to take note. For one thing, neither the Communists nor the United Nations was willing to pay the cost in lives and other ways to try to unify Korea by victory on Korean soil. Neither side was ready to run the risk of a general war by spreading the fighting to the Communist "sanctuaries" in China or to the United Nations sanctuaries in Japan. The non-Korean belligerents wanted more to end the fighting than to unify Korea. The Communists must have wanted very badly to end the fighting or they would not have agreed to the voluntary repatriation of prisoners. They opposed this with all the means at their command short of continuing the war and finally agreed to the loss of face involved in the refusal of over 74 per cent of the Chinese "volunteers" to return to the fatherlands the Communists were in the process of transforming.

The Communists turned on the full force of their propaganda to obscure by extravagant claims of victory the bleak fact that they had failed in their major objective to win all of Korea by force, that they had provoked a successful application of the principle of collective action, under UN auspices, against aggression, and that they had caused the United States to speed up its rearmament and redouble its efforts to strengthen regional security and economic aid against direct and indirect aggression.

The war in Indochina

As the Korean crisis subsided into a stalemate, the war in Indochina, which had been treated as a brush fire or a fringe war for several years, suddenly seemed on the point of spreading throughout Southeast Asia. To what degree the stalemate in Korea enabled the Chinese Communists to increase their aid to Ho Chi Minh is not clear, but it is a fact that the Vietminh successes increased in range and significance after the Korean cease fire. It is also true that the regime of Bao Dai had lost prestige and the power of resistance and that both the funds and the morale of the French had been all but exhausted in a war that they could afford neither to win nor to lose. The United States seemed to be faced with the unpleasant choice of seeing all of Indochina fall into Communist hands or of intervening as in Korea, but without such a clearly drawn issue and against the prevailing opinion in Asia and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[6]

Geneva Conference, 1954

At the four-power conference in Berlin in February 1954, the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed to meet at Geneva on April 26 to discuss Korean questions and peace in Indochina.

Representatives of nineteen countries met at the Geneva Far Eastern Conference on April 26, 1954, to discuss these matters. The Russians again tried to have the Chinese People's Government given a status of equality with the Big Four but, largely through the opposition of the United States, failed. The plan for unification of Korea on the basis of free elections made no headway in the Conference chiefly because of conditions and obstacles presented by the North Korean regime, supported by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Government. The Communists, who had been declared aggressors by the UN, took the line that the UN was the aggressor and should therefore be excluded from all responsibility for the proposed elections. This

[6] The story of the war in Indochina and the cease fire has been told by Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina* (Stanford, Calif., 1954) and *The Struggle for Indochina Continues* (Stanford, Calif., 1955).

line had about the same relation to reality as the myth about the Chinese "volunteers" who in complete formations and with full equipment and logistical support had joined the Korean War. If the Communists of the Soviet Union did not originate this argument, they supported it. Korea remained divided, with the elections as far off as ever. So far as Korea is concerned, Soviet policy since Stalin has been to hold to the present division, build up North Korea militarily and economically, wait confidently for the disintegration of the present regime in the Republic of Korea or its abandonment by the United States and permit North Korea to remain in the sphere of interest of China.

The Communists had much greater success in that part of the Geneva meeting that dealt with Indochina. They were in a much stronger position, because the Vietminh forces, aided by China which in turn was aided by the Soviet Union, were winning victories. Their forces captured Dienbienphu on May 8, while negotiations were going on. The French, upon whom resistance largely depended, were weary and divided. The Vietnam nationalists were at odds among themselves and with the French. The Americans, to whom both the French and the Vietnamese looked for material and moral support, were unwilling to intervene in force and so become involved in another "Korea," and they were reluctant for domestic political reasons to negotiate with the Vietminh and the Chinese Communists, with whom it was necessary for somebody to negotiate if the seven years' war in Indochina were to be ended. Neither the French nor the Americans came to Geneva with a program, much less a joint program, except the admirable but unrealistic objective of a free, united, and democratic Indochina, an objective that might have been realized only if the Vietminh had been losing instead of winning the war.

The Communists appeared to be willing to accept a stalemate of the Korean type. Since United States politics and policy prohibited Mr. Dulles from talking either peace or war with the Communists, the leadership and the laurels of the conference were taken by Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Molotov, who served as presidents, and by Mr. Chou En-lai, who showed great skill in making the best use of the advantageous military and diplomatic position of the Communists and of the awkward predicament of their opponents, who were made to appear as opposed to peace and incapable of war.

Provisions on Indochina

On July 21, 1954, the representatives of the governments directly concerned signed agreements which included three provisions: All of north Vietnam from the Chinese border to approximately the seventeenth parallel was left under the control of the regime headed by Ho Chi Minh, now known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Vietnam south of the parallel remained under the state of Vietnam, at that time headed by Bao Dai, the Emperor in absentia, who was soon succeeded by Ngo Dinh Diem, as the de facto head of the Vietnam government. The United States agreed to respect these terms but not to be responsible for their enforcement, which was left to a commission of Polish, Canadian, and Indian members under Indian chairmanship. The independence of Laos and Cambodia was recognized, and Laos was in effect divided like Vietnam when the Communist, Vietminh-led Laotian rebels, known under the ancient name of Pathet Lao, were given special status in three provinces, a status which they have since maintained with arms. The conference reaffirmed the unity of Vietnam (North and South) and agreed that its future status should be decided by a free and secret election to be held in July 1956.

COMMUNIST CHINA AFTER GENEVA

With the prestige gained by military success in Indochina and by diplomatic successes at Geneva the Communists intensified the propaganda of peaceful coexistence, and at the same time the Chinese Communists kept up the tension in the Formosa Strait by military activity and by threats to liberate the island of Formosa from alleged American occupation.

The five principles of Chou En-lai and Nehru

On June 28, 1954, Premier Chou En-lai and Pandit Nehru proclaimed their "five principles" of international conduct as a sound basis for peaceful coexistence among the nations of Asia. These principles had been the basis of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet of April 29, 1954. The five principles were: (1) nonaggression, (2) noninterference, (3) mutual respect, (4) equality and mutual benefit, (5) peaceful coexistence. There was, of course, nothing new about these principles. As a matter of fact, seventeen years before, on July 16, 1937, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in different words, had covered all of these principles and in addition that of disarmament in his six "fundamental principles of international policy." They all are excellent proposals and all of them have been violated by the Communists, who committed flagrant aggression in Korea, interfered in every Asian country, and showed the utmost contempt and disrespect for the new governments set up by national and socialist parties of East and South Asian countries.

The joint promulgation of the five principles, however, had a great effect in Asia, for several reasons. They were proclaimed to be the basis of a "peace area" to which Red China and India and later Burma and Indonesia belonged. The USSR not only approved the "peace area" but, in effect, joined it by claiming that these were the very principles on which Soviet policy had been founded. The announcement was well timed, since it was issued while the Geneva talks were going on and world attention was focused on peace or war in Asia. The fact that Chou was a cosigner of the declaration seemed to suggest that the Communists might have turned over a new leaf and given up their aggressive program of liberating other Asians from their chosen leaders. The fact that Nehru was a cosigner seemed to suggest that the dangers of Red aggression and subversion could be eliminated if there were only enough confidence and good will to meet the Communists halfway.

Attitudes to U. S.

In contrast to this shining example of peaceful coexistence between "peace-loving" Communists and peace-loving non-Communists, all Communist parties and some neutralists followed the Soviet lead in representing the United States as the imperialist aggressor and "colonizer" and the chief obstacle to peaceful coexistence. They denounced the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization formed under United States leadership at Manila in September 1954 as what *Pravda* later described as "the aggressive SEATO pact" and a "military conspiracy of the colonizers in Asia."[7] Vyshinskii carried the campaign in the United Nations with a demand that something be done about American aggression against China.

[7] May 20, 1955. Translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 7, No. 20, p. 19.

Sino-Soviet relations

During the autumn of 1954 and the winter of 1955, while there was still much talk of war in Southeast Asia, Sino-Soviet relations appeared to reach a greater degree of intimacy and mutual admiration than ever. Following in the footsteps of the Soviet elder brother, the Chinese People's Congress, on September 20, adopted the Constitution of 1954, which was based on the Common Program and the two Organic Laws adopted in 1949. But it also borrowed many of the provisions and some of the language of the Stalin Constitution of 1936. The new organic law proclaimed the successful resistance to United States aggression and "indestructible friendship with the great USSR and the People's Democracies." The Chinese Communist party followed Soviet example in another way by launching a purge as the elder brother had done so often in Stalin's time. On the fifth anniversary of the Chinese Communist assumption of state power, the Soviet Union announced that all Soviet forces would be withdrawn from the Port Arthur naval base and all installations handed over free to the People's Government. This transfer took place on May 24, 1955.

The Chinese Communists gained more prestige than the Russians from the events in Korea and Indochina, and from Chou En-lai's diplomacy at Geneva and among China's Asian neighbors. These achievements may have strengthened Peking's position in dealing with Moscow and underscored the fact that China was not a satellite but a partner of the USSR. In February 1955 Molotov paid his Chinese comrades the honor of including China with the USSR as heads of the camp of Communism. The Soviet official statement accords the Chinese the honor of being referred to as the "great" Chinese people, an honor otherwise reserved for the "great Soviet people." That China was still a junior partner of the Communist axis was clear from the fact of China's dependence on the Soviet Union for economic and technical aid in both civilian and military development programs.[8]

Three years after the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid, China's trade with the Soviet bloc had grown from 26 per cent of the total to 72 per cent. In 1953 and again in 1954, when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Peking, the Russians made economic and political agreements reflecting both China's growing prestige and her growing needs. The dissolution of the joint Sino-Soviet stock companies and the supply of more technicians were promised. But China's import needs were vastly greater than could be supplied by the USSR.[9]

It is suggested that one immediate effect of China's increase in prestige and needs is to cause the Soviet Union to retain China's warm partnership "at the expense of weaker European countries," which have been forced to help foot the bill for China's economic development.

BANDUNG CONFERENCE

The Soviet Union strongly approved of the Bandung Conference, and the Communists did their best to make the most of the occasion to convince the Asians and Africans and, in fact, the world at large, that the Soviet and Chinese parties that had previously supported and directed sabotage, guerrilla, and civil wars against the Asian governments were now wholly dedicated to the proposition that countries having different political and social systems could and should exist peacefully side by side. Large Soviet and Chinese delegations with representatives of fourteen other countries attended an unofficial coexistence conference on April 10 at New Delhi as a kind of warming up for Bandung.

[8] Cf. R. L. Walker, *China Under Communism: The First Five Years* (New Haven, Conn., 1955), especially Chaps. I, II, X–XII; and W. W. Rostow, *Prospects for Communist China* (New York, 1954).

[9] A. Z., "Trade Between China and the Soviet Bloc," *The World Today*, May 5, 1955, pp. 202–10.

President Soekarno's speech

In his speech opening the conference, President Soekarno referred to two events of the past. One was the conference in Brussels by the League Against Imperialism nearly thirty years before. He observed that many distinguished delegates who were present at Bandung had attended the Brussels meeting to discuss their fight for independence. President Soekarno did not mention the further interesting fact that the League Against Imperialism was actually a "front" organization set up under the guidance of the Comintern to establish contact with leaders of Asian nationalist movements such as Pandit Nehru and Soekarno himself. Neither the League Against Imperialism nor the Comintern exists today, but the leaders of the Communist movement have revived their policy of cultivating contact with Asian nationalist leaders.

President Soekarno also mentioned the fact that the Bandung Conference was opening on April 18, the anniversary of Paul Revere's ride on April 18, 1775, and "the opening of the American War of Independence, the first successful anticolonial war in history."

Premier Chou En-lai

Premier Chou En-lai did not salute the Americans as pioneers in the struggle against colonialism, but his references to the United States as solely responsible for the tensions in the "Taiwan area" and in connection with SEATO were made in language much more restrained than had been customary in Communist comment on American policy and national character.

In urging the Asian-African delegates to seek common ground in spite of different ideologies and different social systems, Premier Chou said that two groups of Asian and African countries had gained independence since the war. One group consists of countries led by Communists, the other group of countries like India, Burma, and Indonesia, which are led by nationalists. "Is there any reason," asked Mr. Chou En-lai, "why we cannot understand and respect each other and give support and sympathy to each other?" The Premier failed to mention one important reason why such understanding and support would be difficult, the fact that in all of the countries of the second group the Communists have tried to overthrow and destroy the independent regimes set up by the nationalists. Did he expect that Asians and Africans who had been exposed to Communist conspiracy, abuse, and violence would have forgotten so soon? In any case, other members of the conference repaired the omission and pointed out to the Chinese delegate that Africans and Asians were exposed to more than one kind of imperialism.

Premier Chou replied with courtesy and restraint. He proposed that if "peaceful coexistence" were tainted with Communism the words "Live together in peace" be substituted. He suggested that two more principles be added to the five promulgated by Premier Nehru and himself: (6) "respect for the rights of people of all countries to choose freely a way of life as well as political and economic systems"; (7) "abstention from doing damage to each other." Far more significant was a remark later in his speech. Instead of the familiar

"hate America" routine he said: "As to relations between China and the United States, the Chinese people do not want to have war with the United States. We are willing to settle international disputes by peaceful means." Chou En-lai did not, of course, admit that the problem of Formosa was an "international dispute" but he substituted "talk" for "war" as a method of dealing with differences between the United States and the People's Government.[10] This suggestion of negotiation instead of forceful liberation and the general moderation of his tone added to his prestige and contributed to the success of his diplomacy, opening the way for the talks begun in Geneva on August 1, 1955, by Ambassadors U. Alexis Johnson and Wang Ping-nan.

CHINESE-INDONESIAN TREATY

The Premier of the People's Government gave tangible evidence of Red China's good intentions toward her neighbors by announcing at Bandung his government's willingness "to solve the problem of dual nationality of overseas Chinese with governments of the countries concerned." A treaty was negotiated with Indonesia in which Peking recognized the right of the Indonesian residents of Chinese descent to choose whether to become citizens of China or of Indonesia. This treaty, intended to be the model for similar treaties with other Soviet–East Asian countries, was perhaps also intended to diminish Chinese Nationalist influence among the 12,000,000 overseas Chinese, but even so it appeared to be a step in the right direction in an old and troublesome problem.

[10] This and preceding quotations are from *Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference: Texts of Selected Speeches and Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 18–24, 1955*, distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

U. S.–PEKING TALKS AT GENEVA

Soon after the summit conference, talks began at Geneva at the ambassadorial level between Messrs. Johnson and Wang. After a month of talks the Peking government agreed to release the Americans whom they had seized and condemned as spies. This bandit style of diplomacy was practiced in more primitive societies where foreigners were seized and held for ransom. In the present case, as in Soviet negotiations with the Germans and Japanese, the ransom for the prisoners was some diplomatic concession to Communist demands. Communist concessions on repatriation, however, relieved tensions on a problem that the Communists had deliberately created. Neither at Bandung nor at Geneva had the Communists changed their position on basic Asian issues.

COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

As several observers have noted, there has been much elbow rubbing and bending and much champagne and vodka drunk in the name of peaceful coexistence, but peaceful coexistence remains in the Communist ideology not an end but a means. The new tactical objectives are these: (1) to take advantage of the Asians' desire to make technological and social progress in the shortest possible time; (2) to exploit the Asians' hope of preventing their countries from becoming the battleground of the struggle between the two great power systems; (3) to prevent the West from making use of its greater resources in technology, capital, and the creative initiatives of a free society. Soviet support of the "peace area" based on the "five principles," the offers of technical and military aid not only to the Communist bloc but to the nations of South Asia and the Middle East, and the efforts to identify Soviet policy with that of the Arab-Asian bloc and the Bandung nations generally in opposition to colonialism—these are practical applications of the new tactics.

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The Soviet Union and the United States: Problems and Prospects

By Philip E. Mosely

STALIN'S successors have modulated somewhat the bad manners of Soviet policy and have refurbished its arsenal of diplomatic and psychological weapons. The new flexibility of their tactics has brought important gains and promises more for the future. Stalin's threats and bludgeonings—the pressures against Greece and Turkey, the attempt to starve West Berlin into submission, the Communist attack on South Korea—forced the threatened countries of the free world into countermeasures and new defense arrangements and made the United States, reluctantly, the chief bastion and promoter of resistance to further Soviet expansion. At first timidly, since 1954 with growing self-assurance, the new Soviet leadership has shifted and varied its tactics. Has it changed its basic strategy?

Leading from Weakness?

Since Stalin's death there have been numerous and clashing estimates of the Soviet power position. Some commentators have pictured a Soviet leadership disrupted by the danger or reality of mutual destruction. They have inflated the execution of Beria or the demotion of Malenkov into a harbinger of the imminent downfall of the Soviet system and have overlooked the basic persistence of the Stalin-erected apparatus, which rules through massive and all-embracing institutions that in turn are regulated and propelled by the Communist party. They have often confused the struggle for power within the system—a struggle which is always bitter and often fatal within a totalitarian regime—with a crisis of the system itself.

Stalin's successors have been franker than he was in admitting defects in Soviet economic plans and achievements and have taken some fairly substantial steps to raise agricultural production, improve housing, increase economic incentives, and raise somewhat the standard of living. From this fact many foreign commentators have drawn contradictory but usually comforting conclusions. The new leadership, some say, has abandoned its world-wide ambitions and is primarily interested in promoting the welfare of its own people. Or, contrariwise, the leadership is, others assert, unable to cope with its accumulated economic problems and is therefore interested in achieving a genuine basis of understanding and coexistence with the outside world, even to the point of making major political and territorial concessions.

Within the framework of the basic drive to build heavy industry and military strength, the new leaders have made substantial but still minor concessions to strengthen the lagging fields of food, housing, and living standards. But actual investments in military strength have continued to increase since March 1953, and heavy industry has maintained its remarkable rate of growth. The prospect is strong that the Soviet economy will continue the race to outstrip all other economies except

that of the United States. Ten years from now the American and Soviet economies will overshadow even more ominously those of all other countries.

The prospect is strong for a continued bipolarization of military as well as economic power. True, some analysts predict the widespread development, within a few years, of "cheap" atomic-hydrogen power and the emergence of the intercontinental guided missile as a "poor man's weapon." If these forecasts prove true, the present bipolarization of the newest forms of power may be followed by a new distribution of strength among countries, and by new dangers, too. Until these predictions have been tested, however, one basic factor of great importance is the trend toward ever more complex and costly systems of modern weapons. In this race, which is both technological and economic, only three major countries are now able to stand the pace. In both technology and resources the Soviet Union continues to demonstrate great and growing military strength.

Moscow's Political Offensive

Stalin's policies had, as he boasted, extended the Communist system to one-third of the population of the world, but they had also aroused hate and fear outside the realm of his writ. His successors turned their hands to liquidating the political liabilities which they had inherited, thereby recovering greater freedom of political action. In 1953 Moscow dropped Stalin's stubborn insistence that Turkey surrender one-fourth of its national territory. In 1955 it returned to the Finns the Porkkala enclave, a base outmoded in the age of atomic warfare. It abandoned its grip on Eastern Austria. It persuaded the Yugoslav leadership that the independence and survival of their country were no longer threatened by Soviet enmity. Except in the case of Austria, each of these "concessions" was a recognition of facts which could not be changed except at the risk of war. None of them cut into any Soviet positions of strength. However, for many people fearful of war and yearning for more hopeful omens, the new trend offered "proof" of an entirely new Soviet policy, a permanent policy of live and let live.

In Germany, which the Soviet leadership regards as the key to Europe, it has made no concessions. The two Geneva conferences of 1955 demonstrated the Kremlin's persistent belief that it can exploit the desire of the German people for reunification in order to detach it from its alliance with the West. The fear of Soviet preponderance may deter the West Germans for some years from accepting Soviet terms for reunification. Will it be effective indefinitely?

The Soviet leaders look to a new depression in America, with its repercussions throughout the free world, to force West Germany to seek markets in the Soviet bloc, to detach itself from the West, and to accept Soviet terms for national reunification. Meanwhile, it has made abundantly clear that it has no notion of sacrificing East Germany, its most valuable colony, for the sake of any paper assurances of "security."

Soviet smiles and token concessions have given new currency to Moscow's proposals for a European security pact. At the two Genevas the Kremlin proposed a series of stages by which the Western North Atlantic Pact and the Eastern Warsaw Pact would be fused into an over-all European security agreement. If achieved, this result would completely eliminate the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a framework of Western defense. On the other hand, through its control of the party, secret police, and military apparatuses in the satellite regimes, the Soviet-led groupings in Eastern Europe, now including East Germany and Al-

bania, would still remain a fully effective, ever ready instrument of Soviet purposes.

Of course, the Soviet spokesmen did not expect the NATO governments to swallow the bait, but at no cost to their own strength or programs they have promoted a greater sense of security in the West and a growing reluctance to make sacrifices for the strength of the Western bloc, and have contributed to slow down the rate of NATO's military build-up. If the NATO countries reduce their military efforts by, say, five or ten billions of dollars a year, the relative gain to the Soviet bloc, with its steady increase in military resources, will be well worth a small diplomatic effort.

SOVIET TRAVELING DIPLOMACY

As a symbol of its new flexibility of tactics, the place of the remote and cryptic Stalin has been taken by the eager and voluble travelers Bulganin and Khrushchev. While their appearance in Belgrade may have had relatively little effect upon the cautious and strong-willed Yugoslavs, with their recent memories of Russian interference and menaces, it is more difficult to appraise the impact of their visits to India and Burma. There the flattering attentions of the leaders of a great power have apparently reinforced the feeling that the Soviet Union represents a remote and presumably beneficent power. Other visits have been foreshadowed, to Britain, France, and Egypt. In each mission the Soviet spokesmen emphasize, crudely but not ineffectively, those interests and emotions which may draw other peoples to support specific Soviet policies and, above all, those prejudices and fears which may turn them against the United States.

Under Stalin, Soviet policy concentrated its pressure against its immediate neighbors along the periphery. Under his successors, Soviet policy reaches farther afield. To the Arab countries, which do not feel Soviet pressure directly, as have Turkey and Iran, it offers political support against Israel and promises of economic assistance and military supplies, to enable them to escape from one-sided dependence on the West. To India, which is more interested in its struggle with Pakistan over Kashmir than in any seemingly remote Soviet ambitions, it offers political support for the annexation of the Portuguese enclaves and remarkably favorable terms for constructing a large steel mill. To Burma, which may see the usefulness of direct Soviet interest as a potential offset to possible Chinese Communist pressure, it offers industrial equipment and technical assistance in exchange for its embarrassing rice surplus.

Within the United Nations the new Soviet diplomacy has also shown an unaccustomed sureness and flexibility. On more and more occasions it has found its positions supported not only by the Asian-African bloc but also by a substantial number of Latin American states. It can no longer complain of the "mechanical majorities" rolled up in support of United States proposals. Instead of insisting rigidly upon its one-sided proposals for disarmament, it has flexibly adopted the Western proposal for over-all numerical limitations on defense forces and has pushed hard for the acceptance of early limitations on the use of the atomic bomb, while resisting the insistence of the West on the need for establishing effective controls. Still, in many countries the Soviet tactics in the question of control of armaments have greatly lessened suspicion of Moscow's intentions.

Perhaps the Kremlin's persistent rolling of the "anticolonialist" drums has been its most effective instrument. The "West" is easily identified as the bogeyman for peoples recently emancipated from alien rule, or still seeking their emancipation, and the Soviet leaders are working hard, as they have since 1917, at attuning these deep-seated emotions to their own interests.

SOVIET EXPECTATIONS AND AIMS

While the Soviet leadership continues the strenuous pace of economic development at home and pursues the consolidation of the Soviet sphere, it looks hopefully for signs of economic decay and political disruption in the non-Soviet camp. True, the Soviet picture of American and Western economic life is no longer so grossly oversimplified as it was in Stalin's last years. Delegations of farm experts and housing administrators have admitted that there are new and valuable ideas to be gleaned from Western innovations, and *Pravda* has condemned technicians who claim that everything Soviet is best. On the other hand, Soviet periodicals are predicting an early economic depression in the American economy, which, they maintain, has been sustained only by the armaments race. They point out that the crash of 1929 came ten years after World War I, implying clearly their hope for a new depression, scheduled to begin ten years after the close of World War II.

Even without the long-awaited economic crisis, the Soviet press eagerly picks out each new evidence of "imperialist rivalries" within the non-Soviet world. As Stalin explained in his *Economic Problems of Socialism* (October 1952), these conflicts are bound to undermine any efforts to consolidate the free world and must even lead to new wars within it, wars which could only redound to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Of course, all programs of United States economic assistance, in this view, are designed only to "export unemployment," to weaken foreign competitors, and to establish "control by the dollar" over underdeveloped areas. As in Stalin's time, Soviet commentators believe that Germany and Japan are especially vulnerable to a new depression and to American competition, and therefore especially susceptible to being wooed away from the American-led bloc of "imperialists."

Without waiting for a major depression or a "general crisis of capitalism," the Soviet leadership is working hard to break up those links of solidarity which Stalin's policies did so much to forge within the non-Soviet world. Both by direct diplomatic and not-so-diplomatic appeals and by indirect appeals to pride, fear, and envy, Soviet policy and propaganda endeavor to exploit the inevitable disagreement and dissensions within the free world. Against American policies Soviet propaganda appeals in France to deep-seated fears of a rearmed Germany, in Germany to the suspicion that it is France, rather than Russia, which seeks to keep Germany divided. Soviet policy and propaganda have intensified their main effort, which aims to divide the United States from its allies, and thus to bring about the retraction of American power to North America.

The principal aim of the Soviet leaders, now as under Stalin, is to eliminate the system of bases which, in case of conflict, might support American pressure against the Soviet Union. The United States and the Soviet Union have been approaching "atomic parity," in terms of their capacity to inflict punishment on each other. Soon the principal advantage which the United States and its allies may still enjoy will be the geographical one of being able, in case of Soviet attack, to effect or threaten convergent retaliation from many directions. It would be a long time before the Soviet leadership would, under such conditions, be confident of the ability of their regime to survive, even if they suc-

ceeded in destroying the major American cities.

American and Soviet strategic power may soon enter a stage in which each can destroy the other without the use of intervening bases. However, if American policy, at that stage, discards its alliances or disregards its allies because it need no longer rely on bases outside North America, Soviet policy will be encouraged to increase its pressure on the countries lying in between. As the arm of strategic power is lengthened, the United States will need to build the community of interest within the free world not less actively but more actively than it has done so far.

SOVIET AIMS IN ASIA

Since World War II Soviet policy has failed in Europe to expand its sphere of control beyond the line of its military penetration; in fact, it failed to secure control of Austria and Finland, and in 1948 it drove Yugoslavia into a desperate assertion of its independence. As after World War I, Soviet Communism failed in Europe to win any new country by voluntary conversion to its creed.

In Asia the victory of the Chinese Communists, achieved after many years of political and military struggle, marked the beginning rather than the end of a desperate and crucial wrestling for the future of Asia. The stalemating of the Communist forces in the Korean War and the temporary pause in the military struggle for Southeast Asia offer no inherent assurance of the long-continued stabilization of contesting forces. One of the main purposes of post-Stalin Soviet policy is to prepare favorable conditions for the renewal of Communist expansion in Asia.

By cultivating a renewed sense of security and relaxation among America's Western allies, Soviet policy hopes to avoid a repetition of the dangerous experience brought on it by Stalin's Korean adventure. At the time of the Korean War many countries directly menaced by Soviet threats rallied to support American counteraction in Korea, feeling that this would in turn strengthen their own security in the future. Soviet propaganda was largely unsuccessful, outside the Soviet bloc, in picturing the Korean War as a spontaneous "civil war," in which the United States and the United Nations were gratuitously interfering. In promoting an atmosphere of relaxation, Moscow hopes now to reinsure itself and Communist China against a renewed risk of this sort. Any stepped-up demand for "elections" in Vietnam or any revival of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam will, it hopes, be regarded generally as a purely local affair, to be settled by local forces without interference by outside powers, especially by the United States.

If the Kremlin expects a new period of tensions, risks, and opportunities for Communist expansion to unfold in Southeast Asia, it is entirely logical for it to work hard at strengthening its "peace-loving" posture elsewhere throughout the world. Thereby it can, in effect, hold the ring for the Chinese Communists and their local allies in Southeast Asia while making sure that no threat of major retaliation is directed toward the Soviet Union. If the United States and its allies should then disagree concerning the desirability or necessity of blocking further Communist expansion in Asia, the Soviet leadership might succeed in its aim of separating the United States from its allies and thus dismantling the American-led security and bases system of the free world.

THE AMERICAN POSITION

Faced by the more subtle strategy and the more flexible tactics which are being pursued by Stalin's successors, American opinion has shown a wide variety of reactions. The initial assumption that the Soviet regime was about to collapse or, alternatively, that it would now devote all its energies to the welfare of its people encouraged a natural desire to limit military expenditures and to cut down economic aid to friendly nations. At the same time, in accepting the Soviet challenge to negotiate, President Eisenhower narrowly escaped the position of being forced to "prove" America's peaceful intentions. Instead, he reaffirmed dramatically the American desire to avoid recourse to war and the American willingness to accept a drastic form of arms inspection for itself as well as for others, as a means of building confidence in the prospect of reducing the threat of war.

After the narrow limits of Soviet "concessions" had been made clear, American opinion recognized that it was the manner rather than the substance of Soviet policy which had changed. The question still remained: In the somewhat changed atmosphere, would time work for Soviet aims or for American and free-world purposes?

As many peoples and groups begin to feel less directly menaced by Soviet pressures, the task of maintaining a broad range of understanding and cooperation within the free world becomes more difficult. It will no longer be sufficient to say that the United States is willing to aid other peoples because keeping their "real estate" in friendly hands contributes to United States security. No people likes to feel that its survival or its economic development is going to depend indefinitely on the "generosity" of a more powerful state.

In the long run, interests must be mutual in order to be strong. In order to preserve and strengthen its alliances the United States must make clear the mutual interest of itself and its allies in maintaining the widest possible area of political freedom and economic opportunity within the world. The element of mutuality and joint decision making within the American-led alliance system must be strengthened constantly and systematically. Rather than allowing the United States to "go it alone," the early arrival of the stage of intercontinental combat will give a new urgency to that common interest in joint survival.

The Soviet leadership is endeavoring to deal separately with European and Asian affairs and thus to probe the weak points of American policy. It is in the American interest to combat this Soviet effort. Instead of treating the Communist-bloc demand for early elections in Vietnam as a purely localized matter, American policy would do well to link it with the free world's demand for genuinely free elections in Korea and East Germany. This would make it clear that the United States is working actively to overcome the division of all three nations. Instead of pursuing a completely separate policy with respect to the offshore islands, the United States would be well advised to draw a clear and defensible line through the Formosa Strait and to rally as wide a political support as possible for the defense of Formosa.

The industrial development of the Soviet Union is now largely self-generating, and the race in military technology is becoming closer all the time. The competition for new breakthroughs in military technology cannot be halted or slowed down. This means that the only important—if crude—instrument by which Soviet decisions can be influenced is the maintenance of a very large United States military budget.

When Soviet policy makers feel uncertain about the rate of progress in American military technology, their willingness to use their own very great power in a reckless manner may be restrained. In addition, while very large and growing, the Soviet economy is

hard pressed to meet the competing demands for improved and costly armaments, for domestic expansion of heavy industry, and for some rise in Soviet living standards, not to mention the demands of Communist China for Soviet aid to its industrialization. American policies can do little or nothing to influence Soviet decisions regarding domestic growth or aid to China, but its actions do have a direct effect on Soviet decisions in the military field. A continuing large American military budget is almost the only way of compelling the Soviet leadership to face the competing claims on its economic resources and to consider from time to time the feasibility and the desirability, from its own point of view, of taking on new risks in the pursuit of its world-wide aims.

At the same time the United States must demonstrate that free-world assistance in economic development and in political and cultural progress, offered with freedom and dignity, is both more attractive and more efficacious than the Soviet counteroffers. As far as possible, such assistance to nations eager to develop their productive resources must be offered on a continuing basis and must be co-ordinated with the development of world-wide trade opportunities rather than offered as an emergency response to Soviet blackmail or enticements. Instead of relaxing and forgetting about the needs and aspirations of underdeveloped and ambitious countries, Americans need to think now in terms of longer-range, persistent, and shared programs of economic development.

Above all, in the new phase of Soviet smiles, Americans must realize even more fully that the dangers through which we are passing are not of short-term character. No one policy, no one appropriation, no one administration, can be expected to cope with them once and for all. Whether Americans like it or not, what they do or do not do will be one of the two determining factors in shaping the world of tomorrow. If Americans are sorely tried by the too great predictability of Soviet aims and tactics, probably Kremlin analysts are constantly fuming over the unpredictability of American opinions and actions. A strong, stable, and predictable American position in world affairs is now the most important element in an increasingly unstable equation of forces.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

CHR. L. LANGE and AUGUST SCHOU. *Histoire de l'intèrnationalisme,* Volume II: *De la Paix de Westphalie jusqu'au Congrès de Vienne (1815).* Pp. xi, 482. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France pour l'Institut Nobel Norvégien, 1954. 3,000 *fr.*

Whoever has had, as this reviewer, the privilege of knowing Lange personally, must have been deeply impressed by the figure of this tall, Viking-like Norwegian who dedicated his whole life to the ideas of peace and international co-operation. Lange had been, first, Secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Institute and was, then for many years, Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. In addition, he was a Norwegian delegate at the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 and a member of the Norwegian Delegation at the League of Nations.

He also studied the history of internationalism as a scholar. The first volume of his *History of Internationalism,* covering the time from antiquity to the Westphalian Peace, had been published in 1919. He planned a second volume (1648–1815) and a third volume, covering the period from the Congress of Vienna to the present day. But only after having resigned in 1933 as Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, did he have the time to dedicate himself entirely to his research. While occupied with the second volume, he died in 1938. This second volume has now been published by A. Schou. It covers the period from the Westphalian Peace (1648) to the Congress of Vienna (1815). The first chapters (up to Leibniz) were fully written by Lange. For the period from Leibniz to Adam Smith he left a rather complete documentation. In any case, the account, from Leibniz on, is primarily the responsibility of Schou.

The work treats, first, the general character of the period of absolutism, which is considered as a period of international anarchy, and of the idea of an European balance of power. It examines in detail the doctrines of the international lawyers (Zouch, Rachel, Pufendorf, and the *jus naturae* school), the religious pacifism of William Penn and the Quakers, and the attitude of men of letters and philosophers, particularly of Leibniz.

In further chapters the emergence of the ideas of tolerance (Locke, Bayle, Bar-

beyrac), and of progress, as well as the projects for an eternal peace (particularly of Abbé de St. Pierre), is analyzed. It, then, describes the attitude toward internationalism, prior to the American and French Revolutions, of men of literature (for example, Defoe, Swift), politics and the science of international law (Wolff, Vattel, Martens). There follows an account of the attitude toward internationalism during the two quoted revolutions (Condorcet, Abbé Grégoire, Lessing, Wieland, Herder, Kant), during the Napoleonic era and at the Vienna Congress.

The work, to some extent, intercrosses with certain parts of the two volumes (in German) on the idea of international organization by Jacob Ter Meulen. But by its profound and original investigation not only of the ideas of world-famous men, but also of minor and anonymous writings which are, nevertheless, significant and revealing, it constitutes an important contribution to our knowledge of the history of internationalism.

JOSEF L. KUNZ
University of Toledo

HENRY L. ROBERTS, assisted by JEAN GUNTHER and JANIS A. KRESLINS. *Foreign Affairs Bibliography: A Selected and Annotated List of Books on International Relations, 1942–1952.* Pp. xxiii, 727. New York: Harper and Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1955. $10.00.

It is natural to compare this volume with its well-known predecessors, classics in the field, of which the first volume by William L. Langer and Hamilton Fish Armstrong covered 1919–32; and the second by the late Robert G. Woolbert covered 1932–42. After probing and poking this one—here and there; head, feet, and torso; front, back and middle—one must conclude that in comprehensiveness, in scholarship, and in all-round usefulness, the present volume does, indeed, stand shoulder to shoulder with its elder brothers.

Listing some 9,000 books, in more languages (thirty-four) than most users are likely to find necessary, the Roberts volume records and briefly characterizes the significant books of the decade on "general international relations" (political factors, social factors, and so forth), those on "the world since 1914" (historical accounts of the two world wars and of the aftermath of each), and those on "the world by regions" (including the Antarctic). The annotations are for the most part severely objective, and Roberts appears to be entirely open-minded on such questions as that of revisionism; but he is not afraid to say, for example, of C. C. Tansill's *Back Door to War,* that "as a history [it] suffers from the author's unbridled hostility to the Roosevelt régime."

The policy is set forth in the Foreword of excluding government publications, with few exceptions. Within that framework, the exceptions—such as the publications of the Department of State entitled *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation* and *The Treaty of Versailles and After*—are obviously worth including. But the soundness of the policy itself is dubious. It leads, for example, to excluding not only the volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* and those of *Documents on British Foreign Policy,* but also those (based on captured records) of *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* as well as such nonserial volumes as *Germany, 1947–1949: The Story in Documents.* Leaving out these indispensable sources, while putting in Lippmann's little "think pieces," such as his lectures on *Isolation and Alliances* (56 pages) and his brochure on *The Cold War* (62 pages), seems anomalous, valuable though Lippmann's ideas unquestionably are.

WILLIAM GERBER
Washington, D. C.

LELAND M. GOODRICH and ANNE P. SIMONS. *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.* Pp. xiii, 709. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955. $6.00.

This is the first volume to appear of a series of seven comprehensive studies of the United Nations initiated by the International Studies Group of The Brookings Institution. It is certainly the most thorough and dispassionate appraisal to date of those activities of the United Nations directed towards the peaceful settlement of disputes, the regulation of armaments, and the restraint of aggression.

Professor Goodrich of Columbia University and Miss Simons, a former staff member of the United Nations Department of Security Council Affairs, have paid particular attention to the *processes* of United Nations action on the critical political and security questions which have been brought before it. The image which emerges is of a living, adaptable, essentially pragmatic association of governments, limited and at times frustrated by the crosscurrents of big-power politics, but at the end of ten years having developed a rather remarkable mastery of the art of marshaling agreement among nations to maintain peace. The authors strongly discount the organization's capacity to use coercive means to control national conduct, despite the Korean experience. And they doubt that national armaments can be regulated effectively under the United Nations until all the major powers develop greater mutual confidence in each other's intentions. In the meantime, however, contacts between the Western powers and the Soviet Union are kept alive within the organization, and it thus "provides opportunities and means by which tensions may be reduced, co-operative relations may be established, and some firmer basis for peace and security may be achieved than is provided by military alliances and armament rivalry." The study further claims, on behalf of the United Nations, a "leading and significant part in facilitating the political adjustments that have had to be made as a result of the emergence of nationalism in Asia and Africa."

Recognition of the achievement of *mutual consent* among disputing states as the key to successful United Nations peace action leads to sane conclusions about (1) the veto—actually it has *not* prevented satisfactory solutions from being found, but merely reflected basic conflicts of interest among the major powers; (2) open public discussion of controversial issues—this is not "in all cases the best way to promote the spirit of compromise and accommodation"; (3) majority decisions—resolutions adopted by the Charter specified majorities in the General Assembly and the Security Council have often had little effect because they did not have the support of states whose co-operation was necessary to their implementation; (4) giving the General Assembly authority to use collective force in cases of aggression and other breaches of peace—this might destroy its effectiveness for achieving a cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement.

One might hope that members of the United Nations would come to attach greater importance than does this study to the observance of legal standards and procedures in the handling of international controversies, particularly in determining the powers of the principal United Nations organs themselves. Undoubtedly, legal standards have gone by default in much of what has taken place in—as well as outside of—the United Nations. But to maintain, as do the authors, that it is "a sound position" for the Organization to rely on political rather than legal judgments in undertaking action to preserve peace is to invite even greater disregard by nations of that vital element of social restraint—the rule of law.

PHILIP E. JACOB
University of Pennsylvania

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. *National Minorities: An International Problem.* Pp. xii, 248. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $4.50.

Every age has its fashions—in ideas no less than in costumes. A generation ago, after World War I, the minorities treaties were hailed as the Magna Charta of the weak and oppressed. The "new look" which emerged from World War II focused fondly upon an international bill of human rights which, it was hoped, would assure protection to all, to members of majorities as well as minorities.

The problem of *national* minorities centered in East-Central Europe, where the mixture of population precluded the establishment of "national" states on the West-

ern model. However, the disintegration of polyglot empires in 1918–19, and potent strategic considerations, as well as the principle of national self-determination, impelled the Great Powers to recognize new and enlarged national states in East-Central Europe. This posed a dilemma: millions of national minorities, in some of the states one-third to one-quarter of the total population, would be exposed to persecution or expulsion and, equally dangerous, the peace of the region would be endangered. The peacemakers of 1919 hoped to resolve the dilemma by imposing on the new and enlarged states special commitments to protect the minorities.

The Powers had concerned themselves with the problem of minorities before 1919. The novelty of the minorities treaties, and their fundamental contribution to a solution of the problem, were twofold: provision was made for *enforcement;* and the ideal was to remove the problem from the sphere of bilateral negotiation, that is, to deal with infractions on an *international* basis. Both these principles were abandoned after World War II.

During the past decade a Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted as a body of principles with considerable moral and hortatory influence. However, the effort to formulate legally binding covenants in human rights has come to grief. Apparently the difficulties encountered in the effort to protect some people (the exposed minorities) are not resolved by reaching for the ultimate which is the assurance of human rights to all.

With highly commendable scholarship, Dr. Claude has treated the international aspect of the problem of national minorities as revealed in the published sources. The theoretical groundwork is excellent and the writing clear and balanced. He is at his best when analyzing the published sources and achievements following World War II.

One might have hoped for a more searching account of the origins and history of the minorities treaties, for it would have clarified some of the difficulties encountered since World War II. In 1919 too, the minorities question was one of the "small matters" on the agenda of peacemaking. The Western leaders failed then as now to understand the desire or need for special rights to perpetuate ethnic differences, and the ambiguity of aim and purpose continued after 1919. A more extended treatment of that period would have revealed influences and pressures which were wanting after World War II. The value of the book would also have been enhanced by a chapter on the remaining minorities in East-Central Europe—their numbers, their distribution, their national aspirations and the like. But these strictures apart, Dr. Claude is to be congratulated on a valuable contribution to the subject.

OSCAR I. JANOWSKY
City College of New York

PHILIP C. JESSUP and others. *International Regulation of Economic and Social Questions.*

JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN. *International Organization.* Pp. vi, 173. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1955. $1.75.

In 1942 an essay by the late Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain on "International Organization" was published in the *International Conciliation* series. In it he explained the impact of the economic social forces which we associate with the new technology upon the development of international nonpolitical organization. His generalizations on such subjects as international legislation and administration, the relation of private groups to developing organization, the nature of the international society, and the role of regional agencies were penetrating.

About one-half of this small volume, an essay by three of Professor Chamberlain's former students, brings the subject up to date; it also contains a reprinting of Professor Chamberlain's original essay. The authors give most of their attention to changes and tendencies in the international society which have lately become pronounced. They point out first the considerable area of individual action on the international level within agencies relating to human rights, trusteeship, and consultation under Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations. A second modification of the international society which they emphasize is the diminished concern in economic and social organization for the sovereign equality of states. Third, they bring out the increasing number of public international organs with quasi-state functions that have been set up in response to a need for continuing multilateral activities. The authors conclude with a statement that "read in the light of recent developments, it is plain that subsequent events have not changed his (Professor Chamberlain's) basic conclusions."

A better exposition of the economic and social foundations of contemporary international organization than that contained in this volume cannot be found. The usefulness of the discussion is enhanced by many well-reasoned opinions of the authors on problems which they encountered along the way. For instance, they express themselves on the proper place of the regional as against the universal method of regulation. They show a relationship between the nature of a subject of international action and the question as to whether its regulation shall be assigned to a general organization like the United Nations or a specialized agency. Throughout, the authors give evidence of the scholarly maturity for which they are well known.

NORMAN L. HILL
University of Nebraska

J. F. C. FULLER. *A Military History of the Western World.* Vol. II: *From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588 to the Battle of Waterloo, 1815.* Pp. x, 561. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1955. $6.00.

In this second volume General Fuller continues his study of warfare in the Western world or rather the military operations of Western peoples wherever they may have attained sufficient importance. His method of treatment remains the same, namely, a series of detailed studies of decisive campaigns linked by brief historical chronicles. The latter, however, seem to be more definitely subordinated to the narratives of military operations than in the previous volume, while these have gained in tempo, in vividness, and in sureness of touch. But the author's general historical judgments expressed in the chronicles are marked by a strongly authoritarian attitude, a lack of understanding of the character of struggles for political and religious liberty, and by the acceptance of a now discredited theory regarding the connection between the Reformation and the rise of modern capitalism.

Within the limits of a short review such as this it is impossible to discuss in any detail a work which covers the military history of over two centuries. Only some general comments can be made. American readers will be pleased with the space devoted to Wolfe's operations against Quebec, as well as to the Saratoga and Yorktown campaigns. It is, however, regrettable that for the latter two episodes the writer did not have at his disposal Sir Henry Clinton's *American Rebellion* in the new edition of W. B. Willcox (1954). Many students of military history will be surprised to find no mention at all of the War of 1812, in which, even if it did end in a stalemate, Canada was saved for the British Empire, and only a very scanty reference to the Peninsular War, although it was there that Wellington attained the stature of a great commander and the British army acquired the training which made possible its success at Waterloo.

One of the outstanding merits of the work is that it drives home very forcefully two great lessons of military history. The first, which is only too readily forgotten, is that in future wars one cannot depend for victory upon the tactics and the weapons of the past. The second, that in all military operations superiority of leadership plays a decisive role, a point emphasized by excellent characterizations of outstanding military geniuses such as Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Frederick the Great, Nelson, and Napoleon. Here the great problem for any government is how to recognize this quality of greatness in any of its commanders and how to develop and employ his talents to the best advantages.

A. E. R. BOAK
University of Michigan

LIONEL KOCHAN. *Russia and the Weimar Republic.* Pp. 190. Cambridge, England: Bowes and Bowes, 1954. (Distributed by Frederick A. Praeger, New York.) $4.25.

In this excellent book, Lionel Kochan examines the rapprochement between Germany and Russia that began in the 1920's and lasted until 1934. The "Rapallo Policy" was the most important element in the foreign policy of both countries during that period. The establishment of cordial relations was based on an obvious *quid pro quo*. Russia needed German political and technical help for her internal reconstrution; even more important, Germany was regarded by Soviet spokesmen as a *point d'appui,* a foothold in the enemy's camp. Germany, on the other hand, needed Russia's help and friendship in the struggle against Versailles. The two outcasts of Europe joined forces.

In compact, objective prose the author examines the three basic elements of the relationship—diplomatic, political (that is, the connection between the Comintern and the German Communist party), and military. At first the Soviet leaders counted on an imminent revolution in Germany, which Lenin in 1918 had compared to a rotting tree. This optimistic view declined precipitously with the abortive German Revolution of November 1923, which ended the prospect of a Communist Germany. Thenceforward, relations between the two countries were relegated to the chessboard of international diplomacy. The Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo, signed early in 1922, was strengthened. The Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Locarno Pact of 1925 weakened Rapallo, but the Russo-German Treaty of Berlin of 1926 and its renewal in 1931 compensated for the temporary German defection and restored the balance. In late 1931 Rapallo gradually was overshadowed by the growth of Nazism and the emergence of a German right wing under Brüning that had no use for Russia. When in 1934 Hitler categorically rejected Russian overtures for a continuation of the old relationship, Stalin threw in his lot with the Western powers. This was the end of Rapallo, but not the end of Russia's capitalist *point d'appui,* which was revived by the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939.

The history of this varying relationship is a story of German attempts to regain international status after a lost war. "On each occasion, Germany, after obtaining certain concessions from the West swung away from Russia and then swung back again. In 1925–26 the swing was very slight; in 1929–30 it was perceptibly greater; in 1931–39 it was plain for all to see" (p. ix). The Russian point of view was explained by Karl Radek after Locarno: "A Russia which has been weakened to the utmost by the war could neither have continued as a great power nor acquired the economic and technical means for her industrial reconstruction unless she had in the existence of Germany a counterbalance against the supermacy of the Allies" (p. 100).

This book is important for us today when once again the matter of Russo-German relations occupies the center of the diplomatic stage. Germany remains the linchpin of the whole European system. By accident of geography she has been caught between East and West, the central fact in her historical experience. After her defeat in 1918 she played East and West off against one another in a desperate attempt to avoid the consequences of Versailles. Despite the optimism of many of today's Western diplomats, there is some reason to believe that the same thing might happen again. Diplomacy does not deal with wishful thinking—only with results. George Kennan, perhaps our top expert on Russia, is reported recently to have said that the Russians are planning the "grand nightmare of Western diplomacy," a German reversal of alliances in favor of the Soviet Union. Kennan thinks the Soviets' chances for success "are not bad." Our State Department experts should read Kochan's first-rate book again, again, and again.

LOUIS L. SNYDER
City College of New York

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

ROBERT H. JACKSON. *The Supreme Court in the American System of Government.* Pp. viii, 92. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $2.00.

At the time of his sudden death in October 1954, Mr. Justice Jackson was well under way with the preparation of the three Godkin lectures that he was to have delivered at Harvard University early in 1955. His manuscript-in-progress has now been published as a final statement of the Justice's views concerning the work of the Supreme Court.

This is a slender, little volume, both in size and substance, and it must regretfully be stated that it will add little to Justice Jackson's reputation. One doubts the wisdom of the decision to publish such an obviously unfinished piece of work. The incomparable literary style and the sharply etched and brilliantly argued legal views which were such characteristic qualities of Justice Jackson's Supreme Court opinions are here almost wholly lacking. To be sure, the Justice does state his views on a miscellany of legal and judicial subjects. There is an interesting suggestion that the short time available for Supreme Court conferences makes it difficult for the nine justices to reconcile their views and is thus an important factor explaining the multiple opinions of recent years. There is an exceptionally frank statement of the Court's "apparent yielding to expediency, especially during war time." And the Justice spells out his belief that Congress would do well to end federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.

Apart from such statements, this book is most remarkable for its revelation of the extreme to which Justice Jackson's growing conservatism had carried him at the time of his death. This is made particularly clear concerning the Justice's views in the area of civil liberties. He asserts that courts can do little to defend civil liberties, and he scoffs at the notion that "a 4,000 word eighteenth-century document or its nineteenth-century Amendments" have much value as a safeguard of individual freedom. The "cult" that argues to the contrary is accused of "vicious teaching." Moreover, he once more indicates his distrust of federal civil rights statutes as a basis for the positive protection of civil liberty by government and justifies the extent to which he and other members of the Supreme Court have gone in virtually interpreting existing laws out of existence, by arguing that the federal police force which is necessary for their enforcement has totalitarian potentialities.

Justice Jackson was one of the greatest figures of the Roosevelt Court and in the decade following his appointment in 1941, he made an invaluable contribution to the magnificent developments in constitutional law of that period. Moreover, his reputation is secure. As long as Supreme Court decisions are read, his opinions in such cases as *West Virginia Board of Education* v. *Barnette* and *American Communications Association* v. *Douds* will thrill and challenge men. The present work will not add to that reputation. But neither in the long run can it detract from it.

ROBERT K. CARR
Dartmouth College

RUSSEL D. NYE. *William Lloyd Garrison and the Humanitarian Reformers.* (The Library of American Biography.) Pp. vi, 215. Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown, and Company, 1955. $3.00.

This volume takes its place beside the biographies of Elihu Root, Grant, Franklin, and Morse as a worthy member of the series of biographies edited by Oscar Hamlin.

Designed obviously for the general reader, the volume is free from the usual paraphernalia of scholarship—footnotes, critical comments, and elaborate bibliography. That much research, however, lies back of the work is attested by the "Note on Sources" and allusions through the text to other reformers and to the antislavery literature of the period. It is clear that the author has relied heavily for his general chronological account of Garrison's life on the voluminous work of two of the latter's children, to which all accounts of the life of Garrison must turn.

The Epilogue, as the author terms an appendix, presents an intimate picture of the man Garrison—his appearance, his personality, his character, tastes, and foibles. Throughout the volume he is shown for what he was—the editor, crusader, "reformer incarnate," as Nye aptly characterizes him. Because the author does not hesitate to point out his failings and lack of clarity in thinking (pp. 134, 163), Garrison emerges as a living, vivid personality. A highly controversial character during his lifetime, this reviewer finds herself in agreement with the author's evaluation of Garrison's contribution. Indeed, one could scarcely differ from his conclusion that this reformer was a person of "real historical importance" in the antislavery movement, incapable of compromise or moderation. He symbolized the moral aspect of slavery (pp. 205, 206).

An effort is properly made to place Garrison in his setting and consequently the first chapter treats briefly of slavery's political involvement with the national struggle, the economic importance of cotton, and the development of proslavery philosophy and propaganda. The volume is too circumscribed in length to permit adequate analysis of all the currents which helped to produce Garrisonism. A heavier emphasis on the spiritual impact of the era might have been desirable.

The author recognizes Garrison's goal for what it was, not merely extirpation of slavery, but the redemption of the human race. This explains his scattering his energies to issues of government, disunion, even anarchy, women's rights, nonresistance, even the evils of tobacco—in a word, reform of practically every institution or tradition.

The entire content of the book is organized into seven long chapters, but the reader is aided in keeping his bearings among the many topics of each chapter by the simple device of double spacing between the topics. The style is readable, but an index of four pages seems hardly adequate.

ELLA LONN

Baltimore, Md.

REXFORD G. TUGWELL. *A Chronicle of Jeopardy, 1945–1955*. Pp. v, 489. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $7.50.

Mr. Tugwell has written a stimulating and provocative book. He has a fluent and indeed, at times, an eloquent pen. He writes with the deep concern of a conscientious and sensitive citizen oppressed by the magnitude of the problem unleashed upon the modern world by the advent of atomic and hydrogen energy. To Tugwell, this is man's central problem to which all else is subordinate, to which all human institutions and behavior must adapt themselves if destruction is to be escaped and a life of happiness and prosperity achieved—for the alternatives are thus being sharply and rapidly formulated. The first fifty pages or so might well have been heavily condensed or omitted, for the rest of the book states his essential thesis more convincingly and with more precision.

The *Chronicle of Jeopardy*, an analysis year by year of domestic and foreign situations since 1945, is in reality not a chronicle at all. True, the author sets forth some of the main events which take place each year, but the chronicle of events is so laden or interpenetrated with extensive interpretations—political, economic, sociological, and philosophical—as to make the contribution less a chronicle than a series of reflections upon the events of the day. Many of these reflections are, indeed, challenging, but since no precise method is given for separating the "facts" and what Mr. Tugwell calls his "opinions," the book will cause those who do not share his enthusiasm for public planning, collectivization, and accommodation with the Soviet Union to disagree most violently and, in so doing, to lose many excellent contributions which the author has to make. The nonpartisan will welcome much of the information and the stimulating judgments even though he has the methodological reservations to which I have briefly alluded. The present reviewer is inclined to think that Mr. Tugwell might better have presented a somewhat detailed chronology of events in the first part of the volume, following it with an analysis of the major topics. This would have avoided the chopping up of significant subjects on a yearly basis, which gives the impression of trying to analyze a changing scene which does not lend itself to satisfactory treatment in this manner.

All told, American Presidents, Secretaries of State, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, most of the leaders of the Western democracies, Congress, the State Department, the leaders of the armed forces, and the Communists come off pretty badly, as indeed do most people. Mr. Tugwell believes that the sheer rapidity of change with which the hydrogen bomb superseded the atomic bomb before the armed forces could adapt their methods to the new weapon, and long before nations were willing to begin to see the implications for world society, is symptomatic of the desperate challenge which mankind now faces. If some readers are inclined to disagree with Mr. Tugwell at some or even many points, they could well be recommended to share his deep concern over the new dimensional experience which confronts the human race.

LINDEN A. MANDER

University of Washington

MARTIN MERSON. *The Private Diary of a Public Servant*. Pp. x, 171. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $3.00.

In the comparatively calm atmosphere of this "post-Genevan" period, this tale of subversion and disillusionment seems strangely unreal. To savor the full flavor of Martin Merson's martyrdom, one must recapture the sense of conspiracy, conflict, and panic that enveloped the American people and its government just a year and a half ago. Perhaps "martyrdom" is too strong to describe what happened to the author—a wide-eyed innocent abroad in the political jungles of Washington, D. C., in 1953.

Martin Merson, Harvard law graduate, rising young businessman, ardent supporter of General Eisenhower, found himself with his friend "Bob" Johnson, President of Temple University and Ike's first Director of the International Information Administration, at the center of a melodrama that unfortunately was not fiction but fact. The villains—Senator Joe McCarthy and his stooges: Cohn, Schine, and others—are easier to identify than the hero. In fact, I couldn't find a hero at all. Certainly there was nothing heroic in the conduct of Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary McCardle, Security Officer McLeod, or for that matter, Vice President Nixon or President Eisenhower. As for Johnson and Merson, one is more impressed with them as injured innocents than as heroes. They, along with a half hundred other loyal and able public servants on the staff of the International Information Administration, were victims of that mid-western Torquemada—Senator McCarthy—in his self-styled campaign against "communism in Government." In point of fact, that campaign, as we see it in operation in this book, appears to be not so much a drive on subversives in government as in itself an effort to destroy one of the Government's major agencies for combatting communism in Europe and Asia.

Had Senator McCarthy and his associates been Communist agents, they could scarcely have hoped to accomplish so much toward weakening the United States in the cold war. In a campaign filled with innuendo, slander, and downright falsehood, they came within an ace of destroying the IIA, and, in the process, bringing down upon America the ridicule and contempt of the civilized world. The antics of Cohen and Schine in their European tour of inspection might have been dismissed as low comedy were it not for the devastating consequences of their irresponsible attacks upon the personnel and policies of the IIA. Had they and their chief deliberately set out to create panic and confusion in this vital agency, to destroy its morale and undermine its influence abroad, they could not have done more toward their ends than they in fact accomplished. And Americans are still having to "explain" to Europeans that we are not a nation of book burners as a consequence of the disgraceful "purge" of books in our information libraries abroad.

Author Merson tells his story with a disarming sincerity and simplicity. In spite

of his own naiveté, he and his associates emerge— if not as heroes—at least as honest men and faithful public servants.

As for Senator McCarthy and his Janissaries, let us hope their influence is on the wane. What most troubles me in this tale is the record of inconsistency, insincerity, timidity, if not cowardice, that characterized those in high places. Neither the Secretary of State nor the President gave to Mr. Johnson the support that anyone assuming the general responsibility he was asked to assume, had every right to expect.

The Private Diary of a Public Servant is a must for anyone who would understand why morale in the public service had reached a new low in 1953 and 1954, and is also a sad commentary on the state of public morality in the United States during those trying years. As a portrait of the recent past, it is a unique and impressive document. Let us hope it is not a portent of the future.

PETER H. ODEGARD
University of California
Berkeley

FRED RODELL. *Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1955.* Pp. xii, 338. New York: Random House, 1955. $5.00.

Nine Men is a political history of the United States Supreme Court from the period of the Constitutional Convention up to 1955. The author is professor of law at Yale University whose iconoclastic treatment of the Court should be familiar to readers of popular magazines and of the magazine sections of Sunday newspapers. The authors' thesis, briefly stated in his quotation from Lincoln, is that "our judges are as honest as other men and not more so. They have, with others, the same passion for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. . . . Their power is more dangerous as they are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control."

Although the Court, in passing upon a constitutional case, employs all the forms and procedures of a court of law—private litigants, learned legal briefs, decisions and opinions, majority, minority and concurring —Rodell does not consider it a court of law at all, but a political organ to the same extent as is the Congress or the President, restricted no more than they are by *stare decisis* and motivated by pretty much the same considerations. Hence, the only way to understand the Court is to study the Justices in the light of their political backgrounds and beliefs, and the only honest history of the Court is a political history.

Not only does Rodell relate the history to the Court through the political personalities of the Justice, but he deems almost every Justice to be either a hero or a villain, and he leaves the reader in no doubt as to what role he assigns to each Justice. The principal heroes are Miller, the first Harlan, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Black, Murphy, and Douglas; the principal villains Marshall, the Sutherlands-Van Devanter-McReynolds-Butler quarter, Jackson, Frankfurter, Vinson, Clark, and Minton.

The chief villain is Marshall (as the chief hero is Holmes) and the chief villainy is *Marbury* v. *Madison* and judicial review. According to Rodell, Marshall "by dominating the Supreme Court which dominated the judiciary which dominated the federal government which dominated the states . . . himself effectively dominated the nation for a third of a century."

Rodell has reputable authority for his evaluation of Marshall's importance in establishing judicial review and of judicial review in the American scheme of things. Nevertheless, this reviewer would venture to suggest that in both instances he has overstated the case. A reasonable argument can be made for the proposition that had there been no Marshall there still would have been a *Marbury* v. *Madison,* and had there been no Marbury the course of American history would not have been substantially different. Of the relatively few Supreme Court decisions invalidating acts of Congress, there has hardly been a single one which has not been later substantially nullified, either by amendment to the Constitution or by the action of the Court itself in overruling, distinguishing, or simply disregarding the decision. Like the House of Lords, the Supreme Court exercising judicial review can at most delay effectuation of the people's will; it can never wholly frustrate it.

This book was written neither for lawyers nor for scholars, but for the general public. A certain degree of overgeneralization, oversimplification, and overstatement is a popularizer's privilege. The trouble with this book is that Rodell comes too close to abusing the privilege.

LEO PFEFFER
American Jewish Congress

PETER M. BLAU. *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies.* Pp. xi, 269. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $5.00.

Some widely accepted notions about bureaucratic behavior are here tested by personal observation of interaction between individuals employed in two small governmental units—one in a state employment agency and the other in a federal law enforcement agency. The author, assistant professor of sociology at the University of Chicago, responds chiefly to the studies of bureaucracy by Max Weber and the American school of sociology represented by Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton. However, the book will also interest nonsociologists, especially students of public administration, since Mr. Blau's findings provide a useful supplement and confirmation for recent trends in administrative thought and writing.

Mr. Blau thus joins forces with students of administration, who, from Mary Parker Follett a generation ago to Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon, and others, have challenged earlier characterizations of bureaucracy in terms of hierarchical authority, resistance to change, displacement of goals by ritualistic adherence to means and techniques, and formal institutional categories. One hopes that studies such as this will help to stimulate fruitful communication and interaction between sociological students of bureaucracy and writers on public administration.

The author's report draws attention to relationships among personal incentives, group behavior, and formal bureaucratic structures. For example, he found that when statistical indices were used as a basis for merit ratings, they led to competitiveness among workers in an office, but that professional standards could conduce to group solidarity despite the use of such indices; that enforcement officers found close social relations with other officers a needed source of moral support in their dealings with both supervisors and clientele; that supervisors could strengthen their hierarchical authority by showing leniency in the enforcement of some rules, thereby creating both obligations by subordinates and the opportunity to invoke sanctions if needed; that "bureaucrats" are not so much inherently opposed to change as anxious, whether by promoting or opposing change, to maximize their goal achievements.

In discussing authority and sanctions, Mr. Blau might have clarified his presentation had he made use of Simon's distinctions between different types of authority. Thus the author regards "inducements and coercion through sanctions" as forms of control different from "authority," but seems to imply on the following page (p. 173) that "bureaucratic authority" rests predominantly on the supervisor's "rating power." Yet what does rating power imply but the use of "inducements and sanctions"? Mr. Blau appears surprised to find that bureaucrats do not always resist change, although such public administration studies as the monographs of the Inter-University Case Program, widely used as teaching tools, provide ample evidence of bureaucratic innovation as well as inertia. Although *caveats* such as these will be made by readers familiar with the public administration literature, it is to be hoped that they will not prevent the book's being used as a valuable source of examples, amplification, and stimulation.

FRED W. RIGGS
Yale University

GORDON R. CLAPP. *The TVA: An Approach to the Development of a Region.* Pp. xiii, 206. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $3.50.

The TVA, written by the recent chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority's

Board of Directors, was based on a group of Walgren Foundation Lectures. It is quite readable and, for pepole who are only slightly acquainted with the TVA, quite informative on the public-production side of water-basin controversies. Public *vs.* private production is the chosen setting for many of the author's questions. Description of TVA history rather than critical analysis is predominant. The author, still believing as strongly in TVA now as in the beginning, writes with enthusiasm for his subject. That is good to see in a public administrator.

This seems to be the main intention: to describe how the TVA is a distinctive creation in government and a distinctive creator in a region's economic life. The first two chapters sketch the political formation, public purposes (including new patterns of land uses), building of dams, and other significant achievements of TVA. An appendix tells about the production and use of fertilizers. The third chapter describes how the people of the valley have obtained more in employment, income, and new industries. A fourth chapter outlines the joint relations between the TVA and state (or local) governments on such matters as electric service, taxes, and reforestation. Much of this is familiar information. Some of it also gives credit too easily and completely to TVA; for example, the industrial, employment, and income changes that occurred in contexts of war, prosperity, and atomic-energy production, which were not peculiar products of TVA. Indeed, the Authority is made to appear too distinctive, too free from questions or evidence of deficiencies throughout the book.

The last two chapters deal with electricity production and pricing. A low-price policy, creating large increases in total electricity sales and per family consumption, is emphasized again. Yet when increases in output are presumed to be accompanied (continuously?) by lower unit costs ("distribute fixed charges over a larger number of kilowatt-hours"), the economic reasoning is loose and inadequate. Nothing is said about the continuation of old pricing choices, though steam plants become increasingly nowadays the sources of electricity. Nor is anything said about the new and large steam plants as significant shifts in the TVA's technical character from multi-purpose to single-purpose projects.

Like many earlier writings, this book recognizes an achievement in the "competitive spur" to neighboring private companies. "Comparison" is a better economic term here than "competition." Yet, clearly enough, the TVA prices have effects on the surrounding private-firm prices, though I do not understand the nationwide effects that are implied in the concentric-zone figure on page 122. Something else is emphasized more strongly, however, than the pricing policy: the comparisons of private and public systems in anticipating demand increases. In these comparisons the private electric firms fall behind the TVA record, reflect conservative investment choices, and are believed to be responsible for present and pending shortages of electricity.

Even if public and private systems are compared frequently in the book, we do not learn how to choose efficient limits between them. Nor is this an economic study of cost, pricing, and investment choices. Neither is it a study of how managerial decisions were made by the author and his fellow administrators. Instead, it is a guide to a man's beliefs in and hopes for an uncommon American venture in public management, the TVA.

EMERY TROXEL
Wayne University

W. DEAN BURNHAM. *Presidential Ballots 1836–1892*. Pp. xix, 956. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. $10.00.

Mr. Burnham has made an unspectacular contribution to the study of American politics, but it is one which will bear fruit in the years ahead. The gathering of election data is an uninspiring task at best, but when one sets out to collect the county returns in all presidential elections from 1836 to 1892, he plans a course of disappointment, hard work, and picayunish reward. This is the only logical explanation of why these basic data have not been assembled before. It is natural, I suppose, for scholars to prefer interpretative analysis rather than mere collection of data. This has led to overanalysis of sparse data and, therefore, to a scholarship in American popular government which lacks a fundamental basis. The Washington scene has been brilliantly described and the main actors there have been psychoanalyzed with special emphasis upon their social activities, their economic interests, and their political predilections, but little has been done to explain how they happened to become members of the Washington caste.

Mr. Burnham employs a different perspective. He has gone to the country, to the sources of political power, to the homes of all those people who are merely sojourning in the nation's capital. He has opened up a whole new approach to the understanding of our politics, at least he has contributed some of the materials for that more fundamental approach. The correlation of census data with political party votes in specific counties is now possible.

I wish that Mr. Burnham had spent more time in commenting upon the county-vote data and especially in relation to their probable accuracy. Also, his method of presenting the splinter-party votes is not quite satisfactory. It is true that he gives the protest totals, but there is no designation as to the nature of the protest. How many of these were Prohibition, Socialist, or agricultural revolt votes? A study of lost causes is one of the most fruitful in American politics, for such splinter movements have had a profound influence upon the behavior of the major parties.

The author has given his own analysis of the presidential elections from 1836 to 1892. His chief contribution is that he relates the county decisions to the total victories. Using the census classification of sections, Mr. Burnham is always forced to explain that Missouri is a maverick in the West North Central or that Kentucky does not behave politically like Alabama or Mississippi. The obvious answer to his difficulty is that these states belong in a border category with West Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING
University of Oklahoma

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

GEORGE SOULE. *Time for Living*. Pp. vii, 184. New York: Viking Press, 1955. $3.00.

In this very interesting and provocative little book George Soule traces the rise in economic productivity in the United States, describes some of the most amazing machines and processes of recent years, and finds technology generally good. It has refuted Malthus's predictions and later predictions of Marx, has provided a good living for most of the people, and seems likely to continue its advance, until, some eighty years in the future, it may well provide an average family income of $25,000 a year (1953 dollars), for a far shorter working day than that of today, for technology is as much labor-saving as production-increasing. Soule sees that certain contingencies may prevent this happy economic outcome—exhaustion of resources, for instance—but he is fairly optimistic, too optimistic perhaps, about the future of resources.

Assuming a much shorter workday and much leisure time, not just for the rich, but for almost everyone, what will the people do with their leisure time? Here again Soule is judiciously optimistic. He sees people, even now, using their leisure in caring well for their families, reading (more than ever), gardening, engaging in Do-It-Yourself activities, in sports, traveling, working in voluntary organizations, playing in orchestras, amateur dramatics, and getting "what passes for education." He believes that the chances are good for a continuation and expansion of these leisure-time activities so needed in a technological civilization.

Mr. Soule sees the danger of mass promotion, aimed as it is at a low level of sophistication, sees that in an economy of mass production and mass distribution ex-

cellence has less and less chance of gaining recognition, sees that there is real danger of further regimentation of the mind, but does not stress the latter very much.

Mr. Soule's book does seem too hopeful, too optimistic, but of course time may prove it correct. At any rate, it should serve a noble purpose in pointing out what sort of life we may have if we can avoid wars and depressions, conserve our resources, reduce our birth rate, and avoid regimentation and a few other evils.

The book is well and interestingly written. It should have a wide appeal.

JOHN ISE

Goucher College

WILLIAM F. WHYTE, and others. *Money and Motivation: An Analysis of Incentives in Industry.* Pp. xii, 268. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $4.00.

Money plays such a dominant role in employment that it is difficult to realize other motives may be as powerful or even more important. Many studies have shown that employees in heavy industry, retail merchandising, and white-collar workers, when asked to list in order of importance what they consider on, and what they expect from, their job, do not list wages first. Liking the job, chances for improvement, liking the people one works with are often considered more important than wages. The implication is not to be drawn that people expect to work without pay. They want other satisfactions as well.

Professor Whyte, of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, draws upon a series of case studies of his colleagues, and upon his own experiences, to demonstrate the complex relations between piece-rate incentives and economic production. The incentive system is not the simple matter of granting a proportionate increase in wages for every additional piece produced after the "normal" rate of production has been achieved. Production even when based upon piece-rates involves the relations of a worker to his fellow workers, to his department, other departments, to the entire plant, the company's competitors, and the union.

The workers' responses to financial incentives depend in large measure on the organizational context in which they work and upon the social system of which they are a part. Determining incentive rates is generally considered to be a technical engineering problem. This is the chief reason why incentive rates so often run into snags of restricted output, lowered morale, friction between workers and departments, and trouble between management and union. An incentive system is also a human relations problem involving the entire social setting of the industry. This, basically, lies behind the fair success of the Scanlon Plan (discussed in Chapter XIV).

Professor Whyte's thesis is not new. The theoretical framework of Part IV of the volume, A Theory of Economic Incentives and Human Relations, is familiar to every competent graduate student in sociology. (Professor Whyte is overly gracious, I think, in stating that the theoretical ideas he follows were developed by Chapple, Arensberg and elaborated by Homans. The main theoretical concepts relied upon, namely, symbols, sentiments, activities, and interactions, have been used in sociological analysis for at least the past twenty five years.)

These comments in no way are meant to detract from the excellent, pin pointed study of Professor Whyte. The thesis he demonstrates is not widely understood or accepted by managerial personnel. I recommend this study as one of the finest of its kind for any manager who has been frustrated in dealing with incentive systems. Furthermore, it is an invaluable study for anyone interested in understanding the *social* nature of industry.

NATHANIEL CANTOR

University of Buffalo

MABEL NEWCOMER. *The Big Business Executive: The Factors That Made Him, 1900–1950.* Pp. xii, 164. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.00.

Instead of being concerned with the *executive function,* this study makes inquiry into the total business experience and background of those *individuals* who

reached the top management positions in large corporations. The data presented in report form from several sources shows how individuals rose to these positions, how they were selected, and how family background and formal education influenced their lives. Three generations of executives are included in the study which covers the period from 1898 to 1953. Practically all of the chief executives in the railroad, public utility, and industrial fields are included in this period.

The research findings of the author are presented in a concise and interesting style with 62 tables of statistical data to support the text materials. Specific areas covered in the study of individual executive careers include the following: (1) social origins such as nationality, religion, and politics, (2) economic origins such as father's occupation and income, (3) education of executives, (4) early business careers, (5) service in their own organizations, (6) incentives for holding executive office, and (7) qualifications for the successful executive. Limitations of the study are given to those who may wish to interpret the data for trend purposes.

In the summary chapter entitled "The Profession of Business Administration," the author states, "the fact that professionalization of leadership is occurring is evidenced by various changes." These changes (1900 to 1950) in pointing the way to top management positions are: (1) the greater degree of education required for executives, (2) increasingly better chances for those from low-income families to reach the top, (3) the development of a code of ethics for management, (4) the long period of apprenticeship and a gradual rise to top positions, (5) a more scientific approach by executives with improved planning and research abilities, and (6) the division of power and authority among many executives in an organization instead of rule and decisions by one individual. Consideration is also given to the trend of greater separation of management from ownership. The wider diffusion of stockholdings results in fewer executives having any sizeable investment in their own firms.

This report and interpretation of the author's search into the background and careers of top management executives is one of the most interesting and significant publications on the subject since Miriam Beard's *History of the Businessman* in 1938. It is recommended for administrators and faculties of Schools of Business and Departments of Economics. Pertinent information is provided for planning purposes to guide college graduates toward positions of top executive leadership.

JOHN F. MEE

Indiana University

CLINTON S. GOLDEN and VIRGINIA D. PARKER. *Causes of Industrial Peace Under Collective Bargaining.* Pp. xiv, 369. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $4.75.

More than fifty years ago, Nicholas Paine Gilman published a volume called *Methods of Industrial Peace.* Considering the state of the literature in the field at the time (1904), this work of over 400 pages represented no mean achievement. Gilman noted in his Preface that there was "a surprising lack of books in the English language on this vital matter," and his prescription for the attainment of this goal sounds remarkably modern. The ingredients included the full aceptance of unionism by employers, a similar acceptance of the processes of collective bargaining, the quick settlement of grievances in the shop by "conciliation committees," and the arbitration of all disputes arising out of the collective bargaining agreement. He believed that "if such committees and collective agreements were universal, strikes and lockouts would largely disappear." Gilman also warned that unless these and other parts of his prescription were accepted by the parties themselves, the state would step in with a system of compulsory arbitration.

Today there is still the comparative lack of books of which Gilman complained, the prescriptions advanced have not changed much, and the warnings continue along similar or closely related lines. Industrial peace is still not newsworthy enough for even the parties to co-operate with the late attempt of the Bureau of

Labor Statistics to put its news of peaceful negotiations and contract signings on a par with its strike statistics. All this makes the present volume doubly welcome.

To paraphrase the eminent William M. Leiserson, the performance of the marriage ceremony does not guarantee a happy married life. Similarly, he pointed out, the establishment of collective bargaining in the legal sense does not guarantee a peaceful relationship. And so here the authors go beyond the establishment of collective bargaining and report on the factors which have led to peace in this relationship. The volume has its origin in the case studies made by the National Planning Association, published *seriatim* since 1948. These case studies are summarized in the latter part of the book and constitute the bulk of the volume physically. The first part carries six essays under the collective title Fundamentals of Labor Peace, A Final Report. All of the reporters are recognized experts in the field, but since so many of us interested in this subject have read the case studies as they appeared, perhaps the most rewarding section is that by Charles A. Myers on Conclusions and Implications. For this is the real nub of the problem—to what extent are the conclusions here reached transferable to other companies with different economic, political, and social environments; to others with the same environments, but who have not found the comparative peace enjoyed by the companies studied; to what extent can the environments be changed, in the short run and in the long run, to bring about conditions more favorable to the achievement of industrial peace, and so forth. Here is food for thought. No ready or easy answers are offered. Perhaps the best partner to this excellent volume would be "matching" case studies of the failures in the quest for industrial peace. Let us hope that others take up from this fine start.

HERBERT J. LAHNE
Washington, D. C.

FONDATION NATIONALE DES SCIENCES POLITIQUES with the assistance of the INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION and the INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE DOCUMENTATION. *International Bibliography of Economics* (*Works Published in 1952*). Vol. I. Pp. 429. Paris: UNESCO, 1955. $7.50.

This is the first volume of a world-wide bibliography of economic literature. It contains some 7,000 entries—books and periodical articles—for the year 1952. Nothing on this scale has ever been attempted in the past, and no words need to be lost to point out the potential importance of the huge enterprise.

Seven-eighths of the book is made up of the classified bibliography, which is organized under ten broad headings with very detailed subclassifications. Editorial comment is used sparsely, and is limited, in the main, to elaborations of titles that do not convey an adequate explanation of the content of an entry. Titles in foreign languages other than French are supplied in English translations. This bibliography is followed by indices of authors, subjects (six pages only), and geographical regions. A list of periodicals concludes the work.

The sponsors of the work frankly characterize it as experimental with regard to nature, content, and classification, and they invite the users' comments. The restrained use of annotations seems justified in order to prevent the volume from becoming excessively bulky. There is much to be said, however, for an expansion of the coverage. Numerous important periodicals are not included, for example, such publications of international appeal as *Metroeconomica, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Cartel,* and *International Financial Statistics.* There are references to the contents of the periodical of the American Statistical Association, but not to the periodicals of its British counterpart. The Dutch *Economist* is included but apparently not that of London. The coverage of acounting, banking, business, and legal periodicals is inadequate. As much is made of Economic Life—which serves as one of the ten broad classifications—the coverage might well be extended to articles in *Schmollers Jahrbuch, Planning, Fortune,* and the *Journal of Industrial Economics.*

With respect to the classification, it is pointed out rightly in the Preface that the scheme should not be one "to illustrate or emphasize any particular conception of economics." It seems, however, that the number of broad over-all headings—ten—is too small, whereas many of the subclassifications are unduly narrow and detailed and invite confusion in spite of frequent cross-references. The American Economic Association as well as New York University's *Economic Abstracts,* both with classifications much narrower in scope than the work under review, use seventeen over-all groupings. Economic Policy, the largest of the ten classifications, contains over 2,000 entries, that is, more than one-fourth of the total. The arrangement might be brought into better balance by bringing international economic policy into the International Relations group and by establishing a special group for Labor. Last but not least, the subject index is by far too brief and might well be expanded to a multiple of the number of pages now covered by it.

The sponsors of the volume make it plain that they have an open mind, and while, no doubt, they will be unable to satisfy all prospective users, there is good reason for the hope that future volumes will show progressive improvement. Whatever shortcomings the first volume may have, it surely is an indispensable research aid that belongs in every university library.

HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL
Catholic University of America

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

HERBERT H. HYMAN and others. *Interviewing in Social Research.* Pp. xvi, 415. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1954. $8.00.

This book reports the results of the National Opinion Research Center's systematic studies of the sources of error in the interview. These were done under the direction of Herbert Hyman, with the collaboration of a number of members of the staff of NORC. The research was commissioned by a joint committee of the Social Science Research Council and the National Research Council and was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation.

The study began with a careful examination of the literature on interviewing and numerous consultations with experienced research workers for the purpose of collecting and constructing a number of hypotheses concerning the possible error-producing factors in the interviewing process. The hypotheses resulting from this search guided all subsequent phases of the research. They were tested by especially designed quasi-experimental projects which were done in connection with studies made for other purposes by NORC and other research agencies. These experiments deal with the following sources of effects which tend to produce error in the interview: first, with those deriving from the interviewer; second, with those deriving from the respondent's reaction to the interview situation; third, with those deriving from the relationship between interviewer and respondent under the impact of situational factors that are largely external to them both; and, fourth, with those deriving from normal operating conditions. Finally, attention is given to various ways of reducing and controlling error.

Space will not permit discussion of these quasi-experiments. However, it may be said that they were carefully and imaginatively designed and executed. The conclusions are stated in detail and properly flow from the empirical evidence. The general conclusion is that the effects of the bias introduced by the interviewer is much less than has been commonly expected. The interviewer's ideological views seem to be of negligible significance. His expectations of how the respondent should or will respond and his expectations as to the distribution of responses among respondents have some, but much less, influence than ordinarily has been supposed. The results also indicate that respondent reaction in the interview situation—particularly group membership differences between interviewer and respondent—has some influence, but not nearly as much as has been commonly thought. Finally, the error ef-

fects deriving from the relationship between interviewer and respondent, on the basis of the evidence presented, seem to have been greatly overestimated by social science research methodologists. Certainly, the results of the studies indicate that in a well-conducted research organization, where interviewers are carefully selected and trained, procedures are carefully developed, questions and questionnaires thoughtfully devised and tested, and field work adequately supervised, the interview is a reliable and valid way of eliciting data about social behavior.

Interviewing in Social Research is not designed to be a guide to interviewing. However, it can be read with profit by those who wish to improve their interviewing technique. Those who are concerned with the development of research will find it one of the best methodological studies in the social sciences to date.

WILLIAM H. SEWELL
University of Wisconsin

EVON Z. VOGT. *Modern Homesteaders: The Life of a Twentieth Century Frontier Community.* Pp. xi, 232. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1955. $4.25.

This is a study of a small, mainly pinto-bean farming, community in the arid plateau lands of southwest New Mexico. "Homestead," its fictitious name, was originally claimed, mostly from the public domain, in 1929–32 by eighty-one families of small southern white farmers who moved on from the Texas panhandle and Oklahoma. A total of 140 families have settled there but some became discouraged and left, so that now there are remaining about sixty-one families and 232 people. This book deals with their lives and experiences in the arid region from clearing the land, the introduction of commercial farming, droughts, frosts, wind erosion, failures, government price supports, discouragement, gradual decrease in numbers, and the final beginnings of the return to grazing and cattle ranching again upon the former cultivated soil.

The organization of work, or its scientific aim, is to show the relation of "values" to community organization, to its persistence, and to its life career. The author says that the dominant values of the people at the start were those of the mastery over nature, optimism for the future, and a system of equated working and loafing—the first during the crop season and the second in the off season. However, when the settlers came to New Mexico, they soon found themselves an isolated "anglo" community, having to live shoulder to shoulder with neighboring communities of well-to-do Pueblo Indians, poor Navahos, Catholic Spanish-Americans, and hard-working (aggregated-village) Mormons. To their original basic attitudes or values, they added a system of appraisals of themselves as an ethnic group in relation not only to the world at large, but to these other ethnic groups. Out of these appraisals considerable community antagonism arose, particularly with the Spanish-Americans.

The work is the story of these "Texicano" people in relation to the vicissitudes of nature (low and fluctuating rainfall and short and fluctuating growing season), to the other four ethnic groups mentioned, to each other, and to the ranching economy which continually sought to expand into the cultivated lands again. Its uniqueness lies in the conception of dominant values of the people as "constants" and its contention that the life history of the community, from its inception, first success, and through gradual withering away, was largely a reflection of these persistent and almost unchanging values.

The book thus introduces a new idea, or at least a new variant of one, in the field of community studies. As such it deserves wide reading and serious study. Most community studies are largely hodgepodges of mechanical descriptive details, but this one, at least, has an integrating theme. The small farmer, the marginal man in our present factory agriculture, is tending to become extinct like the American bison and the whooping crane. Most of the communities established during the thirties decade by Subsistence Homesteads, the Resettlement Administration, and other agencies or private individuals, have by now also gone the way of all flesh. Vogt's ideas must explain a class of similar phenomena before they can be accepted as valid scientific truths. Nevertheless, the author at least has ideas, and this means he should enlist a thoughtful audience.

CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN
Harvard University

JOSEPH W. EATON in collaboration with ROBERT J. WEIL. *Culture and Mental Disorders.* Pp. 254. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $4.00.

Culture and Mental Disorders deals with the interactive role of social factors in mental disorders. The study was directed by a sociologist in collaboration with a psychiatrist, using a research staff from sociology, psychiatry, and psychology. Persons were studied and "good informants" were interviewed. Contacts were made with hospitals and social agencies. Data were collected from ninety-three Hutterite colonies and compared with findings in nine other studies.

This research is a shift away from the biopsychological emphasis in accordance with the realization that the explanation of mental ill-health falls between the sciences. The authors are aware that the study of mental ill-health is unfinished business with no place for a biological or sociological bias.

One wishes that the authors could restudy these colonies with the valuable information now at their disposal. They exploded the old hypothesis that few cases of mental disorders will be found in a relatively simple way of life. They have answered many questions and have raised many more. Is the Hutterite way of life simple? Strongly religious, it demands strict conformity and produces feelings of fear and guilt.

There seem to be few crisis situations in Hutterite life, but is mental ill-health produced in critical experiences or in little day-by-day experiences? Is a crisis met by the mental ill-health slowly achieved in daily living? Is a physical disturbance a causative factor or just a critical experience met with concealed mental ill-health? Is an organic malady an event? Is the behavior of a person with "infectious, traumatic, glandular, and neurological variables" entirely different from a person experiencing social variables? In this study these authors have qualified themselves to answer these and many other questions through further research.

How important is the prevailing mood in group life? There seems to be a manic depressive mood based on a sin-guilt complex in the Hutterite colonies. Are the mentally-ill the persons who have exaggerated this mood in meeting organic and cultural events? Does the mental ill-health of the patient exist also in the group of which he is an interactive part? All of his other human nature belongs as much to the group as it does to himself, how about his mental ill-health? The colony is the unit of living, is it also the unit of illness?

Genetic, organic, interpersonal, and cultural aspects of mental ill-health were considered. Research procedures are reviewed. There is a good bibliography, but no index. Anyone interested in mental ill-health will find this a valuable book, basic in many ways to any research.

L. GUY BROWN
University of Rhode Island

ALBERT K. COHEN. *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang.* Pp. 202. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $3.50.

Briefly put, Cohen's major thesis in this stimulating book is that the delinquent subculture represented by the gang is a response to the status dissatisfaction of numerous working-class boys who are reacting against the middle-class value system. These middle-class norms include such values as get-ahead ambition, individual responsibility, cultivation and possession of useful skills, ability to forego immediate pleasures for future planned success, good manners and courtesy, control of physical aggression, "wholesome" recreation, a well-ordered home, and particularly possession of and respect for property.

Since working-class children are for the most part unable to attain these values, they are always conscious of a painful comparison between themselves and better-advantaged middle-class children. And they

are constantly reminded of their unpleasant bottom-of-the-heap position by their middle-class school mates and those middle-class figures represented by their teachers and the heads of community recreational agencies which are supposed to serve them.

"The crucial condition for the emergence of new cultural forms is the existence, in effective interaction with one another, of a number of actors with similar problems of adjustment." Thus, the reaction of the many working-class boys to this constantly irritating status inferiority is the development of the delinquent subculture, which confers upon them status superiority in terms of new norms peculiar to the delinquent *milieu* and diametrically opposed to middle-class social values.

Cohen describes the delinquent subculture as nonutilitarian, malicious, and negativistic. Boys in gangs steal things for which they have no use; they destroy and deface property out of pure malice; and their way of thinking is negativistic. Their explicit and complete repudiation of all middle-class standards eventuates in the active flouting of all the values of the middle-class status system.

For these boys the delinquent subculture must be a group solution, in which deviant values are given support by the general concurrence of the participants. Thus, working-class boys can achieve the status-goals denied them in the middle-class system by conforming to the norms of their peers and fellow delinquents.

In explaining middle-class boy delinquency as a masculine protest against identification with the mother, Cohen overlooks the possibility of a broader adolescent subculture affording relief to middle-class children from exacting middle-class socialization. Such a subculture is exemplified in the wild parties of high school secret societies.

This reviewer feels that Cohen's theoretical formulations would be greatly strengthened had he included case studies of typical delinquent subcultures and of the impact of these subcultures upon individual gang boys.

FREDERIC M. THRASHER

New York University

CHARLES M. HARDIN. *Freedom in Agricultural Education.* Pp. xviii, 275. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, $4.50.

This volume constitutes a valuable contribution to the literature of academic freedom, government aid to education, and practical politics. On the basis of scholarly preparation and experience, the author was admirably equipped to undertake its preparation. For many years he has been interested in the subject of agricultural policy and the part played by political factors in its shaping.

Initially, the study, which ultimately evolved into the book here reviewed, was undertaken at the suggestion of Dr. John D. Millett, now president of Miami University, and formerly executive director of the Commission on the Financing of Higher Education. Dr. Millett and his Commission colleagues were especially anxious to ascertain to what extent, if any, the policies, programs, and personnel of our colleges of agriculture, agricultural experiment stations, and Extension services which receive financial support from the federal government are subjected to federal interference and control. The answer to this question would, they felt, throw light on the prudence and wisdom of extending federal aid to higher education generally. Professor Hardin, however, wisely believed that his research should not be confined only to this topic, but should be broadened to include the effect of political pressures from whatever source and by whatever means upon agricultural instruction and research. It followed logically that he should also study the relevant agricultural agencies as political interests and appraise their function respecting the making and administration of farm policy.

This larger task he has done in masterly fashion. Not only has he made an exhaustive examination of the printed materials, but by means of field trips and personal interviews he has amassed a wealth of contemporary material which adds richness to the quality of his findings and interpretation.

On the basis of this meticulous study, Professor Hardin finds that federal domination has failed to follow the federal dollar in the administration of federal grants to agricultural education agencies. He does find, however, some evidence of direct pressure in the domains of research and Extension. This pressure, he also finds, is much greater on the part of state and local groups than on the part of federal agencies. In recent years intrastate interest groups have been more direct and active in scrutinizing the research of the colleges of agriculture and Extension services.

Professor Hardin also finds that the colleges of agriculture are political interests, that they have their own heavy commitments and political allies among farm groups. They also contribute to the shaping of public policy by undertaking policy-oriented research and in other ways.

All those interested in academic freedom will find informative and illuminating the author's description of ways in which the instructional and research staffs have dealt with controversial issues and with those interest-pressure groups which have sought to stifle or control those whose teaching and research they opposed. Finally, the reviewer is inclined to believe that Professor Hardin is correct when he concludes that the experience of federal grants-in-aid for agricultural research and instruction suggests that federal grants could be safely and profitably expanded to aid other kinds of research and higher education without fear of federal domination.

HARRY J. CARMAN

Columbia University

VANN C. WOODWARD. *The Strange Career of Jim Crow.* Pp. xi, 155. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $2.50.

This little volume by a distinguished historian at Johns Hopkins University is much more important than its lack of bulk would indicate. It is an account of the development of racial segregation in the South from the time of the withdrawal of federal troops in 1877 to the present.

At a time when the Sumnerian thesis of the near immutability of the mores is coming under increasing attack from sociologists and social psychologists as the result of an accumulation of experiments and events, and when the modification of this thesis has considerable relevance for the area of race relations, Professor Woodward adds new perspective to the problem by approaching it, so to speak, from the historical rear. The period between the end of Reconstruction and, say, 1900 in Southern life has not been widely investigated by scholars, and such an area tends to become, in Woodward's felicitous phrasing, a "twilight zone that lies between living memory and written history" and thus one of the "favorite breeding places of mythology." The common belief is that Jim Crow laws and practices were imposed rather quickly by an undivided white South soon after self-rule was restored. Such a view raises the vision of an unbroken and undivided attitude towards Negroes by the whites of the South which extends indefinitely backwards into time and, by implication, forward into the future. While Professor Woodward points out that much research remains to be done before this era is completely illumined, enough is known now to explode this view once and for all.

It may come as a surprise to many to learn that Negroes voted in large numbers in the South for more than two decades after Reconstruction. Or that the great majority of the Jim Crow laws were passed *after* 1900. While Professor Woodward in no way claims that the last two decades of the nineteenth century were a golden age of race relations in the South (quite the contrary!), he does make it clear that there were varying attitudes as to the *degree* of subordination appropriate for the Negro, and the triumph of the doctrine of complete segregation and subordination came about only gradually and only after considerable controversy among the whites themselves. The various economic, political, and social forces which conspired to bring about this development are skillfully adduced.

The career of Jim Crow is brought up to date, but the more recent analysis, while well done, is familiar ground to contemporary students of race relations and will be of less interest.

MILTON M. GORDON

Haverford College

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

PIETER GEYL. *Debates with Historians.* The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955. Guilders 12.40.

This is a great, little book containing thirteen lectures on the art of writing history.

The rapier thrust of Professor Geyl's professional criticism has long been a fresh and stimulating treat to American historians. The author plays no favorites unless it be Ranke. Whether dealing with Macaulay, Carlyle, Michelet, Randall, or Toynbee his scapel cuts clean, separating truth from fiction, exposing *nonsequiturs,* ever defending vigorously objective methods which should (but never do) characterize the historian.

The most vital part of this book, and almost half the pages, relates to Geyl's private war against Arnold Toynbee. It began briskly in 1946 and has continued ever since. Geyl fights as a gentleman should, never hitting beneath the belt, without malevolent and petty criticism, but nevertheless striking heavy blows.

His major attack may be summed up under three heads: Toynbee is unscientific and unscholarly since he blueprints in detail what his conclusion is to be before commencing his research; Toynbee is so hostile to Western civilization that he distorts facts to prove his point; and Toynbee's religio-prophetic attitude of mind prevents his being a sound historian.

The first of these approaches to Toynbee has already been analyzed by this reviewer in his review of *The Pattern of the Past* (Boston, 1949), but the third, Geyl's lecture on *Toynbee, the Prophet,* is new this year (1955), and is based on Toynbee's last four volumes recently published.

These four books contain, according to Geyl, "long sustained arguments juggling with the events, the crises, the wars, revolutions, state formations and religious manifestations of all centuries and all races. . . ." They prove "absolutely nothing."

Geyl then proceeds to rake Toynbee fore and aft, accusing him of distortions, of half truths twisted out of content, concerning trade unions, the Jews, national socialism and so forth, all for the purpose of demonstrating a religious interpretation of history that defies sound scholarship and rational intelligence. "To see," writes Geyl, "a self-styled historian reducing the whole mysterious movements of history to a single motif, rejecting whole centuries as uninteresting, forcing it into the scheme of a presumptuous construction strikes me as going against all that history stands for."

Toynbee, he continues, "dwells in a world of his own imagining where the challenge of rational thinking mortals cannot reach him." Therefore Toynbee is no true historian, a point of view argued by Geyl with no little skill.

Debates with Historians will be of interest to all who wonder what history is, and how it should be written. It is heartily recommended to all young students pursuing graduate studies, and no seminar room should be without a copy.

WALTER P. HALL
Princeton University

JACQUES DELPECH. *The Oppression of Protestants in Spain.* Translated by Tom and Dolores Johnson. Pp. xii, 114. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955. $2.00.

A very brief historical Introduction by President Mackay of Princeton Theological Seminary precedes the largely factual narrative of the author. Much of this material has long been available. Spain has always been a Roman Catholic country. American Catholic journals may interpret Spanish Protestantism as a fact, Spanish Catholicism interprets it as a threat. Spain escaped the Reformation because it already enjoyed the privileges the other countries of Europe desired.

"Every baptized person is a Catholic," in Spain in law and fact; elsewhere in theory. Such a person, even if he separates himself from the Church or is excommunicated by her, *remains subject to her.* He remains on the roll! There is no column in the American Catholic Directory for losses except by death. Nothing can relieve any baptized Roman Catholic from his obligations to the Church. Canon 87 of the *Codex Juris Canonici* settles the true interpretation of what it means to be a Roman Catholic. Protestants seem unable to understand this! (p. 35). "Spain cannot grant the same rights to Protestants as to Catholics . . ." (p. 37). Protestantism "was born in corruption and was the exclusive product to the vilest passions—sensuality, pride, and avarice" said a Spanish pamphlet (p. 39). ". . . To become a Protestant is nothing else but open apostasy against the Christian religion . . ." (p. 40).

Spanish Protestantism almost disappeared after the Spanish Civil War, but in 1945 Franco issued the *Fuero,* the fundamental law of the regime, which in Article 6 protects religious beliefs and "the private practice of worship." In 1951 the Jesuit scholar Don Luis Padrosa, director of the Loyola Institute in Barcelona, was converted to Protestantism, indicating that Protestantism was again making an impression. Mixed marriages are a problem even in Spain and burial services as well (pp. 75 ff.). Protestant army officers, nurses, teachers suffer from numerous disabilities. All hospitals are under Catholic control.

Roman Catholic journals in France, England, United States, and Denmark have protested and condemned acts of Spanish Catholics. The weekly *Commonweal* complained that "Cardinal Segura is undoubtedly moved by *a* Catholic concept of Church-State relationship. *A* Catholic concept, *not the* Catholic concept. If it were *the* Catholic concept, then Mr. Blanshard's darkest fears would be justified" (p. 100). The Jesuit weekly *America* stated: "full religious liberty should be the normal state of affairs in all advanced countries. Repressive legislation is on the primitive side" (p. 101).

In 1954 General Franco declared that separation of Church and State was inconceivable, "Will you tell me where, in a Catholic society, the temporal ends and the spiritual begins"—precisely so.

The conclusion asserts that "in spite of official declarations by Church and State, the Protestants of Spain do not enjoy the toleration that the regime promised them in 1945."

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN
Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, JR. *Billy Sunday Was His Real Name.* Pp. xxix, 325. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $5.50.

Had Billy Sunday not been born, Horatio Alger might have created him. He was, says Dr. McLoughlin, "a living embodiment of the mythical farm boy who went to the city and made good, an orphaned bricklayer's son who rose to fame and wealth." This volume, written by a Brown professor of American civilization and political science, meticulously traces the saga of a figure who, at the turn of this century, symbolized the frantic struggle of Protestant fundamentalism against the invasion of liberalism into the thought and mores of the nation.

The Reverend William A. Sunday was born in 1862, the son of German immigrants whose name had been Sonntag in the old country—hence, the significance of the book's curious title. From a childhood plagued with misfortune, Billy first emerged as a major league baseball player who set two records which stood for many years: he rounded the diamond in fourteen seconds and stole ninety-five bases in one season. Meanwhile, he met his future wife, "Ma" Sunday, who today continues to brandish the sword of the Lord and who contributed generously of her memories to Dr. McLoughlin's research. Largely through her influence, Billy was "saved," decided upon a religious vocation, and, by 1896, found himself treking through Iowa as a promising evangelist. By his death in 1935, Sunday personally had addressed over 100,000,000 people and had led a million penitent souls down the sawdust trail to glory.

Dr. McLoughlin's book, unlike most previous accounts of Sunday, is neither unduly sympathetic nor hostile. It attempts to recapture the evangelist's personality through graphic portrayals of his manner and vivid excerpts from his coarse

rhetoric. It also seeks to recount, in an impartial way, Sunday's revival techniques and their results, quoting judgments both of his friends and foes. The breadth and scholarship of this study testify to McLoughlin's ability and persistence. Paraded before the reader is a galaxy of facts and figures: names of Sunday's influential friends in the business and political worlds; details of the financial support of his revivals; his attitudes on political, social, and moral problems; bristling quotations demonstrating his bitterness against an assortment of enemies; and a host of other aspects of the Sunday phenomenon.

In addition to unfolding another novel chapter of American history to wider view, *Billy Sunday Was His Real Name* is of value to those who would better understand the current renaissance of revivalism in America. Dr. McLoughlin devotes considerable attention to the way in which Sunday adapted to his own day the techniques developed earlier by Charles G. Finney and Dwight L. Moody. In 1955 we are in a position to make further comparisons and contrasts between the efforts of these evangelistic patriarchs and those present-day heralds of the altar call who are preaching the same gospel to adherents of the same "old-time religion."

RALPH L. ROY
Fund for the Republic

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

McKIM MARRIOTT (Ed.). *Village India: Studies in the Little Community.* Pp. xviii, 269. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $4.50.

S. C. DUBE. *Indian Village.* Pp. xiv, 248. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955. $3.00.

The first of these two books is one of a series of *Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations,* of which the general editors are Robert Redfield and Milton Singer. They state in their Foreword that "the primary interest that brought about this volume is not the effort to understand India and her changes. It is the effort to understand how to seek understanding of any great civilization and its enormously complex changes through anthropological studies of villages. The questions asked in the seminar that gave rise to this book were questions of "method": "What forms of thought for understanding a small community are relevant when the community is an Indian village? What changes in ways to which anthropologists are accustomed when they work in isolated tribal communities are demanded when they work in a village that is part of a large society, when they study a local culture that is part and cause and product of an ancient civilization?" (Foreword, p. ix).

The contributors to this volume, Alan R. Beals, Bernard S. Cohn, E. Kathleen Gough, Oscar Lewis, David G. Mandelbaum, McKim Marriott, M. N. Srinivas, and Gitel P. Steed, whose papers deal with eight villages in different parts of India, have all to a greater or less degree presented material pertinent to a consideration of these questions. In this respect the paper of McKim Marriott, entitled "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization," is especially valuable. Based on field work in a north Indian village, it deals specifically with "two related questions of method: (1) can such a village be satisfactorily comprehended and conceived as a whole in itself, and (2) can understanding of one such village contribute to understanding of the greater culture and society in which the village is imbedded"? (p. 171). Few with experience in India or in other areas with a great tradition will doubt the validity of his answers. Drawing on the data of social organization and religion, Marriott concludes that the village cannot be considered as an isolate and that "a focus upon the small half-world of the village and a perspective upon the universe of Indian civilization thus remain mutually indispensable for whole understanding, whether of Hinduism or of the traditional forms of India's social structure" (p. 218). In conceptualization and in the handling of his material his work is exemplary. Mandelbaum, in a paper on "The World and the World View of the Kota," approaches these problems from another angle. From an exposition of the world view of the Kota he moves to a comparison with other villagers described in this volume and considers the possibility of determining an Indic world view. His attempt is not wholly successful, in part because, as he points out, the concept of world view needs refinement, and also because the other material does not readily lend itself to this use, but his paper is suggestive and points to possibilities for future work.

Aside from matters of methodology and theory these papers, which all reach a high standard of excellence, form a major contribution to the study of rural India, especially as regards social structure and social change. In this respect, and because the author is aware of and specifically refers to relations between Shamirpet and the world outside, Dube's book, *Indian Village,* might be considered as a companion volume. The team of investigators from Osmania University, whose work is here reported, studied a village in Hyderabad, an area on which little information has so far been available. Dube's aim as stated is deceptively simple, "to give a clear and intimate picture of some aspects of life in an Indian village" (p. 15). He has written informatively on social, economic, and ritual structure, and his book is especially noteworthy for the wealth of material on interpersonal relations.

DOROTHY M. SPENCER
University of Pennsylvania

V. H. H. GREEN. *The Later Plantagenets: A Survey of English History Between 1307 and 1485.* Pp. 438. London: Edward Arnold, 1955. (Distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York.) $4.00.

As Mr. Green points out in his Introduction he has undertaken a formidable task. Compared to the enormous amount of work which has been done on the Norman and Angevin periods, the Later Middle Ages in England has been gravely neglected. The standard surveys of the period are out of date, substantial monographs are few, and the bulk of recent research appears in articles in learned journals. Mr. Green has combed through this mass of periodical literature. The student who wants to know the most recent views of scholars on the innumerable debatable points in the history of the period will find most of them in this book. He will also find illuminating expositions of certain subjects such as the wool trade and the wars of the roses. Mr. Green has produced a guide to recent scholarly work in the period for which the historical profession should be grateful.

Unfortunately despite its virtues, Mr. Green's book is most unsatisfactory. Apparently, the author lacks the sense of continuity so important in effective historical writing. The book is a jumble of vaguely connected episodes. Vital events are left out and then referred to as if the reader knew all about them. There is no mention of the murder of John the Good, Duke of Burgundy. Hence the whole later Burgundian policy is left largely unexplained. There are several references to Henry VI's madness, but no mention of its beginning and no real discussion of its nature.

Even more serious in a scholarly historical work is Mr. Green's carelessness about accuracy in detail. The map of France at the beginning of the Hundred Years' War shows the Capetian royal domain as it existed before the reign of Philip Augustus. This is particularly inexcusable as Shepherd's *Historical Atlas* has an excellent map on this subject. On page 275 Mr. Green states that "they [the English kings] kept the appointments to the offices of seneschal, constable, and mayor of Bordeaux in their hands." Then on page 277–78 he tells how the mayor of Bordeaux was elected by a group of officials known as *jurats.* Mr. Green's failure to notice that under the Treaty of Brétigny the renunciation of the English king's claim to the French crown and the French king's surrender of his suzerainty over Gascony were to be simultaneous and never took place leads to a number of confused statements. On page 243, Henry IV is called the nephew of Richard II. On page 172, Mr. Green seems to say that the calling of the French estates general in 1343 was the first time that body had been summoned. When a reviewer notes so many obvious

errors, he is inclined to suspect the existence of others which he did not detect.

SIDNEY PAINTER
Johns Hopkins University

ASA BRIGGS. *Victorian People: A Reassessment of Persons and Themes, 1851–67*. Pp. ix, 313. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $5.00.

Victorian People reminds one of Lytton Strachey's *Eminent Victorians*. It is better history, yet at the same time inferior as a work of art.

It is better history because more scholarly, more objective, and much fairer in its appraisal of the importance and character of those Victorians chosen to reflect the life and spirit of the Victorian high noon. It is a failure as a work of art because one is but dimly aware of the forest because of the overemphasis on the individual trees.

Eminent Victorians is a bitterly prejudiced book, and occasionally poisonous; but one does get an over-all picture, no matter how false, of Victorian civilization. This is lacking in *Victorian People*, despite the earnest effort of the author to paint one.

Mr. Briggs has selected his *personae* with discrimination. Samuel Smiles, Trollope, Bright, Roebuck, Disraeli, and Hughes, author of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, are all representative Victorians, and this book is replete with interesting facts concerning their lives. Possibly the trouble lies here —too many facts!

In all fairness to the author one should acknowledge, for instance, that the detailed account of Disraeli's activities at the time of the Second Reform Bill could not be improved upon, and the same holds true of Roebuck in regard to the Crimean War. But in both instances objective facts dominate the stage. There is no light, no shade, no *chiaroscuro* wherefore two striking individuals never emerge as such, both smothered in minutiae. Compare Arnold of Rugby as described by Strachey with the same man described by Mr. Briggs. Strachey's portrait is vicious, but one remembers it; Mr. Briggs' painting is blurred, since he includes too many obvious facts concerning the English public school.

Victorian People, though intended for the general public, is a professor's history. It bears all the earmarks of the profession: exhaustive scholarship, the ploughing up of new fields of research, delving into the post-Parliamentary career of Robert Lowe, tracing the late career of Hughes to a colony in Tennessee. In other words this is a very useful book for teachers of English history in search of lecture material.

To catch the color, the warmth, the meaning of the eighteen fifties and sixties is a literary problem of the first magnitude for which there are no simple answers. To this reviewer, however, it seems significant that no poet is included in the list of *Victorian People*. Poets, by definition, are excused from dealing with facts, and on that account they are frequently the best interpreters available for historic reconstruction. One wishes that either Tennyson or Browning had been included in *Victorian People*.

WALTER P. HALL
Princeton University

LEWIS NAMIER. *Personalities and Power*. Pp. vii, 157. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $3.00.

Personalities and Power by a British historian contains twelve occasional papers of uneven length and uneven merit. Chapters III–V were prepared as lectures for special occasions on the party system in a constitutional monarchy, on King George III, and on the representation in Parliament. Chapter IX dealing with nineteenth-century European history was also prepared as a lecture. Six of the last seven chapters, as well as Chapter II, are reviews of important books, especially the last three dealing with the diplomacy of interwar years, Germany, and Hitler. The lectures and reviews, as well as the remaining two short chapters, were originally published in British periodicals.

The opening chapter on human nature in politics is a good beginning, but it is too brief (pp. 1–7) to be of much value except showing the author's dexterity to treat the subject from the viewpoint of a psychologist. So is Chapter II on the profession of historian. The longest chapter in the book is the Romanes Lecture for 1952 on "Monarchy and the Party System." There as well as in the next chapter (the Academy of Arts Lecture for 1953 on King George III) the author is at his best because he is perfectly at home with his subject. Unfortunately this is not the case when Sir Lewis writes on nineteenth-century European history, still less on Germany and contemporary events. Here he simply lets his emotions and feelings overshadow his judgment and learning. For instance, his statement that the Upper Silesian plebiscite of 1935 "should never have been held" (p. 116) makes little sense. There is even less sense in thinking that latent German nationalism is as dangerous to the West today as is Russian Bolshevism (p. 127). In this and in other connections Sir Lewis pursues his vendetta not only against the Nazis, dead or alive, but also against all Germans with pathological intensity. And this is regrettable, because one would have presumed that this friend of Churchill, a Fellow of the British Academy and recently knighted, could, under the mellowing weight of honors, acquire some sense of humility and learn to restrain his feelings when passing judgment on a whole nation or nations. Incidentally, the publisher's statement (on the wrapper) that the author's pieces of historical illumination "can stand comparison with the essays of Macaulay, Ranke, and Sorel" is as wide of the mark as are some of the assertions of Sir Lewis Namier.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
Library of Congress

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

JOZO TOMASEVICH. *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*. Pp. xii, 743. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1955. $7.50.

This is an account of the history of Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene agriculture from the Middle Ages up to 1938. The account is based mainly on secondary sources and most of these are by native South Slav writers. The author discusses first the feudal systems, then the political and economic changes connected with the downfall of feudalism in these lands. In the second part of his work the author treats the formation of pre-World War II Yugoslavia. The major part of this work is Part III in which the author gives a detailed account of the problems of agriculture in the period between the two world wars, but stops short of the important political and economic changes in 1939 when an autonomous Croatia was formed within the framework of prewar Yugoslavia. This leaves a serious gap in the study. In the period 1918–38 the author discusses peasants as a political force, resources of agriculture, and agricultural overpopulation. Then he gives an account of the agrarian reform, the structure of the farms, the state measures to safeguard the land, and the problems of output of agricultural goods. He has also chapters on agricultural credit, agricultural taxation, agricultural market, and health in rural areas.

As long as the author limits himself to economic questions of production, distribution, taxation, and market, he assembles a great amount of data from a variety of sources which are otherwise unavailable to the American reader. These data, for instance, give a rather objective picture of the agrarian problems of Yugoslavia between the two world wars. But, as soon as the author attempts to give a sociological and anthropological interpretation of peasants and their culture, he is at a loss because of his lack of training in these fields. Like a number of other South Slav writers, he has been influenced by the ideas of Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism. This has affected both the selection and the interpretation of his sources; it has, for instance, weighed in his evaluation of the effects of Turkish feudalism on the South Slavs. The author tends to ascribe some of the less attractive qualities of these people "to a general regression in the economic, social, and cultural life" caused by the Turkish rule of these lands (p. 193). Likewise, his ethnocentrism and lack of sociological and anthropological data and

concepts lead him to view all South Slavs as belonging to basically one culture (p. 248), thus disregarding autochthonous cultural differences in the family structure and interpersonal relations as well as in the community structure and community relationships. For instance, he denies the existence of basic cultural, social, and psychological differences between the migratory sheep-raisers in the Dinaric mountain range and the sedentary tillers of the soil in the Pannonian plains. Also, the author disregards the influences of religious differences between Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam as well as differential urban influences on these peasant peoples that have been for centuries located at a crossroad of cultures and civilizations. But when the author is free of such biases and avoids interpretation, he brings valuable data which can be used, to a certain extent, as a background for the understanding of some of the economic problems of contemporary Communist Yugoslavia. The author does not indicate how the Communist party in its underground activities took advantage of the economic difficulties of former Yugoslav regimes when planning to seize power. The documentary sources concerning these activities of the Communist party of Yugoslavia in the period between the two world wars have been available now for a number of years because they were published in the official party publications, particularly in the eight volumes of the *Istoriski Arhiv* (Belgrade, 1949–51.)

D. A. TOMASIC
Indiana University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

CARL E. SCHORSKE. *German Social Democracy 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism.* Pp. xiii, 358. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $5.50.

The Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Western Germany, forming the left wing opposition bloc in the *Bundestag,* boasts a history of greater continuity than that of any other German party. Its tradition dates back as far as to the decade preceding the foundation of the new German Reich in 1870, the time when August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht had been laying the basis of a socialist labor party. However, this tradition is disrupted by a breach of fateful significance. The German Social Democrats today are stanch defenders of democratic liberties and parliamentary procedures, in their relationship to the existing state they are anything but revolutionists, and none could be more bitterly opposed to communism than they. Yet the Communist party as well as its predecessor under the Weimar Republic, the Independent Socialist party, can claim to be an offshoot of that very same tradition, split off during World War I, on the eve of Germany's defeat. The overt schism, brought about by the disintegration of German society under the threat of military disaster, made evident a cleavage as old as the German socialist movement itself, an element of growing dissent throughout its history and, in point of fact, one of the chief determining factors in its ideological and institutional development. Professor Schorske, in his competent and valuable book, relates, stage by stage, the progress and the varying manifestations of the tension which broke into open conflict in 1917. His emphasis is on the institutional and political history rather than on ideas. But also the development of doctrine is sketched in with a sure grasp of the essential. The author, laboring in a field ploughed up by numerous research workers before him, does not aim at originality, and his account, on almost every point, confirms, and at the same time refines, a familiar story. It is the story of a revolutionary party in a, by and large, progressive society. In order to survive as a party it must embrace the cause of democratic progress, thereby adapting itself to the existing society and, by the same token, jeopardizing its revolutionary pathos. Then, in order to keep alive the idea of revolution, integral part in this case of the Marxian heritage, it must renew its appeal to the restive masses by relentless hostility to the powers that be. In the long run the two requirements will prove incompatible with each other. The virtues of the reformist or revisionist wing will consist in a combination of high-minded idealism with moderation, democratic tolerance, and a willingness to take into account also those facts and developments which are at variance with the predictions of Marx, the prophet of revolution. Eduard Bernstein, the great theorist of revisionism, stands out as an exemplar of these accomplishments. Again, on the revolutionary wing, distinction is attained by that single-minded devotion to the future of mankind, even to the point of fanaticism, which gave Rosa Luxemburg her heroic stature. The author, who has no axe to grind, is able to pay an equally well-balanced tribute to both socialist prudence and socialist heroism.

HELMUT KUHN
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Germany

HENRY C. WALLICH. *Mainsprings of the German Revival.* Pp. xi, 401. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955. $4.50.

In 1945 Germany was a defeated, broken country, her cities in ruins, and her people stunned and bewildered. Just a decade later the West German economy has attained a recovery almost without parallel in history. There has been a rapid expansion of production and exports since 1948. In a recent article in *The New York Times,* Melvin Lasky reports that the German *Volkswagen* is beginning to conquer the small-car market throughout the world, and that the Germans are setting up complete assembly plants for the car in several foreign countries. Unemployment has been reduced; Germany's currency reserves are almost equal to those of Great Britain; her public finances, showing surpluses despite tax reductions, are the envy of Europe.

Other observers have explained this remarkable phenomenon as mainly due to American favoritism towards Germany, which has received from the United States more than four billion dollars as a gift on the mere promise of remilitarization. In this first-rate book, Henry C. Wallich, professor of economics at Yale University, grants the importance of effective American aid and German hard work, but he points out that other countries have also worked hard and received aid with far less spectacular results. Professor Wallich believes that the recovery of West Germany is a classic case of the free-market economy operating successfully with a limited number of strategically selected controls, and greatly helped by political and economic events outside its borders. Putting it simply, Germany "has done the right things and has had the good luck to do them at the right time."

In his superbly organized book Professor Wallich turns his attention to the facts of Germany's comeback in production and income, her monetary and fiscal policies, the free market policy, investment, industrial structure, population and refugees, labor's performance, the political bases of revival, the economic consequences of the German mentality, and Allied aid and occupation.

West Germany, says the author, has been far from a laissez-faire paradise: everything has been planned and managed by the Government—and from the standpoint of the employer and capitalist. Professor Wallich is convinced that few West Germany leaders want reunification, despite their political speeches, at least not at the present time. Agricultural East Germany had to be supported before the split by high tariffs on food, thereby increasing the cost of manufacture in the West. Today the West can buy more cheaply in the world's markets. Unification at this time would bring redundant economic capacity.

In her recent bestseller, *A Train of Powder,* Rebecca West attributed the current beaver-like activity of the Germans to their desperate search to forget the past and sublimate their guilt feelings by a highly neurotic concern with work, work, and more work. Professor Wallich, too, expresses concern that since the war the Germans have paid attention to little but economic pursuits—politics and culture have received only marginal attention. He warns that for a nation of Germany's tradition this state of affairs is disquieting. "The present political and cultural vacuum in Germany compels one to speculate what

might fill it. None of the possibilities mentioned seems very likely [*resurgence of Nazism; defection from the West; a deal with Russia; a new man on horseback*]. Yet the existing condition appears unstable and in danger of being displaced by some new enthusiasm. God help Germany and the world if it is again the wrong one" (p. 21). To this shrewd observation one can only utter a fervent "Amen!"

This is a good, strong, solid book with lots of backbone, useful not only to the professional economist and historian but also to the general public. It is must reading for every American for whom this question is literally a matter of life and death: will Germany maintain a stable democracy and will she anchor herself firmly on the side of the West?

LOUIS L. SNYDER
City College of New York

OTHER COUNTRIES

CHUNG-LI CHANG. *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society.* Pp. xi, 250. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955. $5.75.

At last! Professor Chang has made a fine beginning by taking the subject of the Chinese gentry out of the category of "weather problems." He and his colleagues have begun to do something about it in a difficult but essential way. They have gone carefully to the voluminous Chinese texts and begun to mine them of their vast resources which have hardly been touched in terms of modern social science research. This volume represents their beginning. Professor Franz Michael in a fine introduction to the book tells us of its background and of its supplements to come. It is difficult for Western scholars who have not had to grapple with texts in Chinese, Japanese, and similar languages to appreciate the problems that they pose, but a few moments talk with scholars in these fields is enough to convince almost anyone that there exists in these texts a mass of first-rate resources on the past that can be matched in no other area of the world. One need not dwell on the fact that, although these resources have existed for centuries and the areas concerned have been of vital importance to Westerners for decades, at the very least, their use for modern purposes has only recently ceased to be both sporadic and rare.

Professor Chang has not essayed any particular analytic treatment of the rich material he has presented. He has contented himself with going to the texts and extracting as thoroughly as he could materials on the number, distribution, differentiation, and origins of the gentry during the Ch'ing Dynasty. He points out wisely that much of what these materials indicate probably holds relatively well for other periods of Chinese history, but he ties these matters down rather neatly for his chosen period at least. He presents detailed figures on most of his topics, but he makes it quite clear that he is well aware that these figures are not to be mistaken for statistics which satisfy the most rigorous demands of proper statistical procedures. He does feel that they are the best that can be done with the texts as they are, and he presents his arguments explicitly as to why he feels that the inescapable inelegance of these figures from the modern statistical point of view are not likely to threaten his uses of them very seriously. A careful considerate man could hardly be asked to do more.

Professor Chang has inaugurated a great service to those concerned with the study of Chinese society. He has also made a considerable contribution to those interested in more general problems such as those concerning elite groups, bureaucracy, and so forth. His and similar contributions will make many analytical ventures possible that might otherwise never get beyond the speculative level.

Far Eastern specialists will also bless the publishers for a bibliography and glossary that give the Chinese characters for the titles and terms used in the text. Exigencies of publishing costs have in the past forced all too much penny-wise, pound-foolish publication in these respects.

MARION J. LEVY, JR.
Princeton University

RICHARD L. WALKER. *China Under Communism: The First Five Years.* Pp. xv, 403. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955. $4.50.

Since its conquest of power, the Communist government in China has carried through a revolution that has affected every aspect of Chinese life. In his study of the first five years of Chinese communism, Richard Walker has described the measures which the Communists employed to change the whole structure of Chinese society. Walker's book reveals the whole scope of this most ruthless form of totalitarianism and is one of the best detailed studies yet made of the Chinese Communist regime. The wide use of Communist sources greatly enhances the authenticity of this book's conclusions.

Into their first five years of rule the Communists have packed a series of drives which Walker describes and analyzes. He characterizes each of the five years according to the shift in emphasis of the Communist measures: the "Flush of Victory" is followed by the "Year of Violence," the "Year of Regimentation," the "Year of Retrenchment," and the "Year of Decision." After a survey of the moves of these years, Walker discusses separately the various methods which the Communists have used and their effect on different groups in Chinese society and on the relations between China and the outside world. He describes in a carefully documented way the effects of the Communist measures of psychological control, the fearful tools of psychological mass coercion, and the establishment of a "dread prison for the mind." He discusses circumstantially the whole "dehumanization of Chinese civilization" that has been accomplished; the destruction of the privacy of home and family, the condemnation of mercy and compassion as concepts of bourgeois society, and the destruction of individual thinking. He carefully analyzes the technique of the drives or movements aimed at stirring up hatred and destroying whole social groups. He outlines the measures of economic control and the problems faced by the Communist economy to push an industrial revolution fast enough "to defeat the Malthusian counter-revolution." (Most recently Communist China has been the first Communist country that has shown an interest in the "bourgeois" ideas of birth control.)

Walker discusses the effects of these Communist measures on the peasants, the workers, and the intellectuals. He demonstrates the falseness of the Communist claims about the high incidence of landlordism in China, claims which were contradicted by the statistics of the Communist land distribution drives themselves. This legend of landlordism was the only remaining argument in the Communist fiction of "feudal China," a fiction which is necessary to maintain the applicability to Chinese conditions of the Communist doctrine of the scientific interpretation of human history. In practice, the burden of the peasants is believed to be higher today than in former years. The pressure on the workers for higher production has increased with the use of piecework pay, of "labor heroes," and labor courts. But the worst aspects of Communist policy can be found in the establishment of totalitarian orthodoxy which has forced the Chinese intellectual to an abject surrender of his freedom of thinking.

Finally, Walker analyzes the position of China within the framework of the Communist world and the bitter Communist attack against the United States. In conclusion the author gives his own views on the United States stand and stresses the importance of aiding "in creating alternatives which the people will choose instead of communism."

FRANZ MICHAEL
University of Washington

GEORGE PADMORE. *The Gold Coast Revolution: The Struggle of an African People from Slavery to Freedom.* Pp. vii, 272. London: Denis Dobson, 1953. 12*s.* 6*d.*

A West Indian whose grandfather was a slave, George Padmore has made himself an aggressive and doctrinaire protagonist of the peoples of Africa now engaged in liberating themselves from European control. To an already fairly long list of

books attacking colonialism and imperialism, he now adds this study of recent constitutional developments in the Gold Coast. Although he goes far back into a dimly known past for background, he concerns himself primarily with events in the Gold Coast since 1945.

His pleasure in telling this story is obvious, for he is an enthusiastic and uncritical admirer of Kwame Nkrumah, the African Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, and of the Convention People's Party (CPP), to which under Nkrumah's leadership should go much of the credit for the steps made toward self-government since 1945. His enthusiasm for the present government of the Gold Coast causes him to write as a warm partisan with little good to say for the political opposition to Nkrumah and the CPP. Criteria of praise and condemnation are expressed in the Marxist vocabulary. While much of his criticism of the British is shared by less passionate writers on colonialism, the latter, quite properly, give the British more credit than Padmore does for the large measure of autonomy the Gold Coast now has. Haste in the preparation of the book reveals its carelessness in several ways. The reader is given references to only about one-third of the many long quotations going into the body of the text; the page references given on page 213 are not accurate; and H. A. Wieschhoff's name is misspelled every time it is mentioned.

These shortcomings do not deprive the book of value. On the contrary, it should be read by all persons interested in finding out if Africans can govern themselves because of the revolutionary significance for all Africa of the successful outcome of this great political experiment on the Gold Coast. The book shows the formidable tasks facing the new government in every field—constitutional, economic, educational, technical, political, regional. Two chapters dealing with economic resources and industrial development suggest that economic planning and governmental controls on a large scale must take place before solid economic foundations are there to support the new state, which has hopes of becoming a dominion in the Commonwealth. One chapter is devoted to Ewe nationalism, a complex problem of many headaches for the Gold Coast, the British, the French, and the United Nations. New and serious problems have developed since Padmore finished his book in 1953—the expulsion of Communists from the CPP for their activity in labor unions, charges of corruption against Cabinet members and even against Nkrumah, intensified activities of the political opposition, and the demand for a federal form of government. For an understanding of these problems Padmore supplies essential background, if not a complete one.

HARRY R. RUDIN

Yale University

PHILIP D. CURTIN. *Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas in a Tropical Colony, 1830–1865.* Pp. xii, 270. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $4.75.

The West Indian islands, which had played a significant role in the economies and rivalries of European powers before 1800, underwent thereafter a serious decline. As a result, historians have paid scant attention to the colonies in deterioration. Curtin's scholarly study is more than a history of the doleful days of Jamaica: it is also an analysis of the interplay of ideas between England and the planters, of the entire social scene in a plantation colony, and of the crisis resulting from the emancipation of slaves.

As his subtitle indicates, Curtin is particularly interested in ideas. Although the Jamaican planters were English in culture and education, they nevertheless had the prepossessions of local tradition. Ideas could not readily be transported across the seas and applied to the colony: some were resisted, some transformed, many ignored. Humanitarianism caused a necessary readjustment of life, since it resulted in laws to be obeyed, but the idea itself took no root in Jamaica. In the whole interplay, Curtin shows the validity of the Herskovits idea of "culture focus"—that each people has a "prevailing interest" in one aspect of life. Unless the colonial power is fully aware of this focus, it cannot count upon the aceptance of its theories, its practical proposals, nor any "desirable" aspect of its culture. The unpredictability of the colonial attitude toward contemporary economic, political, moral, and religious ideas in the home country gives significance to this case-study at the present moment of colonial crisis in Africa and Asia.

At emancipation, the Jamaican planters refused to accept the ideas of the Colonial Office, and yet they could devise no workable alternative system of their own. Ex-slaves became independent settlers following their own interests, and so there were two economies and two Jamaicas. Self-government failed, and the planters relinquished complete control of the colony to London.

The first half of the book, concerned with Jamaica on the eve of the revolution caused by emancipation, is absorbingly interesting; the second half, an account of the resultant two Jamaicas, stops abruptly with the failure of self-government. The reader needs a postscript to inform him of England's attempted solution of problems that had proved too difficult for Jamaicans. The one outline map is neither detailed nor conveniently located; much useful information is hidden in notes following the text. These minor defects are insignificant, however, in a book that is not only a contribution to our knowledge of the Caribbean and of colonial life and policy, but also a relevant comment upon the effect of European ideas in the modern colonial world.

JAMES G. LEYBURN

Washington and Lee University

JOHN and MAVIS BIESANZ. *The People of Panama.* Pp. xi, 418. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $5.50.

From the advent of the Panama Railroad builders in 1850, through the dramatic though frustrated years of Ferdinand de Lesseps' effort to thrust a canal across the waist of the Americas, to the completion of the Panama Canal by the United States Government, a vast number of workers of many nationalities, cultures, and colors were drawn to the Isthmus at Panama. These and their numerous descendants and successors have added a blend of varied hues to the Panamanians and indigenous Indians, themselves of diverse extractions and origins. In the Canal Zone and the adjacent urban centers of Colon and Panama City are to be found an extraordinary mixture of white and dark skinned peoples: French, Spanish, Greek, Chinese, Hindu, Jamaican and Barbadoan, as well as Americans and Panamanians of many classes and stations.

Through this mixture run complex lines of class and economic privileges, some based on national affiliation, some on social caste, others on color or racial extraction, and still others upon the type and locale of employment and residence. These lines of demarcation are directly related to pay rates, housing conditions, purchase privileges, medical and educational opportunities, and general public status.

The Canal Zone and Republic of Panama as a whole comprise a sociological cosmos affording many unusual insights into social structure, human behavior, and attitude patterns. It is into this complex pattern that the Biesanzs have directed their inquiry. Their volume adds a fresh approach to the fascinating history of the Isthmian region; a new dimension to the understanding of the politics and problems of a sister Republic and our relations with it. *The Peoples of Panama* is a serious, but thoroughly readable, sociological study of the peoples who live and labor together within the Isthmus. It is primarily concerned with the life conditions, problems and attitudes of four groups: the industrious Panamanian peasants, the pleasure-loving politically acute urban Panamanians, the various groups of Americans living in and out of the Zone, and the large numbers of segregated West Indians and their descendants whose position poses serious tests for American ideals and democratic principles.

No words are minced in criticizing the effects of long-continued policies that have marked off one group from another. But taken as a whole the treatment is a constructive one recognizing the difficulties and limitations that exist and praising United States and Panamanian authorities where statesmanship and constructive effort have

been shown. The authors believe that implementation of the new treaty with Panama and the alteration in educational policy for the Zone will provide vital tests for better relations between the two Republics and for a better orientation and happier future for the colored employees of West Indian descent.

The book is the result of nine years study. During this time the senior author spent one year as United States visiting professor of sociology at the University of Panama.

NORMAN J. PADELFORD
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RACIAL DESEGREGATION AND INTEGRATION

Edited by

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CHARLES J. RHOADS

1872–1956

The Academy lost one of its oldest friends by the death of Charles James Rhoads on January 2, 1956. Mr. Rhoads was elected Treasurer of our organization upon the death of Mr. Stuart Wood in 1914 and remained in that office for more than forty-one years, giving unselfishly of his time and great financial acumen to the successful management of the funds of the Academy. When he accepted the treasurership he had already had a distinguished career as an officer of the Girard Trust Company of Philadelphia and had just become the first Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, an office he held until the end of World War I, when he was elected President of the Central National Bank. In 1929, President Hoover called him to the important post of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, which he filled until 1933. His interest in philanthropy and education was shown in his work with the American Friends Service Committee during World War I, his chairmanship of the Philadelphia County Relief Board, and his work as trustee of Bryn Mawr College and of the American-Scandinavian Foundation, to mention but a few of such positions which he held either at his death or earlier.

Mr. Rhoads has left a place on the Board of Directors which he occupied with great devotion, and a keen sense of the obligation and trust which it involved.

FOREWORD

Within the last two years three momentous decisions on human rights have been handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States. On May 17, 1954, the Court declared racial segregation in the public schools of this nation to be unconstitutional. On May 31, 1955, the Court ruled that the defendants in the aforementioned case "make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance" with that ruling. On November 7, 1955, the Court, in effect, applied to public parks and beaches the principle enunciated in its May 17 ruling that separate educational facilities are unequal. These decisions are being interpreted as expressing a general rule under which certain racial statuses of the past are rendered null and void and new statuses are to be created. They may well be harbingers of significant changes in human relations throughout the country.

The fabric of these decisions, however—their trim yet tangled actuality—is no product of the moment but has been woven over the years. Public policy, state rights, decrees of judges, acts of legislatures, popular and unpopular opinion, have all entered into the design. And as abstractions meet concrete situations in many areas—educational, economic, political, and social—each will affect the other in the impact. For the decisions reveal a society at peace with confusion, surging toward a more democratic objective. Their ideal is social justice and their logic the logic of things that change.

But what is the meaning of these decisions for social life in the United States? What are the matters of immediate and practical concern which demand rational action and realistic planning? In general, we see two processes at work—desegregation and integration. Desegregation we regard as a neutralizing process that must occur when groups have been prevented from having equal access to the materials of a society and egalitarian relations with other groups, races, ages, religions, sexes, or classes because of edicts or customs which have limited the character and extent of their participation. The segregated society may be typified by separate schools for races and peoples, white primaries, denial of equal access to places of public accommodation, laws preventing racial intermarriage, and other procedures and rules. Desegregation is at once the removal of these barriers and the essential prerequisite to integration. It is achieved to the degree that it succeeds in modifying the social institutions, the personal behaviors, and the value systems which supported the segregated structure.

Integration, on the other hand, is the situation and the process which exists when men in society are breaking down such barriers while moving toward the full acceptance of all people without reference to their racial, religious, or ethnic differences. It is the process of achieving full equality of status and condition. The elimination of "Negro jobs" or "Mexican jobs" in employment, the establishment of "open occupancy" tenancy programs in housing, are but first steps toward integration. Ultimately, integration is an ideal condition which ceases to exist once it is achieved. In a culturally healthy community the condition may be achieved so gradually and so effectively as to attract little or no popular attention or opposition. In other situations the transition may be fraught with real or imagined dangers. Whether the transition from segregation to integration through desegregation is easy or rugged, the change always involves some social cost to the existing sys-

tem. As a consequence, the social community is called upon to determine (1) how far integration should go; (2) under what conditions it is to be achieved; and (3) within what limitations it shall occur.

This issue of THE ANNALS seeks to present significant aspects of the changes that are occurring in selected sectors of the United States community. There has been a deliberate effort to avoid retelling of the better-known examples of resistance to change as well as of successful integration. Our major concern has been to bring into central focus selected aspects of achieved and predictable change. In such a unique situation as that of desegregation this is no mean task. Our authors, however, have sought to orient their contributions around such knowledge, insights, and perspectives as will represent a contribution to the understanding of human rights and human relations within the contexts of stateways and folkways.

IRA DE A. REID

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History of Racial Segregation in the United States

By JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN

THE enactment of state segregation statutes is a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of race relations in the United States. Of course there had been numerous segregation practices and some segregation statutes for many years, even before the nineteenth century. But it was not until the final quarter of the nineteenth century that states began to evolve a systematic program of legally separating whites and Negroes in every possible area of activity. And it was not until the twentieth century that these laws became a major apparatus for keeping the Negro "in his place." They were both comprehensive and generally acceptable, because they received their inspiration from a persistent and tenacious assumption of the innate inferiority of the Negro and because they had their roots deep in the ante-bellum period.[1]

LEGACY OF THE SLAVE REGIME

For centuries many Northerners and Southerners subscribed to the view that Negroes were of a permanently inferior type. As slavery came to be concentrated in the Southern states and as that section became conspicuous by the tenacity with which it held on to slavery, it built its defenses of the institution along lines of the inferiority of the Negro. A whole body of thought was set forth to demonstrate that "the faculties of the Negro, as compared with those of the Saxon, qualified him for a state of servitude and made him unfit for the enjoyment of freedom."[2] Slavery was, therefore, the natural lot of the Negro; and any efforts to elevate him to the status of freedom and equality were manifestly in opposition to the laws of nature and of God.

The slaveholder's task of keeping the Negro slave in his place was complicated by the presence of several hundred thousand Negroes who were not slaves, although they can hardly be described as wholly free. So that they would not constitute a threat to the slave regime, free Negroes were denied the full rights and privileges of citizens. They enjoyed no equality in the courts, their right to assemble was denied, their movements were circumscribed, and education was withheld. Their miserable plight caused them to be unfavorably compared with slaves and confirmed the views of many that Negroes could not profit by freedom. They were regarded as the "very drones and pests of society," pariahs of the land, and an incubus on the body politic.

Outside the South free Negroes fared

[1] For an illuminating discussion of the assumptions of the inferiority of the Negro see Guion Griffis Johnson, "The Ideology of White Supremacy, 1876–1910," in Fletcher M. Green (Ed.), *Essays in Southern History Presented to Joseph Grégoire de Roulhac Hamilton* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949), pp. 124–56.

[2] William S. Jenkins, *Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 243. See also Albert T. Bledsoe, "Liberty and Slavery, or Slavery in the Light of Moral and Political Philosophy," and Samuel C. Cartwright, "Slavery in the Light of Ethnology," in E. N. Elliott, *Cotton Is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments* (Augusta, Ga.: Pritchard, Abbott and Loomis, 1860), pp. 271–458, 691–728.

only slightly better. White Christians began to segregate them in the churches in the first decade of the national period, and Negroes in Philadelphia and New York City withdrew rather than accept this humiliation. As early as 1787 a white philanthropic organization opened a separate school for Negroes in New York City. In 1820 the city of Boston established a Negro elementary school. Separate schools became the practice throughout the North. When Charles Sumner challenged the constitutionality of segregated schools in Massachusetts in 1849, his position was bitterly opposed; and it was not until 1855 that the legislature of that state abolished them. Meanwhile numerous acts of violence in urban communities underscored Northern hostility to free Negroes. Between 1830 and 1840 anti-Negro riots occurred in Utica, Palmyra, New York City, and Philadelphia.

These ante-bellum experiences with free Negroes proved invaluable in the period following the close of the Civil War. In 1865 white Southerners were not "caught short" in facing the problem of the freedmen. From their point of view the former slaves simply augmented the group of free Negroes that they already regarded as "the most ignorant . . . vicious, impoverished, and degraded population of this country." [3] Thus, the whites merely applied to the former slaves the principles and practices that had guided them in their relations with ante-bellum free Negroes. The latter had subsisted somewhere in the hazy zone between slavery and freedom. To concede the freedmen this "place" was regarded by white Southerners as generous, the Emancipation Proclamation and the Reconstruction amendments to the contrary notwithstanding.

[3] From a statement by Howell Cobb, quoted in Jenkins, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 246.

NEW LAWS, OLD RELATIONSHIPS

When the economic and social structure of the Old South toppled at the end of the Civil War, the ex-Confederates immediately began to erect a new structure based on the old philosophy. As a distinguished Southern writer put it not many years ago, "If the war had smashed the Southern world, it had left the Southern mind and will—the mind and will arising from, corresponding to, and requiring this world—entirely unshaken." [4] The smoke of battle had hardly cleared when the vanquished leaders, enjoying a remarkable amount of autonomy, began to fashion their new world upon the model of the old. With characteristic directness of action they went straight to the heart of their problem and worked out ways and means of holding on to the way of life that had meant so much to them.

As the ex-Confederates proceeded to restore order in their war-torn communities, they took little cognizance of the implications of the Emancipation Proclamation and the proposed Thirteenth Amendment. The major assumptions of the slave regime, the cornerstone of which was the permanent inferiority of the Negro, were still so powerful as to be controlling in most matters involving Negroes. While making some concessions, such as the competency of Negroes to testify in the courts, they nullified almost every semblance of freedom with numerous proscriptive laws. Mississippi legislators passed laws forbidding Negroes to rent or lease lands except in incorporated towns. They also enacted a law requiring every Negro, after January 1, 1866, to carry on his person written evidence that he had a home and an occupation. Louisiana forbade Negroes

[4] W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), p. 103.

to move about in certain parishes or to be out at night without special permits. North Carolina extended to the freedmen the same privileges, burdens, and disabilities that had previously applied to free persons of color.

That the races should be kept apart, except where the whites were clearly in a superior role, was an important feature of most codes. Louisiana required that every Negro be in the regular service of some white person who was held responsible for his conduct. Mississippi forbade employees of railroads to permit Negroes to ride in first-class cars with white persons, except in the case of Negroes or mulattoes, "traveling with their mistress, in the capacity of maids." Many states provided that if Negro offenders could not pay their fines they were to be hired out to "any white person" who would pay the fines and costs and take the convicts for the shortest period of time.

Negroes were not indifferent to the process by which their former masters and their associates were nullifying the gains of the war. While they displayed no spirit of vindictiveness against those who had held them in slavery, they manifested a firm determination to secure the rights to which they, as free men, were entitled.[5] The better educated and the more articulate among them assumed the leadership in expressing apprehension regarding the developments that were pushing them back toward slavery. They were especially concerned about the numerous acts of violence perpetrated against the freedmen, the burning of their schools and churches, and the economic proscriptions to which they were subjected. In Harrisburg, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, and Cleveland they met in conventions and solicited the support of their Northern fellows in the effort to attain first-class citizenship. In Alexandria, Norfolk, Raleigh, Charleston, and other Southern communities they met, exchanged views, and addressed appeals to Southerners, Northerners, and federal officials. These supplications fell on deaf ears in the South, but they contributed to the increasing awareness elsewhere that the victory at Appomattox was empty.

[5] On the point of the absence of vindictiveness among Negroes see Francis B. Simkins, "New Viewpoints of Southern Reconstruction," *Journal of Southern History,* Vol. 5 (February 1939), pp. 49–61.

FEDERAL INTERVENTION

The ex-Confederates looked upon the lenient Reconstruction policies of Lincoln and Johnson, which gave them virtual autonomy in every phase of life, as a normal concession to a section which was right on all the basic points in the dispute that led to the war. In the North, however, many people viewed the policy of leniency with skepticism from the outset; and congressional leaders made no secret of the fact that they regarded the resultant Presidential actions as unwise and improper, if not actually illegal. The first significant assertion of their own prerogatives was the passage of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill in March 1865, which called for an extensive program of relief and rehabilitation in the South.

The Bureau's establishment of schools for the former slaves and its attempt to protect them in their relations with white employers were especially obnoxious to the white Southerners. They were loud in their condemnation of both these features of the Bureau's program, calling them incendiary, radical, and political. They realized all too well the adverse effect that a successful prosecution of the program would have on the continued subordination of Negroes. The attempts of whites to drive out teachers of Negroes and to assert their authority over their employees were

well calculated to subvert the program of complete emancipation and to preserve the old relationships between Negroes and whites.

The findings of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, established by Congress in 1865, convinced a majority of congressional members that federal intervention was necessary to salvage the victory over the South. The committee was of the opinion that there was in the South "no general disposition to place the colored race . . . upon terms even of civil equality" and that no semblance of order could be maintained without the interposition of federal authority.[6] In accordance with the recommendation of the Joint Committee, Congress proceeded to enact a civil rights measure, to submit the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, and to pass a series of laws placing the reconstruction of the former Confederate states under congressional control.

Civil Rights Act of 1866

The Civil Rights Act that became law on April 9, 1866, defined citizenship so as to include Negroes. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois said that the purpose of the bill was to destroy the discrimination against the Negro in the laws of Southern states and to make effective the Thirteenth Amendment.[7] White Southerners were, of course, outraged that Congress should undertake to guarantee the equality of Negroes, especially since the law had been enacted in the absence of representatives from the former Confederate states. As a matter of fact, fear that at some later date a majority of Congress or a federal court would strike down the Civil Rights Act was an important motivation for writing the provisions of the act into the Fourteenth Amendment.[8]

Fourteenth Amendment

During the debates on the resolution that was to become the Fourteenth Amendment the question arose as to whether the proposed amendment protected Negroes against discrimination and segregation. There was no agreement, but proponents of the amendment were optimistic regarding its effect. In supporting the amendment, Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan said that the equal protection clause "abolishes all class legislation in the states and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another." Representative John Bingham of Ohio declared that the amendment would protect "by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any state"[9]

Southern resistance

Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the radical legislation embodied in congressional Reconstruction was sufficient to protect the Negro in his political and civil rights. Southern resistance was stiff and effective, while efforts at enforcement left much to be desired. Once they recovered from the initial staggering blow of Radical Reconstruction legislation the ex-Confederates grimly went about the task of nullifying it in every possible way. By violence, intimidation, and ingenious schemes of economic pressure, by increased participation in political affairs, they began to "redeem" their state governments. Neither the Fifteenth Amendment nor the Ku Klux Klan Acts could stem the tide. In one state after another, between 1870 and 1877, they were successful; and as they took over the Southern state governments, they began to enact laws to separate Negroes and whites.

[6] *Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, at the First Session Thirty-ninth Congress* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866), p. xvii.

[7] Horace Edgar Flack, *The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1908), p. 21.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 75–87, and Benjamin B. Kendrick, *The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1914), pp. 267–69.

[9] *Congressional Globe,* Thirty-ninth Congress, First Session (Washington: F. and J. Rives, 1866), pp. 2766, 2459.

Civil Rights Act of 1875

Congress, against the bitter opposition of the ex-Confederates who were taking over the seats the Radicals had occupied, made one final effort to prevent the destruction of the rights of Negroes. Between 1871 and 1875 it devoted much attention to various proposals for a comprehensive national civil rights bill. While the act that was passed in 1875 omitted the provision of earlier drafts requiring the admission of persons regardless of race to all public schools, it declared that all persons, regardless of race or color, should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public amusement. In its scope and in its provisions for enforcement it far surpassed anything that had ever been done in the area of protecting the civil rights of Negroes.

Although the Southern whites viewed the Act of 1875 with utter contempt and violated it with impunity, they were not entirely comfortable so long as it was on the statute books. They found it impossible, therefore, to restrain their elation when the Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional in 1883. When the decision was announced during a performance at the Atlanta Opera House, the audience broke into "such a thunder of applause . . . as was never before heard within the walls of the opera house."[10] An Arkansas newspaper expressed hearty agreement with the majority of the Court when it said, "Society is a law unto itself, which in matters social in their nature overrides the statutes. Against its decrees the written law is powerless."[11]

SEGREGATION—THE FAVORABLE CLIMATE

Before the momentous decision in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883 segregation by statutes was confined to a relatively few but highly important areas. In many states, for example, the laws against intermarriage preceded the Civil War by many years.[12] Although they were omitted from some state codes during Reconstruction, there was no wholesale repeal of them, and they remained in effect in many parts of the North as well as in the South.[13] The practice of maintaining separate schools for white and Negro children was well established in the North before the Civil War; and in the South if ex-Confederates provided schools for Negro children at all they were of course separate. Although the Radicals made some attempts to break down segregated schools during their brief period of control, they met with little success.[14] In the military services Negroes had almost always been

[10] Atlanta *Constitution,* October 16, 1883.

[11] Little Rock *Daily Arkansas Gazette,* October 19, 1883.

[12] Intermarriage was prohibited in Arkansas *in 1838; in* Louisiana in 1810. For a discussion of these statutes see Charles S. Mangum, *The Legal Status of the Negro* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), pp. 236–73.

[13] Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, *Race Distinctions in American Law* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1910), pp. 78–101.

[14] Francis B. Simkins and Robert H. Woody, *South Carolina During Reconstruction* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932), pp. 439–42, and T. Harry Williams, "The Louisiana Unification Movement of 1873," *Journal of Southern History,* Vol. 11 (August 1945), p. 362.

segregated, and the Civil War did much to strengthen the practice.

The decision in the Civil Rights Cases was an important stimulus to the enactment of segregation statutes. It gave the assurance the South wanted that the federal government would not intervene to protect the civil rights of Negroes. The decision coincided, moreover, with a series of political and intellectual developments that greatly accelerated the program of segregation. In the eighties several Southern governments were embarrassed by financial scandals, and some of them outstripped the Reconstruction governments in defalcations and pilfering.[15] Meanwhile, the agrarian unrest induced by widespread economic distress frightened the conservatives and forced them to adopt extreme measures in order to regain the leadership which in some states they had temporarily lost to white and Negro Populists. Distressed by the possibility of a strong new party composed of white and Negro farmers and workers, they dominated the Negro vote where they could and expressed grave fears of "Negro domination" where they could not. Thus, the magical formula of white supremacy, "applied without stint and without any of the old reservations of paternalism, without deference to any lingering resistance of Northern liberalism, or any fear of further check from a defunct Southern Populism," gained ascendancy in the final decade of the nineteenth century.[16]

These were the years that witnessed the effective constitutional disfranchisement of Negroes by such devices as understanding clauses, grandfather clauses, and good conduct clauses. They also saw the launching of an intensive propaganda campaign of white supremacy, negrophobia, and race chauvinism, supported by a sensational and irresponsible press that carried lurid stories of alleged Negro bestiality. New waves of violence broke out, with increased lynchings of Negroes, unspeakable atrocities against them, and race riots. Concurrently, and at a "higher level," the literary and scientific leaders of the South wrote numerous tracts and books designed to "prove" the inhumanity of the Negro.[17] In this climate segregation took a giant step toward a fully developed white supremacy apparatus.

SEGREGATION STATUTES—THE GIANT STEP

In the decade after the Civil War few laws were enacted demanding segregation. The first state segregation statutes were those of Mississippi and Florida in 1865, requiring segregation on public carriers. Texas followed in 1866, but five years later repealed the act. The Tennessee law of 1881, sometimes referred to as the first Jim Crow law, directed railroad companies to provide separate cars or portions of cars for first-class Negro passengers, instead of relegating them to second-class accommodations as had been the custom. There were only two votes against the measure in the House and one in the Senate.

In the ensuing twenty years separation of Negroes and whites on public carriers became a favorite preoccupation of Southern legislators. By 1892

[15] C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877–1914* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), pp. 67–70.

[16] C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 65.

[17] See the books by Thomas Dixon, notably *The Leopard's Spots: A Romance of the White Man's Burden—1865–1900* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1902); Charles Carroll, *"The Negro a Beast;" or, "In the Image of God"* . . . (St. Louis, Mo.: American Book and Bible House, 1900); and Robert W. Shufeldt, *The Negro, A Menace to American Civilization* (Boston: R. G. Badger, 1907).

six other Southern states had joined the ranks—Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Kentucky. In some states, however, opposition had been bitter. In Louisiana, for example, a Negro representative declared that the law would humiliate Negroes and "make them appear before the world as a treacherous and a dangerous class of people."[18] In Arkansas a Negro member of the House sought to ridicule the bill's supporters by insisting that if whites did not want to associate with Negroes there should be laws to divide the streets and sidewalks so that Negroes could go on one side and white people on the other. "He would like to see an end put to all intercourse between white and colored people by day, and especially by night."[19]

With the pattern firmly established in a number of Southern states and the pressure for segregation growing, the other Southern states followed before the end of the century. South Carolina passed its law segregating Negroes and whites on railroads in 1898; North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland soon after. When Oklahoma entered the Union in 1907 segregation had already been provided for.

By this time laws were being extended to cover all activities related to transportation. In 1888 the railroad commission of Mississippi was authorized to designate separate waiting rooms for Negroes and whites. By 1893 the railroad companies, on their own initiative, were doing the same thing in South Carolina, and in 1906 the state required separation of the races in all station restaurants and eating houses. Ultimately, legislation covered steamboats, buses, and other forms of transportation.

[18] *Louisiana House Journal, Second Session, 1890,* pp. 202–203.

[19] Little Rock *Arkansas Gazette,* February 14, 1891.

Twentieth-century varieties

The first decade of the twentieth century witnessed the enactment of a wide variety of segregation statutes. Georgia had required separation of the races on streetcars as early as 1891. It was between 1901 and 1907, however, that North Carolina, Virginia, Louisiana, Arkansas, South Carolina, Tennessee, Mississippi, Maryland, Florida, and Oklahoma followed suit. Ordinances in Southern cities were even more specific than state laws. In 1906, for example, the city of Montgomery, Alabama, went so far as to insist that Negroes and whites use separate streetcars.

Wards of society—still separated

As the states assumed greater responsibility for the various wards of society they were careful to provide separate facilities for whites and Negroes. In 1875 Alabama made it unlawful for any jailer or sheriff to imprison white and Negro prisoners before conviction in the same apartments of the jail, if there were sufficient separate apartments, and ten years later prohibited the chaining of white and Negro convicts together or housing them together. In 1903 Arkansas directed that in the state penitentiary and in county jails, stockades, convict camps, and all other places where prisoners were confined, separate apartments should be provided and maintained for white and Negro prisoners. Within the next ten years most of the other Southern states had similar legislation. During the same period segregation of white and Negro insane, feeble-minded, blind and deaf, paupers, tubercular patients, and juvenile delinquents was provided for.

No detail too small

In rounding out the system of legal segregation some states provided for the separation of whites and Negroes at

work, at play, and at home. In 1915 South Carolina forbade textile factories to permit employees of different races to work together in the same room, or to use the same entrances, pay windows, exists, doorways, stairways, or windows at the same time, or the same lavatories, toilets, drinking-water buckets, pails, cups, dippers, or glasses at any time. In 1905 Georgia passed a law making illegal the use by Negroes and whites of the same park facilities; individuals were permitted to donate land for playground use only if they specified which race alone was to make use of it. Until 1940 Negroes and whites in Atlanta, Georgia, were not permitted to visit the municipal zoo at the same time. In 1929 Oklahoma authorized the Conservation Commission to segregate the races in the use of fishing, boating, and bathing facilities on lakes and streams under the supervision of the state. Arkansas enacted a law in 1935 requiring the separation of Negroes and whites at all race tracks and gaming establishments. Beginning in 1910 several cities, among them Baltimore, Atlanta, and Louisville, passed ordinances designating certain blocks, territories, and districts as Negro or white and forbidding members of one race to live in the area assigned to the other. Such zoning laws, however, were declared unconstitutional in 1917.

The supply of ideas for new ways to segregate whites and Negroes seemed inexhaustible. In 1915 Oklahoma authorized the Corporation Commission to order telephone companies to maintain separate booths for white and Negro patrons. North Carolina and Florida provided that textbooks used by the children of one race be kept separate from those used by children of the other race, despite the fact that both states have stringent rules covering fumigation of textbooks. In 1922 Mississippi forbade members of both races to ride in taxicabs at the same time unless the vehicle held more than seven passengers and was traveling from one city to another. New Orleans deemed it in the interest of the public welfare to enact an ordinance separating Negro and white prostitutes.

Two worlds—roads closed

The law had created two worlds, so separate that communication between them was almost impossible. Separation bred suspicion and hatred, fostered rumors and misunderstanding, and created conditions that made extremely difficult any steps toward its reduction. Legal segregation was so complete that a Southern white minister was moved to remark that it "made of our eating and drinking, our buying and selling, our labor and housing, our rents, our railroads, our orphanages and prisons, our recreations, our very institutions of religion, a problem of race as well as a problem of maintenance." [20]

EXTRALEGAL ASPECTS

Yet law was only one part of the mechanism keeping the races segregated. Numerous devices were employed to perpetuate segregation in housing, education, and places of public accommodation even in communities where civil rights statutes forbade such practices. Patriotic, labor, and business organizations kept alive the "Lost Cause" and all that it stood for, including the subordination of the Negro. Separate Bibles for oath taking in courts of law, separate doors for whites and Negroes, separate elevators and stairways, separate drinking fountains, and separate toilets existed even where the law did not require them. Finally, there was

[20] Edgar Gardner Murphy, *The Basis of Ascendancy* (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1909), p. 138.

the individual assumption of responsibility for keeping Negroes in their place, such as the white man who placed a rod across the boat to segregate his Negro fishing companion while they ate lunch, and the archivist of a Southern state who cleared a room of manuscripts, ordered a special key, and assigned an attendant to serve a visiting Negro scholar who would otherwise have had to use the regular search room, from which he was not barred by law.[21]

By the middle of the twentieth century the pattern of segregation was as irregular as it was complex. Every conceivable form of segregation had been evolved, although one would have to visit many places to observe all the variations. The wall of segregation had become so formidable, so impenetrable, apparently, that the entire weight of the American tradition of equality and all the strength of the American constitutional system had to be brought to bear in order to make even the slightest crack in it.

[21] For numerous examples of the informal but tenacious practices of segregation see Charles S. Johnson, *Patterns of Negro Segregation* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943).

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The United States Supreme Court and the Segregation Issue

By Rayford W. Logan *

FROM the 1870's to the beginning of this century the status of the Negro in the United States steadily worsened.[1] Then ensued a decade that has been aptly termed "a low, rugged plateau," [2] during which a few Negro leaders and white supporters began to campaign militantly against what is now called second-class citizenship. World War I, the Great Depression, and the New Deal, World War II and the cold war, have greatly accelerated nationwide changes which facilitated gains for Negroes that few persons at the beginning of the century could have envisioned. These gains embraced practically every aspect of Negro life, and they have greatly altered the climate of opinion with respect to the status of the Negro in the American democracy. An increasing number of Negro leaders and their supporters, keeping pace with and sometimes moving ahead of these gains, have recently renounced the goal of equality within a segregated society and have urgently advocated desegregation and integration.

* The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Professors Charles W. Quick and Howard Jenkins, Jr., of the Howard University Law School, Mr. A. Mercer Daniel, Librarian of the Law School, and Professor Harold O. Lewis of the Department of History for aid in locating the relevant cases; to Professor Quick and Professor John Hope Franklin of the Department of History for a critical reading of the article.

[1] See Logan, *The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877–1901* (New York, 1954).

[2] Henry Arthur Callis, M.D., Washington, D. C., a student at Cornell University at the time, suggested this phrase.

Era of Adverse Decisions (1873–1910)

The decisions of the Supreme Court have both reflected and helped to determine the changing status and goals. From shortly after the Civil War to the end of the first decade of this century, most decisions furthered the declining status of the Negro. The Court virtually nullified the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by declaring that it protected only rights that inhere in United States citizenship and that most rights inhere in state citizenship. It held unconstitutional most of the important provisions of the Civil Rights Act of May 31, 1870, the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, and the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875. These decisions declared that the Fourteenth Amendment was prohibitory upon states and not upon individuals and that the Fifteenth Amendment was applicable only when the denial of the right to vote was based upon race, color, or previous condition of servitude.[3]

The Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana law forbidding discrimination in interstate commerce on the ground

[3] The relevant decisions are Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36 (1873); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883). They may be conveniently consulted in Thomas I. Emerson and David Haber (Eds.), *Political and Civil Rights in the United States: A Collection of Legal and Related Materials* (Buffalo, 1952).

that it placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.[4] In *Plessy v. Ferguson* [5] the Court for the first time sanctioned a state segregation law on the ground that it was a reasonable use of the police powers of the state provided that the accommodations were "equal." The Court repeatedly declined to intervene in cases of alleged exclusion of Negroes from jury service when counsel for the plaintiffs did not show in the trial court that the exclusion was based on race or color.[6] The constitutionality of the Mississippi disfranchising amendment of 1890, which arose collaterally in a case involving exclusion of Negroes from jury service, was upheld.[7] The Court refused to take jurisdiction over the Alabama disfranchising amendment, partly because the question was a "political" one,[8] and also declined to intervene against a Kentucky statute prohibiting Berea College from continuing to admit Negro students, since the charter of the College reserved to the state the right to alter or repeal its charter.[9]

In 1910 in a case involving interstate commerce the Court held that a railway company had the right to require separate coaches for white and colored passengers, ruling that in the absence of congressional legislation the carrier could make reasonable regulations for the conduct of its business. As to what was "reasonable," it was said that this "cannot depend upon a passenger being state or interstate." [10]

[4] Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878).

[5] 163 U. S. 537 (1896).

[6] See, for example, Charley Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592 (1896) and Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U. S. 101 (1896).

[7] Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213 (1898).

[8] Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475 (1903); Giles v. Teasley, 193 U. S. 146 (1904).

[9] Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).

[10] Chiles v. C. & O. Ry Co., 218 U. S. 71 (1910).

The only type of state action that the Court struck down was that which prevented Negroes from serving on juries on account of their race or color.[11] The Court also held that action by individuals in their capacity of state officials constituted state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.[12]

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to grant relief to a plaintiff in a case involving the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that its enforcement was a legislative matter and that Congress had not enacted legislation to enforce it. In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court in 1946 held that the question was a "political" one.[13]

Era of Favorable Decisions (1911–55)

The reversal of the general trend of the Court's decisions after 1910 is the more noteworthy in view of the general inaction of Congress and the belated action of the executive branch with respect to civil rights. There are, however, significant exceptions to the reversal. The scope of the privileges and immunities clause is still limited to United States citizenship. The civil rights decision of 1883 is still the law of the land, and the Court in 1913 held that it applied to marine as well as to land jurisdiction.[14] As late as 1920 the Court upheld a Kentucky law requiring separate cars that involved interstate travel between Ohio and Kentucky on the ground that, since the company was chartered in Kentucky, it was subject to Kentucky

[11] The classic case is Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1880).

[12] *Ex parte* Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880).

[13] Saunders v. Wilkins, *cert. denied*, 328 U. S. 870.

[14] Butts v. Merchants and Miners Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126 (1913).

laws.[15] Attempts to have state poll tax laws declared unconstitutional have failed.[16]

While some of the most far-reaching decisions have been handed down since the entry of the United States into World War II, a few important ones precede 1941. In fact, two—*Bailey v. Alabama* and *Guinn v. United States*—antedate the entry of the United States into World War I and one—*Buchanan v. Warley*—came shortly thereafter.

Peonage and involuntary servitude

In 1911 the Court held that peonage violated the Thirteenth Amendment,[17] and since the establishment of the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice in 1939 a widespread decline in peonage and involuntary servitude has occurred. In the face of new devices, the Supreme Court acted; for example, in 1944 it struck down as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment an Alabama statute which enabled employers to force employees in debt on account of advanced wage payments to continue work for them under threat of criminal punishment.

The franchise

In 1915 in *Guinn v. United States*[18] the Court for the first time declared that the grandfather clause, one of the devices used to disfranchise Negroes, violated the Fifteenth Amendment. A new Oklahoma registration law that sought to circumvent this decision was held unconstitutional in *Lane v. Wilson*.[19] Meanwhile the Court had twice ruled that action by the state of Texas in providing for a white primary violated the Fourteenth Amendment.[20] But in *Grovey v. Townsend*,[21] the Court held that action by the Democratic state convention barring Negroes from the primary was not state action and, hence, not a violation of the Constitution. The Court, however, reversed itself in *Smith v. Allwright*, declaring that "when, as here that privilege [of membership in a party] is also the essential qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the State makes the action of the party the action of the State."[22]

This decision resulted, on the one hand, in a considerable increase in the number of Negro voters in southern states,[23] and on the other, in attempts by several states to circumvent it. In Alabama the Boswell amendment permitted the registration as electors of only those persons who could "understand and explain" any article of the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a United States district court which had held that the requirement violated the Fifteenth Amendment.[24] South Carolina tried to separate completely the Democratic primary from state action by removing all mention of primaries from the state constitution and statutes. District Judge J. Waties Waring ruled that the Democratic primary remained an integral part of the state election machinery, and the Supreme Court upheld the decision by denying certiorari.[25] Georgia amended its constitution in 1945 to make eligibility for voting dependent on ability to

[15] South Covington and Cincinnati Street Ry. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 252 U. S. 399 (1920).

[16] See especially Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17 (E. D., Va., 1951), *aff'd*, 341 U. S. 937 (1951).

[17] Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219.

[18] 238 U. S. 347.

[19] 307 U. S. 268 (1939).

[20] Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927), and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932).

[21] 295 U. S. 45 (1935).

[22] 321 U. S. 649 (1944).

[23] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949), Chap. XXIX.

[24] Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, *aff'd*, 336 U. S. 933 (1949).

[25] Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, *cert. denied*, 333 U. S. 875 (1948).

"correctly read in the English language any paragraph of the Constitution of the United States or of this State and correctly write the same in the English language when read to them by any one of the registrars." County registrars appointed under the Registration Act of 1949 brought suit against a county official who had refused to pay their salaries. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had not been violated since the case did not involve the right to register to vote; the United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.[26] But the Court declared that, since for more than sixty years the county-wide Jaybird Association's candidates had invariably been nominated in the Texas Democratic primaries and elected to office, the election machinery of the Association and of the Democratic party violated the Fifteenth Amendment.[27]

The Court has also invoked Sections 241 and 242 of Title 18, United States Code (1948), to uphold indictments against election officials who had made a fraudulent count of ballots in a federal primary election and who had stuffed ballot boxes in a federal election.[28]

Housing

Shortly after the United States entered World War I the Supreme Court enunciated the basic principle which has governed subsequent decisions. In *Buchanan v. Warley*[29] a unanimous Court declared unconstitutional the provisions of a Louisville city ordinance which denied to colored persons the right to occupy houses in blocks in which the greater number of houses were occupied by white persons, and vice versa.[30]

Later, the Court was faced with the problem of restrictive covenants by which groups of individuals contracted not to dispose of their property to Negroes, Jews, Armenians, Mexicans, Indians, Orientals, Syrians, and other "undesirables." The Court held in *Corrigan v. Buckley*[31] that a restrictive agreement involving action by private individuals did not present a substantial question.[32] State court action to prevent infringement of such a restrictive covenant, however, was held to violate the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.[33] This decision, like *Smith v. Allwright*, provoked various devices to circumvent the clear mandate of the Court. For example, "gentlemen's agreements" proscribe the selling or renting to Negroes outside existing colored districts.[34]

In regard to public housing the Court followed the strict interpretation of state action. It held that the housing project of the Stuyvesant Town Corporation, built under the New York Redevelopment Companies Law, was not state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.[35] But in 1951 the New York City Council passed an ordinance to prohibit discrimination or segregation in all private housing enjoying total or partial exemption from city

[26] Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, *appeal dismissed*, 339 U. S. 946 (1950).

[27] Terry *et al.* v. Adams *et al.*, 345 U. S. 461 (1953).

[28] United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941); United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385 (1944).

[29] 245 U. S. 60 (1917).

[30] See also Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S. 704 (1930).

[31] 271 U. S. 323 (1926).

[32] See also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 (1940).

[33] Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).

[34] Emerson and Haber (Eds.), *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 1028–34.

[35] Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 299 N. Y. 512, *cert. denied*, 339 U. S. 981 (1950).

taxes or receiving direct or indirect aid from the city.[36]

Public accommodations

Morgan v. Virginia[37] concerned a Negro interstate passenger traveling on a bus from Virginia through the District of Columbia to Baltimore, Maryland, who had refused to obey the request of the driver to move to a back seat partly occupied by colored passengers in order to make room for a white passenger. She had been arrested and convicted of violating a Virginia statute which required that she sit in designated seats. The Supreme Court held that the statute was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, largely because of the inconvenience caused passengers by the frequent necessity of changing seats.

To invalidate the denial to a Negro of an unoccupied Pullman seat and of an unoccupied seat in the dining car,[38] the Court invoked Section 3, paragraph 1, of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887—the provision which makes it unlawful for a railroad in interstate commerce "to subject any particular person . . . to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."

Since the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and the civil rights decision did not apply to the District of Columbia, discrimination in the District of Columbia was not affected by it. Discrimination there was forbidden by measures enacted on June 20, 1872, and June 26, 1873, while the District was under a territorial form of government. The Supreme Court held that these acts, especially that of 1873, were still in effect and that consequently a "respectable well-behaved person" had to be served without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude by keepers of hotels and certain other public places.[39] Subsequently, not only hotels and restaurants but also theaters, which were not designated in the acts, have generally opened their doors to Negroes.

Until November 7, 1955, Supreme Court decisions with respect to public golf courses had been inconclusive.[40] On that date the Supreme Court in effect applied to public parks and beaches the principle enunciated on May 17, 1954, in the School Segregation Cases that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."[41] The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit had held in March 1955 that segregation in two public parks in Maryland violated the principle enunciated in the public school cases and added: "It is now obvious that segregation cannot be justified as a means to preserve peace merely because the tangible facilities furnished to one race are equal to those furnished the other." The Supreme Court merely affirmed this decision. A federal district court had ordered equal facilities for Negroes on a public golf course in Atlanta, and the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit had affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court on November 7, 1955, ordered these judgments vacated and the case remanded to the district court with directions to enter a decree in favor of the plaintiffs that would conform with the ruling in the two Maryland cases.[42]

Trade unions

The Court has also strengthened the rights of Negroes in trade unions. It

[36] Emerson and Haber (Eds.), *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 1052.

[37] 328 U. S. 373 (1946).

[38] Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80 (1941); Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950).

[39] District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U. S. 100 (1953).

[40] See Robert B. McKay, "Segregation and Public Recreation," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 40 (October 1954), pp. 713–16.

[41] See below.

[42] Washington *Post and Times Herald*, November 8, 1955, pp. 1, 12, news article.

has held that a state has the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit discrimination on account of race, creed, or color by any labor union with respect to membership or union services. The Court has also declared that the union as the bargaining agent of the employees selected in accordance with the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 has the duty to represent all employees without discrimination because of race or color, and that it can be compelled so to do by judicial action.[43]

Picketing

In *Hughes v. Superior Court*,[44] the Court upheld a California injunction against picketing by the Progressive Citizens of America to induce a retail chain store to institute hiring practices whereby the proportion of Negro to white employees would approximate the proportion of Negro to white customers. California did not have a fair employment practices statute, and the Court held that the state might constitutionally implement its public policy against selective hiring based on race by prohibiting picketing for such a purpose. But in *New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Company*,[45] it ruled that picketing in that instance was a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris–La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act of 1932.

Due process

In *Strauder v. West Virginia*,[46] the Court had held that state statutes excluding Negroes from juries violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Ralph F. Bischoff has observed:

> Ever since *Patton v. Mississippi*, 331 U. S. 463 (1947) reaffirmed and lent force to the almost forgotten case of *Strauder v. West Virginia* the constitutional intent that Negroes shall not be discriminated against has been more often complied with. Where the defendant in a criminal case makes out a prima facie case of illegal exclusion, it is the state which must present detailed proof to the contrary. . . . A relatively healthy status . . . is apparent from the lack of cases on the subject in 1954.[47]

What is more important is the fact that the Court has adopted the principle that the exclusion of Negroes and other minorities is prima facie presumptive evidence of discrimination.[48]

Moreover, the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantees the accused a trial free from mob domination or pressure.[49] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." In the famous Scottsboro case,[50] the Court held that "the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."

Education

For fifty-eight years the doctrine of "separate but equal" accommodations, sanctioned in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), was the law of the land. But beginning

[43] Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88 (1945); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944); and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944).

[44] 339 U. S. 460 (1950).

[45] 303 U. S. 552 (1938).

[46] 100 U. S. 303 (1880).

[47] "Constitutional Law and Civil Rights," *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 30 (January 1955), p. 54.

[48] Norris v. Alabama 294 U. S. 587 (1935); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953).

[49] Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).

[50] Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).

with 1938 the Court defined equality in such a way as to pave the way for the reversal in 1954 of the principle itself. In *Missouri* ex rel. *Gaines v. Canada*,[51] the Court held that if a state provided legal education within the state for white students it must provide legal education within the state for Negro students. In 1950 in *Sweatt v. Painter*,[52] the Court held that a Negro student had to be admitted to the University of Texas Law School, since the newly established law school for Negroes could not provide substantial equality in such matters as "reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige." At the same time it held[53] that a state after admitting a Negro to graduate instruction must not afford him different treatment from other students solely because of his race.

Finally, on May 17, 1954, the Court unanimously concluded that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Four cases were decided under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and one, arising in the District of Columbia, under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.[54] On May 31, 1955, the Court ruled that "the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling." If some additional time was necessary, the burden rested upon the defendants "to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date."[55]

CONCLUSION

The decisions in the public school cases have provoked more threats of evasion and defiance than has any decision in recent years. William Graham Sumner's dictum that "stateways cannot change folkways" is gaining new popularity. Any prediction about the extent to which these threats will be successful would be almost worthless. In the meanwhile, other decisions of the Supreme Court during the past forty-five years have greatly altered the American way of life.

[51] 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
[52] 339 U. S. 629.
[53] McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637.
[54] Brown v. Board of Educ., Briggs v. Elliott, Davis v. County School Board, Gebhart v. Belton, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
[55] 349 U. S. 294 (1955).

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Segregation in American Education: An Overview

By AMBROSE CALIVER

THE issue of segregation in American education is not new, nor is it an isolated phenomenon. Therefore in order to understand it today its historical antecedents must be studied in their broad social, economic, and cultural context. Since these are treated directly or by inference in other parts of this volume only sufficient attention will be given them here to place the subject in its proper perspective.

BACKGROUND OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION

Segregation with respect to education is perhaps the most complete and severe expression of institutionalized prejudice, and, like slavery, it existed in all the Colonies in the early days. For economic reasons and under the influence of the atmosphere following the American Revolution, slavery disappeared in the North. Abolitionist sentiment grew, and agitation against segregated schools increased. In the South, slavery and the pattern of segregation tightened their grip. Black laws were enacted making more stringent the constraints surrounding Negroes. As the "Great Debate" moved on into the Civil War the South added to the issues of slavery and state rights that of the preservation of its social structure and way of life.

During the first two years after the close of the war, the southern states generally made every effort to restore as far as possible the Negro-white relationships existent during slavery. Laws resembling the ante-bellum Black Codes were speedily enacted. Conditions became so bad that Congress took a hand, and passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867. The Reconstruction governments, which operated until the late seventies, have been the subject of much criticism, and undoubtedly there was some political chaos, extravagance, and corruption. Nevertheless, constructive benefits resulted, among them the firm establishment of a public school system and the enactment of laws providing for the education of Negroes on an equal basis with that of the whites.

Public education at that time was not popular even for the whites. It was a signal achievement, therefore, that in spite of poverty, suffering, and disorganization schools were organized. What was done came largely through the leadership of the Freedmen's Bureau, and as a result of the eagerness of Negroes to learn and the co-operation of some of the "moderate" white southerners and large plantation owners who accepted the facts of the new order. Most of the whites, of course, opposed the education of Negroes because of its political implications, their dislike of the sponsoring Bureau, their disbelief in the educability of Negroes, their fear of loss of status, the poverty of the states, and other attitudes engendered by the slave system. Hence, when the conservative poor white southerners gained control after Reconstruction, no time was lost in wiping out practically all the gains made by Negroes after the war.

By the end of Reconstruction Negroes had achieved a semblance of educational equality. There was even considerable sentiment for mixed schools, which actually existed for a short time in a few places. Already the theory of "separate

t equal" had been challenged. Litition attacking segregation and dismination started soon after the Civil ar and has continued intermittently til the present time. One writer ınd that forty-four cases reported beeen 1865 and 1935 challenged segation and twenty-eight cases were ought to remedy specific inequalities. ıtil recently, however, most of the igation, although suggesting interest eradicating segregation, has concented on the elimination of discrimina-n under the doctrine of "separate but ual."

For a short time after the overthrow Reconstruction Negroes received a atively fair share of public school nds, under the promise of southern ite politicians to distribute public ıool funds equally if Negroes discontued their advocacy of mixed schools. ch equality as was achieved, however, l not last long. Segregation in pracally every phase of life soon became mly fixed in the South by constitu-ınal provision or by statute, and dur-g the last few years of the nineteenth ntury Jim Crowism was rampant. egroes were disfranchised, discrimited against, suppressed, and lynched. ıe Civil Rights Act enacted in 1875 d omitted all reference to schools, d, probably in consequence, seventeen ıthern states and the District of Conbia enacted laws requiring separate ıools. In fact, segregation was mainned in the school systems of eight nsouthern states.

In 1896 the Supreme Court handed wn the famous *Plessy v. Ferguson* deion, which sustained a Louisiana state requiring separate railroad accomdations for Negroes and whites and support of the decision referred to e accepted practice of public school gregation. This sanction by the high Court of the previously state-sancned system of segregation was, in effect, a green light to those who had set out upon a systematic course of discrimination against Negroes. Inequalities in the allocation of public school funds now began in earnest, and in practically every item of school expense the gap between Negroes and whites grew wider year by year, in spite of the provisions in constitutions and statutes for equal opportunity for each race.

Inequalities in elementary and secondary schools

One of the clearest pictures of the developing pattern of inequality has been presented by Horace Mann Bond [1] in a list of yearly state expenditures per pupil, Negro and white, from 1871 to 1933, with ratios. In North Carolina, for example, up to 1900 differences in expenditure for the two races were very slight; in fact, in some years per capita expenditure for Negroes was slightly more than that for whites. Beginning with the school year 1900–1901, however (when $1.38 was spent for each white child to every $1.00 spent for each Negro child), the differential began to rise, in 1917–18 reaching the high point of $3.08 for whites to $1.00 for Negroes. Actual per capita expenditure for each was pitiably small—in the same year, for example, $6.53 for whites and $2.12 for Negroes. By 1932–33 the per capita expenditure for whites and Negroes had risen to $19.40 and $9.24 respectively, still more than twice as much for white as for Negro children. Beginning with the late thirties the differential decreased progressively to 1952, when North Carolina spent an average of $186.30 for each white and $149.60 for each Negro child.

Alabama presents a similar pattern, although more unfavorable. Although the differences are small up to 1891–92,

[1] *The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1934), pp. 155–56.

the fluctuation is less. At this time publication of expenditures by race was discontinued. When it was resumed in 1907–8, the per capita expenditure for whites was $5.05; for Negroes, $0.89. By 1931–32 it had risen to $17.93 and $4.43 for whites and Negroes respectively. In Alabama also the trend began to be reversed in the late thirties, and in 1952 the state was spending an average of $172.48 for each white child and $107.84 for each Negro child.

The figures do not differ greatly for other southern states: some are worse; a few are better. One of the most vicious practices of discrimination against Negroes under the "separate but equal doctrine" has resulted from the so-called state equalization allotments, made to counties or local districts as supplements to their school funds, on the basis of school population (Negro and white). In many instances, the local administrative unit not only refused to give Negroes the full amount of the state funds to which their school census entitled them, but failed to give them any of it. The funds so diverted to white schools from Negro schools amounted literally to millions of dollars a year.

Inequalities in benefits from federal funds

In practically all southern states, there have been until recently glaring inequalities in the amounts received by Negroes from most of the federal funds appropriated annually for education and research. The federal funds are distributed equitably among the states, and, in general, the state funds are also distributed equitably among the local administrative units, but discrimination has occurred in the distribution within the local administrative unit.

Funds are allotted on the basis of total population, and according to the data presented, the amount received by Negroes was over $400,000 less than their share of the allotments. In 1934–35, the amount of federal funds expended for vocational education in Negro schools per $1.00 due Negroes was only 46 cents. According to the 1947 reports received by the Office of Education from the seventeen southern states, there was only a slight increase (0.8 percentage point) in the proportion of the total federal funds allotted to Negroes.

The inequalities noted in the expenditure of funds for vocational education were also found in the expenditure of funds for agricultural extension; Negroes have failed to receive the amount corresponding to their ratio to the total population. It is generally known among persons familiar with federal appropriations for education that Negro institutions receive practically no federal funds for research and experimentation programs, nor until recently have they participated in the programs of the white institutions. Accordingly, many potential research projects relating to the special needs and interests of Negroes have been excluded from the programs of experimental stations and in addition Negroes have lacked the opportunities to develop research workers, scholars, and leaders that experimental station activities provide.

For the year ending June 30, 1947, the total funds allotted for agricultural extension work in the seventeen southern states amounted to $24,192,734.93. Of this, Negroes received $2,044,178.66, or 8.8 per cent, of the total—an increase of only 2.6 per cent over 1937—although Negroes represent nearly a fourth of the population in these states.

While no extensive study has been made of the situation in recent years, from reports and general observations it is my opinion that the situation has probably not changed very much.

One way of lessening such discrimination is to incorporate an equalization

clause in federal appropriation acts. Examples of acts containing such a clause are the so-called Second Morrill Act of 1890 and the Nelson Amendment of 1907, providing federal funds annually for certain educational programs of the land-grant colleges. Under this act the institutions for Negroes have generally received an equitable share of the federal funds that have been distributed to the states. Other examples of provisions for equitable distribution are found in some of the legislation and administrative directives concerned with Works Progress Administration, National Youth Administration, Public Works Administration, and federal housing.

Experience has shown that where such safeguards were not included in the legislation, almost invariably discrimination prevailed in the distribution of the funds on the local level, and that where such safeguards were included, they were accepted favorably by state and local administrative authorities and discrimination was reduced to a minimum.

DISCRIMINATION CHALLENGED AND THE PATTERN CHANGES

For many years the voices raised against these inequalities were few and feeble. An effort was made, however, through the publication of studies, to make the public aware of the progress and needs of Negro education. Beginning with the first report of the United States Commissioner of Education in 1870 practically every annual report has contained some reference to Negro schools. Up to 1930 there had been a total of 241 such references in the annual reports and biennial surveys, and fourteen circulars, special reports, and bulletins on the subject of Negro schools had been published.

With financial support from the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the Office of Education sponsored a comprehensive study of the education of Negroes by Thomas Jesse Jones, and published its results in a two-volume government bulletin in 1916. This report stimulated considerable discussion for several years, focusing the attention of the nation on many of the discrepancies in the education of Negroes.

There were also some early nongovernmental studies and reports on the educational situation among Negroes, the most notable of which were the Atlanta University studies of *The Negro Common School,* directed by W. E. B. Du Bois during the beginning of the century. These studies were among the first really to challenge the inequities suffered by Negroes, and undoubtedly did much to arouse the nation.

There was no definite and consistent attack on educational discriminations through publication of the facts until the early thirties, when the Office of Education established the position of Specialist in the Education of Negroes and Howard University began the publication of the *Journal of Negro Education.* It has been said by disinterested persons that the activities of these two agencies in studying and promoting the improvement of Negro education, particularly during the past twenty-five years, have made significant contributions to an understanding of the problems.

In spite of the limitations imposed on Negroes, tremendous progress has been made in their education. It must be kept in mind, however, that until only recently the progress was "absolute" rather than "relative." While Negroes advanced from year to year, the gap between Negroes and whites remained about the same, or in some instances became wider.

Closing the gap

Continued publication of the facts of discrimination under the doctrine of "separate but equal" began to advance

the education of Negroes, and here and there lessened slightly the gap between the two races. The question began to be asked, "How should progress in the education of Negroes be measured—against the Negroes themselves or against the whites?" As the answer became obvious, another question was asked, "At the rate at which the gap is closing, how long will it take Negroes to catch up, to be provided with the same educational opportunities as those of other citizens?" There were varied answers, but the consensus was that it would take *too* long. Hence it was decided to start another round of litigation, in order to eliminate discriminations and enforce equity.

As Negroes began to win these legal battles, almost immediately *real* comparative progress could be discerned in the education of Negroes. The following facts indicate what has been termed "an almost feverish activity" in Negro education during the past decade and a half.

In per cent of enrolled pupils attending schools, in average number of days attended, and in average length of school term, Negroes and whites are practically equal. In 1940, 54 per cent of the Negro elementary schools were one-teacher schools; in 1952, the percentage had dropped to 10.2. The 1940 expenditure per Negro pupil was only 43 per cent of that for the whites; in 1952 it had risen to 70 per cent. Capital outlay per Negro pupil (in eight southern states) was 23 per cent of that for the whites in 1940; in 1952, 82 per cent. The average years of college training received by Negro and white classroom teachers in 1940 were 2.7 and 3.4 respectively; in 1952, they were 3.5 and 3.8. The average salary of Negro teachers (in twelve southern states) was only 54 per cent of the average for white teachers; in 1952, it had risen to 87 per cent.

The gap between the two races not only has become less and less, but in certain instances has closed entirely. In addition many special devices were designed to assure greater equity. One of these was the provision of out-of-state scholarships for Negro students to institutions giving courses provided in the white but not in the Negro institutions of their own state. Although few persons believed this arrangement really provided parity, most of the states used it, and hundreds of Negro students thus received advanced training they might otherwise not have had.

Not all the advance noted was due to the prodding of Court decisions. But it is a well-known fact that the great spurt upward in educational provisions for Negroes did not get under way generally until the late thirties, particularly after the Gaines decision in 1938.

Presentation of facts

The manner of presentation of the facts of Negro education is an interesting study in itself. At first in many cases the facts were presented verbally in meetings, as it were sub rosa; then they began to be distributed privately among a few friends of the "cause." As they began to be more widely published, there was a hesitancy to make direct comparisons with similar facts about whites—"Comparisons are odious," and "It might do more harm than good." In time facts were published alongside similar facts for whites without interpretation—"Let the facts speak for themselves." Finally description, discussion, interpretation, conclusions, and recommendations came into the record.

Many persons believed that not only did widespread dissemination of the facts relating to the education of Negroes lay the foundation for the court cases, but also that the facts became silent and irrefutable witnesses during the litigation. Legal victories, as well

as the logic of the situation and the world scene, exposed the false basis of *Plessy v. Ferguson.* At the same time the concept of equality began to be expanded. The inevitable next step, therefore, was to attack segregation head on. Steps in this direction were taken in 1950 in the Sweatt case.

SEGREGATION CHALLENGED

In spite of the promise of equity by the politicians in the late seventies and in spite of the order of the Supreme Court in 1896, the principle of equality was not applied by the Court itself until 1935 (and then only in a limited sense), in the case of *Donald Murray v. the University of Maryland.* When the half century of discrimination suffered by Negroes is considered, the "separate but equal" dictum notwithstanding, the decision of Negroes to take their case to the courts can be understood. Equally understandable is their determination to go to the heart of the problem—segregation itself—instead of nibbling at the periphery for another half century. Their first step, then, was to attack segregation on the ground that it violates the basic civil rights of citizens.

Civil rights violated

Because of the relationship of education to all phases of life, and because of the pervasive nature of its processes, no area of life provided a better opportunity to test the principles of civil rights embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. The way was prepared for this test when the Supreme Court began to define the personal character of the relief sought in the school cases. The Attorney General in his 1953 brief interprets the matter thus:

> The judicial inquiry . . . is not simply to determine whether there is equality as between schools: the Constitution requires that there be equality as between *persons.* The Fourteenth Amendment compels a State to grant the benefits of public education to all its people equally, without regard to differences of race or color. This has not always been as clear as it is today.

The Chief Justice touches upon the same matter when he says in the May 17, 1954, opinion:

> In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868. . . , or even to 1896. . . . We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
>
> We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Negroes were therefore on safe ground when they based their major argument on the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which was designed to bestow on them the benefits and obligations of *full* citizenship. Furthermore, because of the wide ramifications of education, they were wise in bringing the test in this field.

Democratic principles disregarded

Democracy as a way of life has developed gradually throughout the ages. From historical records it appears that man has endeavored to build that kind of social order which would permit the greatest realization of human aspirations, without the restrictions commonly imposed by despots, dictators, or other totalitarian governments. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights embody both letter and spirit of the principles of freedom, justice, and equality.

In a multiplicity of ways, segregated schools have violated these democratic principles, as well as the fundamental concept of the worth and dignity of every individual which underlies our American way of life. Real education is in essence a democratic process. It cannot operate, therefore, in an atmosphere that is restrictive, coercive, or lacking in freedom. Moreover, our leadership of the free world has been seriously hampered because of our segregated institutions. Hence, it was a service to the cause of freedom and our way of life to remove the national sanction which we have been giving to segregation.

Psychological and social hazards

Advocates of segregation have denied the validity of the arguments that segregation was inherently injurious psychologically, emotionally, and socially. However, they have done what every dictator or authoritarian ruler does when he wants to condition his people to accept his rule of force and fear, namely, taken complete control of the education of the people—children, youth, and adults. In every other area of life the pattern of segregation varied somewhat from state to state, from county to county, and sometimes from situation to situation *within a community.* But in education, segregation in the South was complete and inflexible.

The rigid adherence to the caste system of segregation gives testimony to the southern whites' belief in the "training" and "conditioning" potentialities of the sanctions imposed by segregation. They knew how such a system would affect Negroes—their goals, values, aspirations, and attitudes, as well as their knowledge, habits, and spirits. Segregated schools have prevented Negroes from achieving those major desiderata found in every normal human being—a sense of security, a sense of belonging, a desire for appreciation, and a desire *for self-expression.*

Segregation is expensive

One of the strongest arguments against a continuance of the separate but equal system, if it were really equal in physical facilities and in finance, is that it would simply cost too much. Already the southern states are putting a higher proportion of their low income into public schools than most of the other states. To attempt the herculean task of equalizing Negro and white schools would practically bring financial ruin to the South, according to the estimates of some authorities. It should be stated, however, that other authorities do not agree with this prediction.

In discussing equalization of Negro with white education within the framework of "separate but equal," it must be understood that any over-all figures on costs are merely estimates, because exact costs could only be determined by a detailed survey of many items in each school administrative district, taking into consideration a variety of factors that have special relation to the particular situation.

In eight southern states, in 1949–50, the total expenditure for Negro and white schools was $535,030,000, of which $415,902,000 was for white schools and $119,128,000 for Negro. The per pupil expenditure in average daily attendance (hereafter referred to as A.D.A.) for both Negro and white pupils was $134.83; for white, $156.66; for Negro, $91.43. Applying the extra-pupil expenditures in A.D.A. in the eight states for the respective races

the A.D.A. in the seventeen southern states and the District of Columbia gives a total estimated expenditure of $1,014,390,000 for whites and $195,571,000 for Negroes. If the per pupil expenditure for Negroes should be raised to the white level of $156.06, the estimated total expenditure for Negroes in the seventeen states and the District of Columbia would be $330,395,000. This is $134,824,000 (10.2 per cent) more than the actual estimated expenditure for 1949–50.

If the estimate is made on the basis of classroom units, an additional annual requirement of $95,216,739 is needed in order to raise the average expenditure per classroom unit for Negro pupils up to that for white pupils in the seventeen states and the District of Columbia.

The cost of school property per pupil enrolled in 1949–50 was for whites, $334.94; for Negroes, $85.08. This is a shortage for Negroes of $250 per pupil. Applying this to the total of Negro pupils enrolled in the seventeen southern states and the District of Columbia for that year, an additional estimated $600,000,000 would be needed to equalize the facilities for Negro and white pupils. This estimate is made on the basis of original costs. However, facilities cannot be provided at today's costs for $335 per white pupil. It is estimated that the cost of construction today including the land, building, equipment, and architectural and legal fees would be approximately $1,200 per pupil. It would, therefore, cost an estimated two billion dollars to provide equal physical facilities for Negroes. In order to raise the cost of transporting Negro children at the 1949–50 level to that expended for white children, it would require an additional expenditure of $55,574,582.

Such estimates indicate how expensive it would be to attempt to do, even for one year, what the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision told us over fifty years ago we had to do.

Second Chance for American Education

The Supreme Court decision declaring segregation in education to be unconstitutional gives American education a second chance. Immediately after the close of the Civil War, and during the intervening years from that time to the present, many schools have been almost completely oblivious of their responsibility for a constructive approach to the broad issues of race relations in this country. The lack of knowledge, understanding, appreciation, and acceptance among our citizens of the fundamental principles underlying the kind of human relations required in our democracy suggests that the schools, on the whole, have failed to meet their obligations in this matter.

One reason for this lag on the part of educational institutions was the lack of scientific knowledge and techniques in the field of human relations generally and intergroup education in particular. Furthermore, school people by and large did not realize that this area of human development lent itself to educational processes. Neither of these excuses is valid now, because we have both the knowledge and the know-how of its application.

It is the considered judgment of this writer that much more could have been done by the schools, however, if we had made a serious effort to co-ordinate and apply the knowledge we had from the fields of psychology, sociology, anthropology, biology, history, and religion. If a fraction of the time that was used in devising ways and means of keeping Negroes in a subordinate status had been used in understanding them as human beings and American citizens, and in fully utilizing their resources and talents for the good of all, the South would probably not for so many years have been considered the nation's number one economic problem and our most backward area socially and culturally.

It has been said often—and truthfully—that the South is not a homogeneous entity. The variety of attitudes, temperaments, moods, and behaviors is confirmed, as was said earlier, by the variety of patterns of segregation—except, of course, in education, where segregation was complete and inflexible. Even there, however, were potentialities for change, as evidenced by the variety of reactions to the Supreme Court decision on school segregation.

The litigation on segregation during the past decade has been an educational enterprise in itself—albeit an informal one. However, if we are not to revert to a confused, discouraged, and chaotic condition similar to that immediately following the Civil War and Reconstruction, it would seem wise to inaugurate in the schools formal and purposeful educational programs designed to apply to the problems resulting from desegregation the best available information. The problems will be found not different in kind from those usually faced by school people—problems of school attendance, socioeconomic backgrounds, scholastic achievement, dropouts, and so forth. The difference in the dimensions of the problems, however, gives an added challenge to our knowledge and skills in applying the principles of good administration, guidance, and remedial teaching.

Desegration and integration have progressed in many southern as well as border states, and in elementary and secondary schools as well as in colleges and universities, without special incidents, except in a few cases inspired from the outside. This achievement is, in the main, a tribute to the good judgment and leadership of school administrators, of teachers, and particularly of students. Wherever the channels of communication among all the elements involved have been kept open and wherever the principles of sound education and good human relations have been employed with fairness and firmness, the transition, in general, has taken place effectively. This fact places a heavy responsibility on public officials who by word or deed attempt to thwart the processes of justice and the achievement of our national destiny of democracy for all.

The Supreme Court decision not only made possible the freedom of the segregated, but also released the segregationist in a variety of ways. In the long run it is to the advantage of all to implement the decision and to make the transition from segregation to integration as effectively and speedily as possible, for the freedom of none is safe so long as the freedom of one is in jeopardy.

American education, at long last, has been given in this decision a second chance to come into its birthright. It now has the opportunity not only to conserve and transmit our heritage, but also to rise to the full stature of its potentialities and to promote the best in our culture.

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The Search for Facts

By PHILIP H. COOMBS

A FEW weeks ago, the American correspondent of *Dagens Nyheter,* Sweden's largest newspaper, called at the office of the Fund for the Advancement of Education in New York to pick up a copy of the November issue of *Southern School News,* and took the occasion to thank the Fund for having helped to enhance his stature as a journalist. To a member of the Fund's staff who was puzzled by this expression of gratitude, the Swedish correspondent gave an unusual explanation. On May 16, 1954, he had cabled a long dispatch to his paper on the background of public school segregation in the United States, and on the following day, when the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its historic decision overturning the Plessy doctrine, his paper was in a unique position to comment intelligently on the implications of the Court's decision.

"My editor," he went on, "was impressed by the timeliness of my dispatch, and I want to thank the Fund because the dispatch was based on an advance copy of *The Negro and the Schools* which you sent me the week before." [1]

This apparent master stroke of journalistic timing was, of course, nothing but pure luck—not only for the Swedish correspondent but also for the University of North Carolina Press, which released the book the day before the Court's ruling and thereby provided a fitting climax to one of the most unusual, and in many respects most rewarding, projects supported by the Fund since its establishment by the Ford Foundation in April 1951.

The episode illustrates the keen demand for objective facts about a highly important and controversial issue of American society which the Fund's support of the "Ashmore Project" and of the Southern Education Reporting Service was intended to serve. In the Fund's view, these projects put to trial the familiar premise that if people in a democratic society are given impartial and accurate facts about a social problem or issue, their attitudes, decisions, and actions will be wiser and more effective, and the process of social adjustment made necessary by such problems will be improved.

This article attempts to tell the story behind these particular projects, in the hope of shedding additional light on some of the basic forces that are bringing rapid improvement in the status of the Negro in American society.

THE FUND AND NEGRO EDUCATION

For reasons outlined below, the activities of the Fund concerning the education of Negroes have departed considerably from the well-beaten path set by older philanthropic agencies.

In the first place, the Fund's basic mandate was to work toward the advancement of education of *all* American youth. This goal could best be pursued, its directors and officers believed, if the Fund's program were concentrated on a relatively few critical problems confronting all schools and colleges and if, with respect to these selected problems, the Fund's resources were employed largely as risk capital to support promising new ideas and experiments. This policy decision, made at the Fund's inception, ruled out the making of general support or endowment grants to institutions, and it ruled out Fund consideration of many significant problems and ideas which fell outside the selected problem areas. With the benefit of advice from many experienced persons, Fund officials selected the following major objectives for the new organization's program: (1) the improvement of teaching, (2) improvements in curriculum, (3) clarification of the functions of educational institutions, (4) equalization of educational opportunities, and (5) improvement of educational management and financing.

These considerations alone would have dissuaded Fund officials from undertaking a special program of support to Negro institutions as such, but there was a further compelling reason. The Fund had entered the philanthropic field at a time when the status and outlook for Negro education appeared to be undergoing rapid and far-reaching changes. Over a wide span of years, private funds associated with such names as Jeannes, Rosenwald, Peabody, Carnegie, and Rockefeller had been applied generously and effectively in the Southern Region, to support the advancement of education generally and more specifically to spur the construction of common schools for Negro children, to train teachers and administrators for them, and to develop higher educational institutions for Negroes. These earlier "pump-priming efforts" had achieved striking results; among other things they helped develop many of today's outstanding Negro scholars and leaders in a wide variety of fields and to produce today's much larger flow of public funds into Negro schools and colleges throughout t South. They had been carried o however, largely within the South's t ditional framework of "separate b equal," giving a greater measure of ality to the principle of "equal" but s dom challenging the practice of "se rate." On these terms northern mo had been welcomed in the South a had helped build the dual system education. Paradoxically, this syst contained the seeds of its own undo because under it, as Ashmore has served:

> . . . most Negro children received the sa *kind* of education as the whites, inferior it may have been in quantity and qual and this in itself was something of a vi tion of the spirit of the prevailing pul policy, for it was hardly logical to te the equalitarian lessons of American tory and the duties and responsibilities citizenship to a people who were presun to be permanently relegated to the lo orders.[2]

Participation on equal terms

By the time the Fund came onto scene in 1951 this whole framework "separate but equal" was being s ously challenged in the federal cou and powerful forces which had their ception in the New Deal programs the thirties and in World War II w fast eroding the whole system of se gation. Although officials of the F were thoroughly sympathetic concer the financial plight of Negro colle and disturbed by the inequalities educational opportunity that still ha capped Negro young people, they lieved, along with most Negro educa they consulted, that it would be a w and more timely policy to treat "N institutions" on a parity with all oth If institutions which until now served only Negroes were ultimatel

[1] Harry A. Ashmore, *The Negro and the Schools,* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954.

[2] Ashmore, *op. cit.,* p. 19.

serve all qualified students regardless of race, then the sooner they were judged by the same standards and participated on equal terms in various programs with all other institutions, the more quickly they would be fitted for their changing functions. This was a courageous and farsighted position for Negro educational leaders to take. It was on this basis that Fisk University and Morehouse College were welcomed into the experimental Program for Early Admission to College, that Dillard University was granted support for a self-study and for a teacher training experiment in co-operation with Harvard, that Hampton University received aid to carry out a broad program of teacher improvement for the Virgin Islands, that numerous faculty members of Negro colleges, both private and public, received awards under the Faculty Fellowship Program, and that many Negro high school teachers likewise participated in the Fund's Fellowship Program.

Having set this course with respect to Negro colleges, the officers of the Fund continued their search for fruitful ways to encourage greater equality of educational opportunity, not alone for Negro youngsters but for any others who were handicapped by economic, social, or other barriers. To this end, grants were made to the University of New Mexico and to the National Negro Scholarship Fund to experiment with new ways of locating talented young people who could profit by a college education but who, because of cultural and economic handicaps, were not likely to get one unless given special encouragement. Likewise, a grant was made to the New York City Board of Education to seek out ways of overcoming the language and other cultural barriers which curtail the educational opportunities of many young Puerto Ricans.

BIRTH OF THE "ASHMORE PROJECT"

The Fund called a series of conferences early in 1953 with leading educators, Negro and white, to discuss further possible approaches to the delicate and complex problems in this area. There emerged a strong consensus that the Fund could at this point in history make an important contribution by sponsoring an objective, scholarly study of racial segregation in the public schools and of recent experiences with desegregation in certain school systems and colleges. This question had been debated long and hotly but seldom with benefit of sufficient facts which could be accepted by all concerned as authoritative. Nothing, it was suggested, could help more to lift the discussion to a calm and rational level than an abundant supply of pertinent and reliable facts. The need for such an investigation had long been recognized. Myrdal's monumental study, completed ten years before, had dealt with the question as one aspect of what he described as "the Negro problem and modern democracy," but much had happened to the status of the Negro in the intervening decade.[3] The need was now more pressing than ever in view of the five segregation cases pending before the Supreme Court. Whatever the outcome of those cases, it was felt that information regarding this whole subject would be useful to public school administrators, to school board members, to college officials, and to others carrying heavy educational responsibilities, in reaching wise decisions in an area supercharged with emotions. Primarily with the needs of these practical decision makers in view, the officers and directors of the Fund decided to support the suggested study.

It was determined at the outset that the Fund would not attempt to argue the case for or against segregation in the public schools and would avoid direct or indirect involvement in the litigation before the Court. This study, it was felt, should examine the past and present characteristics of the dual school system, the implications of the great population shifts for the schools, the legal structure undergirding the dual school system, the economic requirements for educational improvement for *all* young people in the Southern Region and the prospective economic ability of the region to meet these requirements, and the recent experiences with desegregation in certain higher educational institutions in the South and in several public school systems of border state communities. This was a tall order to be filled on a short time schedule —the month was June 1953 and the Court was expected to rule on the segregation cases sometime in the fall—and there appeared no single institution or agency equipped to handle the assignment on this basis. Thus the Fund itself, despite previous practices to the contrary, would have to assemble a temporary research staff of well-qualified people from many quarters. This would be no easy task, because the summer holiday of colleges and universities had already started. As it turned out, the proposed research task was so challenging that scarcely a single person declined the invitation, though frequently this meant substantial readjustment of personal plans and no little inconvenience.

[3] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.

Director and staff

The choice of someone to direct the study was the first and most crucial problem. In this the Fund was exceedingly fortunate in securing—after a telephone chase through several states and into Canada—the services of Harry A. Ashmore, executive editor of the *Arkansas Gazette*, a widely known and respected southern editor deeply interested in and well informed about problems of both education and race relations. Not least of his assets was a rare sense of perspective and good humor, always on tap when needed. Mr. Ashmore was given complete freedom to assemble the staff, plan and carry out the research, and write the report.

When Ashmore was asked to define the responsibilities of research director to Philip Hammer of Atlanta, who stepped out of his role as executive officer of the Committee of the South to accept this post, he replied by telling the story of the man at the bar who heard two fellow tipplers debating whether man's best friend was the horse or the dog. He intervened to observe that both were wrong: "Man's best friend is the male alligator, and here's why. The female alligator each year lays more than 20,000 eggs, whereupon the male alligator proceeds to stomp on all but two or three. Were it not for the male alligator, we'd all be up to our hips in alligators." Ashmore then drew the moral for his new research director. "When all those scholars get going," he said, "they'll be grinding out facts like a female alligator lays eggs. Your job, Hammer, is to stomp on all but a few of the best. I'll take over from there."

Several months and many facts later, Ashmore emerged with a remarkable document. It was in his own words, but it reflected the competent and devoted efforts of more than forty scholars from half as many institutions, mostly southern, and from a variety of fields, including anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, education, and law. The fact that the Court deferred its decision to the spring of 1954 meant that a more extensive and thorough research effort could be made prior to publication of the Ashmore report. The whole process of developing the re-

ırch plans, getting them carried out schedule, sifting out the most signifi- ıt findings, filling in important gaps the last minute, then blending these ny parts into a coherent and read- le whole, was a fascinating experi- :e and probably sets some kind of rk in the history of American schol- hip.

-operating school officials

Most of the facts needed could not be led from existing documents in air- ıditioned libraries, and even where ɔlished data were available, as any- : knows who has worked with educa- ıal statistics, they were often char- erized by serious inconsistencies of ınition, discontinuities, and important ɔs. Thus most of the facts had to be ; out the hard way, by field trips to ely separated communities, by long 's spent in educational offices, by ex- ded interviews, and by written re- sts. Often the people who pos- ɜed the needed facts were torn be- en a strong desire to co-operate with esearch effort whose final product y were anxious to receive and the sible embarrassment that might re- from being caught in the act of h co-operation, in view of the trou- l political climate which shrouded whole subject being studied. With- the unstinting co-operation of many :hern school officials, who were mo- ted by a strong desire to improve cation, the project could not have :eeded. There was hardly a single ance in which requested help was readily rendered.

nslating the jargon

ne especially interesting side light the problem of getting scholars ı different fields to penetrate one :her's jargon and to communicate in ɪmmon tongue. Most painful of all ır some of the scholars at least— was Ashmore's skillful effort to trans- late their professional statements into lucid prose. On one memorable occa- sion, when Ashmore was defending stub- bornly a "natural law of sociology," which he had concocted in an early draft, a sociologist on the team, in a state of utter frustration, bawled out, "But you're violating the discipline!"

Not beyond resolution by reasonable men

Ashmore violated more than one disci- pline before the presses ran but his final product was heralded as a distinct con- tribution to several of them, and he was dumfounded later by an invitation to join one of the learned societies. His introduction to *The Negro and the Schools* posed this significant challenge to his own profession of journalism and to those who sometimes doubt the power of human reason and reasonableness to solve difficult social problems:

> In many important ways this volume puts to the test one of my cherished theo- ries—that in addition to its usual functions of preparing a first draft of history, enter- taining children of all ages, and promoting the sale of certain goods and services, jour- nalism should serve as a two-way bridge between the world of ideas and the world of men. In any event my experience as a journalist in a company of scholars has strengthened my conviction that no prob- lems are beyond resolution by reasonable men—not even the thorny ones that lie in the uncertain area between the polar atti- tudes of the American white, who does not yet accept the Negro as his equal, and the American Negro, who is no longer satisfied with anything less.[4]

Further publication

Full justice could not be done in a book of such broad compass and limited length to the extensive research findings

[4] Ashmore, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. xv.

of the Project, and so arrangements were made to make fuller use of these materials in a series of supplementary articles and books.[5] The original re- search documents have since been de- posited with the Joint University Li- brary at Nashville, Tennessee.

Factual and objective

The underlying premise of the project —that there existed a need for straight facts on this controversial subject—was amply validated by the public reception of *The Negro and the Schools*. News- papers throughout the country gave it prominent coverage, in news columns, editorials, and book reviews; it was dis- cussed extensively on radio and tele- vision; and it soon became a source book for conferences, workshops, school and college classes, local study groups, and for committees appointed by the governors to chart future public school policy. It was digested and given wide circulation in pamphlet form by the Public Affairs Committee and by the Southern Regional Council. The strenu- ous effort to make the report "factual and objective" apparently succeeded, judging at least by the almost uni- formly favorable comments by editors and action groups holding widely di- vergent views on the issue of segrega- tion.

[5] Robert A. Leflar and Wylie H. Davis, "Segregation in the Public Schools—1953," *Harvard Law Review,* January 1954; Truman Pierce, *Bi-Racial Education in the Southern States* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955); Ernst W. Swanson and John A. Griffin, *Pub- lic Education in the South Today and To- morrow* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955); Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Margaret W. Ryan, *Schools in Tran- sition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro- lina Press, 1954); Guy Johnson, *Integration in Southern Higher Education* (to be pub- lished).

SOUTHERN EDUCATION REPORTING SERVICE

Encouraged by this experience, the officers and directors of the Fund gave considerable thought to further steps that might appropriately be taken to assist state and local administrators in meeting the many problems raised by the Court's decision. The idea emerged that it might be useful to establish some sort of reporting service by which vari- ous communities and states could be kept accurately and fully posted on de- velopments elsewhere, as an aid to help- ing them meet their own problems calmly and wisely. The Fund subjected this idea to the critical scrutiny of sev- eral leading educators and newspaper editors in the South, purposely choos- ing editors with widely differing points of view on the subject. Their reac- tion was enthusiastically favorable, and though all were acutely aware of the explosiveness of the subject, they unani- mously agreed to constitute themselves the Board of Directors of what came to be known as the Southern Education Reporting Service, with Virginius Dab- ney as chairman and Thomas R. War- ing vice-chairman. The Fund agreed to underwrite the venture for a trial year.[6]

[6] The founding directors of the Southern Education Reporting Service included: Frank Ahlgren, Editor, Memphis (Tenn.) *Commer- cial Appeal;* Dr. Gordon Blackwell, Director, Institute for Research and Social Science, Uni- versity of North Carolina; Chancellor Harvie Branscomb, Vanderbilt University; Virginius Dabney (Chairman), Editor, Richmond (Va.) *Times-Dispatch;* Coleman Harwell, Editor, Nashville *Tennessean;* President Henry Hill, George Peabody College; President Charles S. Johnson, Fisk University; C. A. McKnight (Executive Director), Editor, Charlotte (N. C.) *News;* Charles Moss, Executive Editor, Nash- ville (Tenn.) *Banner;* T. R. Waring (Vice- Chairman), Editor, Charleston (S. C.) *News and Courier;* Dr. Henry Willett, Superintend-

It was determined at the outset that the service would be strictly factual and objective, with no editorial comment; that it would be operated by experienced newspaper personnel from the Southern Region; and that it would be distributed only on request.

The new board moved swiftly to secure the ablest director they could find and were successful in persuading the distinguished young editor of the Charlotte (North Carolina) *News,* C. A. McKnight, to accept the post on a full-time basis for one year. He in turn, with the advice of the board, other southern editors, and various commissioners of education for southern states, arranged for the part-time services of an outstanding reporter in each of the seventeen states affected by school segregation laws, as well as the District of Columbia.

Southern School News begins publication

Southern School News, thus conceived and ably staffed, got off to a fast and distinguished start, with its first monthly issue of sixteen pages, tabloid size, arriving in time for the opening of school in September 1954. This first issue demonstrated, as had been hoped, the feasibility of reporting a vital news story in depth, with objectivity and balance. Full reliance was placed on the facts alone for capturing the reader's interest, not on flashy headlines or upon the overplaying of conflict situations. An honest effort was made to report *all* the significant news in proper perspective, leaving the reader to interpret it for himself.

Regular daily newspapers throughout the country, but especially in the South, were quick to draw upon this new resource for building their own stories. Subscription requests mounted rapidly to a total of 30,000 by the end of the first year, from individual citizens, teachers, school administrators and school board members, governors and legislators, ministers and lawyers, and private organizations that ran the opinion gamut from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to the National Association for the Advancement of White People.

In an extensive poll of readers near the end of the first year of publication, including most southern governors and state education commissioners, more than 98 per cent expressed the view that *Southern School News* was "strictly factual and objective," and a large majority advised in favor of continuing the enterprise for at least two more years and establishing a modest subscription rate.

News and research center

In addition to publishing a monthly issue, the staff of the Southern Education Reporting Service, located in Nashville, Tennessee, soon found themselves burdened by an unexpected function, that of regional news and research center on the school segregation issue. One of Editor McKnight's first actions had been to cast out a wide dragnet for all documentary materials pertaining to the subject—news clippings from all over the region, important speeches and reports, new legislative bills, pamphlets, and the like. All of these materials, with the meaty reports from his own correspondents in the field, soon had his office bulging, and he called for technical help from the nearby Joint University Library. Meantime his office also became a way station for all sorts of fellow newsmen and magazine writers with assignments to prepare special articles on the South's number one news story. McKnight was soon obliged to equip and staff a special reference room

ent of Schools, Richmond, Va., P. B. Young, Sr., Editor, Norfolk (Va.) *Journal and Guide.* (The titles given are as of June 1954.)

to meet the needs of these reporters. In their wake, to examine the same materials, came Ph.D. candidates and other students of race and educational problems, anxious to do research. Like his fellow editor from Little Rock, McKnight soon found himself occupying the uncharted space between the world of journalism and the world of scholars.

Trial year ended

Before the trial year had ended, the directors of this unique reporting service were satisfied that the venture had more than met their expectations, and they petitioned the Fund for a further grant to sustain two more years of operation, with the provision that *Southern School News* would earn part of its costs by the institution of a modest subscription fee. The board of the Fund concurred in this evaluation and made the requested grant. With a year of distinguished service to his native South and to his profession behind him, McKnight returned to an important new editorial position in Charlotte, but only after he and his board had persuaded another able young southern editor, Don Shoemaker, to leave his position as editor of the Asheville (North Carolina) *Citizen,* to take the directorship of the Southern Education Reporting Service.

Under Shoemaker's leadership, the *Southern School News* is continuing to take on significant new dimensions as experience suggests new opportunities for reporting useful facts. The new policy of paid subscriptions, as expected, caused an initial drop in the mailing list, but in each succeeding month there has been a steady rise. A recent analysis showed an extreme variety in the types of subscribers, and in their views. Present plans call for the enterprise to continue operations until the summer of 1958, by which time, perhaps, the flow of events will have carried it to the point of diminishing returns. Only time and the reports carried in *Southern School News* will tell.[7]

THE BALTIMORE STORY

One other small but interesting project supported by the Fund arose from the temporary difficulties encountered in Baltimore soon after desegregation of the public schools was undertaken in the fall of 1954. When the difficulties subsided, several leading citizens of Baltimore became convinced that it might be useful, for Baltimore and perhaps for other communities with a tradition of racial segregation, to review carefully and objectively the factors which had affected the whole process of transition from a segregated to a nonsegregated school system in Baltimore. Such a calm examination, it was felt, might reveal useful lessons for the future. The Fund responded favorably to a joint request from the Governor's Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations and the Mayor's Commission on Human Relations for modest financial assistance to cover the research and publication expenses of such a study, to be carried out under the sponsorship of the two commissions. The final report, *Desegregation in the Baltimore City Schools,* published in July 1955, has enjoyed a wide readership and highly favorable comments in many other southern communities.[8]

ASSESSMENT

It will never be possible to evaluate the real effectiveness of the foregoing activities supported by the Fund for the Advancement of Education, but it can be said with assurance that it has

[7] Subscriptions to *Southern School News* are available at $2.00 per year from The Southern Education Reporting Service, P. O. Box 6156, Acklen Station, Nashville 5, Tennessee.

[8] Copies of this report are available upon request to President Otto Kraushaar, Goucher College, Towson, Baltimore 4, Maryland.

n a thoroughly rewarding experience
the many able persons who partici-
pd in them, scholars and journalists
ie. The evidence available at this
ting is certainly sufficient to renew
's faith that well-directed scholar-
, objective facts, and honest journal-
are powerful instruments in a de-
cracy for smoothing the process of
found social adjustment. There is
cifying evidence, too, that the sur-
lingly wide circulation in other coun-
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tuments resulting from these projects
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s
has helped to provide a truer and hence more favorable picture of the Negro's position in America—and of the progressive improvement in that position. Finally, at a time when the unique American institution of private philanthropy is under heavy attack—from one direction for being too influential and from another for being too timid—it is gratifying to examine one case where a private foundation succeeded in dealing extensively with one of the most controversial issues of the day without losing its courage or its charter.

Philip H. Coombs, Old Greenwich, Connecticut, is secretary and director of research the Fund for the Advancement of Education, established by the Ford Foundation. He a been a member of the faculties of Williams College and Amherst College, and, in s rnment service, economist in the Office of Price Administration, the Office of Strategic r ices, and the Office of Economic Stabilization, economic adviser to the United States C y Air Forces on strategic bombing, deputy director of the Veterans Emergency Hous- Program, and executive director of the President's Materials Policy Commission S ley Commission). He was also economic adviser to Governor Chester Bowles of necticut and a consultant to the Ministry of Education of the Government of India.

Legal Inventions and the Desegregation Process

By JAMES M. NABRIT, JR.

THE disintegration of the Solid South as a political, social, and economic entity is strikingly illustrated in the diversified reactions in that area to the May 17, 1954, decision of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring segregation in public school education unconstitutional. Those reactions ranged all the way from open defiance of the Court and a call for its impeachment to complete acceptance and implementation of the opinion. Proposals extended from those calling for abolition of public schools and evasive tactics on the one hand to those embracing immediate integration and progressive or gradual integration on the other, and within the entire range responsible executive and legislative leaders submitted numerous propositions. Many became a part of state constitutions by amendment; others became law by legislative enactment; others became operative through executive and administrative regulations; others passed only one branch of the legislature; others languish in committees; while still others served merely as material for political speeches. A look at these proposals may reflect to some extent the degree to which this region is no longer solid, even if it remains south.

The thrust of the Supreme Court decision primarily reached segregated public schools in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Except for a law suit by a citizen's group to delay integration in the District of Columbia until the Supreme Court had rendered a final judgment, no legal proposals were seriously made to circumvent the May 17 decision in the District of Columbia, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, or West Virginia. In all of these areas, except Texas, integration is progressing steadily and swiftly. Some integration has taken place in Texas. Although similar delaying or circumventing proposals were made in Tennessee, Florida, Arkansas, and Virginia, they apparently have not been accorded state-wide support—yet in Virginia a suit was instituted to prevent the use of a bond issue authorized before the May 17 decision for construction of a segregated school for Negroes. Integration has begun in Arkansas. In Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia opinion has not yet crystallized, although Florida and Tennessee seem inclined toward compliance while Virginia appears leaning toward defiance. The states in which most strenuous efforts have been expended in devising legal methods of evading the May 17 decision and in which such proposals appear to have strong executive, legislative, or community support have thus far been Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. In these states, no integration at all has taken place.

The various proposals for evasion may be roughly divided into two main categories: (1) proposals designed to permit the continued operation of public schools on a segregated basis; (2)

proposals designed to abolish the public school system and to change to a system of private schools supported by the state.

PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO CONTINUE SEGREGATION

Various devices have been utilized or suggested to permit the continuance of segregated public schools.

Changing the regulations governing attendance

These proposals, which have been made in Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, are designed to create administrative obstacles to legal action by proponents of integration. They are worded so as to make it difficult to separate pseudo-administrative difficulties from valid ones. One of the key measures seeks to transfer all authority over assignment and enrollment of pupils to local boards or superintendents, thus making it necessary to sue each school board or superintendent and thereby diffusing the impact of any adverse legal opinion.

A proposal in North Carolina would give county and city boards of education "full and complete authority" over assignment and enrollment, adding:

> . . . no pupil shall be enrolled in, admitted to, or entitled or permitted to attend any public school in such administrative unit other than the public school in which such children may be enrolled pursuant to the rules, regulations and decision of such board of education.
>
> In the exercise of the authority conferred by Section 1 of this Act upon the county and city boards of education, each such board shall provide for the enrollment of pupils in the respective public schools located within such county or city administrative unit so as to provide for the orderly and efficient administration of such public schools, the effective instruction of the pupils enrolled therein, and the health, safety, and general welfare of such pupils. In the exercise of such authority such board may adopt such reasonable rules and regulations as in the opinion of the board shall best accomplish such purposes.

The bills set up the machinery for appeals for the parents of children in case local boards deny admission to some children. First, an appeal may be carried to the local boards. Failing there, parents then appeal within ten days to the Superior Court in the county, where the case will be heard for the first time "before a jury in the same manner as civil actions are tried and disposed of therein." From the Superior Court, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court.

This proposal has three facets: (1) the wide range of administrative discretion, (2) the use of the trial by jury (usually composed of the segregating majority), and (3) appeal to the state Supreme Court, a long and expensive procedure; it seeks to require exhaustion of the appeal to the courts as a part of the administrative remedy before a litigant could even sue in the federal courts. The proposal is subject to attack principally upon its results—if all enrollments end up segregated by race the assignment is unconstitutional. It may also be attacked for combining administrative with judicial remedies, and for imposing trial by jury with its long delays, which might be considered a futile process. Nor does it contain the "plan" for ending segregation which is a basic factor in the implementation of the May 17 decision of the Supreme Court.

The Tennessee proposal seeks to enlarge the problem by "invoking the police power of the State to preserve the peace, protect the health, and morals, to improve the educational advantages and opportunities of all the pupils of all the public schools in the state and

insure the peace, health, contentment, happiness, and tranquility of all the people of the state. . . ." It attempts to place in the state statutes the very arguments rejected by the Court in the May 17 decision and it would appear to be headed for a similar fate.

Virginia would vary the formula somewhat by (1) making individual assignments of children, (2) arranging attendance through new attendance districts, and (3) allowing children within proper limitations to select their schools. "These assignments of individual students would be made on the basis of academic backgrounds; health requirements; personality, practices, needs and desires; the intensity of racial feeling in that area." This variation, however, contains the defects inherent in the North Carolina and Tennessee proposals.

Georgia goes a step further and authorizes the superintendent to consider psychological, sociological, and other scientific data. Appeals are permitted to the local board, the state superintendent, and finally to the state Board of Education. At this point it is stated, apparently in desperation: "The opinion of the state board shall be final and conclusive, and shall not be subject to review of any court or tribunal by appeal, certiorari, or in other manner."

Thus Georgia merely ignores our history, our Constitution, and our system of government. This provision would not last long in the courts. The requirements of due process are satisfied if a statute authorizing administrative determinations permits an opportunity for a fair hearing before an administrative tribunal and precludes judicial review unless this administrative remedy is exhausted.[1] But the extent to which due process requires judicial review of administrative determinations after opportunity for a fair hearing before an administrative tribunal depends on the character of the right asserted. Where a claim of constitutional right not involving personal liberty is asserted in the proceeding, due process requires an opportunity for judicial review to permit judicial determination of the issues of law, and where the claim of constitutional right involves personal liberty, opportunity must be allowed for judicial determination of the facts as well as the law.[2]

Mississippi, as might have been expected, approaches this problem in a more direct fashion. It declares the policy of the state of Mississippi to be that a free public education is a privilege and not a right, and that such privilege shall be extended only to those persons or their children who accept the same under the terms and conditions upon which it is offered. No child would be able to obtain a free public school education whose parents do not, precedent to enrollment, file with the school trustees an unconditional waiver, for themselves and their child so enrolled, of any and all rights they or their said child may have to any legal, equitable, or administrative complaint of the assignment by the board to any attendance center within the district. The assignments would be commensurate with public peace, safety, the health and morals of the people of the district, the welfare of the child being assigned, and with the available facilities. Boards would be authorized to refuse enrollment of any pupil whose parents refuse or fail to file the waiver. Thus Mississippi, for a child to be enrolled, would insist upon waiver of a constitutional right. The Supreme

[1] Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742 (1948).

[2] See Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 76 (1936).

Court has decided that such a condition attached to the exercise of a right is unconstitutional.[3]

South Carolina would remove the compulsory features of the existing attendance laws and "redesignate attendance teachers as 'visiting teachers' charged with obtaining attendance through influence and persuasion rather than through the exercise of legal authority." This proposal like all the others is merely another attempt to gloss over race as a basis for enrollment and would be similarly ineffectual. It is really another invitation for "law suits."

Alabama adds some interesting factors in its proposals. It provides for intelligence and aptitude tests but authorizes consideration of all factors involved in the pupil's adjustment to his school and surroundings, such as: distance from home to school, educational background, and home environment. It may consider whether or not the assignment would sever long-established ties of friendship and place the pupil in hostile surroundings from which his former friends and associates are completely missing; the pupil's wishes as evidenced by a written request from his parents or guardian that he be assigned to a particular school; and whether or not in the judgment of the board the assignment would cause or tend to cause a breach of the peace, riot, or affray. All appeals must be accompanied by a bond "conditioned to pay all costs of appeal."

This proposal, like the others, seeks to make appeals difficult or impossible and to subject the dissatisfied pupil to the risk of failing to exhaust administrative remedies grounded in discretion. The chief factor underlying each proposal, however, is race, and though it may take some time to secure an adjudication of the validity of each, there would seem to be no question but that all are basically unconstitutional in the light of the segregated school setting in these states.

[3] Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922).

Imposing sanctions against integration

In measures imposing sanctions against integration, Louisiana, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina are proposing to act as if the May 17 decision had never been handed down. Obviously that decision voided not only all laws requiring segregation in education but also all laws which would make it a crime to abide by the decision. Measures of this nature, then, are in reality defiant gestures by a violently agitated community.

For example, Louisiana provides that the "State Board of Education shall not approve any public schools which violate the new segregation provision." She also prohibits the "granting of free school books and other supplies, or state funds for the operation of a school lunch program to any school violating the segregation provision."

Georgia makes it a "felony for any school official of the state or any municipal or county systems to spend tax money for public schools in which the races are mixed, with punishment set as two years in the penitentiary in addition to liability for the money expended," and the state Board of Education adopted a resolution to revoke "forever" the license of any teacher who "supports, encourages, condones, or agrees to teach mixed classes."

Mississippi provides for a twenty-five-member Legal Education Advisory Committee headed by the Governor, with unlimited power to conduct hearings and command appearances of witnesses to ascertain the effect of enforced public school integration on "law and order" in local communities. Subpoenas and process issued by the committee for persons, books, and records would be served by sheriffs in the eighty-two counties. Mississippi also makes it unlawful for any member of the white or Caucasian race to attend any school of high school level or below wholly or partly supported by funds of the state which is also attended by a member or members of the colored or Negro race. It provides for a fine of not less than $1.00 nor more than $25.00 and/or imprisonment in the county jail for a period not to exceed six months.

North Carolina would deny state funds to any city or county which integrated its public schools.

These four states comprise an area of unyielding resistance to the May 17 decision and their opposition will make implementation of the May 17 decision exceedingly difficult.

Changing the language of present segregation requirements

Louisiana has amended its constitution to provide that all public elementary and secondary schools be operated separately for white and Negro children and that "this provision is made in the exercise of the state police power to promote and protect health, morals, better education and the peace and good order of the state and not because of race." Mississippi has similarly amended its constitution.

In such amendments, these two states indicate their avowed purpose to continue segregation without regard to the May 17 decision, in open defiance of the highest court of the United States.

Alabama and North Carolina have not yet gone so far in their proposals to change their statutes.

Alabama would provide for individual choice of the kind of school which parents in any area may desire. If, for any reason, the system does not result in an acceptable or workable solution, then the public schools involved may discontinue operation, and the education of the pupils concerned may be aided as provided for by individual public assistance. North Carolina and Alabama both would remove the segregation provision from their state constitutions. Alabama would provide for city, county or state school authorities the right to have separate schools, where necessity exists therefor, and would compel a child to attend classes where races commingle.

Florida and Virginia have proposed voluntary or triple-choice school systems, which would also seem to be void under the May 17 decision. Nevertheless, these plans will give rise to long and expensive litigation.

Requesting congressional action

The Alabama Senate approved a resolution sharply criticizing the Supreme Court's segregation decision. As finally passed, the resolution was a watered-down version of a more vigorous one introduced by Senator Albert Davis of Pickens County (48 per cent Negro) calling for the impeachment of the high court.

Both the House and Senate in Georgia approved two resolutions which would amend the Constitution of the United States to make states solely responsible for the policies under which their schools operated. One seeks to have Congress initiate the proposed constitutional amendment; the other seeks ratification by the legislatures of at least two-thirds of the states.

In Mississippi Congress was memorialized to enact legislation limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the Court as well as of other federal courts. The resolution recited that

> . . . federal courts, and more particularly the United States Supreme Court, have through numerous opinions and decisions invaded the fields of the legislative and

ecutive branches of government, and have invaded the field of government which should be left to the control of the several states of the union.

Pointing out that the Congress is authorized under the Constitution of the United States to "control and limit the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts," the resolution memorialized the Congress to

> . . . enact legislation limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts so that the fields of government of the executive and legislative branches and of the several states shall not be invaded but shall remain separate and distinct.

It asked Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States an article giving the states exclusive authority to regulate, administer, and operate their respective educational systems as they deem necessary and proper and providing that "neither the Congress, the President, nor anything in this Constitution shall in anywise interfere therewith or otherwise affect same."

In South Carolina the Governor's recommendation for a similar resolution was embodied in concurrent resolutions.

Whatever differences of opinion we may have with the conclusions of these representatives in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, we cannot object to their inalienable right to petition Congress for redress of grievances or to call for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The language of the resolutions, however, gives some indication of the temper of the people.

Intimidating teachers

Another key proposal in evading the May 17 decision lies in measures aimed at silencing teachers by threatening their job security. Most of these measures are constitutional, but since they place white teachers at the mercy of local boards they may not be politically acceptable to white teachers or very effective. The Alabama resolutions would in addition violate the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. For the Supreme Court has said: ". . . We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." [4]

Alabama would allow the school board to cancel the contract of any teacher who advocates desegregation or belongs to an organization advocating it and would make officers and teachers judicial officers and immune to suit.

The Georgia state Board of Education abandoned two resolutions previously adopted which would have revoked the teaching license of any teacher who approved of or agreed to teach racially mixed classes or held membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Instead, the board will require teachers to sign an oath to "uphold, support and defend the constitution and law" of Georgia.

In North Carolina a proposal would put teachers and principals on a one-year contract basis, in contrast to the present continuing contract (if a teacher is not notified by the end of the school year that he is not being rehired, he automatically has a contract for the next year). Another would let city and county Boards of Education establish "attendance areas" for schools without regard for school district lines. The change in teacher contracts was said to have been recommended because the Supreme Court's opinion probably made

[4] Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952).

separate districts for white and Negro children unconstitutional. Therefore, school redistricting will be necessary. Since school districts are employers of the teachers, who have continuing contracts, they would have a contract with old district boards after the new district boards were set up. One-year contracts would remove the possibilities of litigation and, after redistricting had taken place, the old system of continuing contracts could be restored by a subsequent General Assembly.

South Carolina would simply eliminate from the state code a section which now provides that public school teachers are considered automatically re-employed at the end of each school year unless notice to the contrary is given. Representative Charles G. Garrett of Greenville County proposes to introduce in the 1956 General Assembly a bill to forbid any state, county, or municipal employee to belong to the NAACP.

Changing the language providing for public education

An attempt to evade the May 17 decision by removing the right to an education from the state constitution and laws is an effort to retain segregation by offering public education privately. Such measures are unconstitutional, like the attempt in Texas to permit a private primary to choose public officials. Of this attempt the Supreme Court said:

> When a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into play.[5]

South Carolina has amended its constitution to provide for elimination of the provision for a liberal system of free public schools.

[5] Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953).

In place of public schools, an amendment recommended by the Boutwell Committee of Alabama says:

> It is the policy of the State of Alabama to foster and promote the education of its citizens in a manner and extent consistent with its available resources, and the willingness and ability of the individual students.

But, the amendment adds:

> . . . nothing in the constitution shall be construed as creating or recognizing any right to education or training at public expense, nor as limiting the authority or duty of the legislature to require or impose conditions of procedures deemed necessary to the preservation of peace and order.

PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO ABOLISH PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTE STATE-SUPPORTED PRIVATE SCHOOLS

Abolishing requirements for public education

Mississippi and South Carolina have amended their constitutions to provide for abolition of public schools by legislatures or counties or school districts. Georgia proposes a similar amendment. Alabama would permit the state to discontinue the public schools wherever necessary to avoid friction or disorder and to allow the state and its subdivisions to devote public money to the aid of private education when adequate public facilities are lacking or public operation involves the adoption of coercive policies.

These proposals are similar to the action taken in South Carolina to avoid the constitutional ban against the white primary and are likewise unconstitutional. Following the decision banning the white primary, South Carolina repealed all its statutes and constitutional provisions relating to primary elections. In an action brought in a federal district court to enjoin officials of the South Carolina Democratic party from refus-

ing primary ballots to Negroes, the officials contended that the party was a private organization free from all state control and therefore not subject to the prohibitions of the Constitution against state action. The District Court granted an injunction, and on appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the party officials were subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. "Having undertaken to perform an important function relating to the exercise of sovereignty by the people, they may not violate the fundamental principles laid down by the Constitution for its exercise." [6]

In a later decision, the Supreme Court has said of education:

> Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.[7]

Providing for grants to private individuals or schools

Georgia would make grants of state, county, or municipal funds to parents in discharge of all obligations of the state to provide education for its children. North Carolina would make tuition grants to families of school-age children to be used for tuition in private schools.

Providing for leasing, selling, or disposing of school property

Georgia would make school buildings available for educational purposes, leased to individuals under the requirement that tuition in excess of the aggregate of state and local grants not be charged, and regulated by state Boards of Education as the Public Service Commissioner regulates public utilities. Alabama and Mississippi would authorize their legislatures to dispose of school property. South Carolina would vest school trustees with the right to lease as well as to sell school property. A member of the House of Delegates in Virginia suggested leasing school buildings to private corporations. Under his plan, the private school operators would be free to admit any child they wanted to, and any child would be free to attend. The state Board of Education would retain control of educational standards.

The last two devices, grants in aid of private schools or direct grants to pupils and disposal of school property, raise serious educational questions. As a general rule, states may dispose of property and may aid private institutions as a part of their sovereign status. If the state abolishes public schools in order to evade the May 17 decision, what does it propose to substitute for (1) a system of accreditment of teachers, (2) the teacher retirement system, (3) uniformity of standards and curricula, (4) loss of federal funds, and (5) the unity of its educational policy? When factors such as these begin to affect the whites, measures of this kind may collapse. Indeed they appear to be posed as threats rather than as soundly considered educational proposals.

[6] Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (C. C. A. 4th 1947), *cert. denied*, 333 U. S. 875 (1948).

[7] Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

But even if they were sound educationally, they would still be fatally infected with unconstitutionality, for they would not remove the state from the field of education and would fall when tested by the May 17 decision and the primary cases. Difficult legal problems will be posed, however, in any attempts to restrict state expenditures of funds or disposal of state property.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be said that Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina are using or contemplating use of every conceivable method of evading the May 17 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in open defiance of the Court.[8] This position seems to be overwhelmingly supported by the executive and legislative branches of the governments and by the majority of the people in these states, and, one might add, by the judiciary also. North Carolina and Virginia are tending in that direction. Florida is not yet clearly placed but appears to favor local option. Texas and Arkansas seem disposed to comply with the decision. Oklahoma, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, Delaware, and West Virginia are integrating. The District of Columbia has integrated. The five recalcitrant states are the well-known Black Belt states, which, although some of them have large cities and are highly industrialized, have ne thrown off the political domination the farmers who have occupied t famous black strip of land. The tensity of the efforts to evade the fect of the May 17 decision seems bear in each instance a direct relati ship to the level of education and stage of industrialization. Political franchisement of the Negro is heav where the efforts to evade the deci are greatest. A Point Four progran Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis sippi, South Carolina, and perh North Carolina would seem necessar these evasive efforts are symptom Education, industrialization, polit freedom (registration and a two-p system), and mechanization of agri ture are still basic needs in this are the reaction to the Court decision i be taken at face value.

That the hard core of resistanc equal treatment of the Negro has rowed and that the South is no lo solid in its racial attitude is a hop sign, but an extended period of lit tion seems inevitable as one scans numerous and diversified proposals signed to circumvent the Supreme C decision. There is no question, howe that the end result will be the dest tion of all these proposals as unco tutional obstacles to desegregation.[9]

[8] Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954).

[9] See Francis B. Nicholson, "The Standing of the South's School Resis Proposals," 7 *South Carolina Law Qua* 1 (1954).

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Resistance Movements and Racial Desegregation

By Harold C. Fleming

SINCE the era of Reconstruction, every period of crisis in the relations of the South and the nation has given rise to resistance movements below the Potomac. The archetypal pattern was set by the original Ku Klux Klan. Political developments around the turn of the century wove the ethos of white supremacy into the social, economic, and political fabric of southern life. During the past half century that fabric has been so stretched, patched, and retailored that in many respects it is hardly recognizable. But the tough strands of the Lost Cause have managed to hold together, providing today virtually the last reminder of a once-united white South.

Since the Supreme Court's decision of May 17, 1954, at least twenty pro-segregation groups have appeared on the southern scene.[1] Among these organizations there are wide variations in ideology and effectiveness, but they have in common the aim of mobilizing resentment against "outside interference" in the racial affairs of the region. And a substantial number of them are loosely federated under the spiritual authority of the White Citizens' Councils.

Ku Klux Klan

It is a measure of southern progress that the mummery and frontier methods of the old Ku Klux Klan are no longer respectable. There is, to be sure, a newly chartered organization which seeks to trade on the name. But it is little more than a pallid ghost of its adopted ancestor. Indeed, since the demise of the powerful Klan of the 1920's, successive incarnations have declined steadily in strength and in influence. The revival of the hooded order after World War II lasted only a few embattled years. Then it found itself denounced from the pulpit and the platform, legislated against in state capitols, and prosecuted by state and federal law enforcement agencies. Its bankruptcy was complete when it appeared on the United States Attorney General's list of subversive organizations.

The current Klan's attempts to exploit reaction to the Supreme Court's ruling have hardly been noteworthy so far. The self-styled Imperial Wizard is an Atlanta paint sprayer named E. L. Edwards. Edwards has made speeches and distributed literature in parts of Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas. Aside from these efforts to recruit dues-paying members, the Klan has shown little vitality. Ineptly led, unmasked by state laws, and inhibited by the unfriendly attentions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it is a "fringe" group in the full meaning of the term.

[1] U. S. Klan, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, National Association for the Advancement of White People, Association of Citizens' Councils of Mississippi (also White Citizens' Councils of Alabama, Arkansas, South Carolina, and Texas), Constitution Party of Alabama, American States Rights Association of Birmingham, White America, Inc., of Arkansas, Christian Civic League of Georgia, States Rights Council of Georgia, Knights of the White Christians of Louisiana, Society for Preservation of State Government and Racial Integrity of Louisiana, Southern Gentlemen of Louisiana, Maryland Petition Committee, Baltimore Association for States Rights, North Carolina Patriots, South Carolina Committee of 52, States Rights League of South Carolina, Tennessee Federation for Constitutional Government, Tennessee Society for the Maintenance of Segregation, Defenders of State Sovereignty of Virginia, Virginia League. This list is based on reports in *Southern School News* and files of the Southern Regional Council.

National Association for the Advancement of White People

One of the factors contributing to the decline of the latter-day Klan has been its appeal to anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish bigotry. The South has its share of prejudice against these religious minorities, but extreme manifestations of it are generally considered disreputable. A case in point is the experience of the National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP), the first and most widely publicized pro-segregation group of the present cycle.

The NAAWP—the personal creation of Bryant Bowles, a Floridian with a well-documented police record—won overnight notoriety for its role in the Milford, Delaware, controversy. At the beginning of the 1954–55 school term, the Milford Board of Education had admitted eleven Negro students to the hitherto white high school. Bowles quickly seized the opportunity to rally resentful white people of the area and to direct them in a campaign of school boycotts and demonstrations. State authorities reacted with equivocal and confused public statements, which had the practical effect of repudiating the Milford school board. In the end, segregation was restored, the school board replaced, and Bowles elevated to a position of honor in segregationalist circles.

The outcome of this local skirmish unquestionably gave encouragement and impetus to the resistance movement throughout the South. But the subsequent career of the NAAWP has been anticlimactic. Bowles's attempt to exploit antidesegregation sentiment in Baltimore was thwarted by prompt and resolute action on the part of civic groups and public officials. Unsavory details of Bowles's background came to light, and he found himself indicted on a charge of violating state school laws.

These liabilities alone might not have prevented Bowles from extending the NAAWP into the South and making of it the mass movement he had predicted it would be. It soon became apparent, however, that he was making overt and blatant use of anti-Semitism. He distributed to NAAWP supporters thousands of copies of such anti-Jewish nationalist publications as *Common Sense* and the *American Nationalist*. He also shared the platform with individuals whose anti-Semitic records were well known, and himself startled audiences with diatribes against "the Jews who are alien to the white race and most influential and instrumental in the spoiling, looting, and defilement of it. . . ."[2]

By these tactics Bowles forfeited the possibility of securing influential community backing for his organization. During the summer of 1955, a segregation-minded group in Charlotte, North Carolina, invited Bowles to address a rally, looking toward the establishment of a local chapter of the NAAWP. A public airing of Bowles's anti-Semitic activities, however, caused several of the local sponsors to withdraw and evidently destroyed any prospects of an effective organization in Charlotte. At this writing, the NAAWP appears to have little or no following outside of southern Delaware, and its long-range hopes there seem none too bright.

Significance of Extremist Groups

The contemporary Klan, the NAAWP, and other organizations of extremist temper cannot be dismissed as of no consequence. In a disturbed social

[2] Charlotte (N. C.) *News*, July 25, 1955.

ıation, fringe groups of this kind ı constitute a serious threat. Dur- quiescent periods, they maintain a ·d core of professional organizers and licated followers. When tension in ;iven area reaches a sufficiently high el, these experienced agents may ve as catalysts of violence.

While the danger of mob action should be overlooked, neither should it be ggerated. There is reason to believe t even the most vocal champions of regation among southern state offi- s would act to quell public disorders. ey are well aware that widespread or longed violence would have disas- ıs consequences for their respective es, in terms of both economic pen- es and possible federal intervention. ıs rioting and other forms of mob on, if they occur, are likely to be dized and of short duration.

THE BLACK BELT

n short, the organizations whose overt eal is to the violence-minded are not extinct, but they are becoming ob- te. The legitimate heirs of the Re- struction Klan use a subtler ap- ach. They have translated the law- elements of the resistance tradition ı more modern idiom—modern, that in terms of the plantation culture ch persists in the subregion com- ıly called the Black Belt.

'his band of agricultural counties, tching from southeast Virginia to Texas, was the heartland of the e South, just as today it is the last nghold of segregation. Both the ıomy and the social system of the :k Belt have traditionally depended the subservience of the large Negro ulation, which ranges from 40 to 80 cent of the county totals. During last century, the planter aristocracy his area imposed its will on the re- ant, and sometimes rebellious, South the highlands and the piedmont. And in the decades following the Civil War, the values of the plantation society were fixed in the states of the lower South by means of distorted legislative apportionment and similar political devices.

The agrarian Black Belt, weakened by a steady outflow of population and the ascendancy of urban industrialization, has made many concessions in the last generation. Nevertheless, in coalition with some urban business and industrial interests, it still exerts a powerful influence on the state governments of the Deep South, and it still clings fiercely to the doctrine of white supremacy. It is not surprising, then, that the most formidable of the existing prosegregation movements was born in the Mississippi Delta.

WHITE CITIZENS' COUNCILS

The first White Citizens' Council was established in Indianola, Mississippi, a few months after the Supreme Court's 1954 school decision. A state headquarters was later opened in Winona, Mississippi, the home of the executive secretary, a young planter named Robert B. Patterson. The movement was extended into surrounding counties through mimeographed mailings and semisecret meetings. By October 1954 the WCC, organized in some twenty-one counties, was strong enough to play a significant role in the passage of two state constitutional amendments—one designed to facilitate disfranchisement of Negro voters, the other aimed at circumventing the Supreme Court rulings.

Today the WCC claims more than 250 chapters in Mississippi, with a membership of 60,000. The organization has also established itself in Black Belt counties of Texas, Arkansas, Alabama, and South Carolina, as well as maintaining close ties with similar organizations elsewhere in the South. In the words of Robert B. Patterson, "In some of the states they go by different names, but we are all seeking the same goal, and that's what counts." [3]

The constituency of this loose federation was defined, at least in part, in the first issue of the WCC's official publication. An introductory editorial announced that subsequent issues would be mailed not only to WCC members in the several states, but also to members of seven other prosegregation organizations.[4]

Official pronouncements

The WCC's published statements of purpose have been couched in relatively lofty and generalized phrases. The official slogan, for example, reads: "Dedicated to the maintenance of peace, good order, and domestic tranquility in our Communities and in our State and to the preservation of our State's Rights." [5]

The main object of the WCC's official pronouncements appears to be twofold: to create an aura of respectability around the movement; and to divest the central organization of responsibility for the utterances and actions of its component groups. Toward the first end, WCC literature has stressed the claim that its leaders are drawn from the "best" people and that its program is essential to the prevention of violence. The leaflet just quoted declares:

> The highest type of leadership has been provided in each community where councils have been formed. We intend to prevent violence, friction and race hatred. We intend to carry out the peaceful relations we have had with our colored citizens. . . .

Even critics of the WCC will concede that many of the leaders of the movement have community status in terms of political influence, economic power, or both. What these critics do not concede is that status of this kind automatically confers respectability on the aims and methods of the movement. As Hodding Carter has commented:

> . . . by and large, the men who thus far have led the Councils' movement have standing in their communities. They are, primarily, men with an obsession—namely, that integration of the public schools means blood integration as well—and this obsession is shared by many who abhor the Councils. It may be remembered unhappily, that at the outset of the Klan's revival in the '20's, men also gave way to their obsessions, whether about Negro, Catholic or Jew or all three.[6]

Some uneasy recognition of this fact may underlie the WCC's insistence on decentralized responsibility. The literature of the organization asserts that local councils are independent—a point that is repeatedly emphasized by spokesmen for the parent Mississippi association. One WCC official typically disclaimed knowledge of techniques being used with the statement, "You must realize that the Citizens' Council movement is not a closely controlled movement." [7]

Economic pressure an accepted method

The advantages of such vaguely defined lines of responsibility are obvious when one turns to the question of method. Initially, the WCC made no secret of the fact that its chief weapon

[3] Montgomery (Ala.) *Advertiser* and *Alabama Journal*, June 26, 1955.

[4] Tennessee Society for the Maintenance of Segregation, Tennessee Federation for Constitutional Government, American States Rights Association of Birmingham, Georgia States Rights Council, Patriots of North Carolina, Defenders of State Sovereignty of Virginia, The Virginia League.—*The Citizens' Council* (Jackson, Mississippi), Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1955).

[5] "The Citizens' Council," five-page leaflet, published by the Association of Citizens' Councils, Winona, Miss. (n. d.).

[6] "A Wave of Terror Threatens the South," *Look*, March 22, 1955.

[7] Montgomery (Ala.) *Advertiser*, August 22, 1955.

would be economic pressure. One of the original leaders of the movement, former state senator Fred Jones of Inverness, Mississippi, issued a public statement in October 1954, in which he said:

> We can accomplish our purposes largely with economic pressure in dealing with members of the Negro race who are not cooperating, and with members of the white race who fail to cooperate, we can apply social and political pressure.[8]

In the context of the Black Belt, this was little more than a verbalization of the obvious. The livelihood of Negroes in this agricultural area, except for an occasional professional man, has traditionally depended on the good will of white landlords, bankers, merchants, and local officials. This economic dependence has always been a major instrument of social control. For example, it largely accounts for the fact that the counties with the densest Negro populations have few or no Negro voters.

As the WCC spread outside the Mississippi Delta, however, the principle of economic coercion drew strong criticism. At an organizing rally in Dallas County, Alabama, one speaker spelled out the principle in this bald language:

> The white population in this county controls the money, and this is an advantage that the council will use in a fight to legally maintain complete segregation of the races. We intend to make it difficult, if not impossible, for any Negro who advocates desegregation to find and hold a job, get credit or renew a mortgage.[9]

Press criticism

This widely publicized statement was roundly condemned by many newspapers, in the South as well as elsewhere. The Montgomery *Advertiser*, for example, in an editorial entitled "Economic Lynch Law," declared:

> The manicured Kluxism of these White Citizens' Councils is rash, indecent and vicious. . . . This ("economic thuggery") is rash because the Negro himself holds a powerful and growing economic power of his own. The merchants, the bankers, the grocery stores and the autodealers could find that they have grasped a two-edged sword that cuts wickedly in two directions. . . . What is proposed is indecent and vicious because we find a dominant group standing in the shadows threatening to confiscate the meat, drink, and shelter of dissenters.[10]

Organizational responsibility minimized

Since that time, leaders of the WCC have minimized or disavowed organizational responsibility for economic reprisals. Illustrative was the answer to press queries given by Alston Keith, chairman of the Dallas County WCC, after some sixteen Negro signers of an integration petition lost their jobs. Keith declared that the council would not take credit or censure for what he called a "spontaneous reaction" to the filing of the petition. But he added, "I don't believe there would have been the unity of action that there was without the educational work of the citizens. They did just what we have been advocating right alone."[11]

More circumspection is displayed by some, as witness this endorsement by South Carolina's Lieutenant-Governor Ernest F. Hollins:

> It is my belief that the Citizens' Councils, by mobilizing the best leadership at the community level, can help to restore decency in government and maintain peace and security for all people, both white and Negro. I am glad that responsible spokesmen for the movement say they do not use organized economic pressure as a weapon against anyone. . . . The organization of pressures is full of dangers.[12]

Effectiveness of economic sanctions

Whatever degree of direct responsibility may be attributed to the WCC, both economic and social pressures have been widely used against advocates of desegregation. Negro teachers have been discharged, Negro farmers have been denied credit, and Negro merchants have been boycotted by wholesale distributors. In a number of instances, signers of desegregation petitions directed to local school boards have recanted after their names and addresses were published by the newspapers. In a few cases, white persons believed to hold unorthodox racial views have been "advised" by organized groups of their neighbors to move; and a small but growing number of white ministers have lost their pulpits because of their opinions on segregation.

The relatively few publicized incidents of this kind clearly do not measure the full extent of economic and social pressure. Furthermore, "economic lynchings," like the physical lynchings of years past, are intended as object lessons; they are meant not only to penalize the individual victim but to silence and neutralize other potential dissenters. The effectiveness of this inhibiting function is a matter of speculation, but there is no doubt that a climate of fear and repression is widespread.

It should be noted, however, that the double-edged quality of economic sanctions has been felt in some communities. In Orangeburg, South Carolina, merchants and food distributors who co-operated in the WCC program found themselves boycotted by the Negro students of State College. Reports from other communities in the Black Belt indicate similar declines in Negro patronage of business establishments operated by WCC members. A countermeasure of another sort was the deposit of $250,000 in the Tri-State Bank of Memphis by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and other organizations to supply credit to victims of the WCC economic blacklist. The outcome of this economic tug-of-war cannot yet be foreseen, but it is apparent that Negroes will not be the only ones to suffer.

Fundamentally, the Southern resistance movement is a desperate rearguard action against the slow but inexorable advance of democratic values. The plantation culture's area of influence has shrunk steadily, until today it clearly dominates only four state governments—those of Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana—and in most of these states it is not wholly unchallenged. The resulting awareness of threat, from both within and without, has heightened the intolerance of the resistance leaders.

The propaganda of the WCC and related groups advances the segregation dogma with inquisitional fierceness. Integration, according to this orthodoxy, is an aim of the Communist conspiracy, designed to bring about "mongrelization" of the races and the consequent collapse of our society. The NAACP and other organizations with like purposes are stigmatized as agents of this vast alien plot. The Supreme Court is vilified as the "political tool" of the conspirators, while the schools and churches are represented as honeycombed by "neo-communist and neo-socialist teachers and preachers."

Political implications

Indeed, the new resistance doctrine has political implications far transcending the issue of racial segregation.

[8] Jackson (Miss.) *Clarion-Ledger*, October 24, 1954.

[9] Montgomery (Ala.) *Advertiser*, December 1, 1954.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Chattanooga (Tenn.) *Times*, September 8, 1955.

[12] Winston-Salem (N. C.) *Twin City Sentinel*, September 16, 1955.

Doubtless for the rank and file of adherents negrophobia is the sole motive force. But the leaders of the movement evidently view the segregation issue as a rallying point for broader purposes. W. J. Simmons, executive secretary of the Jackson, Mississippi, Council, made this revealing statement in an interview with Associated Press reporter Bem Price:

I think (the WCC) is much more than a white supremacist group and I think it is much more than a protectionist group. I think it is fundamentally the first real stirrings of a conservative revolt in this country, judging by the responses we've gotten from other states. . . . Some of the people who are attracted to this movement may not be concerned about the Negro. What would be classed as the old white supremacist movement has no place. It is too narrow.[13]

The WCC lays great stress on political participation by its members. Each local council, declares the prospectus, should have a Political and Elections Committee.

This committee studies candidates for local and state elections and presents their qualifications to the voters. It attempts to get candidates to voice their opinion on vital subjects prior to election. It can reach each voter personally to present the truth on all matters to the people.[14]

The criteria to be applied in judging candidates are not stated. But in the same leaflet appears this suggestive passage:

The idea now is seemingly to pride ourselves in the fact that everybody in the world should be made equal by law, regardless of aptitude or heritage. The "have nots" must share equally with the "have gots" in this new world order. . . .

This integration scheme ties right in with the new, one world, one creed, one race philosophy fostered by the ultra-idealists and left-wingers.[15]

The political orientation of the resistance leadership emerges even more clearly in the announcement of a new regional organization called the Federation for Constitutional Government. This superorganization lists among its officers the principals of the WCC and its affiliated groups; it also boasts the sponsorship of many of the leaders of the 1948 States' Rights, or "Dixiecrat," party, including J. Strom Thurmond and Fielding Wright, who were the presidential and vice-presidential nominees, respectively.

The preservation of segregation is, of course, one of the aims of the new federation; but this aim is overshadowed by such purposes as "resisting nomination of leftist candidates for president and vice-president and other offices" and "opposing adoption of socialistic (national party) platforms." Plainly, a new political movement is under way, its voting strength hopefully vested in the membership of the WCC and other resistance organizations.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Any assessment of the southern resistance movement at this date must be tentative. So far, attempts to implement the several desegregation rulings of the Supreme Court have not reached a decisive stage in the Deep South. Only as litigation is carried to its ultimate conclusion will the effectiveness—and the dangers—of the prosegregation groups be fully measured.

Meanwhile, it is possible to sum up the strengths and weaknesses of the resistance movement as it appears today.

[13] Montgomery (Ala.) *Advertiser*, August 22, 1955.

[14] "The Citizens' Council" (cited note 5 *supra*).

[15] *Ibid.*

Strengths

1. In areas of the South with proportionately large Negro populations, white sentiment is overwhelmingly opposed to desegregation. The very real anxieties and fears of the public offer a fertile field for racist exploitation.

2. Negroes are politically impotent and economically dependent in precisely those areas where their numbers are largest; hence, they are unable to make their full weight as a group felt in the struggle against oppressive measures.

3. Advocates of extreme prosegregation views are far more vocal than moderates or liberals; many white southerners who are opposed to the resistance groups fear the consequences of speaking out.

4. Political control of at least four southern states is in the hands of politicians who are wholly sympathetic with the aims and methods of the resistance groups; the States Rights Council of Georgia, for example, was organized by the Governor and other leading officeholders. In four additional states, the resistance groups exert strong, if not always decisive, influence on the legislatures and public officials.

Weaknesses

1. The once Solid South is solid no more. School desegregation is proceeding apace in such border states as West Virginia and Oklahoma; is under way in parts of Texas, Arkansas, and Kentucky; and appears in prospect in eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina. As the domain of segregation shrinks, the resistance groups' claims on sectional loyalty will be steadily weakened.

2. The growing Negro vote is gradually but relentlessly eroding the political base of die-hard resistance to racial change.

3. All the principal religious bodies active in the South are officially committed to the principle of desegregation. Although opposition to this principle is widespread at the congregational level, church leadership is not likely to recede from its position. As time goes on, more and more clergymen and church people may be expected to challenge segregation on moral grounds.

4. While the individual Negro in the Black Belt is relatively powerless, Negroes in the mass are capable of formidable economic retaliation. White merchants and businessmen are becoming uncomfortably aware of the potentially disastrous effects of organized boycotts by Negroes.

5. The ultraconservative political aims of the resistance leadership may ultimately alienate much of its following. Many rank-and-file members of the WCC are working people whose economic interests conflict with those of the "Dixiecrats," who are generally hostile to organized labor, progressive tax measures, and government programs benefiting low- and middle-income groups. This conflict of interests is presently obscured by racial feeling, but it is likely to be recognized in time.

6. The "respectability" of the WCC is threatened by its affinity with extreme nationalist movements elsewhere. The WCC has admitted distributing the anti-Semitic literature published by such groups, with the defense that only the anti-Negro content was considered relevant.

7. Despite loud public denials, leaders of the resistance movement realize that it can only be a delaying action. No one seriously believes that the Supreme Court's decisions will be reversed or that a handful of states can resist the national policy of desegregation indefinitely. And, although delay might be extended for a long time by determined efforts, the knowledge that de-

feat is ultimately certain should have an increasingly demoralizing effect on the movement.

In sum, the southern resistance movement is a foredoomed effort. The question is, how long can it be sustained and at what cost in human suffering and degradation?

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The Girard College Case: Desegregation and a Municipal Trust

By MILTON M. GORDON

WHEN Stephen Girard, French-born Philadelphia merchant and banker, died in 1831 he was one of the richest, possibly the richest, American of his time.[1] Increasingly occupied in the latter years of his life with public benefaction, Girard left the bulk of his estate in trust to the city of Philadelphia for the establishment of a "college" for the education and maintenance of "poor male white orphans."[2] The will specified elaborately the nature of the physical plant to be erected and left general instructions for the content of the curriculum. The first huge Greek-revival buildings were finally completed, and the College opened its doors in 1848 and has been in operation ever since, providing its scholars with board and room, clothing, supervision, and an elementary and secondary school education up to the maximum age of eighteen. The estate has grown in size with the passage of the years until in 1955, apart from the value of the campus property itself, it amounts to over $88,000,000, giving Girard College with its current enrollment of about 1,100 boys an endowment greater than that of any college or university in the country with the exception of Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and the University of Texas.[3]

Upon Girard's death, the city of Philadelphia created a special Board of Trustees to administer the estate; in 1869 this arrangement was superseded by a legislative act which created a Board of Directors of City Trusts and transferred to it the administration of the Girard Estate and other similar trusts. This board includes the Mayor and the President of City Council, ex officio, and twelve other citizens appointed by the Board of Judges of the Courts of Common Pleas of the County of Philadelphia.

For over a century, then, the city of Philadelphia, through its special boards, has administered a trust which is used to operate a boarding school and home for male orphans, excluding nonwhites. Against the background of changing social and cultural conceptions of race relations, the impact of the recent Supreme Court decisions against segregation in public education,[4] and the large and growing Negro population in Philadelphia (about 20 per cent of a total population of over two million[5]), a

[1] For a judicious, unbowdlerized, and essentially sympathetic account of Girard's life, see Harry Emerson Wildes, *Lonely Midas* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1943). The authorized biography is John Bach McMaster, *The Life and Times of Stephen Girard*, 2 vols., Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1918.

[2] A nineteenth-century court decided that under the terms of the will an orphan boy was one who had lost his father. See Soohan v. City of Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 9 (1859).

[3] Girard College, however, receives no income in the form of tuition or payment for room and board. Its entire income derives from the estate.

[4] Segregation in the Pennsylvania public schools has been illegal since 1881.

[5] In the 1950 United States Census of Population, the city of Philadelphia had 2,071,605 inhabitants of which 376,041, or 18.2 per cent were Negroes. A recent estimate by the Philadelphia City Planning Commission gives the 1955 population of the city as 2,161,000, and

challenge to this policy was predictable. Furthermore, Philadelphia had been one of the first municipalities to have a Fair Employment Practices law, and its Home Rule Charter, adopted in 1951 under the stimulus of new civic enthusiasm, begins with a Preamble which declares against discrimination on account of race, religion, or national origin. The charter also set up a Commission on Human Relations, which administers the fair employment provisions and other legal ordinances in the discrimination area and has a general mandate to work for better group relations in the city. Against the background of all these factors the challenge to Girard College's racially exclusive admissions policy materialized in 1954.[6]

THE CASE

In February 1954, six poor Negro orphan boys of the required ages applied for admission to Girard College. Citing the provisions of the will, the Board of Directors of City Trusts rejected their request. In May of that year, the Council of the City of Philadelphia, the city's elective legislative body, adopted a resolution requiring the City Solicitor to petition the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County to review the provisions of Girard's will to determine whether the College should now change its admission policy and admit Negroes. Subsequently, in September, Raymond Pace Alexander, a member of the City Council, in his capacity as a private attorney, filed in the Orphans' Court a petition on behalf of the six excluded Negro boys,[7] and on the same date the City of Philadelphia, acting through Mayor Joseph S. Clark, Jr., and the Commission on Human Relations and represented by the City Solicitor, petitioned the court for a citation upon the Board of Directors of City Trusts to "show cause" why the Negro applicants should not be admitted to Girard College.

In due course the Board of Directors of City Trusts filed a contesting answer. Thus the legal issue was joined, curiously enough, not only between a private party and an organ of the municipality but also between, on the one hand, the City of Philadelphia in the capacity of the Mayor and the Commission on Human Relations, represented by the City Solicitor, and, on the other, one of the city's agencies, the Board of Directors of City Trusts, represented by its appointed counsel.

The Orphans' Court assigned the case for hearing to Judge Robert V. Bolger, who heard oral evidence in March and April of 1955. At these hearings a number of social scientists testified for the petitioners on historical, sociological, and psychological issues related to the argument. Philadelphia newspapers gave generous coverage to these hearings, keeping the Philadelphia public informed on the issues of the case. Some time later, oral legal argument was heard by Judge Bolger and written briefs were presented by the two petitioners, by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,[8] whose arguments supported those of the City Solicitor, and by the respondent, the Board of Directors of City Trusts. Earlier, James M. Marsh, attorney, had been appointed *amicus curiae* by the court.

On July 29, 1955, the Hearing Judge handed down a decision in favor of the Board of Directors of City Trusts, affirming its action in denying admission to the Negro applicants and dismissing the petitions. Exceptions to this decision were filed by the losing parties. These steps automatically assign the case for review by the Orphans' Court *en banc*. In view of the importance of the case, it appears likely that, whatever the decision,[9] the holding by the entire Orphans' Court will be taken to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and, because a constitutional issue based on the Fourteenth Amendment is involved, there is the further likelihood that the Supreme Court of the United States will ultimately be petitioned to review the record.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE

Apart from the issue of the substantive relief which is being sought for Negro boys now excluded from admission to Girard College, the case has particular significance for students of the desegregation process and social scientists generally for two reasons:

First, the final decision in the case will undoubtedly establish an important precedent for all other cases which do now or might in future revolve around the same issue: a charitable legacy, left in the public trust, with a racially discriminating provision attending its use and operation. In this respect the Girard legacy will be running true to form, for the series of legal issues which it has raised, and the court decisions over the past hundred years which have respectively settled them, have played a classic role in the development of this area of jurisprudence in the United States. Judge Bolger, in referring, in his decision, to the first great nineteenth-century case in which a number of Girard's heirs challenged the validity of the will and were soundly defeated,[10] characterized it as one which "probably established the basic principles of the law of charitable trusts in this country."[11]

Second, the presence in the case of major sociological and psychological issues and the liberal use of social scientists as expert witnesses add an important second chapter to the story of the participation of the social scientist in major litigation, the first being the School Segregation Cases recently decided by the United States Supreme Court. The role of social-science expert testimony is so recent and so unexplored that there is a great need for careful study by the social scientist himself of the opportunities, the complexities, and the pitfalls in this new and glamorous arena which summons his services.[12] One might add that such

a Chamber of Commerce study estimates the Negro population as 443,300, or 20.5 per cent of the total. See *Economic Bulletin for Chamber of Commerce News,* October 12, 1955.

[6] It is interesting to note that as far back as 1891 the City Council had passed a resolution requesting the City Solicitor to rule on whether "the City of Philadelphia can be used to execute acts that discriminate against any citizen of Philadelphia on account of color." The City Solicitor ruled that the execution of the trust was legal. See Brief in Support of Petition of William Ashe Foust and Robert Felder for Admission to Girard College (1955), pp. 21–22, Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, No. 10, July Term, 1885.

[7] For technical reasons, all the petitions and briefs in the case were later revised to deal with only two of the Negro applicants.

[8] Girard's will provides that if the city "knowingly and wilfully [sic]" violates his provisions, the estate is to go to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In the event of the Commonwealth's dereliction, the United States of America is named as the final legatee.

[9] On January 6, 1956, the Orphans' Court *en banc* unanimously sustained the Hearing Judge and dismissed the exceptions. The City Solicitor announced that he would appeal the decision.—Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin,* January 6, 1956.

[10] Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127 (U. S. 1844). No less a personage than Daniel Webster argued for the heirs before the Supreme Court of the United States—but to no avail.

[11] *In re* Estate of Stephen Girard, Deceased (July 29, 1955), p. 9, Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, No. 10, July Term, 1885.

[12] See Kenneth B. Clark, "The Social Scientist As an Expert Witness in Civil Rights Litigation," *Social Problems,* Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 1953), pp. 5–10; Edmond Cahn, "Jurisprudence," *New York University Law Re-*

participation also offers the social scientist the opportunity to examine and explore the degree of sophistication with which the legal profession uses and evaluates his contribution. In short, there is an interactive process between law and the social sciences beginning to take place which bears careful examination and appraisal by all the parties concerned.

Let us now examine the principal arguments of the contesting parties in the Girard litigation.

ARGUMENT OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

The argument of the city of Philadelphia, acting through the Mayor and the Commission on Human Relations,[13] is essentially five pronged.

Violation of Fourteenth Amendment

First, it claims that the administration by the Board of Directors of City Trusts of a charitable trust containing a racially restrictive clause is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws." The City of Philadelphia is a legal creation of the Commonwealth (state) of Pennsylvania and therefore any action by the municipality or any of its subdivisions constitutes state action. In the *Shelley v. Kraemer* case of 1948, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the power of government could not be used to enforce a racially restrictive housing covenant. Similarly, the Board of Directors of City Trusts, an agency of the city, cannot use its governmental powers to enforce a privately willed policy of racial exclusion, for such action would constitute state action in violation of the equal protection clause. Reference is also made to the decree of the Supreme Court in the School Segregation Cases.

Violation of public policy of city, state, and federal government

Second, the color restriction upon admission to Girard College constitutes a violation of the public policy of the city, the Commonwealth, and the federal government. The city, in 1955, operates under a Home Rule Charter whose Preamble expresses its aim of providing a government "in which all qualified citizens may participate equally without any distinction based on race, color, religion, or national origin." Moreover, the city has implemented this provision in the creation of the Commission on Human Relations with its mandate for eliminating discriminatory behavior. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has demonstrated its antidiscrimination policy by enacting statutes which forbid racial discrimination in many areas: public schools, public assistance, public contracts, urban redevelopment, public housing, public employment, and public accommodations. The policy of the United States against racial discrimination is revealed in civil rights legislation and in the Fourteenth Amendment cases culminating in the decision against segregation in public education.

Doctrine of cy pres

Third, the city points to the legal doctrine and precedent which permit courts of equity to modify the provisions of a will while remaining within the general framework of the donor's intent. Such action is justified when a particular provision of a charitable trust has become illegal, impracticable, or impossible, and is accomplished through the equity jurisprudence doctrine of cy pres.[14] A number of cases where such deviations have been granted by court order are cited; interestingly, two of them are in the legal history of the Girard Estate itself. The Girard will had specified that none of its real estate should be sold and that it should be leased for maximum terms of five years. In both of the cases (one in 1868, the other in 1950) the Orphans' Court had authorized a change in these administrative provisions. Therefore the court has power to authorize the deletion of the term "white" from the College's admission policy.

True intention of Girard's will

Fourth, the carrying out of the true intention of Girard's will to establish a school to endure in perpetuity requires recognition of the vast changes that have taken place since his death in the areas of human relations, education, and social science, and the removal of the color restriction because of these changes. Moreover, Girard, specifically, had shown in his will a concern for the moral quality of the instruction to be provided in his college and had instructed that the students be taught "the purest principles of morality," that they should learn to "evince benevolence towards their fellow creatures," and should develop "a pure attachment to our republican institutions, and to the sacred rights of conscience, as guaranteed by our happy constitutions."[15] At the time of his death the lowly status of the Negro, slave or free, the fact that such education as there was, whether public or private, was racially separate, the pervasiveness of notions of racial superiority and the lack of scientific knowledge about race, and the lack of public concern for equality of treatment would have made it natural for Girard to have created his college exclusively for white boys. The subsequent abolition of slavery, the adoption of the other Reconstruction amendments, the development of public concern for equality of treatment, the accumulation of scientific knowledge about race and racial equality, the desegregation of education, and the rise of modern theories of good educational practice have brought about a state of affairs which demand the abolition of the color bar in order that Girard's concern for the moral and spiritual quality of the orphans' education might be effected and the College remain abreast of the times.

Expert witnesses in social science

It was at this point that expert witnesses in the social sciences, education, and community affairs were introduced by the city. E. Sculley Bradley, Chairman of the Graduate Department of American Civilization of the University of Pennsylvania, described the culture of Girard's lifetime, concentrating on the status of the Negro and the characteristics of the educational system, and outlined the major relevant cultural changes which have taken place since Girard's death. Ira De A. Reid, Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Haverford College, discussed the developments in scientific knowledge about race which postdated Girard's lifetime and described the results of recent experimental studies, pointing to the undesirable effects of racial isolation on attitudes and behavior in intergroup relations, and the advantages to be gained by both white and

view, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1955), pp. 150–69; "The Lawyer's Role in Modern Society: A Round Table," *Journal of Public Law*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1955), pp. 1–48.

[13] Represented by the City Solicitor, Abraham L. Freedman, and the Deputy to the City Solicitor, Harvey Levin.

[14] Literally, "so nearly"—in other words, the doctrine of approximation.

[15] Interestingly, Girard barred all ministers or ecclesiastics "of any sect whatsoever" from the College grounds. There is, however, no ban on the teaching of religion or religious principles, and such teaching is carried on; the newest building on the campus is a large and handsome chapel; and the boys also attend services of their choice outside the College.

Negro children in eliminating such isolation. Isidor Chein, Professor of Psychology at New York University, testified further on this latter point and affirmed the importance of group memberships and equal-status relationships in shaping attitudes and behavior in human relations. Gilbert F. White, President of Haverford College, described present-day practices and preferred policies in higher education on the segregation issue, citing resolutions by organizations of professional educators endorsing racial integration in the schools. Alice V. Keliher, Professor of Education at New York University, testified on the importance of nonsegregated education for the development of unprejudiced attitudes in children. George Schermer, Executive Director of the city's Commission on Human Relations, described the general benefits to the city of Philadelphia to be derived from eliminating the color bar at Girard College, stressing the undesirable symbolic effect on the community of the present policy. Maurice B. Fagan, Director of the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission, a private agency, also emphasized in his testimony the desirability for community morale of eliminating the color bar in an institution administered by the city.

Color restriction of secondary import

The city's fifth contention, derived from a general analysis of the provisions of the will, is that the color restriction is secondary in import to Girard's desire to have the College administered as a public rather than a private trust. The conclusion, then, derived from the application of law to the deductions from the principal claims enumerated above, is that since the two provisions (the color restriction and the public trust) cannot legally be carried out simultaneously, the dominant purpose must prevail: the city must be retained as the trustee of the College and the color bar must be removed. Thus the city's principal intent is not that the College should pass from its hands but that it should remain as a municipal trust with the color bar to admission eliminated.[16]

ARGUMENT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF CITY TRUSTS

The argument of the rebuttal in testimony and of the Brief of the Board of Directors of City Trusts[17] may be considered directed at three areas of dispute: (1) the specific constitutional and legislative provisions and accumulated judicial decisions as they bear on the case, which we may refer to as the "legal" issues; (2) the matter of "public policy"; and (3) the social science (including educational and "community") testimony which had been presented by the petitioners.

Legal issues

The very specific, clear, and precise nature of the directions of Girard's will, including the color restriction, was asserted, and the legislation and massive judicial history which have firmly supported the validity of the trust and the city of Philadelphia's right to administer it were reviewed in detail. On the constitutional issue, two arguments were made: (1) That a charitable trust, if valid, becomes a "vested" property right which is not subject to the retroactive force of legislation passed subsequent to its effectuation. Constitutional provisions operate "prospectively" rather than "retrospectively," unless specifically worded to the contrary. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is prospective and was passed subsequent to the probation of Girard's will and is therefore not applicable to the disposition of the Girard Estate. (2) That the City of Philadelphia, a municipal corporation, acts in a triple capacity: public or governmental, when it exercises ordinary governmental functions; proprietary or municipal, as when it operates a public utility; and fiduciary, when it administers a trust. It is only when acting in the first capacity—public or governmental—that it is acting as an agent of the state and thus carrying on state action. The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter specifically exempts the Board of Directors of City Trusts from its provisions. Thus the administration of the trust is not state action and not subject to restrictions on state action.

The doctrine of cy pres is considered inapplicable to the present case because Girard's fundamental intent, as distinct from the administrative provisions he inserted to fulfill his fundamental intent, included the racial restriction and because it has not become impossible, impractical, or illegal to continue the College with the present restriction.

Public policy

Previous judicial decisions are cited to support the claim that public policy does not extend beyond specific constitutional or statutory provisions and judicial decisions which deal with the issue at hand. Thus the burden of proof is thrown upon the city to find specific provisions which forbid the administration of the trust as constituted at present, and the adducing of antidiscriminatory legislation in other areas is, by implication, deemed irrelevant.

[16] The arguments submitted in the Brief of Attorney Alexander for William Ashe Foust and Robert Felder, the two applicants for admission, and that of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are essentially similar to those of the city. Alexander adds the considerations of tax exemption and the Charter of the United Nations.

[17] Represented by its Solicitor, Joseph P. Gaffney.

Social science testimony

The Board attempted first to have the social science testimony stricken from the record as irrelevant and immaterial. This move failing, Counsel for the Board cross-examined the expert witnesses and presented several rebuttal witnesses for testimony pertinent to the issues raised. Its chief witnesses in this area were Merle M. Odgers, former President of Girard College and President of Bucknell University, E. Newbold Cooper, then Vice-President and now President of Girard College, and John A. Diemand, a former student at the College, President of the Insurance Company of North America and President of the Board of Directors of City Trusts. The bulk of their testimony brought out that students at Girard College, though they have no Negroes as fellow pupils, meet them in athletic contests, interscholastic events, and community affairs, that Negro visitors are invited to the College to speak, that good interracial and intercultural principles are stressed in the educational curriculum and the achievements and rights of all races taught, and that Girard students go to their own family homes frequently on week ends and vacations (including the long summer recess) and have there the same opportunities as other boys for interracial contacts.

This testimony also brought out that Girard College was well regarded with reference to the quality of its graduates and had produced many outstanding members of the community. Further, it was claimed that the students and alumni of the College are no more racially prejudiced than the community at large and, if anything, are less prejudiced as a result of the quality of the education which they receive. Thus the testimony of the social-scientist witnesses is characterized as "opinion evi-

dence" which does not deal directly with the situation at Girard College and is controverted by the facts that have been presented by the school's administrators and one of its prominent graduates who has been in close touch with the school for many years.

COURT DECISION

The Hearing Judge of the Orphans' Court ruled in favor of most of the arguments presented by the Board of Directors of City Trusts. On the constitutional issue, the court supported the theory of the separation of municipal powers which declares that the city, acting in a fiduciary capacity to administer a trust, is engaging in individual rather than state action. Thus the Fourteenth Amendment is not being violated. Girard College is declared to be a private institution, and this is construed as a part of the primary intent of the donor, with the provision for munipical administration of the trust simply means to an end, namely, perpetual operation of the College. "Public policy" is interpreted in the objectively narrow manner, and since the court finds no constitutional provision, legislative act, or court decision violated by the restrictive clause, the operation of the trust is held not to offend public policy.

Changes in cultural conditions are ruled to be not sufficient by themselves to admit modification of the provisions of a will by means of the doctrine of cy pres. The necessity for such a change must have a direct relation to the testator's purpose: "Such a purpose must have failed in one way or another." [18] In this case, such failure has been alleged in the testimony that desirable educational practices which Girard intended cannot be carried out when Negroes are not admitted to the College. However, the court held that the social science evidence on this point is unconvincing, since it is "opposed by countervailing factual and credible subjective experience testimony" dealing with the "exemplary records of citizenship" [19] possessed by the graduates of the College, with the nature of the curriculum, and with the opportunities for association with Negro boys outside the classroom. Thus it is ruled that "the present policy of nonintegration is not inherently harmful to either the students at the College or to the public at large," [20] and the educational policy of the trust has not "failed."

SOCIAL SCIENCE ISSUES

An evaluation of the role and reception of social science evidence in this case must inevitably pose the question: What is the nature of the relationship of generalizations about human behavior, derived from an accumulation of experimental evidence, to specific situations which appear to fall within the area of the generalization but have not themselves been empirically examined? The generalization that the "social situation" influences behavior and attitudes, or, at a slightly lower level of generality, that a situation of racial integration, under conditions of equal-status contact, is one favorable to the development of amicable racial relationships and attitudes, now has a respectable, though by no means definitive, history of experimental verification. Is this to be dismissed as mere "opinion" and of no weight in the evaluation of an empirical situation which bears some resemblance, at least, to the conditions of the generalization? It would seem, rather, that the question becomes one of careful delineation of the variables present in the experimental situation and a careful comparison with the variables discernible in the case under review. In the Girard College example, racial isolation in the classroom and the dormitory is countered by an educational program positively oriented to intergroup relations and some contact with Negroes outside the classroom and dormitory. Is the presence of these variables sufficient to destroy the experimentally derived relationship between isolation and prejudice? Deductively, the question must be posed in this way. Inductively it can be decided only by further experimental study.

In the second place, how much scientific validity can be attributed to general reputational opinion of the quality of a body of people whose numbers run into the thousands, in the absence of a careful empirical study based on scientific principles of sampling? It is well known that negative instances are easily forgotten or frequently disappear from general public knowledge. The fact that Girard College has produced many outstanding citizens and doubtless many more of average attainment and position in the community is in no way in question. But if scientific principles of induction are to be observed, in a court of law where large issues are at stake, great care must be exercised not to overweight evidence about large numbers of people which has not been obtained by standard sampling methods.

Finally, important variables in the present case are changing with each passing day. The world into which Girard College students of a generation or more ago stepped upon graduation is a far different one from that of today, which in turn will differ from that of tomorrow. As racially segregated patterns continue to crumble and topple under the impact of changes in custom, scientific knowledge, and standards of what constitutes morally right behavior, the criteria and the conditions of successful adjustment in the community themselves undergo continual modification. Moreover, a racially segregated school situated in the heart of a northern metropolis, regardless of the excellence of its program in other respects, will itself come to be regarded with increasing curiosity and negative affect. Under these conditions, it would seem premature to conclude that the general beneficent intent of Stephen Girard can be securely attained by the retention of the racial restriction on admission to his college.

[18] *In re* Estate of Stephen Girard, Deceased (July 29, 1955), p. 40, Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, No. 10, July Term, 1885.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

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Policies and Practices of Discrimination Commissions

By Elmer A. Carter

It was in the spring of 1945, when the war to preserve democracy was drawing to a close, that the Committee on Fair Employment Practice, created by Executive Order 8802 of President Roosevelt on June 25, 1941, to end discrimination in defense industries because of race, creed, and color, received its death blow. The first significant intervention of the federal government in discrimination in employment came to an official end the following year, but actually it was destroyed by the savage eloquence of Democratic senatorial leaders on the floor of the Senate during debate on its proposed appropriation for the fiscal year 1945–46. With deliberate intent the budget of the Committee, already reeling from repeated attacks, was cut by the Congress so that only skeletal operation was possible and its final demise inevitable.

Discrimination in employment because of race, religion, and national ancestry has been experienced to some degree by segments of the American population throughout our history. The Irish Catholic was compelled to endure contemptuous treatment in his search for employment following the great Irish migrations and years afterward; the Italian, the Slav, the Pole, the Scandinavian, and the Magyar have, in their turn, had to face resistance to their efforts to gain a foothold in American commerce and industry and to acquire skills which would ensure adequate income and the opportunity of acquiring a competence. But discrimination against the Negro has dwarfed its manifestation against any other racial or national group. He is the perfect example of what has been termed dynamic causation. Caught in a vicious circle, he is at once the victim and the excuse for racial discrimination. The identity of color of the subject group with that of the dominant majority has served to ameliorate and soften and finally to overcome in large measure the handicaps and restrictions which served to deprive other groups of their share in the nation's economy. Color difference, the slave tradition, and fear of the competition of Negro workers are the principal links in the chain which has bound the Negro to the periphery of American industrial development and condemned the great majority to a standard of living measurably lower than that of most of his fellow citizens.

Mounting agitation, increasing in volume and bitterness and culminating in a threat of a march of blacks on Washington, finally wrung the executive order from the reluctant hands of the President. The entrance of the federal government as an active participant in the struggle against discrimination gave that struggle new impetus and a new dimension. By the Presidential order the struggle was lifted out of the context of social welfare and became identified with the historic struggle for civil rights.

Intimations of the increased responsibility which the national government might assume were apparent in the earlier provisions for a minimum allocation of wages to Negro workmen in contracts for building construction.[1] There can be no question that the executive order of President Roosevelt was a powerful stimulant to the Negro's loyalty during World War II. Nor can it be doubted that the work of the FEPC allayed heightening racial tensions. Its total record, judged by the conditions it faced—inadequate staff, entrenched prejudices, calculated indifference in high places—was impressive if not spectacular.[2]

[1] Robert C. Weaver, *Negro Labor—A National Problem* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1946), p. 11.

With the collapse of the FEPC, momentary despair gripped those who had hoped and fought for its retention. They could anticipate no other consequence save a reversion to the conditions which had characterized the treatment of the Negro in American industry prior to the Presidential action. They envisioned widespread disturbances and racial resentment as the nation returned to peacetime economy. These apprehensions had sound bases in history, in the events following the close of World War I when the phrase "last to be hired and first to be fired" received, with few exceptions, dramatic, nationwide, and cruel confirmation in the great industrial centers of America where Negroes, by reason of defense requirements, had gained an uncertain foothold in industry.

The brief and limited assumption by the federal government of the responsibility for dealing with racial discrimination in industry marked the beginning of the third phase of the struggle to bring the Negro within the compass of the American democracy. The first phase of this struggle was climaxed by the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln ending chattel slavery, a strategic measure dictated by the waning fortunes of the Union armies in the field. The second phase was, undoubtedly, the enactment of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which formally ended the system of slave labor and clothed the new freedmen with the sanctity of citizenship. The third phase, the outline of which began to emerge with President Roosevelt's executive order, seemed to be aborted when Congress refused to cast into permanent mold a government-supported agency charged with the responsibility of ending discrimination in employment and thus left the Negro still hobbled in the labor market. As victory over nazism and fascism neared, all the signs pointed to the probability that the struggle of the Negro in America to become a first-class citizen had suffered a major setback in the field of employment by congressional rejection of a permanent FEPC.

[2] Malcolm Ross, *All Manner of Men* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948), pp. 257–60.

First State Fair Employment Practices Law

But the movement to end discrimination in employment by government action initiated by the executive order was not to be halted by the defeat of the efforts to give permanence to the FEPC. Almost unnoticed at the time in the heat of the fierce conflict raging on the floor of the House and the Senate was the shift of the terrain of the major struggle from the national congress to the state legislatures. While the FEPC was being done to death in Washington, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York signed the first so-called fair employment practices law ever enacted in America. This law, known as the Ives-Quinn Bill, was a bipartisan measure sponsored in the New York State Assembly by Irving M. Ives, Republican majority leader of the Assembly, and in the Senate by the late Elmer F. Quinn, Democrat, minority leader of the Senate. There was no equivocation in the language of this statute, the preamble of which declared:

> It shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of

the public welfare, health and peace of the people of this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the constitution of this state concerning civil rights; and the legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color or national origin are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state. A state agency is hereby created with power to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment, in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement and in publicly-assisted housing accommodations because of race, creed, color or national origin, and to take other actions against discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin, as herein provided; and the commission established hereunder is hereby given general jurisdiction and power for such purposes.[3]

Most of the arguments which were so fervidly advanced against the creation of a permanent FEPC during the debate in the Senate and the House of Representatives were advanced in Albany during the debates on the Ives-Quinn Bill in the New York State Legislature. Only the appeal to the deities of white supremacy was lacking. Some of these arguments may still be heard when consideration is being given to laws against discrimination in the various states, but time and experience have shorn them of any validity which they might once have possessed. One in particular dies hard, the belief that Negroes and whites cannot and will not work together without friction, despite the mass of evidence to the contrary documented before the first Fair Employment Practice laws were passed. It would be difficult to imagine more complete refutation of this presumption than is presented in hundreds of commercial and industrial plants ten years after the enactment of the laws against discrimination in public and private employment throughout the nation.

There was ample precedent for this course of action in New York State and in the other states which swiftly followed. Legislative measures directed against discrimination had been enacted in New York since 1909 and in several other states even earlier. Before Executive Order 8802 was promulgated, New York had acted against discrimination in war industries. Governor Herbert H. Lehman had appointed a committee on Discrimination in Employment within the New York Council of Defense, later changed to the New York State War Council. This committee, empowered to investigate and prevent discrimination in defense industries because of race, creed, color, or national origin, made investigations of discriminatory practices and cited cases to the Industrial Commissioner charged with the enforcement of the laws against discrimination in employment.

FEP Laws in Other States and Cities

Following the enactment of the New York law (called the Law Against Discrimination) in the spring of 1945, similar laws, patterned in part on the New York law, were enacted in New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Wisconsin; as this article is written laws creating agencies to eliminate discrimination in employment have been enacted in sixteen states and thirty-six cities. The form which this legislation assumed was in part, at least, shaped by the experiences and results which attended the efforts on the national level of the FEPC and on the local level of the Committee Against Discrimination in Employment of the New York Council of Defense and, in part, by the memory of the fate of the prohibition amendment. The laws in the cities and states vary in many aspects, but there is one factor common to all, namely, primary reliance on the potential of conciliation and persuasion and conference to eliminate discrimination in employment because of race, color, creed, or national origin.

When one considers the character and extent of the practice of discrimination in America, particularly racial and color discrimination, it would appear that reliance on such inconclusive procedures was an evidence of uncertainty and timidity in approaching the problem. It was pointed out by skeptics that there had been no lack of effort to end discrimination through persuasion. Private agencies had for many years exerted every method of persuasion to achieve some relaxation of discrimination against Negroes in industry. Armed only with this power, the National Urban League and its branches, with directing boards of outstanding citizens of both races, had knocked at the gates of American industry for three decades, achieving only sporadic success and this confined largely to the unskilled and semiskilled areas of employment, on isolated sectors of the industrial front. Certainly the history of the Negro in America provided justification for doubt as to the ultimate efficacy of this procedure in times of peace. For, after all, no fundamental change in the Negro's status in America has ever occurred save in the midst of war or in its wake. The threat of national disaster has levered the Negro's destiny in America. Reassuring answers to these misgivings were contained in the reports of the FEPC and the Committee Against Discrimination in Employment of the New York State War Council. But bright as was the record of their accomplishments, it was the consensus of those who had intimate knowledge of their operation that a law without sanctions or provision for plenary procedures against discrimination must be ineffectual. As a result, the first law against discrimination in employment combined in its provisions the obligation to conciliate where possible and the power to compel where conciliation failed. This provision in one form or another is contained in the laws of at least twelve of the sixteen states.

Sanctions and Compliance

Resort to sanctions in those states and cities where they may be invoked has been exceedingly rare. Agencies charged with the administration of FEP laws were at the outset hesitant to seek compliance by force. Extraordinary efforts to achieve elimination of unlawful discriminatory practices through the conciliation process have characterized the history of all FEP laws in existence. This approach has been largely responsible for the decline in active organized opposition to FEP legislation in those states which have had some experience in its administration. Enthusiastic support of this legislation, as a matter of fact, has come from individuals and organizations which once bitterly opposed the law.[4] Any other approach, emphasis on compulsion, swift citation to public hearing, would unquestionably have inspired renewed opposition and the search for vexatious legal barriers to hamper its administration.

It has long been recognized that the "preliminary attempt at understanding and conciliation" is an indispensable

[3] The law was amended in 1952 to include places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement and in 1955 to include publicly assisted housing.

[4] For example, the following: "I am one of those who was against the Anti-Discrimination Law when it was first introduced and worked hard to prevent its passage. Now after six years of operation, particularly as it is so ably enforced, I find that our fears have not been realized, but much more genuine progress has been achieved."—Statement by M. D. Griffith, Executive Vice President, New York Board of Trade, December 5, 1951.

part of the process of ending discrimination. The conclusion of the Temporary Commission Against Discrimination of New York State that "the great majority of the complaints can and will be satisfactorily settled on the threshold by conference, persuasion and conciliation . . ." has been borne out by the record of all the states which have anti-discrimination laws.

The effort to conciliate depends on a finding of probable cause to credit the allegation in a complaint charging discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. Discrimination now is rarely overt and seldom if ever admitted. The circumstances out of which a complaint arises are usually susceptible to more than a single interpretation. More often than not recognition of the syndrome of racial and religious prejudice, apart from the specific allegation, is necessary to reach a determination of "probable cause." The effectiveness of the conciliation procedure depends upon the discovery of the focus of infection as well as its extent. Is the source of discrimination in the attitudes of management based on apprehensions and fears of consumer resistance or employee antipathies? Does discrimination emerge as complete exclusion, limited or quota employment, or segregated employment on the basis of race or color or creed or national origin?

Discrimination is not an isolated phenomenon and it assumes many forms. The framers of the law were aware of this, and the legislative injunction to the New York commission, which is implicit in the laws of all the cities and states, is not merely to eliminate but also to prevent discrimination in employment. The preventive aspect, which after all must be the ultimate measure of success, has been and is the goal of all the agencies charged with the administration of state FEP laws. It is with this in view that the method of approach to complaints has been developed, embracing, as a rule, examination of hiring policies and employment patterns of respondents beyond the employment category specified in a complaint and including in the terms of conciliation, where probable cause is found, sweeping measures affecting the whole employment process—recruitment and the sources of recruitment, interrogations on employment application blanks (which have been subject to rulings by an administrative agency or, as in some statutes, set forth in the law [5]), and methods of evaluation for promotion or dismissal; and where membership in labor unions is in question, the history of the organization in terms of the industry and the conditions which prevail in the labor market.

INTERPRETATION OF N. Y. FEPC LAW

At the outset there were misconceptions in New York State of the provisions of the New York law and the interpretation which would govern commission action. The misconceptions were shared by those whom the law was designed to benefit, the victims of discrimination, as well as those who might be charged with discrimination. Understanding of the law by respondent and complainant is a prerequisite of successful conciliation. The conciliation agreements rest on certain fundamental assumptions:

> Quota employment, token employment, in fact any type of exclusion in any job category because of race, creed, color or national origin, as well as discrimination in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, constitutes an unlawful employment practice unless based on a bona fide occupational qualification. . . .

[5] Provisions dealing with lawful and unlawful pre-employment inquiries are included in the statutes in Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.

The law, however, is not retroactive. It does not require the discharge of existing employees to provide work opportunities for minority group representatives previously rejected, nor does it require employers to create unnecessary jobs merely to afford such opportunities to minority groups. The goals of the commission are, therefore, necessarily prospective. It is not concerned with the specifications which an employer may find necessary to secure satisfactory job performance except that such specifications shall not, directly or indirectly, be discriminatory. It requires that these job specifications be applied equally to all applicants regardless of race, creed, color or national origin. Visible progress under the law is thus dependent on the rate of job turnover, new job opportunities, the availability of qualified minority group applicants, and their ability to excel in open competition on an equal basis with all other applicants.[6]

The New York commission has been forced to face an insistent challenge to these rulings on the grounds that the above interpretation will require a century, if literally applied, to bring about actual integration. It has been urged that even quota employment might provide the opening wedge. The New York commission has taken the position that quota employment is in itself the recognition and acceptance of difference, of inferior status; that the immediate gain is transitory; that the minimum invariably becomes the maximum; that it does not serve to end discriminatory practices but merely to channel them.[7]

THE CONCILIATION PROCESS

The conciliation process affords the employer respondent charged with discrimination an opportunity to bring his hiring practices and methods into compliance with the law without stigma and without shock. It provides the indifferent employer respondent, who is anxious as to the possible reactions of other employees or union members to the introduction of Negroes, with convenient insulation. He can hide behind the cryptic pronouncement, "It's the law." Another factor of vital importance in the success that has attended the attempts to eliminate discrimination through conference and conciliation has been the opportunity the conference affords to examine the rationale of discrimination and dissect the myth and the rumor. More than might be imagined, one can sense in every conference the soundness of what Gunnar Myrdal observed:

> The importance of the inculcation of the general principles of democracy in the American people which has been going on for so many generations should not be under-rated. It is true that practical and specific issues are often avoided in a rather opportunistic way, so as not to disturb the conscience of the white people. The fact that ignorance and unconcernedness are so opportune means, of course, that additional popular education along more concrete lines will meet tremendous emotional resistance. But this resistance is not insurmountable. People are also bent upon rationality. Their allegiance to the ideals of the American Creed is strong and is held consciously.[8]

Successful conciliation comprehends the elimination of the unlawful employment practice complained of and, more, that steps shall be taken to prevent its recurrence and to assure equality of opportunity on all levels of employment. In every conference of conciliation there is the appeal, subtle or otherwise, to the fundamental ideals of the American creed. The response to this appeal is

[6] Henry Spitz, "Patterns of Conciliation Under the New York State Law Against Discrimination," *New York Law Journal*, Vol. 125, No. 68 (April 9, 1951), p. 1268.

[7] Quota employment is banned by express provision in the laws of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.

[8] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. 384.

one of the bright spots in the records of this legislation.

The terms of conciliation are designed to give a respondent employer an opportunity to make the transition from a policy of discrimination in employment to that of nondiscrimination in an orderly fashion and to inaugurate this new policy in such a manner that it becomes a part of the normal employment procedure. An employer against whom a finding of probable cause has been made routinely in New York State and in all the other states is asked, within the framework of the laws, to restore the complainant's lost civil right[9] by employment immediately or on the occasion of the first vacancy, if he is found to be fitted by training and experience for the job in question, or that he be compensated for loss of earnings due to discrimination (where this is permissible) or both. As a rule the respondent, when an employer, is required to see to it (*a*) that its officers charged with the responsibility of hiring shall be advised that nondiscrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin is the policy of the respondent for every category of employment in the usual manner that directives are given to officers, with a copy to be sent to the commission; (*b*) that employment agencies or other sources of recruitment of personnel utilized by the respondent employer shall be instructed that in making referrals to the respondent no consideration shall be given to race, creed, color, or national origin. There are other terms of conciliation, depending upon the particular situation revealed by the investigation. They may comprehend distribution of commission literature to employees—pamphlets and brochures on the law—and elimination of certain questions on employment application blanks pertaining to race, creed, color, or national origin. In addition to the strict terms of conciliation involving the disposition of a verified complaint, recommendations of a preventive nature may be made, such as broadening the base of recruitment of personnel by the inclusion of non-fee-charging agencies, widening the range of high schools and colleges utilized in personnel recruitment to give heterogeneity in terms of race, creed, and color to the applicants among whom the employer will select future employees.[10]

[9] The right to work is declared to be a civil right in Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington. In Massachusetts the right to work is "hereby declared to be a right and privilege of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth."

REVIEWS OF EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

The commission tests and examines the effectiveness of the conciliation agreements by regular review of hiring policy and employment pattern in those establishments which have consented to carry out the terms of the agreements. Where no probable cause has been found to credit the specific allegation in a complaint alleging discrimination but where the general employment pattern or the history of employment is such as to warrant the inference of discrimination, respondents are urged to take steps to prevent discrimination. A commissioner had occasion to write an air transport company the following letter after he had dismissed a complaint charging discrimination because of creed:

> You will recall that in our conference I pointed out to you that the total absence of any Negroes from any clerical positions in this company, while not conclusive as to a discriminatory policy in itself, is so contrary to the experience of the commission where honest effort has been made of compliance with the provisions of the law as to raise serious question as to the hiring practices. This would hold equally true where there is a total absence of any young Negro women ever to be employed as stewardesses or hostesses.
>
> I wish to request that you instruct all individuals charged with any phase of the hiring process that discrimination because of race, or color, or creed, or national origin is in violation of the Law Against Discrimination of the State of New York, and, further, that it is the intention of the company to comply with the Law Against Discrimination.

[10] Such agencies might include the National Urban League, the Federation Employment Service, and high schools with a high incidence of Negro enrollment.

During a review of the case some months later, respondent's personnel director reported that a Negro girl had been hired as a reservation clerk in its Buffalo office and that she seemed happy with her position as well as popular with her fellow workers. A second review inquiry in 1954 revealed that although business was slow, two Negro girls were employed in the New York main office, one as a typist, the other as a clerk. On a third review in 1955, the respondent reported that it had taken steps to obtain applicants of minority groups; that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Urban League had been requested to refer qualified applicants and that they had been so doing. Jobs as reservation agents in the New York offices had been offered to a Negro man and a Negro girl, although only the former was able to accept.

A recent review of the pattern of employment of one of the great banking institutions, the First National City Bank of New York,[11] which prior to the law had Negroes employed in only the messenger category and there a very small number, indicates that there were approximately 171 Negroes employed in the main office and in the various branches in the following categories of employment: assistant section heads, senior clerks, junior clerks, bookkeepers, head bookkeepers, tellers, stenographers, typists, clerk-typists, adding machine operators, IBM operators, file clerks, messengers, and messenger-guards. The same pattern obtains at the Chase Manhattan Bank and many other financial institutions. A similar picture has been found on review in scores of establishments which formerly employed Negroes, if at all, in no positions above the menial or custodial level.

This in itself is not proof of complete absence of resistance to the employment of Negroes, but it cannot be dismissed as token employment even if the total number of employees is upward of ten thousand. Its significance lies in the fact that the wall which kept Negroes out has been breached and advance has been made in the removal of social and psychological barriers to promotion. The problem of promotion, of elevation to supervisory posts, must be faced once discrimination has been eliminated at the first level. The results attendant upon this step have not justified the widespread apprehension of disaffection on the part of white personnel that was anticipated by a substantial segment of management.

[11] No probable cause was found to credit the allegation in a verified complaint filed against this respondent.

INDUSTRY-WIDE CONFERENCES

The complaint procedure has its limitations. The person aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice very often is reluctant to seek legal redress. Fear of reprisal, risk of being tagged a troublemaker, act as deterrents to the urge to file a verified complaint charging discrimination. The complaint technique has been buttressed by the industrial conference to which leading figures in a given industry are invited to discuss and to recommend steps for more far-reaching compliance

with the law. Results of these conferences have in some instances exceeded the expectations of the sponsoring commission. One cannot depreciate the influence which individual business leaders may exert on their associates in their own or in related fields. In Philadelphia it has been reported that this approach has achieved significant extension of employment opportunities for groups hitherto excluded from certain industrial plants. In New York the communications council, composed of the leaders in the communications industry (American Cable and Radio Corporation, New York Telephone Company, RCA Communications, Inc., and the Western Union Telegraph Company), published and distributed an attractive brochure which has unquestionably been of tremendous value in developing receptive attitudes on the part of employees and stimulating affirmative action toward compliance in other business areas.

Television

The educational possibilities of television present a continuous and sometimes a disturbing challenge. How powerful an instrument television may become in shaping attitudes and reducing racial antipathies and religious intolerance no one really knows, but few will question its potential. It is, perhaps, the most important segment of the entertainment industry. The field is one in which discrimination may be sensed but not easily proved, and in such an area the conference method provides the most effective approach. It was at the instance of the Coordinating Council for Negro Performers that the New York commission scheduled a conference of the representatives of the great advertising agencies and the television and radio networks in order to examine the conditions of employment which prevailed in the industry. For a number of years alleged discrimination against the Negro performer has been a subject which has provoked considerable comment and resentment. To cope with this situation all the great labor organizations in the entertainment industry have created permanent committees against discrimination. Until the commission-sponsored conference was held, two assumptions were more or less accepted to explain this discrimination: that there were natural limitations to the number of roles in which a Negro could be used; and that advertisers of products did not dare hazard the risk of disapproval of Southern audiences by the use of Negroes in other than traditional roles.

Spokesmen for the Negro performers charged that Negroes were systematically excluded from television programs except for so-called Negro roles which were in many instances totally unrealistic. If a person from another planet were forced to get his knowledge of the City of New York from the television screen, they maintained, he would probably conclude that the only Negroes in the metropolitan area were prize fighters or domestics. In all areas of human activity, it was pointed out by representatives of the Coordinating Council for Negro Performers, Negroes were apt to be seen: in hospitals as nurses and sometimes as physicians and surgeons, in police courts as prisoners or officers, in railroad stations and air terminals as passengers as well as porters, in subways as motormen and guards, as spectators at sports events or lining the avenue watching parades. In short, they were a part of that vast multitude known as New Yorkers. But in the projection of these areas on the television screen, Negroes were rarely seen in the ordinary familiar occupations and activities.

Representatives of both the advertising agencies and the networks conceded that without violating artistic standards it would be possible to cast Negroes in a number of parts which would not carry the connotation of Negro roles. But more revealing was the unchallenged assertion that there had been no substantial disapproval by Southern audiences or viewers of programs in which Negroes were cast in other than those roles which reflected the slave tradition. It was the consensus of opinion that the powerful pull of habit rather than deliberate intent is responsible for the failure to afford Negro performers a greater chance in television and radio. There is reason to believe that the pledges of the conference participants to remedy by affirmative action a situation which all present agreed was regrettable has been honored in a manner that deserves commendation.

The most enduring education is that which is part of the warp and woof of daily living. Acceptance of the Negro in office, in shop and factory, has been made more difficult by the fact that for the most part the Negro lives in a different world, leads an existence apart from his fellows. One of the great objectives in any educational program to end discrimination is to reduce the shock of difference by portraying the Negro as just another citizen in those activities in which his fellow citizens participate.

FEP—Factors in Success

One cannot discount certain other factors which must be considered in any appraisal of the effectiveness of the New York law or indeed of any of the laws against discrimination in employment which have been enacted in the last decade. Full employment, an expanding industrial plant, and a tight labor market have, no doubt, served to facilitate the administration of these laws. Change of employment policy is not too difficult of accomplishment in the face of pressing need for help. A low unemployment level has been a vital force in the expanding opportunities of Negroes in industry. There seems to be universal agreement that there has been a significant change in the opportunities for employment among Negroes and striking alteration in the pattern of employment in the State of New York since the effective date of the law. This is, likewise, the verdict in most of the other states and in many of the cities which have passed FEP legislation. There is a paucity of statistical data to support this opinion. But visual observation and case material in the files of the New York State commission and other agencies, private as well as public, as to the incidence of Negro employment in communications, in large and small industrial units, in the field of insurance, in banking, and in newly developed electronics—where Negroes were conspicuously absent prior to the enactment of the law—will tend to support this view. Although not so visible or apparent, there is reason to believe that resistance to the employment of adherents of the Jewish faith in certain commercial and industrial areas has, likewise, steadily declined.

Because of the success which has marked the conciliation process in meeting discrimination in employment and the results obtained through persuasion, there has been a tendency to conclude that the final elimination of discrimination can be achieved by this means alone. It has been suggested that the meager number of cases which have been noticed for hearing by the various commissions is proof of the contention that education without compulsion is sufficient in the long run to induce an orderly abandonment of discriminatory practices.[12] But the power

[12] During the period that the various state FEP laws have been in operation a total of

of compulsion is an important element in attaining compliance. The factors noted above—a tight labor market, expanding economy, the inclination under urging to reconcile individual practice with the tenets of the American creed —have contributed mightily to the readiness of those charged with discrimination to move, under the direction of the commission and similar administrative agencies, toward compliance with the provisions of the law. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that bigotry, long-held prejudices, deeply ingrained habits of thought always yield readily to mere argument, especially when concession requires embarking on a course of action which may be at variance with that hallowed by tradition and custom. The fact that the alternative to acceptance of the terms of conciliation is a hearing in which hiring policy and employment patterns, racial and religious attitudes, will be subjected to public gaze plays a significant part in stimulating compliance. And the power to invoke sanctions, to issue a cease and desist order enforceable in the courts against those who would defy the law, acts as a powerful deterrent to all save a very few. There is grave doubt whether the conciliation process would obtain comparable results in a period of rising unemployment if the administrative agency were stripped of its powers of invoking sanctions.

There are, of course, individuals who flout the law and have no intention of complying with its provisions. There are areas of employment where discrimination on the basis of race and color and sometimes religion appears to be flagrant and where compulsion seems to be the only method which can secure even a gesture toward compliance. Effective methods to bring these areas into compliance in the absence of verified complaints and in the absence of a labor market where requisite skills are available is one of the continuing problems of the commissions.

CASES INVOLVING ORGANIZED LABOR

Discrimination by segments of organized labor, particularly in those representing skilled crafts, has long been one of the recognizable phenomena of the American labor movement and, therefore, of great concern to framers of FEP legislation. Slight progress has been made in changing discriminatory employment on railways—exclusive at its worst, segregated at its best. The great railway brotherhoods have rendered perfunctory acknowledgment of the existence of the laws by making the racial clauses in their constitutions inoperative in the states with laws against discrimination in employment. Grudgingly Negroes have been admitted into chapters of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.[13] In Oregon the Industrial Commissioner, after public hearing, issued a cease and desist order against one of the lodges of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen which had been charged with refusal to admit three Negroes to membership.

Court support in Connecticut

A case in Connecticut arose out of the attempt of two Negroes to be admitted to membership in Local 35 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, American Federation of Labor. When denied admission to the union as *apprentices*, these men filed complaints with the Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights, the body which

18 hearings has been held: 3 in Connecticut, 2 in Massachusetts, 6 in New Jersey, 4 in New York, and 1 each in New Mexico, Oregon, and Wisconsin.

[13] New York commission, after complaints filed against the J. F. McGrath Lodge of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

administers the Connecticut law against discrimination, charging that they had been refused membership in the union because of their race, in violation of the law. After investigation of the charges, the Connecticut commission found reasonable cause to credit the allegations in the complaints that the complainants were denied membership in the union because of their race and color. Following the finding of the commission, efforts to effect a conciliation were initiated but they resulted in failure.

The case was then noticed for public hearing and later, in accordance with the statute, the hearing was held before three hearing commissioners. Thirty witnesses were examined during the course of the hearing. The position of the State of Connecticut in regard to certain contentions of the respondent union is worthy of special notice. As to the union's contention that the limitation on membership to sons and relatives of present members affected Negro and white alike, the hearing commissioners declared that nonetheless this constituted "an absolute and continuing ban on Negro applicants since there was not and never had been a Negro member of the union." At the conclusion of the hearing an order was issued to the respondent union to cease and desist from excluding complainants to full membership.

The respondent union appealed the decision of the hearing tribunal to the Superior Court of Connecticut. The appeal was dismissed and the order of the hearing tribunal affirmed. In no way dismayed, the respondent union appealed from the decision of the Superior Court to the Supreme Court of Errors, the highest court in the state. In a unanimous opinion this high court held that the lower court had not erred in sustaining the hearing tribunal. Later, the court was to hold the union in contempt and to fine that organization $2,000. In its decision the Superior Court commented as follows:

> It is material to consider that the order has its source in the efforts of the people of this state through a duly constituted authority to eliminate from labor relationship the virus of race discrimination.[14]

A segregated union integrated by conciliation

Where the conciliation process failed in this case and the law and the finding of the Connecticut commission were challenged in the courts, in an important case involving another form of historic discrimination by labor organizations (the segregated union in the same craft, based on race and color) success attended the efforts of conciliation. Without going into its genesis, which can be paralleled in other phases of American life, it now is generally recognized as an unfortunate survival of the custom of racial repression of the early labor movement. It is basically a repudiation of the democratic principle; at its worst it is likewise a betrayal of the historic aims of organized labor. The New York commission was called upon to face this situation when the president and a member of the theatrical stage employees auxiliary Local No. 1-A of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States and Canada, AFL, filed verified complaints against the president of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States and Canada, AFL, and the president of the Theatrical Protec-

[14] International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 35 v. Commission on Civil Rights of the State of Connecticut, Superior Court, Hartford County, Files No. 90351 and 90352, Memorandum of decision in action for contempt, filed March 26, 1954.

tive Union, Local No. 1 of the IATSE and MPMO of the United States and Canada, AFL, in which they charged among other things: the maintenance of Local No. 1-A as an auxiliary, segregated local; limitation of Local No. 1 to white persons only; restriction of work opportunities of Local No. 1-A to a limited number of theaters; and deprivation of collective bargaining rights of members of Local No. 1-A.

After an investigation of the complaints, the investigating commissioner made a finding of probable cause to credit the enumerated allegations in the complaints:

> Local No. 1-A is an auxiliary union which, despite the fortuitous presence of several white individuals, was expressly organized to segregate Negroes who by pressure and agitation had secured employment in those theatres located in heavily populated Negro districts. The history of its organization renders this conclusion inescapable and the limitation of its activities confirms it.

Upon the finding of probable cause there ensued the conferences of conciliation and persuasion between the investigating commissioner and the officers and executive committee members of the respondent union. The terms of conciliation were (1) that the members of Local No. 1-A should, as of April 1, 1955, be admitted to membership in Local No. 1 without discrimination in any form and with the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities then accorded members of Local No. 1; and (2) that the details of the transfer should be submitted to the Commission Against Discrimination for its approval. The respondent union, Local No. 1, accepted the terms of conciliation and "at a regular meeting of its membership the thirty members of Local No. 1-A were balloted upon for acceptance into membership in Local No. 1 and a unanimous vote cast in their favor."

PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS

It is the tremendous confidence in the efficacy of the conciliation process as exemplified by the progress in eliminating discrimination in employment that has led to the amendment of several FEP laws to extend their jurisdiction to cover discrimination in places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement.

Between 1949 and 1955 laws in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts were amended to encompass discrimination in areas of public accommodation and in publicly assisted housing. It was held by many of those who were acquainted with social and economic conditions of racial discrimination that the conciliation procedures as developed in the field of employment might well be expected to achieve similar results in eliminating discrimination in places of public accommodation, resort, and amusement. Civil rights statutes providing civil and criminal procedures, honored more in the breach, had progressively ceased to be utilized by the victims of discrimination. The reasons are not difficult to apprehend: the burden of proof placed on the victim, the difficulty in winning civil action (particularly in small towns where the offense is not deemed too serious), the probability of lengthy litigation and the uncertainty of the result, the habitual lack of zeal of county attorneys in initiating criminal action.[15]

The procedures of administration in this area are identical with those used in cases of discrimination in the field of employment. On a finding of probable cause to credit the allegation in the complaint, the effort follows to eliminate the unlawful discrimination complained of by conference, conciliation,

[15] Morroe Berger, *Equality by Statute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 111.

and persuasion. The terms of conciliation here of necessity must be dominated by the preventive motif. The administrative agency created originally to end discrimination in employment is not empowered to impose fines, assess damages, inflict punishment, or in any way usurp the judicial function. Nor is this its role. What the administrative agency attempts to do is to bring about a voluntary abandonment of discriminatory practices on the part of the respondent. There have been instances where a request for refund of money legitimately expended for transportation to accommodations which were refused because of race and color of the complainants was included in the terms of conciliation, but the occasions for even this financial recompense have been rare. Where conciliation efforts fail, the complaint is noticed for public hearing and the commission is empowered to issue a cease and desist order and to require affirmative action which comprehends extension of full, equal, unsegregated accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges to all persons.

As might be expected, the barber shop and beauty parlor, the swimming pool, the motel, tavern, and grill, the resort hotel, have been the source of most complaints in this field. Where the club as a place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private ends and the place of public accommodation begins has been a question which has precipitated the most bitterly fought legal battle in the New York commission's history, with the final outcome still in doubt.[16]

Discrimination in this sphere has its base in the fear that Negro customers will drive away business rather than in actual racial or religious antipathy. There can be little question that the lifting of economic inequalities by the steady widening of employment opportunity has induced weakening of racial barriers along the whole front. Coupled with this has been the increasing importance of the Negro vote, which is the object of special solicitude on the part of political leaders sensitive to the causes of racial resentment which might be reflected at the polls and to the steadily increasing number of Negroes who occupy important and responsible positions in departments and agencies of government—city, state, and federal.

[16] The Castle Hill Beach Club was declared by the commission to be a place of public accommodation. After public hearing a cease and desist order was issued. Upon judicial review the commission was sustained in the New York State Supreme Court. The case is now before the Appellate Division.

END PRODUCT . . . INTEGRATION

Although there has been no precise measurement of the change that has taken place, that there has been considerable change in the past ten years in the attitudes and practices of hotels, restaurants, and taverns in New York and in the other states with FEP laws is the consensus of opinion among Negroes and whites in a position to know. It is common now for the Negro college fraternities and sororities and some of the professional women's clubs to hold their parties amid the magnificence and luxury of the great hotels. This change cannot be attributed wholly to the FEP laws against discrimination. Their extended jurisdiction is of recent origin, but FEP legislation has a cumulative effect on discrimination in every area.

One-third of the states in the United States now have FEP laws designed to end discrimination in employment. It would seem that the fears, the apprehensions and anxieties, always present whenever proposals for such legislation are discussed, have begun to subside. The results achieved in eliminating and preventing discrimination without industrial shock, without acceleration of ra-

cial antipathy, in those states which have enacted this legislation have, undoubtedly, contributed to the creation of a favorable public opinion without which the adoption of these laws by other states would have been infinitely retarded. In this respect it would be difficult to measure the immense influence which has been wielded by privately supported educational and civic organizations.[17] Through study and research they have been able to meet conjecture with facts and they have been able to banish the racial myths and stereotypes which sustain discrimination. They have dramatized the shameful contradiction between the ideals of democracy and its practice. They have aroused their constituencies to the evils of racial segregation and religious intolerance.

But the struggle is not over when the legislation is enacted. The most important sector in the conflict is on the job—in the shop, in the laboratory, in the factory, in the office. White workers and Negro workers will finally write the story of discrimination in employment, its swift end or a prolonged and fruitless struggle. Organized labor is playing an increasingly important role in preparing the way for integration. Antidiscrimination committees are a commonplace in scores of local labor organizations, and extensive educational programs to indoctrinate the membership in the dangers of discrimination have been sponsored and conducted by not a few labor organizations. The rationalization that discriminatory policy is based on the attitude of the workers is being riddled. The merger of the two great wings of the American labor movement has in it the possibility and opportunity, if seized now, of wiping out this encumbrance to the attainment of real democracy in America.

[17] These would include such organizations as the National Urban League, the NAACP, the Catholic Interracial Council, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the American Friends Service Committee.

FEDERAL COMMITTEES ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

After the dissolution of the federal FEPC in 1946, repeated efforts to revive it were to meet with failure, but the concept of federal intervention in the problems of discrimination in employment was not abandoned. Reentry of the federal government in the struggle against discrimination came in 1951 with the creation of the Committee on Government Contract Compliance by executive order of President Truman. In every government contract there is a clause which specifically forbids discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin. But observance of this phase of the contract had not been subject to the same scrutiny as other phases of the contract by the contracting agency of the federal government. The Committee was created to examine and study compliance procedures with a view to strengthening them and to bringing about more widespread compliance with the terms of the contract.

In 1953 this committee was abolished by the executive order of President Eisenhower which established the new President's Committee on Government Contracts. Chairman of the Committee is the Vice-President of the United States, and the prestige of this high office graces its deliberations and directives. In the light of the fearful predictions of disaster made in the Congress whenever a bill has been introduced to create a federal agency empowered to eliminate and prevent discrimination because of race and color, it is interesting to read the press reports of the October 25, 1955, Conference on Equal Job Opportunity which

was sponsored by the President's Committee on Government Contracts. At this conference, attended by fifty-five business and industrial leaders of America whose firms employ 15 per cent of all workers and produce 15 per cent of all goods:

> . . . confidence was expressed that the elimination and prevention of discrimination in employment against Negroes, South as well as North, East, and West, was a goal within reach. Success, so it was reported, has attended efforts to integrate Negroes in a number of industries "in the Deep South."

Major business leaders reported that "the fears that many concerns had in putting non-discriminatory policies in force, particularly in the South, have proved not to be justified." "It has not been necessary in any instance up to now," Vice-President Nixon is reported to have said, "for the government to exercise its power to cancel a contract with a firm for non-compliance with the anti-discrimination clause that is in every government contract." There was this modification, "We feel that we have made substantial progress and we still have a long way to go." [18]

[18] Earl Mazo in the New York *Herald Tribune*, October 26, 1955.

LEGISLATIVE POSSIBILITIES

There is reason to believe that Illinois, Ohio, and possibly Missouri will enact FEP legislation in the not too distant future. No expectancy for similar action on the part of southern states exists anywhere. The situation in race relations in the Deep South is one of tense equilibrium. The South is in transition from a dominant agricultural economy to an industrial economy, but the change has not been completed. Integration in the market is a necessary condition before such legislation, even if enacted, can hope for success.

The contemporary experience of the states which have enacted FEP legislation, the possibilities revealed by even limited federal action, demolish all the arguments that discrimination cannot be effectively dealt with by law. The experience of great industries in the South would indicate that economic pressures sometimes can achieve the same end. But this does not obviate the need for law. For it is unthinkable that in the light of present world conditions the elimination of this wasteful and indefensible practice should be left to the onset of national crises or the vagaries of chance.

Elmer A. Carter, New York City, was appointed a member of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination in 1945 and is now serving as Commissioner of that body. In 1935 he was appointed to the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Council and in 1938 he became a member of the Board of Appeals of Unemployment Insurance. He was formerly editor of Opportunity—Journal of Negro Life.

Integration in the Armed Services

By James C. Evans and David A. Lane, Jr.

THE feature article, "The U. S. Negro, 1953: A decade of progress . . . ," in the May 11, 1953, issue of *Time* asserted, "The biggest single blow against segregation in the U. S. has been struck by the armed forces." Similarly, the *New York Times* of February 14, 1954, called the Armed Forces racial integration "one of the biggest stories of the twentieth century. *Per se* it warrants no lesser description." Elsewhere the observation has been made that one of the most significant aspects of the achievements of our forces in the Korean conflict was the validation, in the field and under fire, of the racial integration program through which co-operation and cohesion were at last substituted for conflict and confusion.

As late as 1941 a War Department spokesman, addressing Negro newspaper representatives at a conference on the problem of racial segregation, held in the Munitions Building in Washington on December 8, stated the position that had governed policy since 1914 and that was to continue at least through 1944 and probably longer:

> The Army did not create the problem. . . . Military order, fiat or dicta will not change these viewpoints [in support of racial segregation]. The Army . . . cannot be made the means of engendering conflict among the mass of the people because of a stand with respect to Negroes which is not compatible with the position attained by the Negro in civilian life. This principle must necessarily govern the Army not only with [respect to] this subject of contention but with respect to [any] other dogma, be it religious, political or economic. The Army is not a sociological laboratory; to be effective it must be organized and trained according to principles which will insure success. . . .[1]

Nevertheless, the years between 1941 and 1953 saw a change in the racial policies and practices of the armed services that was so nearly a transformation that it evoked statements of genuine surprise and sometimes enthusiasm from those concerned with advances in human relations. Increasingly, as the press carried summaries of such advances, it gave priority to the continuing success of the integration program in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. One recent summary said:

> Historians agreed that the three most momentous events of the Golden Decade [1945–55] were: (1) The Supreme Court decision banning segregation in the schools; (2) the abolition of segregation in the Armed Forces; and (3) the decisions invalidating subterfuges that kept Negroes from voting in the South.[2]

Earlier a United States Senator characterized Armed Forces integration as "the first truly effective step that has been made in implementing the Emancipation Proclamation."[3]

The military establishment, in effect, executed an "about face," discarded the markers so long and supposedly so firmly established, and set out in a new direction. In so doing, with the primary objective of improving military efficiency and strengthening national defense, it took cognizance of the pressures engendered by the nation's urge toward justice and equity for all citizens in uniform, by the world-wide deployment of our forces, and by the United States position of leadership in a world in which attitudes and practices with respect to race and color were becoming more and more significant.

[1] Official release to the press.

[2] *Ebony*, November 1955, p. 135.

[3] Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Jacket of Lee Nichols, *Breakthrough on the Color Front*, New York: Random House, 1954.

It is the purpose of this account to trace the outlines of this development, pointing out both its accomplishments and its limitations, as a basis of analysis and possibly of application.

Historical backgrounds

There is clear evidence that Negroes served widely, without being segregated, in the nation's early fighting forces. They served in the French and Indian Wars, and when Washington took "command of the Continental Army, Negroes were already in the ranks of the revolutionary militias which constituted that Army."[4] It is difficult to determine the total number of Negroes in the Revolutionary Army, for many of the state rolls carry no designation of race. They served, however, principally in the ranks, along with other patriots, and the separate Negro company did not appear until near the end of the conflict.

Moreover, "the Revolutionary Navy had a larger proportion of Negroes than the Army. . . . Negro pilots, because of their intimate knowledge of coastal waters, were in demand. . . ."[5] Another record reads:

> In 1816 I was surgeon of the *Java* under Commodore [*sic*] Perry. The white and Negro seamen messed together. About one in six or eight were Negroes. . . . There seems to have been an entire absence of prejudice against the blacks as shipmates among the crew. . . .[6]

Despite the patriotic service of Negroes in all the wars from the founding of the Republic, the separate Negro unit, with all its inherent limitations, almost always with white officers, was destined to become the established pattern for decades. Moreover, the Negro citizen had to fight to maintain his right to a place in the fighting forces. Following the Civil War, the 24th and 25th Infantry and 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments were maintained as Regular Army units pursuant to a statute of 1866 which provided that "the enlisted men of two regiments of Infantry [and] . . . the enlisted men of two regiments of Cavalry shall be colored men." The authorization of these four units, which later achieved distinguished records, served to prevent total exclusion of Negroes from the regular forces. The record of the separate units fittingly drew to a close with the 24th Infantry Regiment achieving, at Yechon, the first decisive American victory of the Korean conflict.

At the beginning of World War II Negro officers in the Regular Army numbered three line officers and three chaplains. There were possibly five hundred Negro Reserve and National Guard officers, but few were in the grade of major or higher.

Procedures for overcoming this shortage in the face of officer requirements for the expanding forces were, to some degree, a forerunner of the program of integration that was to follow a decade later. In World War I a separate officer candidate school for Negroes had been established. In World War II, however, both white and Negro personnel, upon qualifying, were trained in

[4] Army Service Forces Manual M-5, *Leadership and the Negro Soldier* (October 1944), p. 74.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[6] Dennis D. Nelson, *The Integration of the Negro into the U. S. Navy* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1951), p. 4.

the same officer candidate schools. In 1942 Judge William H. Hastie, then the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, wrote in THE ANNALS:

> . . . Negro officer candidates are attending classes and participating in field exercises with other outstanding young Americans of every race and religion from every part of the country. These soldiers have been and are a living demonstration that ability and leadership are not racial characteristics. It is to be remembered that many of their classmates have never had an opportunity to work with or even to observe Negroes equipped by training and experience to compete with them on a basis of equality.[7]

During World War II also there were limited efforts at various times to improve the internal co-ordination of Army effort by lessening the impact upon Negro troops of regulations and practices enforcing racial segregation. Among them was the issuance by the Army, in 1944, of Army Service Forces Manual M-5, *Leadership and the Negro Soldier,* designed "to provide the main substance for a course of ten periods of instruction in schools for officers." Although not presuming to anticipate change in the established pattern of segregation, this document was in many respects a forthright statement of advanced principles that foreshadowed change.

POSTWAR PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Following World War II a step of great significance was taken when the Gillem Board submitted, in November 1945, the report of its study, "The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army." Based on experiences of the war, this report led to the announcement in 1946 of a policy which assured the Negro citizen of a continuing place in the Army; established a numerical ratio based on that in the civilian population; abolished the "all-Negro" division; authorized the grouping of Negro units and white units of smaller size into composite organizations; and for the first time took the position that, in the event of another major war, all personnel assignments should be made without regard to race. Perhaps of even greater significance, this study, in the light of the subsequent necessity for large military forces deployed world-wide, led to a revealing and a re-evaluation of all policy positions concerning the utilization of Negro manpower during both peace and war.

Subsequent attention, increasingly affirmative, led to the establishment, by Executive Order 9981, dated July 26, 1948, of the Fahy committee, which was charged with the responsibility of examining all existing Armed Forces regulations and practices, with a view of putting into effect an announced national policy of "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin."

This committee inquired into the position, long held by military planning staffs, "that (1) Negroes do not have the education and skills to perform efficiently in the more technical military occupations, and (2) Negroes must be utilized, with few exceptions, in segregated units." It "believed the assumption that equality of treatment and opportunity would impair efficiency, was of doubtful validity" and after extended study and hearings it "found, in fact, that inequality had contributed to inefficiency." The committee was "convinced that a policy of equality of treatment and opportunity . . . [would] strengthen the nation."[8]

The report of this committee, made in 1950 and entitled *Freedom to Serve,* provided the philosophy and the working basis for the program of racial integration, with no restrictions as to racial quotas, that has advanced with significant success in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

[7] Vol. 223 (September 1942), p. 59.

[8] President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, *Freedom to Serve* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 11, 67.

IMPLEMENTING POLICY

There follow now brief accounts of action taken and results effected as the services have moved to implement policy directives on racial integration.

Integrated units

As an item of general impact, June 30, 1954, was eventually agreed upon as the time limit for the dissolution of all-Negro units in the Forces. The program proceeded even ahead of schedule, so that on that date answers to the often-asked question about the number of Negro units remaining had come to be a matter of definition. There are no longer any all-Negro units in any of the services proper, though some exceptions are found in civilian components, principally a number of school and college Reserve Officers' Training Corps units. Integrated activities include organization, assignment, training, billeting, mess, supervised recreation, and all other unit operations.

Removal of racial quotas

Contrary to some predictions, removal of racial quotas and other restrictions has not resulted in any disturbing imbalance of the ratio of Negro personnel to white personnel. In a positive direction, the abolition of racial quotas for service school selection and subsequent training and assignment has more than doubled the number of Negro officers and enlisted personnel attending such schools. Significant evidence is given, moreover, by the table indicating percentages of Negro personnel in the total personnel of the various services, in 1949 and 1954. The tabulation[9] is of more than usual value because the current position in the Department of Defense toward eliminating all racial statistics will make future compilation of such comparative data practically impossible.

PERCENTAGE OF NEGROES IN THE PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES, BY SERVICES, JULY 1, 1949, AND JULY 1, 1954

	July 1, 1949	July 1, 1954
Army Officers	1.8	2.97
Army Enlisted Men ...	12.4	13.7
Navy Officers	0.0	0.1
Navy Enlisted Men ...	4.7	3.6
Air Force Officers	0.6	1.1
Air Force Enlisted Men	5.1	8.6
Marine Corps Officers ..	0.0	0.1
Marine Corps Enlisted Men	2.1	6.5

Assignment according to merit

Racial integration in the Armed Forces has given Negro personnel the opportunity to demonstrate skill and ability without limitations imposed by race. Furthermore it has released all personnel from numerous useless limitations centering around race. While the program has perhaps been under way for too short a time to bring about complete equity, Negroes are in responsible and important staff and field assignments on a fully integrated basis. Moreover, no unusual difficulties such as had been anticipated in some quarters have arisen out of the assumption of the command function by Negro officers and noncommissioned officers. In the Air Force one Negro officer is on active duty in the grade of brigadier general. In both the Army and the Air Force the promotion of more Negroes to that grade in the not-too-distant

[9] *Integration in the Armed Services: Progress Report,* prepared by the office of James C. Evans, Civilian Assistant, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Washington, D. C., January 1955), p. 4.

future is indicated. Advancement of qualified Negroes throughout the hierarchy increasingly becomes routine.

Navy recruit training

In the Navy the concentration of Negro personnel in the stewards branch has been traditional. A significant step toward change was taken when the Department of the Navy announced on March 1, 1954, that separate recruitment of stewards was being abolished. The effect of this change in policy was to give all seaman recruits an equal opportunity to qualify for service in any of the Navy's specialty groups at the end of recruit training. The racial concentration in the stewards branch was not immediately dissolved under the new program, but Negro recruits are now assured of the same opportunity as that of all other recruits to seek their branch of service on the basis of recruit orientation, testing, and training.

The Marine Corps

A tradition of 167 years was broken when the United States Marine Corps accepted Negroes in 1942. The total inclusion approached twenty thousand before the end of World War II. After baptism of fire on Saipan, the Commandant of the Marine Corps announced, "The Negro Marines are no longer on trial. They are Marines, period." [10]

Service records of individuals and of units facilitated another departure from tradition in implementing the integration policy. This, when promulgated, proceeded without incident on the same timetable as the other services.

Air Force technical training

The Air Force accumulated considerable experience in integration as a result of a policy decision made in connection with Air Force training contracts with schools in states with racial segregation laws. The policy statement read:

> The Air Force will let contracts for technical training in civilian schools in accordance with the effectiveness of the service that the school can render to the Air Force. When airmen are to be sent to schools in States having statutes requiring segregation, Negro airmen will be given the option of not going if they choose. In that event, the Negro airman will be sent to a school which can accept both white and Negro airmen.

Schools for dependents

Without any formal directive, in a number of states several schools for dependents, located on government property, had been operating for some time, without incident, on a racially integrated basis. As the question of integration in public schools received widespread attention, it was determined as a matter of policy that with the beginning of the 1953 fall term all such schools operated by the military on military posts and stations would be organized and conducted on an integrated basis. This policy was carried out on schedule.

Policy concerning schools located on military installations but operated by local educational agencies was announced on January 12, 1954, when the Secretary of Defense directed "that the operation of all school facilities located on military installations shall be conducted without segregation on the basis of race or color," regardless of other considerations. He stipulated that this policy would be put into effect "as soon as practicable, and under no circumstances later than September 1, 1955." It will be noted that the United States Supreme Court decision against segregation in public schools followed four months after the announcement of the Secretary of Defense. At the present time all such schools are fully integrated, except two where negotiations are in progress centering around long-term leases still in force.

[10] Jean Byers, "A Study of the Negro in Military Service" (unpublished; 1947), p. 253.

Defense contracts

In a directive issued June 11, 1954, the Secretary of Defense provided for a program to familiarize contracting officers, contract administrators, and other personnel concerned with procurement with "the spirit, intent, and requirements of the President's policy" of nondiscrimination with respect to government contracts. In implementing this directive the Army, Navy, and Air Force conduct educational programs to impress upon contractors their responsibilities with respect to nondiscrimination in employment.

Civilian employment

It is also the established policy of the Department of Defense that its own civil-service employees shall not be discriminated against because of race, sex, color, or religion. Fair practices officers implement this policy. Nevertheless, it must be said that the utilization of individual Negro employees, especially Negro women, at maximum potential often appears as only a distant objective. Continuous evaluation of impeding factors is being made, and some progress has been noted. However, much remains to be done before complete equity is achieved in testing, selection, orientation, training, assignment, guidance, and advancement of Negro employees. The situation is neither explained nor resolved by pointing out that conditions are not measurably better elsewhere, except in the uniform of the Armed Forces. Improvements apparently depend on educational efforts and the enforcement of the fair employment practices programs of the government, the department, and the services.

Civilian employee facilities

On the other side of the picture, the Secretary of the Navy on August 20, 1953, directed the complete elimination of all barriers to the free use of previously segregated facilities for civilian employees on government-owned shore stations of the Navy. Despite evidences of objection to this modification of customs of long standing in some sections, effective negotiations and follow-up brought about full implementation of the directive. Concurrently, similar measures were taken by the Army and Air Force, with a minimum of publicity and with no untoward incidents.

The Secretary to the Cabinet, in citing examples of accomplishments in the field of civil rights in a 1955 Columbus Day address, said:

> If you have been in the Naval yards at Norfolk, Virginia, or Charleston, South Carolina, you have seen the change that came about when segregation was abolished in connection with all facilities used by civilian employees. If you have been on any military base—in the Deep South or in Greenland—you have seen Negro and white working and relaxing together. . . .

Community relations

Community mores with respect to race vary from locality to locality in the United States and in different parts of the world. It is paradoxical that the Negro citizen in uniform has frequently been made to feel more at home overseas than in his or her home town. Such matters are largely beyond the direct purview of the Department of Defense. Even so, marked progress has been made in clarifying civilian-military relationships off duty and off post, and achievements to date in replacing controversy with co-operative effort reflect credit upon the services and upon the commands immediately concerned.

When it is suggested that this clear-

cut development in the military services has significance for the social sciences, reactions vary, ranging from studied doubt of the reality of the development to denial of its applicability to the social milieu outside the military. Nevertheless, without untoward incidents of consequence, the Armed Forces, as a concomitant of efforts to improve military efficiency through the elimination of racial segregation, have developed within their own communities, both in the United States and overseas, examples of racial integration in housing, transportation, religious worship, education, recreation, and other aspects of community life for service personnel, civilian employees, and their families that are now the rule rather than the exception.

SUMMARY

The widely publicized and generally accepted thesis that the Armed Forces have in fact effected racial integration in all their activities is supported by the evidence. The documentation of this development will expand as the records increasingly become available for study.[11]

The operation was thoroughly planned in accordance with procedure for operations of such size and was carried out by personnel at all echelons under clear and unequivocal directives. There have been no untoward incidents of consequence. The fighting forces have been strengthened rather than weakened.

Combat effectiveness is increased as individual capabilities rather than racial designations determine assignments and promotions. Economies in manpower and funds are achieved by the elimination of racially duplicated facilities and operations. Above all, our national security is improved by the more effective utilization of military personnel, regardless of race.[12]

A new standard of achievement in human relations has been raised. It cannot be doubted that the results have benefited the services and the nation at home and abroad.

More remains to be done. This account has pointed out some areas of needed improvement. The rate of progress has varied from service to service and, as in all other such developments, there are and will be instances of discrimination that must be dealt with as they arise. Progress in civilian personnel employment practices lags. Some major problems in ROTC, National Guard, and other civilian component operations not controlled solely by the federal establishment will become increasingly urgent under current laws and directives for strengthening the reserve forces. Increasingly the basis of measurement and judgment will be not the distance over which the movement and other similar movements have advanced, but the distance yet to be covered in the direction of equity. The principle of integration has been established, however, and is being successfully implemented.

A clear enunciation of the position which the Armed Forces have developed under the policies now established was made in a radio broadcast on February 17, 1954, when Dr. John A. Hannah, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, made the following statement:

> The obligations to defend our country and our beliefs are borne equally by all of our citizens without regard to race or color or religion. . . . It should be a real gratification to all thinking Americans to know that our Armed Forces are leading the way in demonstrating both at home and abroad that America provides opportunities for all of her people. . . . In spite of all predictions to the contrary, I have yet to find a field commander in any service who has anything but commendation for complete racial integration. . . . We are demonstrating in action as well as words that we really believe in social justice, economic justice, and political justice for all people of all races and colors. . . .

[11] Examples include the unpublished official volume by Major Ulysses G. Lee, "The Employment of Negro Troops in World War II," and "Project Clear," a comprehensive research report on Army integration.

[12] Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, March 31, 1955.

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Integration in Public and Private Housing

By Robert C. Weaver

RESIDENTIAL racial patterns assume new significance in light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court banning segregation in public schools. Long before this action, concentration of nonwhites in ghettos had nullified legal prohibitions above the Mason-Dixon line on racially separate schools. After the decisions, residential segregation became a principal proposal for "getting around" the Court's decrees in the South. In all regions of the nation, restriction of colored citizens to certain areas creates de facto separate neighborhoods and public facilities—including schools—thereby delaying participation and acceptance of nonwhites in the educational, political, economic, and social aspects of American life.

Integration in housing, as in other matters, is more than proximity and spatial patterns. It involves casual associations between peoples of different races and color. It is complete when people of minority and majority groups are treated as individuals with no conscious concern for their ethnic background. Had we achieved this state, there would be no occasion for the present issue of The Annals.

Publicly Assisted, Low-Rent Housing

The federal public housing program affords the most complete quantitative data on the movement toward desegregation in housing. From the beginning of the program, there was widespread minority group participation at the same time that the issue of residential segregation was seldom raised in the South and was avoided in the North.[1] By the end of World War II, northern housing authorities had made some progress toward adoption of nonsegregation policies.[2] More recently, the trend has continued at an accelerated rate, including border cities such as Baltimore, St. Louis, Washington, and Wilmington.

Figures presented in Table 1 indicate that local authorities (or states) may adopt open-occupancy policies and still not effect compliance. Where a public housing development is located in, or contiguous to, an existing, established area of nonwhite concentration, it almost invariably becomes an all-minority group project. This is occasioned by the pressure of nonwhites to get into the unit and the disinclination of whites to enter and remain in a predominantly colored community. In practice, it is difficult to maintain a racially mixed pattern of living once the proportion of nonwhite tenants exceeds 40 to 60 per cent. Also, it is more difficult to introduce white tenants into a previously all-Negro or predominantly Negro public housing project than to bring nonwhites into a previously all-white development. Either of these changes presents more problems than establishing integrated patterns of living at the outset.

By March 1955 there were nine states with open-occupancy policies governing

[1] Robert C. Weaver, *The Negro Ghetto* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1948), pp. 75–76. Public housing prior to World War II served to strengthen residential segregation in the North.

[2] *Ibid.*, Chap. X; Charles Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbors* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), Chap. XXII.

TABLE 1—Trend Toward Desegregation and Spatial Integration in Federal Public Housing Projects, 1952–55

Year	Number of States		Number of Localities				Occupied Projects in Localities Covered	
	With Open-Occupancy Policy	No Policy; One or More Projects Spatially Integrated	With Open-Occupancy Policy			No Policy; One or More Projects Spatially Integrated	Total Occupied Projects	Total Projects Spatially Integrated
			Total	One or more projects spatially integrated	No projects spatially integrated			
1952....	7	12	120	43	77	27	478	210
1953....	8	15	186	71	115	34	694	268
1954....	8	16	226	88	138	39	726	297
1955....	9	18	243	102	141	29	722[a]	341

[a] Decrease in total occupied projects due to disposition of war projects.

Source: Adapted from a table appearing in *Open Occupancy in Housing Programs of the Public Housing Administration, as of March 31, 1955* (Washington, D. C.: Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1955), p. iii.

public housing. An additional eighteen states had one or more localities with a similar policy.[3] As is illustrated in Table 2, the extent of spatial integration varied among the twenty-seven states involved. Progress toward nonsegregated patterns of living reflected the extent of nonwhite concentration in urban centers, the relative size of the Negro population, the extent of local ordinances and administrative rulings, the length of time legislation had been in force, the type of law-enforcement machinery and methods in effect, and the location of sites. In at least two southern cities, spatial integration occurred in response to the play of supply and demand.[4]

In all locations, spatial integration in public housing has brought interracial contacts. The fact that this has occurred in many communities and that it often reflects conscious efforts to change from segregated to racially mixed projects illustrates the possibilities of such actions. Also, of course, tens of thousands of white and nonwhite low-income families have discovered, some for the first time, that interracial patterns of living are practical.

Spatial Integration in Connecticut and New York

Some idea of the degree of spatial integration resulting from state and local antidiscrimination and antisegregation

[3] For a detailed analysis of state and local nondiscrimination laws and ordinances governing public housing, see "Non-Discrimination Clauses in Regard to Public Housing, Private Housing and Urban Redevelopment Undertakings" (mimeographed), Washington, D. C.: Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1955.

[4] The Housing Authority of Rayne, Louisiana, operates a seventy-six-unit project. Of the tenant households, thirteen are Negroes. This situation developed because there were chronic vacancies in the project designed for Negroes at the same time that the white project had a long waiting list.—*Open Occupancy in Housing Programs of the Public Housing Administration* (Washington, D. C.: Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1955), p. 21.

The Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Crystal City, Texas, stated in a like vein, "We had not thought of this as being anything unusual. We had . . . housing units for rent . . . and there were families who needed and wanted them . . . there have been no racial problems. . . ." As of March 1955 the thirty-two-unit project in the city had four Negro tenant families.—*Ibid.*, p. 57.

TABLE 2—EXTENT OF SPATIAL INTEGRATION IN FEDERAL PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS, 1955

States		Localities with Spatially Integrated Projects			Projects Housing Whites & Nonwhites				
Open-Occupancy Policy	No Policy But Having Some Spatially Integrated Projects	Total	Open-Occupancy Policy	No Policy	Spatially Integrated	No Pattern[a]	Separate Within Buildings	In Separate Buildings	In Transition to Spatial Integration
Totals 9	18	131	102	29	341	43	4	33	9
	Arizona	3	2	1	3	1		2	
	California	28	23	5	80	4	1	8	2
	Colorado	2	2		14				
Connecticut		14	10	4	26	3		7	1
	Delaware	2	1	1	4				1
D. C.		1	1		5				1
	Illinois	3	1	2	12	2			
	Iowa	1		1	3				
	Louisiana	1	1		1				
	Maine	1		1	2				
	Maryland	1	1		3				
Massachusetts		7	6	1	17	11			
Michigan[b]		2	2		2				
Minnesota		2	2		3	2			
	Nebraska	1	1		3		3		
	New Hampshire	1		1	1	3			
New Jersey		17	16	1	44	5			2
	New Mexico	2	2		2				
New York		12	12		49	1			1
	Ohio[a]	6	4	2	12	1			1
	Oregon	1		1	1	1			
	Pennsylvania	14	10	4	33	4		14	
Rhode Island						3		2	
	Texas	1	1		1				
	Utah	2		2	2	1			
	Washington	5	3	2	15	1			
Wisconsin		1	1		3				

[a] No pattern (too few Negroes in occupancy to form a pattern).
[b] Includes court orders.

Source: Adapted from *Open Occupancy in Housing Programs of the Public Housing Administration*, table on p. iv.

laws may be obtained by probing into racial occupancy patterns in Connecticut and New York—two states for which comprehensive data are available. The statute barring discrimination or segregation in public housing in Connecticut became effective in October 1949. By 1954, 61 per cent of the low-rent projects were spatially integrated; 27 per cent were segregated by building or section; 6 per cent were all-white and 6 per cent were all-Negro. "A shift in occupancy patterns [after passage of the legislation] is particularly noticeable among the low-rent projects. Integration [in occupancy patterns] exists in only four out of every ten projects opened prior to July 1949, whereas it exists in *all* of the projects opened in the more recent period." [5]

[5] *Racial Integration in Public Housing Projects in Connecticut* (Hartford: Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights, 1955), p. 15. The figures cited above do not include Bridgeport, the third largest center of Negro population in the state.—*Ibid.*, Table 5.

These results were obtained in a state which, at the close of 1953, had approximately 9,000 low-rent public housing units and a Negro population of about 60,000. All low-rent public housing in Connecticut was financed by the federal government. In contrast, the Negro population of New York State was about 1,000,000 by 1955. In June of that year there were in the state 146 completed low-rent public housing projects, containing 94,802 dwelling units; this housing was financed by the federal government, the state, and New York City. Sixty-eight of these completed developments were in New York City and 78 were in upstate New York. One third of all dwelling units in the program of the state were occupied by Negro families and another 8 per cent by Puerto Ricans.

New York City

Although New York City (as well as most cities in the state) started its program of public housing on a segregated basis, the local authority initiated integration in the late 1930's at the behest of the United States Housing Authority. Today, there are some Negroes in each of the low-rent projects operated by the local authority. The proportion of nonwhites (Negroes and Puerto Ricans) varies from 99.8 per cent to 9.5 per cent. Negroes are most highly concentrated in projects built on sites within established nonwhite ghettos; the next highest concentration is in sites contiguous to established ghettos; the lowest concentration is in projects furthest removed from established centers of nonwhite residence. However, the program has done more than anything else to introduce colored families into new sections of all five boroughs of the city. This is, from the point of view of accelerating spatial integration in shelter, a most important contribution, since it represents establishment of new, democratic patterns of living in scores of neighborhoods where few if any nonwhites resided before the advent of public housing in New York City.

Upstate New York

The situation outside New York City is more complicated. While in 1950 Negroes constituted 9.5 per cent of the population of the metropolis they were only 2.5 per cent of the people upstate. With the exception of Lackawanna, there was no participating upstate city outside of Westchester County in which 10 per cent or more of the population were Negroes. Actually, 95 per cent of the nonwhite households in the state were concentrated in the metropolitan area and Buffalo. In eight of the forty upstate communities having low-rent public housing programs, the nonwhite population was less than .25 per cent. It was less than 2 per cent in seven additional cities.

There are fifteen projects in upstate New York with no Negro occupants; most of them are in communities with few if any colored residents. More than half the upstate projects have fewer than 10 per cent of their units occupied by Negroes, while three have all-Negro occupancy. In Schenectady, low-rent public housing projects which were opened and operated on a segregated basis have been spatially integrated in recent years; this is one of a few local programs where whites were successfully introduced into an established all-Negro project. The first public housing project in Syracuse was planned and originally operated with a Negro wing of some sixty units. Today the number of colored households in the project has more than doubled, and the 20 per cent of the tenants who are Negro live in all

parts of the project. There are, however, in some upstate cities, local programs which have only token nonwhite participation in projects removed from centers of Negro concentration, while projects in Negro areas are still inhabited predominantly by colored families.[6]

Buffalo has a varied pattern, including an all-Negro development which was designed and operated as such from the beginning of the program in the city. On the other hand, all other projects in the authority's program have some Negroes; those removed from the center of nonwhite concentration have small proportions, ranging from 2.5 to 7.1 per cent. One project, situated in the downtown area, is becoming increasingly Negro occupied, although it still has a biracial pattern. At the outset, about 15 per cent of the occupants were Negroes; today over 50 per cent of the units are tenanted by Negroes. While whites have moved out into other areas, more and more vacancies have been taken up by nonwhites, many of whom have priority because of their displacement from slum areas which are being developed for low-rent public housing. This may be offset, however, by admission of Negroes into a new project now under construction on what was a vacant site removed from the center of Negro concentration. The situation is symptomatic of a pressing problem, indicating what is so apparent in New York and other cities, that racial patterns in a community's public housing operating under an open-occupancy policy depend, in large measure, upon the location of sites and the timing of the construction of different projects; the latter, in turn, determines whether or not eligible white and nonwhite applicants have the choice of moving into one or several developments.

[6] Recent legislation in New York State, in the form of the first Metcalf-Baker Law, has placed enforcement of the state's nondiscrimination legislation for public housing in the state Commission Against Discrimination. This should accelerate integration.

URBAN REDEVELOPMENT

A second major publicly assisted housing program is authorized under redevelopment and urban-renewal legislation. In this instance, construction is usually sponsored and financed by private enterprise, often with Federal Housing Administration insured mortgages. The land, however, is acquired (through condemnation, where necessary) by a public agency and resold at a markdown to the redeveloper. Nondiscrimination legislation applies to these programs in New York State, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as well as in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. Since this is a relatively new program, there is not yet a body of data reflecting racial occupancy patterns. Its initiation, however, is affecting adversely the stability of interracial low-rent housing projects.

About two-thirds of those displaced by redevelopment projects are nonwhites and, as relocation families, usually have a priority on vacancies in public housing projects. Their admittance often upsets the racial balance in projects, hastening a development's becoming all or predominantly Negro. At the same time, displacement of large numbers of nonwhite families incident to slum clearance and public improvements places additional pressures on all transitional neighborhoods. The resulting immediate need for shelter on the part of a large number of colored families offers great economic incentives for doubling up and improvised conversions. Where there are not effective ordinances and occupancy standards, inundation of areas is inevitable and, in its course, racially integrated neighborhoods are threatened.

PUBLICLY ASSISTED MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING

Some states, such as New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, have relatively small programs of middle-income housing. In the North, this, too, is legally open-occupancy housing. So far, however, the degree of nonwhite participation in middle-income housing has been much less than an analysis of the relative effective demand of nonwhites for this type of shelter would suggest. The one exception is in the no-cash subsidy program of the New York City Housing Authority; here, too, however, while nonwhites are in all such projects, they are, as one would expect, concentrated in the two developments located in or adjacent to Harlem, and the number and proportion of Negroes in other projects decline generally in proportion to the project's distance from existing Negro concentrations. Only one of the privately constructed, limited-dividend projects sponsored by the New York State Division of Housing and located in the New York metropolitan area has more than twenty nonwhite families; some have none. Present administration of the Division of Housing, however, is committed to de facto open occupancy in all future middle-income projects and in existing limited-dividend developments as vacancies occur.

It appears, therefore, that in the North and to a lesser degree in border cities publicly assisted housing is currently accelerating the trend toward spatially integrated living, owing mainly to the contribution which low-rent public housing programs are belatedly making in this direction. On a national front, urban renewal has, so far, been a negative force, serving generally to endanger unsegregated patterns in public housing or initiate new patterns of residential segregation in those communities where it is not prohibited to do so by law. However, where, as in New York City, there is a combination of adequate protective legislation, effective compliance machinery, and strong community consciousness on the issue, urban renewal will ultimately serve, as low-rent public housing has served, to disperse the nonwhite population in the city. Cleveland is starting to use its redevelopment program to break up an evolving Negro ghetto by bringing some of the suburbs back into the central city. As a first step, a redevelopment project on vacant land providing 1,200 units of new housing for both low and middle-income families of all racial groups is proposed.[7] These examples indicate that the program, despite its performance to date, could become a force for integrated patterns of living above the Mason-Dixon line.

PRIVATELY FINANCED HOUSING

For some time, whites have been moving out of the central city areas into restricted lily-white suburbs; simultaneously, nonwhites have entered more housing within the borders of the central cities. In the process of this population movement, nonwhites have entered new neighborhoods.

A detailed study of Negro housing in Chicago indicated that the postwar movement in that city is largely a ghetto extension. On the other hand, analysis of block statistics of the 1950 census in Detroit and Washington, while revealing a somewhat similar over-all pattern, indicated that subsequent to repudiation of judicial enforcement of racial housing covenants Negroes with high incomes have bought expensive property in areas where, both because of the remoteness of the neighborhood from centers of colored concentration and because of high selling prices of

[7] "Cleveland: City with a Deadline," *Architectural Forum,* Vol. 103, No. 2 (August 1955), pp. 135–36.

surrounding properties, the chances of total or appreciable nonwhite inundation seems remote at the present.

In Philadelphia, too, there are desirable areas of racially mixed housing which appear to be stable. One of these is a middle-class neighborhood of some thousand homes into which Negroes have recently moved without fuss. Only 80 houses changed hands in the past year; 52 of these were sold to white buyers, 26 to Negroes, and 1 to a Chinese American.[8]

Rent control, while it often delayed the entrance of nonwhites into new areas, has also sometimes served to introduce and stabilize interracial patterns of shelter, as in the following instance.

Upper Riverside Drive in New York City lies in the path of Negro expansion. Prior to rent control, few colored families had entered the area. Rent control, however, prevented eviction of existing white tenants at the same time that it limited the degree that rents could be increased for new occupants. This meant that whites, who normally might have moved out rapidly with the advent of the first colored occupants, remained in tenancy because comparable shelter was either nonexistent or priced out of their ability to pay. The incoming nonwhite tenants could be carefully chosen, and many were able to carry rental charges without resorting to overcrowding or doubling up; owners had little incentive to encourage overoccupancy, since rents were fixed in terms of former single-family use.

Thus, in many apartment houses on the Drive white and colored families of comparable economic and social status have been living together for several years. There are indications that if rent controls continue (as they probably will in Manhattan), these buildings may remain interracial for some time. The volume of middle-income construction completed, under-way, and planned in Harlem and elsewhere in Manhattan will relieve the pressure for medium-priced housing in the Negro market, thereby somewhat limiting the extent to which rents can be raised in existing dwellings in and adjacent to the area. Almost a decade of stable interracial living in upper Riverside Drive area has conditioned both white and Negro residents to such a pattern, so that some of the housing there may continue to be interracial even after rent control has been repealed.

FHA AND VA INSURED CONSTRUCTION

A final factor in this situation is the growth of nondiscrimination legislation covering credit and Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration insured construction. New Jersey has amended the state banking and building and loan association laws to include phrases requiring that mortgages be made without regard to race, creed, or color of the borrower. This should accelerate the purchase of houses by nonwhites outside existing ghettos. Even more significant is passage of the second Metcalf-Baker Law in New York, extending the definition of publicly assisted housing (prohibited to discriminate by the earlier Wicks-Austin Act of 1950) to include FHA- and VA-insured construction. The Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights has recently interpreted FHA- and VA-insured construction as publicly assisted housing, subject to the state's nondiscrimination and nonsegregation statute. New Jersey, too, is considering a bill similar to New York's second Metcalf-Baker Law. This legislation has passed the state Assembly and is now before the Senate.

Those concerned with racial problems in shelter will watch developments in New York State with interest, realizing that while compliance[9] will not, in itself, solve the housing problems of nonwhites, the impact of the law can be appreciable.

[8] "Report of Church Community Council of Pelham" (mimeographed), Philadelphia, Pa., 1955.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SPATIAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AND NORTH

Prior to the School Segregation Cases, residential segregation was less important in the South than in the North. But when the Supreme Court declared separate public schools unconstitutional, several southern leaders minimized the impact of the decision by observing that residential segregation would soften and often remove the possibility of change. Subsequently, the then President of the National Association of Home Builders, speaking in his native Texas, observed:

> The Supreme Court ruling concerning schools, in my opinion, will have a profound effect on housing at an early date. This is the most recent of a long series of rulings which have concerned the place of the minority groups in American life.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> I have felt for some time that the home building industry must tackle this problem head on and we must plan and provide adequate and good housing for minorities of this Nation in *proper areas with proper facilities* or get ready for Congress and the Courts to seek their solution by decree and statute. . . . If we meet the issue now, plan and provide the Negro with housing on comparable Financial Terms, *but in planned communities,* society will be much better off. I know we will be happier and I sincerely believe they will be happier.[10]

In a word, there are now strong institutional forces in the South dedicated to perpetuation and extension of separate areas of living for nonwhites. This will find its most effective expression in advocacy of more all-Negro, low-rent public housing, clearance of racially mixed substandard areas and their redevelopment into segregated neighborhoods under Title I projects, and promotion of new and much more attractive Negro neighborhoods.[11]

At the same time, the constant production of new housing in suburban areas in the South and the need for buyers and renters to absorb the older units, now somewhat obsolete, render the nonwhite purchaser especially attractive to those who operate in the housing market. Thus, as residential segregation is being developed in newly constructed housing, there is a concurrent movement of nonwhites into new neighborhoods. Here, again, the basic question is the stability of interracial patterns which emerge. It is clear that social, political, and prestige pressures are being exerted upon the whites to move out; economic forces are less clear. In the first place, values in transitional areas do not necessarily fall, as was formerly expected. Then, too, the crafty

[9] Owing to legislative technicalities, the second Metcalf-Baker Law does not have specific compliance machinery. Governor Harriman, however, has appointed a Compliance Committee, which is acquainting the industry with the provisions of the law, informing them of the dimensions of the problem, and urging their co-operation; it is also seeking the support and co-operation of FHA and VA.

[10] Speech of Richard Hughes before the Texas Mortgage Bankers' Association at San Antonio, Texas, May 21, 1954. Italics mine.

[11] The most dramatic development of this type is Pontchartrain Park Homes in New Orleans. It is "the fanciest minority subdivision in New Orleans (and perhaps the whole Nation)." In kicking off the mammoth sales promotion held in an auditorium-sized exhibit and sales room on New Orleans' Main Street, Mayor Morrison asserted: "The development will be super deluxe, with features that cannot be matched in the City." The subdivision is an excellently located tract of 210 acres. It encircles a 185-acre city park including an eighteen-hole golf course, swimming pool, and playgrounds. Pontchartrain Park adjoins a famed white development of high-priced homes. It will have 1,000 homes ranging in price from $9,725 to $30,000.—"Minority Housing," *House and Home,* Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 1955), pp. 146–47.

white seller may postpone closing a deal in the belief that he can do better if he does not put his house immediately on the market. In the present situation, however, this is at best a delaying influence.

In the North, interracial public housing projects throw white and colored families of similar economic background together under conditions of equality. In a number of instances, also, higher-income Negroes are moving into medium-priced homes, where they, too, become neighbors of whites with comparable social and economic backgrounds. Although many of the pressures which discourage formation of permanent patterns of unsegregated living in the South are found in the North also, their intensity is much less. Most significant, racial mixture in schools, although far from universally approved, is not emotionally charged, and the political powers of the Negro are constantly expanding the scope and efficacy of nondiscrimination legislation in housing.

Suburban housing

The key to the situation in the North, however, probably lies in the racial composition of newly constructed suburban housing. If there are effective legislative actions and if a few of the major producers of new housing establish successful open-occupancy developments, the unsegregated patterns now emerging in the older sections of northern cities will be supported. Of course, destruction of racial ghettos will not immediately result. The majority of nonwhites will continue to live in areas of high concentration, but new patterns will emerge elsewhere, and slowly the Negro and other colored groups may begin to disperse as have other ethnic city groups.

SPATIAL INTEGRATION AND RACIAL ATTITUDES IN PUBLIC HOUSING

Intergroup contacts, per se, need not, and do not always, lead to democratic interracial understanding. Under slavery, for example, there was contact and often affection. It was a fairly stable relationship in many places, but of course there was no equality. The translation of this attitude in post-Civil-War terms was found in the position of the southern conservatives who did not feel the need for total segregation, disfranchisement, and ostracism because they could maintain their position of superiority without these devices. Many among them must have realized that their program would assure the inferior status not only of Negroes but also of poor whites.

A basic question which concerns us, therefore, is the extent to which spatial integration in shelter has facilitated mutual acceptance across the color line. Where contacts have been under conditions of equality, they may be expected to have led to such acceptance and to generation of more favorable racial attitudes, and thus to be steps toward complete integration. Complete integration is used to describe a situation in which white and nonwhite families not only live in a spatially mixed community but also accept one another, associate without self-consciousness, and do not look forward to release from each other as neighbors. Social relations need not be close—just as persons in an all-white or an all-Negro community co-operate on mutual problems without necessarily accepting all, or perhaps any, of their neighbors as social intimates. Obviously, such integration in an apartment in Manhattan would manifest itself quite differently from integration in a suburban community or in a small town in New England or the Middle West.

There are a few recent, carefully designed studies of racial attitudes in spatially integrated public housing projects. Racial attitudes in completely mixed projects are compared with those where there was partial segregation or separate projects.

A basic, and anticipated, revelation of studies of racial attitudes in spatially integrated public housing units is that opportunities and likelihood of getting to know persons of a different race are greater. This is a matter not only of proximity but also of the acceptability in integrated units of interracial contacts, for different occupancy patterns are closely correlated with differences as to how one is expected to behave. It has been observed also that the influence of living together is strong enough to reverse relationships often encountered in research studies between prejudiced attitudes and such factors as religion or political attitudes. There were, of course, more contacts, and approval of contacts, between children than between adults.

An advance toward complete integration

Spatially integrated projects represent a "real, though limited advance in the direction of integrating Negroes into the total life of the community."[12] Actually, the greatest amount of interaction between white and colored tenants took place in homes of the participants. Neighborly actions, such as helping each other in times of sickness, were most frequent; next were things like having tea and coffee together or minding one another's children. Least frequent were activities extending outside the project, such as shopping or going to the movies together.

The contrast between internal and external contacts and influences found another expression. While both white and Negro parents in public housing developments in Connecticut felt that it was desirable for children of both races to play together, whites, in general, would prefer to live in all-white projects. Although, to date, the integration achieved in some Connecticut public housing projects has been primarily of a physical nature—especially in the case of adults—the present spatial arrangements offer a basis for developing feelings of real neighborliness. Potentialities in the situation have seldom been fully realized, owing largely to a lack of management-staff orientation, failure to encourage tenant organizations, and absence of effective programs for interracial understanding. Results to date, however, suggest that spatially integrated housing may become a real factor in achieving real integration. Since the studies of attitudes now available to us indicate that fear of losing social status is a basic deterrent to such results, it is necessary to look beyond the projects into the larger society which does so much to form attitudes and direct behavior in public housing developments and elsewhere.

REACTION TO NEGRO NEIGHBORS

The classic response to Negro migration into new residential areas has been white flight. This process, so frequent in its occurrence and so dramatic in its consequences, has often blinded the public to the fact that it has never been the universal pattern. Actually, even in cities where the Negro ghetto or ghettos are rapidly expanding, there have been and are middle-income neighborhoods in which whites and nonwhites live side by side. Where the colored population is small, similar areas have maintained stability and whites have not abandoned them.

Washington, D. C., offers an example

[12] *Racial Integration in Public Housing Projects in Connecticut* (cited note 5 *supra*), p. 64.

of the former situation. Because a number of Negroes in the nation's capital have for several generations enjoyed steady incomes, they have long sought and secured attractive homes, thereby anticipating a current national trend. The entrance of colored families into Brookland, a suburb of medium-priced homes in Washington, is a case in point. In this instance, white and nonwhite families of comparable incomes have lived side by side for some sixty years. With the rapid increase in the Negro population and recent significant improvement in economic status, nonwhite demand has exerted great pressure on Brookland—the most desirable suburb occupied by nonwhites prior to 1948. Consequently there was a threat of inundation. Whites in Brookland and adjacent areas, however, resisted the idea of leaving their established homes, and repudiation of restricted housing covenants served to open other desirable neighborhoods to colored purchasers. As a result of these developments, there has been an easement of the pressure of nonwhite demand in Brookland and its environs.

In Duluth, Minnesota, where there is a small Negro population, almost all nonwhites live in neighborhoods that are predominantly white. A recent survey of the Negro population in the city reported that an overwhelming majority of the colored residents did not feel they had been victims of racial discrimination.[13] Similar patterns of dispersion exist in many smaller cities in various sections of the nation.

Acceptance of a few Negro families in an area

In the last decade a new trend is appearing. It finds expression in the entrance of a few Negroes into desirable medium-cost neighborhoods, where they purchase or build homes. Their reception has varied, but there are signs that whites are no longer generally fleeing in fear of inundation or destruction of property values. In Minneapolis, for example, it was reported that when a single Negro family moves into an otherwise white neighborhood there is a tendency to accept or accommodate to him as a neighbor. As in public housing, where whites lived close to, and had contact with, nonwhite neighbors they were more favorable to them and to interracial contacts than those who lived further away, a tendency that was more pronounced in areas where Negroes had been living for at least ten years. Thus, it appears that in northern cities where there is a scattering of Negro families living in predominantly white areas, whites are increasingly accommodating to, and accepting, them as neighbors.

Similar reactions were reported in the San Francisco area. Some 550 white residents in 35 neighborhoods containing not less than one or more than five nonwhite families were interviewed. The neighborhoods were all above the slum level. One hundred and fifty of those questioned had moved into the area after at least one nonwhite family was resident therein. Eighty per cent stated that the presence of colored neighbors made no difference to them. The majority felt that the presence of nonwhites had made no change in property values; 12.5 per cent thought that property values had declined because of the presence of nonwhites, but 19 per cent felt these same values had increased. Most had no contacts or extremely casual contacts with their Negro neighbors; however, it is difficult to determine whether this reflects racial attitudes or the pattern of social relationships in a metropolitan center.

[13] Gus Turberville, "The Negro Population in Duluth, Minnesota, 1950," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 36 (March–April, 1952), pp. 231–38.

> In general [the study records], the findings . . . appear to indicate that the large majority of white residents in the 35 neighborhoods studied have witnessed the coming of non-white neighbors with equanimity. This is not to say that the white residents have looked upon this development with favor, but they have accepted it and adjusted themselves to it with little outward show of disturbance. Indeed, to the large majority of respondents, whether or not a few members of racial minority groups take up residence in their neighborhoods appears not to be a subject of particular importance.[14]

These evidences of acceptance could be expanded, suggesting what *House and Home* characterized as evidence "that some city neighborhoods—at least in the North—are ready to accept immigrant Negroes without fuss."[15] In some places, there is more than accommodation and acceptance: the beginnings of real integration are revealed. One such instance is occurring in Westchester County, where seven Negro families live in a community of forty-five homes valued from $20,000 to $45,000. The nonwhites, like their neighbors, are business and professional people. Colored residents participate rather freely in community affairs, and the current president of the civic association is a Negro doctor.

Although there is no overwhelming body of evidence indicating a break in the color bar in housing, signs of change are appearing. When viewed in the light of general trends away from segregation, it is clear that housing has lagged and is lagging in the development of interracial patterns. At the same time, it has responded to new situations occasioned by successful litigation against racial restrictive covenants, appreciable improvement in the Negro's economic status, desegregation legislation in the North, and the general weakening of the color line. These forces cannot be denied, and already we are moving toward increasing acceptance of Americans as individuals. When we do so on the neighborhood level, substance will be given to antidiscrimination and antisegregation legislation and policies in other aspects of life.

[14] Davis McEntire, "A Study of Racial Attitudes in Neighborhoods Infiltrated by Non-Whites" (mimeographed) (Berkeley: University of California, 1955), p. 4. The study also appeared under the same title in *Bay Area Real Estate Report* (San Francisco), Second Quarter, 1955, pp. 126–29.

[15] "Minority Housing" (cited note 11 *supra*), p. 194.

Robert C. Weaver, Ph.D., New York City, recently appointed state rent administrator, Temporary State Housing Rent Commission, State of New York, was previously the state's deputy commissioner of housing. He has served as consultant to the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration, special assistant to the Administrator of the United States Housing Authority, executive director of the Chicago Mayor's Commission on Human Relations, visiting professor at Teachers College of Columbia University, visiting professor at the School of Education of New York University and director of Opportunity Fellowships of the John Hay Whitney Foundation. He is author of Negro Labor: A National Problem (1946) and The Negro Ghetto (1948).

Eliminating Educational Segregation in the Nation's Capital—1951-1955

By Irene Osborne and Richard K. Bennett

IN September 1951 the Community Relations Program of the American Friends Service Committee began a project designed to aid in the elimination of segregation in the city of Washington. Extensive practices of racial exclusion and discrimination were especially significant and disturbing in the city which symbolizes a democratic people and expresses the nation's will to a watchful world. When we began this Quaker program we had no clear idea of how we could help. We did have a conviction that to segregate is to do harm, that people would rather do better, that the means could be found to right a great wrong. This is the story of that Quaker project.

The four-year program did its work with two staff members during the first three years, with only one for the final year. We began with a job description which read only, "See what you can do about segregation in the nation's capital." Often uncertain and sometimes afraid, we knew that we must learn and that we would need the help of other people.

The decision to concentrate on problems of segregation in the fields of education and recreation was made early. We first took a look at the city to find where progress in desegregation was taking place and where it was lacking, and to determine the resources and needs of an already established structure of citizens' organizations. When we had completed our first, intensive look, we felt that we saw the need for additional organizational effort.

Basic to all other forms of segregation was the absolutely dual school system. It kept white and Negro children apart in the years that counted most. It left no areas for joint effort of white and Negro parents or white and Negro teachers. The school structure was widely cited as the reason for a similar pattern in other institutions. Although citizens had protested and opposed school segregation for years, repeated failure and an awareness of the great difficulty of doing the job hampered effective action and resulted in apathy. School and District officials took the view that the school laws required complete segregation. Real communication was not possible while the basic issue, that of the immorality and human wastefulness of segregation, was not even accessible for discussion.

Closely allied to the school system was the public recreation system. The Recreation Board in 1949 had adopted an official policy of gradual desegregation of its playgrounds. In the first three years, under the gradual policy, only 30 out of 140 areas had been opened for interracial use. On most of the interracial playgrounds, more effective programing was still needed.

The years 1951 to 1955 proved to be dramatic for the history of the city and for the story of desegregation. In these years, the city made changes in its racial practices so rapidly as to be startling to even the most optimistic. These changes grew out of complex social, economic, and political forces world wide in scope. The city's progress reflects

untold hours of labor by its citizens. The social action movement toward desegregation has at long last begun to reach its goal. Most of its heroes are unknown and unsung.

Washington As a Community

Washington's people number more than three-quarters of a million. The metropolitan area, including suburban areas in Virginia and Maryland, has a population of well over a million.

The District of Columbia is the home of the voteless citizen. It has no local self-government, no Congressman or Senator, no voice in the selection of the President. It is governed by a Board of Commissioners appointed by the President; Congress is its legislative body; its institutions depend upon the authority of numerous federal government departments and local independent boards. Hence, the lack of clear centers of authority and responsibility makes citizen action the more difficult.

Economically, the city is unlike any other. The federal government is its principal employer. It has no productive industry and, consequently, it is lacking both in business tycoons and in labor organization. An unusual portion of its citizens are white-collar workers: professionals and technicians, idea men, executives, secretaries, clerks. Another large group is in the service occupations. The number of skilled and semiskilled laborers is proportionately lower than is normally the case in other communities.

Race relations in Washington have an importance that is widely recognized. More than a third of the population are Negroes. The Negro community is complex and highly organized. It has a well-developed aristocracy and a large middle class as well as the impoverished. At one extreme, it has technicians and professionals in government, medical specialists and lawyers, teachers and administrators. At the other extreme are those who dwell in the Washington slums: service employees, unskilled laborers, and the marginally employed. In between are an unusually large number of Negro secretaries, clerks, messengers, postmen, policemen, cab drivers.

With homes spread over most areas of the city, Washington Negroes are less "ghettoized" than in most American communities. Their numbers have increased through continuous in-migration. White families, especially those with children, have been moving to the suburbs for many years. Negro families, restricted by discrimination in housing, have remained in the District with their children.

Toward First-Class Citizenship

In 1951, when AFSC began its program, the city was rigidly segregated. With few exceptions, restaurants and theaters and hotels excluded Negroes altogether. The dual pattern obtained in schools, churches, civic organizations, and in many professional societies, character-building agencies, and clubs and associations. Discriminatory practices, often outright segregation, occurred in hospitals and medical services, welfare agencies, and the District government. Discrimination in employment presented a major problem. Traditional restrictions in housing remained, even under the pressure of the needs of an expanding Negro population.

Even so, there were areas relatively free from segregation. The public transportation system carried passengers without segregated seating. In many government offices Negro and white employees worked side by side. All government cafeterias, serving thousands daily, were open to everyone. A few churches had interracial membership. All but one of the city's universities had open admission policies. Many organizations which were opposed to segrega-

tion on principle had open membership. Negro and white children, often neighbors, played together in the yards and on the streets.

Things were changing, though the change often seemed slow. The more sophisticated "art" movie theaters began to admit patrons without discrimination. Legitimate and concert stage opened to everyone after some years of many and varied pressures. The better hotels often served banquets or conventions on an interracial basis, and a few accepted individual Negro guests. Restaurants began to change policy one by one, and the "open" list was a growing one.

A major break in the segregation pattern came with the Thompson Restaurant decision in June of 1953. The Supreme Court declared still valid an 1873 law forbidding discrimination in eating places. The decision was known and understood by everyone in the city. The Commissioners announced that they would enforce the law. The Restaurant Association advised its members to comply. Literally overnight, restaurants opened their service to everyone.

During the next year, other changes followed. All movie houses opened their doors, after agreement among the three large chains. The Commissioners announced a policy of nondiscrimination for the District government, both in employment and service. The District of Columbia Medical Association admitted some Negro members. More hotels eased their restrictions. Negroes made gains in employment, especially at the professional level.

The school decision in 1954 provided the next major change. The Board of Education moved quickly to an agreement to undertake a desegregation program. The Board of Recreation promptly removed all racial designations from its playgrounds. The work of implementation began. A number of organizations followed the lead of the public schools: settlement houses, children's organizations, parent-teacher associations, and one university, the last to drop restrictions. First steps were taken to desegregate the Fire Department, a job long delayed by false starts.

The city has taken on a new look. For the individual Negro there is freedom of movement and greater opportunity. For the Negro community, there is a lowering of barriers, the beginning of merger with the whole. For the city and the nation it symbolizes, there is greater dignity.

There are still problems. The school desegregation program is not yet complete. Hotel policy is shifting and confused. The Metropolitan Police Boys' Club, a semipublic agency, remains segregated despite extensive and continued protest from citizens' groups. Much remains undone in medical service, social work, and religious institutions. Employment and housing are still riddled with discriminatory practices.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FROM A DUAL SYSTEM TO AN ACTIVE PROGRAM OF DESEGREGATION

The public school system is a large and complex one, enrolling more than a hundred thousand school children. Over half of its children and teachers are Negroes. In 1951, when we began work, the dual pattern was an absolute one, separating pupils at all levels from the kindergarten through the teachers' colleges. Teachers, principles, and administrators were racially appointed and assigned with equal strictness. Division I for white children and Division II for Negro children were operated as separate and distinct units.

School problems

School officials and the community struggled with serious school problems created by rising enrollments, an old and inadequate school plant, and a stringent operating budget. The dual system accentuated these problems and produced many unnecessary ones.

Increasing enrollments in Negro schools resulted in severe overcrowding. Enrollments in white schools declined, leaving empty seats and unused facilities. The rigid color line served as an absolute barrier to matching facilities and services with need.

The problem of teacher supply and assignment was especially troublesome. There was a shortage of salaries for teachers in the Negro division, so their schools were understaffed, even though there was no shortage of available Negro teachers. White secondary schools still retained excess teachers, who could not be assigned to meet the pressing needs in the Negro high schools. The white elementary schools faced a shortage of qualified applicants and regularly employed teachers who could not qualify for certification.

The Board of Education and the Superintendent were unwilling to discuss the basic issue of segregation. Mindful of the "separate but equal" doctrine, they were reluctant to admit inequities. Year by year, they made piecemeal adjustments, always too little and too late. Teachers' salaries for Negro schools were created from savings and borrowed from white schools in a hasty scramble that recurred every fall. Negro schools converted playrooms and auditoriums into classrooms, went on double shifts, and struggled with oversized classes, often in neighborhoods where there were half-filled white schools nearby. Schools were transferred from white to Negro use, creating neighborhood tension and public strife as Negro parents proclaimed their need and white parents protested loss of schools.

The consequences for the education of children were chronic and severe. There was less for the Negro child: less for him to work with, less service to meet his need, and, as a result, less recognition of him as a person. Operation of the entire system inevitably became uneconomical, inefficient, and inflexible, with consequent loss for all children and for the community.

The public scarcely realized how closely the problems related to segregation. White citizens, even those relatively free from prejudice, had too little knowledge and too little involvement with the real problems. Negro citizens suffered both from discouragement and from growing resentment.

Stirrings in 1952

The year 1952 vibrated with major stirrings over the school issue. Controversies about school transfers were so severe that the racial implications could no longer be concealed. Citizens' groups became more active in demonstrating to the public the meaning of segregation. The Board, in some confusion, ordered a study of the savings to be expected under integration, then fearfully reversed itself and called a halt to the study. The press gave increasing space to school news. Three new Board members were appointed, more liberal than those they replaced. It began to be said, "Of course, the schools will some day be integrated." While the day still belonged to a vague future, many began to believe, hopefully or fearfully, that it would come "in our time."

In December of 1952, the Supreme Court held its first hearing on the package of four state cases and ***Bolling v. Sharpe***, the District school case. The atmosphere in Washington changed noticeably: there was heightened public awareness and official interest on the part of the Board, which voted to seek the advice of the community on how desegregation should be best accomplished, "in the event the Court should so order."

Discussion and planning

The procedure for receiving citizens' views engaged public attention for several months. Individuals and organizations sent in writing their recommendations on how to make the transition and the "necessary educational preparation." The Superintendent reported to the Board on citizen comment. Then, the Board invited a group of leading citizens to speak to them on the subject. Those opposed to integration boycotted the entire proceeding throughout, calling it "premature." Consequently, the views that went on the record were largely those of sympathetic people who had given some thought to the subject. There was substantial agreement among those reporting that an integrated school system should be established by making pupil assignments on a geographic basis without regard to race and by providing for integration of teaching staffs.

The Board refused to engage in further public discussion of the subject, but school officers in closed meeting began giving regular attention to planning for desegregation. Public interest grew. Organizations increasingly presented meetings on desegregation and on the general theme of racial understanding. The more committed groups began studying the record of experience in desegregation in other areas of the country. Teachers and principals now believed that the day was, indeed, near; and many were considering what might be expected of them.

Naturally, there were viewers-with-alarm. It was said that white teachers would resign; that Washington teachers could not do an adequate job; that white parents would take their children out of a school; that Negroes did not want integration; that school officials would never do an honest job; that chaos would result. Still the thinking and planning went on.

In June of 1953, the Supreme Court announced its order for further argument and posed its five famous questions. The next school year, 1953–54, was a difficult one. Severe school problems continued, with the segregated solutions hopelessly inadequate. Facing an uncertain future, school people felt growing anxiety and unease. Still, much constructive interest of citizens continued. School officials proceeded with plans that remained unpublicized. An administrative and teacher committee undertook planning of intercultural education, resulting in a series of workshops in human relations for principals and administrators.

Washington declares for prompt desegregation

When the decision came on May 17, 1954, the stage was set for action. After a confused twenty-four hours, officials decided to proceed with desegregation at once. On May 25, the Board of Education adopted a forthright statement of policy, affirming its intention to operate an integrated school system on a nondiscriminatory basis. Throughout the summer, Board and community debated the plan the Superintendent announced for making the transition. The plan was criticized, altered, criticized, and altered again. A new zoning map was drawn setting boundary lines on a desegregated basis.

School opened in September 1954 with 122 schools having mixed student bodies, affecting about two-thirds of the city's school children. Thirty-eight faculties were integrated. Children had been transferred from overcrowded Negro schools into white schools. Some inconvenient school assignments had been corrected. Newly enrolling children were assigned according to the new map. Some thousands of children were granted optional transfers.

Beginning in 1955, all who wish may attend school on the basis of the desegregated boundary lines. Those first entering are required to do so. By 1960, attendance within new zones will be fully enforced for all pupils.

Opposition to desegregation was expressed in a court suit which failed, in a three-day student demonstration that remained peaceful and unsuccessful, and in considerable public talk. The community accepted the fact of desegregation, settled down to the reality, and did a creditable job of working in the new situation. Teachers did not resign, but stayed at work and did well.

There are criticisms of the plan: the option feature (allowing children to stay where enrolled until graduation) acts as a brake on the desegregation process; desegregation is largely a one-way process, with most transfers from Negro schools into white schools; little has been accomplished and little tried by way of integrating Negro schools. The first-year steps were partial, still discriminating against many and using several sets of rules as to where children should enroll. Still, much de facto integration was accomplished, demonstrating how much can be done in a short time.

On the job and learning

The first year was a year of learning. The emphasis shifted from the policy makers to the practitioner on the job. Both Negro and white teachers learned, largely by knowing each other and by overcoming their own anxieties about race. Children adjusted to changes in their school assignment and to new faces in the classroom. Parents began to work together in integrated PTA's. The administrative staff was reorganized, so that both white and Negro officers served teachers and children of both races. With the hurdle of desegregation over, the way was open for integration to begin.

AFSC PROGRAM IN OPERATION

We heard many citizens complain that school controversies were so involved they could not understand the issues. To meet this need, we published a regular newsletter on local school problems. We reported desegregation news from around the country and made regular reports on the legal status of the school cases. Later, the newsletter was most useful in reporting to the public the administrative plans for desegregating the schools, outlining the first steps taken, and following the course of the first year's desegregation program.

Assembling facts

We learned quickly that we could not talk with officials or, indeed, with the public about local problems unless we were well informed. We found that the public had a genuine hunger for further knowledge. So we undertook the job of assembling major facts about local schools and the recreation system. We spent many hours analyzing material, figuring pupil-teacher ratios, and setting up tables. We were particularly alert to the kinds of facts which demonstrated the inequality of a segregated system and the impossibility of solving problems through any means other than integration. Finding wide interest, we kept a file of current data, such as enrollments, conditions of school buildings, class sizes, and pupil-teacher ratio. Throughout the program we had many calls for such material. Some groups needed it for their own study; some as a basis for testimony in hearings on school or recreation budgets; and some for support of statements they were making to the Boards.

Requests for advice

As local interest developed, our office received an increasing number of requests for assistance to groups. Most

frequent requests were for advice on program or leads to speakers. At times organizational leaders sought guidance in difficult situations where the membership was resistant and fearful of conflict within the group. We were sometimes asked to help in starting something new. In response to such requests, staff members gave information, advised on programs, found speakers, offered counsel, and acted as trouble shooters.

Issue of teacher integration

As the school integration question developed, the issue of teachers came more and more under discussion. We felt we needed evidence on experience with teacher integration. In 1952, we wrote to the superintendents of a number of integrated school systems throughout the country. We inquired whether they had any integrated teaching staffs and, if so, how this policy worked out in practice. We were able, through this procedure, to locate fifty-five cities in which integrated teaching staffs were used. Comments made by the superintendents gave eloquent documentation of the success of teacher integration and acceptance by the public. This material was most helpful at the time Washingtonians and officials were giving serious attention to the hows of integration.

THE SEMINAR TECHNIQUE

For many years AFSC has used the seminar as a method of education. It is a method which relies on group-shared experience. It is flexible, suitable for use on any human problem. In the Washington program, we adapted it for use in helping teachers consider their role in an integrated school system.

Teachers preparing for integration

We offered the first seminar, entitled "Classroom Problems of an Integrated School System," in February of 1953. We had planned for a group of about thirty, but found that we had over a hundred applications. To meet the demand, we arranged an additional seminar in March and another in May. For the school year 1953–54, we planned four seminars in a series called "Let's Talk It Over."

Each seminar began after school on Friday and continued through dinner and the evening. The group reconvened on Saturday for an all-day session ending at teatime. The meetings were held at Davis House, an AFSC guest house. The setting was informal and friendly, allowing time for leisurely meals and impromptu conversation.

Major emphasis was placed on discussion by the total group. A permissive atmosphere encouraged teachers to speak frankly and think honestly. We chose as chairman a group leader experienced in working with teachers. Other consultants included teachers in integrated situations, those with experience with the transition process, and specialists in intergroup education and human relations. At times the group used films, role-playing, rumor clinics, small group buzz sessions, and pamphlet and display material.

Attention centered on the questions most on the minds of the participants: What are the special problems that occur when schools are changed from a segregated to an integrated basis? What are the teacher's special responsibilities in the transition period? How can we involve the community in planning and carrying out the school program? What are the insecurities that teachers feel as professional people? How can we build security in people so that they can meet changing conditions? What classroom methods can the teacher use to be of help to the children? How can we affect favorably the intergroup attitudes of children?

Seminar information was distributed to all schools with the co-operation of the school administration. Teachers attended on their own initiative. Although principals and administrators were encouraged to attend, we took care to ensure that each group contained a majority of classroom teachers. Each group was interracial.

Participants differed widely in background with respect to questions of race relations. Meeting together were crusaders in the cause of integration and the reluctant, the fearful, the antagonistic. Convinced that school integration would come, teachers were aware of the problem and a need for help. Consequently, there was no danger of simply "talking to the already convinced." Here the line between education and social action disappeared; the seminar was both. These seminars demonstrated a number of positive outcomes which can be achieved through short-term discussion.

Board members

A similar seminar was offered in March of 1954 for members of the Boards of Education and Recreation and those of private agencies serving children and young people. Agencies were aware of growing responsibility in the area of race relations. The Boards of Education and Recreation were anticipating a Supreme Court decision which would affect their operation. Most private agencies were still segregated, and their boards had begun to consider the need for a change in policy. Seminar invitations were issued to individual board members in co-operation with United Community Services. Thirty-eight persons attended, representing a variety of services. The group discussed the relation of the agency to its neighborhood and community, the role of the board in setting policy, and the needs of staff in building interracial programs.

High school leadership group

After the Supreme Court decision, a group of high school students eagerly expressed interest in finding some opportunity for white and Negro students to talk together about forthcoming integration. To meet this need, AFSC and the Anti-Defamation League worked together in offering a seminar, held in June of 1954. Students attended from high schools to be integrated in September, from other public schools throughout the city, and from some private schools. A senior from Sidwell Friends School acted as chairman. Students talked about their own attitudes and those of others. They discussed means of ensuring a place for everyone in school activities. They aired racial stereotypes and checked recurring rumors, moving toward a more realistic perspective. They expressed much idealism, much willingness to be natural themselves. They were a leadership group and shared awareness of the responsibilities of leadership.

ACHIEVING DESEGREGATION

As citizen groups undertook study of how the transition to integration can best be made, they expressed a need to learn more about experience in other parts of the country. To meet this need, AFSC staff looked into the published material about desegregation, made some visits to newly integrated schools, and talked with those who had made an intensive study. We were then able to offer some materials, suggest leads for further study, and report some conclusions based on experience. Requests for such material and advice came from Washingtonians and from people throughout the South.

When Washington citizens were writing their views to the Board of Education, we worked closely with the Joint Committee on Education in giving help.

With the Joint Committee, we prepared an outline of suggested topics and major principles to be governing in an integrated system. We gave help to many groups in writing their statements.

A pamphlet, *Working Together: Integration of Washington Schools,* was published on the eve of the Supreme Court decision in 1954. It reported the Service Committee's recommendations for integration of Washington's schools, based upon the observation and study of staff members. In public discussions of coming integration, certain questions were asked again and again. Some were expressions of stereotyped thinking. Some reflected an honest desire for information. Still others were mainly expressions of anxiety and concern about the success of an integration program. The pamphlet attempted to answer twenty-four of those questions most often asked.

We began early to talk with Board members about the most effective means of desegregation. We stressed the need for a clear statement of policy and for prompt and decisive action. We advised pupil assignment without regard to race and urged that teacher integration be undertaken along with pupil integration, following the principle of employment on merit.

When the Supreme Court made its 1954 decision, we joined with other community groups in asking for immediate adoption of a desegregation program. As plans were announced throughout the summer, we made critical appraisals, commending the Board for its prompt policy statement and stating our objection to delays and compromises in the administrative program.

Watching the Desegregation Program in Action

As Washington schools entered their first year of integration, requests came from every side for information about the school program. Citizen groups wanted to know how it was working and what the problems were. Parents wanted explanation of the plan and their children's rights under it. People in southern areas wondered what they could learn from the Washington experience. Reporters and magazine writers asked for information and leads to stories.

Keeping up with events

The staff undertook to keep up with events. We talked with teachers and principals, visited schools, studied school statistics. Finding a bewildering variety of experience in different schools, we looked for major conclusions to be distilled from the total experience.

When the student demonstration occurred in October 1954, we joined other community groups in emergency action. The groups met daily while pupils were remaining out, sent observers to the affected schools, and talked with District officials and the press about the best handling of the situation. When the demonstration ended, we commended District and school officials for holding firmly to principle and joined them in discussion of the implications of the incident. All agreed that student actions were to be taken more as adventures than as displays of hostility. Demonstrations were not major disturbances of the peace nor deterrents to the desegregation program.

Throughout the year, there was need for appraisal of new steps taken, conferences on snags, re-evaluations of policy and practice. The school administrative staff was reorganized to provide for integrated operation; there was public controversy about some of the new assignments and criticism because some steps were not completed when the year ended. PTA's and civic groups called upon AFSC for evaluative comments and public reports. There were countless rumors about school operation, rumors that needed careful checking to separate fact from fancy.

New questions

A new set of questions was being raised now when citizen groups discussed desegregation: "Is integration lowering school standards?" We found no such danger. Schools were developing improved programs to meet varied needs. "Is integration creating problems?" Integration has solved the most severe school problems: through better use of its facilities, the school system can now do a better job of meeting problems as they arise. "Are white families moving out of the District because of integration?" Movement to the suburbs has been going on for many years; this year's changes occurred in areas of the city where the white population was already rapidly decreasing and merely continued a long-time trend.

The Right of Every Child

AFSC reported on Washington school desegregation in a pamphlet, *The Right of Every Child,* published in 1955. The pamphlet described the Washington plan and the steps taken during the first year. Attention is given to the experience of children and teachers within the integrated schools. The report made a critical evaluation of the policy and its implementation.

Deaf Children

AFSC took an interest in arrangements for the education of deaf children, who are trained at District expense at the Columbia Institution for the Deaf. Prior to 1952, only white children were placed in the Columbia Institution; Negro children were sent to a segregated Maryland school and an integrated school for the blind in Pennsylvania. A United States District Court ruling of 1952 resulted in arrangements for Negro children also to attend the Columbia Institution. At first, they were in segregated classes. After the 1954 school decision, complete integration was effected, both in classes and in living quarters. We worked with several community groups, led by the American Veterans Committee, in expressing criticism of earlier discriminatory practices, conferring with officials, and visiting the school.

Teachers' College

Under segregation Wilson Teachers' College for white students and Miner Teachers' College for Negro students were operated as parts of the city school system. Many citizens favored integration of the colleges even before they were willing to support integration of all schools. In 1952, we joined with a group of twelve organizations in presenting a plan for the merger of the two institutions. In reporting to the public, we continued to note the inefficiency and educational loss involved in maintaining two colleges.

During the first year of the desegregation program, the colleges continued to operate as separate institutions, with each having a nondiscriminatory admission policy. Community groups urged that plans be made for merger. The administration announced that, for 1955–56, the colleges would function as a single institution, but would continue to use two sites. We criticized these plans, believing that integration would not be effected until the merged institution was placed in a single plant.

Information and Counsel

As national interest in the City's progress mounted, our staff several times prepared detailed reports or contributed articles on some phase of the Washington scene. Since school desegregation has become imminent in the South, AFSC has received many requests for

assistance—reports on the Washington story, counsel on the best means of desegregating, and help to citizen groups eager to make a contribution. During the last year of the program, a major portion of time was spent in answering such requests.

THE CITY HAS TAKEN OVER

When AFSC came to the end of its four years' work, it did so with the feeling that the community has now taken responsibility for the problems of segregation. We saw a city rise to a new sense of vitality, a new respect for its people, a new recognition of mutual obligation on the part of its citizens. Once those who worked for integration were few in number and, seemingly, weak in power; now the city's officials and many specialized services and efforts are devoted to the job of completing the task.

Irene Osborne, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, consultant on school integration, American Friends Service Committee, was one of two people who supervised the Washington community relations project reported above. She has recently visited the twelve southern states under the auspices of the Southern Regional Council. Prior to her connection with AFSC she taught sociology for five years at Albany State Teachers College and other institutions.

Richard K. Bennett, Philadelphia, has been with the American Friends Service Committee since 1946, currently as secretary of the Community Relations Program and earlier as assistant secretary of Foreign Service and of the Peace Section. During World War II he was a conscientious objector, serving as a guinea pig in antimalarial experiments. In 1949 he worked for three months as a special assistant in the United Nations Department of Social Affairs, on preparation of a plan for the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to replace the International Refugee Organization.

Integration in Professional Education: The Story of Perkins, Southern Methodist University

By MERRIMON CUNINGGIM

IN November 1950, the Board of Trustees of Southern Methodist University took action to permit one branch of the University, Perkins School of Theology, to admit Negroes as regular students. Several features of this action were symptomatic of later developments.

The men responsible were not fuzzy idealists or emancipated sophisticates. They were, for the most part, southerners who still clung to some of their regional reflexes, but they were all churchmen, clergy and laity, who felt, in varying degrees, the judgment of the Christian ethic upon them. One influential member of the Board is reported to have said in the discussion, "I don't like this proposal. It goes against what I've always believed. But I can tell which way the wind is blowing, and I'm going to vote for it." This first step was indicative of the continuing ability of the Board to detect which way the wind was blowing before the wind had become a gale. SMU has moved steadily on: the Law School was opened to Negroes last year, and the Graduate School this year. The University has not succumbed to the temptation, sizable in its region, to hold back for the sake of short-range, though supposedly large, financial advantage over tax-supported institutions whose desegregation is now dictated by the Supreme Court decision.

The method was gradual. One school at a time was to be the formula, and the School of Theology was to be first. This may be, as southerners contend, the only method that will work, but inherent in it is the danger that progress will be slower than necessary, or even cut off altogether. As will be described below, the University did not escape this danger. Gradualism is no guarantee against die-hardism.

Finally, the Board's action was not announced. The University indulged in no public breast-beating of virtue. To this moment no general description of what happened at SMU has been made available. Though such a policy can have the mark of expediency about it, its real justification lies rather in the freedom it allows for getting ahead with the job. If the job is got ahead with, and if, as was true, no effort is made to hide or deny the developments taking place, then a policy of no publicity can give important protection to a program of desegregation in its early stages.

FIVE NEGROES ENROLLED

So the way was open. A couple of rapid admissions were made in January 1951, two local Negro ministers who wished to seize the opportunity for taking special courses. But both failed to make the grade academically. Thus no Negroes were enrolled at Perkins in the school year 1951–52, and it was clear that special effort would have to be made if fully qualified men were to be secured. Five able men were admitted in September 1952. They were from Arkansas, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas, and represented three different denominations. Because they were the key figures in SMU's experiment, their names deserve

to be recorded: John W. Elliott, James A. Hawkins, James V. Lyles, Negail R. Riley, and Cecil Williams.

These five stayed all three years of the regular course leading to the bachelor of divinity degree. Though they had made uniformly good records in their undergraduate study, the Negro colleges from which they came were not strong enough to guarantee them safe curricular passage through their professional training. Accordingly, all five had moments of academic difficulty, though not for lack of native intelligence. But they completed their work, improving as they went along, and one of them came close to achieving honors. At commencement in the spring of 1955 they received the first degrees that SMU had ever awarded to Negroes.

But the most remarkable aspect of their career at Perkins was the contribution which their presence made to the life of the School. They were fitted to take part in the experiment by virtue of their poise, common sense, and manly sensitivity to the issues which were raised. Other Negroes have followed and will continue to follow in their steps, but it is they who deserve the credit for showing what was possible. As one of them once said, "I know how Jackie Robinson must have felt."

What did their presence mean for the School? What conclusions have been drawn by those who had firsthand contact with those five and their successors? With over three years' experience the time is now ripe for at least tentative summation. Seven items will be mentioned. Probably most of them will simply confirm what is already believed, but one or two of them may surprise northerners who do not know the South, or even southerners who think they do.

Unreadiness of Whites for Integration

The first conclusion is trite: the unreadiness of most whites for integration. But reference is made not merely to the foes of the process, for the Perkins experience showed that some who want, as well as all who oppose, desegregation may unwittingly stand in the way of integration.

For instance, there was the girl who sat at table one evening with one of the Negro students, and in a burst of enthusiasm went to her room and wrote, "Dear Mamma, The most wonderful thing happened to me tonight. . . ." But Mamma did not think it was wonderful, nor did the rest of the mammas in the southern county-seat town from which she came. That problem was successfully if painfully resolved, but all along more moments of stress have been caused by students who favored the process than by opponents; actually, there were almost none of the latter in the University student body.

The faculty, too, were not ready, however friendly. Their first tendency was to deal too generously with the Negroes, a natural response in light of the academic difficulties which the Negroes experienced. The faculty sought to overcome this beneficent discrimination, and when they did, occasionally they swung too far. One day one of the Negroes said, "Professor So-and-So is certainly taking it out on me." But when the reply came, "I'm sorry," the student responded, "No, I'm glad." It was truly a step along the way of progress. The professor was sympathetic, and the student knew it. But further steps remained to be taken, for color was still an issue. Integration means lack of color sense, and it would be foolish to pretend that even the friends of desegregation are yet ready for it.

Unreadiness of Most Negroes

The second proposition is complementary to the first: the unreadiness of most Negroes for integration. Lack of proper academic preparation for rigorous graduate study, so often noted, is only the beginning of the matter, though a necessary recognition. The feeling at Perkins was that if a conscientious search was made during 1951–52 for a capable entering group, the problem would be cared for from then on. Some members of the staff even imagined that "too many" might apply, and that a question of quota might arise. But the hope or fear, as the case happened to be, failed to materialize; and Perkins has discovered that it must make careful search every year.

But what might be called "social unreadiness" is even greater than the academic. Because of good luck in the character and behavior of the first five Negro students, the Perkins evidence for this proposition came not so much from the students themselves as, occasionally, from the Negro community of Dallas—the newspapers, the churches, the local office of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. No criticism is intended, for what else does one have a right to expect? As President Benjamin Mays of Morehouse College has pointed out, Negroes cannot get ready for integration in a segregated society. While desegregation proceeds, it is well to be reminded that Negroes as well as whites are often socially immature, and unprepared for the new day.

Method of Cautious Advance

Then how shall one proceed? The Perkins experience led to the conclusion that cautious advance is the only feasible method. Neither word must be emphasized at the expense of the other. Caution without advance is as bad, as disastrous, as advance without caution. The two together give promise of success.

Does such a method necessitate the sacrifice of principle? In answer, clarity as to the nature of the principle is called for. The principle is not merely legal equality, for the goal is not merely desegregation. The goal is integration, and thus the principle must be a sense of real relatedness, or to put it in religious terms, brotherliness. The method, then, must be such as to give some hope of achieving both legal equality and relatedness. Uncautious advance might achieve equality, though even that is debatable; but the way of slashing attack can never bring brotherly sentiments to pass. This is the conviction at Perkins.

The adoption of such a method means that one must play the tune by ear. What an unparalleled opportunity for rationalization! And rationalization undoubtedly was present now and again. Why were the Negro students advised not to take part in the picketing of a local movie which an NAACP official sought to persuade them to join? Because such activity might have resulted in bad publicity for the School. If this seems an instance of too much caution, some other incident could easily give just the opposite impression, to the local constituency if not to the readers of this account. But the point is not that over- and under-caution may both have been exercised at times; it is, rather, that such a method allows large opportunity for the play of extraneous considerations and for self-justification. Only a saint could practice such a method with complete success, and no saint would try it. At the least, therefore, the danger of rationalization should be recognized in the hope that recognition will reduce the danger.

The method is difficult to practice as well as dangerous to adopt. It requires minute preparation for each new activity, the ceaseless effort to think through all possible developments and repercussions. When the five students first set foot on the University campus, every step they took represented the covering of new ground.

For example, should they attend SMU's home football games, all of

which are played in the city's Cotton Bowl? The Cotton Bowl officials said that if they were asked, they could not give permission, for the Jim Crow law was still on the books. But what if they were not asked, and if the Negroes were sent to the student section as a matter of course? Oh, they wouldn't raise the issue, for they didn't want any trouble. This was as much clearance as could have been expected; and so, after a most careful briefing of those who might have contact with them, the Negro students went to the first home game of the 1952 season, and have been going ever since.

But what about their participation in, say, intramural athletics? They are regular students, aren't they? When a white student's desire to have the Negroes participate led to its discussion by the University Faculty Council, the Council tabled the question, for though none of those gentlemen had any objection, perhaps since the question had been raised the decision had better be postponed until any possible objection from others had been heard. But why make a question out of it? Why not treat it "naturally" and let them play? They played; and the question as to whether they should play is still on the table.

Maybe it was just as well that they did not play touch football that first year. No telling what will happen in body contact sports, they say. But the baseball season came along, and surely baseball is all right. But one of the Negroes wants to be a catcher; suppose he blocks the plate against some student from, say, the Law School. Oh, take the risk; you can't control everything. As a matter of fact, he was a good catcher and he did block the plate; and nothing happened, except of course a clean, honest, nonsegregated "rhubarb."

And so it went, at least for the first year. Cautious advance, the Perkins community learned, was not easy on the nerves, but it worked, as probably no other system would have done. The second time was always easier than the first. Before long most of the precedents had been set; and the five Negroes spent their careers at Perkins, studying, playing, worshiping, eating, singing, and living together with all the rest, as full members of the academic community. Interviewed at his graduation by the Dallas Negro newspaper, the *Star Post*, Cecil Williams said that the five had hoped to "be received as regular enrolled students, thereby receiving all privileges." Then the paper reported: "He further states that during his three year stay on the campus he has received all that he had dared hope for and even more." [1]

NEGRO PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS

The heart of the method is still to be mentioned. The Perkins experiment began with the assumption that the Negroes themselves must be full partners in the making of decisions affecting their activities, and the course of the experiment has proved the soundness of that assumption. Though their life inescapably had a special quality, and called for peculiar awareness by them and by School officials, no rules were laid down that applied to them alone. When they first arrived they were assured that no arbitrary limits as to their participation in the School's affairs would be set. On the contrary they were invited to share in a discussion of problems of behavior, and to do so in anticipation rather than to wait for the problems to arise. They would be offered advice freely, but were told that they were to take what little liberty of decision such a method allowed them—for the advice of School officials would inevitably be a strong pressure upon them—in determining their own course

[1] Dallas *Star Post*, May 28, 1955.

of action. Since they half expected to be greeted by fiat and authoritative regulation, they gladly agreed to this policy; and it has been consistently followed to the present time.

Take, for example, the episode of the picket line. Though they were advised not to take part, two of them decided to do so. All of the other activities which have been referred to represented decisions in which they participated, or which they made without counsel. Many questions were hard to handle. On one or two occasions they felt distaste in the self-restricting decisions which they made. But even in moments of great trial they were loyal to the method. Referring to this experience, Negail Riley said in a personal letter, in retrospect after his graduation, that "honesty and discretion were the key" to the integrative process. Then he called to mind one of their disabling choices: "Our decision not to participate in the community swimming on Family Night came as the result of an honest and discreet appraisal of the situation. . . . The decision to swim would have been retrogressive, especially since Family Night was the program of the larger community that did not have a unanimously benignant attitude." Such responsible thinking showed itself in both affirmative and negative decisions, and the method of cautious advance worked only because the Negroes themselves participated in it fully.

THE NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION

But opposition arose, as it will sooner or later in any situation that seeks to move toward real integration. At Perkins it began to show itself in the spring of 1953, as the Negroes were completing their first year's work, and came to a climax in the late summer. It might have arisen about any number of practices or events; actually it seemed to take its cue from the fact that some of the Negroes were rooming with white students. This, strangely, had not been a matter of consultation with School officials because it had developed altogether normally. Four of the five had been assigned to the dormitory from the beginning; they had made friends with white students, who had invited them to be their roommates. But this original "charge" soon gathered a cluster of other practices about it, including, as perhaps the one most offensive, the method of giving the Negroes themselves the right of decision.

In the ebb and flow of discussion the nature of the opposition came to be clear. It was composed of men who had no firsthand contact with the Negroes, but this did not prevent their making a serious attack upon the experiment. In fact, the opposition was aimed at the most vulnerable point for any institution which, like SMU, possesses insufficient endowment and needs badly the support of its friends. The conclusions as to the character of the opposition which the Perkins experiment provoked, and which can be expected almost anywhere in the South, is that it consisted not of Ku Klux types but of community leaders who were uninformed, frightened, altogether sincere, misled by sweet assurances, angry, and yet aware of the essential weakness of their position.

They were uninformed in that their ignorance of what had taken place was greater than their knowledge; they possessed a few facts and a large body of misinformation. They were frightened because both what they did know and what they thought they knew shook the foundations of their segregated society and plunged them into a new world for which they were unprepared. They were thoroughly sincere in their opposition; they were convinced, by virtue of the beliefs which they had held so long unchallenged, that the old order was good and the new was full of peril.

They felt that they had been misled by sweet assurances that no such integration as was in progress would be attempted; some of them actually believed that when the Board took its original action, the sole intention was to let the Negroes come and sit in the back of the classrooms. As a result they were angry; for it is angry men who issue ultimatums. But though communication is difficult with uninformed, frightened, sincere, misled, angry men, enough took place to show that they were aware of the essential weakness of their position; even when aroused to attack they remembered "which way the wind was blowing."

AMELIORATIVE STUBBORNNESS

Because the experience at Perkins included the rise of opposition, it also provided an opportunity for response, and an arrival at a conclusion in respect to the nature of a successful strategy in meeting the opposition. The issue was joined behind the scenes. No public clamor was raised by either side. The outcome was altogether happy: not a single policy of the School was changed, and the program of treating the Negroes as regular students proceeded as before; moreover, the University was exceptionally fortunate in keeping the friendship of most of those who were disaffected. That this result was achieved a good six months before the Supreme Court's decision of May 17, 1954, is now a matter of pride to nearly all of the University community, including even some of those who were upset at the Perkins developments.

The conclusion to which this experience pointed is that opposition must be met by what might be called ameliorative stubbornness, which is not unlike the method of cautious advance described above. Not all amelioration, and not all stubbornness; the two must be joined together in co-operative tension. The substance of this position can best be described by five statements. First, it calls for a strenuous effort at education; the members of the opposition must have their misinformation of the local situation corrected and their horizons broadened with facts from other scenes. Second, they need comfort; because they are sincere, they must not be treated as if insincere, and because they are frightened, they must not be frightened worse. Third, education and comfort both require honesty if they are to be effective; false assurances and dissimulation have no place in solving the problems of desegregation and integration. Fourth, the opposition must be faced by the forthright expectation of victory; they voice the dying gasp of an outmoded order, and in all confidence and love they must be made to know it. Fifth, though victory is expected, it is not assured; and the proper mood is what someone has called "divine carelessness," that is, the kind of temper that can ride above the battle, and even if it is lost not be defeated. Who knows what lies ahead? But thus far these ways of meeting opposition have proved fruitful at Perkins.

INTEGRATION CAN COME

The last proposition is the most significant. In 1952 Perkins provided effective desegregation, but not integration. Yet the experience of the intervening years has led to the conviction that, though real integration can come only with time, it *can come*. No one at SMU boasts that it has yet come in all its fullness, but it is visibly on the way. If neither whites nor Negroes are ready for it, they are much readier than once they were. The method of cautious advance, that accords full partnership to the Negroes in the making of decisions, has contributed to its coming. Insights gained into the nature of the opposition and strategies employed in meeting it have brought the day of integration closer. This is the really important thing that has happened at Perkins, namely, that to a remarkable degree Negroes are now received on their merits, not as objects of pity or excessive generosity or the exercise of virtue, but as people. Perkins is not yet color blind, but many a red stop light looks green.

Evidence for such a development is always elusive, but not lacking. For example, in the winter of 1951–52, when the way was open but no Negroes were enrolled, the Perkins Student Council established a scholarship fund for Negro students as an earnest of their welcome and raised almost $1,000 for it. Only one student objected, and the grounds of his objection were just the opposite from what might have been expected. He felt that the fund was a mistake because it emphasized color, whereas the Christian witness was to forget color. He was ahead of his time, yet not very much, for the Student Council has recently decided that the need for proving welcome is now past. Next year's scholarship drive will go toward some other pioneer project, for Negroes are now at home.

Or consider the superficial matter of class elections. In the fall of 1952 one of the Negro students was nominated for a class office, and elected. In the fall of 1954, when the five had become seniors, one of them was again nominated for a class office, but defeated. For him who can read the signs of the times, and knows the comradeship in which the Negroes were held, this is progress toward integration. The white students had got beyond their first nervous cordiality, and not only discrimination but discrimination-in-reverse was passing away.

One final illustration: Perkins is proud of the degree to which integration is being achieved, but why should it be? It is an institution for the training of Christian ministers, part of a university that is nurtured by a Christian church. The Christian gospel spoke its piece on this point a long time ago, and now the American gospel has caught up with it. What cause is there for pride in a development that was long overdue? This point of view, of course, was bound to be expressed by someone in the Perkins community, some faculty member or student who was sufficiently secure in his sense of belonging to be able to say the reproachful, healing word to his fellows, and to have it listened to. But the one who said it was one of the five Negroes, during his last semester. That was one hint of their status, and another was immediately forthcoming—no one on the campus thought his speaking was strange.

Then let Negail Riley's words serve as the conclusion:

> Often there are comments heard to the effect that our presence has meant more than many sermons. This is truly a compliment, yet the gospel must be preached. . . . As we look upon brotherhood in action at Perkins, we must not become complacent, for there is much left to be desired, at SMU, in the Church, and in this country; neither must we lose sight of the far vision that is ours as witnesses of Christ.[2]

[2] Perkins *Log*, March 31, 1955.

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Desegregation, Integration, and the Negro Community

By Hylan Lewis and Mozell Hill

If one were to review the serious literature devoted to the Negro in the United States during the last twenty years, a great deal of it would be found to be dated, excessively abstract, and a poor guide to the range in types of communities in which Negroes now live. With notable exceptions, serious and scholarly accounts are just a cut above popular stereotypes and generalizations: too frequently they have become fixed in social-science and administrative exchange despite limited validity and usefulness. One of the functions of minority protest and pressure is to force an updating and correcting of scholarly conceptions as well as lay images. It is begging the factual question to say that Negro communities in the United States are specific local areas in which persons designated as Negroes live in preponderant numbers; and further that such units derive distinctive character from the fact that Negroes who live in such areas—and undoubtedly a large proportion of the Negroes who do not—tend to act toward themselves and others as if they have different life chances and participation possibilities. Such elementary conclusions should be just the starting point for any attempt to describe and analyze the manner in which Negroes and institutions in different communities respond to desegregation.

The range in types of Negro communities and neighborhoods is not significantly different from that of American communities and neighborhoods in general; they run the gamut from closed to open, small to large, cohesive to loose, and from mid-city slum to suburbia and "exurbia." In Negro communities as in communities anywhere in the United States the economy, regional cultural features, demography, and history interplay to qualify life and to condition the relationships of institutions and persons to the larger community. The precise effect of these factors taken separately or in the many possible combinations is still inadequately understood or measured. For example, the most common of these linkages—that which suggests an inverse relationship between numbers or the ratio of Negroes to whites and the quality of race relations (and by implication the possibility of integration—has too many exceptions to be reliable. The Negro-white ratio is but one of many factors whose weights vary from situation to situation as they appear in different combinations. Numbers as such are not crucial but rather the perception of numbers in so far as reactions to Negroes in any instance may be concerned; and the responses of any Negro community to desegregation are not only functions of the number of Negroes in the community but also of the quality of organization, leadership resources, heterogeneity of the population, and so forth. It is not the province of this paper to try to list the many actual and possible kinds of Negro communities and presumably by token of these the many actual and possible kinds of responses to desegregation. Our limited purposes will be to set forth propositions about the nature of Negro communities wherever found in the United States and, given these, to suggest something of the range of reactions, the logic,

the value conflicts, and the costs and rewards for different persons and groups in Negro communities.

Common Features of Negro Communities

Each Negro community represents a unique set of shared responses to selective American attitudes, customs, and institutions that keep Negroes in some degree separate and deprived. Changing "racial" institutions, in-group ways and anxieties, are those which are adaptive to special sets of American conditions which are themselves changing and characteristically operate unevenly and nonrationally. Although the details and the settings of "racial" behavior vary enormously, the following features are common to Negro communities in the United States wherever found: (1) a group of people who share and organize experiences of being treated as Negroes; (2) a capacity for elementary identification or empathy with other Negroes; and (3) circulation by all types of media of in-group symbols and myths, which are largely pragmatic variations on common American themes—success, happiness, self-fulfillment, survival, democracy, and so forth. With stress on diversity and change in Negro communities on the one hand and the ascribing of certain minimal core experiences and sensitivities on the other, our analysis of what happens, or is likely to happen, in Negro communities is based on three assumptions: (1) in every Negro community as defined there is necessarily group and personal sensitivity to the facts and prospects of desegregation and integration; (2) the responses of particular communities are functions of many inside and outside factors; and (3) the orientations and relations to power of Negro community leaders are among the most important inside factors.

Changes of the Past Decade Reflected

Even if desegregation had not come lately to be more of a formal, public, and legal process, and if the companion myth of integration had not been revitalized nearly fifty years after its strategic renunciation during the Booker T. Washington era, the changes of the past decade—the post-Myrdal years—would have necessitated a new estimate of living and expectations in Negro communities in the United States. Much of what was presumably known about Negro communities has been dated by changes in the economy; in income and occupational distribution; in the distribution of Negro and white populations between regions, within regions, and within urban centers; and in federal, state, and local sensitivity to the rights and needs of minorities. These made for extensive and basic changes in the Negro community, primarily through revising the range of participation and expectations. They set in motion a kind of "creeping desegregation"—selective and uneven, less formal, and less threatening. A significant clue to change is the fact that the most active organized and systematic current interest in the character, tastes, motivations, and expectations of the Negro is that of the market researchers. In their efforts to exploit consumer demand in the Negro community, they are actually creating a "Negro market" or reinforcing the myth. The Negro market does not represent a demand for special goods or services but rather an underrated demand for conventional and quality goods and services.

It might be noted parenthetically that increased Negro income, access to credit, capital accumulation, political strength, and the concept of the Negro market also have had the effect in many in-

stances of strengthening old racial institutions, fostering new or better quality services primarily for Negroes, and permitting integrated participation under special or limited conditions. For example, at the same time that open housing has been increasing, there has been an increase in the number of new, better-quality real estate developments exclusively or especially for Negroes—and financed by both white and Negro capital—an increase which represents expansion and increasing differentiation within the Negro community itself. New capital and new consumer demand have likewise increased the number of hotels and motels for Negroes, of local radio stations and programs geared primarily to segments of the Negro population, and of branch offices of banks and insurance companies more convenient to the Negro patron.

In some instances the fact or promise of integration has become a commodity —a way of promoting a new commercial venture such as the ill-fated Moulin Rouge Hotel in the otherwise segregated Nevada community of Las Vegas; or the integrated golf course in Charlotte, North Carolina, which returned to segregation when the number of Negroes paying to use the course did not meet expectations; or the case of the newly organized Georgia insurance company that writes to a select mailing list:

> You are invited to become a part owner in a unique new life insurance company—a company that is *making integrated stock ownership of a life insurance company a practical reality*. . . . The ———— Company is being formed to render a real and needed economic service to the Negroes of Georgia.

It is ironic, and one of the manifestations of this transition period, that when some of these enterprises fail because of risky business practices or simple miscalculations of the motivations and practices of the Negro consumer or patron they are erroneously cited as examples of the failure of Negroes to co-operate in supporting something that is beneficial for them—or worse, of indifference to integration. It is doubtful that in any Negro community just the mere fact of a competing or new institution or service being integrated will guarantee its success or significant Negro support. There are many questions: Is this real or spurious integration? Is there really effective demand for the services? Is the presumed psychic compensation of commercial, snob-appeal, or even altruistic integration sufficient to offset possible sacrifices, premium prices, and the pain of changes in habit and routine?

Factors in Community Change

As indicated earlier, the fact in many communities—and the better chance in all—that Negroes can participate increasingly in activities not based in the Negro communities, in voluntary associations not restricted to or designed primarily for Negroes, and in entirely new areas of public and private life automatically transforms Negro communities. Listed below and discussed are propositions relating to processes or circumstances primarily within the Negro community that affect the course of change.

Some Segregation Will Remain

For at least a generation, significant aspects of the total life of most Negroes in northern and western communities as well as in the South will remain segregated in fact because of involuntary and voluntary clustering.

The disproportionate clustering of Negroes within an area or areas is the tough and stubborn physical basis for Negro communities and the persistence

of some segregation. This is not likely to end soon or dramatically. In fact, formal and informal planning in many urban communities of the North and South—for example, the actual working out of urban redevelopment in many instances—has the effect of strengthening old segregated communities or of setting up new segregated housing areas. And even if discrimination were not a factor in the persistence of large Negro communities in places like Chicago, New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles, the physical, economic, and social problems of dispersing and absorbing the many new migrants who are only incidentally Negroes are stupendous.

The all-Negro communities like Mound Bayou in Mississippi and those founded in Oklahoma and other states after the failure of Reconstruction, designed to be examples of what Negroes could achieve alone and essentially withdrawn from white influence and control, established a tradition and persisted as a way of life for a relative few; and their prime significance for their own members as well as for other Negroes has been symbolic and sentimental. Race pride and sentiment will continue to play a stubborn, but, on the whole, a losing, part in the continuance of voluntary segregation, not only in such communities but also in other communities and institutions in which Negroes have a significant investment in pride, history, and tradition.

Selective and Uneven Desegregation

Where some measure of choice is involved in any Negro community the transition from segregated to nonsegregated practices will be selective, uneven, and fraught with the conflict of interests and sentiments.

Residential clustering, pride and sentiment, normal inertia, and caution and discretion in the face of opposition mean that where it is possible to exercise choice the disposition of Negroes to participate in nonsegregated activities or to desegregate Negro institutions will vary with the type of institution, with the characteristics and interests of the persons involved, and with the effectiveness of the leadership. De facto segregated and nonsegregated institutions and activities will continue together as, for example, in Washington, D. C.; however, the competition or the availability of nonsegregated activities will tend to force a modification of old-line racial institutions. There will be some conflict between the real and propagandized values of group pride in institutions on the one hand and the real and publicized virtues of unsegregated institutions on the other. At the extremes there will be those who will make sacrifices to affirm and support each while decrying the "renegade" behavior of their opposites. In the case of either type, behavior is not likely to be consistent: for certain activities or services, desegregated institutions will be preferred and patronized; for others, familiar or even new racial or community institutions will be supported out of habit or with the rationalization that this support is not compulsory. There are also the possibilities of frequent internal conflict and guilt for some who choose the easy and familiar over the newer and "right." As suggested, when personal conflict appears as to the patronage of segregated or nonsegregated activities, it is most likely to be resolved not on a basis of "right" but rather on the answer to the questions, Do I have to do it? Do I have free choice?

For Special Individuals

In its earlier stages, the approach to integration tends to be perceived or experienced in the Negro community as the rapid increase of desegregated ac-

tivities and choices largely for the emancipated, the mobile, the restless, the lucky, the talented.

The experiences of successful or active persons outside the Negro community are positive proof of what can happen and result in some collective affirmation of the social system despite the fact that these instances may not be truly indicative of the objective chances for the individual Negro's personal preferences or expectations. They serve as examples and incentives; they help to reinforce the sense of personal worth; they help to erase the stigma of inferiority and to that extent make the changing Negro community more tolerable and less a ghetto.

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

Selective personnel demands of newly integrated institutions may cause some institutions in the Negro community to lose experienced or skilled personnel. And some old-line institutions not only find it difficult to keep or recruit key personnel but also find themselves under the simultaneous pressure to improve training programs or organizational efficiency because of new possibilities for current and future students.

There are many scattered instances of the businesss or educational institution in a Negro community which lost secretaries, bookkepers, staff persons, and technicians to integrating government, business, and educational agencies. And with expanding opportunities those institutions charged with training, particularly in the professional and technical areas, feverishly seek to improve and enlarge training and guidance. There is intense regret and embarrassment over the fact that in many instances known opportunities or demands far exceed the number now trained or qualified. It is not possible, or even desirable, for every existent Negro training institution to improve or to expand its general education and technical and professional offerings. The problem of priorities and personnel will remain acute, particularly in the early stages of desegregation; and it is complicated by group pride, sentiment, and normal self-interest within the Negro community—and by adamant positions on segregation in some states.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

The institutions of Negro communities are selectively faced with changes in patronage, support, organization, and ideology.

As indicated earlier, many racial institutions will persist, although they will tend to operate in a different context and with different sensitivities. One of the simplest and earliest adjustments is to indicate symbolically or by token that they are not in public ideology and purpose exclusively for Negroes. This has happened in the case of the denomination which changed its name from Colored Methodist Episcopal to Christian Methodist Episcopal and in that of the athletic association which changed from Colored Intercollegiate Association to Central Intercollegiate Association. It is also seen in the recruitment or acceptance of white staff, students, or members, paralleling the efforts of "white" churches and educational institutions to integrate where the situation is favorable to substantial desegregation. Of the Negro institutions and professional associations subject to licensing, the publicly supported one is more likely to fold because of legislative or administrative edict and professional advantage than is the private Negro institution, voluntary association, business, or service. Private institutions are more likely to seek to adapt than to go out of business voluntarily, although they may lose some clientele or support. Where

threatened, banks, insurance companies, churches, hotels, and so forth are likely to try to compete on an open or closed basis. To some extent segregated institutions in the Negro community which are actually marginal or of low efficiency or which are conceded to be "wrong" may survive, because with a shortage of certain services there is demand for the contributions of even the least efficient or tainted. Those institutions which seek to adapt or which have no alternative but to continue may try to compete through improving services and operating efficiency or through tapping new markets and clientele within both the Negro and the white groups. Some Negro institutions will compete successfully and survive primarily because of the skillful use of in-group know-how and "race" propaganda. So long as integration remains segmental and in process, Negro institutions and organizations which serve in the breach or which exist to protest or to mobilize for more participation will have a place in the Negro community.

EXPANSION AND DIVERSIFICATION OF COMMUNITY SERVICES

The areas in which Negroes live become more diversified and complete in services and callings available to all Negroes as branches and representatives of public and private service and business institutions locate there. Desegregation in other areas stimulates this trend.

This long-time trend will continue and be speeded up by the initial examples and threats of desegregation. In many instances it will represent the belated recognition of neighborhood political power or consumer demand; in other instances the real purpose will be to delay or divert the participation of Negroes in activities outside the Negro areas. In the case of public services like firehouses, police, post offices, and libraries, such gestures or innovations will be both praised and condemned within the Negro community. They will be praised as concessions won, services gained, and sources of additional white collar and managerial jobs. They will be condemned as discriminatory, particularly when chances of promotion for personnel in the total system are limited, when the part played by Negroes in policy making is small, and when look-what-we've-done-for-you expressions come from the white community: "It's just as good as ours" or "It's better than the whites'." Within the Negro community these apparently contradictory responses which make outsiders often ask querulously, "Just what do Negroes want?" are actually complementary. Concessions wrested or granted become vantage points for seeking new goals. The "realistic compromise" and "agitation for more" reinforce and play back on each other; they are normal byproducts of "racial" experience. They are latent in every community; and the expansion and diversification of the Negro community, whether because of desegregation or the setting up of new services, tends to activate and speed up the spiral process. It is more difficult to suppress or intimidate the agitator in diversified and heterogeneous Negro communities. Until the Negro community as defined disappears there will always be something to agitate about. Continued desegregation means that agitation will be carried on, when necessary, with greater skill, resourcefulness, and confidence in the outcome.

A CHANGING SOCIETY

Desegregation means that Negro society tends to become more open; that class differentiation becomes sharper; and that new bases of distinction appear.

Participation on a basis of merit means not only that a wider range of callings is open to Negroes but also that many Negroes are upgraded to higher-skill classifications and to unique (for the Negro community) and more prestigious positions or relationships with colleagues. This new basis for ranking is reinforced by generally increased income which makes possible for new groups the indulgence of personal tastes in living arrangements and recreation on levels and—thanks in part to desegregation—in places hitherto not accessible. A premium tends to be placed on achievement and behavior that represent breaks with the offerings and norms of the meager and restricted Negro community. To the extent that this behavior is new and to the extent that significant other areas of life are still restricted or "racial," it and the *arrivistes* who practice it may have a feverish and exaggerated quality. The possibility is great of cleavage between those who are able to and choose to maximize non-Negro community activities and those who are not able to or who do not choose to broaden participation and contact. Mobility as such in this sense becomes an important criterion of social rank.

By-products of this more fluid situation are the questions with which both young and old professionals and technicians are sometimes faced: Which represents the greater "need" for my services, blazing the trail and expanding opportunities for other Negroes in an integrated setup or the continuing demands for new and more talent in the Negro community from which I have come? And which course offers greater rewards—psychological and material? Such is the nature of the changing Negro community that sound rationalizations can be found for each course, and matching instances can be cited of the choices of each. And further, the careers of many Negroes have combined the two kinds of service and satisfaction. This too is part of the logic of transition from segregated to nonsegregated communities of which the expansion of Negro communities is a necessary phase, given the current situation.

NEW TYPE OF MARGINAL PERSON

Segmental desegregation tends to produce a new type of marginal person.

This person is in some ways a counterpart of the hybrid institution mentioned earlier that operates with reference to special or limited interests in both Negro and white communities. It is increasingly common for both Negroes and whites to play many pluralistic roles inside and outside the uneven color line. As individuals move more easily from partially or almost completely segregated to less or nonsegregated orders, there need be no consistency in role or context in residential area, school, church, assembly line or store, business or profession, public office, leisure-time activities, intimate associates. It is entirely likely that for increasing numbers in our larger urban communities this marginality is—or can be—positive, yielding its own rewards and satisfactions; and that it need not be as personally tragic as the classical image of the marginal man was painted. Some persons in the new Negro community that desegregation is helping to usher in can because of enhanced mobility enjoy at least temporarily selected rewards of integrated segments as well as some of the personally preferred values of the Negro community. The fluidity or relative frequency with which individual Negroes from Negro communities may and do move in segments of the total community, which segments they are, the uneven spread of big and little patches of desegregation, will be for a considerable period better indices to the speed and success of integration than the changes that take place in the physical distribution of the Negro population. Physical distribution, however, is of course always a limiting factor and ultimately the critical index.

IN SUM

Segmental desegregation, along with other factors, is transforming the Negro communities—some very slowly and others very rapidly. At this time the most important fact about all Negro communities is that whereas they may not be disappearing as physical entities, they and their institutions are becoming inexorably less "racial" and less the major framework for the life and values of the individual Negro.

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The Integration of Americans of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Oriental Descent

By J. Milton Yinger and George E. Simpson *

CURRENT studies of desegregation are making clear the extent to which discrimination is a system of interdependent parts, each affecting and being affected by the others. Steps toward the integration of all racial groups in the schools put strain on other patterns of discrimination—in transportation, in public recreational facilities, in job training, and the like. On the other hand, failure to reduce discrimination in housing, in economic opportunities, and elsewhere strongly inhibits the achievement of integration in the schools in any but a formal sense. If residential segregation, poverty, and a class subculture that gives education a low valuation continue to affect minority groups, the achievement of legal integration in the schools loses much of its significance.

This interdependence of the various patterns of discrimination is clearly revealed in the study of the smaller minority groups in the United States as well as in the analysis of the changing status of the Negro. Most of the papers in this volume refer primarily to Negroes, the largest and probably the most disprivileged minority. Yet there are vastly important problems and lessons to be learned from the study of other groups as well.

The process of integration varies, of course, from group to group, because of differences in the degree of cultural contrast, in size and location of the group, in the length of time they have been in the United States, language factors, economic status, and other variables. The situation is quite different, for example, for a small Japanese-American group, with a relatively high proportion of urban and middle-class members, than for the much larger group of Mexican Americans, who are largely rural and lower class.

For each of the groups we shall discuss, the situation is highly dynamic. Patterns of segregation in schools, job opportunities, labor unions, housing, the armed services, transportation, recreation, churches, political groups, intermarriage laws have all, in some measure, been challenged and changed. In this brief paper, we can only suggest some of the aspects of desegregation and integration as they affect a few selected groups.

* The authors wish to thank the many persons who kindly responded to our requests for information by sending helpful letters and materials relevant to the topic. Discussion of the American Indian, which was originally projected as part of this article, will appear in a later publication.

Americans of Mexican Descent

There are about two and a half million persons of Mexican descent now residing in the United States, half of them in Texas, and most of the others in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado. In addition, there are about two hundred and fifty thousand Hispanos, descendants of Spanish colonials, who have maintained a distinctive subculture for over three thundred years. Although they face serious economic problems and some social isolation in New Mexico, where most of them live, the difficulties of the Hispanos are of a different order from those of the Mexican Americans with whom we shall be concerned.

In 1946–47, the courts ruled in the Mendez case in California that segregation of Spanish-speaking children in the schools was illegal. The ruling of Judge McCormick anticipated some of the arguments of the 1954 Supreme Court decision in its emphasis on the harm wrought by segregation, with its inevitable implication of inferiority. The Delgado case in Texas, in 1948, also established the illegality of segregation of Mexican-American children in the schools. There followed a statement of policy by the Texas State Board of Education in harmony with the court decision, and instructions were sent to the local school districts to eliminate segregation of Mexican-American children.[1] The court permitted separate classes at the first-grade level only, after scientific tests of language proficiency, for those who do not know English, whatever the national background.

Judgments differ somewhat on the degree to which these court decisions, and other influences, have brought about the desegregation of Mexican-American children in the schools of the Southwest. There is virtual unanimity on the observation that long steps in the direction of desegregation have been made. There is a growing conviction on the part of educators that the best way to teach English to a Spanish-speaking child is to place him in a class where many of his fellow pupils speak English natively.[2] This conviction has eliminated one of the rationalizations for segregation on a language basis that easily spilled over into segregation on the basis of Spanish name and nationality background. With the destruction of any legal basis for the segregation of Mexican-American children in the schools, the process of integration has been accelerated. Yet one must note the continuing presence of segregation as a result of gerrymandering and the "free choice of school" principle.[3] It is also necessary to stress the barriers to school integration imposed by the economic status of most Mexican Americans. The children of migrant workers are often not in school during the winter. With only a few months of schooling in the fall and spring, they continually fall behind their classmates and often drop out of school at an early date. Legal desegregation does not eliminate barriers to full integration that rest on economic disprivilege.

[1] See George I. Sanchez, *Concerning Segregation of Spanish-speaking Children in the Public Schools,* Austin: University of Texas, 1951.

[2] This is not inconsistent with the increasing attention to the special needs of Mexican-American children. See, for example, *Teachers' Guide to the Education of Spanish-speaking Children,* Bulletin of the California State Department of Education, October 1952, and *Teaching Children Who Move with the Crops,* published by the Fresno County Public Schools, Walter G. Martin, Superintendent, September 1955.

[3] A four-year campaign to end gerrymandering in the elementary schools of El Centro, California, was ended in December 1955, when officials of Imperial County agreed to eliminate the protested practices. A suit had been filed in the United States District Court in February 1955, and a retrial was pending when the settlement was reached. See *New York Times,* December 4, 1955, p. 64.

Temporary migrant workers

Among the migrant workers, it is the temporary residents, both the legal entry and the illegal "wetback," who are in the most difficult circumstances. Inflation in Mexico, rapid population growth, especially in border areas, and the low wages "south of the border" have sent a stream of migrants into the United States. Desire for cheap labor for the seasonal jobs involved in picking crops has been the basis of their admission. Their status has been very uncertain, however, because of conflicting interests in the United States. Present immigration procedures, operating under the McCarran-Walter Act, enhance the insecurity of the noncitizen Mexican. He is deported or allowed to stay de-

pending on a delicate balance of forces in United States politics, some of which seek to maintain a flow of cheap, tractable labor and others to deny the entrance of "undesirables" or workers who depress the wage scale. Abrams describes the problem sharply when he writes:

> Thus, in the case of the migrant Mexican, and to some extent other migrants, we have a unique kind of internal colonialism. The native laborer works hard for pitiful wages, suffers the social inferiority of a native in the eyes of his master and the community, and lives under the sub-human conditions so often characteristic of native colonial life. The difference between the traditional and the new colonialism is that our colonial natives are kept with us within distance when we want them—and then driven out of the community when no longer needed.[4]

Interacting deterrents to integration

Although Mexican Americans who are permanent residents of the United States are probably less disprivileged than the migrants, their status is also kept down by a group of interacting forces that operate as serious deterrents to full integration. Mobility, low income, poor health, lack of facility with English, and lack of persistence in school cumulatively block improvement in status. Broom and Shevky have noted a number of mutually reinforcing barriers to the integration of Mexican Americans: (1) The pattern of employment in homogeneous gangs tends to insulate many of them from contacts with non-Mexicans. (2) The status of casual laborer means instability of employment, frequent migration, and consequent institutional and residential isolation. (3) The language barrier, a symbol of group difference which would not be so important were it not for the other factors, has led to some segregation, school retardation, limited job opportunities, slower acculturation—a vicious circle. (4) The cleavage between generations has meant that Mexican youth are often left with inadequate adult models, a problem that is associated with the formation of gangs which have further blocked integration.[5]

Favoring desegregation

Our picture would be incomplete, however, were we to fail to describe some of the forces working for desegregation and integration. There has been some improvement in real wages of migrant workers since 1945. More Mexican Americans are finding industrial jobs, although primarily on the unskilled and semiskilled levels. Urbanization and job diversification have sped the process of acculturation, improved income, and brought some workers into touch with labor unions. While Mexican-American workers have not found ready acceptance in some of the unions, many, especially those in the CIO, have welcomed them. Working together on common economic problems is an important source of integration among separated groups.[6]

Although the political impotence characteristic of most depressed groups has retarded the integration of Mexican Americans, there are signs that this impotence is being reduced. The 250,000 or more who served in the Armed Forces during World War II returned to civilian life with a broader view. These, joined with the industrial workers and

[4] Charles Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbors* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 55.

[5] See Leonard Broom and Eshref Shevky, "Mexicans in the United States, A Problem in Social Differentiation," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (January–February 1952), pp. 150–58.

[6] See William Becker, "Conflict as a Source of Solidarity: Some Notes on the California Farm Labor Scene," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1953), pp. 25–27. Broom and Shevky give strong emphasis to unions: "No other secular organization appears at this time to be so capable of affecting so decisively the pattern of Mexican isolation."—*Op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 157.

the slowly increasing middle class, have begun to overcome the inertia that blocks effective action. There are several Mexican-American city councilmen in Texas cities; Los Angeles elected one in 1949; Unity Leagues stress voter education.[7] If there is at the moment no equivalent of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or the Japanese American Citizens League among Mexican Americans, it can be said that they have their Booker T. Washingtons, emphasizing the importance of self-improvement, pride in their own heritage, and opposition to discrimination. With varying emphases, such organizations as the League of United Latin-American Citizens, GI Forums, the Latin-American Educational Foundation, Unity Leagues, and the Alianza Hispano-Americana are working to improve the status of Mexican Americans. In recent years there has been some shift away from the mutual aid and self-improvement approach toward a more vigorous demand for equality and the elimination of discrimination. This shift, which may have been retarded by the fact that aggressive and able Mexicans have escaped into the dominant group or allied with it more easily than have Negroes and Japanese, can be symbolized by the organization, in 1954, of a Civil Liberties Department of the Alianza Hispano-Americana, with a program dedicated to "education plus action." This may well express the activities of Mexican Americans in the next few years.

PUERTO RICAN MIGRANTS

Approximately 80 per cent of the 490,000 mainland Puerto Ricans live in New York City, but other settlements are found in Bridgeport, Newark, Passaic, Trenton, Camden, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Youngstown, Cleveland, Lorain, Gary, Chicago, Aurora, Joliet, Savannah, and Milwaukee. Puerto Ricans, most of them recent arrivals, constitute 5 per cent of New York City's population. By mainland criteria, two-thirds are colored.[8] Most of the migrants are without much skill, and three-fifths of them arrive in New York with very little facility in the English language. In many respects their experience resembles that of other immigrant groups. They are poor and uneducated and live in the least desirable sections of the city. Landlords and sharks exploit them; native Americans accuse them of "clannishness" even though the newcomers are divided by class, religion, and so forth; their crimes become "crime waves"; and they are the current scapegoat for many of the community's ills. Competition and conflict predominate in their relationships with natives, but these are giving way gradually to accommodation and assimilation.[9]

The occupational mobility of the Puerto Ricans in New York has been limited, consisting mainly, if it occurs at all, of a rise from unskilled to semiskilled jobs. Puerto Rican labor union membership is impressive, with 51 per cent of those in the labor force in 1947–48 reporting such membership.[10] However, there has been some discrimination. In one labor union, the non-Jewish members (Latin Americans, Negroes, and others) are employed largely in the less-skilled, less-well-paid crafts, owing partly to recency of entry into the trade

[7] See John H. Burma, *Spanish-speaking Groups in the United States* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1954), pp. 105–22.

[8] It is interesting to note that the 1950 U. S. Census of Population, *Puerto Ricans in Continental United States*, Special Report P-E, No. 3D, gives as "Percentage White": Puerto Rico, 1950– 79.2; Migrants, 1950– 92.3. Cited in Migration Division, Department of Labor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, *A Summary in Facts and Figures, 1939–1954*.

[9] C. W. Mills, C. Senior, and R. K. Goldsen, *The Puerto Rican Journey* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 82–83.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

and partly to barriers erected by the "old-timers." [11]

In seeking to avoid the kind of crusade for "Americans" and against outsiders which other immigrant groups have faced, the Puerto Rican government has adopted a policy of caution. Farm contract labor is carefully limited and supervised, and the government acts as the principal employment agent and adviser for industrial migrants already on the mainland. One writer states that this policy has restricted the job opportunities of Puerto Ricans.[12]

Puerto Ricans in New York City schools

In 1953, Puerto Ricans comprised 8.2 per cent of the elementary pupils in the New York City public schools; 38.3 per cent of these children were "non-English-speaking." The table below shows the figures and percentages by boroughs.

	Total Pupils[a]	Total Puerto Rican	Per Cent Puerto Rican	Non-English-Speaking Puerto Rican
Manhattan	102,326	24,437	23.9	10,225
Bronx	115,871	12,226	10.5	3,921
Brooklyn	210,629	9,189	4.4	3,596
Queens	120,306	853	0.7	198
Richmond	18,930	146	0.8	14

[a] Peter Kihss, "Puerto Rican Will to Work Stressed," *New York Times*, February 25, 1953, p. 18 C.

In 1951, seventy-five schools in Manhattan had some concentration of Puerto Ricans, and these children constituted 50 or more per cent of the pupils in eight schools. They were 50 per cent of only one school among the twenty-five in the Bronx which included Puerto Ricans. In Brooklyn there were only two schools with a Puerto Rican enrollment of 50 per cent or more.[13] In one study of seven New York public schools, the percentage of pupils of Puerto Rican parentage enrolled ranged from 21 to 99 per cent.[14]

Efforts to avoid the segregation of Spanish-speaking children in New York City schools have included special "vestibule" classes under a Spanish-speaking teacher who teaches them English and some orientation to school and community life; individual help from teachers or from English-speaking students designated as "big brothers" and "big sisters"; substitute auxiliary teachers who speak Spanish and are assigned to orient Puerto Rican pupils and their families; encouraging English-speaking and Spanish-speaking children to play games together and to go on sightseeing trips together; and providing evening classes for adults (one-fifth of all persons attending elementary school evening classes for adults—or about eight thousand—are Puerto Ricans studying English).[15] According to Clarence Senior, of Puerto Rico's Department of Labor:

> . . . aside from the natural "segregation" which is involved in the migration of any working class group, we find little evidence of nonintegration of Puerto Ricans in the school systems in the continental United States.[16]

In New York City, school programs which emphasize intercultural relations have replaced the "americanization" theme of forty years ago.

Assimilation of adults

New York's Puerto Ricans are not active participants in politics. Only 10 per cent of those qualified are registered and they vote lightly.[17] One study concluded that the Puerto Rican's effective social world consists of the household, the apartment house, and the street.[18]

Puerto Rican migration has been welcomed by employers because it has provided New York City with a large source of cheap labor. The problems which have arisen have been made somewhat easier by a greater appreciation today of the nature of culture contact and conflict and by the existence of a number of organizations seeking to create better understanding in intergroup relations. Differential assimilation among the Puerto Ricans will be strongly influenced by employment, sex, education, age, and color.

[11] Will Herberg, "The Old-Timers and the Newcomers: Ethnic Group Relations in a Needle Trades Union," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1953), pp. 12–19.

[12] Charles Abrams, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), pp. 68, 69.

[13] Sophia M. Robison, "Social and Welfare Statistics on the New York Puerto Rican Population," in A. J. Jaffe (Ed.), *Puerto Rican Population of New York City* (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1954), pp. 50–51.

[14] J. C. Morrison, "The Puerto Rican Study—What It Is—Where It Is Going," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1954), p. 168.

[15] Peter Kihss, "Puerto Rican Will to Work Stressed," *New York Times*, February 25, 1953, p. 18 C; Welfare Council of New York City, *Puerto Ricans in New York City* (1948), pp. 41–42. In 1947, the Association of Assistant Superintendents issued a report on *A Program of Education for Puerto Ricans in New York City*. Beginning in 1949, workshops in the teaching of bilingual pupils and courses on educational programs for Puerto Rican children were introduced. In 1954, the Board of Education published a seventy-six-page booklet on *Teaching Children of Puerto Rican Background*. The Department of Education in Puerto Rico sponsors a program designed to facilitate the adjustment of Puerto Ricans who migrate to continental United States (Mariano Villaronga, "Program of Education for Puerto Rican Migrants," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, Vol. 28, No. 4 [December 1954], pp. 146–50). "The Puerto Rican Study," sponsored by the New York City Board of Education and financed by the Fund for the Advancement of Education, is a three-year study of the education and adjustment of Puerto Ricans (J. C. Morrison, *op. cit.* [note 14 *supra*], pp. 167–73). Such professional journals of New York City teachers as *Curriculum and Materials, Strengthening Democracy, The New York Supervisor,* and *High Points* have carried during the past five years numerous articles on the education of Puerto Ricans. For a good brief statement on the integration of Puerto Ricans into the life of the school and the community see Mary Finocchiaro, "Puerto Rican Newcomers in Our Schools," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1954), pp. 157–66.

[16] Letter of October 25, 1955.

[17] "Snapshots of the Interstate Metropolis," *The Reporter*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 8, 1955), p. 21.

[18] Mills, Senior, and Goldsen, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*), p. 122.

AMERICANS OF ORIENTAL DESCENT

About three hundred thousand persons of Oriental descent, most of them citizens, reside in the United States. In the century or more since the first substantial number of Chinese came to this country, treatment of Orientals has ranged from intense discrimination to almost full acceptance. We shall only suggest some aspects of this range with reference to two groups of Oriental descent, the Chinese and Japanese.

Chinese

Active discrimination against the Chinese, which had been found particularly in the West, began to decline about 1900. This change was a function of their gradual acculturation, the virtual cessation of the growth of the Chinese group (there were 107,000 in 1890, 118,000 in 1950), the improvement in their economic status, and their replacement, as targets for hostility, first by Japanese and later by Mexicans and Negroes. The common effort of China and the United States in World War II gave further impetus to the process of integration—a gain that the Korean War and the current conflicts with Communist China seem not to have affected to any great extent. The McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952, granted naturalization rights to resident Oriental aliens, who formerly had been ineligible for citizenship, and brought the nations of the Far East within the quota system. The reduction in discrimination that this in-

volves must be weighed against the fact that the quota system is a device for ensuring that the major proportion of immigration from outside the Western Hemisphere shall come from Western Europe. The quotas for most of the countries of the Orient are the minimum of one hundred per year.

There is virtually no segregation of Chinese in schools or in places of public accommodation. A summary in the *New York Times,* referring to both Japanese and Chinese, holds that they "have moved into a status close to first-class citizenship."[19] One should not forget, however, the lingering patterns of discrimination. In July 1954 the National Exchange Club revoked the charters of two California chapters for refusing to ask two Chinese members to resign. Both the refusal and the revocation are significant. Housing is perhaps the most serious aspect of the remaining discrimination. As the traditional Chinatowns have lost some of their residents, "residential Chinatowns" in the suburbs have appeared, a product, in the judgment of Robert Lee, of restrictive covenants and practices, of fear of lack of welcome in other neighborhoods, and the desire to live with fellow Chinese for social and recreational reasons.[20]

This housing problem is occasionally brought to national attention by some dramatic situation. In 1952, there were vigorous protests by several white neighbors when Sing Sheng bought a home in a suburb of San Francisco. In 1955, Dr. Samuel Lee, a Major in the Army Medical Corps, Olympic diving champion, and good-will ambassador for the United States, was unable to buy a home in Garden Grove, California. He is a Korean American married to a Chinese American. In both of these cases, the news brought many offers of houses and declarations of support; but the crucial fact for less-well-known or milder persons is the quiet discrimination they face in the matter of housing.[21]

[19] *New York Times,* May 29, 1955, p. 19.
[20] Letter of August 11, 1955.

Japanese

Early in the twentieth century, the Japanese became the heirs of some of the hostility formerly directed against the Chinese. By hard work and thrift, some of them "leaning over backward" to follow middle-class values, they rapidly achieved a modest economic security. Their rapid acculturation did not protect them, however, against discrimination. If the Mexicans have been criticized for their *lack* of "American ways," the Japanese have been attacked for their *excess* of virtues—they work too hard or strive too vigorously for education.

The culmination of the discrimination against Japanese Americans is undoubtedly their "relocation" from the West Coast in 1942. This is now widely regarded as the most serious violation of the rights of citizens and of peaceful resident aliens ever actively sponsored by the federal government.[22] All Japanese Americans, about two-thirds of whom were citizens, were compelled to leave the West Coast and were held in the relocation camps. Gradually, during the next three years, some of them were permitted to leave the camps, for the purpose of entering school, of joining the Armed Forces, or of employment in other parts of the country. After the war, over half returned to the West Coast. They had suffered a loss, from the sale or deterioration of homes, farms, and businesses, variously estimated from 350 to 500 millions of dollars. Some slight violence greeted their return, but the pendulum has swung rapidly in their favor, as a result of many forces. The obvious loyalty of the great majority of Japanese Americans, the outstanding record of their men in the Armed Forces, their extensive acculturation, the activity of such groups as the Japanese American Citizens League (which has fought for restoration of losses due to the relocation and for the repeal of discriminatory legislation), the shifting of hostility toward Negroes and Mexicans, and perhaps the pressure of guilty consciences in many white Americans—these are among the factors involved. Since 1952, when resident aliens of Oriental descent became eligible for citizenship, over six thousand Japanese have been naturalized—a symbol of the extent of the integration.

[21] See Robert Lee, "The Case of Sammy Lee," *New Leader,* September 5, 1955, pp. 15–16.

[22] There is an extensive literature on the causes and consequences of relocation. See Leonard Bloom and Ruth Riemer, *Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War on Japanese Americans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1945); Carey McWilliams, *Prejudice—Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1944); Jacobus ten Broek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954); Dorothy S. Thomas, *The Salvage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952); and Dorothy S. Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, *The Spoilage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946). There are some differences of interpretation among these authors concerning the balance of forces that caused the relocation order. Perhaps the most carefully reasoned statement is that of ten Broek, Barnhart, and Matson, although they may underemphasize the powerful, if indirect, influence of private groups and the climate of opinion they had helped to create.

SUMMARY

Mexican Americans have been segregated in numerous school systems of western and southwestern states, but such segregation is being contested and is decreasing. Because of residential concentration, Puerto Rican children constitute sizable proportions of several New York City elementary schools, but no school is all Puerto Rican and attempts have been made to reduce the isolation of these pupils. Chinese-American and Japanese-American school children are nowhere segregated because of race. Previous federal and state court decisions have influenced minorities other than the Negro, and the 1954 ruling may be effective in preventing the segregation of these groups in the future or in strengthening their legal position if segregation is introduced.

Integration of the minorities with which this paper has been concerned has moved more slowly on the job market and particularly in housing than it has in the schools. But the process is under way. If one may, with good evidence, remark, "How much that is discriminatory remains!" he may, in more optimistic mood, declare, "How much that was discriminatory has been improved!"

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Racial Policy and International Relations

By John F. Melby

THE bulk of this issue of The Annals is, I assume, addressed primarily to Americans—as it should be. But since the whole problem of desegregation and integration is part of our dirty linen which inevitably is from time to time on view for the world, I would concern myself here with what the world sees and, thus, speak not only to Americans, but also to others who are troubled about the problem. Some of the things I shall say will be rather harsh; but I trust they will need neither apology nor explanation.

By some kind of empathy the United States has come to be identified in the world mind with the equality of men, not equality as Mr. Jefferson has been misinterpreted to mean it, but equality of opportunity and of initial advantage. Part of this reputation has been deserved, but part of it is belied by the actual facts. At the outset let it be clear: the evil part of the American record on racial policies, especially in the light of our professions, is a major blot on our escutcheon, and it does positive and serious damage to the whole cause of freedom and democracy in these days in which the United States has emerged into a position of world leadership. One could even argue that the correction of racial abuses in this country is so vital and integral to the democratic cause to which the American people have dedicated themselves that there can be no quibbling over the remedy if our whole structure is not to be mortally affected. Coercion must be used should it be necessary, since the argument for gradual social change has too long and too often been abused to be any longer acceptable if we would continue to fill our role of leadership in the free world. It is an extraordinary fact that a world never noted for its racial tolerance in theory or in practice has come to look on the United States as a symbol of equality, and that the oppressed turn to America in the hope of finding understanding and an untarnished record. The burden of responsibility thus placed upon us is a heavy one.

Damage to American Prestige

It would be gratuitous to belabor unduly the point of how much damage has been done to American prestige by our enemies throughout the world by the simple device of pointing out the failures of our racial professions and the gross violations of the spirit of the Constitution. Our enemies and our friends have seldom been reluctant to bring these lapses to our attention—as indeed they should. If any reader be in doubt on the point, he need only check the percentage of Communist propaganda which concerns American racial discrimination or, in friendlier circumstances, the prominence given to racial atrocity stories in the Asian press. The observation applies with equal force to Europe, which is far less sensitive to the problem than are Asia and Africa.

Nor is there need to assume, as it might be comforting to do, that those who disseminate tales or react strongly against American discrimination necessarily do so from malice or in awareness that what they say—or say they believe—is untrue or at least not the whole truth. A special report last fall issued by the American Jewish Committee on European reaction to the Till case stated that American prestige had been "seriously damaged" and that European reaction had been "swift, violent, and universal"; nor was it limited to Communist groups, but came from liberal and conservative elements. And neither is the reaction against us confined to those groups whose somewhat limited access to information might excuse some of the distortion in their minds.

I well remember two fairly high-level Soviet officials, both concerned with Russian press and information activities, one in Moscow and the other in China, whom I came to know fairly well some years ago when I was involved in the same sort of work for the American government. Both were educated, well-read men who knew a good deal about the United States and were able to separate fact from an official line. Both were convinced almost beyond reach of argument that the fact and substance of race relations in America differed little from those of 1860, whatever the changes in outward form. Any attempted balancing of the picture on my part was discounted as being only what an American official might be expected to say. Could I produce written evidence of my statements? I could not, because the balance of the material in the American press as between advances and failures clearly seemed to substantiate their worst assumptions. Any attempt to explain this imbalance on grounds that trouble and sensation are news which people prefer to read, whereas orderly progress is not, and that a free American press for the most part prints what it thinks people will read was only an open offer for an attack on the general irresponsibility and immaturity of the American people and press.

"Freedom of the Press"

It is no answer to say that this reaction came from those who have turned out to be hostile to us, despite the fond illusions of the war years. Just as vividly can I remember comparable conversations with many Asians and Europeans whose friendship and sympathy for the United States have been demonstrated beyond question. The American kind of freedom of the press is hard enough to explain to peoples in this world who have traditions of freedom themselves; for that vast majority lacking any such tradition the task often seems hopeless. It is all very well to explain to the more sophisticated that a few American communities and their press have learned the hard lesson that exposure of racial atrocities is not necessarily the cure, that sensational headlines as likely as not can inflame passion and prejudice, and that, therefore, there are instances of responsible suppression of news. This, however, is no answer to the gnawing question about the responsibility of the press to educate and to inform fully; or if one accept the stated excuse of publishers that the public will not read the kind of news which should be published, then the even more troublesome question about the maturity of the American people who claim leadership of the free world.

The action of a Protestant congregation in Connecticut in electing a Negro as its minister without even considering his race, or the closing of a church by the Archbishop of New Orleans because of trouble over a Negro priest, which earned him the commendation of the Vatican, receive minimal coverage, where reported at all (a notable and expected exception of course being the *New York Times*). On the other hand, the Washington *Daily News* devotes a full half page to the disgraceful utterances and activities of a faculty mem-

ber of Georgetown University; whereas the disclaimer by the University that the good doctor in any sense represented the views of the University can be covered in a sentence, and is not considered worthy of a headline which would give the casual, average reader the impression that one of the great universities of America was having no truck with this kind of racial shamelessness.

Since public immaturity is hardly the whole answer in a people who have shown themselves so mature in other respects, perhaps part of the answer is that an American sense of shame and guilt that the record has not been better than it has, has led us to play down the advances and play up the failures—a kind of self-flagellation, which may be a hopeful sign for the eventual outcome. It is not in my province here to assess the meaning and implications of such a possibility in domestic American terms, but it is important to repeat again the damage it has done us abroad and the serious reservations it has created in the world mind, especially the Asian, about the validity of our professions.

A Story to Be Told

The fact is—and here I speak as much to Asians as to Americans—that there is another and exciting part of the picture of which all Americans can be proud. Despite the failures and despite the unpleasant fact that the United States was among the last of the so-called civilized countries to reject slavery as national policy, the racial advances of the United States during the past ninety years have been one of the great stories of recorded history. Without in any sense condoning what we have not done, we can and should speak with assurance of what we have done. Ninety years ago there was fought the bitterest and most devastating war in the history of the Americas—a civil war at that; a primary issue was freedom and equality for a large minority group brought here from an alien culture generations before and kept in servitude, illiterate, without economic opportunity, step by step losing its own ancestral and cultural traditions and because of its status having only the narrowest chance of creating something new, and whose psychological and social problems were complicated as offspring resulting from exercise of their property rights by white owners in periodic visits to the slave quarters were for the most part also kept in slavery. At the time this group was largely concentrated in that section of the country which for decades remained dedicated to nullifying the promises of the Emancipation and in which certain elements seemingly would still rather perish than change. The rest of the country was quickly too preoccupied with the prospects of the dazzling American expansion and development which followed the Civil War to lend much of a helping hand to a group that faced freedom with little else than an inferiority complex and its own considerable natural endowments.

The story of what has happened between then and today has many brilliant pages. It is a story which bears telling and retelling. What that story is can be found in the rest of this issue of THE ANNALS. Our government can and does tell much of it, but it can have only limited impact simply because it is government and not unnaturally suspect. The true impact can come only as we tell the story to each other day by day in true perspective and as private citizens. What free men tell each other carries a conviction nothing else can.

U. S. Position in Asia

No small part of traditional American prestige in Asia has come from our advocacy of "desegregation" for Asians.

In practical terms this began with the open-door policy and was followed by our support for Asian nationalist movements, our belief in the right of peoples to choose their own way of life, our specific compliance with promises to the Philippines, our renunciation of special privileges in China, our acceptance of Japan as a major power. If at times there were qualms about how we seemed to interpret our words at home, there seemed to be no reason for such fears abroad in so far as the immediate and burning Asian ambitions were concerned. We stood up and voted on the right side. Asia today is fully independent, with the exception of the rather special cases of Indochina and Malaya, which no one seriously doubts will in time join the ranks. But a new problem has arisen during the past decade which makes the whole situation uneasy.

Preoccupation with Communism

This problem is the overwhelming American preoccupation with communism and Communist expansion which takes precedence over all other considerations in American thinking, a preoccupation attended by a rather typically American sense of urgency and impatience. We have agreed on the nature of the danger; we believe we know what must be done about it. Anyone who does not accept the diagnosis and the remedy is at best grievously in error and must be corrected, or is potentially a menace. Unhappily, Asia does not always and necessarily agree with us or, as is more frequently the case, sees the problem and the remedy in a somewhat different light, of varying degrees of intensity.

Asian Reactions

Regardless of the nature or degree of disagreement, Asian fears and suspicions are aroused by dogmatic American insistence that the United States alone has the answers. The achievement of "desegregation" has now been followed by the demand for acceptance as equals, for "integration" in which the various Asian voices shall command the same respect as those of the erstwhile colonial powers even when they are raised in dissent or opposition. In frustration at so far having failed to receive that acceptance, Asian countries have understandably focused resentment on the major power that has taken the most rigid and clamorous position about communism in a fashion of which many Asians often disapprove.

It is hardly accident or surprising that Asians in attempting to understand our attitude should—most ably assisted by Communist propaganda—rediscover the glaring chink in our racial armor and begin to suspect that we are willing to desegregate but not to integrate. Close as they are to the achievement of their own independence, they not unnaturally feel intensely about acceptance as equals and in addition fear that American insistence on having its own way in this problem will end up as infringement on their independence. They see in our posture at least a residue of what has been described in an ugly, if graphic, phrase as a "nigger attitude." The reaction is not wholly without justification, as anyone who has observed American behavior abroad can testify. When we are concerned by foreign reactions we would do well to remember that in our position we no longer have a private life, and that what we do at home takes on an enlarged, perhaps often exaggerated, importance in the eyes of the world as evidence of what an anxious world can expect from us. Undoubtedly what Mississippi does about its school system worries New Delhi more than it does Chicago.

A final word of friendly suggestion for Asians. No problems of this magnitude are simple of solution. Certainly

no good solution is possible without mutual understanding and tolerance, nor is failure of understanding on one side really any justification for failure on the other. The Asian record on race relations is not entirely unblemished. Among many examples which could be cited one need mention only the Chinese record with minorities and the various Indian racial and social conflicts to suggest that certain weaknesses and abuses have at one time or another been indulged in by all men. Even if "under Heaven all men are brothers," the perfect brother is still a fairly rare phenomenon.

ALL HAVE SINNED . . .

In all countries, a certain contrite awareness of the mistakes of the past might well contribute to greater mutual respect and understanding, without which no flow of pious wishes or written words can be much more than an exercise in good intentions and bad style.

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Social Science and the Desegregation Process

By HERBERT BLUMER

THIS paper undertakes to analyze segregation as a social process. Subsequently, consideration is given to the problem of desegregation and to the general lines along which programs of desegregation must move. Our concern is primarily with racial desegregation.

Segregation is continuously at work in all human societies as a natural, unguided, and unwitting process. It takes the form of a diverse and chiefly undesigned operation which sets apart groups of people inside of a larger, embracing society. This setting apart may result from practices of exclusion employed by one group against others, or by voluntary withdrawal on the part of given groups, or by the operation of natural forces which place individuals in different localities or different social spheres. The result of this undesigned process is to form disparate groups. Each group is relatively homogeneous. Each constitutes the arena for the bulk of the associations and experiences of its members. Each is limited in access to the life of other groups. Each is denied, accordingly, the special privileges granted by other groups to their members. Segregation is a primary means by which a human society develops an inner organization—an allocation of diverse elements into an articulated arrangement.

NATURE OF SEGREGATION

Sociologists have been concerned with two chief manifestations of this natural process of segregation. These are (1) the formation of diversified areas of residence, chiefly in large cities, and (2) the exclusion exercised by human groups in accepting members and in granting privileges. A brief consideration of these two forms of segregation will be helpful.

Ecological studies of the residential distribution of people, particularly in large cities, show a pattern of distinguishable areas. Each area tends to be distinctive in terms of the people who inhabit it, the kind of local institutions lodged in it, and the general round of life of its people. Such areas are familiar to us in the case of "black belts," "little Italies," and other ethnic areas; they are also noted in the case of slums, workingmen areas, homeless-men areas, apartment-house areas, "gold coasts," and rooming-house areas.

The formation of such differentiated areas, while not unaffected by deliberate governmental policy, is primarily a natural and spontaneous process. They are the product roughly of three kinds of forces: (1) neutral forces, such as level of income and accessibility to places of work; (2) forces of attraction, such as wishing to live among people with whom one identifies oneself; and (3) forces of rejection, as when people are found unacceptable or unsuitable as residents in given areas. This process of ecological differentiation, operating without any over-all conscious design, promotes the formation of separate social worlds, guides and fosters separate areas of association, and restricts participation in the life of outside groups. In our modern complex world this natural process of ecological allocation has become a primary medium and cause of segregation.

The study of human group life reveals clearly another line of segregation in the form of the exclusion exercised by one group against members of other

groups. Such exclusion is indigenous in human societies. Every group having a sense of identity and some kind of purpose exercises some measure of control over membership in its body and over access to the privileges which its life affords. Whether it be a family, a social club, a clique, a group of friends, a business organization, a professional society, a labor union, a church, or a self-conscious neighborhood, the group necessarily recognizes certain criteria of membership and rejects those who are deemed not to meet such criteria. Similarly, it does not grant to outsiders the particular rights and privileges open to its membership. It is only because such group exclusion is so rarely challenged that we fail to realize how basic and extensive it is in the life of human societies. If groups could not draw lines and exercise control over accessibility to their ranks and their privileges, their existence would be intrinsically doomed and group life would be chaotic. In this legitimate sense there is in play in every human society a continuous process of preserving group domains and of excluding outsiders from ingress into such domains. Quite obviously, this process of exclusion has the effect of allocating people into separate groups, of confining them to such groups, and of establishing barriers to their free participation in each other's group life.

These few remarks call attention to the fact that a twofold process of segregation is continuously at work in modern society. This process is natural, spontaneous, and inevitable. It is essential, in the form of group exclusion, to the existence of all human societies; in the form of ecological differentiation it is essential to the existence of modern, urbanized societies. One can say, rhetorically, that the process of segregation in one or the other form is accepted, employed, and condoned by all human societies.

SEGREGATION AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM

It is evident, immediately, that when we speak of segregation as a social problem, as a condition to be prevented or overcome, we are not referring to the total process of segregation. We refer instead only to special instances which have been challenged. Such challenges arise in the form of a claim to the right of being accepted into a group or sharing the privileges which the group denies through its act of exclusion. It is evident that the claim arises and has validity only through the application of the standards of a larger inclusive group, such as an embracing political society with legal rights of citizenship or a transcending moral community with a set of ethical expectations. Given lines or instances of group exclusion become suspect only when they contravene political or moral rights. Since this constitutes the heart of the *problem* of segregation, a few further words of elaboration are in order.

Every human group may be regarded as having properly an area of private rights—chiefly in the form of deciding whom to allow to become members and to enjoy the privileges which the group life is able to provide. As suggested above, the group possession of such areas of private right is sanctioned in every society irrespective of wide differences in the nature of the rights and in the gratifications which their exercise yields. Discrimination arises when a given line of private right is defined legally or morally as a public right and the group does not accept the definition. The continuing exercise of the private right at the expense of a given group having legal or moral claims to the privileges is what constitutes segregation as a social problem. Thus segregation, as a problem, arises in the wake of the application of moral or legal definitions which stake out claims where none existed previously. Many forms of group exclusion may have a legitimate acceptance and status only to be defined later as contravening public rights. Since in our changing modern world new legal and moral definitions are readily applied to varieties of established group exclusions, we may expect new problems of segregation to arise.

In locating the problem of segregation in a clash between established group exclusion and a legal or moral claim to the privileges protected by the exclusion we can identify the lines of force affecting the outcome of the clash. On the one hand, note has to be taken of how deeply set is the practice of group exclusion and how effective is the apparatus for maintaining the practice. On the other hand, attention must be given to the authority attending the moral or legal claim and, again, to the effectiveness of the apparatus available to implement the claim. These observations set a broad framework inside of which a more detailed analysis can be undertaken.

THE SEGREGATING GROUP

To understand segregation it is necessary to see its position in the life of the segregating group. Almost always the practices of exclusion or rejection which it involves have grown up naturally in the life experiences of the group. Through these life experiences the group has come to develop a social position, a sense of identity, and a conception of itself in the light of which the practice of exclusion appears natural and proper. As a natural part of the social order the practice comes to be embedded in feelings and convictions and to be justified logically by a set of reasons whose validity is self-evident. Also, the practice is usually legitimated and bulwarked by the endorsement given by institutional authorities within the group; as the spokesmen of the group their official approval places a stamp of truth and virtue on the practice. Further, as a customary practice the exclusion feeds, so to speak, on itself; its continuous routine occurrence becomes an affirmation of its validity. As each member of the group gives expression to the practice in voice and deed; he reinforces in other members the value which all of them are disposed to attach to the practice. Sustained by these various sources of strength and sanction the established practice of group exclusion tends to be a firm part of the way of life.

This general process which imparts toughness and fixity to established practices of group exclusion is usually intensified in cases of racial segregation. The reasons for this are fairly clear. The recognition of racial or physical difference sustains and intensifies the sense of social or status difference which may have happened to develop between racial groups. The observable physical difference reinforces and rivets the feeling of the dominant racial group that the subordinate racial group is alien and not of its kind. Similarly, the feeling of superiority in the dominant group derives a greater measure of natural validity by virtue of the ability to note biological differences between the two groups. Thus, the feeling of racial difference adds tenacity to the practices of exclusion.

We need to note, also, that the range of exclusions between racial groups is likely to be extensive. They meet each other not in a restricted or specialized way, as in the case of the relation of journeymen to apprentices, but over a wide area of diverse association. Where a sense of racial difference has been fused with a sense of status difference, the inevitable tendency will be to extend the practice of exclusion along the

array of relations. Since each line of exclusion symbolizes to the dominant group its social position, all its established lines of exclusion hang together and sustain each other.

In a further continuation of our background remarks we wish to point out that patterns of racial exclusion may decline and wither away as naturally and unwittingly as they come into existence and grow. Any number of developments may interfere with the conditions and processes that cause and sustain such patterns. The social positions of the two racial groups may be shifted by changes in wealth, education, achievement, and prowess. The dominant group may change its conception of itself and of the subordinate group. Members of two racial groups may be forced through sheer expediency to associate in ways contrary to established lines of exclusion, as under varying conditions of complex industrial life. The dominant racial group may lose much of its identity through the mobility of its members and through their intermingling with other people who are not accustomed to draw the usual lines of exclusion; in this way practices of exclusion do not get the affirmation that comes otherwise from their regular and unquestioned repetition. The spokesmen and institutional leaders of the dominant group may come to appraise the established exclusions in new and different ways; to speak with a divided voice is to fragment the standing of the practices. Such occurrences as these may undermine in a natural and undesigned way established patterns of racial exclusion, without the benefit of organized efforts to eradicate them. The significance of a natural and unwitting disintegration of established patterns of racial exclusion is pronounced. It is doubtful if deliberate efforts to break down given forms of exclusion in a firmly established racial order can succeed without the operation of a prior or a concurrent process of their natural undermining.

DESEGREGATION

We can now consider the problem of desegregation. We are interested in considering the general problem of how practices of racial exclusion which are challenged as morally improper or illegal are eliminated through conscious policy and deliberate action. In other words we deal with desegregation not as a natural and unwitting process but as a directed effort to displace an established form of racial exclusion. In this latter form the problem of desegregation is thrown on a different plane. It is not a task of eliminating or reversing the process which led to segregation but rather of arresting or immobilizing its end operation.

To be sure, much—indeed most—of scholarly thought in current psychological and social science presumes that racial desegregation is to be achieved by the elimination or changing of the process which brings segregation into being. This process is usually given a four-step temporal sequence: (1) conditions which implant (2) attitudes of racial prejudice which (3) lead to racial discrimination which (4) results in a condition of segregation. It is thus reasoned that to eliminate segregation one has to eliminate discrimination; to eliminate discrimination one has to change the attitudes which bring it about; and, usually, to change the attitudes one has to correct the conditions that cause them.

Such a formulation is markedly unsuited to success in conscious efforts at racial desegregation. It implies, essentially, a destruction of a tightly interwoven and solid social structure. This can be appreciated by bearing in mind that a given form of racial exclusion is a customary adjustment which has evolved naturally out of given lines of historic experience; that it reflects the actual social positions occupied by the racial groups in their social order; that it expresses the fundamental conception which the dominant racial group has of itself and of the subordinate group; that it carries the virtue and the validity of authoritative endorsement; that it gains continuous affirmation through the daily reinforcement which members of the dominant group give to one another's feelings and convictions; and that it is an interlinked part of a system of racial exclusion. To try to eliminate the given practice of racial exclusion by altering the network of conditions which bring it about and sustain it is a task of formidable magnitude. To try to eliminate the practice by changing one phase or part of the network—as in the effort to inculcate attitudes of racial tolerance—is to ignore the complicated structure which sustains the phase or part. The attempt to achieve racial desegregation by a correction of the process which brings segregation about represents a highly unpromising line of action.

The alternative is to block the process from achieving its end result. This is done by controlling the decisions of the main functionaries who carry a given form of racial segregation into actual execution. It is important to recognize that in any given kind of racial segregation there are strategically placed individuals or small groups who set the policies and issue the orders without which the given practice of segregation could not be maintained. School boards, superintendents of education, real estate boards, realtors, hotel owners and managers, medical boards, hospital superintendents, and directors of recreational systems are a very few examples. All work through a system of subordinates who in carrying out orders and understood policies sustain in practice the given form of racial segregation. Thus, control of the decisions of the chief functionaries responsible for the actual operation of the practice of segregation offers a direct means of arresting or immobilizing that practice. To put the point in terms of a theory of social action we can say that it is not essential in efforts to change human conduct to alter, on the part of individuals, the feelings and attitudes behind that conduct, or, on the part of the group, the collective values, claims, and expectations which sustain the conduct. Feelings and attitudes, values and expectations, have *to gain expression* in conduct; the apparatus essential to such expression is, itself, vulnerable and offers pivotal points for arresting the end expression. Contemporary social and psychological science is backward in coming to see and appreciate this picture.

ROLE OF FUNCTIONARIES

To exert effective influence on the decisions of centrally placed functionaries in the operating pattern of segregation it is necessary to use the weight of transcending prestige, authority, and power. The functionaries, as members of the dominant racial group, are highly likely to share the feelings and values of that group toward the given form of exclusion, or else to respond to the expectations and pressures of that group. For them to make decisions that are opposed to the feelings and expectations of the dominant group it is necessary for them to be constrained and supported by a transcending group having prestige or power.

Basically, the outcome of the struggle to achieve racial desegregation through conscious effort depends on what influences the central functionaries have to take into account in making their decisions. If the conscious effort takes the

form of an educational campaign to change the views of the members of the dominant racial group or a campaign of moral exhortation to change their feelings, the functionaries are essentially well protected. They need merely, so to speak, await the outcome of such effort; they are subjected to no special pressure to change their customary lines of decision and are not forced in juxtaposition to their own group. Parenthetically, this is another reason for the relative ineffectiveness of attempts to achieve racial desegregation through general educational and moral campaigns.

A different setting is formed if the conscious efforts at desegregation are along lines which force functionaries to take cognizance of solicitations, demands, and pressures made on them to carry out a different line of decision. Such influences, if attended by any degree of weight, have the effect, psychologically, of detaching the functionaries from their group and of leading them to weigh such influences over against the views and expectations of their racial group. This is the kind of setting that is brought into being by the enactment and application of laws against segregation or by the imposition of regulations and expectations against segregation by leaders of associations and institutions in which the functionaries are in some measure incorporated. The functionaries have to take account of these demands and to form their decisions with some regard to the demands. In a genuine sense the functionary is an exposed target. This is the basic fact which structures the struggle toward deliberate racial desegregation. It also provides the opportunity for adroit advancement even where the dominant racial group is solidly opposed in feeling to a given line of desegregation.

ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS

Recognizing the pivotal position of the decisions of functionaries, we easily see the important role of organizational pressure and support. The dominant group in a racial community, to a man, may have strong feelings of opposition to a given form of desegregation, yet be lacking in organizations to mobilize such opposition and convert it into action. Under such conditions, even though sharing the feelings of the dominant group the functionary may readily bow to the outside demands and pressures, particularly if these are backed up by weighty organizational support. Conversely, a functionary sympathetic to desegregation may be effectively deterred, not necessarily by the attitudes held by the members of the dominant racial group but by organizations among them that bespeak trouble. There is no need to spell out other possible combinations. The central point is clear. The carrying through as well as the blocking of deliberate desegregation depends on mobilizing and focusing influence and power on central functionaries. This calls, in the case of either side, for the development of organizational strength. The vehicle of procedure is strategical maneuvering, designed to marshal and utilize the potentials of power and prestige available in the given situation. Such potentials are almost certain to vary from situation to situation, thus calling for different tactical operations on local scenes.


It should be observed that in this contest, so to speak, to affect the decisions of the central functionaries, the advantage in the long run is in the hands of the side which is able to capitalize on the prestige and strength of the transcending group. Agencies seeking to achieve racial desegregation have a particularly strong strategic weapon

(it is not always seen or used) in focusing on the validity of *applying* the transcending legal or moral standard. This makes it unnecessary to challenge or impugn the feelings and attitudes of the functionary toward the subordinate racial group, or to try to change such feelings and attitudes. It makes it unnecessary, further, to argue the merits or the validity of the legal or moral standard. Instead, the approach to the functionary can appropriately be made in terms of the validity and need of *applying* the standard. This provides the opportunity of shifting the contest from a question of a struggle between the racial groups to a question of obedience to the transcending legal or moral standards. Since such standards carry implicitly the dictates of obedience, one is provided with a line along which to press the case which can largely avoid the issue of racial dispute. It may be added that this line becomes the most effective basis on which to build up organizational strength in acting toward central functionaries, for it offers opportunities of enlisting a support inside the dominant racial group that would be lost on the straight issue of racial struggle.

CONCLUSIONS

A few remarks should be made, in closing, on the relation of conscious or designed racial desegregation to natural and unwitting racial desegregation. There can be no question that the former acts back on and abets the latter. Where given programs of racial desegregation succeed, they weaken the support of other established forms of segregation. They interfere with the routine, repetitive affirmation of lines of racial exclusion. Further, in allowing the members of the racial groups to associate as equals in the new situation they lay the groundwork for acting toward one another on a human and personal basis rather than on a basis of membership in racial groups. Deliberate desegregation enters, thus, into a cyclical and reciprocal relation with natural desegregation.

Herbert Blumer, Ph.D., Berkeley, California, is chairman of the Department of Sociology and Social Institutions, University of California, Berkeley, and president of the American Sociological Society. In 1954 he was a member of the International Conference on Race Relations in Honolulu. Before going to California, he was a member of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago (1927–52). Past president of the Society for the Study of Social Problems and former editor of the American Journal of Sociology, he is the author of Appraisals of Social Research (1939) and other books.



Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1955

THE year which has just passed has been a fruitful one for the Academy and one of more than ordinary activity.

Bylaws

At the annual meeting on January 24, 1955, you approved a revision of the Bylaws. According to Article VIII of these Bylaws, amendments may be made "by a majority vote of those present at any meeting of the members of the corporation or of the Board of Directors," and it is also provided that if the Board of Directors amend the Bylaws, the change "shall continue in effect unless and until altered at a meeting of the members of the corporation."

At the meeting of the Board of Directors immediately following the meeting of members mentioned above, the following changes in the Bylaws were made and are now submitted for your approval.

Instead of the following wording:

> There shall be at least one regular meeting of the Board of Directors in each year. The time and place of such meetings shall be determined by the Board of Directors.

Section 2 of Article V now reads:

> A meeting of the Board of Directors shall be held immediately following the annual business meeting of the members. If a quorum of directors be then present no notice of such meeting shall be necessary and at such organization meeting the Board of Directors may elect officers for the ensuing year and may also transact any other business coming before the meeting. In addition to such meeting, regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held on the fourth Fridays of May and October in each year at such place and hour as may be determined by the President or by a majority of the directors.

Furthermore, Section 3 of Article VI:

> The first Vice-President shall in the absence or during the disability of the President have all the powers and perform all the duties of the President.

was amended by the addition of the following words:

> . . . provided however that the Board of Directors may grant the President a leave of absence for any period and may delegate the powers and assign the duties of the President for such period or any portion thereof to some officer other than the First Vice-President, including any officer specially elected or appointed for the purpose, and may revoke such delegation of powers and assignment of duties at the pleasure of the Board.

Meetings

There were two meetings held in Philadelphia during the year. One was our regular spring convention on April 1 and 2, which for the first time in several decades dealt with an important domestic issue rather than with international relations. The general topic of the meeting was "Internal Security and Civil Rights in the United States." A distinguished array of highly competent speakers addressed the convention, and the discussion from the floor was of a uniformly high standard. Attendance at six sessions totaled 1,405, among them representatives of learned institutions and national and international organizations.[1]

On May 20 and 21, a restricted conference on "Methods of Financing Higher Education" was held, which brought together presidents, vice-presidents, and finance officials of institutions of higher learning in the eastern and central areas of the country. The conference was made possible by the generosity of members of the family of Edmund J. James, first president of the Academy, and served to commemorate the centenary of his birth.[2]

Publications

The following volumes of THE ANNALS were published during the year and distributed to all members:

January	*Ethical Standards and Professional Conduct*
March	*Contemporary Africa: Trends and Issues*
May	*Air Power and National Security*
July	*Internal Security and Civil Rights*
September	*Higher Education Under Stress*
November	*The Public School and Other Community Services*

A standard feature of THE ANNALS is the book department, which contains reviews of outstanding works in the social science fields. During 1955, no fewer than 408 reviews were published, prepared by 322 different reviewers and totaling about 308 pages.

Current and past issues of THE ANNALS are in constant demand. In 1955, total sales of individual issues amounted to $11,612, compared with $10,697 in 1954 and $11,747 in 1953.

Membership

During 1955, the Academy admitted 2,652 new members, 265 of whom were student members. There were 3,523 withdrawals and 35 members died during the year. On December 31 there were altogether 14,478 members in good standing, including 3,177 libraries in the United States. The Academy has 1,503 foreign members, including 758 libraries.

Finances

It is a pleasure to report to you that as a result of the moderate increase in membership dues in 1954 and further economies in management, we closed the year 1955 with a favorable balance of income amounting to $11,401.38, compared with a deficit of $7,173 in 1954 and even larger deficits in 1952 and 1953.

Respectfully submitted,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Thorsten Sellin, *Acting President*
C. A. Kulp, *First Vice-President*
Raymond T. Bowman, *Secretary*
Lewis M. Stevens, *Counsel*

Otto T. Mallery, M. Albert Linton, Alfred H. Williams, Stephen B. Sweeney, Jerome J. Rothschild, Norman D. Palmer, James C. Charlesworth.

January 23, 1956

[1] The addresses were published in the July issue of THE ANNALS.

[2] The proceedings were published as a section of the September issue of THE ANNALS and were also reprinted in a pamphlet which was given wide distribution.

REPORT OF AUDITORS

January 17, 1956

MR. T. WESLEY MATTHEWS, *Asst. Treasurer*
The American Academy of Political and Social Science
3937 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 4, Pa.

DEAR SIR:

We have examined the accounts and financial records of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the year ended December 31, 1955. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standard, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedure as we considered necessary in the circumstances, except that we did not count or test the inventory of publications. We did, however, review the inventory procedure and pricing method and we believe that the inventory is stated conservatively.

In our opinion, with the exception of the inventory, the accompanying statement of financial condition and statement of income and expense present fairly the financial position of The American Academy of Political and Social Science at December 31, 1955, and the results of its operation for the year then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.

Your very truly,
SAMUEL R. SAPIENZA
Certified Public Accountant

STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSE FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1955

INCOME		
Dues and Subscriptions: Regular	$52,465.41	
Student	3,054.91	
Subscriptions	24,176.81	$ 79,697.13
Sales of Publications	11,684.68	
Advertising	4,128.75	15,813.43
Investment: Profit on Sale of Investments	7,200.19	
Interest and Dividends	8,263.95	15,464.14
Miscellaneous		33.33
TOTAL INCOME		$111,008.03
EXPENSE		
Membership: Records	$ 5,320.04	
Promotion	14,006.91	19,326.95
Annals—Publishing Costs	46,835.46	
Sales Costs	4,086.22	
Accounting and Finance Costs	6,196.20	
Office Operation	10,256.78	
Philadelphia Meeting	6,393.46	
Advertising	1,928.47	
TOTAL CASH EXPENSE		95,023.54
EXCESS OF CASH RECEIPTS OVER DISBURSEMENTS		$ 15,984.49
Less: Depreciation—Buildings	330.00	
Improvements	3,478.88	
Office Equipment	774.23	4,583.11
NET INCOME FROM OPERATIONS		$ 11,401.38

STATEMENT OF FUNDS

FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1955

Source		
Net income from operations—See Statement of Income and Expense		$ 11,401.38
Add:		
Depreciation on fixed assets		4,583.11
		$ 15,984.49
Securities sold (cost)		52,712.87
Restatement of James-Patten-Rowe Fund		14,652.50
Total sources		$ 83,349.86
Applications		
Securities purchased (cost)	$23,893.33	
Fixed assets	120.84	
Addition to Retirement Fund	526.00	
Correction of inventories of prior years	1,275.05	
Total applications		28,815.22
Net increase in working capital (see Schedule below)		$ 57,534.64

SCHEDULE OF WORKING CAPITAL CHANGE

FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1955

	1955	*1954*	*Increase*	*Decrease*
Current assets	$39,633.30	$25,392.47	$14,240.83	
Current liabilities	——	10,909.59		$ 10,909.59
	$39,633.30	$36,302.06		
Trust fund equities	24,065.78	78,269.18	54,203.40	
Working capital	$15,567.52	$(41,967.12)	$68,444.23	$ 10,909.59
Change in working capital				57,534.63
			$68,444,23	$ 68,444.23

Book Department

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

LESTER B. PEARSON. *Democracy in World Politics.* Pp. ix, 123. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $2.75.

It must have been a pleasure to listen to the Stafford Little Lectures for 1955 and to hear Mr. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, make an effective apologia for such respectable things as democracy, the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth, the Canadian monarchy, parliamentary government, and even diplomacy. The lectures are full of ideas expressed with clarity, directness, and vigor.

The best example of the excellence and of the limitations of the argument is the discussion of the hydrogen bomb. Massive deterrence, Mr. Pearson contends, is useful as a safeguard against the sort of war which might destroy mankind and should not be used or threatened to prevent wars with traditional weapons (including minor atomic weapons). It is justifiable to resist force by necessary violence but not by excessive violence. It follows that war aims should be moderate, and that unconditional surrender should not be sought.

Analogies from the criminal law (self-defence does not justify unnecessary violence) and the Bible (the threat of an eye for an eye is condoned, but not the threat of two eyes for one) are chosen to support this doctrine. They cannot be pressed: the law allows violence against an armed burglar, and, indeed, against a burglar who may be armed. The *talio* regulated revenge; it did not concern defence or deterrence. And unconditional surrender may be the only safe war aim for allies who distrust each other.

The practical consequences of the doctrine are important. It is a doctrine for the strong man armed and not for the weak. A country disposed to practice it must maintain costly armaments at two levels, if not at three (traditional, fission, and fusion). It is not clear what is to happen if it has overestimated its strength and faces defeat; if its allies collapse; if its people recoil from the casualties of traditional war. Must it be prepared to surrender unconditionally? Or, satisfied that it has done its best, may it resort to the hydrogen bomb? It is well to ponder these questions and to remember that our enemies, particularly if as we hope they are weaker than we are, will have them in mind. Mr. Pearson does not press them.

Hypothetical questions, the stock in trade of the academic lecturer, are distasteful to the statesman. So too, one might think, would be the penetrating observation that "the persistent flaunting (sic) of the conviction of the majority would make government impossible." Perhaps we shall never know if Mr. Pearson, who is an unusually frank statesman, permitted himself a moment of cynicism or if the printer let him down!

H. F. ANGUS
University of British Columbia
Canada

KENNETH INGRAM. *A History of the Cold War.* Pp. 239. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $5.00.

A History of the Cold War is a book by a British author who has written a dozen other volumes on political and social topics, including a recent history of World War II, *The Years of Crisis,* out of which this volume grew.

It was his study of the war which led Ingram to attack the "fundamental misconception" that the West put the past behind it when it became an ally of Russia.

This introductory denial of one of our most fixed ideas will make the book unpalatable to most Americans. An even greater shock to our cold war beliefs is to be found in the conclusions of his last chapter: (1) that the Soviet Union never at any time intended to wage a large-scale war upon the West; (2) that there is no evidence of any intent to wage attrition wars through her Satellites; (3) and that the two acts which stirred Europe so deeply, the Communist seizure of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade, were defensive efforts to consolidate the postwar Soviet sphere, growing out of the earlier stages of the cold war.

He reasons that the Berlin blockade did not occur until: (a) the West was setting up a new German state, with a new capital, thereby removing the basic reason for the special status of Berlin; (b) it was evident that the West intended to rearm Germany; and (c) the West introduced a currency reform which would force a similar one upon the Soviets.

In the Korean War we suspect Soviet instigation, but he maintains that "suspicions are not proof." When, also, we abandoned the police role of the United Nations at the 38th Parallel and became cobelligerents with South Korea, we were "no longer morally entitled to indict China." Now he asks whether in China's absence from the United Nations Security Council any action taken by this body is legal?

In reaching his conclusions Ingram omits much supporting evidence. He overlooks almost entirely the tremendous importance of the Truman Doctrine in powering the cold war. Its body blow to the Big Four Conference on Germany, then sitting, is not mentioned. The great role of the atomic-arms race is not developed. The surging tides of preventive-war feeling in this country are not described. However, the author has not offered the book as a final study of the cold war. It is a first outline.

Even those who reject his belief that "toughness" was the worst possible cure for the deep-seated Soviet fear and inferiority complexes cannot afford to miss reading this book, since it forecasts the considerations they have to meet.

D. F. FLEMING
Vanderbilt University

A. H. BIRCH. *Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation in Canada, Australia, and the United States.* Pp. xiv, 314. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1955. $5.60.

In Canada and Australia the central government has almost completely absorbed customs and income taxes, as well as most excises, thus depriving the local governments of revenue. Without subsidies from the central government the poorer states, especially, would suffer, and with the growth of social legislation, where equality of treatment throughout the country is desired, they would be unable to bear the burden. The Australian states derive at least 60 per cent of their income from subsidies; the Canadian provinces, except for Quebec, at least 30 per cent. The tendency since the war has been for the federal contributions to grow. In the United States the figure has risen from 12 to 20 per cent during this period.

In Canada, from the beginning, direct subsidies have been granted in return for

the surrender of customs and excises. At first granted upon a fairly equitable per capita basis, uneven growth of the provinces in population and wealth made the original plan obsolete, but failure to agree upon a general philosophy of subsidies to meet new conditions encouraged political bickering among the provinces. Indirect methods of subsidy and evasion of restrictions in the British North America Act have resulted. Recently, income, corporation, and succession taxes have been "rented" from the provinces according to a plan that gives each province a choice among several methods of compensation. Quebec has not yet come in under the plan.

In the United States, direct subsidies would contradict the theory of local autonomy, but indirect methods have not been uncommon. Grants-in-aid, when compared with the incidence of federal taxation, tend to favor the poorer states. Recently, a more direct approach to subsidies, in a relaxation of the matching principle for states of low income, has appeared in the National School Lunch Act and the Hospital Construction Act.

The book might have been more readable if the complete story for each country could have been told separately, but the presentation of a large research product in a complex subject necessarily involves difficulties in organization. There is a brief section on the newer federations particularly India, Nigeria, British Central Africa, and the proposed British West Indian federation.

W. REED WEST
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WILLARD N. HOGAN. *International Conflict and Collective Security.* Pp. vi, 202. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1955. $3.50.

This is a painstaking case study in format, technique, and scope suggestive of a doctoral dissertation, of what the author calls the "principle of concern" in international relations. War between or among any nations is regarded as affecting all, and when one attacks another it is guilty of an offense against all. The author points out that this "principle" was first incorporated into international organization in Article 11 of the League of Nations Covenant which declared war or the threat of war "a matter of concern" to all of the members of the League.

The problem of the adequate implementation of this "principle" so that aggressors may be restrained or punished, and peace preserved or restored has as yet proved insoluble in a world of sovereign states in which fear and ambition, rather than universally accepted legal principles and a fundamental political consensus, determine the conduct of these states. The presumption of political change only by peaceful means is directly expressed or inheres in the League Covenant, in the Pact of Paris, and the United Nations, as well as in other formal international undertakings; but flagrant aggression and hot and cold wars still keep the world in turmoil. Fleeting hopes for a better order of things were at one time expressed in the phrase the "spirit of Lucarno." More recently the "spirit of Geneva" is even more rapidly dissolving despite the threat of a nuclear war of annihilation.

However, the author does not permit himself to be deflected by a sense of tragedy from the prosaic, but useful task of portraying and analyzing the instruments and procedures of pacific settlement which have been devised since the First World War. Likewise he records the conflicting points of view of nations whose history, political predilections, geographic conditions, and economic circumstances present formidable obstacles to the implementation of the "principle of concern," or even to universal acceptance of its validity.

In the concluding pages the author discusses briefly the opponents of a collective security system such as that provided in the United Nations Charter. These include the isolationists and neutralists who "reject the basic validity of the principle of concern"; (p. 181) the world government advocates whose position is regarded as unrealistic since "the prerequisites and conditions for an effective world government are not presently available"; (p. 182) and the critics such as Hans Morgenthau who find the "concept of collective security . . . in principle unworkable" (p. 181). This the author denies and seeks to demonstrate the falsity of the several assumptions upon which Morgenthau relies to support his position.

FRANK M. RUSSELL
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

JOSEPH M. JONES. *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21–June 5, 1947).* Pp. viii, 296. New York: Viking Press, 1955. $3.75.

DONALD F. DRUMMOND. *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937–1941.* Pp. vi, 409, ii. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955. $7.50.

These two books tell a valuable story of a change in the policy of the United States which was almost revolutionary in character. On February 21, 1947, the British government let it be known to our officials in the State Department that it was impossible for that government to undertake further responsibility in the Near East and would withdraw the forces stationed in Greece. The only way to prevent Greece from falling into the hands of the Russian Communists would be for the United States to fill the breach and become an active guardian of the interests in the eastern Mediterranean. This would be a complete change of American policy since the time of George Washington. Even Monroe's enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, in 1823, contained less danger to American interests than would this new action and its influence on American foreign policy. Nevertheless, it was a momentous action that the Truman administration thus left the policy of George Washington and started the United States in a new direction which was bound to have great significance in the history of the times. Mr. Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress on February 21 and announced his decision to undertake the consequent change to our policy.

Secretary Acheson followed this up by a speech in Cleveland, Mississippi before the Delta Council and on the following June 5, General Marshall carried further the advocacy of the new policy at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. These three speeches with the skillful development of a favorable public opinion, were the remarkable accomplishments of the Truman administration. Mr. Jones tells the story of the fifteen weeks in which the American people and their government assumed the responsibility of world leadership.

The merits or demerits of this profound change in direction will be the subject of study by American historians for years to come. One school of thought now contends that the new developments of these fifteen weeks of change from George Washington to Harry S. Truman were from the sublime to the ridiculous. While others, such as Mr. Jones, think Truman and his advisers were showing signs of real statesmanship. It will be some time during years to come before a proper judgment of the matter can be made.

Mr. Jones was a member of the State Department and tells the story from inside knowledge of events that were rapidly changing the whole world policy of the United States. His book represents the highest type of journalistic writing. He wholeheartedly endorses the new Truman policy. There is no wild propaganda, but a setting forth of the facts of the case as he sees them and with a dramatic power of suspense that holds the attention of the reader as would a novel of our times.

Mr. Drummond gives a fine background of the events leading up to the "Fifteen Weeks." His style of writing is restrained and forthright. He gives a fine description of the passing of American neutrality during the years 1937 to 1941 which made possible the change in policy mentioned above. He, likewise, seems to endorse the strange and tortuous changes brought about by the Roosevelt administration which made possible the revolutionary events that followed. He is careful not to stress the giving of the fifty ships to Great Britain and the broad and audacious policy of "lend lease," which, under the guise of measures of peace, were a virtual declaration of war against Germany and her allies.

Like Mr. Jones, he seems to endorse the policies of Roosevelt and Truman, but in a scholarly way. This is an excellent book and worthy of careful reading by the students of today.

WILLIAM STARR MYERS
Princeton University

RICHARD HOFSTADTER. *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* Pp. viii, 328. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. $4.50.

Although relatively young, Professor Hofstadter has established a reputation for himself among American scholars. *The Age of Reform* adds to his achievements as a brilliant writer. Many books have been written on the period 1890–1940, and this will not be the last, but when the final appraisal has been made many of this author's interpretations will prevail.

This book deals with three reform movements—Populism, Progressivism, and New Dealism. More than one-third of the book (130 pages) is consumed by Populism. Mr. Hofstadter is not concerned with a narrow approach to American agrarian unrest in the 1890's, but he treats the broader aspects of the movement. Populism sprang from the soft side of agrarianism. Its protests were good wholesome Americanism, but the movement spent its force on incongruous and untenable panaceas. Moreover, its efforts towards influencing economic growth were backwards.

If Populism was an outgrowth of increasing poverty among rural folk, Progressivism was a by-product of urban middle class upheaval. It was a reform movement of prosperity, not of economic want. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, perhaps the two greatest proponents of Progressivism, were much in accord in their political thinking. The author contends, however, that neither of these reform presidents had much in common with Franklin Roosevelt.

To this writer, the New Deal was *new* indeed. That conclusion, along with some others, notably, that Populism was the chief source of anti-Semitism in the United States, will not be accepted unanimously by the students of the period. Obviously, there were many contrasts between New Dealism and Progressivism, and it is of these that Professor Hofstadter has written.

Here is a book that is full of new interpretations of three reform movements in an era that has been much written about. It is a reinterpretation of liberalism by a devoted liberal written in a fascinating style. This book will be avidly read by all Americans who are interested in the Age of Reform.

GEORGE C. OSBORN
University of Florida

EDWARD H. BUEHRIG. *Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power.* Pp. x, 325. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. $5.00.

This is a significant addition to the growing list of Wilsoniana. It is a thought-provoking book in that not all of the author's contentions will be generally accepted by students of Woodrow Wilson.

The author traces briefly the diplomatic history of the United States and England during the nineteenth century. By the close of the century, tension between England and Germany was having its effect on the delicate balance which had been reached in Anglo-American relations. If the United States and Germany evolved different attitudes towards the British control of the seas, neither doubted England's maritime supremacy.

The submarine proved the undoing of cordial relations between the United States and Germany. Not only did Germany's use of below the surface fighting ships corrupt our friendly relations with her, but this innovation of maritime warfare lessened the strain that existed on Anglo-American relations. England's effective blockade of extended sections of Europe's coastline and her policy of increasing the contraband list had placed severe strains upon our cordial relations with her.

The sinking of the *Lusitania* caused a breach in amicable relations between the United States and Germany which never healed. This catastrophe led to Bryan's resignation. Lansing, his successor, early decided that the United States must not permit a German victory even if we had to go to war to prevent it. After discussing at some length the reasons for Germany's use of the submarine and of our possible steps to prevent or curtail it, Professor Buehrig concludes that it is doubtful if submarine warfare could have been averted. Germany felt that her survival was at stake, and she used everything she possessed to prolong her national existence.

The initial identification of the league idea, declares this writer, with the United States policy was due to the diplomatic process itself. In adjusting to the sudden shift in the foundations of international politics Wilson, in May 1916, championed a league of nations. Gradually, the President and his personal advisor, Colonel House, shifted their contention from the maintenance of freedom of the seas to guarantees against aggression.

Repeatedly England's foreign minister, Grey, informed House that only by our entrance into the war could Wilson exert all possible influence on the peace. House was convinced, but Wilson had a mental reservation which, by April 1917, was erased. The conviction came not from Grey but the German use of the submarine.

Our traditional nineteenth-century policy —the Monroe Doctrine—was issued to meet a current menace. Wilson began the shift to a new twentieth-century policy of collective security which transition was completed by 1945. These developments are traced in *Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power.*

There are ample notes at the back of the book and the index is accurate. The treatise could have been enlivened by graphic pen portraits of some of the leaders. The book is scholarly, but is burdened with a dull style.

GEORGE C. OSBORN
University of Florida

HUDSON STRODE. *Jefferson Davis: American Patriot, 1808–1861.* Pp. xx, 460. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1955. $6.75.

Although the author does not follow the practice, desirable in so many ways, of using page footnotes except on very controversial points, he does use considerable documentation within the narrative, and has a revealing section on Sources and Notes on Sources. He has, in fact, made use of source materials heretofore not used and has thus been able to throw new light on especially Davis' relations with his lawyer-planter brother, Joseph Davis, and on the sentimental phases of his life resulting in his two marriages.

The author's style is fascinating, and his revelation of the character and personality of his subject is superb. Davis is not the cold, austere individual so frequently portrayed by the pens of other writers. Though tragedies in his family and bodily ailments at times made him remorseful or irritable, he was usually warmhearted and intensely human. His integrity, intellectual vigor, and qualities of leadership endeared many to him and evoked admiration even on the part of his opponents.

The author is at his best in describing Davis' personal relationships, the early environmental circumstances that gave direction to his life, his training at West Point, and the period of military service that followed. The early forces that shaped his career were national in character, and in a military capacity and as Secretary of War, he performed distinguished service for the nation.

Dr. Strode presents his subject as one who had the good of the nation at heart also during the stormy years preceding war, and who sincerely felt that forces at work in the north were threatening the constitutional basis upon which the Union rested. He demonstrates, in convincing fashion, the emotional strain under which Davis labored as secession became an actuality. While the author has the happy faculty of presenting much of the history of the times without losing his biographical subject, the reviewer feels that he might have gone even more into the controversial phases of the 1850's without losing the subject. In fact, further light on the Davis-Douglas controversy, the Cuban question, and sectional differences over economic policies might have enabled the reader better to understand opposing forces, and hence to see Davis' political principles in clearer perspective.

This work is, at all odds, the most entertaining and illuminating the reviewer has read on this famous Southerner, and

those who read it, he feels, will await with interest the succeeding volume.

HENRY H. SIMMS
Ohio State University

RALPH KORNGOLD. *Thaddeus Stevens.* Pp. xiv, 460. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1955. $6.00.

Thaddeus Stevens remains one of the most paradoxical and little appreciated figures of the Civil War period. Loving freedom as few men of his time did, he hated with equal ardor. Possessed of intellectual stature and genuine political shrewdness, occupying a dominant position in government during the early postwar years, he is remembered chiefly for his bitterness, his hatred, and his frustration. More than a decade ago Richard Current wrote an excellent biography of "Old Thad," yet many questions were unanswered, many problems unsolved. Now Ralph Korngold, author of a popular joint study of Garrison and Phillips, attempts a new appraisal of this strange man.

The author has divided his book into four parts. Law and Politics tells of the barren, unhappy Vermont childhood; the study of law; the early days in Pennsylvania; and makes up about one-fifth of the volume. Congressional Interlude is a relatively brief discussion of Stevens' early Congressional experience and the events that led to Secession. About two-thirds of the volume is devoted to the struggle of Stevens, first against Lincoln and then against Johnson.

The early years of Stevens' life are treated in conventional fashion. It is with his last decade that the author is chiefly concerned. Here the author becomes a pleader in attempting to show that Johnson was as incompetent, as unstable, and as unprincipled as he was so commonly portrayed a half-century ago and in attempting to show that Lincoln was inferior in vision, courage, and character to Stevens.

The author loves freedom and those who fought for freedom. He seems to assume that all who have fought for freedom are inherently good, competent, even superior. He attempts to increase the stature of Stevens by belittling all who opposed him. He even goes to the extreme of committing almost every sin recognized by the objective and painstaking historian. In one section of approximately thirty pages, this reviewer finds careless proofreading (p. 172), misquotes (p. 174), misinterpretations (pp. 175, 179, 194), faulty logic (pp. 184, 189), sensational and unsupported statements (p. 197), oversimplification (p. 198), and an uncritical use of sources (p. 201). The author has repeatedly gone to old, discredited, and strongly biased sources.

It is not necessary to malign Andrew Johnson, to distort and misinterpret the leadership of Lincoln, in order to admire the courage, recognize the superb political leadership, and regret the lack of appreciation commonly accorded Thaddeus Stevens. Mr. Korngold's heart is in the right place; it is unfortunate that he chose such uncritical means to arrive at such questionable conclusions.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
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Cortland, N. Y.

DALE O. SMITH. *U. S. Military Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal.* Pp. xiii, 256. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce; Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1955. $3.50.

General Smith, class of 1934 West Point, flew thirty-one combat missions in World War II in command of a B-17 group. Subsequently as director of education at Air University he compiled *Air Force Leadership,* the official manual of the Air Force. His text will convince any reader that he writes with authority, sincerity, and deep conviction. Beginning with the views of Washington on our military policy, he outlines the doctrines of Clausewitz, Jomini, Dennis and Alfred Mahan, and others preparatory to relating the impact of aviation on land and sea power. In his Introduction, he reminds readers of the dangerous Anglo-American habit of denouncing war as something so unholy that it must be ignored, not studied, and he chides Americans of today who still refuse to study why wars continue to recur. The General offers his countrymen much excellent advice.

It was too much to expect an air officer who was reared in the days of Lord Trenchard, Douhet, and General Mitchell to be entirely fair to the sea and ground forces. General Smith is more than generous to the Navy of *1812,* but in quoting from a Japanese officer's statement that control of the air in the western Pacific was the cause of American victory in 1945, he leaves the impression that it was General Arnold's strategic bombers who gained that control. Actually it was Admiral Mark Mitscher's Carrier Task Forces, operating alternately under Admirals Spruance and Halsey, who broke the back of Japanese land and sea aviation. Arnold's bombers were not based near enough to reach Japan until another General Smith, U. S. Marines, captured the Mariannas; even then it was necessary for those incomparable Marines to take another island, Iwo, to provide fighter escort and emergency landing fields to reduce the unbearable losses of bombers.

It was the same in Europe. Anglo-American bombers were given all of 1943 to win the war by direct attacks on the Reich; they only reduced production by 10 per cent; the exhaustion of both bomber forces enabled the Nazis to reach another industrial peak in 1944. Air Chief Marshal Portal, commanding Eisenhower's aviation, knew that the tactical performance of German day-and-night fighters was improving steadily although training periods were reduced by shortage of fuel. So if the invasion were delayed to give the over-optimistic bombers another chance, fighters might prevent the landing entirely. In spite of this manifest failure Anglo-American bombing chiefs with the support of Winston Churchill objected to turning from attacks on Germany's industry to support the landing.

At the end of World War II the theories of air enthusiasts that bombing alone would win wars was completely discredited. This heresy was revived by the dropping of the A-bomb on Hiroshima. Because the first bomb was so heavy that only a very large bomber could deliver it to valuable targets, almost immediately scientists made smaller bombs that could be fired from land and sea artillery or delivered by carrier planes. No longer did the Air Force have a monopoly on delivering nuclear bombs, and they could be used to defend nations and fleets from nuclear attacks.

The most pressing question we face today is defense of the United States from hostile nuclear attacks. The author is apparently convinced that the Air Force can concede the Soviet Union the first blow with nuclear weapon and then retaliate instantly with deadly consequences and win the war. If our country had followed the advice of General Mitchell, we would have had no aircraft carriers or carrier pilots in World War II. If our country accepts the theory that our present Air Force after being subjected to a carefully prepared all out attack, passively awaited, can retaliate effectively, it is inviting national disaster.

W. D. PULESTON
Captain, USN, Retired
Lake Wales, Fla.

ELLA CHALFANT. *A Goodly Heritage.* Pp. xiii, 239. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955. $3.00.

A Goodly Heritage is composed of the wills made by men and women who lived in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when Pittsburgh was a frontier fort or a village of only a few hundred people.

"As you read their formal or their homely phrasing you are reading more than a cold legal document. You are reading their meaning of a life. . . . What matters most gets into a will—what the man truly believes, what he counts precious enough to want continued in the lives of his children or grandchildren. To bequeath pots and kettles that were hard to come by was important. A clock was a treasure; a book, above price—even for a man who could sign only 'his Mark' " (p. xi).

The first chapter of the book deals with "Allegheny County's Oldest Wills" and the first will recorded was that of John Bredy, dated April 14, 1788 and recorded March 31, 1789. The ten additional chapters have the following titles: "Four Early Intestates," "Dictated Wills," "Holograph Wills," "Slavery-Indenture-Apprenticeship," "Religion and Education," "Women in Wills," "Women's Wills," "Pittsburgh—Western

Frontier," "The Fabric of Pittsburgh." There are also a Postscript, four illustrations, a bibliography, an appendix, and an excellent index.

"Through these early wills we today can know the social background of the frontier —the dress, the business, the economic situation when whiskey was an honored medium of exchange; when soldiers' bonuses were bartered for land grants; when slaves were bought and sold and bequeathed to friends and relatives or set free to make their own new lives" (p. xi).

In the early days of western Pennsylvania, there were three kinds of labor: free labor, indentured servants, and negro slaves. However, in March 1780 an act was passed which provided for the "gradual abolition of slavery" in the state. On these pages the author makes two incorrect statements: "Up until 1820, when the Missouri Compromise made slavery illegal in Pennsylvania and in certain other states, anyone who could afford to buy slaves could own them and could dispose of them as he chose" (p. 92). On the next page the author repeats the error: "And forty years later, in 1820, the Missouri Compromise prohibited slavery entirely in Pennsylvania and other states north of 36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude" (p. 93).

The Congress of the United States could not have constitutionally abolished slavery in any of the states wherein the institution existed; therefore, after providing for the admission of Maine as a free state, the Missouri Compromise applied only to the territory within the bounds of the Louisiana purchase.

The book, however, makes an important contribution to American social and economic history.

GEORGE D. HARMON
Lehigh University

BERNARD SCHWARTZ. *American Constitutional Law.* Pp. xiv, 364. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $5.00.

Case books on American constitutional law we have in abundance, a number of them accompanied by excellent notes giving the background of the particular case and the conditions under which it was decided. But treatises on constitutional law, in which the political philosophy of the law is discussed and the development of the law from case to case is analyzed and criticized, are lacking, doubtless because of the very arduous task of writing them.

It is just such a treatise that Professor Schwartz has given us, and lawyers and teachers alike will give a warm welcome to it. While not cast in the form of a textbook and not covering all of the possible topics of constitutional law, it gives us a clear picture first of the fundamental principles and organic structure of government under the Constitution and then proceeds to show the changes that have been taking place in recent years resulting from the necessity of enabling the government to meet the particular problems with which it is confronted.

The analysis of individual cases is careful and impartial, particularly so in dealing with controversial issues, such as the extension of the powers of Congress over interstate commerce, the scope of the treaty-making power, and the role of the Supreme Court in applying the amendments dealing with human rights. Two chapters concentrate upon "The Negro and the Law" and "Civil Liberties and the 'cold war'", both presenting a detached interpretation of what appears to the reviewer as the undue assumption by the Supreme Court of legislative functions.

The purpose of the volume is described as being "to present the workings of the American system of constitutional law to a British audience," suggesting that it consists of lectures delivered at the University of Cambridge by whose press it is published. The result is that there are numerous comparative references to British practice and to the decisions of British courts in cases analogous to those arising under the American Constitution—a feature which will be greatly appreciated by students of political science.

Professor Schwartz is to be congratulated on a work of scholarly research and sound critical judgment. It should prove to be admirable supplementary reading in courses on constitutional law in which case books form the primary text.

CHARLES G. FENWICK
Pan American Union
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ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

J. FREDERIC DEWHURST, and Associates. *America's Needs and Resources: A New Survey.* Pp. xxix, 1,148. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955. $10.00.

This impressive volume is a comprehensive examination of the quantitative record of the American economy. It is a revised and enlarged version of a study that originally appeared in 1947. Past and prospective growth in population, output, income, savings, investment, and consumers expenditures are studied in the aggregate and in various degrees of detail. Some figures are traced back to 1850, but the bulk of the volume is based on data accumulated since the turn of the century. In many instances the *Survey* performs a major service for lay and professional readers alike by developing consistent long-term series from diverse sets of data pertaining to different time periods. This is done, for example, for the data on consumers expenditures. Official time series on the composition of consumers expenditures are available only since 1929; the *Survey* carries the story back to 1909.

The first section of the volume is devoted to the description of basic trends and their projection to 1960. The next part is given over to a study of consumption requirements with separate chapters for food, clothing, housing, and so forth. Other major sections deal with capital requirements, government and foreign transactions, and resources and capacity. Finally, there is a summary chapter which, like most of the material in the first section, was prepared by Dr. Dewhurst. The other chapters were written by a group of twenty-five specialists, many of whom are widely recognized authorities in their fields.

The findings of the *Survey* document the remarkable growth of almost every facet of the American economy. In the century following 1850, the population as reported by the census increased by about six and one-half fold. Despite a halving of the work week, national income (in 1950 prices) was twenty-five times higher at the end than at the beginning of the 100 year period. The difference between the growth in population and in real income reflects, of course, the enormous increase in productivity. Output per manhour has increased at rates that have varied widely, but the average has been around 18 per cent per decade. Interestingly enough, the growth in productivity was greater in the second than in the first fifty years; from 1850 to 1900 output per manhour little more than doubled, while from 1900 to 1950 it nearly trebled. The major upsurge in the recent past has, of course, been associated with World War II and the years of the cold war which followed.

Indeed, almost any extrapolation of past trends into the future must be based on some decision about the relative significance of this period of war and defense-aided prosperity and the preceding period of deep depression. The *Survey,* perhaps properly, takes a moderately optimistic position on this point. Of its three projections of gross national product for 1960, each based on a different set of assumptions, the middle one indicates a 29 per cent increase. The actual increase in the first 4 years of the decade has been 17 per cent.

IRVING B. KRAVIS
University of Pennsylvania

CHARLES WOLF, JR. AND SIDNEY C. SUFRIN. *Capital Formation and Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas.* Pp. viii, 134. Syracuse, N. Y.: University of Syracuse Press, 1955. $3.00.

This report growing out of a study supported by the Ford Foundation analyzes current literature and research dealing with the problem of capital formation in underdeveloped areas. It also discusses at some length future research needs and program possibilities. Special emphasis is put on the problems of South and Southeast Asia and the Near East. The short text (sixty-six pages) is concerned with three aspects of the development problem—"Entrepreneurship and the Demand for Capital,"

"Technological Alternatives and the Optimum Use of Capital," and "Foreign Investment and Capital Formation." The authors believe that foreign investment, while currently of little importance, could have some real significance in "triggering" domestic capital formation if a rather formidable array of obstacles were removed.

Ideas, theories, and tools of analysis pertinent to these topics are taken up seriatim, giving the general reader some conception of the wide range of problems relative to capital formation now engaging economists. As there is no sustained thesis throughout the book and no thoroughgoing critical evaluation of work in progress, the authors have produced what may appear to the layman to be a noncontroversial book on economic development, a highly controversial subject among economists.

The authors observe that there is a need to integrate the work of several social sciences in any serious study of the processes of economic growth; but their own work is not informed by this insight and is confined almost exclusively to an economic exposition. A vital dimension of development, namely the political one, gets short shrift. This is regrettable since it is precisely the more economically backward countries which seem to require greater State participation in accelerating the rate of total capital formation, investment allocation, and even the establishment of special industries.

Encompassing the government's role in economic decision-making is the broader question: "What is the relative strength of those forces opposing and those favoring change?" While the book mentions in summary fashion the need for social change, there is insufficient emphasis on the tremendous impetus given to economic development and capital formation by profound alterations of power relationships within a given society—whether they take the form of the overthrow of feudalism in Japan, recent Communist revolutions, or the emergence since World War II of sovereign states in the East following centuries of colonial rule. Sovereignty, while not a sufficient cause for real economic development, would certainly appear to be a necessary condition in this very context. The really hopeful aspects of South and Southeast Asia's development prospects are the new independence of the various states and the attendant decline in influence of forces identified with the old order.

Planners in new Southeast Asian states intent on rapid economic development may be disappointed by the omission from the bibliography of references describing and appraising the mechanisms for increasing and regulating capital formation in outright socialist economies. Nevertheless, the fifty-page bibliography provides a useful guide to current research by public and private agencies and to the published literature on the wide range of theory and practice of capital formation elsewhere. Coming late to the feast, the poorer nations have a world of experience on which they intend to draw.

HELEN B. LAMB
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

LAWRENCE ABBOTT. *Quality and Competition: An Essay in Economic Theory.* Pp. ix, 229. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $3.75.

Classical theory bequeathed to economics a theory of pure competition with complete monopoly treated as an exceptional case. The year 1933 which saw the simultaneous publication of Robinson's *Economics of Imperfect Competition* in England and Chamberlin's *The Theory of Monopolistic Competition* in this country marked a departure from this viewpoint. The result has been that pure competition and complete monopoly are no longer considered adequate models of reality. No longer treated as typical cases they are still, however, looked upon as idealizations. Now, almost a quarter of a century later, another economist announces his dissatisfaction with the picture of reality which these two recent theories have developed; nor does he accept pure price competition as an adequate idealization.

Professor Abbott has written a book in economic theory which is addressed primarily to professional economists and to graduate students. Although it abounds in references to the contributions of Robinson, Chamberlin, Triffin, Schumpeter, Reder, and others, the book may be read with profit by students of society other than economists. Except for some of the most closely reasoned chapters in the last third of the book dealing with equilibrium theory, the general thesis is set forth so clearly that the argument can be followed by those who have had a minimum of training in economic theory.

It is the author's contention that all current theories concerning competition are inadequate because they make no room for quality competition which is so prevalent a part of present market conditions. He grants that theory must take cognizance of quantitative factors, such as cost and output, but it is Abbott's thesis that qualitative factors must also be included, not as a substitute for price theory, but as an addition, in order to develop an all-inclusive analysis of a private enterprise economy. He points out that entrepreneurial activity consists not only of production methods, a grasp of cost, output, and price, but also an ability to satisfy wants of buyers, as well as an ability to change attitudes of buyers. He suggests that these latter activities lead to alterations in the qualities of products. He cites numerous illustrations to show that consumers' choices are based on quality differences and that product heterogeneity is more common than homogeneity.

The author has attempted to sketch the outlines of a more inclusive theory, running from one extreme, to wit, complete competition (price and quality) through the intermediary stages of pure price competition, pure quality competition, to the opposite extreme, namely the absence of competition. It remains to be seen whether this opening gun in a concerted attack on existing theory will prove to be as fruitful as its 1933 predecessors. In view of the trend toward quantification, this reviewer is of the opinion that many serious obstacles will have to be overcome before Abbott's position is added to the corpus of accepted economic theory.

JULES KOLODNY
New York, N. Y.

G. L. S. SHACKLE. *Uncertainty in Economics and Other Reflections.* Pp. xiv, 267. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $4.75.

Professor Shackle, a British economist of originality and subtlety, has assembled here a number of essays that were published before in journals and elsewhere during the period from 1939 to 1953. Much of the content of the volume is integrated by its pervasive emphasis on that aspect of the theory of the firm which served as the central theme of Professor Shackle's earlier book, *Expectation in Economics,* first published in 1949. It was in this volume that Professor Shackle developed a new and ingenious theory of expectations, which since then has been widely discussed in the journal literature. Shackle is dissatisfied with the traditional theory of expectations, which bases the entrepreneur's decision upon a probability distribution. He visualizes the relevant decisions as unique and crucial, and therefore beyond the applicability of the probability calculus. Instead, in Shackle's model the entrepreneur concentrates his attention upon two possible outcomes of any one course of action, one favorable and the other unfavorable, and each characterized by a blending of result —prospective return, for example—and of surprise attached thereto that arrests the entrepreneur's attention more than do other such blends. With alternative courses of action treated in the same manner, an indifference map can be constructed with courses of action ranked according to their preferability.

The first and largest part of the present book contains articles restating and refining Professor Shackle's theory, and defending it against some of his critics. In connection therewith, there is developed a new theory of profits. The second and third parts of the book are made up of essays on interest rates and on investment and employment. Among the essays of the fourth part, devoted to the philosophy of economics, the reader will find Professor Shackle's inaugural address, "What Makes an Economist," a lecture replete with insight, especially about the role of mathematics in the economics curriculum.

Professor Shackle's book has an equally strong appeal to the "literary" and to the mathematical economist. Here are originality and sustained power of analysis, displayed in a prose that is cultured, lucid,

and persuasive. Few contemporary economists combine mastery of technique with attention to fundamentals in the manner characteristic of Shackle's work. As a stimulus to thought and discussion, the inaugural lecture alone is worth the price of the book, which no serious student of economics can afford not to read and ponder over.

HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL
Catholic University of America

LEE BENSON. *Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York Politics, 1850–1887.* Pp. x, 310. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $5.50.

The years which parenthesize Mr. Benson's scholarly study of railroading and politics are those between New York's Free Railroad Act and the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act. They span thirty-seven years in which the monumental growth of the great trunk lines that nourished the expanding ports of the eastern seaboard brought with it the inevitable end of the laissez faire environment which had made it possible in the first place. The buffeting of free enterprise by the increasing pressures for a regulated economy that characterized the last three decades of the nineteenth century was never more dramatically apparent than in the field of rail transportation.

Despite some rudimentary legislation, largely derived from English canal and turnpike acts, American railroads, prior to 1850, controlled their own operations without any significant public supervision or regulation. After the successful run of Peter Cooper's *Tom Thumb* in 1830, the big cities of the Atlantic Coast soon became the nerve centers of expanding rail systems that rapidly undermined the commercial value of turnpikes and canals. In this frenetic atmosphere, the infant industry's lobbyists were successful in obtaining the passage in 1850 of New York's Free Railroad Law which, in practice, freed that state's railroads from all but the slightest of public control.

The New York act—which was swiftly aped by state after state—was not, as one critic observed, a complete surrender of its right to regulate railroads. The legislature imposed some controls such as the fixing of passenger rates and the requirement of annual reports, and it recognized that the roads had a public character quite distinct from run of the mine corporations. However, all in all, these and other limitations were more theoretical than real and the act ushered in an era of unrestricted rail competition.

The bulk of Mr. Benson's book is devoted to a study of the organized reaction that arose to combat the harmful effects of the great struggles of the railway financiers that reached their peak in the 1870's. The farmer and the small shipper, in particular, began to bear the brunt of such unfair practices as the rebate and discriminatory rate structures, and the Granger Movement directed most of its protest at the railroads. It was successful in securing the passage in several midwestern states of laws establishing uniform rates and railroad commissions to supervise them. More important than this legislation, however, was the Supreme Court's determination in 1876 that such statutes were constitutional, a decision that presaged more stringent regulation.

In 1879, the New York legislature, disturbed by the growing public discontent with trunk line operation, undertook a sweeping investigation of the states. The result of its findings—the Hepburn Report—did much to bring about the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act although Mr. Benson is careful to refrain from giving it full credit, preferring to abide by the proposition that federal control was an historic inevitability as soon as steam locomotion became a fact. Be that as it may, the Committee's finding that "through the want of governmental control . . . have crept in those abuses . . . so glaring in their proportions as to savor of fiction rather than actual history" did much to accelerate congressional action barely eight years later.

The railroad revolution, unleashed by such technological advances as the mass production of steel, and fed by the desperate need of an expanding nation for quick transportation, probably justifies Mr. Benson's thesis that, sooner or later, governmental control was inescapable. More important than the Interstate Commerce Act itself, however, was the emergence of the principle that there were areas in which governmental "interference" with private industry was necessary to alter the track of what Commodore Vanderbilt liked to refer to as "natural competition." That the concept was an expanding one became obvious three years later with the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

WILLIAM KUNSTLER
New York, N. Y.

FRED COTTRELL. *Energy and Society: The Relation Between Energy, Social Change, and Economic Development.* Pp. xix, 330. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $6.00.

The purpose of this book is to show the influence of the various sources of energy on social, economic, and political development. Though low-energy sources are adequately discussed, the emphasis is on the high-energy sources, such as power grids, diesel engines, automobiles, trucks, and tractors.

These complicated high-energy converters have effected, and will continue to effect, many changes in man's way of life. They require the use of large production units, whether under a capitalistic or a communistic society; a high degree of concentration of control over productive operations; widely scattered ownership of shares in the converters; a tremendous increase in the specialization of labor; an expansion of the powers of the state, and an increase in the "judicial" functions of the state to handle the growing number of conflicts that will arise because of the necessary evolution of new codes of conduct. In short, high-energy technology "requires a continuous modification of the habits, training, and occupation of enormous numbers of people."

Despite the undoubted advantages of high-energy technology in areas suited to it, no rapid expansion of industrial converters throughout the entire world is to be anticipated. If this technology is to be adopted and to survive there must be a mixture in the right proportions of energy resources, climate, population, geography, and scientific ideology; but in many areas there will be resistance of long-established customs and ideologies to the changes required by high-energy technology.

What seems probable in the short run is the emergence of three geographically well-defined systems employing high-energy technology. North America will be the base for one; England and Germany for another; and Russia for the third. Incidentally, the author makes a number of interesting comments, at scattered points throughout the book, about the Russian experiment.

What will be the course of civilization in the long run the author is unwilling to predict; there are too many variables involved. He suggests, therefore, that the chief contribution of his essay is its emphasis on the large areas of ignorance that need exploration as a preliminary to forecasting the future development of human society.

This is a thoughtful, stimulating, and important work. It constitutes a significant approach to the dynamics of social change. It should prove of interest to sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, historians, economists, political scientists, engineers, and biologists. It is, in fact, a praiseworthy illustration of "interdisciplinary orientation."

ELIOT JONES
University of Santa Clara

W. LLOYD WARNER AND JAMES C. ABEGGLEN. *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry, 1928–1952.* Pp. xxi, 315. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $5.50.

This book describes the methodology and findings of a study of vertical occupational mobility among some 8,300 representatives of "top management" in a variety of American business enterprises in 1952. It replicates a well-known study made by Taussig and Jocelyn in 1928 to provide comparisons of the experience of two generations of business leaders and it adds additional information. The findings are based on returns from a mail schedule sent to 17,500 persons listed in Poor's *Register of Directors and Executives.*

The most impressive finding of the study controverts the pessimistic forecast of in-

creasing occupational rigidity made by Taussig and Jocelyn and numerous others since that time. The writers find that the extent of movement to the top of the "occupational ladder" was as good or better in 1952 than it was a generation ago. Moreover, the patterns of sequence in occupational "succession" are much the same for the two periods.

What one might call direct occupational "inheritance," representing an extreme of social exclusion in American business, was most evident among leaders of brokerage and investment firms. There was more vertical mobility in other types of business and in large rather than in moderate-sized enterprises. The evidence was inconclusive with respect to the relationship of vertical mobility to the rate of expansion in the firm or industry with which the leader was connected. The writers conclude that "since 1928 there has been a strong trend away from the influence of the family and an increasing emphasis upon competitive achievement. . . . Education is now the royal road to success and to the positions of power and prestige at the higher rungs of big business."

In 1952 the average business leader was more likely to have been born in the North than in the South and to have come from a city rather than a rural area. At the time of study, he was about 54 years of age and it had taken him 21 years to reach a "top management" position. For the most part, he was a college graduate and had started his business career in a managerial or professional occupation. In two cases out of three, his father was also a business or professional man but in only half the cases had he married the daughter of a business or professional man. During the course of his business career he had typically been employed by two or more concerns and had been spatially mobile.

One could wish that more detailed records of the experience of business leaders were available so that the turning points in their career patterns could be identified and accompanying circumstances considered. Moreover, the attitudes of executives as to the factors they think contributed most to their success might be enlightening. Nevertheless, this is a carefully documented report for the student; the writers expect to interpret the significance of their findings, together with the results of some interviews, in a later publication.

GLADYS L. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

CHARLES P. LARROWE. *Shape-Up and Hiring Hall.* Pp. ix, 250. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. $4.50.

This is an excellent study of the longshoring industry in New York City and Seattle; two widely separated areas both in distance and in the basic principles of industrial relations. In the former, with its record throughout the years of thuggery, gangsterism, and extortion, is the shape-up and casual employment; in the latter, with twenty years of democratic union action in co-operation with the employers, is the hiring hall with regular employment and earnings, and a complete absence of gangsters and "finks". One is a system of law and order; the other of violence and turbulence. The book should be widely read and studied; the basis in satisfactory industrial relations for community welfare, industrial efficiency, and human benefits is heavily documented. Noteworthy, also, has been the consistent support of the regime of lawlessness in New York City by public authorities, federal, state and local, and at the same time, the harassment of the union on the West Coast that was attempting to bring into existence a workable system of industrial relations. Perhaps this book will help to clear the vision of those in authority.

This study is also a record of the International Longshoremen's Union in New York City and of its President Emeritus, Joseph P. Ryan, and of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union on the West Coast and its president, Harry Bridges. But more than that, it is a detailed description of how a hiring hall can be run efficiently and in the public interest.

Seattle made the choice for the hiring hall in 1920; in that year Frank P. Foisie, then on the staff of the waterfront employers, set up the system which in its basic features continues today; that is, one central hiring hall with a group of registered men who have seniority and skill, an extra board for men who customarily work in gangs and are used for replacement, and a list of casual employees. A conscious effort was made to equalize earnings and divide work equally among the registered employees and the extra board. During the 1920's, the hiring hall was under the control of the employers; since the 1934 strike, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union has been a full partner in its operation. The dispatchers in the hiring hall are chosen by the ILWU from its ranks. The governing body is the Joint Labor Relations Committee composed of equal numbers of union and employer representatives.

The Seattle hiring hall plan is not the perfect answer; employers would prefer a stabilized labor gang of superior men rather than a rotating system including all workers. Somewhat the same criticism has arisen in England under its dock labor scheme. Nevertheless, the results are infinitely superior for employers, workers, and the public to the product of the New York shape-up, and as it is studied and adjusted, improvements may be expected.

FREDERICK L. RYAN
San Diego State College

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

ROBERT REDFIELD. *The Little Community: Viewpoints for the Study of a Human Whole.* Pp. 182. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $4.00.

In every field a few men are able to present their research so that it stimulates and enriches the work of many others. In anthropology, Robert Redfield is such a man, and *The Little Community* should provoke thought, inform research, and provoke creative disagreement.

Explicitly, *The Little Community* examines the ways in which a small community may be studied as a whole. Implicitly, it is a history of one phase of a discipline and an intellectual autobiography recounted with modesty—one is tempted to say humility—by a distinguished humane scholar. From his professional beginnings as the—by modern standards—rather poorly prepared student of Tepoztlan, Redfield clearly emerges as a man always deeply concerned with the meaning of his activity, both for the world of scholarship and for the understanding of human existence.

In this book Redfield explores the various ways one may think about a small community and the consequences of each frame of reference. Following an introductory chapter, he takes up the community viewed as an ecological system, as a social structure, as a set of life patterns for its members, as the product and creator of a kind of person, as an outlook on life or system of ideas, and as a history. He also considers the problem of the community as a member of a collection of communities or as a part of a larger community and as a combination of opposite tendencies. He concludes with a discussion of the relation between the whole and its parts. Each of these ways of thinking he shows will produce a different picture of the whole. Each picture has its value as well as its deficiencies; he holds out little comfort for those who seek a single road to knowledge.

Little attention is paid to technical method but the discussion of the "inside" (native) view of a community versus the "outside" view and the development of concepts and relationships is of particular interest. He also makes clear the levels of difficulty and precision involved in different ways of studying a community.

The Little Community is a sophisticated book simply written. The intelligent layman should be able to read it with profit. The social scientist ought to read it.

RALPH L. BEALS
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
Stanford, Calif.

MORRIS PLOSCOWE. *The Truth About Divorce.* Pp. 315. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1955. $4.95.

Whatever else their gifts, most lawyers are not blessed with a golden pen; indeed, one gets the impression that legal jargon is to lawyers what Latin prescriptions are to doctors: symbolic devices to befuddle the

uninitiated. Judge Ploscowe is a welcome exception in this respect, for he writes clearly and interestingly. He has given us a most excellent work on the legal aspects of divorce. Whether the reader is a lawyer, social scientist, or lay person, he will find *The Truth About Divorce* absorbing reading, and when he has finished the book he will be a wiser man. In all likelihood much of the content matter will be quoted by other writers for years to come.

Although he does not write like a lawyer, the author has organized his material and presents his case in the best legal tradition. Alternatives to divorce—annulments, criminal proceedings, separate maintenance, and judicial separations—are fully discussed, after which the technical implications of the more common grounds for divorce are analyzed. Various defenses to divorce actions, such as recrimination, condonation, and connivance, are thoroughly covered, as are the legal and judicial incongruities of migratory ("quickie") divorces. The author's legal analysis concludes with chapters on alimony and custody of children. On all of the foregoing points the author writes simply and concisely, cutting to the heart of the matter with a penetrating legal blade.

When Judge Ploscowe turns to nonlegal matters his blade loses its sharpness, and, at least on one occasion, slips. Entering the never-never land of divorce causation, he states (p. 6) that "our lax marriage laws . . . are largely responsible for the swelling ranks of divorce." This can hardly be so, since any social change (for example, an increase in the divorce rate) must be explained not by a constant (marriage laws), but by another variation.

With regard to the philosophy of divorce the author is seemingly inconsistent. He takes a grim view of the legal machinery which permits out-of-state or "quickie" divorces. He believes in the integrity of marriage, that the bonds of matrimony should not be dissolved for trivial reasons, and that the state has a vital concern with marriage; for example (p. 248), "If the judges took to heart the basic principle of law that marriage is more than a private contract and that the state has an interest in every marriage, divorce courts would be be agencies for the conservation of marriage instead of their interment." At the same time the author feels that the couple themselves ought to decide whether or not the marriage should be legally terminated! It is stated (p. 261) that a "change we should like to see adopted by our divorce law is the universal enactment of a statute which authorizes a divorce to be granted when the husband and wife have lived physically separate and apart for the period fixed by law. A statute of this character recognizes that in the last analysis a husband and a wife themselves determine whether a marriage will survive or will be permitted to die." In terms of the principle of divorce, therefore, Judge Ploscowe would merely eliminate "quickies" in favor of "slowies."

The author apparently reconciles the above-noted inconsistency by advocating "the organization in each community of a unified family court adequately equipped to deal with all problems of the family including divorce" (p. 263). Actually, the setting up of an "adequately equipped" family court would cost the taxpayers a mint, with no guarantee of results. In fact, existing family courts don't even publish figures on the effects of their so-called counseling and conciliation service.

It is unfair, however, to assess Judge Ploscowe's volume in terms of his sociological and philosophical perambulations. Basically, he has written a book about divorce law, and he has written it exceptionally well. Students of the family will wait a long time before a better one comes along. If the Judge has overreached himself on the title of the book, we forgive him.

WILLIAM M. KEPHART
University of Pennsylvania

RUTH L. MUNROE. *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought*. Pp. xvi, 670. New York: Dryden Press, 1955. $7.50.

The impartial student of the human mind is often bewildered by the variety of theories and techniques offered by different schools of depth psychology. Most of them call themselves psychoanalytic, others do not. Their practitioners are physicians, psychologists, social workers, teachers, clergymen, and just plain people. A book which helps the inquirer to find his way about in this maze of schools and therapists is very welcome indeed.

This is exactly what this book does. Its author, a clinical psychologist, tells us that both her own and her husband's training are Freudian, yet assures us that she endeavors to be unbiased. She then proceeds to demonstrate her impartiality. She shows a remarkably full knowledge of the writings of the leaders in the more prominent schools: Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, H. S. Sullivan, C. G. Jung, and Otto Rank. Wilhelm Reich she dismisses in a footnote. The exposition of theory and technique is clear and, considering the unavoidable condensation, very complete. In addition she gives a critique of each school, exposing both their excesses and their deficiencies. In the final chapter she attempts a theoretical integration. It is, therefore, much more than a source book or a work of reference. It should encourage, among the less doctrinaire members of all of these schools, a search for a common ground. It should lessen the trend toward isolation and cultism so evident in some more enthusiastic adherents by making each more aware of the other's findings, views, and methods. It is evidence that psychoanalysis is coming of age.

Criticisms are few. Since this reviewer is a student of Jung's analytical psychology, he paid special attention to the section devoted to this school. He is happy to report that impartiality is most evident here—even "a genuine appreciation of the clinical values of Jung's theory" because of "the almost uncanny insights they sometimes showed" (p. 567). Yet in this part there is less discussion of technique and methodology than in those on other schools. Part III, dealing with Adler, Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan, is rather chopped up, going from one to another and back again in a way that may confuse some readers. In the section on Freud, she does not mention the recent work of Thomas French of Chicago on the use of the integrating force of hope in treating psychoneurotics. He has set forth this concept in two volumes entitled *The Integration of Behavior*. This, in the opinion of the reviewer, is one of the most significant advances in psychoanalytic theory in recent years. She does frequently quote another original thinker among psychoanalists, namely, Erik H. Erikson. On the subject of marriage problems there is very little (except for a brief reference to her husband's excellent work in this field), perhaps because Freud and his followers have never had much to say about them despite their frequency and importance.

Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought is announced as one of a series of publications in interpersonal relations edited by Theodore M. Newcomb of the University of Michigan. If the others measure up to this standard, it will be a notable addition to psychological literature.

ROBERT A. CLARK, M.D.
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BRUNO BETTELHEIM. *Truants from Life*. Pp. xvi, 511. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $6.00.

This is the long-awaited and invaluable detailed case book describing Bruno Bettelheim's unique combination of milieu therapy with individual psychotherapy—both carried out through and by his excellent team of *counselors,* a specially educated group of personnel who are supervised by him in their joint roles as child care workers and individual psychotherapists.

The book is made up of a balanced, warm account of the background, treatment, and results with four severely disturbed children, each with a different problem, but each with a basic difficulty in knowing and accepting himself and the world of persons around him.

Paul, who suffered from "institutionitis," needed to discover or rediscover that he was a whole person and not a collection of isolated functions, each neatly cared for by a different person or department. He was "unfrozen" through an intimate and prolonged central relationship with one key adult. It took three years to help him make the transition "from Wild Critter to Great Dictator" to *real person.*

Mary, an assaultive, asocial, seductive, tantruming, schizophrenic girl, had re-

acted to her mother's pathological and prolonged grieving. Her metamorphosis from psychosis to neurosis via fantasy *autoparturition* eventually led her beyond the need for further separation from society.

John's early physical traumata and feeding difficulties gave credence to a previous opinion that he was retarded and his brain was damaged. His dim prognosis was given the lie only after years of agonizing work through phases of repulsive appearance and behavior, when finally he began to enjoy his body and accept the pleasure of being fed.

Each of the four children suffered from one form or another of intellectual backwardness or pseudo-retardation which was reversed through treatment. Actually each of the children had latent talents they were afraid or unable to manifest earlier. This came through the discovery or recovery of basic trust. As Paul put it, "Before, I thought I could only get energy and strength from food. Now I know I get energy from children, counselors, baseball, swimming, and drawing. That is, if I make a picture for somebody."

The revelation of intimate details of the curative relationship between child and counselor and of the interlarding of intellectual interpretation with "corrective emotional experiences" is the great gift of this book to all who study or care for the severely disturbed child.

EARL A. LOOMIS, JR., M.D.
University of Pittsburgh

KARL SAX. *Standing Room Only: The Challenge of Overpopulation.* Pp. 206. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955. $3.00.

The years following World War I produced a number of works—by East, Ross, Knibbs, Sweeny—reviving the Malthusian view, but that was a gentle rain compared with the veritable flood of similar works following World War II. Professor Sax, Harvard botanist at the Bussey Institution, here gives us a semi-popular summary of present knowledge and forecasts. For its brevity it is unexpectedly comprehensive; though lacking somewhat in speculative flair, it is thoroughly scientific. Written in a clear, crisp style notable for incisive terseness and impeccable logic, it eschews imaginative flights into sociologically unrealistic proposals. It restates the facts and prospects of population growth, of present and future supplies of foods, minerals, and energy for different world regions.

The basic thesis is that, unless there is a rather speedy reduction of births, escape from mass poverty will be difficult if not impossible for two-thirds of the world's population. The treatment centers around the concept, "the demographic transition," or the replacement of high-death-rate high-birth-rate cultures by their opposites, accompanied by a change from low to high living standards. Such a transition has taken place in the West; and the author concludes that it "should be possible in Africa and South America, and it might be possible in Central America with the aid of a few scientific miracles. On the other hand, the situation in eastern and southeastern Asia appears to be hopeless" (p. 138). In later chapters social-psychological and traditional obstacles are examined, the similarity of Catholic and Communist totalitarian views noted, and various inconsistencies and futilities pointed out.

In spite of its extreme brevity, the general reader will receive an excellent orientation. One could easily give a more generous estimate of present methods and sources of food increases: one tree today can produce as many apples as grandfather's orchard and cattle can be fed from sawdust heaps. The same is true of the potentials of the new methods of deep-sea fisheries. The deserts seem likely to bloom when a cheap method of desalting sea water is developed. It is not unrealistic to suppose that vast new sources of energy will be found, and that the potentials of sun furnaces are now only glimpsed.

The emphasis on the demographic transition as the acid test is overdone. To set it up as such and then show that it can't occur is to assume that the underdeveloped areas must accomplish the impossible feat of evolving as did the West when all basic conditions are different. This is either to set up a straw man or to plunge into hopeless pessimism. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of present world development is the race between China and India toward industrialization, one by totalitarian methods, the other by humane, democratic policies. China may well win for she can sacrifice a long generation through slave labor while building her roads, dams, mills, and laboratories; her population remaining stationary or even decreasing. India must move slowly on small capital and improve her health services. She risks seeing all efforts at economic welfare swamped by a flood of new mouths to feed during the three generations her transition will take. Her situation is not, however, hopeless. Much depends on the success of the birth control movement. The motive does not need to wait for the demographic transition following an improbable industrial revolution. The reduction in fertility must come before or at least concurrently with the latter.

FRANK H. HANKINS
Smith College

FRED K. VIGMAN. *Crisis of the Cities.* Pp. viii, 155. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. $3.25.

The author of this book was for years a reporter on the *Brooklyn Eagle,* where he specialized in municipal affairs, county government, and public utilities. It was in this capacity that he watched with increased concern, indeed alarm, the efforts of county and city officials to seek solutions to the problems of their units of government. Out of this experience, and a great deal of research, the volume was written. The research dealt particularly with the historical development of American urbanism and the attempts at urban reform in individual cities, especially New York, Chicago, Boston, Pittsburgh, and Los Angeles. Much of the value of the book lies in this wealth of historical material contained in the chapters.

Crisis of the Cities is divided into two parts. Part I contains a study of three principal elements of urban decline. These are urban economic bankruptcy, civic failure, and urban exodus. Part I also contains a valuable historical discussion of city planning and the social hopes that lie in planning. Part II discusses a number of large cities in the throes of crisis and, at the end, forecasts the future of American cities.

This volume is long on problems but at spots is short on solutions. The writer has a reporter's healthy skepticism which holds that the quality of the leaders and human material in our cities will not be able to handle their financial, social, and physical problems. Regarding political leaders he says: "Noteworthy in the history of the modern American city is the consistent character of the municipal politician. Except for the temporary rise of reform mayors and reform parties, the pattern remains essentially unchanged." Apparently he would agree with Joseph F. Dinneen, who wrote the biography of Mayor James Curley of Boston, that "the average city council is made up chiefly of men whose minds cannot comprehend more than four digits and go blank beyond that."

In his final chapter on "The Future of the American City," Vigman says that the "days of reckoning" are here. Frenzied city officials seek solutions. They are handicapped by the "traditional urban classes [who] have stolen out of the corporate limits of the cities, taking with them the funds that could be taxed and the organizational abilities of the employing and white collar classes." They are often surrounded also by "constituencies who fear taxation" and by classes within the city that do not "do honor to the urban principle."

The future of the industrial city is likened to a declining New England mill town or a Pennsylvania mining town. "The city will then be a great industrial plantation where employees must perforce live and from which all other strata of the population will seek to escape."

This book is good reading and is well written. The urban tomorrows will not appear hopeful as you read it, but you will be challenged. Challenges, to move men to action, are needed in the urban future.

WILLIAM E. COLE
University of Tennessee

H. B. M. MURPHY (Ed.). *Flight and Resettlement.* Pp. 231. Paris: UNESCO, 1955, (Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York). $2.50.

There exists an abundant literature on the refugee problem of different countries, approaching it from various angles. On the other hand, general works not limited to a single country treat mainly (if not exclusively) the political, legal, demographic, and economic aspects of the problem. To supply a long-felt need, the reviewed symposium concentrated on psychological and mental health peculiarities of the refugee in various conditions and stages of his existence; it deals almost exclusively with the D. P. type of refugee who has lost his homeland, and who must seek resettlement among people of a different culture. However, there is a provocative article by Miriam L. Goertner comparing German refugees and Puerto Rican migrants in New York City.

The book opens with Dr. Murphy's introduction on "The Extent of the Problem," giving its logical delimitation, categories, and numbers of people involved in the refugee movements. There follows (as Part I) two articles on flight and its immediate aftermath. Part II, Displaced Person includes, apart from Dr. Murphy's interesting observations about the ill effects of life in *any* camp, a description of what the Allies found in Germany after her defeat. Especially gruesome is the picture of thousands of children completely on their own; children from concentration camps with numbers tattoed on their forearms; Jewish children, some of them "fortunate enough to look like Angels" who "found sanctuary in Christian homes," and others who managed to survive "living in cellars during the day and creeping out at night in search of sustenance." Part III, the most rich in material, deals with psychological and sociological aspects of resettlement and Part IV especially with refugee psychosis.

The main value of the book lies in the mass of factual data describing human beings with a tragic past and the difficulties of their adjustment to a new and strange milieu. Generalizations are sometimes less successful. Even an admirer of Freud will hardly enjoy it when Dr. Prine (a Dutch physician), in his brilliant autobiographic sketch, characterizes his and his comrades flight to England as "running away from the bad castrating father to the good Queen mother."

The Editor, Dr. Murphy, has not only contributed five articles of a total of sixteen, he also has supplied several others with introductory notes which help to preserve the unity of the book, so often lacking in symposia. The bibliography is rich and well organized. Maps and diagrams show the distribution of refugees. The text of the book is supplemented by twenty-nine skillfully made and well annotated illustrations.

EUGENE KULISCHER
Washington, D. C.

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS. *The States and Their Older Citizens: A Report to the Governors' Conference.* Pp. xvii, 176. Chicago, Ill.: Council of State Governments, 1955. $3.00.

Older persons are considered a problem today. They constitute a large and increasing proportion of our population. Economic and social changes that have taken place in the United States have altered the position of the aged, posing problems for state and local governments and for many private agencies.

The size of the problem of the aged is suggested by the fact that the rate of increase of older persons is twice that of the total population; the percentage of older men who have jobs is constantly decreasing; older people have sharply lower incomes than the middle-aged and for many these incomes are grossly inadequate; the cost of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance continues to increase; the aged suffer disproportionately from chronic illness and are the least insured against hospitalization costs; a tremendous rise has occurred in the number and proportion of the aged in mental hospitals; and there is a lack of specific services for older people and qualified staff to man them.

The Governors' Conference requested the Council of State Governments to "provide a basis for intelligent planning of adequate care, treatment and rehabilitation facilities to cope with the needs" of the aged. In *The States and Their Older Citizens,* the Council provided a bill of objectives for older people as well as a program for action in the field of aging.

The bill of objectives proposes equal opportunity to work, adequate minimum income, home living or homelike institutional care, physical and mental health or rehabilitation, participation in community activities, social services, and the right to free choice, self-help, and planning of their own futures.

The program for action calls for the elimination of arbitrary age limits for employment and establishment of programs of rehabilitation and vocational training for aging persons; the establishment of facilities for counseling and for early detection and follow-up of diseases; better screening of patients before admission to mental hospitals; establishment of medical home-care programs; state grants to localities for construction of medically supervised nursing homes; and establishment of community centers where aged persons may join in interesting and productive activities.

There is need of increased gerontological research and application of its results in public education and professional training.

DOROTHY C. TOMPKINS
University of California
Berkeley

WILMA DONAHUE (Ed.). *Earning Opportunities for Older Workers.* Pp. x, 277, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1955. $4.50.

This volume is based largely on papers prepared for the University of Michigan Sixth Annual Conference on Aging. Its stated aim is to "examine the nature of the barriers to continued employment or rehiring of older persons, to seek methods by which such persons may be effectively utilized in the labor force and to outline steps by which voluntary organizations and public agencies, and older people themselves, can create new earning opportunities for older workers."

Thirty-three persons from management, unions, public service, education, and medicine contributed to the conference and to this publication. The volume opens and closes with discussions by two especially distinguished contributors. The first chapter, called "The Health and Welfare of Our Senior Citizens", is by Oveta Culp Hobby, former Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The closing chapter, "Making a Life and Making a Living", is by the late Dr. Martin Gumpert, whose words will be greatly missed in future studies of growing old. The chapters in between move from general discussions of such problems as barriers to employment—particularly pension and insurance costs, the health and skills of older workers, and the peculiar difficulties of older women in the labor force—to programs for counseling and placement, what the Government employment security program is, and what various groups—individuals, business and industry, voluntary and community groups, and what the State can do to promote and encourage new earning opportunities. In addition to the discussions of general problems, brief descriptions of several individual projects designed specifically to employ older workers are included.

Since the conference for which the material in this volume was prepared was attended by more than 700 persons, it is not surprising that the papers are for the most part aimed at the general public rather than the student. (The fifteen-page list of references to recent writings on older workers should prove very useful to many persons interested in the field). Some of the contributions, such as the chapter on the effect of pensions and insurance costs by William H. Wandel, or that on motivation of the aging worker by Dr. Jack Weinberg, or Pearl Ravner's careful summary of the research that has been done on the psychological barriers to the employment of older women, are thoughtful and interesting. But many of the others are rather in the nature of brief comments from the conference floor—welcome to a discussion leader but not substantial enough to deserve permanent recording. To someone turning his attention for the first time to the problems of older workers in the United States, perhaps organizing a conference in his own community, this volume would introduce some of the experts and would offer a fair

cross section of the current popular thinking on various issues. For specialists, this collection of papers will serve chiefly as a roundup of familiar ideas about the aging worker.

GERTRUDE BANCROFT
U. S. Bureau of the Census

W. J. H. SPROTT. *Science and Social Action.* Pp. 164. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954. $3.50.

This book is the result of the Josiah Mason Memorial Lectures at Birmingham, 1953. It raises questions which are of importance to the student of social science. There are eight chapters. The first four deal respectively with the nature of social action; personality, society and culture; the scientific approach; and the small group. The last four deal with the subject of assimilation, deviants, the grand manner, and the sociology of knowledge. It is the author's contention that psychology and sociology are elaborations of ideas which inevitably arise from our everyday intercourse with people like ourselves, and that sociology and psychology unavoidably spring from social action. Social action, Sprott holds, is the basic concept in the social sciences. Four aspects of social action consist of: (1) interaction itself, (2) the social constructs within which it is performed, (3) the beliefs which it produces and which in turn guide it, and (4) the physical and demographic environment in which it takes place.

The appearance of disorder which seems to arise in a review of published books and theses are due, first to the variation in the fields of investigation; second, plausibility does not require the establishment of a theoretical framework; third, the subject matter is difficult to handle, partly because of its familiarity; fourth, the social scientist is often too closely associated with contemporary problems; and fifth, he is limited by opportunities offered him. Because of our ordinary social contacts, many of us feel competent to speak on a social concept without any investigation whatever, and as a result of our ignorance of what is actually occurring, a "considerable amount of research is pure fact-finding and nothing else."

Since a social system is a dynamic process, it is only here and there that the dominant features of beliefs and values remain constant over a considerable period. To obtain absolute validity there must be universal agreement since only in terms of agreement and disagreement between persons is there any sense in the notion of "validity".

This book by Sprott shows an exceptional understanding of the relation of scientific inquiry to the field of social action. It provides the entering wedge to an area which in much of our contemporary sociological writing and research has been somewhat obscured.

M. C. ELMER
University of Pittsburgh

HENRY GRAYSON. *The Crisis of the Middle Class.* Pp. xv, 172. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1955. $2.75.

The middle class, Grayson believes, is beset by a crisis that threatens its very existence. Its predicament, which stems most directly from the increasing circumscription of its historic innovative role, is aggravated by the growing acuteness of the more fundamental cultural disequilibrium of Western society. Two cultural lags, involving the disparity between the rate at which social problems are created by the advance of the natural sciences and solved by the social sciences and the incongruity between the knowledge of the intellectuals and the popular beliefs of the masses, only add to the gravity of its plight. Consequently, the author's probe of the crisis of the middle class is conducted within what is essentially an analysis of the crisis of the Western world. His investigation departs from a theory of the structure and dynamics of civilization, inquires into the economic aspects of the major cultural epochs of Occidental civilization, examines the dimensions of the modern business cycle, and outlines the alternatives open to America for solving the problem of cultural lags.

Nevertheless, the author is primarily concerned with the nature of the middle class, its origins, vicissitudes, and prospects. Its emergence appears to require the ruler-slave stratification of a conquest state and the development of portable and negotiable wealth. Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia illustrate incipient stages, while only ancient Greece, which achieved the first industrial revolution, had all of the required circumstances for full maturity of the middle class (pp. 41–44). Still, the Hellenic middle class followed its predecessors into decline. Not until the end of the European Dark Ages did the next major spiral of economic advance begin. Modern England and, more recently, the United States have carried this most recent middle class efflorescence of the second industrial revolution to its apogee. But once more the threat of stagnation and decline impends. Here, as in England, "the middle class individualist is suffering from increasing restrictions and narrowing opportunities brought about by the monopoly-minded upper and lower classes" (pp. 86–87).

Of the author's entire analysis, nothing appears so striking, so unconventional, and so controversial as his definition of the middle class, which is implied in the sentence just quoted and explicitly elaborated elsewhere (pp. xi–xii, 28–29). Membership in the middle class is characterized *not* by rank in the social hierarchy but by an individualistic proclivity to innovate. The excessive brevity of Grayson's historical study is likely to raise the disquieting possibility that the author has simply illustrated, rather than critically tested, his de-stratified notion of the middle class and his Paretian-mechanistic theory of social dynamics which, by deriving change from individualism, logically implies his concept of the middle class.

ROSCOE C. HINKLE, JR.
Ohio State University

LYMAN BRYSON and others (Eds.). *Symbols and Society.* Pp. xi, 611. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, 1955. (Distributed by Harper and Brothers.) $6.00.

This is the second of a two-volume study of the part played by symbols in the life of mankind. The articles included were prepared for the Fourteenth Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life. The sixteen papers and the comments on them by other participants thus represent the collaboration of some forty scholars who met at Harvard University in the fall of 1954 to explore the ways in which symbols influence social thought and action.

This volume surveys the role of symbolism in establishing relationships between individuals, groups, and nations. The studies range from the physical sciences (Philipp G. Frank), politics (T. R. Adam and Karl W. Deutsch), law (F. S. C. Northrop), prestige (Lyman Bryson), education (Robert Ulich), and the Old Testament (Louis Finkelstein) to cultural values and the arts (by various writers). The conclusions which emerge from these diverse and sumptuous offerings illustrate the manifold uses and abuses of the symbolic expressions of human purposes.

The work is described as "the first comprehensive study of its kind." Yet one comes away from it with the impression that the group was not entirely representative of all approaches. For example, there is no treatment of the semantics movement, whether in the form of general semantics (Korzybski, Lee, Hayakawa, Stuart Chase, *et al.*) or the more restricted logistic approaches of Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap. Nor does the work of Bliss's semantography, the fundamental research of Carl Jung on archetypal imagery, or the contributions of Oriental philosophies and religions find adequate recognition. The international symbolism movements—for example, Leibniz's *characteristica universalis, Esperanto, Interlingua,* and others—find no place in these discussions. On the other hand, Harlow Shapley's article on "Galaxies and their Human Worth," included in an Appendix, is a masterly summary, but seems rather irrelevant in this volume. Hudson Hoagland's valuable paper, "Some Considerations of Symbolization and Nervous Action," is quite relevant; but in that event one can only regret that Ralph Gerard's article along similar lines was not also included. But criticism aside, this book and its companion volume, *Symbols and Values,* provide extremely useful source materials

and documentation for all serious students of these important topics.

OLIVER L. REISER
University of Pittsburgh

RICHARD HOFSTADTER and WALTER P. METZGER. *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States.* Pp. xvi, 527. $5.50.

ROBERT M. MACIVER. *Academic Freedom in Our Time.* Pp. vii, 329. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.00.

The attacks on colleges and universities, and on professors singly and collectively, have produced their own antidote: an awakened watchfulness on the part of the victims and a determination to meet the attacks with courage, intelligence, and dignity. A significant aspect of the counter-attack was the establishment of the American Academic Freedom Project at Columbia University by the Louis M. Rabinowitz Foundation, with Dean Louis M. Hacker as executive secretary and professor Robert M. MacIver as director. The two volumes under review are the fruit of this project. McCarthyism was an evil, and there is no compulsion to strain to detect some elements of good in it. "My dear sir," said Samuel Johnson, "never accustom yourself to mingle virtue and vice. The woman's a whore, and there's an end on't." Yet one cannot help thinking that it took a mountain of evil to produce the first major study of academic freedom in the United States.

The volume by Professors Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger is a solid scholarly achievement and ought to be considered a strong contender for the Pulitzer Prize in history. It is based on careful scholarship, it is written in a literary style that has distinction, it is comprehensive and yet well-balanced in its parts and emphasis. The first part, which deals with the European background, the early days of Harvard, the colonial colleges generally, and developments through the Civil War, was written by Hofstadter; and the second part, which brings the study through the founding of the American Association of University Professors in 1915 and the events of World War I, was written by Professor Metzger; but the Preface makes it clear that the book has been "in every sense a collaborative enterprise."

The book by Professor MacIver is concerned with academic freedom "in our time". It does not create the impression of historical writing; unlike the volume by Hofstadter and Metzger, this book is written in a strident key, as a tract for the times. This is understandable, for Mac Iver is concerned with current events about which we have read on the front pages of our newspapers and with issues that have divided citizens into different camps. It creates the impression that the author is concerned almost exclusively with the attacks on and the defeats of academic freedom—although he himself warns against the danger of forgetting that this is a big country, with many hundreds of colleges and universities, and that in hundreds of these institutions no threats to basic liberties have been experienced; that in nearly all the greater institutions attacks on their integrity have been successfully rebuffed. Nothwithstanding this caveat, the reader cannot, I think, but carry away the predominant impression that freedom on the American campus has in recent years been the exception rather than the rule. This is because, I suspect, often the author uses language that has too great a sweep—for example, "The evidence of the magnitude of the wave [of intolerance] comes from many sides. There has been a vast increase of suppressive controls, unofficial and official, over books, public addresses, and generally over all forms of the expression of opinion"; he speaks of "the proliferating censorship of books," and that "it is the libraries of schools and colleges that are subjected to the strongest onslaught"; he says that "the number of organizations carrying forward the crusade of intolerance is very large and has a formidable impact," and that "the spirit of apprehension and the sense of intimidation" have, "according to a considerable amount of testimony," "invaded the halls of learning."

But, as I have said, this failing of the book is understandable, and perhaps is largely insurmountable when one writes of events and issues from which one cannot disconnect himself. On the whole, we should be grateful to Professor MacIver for the book he has written, which has in it much valuable information and which forthrightly advances the debate on behalf of a maximization of intellectual freedom.

MILTON R. KONVITZ
Ithaca, New York

THOMAS EVANS COULTON. *A City College in Action.* Pp. xix, 233. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $3.50.

GAIL KENNEDY (Ed.). *Education at Amherst.* Pp. xi, 330. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $4.00.

These intimate studies of two very different types of institutions of higher education bring into sharp relief both their differences and their common goals. The subtitle and the content of each reflects the differences. The former, *Struggle and Achievement at Brooklyn College, 1930–1955* is a description of the interrelationship of a municipal institution and the community it serves and a candid analysis of several basic and highly explosive issues; the development and expulsion of Communist influences in the college, the impact of World War II, "Basketball and the Smart Money," and the influence of pressure groups. Under the chapter title, "Everybody's Business," the author describes the activities of the American Civil Liberties Union and its Academic Freedom Committee, the Americans for Democratic Action and Students for Democratic Action, and the Joint Committee Against Communism.

The latter, *The New Program* is a description of the recommendations of Amherst's Faculty Committee on Long Range Policy and their implementation over approximately the same period of time. There were issues also at Amherst, but with one exception they were internal issues growing out of departmental interests and differences in educational philosophy. The exception was the Committee's recommendation that national fraternities be abolished because they were "anti-democratic" and "anti-intellectual." When a poll of the alumni showed overwhelming opposition to their abolition, they were permitted to continue but under greater control by the College. Two fraternities withdrew from their national organizations and became local in order to eliminate the racial discrimination policy of the national organization.

The account of Brooklyn College is primarily one of the institutions response to external forces; the Amherst report is primarily one of internal development. The two are complimentary to each other.

There is, however, much basic similarity in these two interesting accounts of developments in higher education since 1935. Both reflect the leadership of able presidents, their support of faculty policies, and their concern for the total welfare of the students. Issues in both institutions were resolved by frank discussion and democratic procedure. Both portray the earnest efforts of conscientious faculties to seek ways to retain the basic values of a liberal education in the face of internal and external pressures. Both volumes emphasize the need for closer co-ordination of the curriculum and student activities and that student responsibility must go hand in hand with student rights. Perhaps most important is the common faith of the faculties of these institutions that higher education has a grave responsibility not only to each individual student but to the nation and the world.

Those who now seek to point up the preferential values of public or of private higher education will do well to read these two interesting volumes—Amherst established in 1821 by the Congregational Church and Brooklyn College created by the New York State Education Law in 1930. In a study of the fifty leading sources of American scholars, Brooklyn College was listed immediately following Amherst.

FRANCIS J. BROWN
American Council on Education

GEORGE D. SPINDLER (Ed.). *Education and Anthropology.* Pp. xxviii, 302. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955. $5.50.

Both educators and anthropologists have a twofold common core of interest: the role of the individual as a member of a social group and the influence of group behaviors, norms, and values on the indi-

vidual. *Education and Anthropology* represents an attempt to examine the above areas of common concern as well as such related topics as models for the analysis of the educative process, the school in the context of the community, conflicts between cultural ideals and educational action, problems relating to intercultural understanding, contrasts between prepubertal and postpubertal education, communication theory in learning situations, and the relationships between anthropological and educational theory.

This book is the report of papers and discussions occasioned by a conference held at Stanford, California under the joint auspices of the School of Education and the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Stanford University, and the American Anthropological Association. In this conference twenty-two recognized educators and anthropologists met for six days to exchange ideas and opinions for the mutual benefit of the two fields.

An especially heartening feature of this book is the realistic approach evidenced by the various conference participants on the contributions each discipline could make to the other. The anthropologists in particular were quick to point out that their major contribution to education is not the supplying of direct answers to specific questions, but rather enabling educators to obtain newer insights through the use of methodological tools for the study and analysis of educational and cultural processes. Both educators and anthropologists, while recognizing the need for more anthropological knowledge in the study of the educational process, agreed that it would be "dreadfully dangerous" to argue: "there was a psychological phase of education; now there should be the anthropological" (p. 277).

Dr. Spindler has not only done an admirable job in so editing the book as to retain the informal "flavor" of the conference, but has contributed a most valuable overview which summarizes the major written works that deal with the relationships between anthropology and education. The book concludes with a paper by Solon T. Kimball on the Supreme Court desegregation decision and a discussion of its educational consequences. Authors of other papers presented at the conference are I. James Quillen, Bernard J. Siegal, John Gillin, Cora Du Bois, C. W. M. Hart, Dorothy Lee, Jules Henry, and Theodore Brameld.

A minor criticism that the reviewer has of this otherwise excellent compilation is the apparent reluctance of the conference participants to give further attention to the relationships between education and that part of the field of sociology that is closely allied to social and cultural anthropology. Znaniecki, for example, in his discussion of the scientific function of the sociology of education deals with a remarkably large number of relationships similar to those found in this book.

STANLEY P. WRONSKI
Boston University

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

LEWIS BROAD. *Anthony Eden: The Chronicle of a Career.* Pp. 280. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $5.00.

The dust cover blurb states that although for twenty-five years Sir Anthony Eden has loomed large in foreign affairs, little is known of the man behind the elegantly dressed public figure. It may be true, but this book makes no great progress toward revealing him. It is a readable sketch based upon slight research; the bibliography consists of a few biographies, personal accounts, and Eden's own published speeches. The result in many chapters is a sketchy narrative in which Eden appears occasionally by name and in a few quotations. Nowhere are there signs of thorough study to satisfy the serious reader, though outlines are traced for a popular audience who likes easy sentences and short paragraphs.

The point of view is that of an admirer of the Conservative party and of the Prime Minister. The author likes Eden the man, the idealist who supported the League of Nations, the skilled diplomatist, and the social Conservative whose slogan is "a property owning democracy." He is likewise an enthusiast for Stanley Baldwin as "the greatest peacetime Prime Minister since Walpole" (p. 91), although his bibliography does not include the biography by G. M. Young which would question this evaluation. The prewar "appeasers," however, do not come off well, and he questions the honesty of Chamberlain's motives and statements. The Opposition is ridiculed and treated with some partisan inaccuracy. It is not true to say that: "the idealists of the left would have been satisfied with nothing short of a punitive war against Italy" (p. 52). His version of Labour's armaments policy is likewise incorrect. Labour did not object to the use of force by the League under certain circumstances and, as many official statements and the Peace Ballot of 1935 showed, would provide it, but for a time it was unwilling to put it entirely at the disposal of a distrusted Conservative government. In retrospect that distinction may seem to have been too fine, but it seemed intelligible to those who remembered the moves of 1919–20 to aid the Poles which might have involved Britain in a war against revolutionary Russia. The interpretation of the election of 1945 and its aftermath is questionable, too; the voters were not looking backward and repudiating Churchill because of Chamberlain's mistakes, but were concerned with the future and thought Labour the better party to implement the Welfare State to which in greater or less degree all parties were committed.

CARL F. BRAND
Stanford University

SHEILA FERGUSON and HILDE FITZGERALD. *Studies in the Social Services.* Pp. ix, 367. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green, and Company, 1954. (Distributed by British Information Services, New York.) $5.25.

As the Preface says, *Studies in the Social Services* by S. M. Ferguson and H. Fitzgerald is a successor to *Problems of Social Policy* by Professor R. M. Titmuss. It examines the effect of war upon families and shows the efforts made by public policy to improvise social services that would take the place of the help normally available within the family in peacetime.

Before the war started it seemed reasonable to anticipate a reduction of the social services for civilians; in fact, this book reaffirms the statement made by Professor Titmuss in the earlier book that far from reducing the social services, the war years and their aftermath brought new and improved services in order to keep up the national morale and the efficiency of industry.

For instance, the mobilization of man and woman power was so complete that the only people left unoccupied were the very young, the very old, and the incapacitated. The dispersal of families and neighborhoods due to the mobilization of munition workers and evacuation schemes removed many possible sources of self-help among families and friends, and to quote, "what distinguishes British experience and what is of great importance to the theme of this book is the unparallelled mobilization of women and in particular of married women." The State, therefore, had to take a hand in looking after the families of servicemen when they were in trouble, and, because of old prejudices against the existing system of public assistance, had to build services on a new foundation.

One notable exception was, however, the Assistance Board, which in 1940 took over the administration of the new Supplementary Pensions for old-age pensionees. From the start, the Assistance Board conducted its administration in such a way that they provided a national scheme of welfare for old people who needed financial assistance and followed the now familiar British pattern of using voluntary organizations and local authority services alike to help their pensionees.

The authors, however, emphasize that it would be a mistake to deny altruism to the nation's social progress in the war years, and it should be a source of national pride that a lively public interest in two of the most helpless classes in the community—the aged and the deprived children began during the war. The government moved thousands of mothers from cities into the country, and therefore had to provide an Emergency Maternity Service, which in spite of its shortcomings proved to be one of the government's most suc-

cessful social ventures. Special interest lies in the section devoted to the social problem of illegitimacy dealt with here with unusual directness. The Government had to accept rseponsibility for the welfare of the unmarried mothers and their babies and to continue to do so after the end of the war.

To make sure that the health of babies and children did not suffer from food shortages, services far in advance of those previously available were gradually built up with the result that many young children were better nourished than before the war.

Day nurseries were established both to relieve householders in reception areas and also, more especially, to allow more women to work in factories. The nursery was a contribution toward the feeling of mutual responsibility between government and the family.

Residential nurseries had to be established for the child who needed full-time care. At the end of the war most of the children went home, but some of the local authorities were prepared to continue some of the nurseries. An interesting section deals with tuberculosis—a family problem and emphasises the economic strain thrown upon the family if the breadwinner has to undergo long treatment. In anticipation of many air-raid casualties, some sanatoriums discharged patients back to their homes when they were in an infectious condition; this was rectified, but the danger of pollution presently became apparent in public air-raid shelters. The scheme of tuberculosis allowances is explained in detail with its shortcomings. With the assessment, "it is not surprising that the tuberculosis allowances scheme, built as it was on a principle of discrimination, should be among the less successful aspects of war-time social policy."

The final chapters deal with the nursing services, the difficulties of extending these services when there was a shortage of nurses before the war, which became even more acute in the war years. This book is a most valuable record supported with appendices of statistics and carefully documented information. It also makes fascinating and easy reading both for a British public who lived through the years described and also for the American readers who have not experienced it.

The language of the authors is so free from "jargon" that it is with something of a shock that one reads in the description of the Home Help Service that the Ministry of Health should encourage immobile women over 40 to take it up. Such are the pitfalls of ministerial terminology.

DOROTHEA RAMSEY
Keswick, Cumberland
England

J. W. GOUGH. *Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History.* Pp. x, 229. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1955. 25*s*.

This is an important work which no political scientist can afford to neglect not so much because of many new contributions made to the subject, but because of its penetrating analysis of the relevant literature and its illuminating criticism of modern studies in this field. The book apparently sprang chiefly from Mr. Gough's conviction that American writers, notably Professor C. H. McIlwain, had overemphasized the role of concepts of "fundamental law" as limiting the competence of parliament in the later Middle Ages and early modern times. Students of this subject were thus led, Mr. Gough feels, to read back into the English constitutional history of that era a well-defined doctrine of "judicial review" of legislation. Mr. Gough is therefore most anxious to avoid attributing to the period before 1641 either the later British doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty or the later American practise of judicial review. In tracing the role of ideas of fundamental law in English constitutional history, he seems to have three aims in view: first, to marshal the evidence for the omnicompetence of parliament; second, to show that the struggle which culminated in the English Civil War was not essentially a contest for sovereignty but for the preservation of the previously "balanced constitution, in which the law held the royal prerogatives poised against the rights of the subject" (p. 56); and third, to show that the influence of the older ideas of fundamental law persisted for some time after the triumph of parliamentary sovereignty at the close of the seventeenth century.

With respect to the omnicompetence of parliament in the later Middle Ages, Mr. Gough amplifies the evidence brought forward in such works as those of W. S. Holdsworth, T. F. T. Plucknett, S. B. Chrimes, and Miss Faith Thompson to show that there was a great deal of conscious law *making* by medieval parliaments and that even the Magna Charta was not sacrosanct. On the other hand, he marshals ample evidence proving that "sovereignty" in the Austinian sense was an idea alien to medieval thought and that there were concepts of "fundamental law" or "laws" by which the actions of kings, courts, and parliaments were presumed to be bound; even though there was no clear cut and precise method of binding them thereto. It is in this connection that Mr. Gough seems to have overstated his case.

This reviewer is not conscious of having been taught by Professor McIlwain that judicial review found a place in the early English constitution. He was, however, taught that to the extent that this problem of binding parliament (whether as a court or a legislature) was grappled with at all it was grappled with by the judges. It was they who in effect sometimes voided statutes, at least in part, by failing to interpret them strictly. It was they who ignored the commands of parliament on those rare occasions when parliament seemed to force an individual (or a corporation) to be a judge in his own cause or to do something manifestly absurd.

Mr. Gough and Mr. McIlwain are not so far apart either in the Middle Ages or the seventeenth century. On the later period, Mr. Gough should be read as a corrective to the sharp antithesis of royal versus parliamentary sovereignty presented by the classic Whig historians and by S. R. Gardiner. This short study presents one of the best and clearest accounts available of the development of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. In doing so, it reminds us of a truth we are now too often inclined to forget, namely that it is not constitutions or "fundamental laws" *per se*, whether written or unwritten which count. It is the will to abide by them and the clear understanding of their historic traditions which is the guarantee against tyranny. Mr. Gough's work should make a significant contribution to that understanding on both sides of the Atlantic.

HOLDEN FURBER
University of Pennsylvania

R. K. WEBB. *The British Working Class Reader 1790–1848: Literacy and Social Tension.* Pp. ix, 192. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) $3.00.

The title of this book, as Mr. Webb explains in his Foreword, pertains to the first chapter which deals with the working class reading public. After struggling with sparse statistics on education, the author estimates that three-fourths of the working people were literate by the middle of the nineteenth century. The rest of the book concerns "the challenge which the literate working class presents to its betters" and is more adequately described by its subtitle, *Literacy and Social Tension.*

Mr. Webb has studied primarily the social tensions of the 1830's, the agricultural disturbances, the breaking of machinery, the agitation against the New Poor Law, and the rise of the trade unions. Relying mainly upon the papers of Francis Place and the materials of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, he has carefully studied the middle class efforts to educate and reform the working classes. He concludes, however, that these attempts failed because the ruling classes did not understand the masses (p. 161).

Social history in the Marxian vein of class warfare imposes a severe methodology, more severe than Mr. Webb has employed. It requires, in this instance a systematic treatment of the statistics of education. It requires also a careful definition of social groups. When speaking of the working class, he is not always clear whether he means urban or rural labor, the artisan or factory worker. Occasionally he lapses from the theme of class warfare to show a coincidence between the artisans and the lower middle classes. If he had studied Chartism and the factory movement, he might have found a greater coincidence of these classes as well as sev-

eral earnest attempts to mitigate social animosities. Moreover, the author's failure to define "radical" leaves the reader in doubt as to whether he means working class agitators or the followers of Jeremy Bentham.

Notwithstanding these defects of methodology, Mr. Webb has compiled a useful catalogue of the literature designed to educate and uplift the working people. Since he is unable to engender sympathy for the middle classes, Mr. Webb would do well to turn his attention to the study of literature of the working classes and present a catalogue of the materials which, in his judgment, lifted the working classes to literacy.

R. G. COWHERD

Lehigh University

A. L. ROWSE. *The Expansion of Elizabethan England.* Pp. xiii, 450. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955. $5.75.

To Dr. Rowse, Elizabethan expansion begins at home—English law and order, English language and custom are introduced, by force when necessary, into the Celtic lands of the Scottish border, Wales, and Cornwall. Ireland is another story, for here bloody conquest was necessary to subdue the country. Even while these tasks were being accomplished, Englishmen penetrated to the distant East and Muscovy, and finally made their first attempts to settle in the New World. In a great burst of energy, the island people caught up to and prepared to surpass the mighty Spanish bid for empire.

The author tells the story with gusto and unabashed partisanship. There are heroes and villains, wise men and fools. The great English soldiers and sailors flash brilliantly. Of the foreigners, William the Silent, "one of the truly great men of history," and Parma, although an enemy, receive the accolade. Essex is the lightweight dilettante, and Philip of Spain is the bigot, sometimes the fool. Above them all is Queen Elizabeth—guiding, goading, scolding, praising, with an uncanny knowledge of all that goes on; but being a woman she hates war! Yet the queen is vigorously defended against the detractors who accuse her of criminal parsimony in the payment and care of her valiant troops. In truth, she could do little to prevent the rampant corruption of captains and civilian purveyors. Corruption, disease, and inefficiency made for the miseries of the armed forces. Despite these difficulties, such great advances were made in ship designing and in military organization, training and equipment, that Elizabethan England emerged as a first-class power. In fact, in the author's opinion, Elizabeth made only two major mistakes: she failed to supply sufficient funds for the conquest of Ireland earlier in the reign, and secondly she intervened in the French civil wars.

To this reader at least, there is hardly a dull moment in Dr. Rowse's book, even though the expert may not find much that is new or different from previous accounts. Attention is held by the careful blending of contemporary sources and modern authorities, and by the verve of the writing, particularly in describing the exploits of the sailor-heroes, the defeat of the Armada, intervention in the Netherlands, and the Irish troubles. May the reviewer nevertheless express a few disagreements? The learned author seems to fall into a curious Celtic racism: Celts are withdrawn, sensual, and bad cooks! Dr. Rowse hates the fanatic, Puritan or Catholic; but is not this hatred carried too far, apropos Motley: "Puritans have seldom much minded about truth in what they say of others"? Or in the dictum that "the odious, the superfluous Civil War in England" destroyed the possibility of integrating England and Ireland?

But then, perhaps these crochets add spice to an admirable book, and in any case do little harm. We look forward to the final volume of Dr. Rowse's Elizabethan trilogy.

E. A. BELLER

Princeton University

WILLIAM HALLER. *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution.* Pp. xv, 410. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $6.00.

Professor Haller in this latest work continues his earlier study, *The Rise of Puritanism* and brings it down to 1649. Utilizing printed tracts, sermons, and other literature to the fullest, the author depicts the struggles of a "Godly preaching ministry" and its "gathered" flocks as they strove to win religious liberty from Charles I and to prevent their newfound freedom from degenerating into chaos. In these pages, replete with quotations and paraphrases of hundreds of sermons, the reader follows the battles of the Saints first against Laud and episcopacy, then against parliament and presbytery and finally against Levellers and sectaries. At last Cromwell, Ireton, and the army intervened to provide the compromise of Independency, which charged individuals, magistrates, and churches alike to maintain truth and oppose heresy, "but nothing, certainly not the prison or the halter, can really serve to that end but 'Gospel conviction'" (p. 339). Throughout the protean conflict the close correlation between religious and political liberty is lucidly illustrated.

There are many heroes in the struggle for liberty and reformation as depicted by Profesor Haller, but John Milton stands forth above them all. Although no Carlyle, Professor Haller has perhaps ascribed too much importance to his hero. While admitting that Milton's tracts had little effect until 1649, the author holds to the opinion that Milton's "participation in the argument for liberty and reformation was a fact of extraordinary significance" in the history of Puritanism for his writings carried "the enduring ideas of Puritanism to later generations" (p. xv). Be that as it may, Professor Haller's admiration for Milton the literary figure caused him to elevate the poet to a loftier stature than he deserved during the period 1642–49.

All but the expert will find some sections of the book rough sledding. On the other hand, some portions are delightful. In spite of its unevenness *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution* is a fascinating study based upon sound scholarship. Long awaited it should be well received by students of literature, history, and political science, as well as by those interested in man's struggle for freedom as it unfolded during the Puritan revolution.

JOHN J. MURRAY

Coe College

THOMAS L. COONAN. *The Irish Catholic Confederacy and the Puritan Revolution.* Pp. xii, 402. Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds; New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $6.00.

Dr. Coonan maintains that the Irish rebellion of 1641 and the ensuing Catholic Confederacy were the outcome of the agitation of the Catholic Irish for an independent Irish parliament under the crown analogous to the English parliament. This agitation paralleled that of the English parliament against Charles I. It foreshadowed the coming struggle of the American colonies for representative government under the crown, independent of the Westminster parliament, and thus anticipated the future constitutional development of the British Commonwealth. The Irish Catholic Confederacy was made possible by the collapse of royal power before the attack of a strongly Protestant parliament, and if things had turned out differently might have made possible the early establishment of a Dominion of Ireland with its own parliamentary government. But the outcome of civil war in England left the Irish with the English parliament and the Puritan army to contend with, and nothing to depend upon besides its own resources but the word and the authority of a defeated king who had previously inflicted Strafford upon his Irish subjects. The revolutionary regime in England had no intention to relinquish any aspect of the sovereignty in England or Ireland of which it had now taken possession. Cromwell came to Ireland and put an end to Irish Catholic hopes. But the reason for Cromwell's success in this was not really or not only the evil embodied in him and his cause, but also the weakness of the Irish Confederacy itself, which began disintegrating from within almost from the moment of its inception. The roots of this weakness reached far back into Irish history. The difficulty was that, although there was among the Irish a deep, even fierce, sense of being Irish and Catholic, Irish nationalism had been able to develop no cohesion, no unity, and no sense of what effective action in the cause of national unity required. There was conflict of in-

terest going back to Norman times between the Anglo-Irish feudal landlords and the Old Irish with their own customary social organization. There was the conflict between the Old Irish and the Anglo-Irish on the one hand and on the other the swarms of English and Scottish intruders who came in under the Tudors and Stuarts, and this conflict was complicated by religious differences. Religion on both sides went hand in hand with inflamed nationalism. There were, not least important, the unending jealousies and rivalries among the Irish themselves. There was the clergy on both sides to keep the fires of conflict well stoked. Consequently the history of the Catholic Confederacy, as this writer presents it, is a story of vain appeasements, fruitless compromises, betrayals compounded, disintegration and defeat from which the Irish spirit has not yet recovered. The story has been told often enough from the English Protestant point of view. It is good to have it also told as Father Coonan tells it in such well-documented detail from an Irish Catholic point of view.

WILLIAM HALLER
Folger Shakespeare Library

JOSEPH FRANK. *The Levellers*. Pp. viii, 345. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $5.00.

Basing his story primarily upon the pamphlets and tracts of John Lilburne, Richard Overton, and William Walwyn, Professor Frank has written an artistic and informative book on the rise and fall of the Leveller party. Supplementing the writings of his three social democrats with the works of their friends and enemies, Professor Frank traces the growth of the Levellers step by step until the individual efforts of Lilburne, Overton, and Walwyn merge with those of John Wildman to bring forth the various agreements of the people. Lilburne's propensity for martyrdom, Walwyn's philosophical radicalism, and Overton's sardonic skill are evaluated as are the roles they played in hammering out the postulates of the Leveller party.

By appealing to history, God, reason, and nature, the Levellers brought forth a political philosophy which had to wait two hundred years before it found acceptance. This ideology, rejected by the factions of the time, consisted of four overlapping elements: optimism, secularism, rationalism, and pragmatism. Professor Frank weighs carefully the Leveller contribution to modern society and convincingly shows that the Levellers were the progenitors of constitutional democratic government rather than harbingers of communism. Their leveling was mainly in the political sphere and not in the economic as their many enemies charged.

Professor Frank's work is of intrinsic value for the student of seventeenth-century political thought and party warfare, and stylistically is an improvement over some of its predecessors in the field. At times, however, he allows his enthusiasm to carry him out on an historical ebb tide. His using Lilburne's tracts to substantiate Lilburne's successes is not always conclusive evidence. Presentism also occasionally raises its insidious head. These later remarks are personal observations and are in no way intended to detract from a thorough, well-written treatment of the writings of three seventeenth-century social democrats.

JOHN J. MURRAY
Coe College

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL and others. *Satellite Generals*. Pp. vi, 165. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955. $1.75.

The Hoover Institute and Library of War, Revolution, and Peace, under the able guidance of its chairman, Harold H. Fisher, and its director, C. Easton Rothwell, and with the aid of the Carnegie Corporation, is currently engaged in the preparation of studies designed "to describe the world revolution of our time and its consequences for world politics and national policy." The monographs in print to date are grouped under five headings: General, Elites, Symbols, Communities, and Institutions. Since the "world revolution" embraces a series of racial, colonial, nationalistic, scientific, and technological changes on a global scale, all prospectively of decisive significance for the fortunes of mankind, it is to be hoped that these studies will not continue to be limited, as is thus far the case, to the institutional differences and ideological rivalries among democracy, fascism, and communism.

Within these limits the present survey, subtitled *A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere,* is among the more valuable of the series. Its purpose is to illumine the dilemma of Communist power-holders who require, simultaneously, professional skill and unquestioning loyalty from military commanders. Its method is to survey the careers of representative generals in the armies of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and China. The research staff comprises, in addition to Ithiel de Sola Pool as editor, George K. Schueller, Robert H. Billigmeier, Cary Fisher, Paul Katona, Cheng Yuan, Janusz K. Zawodny. All have toiled valiantly among obscure sources. Their findings, as here published are admittedly out of date in some details, but are more complete than could reasonably be expected. Numerous new insights into Communist military theory, practice, and organization are afforded, for which all scholars and policy-makers should be grateful.

Carping criticism of so difficult an enterprise, here executed so remarkably well, would be strictly out of order. It may nevertheless be noted that China is in no meaningful sense a "satellite." Some would still question the factual accuracy of the statement (p. 57) that 4,300 Polish officers were "murdered by the Russians at Katyn." And it may be doubted whether wishful thinking of the usual cold war variety, postulating alternately that the Communist systems are menacing monsters of invincible might and malice or are on the verge of internal breakdown because of insoluble paradoxes, represents the most useful orientation of scholarship aimed at description, analysis, understanding, and prediction.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

Justice Enslaved: A Collection of Documents on the Abuse of Justice for Political Ends. Pp. 535. The Hague, Netherlands: International Commission of Jurists, 1955. No price.

This compendium of materials was originally prepared for the use of the lawyer-delegates from forty-eight countries outside the Iron Curtain who met in Athens in June 1955 for the International Congress of Jurists. It is now being distributed in English, French, and German versions by the International Commission of Jurists.

The collection contains 591 "documents" arranged under four main heads: Public Law, Criminal Law, Civil and Economic Law, and Labor Law. In each instance the editors have used appropriate articles from the United Nations Declaration of Human Right to keynote (by contrast) the subgroups of evidentiary materials. The case to be made is unfortunately no longer news: it is that the Soviet nations regard and utilize the legal system as a handmaiden of political control and that justice there is "enslaved". One rather imagines that the German title might have used the word *Justiz,* with its connotation of law administration—for this is the subject of the volume.

The materials to be found here range from such readily accessible items as sections of the Soviet constitution to depositions from Iron Curtain refugees and extracts from speeches of Satellite law officials such as East Germany's notorious Frau Benjamin and Bulgaria's Nikola Takov. The array is wide, massive—and soberly depressing. To anyone trained in, or even only accustomed to, the legal traditions of the West, whether common law or civil law, the partisan polemics of the judges of the people's democracies can only appear as sordid travesties of anything resembling a legal system. The International Commission of Jurists indicts the practices portrayed in these pages as flagrant betrayals of the rule of law and pleads with lawyers throughout the free world to strengthen faith in the rule of law as the principal foundation stone of free government.

As a legal brief, marshalling evidence to substantiate its charges, this is an impressive effort. As a source for students of judicial administration, it offers documen-

tation that is, if not novel, then certainly scarce: decrees and decisions of Satellite courts, memoranda of the East German secret police on such sensitive matters as the procurement of informers, and numerous refugee statements.

For the researcher, the value of some of the most shocking documentary materials is limited by the, presumably necessary, anonymity of the sources. Throughout, the editorial work leaves something to be desired. Apparently the German version was the original and the English edition is a translation prepared by German hands, or at least not by anyone for whom English is the primary language. Sentence structure and word choice combine to give the text an aura of heaviness and abstruseness. Proofreading failed to prevent such obvious slips as omissions of closing parentheses or the use of a person's given name in a document that otherwise takes pains to conceal his identity.

These mechanical defects may deter readers. Students of Soviet law will prefer to draw on such writers as Harard and Berman. But as an indictment of the lawlessness of Communist law this volume is tellingly effective.

FRANCIS H. HELLER
University of Kansas

HANS KELSEN. *The Communist Theory of Law.* Pp. viii, 203. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $5.00.

I am tempted to say that the subject of this book is not worthy of the writer, for Communist theories of law are too crude, too confused, too contradictory to give much scope to the critical powers of a man like Professor Kelsen. He possesses all the qualities that the legal theorists (if I may so call them) criticized by him conspicuously lack: he is scrupulous, acute, dispassionate, and relevant. He cares deeply for what matters least to them, which is the study of law for its own sake. More even than most "bourgeois" writers on law, he lives in quite another world from theirs. Whatever else may be said about him, no one will pretend that his kind of jurisprudence has a political or social bias or is intended to serve a practical end.

Soviet theories of law are, in this book, revealed in all their blatant poverty—carefully, patiently, lucidly, without malice and without irony. It is an operation done by an expert, who uses his sharp instruments, not to wound, but to dissect. There is, indeed, about the book, a certain hospital atmosphere, bare and antiseptic, except that the author no more seeks to cure than to kill. For he knows that the theories he pulls apart so deftly are also, in a sense, out of his reach, being products of policy and of faith, ideology and not science.

The best chapter is perhaps the first. It would be difficult to explain more succinctly and clearly the confusions that make up the notion of "ideology" as we find it in the writings of Marx and Engels. Marx at least, if not Engels, was much less simple-minded than most of his Russian disciples, and the criticism of his ideas and arguments, though more difficult, is also more rewarding. But I am inclined to believe that Professor Kelsen oversimplifies the Marxian doctrine by assuming that Marx, when he treats law as part of the "superstructure," nearly always treats it as if it were ideological in a sense in which it clearly cannot be, as if it were a way of looking at social reality which distorts its true nature. But Marx, though he sometimes speaks as if everything belonging to the "superstructure" were ideological in this sense, much more often implies the contrary; much more often speaks as if the "superstructure," though determined by the "substructure," were only in part ideological. It does not therefore follow that Marx, whenever he (as he often does) clearly implies that law is not ideological, is referring it to the "substructure."

Unavoidably, the later chapters are somewhat repetitious, for the stock of ideas of Soviet jurists is not great, and they are seldom original even in their mistakes and absurdities. Time and again, Professor Kelsen has to make the same points against them. It may be, however, that he insists, if not too much, then sometimes in a way apt to mislead, on the need to distinguish sharply between legal norms and social relations. No doubt, they are not the same and ought not to be confused, but the connection between them, even in thought, is closer than Professor Kelsen appears on occasion to think. Social relations are not even intelligible apart from the normative order, for they always involve rights and obligations. It is surely one of the many faults of the Marxists, as social theorists, that they do not admit this, but treat social relations as somehow quite separate from morals and from law. I hope that Professor Kelsen does not agree with them.

JOHN PLAMENATZ
Nuffield College
Oxford, England

LEOPOLD H. HAIMSON. *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism.* Pp. viii, 246. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $5.50.

This volume, which is conceived by Dr. Haimson as the first of a series on the development of Bolshevism in Russia, attempts to accomplish several tasks in hardly more than two hundred pages of text. It is an essay on the evolution of the Russian intelligentsia, a study of the reception given Marxism in Russia and of the transformation of Marxism there, an analysis of the emergence of Bolshevism and of Menshevism, and an analysis of the early development of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Lenin, and Martov. It has quite a good bibliography, and it has been carefully edited and printed.

On the whole, Dr. Haimson reviews in some detail what has become for most scholars a fairly familiar story because the spread and transformation of Marxism in Russia has been a subject of careful study both in the Soviet Union and in the West for some time. He does add materials with regard to Axelrod and Martov which were not generally known, but this benefit is diminished to some degree by his failure to be even more full on these men, who have not received the attention from scholars which Plekhanov and, above all, Lenin have received.

Dr. Haimson chose to analyze the origins of Bolshevism in Russia in a chronological fashion, with some modifications. This procedure does assist in describing to the reader the painful and confused swirl of discussion over plans and programs, but at the same time it causes some confusion. Thus, it is difficult to follow the strands of thought of the four principal individuals when they are tangled and meshed again in almost every chapter. Dr. Haimson's style, which is somewhat affected by sociological jargon, is to some degree responsible for this confusion.

In the conclusion, which is quite excellent, he pulls together his ideas on "consciousness" and "spontaneity" as two established conflicting categories. This is a stimulating and perceptive chapter, but one is struck by the lack of connection between it and the body of the volume.

ROBERT F. BYRNES
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New York, N. Y.

HARRY HODGKINSON. *The Language of Communism.* Pp. xiii, 149. New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, n. d. $3.75.

To students of foreign affairs, Soviet Russian is a growing headache against which little remedy is offered in our classrooms and special literature. The theory prevails that Russian is the language of Pushkin and Tolstoy, and no manuals of modern Soviet usage exist. Some novelties, for example, "soviet," "bolshevik," "cominform," "agrogorod," become our loan words before Russian-English dictionaries give them entries. Others can be looked up in Ushakov's *Russian Standard Dictionary,* the last volume of which is dated in 1940. Except for some work in technical fields, there have been no attempts to fill the gap.

More important than lexical are semantic and stylistic changes. Agreements appear to have been reached when the two parties mean quite different things by the words they use. Each continues to act in terms of his own understanding of them, and there follow inevitable accusations of betrayal from either side. Complaints are loud and frequent. Would not many disillusions have been avoided had we been wise enough to find out, before making agreements with the Communists, what such words as "freedom," "democracy," "peace," and "coexistence" mean to them? We have no guide, besides conjectures and

impressions. The problem involves the general question of relationship between language and culture.

While scholars ponder, the problem is attacked by Harry Hodgkinson, sometime intelligence officer in the British Royal Navy. He wrote a book in the classical fashion published as *Doubletalk* in Great Britain, and *Language of Communism* in the United States. The text is preceded by the statement that "the meaning of a Communist word is not what you think it says, but what effect it is intended to produce." The book is inspired by practical consideration and represents a glossary of terms which, in Communist usage, are not only means of communication but "weapons" and "instruments of struggle."

The book lives up to its promise but in parts. Two-thirds of the 164 entries are "information, please" type summaries of the Communist theories of genetics and of astronomy, of "family," "art," "astrobotany," "sports," of "current Soviet military thinking" (pp. 79, 138–43) and "foreign policy" (pp. 50–51); of the party attitude toward "alcoholism," "religion," "America," even "Nobel Prize" and "Shakespeare." The reader is given a list of fifty-four famous "inventions" on which the Communists claim Russian priority (pp. 61–66); he is told that "women" are exploited in the USSR and in the satellites (pp. 143–45), and that the Soviet "plumbing" is bad (pp. 99–100). The author's comments contain little that is new but are readable and witty.

Only fifty odd entries deal with language in the proper sense. Some definitions are pertinent and useful, for example, of "aggression," "agitator," "collectivity," "espionage," "culture," "genial," "warmonger." A number of others are debatable or incomplete, and a few are rather inaccurate. Important words such as "elections," "compromise," "*partiinost*," "agreement" are lacking. Instead, we find "lysenkoism" (pp. 72–75), "yezhovschina" (p. 117), and "zhdanovschina" (pp. 148–49), which, coined in Soviet Russia as they may have been, belong to the language of *anti*-communism. It is a good bet that they are never used in the Communist press!

The author's comments are supported with quotations from many sources. The degree of authority of the sources is not evaluated, and some selections make the reader wonder. Transcription of Slavic words is inconsistent and careless.

With all its limitations, Mr. Hodgkinson's book is not without value. It touches upon one of the most urgent problems of foreign relations and of scholarship. Contributing little itself to a solution, it has the daring and the merits of a pioneering work.

NICHOLAS P. VAKAR
Wheaton College

CONSTANTIN DE GRUNWALD. *Tsar Nicholas I*. Translated by Brigit Patmore. Pp. ix, 294. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $4.50.

Constantin de Grunwald began his study of the life of Tsar Nicholas I with many advantages: knowledge of the sources, access to important archival material in Vienna, experience in the writing of biography (Metternich, Baron de Stein, and Bismarck), and that fundamental requisite for good biography, sympathy for his subject. He has used these advantages skillfully to write a highly satisfactory life of the Russian ruler.

The author faced no serious competition in this particular field; few had previously undertaken a study of Nicholas I, and none had succeeded in completing an adequate one. That fact is not surprising in view of the broad and intricate nature of such a study. Nicholas ruled during one of the most critical periods in Russian history, one that included the Decembrist Revolt, the Polish Revolt of 1830, intervention in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, the Crimean War, the crisis of serfdom, the beginnings of Russian greatness in fiction and music, the growth of the intelligentsia, and the development of a Russian police state.

As Grunwald indicates, Nicholas was an ordinary man with extraordinary power living in an extraordinary time, a man who achieved fame and notoriety as a result of the circumstances under which he was born and the age in which he lived rather than as a consequence of his contributions as a ruler. Though it must have been difficult to keep a biography of this man from being resolved into a history of his times, Grunwald has managed to keep the spotlight on Nicholas rather than on the state and to depict events as they affected him or were affected by him. The result is a nicely balanced picture of Nicholas as a person and as a ruler.

Tsar Nicholas I is a modest book: it is short, and it gives no hint that the author is seeking the accolade of "definitive" for his work. It is written smoothly and interestingly. Some may wonder why the French translation of Russian titles is retained in the footnotes (the work was published in French in 1946); and some may disapprove of the degree to which the author's sympathy for his subject leads him to accept the tsar's views of reality, particularly with respect to the Polish and Jewish problems and the police state. But any reader will find the book a useful introduction to an important and much neglected subject.

SIDNEY HARCAVE
State University of New York

THAD PAUL ALTON. *Polish Postwar Economy*. Pp. x, 330. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $5.75.

The analysis of the economy of a country is not an easy assignment in itself. But it becomes highly complicated with a country which has the bad habit of publishing only fragmentary statistics of its economy. This is the case of postwar Poland. Furthermore, in the so-called peoples' democracies there is a peculiar discordance between the word of the law and the manner of its application. Judging from the texts of the laws and regulations issued by the Communist regimes in the peoples' democracies, their present system of government is almost ideal. However, in examining the application and execution of these laws and regulations one sees the ideal vanish.

Mr. Alton made extensive and effective use of Polish and other sources used for his analysis. He discusses the political framework in which postwar Polish economy developed; he analyzes planning in agriculture, industry, and finance. Much space is given to a detailed description of the intricate mechanics of state control and administration of Poland's economy. By relying on official publications, however (others do not exist in present-day Poland), this description suffers from one-sidedness: in effect, it summarizes what Polish Communist officials want to see in and what they write about this administration. So, for instance, Mr. Alton writes that "the newly created enterprises operated on commercial principles on the basis of financial and economic plans approved by higher levels of the economic administration" (p. 91). This sounds very businesslike and promising. But how does it work in practice? True, Mr. Alton mentions that in 1953 "the administrative and control machinery still failed to come up to the desires of the planners" (p. 103), but the reader obtains no glimpse into these failures and is unable to evaluate their importance.

One merit of Mr. Alton's approach is just his use of sources originating in the country whose economy he is analyzing. Information obtained from these sources build the backbone of his book. However, he could have obtained more of these sources. His list of almost one hundred "Works in Polish" that he used includes only three books; the remainder are articles in a few periodicals from Poland, periodicals which are mentioned separately in the bibliography. A few additional books are mentioned as "Public Documents." There are at least a dozen other books on the subject available in libraries in this country. Finally, not a single item published by the Polish emigration since 1945 was consulted or mentioned.

These shortcomings do not, however, prevent the evaluation of Mr. Alton's book as a remarkable contribution to a better understanding of the intricate problems of Poland's postwar economy. To the scholar and specialist, it will give an intelligently prepared digest of Polish laws, regulations, and planning procedures. Considering that the source material is contained in publications in the Polish language, the book will be a welcome tool to those who do not know this language.

W. S. SWORAKOWSKI
Stanford University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

EWAN BUTLER. *City Divided: Berlin 1955.* Pp. 187. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $3.95.

Since World War II, and more particularly since the split of Germany, Berlin has become a focal point in world history. The Berlin blockade and airlift, the Juné Revolts, and the Berlin Four-Power Conference in 1954 have repeatedly thrust Berlin to the forefront of the cold war and have made it a barometer for measuring the tension between East and West. And even when the city is not rocked by some dramatic crisis it continues to command the attention and concern of the Western powers because of its prime importance as bulwark of the free world and as a window through the Iron Curtain. It is indeed this latter function, made possible by the four-power status of the city, situated 100 miles inside Communist East Germany, that gives Berlin its continuous significance. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of books have already been written about postwar Berlin, both by former American officials like Brigadier General Frank Howley or Lowell Bennett, and by journalists like Curt Riess. The present work is also by a journalist, a competent British observer, who attempts to read the life-pulse of this anomalous metropolis. In some eighteen brief, breezy chapters the author sketches the historical background, the life and activities of the burghers, and some of the unique features and institutions of this besieged fortress. He obviously knows the city well, has explored some of the main thoroughfares, theaters, and stores, hotels, cafes, and night clubs, both in East and West Berlin. He is successful in conveying the atmosphere of the city, the scene of relentless and militant political, economic, and cultural warfare between two worlds. It is also, as he points out, the scene of spies, smugglers, and kidnapers. But Berlin is much more than all this. It is essentially the mental and political health of the Berliners, quite in contrast to the more complacent and conservative West Germans, that give this city its unique and admirable quality. Berlin is, as it were, the gadfly of the German body politic. It is a pity that one misses in this book certain characteristic features that make Berlin what it is. There is lacking, for example, a sufficient emphasis of the refugee problem which at certain times threatened to turn the whole city into one vast refugee camp. A description of the city's refugee processing center and one of its many camps would have been a rewarding contribution. One misses any discussion of such typical anti-Communist organizations as the Free Jurists, the Fighting League against Inhumanity, and similar groups. One would like to see a discussion of the functions and activities of the Allied occupation agencies which play a very considerable role in a city that is technically still occupied territory. And although the book's title is *Berlin 1955*, the historical discussion would have justified, nay, required a portrayal of the leader who more than any other man embodied the spirit of postwar Berlin: the late Ernst Reuter. Unfortunately the account is marred by a few factual errors and mistakes in spelling. On the whole, one is thankful that a keen observer and a warm friend of Berlin has told again the story of this fighting outpost, but one wishes at the same time that before long a historian will produce a serious, balanced, and reliable work on this important subject.

CARL G. ANTHON
American University of Beirut

RUDOLF COPER. *Failure of a Revolution: Germany in 1918–1919.* Pp. xi, 294. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $5.00.

The author, a journalist and a native of Germany, retells the often-told story of the revolution which followed Germany's military collapse in 1918. He terms the revolution a failure because, in his opinion, it set up a democracy with no "democratic social and economic substance to support it"—a rather sweeping indictment of the Weimar Republic. In view of this diagnosis the writer understandably deplores the failure. But does he realize that the only conceivable success of the revolution of 1918, and certainly the one anticipated by its leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, would have been the victory of communism in Germany? There is in these pages, apart from their ideological bias, nothing that could be called new or instructive—they rather illustrate the saying: "Books generate books." The writer, it is true, claims first-hand knowledge: "I saw and heard in action most of the men and women who speak from these pages and of whom these pages speak. I knew many of them. I am not an actor in this book, though you might have found me in many of the crowds I describe" (p. xi). But since the author, at the time of the revolution, was a lad of just 14 (according to the biographical information on the flap of the jacket he was born in 1904), we will be permitted to maintain, with due allowance for prodigious precocity, a degree of scepticism in regard to his authenticity as an eyewitness.

HELMUT KUHN
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Germany

KARL GRUBER. *Between Liberation and Liberty: Austria in the Post-War World.* Translated by Lionel Kochan. Pp. 240. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $4.50.

Mr. Gruber was head of the resistance movement in Tyrol which took over the province a few days before American troops entered on May 3, 1945. For a brief period he acted as Governor of that province under both American and French occupation forces, and he makes some interesting contrasts between the two. On September 25, 1945, he resigned this post and took over the direction of Austrian foreign policy in the central government headed by Karl Renner. To speak of an Austrian foreign office or a foreign service at this time would be a misnomer, but there were many problems to be dealt with and under Gruber's direction Austria progressively won back her position in international affairs. In 1953, while still in office, Gruber published the German edition of this volume, and excerpts were printed in the Vienna press. This led to heated controversy, particularly in regard to some of his observations on internal politics, and the question was raised whether a foreign minister should publish his views in book form while still in office. In a Foreword to the second edition Gruber defended his right to do so, but nevertheless the episode led to his resignation and subsequent appointment as Ambassador to the United States.

The book is written discreetly as one might expect, and there are no startling revelations. On the other hand it is informative in a broad sense. There is a good chapter on the question of South Tyrol, but much more needs to be said to clarify the position taken by the powers. There were plenty of American officials who knew about the historical aspects of this issue than Gruber seems to think. If the powers fell back on the boundaries of 1938 in this case, they also did so in the case of the boundary difficulties with Yugoslavia. Gruber attributes much of the Austrian success in the latter dispute to his adamant stand that Austria would never agree to a diminution of her frontiers. Much is also said about the negotiations for a state treaty, but again the account is general and details must be sought elsewhere. In this matter the description of the Moscow Conference in 1947 and Austria's appeal to the United Nations in 1952 is most informative. Although there can be no question as to Gruber's Western orientation, he has no bitter diatribes against the Russians. They are hard bargainers, schooled in the ways of the market places of the East, but they can be dealt with if one's patience holds out.

The book is interlarded with humor and acute observations on personalities and politics. Characterized more by English than American idiom, the translation seems excellently done, and the book reads smoothly and easily.

E. C. HELMREICH
Bowdoin College

CHARLES W. HALLBERG. *Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852–1864.* Pp. 448. New York: Bookman Associates, 1955. $5.00.

This book by the author of *The Suez Canal: Its History and Diplomatic Importance* is typical of the better diplomatic studies—detailed, archival, narrow

in space-time dimensions, competent. The subtitle, *A Study of Austro-French Relations* is more descriptive than the main title, but unfortunately, it is poorer copy. Although we hear about Franz Joseph from time to time, especially in the conclusion, we meet and know rather his chief ministers, Schwarzenberg, Buol, and Rechberg; this is also true of Napoleon III and his numerous advisors.

Here is no Napoleon le Petit, no Caeserean Democrat, but Napoleon III, Revisionist; he is a capable, enigmatic man committed to overthrowing the Congress of Vienna settlements to make way for the *Idées Napoléonienne* of nationalism and the predominance of France. The whole development is colored by Hallberg's adoption of the standard view of the Congress of Vienna as anti-French, antiliberal, antinational. Napoleon III saw it that way also. To examine Hallberg's exposition of the bases of Austro-French antagonism is to realize that we have no corner on ideological diplomacy. Napoleon III is fighting the good fight against dynasty, oppression, and reaction in behalf of nationalism and the preponderance of France. Austrian actions rested on an opposing policy of dynasty and conservatism. All this is evident in the contretemps over recognizing Louis Napoleon as Napoleon III, in his Italian, Rumanian, and Polish ventures, and in his expansive plans for a general reorganization of all Europe which would at once emulate and repudiate the reorganizations of 1815.

Hallberg builds securely on archival materials, especially from the Haus- Hof, und Staatsarchiv. His documentation produces the security of detail. More specifically it shows up the myths of an Anglo-French ultimatum forcing Austria into a triple alliance against Russia, of Franz Joseph as a mere tool of Buol, and of Drouyn de Lhuys being jockied out of office in 1853 by Lord Cowley. Buol, Hallberg rehabilitates in a limited and gentle manner. Regrettably, there is nothing conclusive about the reasons for Napoleon's early withdrawal from the Italian war.

Clear in style, this book lacks vivaciousness; this is not to suggest dullness, for the book is not dull. Skillfully employed quotations add salt to a meaty dish. The riches in the footnotes are disgustingly hidden between the conclusion and the extensive bibliography. The index is full and usable. In fine, here is a book which is important for serious students of the mid-nineteenth century.

GARLAND DOWNUM
Arizona State College
Flagstaff

MARIO EINAUDI, MAURICE BYE, and ERNESTO ROSSI. *Nationalization in France and Italy.* Pp. x, 260. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955. $3.50.

The fourth "of a series devoted to the political, economic, and constitutional problems of post war France and Italy," this volume presents a brief for comprehensive organization of most of the nationalized sectors of these two national economies. All three authors assume that nationalization in both countries is here to stay—perhaps to be further expanded in some directions. But while notable improvements have been made in many instances, yet management is frequently subject to harassing political interference, efficiency is sometimes low, responsibility is difficult to fix, and the need for technical organization and planning is generally evident. In both countries part of this confusion is a heritage of the past circumstances under which nationalization took place: "In Italy, amid the secrecy imposed by the fascist dictatorship trying to avoid public scandal; in France, in the rush of the glittering hopes created by victory and liberation." Part of it is due also to the impact of conflicting interests and policies of employers, trade unions, established governmental civil service bureaucracies, but above all to the rapidly changing power structures of the political parties to the center and left.

Several lines of therapy are suggested. Especially favored are (1) the autonomous public corporation of the type developed in labor-dominated postwar Britain where government has taken over most of the economic activity as in "natural monopolies" public utilities; (2) where nationalization has stopped short of complete government ownership, the reorientation of public corporations in order to make effective use of the yardstick principle as in the Tennessee Valley Authority; (3) where international interdependencies and the need for the development of large free-market areas are especially striking the subjection of national corporations to super-national authorities as in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community; and (4) the giving up, or "privatizing," of a wide variety of relatively small, scattered industries and businesses from whose operation by government, even to the most ardent socializers, little of public advantage can be expected.

There are a few flaws in these otherwise admirable short studies. Closer familiarity with the British nationalized industries would have disclosed that they are by no means the models of efficiency these authors imply. Nor will it do to assume that the nonnationalized industries in that country are left untouched because they are not in need of reorganization. The chaos of the British textile industry is a particularly striking case in point. Again, TVA was only in part advocated because of its yardstick function. Far more important were the problems of multiple purpose development. The need for technical rationalization of both French and Italian industries, heavy and light alike, is greater than these writers suppose.

Nevertheless, this volume is a remarkably compact, objective, and well-reasoned presentation of one of the most significant problems of contemporary times.

ROBERT A. BRADY
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ELIO CARANTI. *Sociologia e statistica delle elezioni italiane nel dopoguerra.* Pp. 176. Rome: Editrice Studium, n. d. L. 200.

While statistics in Italy has a long and brilliant history, electoral statistics and its scientific elaboration had to wait for the fall of the Fascist regime. Therefore Elio Caranti's little book, in spite of a certain lack of depth and of methodological shortcomings, must be welcomed as a pioneer work which will render good services to an expert reader and will provide the unexperienced one with a well rounded, if not wholly unbiased, political orientation.

Though Signor Caranti occasionally quotes American works, his methods are chiefly those of the French school of *géographie électorale* founded by André Siegfried. This is quite understandable since France and Italy have much in common, including a multiparty system. Siegfried, however, singled out two opposite tendencies—conservatism and progressiveness—as the basic ingredients which, more or less watered down or intermingled, form the foundation of the checkered and changing political spectrum of France. Perhaps because he does not like to call his own party "conservative," Signor Caranti, obviously a Demochristian of the left wing, introduces a few more "cardinal points," extremism (represented by Communists and Fascists) and moderation (represented by Demochristians and Republicans). Certainly this distinction has tremendous practical importance and may often lead both extremes to gang up against a coalized mean; but does it really represent another Cartesian co-ordinate rather than a difference in intensity along the same line? Moderate though they are, the policies of the Demochristians are definitely conservative. In words if not in deeds, the Communist platform is extreme but progressive. If Siegfried's graded scale needs another co-ordinate, this ought rather to be the opposition between lay and religious tendencies, which is independent of conservatism and progressiveness and may be observed at all ranges of the graded scale.

One does not have to agree with Signor Caranti to appreciate the wealth of statistical data often divided by regions, provinces, age groups, and sexes which he offers on every Italian vote since 1946 and on a good deal of relevant economic, cultural, and social problems. The latter will prove most instructive for the average American reader who can easily find in his newspaper a competent analysis of the Italian vote and its changes from one election to another, but not a reminder of such underlying factors as the following: in Upper Italy only 0.3 per cent of brides in 1951 were unable to sign their wedding certificate, whereas in Southern Italy the

illiterate brides were 12.2 per cent; there are 45.5 radio sets for every 100 northern Italian families, but only 21.4 for every 100 families in Sicily and Sardinia. Caranti's data come mostly from the official figures of the Istituto Centrale di Statistica and from the polls of the Istituto Doxa, an Italian equivalent of Gallup. The following sample will point out the interest of these polls: only two thirds of those who were asked whether communism was incompatible with Catholicism gave an affirmative answer.

At the bargain price of roughly thirty cents, the book is a mine of information, and it should be on the desk of every student of Italian politics.

ROBERT SABATINO LOPEZ
Yale University

MARSHALL W. BALDWIN (Ed.). *A History of the Crusades.* Vol. I: *The First Hundred Years.* Pp. xxvi, 694. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955. $12.00.

While the episodes of the Crusades will probably never be excelled for story-book thrills from real history, there is today unquestionably a greater appeal to the student of social history in the recollection of this medieval epic. Conscious of the threatening alliance of Eurasians under a political ideology alien to the Western world, the American reader will quicken to the more recently established fact that the Crusades were not essentially the romantic episodes of knights errant, but rather the key to a clash of two civilizations over four centuries upon a frontier ranging from Portugal to the Euphrates, and from Cairo to the Baltic Sea. A generation of patient research into Arabian and Byzantine, as well as more traditional Western sources, has now uncovered the pattern of ebb and flow throughout this vast theatre of operations.

This is a splendid volume, enlisting as it does all the equipment of modern scholarship to put this new history at our disposal. Fourteen maps conveniently located throughout the text, and the normalization of spelling from one-half dozen languages, more than compensate for the increased cost. The projected five volumes are all to be constructed, like the familiar Cambridge histories, from the contribution of various chapters by specialists. Of the fifteen contributors to this first volume, almost one-half are from abroad, including such names as the famous Byzantine scholar, Steven Runciman of London, England. Despite the co-operative structure, the single theme has given remarkable unity and continuity to an immense coverage of detail and incident. This is largely due to the clarity with which the stage is set for the Crusades in the first one-half dozen chapters of this volume. The pattern of success or failure is already seen in the cycles of religious fanaticism, military oligarchy, and stagnation among the Mohammedans; in the clash of feudal ambitions in the Western ranks; in the desire of Eastern Christians to maintain their ancient traditions and liberties before the Christian foreigner as well as the old Moslem neighbor. And yet for this reader the most fascinating quality of the volume is the manner in which individuals and personalities break through the familiar patterns at every stage; it is still the stirring story of those least subtle of men, the religious enthusiast and the professional warrior, while the length of the volume makes it possible to bring out the full color of the times, as with the Assassin sect or the People's Crusade. Professor Baldwin and his associates are to be congratulated for a work that will undoubtedly become a classic in its field.

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NAPHTALI LEWIS and MEYER REINHOLD (Eds.). *Roman Civilization.* Vol. I: *The Republic;* Vol. II: *The Empire.* Pp. ix, 544; viii, 652. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, 1955. $12.00.

This useful addition to a notable series of source translations is well organized and carefully thought out. The excerpts are arranged under topics, some 373 altogether, numbered consecutively for each volume. These topics may be broad—for example, No. 66 in Vol. II, "Freedmen"—or specialized—for example, the last topic in Vol. I, "The Julian Calendar." Where needed the editors have supplied separate introductory statements about the passages and references to modern literature or, in the case of archaeological finds, added information on their discovery and preservation. The seventeen chapters are skillfully designed to maintain a chronological frame of reference without undue fragmentation of the subject matter. The bulk of the first volume concerns the period between 264 and 27 B.C., though the earlier Republic and the Monarchy are not neglected. In Volume II there are three main periods: The Augustan Age; The Roman Peace (A.D. 14–192); and the later Empire (A.D. 193–337). The last three chapters include excerpts on law, the army, and religion, for the empire considered as a whole. Frequent cross references prevent this grouping from becoming a strait jacket. The emphasis in both volumes is social, economic, and institutional rather than political or aesthetic, since the editors assume the reader will be familiar with "the main lines of Roman history and literature . . ." (I, vii). This policy enables them to include generous selections from the documents, and much of this material has not been available to the English reader (see I, 41; II, vii).

No one can hope to win universal agreement as to what such a book ought to contain. The *Res Gestae* appears in full (though this has long been available in English), and there are abundant selections from Roman laws and other official documents, from the Laws of the Twelve Tables all the way down to the Edict of Milan. Less solid but more moving are the funerary inscriptions, election advertisements, and extracts from private correspondence—especially letters from humble individuals not striving for authorship—which bring us very close to the every-day life of ordinary people. But occasionally the editors forget their role of referee and take sides in the struggle. There is unmistakable prejudice in singling out Cicero for his 'unscrupulous demagogy" in attacking the Rullan bill (I, 274), and in raking him over the coals once more for his compromise of principle while governing Cilicia (I, 366). The copious selections from Cicero given here fail to do justice to his personal charm and his wit. But we are not spared the revolting details of his assassination (I, 303). Seneca, also, is exposed in a footnote for failing to live up to his Stoic principles in real life (II, 255), but nothing is said about the philosophic calm with which he met his death.

The book includes substantial bibliographies, both general bibliographies for each volume and separate ones for the individual chapters. The editors have avoided citing books in foreign languages because: "The realities of the American educational scene . . . are that only a most exiguous number of our students have any acquaintance with either Latin or Greek, and very few possess facility in the use of any foreign language" (II, viii). This statement, if correct, is surely an indictment. What have our foreign language departments been doing? But even if it is correct, to give up the struggle for literacy is to make a more than Ciceronian compromise of principle. Surely a few titles of particularly readable books in French, German and Italian ought to be included, if only as a reward to the handful of students who can read them, and as an incentive to those who cannot. Otherwise there are bound to be absurdities. For example, Carcopino's mediocre work on Cicero appears because it has been translated, while a really important work like his *Autour des Gracques* does not. Mommsen is represented only by his *Provinces* (the *History of Rome,* though available in English is left out), while his monumental *Römisches Staatsrecht* is not mentioned.

In closing it should be added that each volume is provided with indices, both general and source indices, and that Volume I also contains a convenient series of thumbnail biographies of classical writers on Roman history. There are surprisingly few typographical errors.

TRUESDELL S. BROWN
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R. E. SMITH. *The Failure of the Roman Republic.* Pp. viii, 202. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $4.75.

Historical autopsies upon the Roman Republic are perennial, yielding in interest

only to explanations of the "fall" of the Empire.

Professor Smith maintains that in the period after the Second Punic War, the Senate governed by virtue of demonstrated capacity to govern. Roman society was aristocratic, but integrated, with tradition the chief cohesive force as exemplified in the epics of Naevius and Ennius which interpreted Rome's history as the unfolding of destiny foreordained by the gods.

After the Hannibalic War Rome's attitude continued to be that of a city state, preoccupied with concern for self preservation. The provinces, acquired primarily to keep them out of the hands of potential enemies, were Rome's extension of herself. The great problem of the Republic was to emerge from the mentality and organization of a city state to rule an empire, with acceptance of responsibility for the provinces and for the world.

The destruction of Corinth and Carthage in 146 B.C. was a great turning point. No longer need resurgence of Carthaginian power be feared, nor could Greece again be a base for threats such as had been posed by Philip V and Antiochus III. Self preservation ceased to be a paramount consideration of policy; gone was the earlier sense of urgency that had made possible complete acquiescence in senatorial rule.

Problems of transition to world rule might have been solved, but the Gracchi, "by the means they adopted in pursuit of their ends precipitated a spiritual crisis in Rome which was the first cause of all that followed" (p. 5). With the upheavals of the Gracchan period the social and political harmony of an earlier era was shattered. The rise of the *equites* constituted a powerful divisive force, and the proletariat were a ready instrument of violence and revolution.

The volume presents no new factual material, and the interpretation is novel only in the degree to which the Gracchan responsibility for the Republican debacle is emphasized. Cause and effect become somewhat confused; spiritual decay is presented as a basic cause of political breakdown, but it is also a consequence of this breakdown. Some readers will be dissatisfied with Professor Smith's comparative neglect of economic factors on the ground that, since the Romans did not understand economic forces, they ignored them in political action. The space devoted to literature may be considered excessive in an over-all interpretation of the failure of the Republic.

CHARLES EDWARD SMITH
Louisiana State University

JOYCELYNE GLEDHILL DICKINSON. *The Congress of Arras, 1435.* Pp. xxii, 266. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1955. (Distributed by Oxford University Press, New York.) $6.75.

In reading a volume on the Congress of Arras which is subtitled a study in medieval diplomacy, the question arises as to whether or not the diplomacy of the fifteenth century can be characterized as truly medieval. Is it not rather transitional to the diplomacy of the early nationalism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? In this study, however, the author is careful to distinguish the congress as an example of later medieval international diplomacy and, as such, it is to be considered.

It often happens that set forms of diplomatic usage and behavior are often achieved and enforced at the end of an era when the spirit of diplomatic negotiations has already radically changed or is in the process of change. Such was the case at Arras. It provides an excellent source for the study of later medieval formalities and is, indeed, a comprehensive view of the types of personages involved in medieval diplomacy, the methods of negotiation, and the customary procedure and ritual attendant upon such meetings of great civil and clerical powers. At the same time, one senses a pervading nationalism at Arras which was too strong to be truly medieval.

The present study is above all concerned with the technicalities of medieval formal diplomacy as exemplified at Arras. The author has carefully analyzed and painstakingly arranged all the minutiae of detail available—and the sources for this particular congress are quite voluminous. A large part of the book evaluates the various embassies attending, their instructions, and duties. This section is especially interesting for its detail on the papal mediators and conciliar representatives. Of greatest value to the student of diplomacy, however, are the chapters on the setting and procedure of the congress and the procedure of the Franco-Burgundian treaty.

One could wish that the historical significance of Arras were not so obscured by detail in this study. Events leading up to the treaty have been largely glossed over, and economic considerations ignored completely. These lacks are relatively unimportant, though, when the author has so admirably treated the procedural details regulating international diplomatic customs of the fifteenth century.

The appendices include sixteen previously unpublished sources dealing with invitations and replies to the congress, instructions and powers of the delegates and mediators, and the consequences of the congress. These are admirably chosen to illustrate pertinent points of diplomatic procedure. Other appendices include an annotated source list, a list of the Duke of Burgundy's gifts to those attending the congress, and a note on the Burgundian memoranda concerning peace with France. The author has also provided an excellent bibliography and an index.

M. NICKERSON HARDWICKE
Downey, Calif.

JOHN H. MUNDY, RICHARD W. EMERY, and BENJAMIN N. NELSON (Eds.). *Essays in Medieval Life and Thought.* Pp. xviii, 258. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.00.

This is a collection of fourteen essays published in honor of Austin Patterson Evans of Columbia University by students trained in his graduate courses. In an introductory essay there is a sensitive appreciation of him by Henry H. Wiggins of the Columbia University Press, with whom Evans has had long and close association. A book of this sort must be judged for what it claims to be: a sincere tribute of young scholars to the learning, integrity, and kindness of an exacting master, ever-helpful guide, and prized friend. The essays are arranged in three groups: Religion and Heresy, Science and Thought, Institutional and Local History, and, as would be assumed, in most cases reflect interests that have long held Professor Evans' attention. Some are the result of investigations he urged to be made by careful, often arduous and difficult examination of printed and manuscript sources. Many of the authors present their findings in tentative fashion and all are duly modest, possibly too modest in evaluating their offerings. There is respect for what others have done and full understanding of what yet needs to be accomplished in the many areas of scholarship represented.

William May's "The Confession of Prous Boneta, Heretic and Heresiarch," a posthumous publication; Francis Benjamin's "The *De Quantitatibus Stellarum* of Thebit Ben Kourrah," Marshall Clagett's "The *Quadratura per Lunulas.* A Thirteenth-Century Fragment of Simplicius' Commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle," George Fowler's "Engelbert of Admont's *Tractatus De Officiis et Abusionibus eorum,*" and Sister Mary Ambrose's "Statutes on Clothmaking: Toulouse 1227," are all welcome scholarly contributions of distinction. They are all, however, primarily works for specialists among medievalists and meaningful only for readers with a knowledge of Latin. Problems of our own day give heightened interest to Albert Shannon's "The Secrecy of Witnesses in Inquisitorial Tribunals and in Contemporary [thirteenth and fourteenth centuries] Secular Criminal Trials," which explains conditions prevailing when a court of exception considered it necessary to withdraw "certain refinements of the ordinary judicial processes." Pearl Kibre's fine "Academic Oaths at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages" will be read with profit and understanding by modern professors. "An early and important step on the road we are still travelling" is analyzed in Merriam Sherwood's "Pierre Dubois on the Arbitration of International Disputes." For the more philosophically minded there is Dayton Phillip's "The Way to Religious Perfection according to St. Bonaventure's *De Triplici Via*" and Charles Trinkaus's "The Religious Foundations of Luther's Social Views." Richard Emery contributes an especially interesting study on "Flemish Cloth and Flemish Merchants in Perpignan in the Thirteenth Century" and Peter Riesenberg deals systematically with the importance of "Roman Law, Renunciations, and Business in the Twelfth and Thirteenth

Centuries." John Mundy supplements earlier studies of Toulouse in his "Hospitals and Leprosaries in Twelfth- and Early Thirteenth-Century Toulouse," and Kenneth Setton in his "The Archaeology of Medieval Athens" by wit and learning gives life and meaning to material from excavators' notebooks.

GRAY C. BOYCE
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DAVID RODNICK. *The Norwegians: A Study in National Culture.* Pp. vi, 165. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. $3.25.

The Norwegians is a report of a study based on field work carried out during Dr. Rodnick's one-year visit to Norway in 1950 as a Fulbright research grantee. The publisher has attempted to make up for the author's failure to clearly express the purposes of the study. The blurb on the paper cover points out that Dr. Rodnick seeks to find out what Norwegians are like, how they get along together, and why they behave as they do.

The book will inevitably be met with suspicion by many because the author also has neglected to describe clearly the sample and the procedures followed in collecting the data.

The findings and interpretations are presented in eleven chapters dealing with personal and cultural characteristics of Norwegians: family relations, descriptions of various occupational and socioeconomic groups, religious patterns, and political trends. Chapter II deals with Norwegian people's attitudes toward other nationalities. In reading this chapter one should keep in mind that Scandinavian people's appraisal of each other is characterized by subtle banter and raillery, the true meaning of which is not easily detected by a visitor. Those sections of the book are best where the author has been able to supplement the interview material with information from other sources. The topic of religion has received undue emphasis at the expense of such important variables in Norwegian culture as education and recreation. Problems of translating Norwegian ideas into American English are apparent. The word "clever" is put to strange uses. The reader will be aided in his understanding of many quotations if he substitutes the word "able."

Another weakness of this study is its failure to organize observations around relevant themes. However, in view of the limitations of the data, an attempt in this direction might have done more harm than good. As it stands, the book is of little scientific value and at best it is a readable account of some features of Norwegian life. Above all, it furnishes proof of the author's statement that "it is not possible for a visitor to understand through one year of field work the complexities of three and a quarter million people and to be able to conclude that his description is exactly what they are like."

OLUF M. DAVIDSEN
University of Wisconsin

OTHER COUNTRIES

STANLEY R. ROSS. *Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy.* Pp. ix, 378. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $5.50.

Francisco I. Madero was an unlikely revolutionary. Born of a marital union representing two of the greatest landowning families in northern Mexico, it was strange that he should have launched an attack on the very system—"the Diaz peace"—of which he was a beneficiary. But stranger still was the fact that "the Apostle of the Mexican Revolution" had no intention of being a revolutionary. The man who opened the floodgates to socio-economic revolution steadfastly refused to recognize the urgency of meeting the demands for reform, but was preoccupied in giving to the people of Mexico democratic conditions under which they, through their representatives, could devise the needed laws, all in good time.

Madero's failure to understand the significance and strength of the forces he had unleashed proved to be his undoing. Blindly confident that faithful adherence to democratic processes, conciliation, and co-operation would consolidate the nation, he gravely miscalculated the depth of the cleavage that separated the old and the new orders in Mexico. It was a situation not congenial to democracy, and it was the tragedy of Madero that he chose to stand or fall in support of an impossible ideal.

Francisco Madero has had his adulators and his detractors. His character and his role in the Mexican Revolution has intrigued numerous writers. From the more objective studies has emerged a generally accepted representation of the man. The writer of the present biography adds a bit of colorful detail to the portrait, but it remains substantially the same. This is not a "new" Madero. On the contrary it is simply a touching-up of the kind of Madero we have believed he was: "a sincere, well-intentioned idealist" whose "conduct was influenced by a generous, emotional, and overly optimistic, overly enthusiastic nature." Often confused and vacillating, he proved to be inadequate presiding over a nation in chaos. Indeed, who could be adequate?

The reviewer noted with surprise that this book contains no mention of Charles C. Cumberland's *Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero,* published in 1952. Could Dr. Ross have been unaware of the existence of this volume? If not, why isn't it mentioned? Certainly not because he regarded it as valueless, for in fact both writers use substantially the same source materials and arrive at remarkably similar conclusions. In fact Cumberland's final chapter "An Evaluation," could serve equally well as a final chapter of the Ross study. A minor difference is that Dr. Ross is a more interesting and facile writer. His Madero is a more vivid personality.

J. LLOYD MECHAM
University of Texas

ALVIN H. SCAFF. *The Philippine Answer to Communism.* Pp. viii, 165. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955. $4.00.

The Republic of the Philippines, "showcase of democracy" for the Far East, has to display a practical product. Moreover, as the only predominantly Christian country in Asia, it is the proving ground of Western religious ideals in the contest against an ideology which would nullify God and enthrone the state. *The Philippine Answer to Communism,* written by an expert in Philippine affairs, now on the faculty of Pomona College, is the result of a Fulbright Grant study of the successful fight in the Philippines to overcome a threat of communism comparable in seriousness with that in China, Korea, Malaya, and Indochina.

Many early observers, including this reviewer, believed that the Huks, abbreviation of Hukbalahap meaning in dialect, People's Army Against the Japanese, were a loosely organized group of dissidents reluctant to lay down their arms at the end of the War and rather enjoying a life of violence and plunder. There is an inertia in the lawlessness of warfare which could account for the Huks without borrowing trouble from the worldwide menace of communism. Dr. Scaff points out, as we have learned through harsh experience, that the Huk revolt was, in fact, a carefully conceived Communist thrust.

The hard core of the organization derived from many uprisings in the course of Philippine history and militant movements by Socialists and Communists dating back to the '20's. Fattening on agrarian unrest it was ready in 1946 to take over what had been an effective guerrilla unit on the Island of Luzon as a readymade medium for direct revolutionary activity. For most of a decade following Philippine Independence, greed, political corruption, and ineffective military controls, added strength to the rebellion and almost cost the Philippines their democratic government. A man of the people, Ramon Magsaysay, first as Secretary of National Defense and then as President is given much of the credit for stemming the tide of revolution and breaking up the Communist-Huk organization as an effective threat.

A specific device employed by the Philippine Army through an agency labelled Edcor (for Economic Development Corps) is a farm-settlement program for defecting or captured Huks. The author dwells upon this recent development and presents many case histories based upon interviews and illustrated by photographs, throwing light on the motivation of the malcontents and the essential elements of their rehabilitation.

It would be an unwise oversimplification

of the problems of the new Philippine Republic to ascribe the recent anti-Communist victory to a resettlement plan which in two small frontier areas in Mindanao might account for a few hundred reformed Huks out of a force which was once estimated at a hundred thousand. The conclusion which the reader must reach is that in a country of democratic traditions the threat of communism may be met successfully, as it appears to have been in the Philippines, only by first creating a political, economic, and social atmosphere favorable to the people from whom the government stems.

In a book on the same subject, *Crusade in Asia* (1955), compiled from a rich treasure of personal reminiscences, General Carlos Romulo sounds the real keynote of the valiant campaign waged by his countrymen in answer to the threat and the promise of communism: "When a government is clean, competent, honorable, and representative of the wishes and needs of the people, when it is the people, Communism doesn't have the ghost of a chance."

ERNEST SCHEIN

Washington, D. C.

J. GARNER ANTHONY. *Hawaii Under Army Rule*. Pp. x, 203. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955. $5.00.

This small volume tells some of the story of a shameful episode in recent American history. In the fall of 1941, the Hawaii Legislature enacted a sweeping Defense Act, at the request of the Commanding General and vested in the civil governor powers over the inhabitants of Hawaii and their property "adequate to meet any emergency limited only by minimum safeguards for the rights of the individual." But, within hours after the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, this Act was bypassed, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, martial law was proclaimed, and the Commanding General became military governor of the Territory and proceeded "to exercise increasing stringent controls over the civil population . . . regardless of whether or not they [had] any basis in military necessity. These controls [were] exercised in the form of general order [which] proceeded upon the theory that the Constitution itself and all federal and territorial laws may be freely ignored or suspended at the will of the commanding general." General orders regulated food, prices, liquor distribution; froze labor in civilian occupations; substituted provost courts disgracefully administered for the civil courts.

Garner Anthony, who protested this conduct both as private citizen and, later, as Attorney General of Hawaii, writes with vigor and with bitterness. He tells the story as seen by a lawyer reared in the traditions of American constitutionalism and respect for human rights. It is written in anger, with an eloquence that should arouse equal anger in the reader—and his book should be read by everyone concerned with the preservation of America from authoritarian assaults, whether from without or from within. One of the most saddening components of the disturbing complex is the reported complaisance of the citizenry; yes, the positive endorsement of the usurpation by eminent and influential elements of the population. As late as December 27, 1942, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce declared that the "military governor has been eminently fair and considerate of our civil rights," while about the same time one of the two large local newspapers declared that "Hawaii has been a test tube and a guinea pig for what might happen on the mainland. It does not mind this role. It is proud that it has had the opportunity to serve in this humble way. . . . The public has accepted military rule. . . . It does not ask its abolition or that Washington turn over all of the duties of the military in government to civilian authority."

The author indicates that other elements of the population disagreed. But it is a weakness of the book that we receive no rounded portrayal of "Hawaii under army rule." Mr. Anthony approaches the topic as a lawyer, and largely limits himself to formal legal and governmental aspects of the situation described. The reader would welcome application to the subject of the techniques of the sociologist, political scientist, psychologist to the end that he be given the full story of American citizens under military government. That story remains to be written.

Five appendices carry the proclamations relating to martial law, the general orders of the military governor and Attorney General Anthony's devastatingly critical report to Governor Stainback. Unfortunately, most of these essential documents are printed in very small type and from unclear type.

ALLAN F. SAUNDERS

University of Hawaii

CHESTER C. TAN. *The Boxer Catastrophe*. Pp. ix, 276. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.50.

Although a number of Western books have been written on the subject, there is more than justification for the appearance of the volume under review. The author has made the best use of both Western and Chinese source materials.

The introductory chapter treats the unhappy relationship between China and the West, the inevitable conflicts and the failure of the Hundred Days reform movement. It goes on to examine the genesis and the development of the Boxer movement and how the movement was being harnessed by the reactionary forces rallying around the Empress Dowager. But a greater part of the empire, under the leadership of several able governors, refrained from plunging into the catastrophe and this resulted in the maintenance of peace in the southeast. After the fall of Peking, the court took flight and there was no hope for the reactionary group. Li Hung-chang carried the heavy burden of negotiating a peace under the most disadvantageous circumstances. Imperial Russia pressed hard to get concessions in Manchuria as embodied in the Tseng-Alexeieff agreement, which, however, the Chinese court braced itself not to sign. The story ends with the international settlement and the return of the court to Peking.

The author has labored through the Chinese materials to bring out a number of valuable revisions. Mr. Tan refutes the theory of origins of the Boxers proposed by George Nye Steiger in his *China and the Occident*. Steiger asserted that the Boxers were volunteer militia, recruited in response to the express commands of the throne. But according to Mr. Tan, "the Boxers were officially reported to have appeared in Shantung as early as May 1898 while the first decree ordering the organization of the militia was not issued until November of that year," and that the Boxers began as a volunteer association under the influence of the heretical sects with the declared aim of fighting the native Christians. Mr. Tan also reexamined the parts played by the leading statesmen of the time such as Li Hung-chang, Jung Lu, Liu Kun-i and Chang Chih-tung. He gives special credit to Sheng Hsuan-huai, the Director of Railways and Telegraphs and of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, who had contributed a great deal in influencing the measures taken by southern viceroys to maintain peace in the southeast. Another interesting point he makes is that the Tseng-Alexeieff agreement was signed without the Imperial Court's knowledge and that the text of the agreement printed in several outstanding document works is incorrect.

The introductory chapter does not match the quality of the following chapters because the author ventures with somewhat untenable generalizations. He seems to make light of the anti-foreign feelings of the common people as reflected in religious persecutions and the Boxer movement. He also fails to enlighten the reader as to the policy of foreign trade, if any, of the Ming government. The 1529 memorial of the Viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (p. 5) deals with the ban on trade which resulted from the unhappy episode of the Folang-chi (Portuguese) mission. But the context conveys the idea that the ban tried to remedy the situation caused by Japanese piracy. As to the central subject itself, it may be more desirable to elaborate the thinking of the conservatives at court and the actual practices and ideologies of the Boxers themselves. All these, however, are minor limitations and do not affect the value of the book.

KWAN-WAI SO

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RALPH L. POWELL. *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895–1912*. Pp. x, 383. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $6.00.

I like to approach a book review with a dual perspective, on the one hand asking

myself "what is good about this book," and then asking "what are its shortcomings?" Applying this test to Mr. Powell's volume, I shall say immediately that most of my opinions about it are favorable, and I welcome it as a worthy and scholarly addition to our growing literature on modern China. This is not to say that Mr. Powell has exhausted the subject or produced a definitive volume, but he has opened up a new approach to modern Chinese history, given us some interesting new angles on such events as the 100 Days Reform, the Boxer Movement, the revolution of 1911 and the compromise aftermath, and on the career of Yuan Shih-k'ai.

He has used mainly Western sources, many of them obscure and rich, but he has also made use of the *Veritable Records* of the Ch'ing dynasty, certain collections of memorials, and a number of secondary books and articles by Chinese authors which prevent his assuming a purely Western point of view. He has not, as far as I can tell, gone into Chinese provincial gazeteers and other grass roots materials which must be explored before telling the full story, but one man cannot do everything on any subject

I do have one criticism, one which I think should be taken into consideration by any historian who ventures into the field of military history. There is an easy ensnarement, by which the writer on military history can come to regard "progress" and "success" in the development of an improved military establishment in a country as true progress and success. In a very limited sense, of course, it is "success" to make troops well trained, well groomed, "an efficient fighting machine." But from the long view of history it is clear that such "success" is merely expediency, necessary perhaps to meet a "clear and present danger" (and certainly the Chinese of the 1895–1912 decade were facing that), but not a goal worthy of the definition of "progress."

At various points in his book Mr. Powell seems to be cheering on more efficient military organization and tactics as the end all of the problems for China. For example, he seems to regard it as a sign of improvement when (pp. 196–97) the breakdown of civilian control of the Board of War made it possible to have "more competent military administrators"; and he indicates it as a mark of progress that the "people were finally being shown that the military profession could be respectable" (p. 208). This seems to me true only within a military-power politics frame of reference. The Confucianist instinct against militarism is truer for purposes of progress.

However, in his conclusion Mr. Powell tones down this implication when he says, "Military developments in China during the last half century of the monarchy have had a marked and detrimental effect on more recent Chinese history" (p. 338). With an emphasis on this correction of the tendency I have noted above, I would unreservedly recommend the book to scholars in the Far Eastern studies field.

HILARY CONROY
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ROBERT S. SCHWANTES. *Japanese and Americans, A Century of Cultural Relations.* Pp. x, 380. New York: Harper and Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1955. $4.00.

Japan has been adjusting to Western modernism while the United States has been a leader and part of that dynamic civilization. Americans have only begun to gain noticeably in the desire and ability to understand Japanese culture. Americans have been keen to impress Japanese with the fact that they are creatively interested in cultural as well as in technical and organizational matters.

Extensive research has resulted in a volume which will be useful for a variety of people active in inter-cultural relations. The treatment has been enhanced by the author's knowledge of Japanese language and his genuine appreciation of many facets of Japanese culture.

If one should try to read this book with the detachment of, say, a European or Near Eastern social scientist, however, a number of points should be mentioned by a reviewer. Implicit in many passages is the point of view of an American nationalist, to be sure interested in cultural relations for their own sake and for the mutual understanding of many individuals, but also impelled by the urgencies of combating communism into an acceptance of public relations with political objectives. See on page 253 the statements: "Botanical exploration and borrowing goes on all the time, of course, without creating any special feeling of indebtedness. For a cultural effect there must be flowers plus publicity."

In the Introduction and at two or three places in the main study there are allusions to the thorny problem of possible conflicts of national interests capable of overriding cultural appreciations. One looks in vain for an appraisal of how Japanese and American interests have developed since 1945 in this connection. And there is not much analysis of important sectors of Japanese society which react rather differently to American policies as well as to cultural ideas and products. Since the Japanese, too, know that "actions speak louder than words", what have been the effects of American policies on Japanese receptivity to democratic ideas and practices, for example? There is not a single mention of McCarthyism in this volume, though the reviewer seldom spent an evening among Japanese intellectuals during 1953–54 when that did not become a topic of conversation. Americans do well to admit that democracy is an ideal toward which we strive and are joined by the Japanese. Yet, if our policies encourage the "reverse course"—away from democratization—and at home tolerate serious erosion of democracy in the process of opposing communism, the best of information programs cannot hope to exert as much influence on the Japanese in a democratic direction. Or to say this positively, our information programs are more effective when our performance squares with declared values.

On pages 32–33, the author realistically points out that whereas more adequate communications can increase mutual sympathy and understanding, close contact on a broader scale (as in the case of *issei* and *nisei* in Pacific Coastal states and numerous Americans in occupied Japan) can lead to more friction. The paradox (as hinted on p. 254) that better acquaintance by peoples of different cultures clarifies not only what they share but how they differ, could have been further developed. Professionals in the fields of public and cultural relations tend to stress commonality, while social and cultural anthropologists tend to emphasize divergence. As an historian the author tries to strike a balance.

ALLAN B. COLE
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TIBOR MENDE. *South-East Asia Between Two Worlds.* Pp. viii, 337. New York: Library Publishers, 1955. $3.95.

Dr. Tibor Mende, a native Hungarian and former economic editor of the European edition of the New York *Herald Tribune,* tells us how the people of Indonesia, Burma, and Pakistan live; what their problems are; and how they attempt to solve them. He believes that these countries provide the answers to the problems of Southeast Asia, which term he stretches unconventionally to include the vast territory from the Khyber Pass to Indonesia, including India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and the former French Indochina. This strategic area includes 600 million people, or one-fourth of mankind and contains important raw materials which Soviet Russia and Red China lack. The author's views are based on his observations in these countries, most recently in 1952–53, and on a limited amount of research. Unfortunately, he touches on too many problems to cover any one of them thoroughly.

The author concludes that the choice of southeast Asia (in his wider sense of the term) lies between India's socialistic "planning by persuasion" and Red China's "planning by force" (p. 318). To "graft Western institutions and technology, or the Western economic system, on the South East Asian societies is a utopian enterprise" (p. 281). In the absence of an entrepreneurial class, capital accumulated from domestic savings, and labor imbued with the acquisitive spirit of the Western workers, Southeast Asia's development "can take place *only through direction from above* [italics by the author]: by government initiative and state management. Unpalatable as the words may sound, this means state planning" (p. 288).

The important contribution of this book is that it poses as a challenge the vital ques-

tion of how we can best help the Asian nations to meet their needs and achieve their aspirations, although it does not succeed in answering it. Much more research and a more balanced use of statistics are needed to provide a convincing answer. For instance, it constitutes an assertion, rather than sound analysis, to say: ". . . if nothing unforeseen intervenes, the standard of living of the people of the Soviet Union—or their consumption of goods per head—will probably surpass that of most of Western European countries before 1960 and will reach Great Britain's in about ten years" (p. 328).

The author is correct in stating that Asians "are not flattered by references to their countries as 'underdeveloped'" (p. 273, n. 1). He should mention this fact to his publisher, who claims on the blurb that Dr. Mende "has written six books on the world's under-developed areas."

JOHN BROWN MASON
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FOREWORD

At the present juncture in international affairs the problems raised by the economic advancement of the so-called underdeveloped countries have assumed exceptional importance. In the last ten years these problems have been made the subject of a multitude of inquiries and studies, but in most instances the pressing immediate needs of populations whose livelihood had been impaired by war or some other catastrophe, or the longer-run perspectives of narrow economic planning, have been the chief concern of these studies. As a result relatively little knowledge has been gathered about the noneconomic aspects of technical change, and the scientific study of cultural and social conditions in underdeveloped countries has also remained behind the concern with practical matters. Moreover, to the extent to which knowledge of the social implications of technical change has become available, it was gathered to a large extent from historical and sociological studies of more highly developed countries with Western culture and institutions. Yet in view of the different cultures and over-all social conditions in underdeveloped countries, studies of social and political movements and adjustments of social relations to the new forms of economic activity are likely to lead to different results if the peculiarities of these countries are taken into account.

Two examples of how profound these differences may be must suffice. Whereas all Western countries, at the beginning of their process of industrialization, showed moderate population densities and were thus able to absorb rapidly growing populations without great dislocations, population densities in countries such as India, Eastern Pakistan, Java, and Egypt are among the highest in the world, and it is difficult to see how very much larger populations can be absorbed in these countries without serious and far-reaching social and economic disorganization. In the second place, the economic growth of some Western countries, among them the United States, was inaugurated under the general value system derived from Puritan and Presbyterian religious doctrines; the values of Asian peoples are derived from Islam or Buddhism, religions whose view of salvation and the good life differ profoundly from those of Calvinism.

The subsequent articles are designed to present some rather general and some more specific conclusions derived from a study of social conditions and consequences of technological modernization in underdeveloped countries. The contents are divided in two main portions. The first nine essays are concerned with some of the general social consequences and conditions of economic advancement in underdeveloped countries. They center on problems of population growth and urbanization, political movements and administrative institutions, entrepreneurship, labor conditions and standards of consumption, and on the general changes in value structures in society. To the extent to which they describe situations in certain countries, these descriptions serve primarily as examples of the more general propositions developed by the authors of these papers.

The last six articles in this work apply the general principles and the general knowledge of social consequences of technical change to a series of particular countries. These countries were chosen so as to have a representative sample from each major region of the underdeveloped world. Japan; West Africa; Jamaica, a Caribbean island; Egypt, a Middle Eastern Moslem country; Ceylon, a South Asian

heavily populated country; and Israel, a nation in which a dominant Western-educated elite is confronted with a population that grew up largely under conditions of economic backwardness—there seem to be characteristic examples of the conditions of economic development found in the various parts of the world. This list is rounded out by the examples contained in some of the earlier papers. Dr. Nash writes about a typical Hispano-American country in Central America with a large indigenous Indian population, Professor Singer writes about India, and Dr. Comhaire primarily about Africa south of the Sahara.

Thus a good many countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are considered in one way or another. But the six studies designed to elucidate patterns of social change accompanying economic and technical change in particular countries also stress some aspects of social relations which are not treated at all, or only marginally, in the "topical" essays. Professor Bennett and Mr. McKnight investigate the role of a social elite, Professor Harbison and Mr. Ibrahim are concerned with labor-management relations, Professor Morgan with the problems of an agrarian society, and Professor Eisenstadt with the adjustment of immigrants.

Taken together, the essays presented here offer, therefore, a fairly complete discussion of the various problems that arise in the social, political, and cultural life of peoples undergoing rapid economic change. At the same time they exhibit the variations in these changes in diverse countries with differing cultures and civilizations. They display, I believe, the multitude of problems confronted by these countries, and some possible approaches to their solution.

BERT F. HOSELITZ

Nationalism, Economic Development, and Democracy

By BERT F. HOSELITZ

AN often observed characteristic of the newly emerging societies in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the economically less advanced portions of the world is the sharp and undisguised nationalism prevailing in these countries. Sentiments of nationalism are loudly proclaimed in countries which have recently gained independence as well as in those which are still under some form of foreign colonial domination. They are present also in countries which have gained independence some time ago, such as the republics of Latin America, and in those in which foreign domination has never succeeded in establishing itself. Even the form of government of a country, its membership in the Communist bloc or among the free nations of the world, does not seem to make any difference: Chinese nationalism is as strong and as dynamic in its aspirations as Indian or Indonesian nationalism.

To be sure, the actual forms which nationalist movements take are dependent upon the narrower political conditions under which these movements exist. In some countries the attainment of independence is the immediate goal; in others it is the full integration and consolidation of a country's territory; in still others, an expansionist, aggressive type of nationalism is discernible; and in some countries national sentiment is directed primarily towards cultural integration rather than political ends.

Since apart from political or cultural objectives all these countries also have the economic objective of increasing the level of living of the members of the society, the question may be asked what relationships exist between the processes leading to higher welfare aspirations on the part of the people and the nationalist sentiment prevailing among them. Moreover, both the implementation of a planned program of economic advancement and the spreading of an ideology of nationalism require agencies which often overlap and supplement one another. The men and agencies that advocate most vociferously the need for economic advancement also stress the common national objectives of their societies; indeed the ideology of nationalism seems to be one of the requirements for the achievement of developmental goals in societies on a relatively low level of economic advancement.

LIVING STANDARDS AND NATIONALISM

This paper is devoted to an examination of the relationships between aspirations for higher levels of welfare and nationalist movements and trends. First, I shall describe the negative and the positive aspects of nationalism in underdeveloped countries. The former defines the separateness and exclusiveness of a group; it often stresses its antagonism to others, especially those who are, or are felt to be, opponents of indigenous national aspirations. The second attempts to give meaning to the communality of interests of a given group and to define the rights of membership in the group of all those who are said to belong to it. It tends to break down loyalties to particularistic subgroups, such as clans, tribes, or specific ethnic or linguistic groups in a country, and to replace them by loyalty to the nation as a whole. Next, I shall attempt to relate the positive aspects of in-

digenous nationalism to forms of economic development and trace the interrelations between them. Finally, I shall try to relate the social processes involved in economic development and the growth of a common national consciousness in an underdeveloped country to its sociopolitical structure. In this way I hope to clarify the interaction between exigencies of maintaining social privileges arising out of a stratified society and democratic implications associated with the improvement of mass living standards supported by a common nationalist ideology. If the problem is posed in this fashion it may be possible to discover what are the chances of democratic developments in these countries, as against the likelihood of some form of authoritarian government.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS

A nationalist ideology and a welfare-oriented program of economic development have as common characteristics, on the one hand, the aim of affecting the life of all members of a given society and, on the other, stress on the interrelation between the welfare and security of each member of the society and the welfare and security of the society as a whole. Let us analyze these two features somewhat more in detail.

Programs of economic development may have various more or less immediate objectives, but one common goal of most of them is a general rise in mass levels of living. In some countries this objective is stressed much more strongly than any other, but even in those countries in which more emphasis is placed upon the building up of capital equipment or a military machine, some stress is laid on the ultimate benefits which economic development programs will have on the general level of economic welfare of the masses. Economic development is thus commonly declared to be an essentially democratic process. Its benefits are expected to accrue to all members of the society, and even where collective aims are given preference, the impact upon the private personal welfare of the members of society is stressed as a concomitant development.

Just as programs of economic development are represented to be matters of concern for all members of a society, so the equal partnership of all members of that society is "legitimized" by increased emphasis on their common nationality. A nationalist ideology normally presents a Janus-faced appearance. On the one hand it delineates a series of features which are common to all members of a given nationality, which tie them together, and which establish a special kind of solidarity between them. On the other hand it lists a series of factors which divide this nationality from others, which indicate its separateness, its exclusiveness, and often its alleged superiority over others.

NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM

In countries which still lack independence the foreigner is easily discerned. The dominant metropolitan power is the representative of all that is foreign to the subject nation; the common positive tie is the struggle to emancipate all members of the indigenous population from the foreign yoke. Once independence has been achieved, the image of the foreign dominating power disappears from the immediate scene, and with it a convenient scapegoat on whom could be placed all the ills from which the indigenous society suffered.

But the image of the domineering foreigner is too good a symbol in nationalist propaganda to be let go altogether. Thus we observe a not infrequent technique employed by Communist parties, especially in former colonial countries, of discovering at various times the workings of alleged oppressors in their midst. The fact that even today in Russia and China the actual presence of "imperialist warmongers and their native stool pigeons" is every now and then discovered is eloquent testimony to the powerful role which the foreign dominating power plays in the process of building a nationalist ideology in these countries. Similarly, though admittedly in less crude fashion, the sins of imperialism are still today appealed to in many countries of Asia and even Latin America, even though the former imperialists have lost control and, in many cases, have completely withdrawn from these countries.

The loss of significance of these negative aspects of nationalism and the dilemma created for native leaders by the weakening and gradual withdrawal of the dominant foreign power can be well seen in West Africa. Technically the British territories of that part of the world are still in a colonial status. But in Nigeria and, above all, the Gold Coast, a rather high degree of self-government has been attained. The purely political nationalist objectives have been won to a large extent, and although these countries have not yet attained *de jure* independence, many powers, especially in the economic field, are exercised now by natives rather than Europeans. This has weakened the negative appeal of nationalism and has introduced a number of difficulties for the more doctrinaire and above all the irresponsibly inclined nationalists. Just as in the fully independent countries it is becoming more difficult to place economic failures at the doorstep of the former dominant power, so in these semi-independent countries nationalist leaders have been forced more and more to stress the positive aspects of nationalism rather than its defensive features, its opposition against the foreign oppressor.

POSITIVE ELEMENTS

Through the attainment of full independence or a larger or smaller measure of local autonomy, the main aspects of nationalist ideology shifted. Its features as a movement of opposition and defiance were weakened, and its positive elements became more and more important. The main positive element of nationalism is the proposition that all members of a given country belong to one and the same in-group, which is distinct from the various out-groups surrounding it. This aspect of nationalism is of considerable importance also as a factor of economic development. Since among the goals of economic development programs the attainment of higher levels of mass welfare is stressed, membership in a national group assures participation in this improvement of private economic conditions. Moreover, it also enhances the second aspect of nationalist ideology in stressing the interdependence of the economic and political goals of all members of the in-group and in supporting the proposition that what benefits the community also benefits each individual member of it.

This positive aspect of nationalism in many underdeveloped countries seems to be an indispensable aspect of the actual achievement of higher levels of living. It must not be forgotten that many of these countries exhibited until recently a high degree of heterogeneity in social structure and institutions. Some writers in discussing the social arrangements of these countries have spoken of dual or of plural societies. But even if we disregard these abstractions as too general, when we look at underdeveloped countries more closely we find that almost all of them comprise several ethnic or linguistic communities and that, apart from such divisive elements as castes and deep class lines, there are sharp differences between city and country,

between occupational groups, and between persons belonging to certain clans, fraternities, or other groups and those outside such groups.

DIVISIVE FORCES IN NATIONALISM

In fact, the rise of nationalist sentiment in underdeveloped countries has strengthened some of these divisive tendencies. In India, for example, the attempt to make Hindi the common national language has met with increased opposition from other language groups and, in fact, the language question has brought to the fore a kind of local "nationalism" which seeks to go beyond the dispute over a national language and to establish additional political goals, notably a higher degree of local autonomy. In other words, the linguistic controversy, which could be regarded as a symptom of cultural nationalism, becomes tinged with political aims that tend to strengthen the divisive internal forces. A similar development is discernible in Nigeria, where the political leaders of the three major ethnic groups, the Ibo, the Yoruba, and the Hausa, waver between supporting an all-Nigerian nationalism and a tribal nationalism.

Effect on economic development

Such divisive forces in nationalist movements have unfavorable consequences for economic development. In Nigeria the primary problem before the native leaders is the issue of full independence. Though Nigeria is, in a sense, an artificial state, with boundaries which do not correspond to any ethnic or natural lines of division, the most successful policy in attaining the goal of independence is the fostering of a common Nigerian nationalist ideology rather than an ethnically divided one. Yet the existence of separatist nationalist movements shows that common Nigerian national sentiment is relatively weak, and there is a definite likelihood that the three peoples may form separate states once the goal of independence is reached. Separation was also one of the results of the attainment of political independence of British India, although the divisive force there was religion rather than linguistic or ethnic differences. In Burma division has only been avoided after a long and destructive civil war, which delayed economic development greatly, and the granting of far-reaching powers of local autonomy to some ethnic groups within the Union of Burma. This process of "balkanization," even where it does not lead to internal struggles, has doubtless an unfavorable impact upon economic development. Not only does it impede the optimum harnessing of all human and nonhuman resources of a given region, and thus interfere with their optimum allocation, but also it tends to maintain particularistic relations in many fields of social action and slows up in this manner the development of fully rational, efficient forms of political and economic administration.

TRANSFER OF LOYALTY TO THE LARGER GROUP

Thus the penetration of attachments and loyalties to particularistic entities and their replacement by loyalty to the whole nation is the most important positive effect of nationalist ideologies in underdeveloped countries. If we consider that in most of these countries the great majority of the people are still engaged in subsistence agriculture and therefore living in villages to a large degree economically self-contained, the paucity of interaction between them becomes plain. Their limited economic horizon affects their world view and their political awareness. Anthropological studies in many parts of the world have shown that the common understanding of the villagers of their place in the world usually does not reach far beyond the limits of their village. They maintain relations with persons living in the surrounding region and occasionally may go to a nearby town, but their loyalty is to their own home community, and people in other parts of their country are regarded by them as strangers. The function of nationalism in such a society is the transference of loyalty from the narrow village or kinship group to the larger national group.

To be sure, in many underdeveloped countries a number of factors which facilitate this process have been operating, some for a long time and others more recently. The establishment of Western enterprises in parts of underdeveloped countries has tended to break down the isolation of the villages. They have attracted workers from the villages and have brought them in contact with persons from other villages, towns, and often also other parts of the country. The growth of urban centers has had a similar effect. Villagers have migrated to the cities and settled there, permanently or temporarily. There they have been thrown with persons from other parts of the country, have worked and often lived with them, and have attained membership in clubs, trade unions, or other voluntary organizations composed of many people with whom they had no previous tie, kinship or regional. A similar melting-pot effect was exercised by service in the army or sometimes in work gangs, and the effects of warfare which forced many people to flee their homes and settle among strangers also brought about the establishment of new contacts and the general enlargement of the horizon of simple people, whose previous world was confined to the boundaries of their village or district.

All these processes which tended to make people more mobile geographically and to enhance the number and frequency of contacts between them led to an increased awareness that beyond those persons with whom one customarily maintained face-to-face relations were others who had some things in common with the members of the in-group, and yet were strangers. It was this faintly felt tie that received its most powerful support from nationalist ideology. Nationalist symbols provided a meaning and an interpretation for the very imprecise and blurred sentiments of community of interest and destiny which people in many underdeveloped countries began to experience. They drew a firmer boundary around the new in-group and defined in more expressive forms the differences between that in-group and the various out-groups. And they showed how the activities of each member of the in-group interrelate with, and are dependent upon, what others of the same in-group are doing, even though the various actors may not know each other personally. In the course of this process the main goal of nationalism tended to be achieved, namely, the gradual transference of primary loyalties from the village or kinship group to the larger society.

Difference from earlier large states

In this, the modern sentiment of nationalism differs from analogous ideologies held in the earlier large societies in underdeveloped countries. The establishment of large states in the territories of many underdeveloped countries is nothing new. The Mogul Empire in India, the empire of Majapahit in Java, even the kingdom of Dahomey in West Africa, were large states covering the major part of present nations or peoples aspiring to independent nationhood. Like the monarchies of early mediaeval Europe, however, they were not built upon nationality as a common bond but rather upon submission to a common

ruler and assignment of places in a sociopolitical hierarchy with this ruler at the apex. In this sense the upsurge of a nationalist ideology in Asia and Africa is an outgrowth of the contact of these peoples with Europe and the West. Nationalism provides a means by which strong common ties can be established without hierarchical subordination and with maintenance of the principle of equality as a significant political value. This is the reason why programs of improvement of mass welfare, buttressed by a nationalist ideology, have, in principle, an egalitarian, democratic hue, and this is the chief feature by which modern nation-states in underdeveloped countries are distinguished from their monarchical predecessors.

LEADERSHIP

But although this phase of nationalism combined with aspirations to higher levels of welfare on a mass basis appears to offer a fertile soil for democratic political institutions, the very need for the institutionalization of these processes requires strong centralized leadership, which in turn makes possible the development of autocratic and, in extreme cases, even totalitarian government.

Requirements of national propaganda

Although nationalism attains and preserves a momentum of its own in the societies of the West, the very newness of nationalist ideology in many underdeveloped countries requires that it be attended to and supported constantly. In spite of the persistence of processes of social and economic change which tend to break down the isolation of the villages, and in spite of the buttressing of these processes by an officially promulgated nationalist ideology, the attachments of the kinship group or the local community in many underdeveloped countries are strong enough to make necessary the constant maintenance of nationalist propaganda and agitation. This requires a staff of skilled and devoted persons who become the chief manipulators of nationalist symbols and the elite personnel in the promulgation and diffusion of these symbols.

The logical group to undertake this task in an underdeveloped country is the leadership of political parties both in and out of government office. In fact, the manipulation of nationalist symbols might be regarded as one of the two or three most significant and appropriate functions of political party leadership in underdeveloped countries. This statement applies to all parties which wish to maintain and enlarge their influence and extends from the parties on the radical right to those on the radical left, that is, the Communists. The association in underdeveloped countries between nationalism and Communist ideology has often been observed, in spite of the pretensions of Communists to an ideology of internationalism. Resentment against those alleged to have kept large colonial populations in a state of poverty and hence to have "exploited" them and resentment against the foreign powers which until recently have supplied the political machinery maintaining this condition of exploitation have combined to offer these Communist parties a fruitful soil for action and propaganda. It should be noted that the Communist appeal depends upon this two-pronged resentment: on the one hand against the "exploiters" and on the other against the foreigners who are either identified with the exploiters or presented as supporting them.

But the Communist leaders are not the only ones who use nationalism as a plank in their party propaganda. In fact, the ability of a party to manipulate the nationalist symbols and appear in the eyes of the masses as the true representative of nationalist aspirations seems to be an important factor of its success. For example, the relatively poor showing of the Socialists in the Indonesian elections of 1955 must be attributed in large part to inability to make optimum use of nationalist propaganda.

If the proposition is granted that nationalist propaganda requires ceaseless activity because of the still somewhat ambivalent loyalties of many simple people in underdeveloped countries, and if it is granted that the persons in positions of political leadership in the government and political parties are the primary carriers of this nationalist propaganda, the ultimate political effect of nationalist trends and their association with economic development programs will depend upon the aims and objectives of the leaders. For this reason it is important to ask not only what these aims are but also what the social composition of the new political leadership in underdeveloped countries is and what the relation of the leaders to the mass of peoples over whom they exercise power.

Gap between the elite and the masses

One of the outstanding characteristics of the political elite in underdeveloped countries is the wide cultural and educational distance which separates them from the masses of the people. The exigencies of government, administration of economic and political bureaucracies, and control of media of mass communication require a degree of technical and organizational skill which could only be acquired in the West or in Western dominated institutions. Thus in those countries in which independence has been attained the political elite are to a considerable degree Western educated and have adopted not only Western forms of behavior but in many instances also Western values. Even in countries which are still lacking full independence, as, for example, Nigeria and the Gold Coast, many members of the native political elite conform to this pattern. The social distance between these persons and the mass of their followers is often greater than that between them and the Western foreigners designated by nationalist propagandists as the main representatives of the inimical out-group.

The result of this situation is, first, a sharp class division between the common people on the one hand and members of the government and leading political figures on the other. Another result of the conflicting cultural orientations of the elite and the masses is the monopolization of many functions of leadership by the members of the elite. Modern administration, in the political as well as the economic field, requires rationalized, impersonal bureaucracies. Their optimum performance depends upon the assignment of roles on a universalistic, achievement-oriented basis. But in view of the fact that traditionalist, often strongly particularistic, norms are widely observed among the popular masses, the political and to some minor extent the economic elite occupy a favored position with respect to leadership. Although widespread extension of education would gradually make it possible for increasing numbers to compete for leadership roles, most underdeveloped countries lack the necessary educational facilities and hence are deficient in suitably trained technical personnel with qualifications necessary for the fulfillment of administrative tasks on the higher or even medium levels.

The social characteristics of the political leadership group therefore tend to place it in a position somewhat apart from and on top of the mass of the people, and the often observed absence of

a middle class in underdeveloped countries is perhaps not so much a true description of actual facts as a reflection of the social distance between those who are leaders in some political or economic area and those who are not. Since it takes a long time to develop adequate educational institutions, the members of the present elite are able to maintain the social differentiation which endows them with positions of leadership. Correspondingly, we can understand why in most underdeveloped countries education is so highly prized. It is perhaps the most important, though not the only, means of social advancement.

Aids to social advance

Besides education, there exist several other avenues of social ascent. One of them, as in Western countries, is the acquisition of wealth, and another the attainment of positions in the bureaucracies of religious and voluntary organizations. The former usually requires educational attainments of a high order. The latter, among which positions in trade unions and some semipolitical bureaucracies are the most important, has on the whole greater significance in underdeveloped countries than in the West, since there the ties between trade unionism and political partisanship are stronger and more obvious.

An aid to rising in the social scale is the fact that the economic expansion of the countries, even if gradual and halting, and the increase in political and administrative tasks require the gradual enlargement of the social elite. In countries where pressures to move upwards are strong, because there is a relatively greater abundance of trained personnel or because economic development is slow and stagnant, the supply of "intellectuals," especially intellectuals of certain kinds—for example, lawyers—may exceed the demand for them and force them into accepting leadership in political counterelites, such as radical political parties or popular movements with real or alleged charismatic objectives. This development has, for example, occurred in India and is one of the reasons for the violent political radicalism of many Indian intellectuals.

Economic Development and Social Structure

The general picture presented by the social structure in underdeveloped countries thus is one in which there exists a wide gap between the upper and the lower classes. The upper classes have adopted many Western values and forms of behavior; they are familiar with the operations of a money economy; and many things bought from the West become status symbols. The lower classes frequently follow traditional indigenous values, often have little skill in monetary transactions, and live to a considerable extent still in an economy in which the village or a more or less clearly defined local region is largely self-sufficient. As a consequence of this dichotomy in values and behavioral norms, the upper classes enjoy an almost exclusive monopoly of access to those "goods" in society which are most highly prized: political power, education, and wealth.

Centralized planning

The power of this group is enhanced by the fact that economic development in almost all underdeveloped countries is fostered to a large extent by the central government. This is not the place to discuss whether centralization of developmental planning is a matter of choice or necessity for these countries. In view of the fact that they still lack most of the capital equipment which is usually referred to as "social overhead"—transport and communications networks, power stations, educational and health facilities, and the like—and in view of the further fact that these installations are of primary importance for economic development, a high degree of centralized developmental planning may be unavoidable. At any rate the prevailing inclination of governments to undertake the function of programing economic development can easily be understood. But the result of this centralization of developmental planning is the enhancement of the power of the sociopolitical elite and the increased dependence of the large mass of the people upon decisions made by this relatively small section of the population.

Conflicting forces

The main dilemma of political, and with it economic, development in underdeveloped countries results from this divergence between, on the one hand, the actual structure of social relations, which is rigorously hierarchical and associated with deep social cleavages, and, on the other, the collectivity-oriented values expressed by nationalism in its positive aspects and the ideology of elevation of mass living standards. The pressure of these ideologies tends to push in the direction of greater democracy and mass participation in political and economic processes. The interests inculcated in the members of the political elite and buttressed by the inequalities in the social structure tend to push in the direction of authoritarianism and a high degree of centralization of governmental powers.

It is difficult to predict the outcome of these conflicting forces. In different countries different results may ensue. For example, some observers who have noted the pressures discussed in this essay in the emerging societies of Africa have expressed the fear that the attainment of independence may there be associated with the coming to power of a highly authoritarian black elite rather than with a democratization of political and social relations. Such an outcome seems not improbable since, as may be seen in Central and Eastern Europe, a nationalist ideology can be diverted to the support of totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian governments as well as democratic ones.

As against this alternative must be held the potentialities for greater equality and freedom which stem from the struggle for political independence. Although the internal class relations in the societies of underdeveloped countries provide a fruitful soil for authoritarian political developments, the forces unleashed by the struggle for independence may lead in the opposite direction. The actual course of political developments in these countries appears to me to depend upon two factors, which are operative with varying force in different underdeveloped countries. One is the rapidity of economic development, and the other is the success of transforming the many particularistic hierarchical relations now existing on the social and political levels into a system in which the different interest groups become coordinated, with power distributed among them, rather than subordinated within one hierarchy.

Rapidity of economic development

The impact of rapid economic development upon the potentialities of democratic political institutions is not very difficult to see. If the economy, especially in its consumption goods sector, grows rapidly, the goal of improved mass living standards can be implemented more fully. Although economic growth, and especially industrialization and urbanization, remain associated with recurring episodes of social disorganization, the visible increase in consumption standards compensates for this to some extent, and the implementation of developmental programs can count upon

a greater degree of consensus. The government needs to use fewer constraints, and there tends to develop less conflict between the leaders and the mass. Moreover, a rapidly growing economy has a greater and more insistent demand for skilled personnel, and the rising members of the lower social strata are less frequently frustrated in their desire for social and economic advancement.

Remolding the social structure

But economic development alone, even if it stresses and actually succeeds in bringing about an elevation of consumption standards, does not guarantee the evolution of democratic political forms unless the sociopolitical structure is remolded at the same time. It has been argued that a nationalist ideology tends to break down particularistic loyalties and interests. But if its over-all effect is to bring the various groups, once they are robbed of their traditionalist values, into a rigorous hierarchy with a small group of nationalistic, sometimes charismatic, leaders at the top, democratic political forms will have a negligible chance of evolving. The main problem before these societies is not merely the abolition of particularist elements in their sociopolitical structure, but the replacement of these elements by groupings which, though universalistically oriented in their over-all values, nevertheless maintain independence of action and the power to represent the interests of functionally diverse social elements on an approximately equal level.

Two possibilities

In more concrete terms, this can be expressed by saying that there are two possible ways of eliminating the existing particularistic structures in underdeveloped countries.

1. They may become rigorously subordinated to a central hierarchy. The leaders of the various village and regional communities, even of ethnic and linguistic groups, are assigned positions on various lower levels of this hierarchy and exercise their power roles through it. The society returns to the type prevailing in earlier monarchical periods, only with the difference that modern methods of communication and the addition of a nationalist ideology provide this structure with increased strength and resilience as compared with its monarchical forebears. The similarities to these earlier structures are even enhanced if, and to the extent to which, the leadership in the new hierarchy is endowed with charismatic qualities.

2. Democratic development, on the contrary, is aided if the dissolution of particularistic groups leads to their replacement by functionally specialized groupings among which power is distributed in a more or less co-ordinate fashion. Or, more concretely: If the present petty elite in the village, the region, the ethnic or linguistic group, are robbed of their positions of leadership in these particularist groupings and new groups are formed along political party lines, occupational interests, or social class lines, leadership in these new groups depends not upon undifferentiated localized control and power but upon adequate representation of the interests of the members of the new group.

It does not matter greatly whether the leaders in these new groups are identical with those in the old ones or not. In general, the universalistic values which are forced, as it were, upon the leaders of the new interest groups, will tend to bring about a gradual replacement of the old elite by new leaders, and thus will tend to encourage a circulation of the elite. New leaders will attain positions in the functionally differentiated groups not because of the position of their family or the accidents

surrounding their birth (in other words, not because of genealogical or magical qualities), but rather because of achievement in representing the group interest. This, in turn, will contribute to the greater degree of circulation of the elite and also to the distribution of power among the various interest groups, since each of them, provided it maintains its independence of action, will find a place in the total social structure in accordance with the success with which it can uphold the special interests of its members as against the claims of other competing interest groups.

Given an essentially universalist orientation of the members of these groups, the competition for influence and power need not lead to a rupture of society but will rather eventuate in an over-all rough balance of the power positions of these groups. In the most commonsense terms, one might say that if and to the extent to which tribal chiefs and village heads can be transformed into or replaced by secretaries of competing political parties or trade unions, officers of independent chambers of agriculture, industry, or labor, or chairmen of regional welfare or health committees, the over-all chances of democratic development in underdeveloped countries will be much enhanced. It goes without saying that this development will take place only if this change is one in substance rather than one in name.

THE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE

In general, economic development sets a framework in which these sociopolitical changes may take place. It affords opportunities for the evolution of less tradition-oriented and more rationalized social and economic action. But whether these opportunities will be grasped and implemented so as to lead to democratic political institutions will also depend upon whether the nationalist symbols are used to enthrone a centralized bureaucratic authoritarian leadership or to provide new avenues for political expression of diverse functionally oriented interest groups in a sociopolitical framework in which power is not centralized but widely distributed.

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The Impact of a Money Economy on Consumption Patterns

By Elizabeth E. Hoyt

In this paper I am interpreting my subject as the effect on consumption patterns of situations in which new money income results from new opportunities to make or earn money under conditions of technological change. It is implied in my subject that new opportunities for choice are offered. The most important source of these would ordinarily be the market. There is, however, another source, namely, goods and especially services which may be offered free or at low cost by government, religious, or social agencies; these may directly affect consumption choices and indirectly influence market choices as well.

No situation of economic change in underdeveloped societies is a simple one, and many noneconomic as well as economic influences affect the spending and use of income. These influences vary greatly from time to time and from place to place. Further, we have no complete picture of the impact of economic change on consumption patterns in even one underdeveloped society. Economic change has been studied much more frequently from an interest in production or an interest in distribution than from an interest in consumption. For consumption we have some studies of family expenditures, usually made with primary concern for whether or not people have enough (in no case known to the writer do we have studies relating to the same people at different periods made with the same classifications and interpretations of spending); evidence of change from the production and sale of new goods and services in the economy; some studies relating to particular areas of consumer expenditure, as food and housing; and a variety of more or less organized observations of change, some of them made by careful observers. It would be premature, in fact, to look for accurate measurement in a field in which basic theory needs development and for which we first need to agree on what it is most important to measure.

The subject of consumption change under impact of a money economy might be approached from the point of view of effects of buying on production, effects on trade, effects on stability, and of several other interests to which the actions of consumers contribute. The point of view of this paper is that of consumers as such, their attitudes and behavior and their welfare in so far as the latter is a matter of objective proof or objective agreement.

Resistance to a New Money Economy

It is safe to say that among underdeveloped peoples there is likely to be some resistance to a new money economy. The attractions of new goods and services do not completely outweigh the objections to regimented production, loss of leisure, closer contact with outsiders as officials or taskmasters. Even freedom from want itself unless the want is dire may at first seem less attractive than freedom to carry on in the old way.

The easiest transitions to a new money economy occur when change is slow and people are able to set their own pace.[1]

[1] Actually the test of successful change is equilibrium among the changes, which is most likely to be achieved when change is slow and the people affected have an opportunity to make their own selections and adjustments. An outside group, say an employer or a colonial government, introducing change is almost certain to interpret success in terms of its own cultural values. When a day of reckoning and confusion comes, the outside group is likely to ascribe the confusion to agitators, failing to recognize that they themselves did not understand the cultural situation with which they were interfering. The people affected need to have adequate opportunity to select among new alternatives which conform to their own sense of equilibrium; this requires not only a variety of alternatives but time to become acquainted with their significance.

Such an opportunity is found in the agricultural production of peasant proprietors, who can adjust their work and income as their wants expand. In some parts of Africa it is customary for the owners or administrators of large plantations to offer their workers the opportunity of doing only half-time work for wages, since they find the people more willing to be employed if they can have less money and more leisure, or more time to provide their own food. A similar desire to work shorter hours and provide their own food, or part of it, is found among the Indian employees of the plantations of Guatemala, and employers furnish their workers with milpas, small plots of ground for agricultural production. Thus the problem of transition to a money economy is simpler in rural regions than it is in cities, where employees have no opportunity to produce their own food and the employer or some other agency must furnish housing for each employee in a crowded area. In South Africa, East Africa, and Central America, the regions with which I am best acquainted, full-time wage earners in cities or mines very often keep their wives and children in the country; they themselves can escape there when some particular object of spending is obtained or when the pressures of full-time employment become too great. One result of this kind of employment, of course, is that wages tend to be set at the cost of sustenance for a single man, rather than at a family level; and a major problem of support arises for such wage earners as to bring their families to cities.

Another and curious example of compromise transition is found in the Gezira in the Sudan, where a large-scale social and economic planning project has set up hundreds of peasant proprietors who are under a certain mild compulsion to produce cotton and other economic crops. By means of this, peasant incomes have greatly increased. Many of these "peasants," who have no particular use for all the new consumers' goods such incomes could bring, now employ others to do a part of their work for them, while they themselves spend a good portion of their prosperity in leisure or in supervising the work of their employees.

Where people are plunged all at once into a situation away from home in which they have no choice but full-time earning for money, they have lost their familiar anchorages and are without experience to guide them in the new set of conditions and the new opportunities for spending which the money economy brings. Such situations do not automatically take care of themselves. The use of money and opportunity has to be learned, and the price can be a high one.[2]

[2] The Belgian Congo is frequently mentioned as a place where major economic change has been favorable to native people, but as yet this remains to be demonstrated so far as effects on consumption patterns are concerned. In 1952–53 the International African Institute set up and UNESCO financed a study to be called "Social Implications of Technological Change and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara." The field work was carried on in Stanleyville, Belgian Congo. Unfortunately the findings of the study have not yet been published and could not be made available for the purposes of this paper.

FIRST NEW CHOICES

The first uses of new income are likely to be for more of what has customarily been enjoyed or for new choices which do not much disturb old consumption patterns. They tend to be either easily incorporated additions (like a taste for new sweets within the food pattern) or something which can function outside the existing pattern without much immediate effect upon it (like a bus trip).

The first new choices in general fall into four categories, of which the fourth to some extent crosscuts the other three. The first of these categories is goods making an immediate appeal to sensory tastes which are universal or nearly universal among all peoples, such as sweets of all kinds, including cakes and sweet drinks, tobacco and drugs which give temporary emotional satisfaction, and intoxicants. Most of these have the advantage of being relatively cheap, and traders can readily put them on the market. The introduction of new spirituous liquors to American Indians and of great supplies of opium in Asia are well known examples. Almost everywhere the per capita consumption of sugar notably increases as a new money economy comes in.

The second category, in some cases related to the first, is proprietary medicines and devices to which magical or semimagical qualities are attributed. The category is smaller than the others but it may be the most harmful in its effects. It was noted that after various proprietary medicines, or claims for them, were made illegal under the United States Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, a great increase in their sale took place in Central and South America. A considerable part of the advertising in vernacular papers published among underdeveloped peoples is of proprietary drugs and devices, and even where people cannot read they can be attracted by colored posters, as one I saw in an isolated region of Honduras —Christ holding out to a sufferer a familiar box of pills.

Prestige and emulation

The third category is of goods and services associated with prestige, either something already in use and approved among the native people (as metal ornaments) or something approved by outsiders whom the native people desire to emulate. Among foods, white flour and white-flour products generally have more prestige than the old familiar staples. Very often the most prestige-carrying goods are something to wear, both because what is worn is conspicuous and because such goods, though not necessarily inexpensive, are relatively so compared with housing, house equipment, and vehicles. That beads, metal decorations, and bright cloth should be a part of the equipment of traders going to far-flung tropical shores is taken for granted. At the present time, parts of tropical Africa offer an immense market for the second-hand clothing of Europe. Recently there has been a great run in British East Africa for dark spectacles, so much so that an African character wearing dark spectacles is used to typify a vain simpleton, the reason being that dark spectacles are desired for dress wear at social events after the sun has set.

A great deal could be written about the social conditions which most favor emphasis on conspicuous and emulative consumption, and how they favor it. Where caste is rigid or differences between native people and the outsiders introducing change are felt to be very great, emulation favors more expensive or fashionable forms of what is already in the caste or native culture. Where there are social classes but mobility among them is readily possible, people naturally tend to copy the class above, and if the outsiders are admired the highest native class copies outsiders. A good example is found among the Baganda of Uganda, a stratified but not rigidly stratified society, where each stratum copies the one above and the top group, represented by the king and his associates, copies the conspicuous culture of British royalty and aristocracy, so far as this culture is known in Uganda. Not only British dress but the elaborate complex of fashionable social events is taken over by this group. On the other hand, in two more democratic tribal societies with which I am somewhat familiar, that of the Kikuyu in Kenya and the Chagga in Tanganyika, emulative consumption tends to take over some conspicuous traits believed to belong to a world society and the customs of the British aristocracy as such have no particular appeal.

Targets

The fourth category, to some extent crosscutting the first three, has been described as "targets," a target purchase usually being something relatively important or substantial which stands by itself and is not necessarily bound in with other culture changes. When a person has once hit his target he can sit back and rest for a while—perhaps for the remainder of his life. Regular food and drink would hardly be included in this category, but the giving of a feast might be a target. More expensive clothing purchases are very often targets—shoes, for instance. A target may be almost anything which commends itself to people because of its obvious usefulness or its associations with prestige, but the choice of particular targets depends in part on aggressive salesmanship. The wide introduction of the sewing machine is a case in point. An intelligent African I knew had worked several years to save enough money for a bicycle (a target desired for both its usefulness and its prestige), and the bicycle had become the limit of his horizon; he could not conceive of anything that cost more than a bicycle, even the coronation.

It is true that most target goods serve some "useful" purpose, but it is not true that ability to serve a utilitarian purpose is necessary for their introduction. Immediate sensory and emulative appeal is likely to bring them in; but once introduced they may remain and more of them be desired because their utilitarian superiorities have become obvious. In respect to targets, Major Orde-Browne says:

> . . . astonishing differences will be found to exist between tribes. Cooking-pots, hurricane lamps, shoes, unbrellas, hoes, and numerous other items will each be found to be the particular favourite of a certain community. . . .
>
> The primitive tribe will as a rule be attracted at first by trifles of little value; a knife, axe, or other useful article may be purchased, but it is often accompanied by a number of quite unnecessary adjuncts, such as shoddy but showy clothing, brightly coloured hats, or toys such as mirrors and mouth-organs. Later, the first novelty of the contents of the store will have worn off, and more sensible things will be favoured; metal cooking-pots have been found superior to easily fractured earthenware, blankets are appreciated, or the attractions of lamps may be discovered.[3]

A special case of target—which also, of course, may bring about a major modification of culture pattern—is the

[3] *The African Labourer* (London, 1933), p. 35. See also L. Bernot, "Markets in the Chittagong Hill Tracts" (Eastern Pakistan), *Information* (Paris: International Social Science Council, International Research Office on Social Implications of Technological Change), Vol. 2 (October 1954), pp. 1–6; Cyril S. Belshaw, *In Search of Wealth* . . . (Southeastern Papua), American Anthropological Association, Memoir No. 80 (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Part 2 [February 1955]).

desire for education, most commonly the education of children, though adult education as a target is not absent. In British East Africa education is not free, and again and again I was told there that the reason a father or brother had left home to earn was so that the children, or the younger ones, could be educated. In one place, the Kikuyu region of Kenya, where not enough schools were available even if people could pay to go, the building of schools had become a target; and the people were erecting them on every hilltop, contributing their labor. It was said that some families gave to such a target as much as half their money income.

MAJOR MODIFICATIONS OF CONSUMPTION PATTERNS

"Modification of consumption patterns" may apply to the separate patterns of family expenditures—food, housing, clothing, and so on—and it may apply to consumers' use of resources as a whole.

Food

To begin with the separate patterns, and with food, the weight of evidence indicates that in areas that have come under the influence of a modern money economy diets are poorer than they are in more primitive areas.

In general, the effect of a cash crop or wage economy on nutrition has been one of lowering the level by disturbing the balance achieved under subsistence economy, introducing processed foods as prestige foods, limiting the amount and quality of subsistence crops in favor of cash crops, or the amount of time spent in preparation and preservation of food for home consumption.[4]

A study of the American Geographical Society supported by the United States Office of Naval Research concluded, on the basis of incomplete evidence it is true, that of 209 tribes selected as "primitive," only 12 had diets defective in both energy and protective foods, 7 had diets defective in energy only, and the remaining 190 had diets that were adequate, at any rate for the life the people were leading. On the other hand, most of Asia, about half of Africa, and about half of South America, areas which had come to a greater extent under the impact of a money economy, had diets defective both in energy and in protective foods. The best nourished areas of the world were, in general, those that we regard as the most civilized and those that we regard as the least civilized.[5]

Some deterioration of diets would, on a priori grounds, be expected. The quick expansion of tastes for sweets, mentioned in the preceding section, almost always means less rather than more protective elements in the diet. White sugar contains no protective elements, and a considerable increase in the consumption of sweets usually means a smaller consumption of foods containing vitamins and minerals. Desire for prestige foods strengthens the demand for sweets and may lead also to increased consumption of white flour and polished rice. As people give up their old subsistence agriculture and buy their food in markets, white flour and polished rice, which are more easily preserved than whole-grain flour and rice

[4] Margaret Mead (Ed.), *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, a manual prepared by the World Federation for Mental Health (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1953), p. 260. See also *ibid.*, pp. 211–20. The book is published also by Mentor Books, New York, 1955.

[5] "Study in Human Starvation," Sheet 2: "Diets and Deficiency Diseases," *Atlas of Diseases*, Pl. 9 (New York: American Geographical Society, 1953). An extensive bibliography is given. (The *Atlas of Diseases* is published and distributed plate by plate.)

rich in vitamins and minerals, tend to take the place of the more nutritious cereals, and to some extent also of vegetables and plantains, which contain elements essential for balanced consumption. Prestige value attaches itself not only to white-flour products but also to food in packages and cans, which increases the cost of the diet without necessarily improving it.[6]

Where workers employed away from home eat in large numbers in commissaries run by employers, considerable attention has been paid to giving them food that will increase their productivity. A diet worked out in detail to every calorie and every established protective element is fed to workers in the copper mines of the Rhodesias and the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, and whether they like it or not they have no choice but to take it. I know of no evidence, however, indicating that such diets influence food consumption in the homes of the workers when they return to them; on the contrary there is evidence to show that, since the women of the family are those who prepare the food, changes in the diets of men in mining and industrial establishments have little effect on family nutrition.

The first impact of a money economy is typically accompanied by the introduction of new diseases, but in many cases there is a good record of improvement later, when doctors, nurses, and hospitals for native people are introduced. Satisfactory figures on change, however, are lacking.

[6] Considerable research has gone into the preservation of whole cereals and to the restoration of vitamins and minerals to commercially prepared foods. This can be done, and sometimes quite inexpensively. The problem now is chiefly to ensure that the more nutritious products are on the market and are the ones actually used by the people. Such groups as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization are trying to bring this about.

Housing

In the area of housing the weight of evidence is not so strongly on one side as it is in the case of food. According to circumstances, both improvement and deterioration take place. So long as people can live in their own native habitat, changes tend to be for larger space, better construction, and more amenities; but these changes come slowly. On the other hand deterioration comes rapidly when workers move themselves, and especially their families, to centers of industry. There is no worse housing in the world than in the slums of many Asian and African cities. Flimsy construction, as of cardboard and tin, terrific crowding, the absence of elementary sanitation, and the presence of insects and rodents—all these distinguish the kind of houses in which many workers have to live when industry expands. A great deal has been written on experiments in good housing for underdeveloped peoples as they come to new centers of labor, and there are many such experiments under municipalities and employers, but compared to the need for them they are numerically unimportant. What is also little recognized is the fact that employers of labor in providing "good" housing often pay little attention to what workers want; for example, they substitute identical rows of rooms for separate huts, thus depriving families both of privacy and of the opportunity to have in their homes a little variety and expression of personal taste. So the values gained by better construction and equipment, when these are given, may be more than offset by the fact that the new houses do not accord with the families' living habits and interest in their home.

Clothing

So far as clothing is concerned, when a money economy is initiated direct ef-

fects on welfare are generally not very important, though the introduction of new kinds of clothing needs to be accompanied (as it sometimes is not) by understanding of ways to use it hygienically and keep it clean. The indirect effects may be considerable, however, because clothing makes one of the earliest appeals to consumers' interest, and after absolute necessities are met it attracts expenditures more rapidly than objectives which, like housing, require more experience and education. It is of interest that in underdeveloped societies in general men change their styles of clothing before women change theirs, that for both sexes the ages where change comes first are from twelve to twenty, and that for both sexes the forms of outer wear are generally changed before underwear. This is in accordance with what we should expect from the facts that women are held to be culturally the more conservative sex, that disposition to change in general is more marked at adolescence than at other periods of life, and that outer wear, being more visible than underwear, is more subject to the influence of emulation.

Recreation

It is difficult to generalize on the effects of a money economy on recreation, since influences which may be much more important than those of money economy enter into the picture. Recreation, moreover, is closely related to adjustment in the pattern of consumption as a whole. Motion pictures of certain types (in my experience the most popular types are animated cartoons and Wild Wests) are greatly desired and extend the horizon in various ways. But much of the change in the recreation area is due not so much to the availability of new commercial forms of entertainment as to the lapse of old forms of tribal recreation, sometimes related to tribal religion, and to their suppression or discouragement by the authorities, and in some cases, to the provision by those authorities of new forms of recreation free or at low cost. In British East Africa, for example, the government has encouraged the institution of social halls where beer or tea can be obtained, and in some cases the beer hall plays a major part in the recreation of the community.

Social participation

Social participation, which is a part of the pattern of consumption, is related in some way to all the categories of consumption, particularly to recreation and to contributions to religion, organizations and movements, and gifts to other people. Most people in economically underdeveloped societies have more of a large-family system than we, and under the impact of a money economy this tends to break up. But the need of social participation, the willingness and desire to contribute to others, remains, and seeks other outlets. I know of no study which deals with the nature and amount of contributions among underdeveloped peoples under the impact of change, but I know that sometimes the amount, in proportion to income, is very great. I have spoken of the large contributions to schools made by the Kikuyu. Contributions to organizations are likely to be especially great if the people see a means to bolster their morale through a religious, educational, or political organization of their own. The rapid growth of what to our eyes are peculiar religious movements among underdeveloped peoples is a good example of this. Some of these movements or churches operating as Christian introduce old magic under new guises, represent Christ as an Indian or a Negro, and make a great economic show which serves to compensate the members for the sense of personal inferiority they may have received from the outsiders who are the agents of economic change. Members live vicariously in the splendors of this organization.[7]

The total pattern

This latter part of our discussion has indicated that what may happen to the pattern as a whole is much more important than what happens in any single category of consumption. We need a word on the nature of total patterns,[8] which are made up of parts interrelated and to a considerable degree interdependent. Any influence which disturbs any part greatly is likely to react on the rest; and the whole may be disturbed also by any over-all conditions which increase or decrease available resources in any major way, or which (particularly in the case of standards of living) introduce new concepts of the values of life.[9]

As has been said, if change comes slowly to underdeveloped peoples and they can set their own pace, no very serious problems may arise. But people who find themselves precipitated into a new situation of greatly increased purchasing power may go berserk with it. They may not know what to do with the new money, and the transitory delights of sensory and emulative spending may take it all before a wider range of alternatives comes into the picture. Not only may the people throw away their money for almost any new object, but unaccustomed spending of a sensory and emulative nature may lead to decay of morale and permanent loss. The willingness to follow any leader who promises prestige and security and the increase of crime found in societies in process of very rapid change are symptoms of this.[10]

Obviously more than consumption patterns are involved in the tensions and attitudes towards life which arise under the impact of a money economy. The problems call for understanding from many disciplines besides econom-

[7] See B. G. M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa,* London, 1948.

[8] Our subject might include discussion of changes in proportions given to different categories of expenditure as a money economy comes in. For example, a money economy tends to increase real income, and it is as true as it ever was that as incomes increase a smaller proportion of income is usually spent for food (Engel's law); indeed, this should be obvious. Also, as income increases it is likely that for a considerable time a larger proportion goes for durable goods. (Cf., for United States, "Income Sensitivity of Consumption Expenditures," *Survey of Current Business,* Vol. 30, No. 1 [January 1950], pp. 17–20. As far as I know, however, no statistical data on proportions for expenditure for durable goods in a group of underdeveloped countries have ever been compiled.) In services, too, proportionate expenditures of underdeveloped peoples tend to increase with income, though this does not mean that such proportions increase indefinitely. For example, people in underdeveloped societies who are very poor by our standards may employ a servant as their means increase; but as they step out of the category of "underdeveloped," expenditures for servants may decline and greater proportionate expenditures for household equipment be made. A considerable body of data on family expenditures has been collected among various underdeveloped peoples, and it might seem at first that we could compare proportions of expenditure made by less-developed groups with those made by the more developed. But since the background conditions of the different societies are very different, and since the studies vary greatly in selection of families and in classification and interpretation of data, as well as in accuracy, it would be dangerous to use them for this purpose.

[9] The *locus classicus* for discussion of standard of consumption and standard of living is Joseph S. Davis, "Standards and Content of Living," *American Economic Review,* Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1945), pp. 1–15. Among other things, this stresses the importance of balance in the whole.

[10] See Margaret Mead (Ed.), *op. cit* (note 4 *supra*). Cf. E. E. Hoyt, "Tiquisate, A Call for a Science of Human Affairs," *Scientific Monthly,* Vol. 72, No. 2 (February 1951), pp. 114–19.

ics, and a whole complex of related values must be understood. Consumption patterns are the most tangible part of this complex.

THE MARKET AND OTHER MEANS OF CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE

Little thought has been given to the nature and organization of markets in underdeveloped societies as an appeal to new purchasing power and as an encouragement to increase this power. In the earliest stages of development of money economies among underdeveloped peoples in modern times a good deal of emphasis was placed on compelling the people to work by force or by laws requiring every man to give evidence that he had been employed so many days out of the year or by taxes that could not be met except by new forms of labor. At a later or higher stage attention was paid to trying to make the conditions of employment pleasant, as by giving prizes for regular work. Very little attention indeed has been or is being given to motivating the people by giving them a new and greater choice of goods. The value of the spread of wants to stimulate economic development has been for the most part unperceived.[11] One can look through whole shelves of books on the economics of underdeveloped areas without finding reference to the importance of incentive through development of wants or the importance of markets as a means by which this incentive can be given. This silence contrasts oddly with the emphasis on aggressive salesmanship and advertising in our own economy. It might be assumed that we need to have our imaginations stimulated, but that underdeveloped peoples have imagination enough already.

[11] Cf. I. C. Greaves, *Modern Production Among Backward Peoples* (London, 1935), Chap. V ("Monetary Incentives and the Standard of Living").

The general assumption has been that if the profit motive of traders is given relatively free play the problems of supplying new goods and services through markets will be taken care of by itself. In my experiences in Central America and British East Africa, the markets show cultural lag. Indeed the traders themselves are in general unfamiliar with the wide range of inexpensive goods which we in the United States take for granted, as a result of the competition of five-and-ten-cent stores, mail-order houses, and other merchandising agencies which offer mass-produced goods at low prices. Also, particularly in Central America, tariffs interfere with imports for popular consumption, and in both Central America and East Africa there is little manufacture of such goods within the countries themselves.[12] On the other hand, in these countries or areas there appears to have been no lack of effort to supply the people with goods and services of an elementary sensory nature such as I spoke of earlier —sweets, proprietary medicines, tobacco, soft and hard drinks—and prostitutes and temporary wives are readily available for wage earners away from home and for some who have their families with them. Governments fight such sensory amenities in some cases, but

[12] That offerings of inexpensive consumers' goods are neglected in underdeveloped countries which have been under the impact of a money economy for some time is suggested by W. H. Nicholls in "Domestic Trade in an Underdeveloped Country—Turkey," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 59, No. 6 (December 1951), pp. 463–80. Not only was there inadequate attention to consumers' wants or needs in Turkey, but "in so far as . . . the consumer-goods industries have . . . been developed, the government has frequently followed a high-price policy to produce the profits necessary to offset losses" incurred elsewhere (p. 465). The author of the article believes that his conclusions are "probably applicable to other countries in approximately the same stage of economic development as Turkey" (p. 478).

are less active in providing a range of alternatives which might take their place.

Two examples of market development

In contrast to this negligence or lethargy, I should like to mention two approaches to the development of markets, one by a colonial and the other by an independent government. The first is in Danish Greenland, where the colonial government has for many years put emphasis on the development of the trading post as an agency for bringing modern civilization to Eskimos. In the second case, at the request of the government of India Professor Lincoln Clark of New York University conducted in the summer of 1955 a marketing experiment to see what consumer response would be to a variety of inexpensive goods sold through mobile stores in different types of regions. To finance this the Indian government set up the National Small Industries Corporation. It is significant that private capital was unwilling to take the risk. The government hopes, however, that after it has demonstrated that selling a variety of inexpensive goods is good business, private investors will buy stock in the corporation.

Our assumption that private capital will take the risks involved in such new undertakings arose at a time of great economic expansion, during and following the commercial and industrial revolutions in Western Europe and the United States, when large risks were taken by men inoculated with the spirit of enterprise and selling primarily to their own people. Very different conditions are involved in the development of new consumers' markets among underdeveloped peoples, either by members of those societies or by businessmen from without. For our businessmen to see opportunities of profit in our own society by selling to our own people calls for less imagination than to see such prospects far afield, especially as the opportunities at home are now very great.

Other contributions to integrated consumption

It is obvious, of course, that a wide range of goods offered through markets, important as it is, is not by itself enough to take care of the development of incentive in an intelligent way. Consumers would still need protection from harmful or deleterious products, and although the offering of a wide range of alternatives is far better than the offering of a narrow range, there could still be disorganization in consumption patterns. The subject is too large to be treated here with any completeness, and I shall not discuss education, which in its broad sense is the foundation of constructive and integrated consumption. I should, however, like to mention two efforts made by native people themselves to deal with the problems involved in incorporating new goods and services into their consumption patterns.

The first example is Japanese. At least as early as the Meiji period, the rulers of Japan began to send some of their own people abroad to examine and bring back elements of foreign culture which appeared to them desirable. These elements were then further examined in Japan and if they passed the test were modified as necessary and introduced into the home culture under the aegis of the emperor, who was also the cultural high priest.

The second example is from modern Kenya. I have mentioned earlier the passion for school building which I saw in the Kikuyu territories in 1950–51. Some of these schools were "independent" schools and had as one of their objects to bridge the gap between the old cultures and the new as a money economy came in. Important elements

both of the curriculum and of extra-curricular activities were the peoples' own efforts toward easing the cultural transition. But when Mau Mau troubles broke out in 1952, these schools were closed on the grounds that they were contributing to Mau Mau; they were not permitted to reopen under their former direction; and their constructive and positive contributions to consumption adjustment were not examined. In this case the money necessary for such a study was offered to the British Colonial Office, the Colonial Office itself to appoint the personnel for the study. It was said that tensions were too great to make study possible, and the offer was declined.

TOO LITTLE EXPLORED

In relation to their great importance, consumption patterns and adjustment within them have received little attention, and little research has dealt with them directly. Consumption problems in general have been less studied than those of other main areas in economics, partly because the consumer's interest is everybody's interest, not that of a special group. In addition, consumption requires a considerable appreciation and some knowledge of social sciences other than economics; in fact, it is the economic example par excellence of need for collaboration among the social sciences. And the problems of consumption, difficult enough at home, become even more difficult when our concern is with the consumption patterns of underdeveloped peoples. We need to acquire a new set of facts and we need to enter into the minds of others, understanding why a condition of wants or lack of wants which seems to us completely unreasonable may not be unreasonable in view of the background against which the condition occurs. Only with such understanding can we see the most intelligent ways by which we can help in providing adequate substitutes for what is passing and in enlarging the range of alternatives for choice. Only with such understanding can we help the people to see their own situation in relation to others, so that they themselves can lay the foundations for their own balanced development.

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The Recruitment of Wage Labor and Development of New Skills

BY MANNING NASH

IN the vanguard of theoretical and practical problems of economic development are the formation and training of a labor force. Attempts to raise the productive capacities and levels of living in regions called "underdeveloped" depend in large measure on the successful and orderly transfer of workers from agricultural and traditional pursuits to occupations connected with the highly rationalized enterprises of modern production.

The change in the disposition of the working population is not only a quantitative redistribution but a qualitative one. A labor force amenable to, and useful in, the process of economic development must at least develop the characteristics of regularity and continuity, technical proficiency, and relatively high productivity. In the context of economic development the emergence of a labor force is not the mere grafting on of manual skills nor the sheer mobilization of numbers of hands. It is a deep-going social process which penetrates the psychology of the worker and reorders his cultural norms and social relations.[1]

Modern inquiry into the process of the transformation of peasants and primitives into members of an industrial labor force is concerned with three analytically distinct aspects of the single social process. (1) What are the circumstances, incentives, and motivations which will induce workers to leave traditional modes of production and enter modern economic activity?[2] (2) What are the processes and mechanisms whereby the personality of the worker, his social relations and cultural norms, become modified so that commitment is made to the industrial way of life? (3) What is the range of social structure, cultural pattern, and personality type which may carry on industrial production?

These large areas of investigation must be resolved by studying a series of variables or factors which in their interconnections will show why peasants and primitives work, how a productive labor force is developed, and what are the limits of the institutional structure of such a labor force. Satisfactory answers to the questions raised are contingent upon a series of empirical instances in a framework of controlled comparisons between the cases. Such an empirical basis hardly exists. The literature on the evolution of a wage labor force is not directly concerned with the problem as such. Most inferences are by-products of studies oriented to other ends.[3]

[1] M. J. Herskovits, "Motivation and Culture Pattern in Technological Change," *International Social Science Bulletin,* Vol. 6 (1954), pp. 388–400; R. Firth, "Money, Work, and Social Change in Indo-Pacific Economic Systems," *ibid.,* pp. 400–410.

[2] This question takes its form from the work of Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrialization and Labor,* Ithaca, N. Y., 1951. In asking it I am concerned with the voluntaristic offering of persons for wage work. Direct and indirect coercion, from slavery to the head tax or vagrancy laws and debt peonage, has sufficed in the past to recruit wage labor. Such labor forces do not offer promising material for economic development, and such methods of recruiting are here considered self-defeating for the end in view.

[3] Wilbert E. Moore, *op. cit.,* makes this evaluation of the literature. His work (*In-*

I shall orient my discussion around the case history of the successful adaptation of a peasant society to industrial work. In the course of this exposition I shall block out those social and cultural factors which appear crucial in the process of labor recruitment and commitment. Such generalizations as I shall arrive at will be "diagnostic." That is, they will point to what, in any primitive or peasant society undergoing economic transformation, seem to be the areas of social life most intimately and immediately involved with, and strategic for, the emergence of a labor force. I need hardly enter the caveat that the range of diversity in peasant and primitive societies precludes the automatic application of principles, or that it is the daily, small-scale actions and decisions which are most likely to determine success or failure, rather than the mere possession of general knowledge.

CANTEL, GUATEMALA

I choose to write about Cantel, an Indian community in the Western Highlands of Guatemala, first because I have intimate, firsthand knowledge of this community, and second because the social and natural situation of the community permits a large degree of control over inference. Cantel is an agrarian community of peasant Indians about six miles from Quezaltenango. Like its neighbors it is a self-conscious local society. Its people have an ethnic identity, a set of shared and particular cultural features, a dialect, and costume which serve to distinguish the local society from other Indian societies and from the larger national society and culture of Guatemala.[4] Cantel's radical difference from the Indian communities around it consists in the fact that Central America's largest textile mill operates within its boundaries, drawing on the local Indian population for its labor force.[5] This circumstance permits the controlled comparison of Cantel's institutional structure with that of neighboring *municipios*, socially and historically similar but for the presence of the factory.[6] Internally, Cantel offers the opportunity to contrast a farming population with a factory population whose cultural norms and economic activities were identical prior to the coming of the factory. Such a social and natural situation permits the description and analysis of the process of labor recruitment and commitment with some confidence as to the correct selection and weighting of variables.

dustrialization and Labor [Ithaca, 1951]; "Primitives and Peasants in Industry," *Social Research*, Vol. 15 [1948], pp. 41–81; "Theoretical Aspects of Industrialization," *ibid.*, pp. 277–303; *Economy and Society* [Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1955]) is both an excellent summary and a skillful interpretation of the literature.

[4] The cultural features of Indian communities like Cantel are briefly summarized in R. Redfield and S. Tax, "General Characteristics of Present-Day Mesoamerican Indian Society," in Sol Tax (Ed.), *Heritage of Conquest* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), pp. 31–39. The relations of one Indian community to others are described by Sol Tax, "The Municipios of the Midwestern Highlands of Guatemala," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 39 (1937), pp. 423–44. These communities closely approximate the "corporate" type described by Eric R. Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 57, No. 3, Part 1 (June 1955), pp. 452–71.

[5] A fuller description of Cantel can be found in Manning Nash, "Cantel: The Industrialization of a Guatemalan Indian Community," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1955.

[6] The methodological rationale of the comparative method in modern anthropology is expounded by Fred Eggan, "Social Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Comparison," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56, No. 5, Part 1 (1954), pp. 743–63. See also O. Lewis, "Comparisons in Anthropology," *Yearbook of Anthropology—1955* (New York, 1955), pp. 259–92.

THE FACTORY

The factory came to Cantel some sixty-five years ago, not because of special labor advantage but rather because the river dropped near Cantel and thus could supply the water power necessary to the factory. The Indians of Cantel, who now form the work force of the factory, were not the first recruits to wage labor. The first workers came from the surrounding villages in the valley of Quezaltenango. These workers were, on the whole, poor propertyless Ladinos (as the carriers of the national brand of Hispano-American culture are called). Along with these Ladinos came some "ladinoized" Indians, persons, for one reason or another, detached from their local Indian communities. Still later some Canteleños, marginal in terms of participation in community affairs, accepted factory work. This labor force was characterized by chronic absenteeism, high turnover of personnel, and the continual loss of skilled hands to Guatemala City. Management met these problems by a combination of coercion and paternalism. Local police were used to round up late and absent employees. Troops of the national government were on hand to quell labor disturbances and curb the villagers' antipathy to the factory. The firm offered inducements of land and housing and tried to settle the minutest disputes by direct intervention of top managers. But until the third decade of the twentieth century, high turnover, absenteeism, and low productivity persisted.

Today (as of 1954, and prior to the dissolution of the local union in that year) the factory of Cantel employs about nine hundred Canteleños, one-fourth of the community's working population. The work force is regular in reporting, skilled in technical operations, not marked by high turnover, and of reasonable productivity. Between the founding of the factory and its current operation, therefore, there has taken place a process of commitment of workers, so that a labor force with characteristics suitable to further economic development has emerged. How did such a working population become attracted to factory work, and how did those who came to the factory become sufficiently involved in it to stay and learn new manual skills together with the discipline and routine of centralized machine production?

ATTRACTIONS OF FACTORY WORK

When it is asked why the first Canteleños accepted factory work, the answer is poverty. Cantel is essentially an agrarian community where most people's living depends upon ownership of or access to tillable land. To meet Cantel's modest definition of a standard of living, twenty *cuerdas* (a *cuerda* is a land measure equaling 0.108 acre, so that twenty *cuerdas* equal 2.16 acres) of good land are needed. The average land holding appears to lie between eight and nine *cuerdas* per family. And from the sample made of those who are factory wage workers, only two persons with more than ten *cuerdas* were so employed. In its early days, the factory paid a wage equivalent to the going rate for field hands, but since the enactment of a minimum wage law factory work pays more than double the field wage. Poverty is the first propellent to factory work, and a significant economic differential return for labor is the second.

Money is a familiar thing in Indian Guatemala, a part of daily experience and necessary for the purchase of many of the essentials of life and for participation in the ritual aspects of community membership. As such, the economic differential of the rewards of factory work is translatable into the goods

of traditional life. A wage from the factory has certain other characteristics which make it appealing when contrasted with farming income. It has regularity, week after week, and continuity, year after year. Agricultural returns, both for hired help and proprietors, have peaks and troughs corresponding to the harvesting, planting, and marketing cycle. And since farming in Cantel is but little removed in technology from pre-Columbian methods, there are in addition lean and fat years. Factory wages—since the factory has worked without major stoppage except for a brief period in the depression—are more nearly matched to the constant need for money. The factory employee recognizes in expressions like *el centavo mas seguro* ("the sure and continual penny") this advantage which is the economic attraction of the factory.

Beside wages, factory employment offers social services. Housing is provided in 125 separate, rent-free houses. The houses are not large, nor do they have patios as do all other houses in Cantel, however poor, but some are equipped with electricity, elsewhere available only in a few houses in the town center. The social importance of having a house, of being head of a household, cannot be overestimated in Cantel, so that this practice enables many to set up an independent household. In addition to housing, the factory operates a school for employees' children. The school has a six-hour day in contrast to the four-hour day of the national schools. This longer day is considered advantageous for the absorption of knowledge. By parents who have decided that something of the national language, Spanish (usually a second language and learned in the school; Quiché is the language of the home), is useful for their children, the supposed virtue of the longer day is recognized.

Some minor social services are available only to factory hands. Medical facilities consisting of the services of a doctor who makes daily afternoon visits, a nurse always on hand, and a clinic dispensing simple palliatives along with medical advice are paid for by the mill. The clinic and the doctor's services are not highly valued by the factory worker, since the examination is superficial and the Indian knows he would get a better treatment were he pay for it. But the prenatal care given to factory women or wives is more valued. Being a factory worker entitles one to participate in the Guatemalan system of social security, which is an accident and ambulance service rather than an old-age retirement plan. This medical care is a distinct good, although only utilized in crises or accidents.

These factors, taken together, are the economic dimensions of the factory's attractiveness: a clear and significant income differential, social and medical services, and the possibility of a house or land use lent by the factory. They have their pull in a context of rural poverty and inadequate land resources.

ADJUSTMENT TO OCCUPATIONAL ROLE

Between recruitment, which is accomplished by the economic and social service factors enumerated, and commitment, which is the personal involvement in and attachment to the industrial work cycle, lies adjustment or adaptation to a new occupational role. The Canteleño in the factory finds himself working under conditions for which there are no analogues in his society or life experience. He or she comes to the factory usually illiterate,[7] without previous experience with machinery of any kind; neither the gadgets of the housewife nor the motors and tools of Western men. The incoming worker is used to small

[7] For the past four or five years only "literates" have been hired.

work groups where work is carried out by men repeating the same kind of task rather than a true division of labor requiring co-ordination and teamwork. The worker is used to setting his own rhythm of physical output, not adjusting to a machine tempo. He is accustomed to work without direction or supervision. He works with relatives or acquaintances, not strangers, choosing with whom he shall share effort. If tired or ill he need not go to his field, whereas the factory has a fixed hour of reporting and a set number of hours of continual effort. In agricultural work, standards of performance are judged by himself against a physical harvest; in the factory, output is measured by impersonal standards of numbers of inches of cloth, and there is no product which is the worker's own.

Training techniques

This discontinuity between the occupational role of farmer and factory worker sets the problem of accommodation of the individual to factory work. Induction into the factory routine and the pattern of authority in work relations facilitate personal adjustment. New workers in the factory are trained by other Canteleños, in a manner similar to the learning situations in the home and throughout childhood. Essentially the new skills connected with factory work are learned through observation of the already skilled operator by the recruit. Not much verbal instruction is given, not many questions are asked, and no display of superiority or overt use of authority is made. The novice begins work when he feels he is able to perform, not after a fixed training period. Such a pattern of training duplicates the older-younger sibling learning in a Cantel home and avoids the public shame of bad performance or too rapid demands on the novice. For skills of greater technical proficiency than running a weaving or cotton spinning machine, training lies in the hands of the technical staff. The technical staff consists of a British engineer in charge of weaving, another Britisher in charge of spinning, and a German dye master. These foreign engineers have both Indian and Ladino assistants who work in machine maintenance, electrical shops, and a carpentry workshop. Here training is carried out differently. If the training situation for the mill hand is analogous to the home, the highly skilled training is similar to the school. Performance is more difficult to secure, and the engineers complain that costly mistakes are often made. Raw recruits to factory work do not get selected for this work, and skilled trainees are taken from the mill hands who have already shown an involvement with factory work.

An acceptable schedule

The time and tempo patterns of factory work are not large problems in adjustment. The peasant Indian is a regular and hard worker, so that getting to work daily fits his value system and his past work experience. Reporting at a fixed hour was once a problem, but sanctions of wage loss cured this. Factory work does not, furthermore, require a different diurnal or annual cycle from agricultural work. The three-meals-a-day custom can easily be carried on by the factory worker, as well as the customary leisure time. The factory closes during communal festivals, and workers are given time off to participate in social and religious communal duties.[8] The work year of the factory is neces-

[8] The adjustment of the factory and community is described in Manning Nash, "The Reaction of a Civil-Religious Hierarchy to a Factory in Guatemala," *Human Organization*, Vol. 13 (1955), pp. 26–28.

sarily in accord with the workers' demands, rather than an ideal one from the point of view of most efficient production. Several attempts by the managers to alter the work pattern have come to nil. The factory comes back to a schedule acceptable to the Canteleño.

In comparison to the physical demands of agriculture, factory work is, in many senses, less demanding and less fatiguing. Even housework in Cantel is a physically trying task when compared to factory work. There is some need for adjustment to the strange tempo of machine rhythm, but this is not difficult. Questioning about difficulties in getting used to physical strain and tempo in the factory elicits blank stares or long pauses while memory is ransacked. For peasants who value industriousness and are accustomed to few physical comforts and a life of toil, the shift in work pattern when entering the factory is at most only a ripple and not a jolt. Some selection, of course, takes place in terms of the routine of work and effort. Those who leave on this count leave early, and they are those whose work habits are not regular even in traditional occupations—chiefly the young loafer, the habitual drinker, and the housewife seeking escape.

The Canteleño foreman

The co-ordinated work of a machine line is under a foreman who, like his workers, is a Canteleño. In the exercise of his role, he takes into account the cultural notions of the legitimate exercise of authority; there is little overt display of power or direct giving of orders. Co-ordination on the machine line becomes not greatly different from a work party at harvest time. The identication of foreman and worker insulates the management from the informal norms which on the one hand govern productive output and on the other assist the worker to integrate himself into a group work situation.

NEW SOCIAL RELATIONS

Commitment to factory work is only partly explained by adjustment to the occupational role. Around that role have grown up sets of social relations and cultural norms which help to tie the worker to his job and to make the job itself more desirable.

The labor union

The *sindicato,* or labor union, of Cantel was the chief agent through which new social relations evolved in conjunction with wage work in the factory. As a direct economic consequence of unionization, wages were raised, a mechanism for direct and swift airing of grievances was instituted, some control over the job and conditions of work were gained. But in addition to these gains, the fact of unionization and participation in a voluntary organization in itself made for greater involvement with factory work. Workers, by attending the frequent union meetings, developed friendships among themselves on the basis of personal choice and came to have a sense of distinctness as a pressure group and a power group. Since personal friendships of any deep and intimate nature are lacking in traditional interpersonal relations, the growth of personal ties in a job-union context gave those who developed them additional reasons for staying at the factory.

The power and pressure aspects of the union's political activity gave factory workers a sense of communal importance and individual worth. The union acted often in the name of the factory workers as a group in the community. It worked jointly with the community to get a school of the modern type built in Cantel; it helped pay

for a bridge across the river which divides the town settlement from the factory, and together with the community paid for the making of a public bathing place. Union membership, which just before the revolution of Castillo Armas was nearly coterminous with factory employment, made individuals feel both socially more useful and politically more powerful. The union played the role of welding the worker to his job, as well as increasing his control over it and return from it. In the week after the revolution which brought the union to an end, thirty-two workers, mainly those who had been politically active and those who feared a wage cut without the presence of the union, voluntarily left their jobs, the largest single week of turnover in more than three decades.

Leisure-time activities

Other voluntary associations playing in lesser degree the role of the union have grown up around factory work. A bicycle club, a basketball team and a soccer team, and a religious society dedicated to a patron saint of the factory settlement are the associations based on leisure-time activity in which membership or participation is contingent upon factory employment.

Background continuity

This attachment to and involvement in factory wage work takes place against a background of social and cultural continuity. The factory worker, when compared to the nonfactory worker, is not, beyond the bounds of the factory walls, visibly socially differentiated or culturally distinct. The factory worker's values, world view, familial relations, religious notions, social obligations, nearly match those of his agricultural counterpart. Such small social and cultural differences as have obtained between factory and nonfactory worker tend to be additive, rather than opposed to traditional norms and usages. In short, the factory worker continues in those relations and with those cultural norms which in the past have given the context of meaning for occupational effort.

Some new items of consumption are restricted in use only to factory workers, and some items of consumption are used most frequently by factory workers. The bicycle, wrist watch, correspondence course, and motorcycle are owned only by factory workers. Radios, shoes, sewing machines, canned foods, felt hats, and fully cut men's jackets with shirts and ties are more used by factory wage workers than the rest of the Cantel population. On the whole, it appears that new income is used to implement old cultural needs and wants. Factory workers use more of, and different proportions of, the same things that nonfactory workers use. Women's dress illustrates this. The Indian costume of the factory girl is, in content and style, exactly like the agricultural housewife's—except that it tends to be of better material, have more embroidery, be newer, and to be one of a wardrobe.

INTERACTING FACTORS IN LABOR RECRUITMENT AND COMMITMENT

The recruitment and commitment of the labor force of Cantel, in summary, appears to be a product of the interaction of several factors. In isolating these factors which seem to underlie the successful emergence of a wage labor force, I am at the same time offering a theory of wage-labor recruitment in peasant societies. Stated rather abstractly, and with some attempt at rigor, it may be said:

A wage labor force which is regular, efficient, and willing to learn new skills

will be recruited from peasant societies and maintained at wage work if: (1) the economic returns of wage labor are significantly greater than alternative opportunity in an impoverished rural area; (2) the income is translatable into customary channels of expenditure; (3) the training for wage work, the exercise of authority on the job, and the standards of output allow the recruit to adjust occupationally at his own pace; (4) new relations emerge in the context of wage work, and if these new social relations involve personal bonds; (5) a workers' organization evolves which gives wage workers some command over the job and conditions of work; (6) the institutional structure beyond the wage work situation is relatively intact so that a set of cultural norms and social relations continue to give content and meaning to work effort and coherence to personality; (7) the wage worker is not significantly differentiated socially or isolated culturally from those with whom he has the greatest frequency and depth of social interaction; (8) there are new wants tied to money wages and some social and medical services contingent to staying at wage work.

These eight variables apparently are logically adequate to describe the successful adaptation to wage work in Cantel. Several large areas of doubt, however, remain, even if the posited factors are accepted. First, the question of the weighting or ranking of the variables is left unresolved, although the order in which they appear testifies to my conviction as to their relative importance. Second, such a process as took place in Cantel is only one of a number of possibilities. And finally, the question of the role of cultural variability is not directly faced. We are left unsure, then, as to the relative importance of the variables, the delimitation of other processes of development, and the meaning of different cultural heritages in the recruitment and commitment of a wage labor force.

Comparative evidence, controlling some of the variables, is needed to assess the general adequacy of such a series of propositions as are offered here. By crude inspection, cases in which unsuccessful labor recruitment and commitment processes were undergone appear to lack one or another of the eight factors enumerated. Thus in much of Africa unions are not permitted, traditional social relations are subverted, and satisfying new ones are not permitted to emerge, while the rate of pay is often only nominal.[9] In South and East Asia, money returns are low, living conditions associated with wage work are poor, and much of the social and cultural life of the wage worker is disorganized.[10] In China the conditions of factory work and especially the pattern of the plant authority make for disgruntled workers.[11] In Latin America the work force in many countries leaves regular employment at the first opportunity. This catalogue does not advance our theoretical understanding, although it gives a certain aura of plausibility to the theory here developed. Only further field work can solve the problems.

[9] For social disruption under modern conditions see L. P. Mair, "African Marriage and Social Change," in Arthur Phillips (Ed.), *Survey of African Marriage and Family Life* (London, 1953), pp. 1–171. Illustrative also are J. M. Tinley, *The Native Labor Problem of South Africa* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1942); G. St. J. Orde-Browne, *The African Labourer* (London, 1933); A. Doucy and Pierre Feldheim, *Problèmes du travail et politique au Congo belge* (Brussels, 1952).

[10] See R. Mukerjee, *The Indian Working Class* (Bombay, 1945); Kewal Motwani, "The Impact of Modern Technology on the Social Structure of South Asia," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1951), pp. 783–93; Manning Nash, "Some Notes on Village Industrialization in South and East Asia," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 3 (1955), pp. 271–77.

[11] Shih Kuo-Heng, *China Enters the Machine Age*, Cambridge, Mass., 1944.

INDUSTRY WITHOUT DESTRUCTION

The emergence of the Cantel wage labor force and the relatively smooth adjustment of the factory and community to each other are historical products, evolved over time without plan or blueprint. If the community had been studied in the early 1920's, the results here described could not have been forecast, for then a reasonable observer would have had strong doubts about the stabilization of a labor force and would, in justice, have singled out social and cultural features which would impede or prevent the operation of a factory using Cantel Indian labor. Yet it is this same institutional structure, with but slight modifications, and the same factory, again with minor changes, which live in peaceful coexistence.

Theoretically, such an admission implies that the range of social structures and conventional understandings in which modern industry may operate is not yet charted. Procedurally and practically the consequences are significant: administrators, planners, technical assistance experts, and social scientists cannot specify with confidence what degree and kind of change will be necessary in a peasant society if it is to have a wage labor force, though they may be able to say what is necessary to get a process of economic development started. If this is indeed the case, then the course of wisdom appears to be that of allowing the peasant to choose between as many alternatives as the ingenuity of the administrator and the peasant can devise.[12] The process of economic betterment of the peasant and primitive depends upon their personal commitment. It is only prudent to proceed along those paths which the people of underdeveloped countries wish to tread.

Perhaps Humboldt's observations on the drive for progress of the last century are even more applicable today than when made:

> We hear it frequently repeated in the Spanish colonies, that the inhabitants of the warm regions (tierra caliente) will never awake from the state of apathy in which for centuries they have been plunged, till a royal *cedula* shall order the destruction of the banana plantations (*platanaris*). The remedy is violent, and those who propose it with so much warmth do not in general display more activity than the lower people, whom they would force to work by augmenting the number of their wants. It is to be hoped that industry will make progress among the Mexicans without recurring to means of destruction.[13]

For our times we cannot afford the luxury of calling our needs other people's imperatives; we must primarily take into account the aspirations and values of those from whom we seek to lift the stigma of poverty.

[12] The theoretical and anthropological canons underlying such a course are presented in Sol Tax, "Selective Culture Change," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1951), pp. 315–20.

[13] Alexander Humboldt, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, translated by John Black (New York, 1811), Vol. II, p. 299.

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The Evolution of Entrepreneurship in the Process of Economic Development

By Leo Silberman

THE underdeveloped countries share with the so-called developed countries a common preoccupation. However at variance their general problems, they must both maintain a high degree of enterprise if their economies wish to take advantage of current opportunities —indeed if they want to keep going at all. Under the prevailing political, demographic, and technological pressures discussion must sooner or later center on the demiurge of economic change, the enterprising individual. Real, full-blooded persons whose genesis, role, and training can be studied therefore engage the attention of the theorists, bringing economics and historical scholarship into a closer, fruitful relationship. The new interest has a wide scope. The entrepreneur may be a private individual, the head of a cooperative society, or member of the board of a nationalized industry. In any guise the manner in which he makes his economic decisions and adapts them to new areas—many of them stagnant, economically uncreative—will unlock new, rich, factual material of the utmost importance to economic theory. The purpose of this paper is to examine (1) the reasons why despite a hopeful beginning in the eighteenth century this discussion is still a relative novelty; (2) the particular political and conceptual labors which in the underdeveloped territories are giving birth to entrepreneurship; and (3) the likelihood that amid these difficulties new aspects of economic entrepreneurship will be discovered.

What gives the new focus a special point of interest is its relevance to teaching. American universities, of course, can look back upon forty years of industrial economics and administrative engineering. Until the postwar days, however, schools of business did not attract the right kind of students. As surveys in *Fortune* (among others) show, the average IQ is below those of other university departments and senior executives have not usually been trained in them. In Europe, and still more in the underdeveloped countries, academics have been largely indifferent to the professional training of the businessman. Aided at last by American foundations, by the United Nations or their agencies, or by their governments, the underdeveloped countries are just establishing institutes of management, schools of business administration, or special "administrative staff colleges." The International Labor Organization has started a department directed towards the improvement of management and its morale, a move which would have surprised the founders of the Organization.

As a theoretical movement, the inquiry into the "entrepreneurial elites" goes back some ten years.

One can trace it to its origin, recalling a small, and at the time seemingly unimportant, controversy in 1946–47. Professor Frederic Benham's *National Income of Jamaica* was taken to task in a long review by Arthur Lewis, a West Indian by birth, who since has advised a number of governments concerned with promoting economic growth. Prior to the war, Colin Clark's work and plea for a trend-minded, statistically informed economic analysis, and the subsequent difficulties of governments with production and wartime taxation, gave occasion for a number of national income inquiries. The West Indies, which had languished ever since the Great Depression, were an obvious area of study. Benham showed painstakingly the contributions made by the different sectors of the economy to the national income, but, on the constructive side, concentrated on agriculture and a demand for higher labor productivity, tempered by an undisguised pessimism that in hot climates little could be expected; the small local market gave faint hope for industrial developments. Lewis challenged all this. He criticized the neglect of the sociological and educational problems of entrepreneurship. To him Benham reflected the "laisser faire philosophy of the British West Indian governments, which was "the principal obstacle to the industrialization of the islands."

> Successful industrialization demands self-confidence, drive, initiative and soundly conceived policies, and it is precisely these that are most obviously lacking in those who have the formal responsibility for the development of manufacturing in the island. . . . Oxford has no particular geographical advantages for motor car manufacture; it just happened that Lord Nuffield's father had a bicycle shop there.[1]

On Forgetting a Concept

At first sight it must seem odd that these phrases and emphases came as something new. *How was it that economists could have taken entrepreneurship for granted?* The earliest economists were aware of the problem. Colbert complained that "French businessmen have no initiative; they won't touch anything that is novel." [2] Colbert's official life was spent in the search for means of stimulating French entrepreneurship. In *Le Parfait Négociant* (1736), dedicated to him, Jacques Savary hoped to counteract "the disdain of our youth for industry and commercial careers." A generation later, the "father of political theory," Cantillon, quite in the modern manner, told us "how villages may be settled; how market towns may be established; how capital cities may be established"; and in Chapter 13 of the *Essai sur la nature du commerce en général* showed why the number of risk bearers must be small and entrepreneurship a scarce resource:

> Entrepreneurs can never know the volume of consumption in their town, nor how much their customers will buy of them. This causes so much uncertainty among these entrepreneurs that there are almost daily bankruptcies among them.

Cantillon introduced the term *entrepreneur,* for which no happy English word was found. The article on commerce in the *Encyclopédie* gave practical hints on enterprise. Adam Smith referred to Cantillon. But already Adam Smith had little doubt that if the market presented opportunities there would always be men who would turn them to good account. Enterprise was an economic not a human problem. More and more discussion revolved around the just reward which enterprising individuals could expect, less and less on the generation of managerial ability and risk taking. Entrepreneurial talent was a mystery. Alfred Marshall wrote of "the supreme economizing force of a great constructive genius working at a

[1] W. Arthur Lewis, "The Industrialization of the British West Indies," *Caribbean Economic Review,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (May 1950), pp. 34, 36.

[2] Quoted by Paul Kaeppelin, *Les Origines de l'Inde française. La Compagnie des Indes orientales et François Martin* (Paris, 1908), p. 273.

new and large problem with a free hand," and thought that "Mr. Vanderbilt probably saved to the people of the United States more than he accumulated himself." [3] It was idle to plumb the depths of entrepreneurial genius. Anyway, at home and overseas, the intelligent nineteenth-century observer found no want of enterprise. It was not like Mr. Vanderbilt's but there was no occasion to worry oneself on this score:

> Broking and discounting and forestalling and retailing were going briskly along either bank of the Ganges while Gurney and Overend were squabbling over the skin of a badger; while Fortnum and Mason were driving a bouncing trade in acorns; while Rothschild was compounding his last grinder with some fierce chieftain in Franconia.[4]

One will look in vain for any mercantilist anxiety over entrepreneurship in the volumes of Cromer on Egypt. The British agent and consul general, scion of the Baring banking family with a background in Jamaica, the Ionian Islands, and India, dealt with a dozen developmental problems; was concerned with standards of honesty and competency in the overseas administrations, the building of ports, the Suez Canal, the repayment of loans and khedival extravagances; but nothing was mentioned about the dearth of enterprise among the ordinary Egyptian countrymen. Today Egyptian nationalists are supremely concerned with the "egyptianization" of trade and have a whole corpus of legislation to promote it; they deem the stimulation of enterprise (by fair means and other) one of their prime duties; indeed Egypt has, as the wits might say, been "Baring too much." However, this is a recent, postwar dissatisfaction. Egyptian nationalism in Cromer's day and into the interwar years was silent about entrepreneurial matters, for it, like the rest of the world, put the accent on other considerations, which still form the grand antithesis to what must appear to many of the older generation as a strange evolution, "promoting the promoters."

[3] *Principles of Economics,* Book VI, Chap. XII, § 11.

[4] G. O. Trevelyan, *The Competition Wallah* (Cambridge, Eng., 1864), pp. 254–55.

Specter of Overenterprise

British and Arab nationalists agreed in the interwar years that entrepreneurial problems should take second place, that they ranked in importance far behind strategic and administrative developments and welfare. "I'm damned if I let any Whiskeyfied Scot engineer into the Sudan," wrote Sir Douglas Newbold to a friend.[5] The Chief Secretary pointed with pride to the government-run railways, the government hotels and Nile ships, the sugar monopoly, and to the nationalization of gum products and of the Gezira Cotton Scheme—in fact, of everything of any real interest in the Sudan. The Sudan needed no more enterprise.

Schooled in the fight against the slave traders, in the protection of indentured labor (long before in Europe factory inspectors had become effective instruments), in the prohibition of further land alienation and the redemption of debts foolishly incurred by ignorant, wasteful chiefs and sultans, the British, French, and Belgian Colonial Services saw themselves as a counterweight to large-scale enterprise. Social reformers made the most of the exploitative aspects of enterprise. "The soap boilers of the world" (as Milner called them) might argue that Nigeria needed new incentives, but the Nigerian government refused them concessions. They pleaded

[5] K. D. D. Henderson, *The Making of the Modern Sudan: The Life and Letters of Sir Douglas Newbold* (London, 1953), p. 100.

that to achieve progress, Nigeria had to export; progress would give hope; hope would unleash the productive faculties of the Africans; a busy society would attract further capital and secure higher standards of living. Left to himself the African with his "magical techniques" would continue to collect wild oil-palm fruits instead of cultivating them: he would lose time climbing trees deep in the indigenous forests, stack the fruit in heaps where it would ferment, and so deliver oil of low quality. The government was deaf to these representations. Its business was to make haste slowly; its real "dual mandate" was to protect indigenous society from the ravages of detribalization and achieve probity in the civil service. This if anything was the meaning of the League of Nations Mandate system, the conventions of the ILO, the policy of indirect rule with its respect for native custom and native law. More and more overseas governments had become conscious of the drain which foreign enterprise constituted in the remittances of dividends, savings, and pensions spent in the European countries.

Those engaging in retail trade—the Lebanese, the Greeks, the Indians, the Chinese with their long string of middlemen—seemed a great annoyance, raising the cost of consumption goods and thus reducing the real income of the natives. Their books were kept in strange languages or not at all, and they paid little in income tax. In times of stress their propensity for gun running, diamond smuggling, drug peddling, black marketeering, exposed their natural inclinations. They entered into rings which kept the natives out, and they tried to corrupt the civil service. The stereotype became so fixed that the Martindale Commission wrongfully charged the Supplies and Customs Departments of the Gold Coast with corruption by a "group of importers, none of whom notably was of other race than Greek or Asiatic." [6]

Fear of a proletarianization of the tribal peoples was now uppermost in the minds of the welfare-conscious governments, thoroughly scared by the depression of the prices of tropical products on the world market. The interwar period was fertile above all in restrictive practices. International cartels for the control of metals, nitrate, sulphur, quinine; the Stevenson Plan for the limitation of rubber production and the Chadbourne Plan for wheat; sugar quotas and the burning of coffee; were much publicized. In a pacifist age the uneasy feeling that enterprise was at the bottom of the "imperialist rivalries" and war recalled the old remark by Goethe: "War, trade, and piracy, an inseparable trinity." This was not the atmosphere in which entrepreneurship could be fostered or become a plank of overseas development as it has today. And yet the recent debate has not come completely as a surprise.

Meaning of "Entrepreneurial Elite" Discussions

We were being prepared for it before World War I. Werner Sombart's *Der Bourgeois,* a *Geistesgeschichte* of capitalist man, still conceived him as a rugged individualist, a piratical, condottieri type, but Sombart foreshadows the day when bourgeois will have to be made not restrained. "In the first stages of capitalism entrepreneurs seek a system, in the mature stages the system seeks entrepreneurs." He ends his book with the question:

> And what will happen when the time of senescence comes? It is not our business to inquire into the period when the capitalist spirit will have exhausted its vitality.

[6] Quoted by P. T. Bauer, *West African Trade* (Cambridge, Eng., 1954), p. 86.

The giant gone blind may perhaps be harnessed to the cart of democratic culture-mongering. Or perhaps the time of the *Götterdämmerung* will have struck and the gold will be returned to the Rhine stream. Who can tell? [7]

Contemporary policies intend to harness the entreprenurial drives to national policies designed to speed the process of economic growth; they are often suggested by "planners" with little personal sympathy for the world of the "bourgeois" and the moneybag. One has the suspicion that the entrepreneurs are to be the cart horse of "democratic culturemongering," a kind of Lucifer who unwittingly promotes a divine plan.

Inevitably one thinks of Schumpeter in this context. Schumpeter was a man of very different stamp from Sombart, but in his *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942) he echoed some of Sombart's impressions of a capitalistic *Götterdämmerung*. He spoke of the "obsolescence of the entrepreneurial function," a consequence of technical and statistical progress; what amounts to a time and motion study of every phase of industrial activity will shortly replace the old flair and the capitalist intuition. "The more we progress in our control over nature and the more the domain of rationalization and calculation is extended, the more will the importance of the entrepreneur decline, as the importance of the general has already declined." [8] Schumpeter saw youth turning its back on money-making; high taxation abolished the leisure classes; an opprobrium had fallen upon the rich men that survived. However, curiously enough, Schumpeter is nowadays more often quoted for his contrary views, for his earlier glorification of the leadership function of the entrepreneur class endowed with "excess energy," prepared to do "more and more things differently." "The entrepreneur is nothing but leadership expressed in the economic field." [9]

Looking over the history of economic theory since the days of Cantillon, we can see a gradual sharpening of concepts: there is the classical undifferentiated notion which combined in one person—the man of property—the functions of financing, managing, and selling; the nineteenth century separated the capitalist from the production manager; Pareto, taking exception especially to Marx's analysis, sharply contrasted the psychology of the entrepreneur and the rentier; finally we reach Schumpeter's Promethean definition of the innovating entrepreneur as one who breaks out of the traditional culture flow, one who rebuilds the economy, and redirects human interactions towards new forms of living. Thus investment becomes the economic equivalent of personal "commitment": a nation which hoards its strength forsakes its obligations; it abandons its frontiers. National income now becomes a function of employment, employment of investment, investment a strategic defense—of progress, of the security of the currency, and of political security. When in 1940 the German armies overran France, the lack of overseas enterprise in the French Empire made the arguments for a humiliating surrender in Paris most plausible.

Postwar world

In the postwar world the voice of world opinion has been added: our social conscience is demanding the raising of overseas living standards. An increase in world prices and in the output of the raw materials exported by backward areas gives a note of realism to these demands. Purse strings have been loosened; economies are healthier. In 1938, the Gold Coast earned 4.5 million pounds from its cocoa exports; in 1952 these had risen to 52.5 million. Prior to the war, Nigerian exports were less than 10 million pounds; in 1951 they totaled 116 million. Southern Rhodesian exports increased from 1.6 to 28 million pounds. In South America and Asia similar progress has been achieved. Copra from the Polynesian islands sold at £5 per ton before the war; now it fetches £60. Travelers to the smallest islands report the spread of mosquito nets and electric flashlights in the forests. Surfaced roads, more children wearing shoes, street lighting, the replacement of thatched roofs by permanent materials, herald the coming of new days. Technical and agricultural discoveries, medical progress, cheaper transport, better international communications, migration and exchange schemes, more education (the enrollment at the University College of the Gold Coast in Achimota rose in six years from 90 to 480 students)—the territories have at last a chance of deploying their entrepreneurial capabilities. Meanwhile in the hands of Keynes economics made sense of dynamic analysis.

[7] Werner Sombart, *Der Bourgeois* (Munich and Leipzig, 1913), p. 464. The work was published in English under the title *The Quintessence of Capitalism*, translated and edited by M. Epstein, London, 1915.

[8] *Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung* (2nd ed.; Munich, 1926), p. 125.

[9] *Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaft* (4th ed.; Jena, 1923–28), p. 482.

NATIONALISM THE SECOND LANGUAGE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Keynesian economics was directed primarily against the rentier mentality. People could call themselves businessmen and yet refuse to invest; playing safe they could invest in consols rather than in industrials and generally show pusillanimity in their economic conduct. There was in the developed countries a dangerous propensity to hoard and by the use of a dear money policy to exploit many imperial monopolies. They were defiantly resting on the oars of previous venturers who had rowed themselves up the Nile or the Ganges. Recalling the spurned wisdom of mercantilists (Josiah Child had misgivings about emigration, for it constituted to the motherland a loss of social intelligence and of manpower), Keynes as early as 1924 attacked the Colonial Stocks Acts which had caused "large sums to flow abroad without there having been a vestige of deliberate calculation on the part of anybody that this is the best way of employing resources in the national interest."

> . . . the nineteenth century . . . came to look on an arrangement as normal which was really most abnormal. To lend vast sums abroad for long periods of time without any possibility of legal redress, if things go wrong, is a crazy construction; especially in return for a trifling extra interest. . . . If a loan to improve a South American capital is repudiated we have nothing. If a Poplar housing loan is repudiated, we, as a nation, still have the houses. If the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada fails its shareholders by reason of legal restriction of the rates chargeable or for any other cause, we have nothing. If the Underground System of London fails its shareholders, Londoners still have their Underground System.[10]

Keynes reintroduced and gradually familiarized us with the national, or rather the nationalist, interest. The nineteenth-century belief in a world economy of interlocking continents, the peripheral nations in continuous and growing commercial dependence to the Western manufacturing nations, had been dissipated in World War I. Another world war, and the "dependent"

[10] Quoted by S. Herbert Frankel, *Some Conceptual Aspects of International Economic Development of Underdeveloped Territories* (Essays on International Finance, No. 14 [Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University, Department of Economics and Social Institutions, International Finance Section, May 1952]), p. 11.

developed their own fierce nationalism. Hence at a moment when entrepreneurship is once again acclaimed and international investment is considered important for international survival, nationalism (in both the old and new countries) runs a turbulent crosscurrent. We find Mr. Richard Wright advising Mr. Nkrumah, the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast:

> Beware of a Volta Project built by foreign money. Build your own Volta, and build it out of the sheer lives and bodies of your people! . . . Africa needs this hardness, *but only from Africans.*
>
> . . . Be on top of theory; don't let theory be on top of you.
>
> . . . I am an American and my country too was once a colony of England.[11]

Lever Brothers and Shell and the other large foreign companies which operate in the United States cause no adverse criticism among patriotic American citizens, but the same firms or their local subsidiaries are the subject of controversy and sometimes of revolutions in the countries which simultaneously complain of being underdeveloped and in need of foreign technical aid. The United States plentifully provided with entrepreneurial talent and know-how will absorb without fuss foreign enterprise. Whereas the countries starved of capital and commercial skills of a high order make countless difficulties. Moreover, the present buoyant developments in the "developed" countries give an opportunity for profitable investment at home. Contrary to the assumption by Hobson and Lenin at the beginning of the twentieth century, there is little money pressing for export in overseas investment, less in the more mature stages of capitalist development than in its early phases. Mr. Benjamin Higgins calculates that if the United States were to invest the same proportional amount of her national income as that invested by British capitalists of the nineteenth century abroad, her lending abroad would have to be increased tenfold, to an annual amount of 600 billion dollars. Where, as in the oil industry, foreign capital is invested in a massive way the very size and monopolistic character of the undertakings give rise to misgivings in the weak overseas countries.

[11] *Black Power* (New York, 1954), pp. 349–51.

The foreign flag follows foreign trade

Nationalism is of course right to remember that the foreign flag frequently followed foreign trade. In the process the term "native" acquired a belittling connotation. From small coastal stations and trading concessions the East India Company made the whole subcontinent a British dominion. The Baghdad Railway was the football of imperial rivalries. Kruger at Pretoria appreciated the threat which the *uitlanders* at Johannesburg constituted to his archaic Boer Republic. The long war which ensued was not completed with the Treaty of Vereeniging; it goes on to this day. The Boer Chamber of Commerce last year called with defensive fervor upon all the *volk* to "buy Boer" and build firms free of British participation. The same policies have begun to animate in turn South Africa's non-European sections. Even the Cape Colored, people of slave and mixed descent, traditionally artisans, servants, and workers in the vineyards, feel:

> . . . it is time that the Coloured people show a little enterprise themselves. Apart from a fairly large number of Indian shops and very few isolated business concerns (usually one-man shows) the commercial enterprise of the Coloured man is a blank. Something can be done if only the people have guts and ambition. It is time that we made our own openings for our youth.[12]

Sectional nationalism

Sectional nationalism is invoked to assist the concentration of capital, to ensure a market for the enterprise belonging to one's own ethnic group, to use a local rather than a foreign bank, to rig licenses, and on occasion to expel the foreigner.

> In Kumasi in the Gold Coast there is opposition from Ashanti traders to the Goa migrants, and farther South by the Fanti to the Kwahu, as well as to the Yoruba from Nigeria. Somewhat similar tendencies can be seen in Sierra Leone where in the Protectorate area there is now a noticeable hostility to the Creoles from Freetown and the Colony. In Nigeria, almost every prominent Yoruba chief has trading interest and so have many Hausa emirs. In many instances the official attitude has failed to check and has at times encouraged the restrictive aims of sectional interests, possibly for reasons of administrative convenience and because of fear of political unsettlement.[13]

Statesmanship is engaged in an uphill fight to keep federal bodies together. In Nigeria, in the West Indies, in Malaya, plural societies show centrifugal tendencies. Partition schemes and immigration restrictions are multiplying. British Honduras in need of manpower is opposed to Jamaicans, linguistically and racially kinsmen, for fear of the greater vitality *and entrepreneurship* of the people from the neighboring island.

Values of nationalism

Nonetheless, it must be admitted that nationalism breaks down the belief that some products and techniques belong to the foreigner; [14] that trades are fixed, the specialism of certain races; the manipulative element which accompanies political resurgences has reduced (or at least shifted) the magical beliefs. It is no more believed that a certain sail or craft must for all time be Moslem, another technique or instrument Hindu. Myrdal and Nurkse have stressed the positive features of nationalist policies: the transcendence of parochial boundaries, the activization of large numbers, dynamic commercial policies, and a civic pride in physical reconstruction. "Nkrumah's Special Talcum Powder" bearing the nationalist colors may cause a smile in Europe but the nationalists and the Gold Coast may have the last laugh.

In East Africa, the African has traditionally been the hewer of wood and the carrier of water; the Sikh and Moslem Indians were the craftsmen; the Hindu the retailer; the European the wholesaler; Arabs found a place in government and the police force of the Coast; Goans were the clerks and men of trust; Somalis the cattle dealers. *The Report of the Royal Commission on East Africa* (1955) has pointed out that progressive policies lie with the fostering of diversification. The viewpoint of this report, which constitutes an authoritative statement of sound contemporary opinion, is well summarized in the following sentences:

> By the present policy of exclusive tribal reservations and under the various obligations by treaty, agreement and formal declaration of which we are instructed to take account in our deliberations, Kenya

[12] *The Sun* (Cape Town), September 9, 1955.

[13] Bauer, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 40–41.

[14] "When European powers came with better ships the Moghul Emperors never tried to improve their own ship building. They took superiority for granted. For more than a hundred years before the battle of Plassey the patrolling of the waters of the Bay of Bengal by the ships of the East India Company and other European powers made no impression on the rulers and people of Bengal."—S. Bhattacharya, *The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal from 1704–1740* (London, 1954), p. 224.

in particular has been divided up into a number of water-tight compartments, none of which is or can be made economically self sufficient, and the frustrations of the last 20 years have been largely due to the failure to recognize the fact. Therefore we think it necessary to break down tribal and racial boundaries and to replace them by confirming individual titles of land, where they exist, and to encourage their acquisition where they do not.[15]

A recent supplementary study made in Uganda of how to help Africans in trade and industry places squarely in front of overseas governments the problem of finding new outlets for entrepreneurship, using the national self-consciousness before it has gone sour to promote the sponsorship of viable enterprises. There is a note of urgency in all this. The rapid increase in population was not foreseen by the policy makers of the past; the growth of educated commoners and the soldiers returning from overseas wars make the authority of the chiefs look outdated; the transfer of ideas in a world of radio and films has its "demonstration effects." In search of a concrete expression of enterprise the new countries look to industrialization. Arthur Lewis seemed once an extremist, but the Steel Report on *Industrial Development in the Caribbean* (1950) made for the Caribbean Commission and the study made by a team of British industrialists on the *Industrial Development in the British West Indies* have brought his remarks into the fold of economic orthodoxy. And there is the example of some progressive governments, such as Puerto Rico.

INDUSTRIALIZATION THE PRINCIPAL CONTENT OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP?

The Puerto Rican entrepreneurial welfare state is frequently cited, more especially in the Caribbean. The annual increase of its national income by 3 per cent is a remarkable achievement. Explaining it, the former Governor of Puerto Rico has underlined the novelty of the Puerto Rican approach:

> The British [West Indies] have had a development program since before the war. It resulted from the recommendations of the Moyne Commission of 1938. From the first, however, it concentrated on welfare rather than productive development. The result was a series of fine educational, health and allied institutions beyond the means of the local governments to support, although the policy was not to outrun local resources. In Puerto Rico a sharply contrasting concentration on productive facilities has set in motion an upward spiral so decisive that the island has become a kind of pilot plant for induced economic development among all underdeveloped peoples.[16]

Puerto Rico is a significant example of an intelligent government promoting capitalist enterprise without having recourse to extensive state subsidies, tariffs, devaluation, and state-run industries; as part of the United States, the island is precluded from embarking on these devices. Instead, an imaginative effort is made by the Puerto Rican government to attract American entrepreneurs by means of tax holidays; freight rebates; government-built factories and government-trained labor; plentiful cheap labor; free market research and engineering advice. The "feudal cast," the exclusive dependency on sugar, the slothfulness of colonial days, have given way to a remarkably dynamic and vigorous social and entrepreneurial experiment.

But Puerto Rico can also be quoted by the skeptic. It has not solved the island's basic economic problem—growing unemployment. Only 302 factories have been opened up, employing no more than 28,000 workers. The multiplier effect of new investment is small. The required government expenditure in planning the new investment and advertising for more of it is very large and would be beyond the capacities of most underdeveloped countries. Much of the trained labor migrates to the continent, where wage rates are better. Some of the capitalists that have been attracted may leave the island again when the minimum wages creep up or the tax subsidies end.

To the skeptic the case for promoting industrial entrepreneurship seems psychological rather than economic. Factories are monuments of progress. They convey a new ethos and testify to the application of science and production planning. In the tropics they are as much an expression of the twentieth century as the harbor constructions, the ocean liners, and all-purpose merchant houses symbolized to the nineteenth century the emergence of world trade. They are a negation of the agricultural and pastoral past, when surpluses were immediately consumed or invested in the land or in luxury items. However, the enthusiasts-for-industry need perspective. They must not overlook the patient work of peasants in ditching, fencing, clearing, maintaining, and tilling their fields, capital with the promise of increasing returns as management and knowledge slowly improve. The World Bank's *Report on Nigeria* lauds the achievements of the postwar years and omits the work of the periods that have gone before, which, less spectacular, may be for that reason better understood by the people themselves. It is the managerial elites and the United Nations School, as one may call it, who believe in industrialization. They favor the policies which change the ratios of rural population to urban population, and they increase, by deliberate action, the inroads to be made by the money economy. They concentrate attention on large-scale investments and measurable indexes of progress. Their theoretical bias has been fashioned by the so-called New Welfare Economics and its econometric study of risk, indebted to probability and games theory. Fundamentally, UN economists are interested in the evolution of scientific businessmen, a species of "stochastic entrepreneurship."

New Laisser Faire School

Opposed to them are all those who remain unimpressed by what still appear to be artificial models with assumptions of constant technological ratios and linear relationships and doubtful methods of aggregation in only apparently sophisticated input-output matrices. S. H. Frankel, P. T. Bauer, and others of the New Laisser Faire School stress (with support from some anthropologists) the small-scale efforts of the ordinary man. Accepting a bad world as probably the best of all possible worlds, with everything in it as a necessary evil—the multiplicity of middlemen, underemployed resources, ramifying family commitments—they deny that there are really unproductive employments; nor are they convinced that induced mechanization is the answer for countries which have an abundance of labor. Unexpectedly in agreement with the mercantilists, they feel with Colbert that machines in the tropics can be the "enemies of labor," and with Postlethwayt they recommend prudence lest by the employment of machines "we lose in strength what we gain in expedition." [17]

[15] P. 56.

[16] Rexford G. Tugwell, review of Mary Proudfoot's *Britain and the U.S.A. in the Caribbean*, in *American Economic Review*, Vol. 45 (June 1955), p. 412.

[17] *The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, Translated from the French of Monsieur Savary . . . with large Additions and Improvements . . . by Malachy Postlethwayt* (2nd ed.; London, 1757), Vol. II, p. 121, under "Machine."

The members of the New Laisser Faire School recognize in the mechanistic formulas the arid minds of international and national bureaucracies with their known proclivities for forms and things done by rote. They are conscious that enterprise is a matter of ingenuity and shrewdness, judgment and "heterodoxy." They rejoice in the close connection of entrepreneurial psychologies with gambling:

> With uncertainty absent, man's energies are devoted altogether to doing things automatically; . . . with uncertainty present, doing things, the actual execution of activity becomes in a real sense a secondary part of life. The primary problem is deciding what to do and how to do it.[18]

One recalls that official spokesmen and moralists have never taken kindly to the entrepreneur: that St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Scottish divines, and many after them have spoken of "the too great fondness for trade"; that the guild of "projectors," *donneurs d'avis, brasseurs d'affaires,* who surrounded any gullible king or emperor in Christendom disgusted all the pedestrian regular servants. The future happened to be with the demimonde of enterprise. Without that "Commercial Revolution" no Industrial Revolution! The New Laisser Faire School goodnaturedly accepts the inevitable accompaniment of economic progress, the humus of enterprise, the slum streets of entrepreneurship, which sharpen the wits of everyone, not least the consumers who are duped.

Background realities

Alberti, writing in the fifteenth century, knew of only six major means of acquiring wealth: "(1) treasure hunting; (2) legacy hunting; (3) being a 'client' of patrons; (4) usury; (5) tiring out beasts of burden; and (6) merchandising."[19] Throughout history there has been a tussle between those who make their way by honest but unimaginative toil and the gamblers, pirates, hucksters of patent medicines and the exploitative mediums of newfangled religions. The latter are to be found in every overseas harbor town; but the port town is the gateway of trade. In them the African, the Indian, and the Middle Eastern beggars, battering on the innocents' pity in the best tradition of *The Beggar's Opera,* teach a surer sense of realities than the idealistic planners. Their presence eloquently verifies the sparsity of national wealth.

> The total currency in circulation in Nigeria in 1951 was £40,000,000 and this included money held for business transactions and for current expenditure on consumption as well as for savings accumulated over a period. The total volume of bank deposits outstanding was about £18,000,000 and these were largely business and government deposits.[20]

On such a fragile basis, industrialization is a more than usually hazardous business, particularly in view of the known low marginal efficiency of capital, the higher profits demanded, the longer waiting period, the social overheads. The failure of mechanized agriculture in the case of the costly East African Groundnut Scheme, which tried to cultivate five million acres and after spending £52 million now operates an experimental station of 60,000 acres, should be a lasting warning. While industrialization remains the ideal of those with an "architectonic" approach to development, its pace forced by governmental timetables and targets, the perspicacious "developer" will never forget

[18] F. H. Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit* (New York, 1921), p. 268.

[19] L. B. Alberti, *I Libri della famiglia* (Reprint Series III, Vol. XIX [Milan, 1911]), p. 211.

[20] Bauer, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 14

the absorptive capacity of the economy in question. His is an ecological and historical approach, giving the recognition to small-scale enterprise.

THE SMALL MAN'S ENTERPRISE

An early report from a colonial governor instanced an interesting form of the small man's "developmental" entrepreneurship:

> There is a class of people here called "entrepreneurs," generally men without capital or ostensible means, or settled occupations, whose leisure and habits give them great facilities in treating with the disengaged and unsettled Indians, of which they avail for the purpose of collecting together bands of 20 to 100 men whom they attach by furnishing them means of indulgence in advance against their future earnings and whom they succeed in engaging by the promise of indulgences and wages greater than a prudent planter can offer.[21]

These labor contractors are one of many. In developing economies small shops, Christmas clubs, funeral clubs, secondhand clothing, entertainment, food and drink, give occasion for entrepreneurship in all but the least advanced tropical countries. On a higher plane we find ice making; beermaking; processing of insecticides and other local products, including building stone and cement; shoemaking and tailoring; repair and maintenance shops. There is the ubiquitous taxi driver. Newspapers and movie houses provide lucrative openings for those who know how to cater to a public.

Small enterprise is at its best in exploiting some traditional culture trait, perhaps for the production of curios or souvenirs. Performers like fire walkers or drummers, the dragoman guiding tourists through Cairo, deep sea divers, and the dancers of Bali—their organization and exploitation rapidly fuse with the larger tourist industry. In Jamaica tourism is the third industry of the country and the second largest dollar earner. "Whoever you are, wherever you are, tourism matters to you" is a slogan recently launched by the Jamaican government. Converting swords into plowshares is less frequent than the conversion of soldiers into hotel keepers, following the famous example of the Swiss. The buccaneers of Jamaica, the terror of the Spanish Main, make a dramatic backdrop to tourism, and in 1947 Jamaica registered 55,000 tourists who spent 5.5 million dollars; by 1953 their number had grown to 120,000 spending 14 million dollars. For every person directly employed in the tourist industry four other persons find a livelihood outside the industry. Since the tourist industry flourishes on ideas, a high standard of service, adaptability, and discretion, it is the seedbed of many forms of enterprise. Its weakness is its vulnerability to the trade cycle and, less calculable but nevertheless real, the spread of a certain venality in the population. Treasured rituals are surreptitiously transformed into curiosities, and beauty spots are commercialized. In a more subtle way than the old-time colonials, the holidaymakers take over the country and cheapen it.

Every progressive step is achieved at the expense of some loss, and if we stress this obvious observation it is only —as the fate of the notion of entrepreneurship and its long neglect by economics revealed—that the obvious is often overlooked. A survey of the historical process of modern societies, helped and hindered as it has been by policy measures, education, and theoretical analysis which have given the dynamic elements of an economy careful attention, then leaves us with a sense of the complexity, difficulty, am-

[21] Colonial Office Papers: *Labour (Colonies). West Indies and Mauritius.* Governor of Mauritius Report (London, 1847), p. 325.

bivalence, and with the immense creative opportunities open to entrepreneurial action.

The welfare preoccupations of the interwar years fall into place as a kind of hinterland of modern policy operations with a quartermaster's functions behind the front line of entrepreneurs. Political parties may constructively advance judgment where and how the balance between the different forms of entrepreneurship is to be struck. In any case, research will seek to remove the irritant of ideology from the discussion. The *forms* of entrepreneurship will have to be of a much less uniform kind in the future. Western-type capitalism will be one subculture in the entrepreneurial world. Itself a mixture of new and ancient elements, of co-operatives and public boards, entrepreneurial civil services and sedate bank-clerkish private industry, it cannot object to further experimentation.

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Economic Change and the Extended Family

By JEAN L. COMHAIRE

ECONOMIC change as it operates today in underdeveloped countries involves a conflict between two or more different cultures which was absent in the Western world at the time of its own industrial revolution. One of the consequences expected from the introduction of a money economy and from urbanization is the dissolution of the joint family, a universal institution, more universal indeed than the nuclear family of contemporary Western society. Factors of such change, whose destructive effects are generally recognized, include the dispersal of kin, contacts with strangers, and prevalence of market values.[1] Disturbing reports on family disorganization reach us from all parts of the world recently affected by economic change. Even comparatively advanced countries, such as the West Indies and West Africa, are conspicuous for a high percentage of marital unions which, under the existing laws of European origin, are declared irregular.

But if the threat to the extended family—or even to any form of family—looks obvious, the degree to which other institutions, and more particularly the small patrocentric family of the Western type, are going to replace the old-style family offers ground for considerable doubt. In the Western world, everything combined to bring about the triumph of the nuclear family. Institutions inconsistent with the needs of an industrial society were slowly undermined, and the extended family broke up the more easily that Indo-European societies had a millenary tradition of simple kinship structures.[2] Today, underdeveloped countries are all on a sudden provided with modern plants of the largest possible scale, with comparatively little need for individual skills (an important factor in the growth of an individualistic middle class), so that a repetition of the Western process should by no means be expected.[3]

In the appraisal of the situation, the danger of ethnocentrism and also of economic determinism should be constantly kept in mind. Human societies have many ways of meeting identical challenges, and even if it could be proven that industry everywhere calls for the recognition of achievements rather than of family status, it should nevertheless be remembered that heredity never is more than the basis for what ultimately constitutes a social rather than a biological concept.[4] Will anyone claim that Western business never discriminates on other grounds than individual abilities, rather than on the basis of racial and family heredity held to be sufficient evidence in the matter of these abilities?[5] The same applies to Western bureaucracy, whose problem of selection, in underdeveloped countries, is made more difficult by the

[1] Daniel F. McCall, "Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa," THE ANNALS, Vol. 298 (March 1955), pp. 151–60.

[2] Claude Levi-Strauss, *Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté,* Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1949.

[3] Bert F. Hoselitz (Ed.), *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.

[4] Meyer Fortes, "The Structure of Unilinear Descent-Groups," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 55 (January–March 1953), pp. 17–41.

[5] Everett C. Hughes, "Queries Concerning Industry and Society Growing out of Study of Ethnic Relations in Industry," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 14 (April 1949), pp. 211–20.

prevalence of family and other personal relations.[6]

On the other hand, before trying to visualize where the native family is headed, we must be careful to take stock of everything in its original situation. In tribal society, groupings of kin are not usually clearly divided into two or three definite categories, such as immediate family, lineage, and clan, whose break up would mean the end of everything. There may be any number of recognized groupings, including any number of generations.[7] An African village also is no preserve of one or more of these groupings; it is a community of strangers and slaves living together with members of the land-owning kin group.[8] Recent research, moreover, has demonstrated that although an extended family, in order to be manageable, must be limited to relatives according to one single line of descent, either patrilineal or matrilineal, many African societies nevertheless grant some degree of recognition to both lines.[9] Those tribal communities, far from being stagnant, were living organisms long before the advent of Europeans. Adventurous young men all the time kept leaving their villages, to start a new life in some other community where they of necessity became the founders of nuclear families which at the next generation became extended ones. It is important to keep such a situation well in mind, because institutions already tested that way should not be expected to give way without a fight under the pressure of Western-inspired change.

[6] Bert F. Hoselitz, "The Recruitment of White-Collar Workers in Underdeveloped Countries," *International Social Science Bulletin,* Vol. 6, No. 3 (1954), pp. 433–41.

[7] Melville J. Herskovits, *Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 176.

[8] Jean L. Comhaire, "The Community Concept in the Study and Government of African and Afro-American Societies," *Primitive Man,* Vol. 25 (July 1952), pp. 41–48.

[9] A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and C. Daryll Forde (Eds.), *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1950.

BELGIAN CONGO FAMILY TRENDS

The Belgian Congo stands as an excellent case in point. Nowhere do the native institutions look more primitive and so less able to adjust themselves to the needs of a Westernized world. Nowhere are they subject to a better integrated assault from state, church, and business, all committed to the triumph of the nuclear family. As a Belgian administrator, now in the copper mining business, once put it, "Such promotion of the Western family constitutes the most significant process now on its way in the [Elisabethville] center." [10] However, the same author agrees that tribal, clan, and kinship ties remain an important factor in urban life, and also that the policy of his government makes the maintenance of parasitism founded on extended family ties inevitable. Another observer of the Belgian Congo industrial setup states that clan ties enable the workers to display "a casual attitude towards their employment" by always giving them a place where they may go for help.[11] In a field where religious bias easily creeps in, it is interesting to note that a strong plea on behalf of the extended family was lodged by a Belgian Catholic author, who claimed that the Congolese clan had substituted new functions for those lost through economic change and who refused to deplore such amazing vitality. In his view the growth of a father-centered Christian family depended on monogamy rather than on the abolition of extended family ties, and the Catholic faith should not be unable to assimilate any residue of ancestor worship that might otherwise be inherent in such relationships.[12]

[10] Fernand Grévisse, *Le Centre extra-coutumier d'Elisabethville* (Brussels: Institut royal colonial belge, 1951), p. 388.

[11] Arthur Doucy, "The Unsettled Attitude of Negro Workers in the Belgian Congo," *International Social Science Bulletin,* Vol. 6, No. 3 (1954), p. 442.

In Léopoldville, the capital of the Belgian Congo, the growth of the nuclear family and of a native middle class is impeded by low wages as well as by the absence of private property for African residents.[13] The extended family thus remains a necessary institution, for security and for educational and religious purposes. The newcomer in town and the unemployed both expect from their cousins some help, which they will be prepared to return when fortune changes. Children born in town are often sent to relatives in the rural home who can more easily take care of them and who educate them in customs which include the recognition of kinship ties up to the level of ancestor worship. On the other hand, prosperous native farmers send their children to Léopoldville, where they receive school education while staying with relatives. Urban social life centers around *matanga,* week-long funeral proceedings which include both rites and entertainment, and to whose considerable cost distant relatives must contribute. The absence of middle-class consciousness is reflected in the very small number of intertribal marriages, in spite of the growth of intertribal customs.

GROWTH OF INTERTRIBAL CUSTOMS

An unexpected effect of the introduction of money in all African towns was to give unprecedented strength to the institution of the dowry, or bride wealth paid by the man to his wife's family. The dowry in traditional African society, though very widespread, was important mostly in patrilineal tribes, where the wife's family suffered the loss of all her descendants. In the new towns, the dowry today constitutes a major social problem, even in Léopoldville, where more than two-thirds of the inhabitants are matrilineal in their original tribal law. This no doubt is due to the greediness of parents anxious to make money out of their family position, but it inevitably gives a new meaning to extended family relationships. Relatives sometimes help the young man in collecting the bride wealth, and the depositor, whoever he may be, automatically acquires a measure of control over husband-and-wife relationships.

Developments connected with the bride wealth are only one aspect of the growth of intertribal customs, an important consequence of urbanization. In the tribal villages of southern Africa, matrilineal customs prevail north of the Zambezi River and patrilineal south of it, but intertribal systems are in the making in all urban areas and they everywhere display a matrilineal tinge. At Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia, the persistence of extended-family consciousness is reflected in such habits as joint cooking and joint eating, in addition to hospitality and lavish gifts to distant relatives.[14] In patrilineal South Africa, the dispersal of kin is said to affect relationships with relatively near cousins, but wider clan ties are actually strengthened by the fact that they are more likely to have representation in

[12] Valère Gelders, *Le Clan dans la société indigène,* Brussels: Institut royal colonial belge, 1943.

[13] Suzanne Comhaire-Sylvain, *Food and Leisure Among the African Youth of Léopoldville (Belgian Congo),* Cape Town: University of Cape Town School of African Studies, 1950.

[14] Godfrey Wilson, *An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia,* 2 vols., Livingstone: The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1941–42. The subject has recently been investigated by Professor Clyde J. Mitchell and his staff at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

town.[15] Children often are sent to the country, usually to their mother's village, though this is a traditionally patrilineal country. A major problem of South African urban life is that the bride wealth must include *lobola,* that is some cattle which must of necessity be kept by relatives staying on rural family land. Even the professional class insists on *lobola,* which in all urban inquiries was found paid by anything between two-thirds and three-fourths of the families.[16]

It should also be noted that modern means of communication help to keep together kinsmen whose dispersal under past circumstances would have meant the end of all relationships. A significant function of the joint family today is that of facilitating travel. Colonial bureaucracies maintain their staff scattered all over territories of enormous size, and many Africans take advantage of this situation to travel at a pace that baffles their European employers. They know how relatives everywhere are ready to supply them with board and lodgings and, when not traveling, they make extensive use of mail, telegraph, and telephone services which help them to keep in touch with each other.[17]

FAMILY ORGANIZATION IN WEST AFRICA

The Yoruba of Nigeria, long before colonial times, had gathered together in towns of up to 100,000 inhabitants, where they maintained their traditional family pattern in an urban setup, including some ties of maternal affiliation, which have in recent times been reinforced, although the whole system is patrilineal.[18] The case of Lagos, the capital of the country, deserves special mention, as a striking example of maintenance of extended family ties in a town teeming with political and business activities of the most modern kind.

The people of Lagos, in spite of their extensive associations with the Western world, remain deeply attached to their old family system. To give a recent instance, when a tangle occurred in February 1955 on the matter of who was the rightful head of the Onisemo family, the *oba* (native king) of Lagos appointed a six-man commission to determine the headship. The commission's decision was rejected by the section of the family already in possession of the *iga,* the family headquarters. Tension grew to the point that on August 8 a party of forty persons besieged the place, vainly trying to expel the occupants. The next day the latter ceremoniously proclaimed their candidate head of the family, with the concurrence of Prince Oyekan, a pretendant to the *oba's* crown, who came to dance with the merrymakers.[19]

An important aspect of Yoruba family life is that native political titles often go with the position of head of the extended family. In 1931, the Privy Council in London ruled that the Governor had no right to depose the *oba* for improper conduct, because his title was a monopoly of the Docemo, or Ado family; an official commission then found that the matter of heading certain families was no private business. Their heads are elected by committees of other family heads, styled "kingmakers" in

[15] Ruth Levine, *Marriage in Langa Native Location,* Cape Town: University of Cape Town School of African Studies, 1947.

[16] Arthur Phillips (Ed.), *Survey of African Marriage and Family Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 38.

[17] Jean L. Comhaire, *Aspects of Urban Administration in Tropical and Southern Africa,* Cape Town: University of Cape Town School of African Studies, 1953.

[18] William B. Schwab, "Kinship and Lineage Among the Yoruba," *Africa,* Vol. 25 (October 1955), pp. 352–74.

[19] *Daily Service,* Lagos, July 22, August 8, 9, 10, and 20, 1955.

the case of the royal dynasty.[20] All families anyway hold monthly meetings, attended not only by their members but also by their ex-slaves and by members of associate (which in practice means non-land-owning) families. Political as well as other subjects are freely discussed on such occasions.

Religion is another important function of the extended family. Ancestor worship answers deep emotional needs of mankind not easily disposed of. Funeral rites among the Yoruba are elaborate affairs, conducted at regular intervals, for an indefinite length of time. In 1955, the Animashawun family held a three-day celebration in Lagos, to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the death of Sunmonu Animashawun, the founder of the local branch of the family.[21] Greater tolerance in this matter than Christian missionaries customarily show explains in part the popularity of Islam in Africa, and it should come as no surprise that the Moslem majority in the Assembly of Northern Nigeria recently rejected a bill because it failed to mention brothers and sisters as members of the "immediate family." [22]

Similar situations prevail all over West and West Central Africa. French authors as a rule insist on family parasitism but the Dakar society has been described as resting mainly on parental relationships, with self-employment, as in the case of traders, gardeners, and fishermen, permitting the retention of an almost unaltered tribal family setup.[23] At Cotonou, tribal chiefs are important only to those town residents whose birthplace is too far distant for the maintenance of extended family relationships.[24] At Douala, Europeans and Africans alike complain of the exorbitant rents collected by the clan owner of all the land downtown.[25] At Brazzaville, jobs are as much as possible given by native middlemen to kin rather than on merit.[26] In all cases, family parasitism largely destroys the individual character of the salary paid by European employers and the possibility of a middle class growing out of salaried employment.

FAMILY AND LAND TENURE IN LAGOS

The strongest pillar of extended family relationships in Africa probably is native land tenure, and the case of Lagos is of exceptional importance in this respect. The British government there, far from denying the local inhabitants the right of private property, actually made a determined effort to popularize English laws of property, with the help of detribalized immigrants from Sierra Leone and Brazil, whose attachment to European Christian culture had resulted from exceptional circumstances. Lagos became a colony in 1861, and up to four thousand Crown grants were soon issued on local land. As early as 1862, Chief Oshodi Tappa, who headed a group of refugees from the Nupe, or Tappa, tribe, was given the suburban district of Epetedo for himself and for his wards. He divided the land into twenty-one plots, and an individual Crown grant was issued on each one of these subdivisions.

Today however, the Oshodi family still claims the property of all Epetedo,

[20] H. L. Ward Price, *Report on a Commission of Inquiry Regarding the House of Docemo (Nigeria),* Lagos: Government Printer, 1933.

[21] *Daily Service,* August 26, 1955.

[22] *Daily Service,* August 11, 1955.

[23] Paul Mercier, "Aspects de la société africaine dans l'agglomération dakaroise," *Études sénégalaises,* No. 5 (1954), pp. 11–40.

[24] J. Lombard, "Cotonou, Ville africaine," *Études dahoméennes,* No. 10 (1953), pp. 1–210.

[25] Jean L. Comhaire, "Vues générales sur le Cameroun," *Zaire,* Brussels, Vol. 7 (January 1953), pp. 55–64.

[26] Georges Balandier, *Sociologie des Brazzavilles noires,* Paris: Armand Colin, 1955.

in spite of an ordinance of 1947 recognizing the rights of occupiers of plots, or "courts." At the same time, it should be noted that there is no question of subdividing the original plots, which now are family property. Chief Oshodi II in 1918 succeeded in expelling from Epetedo an ex-slave, or *arota,* who wanted to sell a court granted his father by the first chief. The recognized situation is that in the case of *arotas* the occupants only hold their land subject to reversionary rights to the Oshodi family.[27]

On another occasion, the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled in favor of a man who had refused to sell a family house.

> Now [said the Court], with all due respect to the opinion expressed by Speed, Acting Chief Justice, in the case of Lewis v. Bankole (1883) to the effect that family ownership is a dying institution, I am bound to place on record my view that notwithstanding the lapse of nearly a generation since that judgment was delivered the institution of family ownership is still a very live force in native tenure in Lagos. The purpose of the institution is, as its name implies, to provide a place where members of the family can reside if they so desire and, so long as that purpose is still capable of achievement, I conceive that it would be wrong for the Court to order the sale of property subject to this form of tenure. . . .[28]

The main changes observed in Lagos are that the use of European money enabled the occupants to mortgage their land, though such a right never existed in native law, and that the introduction of English law permitted the seizure of land in execution of judgments against individuals. The results after about a century of operation are appalling. An English expert writes:

> There is plenty of evidence that even in the progressive Colony of Lagos family ownership continues to be an integral feature of the social life and that any sweeping change in the system of land tenure would cause widespread disturbance. So long as the social system of Africans continues to differ from that of Europeans, the African system of landholding cannot be assimilated to that contemplated by English law.[29]

The Lagos families today seem to constitute corporations, run by heads of considerable economic acumen. In several instances, the collective strength so mustered proved effective in securing huge compensations from the colonial government. The Oluwa family, owner of the land on which the Apapa wharf was built, thus obtained compensation to the amount of £22,000, as against an original offer for £500, and the Onikoyi family £32,000 instead of £8,000, for the ground of the former white location of Lagos.[30]

EXTENDED FAMILY IN THE PACIFIC AREA

As the applicability of African experiences to other areas of the world might be doubted, a few other cases reported by competent observers are mentioned here.

All over the Malay-Polynesian area, membership in some kind of kin group has always been associated with individual land rights, so that European property laws by themselves brought no fundamental change in the existing situation.[31] In Malaya in particular, both family and individual customary rights are maintained together in the new rubber economy.[32] In the Philippines, wealth has brought to some tribes both class and kin pride simultaneously.[33] In Samoa, usehold rights are eliminating formerly distinct ownership rights, but there is no formal individualization of property. The household remains the unit and when an individual branches out, group property is restored with the next generation.[34]

[27] M. L. Tew, *Report on Title to Land in Lagos, 1939* (Nigeria, Sessional Paper II/1947), Lagos: Government Printer, 1947.

[28] Nigeria, "Supreme Court, 23 February 1938," *Law Reports,* Lagos, Vol. 14, p. 10.

[29] C. K. Meek, *Land Law and Custom in the Colonies,* 2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1950.

[30] Information supplied by the Land Department of Nigeria.

[31] W. H. Goodenough, "A Problem in Malayo-Polynesian Social Organization," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 57, No. 1, Part 1 (February 1955), pp. 71–83.

[32] Raymond Firth, "Money, Work and Social Change in Indo-Pacific Economic Systems," *International Social Science Bulletin,* Vol. 6, No. 3 (1954), pp. 400–410.

[33] Fred Eggan, "Some Aspects of Culture Change in the Northern Philippines," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 43 (January–March 1941), pp. 11–18.

[34] Felix M. Keesing, *Modern Samoa: Its Government and Changing Life* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 276.

SUBSTITUTES FOR THE EXTENDED FAMILY

The most conspicuous example so far of a complete breakup of a strong family system is that of Africans brought as slaves to the American continent. Many authors have taken it for granted, to the point of denying the possibility of any significant survival of African culture in Afro-American families. The high rate of illegitimacy in particular is mentioned as undiluted disorganization, the possibility of a conflict between Western and African family patterns being ruled out. As a matter of fact, complete family disorganization as anything but a strictly temporary situation may well be the product of imagination rather than of observation.

In the case of the Haitian family, close observation shows that there is in it more organization than is often said to exist, though not necessarily in the sense of the Western Christian father-centered family. *Plaçages,* or unions left unrecognized by church and state, usually are stable marital situations,[35] largely connected with a justifiable reluctance to accept French laws of land tenure and succession.[36] Even in towns, Haitian families are wary of dividing land property, a process which would affect the social and economic power of all their members. Family ties everywhere are kept strong through such devices as attendance at *veillées,* or funeral rites.

A possible substitute to natural family relationships is pseudo kinship, or ritual kinship, but it usually grows strong only in situations affecting even nuclear family relationships, such as that of predominantly male communities of traders and workers in foreign lands. Pseudo kinship then works as a way of maintaining a family atmosphere under circumstances looked at as undesirable and temporary. The most conspicuous example is provided by the organizations of Chinese overseas, which are adaptations of their traditional kinship groups.[37] They are not unknown in Africa, where the term "tribal, or family, union" may be independent of any actual kin relationship.[38] True and permanent substitutes for the extended family exist in Latin America, where

[35] Suzanne Comhaire-Sylvain in A. Métraux (Ed.), *Making a Living in the Marbial Valley (Haiti)* (Paris: UNESCO, 1951), pp. 204 f.

[36] Suzanne Comhaire-Sylvain, "Land Tenure in the Marbial Region of Haiti," *Proceedings of the 29th International Congress of Americanists,* Vol. 2 (1952), pp. 180–84.

[37] Ju-K'ang T'ien, *The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure,* London: London School of Economics, 1953.

[38] Suzanne Comhaire-Sylvain, "Associations on the Basis of Origin in Lagos, Nigeria," *American Catholic Sociological Review,* Vol. 11 (December 1950), pp. 234–36; Simon Ottenberg, "Improvement Associations Among the Afikpo Ibo," *Africa,* Vol. 25 (January 1955), pp. 1–28.

the Catholic Church seems to have eradicated unilateral kin groups by way of relationships centered around godparents,[39] but this case brings us back to what was said at the beginning of this study, on how simple kinship structures are characteristic of Indo-European societies, or of societies of predominantly Indo-European descent.

Before concluding, let us mention that the celebrated institution popularly known as "blood brothers" seems to perform different functions and so be unrelated to our subject.[40]

CONCLUSIONS

Any conclusions on our subject must of necessity remain tentative. One point only is clear: family institutions everywhere are subject to the pressure of disruptive forces, but extended family relationships in many countries have displayed much more vitality than in majority groups of Western societies. Inconsistent as they are held to be with the needs of an economic pattern founded on achievements and mobility, we cannot write them off in the immediate future. Maybe we should also remember that nineteenth-century observers of the Industrial Revolution erroneously expected the downfall without further delay of institutions still much alive today, such as religion and racial discrimination. Human beings being what they are, and not always anxious to be consistent with themselves, many of them seem to be able and willing to delay for any length of time the breakup of the extended family. Colonial policy at the same time does not everywhere foster the progress of the nuclear family as unreservedly or as effectively as it might appear to observers at a distance.

[39] George M. Foster, "What is Folk Culture?", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 55 (April–June 1953), pp. 159–73.

[40] Harry Tegnaeus, *Blood Brothers*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1952.

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The Unpredicted Pattern of Population Change

By KINGSLEY DAVIS

OF all the problems affecting mankind today, one of the gravest and most paradoxical is the close association between population growth and widespread poverty. In the past the world has seen plenty of poverty, but it was not associated regionally with rapid population growth. Instead, such increase as did occur tended to take place among the economically developing peoples—the Neolithic agriculturalists as against the hunters, the industrial West Europeans as against the agrarian Asians and Africans, the colonists as against the aborigines. Now, however, it is primarily the underdeveloped parts of the earth, the parts where additional population is least needed, that are contributing most to the phenomenal inflation of world population. Although relatively new, this development is now so familiar to us that we see nothing strange in it. Yet it is a grotesque and tragic evidence of human self-frustration and an insistent omen of potential danger.

What is hardly realized as yet, and what was certainly not predicted, is the amazing acceleration of the rate at which populations in impoverished regions are growing. At the same time that the industrial nations have been recently exhibiting an unexpected spurt of growth, the underdeveloped areas have been manifesting an equally unpredicted speed-up of their already fast rate of human multiplication. The pace of their increase is faster than any ever known in the Old World industrial countries. It behooves us to take a close look at these new developments.

STARTLING GROWTH IN NUMBERS

No one can deny that population growth in the past was one of the clearest and most demonstrable consequences of economic development. From 1650 to 1930 the commercially and industrially active peoples of European culture multiplied themselves sevenfold and doubled their proportion of the world's population. The Japanese, whose numbers had been more or less static during the long Tokugawa regime, more than doubled their number during the industrial period between 1870 and 1940. Everyone knows in a general way the mechanisms that were involved. Economic improvement brought down the death rate while the birth rate remained high.

It might seem that what is happening now in underdeveloped areas is simply a repetition of what happened earlier in the now industrialized nations. But this is not true. The excess of births over deaths in today's backward regions is far greater than it ever was in the history of the advanced nations. This excess is occurring in regions which, for the most part, already have heavier population densities than the peoples of Europe, North America, and Australasia had in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and they have far fewer resources in relation to human numbers. Their dazzling population increase is occurring in a world with few open spaces and with few outlets for migration. The situation is therefore fundamentally different from what it was. Above all, the rapid population growth is not arising

from the same causes that operated earlier in the now advanced nations. It is not arising from economic development but primarily from other factors that are new today.

To see the unusual character of what is happening, one can look at the growth trends summarized in Table 1. The figures indicate that thirty-eight underdeveloped countries showed an average gain of better than 51 per cent in population during the twenty years from 1935 to 1955. This is the average increase when the countries are taken as equal units. When they are weighted by their populations, the average gain drops to 37 per cent, because the population of India (382 million in 1955) looms so large in the total for the thirty-eight countries (711 million in 1955) and yet has a slow growth for a present-day underdeveloped area. Whichever figure is taken, however, the fact stands out that the growth during the last two decades has been extremely rapid. It exceeds substantially the growth in industrial areas, whether in the Old or the New World. Since the thirty-eight underdeveloped countries were chosen not because of their fast rate of growth but because of the at least approximate accuracy of their population figures for the two dates, their striking numerical increase should be roughly representative of that of underdeveloped areas in general. If the rates of growth are continued, well over half of the thirty-eight countries will double their populations in less than forty years, and the combined population of all of them in less than fifty years.

The full significance of the rapid increase in the population of underdeveloped areas during the last two decades cannot be grasped by comparing them with the industrial countries during the same period. The latter, from 1935 to 1955, had a faster growth in numbers than anybody predicted and thus contributed a good share to the world's population growth. But they were not at this time in an early stage of economic development. A better way is to compare the recent growth in the underdeveloped areas with that which occurred in the earlier history of the industrial nations. Table 2 shows that the countries of northwestern Europe grew during previous periods at a rate less than half that shown recently by our underdeveloped countries. The only countries which ever exceeded the latter rate were the New World nations which started out with almost no people and rapidly gained by both natural increase and immigration. Between 1840 and 1860, for instance, Australia's white population increased by 429 per cent, but the country had had only half a million white inhabitants in 1840 to begin with. For the most part the underdeveloped countries on our list of thirty-eight had little immigration from 1935 to 1955. More of them lost by migration than gained by it. Their growth should therefore be compared to that of the European industrial countries. When this is done, as just noted, the evidence is that genuine industrialization did not create half as much population increase as our backward areas are now experiencing.

TABLE 1—POPULATION GROWTH IN UNDERDEVELOPED AND ADVANCED COUNTRIES, 1935–55

TYPES OF COUNTRIES	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES	PER CENT GAIN, 1935–55	
		Unweighted Average	Weighted Average*
Underdeveloped[a]	38	51.2	37.4
Advanced	17	24.6	23.4
European[b]	10	15.6	11.6
New World[c]	6	38.8	32.6
Asian[d]	1	29.3	29.3

[a] Angola, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Formosa, Gold Coast, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Malaya Panama, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Ruanda-Urundi, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

[b] Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

[c] Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, United States.

[d] Japan.

* Weighted by population of each country.

TABLE 2—POPULATION GROWTH IN ADVANCED COUNTRIES, 1800–1940

TYPES OF COUNTRIES	PER CENT GAIN DURING PREVIOUS TWENTY YEARS[a]						
	1820	1840	1860	1880	1900	1920	1940
European[b]	23.1	17.2	19.7	18.1	19.9	18.0	14.1
New World[c]				64.5	47.2	48.2	30.2

[a] Unweighted averages: percentages added and divided by the number of countries.

[b] Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.

[c] Australia, Canada, United States.

WHY THE RAPID GROWTH?

If the current demographic upsurge in nonindustrial regions is due to economic development, we find the evidence difficult to locate. Since the upsurge is twice what it was in northwest Europe during the period of industrialization there, we should expect to find twice as much economic progress being made now in underdeveloped areas. Actually, however, there seems to be less of such progress in countries like Ceylon, Egypt, Fiji, Jamaica, and Thailand than there was in nineteenth-century Sweden, England, and Switzerland. In fact, most of the backward areas show only enough economic expansion to keep up with the population growth, with little left over for real development.

More conclusive evidence on the question is found by examining the demographic components of the population increase. When this is done it becomes clear that the increase has come from an unprecedented and unforeseen decline of mortality in the underdeveloped areas—a decline much sharper than any ever experienced in the history of the presently industrial nations.[1] Analyzing the data for fifteen underdeveloped countries, we find that the crude death rate dropped by 53 per cent during the thirty years from 1920–24 to 1950–54. The diminution has been accelerating, as Table 3 shows. Over a five-year period (from the average for 1945–49 to the average for 1950–54), the death rate in eighteen underdeveloped countries declined by 20 per cent. The history of the northwest European coun-

[1] For a fuller account of mortality trends, see George J. Stolnitz, "A Century of International Mortality Trends: I," *Population Studies*, Vol. 9 (July 1955), pp. 24–55; and Kingsley Davis, "The Amazing Decline of Mortality in Underdeveloped Areas," *Proceedings of the 1955 Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association*, in press.

TABLE 3—PERCENTAGE DECLINE OF CRUDE DEATH RATES IN EIGHTEEN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES[a]

PERIODS	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES COMPARED[b]	AVERAGE PER CENT DECLINE FROM PREVIOUS PERIOD
Half-Decade Changes		
1920–24	—	—
1925–29	15	6.0
1930–34	16	4.6
1935–39	18	6.3
1940–44	16	8.5
1945–49	16	15.2
1950–54	18	20.1
30-Year Change		
1920–24	—	—
1950–54	15	53.1

[a] Computed from crude death rates as reported in the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook* for 1953 and 1954 and *Population and Vital Statistics Reports*, October 1955.

[b] Eighteen countries were used, but in some cases data were missing for one or both periods compared. The countries used were: Barbados, Costa Rica, Ceylon, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Formosa, Jamaica, Malaya, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Surinam, Thailand, and Trinidad and Tobago.

tries back to the eighteenth century shows no thirty-year period in which a consistent decline occurred between half-decade averages, or in which the total thirty-year change was anywhere near the 53 per cent record of our backward areas. Similar findings emerge when life-table values are used instead of crude death rates to measure mortality trends.[2]

The drop in the death rate has not been equally sharp in all underdeveloped areas. It has been greater in countries with room to expand (like Ceylon and Mexico) than in those with little room for massive and dense populations (like Egypt and India). But speedy declines have occurred nearly everywhere in nonindustrial areas, whatever their condition. Interestingly enough, no one predicted such startling changes in the death rates. As a consequence nearly all past estimates of future population growth in such areas were too low.

In the past the decline of mortality was attributed basically to economic development.[3] This view, essentially correct when applied to the Western industrial peoples, does not fit the contemporary underdeveloped areas. The elimination of high death rates, wherever it has occurred, has been due mainly to success against infectious diseases. In Western history this success came gradually as a result of improved diets, housing, sanitation, and medical discoveries. The downward slope of mortality was gradual because time was needed to invent and apply the technology of death control. Now that the discoveries have been made, and are continuing to be made, in the industrial nations, they can be immediately applied in the nonindustrial areas. Infectious diseases are being conquered in backward regions not through slow economic development within those regions but through the transfer of scientific knowledge and personnel and financial aid from the industrial nations to these regions, often under the auspices of international agencies such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations and the United Nations Children's Fund. It is being demonstrated in country after country that widespread diseases such as malaria, yaws, syphilis, trachoma, cholera, plague, and typhoid can be controlled on a mass basis at low cost. Most of the discoveries that make these accomplishments possible

[2] Stolnitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–51.

[3] *E.g.*, Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1953), pp. 77–82.

are recent: insecticides like DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane), antibiotics like penicillin, vaccines like BCG (bacillus Calmette-Guérin), drugs like sulfanilamide, better instruments like portable X-ray machines, and rationalized public health campaigns and statistical reporting. It is confidently expected, for example, that the cost of curing yaws in mass campaigns can be reduced from about $3.30 per head to $1.00.[4]

The amazingly accelerated reduction of mortality in underdeveloped areas in recent years has thus been accomplished by international disease control, not by economic development in these areas themselves. It required no essential change in the customs and institutions of the people, no advance in general education, no growth in per capita income. The same sort of improvement in health and mortality can be achieved with respect to domesticated animals.

In commending the antituberculosis campaign in Jamaica, C. M. Wilson illustrates the situation:

> It is a noteworthy fact that the general economy of the island has worsened during the seven years just past. Nevertheless, competent public health work, featuring first-hand diagnosis and active treatment of the disease, has proved effective without the much needed upbuilding of Jamaican living standards.[5]

BIRTH RATES AND NATURAL INCREASE

Since disease control has not involved basic changes in social institutions, education, and real income, fertility has remained high in nonindustrial regions. It was higher to begin with in most of these regions than it ever was in northwestern Europe, and it has in most cases declined little or not at all. The industrial countries began lowering their birth rates *before* their sharpest declines in mortality, but the backward areas will do so long *after* their mortality has reached a low modern level. As a result the densely settled and impoverished countries of the world are experiencing an unprecedented population growth which does not reflect economic development but in fact creates strong impediments to it.

Let us look at the figures on natural increase—the difference between birth and death rates. For seventeen underdeveloped areas having remotely adequate vital statistics, the average natural increase during the 1940–49 decade was 21.3 per thousand population per year. This was high enough, but such is the speed of change in this sphere that in 1950–54 the figure was 27.5. Such rates of multiplication did not occur in the history of the now industrial nations. In five northwest European countries,[6] for example, the average natural increase was as follows:

	AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE PER THOUSAND
1735–1799	5.0
1800–1849	9.0
1850–1899	11.7
1900–1949	8.2

Even the New World industrial countries have shown no rate of human multiplication equal to that now found in nonadvanced areas.

Although the United States lacks adequate information on births and deaths back to 1800, we do know that during the period of this country's most rapid demographic expansion, from 1790 to 1860, the average rate of *population growth* was only 30 per thousand per year, and a part of this was contributed by immigration rather than by natural

[4] *Chronicle of World Health Organization*, Vol. 8 (February–March 1954), special issue on *Treponematoses: A World Problem*, p. 63.

[5] *One Half the People* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1949), p. 195.

[6] England and Wales, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.

increase. Today the underdeveloped areas are tending to match this increase by the sheer excess of births over deaths, as the following examples show:

	AVERAGE NATURAL INCREASE, 1950-54
Ceylon	27.8
Costa Rica	37.3
El Salvador	33.2
Fiji	29.6
Formosa	35.0
Malaya	29.6
Mauritius	33.0
Mexico	28.7
Panama	26.2
Puerto Rico	27.6
Surinam	27.0
Trinidad and Tobago	26.6

A margin of error is undoubtedly present in most of these figures, but since there is no reason to think that births on the whole are better registered than deaths, the errors may lead to understatements of natural increase as readily as to overstatements. Such fast multiplication would not seem strange if the underdeveloped areas were still sparsely populated and had rich resources and expanding frontiers—as did the New World countries in the nineteenth century. This situation clearly does not exist in most of the backward regions. It does exist in parts of South America and Central Africa, but even there the accelerated natural increase is not mainly a response to economic opportunity but an anomalous by-product of imported death control.

In the immediate future the rate of natural increase in underdeveloped areas may rise still higher. Much reduction in mortality is still possible, and no evidence exists that birth rates will soon drop sharply. If peace and stability should somehow prevail during the next twenty-five years (an unlikely prospect), the inhabitants of the world's underdeveloped regions could easily double within that time. Since these areas currently contain nearly two billion people (roughly three-fourths of the global population of 2.64 billion), such a prospect is disquieting unless we reject it as improbable.

It is not the underdeveloped areas alone which are growing in population. That such growth is found virtually everywhere, as Table 1 suggests, is one reason why international migration, often suggested by those seeking an easy escape from hard facts, is no solution. A real solution can come only from an ultimate reduction to zero of population growth itself.

SOME IMPLICATIONS

Too much of the theorizing about population and economic development is phrased in terms of mere survival. The problem is assumed to be that of securing enough food to feed the world's people, especially in retarded areas. To do this, economic expansion is certainly required. There is every evidence that such expansion is taking place; indeed, without it the massive population increase we have documented could not have occurred. But the point is that this is not economic *development*. The latter occurs only when the average real income, and hence the average product per man, is rising. Sheer economic expansion in the sense of increased national income to support ever more people at a near-subsistence level offers no solution for the problem of poverty. It is instead an enlargement of that problem.

One can in fact maintain that poverty is more prevalent today than it was a century ago. At that time the earth had about 1.2 billion people; now it has 2.6 billion. If everybody had been poor in 1856 and one billion were not poor now (both untrue statements), the world would still have gained nearly half a billion poor people. The philosophy of public health is that of keeping people alive. The philosophy of economic development is that of improving their level of living. A strange imbalance in most of the world in recent times is that the gains in the one sphere have not been matched by gains in the other.

Our thesis is not that future economic development is rendered impossible by a continued population climb, but that it is rendered improbable. Technological and economic gains *may* eclipse a rapid natural increase, in which case the birth rate would eventually respond to social modernization and thus finally stop the disfunctional human multiplication. But it appears more likely that economic expansion will barely be able to match the 3 per cent population growth per year, much less exceed it.

To see what is likely to happen, we have to look candidly at the political situation which the combination of rapid population growth and widespread poverty provokes in the underdeveloped countries. The leaders of such countries as India, Egypt, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Greece, and Nigeria, where densely settled and poverty-stricken agrarian citizens are increasing at phenomenal rates, are faced with almost insuperable domestic problems. The one thing these countries have in superabundance is manpower. The one safe issue is nationalism. The leaders, whatever their personal desires, are forced by circumstances to focus on international problems and to see in the risk of war a lesser hazard than the risks of peace. If they lack weapons, this is a lack that can be overcome, because the industrial nations, divided among themselves, stand ready to arm their potential allies.

The situation around the entire rim of Asia, in North and West Africa, and eventually in the Caribbean and Central America, is one of unrest. It is an unrest that comes not from poverty alone but from the vision of better things—a vision that contrasts painfully with the unremitting reality. As long as the industrial powers see fit to demand peace, the conflicts may be confined to small areas and short periods; but there is always the chance that a regional fire will become a global conflagration much more deadly than any in the past. Thus the twentieth century may be brought unwillingly to a painful solution of the problem to which its rational control of death and its irrational attitude toward reproduction have in large part contributed.

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The Pattern of Urban and Economic Development: Social Implications

By Catherine Bauer

In the potential progress of underdeveloped countries, the city plays a dynamic multiple role. Urbanization is a key factor in the race between increased productivity and population growth, because it creates the milieu for modern industry on the one hand and apparently tends to reduce the birth rate on the other. Also, most of the political and economic leadership for national development is likely to come from the urban centers. And finally, cities are where the basic social transformation must usually begin. New values and motivations take hold here, gradually spreading outward into the more conservative hinterland.

In most developing countries, a period of very rapid urban growth is imminent, with the present trend toward heavy concentration in ever larger metropolitan communities. But it is by no means certain that these expanding great cities are capable of fulfilling their important role effectively. Rising congestion and chaotic disorganization seem to create serious obstacles for both economic and social progress. Productive enterprise is hampered by low labor efficiency and inadequate services, even when capital and entrepreneurial initiative are available. And extremely bad living conditions may have a harmful effect not only on welfare and working efficiency per se but also in the failure to provide adequate incentives for constructive social adaptation, or satisfactory new values to replace traditional goals.

Substantial efforts are being made to improve housing and urban services in some of the major cities, but the problems multiply much faster than the resources available to remedy them. Assuming the continuance of present trends, the urban environment in general seems doomed to get worse before it can begin to get better.

There are also efforts to promote various forms of decentralization: village industry, satellite communities, company towns, new towns related to resource development schemes. But these experiments have not always proved successful, and in any case have diverted very little urban and industrial development from the burgeoning metropolitan centers.

Certain questions therefore arise. Are these unsatisfactory urban conditions inevitable in the early stages of the industrial revolution, because of inherent economic limitations? Or could conditions be improved with a less concentrated pattern of urbanization and economic activity? Is the present pattern conditioned by economic requirements and the primary need for increased productivity? Or could certain industries and services function quite as well, or better, on a more decentralized basis? And finally, if a greater degree of decentralization is desirable, what form should it take? How can it be effectuated at a scale large enough to reverse present trends?

Rapid Urbanization: the Challenge

The world's population may rise from two and a half to four billions in the next thirty years, according to the United Nations demographers, with most of this increase occurring on the now underdeveloped continents. In countries where medical science is rapidly reducing the death rate while fertility remains high, the population is likely to double.

Moreover, the rate of urbanization will usually be much higher than the over-all rate of population increase. Not only is a far greater proportion of industrial and service employment required to achieve better living levels, but also many people will be forced out of agriculture because of overcrowding on the land. In some countries practically *all* the additional population must find nonfarm support of some kind if they are to survive at all, particularly with the escape valve of mass emigration no longer available.

All in all, the rate of urbanization is likely to be faster in developing countries today than it was in Europe or North America in the nineteenth century, despite (or because of) their economic limitations and regardless of whether or not the resulting problems can be satisfactorily solved.[1]

With perhaps a billion people to be added to the world's nonfarm population in the next thirty to fifty years, for the most part in presently underdeveloped areas, what kind of community are the new urbanites in these countries likely to find themselves living in?

If present trends are projected, the majority may well be residing in vast metropolitan centers, some of them reaching a size entirely unprecedented. The present major cities in Asia and Latin America already tend to be very large by comparison with those in Europe and the United States at a similar stage in population growth and industrialization. And in recent decades, the biggest cities have been growing far more rapidly than the smaller communities. In the underdeveloped countries, there are almost twice as many people in cities of over 100,000 as there are in communities of 20,000 to 100,000.[2]

Of the twenty-five largest cities in the world, according to the latest figures available in 1950, twelve were in Japan, China, India, Africa, and Latin America.[3] And at least eight additional cities in India and Southeast Asia are rapidly pushing into this category; several of them in fact have probably reached there by now.[4] In 1951, India had ten million people in five metropolitan areas, which had increased by 68 per cent since 1941. And the wave of urbanization is just beginning. In 1850, at a roughly comparable stage in the development cycle, the largest city in the United States was New York with only about half a million.

The population of Latin America is expected to double or more in the next thirty years.[5] And if the proportionate increase in cities of over 100,000 continues as at present, their population will be almost quadrupled in the same period, with a still higher rate for the biggest metropolitan centers.[6]

Clearly, present trends suggest the possibility, at least, of mammoth agglomerations, numbered in the tens of millions.

[1] See various reports of the Population Commission of the United Nations; also Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz Golden, "Urbanization and the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 1954), p. 11.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (New York, 1953), p. 389.

[4] Census of India, 1951; and D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million' City in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October 1953), pp. 474–94.

[5] United Nations, *The Population of South America, 1950–1980,* and *The Population of Central America, 1950–1980,* New York, 1955.

[6] Derived from figures in Pan American Union, *Problems of Housing of Social Interest* (Washington, 1953), p. 33.

The urban environment: an insoluble problem?

These growing cities are the focal points for change and progress in their countries. New employment opportunities with higher wages tend to develop here; rising social standards and political demands emanate from them; and it is here that most of the housing construction, improvement efforts, and major expenditures for public works are centered.

Yet living conditions for the majority of the population tend to be very bad, often worse than in the villages because of acute overcrowding, both on the land and inside the dwellings. Densities are frequently fantastic, and one or more families per room is likely to be the general rule for all but the well to do. In some cities, thousands of people are entirely homeless. The most elementary sanitary services are often missing, whether in congested central districts or outlying shack towns. Transportation is inadequate. And local government is weak, lacking essential personnel, power, and financial resources except as intermittently provided by the national or provincial government.

In most cities, real improvements can be found here and there. But by and large they do not keep up with the influx, and over-all conditions are probably getting worse in many respects rather than better, particularly in the largest centers.

This picture is overgeneralized, of course, and exceptions could certainly be found. But it represents a fair summary of the large and growing stack of surveys, reports, and increasingly urgent recommendations issued by public agencies and qualified individuals.[7]

The United Nations, in the words of a resolution by the General Assembly, recognizes "that lack of adequate housing constitutes one of the most serious deficiencies in the standard of living of large sections of the population of the world" and has been increasingly concerned with the problem. Numerous housing and related improvement measures have been inaugurated, with or without international assistance, with tangible results.

What these studies and experiments are mainly demonstrating, however, is the difficulty of achieving any general solution in the growing, congested cities. With a backward building industry, low purchasing power, and limited public funds, even the most rudimentary standards for metropolitan homes and services would require a tremendous slice of the national budget. But poor countries with rising population pressures have a desperate need to increase productivity as quickly as possible. And the economic development experts tend to discourage ambitious schemes for large-scale housing or long-term civic improvements in favor of investments likely to bring more immediate and tangible economic returns.[8]

Meanwhile, with the threat of still worse conditions to come, the pressure for effective action in the congested metropolitan areas is mounting. And at the same time there is a growing demand, primarily from city planning and housing experts, for some form of urban and industrial decentralization.

[7] For example, see United Nations, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* (1952), *Low Cost Housing in South and South-East Asia* (1951); Pan American Union, *Problems of Housing of Social Interest* (1953); Government of India, *Report of the Environmental Hygiene Committee* (1949); and an excellent summary of the local government situation by Joseph Froomkin, "Fiscal Management of Municipalities and Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (July 1955), pp. 309–20.

[8] This is less true than it was a few years ago, but the rising concern with housing and civic needs of the International Bank and other organizations only underscores the importance of finding appropriate and practicable solutions.

CONCENTRATION VERSUS DISPERSAL

Many economists tend to assume that the cost of urban improvement is more or less uniform in any given country at a particular stage of development, irrespective of locational factors.[9] Viewing the expensive metropolitan experiments in the light of obvious national limitations, therefore, they see little hope for any general betterment within the foreseeable future. Moreover, this dismal outlook is fortified by history, since similarly bad conditions prevailed in many Western cities a century ago and have not been wholly remedied even to this day. On the other hand those who promote dispersal and smaller communities are apparently convinced that city size is itself a significant factor in the cost of a decent urban environment, particularly in the less advanced countries.[10] But there has been little systematic analysis to prove or disprove either of these conflicting assumptions, and none under a given set of specific local conditions.

The important distinction between "level of living" and "consumption level"[11] is not always heeded in development economics, however, nor the advice of an eminent consumer economist who offered "a valuable hint toward the technique of improving the living planes of depressed groups of peoples whose productive or earning power is low. A well-balanced simple plane of living may be definitely superior to an ill-balanced elaborate plane. . . . "[12] And in these terms, there is a mass of evidence which strongly suggests a very direct relationship between improvement costs and type of community.

Price of progress in great cities

A big metropolitan community is inherently a very complex mechanism. As long as misery and inefficiency are taken for granted, it can of course get along with very rudimentary services. But as soon as it begins to recognize the need for anything resembling "minimum standards" in the modern sense, whether in the interests of social welfare or productive efficiency, it must have a vast network of utilities and services requiring tremendous capital outlays and highly organized governmental machinery.

And size *is* a factor, as American and European studies demonstrate.[13] But although it costs much more to achieve a given level of living or standard of civic efficiency in a large metropolitan center than it does in a smaller city, this may not be a vital issue per se in a country or city which can afford this investment. For a poor country, however, the cost differential is likely to have serious implications. Moreover,

[9] See Leo Grebler, Possibilities of International Financing of Housing in Underdeveloped Countries (draft, United Nations, Housing and Town and Country Planning Section, 1953); and Max F. Millikan, as well as various other economists, in "Housing and Economic Development" (mimeographed; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, City and Regional Planning Department, 1954).

[10] See *Low Cost Housing in South and South-East Asia*, Report of Mission of Experts (United Nations, Department of Social Affairs, 1951) and Catherine Bauer, in "Housing and Economic Development" (cited note 9 *supra*).

[11] See *Definition and Measurement of Standards of Living*, Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1953.

[12] Joseph S. Davis, "Standards and Content of Living," Presidential Address, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1945), p. 9.

[13] See W. H. Ludlow, "Urban Densities and Their Costs," in Coleman Woodbury (Ed.), *Urban Redevelopment: Problems and Practices* (Chicago, 1953), p. 152.

the differential is likely to be far greater in regions with backward technology and limited resources. Here a modern transportation and utility system, absolutely essential in a large city for any semblance of decency and convenience, will cost relatively more. A smaller community, if properly laid out, can get along with a much simpler standard of services and still maintain a level of living and productivity which would represent genuine progress in most underdeveloped countries.

Housing density is perhaps the key factor. Densities are always likely to increase with city size, and this is almost inevitable where inadequate services limit the supply of usable sites, and where land speculation is rampant. Land prices are disproportionately high in most of the burgeoning metropolitan centers, even in semisocialist countries. And exorbitant land prices (assuming the absence of confiscatory powers or subsidies) mean large crowded insanitary shacks or multifamily structures. But the latter, even at one family per room with shared sanitary facilities, are relatively expensive in underdeveloped countries because building technology is backward. Low densities, on the other hand, make possible an entirely different approach: cheap local materials, simple building methods, minimum utilities, unskilled labor, often on a "self-help" basis, and outdoor space which (particularly in mild or tropical climates) can make up for some of the other limitations. But even if low-density housing were possible on the metropolitan fringe, the problem of extending minimum services over a much wider area would probably prohibit any general solution by this means.

A single illustration must suffice. The price of a tenement dwelling in Bombay (including land) is likely to be three times as much as for equal or better accommodation in an outlying house, and the cash cost of the latter could probably be halved if the owner contributed labor. But the high cost of adequate transportation precludes much suburban development for ordinary workers as long as most of their jobs are in central districts.[14]

It is therefore no accident that the most promising housing and community betterment schemes are not found in the big cities, as a rule, but in rural villages where "aided self-help" and "community development" programs have taken hold. Here real though modest physical improvements can apparently be made, with minimum cash expenditures and without complex administrative or service machinery.

Are there compensating advantages?

Whatever the cost differential, continued metropolitan concentration has a unique advantage over wider urban dispersal in the fact that it is apparently a "natural" or at least spontaneous trend under the conditions prevailing in most developing countries today. People flock on their own initiative to the place where they seem most likely to achieve some kind of subsistence, however minimal. Then the vast underemployed labor supply leads to the concentration of new economic activities in the same place, and the cycle continues on another round. Considerable time may pass before governments are forced to do something about such resulting problems as housing, sanitation, and communications, and then the measures taken are likely to be sporadic *ad hoc* remedies, however costly, to meet particularly pressing emergencies.

On the other hand it takes effective planning and highly co-ordinated action to establish a successful new town or even to divert population and economic enterprise to some existing smaller community. And this is a real problem, even though the capital cost would probably be demonstrably lower than the expenditures required, sooner or later, if the same population and industry were to establish themselves in congested metropolitan centers.

Moreover, the functional role and magnetic power of the great city must not be underestimated, particularly in countries where it is the focal point for rising nationalist pride and the well-nigh exclusive source of political, economic, and cultural leadership. In the early development of Western countries, the metropolis rarely played such a dominant part. Also, it can be claimed that material values assume much less importance in the culture systems of most developing countries today than they have in Europe and North America. Perhaps the emotional attractions and psychological influences of the great city outweigh its physical disabilities.

Unfortunately, with all the voluminous recent research on cultural adaptation and the social dynamics of economic development, very little attention has been given to the urban physical environment and its role in welfare, attitudes, and social change.[15] In general, however, social scientists are now disinclined to see the current development process as primarily a recapitulation of the nineteenth-century Western experience. The difference in conditions and motivations is emphasized, as well as the critical time factors today. The fact that people are driven into cities by rural population pressures, as a general rule, rather than by personal choice or any positive attraction, is frequently stressed, along with the problem of apathy and lack of "drive." Viewpoints and judgments vary greatly, but the relative lack of emphasis on urban environment per se as a significant influence may itself represent a judgment. Nevertheless, two theories have been taking shape which reflect somewhat divergent views on the role of great cities and the issue of concentration versus decentralization.

Community structure and social progress: two views

No one claims that conditions in the big cities are either good or getting better, by any standards or value system. But one group seems to suggest that the extreme social disruption experienced by peasant in-migrants may be not only inevitable but also necessary for the drastic transformation required. The "cataclysmic" break with traditional habits, values, and ties might clear the way for rapid social reorientation, perforce if not by choice, perhaps first taking hold in the factory rather than in the family.[16]

[14] See: *Low Cost Housing in South and South-East Asia* (cited note 10 *supra*), p. 25; Albert Mayer, *Self-Help Housing and Construction: Some Experiences in India* (draft, United Nations, Housing and Town and Country Planning Section, 1952); N. V. Modak and Albert Mayer, *Greater Bombay: The Master Plan in Outline* (Bombay, 1948), p. 30.

[15] Anthropologists tend to neglect the city entirely, *e.g.*, in *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change* (UNESCO, 1953). Demographers, sociologists, and economists are increasingly interested in urbanization as a vital part of the development process. See *World Urbanism*, special number of the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 60, No. 5 (March 1955); and *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, especially Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 1954) and No. 2 (January 1955). But with a few scattered exceptions, there has been little academic concern, in any systematic sense, with the regional pattern of urbanization, resulting community structure, or physical living conditions.

[16] See Kingsley Davis, "Population and the Further Spread of Industrial Society," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (1951), pp. 8–19, and (with Hilda Hertz Golden), "Urbanization and the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas,"

This theory would seem to accept if not embrace the great city, with or without any feasible improvements. And although fertility is admittedly little understood, the shock treatment theory may be supported by the belief that city size and resulting social disruption might be more significant factors in reducing the birth rate quickly than education, higher wages, or better living standards, all of which are likely to come very slowly.

It would be unfair to suggest that this somewhat neo-Malthusian view is presented as a positive planning philosophy, however. Rather it is an objective interpretation of current trends which assumes their inevitable projection into the future and therefore seeks a rationale for accepting a long period of social disorganization.

But a great deal of current evidence suggests that disorganization may be an unreliable tool wherewith to stimulate constructive social change. Broken or rootless families, mass insecurity, and hopeless overcrowding can produce demoralization, unrest, and perhaps a lowered birth rate. But they provide no incentives for positive social adaptation, and they tend to keep workers inefficient and productivity low.[17]

More action-oriented, the other group would mainly argue that there ought to be a pleasanter, safer, and surer way to achieve the necessary social transformation in the present state of our knowledge. By this group it is assumed that current trends and conditions may be consciously modified and new motivations nurtured. Tangible incentives and "new patterns of expectations" with some degree of cultural continuity are held to be the primary need, rather than maximum social disruption, in order to overcome the apathy so prevalent in many poor countries.[18]

The essential problem from this point of view is how to translate limited economic gains into recognized social benefits, however modest, as quickly and cheaply as possible, while at the same time fostering a greater sense of responsible popular participation in the development and improvement process. This approach leads to intensive work on the specific needs and possibilities within a given area and is largely responsible for the current programs of self-help village improvement.[19]

Basic to the problem is also the question of how to temper the "social costs" involved in transforming an ancient static society into a modern industrial democracy, including the heavy sacrifices usually incurred in rapid urbanization. For this purpose the great city has many inherent disadvantages, not only in terms of bad living conditions and high improvement costs but also in its disintegrating social effects and the frustration of individual and group initiative.

Obviously, such a diagnosis supports the desire for a greater degree of urban and industrial decentralization in one form or another.[20] But thus far the recommendations and experiments in this field have had little effect on over-all development patterns. And whether or not a determined national policy could accomplish such decentralization is still an open question.

Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 1954), pp. 6–24; also Bert F. Hoselitz, "The City, the Factory, and Economic Growth," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (May 1955), pp. 183, 184.

[17] See Robert I. Crane, "Urbanism in India," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 60, No. 5 (March 1955), p. 467.

[18] See, for instance, George A. Theodorson, "Acceptance of Industrialization and Its Attendant Consequences for the Social Patterns of Non-Western Societies," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18, No. 5 (October 1953), especially pp. 480 and 483.

[19] The literature in this field is increasingly voluminous, but the general principles are emphasized in *Programme of Concerted Practical Action in the Social Field of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies* (United Nations, 1953), pp. 165–66 and *passim*.

[20] An interesting analysis of the economic and social factors in development in relation to the pattern of industrialization and urbanization has been made by Wilbert E. Moore, "Problems of Timing, Balance and Priorities in Development Measures," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (January 1954), pp. 239–48.

IS DECENTRALIZATION FEASIBLE?

In the first place, great cities are necessary and desirable, and no one seriously proposes to break up the existing centers. Moreover, with their current momentum they will undoubtedly continue to grow no matter what measures of control or diversion are undertaken. The only issue is the *scale* of their future expansion. Must they absorb most of the tremendous horde of additional urbanites due in the next few decades, thus swelling their size to fantastic proportions? And if a more balanced pattern of urbanization is preferable, in economic as well as social terms, how can present trends be effectively redirected?

Also, it is important to note that decentralization can take many different forms depending on local conditions: not only full-blown "new towns" created as entirely independent units but also village industry, groups of industries to serve several villages, expansion of existing smaller cities, and development of satellite communities in the metropolitan hinterland.

Location of employment

In the long run it is the pattern of economic development which determines the size and distribution of urban communities. Even where the people tend to come first, as in many metropolitan centers today, most of them would move again if better economic opportunities became available elsewhere.

The locational requirements of needed industry and business are therefore a key factor in the decentralization question. On this score there seems to be no obstacle at all, at least according to the economic theorists. Obviously, certain types of economic enterprise demand metropolitan locations or depend on linkages or services that only a very large city could provide. But in general, the development experts seem to be arguing for more emphasis on various kinds of enterprise which could be carried on quite as well outside metropolitan areas, and in some cases better.

The arguments for cottage industry, agricultural processing, and simple plants for light manufacture are remarkably similar to those that support low-density housing and smaller communities per se. The scarcity of capital favors small local industries, it is claimed, because they require less overhead and fewer costly urban services, tend to be labor intensive rather than capital intensive, may call forth local savings not otherwise available, and reduce the "social costs" of urbanization.[21] A strong case is also made for industrial dispersal in order to utilize underemployed agricultural labor and benefit rural areas in general.[22]

On the other hand there is rising concern for the unbalanced character of national development which derives from the concentration of investment and economic activity in a few congested cen-

[21] For a detailed analysis, see Henry G. Aubrey, "Small Industry in Economic Development," *Social Research*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1951), pp. 269–312.

[22] *Land Reform: Defects in Agrarian Structure as Obstacles to Economic Development* (United Nations, 1951), pp. 85–86.

ters at the expense of the rest of the country.[23] The size of these swelling metropolitan agglomerations, it is more and more frequently suggested, is in no sense a mark of national progress, but rather a direct reflection of the economic weakness and lack of opportunity elsewhere.

But why, then, is there so little sign of any real shift toward a wider distribution of industrial and urban development?

One answer is that it is difficult or impossible to persuade the people with entrepreneurial skill and capital to leave the big cities, in part for economic reasons (the lack of essential services elsewhere, such as water, power, roads, railroads) and in part for personal or cultural reasons (the lack of adequate schools, health facilities, housing, and so forth).

Yet all these services are today largely in the realm of public responsibility. And in most developing countries governments are even more directly involved in the location of industrial enterprise, through subsidies, licensing controls, and often public construction and operation of plants.

Here, then, is the crux of the problem, which should not be impossible of solution. The pattern of economic development and urbanization is already largely shaped by public decisions. As long as practically all the public services, community facilities, and government-aided industry go into the existing metropolitan centers, they will continue to expand at a tremendous rate, with relatively little urban development elsewhere. If the pattern is to be modified, a number of varied public decisions and investments (which have to be made anyway, in one location or another) must be co-ordinated to the end of diverting industry and urban development to other areas. Within the present framework of planning and administration, however, this is easier said than done.

Need for a regional focus in planning and research

One difficulty is the gulf between "economic planning," carried on mainly at the national level in terms of quantitative analysis and specialized policies, and "city planning," which tries to cope with community problems *after* the basic development trends and decisions have established the pattern. ("Social planning," incidentally, often means national subsidies to help communities remedy these problems.) In this no man's land, some form of area-wide programing of urban and industrial growth seems to be needed. Regional planning is probably the best term for it, although the efforts in this field (including the Tennessee Valley Authority) have rarely been much concerned with urban distribution.[24]

The frequent failure to view development as essentially a continuous process, from the cradle in economic and resource policy to the grave in urban slums, is of course a by-product of overspecialization. But there is now a serious effort, however painful, to achieve better integration between economic and social measures.[25] And the new emphasis on comprehensive community-development programs in rural areas is a significant step toward the type of area planning needed at the regional level.

Systematic research is also required on numerous aspects of the development pattern. Most of the propositions and

[23] *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries* (United Nations, 1951), p. 26.

[24] The need for regional planning in the sense used here is emphasized in *Low Cost Housing in South and South-East Asia* (cited note 10 *supra*), pp. 21–23.

[25] This is the basic theme and purpose, for instance, of the *Programme of Concerted Practical Action* (cited note 19 *supra*).

arguments put forward in this article are necessarily based on highly tentative evidence, from random sources. With more substantial knowledge, quite different conclusions might result. On most of the issues, however, there is a limit to the possibility of reaching more refined judgments as long as the problems are viewed in generalized terms. All the underlying conditions vary tremendously from one area to another, and universal truths are few. General theory is needed, including theory on regional planning. But for research that can be applied to practical policy in this field, intensive interdisciplinary analysis of problems and possibilities in a given area, directly related to potential decisions, is probably the only effective answer.

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Public Administration: A Neglected Factor in Economic Development

By Frederick W. Riggs

THE stability of the Manchu Dynasty, China's last, depended upon its ability to bring annually three to four million piculs [1] of rice by barge through the Grand Canal to Peking. In its early years, the Manchu regime carried out gigantic and successful projects to dredge and build dikes on the Yellow River and to improve the Canal. Gradually, a huge establishment employing, by the mid-eighteenth century, some four hundred civilian officials, twenty thousand military men, and an equal number of laborers, was built up to maintain the Yellow River system.

During the early construction period, annual outlay for the river work cost about three million taels.[2] By the nineteenth century, two hundred years later, regular appropriations for work on the river amounted to four and one-half million taels. But maintenance had deteriorated, and appropriations for emergency repair projects were much higher. An imperial edict of 1811 stated:

> The southern part of the Yellow River in recent years has had floods every year, and so far more than 30 million taels have been spent without achieving any tangible results. At the present time, extensive works are undertaken one after another, costing nearly ten million taels.[3]

Since national revenue was little more than 40 million taels at that time, this was a major drain on the imperial budget.

[1] 1 picul equals about 133 to 140 pounds.

[2] 1 tael equals 1⅓ ounces of silver.

[3] Quoted by Ch'ang-tu Hu in "The Yellow River Administration in the Ch'ing Dynasty," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (August 1955), p. 511.

The reason for this phenomenal cost is to be found in administrative decline. Less than one-tenth of the money spent appears to have actually been used for water conservancy. A contemporary noted that the dikes were deliberately neglected so that they would "rot faster, decay faster, and be carried away faster, thereby justifying the request for more appropriations." [4] The self-interest of bureaucrats had become incompatible with the accomplishment of the objectives they were employed to achieve. In 1855 the Yellow River broke loose, cut through the Grand Canal, brought an end to the Yellow River Administration, and disrupted the revenues of the imperial government, hastening its ultimate collapse.

The administrative troubles of Manchu China were not unique. In many countries today, defective public administration hampers and even prevents the attainment of economic development goals. Evidence may be found in the reports by missions of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Most of these reports, after surveying a country's resources and economic prospects, point out administrative obstacles to further progress. The report on Cuba, for example, notes that "economic advance is not at present restricted by lack of available resources," and the country "has great opportunities for economic development." The report continues, "It is chiefly deficiencies in the 'organizing factors' which limit Cuba's prospects today." Improvements in this field "can have the greatest effect on Cuba's economic progress." [5]

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 512.

In the following analysis we will look at some of the administrative obstacles which hamper economic development abroad. Lest misunderstandings arise, observe that examples of every kind of administrative weakness noted in foreign countries may also be found in the United States. The chief difference is, perhaps, that they cannot afford administrative waste as well as we can.

Governmental Provision of Services

Many of the requisites for economic development—a communications and transport net, educational facilities, public health services—are often provided by government. Waste in the provision of these services, often reported by the International Bank, can stunt the growth of industry and agriculture. In Cuba, for example, the mission found an extensive network of highways deteriorating rapidly for lack of adequate maintenance. Frequently a highway was started and then abandoned. One stretch was graded but never paved. "Successive rains have so thoroughly ruined the raised central graded section that traffic now habitually travels by preference in the ditches on either side." Thus the ultimate cost of paving is estimated at twice what it would have cost to complete the road originally.[6]

[5] International Bank, *Report on Cuba* (Washington, D. C.: International Bank, 1951), p. 67. More than twenty years ago the noted British authority R. H. Tawney, in his report on Chinese developmental problems, wrote that, in its practical work, the "gravest weakness" of the Chinese system of government "is the absence of efficient administration, and, indeed, apart from exceptional individuals, of any adequate idea of what administration means."—*Land and Labour in China* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), p. 173.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 266.

In Mexico the Bank reported new railways under construction although those completed in recent years had fallen into decay because of poor maintenance.[7] In Colombia lack of integration of publicly owned lines adds to the cost of transport. The practice of paying train crews for time regardless of mileage, with extra rates for overtime after 10:00 P.M., "apparently led to deliberate delays by the train crews in order to earn overtime." Unreliability of schedules and delays in service made it "almost impossible for shippers to count on definite dates for rail delivery." [8]

In the communications field, Iraq suffers from poor co-ordination. Telephone equipment ordered abroad often arrives before buildings are ready to receive it. "Equipment is stored and maintained, in some cases for more than a year, waiting for the building to be completed, and even, on occasion, to be started." [9] The mission to Guatemala reported, of that country's telecommunications network, "Were it not for the condition of the government-owned services, coverage of the Republic could be considered fairly good. As it is, however, internal service is low and unsatisfactory." [10]

In education, the school system of Iraq is reportedly "too highly centralized," resulting in stereotyping of instruction and methods, while "the Ministry at Baghdad is so burdened with administrative detail that it cannot give adequate attention to policy and planning." [11] Much of the educational in-

[7] *Economic Development of Mexico* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), p. 97.

[8] *The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), pp. 104–16.

[9] International Bank, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 339.

[10] *Economic Development of Guatemala* (Washington, D. C.: International Bank, 1951), p. 212.

[11] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), p. 70.

vestment made by the Cuban people, according to the Bank's report, was wasted because of "unstable administration, poor planning, political patronage and maladministration of funds." "Administrative faults" are considered the "most important cause of Cuba's educational deficiencies." [12]

In public health, the mission to Turkey complains that the government:

> lacks the organization necessary to plan and carry out the broad program we suggest. The Ministry of Health is complex and overcentralized. Provincial Directors of Health are caught between bureaucratic restraints imposed by the Ministry and the political and administrative control of the provincial governors to whom they are subservient.[13]

Health services in Colombia are impaired by "(1) a low salary scale for public employees, and (2) very poor personnel practices and policies. These conditions are not peculiar to the public health agencies but are characteristic of the entire structure of government." [14]

Agricultural services in Iraq are limited by the fact that the "Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and much of their attention is devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks." "They lack the time, the transport facilities, and, often, the ability to counsel farmers on methods of improving their output." Financial stringency has led government farms to turn to commercial production instead of serving as experimental and demonstration stations.[15] The Bell mission to the Philippines, while deploring the small appropriations for agricultural research, added, "The lack of an efficient agricultural extension service is even more lamentable for there is much useful information already available which could be put into practice." Even the few existing services are so divided into separate specialized organizations that they cannot co-ordinate their work effectively. The Bell mission considered the integration of extension activities in a division free of regulatory duties "the basic need of Philippine agriculture." [16]

The International Bank, in almost every report, notes the inadequacy of statistical reports for planning and developmental purposes. In Iraq, for example, the annual Statistical Abstract "omits useful information which could be collected without too much difficulty; it includes much unnecessary detail and some statistics of highly dubious value; and the same mistakes have tended to be perpetuated year after year." [17] The mission to Cuba found statistics on unemployment, wage levels, cost of living, and prices (except for a few commodities) unavailable, thus hampering planning for employment. "In some cases," the mission reported, "there is no information at all and in almost every case important details are not available." [18]

REGULATION BY GOVERNMENT

As critical for economic growth as the services provided by government are the regulatory and political policies which affect the social climate of development. Much attention has been devoted to the impact of specific policies on economic growth. Even favorable policies, however, may fail of their objectives if they are not well carried out. Unfortunately, administrative regulation becomes more crucial and also more difficult to enforce the more development takes place.

An example is labor-management regulation which arises concurrently with industrialization. Typical of the difficulties encountered in this sphere is the situation in Iraq where the Labor Department is reportedly understaffed and ineffective. "In 1949/50, of 1,228 enterprises inspected, only 136 were found to comply with the law. Of the remainder, 974 were simply warned and 118 cases were referred to courts." The Bank's report adds that it would be desirable "to enforce existing legislation before enacting other labor laws." [19] Sometimes labor laws are interpreted so one-sidedly as to hamper industrial development. For example, employers complained to the Bank's mission to Guatemala not so much about the Labor Code as about the "manner in which it has been interpreted and implemented by the Labor Courts and Labor Inspectors." These interpretations have made it extremely difficult to dismiss an employee without severance pay, which is retroactive, without limitation, at the rate of one month's pay for every year of employment.[20]

The standardization and enforcement of weights and measures is essential for the efficient conduct of commerce and industry, yet many governments have been unable to enforce this elementary step. The mission to Cuba, for example, declared emphatically:

> A vigorously active Bureau of Weights and Measures, backed by laws providing stiff penalties for short weight and misrepresentation in commercial practice, would do more to give the customer his money's worth than a great deal of unrealistic price control.[21]

Adulteration and lack of product standardization has cost many countries dearly on the world market. The Indian Planning Commission laments that "for want of proper grading, agricultural products, such as cashew-nuts, black pepper, turmeric and wool, fetch low prices in foreign markets." It recommends government-enforced grading not only for export but also in the interest of national health.[22] The Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa is initiating controls to ensure that foreign purchasers will receive standardized products, a field in which Chinese efforts have hitherto proved damagingly defective.[23]

Currency and exchange controls have become essential in countries faced with foreign exchange shortages. In the Philippines the need for import controls is accepted by most of the business community, but complaints arise from "the lack of clarity in policy and in the interpretation of the law. The administration is needlessly complex, costly and dilatory." When charges of favoritism and corruption are added, dissatisfaction with the system becomes acute.[24]

Enforcement programs involving the grant of licenses open the door to many administrative abuses. The Indian Planning Commission observes:

> In recent years, the most conspicuous fields of corruption have perhaps been those in which businessmen had to apply for permits and licenses. Supervision and vigilance within the administration were inade-

[12] *Cuba* (cited note 5 *supra*), p. 405.
[13] *The Economy of Turkey* (Washington, D. C.: International Bank, 1951), p. 55.
[14] *Colombia* (cited note 8 *supra*), p. 199.
[15] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), pp. 23–24, 256.
[16] *Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines* (Washington, D. C., 1950), p. 52. Hereafter cited as "Bell report."
[17] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), p. 114.
[18] *Cuba* (cited note 5 *supra*), pp. 502–3.
[19] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), p. 42.
[20] *Guatemala* (cited note 10 *supra*), pp. 256–57.
[21] *Cuba* (cited note 5 *supra*), p. 182.
[22] Government of India, Planning Commission, *First Five Year Plan* (People's Ed.; Delhi: Publications Division, 1953), p. 113.
[23] Arthur F. Raper, Han-sheng Chuan, and Shao-hsing Chen, *Urban Taiwan—Crowded and Resourceful* (Taipei, Taiwan: Foreign Operations Administration and National Taiwan University, 1954), p. 56.
[24] Bell report (cited note 16 *supra*), p. 41.

quate and illegitimate gains were undoubtedly made.[25]

Government planning for land use, resources conservation, community development, and so forth is frequently criticized, not only for its absence, but also for lax or ruthless enforcement. Thus the International Bank found in Iraq that

> surveys, plans and partial plans have generally been hastily drawn and with little regard for the actual conditions prevailing in the community. In any event, municipalities have for the most part continued to develop without reference to any plan. In many towns new streets have been arbitrarily cut through residential and commercial districts with little concern for real needs or for the people affected. The various ministries concerned with the erection of schools, hospitals, public buildings and bridges generally locate their projects without reference to an overall plan and without consultation with each other.[26]

A fundamental manifestation of governmental failure to establish a favorable climate for development is evidence of insecurity, fear, and lack of confidence in the future. The Bank's mission was told by "informed Cubans, in every walk of life," that "one of Cuba's weaknesses is a prevailing lack of integrity in public administration and personal conduct." Many Cubans told the mission that "for many years the misuse of public funds has been extensive and that public administration still leaves much to be desired." "Lack of confidence in the predictability and impartial protection of the law deters Cuban and foreign investment." Evidences abound of lack of continuity and consistency in government policy such as unfinished and abandoned projects, roads, and public buildings.[27]

[25] *Five Year Plan* (cited note 22 *supra*), p. 56.
[26] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), p. 56.
[27] *Cuba* (cited note 5 *supra*), pp. 9–12.

STATE AS ENTREPRENEUR

Increasingly, governments of the "underdeveloped" countries are producing and distributing goods. It needs little argument to show that the success of these public undertakings depends on the effectiveness and efficiency of their administration and management, and greatly affects the pace of development in private sectors of the economy. Yet the reports of the Bank's missions contain many instances of faulty management of public enterprises.

Backstopping its role as producer and distributor, and a critical factor in the over-all development of a country's economy, may be the planning activities of government. In Cuba, typically, a cabinet level National Economic Council, supported by a Technical Commission staffed by high civil servants, is supposed to plan developmental goals, help co-ordinate the work of different government ministries and agencies, provide information and studies for the President, and so forth. Yet the International Bank found that "even if the *Junta* has made a number of constructive suggestions, relatively few results can be noticed in the actual policies of the government." [28] Similar criticisms of the ineffectiveness of central planning machinery may be found in many other reports of the International Bank.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES

What are the reasons for the administrative weaknesses which, as we have seen, so frequently hamper economic development? A universal complaint runs as follows: too many persons are employed, their services are not fully utilized, and they are frequently not qualified by training or experience to do the work that needs to be done. The report on Cuba, for example, notes that,

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 499.

next to the sugar industry, the government is the largest employer of labor. While admitting that many public servants work "with a real sense of responsibility and devotion to duty," many others:

> regard government jobs as sinecures. Apparently in many ministries a number of the employees never appear at all except to draw their pay-checks. Of those who do attend regularly, a significant proportion turn out very little work, either from incompetence, or inertia, or from lack of proper supervision and organization.[29]

The mission to Iraq found public servants inefficient and lacking in morale. It attributed this to the "low level of government salaries and the lack of any sense of real participation in constructive work." Low salaries reportedly put the "probity" of civil servants to a "severe test" and compel many officials to take outside employment.[30] In Turkey the Bank found that:

> recruitment often has no relation to need, with the result that many government offices are overstaffed. Duties are poorly defined and insufficiently coordinated. Advancement depends primarily on seniority rather than demonstrated merit. The inefficient are protected by rigid personnel laws and regulations designed to protect the civil servant rather than to promote efficient administration.[31]

In some countries, especially in Asia where recent colonial administration has left a strong imprint, closed career systems of personnel administration prevail. Elsewhere, especially in Latin America, rapid turnover and patronage appear more prevalent. In both situations, however, the same kinds of complaint are voiced. It would appear that in each instance the personal incentives of public employees are not strongly identified with the organizational or governmental goals they are nominally of working for. Whether because of low salaries, lack of opportunity to take part in program planning and decision making, or little reward for achievement as against mere timeserving, the general pressure of society, the prodding of individual organizations and pressure groups, are not mobilized so as to drive the individual to exert himself to accomplish specific production goals. For many employees, holding the job appears to be an end in itself—the status it confers is more important than the financial reward. Governments are pressed to maximize appointments on the public payroll, without much regard for the ratio between cost and the value of work output. Perhaps all too frequently, as in the case of the Chinese Yellow River Administration, the self-interests of employees become institutionalized in such a way as to defeat the organizational objectives for which they were supposedly employed.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 453.
[30] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), p. 78.
[31] *Turkey* (cited note 13 *supra*), pp. 58–59.

CONSEQUENCES FOR PERFORMANCE

What does this mean for administration? If you cannot count on the loyalty and competence of civil servants, you must try to check their performance at every turn, audit every detail of expenditure, collect only taxes that are most easily supervised. The prevalence of inequitable and regressive tax policies has been widely noted and correlated with the power of privilege and the consequences for development. Less attention has been paid to the relation between tax administration and these policies. Yet governments lacking reliable machinery understandably collect mainly the taxes that are easiest to collect, generally preferring indirect, turnover taxes to direct levies on income.

In Iraq, typically, during the period 1948–49 to 1950–51, only 18 per cent of tax revenues came from land, prop-

erty, and income taxes as compared with 82 per cent from indirect sources, especially customs duties and excises.[32] Preoccupation with finding any source of tax revenue which *can* be collected naturally restricts the ability of governments to use fiscal policy as a means of regulation and to stimulate economic development.

Understandably, also, the taxes that are imposed are not fully collected. It is reported, for instance, that with better administration and enforcement, Colombia might raise its total tax yield by one-third or more. The reason for poor enforcement given by the Bank mission is "lack of adequate staff and trained personnel."[33] The Bell mission attributed mounting deficits in the Philippines to a "failure on the part of the Government to recognize its responsibility to levy taxes and to provide an administrative enforcement staff that can collect taxes."[34] In tax administration there is a point beyond which, for any tax, marginal revenue falls below marginal cost of collection —a law of diminishing returns. In underdeveloped countries this point is often reached very early. The consequence: proliferation of new taxes and surtaxes, and inequitable enforcement.

Inability to rely on staff to carry out policy has many other consequences. Legislatures try elaborately to restrict the way in which public funds are spent. They impose rigid and often ineffective accounting and auditing controls—frequently vested in the same agency—to prevent misuse of funds, thereby throttling imaginative and effective program administration. Cuban expenditure controls illustrate both rigidity and laxity. Pension benefits had to be reduced and delayed because the government had "borrowed" pension funds. "The greatest part of the reserve funds of at least eleven non-government pension and retirement funds were used to cover government deficits." On the other hand, inspectors in the agricultural services often cannot obtain travel and expense funds, so that farmers must call on the inspector in the nearest town. The law setting up a National Transportation Commission established a fixed annual budget of $120,000 and set the salaries of commissioners and senior staff at amounts totaling half the budget. As a result the Commission was able to employ only five inspectors for the whole country.[35]

Overcentralization and Poor Co-ordination

Obstacles to identification of personal with program goals are especially conspicuous in the way the work load and responsibilities of different officials are allocated, that is, in "organization and management." These often make it impossible for anyone to carry out a constructive project without waiting for the concurrence of many others, whereby many people have the power to block action. One result is often to elevate the level of settlement of even minor disputes to ministerial, cabinet, and chief executive levels. Top administrators become embroiled in continual interagency conflicts while subordinates piddle away their energies waiting for requisite approvals. Moreover, because many persons far from the scene of action become involved in decision making, questions are often referred to persons with only remote interest in them, it becomes difficult to assign responsibility for action, and final decisions hinge on the outcome of power struggles among individuals only indirectly concerned.

In Iraq, the Bank's mission reported that "excessive centralization causes ministers and high officials to be overburdened with detail to the neglect of policy formulation and planning. Inadequate use is made of such talent and knowledge as is available elsewhere in the government, including the local administration." In the Department of Agriculture the mission found that "excessive centralization leaves little room for initiative. Even the taking of a field trip requires the consent of the central office." The Ministry of Social Affairs was found to be "too rigid throughout, without sufficient delegation of responsibility and without enough consultation among departments of the Ministry."[36]

In some countries elaborate ministerial secretariats, staffed by generalists who rotate frequently between headquarters and district assignments, have been placed in the line of communication and command between ministers and executive or administrative departments and divisions. Universally this causes great delay while secretariat officials review more and more of the work nominally assigned to and originating in the departments. As a result, in the words of a distinguished former Indian civil servant:

> The head of the department is deprived of all initiative and instead of being allowed to attend to and make progress with his own work, has to spend a great deal of time submitting unnecessary reports, explaining the position in individual matters to the Ministry and getting its orders on points which lie well within his own sphere of authority.[37]

A former British adviser in the Siamese government notes, similarly:

> The ministries get bogged down with masses of papers on more or less unimportant issues, nearly all of which have to pass through the bottleneck of an overworked Permanent Under-Secretary's office.[38]

Tasks often undertaken in America by local governmental authorities and municipalities are frequently taken over by central government. The Bank's mission noted an "extreme centralization of municipal public works" in Cuba: "local initiative is given little chance, and the public is accustomed to expect the central government to do everything."[39] In Turkey:

> Top officials are subjected to an undue pressure of work and the higher levels of the Government have become increasingly clogged with masses of minor problems. Even Ministers feel they must consult the Council of Ministers on operational as well as policy matters.[40]

Because of overcentralization and lack of delegation, those close to the goals of action cannot easily co-operate with their colleagues in other agencies whose work directly affects the success of their own efforts. Characteristically, we find lack of co-ordination and co-operation. Moreover, to overcome this stagnation, new agencies are often set up in the hope that, outside the bog of established structures, action may be possible. But the new agencies simply add to the intrabureaucratic conflict and competition, increasing the burden on the top of the hierarchy to impose co-ordination.

The Bank noted in Colombia, for example:

> Numerous agencies are involved in almost every field of activity, often with little co-

[32] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), p. 173.
[33] *Colombia* (cited note 8 *supra*), p. 265.
[34] Bell report (cited note 16 *supra*), p. 23.
[35] *Cuba* (cited note 5 *supra*), pp. 122, 312, 475.
[36] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), pp. 77–78, 252, 374.
[37] A. D. Gorwala, *Report on Public Administration* (New Delhi: Planning Commission, 1951), p. 39. See also Paul H. Appleby, *Public Administration in India; Report of a Survey* (New Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1953), Sec. II, especially p. 21. (Note that in the above usage, the word "department" is roughly equivalent to an American "bureau.")
[38] W. D. Reeve, *Public Administration in Siam* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951), pp. 38–39.
[39] *Cuba* (cited note 5 *supra*), p. 465.
[40] *Turkey* (cited note 13 *supra*), p. 58.

ordination. In the field of agriculture alone, there are twenty or more agencies, corporations or boards, in addition to the Ministry, whose activities affect agriculture in one way or another. . . . The same is true in lesser degree in the fields of health, public utilities and transport.[41]

In Mexico the International Bank mission found an urgent need for co-ordination of government transportation agencies "if serious waste of resources is to be avoided in the further development of transportation facilities and if the railroads are to cease to be a major impediment to economic growth." [42] In Ceylon the mission complained that un-co-ordinated requests for foreign technical assistance had

resulted in duplication and overlapping, waste or poor use of specialists once obtained, sometimes procurement of the wrong type of specialist or even, occasionally, of an incompetent or completely unnecessary one. We are convinced that there is great need for coordination here.[43]

UNDERLYING FACTORS

Are these administrative difficulties prime causes in themselves, or are they symptoms of more basic conditions? It is well to remind ourselves here of the statement made above, that examples of the administrative difficulties found in underdeveloped countries could also be found in industrialized countries. What we seek, therefore, is not so much unique factors as the reasons why these problems appear to be more crippling abroad than in the United States in their impact on development.

The fact that effective administration is no monopoly of the West is demonstrated in William W. Lockwood's comprehensive analysis of the economic development of Japan. He shows in detail how the government acted effectively, in the early years of industrialization, to:

stimulate new investment and technological change, and to guide economic development in accordance with national interests. . . . A rapid succession of measures established a milieu of law and administration and finance within which the gestation of capitalism took place. Beyond this the government itself ordinarily shared the initiative in building systems of transport and communications, establishing credit institutions and even launching new factory enterprise.[44]

In comparing the work of the average administrator in underdeveloped countries with his counterpart in Japan or in the industrialized West, a sharp contrast may be noted between the terrific pressures on the latter to show results compared with the relative weakness of the incentives offered the former. In Japan these pressures took the form of a vast devotion to the goals of national survival and strength. In private industry, the market may furnish a whip in the form of bankruptcy for the nonproductive. In American government the legislatures, the party battle for votes, the pressures of organized clientele groups and professional societies, combine to prod the public administrator to produce results if he would keep his post and win promotions.

In contrast, in many countries bureaucracy seems to lay down its own terms for survival. Seniority, patronage, strict tenure rules, part-time employment, corruption—these are signs that the dominant pressures on administrators are not directed toward production. They suggest rather the importance of connections with influential families and cliques, of timeserving, of catering to those with standing and money, and so forth. Alternatively these signs may be taken as indications of political weaknesses in government, as evidence that the bureaucracy has become a politically dominant rather than a subordinate organ of government, that administrators deal with their clientele as "officials" imposing orders from above rather than as "public servants" responsive to articulate needs.

The International Bank mission attributed economic stagnation in Cuba, in part, to a "tendency to freeze or rigidify economic relationships." [45] This tendency is linked with the view that total economic resources are constant. Each competitor strives to maximize and protect his share of this unchanging pie. The idea that the pie might be enlarged and that efforts to increase the total would add to the share of each individual is uncommon. In administration this view is reflected in the quest for jobs, security, and tenure as ends in themselves. Administration seems more concerned to protect and freeze status, relationships, and privileges than to achieve organizational output goals.

A frequent corollary of the static view of production is preoccupation with social status, measured not in terms of productivity but by the nature of the activity, mental or manual, in which one engages. The American assumption that status should be measured by production, as indicated by salary, rests, in turn, on the assumptions of the "neutrality of means" and the possibility that compensation can vary directly with output—hence the stress in our administrative lore on job classification and the slogan: "equal pay for equal work." The reduction of human values to the "cash nexus" is a feature of our cultural system that repels people of older cultures, but it appears to have a positive relation to our high level of economic productivity.

The International Bank noted in Iraq that, although the number of students in technical schools appeared inadequate for the needs of the country, even the available graduates were not employed. "They show a distaste for manual work." The mission urged vocational schools to place "emphasis upon the dignity and value of manual labor." [46] A study of senior secondary students in Ceylon showed that more than half aspired to "service occupations," largely government employment, although only 15 per cent of the population can hope to obtain this kind of work. The survey findings reflect "a strong desire for the security and status of government employment . . . a dislike of work involving direct contact with the soil or the exercise of manual skills." [47] Clearly the more public employees limit the ways in which they will permit themselves to be used for organizational purposes, and the more they are able to lay down their own terms of employment, the more difficult it will be to increase their organizational work output.

Space forbids the exploration of other cultural values and social and political factors that affect administrative performance, such as differences in interpretations of the role of law and the hierarchical relationships of individuals, the structure of the family and child-rearing practices, the individual's conception of the self and the roles that he will play, the flexibility and viability of contracts, voluntaristic versus deterministic views of life, sense of time and predictability of future events, diffuseness versus specificness of expectations arising in institutionalized relationships.[48]

[41] *Colombia* (cited note 8 *supra*), p. 344.
[42] *Mexico* (cited note 7 *supra*), p. 98.
[43] *The Economic Development of Ceylon* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), p. 62.
[44] *The Economic Development of Japan* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 572. See especially Chap. X, "The State and Economic Enterprise."
[45] *Cuba* (cited note 5 *supra*), pp. 57 ff.
[46] *Iraq* (cited note 9 *supra*), p. 63.
[47] *Ceylon* (cited note 43 *supra*), p. 57.
[48] One example, showing the effect of different conceptions of law, is noted by Tawney,

CONCLUSION

Attempts to assist and advise persons in non-Western cultures, whether in the fields of public administration or in the substantive fields of economic development, will undoubtedly be more fruitful the more participants become aware of the complex interrelationships between cultural values and administrative and economic problems. No single factor may properly be considered a basic "cause" of these problems. Rather, all factors are interdependently related to each other. Cultures manifest a totality of interactions.

Many of the factors in these totalities, however, can vary independently. In response to such variations, one may expect repercussions and reactions in other variables. Thus decisions about the approach to change in cross-cultural situations depend on strategic calculations concerning which changes are most desired, and most likely to elicit the kinds of reactions that are desired, by participants. Such calculations are made daily by practical administrators and by practitioners of technical assistance. Our hope is that these decisions can become more sophisticated, based on more accurate predictions. Clearly public administration and economic change have this kind of interdependent relationship with each other and with the total cultural setting in which they take place. As such they should be increasingly studied as interacting variables, rather than abstractly as independent phenomena.

in China, where "the object of the official charged with administrative duties is less to impose the law on recalcitrant wills than so to comport himself that a direct collision of wills may be avoided, even if the law suffers in the process."—*Op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 175. The obstacles the Chinese approach presents to the making and enforcement of contracts, so necessary to the Western economic system, are analyzed in Edith E. Ware, *Business and Politics in the Far East* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1932), especially Chaps. II and III. On the other hand, the weakness of pressures for performance in many underdeveloped countries often cause administrators to become preoccupied with procedural and legalistic ritualism at the expense of goal-oriented behavior. For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between cultural values and productive activity, see Margaret Mead (Ed.), *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change,* Paris: UNESCO, 1953. Reprinted by Mentor Books, 1955.

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Cultural Values in India's Economic Development

By MILTON SINGER

WRITING of her impressions of India in 1953, Eleanor Roosevelt incisively states a widespread view of the strategic role of cultural values for India's economic development:

> . . . Prime Minister Nehru is trying to develop a democracy that, though perhaps not exactly like ours, will ensure all the people personal freedom. But if an accompanying material prosperity is also to be achieved—and the government will not be successful unless it can demonstrate certain progress on the material side—considerable education and re-education of the people will be necessary. For a belief in the virtue of renunciation is not an incentive to hard work for material gain; but only hard work by all the people is going to bring any real betterment of their living conditions. Somehow a spiritual incentive, a substitute for renunciation, will have to be found. Somehow they must be made to realize the living and exciting possibilities of the freedom and democracy their new government offers them.
>
> Our material wealth has come to us almost as a by-product of our effort to fulfill our spiritual and democratic ideals and as a result of our philosophy of work. But our ideals are peculiar to our culture; they satisfy us, but they would not necessarily satisfy the Indian people. . . . My own feeling is that with their religious and cultural background something different will be required to spark in them the conviction that the modern struggle of a highly technologically developed state is worth while.[1]

There are many Indians and non-Indians who would agree with Mrs. Roosevelt's diagnosis, although they might not agree on the particular set of ideals required to spark in the Indian people "the conviction that the modern struggle of a highly technologically developed state is worth while." Agreement is much easier to find on the negative thesis that India's traditional ideals and values—asceticism, fatalism, the cyclical view of time, the low value put on manual labor, the village-centered caste society, etc.—are major obstacles to economic development, than on the positive cultural conditions for such development.

Observations made during a recent visit to India have raised serious doubts in my own mind whether the traditional cultural values are as great an obstacle to economic development as has been thought, and whether a substitute for renunciation is needed to provide a spiritual incentive in the Indian people for the acceptance of the new program the government offers them. There are many indications to the contrary—that popular expectations are now running so far ahead of what the government can deliver that more rather than less "renunciation" is needed if wholesale disillusionment with the government is not to set in.

I do not question Mrs. Roosevelt's emphasis on the "philosophy of renunciation" as the prevalent expression of Indian spirituality. For despite the insistent refrain of so many Indians that they are "spiritualistic" whereas Westerners are "materialistic," one does come away from India feeling that there is something to this contrast, and that there is a greater "starving of the senses" in the service of self-realization than one meets with in Europe or the United States. But the contrast mis-

[1] Eleanor Roosevelt, *India and the Awakening East* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 196–202.

leads in its implication that "materialism" has no positive value in India or that "spiritualism" precludes the coexistence of "materialism." These implications are perhaps more commonly drawn by Westerners than by Indians; at any rate they underlie the strong sense of paradox which Americans in India feel when they hear pandits sing Vedic chants over a public address system in a temple yard or meet a Western-educated lawyer at an orthodox wedding ceremony with his Western clothes replaced by a simple dhoti.

INDIAN "MATERIALISM"

In the traditional Indian pantheon material wealth and power have an important place. Lakshmi, goddess of wealth, is worshiped at least once a week and is the patron deity of the merchant caste, known by different names—*vaisyas, banias, chettiars*—in different parts of India. *Artha,* wealth and power, represents one of the four major ends of life, and there is a science of it in *arthasastra.* In the classic work of that name, wealth and power are indeed considered as essential in the scheme of things as are the other three basic values—*dharma* (duty), *mokhsa* (liberation), and *kama* (pleasure). And this judgment is supported by the stories of the epics in which wealth and power, usually the reward of virtue, are ever present.

In their everyday behavior, too, Indians do not show less of that propensity to trade, barter, and exchange than Adam Smith found in the mainsprings of the wealth of nations. Every village has its shopkeeper and every town its bazaar. The mutual exchange of services among cultivators and artisans in village and town has over the centuries been developed to so regular and precise a level that Western students like the Wisers have found in it a special system of economic exchange which they call the *jajmani system.*[2] To Indians it appears odd that this should be singled out as a special system; they take it for granted as part of the social landscape, of the texture of their daily relations with others. The occasions for trade even in the villages are numerous and periodic—weekly fairs and markets, religious festivals where the merchants in the temple streets are a regular feature of the festival.

Specialized skill is highly regarded and expected from the artisan, who by virtue of his hereditary training usually has it, although the artisan crafts are now in decline. Nor is innovation absent from this traditional system. A sacred image maker proudly described to me how by using a finer grain clay from a river bed he was able to develop casting material completely unknown to his father and other image makers.

Behind the mud walls of an Indian village one will not find as much conspicuous consumption as in the towns and cities, but even in the humble village one finds love for fine cloth, bangles, and precious gems. And what is perhaps more important, the desire for land and cattle and oxcarts, a good match and education for his children, a job for a relative, are for the villager real desires and express in these local terms his ambition to improve his position. Some of the things he wants may not be for himself alone or even for his family and caste—a new school, a road, better drinking facilities, these are for all the village.

I have perhaps said enough to indicate that those values and motivations usually associated with the "materialism" of the West are also commonplaces in India. And it is not, therefore, their absence which is the source of that economic "underdevelopment" to which

[2] W. H. Wiser, *The Hindu Jajmani System,* Lucknow, U. P.: Lucknow Publishing House, 1936.

the Nehru government is now addressing itself. But this is only one half of the picture. There is also to be considered that philosophy of renunciation to which Mrs. Roosevelt has called our attention. It is a real and living force today and is frequently invoked by Indians to curb their more "materialistic" desires.

PHILOSOPHY OF RENUNCIATION

The theme of the king or rich man who gives up everything for the sake of a spiritual principle is very common in Indian literature. The dramatization of this theme in the stories of Rama, the Pandavas, Harischandra, are almost universally known and beloved by Indians everywhere. And it is not only the mighty and rich who are expected to renounce, for in the traditional Indian theory of the stages of life, the householder who has discharged his responsibilities to his family should renounce his possessions and eventually all familial ties to become a Sannyasi or holy man who lives on alms. Not all householders live up to this theory, but one does meet engineers, lawyers, doctors who phrase their retirement in these terms, and younger men who walk out of their jobs in order to engage in more "spiritual" preoccupations. The holy man who is poor is respected and his advice and blessing sought after. To the rich man, the appeal that he renounce his wealth and become like a holy man has a compulsion which, when combined with other types of appeal as in Vinoba Bhave's movement, may result in one of the most spectacular voluntary redistributions of land in history.

The Indian world view encompasses both material and spiritual values, and these can be found in the behavior of the ordinary Indian existing side by side and in functional interdependence. Indian thought, too, particularly the work of Tagore, Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan, Raghavan, shows a balance and complexity in these respects which is far from that overspecialization on the spiritual, the sacred, and the life-denying to be found in the interpretations of some Western scholars.[3]

INDIAN ASCETICISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIALISM

The philosophy of renunciation smooths the transfer of holdings from generation to generation within the family, and it may also be used to lever a redistribution of property. In neither of these functions does renunciation constitute an obstacle to economic development. In fact I should go farther and say that in performing these functions it furnishes an incentive for hard work on the part of the younger generation which is going to inherit the property renounced by the elder generation and holds out to the poor and landless a prospect of redistribution in their favor. But in furnishing a "rhetoric of motives" for working hard and for keeping the traditional economy going, the philosophy of renunciation functions negatively in relation to the accumulation of wealth. In this function it serves to redistribute wealth but not necessarily to increase the total national income. There is another and more positive relationship in which renunciation may serve as a direct motive for the increase of wealth, personal and national.

In the *Ramayana,* Ravanna's great wealth and power in Lanka is traced to the fact that he had practiced so many austerities that the gods were compelled to give him what he wanted. The ascetic who gains his boons in this manner is again a very common theme in Indian literature and folklore. And it is

[3] R. Tagore, *The Religion of Man* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1931); S. Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1927); V. Raghavan, "Some Leading Ideas of Hindu Thought," *The Vedanta Kesari* (Madras), February 1955.

not only the gods but other men who find his spiritual powers irresistible. Asceticism takes on a social and practical significance.

I did not myself meet anyone in India who claimed to have acquired his wealth from the practice of ascetic austerities. Most professional holy men—the sadhus—are quite poor, and the sincere among them prefer to remain that way.[4] So perhaps it is only in the stories that asceticism is a technique for becoming rich. Yet the connection between asceticism and economic activity does not appear a farfetched one, particularly to anyone who has read Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. According to Weber, the Calvinistic emphasis on self-denying activity in a "calling" as the path to salvation was easily converted into a "this-worldly asceticism" that provided both the discipline and spiritual sanctions for the economic activities of the early industrial capitalists. The doctrine of "election" lent specious plausibility to the feelings of the prosperous that they were also a spiritual success and of the poor that they were spiritual failures.

Indian asceticism has traditionally been otherworldly. Even in those cases where it is used as a means to acquire worldly goods, the techniques involve a withdrawal from the world, from family and everyday occupation. And so long as it remains otherworldly it is difficult to see how it may provide those incentives for industrial development which Weber found in Calvinism. But asceticism in India has not remained altogether "otherworldly." In recent years it has been undergoing a process of interpretation which brings it quite close to the type of "this-worldly asceticism" which Weber described in Europe and the United States. A leading influence in this reinterpretation has been the views and example of Mahatma Gandhi, who crystallizes a vigorous and continuing effort to bring the religious force of Hinduism into the service of modern social reform.

Gandhi's asceticism

Gandhi's personal asceticism is well known from his autobiographical writings. It is not, however, his vegetarianism and teetotalism, his continence and stand against artificial birth control, that are significantly new. These are the norms of right conduct for all the "twice-born" castes, and many instances are known where a lower caste will give up beef and alcohol in an effort to raise its status.[5] The novel element in Gandhi's asceticism is to be found in his philosophy and program of social reform. His philosophy of nonviolence (*ahimsa*), of the simple life in self-sufficient villages, of the necessity of work and the dignity of manual labor, of service to neighbors, of social justice in the distribution of power and wealth, has breathed a vitality into traditional Indian asceticism which animated India's successful struggle for independence and which shapes much of the present government's domestic program.

Interpretation of the Bhagavad-Gita

Gandhi himself found the source of this social philosophy in Hindu religious traditions and particularly in the message of that "spiritual reference book," the *Bhagavad-Gita*, whose meaning he sought to enforce in his own conduct for an unbroken period of forty years.[6] Challenged by some of his coworkers to deduce the doctrine of nonviolence from

[4] G. S. Ghurye, *Indian Sadhus*, Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1953.

[5] M. N. Srinivas, *Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952.

[6] Mahadev Desai (Ed.), *The Gospel of Selfless Action or the Gita According to Gandhi* (Ahmadabad, 1946), p. 123.

the *Gita*, he translated the work in 1929 into Gujerati, his mother tongue, and published it in the columns of *Young India* together with a commentary. This translation he said he designed "for women, the commercial class, the so-called Sudras and the like, who have little or no literary equipment, who have neither the time nor the desire to read the *Gita* in the original, and yet stand in need of its support."[7]

The apparent justification for warfare in the *Gita* Gandhi dismisses by arguing that physical warfare is "brought in merely to make the internal duel [in the hearts of men] more alluring."[8] He does not read the *Mahabharata* and its crown, the *Gita*, as a historical work; its author uses historical persons "to drive home a religious theme."[9] The theme of the *Gita*—and of all scriptures—is self-realization, "the ambition to become like God." The *Gita* tells how a perfectly realized man is to be known through the example of Krishna, who is "perfection and right knowledge personified." Although all embodied life is an incarnation of God in Hinduism, "it is not usual to consider every living being an incarnation. Future generations pay this homage to one who in his own generation has been extraordinarily religious in his conduct . . . to one who has performed some extraordinary service to mankind."[10]

The *Gita* shows, according to Gandhi's reading, that the best way to reach self-realization and the perfect peace of salvation is through the renunciation of the fruits of action. Renunciation means "desireless action" and requires right knowledge and a devotion which does not consist in blind faith and observances.[11] Action "includes all activity, whether mental or physical." "The *Gita* says do your allotted work but renounce its fruit, be detached and work, have no desire for reward and work."[12]

Renunciation of the fruit does not mean indifference to the result of action. "He who renounces reaps a thousandfold." "In regard to every action one must know the result that is expected to follow, the means thereto, and the capacity for it. He who being thus equipped, is without desire for the result, and is yet wholly engrossed in the due fulfilment of the task before him, is said to have renounced the fruits of his action."[13]

Application to economic life

This doctrine applies to economic life, for the author of the *Gita*

> . . . has drawn no line of demarcation between salvation and worldly pursuits. On the contrary he has shown that religion must rule even our worldly pursuits. . . . The *Gita* teaches that what cannot be followed out in day-to-day practice cannot be called religion. Thus according to the *Gita*, all acts that are incapable of being performed without attachment are taboo. This golden rule saves mankind from many a pitfall. . . . Murder, lying, dissoluteness and the like must be regarded as sinful and therefore taboo. Man's life thus becomes simple and from that simpleness springs peace.[14]

"In trying to enforce in one's own life the central teaching of the *Gita* one is bound to follow Truth and *ahimsa*."[15]

Gandhi is aware that this interpretation of the *Gita's* message rests on the distinctive meaning he gives to the Hindu notion of "yajna" or sacrifice.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 123.
[9] *Loc. cit.*
[10] Desai (Ed.), *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 124.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 127–28.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 128.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 128–29.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

" 'Yajna' literally means worship; hence sacrifice; hence any sacrificial act or any act of service. And in this sense every age may and should have its own particular sacrifice (*yajna*). For mankind lives by *yajna,* sacrifice." [16] The sacrifice called for in this age is "body-labor" in the service of others (*Gita* III), and it is for this reason that self-realization cannot be attained without action which renounces its fruits.

How this path of desireless action may lead to that mechanically disciplined behavior which Max Weber believed necessary for industrial life is suggested by the editor, Mahadev Desai, of *The Gita According to Gandhi:*

> Man must reduce his daily conduct to mechanical regularity and precision, but he must do so intelligently. . . . One has but to withdraw the self, withdraw attachment to fruit from all action, and then not only mechanical precision but security from all wear and tear will be ensured.[17]

I have not sought to suggest that Gandhi's reinterpretation of India's otherworldly asceticism will produce in India "a protestant ethic" and "a spirit of capitalism" which will stimulate a development of industrialism similar to the European counterpart analyzed by Weber. A book on the Indian case would more accurately be titled "The Hindu Ethic and the Spirit of Socialism." I have merely wanted to show that the traditional Indian philosophy of renunciation is not a major obstacle to economic development, that it has in fact been all along functionally linked to the material side of Indian life, and that as interpreted by the religious social reformers of the last hundred years, especially by Gandhi, it is perfectly capable of providing the spiritual incentives and disciplines of a modern industrial society.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 174.
[17] Pp. 179, 180.

CULTURAL VALUES OF THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN

Gandhi, it is true, was not in favor of industrialism; his opposition extended to the socialistic as well as to the capitalistic varieties.

> Pandit Nehru wants industrialization because he thinks that, if it is socialized, it would be free from the evils of capitalism. My own view is that the evils are inherent in industrialism and no amount of socialization can eradicate them.[18]

Yet as Nehru leads India into a program of industrialization one finds Gandhi's spirit very much in evidence, especially his beliefs that economic reform should be brought about by non-violent means, that "work is worship," that an agrarian simplicity of life is to be preferred to "the mad desire to destroy distance and time, to increase animal appetites and go to the ends of the earth in search of their satisfaction."

Industrialization and the welfare state

On the surface the second Five Year Plan, which is to be launched in the spring of 1956, does not appear to be very Gandhian or agrarian.[19] Its emphasis is on rapid industrialization: the national income is to be increased by 25 per cent in five years—through investment in heavy industry, transport, power, and communications—"in order to endow the economy with the capacity for self-propelling and accelerated growth." Nine to ten million new jobs are to be created for the new labor force, and the production of consumption goods is to be increased so that there will be incentive and enthusiasm for popular effort. Housing, schools, health facilities, and other social services are to be extended. If there are cultural values in this emphasis they are the values of the modern industrial state—economic power and independence, mass production and mass consumption, planned development, social welfare. These values are new to India, for although it is possible to find some historical precedents for some of them, the idea of a planned welfare state is, as Professors Altekar and Karve have shown,[20] a relatively recent one in India, as it is in most other countries of the world.

[18] Quoted from *Harijan* for September 29, 1940, by S. N. Agarwal, *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development,* Foreword by Mahatma Gandhi, Bombay: Padma Publications, 1944.

[19] I have used the following three statements as my chief sources on the second Five Year Plan: P. C. Mahalanobis, "Draft Recommendations for the Formulation of the Second Five Year Plan, 1956–1961, March 17, 1955; "The Second Five Year Plan, a Tentative Framework," March 21, 1955; "The Second Five Year Plan, Basic Considerations Relating to the Plan Frame; A Memorandum Prepared by the Panel of Economists, Planning Commission," April 10, 1955.

Cottage and small-scale industries

A more Gandhian note is struck in the feature of the second plan which provides for the development and protection of cottage and small-scale industries. The reason given for this feature is that it will release scarce capital resources for heavy industry, and provide jobs and consumption goods, since the "capital intensive" producers' goods industries will not be able to provide much of either. Ostensibly this is a short-run, ingenious device for cushioning the human costs of heavy industrialization. It should disappear when capital becomes available for investment in consumption goods factories and when unemployment is liquidated. But that it is more than this is evident from the inclusion of other Gandhian planks in the plan frame: the extended arguments to demonstrate that "the very development of agriculture beyond a certain stage requires the development of non-agricultural activities, specially of Industry" to provide markets for agricultural produce, to supply industrial consumer goods, and to provide equipment and products needed by the expansion of agriculture; provisions for land reform, state-supported agricultural co-operatives, and industrial townships to reverse the migration of people and industry to the big cities; the extension of community development and extension service to all villages; the insistence on reducing economic and social inequalities to accord with social justice. Taken together with the provision for the development of cottage and small-scale industries, this adds up to a substantial agrarian program which seeks to carry the Gandhian ideals into action.

[20] Seminar on Interdisciplinary Indian Studies, Deccan College, Poona, 1955, Summary Report, pp. 21–25. I shall be glad to make copies of this report available on request.

Compromises

I have heard some observers in India say that not all members of the planning commission or of Nehru's cabinet sincerely believe in the economic wisdom of the agrarian part of the plan, but have gone along with it out of deference to the popularity of Gandhian "sentiments" or as a practical compromise with the Gandhians in the Congress party. That may or may not be the case, but even if this is true, it testifies to the strength and influence of Gandhian "sentiments" within the country and among some of the leading people in government. To call the second Five Year Plan a compromise between industrialism and agrarianism does not appear to me to condemn it. One might speak of it equally well as expressing the compromise which the Gandhians have made with the industrializers. In fact one can find in S. N. Agarwal's *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India,* published in 1944 with an endorsement from

Gandhi,[21] the outline of a national economic plan essentially quite similar to the second Five Year Plan. Although this leading Gandhian bases his plan on the Gandhian ideals of decentralized, small, and self-sufficient village communities, he does not hesitate to include the following "basic industries" in his plan: defense industries; power—hydro and thermal electricity; mining, metallurgy, and forestry; machinery and machine tools; heavy engineering—ships, locomotives, automobiles, and aircraft; chemicals—heavy chemicals, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals. About the defense industries the author adds a footnote: "Although Gandhiji is an uncompromising pacifist and a staunch believer in nonviolence, he is practical enough to concede that a free India may require an armed defence."

It will not be the role of these basic industries in this plan to supply consumption goods, "which will mainly be supplied by cottage industries," but they will "help the growth and evolution of cottage factories."

Nehru, although far "softer" in his attitude towards industrialization and mechanization than Gandhi, saw good economic reasons for the development of cottage industries:

> India, like China, has enormous manpower, vast unemployment and under-employment. It is no good comparing with the tight little countries of Europe which gradually became industrialised with small and growing populations. Any scheme which involves the wastage of our labour power or which throws people out of employment is bad. From the purely economic point of view, even apart from the human aspect, it may be more profitable to use more labour power and less specialized machinery. It is better to find employment for a large number of people at a low income level than to keep most of them unemployed. It is possible also that the total wealth produced by a large number of cottage industries might be greater than that of some other factories producing the same kind of goods.[22]

The cultural values of the second Five Year Plan represent three different layers of culture—agrarian, industrial, and welfare. The conflicts among these three layers have, in rather characteristic Indian fashion, been reconciled and accommodated to coexist within a single plan and program of action. The ideals of Gandhian agrarianism have been, for the time being, joined to those of the industrial and welfare state for the immediate objective of creating "a socialistic pattern of society."

THE CHANGING VILLAGE

Between the thinking and targets of the second Five Year Plan and the realities of Indian life there exists an enormous gap. I do not mean to question whether cottage industries can supply the jobs and consumption goods on the scale planned for, whether they can be successfully protected from the competition of factory goods, and whether sufficient capital can be found for the expansion of heavy industry, although these matters are problematic and are being much discussed.[23] I have in mind rather the changing nature of the Indian village—within which over 75 per cent of the population is still to be found—and the mental outlook of the villager. Within the last hundred to two hundred years many things have happened to undermine the foundations of the self-sufficient, self-governing village communities described by Sir Henry Maine and projected as the ideal of the Gandhian movement. Individualized land tenure; the expansion of a money economy; the search for better jobs, loans, movies, medicine, and education in the cities; the coming of the suffrage and the political party—all these things have brought the Indian village and villager into a wider and more complex modern world from which disengagement will not be very easy.[24] Nor do the plans and planners that seek to bring to the villager some of the benefits and technology that would improve his lot under these new conditions always meet with a favorable reception. To those who do not understand the experience and mind of the villager, these resistances appear to stem from an unintelligent and stubborn traditionalism. To those who have a deeper knowledge they spring from reasons the planners have not thought of.[25]

Despite these resistances and the ignorant mistakes of well-intentioned reformers, one comes away convinced that the Indian government's tremendous effort at economic reform is taking hold at the village level. It may be that the achievements of the first plan's targets—particularly in food grains—should be attributed to the providence of three good monsoons (at least 40 per cent of it, according to the estimates of one Indian writer). But what impressed me personally from observations of some South Indian villages is that New Delhi has succeeded in establishing communication at the village level and that villagers are co-operating in the community development and extension service programs.

Chain of disciples

The language through which the communication occurs is not that of modern economics used by the planners. In one project village I visited, I asked the head of the village development committee after he proudly explained how they had fulfilled almost all of their targets—in the use of the Japanese method of rice planting, digging of compost pits, planting of trees, construction of latrines, culverts, roads, wells, and so forth—what would happen when the block development officers withdrew their help. He replied confidently that he and the villagers would continue to improve the village themselves. I pressed him to explain why. "Because," he said meditatively, "Gandhiji said the village should be improved, and Gandhiji had a disciple, Nehru, who made a five-year plan for the villages, and we who are Nehru's disciples will

[21] Cited note 18 *supra*. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (2nd ed.; Calcutta, 1947) gives additional direct evidence of Gandhi's qualified acceptance of industrialism and technological invention: "I do visualize electricity, shipbuilding, ironworks, machine-making and the like existing side by side with village handicrafts. But the order of dependence will be reversed" (p. 89). "I would prize every invention of science made for the benefit of all. There is a difference between invention and invention" (p. 48). I am indebted to Robert Redfield for calling my attention to Professor Bose's valuable collection of Gandhi's writings and interviews.

[22] Quoted by S. N. Agarwal, *op. cit.* (note 18 *supra*), p. 50.

[23] Editorial, "Village and Small Scale Industries," *The Economic Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 45 (November 5, 1955): "Is the Second Five Year Plan with all its bold claim of changing the pattern of the national economy to be tied down to medievalism and founder in the impossible attempt to combine huge capital investment in heavy industry with the hand-pounding of rice and the Ambar charkha?"; K. S. Rao, "The Second Five Year Plan—Some Methodological Considerations," *The Economic Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 46 (November 12, 1955); "Planning in India," *The Economic Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 47 (November 19, 1955). I owe these references to Professor David G. Mandelbaum of the University of California.

[24] McKim Marriott (Ed.), *Village India; Studies in the Little Community*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. Gandhi did not envisage *complete* independence for the village but saw it as "a complete republic, independent of its neighbors for its vital wants, and yet interdependent for many things in which dependence is a necessity."—Bose, *op. cit.* (note 21 *supra*), pp. 57–58.

[25] David G. Mandelbaum, "Planning and Social Change in India," *Human Organization*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1953), pp. 4–12.

help him carry out the plan in our village."

This man was a Brahmin and a landlord but he was obviously proud to be taking an active lead in bringing "modern reforms" to the village. His phrasing of the village's relation to the government in terms of the relation of a chain of disciples to their guru, or religious teacher, is most interesting and significant. For this language suggests that it may not be fear of a coercive authority or the expectation of increased "consumption goods" that primarily motivates the people's co-operation but rather their respect for Gandhi and Nehru as "religious" men who show the path to spiritual salvation.

Nehru has frequently disclaimed being religious in any orthodox sense; but as one who has made great sacrifices in the service of others he is worshiped by his countryman and believed to have "a spark of the divine" in him. During last year's meeting of the Congress party at Avadi near Madras, one woman suddenly came forward from the crowd to crown Nehru because she believed him to be an incarnation of Vishnu. Nehru demurred, although he finally interceded for her with the police, remarking that, after all, women have kind hearts. The incident does not mean, as some Americans have interpreted it, that Indians are lusting after royalty. It is rather a dramatic and symbolic expression of the message of the *Gita* according to Gandhi—of the search for self-realization and "the ambition to become like God." "Future generations pay this homage to one who in his own generation has been extraordinarily religious in his conduct . . . to one who has performed some extraordinary service to mankind." Because Indian villagers believe that Gandhi and Nehru have performed such services they worship them and stand ready to undertake public-spirited sacrifices themselves for the sake of approximating the self-realization to which their gurus have attained.[26]

Most villages are not yet within the community-development program, and not all those that are have a record of achievement as impressive as that of the model village from which the exemplary Brahmin leader comes. Only a few miles from this village I visited a colony of *harijans*—Gandhi's name for the untouchables is used all over India—who had hardly heard of Nehru or the Five Year Plans. They said they needed more common land on which to move their congested huts, a connecting path to the main road so they would not always have to wade through the paddy fields, a better drinking well, and free lunches for their children in their mission school. When I asked whether they also wanted easier access to the temple of the adjoining village from whose streets they were excluded, one of them replied, "Why should we want that; God is everywhere." The culture of these *harijans*, except for a school-teacher, a dramatics teacher, and one man who worked in the police force of a neighboring town, is very impoverished. Their horizons did not seem to extend beyond the ambition to acquire a fraction of an acre of land and the articulate group demands formulated by one of their spokesmen. Yet nearly all male members of the colony had heard of Gandhi, referred to him reverentially as "Gandhiji," and knew that land reform legislation was pending which was designed to improve their condition.

[26] When the socialist leader Jai Prakash Narain joined Vinoba Bhave's *Bhoodan yagna* movement, Bhave's secretary said: "In the beginning of this century, India witnessed Ram Krishna Paramahansa as the great Guru and Swami Vivekananda as his great disciple. India of today has in Acharya Vinoba Bhave a great Guru and Mr. Jai Prakash Narain as his great disciple." Quoted in the *Indian Press Digest*, Vol. 4 (Berkeley, University of California), p. 110.

MOTIVE FORCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Is it necessary to seek new spiritual incentives to make the Indian people work hard and bear the austerities added by their struggle to modernize their economy? In their indigenous "materialism," as well as in their philosophy of renunciation, interpreted by Gandhi as a discipline of action in the service of others, and in their quest for spiritual salvation under the guidance of gurus who have already achieved self-realization, may reside the psychological and moral motive forces needed for a democratic and nonviolent industrial development of India.

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The Economic Development of Ceylon

By Theodore Morgan

THE Island of Ceylon is the pearl at the tip of India, barely north of the equator, with a population in mid-1956 of 8.8 million, and a land area half that of Wisconsin. It is an eight year-old independent member of the British Commonwealth, with little or no hostility and some real attachment to Westminster and the English. "Ceylon is the best job the British have done," once said Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, the present Governor General.

About seven-tenths of the people are Sinhalese, descended from ancient invaders out of North India—the Sinhalese view Ceylon as their own country. Slightly under one-quarter are Tamils from South India, of whom half have been in Ceylon for many generations, the other half having migrated during the past century or so. About 7 per cent are of other races.

The temperature hardly changes the year round. Near Colombo, in the southwest, where there is the most rainfall and the population is most dense, the monthly average temperature varies only between 79° and 82°. As one travels up into the hill country of the central south, the climate becomes semi-tropical and temperate. At Nuwara Eliya, 6,200 feet up, the monthly average temperature hovers close to 60°.

Agricultural Economy

Ceylon is an agricultural country. About 72 per cent of the population live in rural areas, producing some tea, rubber, and coconuts, but more characteristically growing rice and minor crops on minute land units. The median peasant rice paddy is under one-half acre. Some 10 per cent more of the population live on large-scale estates, many of them owned and operated by Europeans, and producing most of the export crops —tea, rubber, and coconuts. The remaining 18 per cent live in towns.

Reliance on agricultural exports means variable incomes. Between 1951 and 1952 the buying power abroad of Ceylon's exports dropped nearly a third; and between 1952 and 1955 rose by about four-fifths. This variability is an especial worry for a country that must import about half of its main food, rice. Average monthly incomes for individual income receivers were in 1953 Rs 107 ($22.50); and median income was Rs 66 ($13.90).[1] Income was distributed considerably more unequally than in the United States or England.

Consumption

Has average consumption been rising in recent years? The evidence is mixed. My own conclusion is that per capita consumption has probably risen by 10 to 25 per cent since the late 1930's, after being depressed during World War II. Domestic food production per capita seems to have remained about constant.[2]

[1] The study from which these figures are taken—Central Bank of Ceylon, *Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finances* (Colombo, 1954)—included the value of income in kind as well as of money income.

[2] Per capita consumer imports averaged for 1951–54 16 per cent above 1938 levels, and these imports have been running at about 40 per cent of consumer spending.—Ministry of Finance, *Economic and Social Development of Ceylon, 1926–1954* (Colombo, 1955), pp. 36–37; W. Rasaputram, in the Central Bank of Ceylon *Bulletin*, December 1955, "Gross National Product of Ceylon at Constant Prices." Per capita national income in real terms has risen appreciably, though, I think, less than the figures of the Planning Secretariat show, owing to their failure to adjust for a change in the method of calculating national income between 1950 and 1951—*Six-Year Programme of Investment, 1954–55 to 1959–60* (Colombo: Ceylon Government Press, 1955), p. 4.

[3] Of course, a boom in the prices of Ceylon's exports *due to* war—like the Korean War boom in rubber prices—at the same time that imports remain available at less variable prices, will help out Ceylon's economy so long as it lasts.

Two Crucial Conditions

By "economic progress," I mean below simply rising average real income, that is, a rising quantity of goods and services produced per person. We can take it for granted that Ceylon will gradually import and adapt to its own uses foreign techniques, capital equipment, and varieties of plants and of animals.

Adequate world and domestic order

Such ingredients of progress will inevitably raise *total* real income unless there is overwhelming disruption from war outside or in Ceylon. Peaceful conditions abroad mean continued markets[3] for Ceylon's export crops and continued supplies of half of its food and nearly all its amenities. Peaceful conditions at home mean more investment in the long-run future of the Ceylon economy, and avoidance of the destruction and dislocations that can make progress impossible.

I leave to the reader's judgment the chances of adequate world peace. What are the chances of adequate order within Ceylon? In its favor are isolation by water from other countries, the example of Gandhian nonviolence north in India, the local Buddhist teachings of nonviolence, a working democratic system on the British model, and considerable respect for law and order. And yet, consider other indications. The murder rate in Ceylon is one of the highest in the world—nearly half again as high as in the United States. India, whose culture is much like Ceylon's, fell into savage violence during partition. Ceylon has a Communist movement sufficiently confident to have staged a trial insurrection in 1953, in protest against reduction of the rice subsidy.

On balance, the prospect for Ceylon's continued domestic order seems to me good. I assume in the rest of this paper that a government machine something like the present one continues.

But if, some time in the next generation, a Communist regime should seize and hold power, the social problems of economic progress considered below would still exist to plague the new bureaucrats. A Communist regime devoted in fact as well as in form to raising consumption would face greater obstacles than a democracy because part of the population would be hostile and would act only by compulsion. On the other hand, such a regime would be willing to tolerate greater human suffering —"You must break eggs to make an omelette," said the late Joseph Stalin—and it would be willing to use force.

Checking the population rise

In 1870, Ceylon's population was 2.5 million. Today it is 8.8 million, and is rising 2.6 per cent a year—one of the highest rates in the world. Ten years from now, current growth rates will build up to nearly 12 million people.

One of the great medical achievements of our times is the victory of DDT over malaria. In 1946 the Ceylon death rate was 20.2 per thousand; in 1947, 14.3. Continued medical and sanitary work had reduced the rate by 1954 to 10.4—lower than the death rates of Belgium and France!

But the birth rate remains nearly as high as ever—in recent years between 36 and 41 per thousand per year. Ceylon faces the hard fact that, in view of

the cultural and physical obstacles, modern science can much more easily cut the death rate than lower the birth rate or raise the food supply.

The issue is plain: Any check to population growth will make economic progress more likely or speed it up. Continued or accelerated population growth will make progress slow down or stop. In one meeting of government officials I attended, the problem of development was put as that of keeping the standard of living from falling—not of raising it.

Possibilities of increased production

What are the ways of meeting the needs of growing numbers of people? First, production from existing acreage can be raised. But such advance will take place slowly. A peasantry is by nature conservative: farmers cannot afford to lay a heavy bet on the advice of outside experts who will not themselves starve if their advice is wrong. Two-thirds of the agricultural workers of rural Ceylon are hired laborers or tenants; many of these people have little conscious interest in higher agricultural production. The rise of population already has forced fragmentation of cultivated land into postage-stamp plots for which improved methods are often not practicable.[4]

Second, more land can be cultivated —perhaps half as much again. But the land now left to jungle is not of first quality, and heavy investment is needed to clear, irrigate, and fertilize the marginal lands that are brought into cultivation. Recent land reclamation has cost the state up to $210 an acre.

Be as optimistic as you will about the possibilities of land improvement. As farmers gradually improve their methods and as they and the state develop new lands, the population will still keep on rising—and it is a gamble whether *average* output will rise.

Other solutions to population pressure

Emigration is no way out, since migration has been planned to a near standstill in our present world. Absorption of the growing numbers of the work force into industry is no adequate solution to population pressure either, in a country that is, by present knowledge, not endowed with minerals and fuels for industry. Nor can Ceylon afford to wait and hope that a rising standard of living and broadening education will eventually lead to a falling birth rate. Europe's example suggests that the population would triple or quadruple while, and if, this adjustment was being made.

The remaining possibility is a crucial watershed for Ceylon's future. Can the government plump for family planning, and dispense information and facilities for contraception at hospitals, dispensaries, and maternity homes? Bold action is needed, and considerable expenditure, if the birth rate of 36.2 per thousand is to be brought down within earshot of the death rate of 10.4.[5]

Official opinion leans this way and that. The first prime minister after independence, D. S. Senanayake, felt that Ceylon's population was no issue. His son, the second prime minister, felt it was.

India, to the north, gives example of government-sponsored family-planning clinics. The International Bank mission urged such a policy for Ceylon. In the country as a whole, there is little religious opposition: Buddhist and Hindu opinion seems neutral; Catholic opinion is opposed, but Catholics are a small minority. The growth of social welfare measures of the state means that children are less needed as social security for the parents. On the other hand, if Ceylon remains mostly agricultural, as is highly probable, the spread of social attitudes favoring the small family will be slower than it has been in urban societies.

The handicap of swiftly increasing numbers is so obvious, that, I think, a considerable effort toward family planning will probably be undertaken by the government during the next ten years.

So much for the crucial conditions of economic progress: *enough* peace and order and *not too fast* a rate of population growth. Given these, a rising standard of living is inevitable.

OTHER FACTORS

I come now to the social implications of other influences on Ceylon's economic development. They seem to me to be less crucial than the first two. Yet they are correlated with what happens to public order and to population, and in a situation otherwise nearly neutral can sway the balance toward growth or decline of average incomes.

Nutrition and health

Hungry and sick people cannot do much work. Sick people still need to eat. Improvement in diet and in health are part of the foundation for economic advance.

Nutrition is a problem both of production and of social attitudes and habits. Ceylon's diet is much above Indian standards. Nevertheless, a quarter or more of hospitalized illness is attributed at least partly to malnutrition. Rice is the staple food. The typical diet appears deficient in calcium, iron, phosphorus, certain vitamins, and available proteins. Foods that could supply the gaps—such as milk, cheese, eggs, fruits, and vegetables—enter the main meal of most people only as delicacies, much as candy does in an American diet.[6] The almost universal hookworm infection diminishes available nutrition.

Death-dealing diseases are steadily being conquered in Ceylon. Infant mortality is half what it was ten years ago, and maternal mortality nearly one-quarter; malaria is under control, tuberculosis deaths are falling rapidly, and so on.[7] But there is still much to do. Parasitic diseases continue to sap vitality. Hospitals are overcrowded; doctors and nurses are too few. Ayurvedic (folk) and ceremonial medicine continue to be popular.

Better food and better health are a cause of increased production, for a great deal of continuing improvement is possible just through making people aware of what foods they need and of the ways in which disease is spread. More money to spend is by no means necessary; the aim is rather to have people choose to work and live somewhat differently.

Here are two examples:

1. Rice is the respectable staple food, which you eat unless you are desperately poor. But the same food values can be got cheaper in *kurakkan* (a cereal), and far cheaper in cassava. The cost of calories in the form of cassava is a sixth to an eighth of their cost in the form of rice. The right variety of cassava must be used, and it

[4] Ceylon also suffers from difficulties over land titles. Boundaries are often uncertain, and three sets of land laws—Sinhalese, Dutch, and English—survive side by side. One piece of land, and one coconut tree, sometimes has a swarm of claimants who become still more numerous and their rights more complex with each generation. How seriously should one take a claim of one-fifth of a sixteenth share?

[5] 1954 provisional figures.

[6] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Ceylon* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), p. 735.

[7] *Six-Year Programme of Investment* (cited note 2 *supra*), pp. 380–83.

must be prepared properly to avoid the formation of a poisonous compound in its starch. We can easily show people how to grow and prepare safe cassava. The real difficulty is to convince them that eating cassava can be safe, and that it is respectable. The savings from these cheaper calories could be put into more protective foods. What protective foods? People need to be made aware of what their bodies need, and of the particular food values of the fruits and vegetables they often can easily grow.

2. Among the parasitic infections are hookworm, afflicting about nine in ten of the population, and roundworms, a chief cause of death to children in their early years. Filariasis is not uncommon; diarrheas and dysenteries are both acute and chronic. If there were enough sanitary latrines and better personal hygiene these infections would be wiped out. Less than one house in three has any sort of latrine; many of the latrines in houses, schools, and other public places are in bad order. Among towns and cities only Colombo has an effective sewage system, and even in Colombo only one house in three is connected to the sewer.[8] Few families boil their drinking water. All of them ought to. Nearly all people eat with their fingers. Their fingers are not always clean.

There is no point to the government's latrine building program if latrines are not kept in good order and are not used. Nor would the government need to build them at all if individual families were aware of their importance and put some of their free time into building and maintaining them.

In these matters of diet and hygiene a good deal is gradually being done, and much more could be done to secure the needed change in attitudes. The newspapers; the radio; government billboard advertising and pamphlets; meetings and conversation between the staffs of the hospitals, dispensaries, and maternity homes and the natural leaders of the people, especially village headmen; and, above all, a very serious effort in the schools to inculcate basic knowledge of nutrition and hygiene—these can in time do wonders for the health and vitality of the Ceylonese. "It's just not done" needs to become the automatic reaction to poor practices.

Prestige, income, and training

In Ceylon, as in other countries of the East, class divisions cut deeper than they do in the West. All aspects of status—income, prestige, occupation, caste—are closely correlated with each other. And the range between high and low is far wider than in the West: "Civil servants," says Professor T. L. Greene of the University of Ceylon, "walk with the gods—but the sweepers are less than the dust." We have accordingly a powerful social engine that can either channel peoples' energies into work that will advance economic progress or handicap progress. In fact, it does the latter.

The ambitious young man in Ceylon wants to be a civil servant—from 75 to 99 per cent of secondary school boys recently gave this as their first choice, and 63 per cent of university freshmen.[9] Among the reasons for this choice are the prestige of posts once filled by the British, "economic security," and the large dowries that a civil servant can command. Runner-up occupations are medicine, the law, and perhaps politics.

[8] International Bank, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 750–53; *Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finances* (cited note 1 *supra*), p. 34, Table 39.

[9] Professor T. L. Greene, of the University of Ceylon, unpublished study of 1,365 secondary school students in 1950. Murray A. Straus, "Family Characteristics and Occupational Choices of University Entrants As Clues to the Social Structure of Ceylon," *University of Ceylon Review*, April 1951, p. 9.

Not a single university entrant in the Straus study just cited wanted to be a planter, although tea, rubber, and coconuts are the major export industries of Ceylon.

In sum, the preferred occupations are bookish occupations. Prestige and a sense of personal success go to the person who is skilled in words. The upper social and income groups are disdainful of practical and mechanical work in which you get your hands dirty. The English tradition of university work as a training ground mainly in literary subjects for an elite group has been a reinforcement to these local attitudes.[10]

The result is that, although training in practical fields is available, almost no students choose it voluntarily. The students who choose it are those who are compelled to, because they have failed to pass the examination [11] that would qualify them for further academic work. Their failure means they are the least competent of the candidates, at least in the ways the test measures. It also means they are discouraged. It is from their ranks that the middle range of technicians will mainly be drawn—the foremen and shop managers—on whom Ceylon depends vitally for the prompt and imaginative adaptation of modern technology to local needs.[12]

[10] The University of Ceylon was recently moved from the capital city of Colombo, where many of its students could live at home and attend at low social cost, and placed in beautiful but expensive new buildings, sixty miles inland in the country. The move symbolizes the university as an institution removed from and contemplative of the world, not a part of the world and its problems.

[11] The Standard VIII Selective Test.

[12] It is not surprising, in view of the cultural pressure, that even the successful examinees who go on to the university show up poorly in tests involving physical and mechanical relationships. In a test of 1,950 university male freshmen the median score was one-fourth the American score on the same test.—Murray A. Straus, "Mental Ability and Cultural Needs: A Psychological Interpretation of the Intelligence Test Performance of Ceylon University Entrants," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (June 1951), pp. 371–75.

Swabasha

The new independence of Ceylon has encouraged a *Swabasha* program: school students are to be instructed in Sinhalese or Tamil, depending on what is spoken in their homes. English is to become a secondary language, whereas in the past it has been the primary language of instruction in the upper grades and the university.

The psychology of wanting to have education in one's native tongue is understandable, but the policy will tend toward intellectual starvation. For knowledge of English will wither, and there will be few original writings of quality, and few and often late and imperfect translations into the local languages. The populations that use those languages are relatively small and will not be able to provide financial support for much of a publishing industry. Ceylon will be more isolated culturally and scientifically than it would have been had English been retained as the language of higher instruction.

Obedience and docility

Ceylon's culture teaches obedience and passivity. Schools emphasize learning by memorization, and students often recite in unison. Teachers indoctrinate; they do not encourage their students to experiment and question. Desire is thought the root of evil; asceticism and austerity are revered. In the Hindu and Buddhist views, obedience and resignation are primary ideals of life and will improve one's fortune in this life and in reincarnation.

A Westerner in Ceylon is struck by some degree of pessimism and cynicism about Ceylon's future. Ceylonese peo-

ple hardly believe that the long stagnation of the past is going to change in ways that they want.

CHANGING ATTITUDES AND VALUES

What I have put down on these matters of education and culture indicates a society that values security more than progress. And yet the Ceylonese do want economic progress. I once sampled for two weeks the front page items in the two leading English language papers of Colombo, the *Times* and the *Daily News*. Two-thirds of the items had some connection with economic development.

Development is going on, and as it proceeds, these social attitudes will gradually change in the direction of more practical-mindedness; more mobility, geographically, socially, and economically; the attachment of more prestige to getting ahead financially and greater focus of ambition on financial success; a frame of mind more inquiring, skeptical, and experimental; less attachment to family and to family occupations; more of the unsettling notion that *les grandpères ont toujours tort*. These changes—many of them unpleasant to the Ceylonese—will be concomitants and results of development. But they are also causes of economic progress.

GOVERNMENT POLICY

Several policies that can be emphasized by government would be helpful to progress, and probably also socially acceptable.

Vocational counseling

Effective vocational counseling is needed to steer young people away from vain ambitions for the civil service and into occupations which have more openings and which will further progress—such fields as bacteriology, genetics, agronomy, soil chemistry, engineering in general, agricultural extension, nursing, public health and preventive medicine, and practical teaching.

The disjointedness of training and needs is underscored by the 1950 survey of Professor Greene.[13] Over half of secondary school students wanted to go into professional and public service work, but only one in six could expect to find a job there. Only one-fourth wanted to go into "production" occupations, but almost two-thirds of the opportunities were there.

One result of wrongly directed training is that unemployment and underemployment appear to be equally heavy whether people have had no schooling, primary schooling only, or secondary schooling. According to a 1953 survey, unemployment was about 17 per cent of the work force for all three groups, and underemployment (defined as working less than twenty hours a week) ranged from 10 to 14 per cent.[14]

Relative pay rates

The government could boost the prestige and the attractiveness of practical work by setting its own pay scale higher for such types of work. Maintenance grants for secondary school and university students who are specializing in practical fields could be relatively large. The civil service examinations should be revised so that they give a great deal of emphasis to problem-solving ability in agriculture, biology, and mechanics.

Rote versus educational adventure

The Ministry of Education should do all it can, year after year, to shift educational practice away from the old memorization—reciting in unison and blackboard and book work in which facts are indoctrinated by authoritarian teachers—to training that is an adventure of discovery shared by teacher

[13] *Op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*).

[14] *Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finances* (cited note 1 *supra*), pp. 12, 13.

and students, oriented in large part toward local problems of production, diet, and hygiene. The problem-and-experiment approach can be used on many an issue of seed types, animal breeds, fertilization and irrigation practice, bacteriology, chemistry, and physics.[15]

CAPITAL FORMATION

I have so far said nothing about a matter that in many a treatise swallows up everything else—the volume of capital formation. I have subordinated this matter by postponing it—partly because this article was designed to be mainly on the social implications of economic development; partly because *government* investment is covered so fully in the Planning Secretariat's *Six-Year Programme of Investment;* and partly because I think emphasis on government investment is often exaggerated as compared with the less controllable private investment, and the volume of total investment as compared to the less tangible social influences that determine the productivity of investment.

Of course power, tools, and structure are aids to labor. But investment can have accounted for only a small part of the economic advance of developed countries.[16] In this article I have been implying that matters of culture, diet, and health deserve primary emphasis in Ceylon, as being the prospective causes of increasing returns to present and future capital investment.

OTHER CULTURAL HINDRANCES

A Westerner in Ceylon is conscious of other social attitudes than those I have listed that are hindrances to economic advance. Caste still counts in Ceylon [17] and bars the choice of the best man or woman for a given task. But caste distinctions are weakening and will continue to weaken as development proceeds.

As in any rural and isolated environment—for example, Tom Sawyer's in Missouri—ghosts, spirits, and gods of various descriptions are numerous in Ceylon. Even men who have taken their degrees at Cambridge and London, and the highest ranking graduates of the University of Ceylon, are acutely aware of the spirit world around them. Astrology is more firmly established even than in Hollywood: officials and businessmen often take astrological advice before making important decisions. I can only think that such an attitude is a distraction from the prompt and efficient solution of practical problems. The attitude will wane as economic advance continues, since that advance means more of a materialistic approach toward concrete problems.

The culture of Ceylon encourages women to be especially submissive and docile, and so their contribution to production is lessened. Their movement into industry no doubt will increase as economic progress continues.

As in many another traditional community, close family ties are a hindrance to any individual's getting ahead, and hence to his trying to get ahead. If the

[15] There are today some hopeful trends toward more formal technical training; see *Six-Year Programme of Investment* (cited note 2 *supra*), pp. 351–58.

[16] Gross investment (including depreciation) in developing countries does not usually run above some 10 to 16 per cent of income. Subtract half of this as a rough allowance for depreciation, and net capital formation comes to 5 to 8 per cent per year. Assume that the productivity of capital is from 6 to 10 per cent. Then 0.3 to 0.8 per cent per year of growth in total production is explained by capital formation. But developing countries often raise production by 2 to 5 per cent or more a year. Conclusion: other more important influences than capital formation must be at work. Cf. Leon H. Dupriez (Ed.), *Economic Progress* (Louvain, 1955), the estimates of A. K. Cairncross, p. 235.

[17] Cf. Bryce Ryan, *Caste in Modern Ceylon,* New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers Press, 1953.

culture compels him to share his gains with many a less fortunate relative, his taking risks and struggling for financial success are discouraged. These family ties should slowly soften with increased mobility and the growth of a commercial point of view.

At the government project in irrigation, electric power, and resettlement at Gal Oya, a settler proudly showed visitors his sacks of harvested rice. But the sentiment nearest his heart was the inefficiency of his government, which obstinately refused to repair the roof of his grain room, with the result that his harvest was rotting. The settler's attitude is an extreme case of a common malady. The psychology of looking to government for action and care of everything is deeply imbedded in Ceylon's ancient culture; it has been reinforced by the authority of the Portuguese, Dutch, and British regimes, and reinforced again by the obvious need, in these days, for a great deal of government action to further development. The present Six Year Development Program is a program for investment *by the government.*

The psychology of dependence on Colombo, and the related unique prestige and self-conscious authority of the civil servants, are sharp handicaps to Ceylon's progress. These handicaps, too, should diminish as development proceeds, as more and more people achieve the self-respect and independence that economic progress implies, and as the school system, one hopes, inculcates more of self-reliant, practical-minded attitudes.

CONCLUSION

A final summary view on Ceylon must be optimistic. Ceylon is in a favorable geographical location for stimulus from outside, much as England and Japan are and were. She is removed from probable storm centers and hence may hope for a peaceful future. Certainly techniques will keep on improving. Mistakes will be made by government and by private entrepreneurs, but they will be corrected, or put up with. If the country stays peaceful, production will rise. Production will rise faster if and as attitudes and values change so that they favor economic advance, and if and as real investment speeds up. If the population increase is checked *enough,* the standard of living will rise.

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Approaches of the Japanese Innovator to Cultural and Technical Change*

By JOHN W. BENNETT and ROBERT K. MCKNIGHT

EUROPEAN nations experienced modernization as part of a gradual historical development from feudal society through nationhood and the industrial revolution. Nonliterate tribal societies have undergone related changes as a consequence of colonialization and economic exploitation by the West. In most cases change in these societies has taken the form of a haphazard transition, with accompanying disharmonies in rate and scale as measured by the classic European evolution. Non-Western civilized societies, like Japan, commenced their transformation to modern industrial nationhood from stages of relative political and economic complexity, and with varying degrees and kinds of prior association with Western nations.

In the Asian countries the transition from a traditional social order to a modern framework of institutions has tended to engage the interests and emotions of a majority of the intelligentsia: there have been—and this is true of Japan—few "free-floating intellectuals."[1] The educated person, as an academic or professional specialist, has occupied a vital role: he has been called upon to serve his country and its goals (or to attempt to reformulate them), and he has viewed the world through special lenses colored by the needs and problems of the national experience with modernization. Cultural and technical change in these countries has not been simply a practical problem of instituting educational facilities, constructing factories, and organizing bureaucracies. It has involved the intellectual question of how people are to orient their images of themselves in the changing scene, and how the society is to orient itself to the world as a whole.

In other words, many aspects of modernization in those societies that are "catching up" or have "caught up" with Western developments may be treated as ideological problems of individual and social perspective. In this paper we shall be concerned with the innovator and ideologist in one of these societies, Japan, and will consider the position of highly educated Japanese persons in cultural and technical change with respect to their attitudes, values, and social roles.

MODERNIZATION AMONG THE LATECOMERS

An important difference in the historical process of the modernization of Europe and of a country like Japan lies in the fact that in the latter the changes

* This paper is based upon data acquired in a two-year study of Japanese educated in America, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council. The study included research on Japanese in residence at American educational institutions and on others in Japan who had previously studied here. Considerable documentary study of the Japanese intelligentsia and Japan's modernization provided a necessary foundation for the empirical research. The study of Japanese in the United States was directed by John W. Bennett; the study of "returnees" by Herbert Passin (see Herbert Passin and John W. Bennett, "The America-educated Japanese," Parts I and II, THE ANNALS, Vol. 295 [September 1954], pp. 83–107). A book on the entire study is under preparation at the Ohio State University.

[1] See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia,* translated by L. Wirth and E. Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936), pp. 157–60.

were not so much a matter of social evolution as the products of continuous planning taking place within a few generations. The rapid and *planned* character of modernization in Japan, as in many non-Western civilized nations, has been given an urgent accent by international developments. In Japan the desire to escape colonial or imperial domination—as witness the fate of China—lay behind much of the energy and singleness of purpose which characterized her transformation. In India today, the need to attain modern nationhood as a device to escape economic and military encirclement is equally potent as a stimulus to rapid, efficiently planned transformation. Latin American countries have presented similar profiles. This is not to imply that planning did not accompany some phases of the European transformation, but only that Japanese leaders attempted to exercise strong and continuous rational control over the nation's institutions and their alterations. Modernization thus came to be seen by many Japanese as the result of consciously formulated ends and means and not as a gradual and inevitable evolutionary process.[2]

In view of these differences in the social process of change, it is useful to consider certain broad aspects of the history of modernization as a background for our analysis of basic ideologies. In the case of Western nations, contemporary analyses seem to agree on a definition of three major developmental stages: [3] the first consists of feudal society, with its traditional culture, fixed contractual relationships between classes, and static economy; the second is the stage of dynamic politico-economic expansion, with ideological controversy and great individual mobility; the third is the period of consolidation, with an emphasis upon consumption, greater predictability in career development, and pressures toward conformity (though science may continue its creation of new horizons, and political dynamism, at least between nations, persists).

The directed role of the educated in modernization

These three stages, superficially at least, may be evident in Japan's historical development from Tokugawa feudalism to the contemporary period. However, the *differences* in Japan's changes when compared with those of Western nations are more important for our present discussion. First, as we have noted, the process in Japan was more rapid and under much greater conscious control. Unrestricted individual achievement was less evident, and mobility was generally directed by national purposes or took place within traditional forms of interpersonal relations. The European second, or transitional, stage was exceedingly attenuated. In Japan the balance of political power was retained by the elite aristocracy, and the social forces that might have instituted social-relational forms and philosophy along European lines experienced frequent frustration by a national loyalist mass movement efficiently activated via educational and communication facilities

[2] Control of national development did not take place overnight in Japan. The period between 1860 and 1880 was marked by Western faddism and some confusion over means and ends, but by the late 1880's Japanese leadership was committed to a policy of retaining Japanese cultural traditions so far as possible in the course of modernization. See E. O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); E. and E. Lederer, *Japan in Transition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938); Jesse Steiner, "The Changing Japanese World," *Contemporary Japan,* 1953, Nos. 4–6, pp. 199 ff.

[3] For example, David Riesman's stages, which he denotes by the concepts "tradition-directed," "inner-directed," and "other-directed."—*The Lonely Crowd,* New York: Doubleday and Co., 1953.

by the government. There was less opportunity to escape or to evade the system—for geographical as well as for social-structural and political reasons.

There did not, in this atmosphere, develop an effective philosophy of individual independence and equality, and throughout the entire transition the individual innovator strongly felt his social obligations to his family and to his society. His role within the Japanese social hierarchy, while somewhat less encumbered with ritual and formality, was nevertheless effective in regulating his activities to the purpose of the larger group. It has been the insignificant few rather than the significant many who have broken family ties or have neglected, for intellectualized reasons, their social obligations.[4]

The ideological perspectives of the capable, educated individual have become important aspects of the whole process of modernization, and the intellectual, as he participates in shaping his nation, is continually inspected by his superiors in order to ascertain if he possesses the correct ideological orientation to national goals and purposes. Moreover, the intellectual, in the majority of cases, has accepted rather than rebelled from such engagements with social reality; the supervision was as frequently introspective as externally exercised.

Modernization by example

Finally, greater predictability in social change and increased efficiency in technical change can potentially exist for the nations arriving late in the arena of modern civilization.[5] Western notions about the future of society often have been little more than judicious hunches based on interpretations of history and social trends. Scientific achievements have been marked by experimentation and inefficient trial and error methods. On the other hand the intellectual and the scientist in Japan, particularly the individual with educational experience in the West, have been provided with indicators of the outcome of social innovation and with the formula and blueprints for scientific development. They have had at their disposal the numerous predictions, utopias, and critiques of Western scholars, as well as empirical evidence of confirmation and refutation in the modern histories of European nations.

Thus the educated Japanese person in 1900 felt that he could predict more accurately than the seventeenth-century European his own fate and that of his society simply by looking at examples of Western development.[6] The urgency of the situation precluded actual experi-

[4] For a discussion of early intellectuals in Japan see E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), Chapter 6; Nobutaka Ike, *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950). Evelyn S. Colbert's *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952) covers the period following World War I.

[5] The French advocate of progress, Condorcet, was perhaps the first to realize the significance of European development for nations later facing the task of modernization. He noted that they will be able, by looking to Europe, "to acquire the simple truths and infallible methods which we have obtained after long wandering. . . ."—"Progress and Reason," quoted in Hans Kohn (Ed.), *Making of the Modern French Mind* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955), p. 94. See also T. Veblen, "The Opportunity of Japan," in *Essays in Our Changing Order,* New York: Viking Press, 1934.

[6] The Japanese government program of foreign education for Japanese scholars was developed with this view in mind, so that the basic reference here is the Imperial Oath of 1868 in which Japanese scholars were advised that "Knowledge shall be sought for all over the world, and thus shall be strengthened the foundations of the Imperial Polity."—Translated by Robert O Ballou, *Shinto: the Unconquered Enemy* (New York: Viking Press, 1945), p. 164.

mentation, and the Japanese intellectual was in a position to suggest the outcome of certain innovations, thereby increasing his usefulness to the political administrator. In this favorable atmosphere, the highly educated man in Japan has usually accepted as a personal obligation an active interest in social affairs and has often sought an active role in the political machinery of change. The relatively low pay attached to government officialdom, a position in the foreign office, the Diet, or the home ministry has always been counterbalanced by the social rewards and modes of access to unofficial monetary gain afforded the intellectual who successfully attained such a position. His importance to the process of national development has been duly recognized, if not in the pay scale, at least in social prestige and perquisites.

JAPANESE HYPOTHESES CONCERNING MODERNIZATION

The personal views of educated Japanese with respect to the issues of modernization and the future of Japan can be found to vary in detail, as they have for the intelligentsia of all nations. We shall not be concerned with individual variation in ideology as such. We are interested in the fact that the conditions of national planning of modernization required the educated classes to subscribe to, or to carry out in their particular roles in the transformation, one or another fairly explicit and public orientation or "hypothesis" concerning the appropriate course of national development. We shall describe these orientations or hypotheses in this paper and present some illustrative data upon how individuals conformed to them, or changed with respect to them. There are three major positions, and we have named them the "conservative hypothesis," the "liberal hypothesis," and the "pragmatic hypothesis."

In brief, the "conservative hypothesis" asserted that the successful modernization of Japan was dependent upon maximal continuity with Japanese cultural tradition. Japanese cultural patterns, according to this hypothesis, have been intimately and ideally adjusted to Japanese historical and environmental conditions. In its extreme version, now rejected, the model for social planning was cast by the prehistoric and mythical founders of the nation, and national success depended upon the proper interpretation of and adherence to this ancient plan.[7]

The "liberal hypothesis," on the other hand, asserted that successful modernization depended upon the institution of changes in Japanese society according to Western models of social development. Thus, the "natural" evolution of society as exemplified by European historical development was accepted by Japanese of this persuasion as the model for the Japanese transformations as well.[8]

The "pragmatic hypothesis" asserted that successful development depended upon the resolution of specific and immediate situational problems and that more global attitudes and long-term platforms of change which derived from systematic cultural models were inadequate to meet the complex needs of modern Japanese civilization.[9]

[7] For statements of this position, see I. Nitobe, *Bushido: the Soul of Japan* (Tokyo: Shokawabo, 1904); K. Okakura, *The Awakening of Japan* (New York: Century Company, 1904); C. Tanaka, *What Is Nippon Kokutai. Introduction to Nipponese National Principles* (Tokyo: Shishio Bunko, 1936).

[8] For discussions of the liberal viewpoint, see N. Ike, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), Chap. X. For a discussion of Western models and liberal implications in a special field, see K. Odaka, "Japanese Sociology, Past and Present," *Social Forces,* Vol. 28 (1950), pp. 400–409.

[9] For a discussion of the pragmatic position see G. B. Sansom, *Japan in World History* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), p. 84.

It should be stipulated that by using the terms "conservative" and "liberal" in designating hypotheses about national development we *do* imply certain general correlations with political ideologies and trends similarly designated in Japanese society. However, the relationship is not complete. For example, persons representing many varieties of political action might assume the "liberal hypothesis" as basic to their ideology. Japanese Christians, socialists, pro-Western businessmen, or any persons who accept a Western cultural and institutional model for national development have generally made such an assumption. Questions about the precise relationship of those who adopt one or another hypothesis to Japanese political trends and movements will be discussed in a section to follow, when we will deal with "conservatives," "liberals," and "pragmatists" as persons confronted with particular political situations and trends.

ATTITUDES AND ROLES: CULTURE CHANGE AND TECHNICAL CHANGE

With this background, we can now turn to a consideration of the attitudes and roles of the Japanese innovator with respect to technical and cultural change. We have suggested in the previous discussion that practically all of these innovators, whether they have accepted the "conservative," "liberal," or "pragmatic" hypothesis, have approved of the modernization of Japanese institutions and organization. That is, they have approved of what has generally been referred to in Western writings as "technical change." However, they frequently differ in their perception of the relationship between technical change and the broader culture, or the extent to which the two processes of technical and cultural change are interdependent and demand co-ordination and control.

"Technology" and "culture" do not, of course, yield easily to clear-cut distinction. Actually, technical changes almost always imply or produce culture changes as well, or, given a broad definition of the term "culture," the two processes become indistinguishable.[10] Our purpose in this paper is not to distinguish between the *processes* of technical and cultural change, but rather to show that Japanese innovators have differed among themselves in their conception of the relationship of technical change to the whole culture in which it takes place.

Thus, in general, we find that the majority of the Japanese intelligentsia, excepting an insignificant fringe of fanatic traditionalists who advocate a return to earlier and simpler forms of civilization, have approved of technical revisions of Japanese organizations, industralization, the creation of bureaucracies, mass education, and the like. It has been rather the influence or relevance of these "modernizations" with respect to the broad cultural order that has generated Japanese ideological and political controversy and factional activity.

The three hypotheses—"conservative," "liberal," and "pragmatic"—may be viewed as basic positions taken by Japanese intelligentsia relative to Japanese national development. On the basis of the individual's assumption of one or the other of these hypotheses we can make rough guesses about his political orientation to Western culture and his concrete conceptualization of technical change, as well as some estimate of his contribution to national development. We find, however, that individuals sometimes do not adhere to the logical cor-

[10] See B. F. Hoselitz, "Human Problems in Technical Change," paper prepared for the Fifth National Conference, United States National Commission for UNESCO, November 1955; also, Margaret Mead (Ed.), *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change* (New York: Mentor Books, 1955).

ollaries of their basic assumptions about national development. Rather, we find a certain amount of contradiction between ideologies and ideals and actual behavior; tendencies to compromise with reality; or in some instances to compartmentalize or leave unresolved contradictions between ideals and behavior. All this may now be discussed.

THE CONSERVATIVE HYPOTHESIS

In general, Japanese intellectuals who have assumed the "conservative hypothesis" have tended to resist the introduction of Western cultural values and social behavioral patterns and have viewed technical change as a separate or independent process which ought to take place without important modification of the cultural base. Modernization, in this view, is accomplished for the greater glory and power of Japan.[11] Innovators of this "conservative" orientation have been influential in furnishing the financial means and political authority by which national goals of modernization were accomplished. In addition, the traditional ideals of "conservatives"—loyalty, power, and national glory, integrated with a tight hierarchical social system—have increased national solidarity behind the development program.

The precedent for this "conservative" orientation was established by the intelligentsia of the early modern period. Among certain aristocratic samurai leaders of the Tokugawa regime in the early nineteenth century and among the leaders of the early Meiji Restoration period (1870–90) this view predominated and led to many reforms and reorganizations derived from Western models, but introduced without any direct violation of the conventional social system and hierarchy of control. For example, in the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, reforms and changes were "granted" to the Japanese people in "benevolent" acts which were compatible with the *noblesse oblige* pattern of aristocratic social consciousness which had long existed in the Japanese value system. These reforms themselves did not, by any direct or obvious consequence, interrupt the continuity of aristocratic social and political leadership.

However, the pursuit of national goals in modernization, technological advance, governmental reorganization, and the like led to many indirect or unpredicted consequences, and frequently led to the practical necessity to accept more than just Western techniques of organization, production, and other "noncultural" aspects. That is, the course of modernization, even thought dominated and financed by leaders who attempted to adhere to the "conservative hypothesis," did lead to the influx of many cultural aspects of Western life. Faced with the necessity to accept more of the West than its technology alone, if national goals were to be accomplished, a few "conservatives" did an about-face on the issue and advocated a return to the earlier, simpler Japanese civilization. In the early years one line of ideological divergence among "conservatives" could be delineated between fanatic reactionaries educated in the tradition of Chinese classical learning and those more receptive to the West who derived their standards from the new Western studies. Some of the reactionary "conservatives" became behind-the-scenes leaders of fanatic youth groups who were responsible for assassinations of liberals and violence against Westerners in the early Meiji period; [12] others, more passive in their behavior, isolated themselves from the "shameful" contemporary scene and delved further into studies of Chinese classics, finding a few intellectual followers and a quiet spot in the academic world for their activities. The division between reactionaries and those more receptive to the West also centered upon current political issues. Thus, those intellectuals who remained loyal to the displaced Tokugawa regime were largely removed from public office and assumed the role of reactionaries actively or passively opposed to the new group of young samurai leaders who, for practical as well as ideological reasons, had reinstituted the Emperor to a position of increased political significance.

In any event, conservative leaders in active administrative posts in the new Meiji regime did not, generally, take such a reactionary view of the encroachment of Western culture. Some modified their basic "conservative hypothesis" to accommodate an active receptivity to Western cultural influence. Others modified the hypothesis in a pragmatic direction of compromise and adjustment with the Western trends. Relative to those who assumed the "conservative hypothesis," therefore, we may introduce in addition to the "conservative" political position outlined above, two orientational types: the "conservative-pragmatic" and the "conservative-receptive."

Conservative-pragmatic orientation

Among the conservative-pragmatic group were many educators and political administrators who realized the necessity to reward technical ability and skill as well as social position in awarding educational scholarships and in assigning positions of importance in the rising bureaucracies. For example, the conservative-pragmatic influence is evident in the stringent examinations which have characterized the Japanese educational system and which have modified, though not eliminated, the traditional approach to social reward as a function of inherited position in the social hierarchy.[13] There was, in the early period, a drastic shortage of trained persons capable of instituting the technological and organizational changes called for in the modernization program. In the face of this shortage "conservatives," as well as those with more liberal views, recognized the need to exploit the widest possible sources of potentially capable young scholars and professionals. Later, as national needs were met more fully, the criteria for social and professional recognition came again to be defined more in terms of social backgrounds.

Again conservative-pragmatic influence has been evident in the tolerance of Western religious missions to Japan. Religious tolerance as such is a value which can find support as well as negation in historical Japanese political action.[14] However, tolerance of Christianity by conservative-pragmatic leaders has had the effect of currying favor and recognition among dominant Western powers and has been a necessary practical policy.

Conservative-receptive orientation

There were also those "conservatives" who recognized many familiar features in Western moral doctrine concerning persistent endeavor and frugality which not only found considerable support in traditional Japanese values but also seemed appropriate to the difficult tasks that faced the Japanese in the modernization of their nation. Not a small number of "conservatives" adopted Christianity as their religion and were actively receptive to Western

[11] A concise portrayal of this position is found in G. Droppers, "The Secret of Japanese Success," in G. H. Blakeslee (Ed.), *Japan and Japanese American Relations,* New York: G. E. Stechert & Company, 1912.

[12] For a biographical account, see P. Lowell, "The Fate of a Japanese Reformer," *Atlantic Monthly,* Vol. 66 (1890), pp. 680–93.

[13] For a discussion of Japanese educational channels, see R. K. Hall, *Education for a New Japan,* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949.

[14] See Otis Cary, *A History of Christianity in Japan,* Chicago, 1909.

patterns of moral thought and action. A Puritan religious orientation, rivaling its classic counterpart in the West in severity of moral sanctions, was not uncommon among conservative-receptive leaders in the early period of Japanese modern history.[15]

Even in the area of broader cultural values, early as well as recent conservative intellectuals could, if they looked for them, find considerable justification for equating Japanese values with those of the West. For example, Viscount Shibusawa, prominent in big business in Japan and abroad, who was "conservative" and antiforeign in his youth but more receptive as he accumulated experience with Westerners, provided an impressive list of traits which he perceived to be common to American and Japanese character (note, however, *absence* of traits suggesting "liberal" values such as equality, individuality, and individual gain, in contrast to emphasis on traits suggesting subservience to the larger society): "justice, humanity, fair play, the square deal, self-sacrifice, loyalty, philanthropy, chivalry, co-operation, unity, patriotism, public-spiritedness, orderliness, and respect for law." [16] Recently a postwar "conservative" student was interviewed in America and was found to be favorably impressed by similarities which he noted between Japanese and American systems of denoting social status.

Other variations of the conservative-receptive orientation can be observed.[17] In general, this particular orientation may be characterized by many conflicts and tensions. Precisely what can be accepted from the West while still maintaining a basic conformity to Japanese cultural tradition—or how are Western and Japanese ideals to be integrated into a single, successful system of thought and action? These are problems which some met simply by ideological compartmentalization, retaining, for example, a conservative orientation in personal life and habits while advocating and following a more receptive path in the public administration of professional or political duties. For some—Viscount Shibusawa, for example—the solution lay in part in attempting to divorce personal actions from any cultural context in the pursuit of professional goals which, nonetheless, were seen as contributions to national development. In fact, the historical trend in the direction of "pragmatism," or a tendency to act on the basis of short-term, practical decisions or situational demands, in part finds its genesis in conflicts between conservative motives to preserve the continuity of Japanese culture and generalized receptivity to Western cultural influence.

THE LIBERAL HYPOTHESIS

Even before Japan ended her century and a half of political isolation there were a few Japanese intellectuals who assumed the superiority of Western life and institutions and thereby set the precedent for the later "liberal hypothesis" concerning the needs for modernization in Japan.[18] The position taken by those who have adopted the "liberal hypothesis" has been that sociocultural aspects of Western life must be introduced along with technological modernization. Compared with the "conservatives," however, the "liberals" have had far less opportunity to wield the political power necessary to institute their programs of modernization and social reform. Those among them who based their models for reform completely upon Western culture seldom even gained much public attention—except as radical extremists or political criminals. Thus, like the extreme "conservatives" who turned their backs on contemporary trends in Japan, the extreme "liberals," the syndicalists, the Communists, and those who had too completely modeled their life styles and preferences on Western standards have generally been isolated from active, or at least public, influence in their society—though not generally by their own choice. In some instances their fate was more violent. Arinori Mori, a pro-American statesman, was sent by the conservative Meiji regime as a highly successful minister to the United States, but not long after his return to Japan he was assassinated by a conservative fanatic.[19] Social isolation has been the potential fate of any Japanese overseas scholar with liberal ideals who remained too long and became too well acclimated in a foreign, particularly an American, environment.

Prior to about 1890, the character of Japanese national development was marked by indiscriminate copying of Western ideas and modes. Both liberals and conservatives could dream of successfully instituting social models in the new era of modernization. But the balance of political and military authority throughout the period favored conservative leaders who drew upon national tradition for their ideologies, and before the end of the century the conservative trend was clearly established in the national development program. Thus, from this time on the typical political position of those who assumed the "liberal hypothesis" was one of cautious tact and gradualism in reform. More specifically, "liberals" of this later period generally sought to demonstrate not only their own loyalty to Japan, but also that the Western models which they advocated were somehow compatible with Japanese cultural tradition. The Japanese historian Okakura, a conservative, wrote in 1904 [20] that many leaders of liberal parties of that late Meiji time—the Unionists, for example—drew their models from Western society but were the first to note similarities between Western democratic ideals and Confucian political theory. Western historians observing the same period in Japan have noticed that few thoroughly pro-Western liberals achieved any significance and that "liberal" movements all seemed to have ideological roots in the historical tradition of Japan. By about 1900, therefore, the "liberal" intellectual, whether motivated by Japanese loyalty or by practical reasons, generally found it necessary to modify the "liberal hypothesis" to comply in some fashion with popular ideology or with Japanese cultural patterns.

Liberal-pragmatic position

The successful liberal innovator, that is, the individual who was not forced into oblivion, was, in this sense, a "liberal pragmatist." In emphasizing similarity between Western and Japanese culture, the liberal-pragmatic position bears considerable resemblance to the conservative-receptive orientation. However, the differences are not difficult to detect. The most noticeable common factor in the biographies of Japanese "liberals"

[15] See the biography of Sen Tsuda, in C. Lanman, *Leaders of the Meiji Restoration in America* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1931), pp. 377–78.

[16] K. Obata, *An Interpretation of the Life of Viscount Shibusawa* (Tokyo: Bijutsu Insatsusho, 1937), p. 191.

[17] For example, see the discussion of the so-called "organ theory," originally a conservative invention, but later adopted by Japanese liberals as a model for statehood, in K. Kawai, "Sovereignty and Democracy in the Japanese Constitution," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (September 1955), pp. 663–72.

[18] See D. Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.

[19] P. Lowell, *op. cit.* (note 12 *supra*).

[20] K. Okakura, *op. cit* (note 7 *supra*), pp. 145–49.

is an adolescent experience of emotional rebellion directed toward the culturally defined centers of authority or the social order in general. Significantly, the ranks of radical liberals in Japan thin considerably with age and with adult concern for security and professional success. General social pressure and authority retained in conservative cliques which dominate many professions require compromise or public demonstration of conformity from the ambitious, educated man in Japan. However, throughout their lives, most Japanese intellectuals who have at one time accepted the "liberal hypothesis" tend to be introspectively aware of their actions and attitudes. Many are keenly conscious of the cultural relevance of their behaviors—they know when they are acting like typical Japanese, in contrast to equalitarian and individualistic ideals (for example, in assuming a submissive role toward one defined as superior in the social hierarchy). In contrast, the conservative intellectual seems only rarely to reflect on the "Japaneseness" of his habitual behavior.

Liberal pragmatists, while they have not often achieved positions of political significance, have been successful in many fields. Ryunosuke Akutagawa, whose writings were incorporated in the movie *Rashomon,* achieved considerable literary acclaim as a satirist of Japanese culture during the brief liberal fling which Japan experienced in the 1920's.[21] At an earlier date, Yukichi Fukuzawa, the famous Japanese educator-liberal, maintained a strict policy of aloofness from positions of political authority and public controversy.[22] Cognizant of the conservative trends in Japanese national development, he hoped for and gained the opportunity to promote his liberal views through the promotion of higher education, thereby contributing directly to the program of national development and indirectly to the growth of liberal Western ideology. In this pattern, many "liberal" intellectuals, for example Fukuzawa, unobtrusively taught Western liberal ideals, in the guise of "European" or "American" rather than personal ideologies.

Liberals in the postwar years

In the postwar years the scene changed considerably for "liberal" intellectuals. Many who had been stigmatized and isolated for their prewar and wartime liberalism were placed in positions of administrative and political authority and were made responsible for the field work of the occupation in supervising and instituting Western-style reforms.

Many of the liberals, faced with administrative duties, realized the difficulty, for cultural as well as economic and demographic reasons, of rapidly instituting Western models. They found it necessary frequently to compromise or to use Japanese cultural forms for the sake of expediency and communication with the less tutored and less idealistic public. In the course of events many changed in personal orientation toward the liberal-pragmatic position; others became out-and-out pragmatists, simply fulfilling the specific functions of their role in the administrative bureaucracy; and some divorced themselves from administrative duties and political controversy in order to preserve the integrity of their liberal orientations.

During the postwar years a number of liberal scholars have modified their basic "liberal hypothesis" in still another direction. Among Japanese scholars who have had firsthand experience with Western peoples, a few have returned to Japan quite disillusioned with the West. Many of the disillusioned have seemed to move in the pragmatic direction, and observe, for example, that many aspects of Japanese tradition are more suitable than Western cultural forms to Japanese conditions. Others, however, have adopted what we may term the "liberal-resistive" position, and have viewed the over-all trends of civilization in Japan as well as in the nations of the West as destructive of the finer qualities of human meaning and experience. Taking a view which has been articulated by a number of Western critics of Western civilization (for example, Fromm [23] and Mannheim), they have initiated a personal quest for "higher goals" and humanitarian ideals integrated with the civilized order to serve as models for personal and social reform.

THE PRAGMATIC HYPOTHESIS

We have suggested a general historic trend toward pragmatism, or the assumption of the "pragmatic hypothesis" on the part of Japanese innovators—a tendency, that is, to respond to the needs of particular or immediate situations rather than to one or another rigid cultural model in administrating the national program of modernization. Up to this point we have viewed the pragmatic orientation in political thinking as an outgrowth of experience on the part of conservatives and liberals with practical situations of professional activity or political administration in their own culture. It is probable that most Japanese youth in pursuing a higher education have at one time assumed either the "conservative" or "liberal" hypothesis as an ideal in their personal orientation. However, for some the assumption of one or the other of these culturally determined hypotheses has been relatively insignificant. Thus a graduate engineer studying in America expressed his lack of concern for political and cultural issues by saying that it made little difference to him whether the political order in Japan were Communistic, democratic, or nationalistic—as an electrical engineer he felt assured that his services would always be in demand. Basically he felt obliged to serve Japanese national ends, but he was singularly unconcerned about the political nature of these ends.

The genesis of the "pragmatic hypothesis" as a basic orientation may be traced, it is felt, to at least two sources. First, the parents of many of the current generation of educated youth in Japan were either conservatives or liberals who experienced a compromise of their basic assumptions in the pragmatic direction. Therefore it is possible that pragmatism became ideologically central for some of their offspring. Typically, characterizations of the father by students who adopted the "pragmatic hypothesis" portrayed them to be more involved with business obligations than with political conditions or even family needs. Fathers were admired for their persistence in practical and professional activity.

A second source of pragmatism as a basic orientation has been the downfall of Japan herself as a cultural model. Stoetzel,[24] observing a much wider sample of Japanese youth than the highly educated alone, has pointed to the political apathy that characterizes large numbers of postwar youth who apparently have rejected the idea of placing faith in any cultural model after the de-

[21] See, for example, his *Kappa,* translated by S. Shiojiri, Tokyo, 1949.

[22] *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1948) is a mine of information on "liberal-pragmatic" tendencies. Fukuzawa's entire career may be understood as that of a liberal who avoided all incriminating activities and concentrated upon the construction of institutional form for hoped-for liberal consequences.

[23] See Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society,* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1955.

[24] J. Stoetzel, *Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (New York: UNESCO and Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 214–24.

feat of Japan. Thus although among earlier intellectuals pragmatism was the outcome of compromise or rational adjustment which permitted them to meet the complex needs of Japanese modernization with more versatility, in the current generation pragmatism may become a basic life orientation and may, in some cases, take the form of political lassitude or apathy.

Difficulties of political detachment

However, "pure" pragmatism with regard to political or cultural models among intellectuals has not been an easy course to steer even though it has served many conservatives and liberals alike as a means of adjustment. Political detachment, or a policy of nonaffiliation with particular political ideological groups has limited professional and social acceptance. In the long run the intellectual in Japan has usually been called upon to commit himself, at least publicly, to one or another ideological orientation. This was of course true in the prewar years of intense nationalism and is increasingly the case in the postwar period as Japan's destiny becomes involved with the issues of the cold war, and as advocates of the older order of Japanese nationalism emerge with greater confidence in opposition to recent liberal currents.

In Western nations the intellectual can commonly speculate with some detachment about the probable course of civilization and adopt a "free-floating" attitude toward national and cultural identifications. For the Japanese intellectual similar speculation generally takes the form of a personal ideological commitment with explicit cultural allegiances. The highly educated individual has been constantly drawn into political controversy on this or that practical problem of national development. Emotional involvement, rather than detachment, has been the rule, diminishing the likelihood for political apathy and "pure" pragmatism. In many instances, it has proved detrimental to objectivity in intellectual and innovative endeavor as well.

CONCLUSIONS

Some acculturation studies, as an outcome perhaps of anthropological preoccupation with small tribal cultures, suggest that regularities in culture change can be detected and categorized on the basis of specific cultural differences between the receptor society and the source society. The studies have tended to concentrate on a few specific items of technical skill, material property, or ideology which have found their way to a small community, and to show the influence of these as a direct consequence of their inherent difference from and disintegrative effect on the traditional culture.[25]

In studying innovation in a complex society such as Japan we are struck with some immediate differences: the durability of the cultural base and the ability of conservative leaders to make native cultural ends compatible with a variety of new techniques, ideas, and world views. While westernization in a small, compact tribal community may have an intense and destructive impact on the pre-existing cultural order, in Japan the force of national culture itself, exerted through traditional as well as modern means of social control, appears to have contributed to the extraordinary rapidity of modernization.

In addition, the study of specific changes and influences of new techniques in a small society is an easier task than assessing the influence of new techniques and ideals in a large, complex society. In the latter case, regularity and predictability appear to derive as much from the character of the ideologies and political purposes which influence the adoption of new ideas and techniques as from the effects of the innovations themselves. That is, the intersection of new and old at the level of personal histories of ideologues, political platforms, interest groupings, and the like seems to be as informative for the student of acculturation as the diffusion of specific new techniques and ideologies.

Of course the two approaches—according to the influences of the innovations themselves or according to the motives of those responsible for innovation—form a problem matrix which is difficult to analyze. For example, in Japan it is generally possible to describe the conservative rationale for adopting specific technical innovations. But once adopted, many such innovations had effects beyond those which were proposed by the planners. Mass education led in part to a breakdown of faith in the ritual and lore which formed the essence of Japanese tradition. Tolerance of Western missions, while serving conservative ends as a means to curry favor among powerful Western nations, contributed to the spread of Western ideologies and social-relational patterns which have sometimes been contradictory to traditional techniques of social control. Overseas education, a conservative policy, contributed to the ranks of those who have adopted Western cultural models for reform in ideals and customs.

More generally, the whole conservative platform of modernization contributed to the growth of a cultural medium in which people—especially the highly educated—could assume purposes counter to conservative goals, generally in the direction of pro-Western liberalism. In turn, these proponents of liberal reforms contributed to cultural change through their own innovations: translations of Western books; their own writings and teaching; and, in some periods, direct political action. Thus both the impact of specific innovations and the ideological or political motivations of the innovators contribute to an explanation of the dynamics of cultural and technical change in a complex society.

[25] H. G. Barnett, *Innovation* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1953), offers a suggestive fresh approach to these problems.

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Some Labor Problems of Industrialization in Egypt*

By Frederick H. Harbison and Ibrahim Abdelkader Ibrahim

COUNTRIES such as Egypt which are latecomers to industrialization have at least one great advantage. If they are able to find the necessary capital resources, they can utilize the most advanced technology and machinery which industrialized countries have taken decades to develop. The Egyptian cotton spinning and weaving industry is a case in point. Most of Egypt's mills are new, and many have the very latest machinery which can be bought in the United States, Germany, and Switzerland. As a consequence, some of the Egyptian textile mills, from a physical and technological standpoint, are among the most modern in the world.[1] In striking contrast with their advanced technology, however, is their relatively primitive and wasteful use of manpower resources. This is characteristic of the process of economic development in most countries today. The development of effective human organization lags far behind the introduction of modern technology.

In this article we shall illustrate some of the social consequences of this pattern of economic development by a brief case analysis of the managerial and labor practices of one of Egypt's most modern textile companies. This enterprise, which we shall refer to as the "Kafreldawar Company," is located in a rural area about fifteen miles from Alexandria. It is one of several textile enterprises of the "Misr Group," all of which are owned and operated by Egyptians. The factories of the company have been in operation for fifteen years, and they currently employ over ten thousand persons.

In comparison with some other Egyptian enterprises, the company which we have chosen has exceptionally good management. Its technology and machinery are typical of the latest and the best even in the advanced industrial countries. Its labor resources are typical of those available to industry in the town of Kafreldawar and the surrounding rural area. There is the usual superabundance of unskilled and undernourished agricultural laborers, the vast majority of whom are not only illiterate but also afflicted with endemic diseases of one kind or another. The Kafreldawar Company, over a period of fifteen years, has been successful in building from these human resources a stable and permanently committed labor force whose general standards of living are considered to be well above the average for Egyptian factory workers.[2]

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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the viewpoints of the company or the Egyptian Department of Labor.

[1] In this respect, Egypt's textile industry meets the criterion of some economists for the most appropriate type of industrialization for an economically underdeveloped country. In a recent article, for example, Professors Galenson and Leibenstein argued persuasively, "Successful economic development under present conditions, particularly in the face of gross backwardness, hinges largely upon the introduction of modern technology upon as large a scale as possible."—Walter Galenson and Harvey Leibenstein, "Investment Criteria, Productivity, and Economic Development," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 69 (August 1955), p. 370.

Kafreldawar Company Work Force

By 1952 [3] the Kafreldawar Company had a total work force of about 10,300 persons. About 9,400 of these, or over 90 per cent, were hourly paid factory workers, and about 900 were salaried employees. Of these employees, 30 were members of top management (managing director, managers, and submanagers), about 500 belonged to supervision, and the remainder were secretaries or clerks. Obviously, the building of the managerial and labor resources for an enterprise of this size was a formidable task, and it is important here to scrutinize the policies employed by the company in recruiting and developing the various segments of this labor force.

Top Management

The Kafreldawar Company did not have to start from scratch to build its organization. The top management groups were selected almost without exception from an older and larger Misr textile enterprise at Mahalla which is often referred to as the "mother company." All had a college education or its equivalent; all those connected with production processes were qualified engineers; the vast majority had spent at least one or two years in education at company expense in Europe or the United States; and all were relatively young. With this kind of experienced "top-drawer" management, the company was well prepared to master the technical problems involved in the operation of a modern textile mill.

The organization of this group, however, was more primitive. Effective decision-making power was concentrated in the Managing Director who had fifteen subordinates reporting to him. Since he extended his personal control to all phases of the business, very little authority and responsibility were delegated downward. Although there was no organization chart and no clearly defined relationships between staff and line departments, the chain of command was apparently quite clear to most members of management, and each appeared to know to whom he should report and who his subordinates were. As one might expect, there was very little downward communication and practically no upward communication between the various levels of this organization. Decisions regarding such matters as transfers or promotions were often made at the top without consultation with those who would be most vitally affected. It was very difficult for individuals in the managerial group to discuss matters of broad policy with their colleagues, and an effort to institute "family meetings" to consider and solve problems of a general nature proved to be fruitless. The communication process between the top management and supervision, furthermore, was quite underdeveloped except on strictly technical questions. In summary, the top management at Kafreldawar might be simply characterized as follows: it consisted of a small, well-educated, socially homogeneous and professionally oriented managerial elite, but it did not function as an integrated team. It was rather a group of individuals with good technical qualifica-

[2] Our analysis is based on about sixty interviews with members of the managerial and supervisory organization of the company and a smaller number of key persons in unions and in the Labor Department of the Egyptian government. Most of the interviews were made by I. Abdelkader Ibrahim in Arabic, but a few were conducted jointly by both authors in English. The bulk of the interviews took place in 1953.

[3] On July 23, 1952, the Egyptian Army led a liberation movement which ousted the king. The resulting Liberation government introduced major social and economic programs of development.

tions reporting to a strong boss. It concerned itself primarily with technical rather than with organizational or human problems, and stood more or less isolated from the lower echelons of the salaried workers and laborers.

SUPERVISORS

The five hundred supervisors (assistant submanagers, section chiefs, foremen, and charge hands) were likewise a homogeneous though disorganized group. None were engineers or college graduates, but all were graduates of Egyptian trade schools.

About 20 per cent of the supervisors were former employees of the "mother company" and had been sent abroad for some technical training. They had constituted the nucleus group of foremen and charge hands when the factory at Kafreldawar was opened in 1938, and in 1952 for the most part held the top supervisory positions such as section chiefs or assistant submanagers. For this group advancement into upper management was not possible because positions at this level were always reserved for engineers or college graduates. In order to boost their morale, the company "promoted" some of these top supervisors to new jobs having the same functions but carrying higher pay and a different title. Those who were still dissatisfied, of course, could often get good jobs in other expanding textile mills, but without the formal educational qualifications, they could never gain access to the managerial class.

The remaining 80 per cent of the supervisors were hired at the gate. They learned about job openings mostly from fellow graduates of trade schools, relatives, or friends. Those who could produce birth certificates and school diplomas were usually accepted, and upon passing a required medical examination were given a serial number and had their fingerprints taken. The new recruits were not asked where they would prefer to work nor were they given any induction training. They were not even informed about the wages they would receive nor the section to which they were assigned. In order to get oriented or even introduced to their bosses, most of these recruits had to rely on fellow trade-school graduates or kinsmen who were already employed in the plant. As a typical recruit expressed it, "I was told the name of the section where I was going to work, and I had to ask everybody I met to show me where to go. While I was looking for the location of my job, I came across an old schoolmate and he took me there." Sooner or later, however, the recruits were welcomed by fellow foremen or charge hands who were old schoolmates and, as one of them put it, "This added to our solidarity."

Most of the recruits found that their training in trade school was of very little value on the job. The modern automatic looms in the factory bore little resemblance to the equipment with which they were familiar in school. Since the company had no systematic program of training, the new recruits again had to rely on casual help from their more experienced friends or kinsmen to learn their jobs. Some learned quite successfully; others became discouraged and quit.

Most of those who stayed were critical of the company's promotion practices. The big complaint was that promotions were made on the basis of personal favoritism without proper consideration of skill, merit, ability, or seniority. Another common complaint was that some trade-school graduates were kept on the hourly payroll and were treated like workers.

Most of the supervisors and even some of the administrative staff were participants in the plant-wide union, and many of them became its leaders as a means of gaining personal prestige and higher status within the plant and the community. This sometimes afforded them an opportunity to meet with government officials in Cairo or even to attend as delegates conferences in other countries. Others left the company to become instructors in the trade schools when opportunities became available after 1947. It could be argued that many of these persons left because of the relatively high social status of teachers and government service in Egypt, but our interviews indicated that a more compelling reason, particularly for those who were relatively new in employment, was dissatisfaction with employment at Kafreldawar.

WORKERS

The hiring of the 9,000 workers was a comparatively simple process. Two days each week were designated for recruitment. The applicants waited outside the gate until the personnel officer arrived. He then selected workers on the basis of his experience and personal judgment. Applicants who showed particular alertness or who might appear to be potential troublemakers were passed by. If any applicant showed a letter of recommendation, it would be torn to pieces at once, and he would not be employed. The idea here was "to avoid favoritism." Those applicants who had been previously employed in factories were summarily rejected because the company had an unwritten but firm policy of engaging young workers with no previous industrial experience. It was felt that agricultural workers because of their "simple character" could be more readily trained and easily satisfied. The central objective was to recruit a docile and obedient work force.

Those selected in this fashion were next photographed, fingerprinted, given serial numbers, and passed on for medical examination. The main reason for the photographs and fingerprints was to make sure that no one was hired who had previously been employed by the company. (Job seekers who had been once rejected would frequently change their names.) As a means of reducing turnover, the company wanted to make it clear that anyone who had quit his job would not be eligible for future employment. For the new applicant, however, the greatest hurdle was the medical examination, not because it was particularly rigorous but because of the very high incidence among the village population of diseases such as trachoma, bilharziasis, and ancylostomiasis. Once hired, the factory worker was told to find the section to which he was assigned and to report to work. As in the case of the supervisory recruits, there was no orderly induction procedure nor any formalized training on the job. However, the older workers were skillful in teaching the newer recruits how to behave during their period of probationary employment. For the first six months, the new worker was on probation and could be discharged by the foreman for any reason, but upon recommendation of the foreman, the worker acquired permanent employment status at the end of the probationary period.

According to the supervisors we interviewed, the criteria most commonly mentioned for judging the worker's fitness for permanent employment were as follows: obedience, punctuality and regularity, no complaints from fellow workers, politeness, no talking back, and record clean of sanctions.[4] The objective, obviously, was to recruit and retain docile and submissive labor rather than efficient workmen. Since there was practically no opportunity for uneducated workers to rise into positions of super-

[4] Sanctions are financial penalties imposed upon the worker for such things as tardiness, unexcused absences, carelessness on the job, refusal to follow instructions, etc.

vision, there was little reason to encourage individual initiative or ambition.

Turnover

For the first eight to ten years, the turnover of labor was very high. No genuine attempt was made by the company to assist those hired to adjust to factory employment. The company customarily employed 30 per cent more workers than needed simply to take care of turnover and absenteeism. Indeed, in a period of fourteen years, a total of 54,000 persons were hired to maintain a "committed" force of slightly over 10,000 workers. In the long run, however, the trial and error method of recruitment and commitment resulted in a permanently committed work force. In recent years, turnover has been negligible. Indeed, in 1952 the company had more workers than it needed, and it might have laid off many of them were it not for legislation which restricted the discharge of labor.[5] Since 1952, however, this problem is being solved by substantial expansion of the factories without increasing the size of the labor force.

Wages and productivity

The wages of Egyptian factory labor are, of course, very low. For Egyptian textile wage earners, the average take-home pay is about 195 piastres a week, the equivalent of $5.50. The pay at Kafreldawar is somewhat higher. The difference between the income of a textile worker and an agricultural laborer (fellah), however, is substantial. The textile worker might earn in ten weeks the amount the fellah would get in a year, if the peasant worked the maximum period, which is about two hundred days per year.

The company, because of the very low wage rates prevailing in Egypt, has never been much concerned with the productivity of labor; the important consideration has always been to get the maximum productivity per machine. For this reason, it is estimated that, on comparable machines, six to eight workers may be employed in Egypt for every one in the United States. Thus, despite the low wages, the total labor costs in companies such as Kafreldawar are substantial, and some members of management argue that they may be as high or even higher than in Europe or the United States.

[5] Decree 75/1940, *Journal officiel* (Cairo, Egypt: Government Press), July 27, 1940.

MORALE

The members of top management were generally aware of the deficiencies of its labor force, but they tended to place the major blame on supervision. The supervisors, so top management claimed, did not like to get their hands dirty and preferred white-collar jobs; they had exaggerated notions of the worth of their trade-school education and too great a feeling of superiority over the workers they supervised; they were loath to take responsibility and repeatedly passed on to top management minor decisions which they should have made themselves; in short, they had little ability or feel for handling problems of human relations.

For their part, members of supervision criticized the indolent, slothful, lazy, and untrained workmen whom they had to supervise. The members of supervision were also sharply critical of their superiors, claiming that top management never appreciated the problems faced by foremen and charge hands in dealing with this kind of labor force. The workers, whom we did not interview, were presumably as discontented as the supervisors. Thus the morale of the entire supervisory and labor force was undoubtedly very low.

In comparison with the magnificent factory buildings, the up-to-date automatic machinery, and the extremely efficient plant layout, the wasteful and haphazard techniques of recruiting and training a supervisory and labor force were indeed primitive. Most people in top management, though they had never given much thought to these human problems, were quite frank in recognizing the big gap between technology and effective organization. But, at least before 1952, they were under little pressure to do much about it.

SOCIAL WELFARE AND LABOR POLICIES

At the same time, in comparison with other Egyptian enterprises, the labor policies and social welfare programs of the Kafreldawar Company were fairly advanced. Let us examine them briefly.

In 1952 nearly all of the salaried employees and more than a quarter of the factory workers were living at very low rents in houses or apartments built and owned by the company. These dwellings, grouped into five attractive communities, are well designed and substantially constructed. Schools, playgrounds, sports clubs, and recreational facilities are excellent. Indeed, from a physical viewpoint, the factory buildings and the surrounding company housing would compare favorably with the best in Europe or the United States.

The company also operates a cafeteria which serves three meals a day at greatly subsidized prices. The law requires that any employer hiring more than five hundred workers must provide medical care (including specialists' services), hospitalization, and drugs for all members of the labor force. The law also requires employers to organize classes to teach workers to read and write. This company, however, has gone far beyond the minimum requirements of the law in providing these kinds of services. It also organized a co-operative society for selling groceries and clothing at reasonable cost. In 1952, the company spent a sum equivalent to 20 per cent of the total payrolls for its various social services, and its achievement in this area is widely acclaimed, not only by other employers but by union leaders and government officials as well. Indeed, with respect to social welfare, Kafreldawar is one of Egypt's "show places."

But while the company was spending thousands of pounds to keep its workers happy, it was also making a conscious and studied effort to keep them under firm control. At Kafreldawar, as in most other enterprises in Egypt, the central objective of labor policy was to maintain discipline. We have already noted that the policy of the company in recruitment was directed toward the development of an obedient rather than an efficient work force. This policy was further implemented through the device of sanctions and the control of union activity.

At Kafreldawar, as in other enterprises in Egypt, discipline is enforced by a system of sanctions. For infraction of plant rules, the worker may be given a warning, a cut in pay for a specified period, or dismissal for a flagrant offense such as insubordination. In plants employing over fifty workers, the law requires that the schedule of sanctions be approved by the Department of Labor and that the money deducted from wages as punishment be placed in a special fund to be used for the general welfare of the workers in ways determined by a joint labor-management committee. Before August 1952, however, supervisors at Kafreldawar were given a free hand in making recommendations for these sanctions. This procedure was a potent weapon to keep the workers in line, and, as might be expected, there were many abuses in the use of the sanction power. But so long as the unions were weak, workers had little recourse against such abuses.

Company-controlled union

Furthermore, the Kafreldawar Company, like other large enterprises, was generally in a position to control if not to dominate what unions there were. Many of the union leaders in fact held positions in the management hierarchy. In some cases they were division heads or assistant department chiefs. The Secretary-General of the company was for a long time legal adviser of the union. The union's office was in the company administration building, and the company provided the facilities for the banking and safekeeping of its funds. Elections of officers were free, but according to the testimony of the persons interviewed, the following procedures were common: (1) Top management would indirectly encourage certain employees to offer their names as candidates for union office. (2) The foremen were then instructed, informally, to persuade workers to vote for these hand-picked candidates. (3) If candidates unacceptable to the management were nominated, the company would persuade them to withdraw, and most would comply in expectation of some future favor.

It was clear that the rank and file always knew who were the company's favored candidates, and almost everyone voted for them. The rationale among the workers was that the union was very weak in comparison with the company and that the company would be more lenient with the workers if they elected officers who had top management's approval. The "demands" of the union were characteristically submitted as "suggestions" to the company. If the management acted favorably on such suggestions, they were put into effect on a unilateral basis by the company as a gesture of paternal benevolence. In short, before the Revolution of 1952, the company had complete control over the machinery of worker protest. Its authority to hire, fire, discipline, and direct the working force was unchallenged. For this reason, top management was never much concerned about labor problems. It simply assumed that its paternalistic personnel practices and its social welfare programs would keep the employees and the workers sufficiently dependent upon the company so that they would not question in any way the manner in which management exercised its prerogatives.

RESPONSE TO THE REVOLUTION

Egypt's Revolution of July 23, 1952, marked the beginning of a new era in the labor and management policies of companies such as Kafreldawar. The new Liberation government enacted legislation designed to encourage unions and to make them more independent of the companies, but at the same time took measures to extend its control over management-labor relations in the large enterprises. For example, the new labor legislation makes the union shop compulsory in establishments where three-fifths of the labor force are union members, and it also requires the employer to check off dues upon the request of the union. It encourages the establishment of joint machinery to handle grievances and to police the system of sanctions. At the same time, the regulations prohibiting strikes were strengthened and the participation of the government in what amounts to compulsory arbitration was extended. Under the Egyptian labor laws, the officers of unions must themselves be workers or employees of the company, and outside professional leadership is prohibited in order to keep the unions from engaging in political activities or movements.[6]

[6] Decree 319/1952 relating to labor unions, *Journal officiel* (Cairo, Egypt: Government Press), No. 157 (bis), December 8, 1952.

Thus the net effect of the Revolution was to give workers a feeling of emancipation from the unilateral authority of the company, and to mobilize their support of and allegiance to the goals of the Liberation. Under these circumstances the unions in the textile mills quite understandably were quick to present their "requests" or "demands" to the companies.

Even before the union at Kafreldawar made its demands known, an unexpected crisis developed which dramatized the labor problem and led to the virtual occupation of the plant by the Army. On August 12, 1952, a mob of demonstrators attacked the plant at the time of changing the night shift and set fire to the administration building, the company garage, and several automobiles. The mob was led mostly by persons not employed by the company, but many of the demonstrators were former employees and workers on another shift. The Army came in to keep the situation under firm control. It was concluded that the attack was instigated by anti-Revolutionary reactionaries who were trying to embarrass the new regime. However, it was clear to the top management at the Kafreldawar Company, and particularly to the government, that this demonstration was built upon the feelings of resentment which the workers had against the company and that measures must be taken to solve some of the labor problems that apparently existed.

Salaried employees "suggest"

A few days after this incident, the salaried employees submitted their "suggestions" to the company. Among other things they requested the following: a more definite and regular system of annual salary increases, increased pay and fringe benefits, upgrading to the status of salaried employee of all charge hands paid by the hour, the establishment of a committee to review complaints, and a reduction of the bonus given to members of the board of directors. These matters were resolved, not by collective bargaining, but by joint determination of the company and the government. Most of the requests, except those relating exclusively to management such as the directors' bonus, were granted at least in part.

Union demands for wage earners

Two weeks later the union submitted a long list of demands on behalf of the wage-earning group, the most important of which were: (1) wage increases, fringe benefits, and improvements in working conditions; (2) provision for annual bonuses and regular increases in pay each six months; (3) upgrading to the status of salaried employee of those skilled mechanics who performed work similar to trade-school graduates; (4) payment of an incentive bonus to the best three workers in each of the production departments; (5) formation of machinery to pass upon sanctions, disciplinary cases, and grievances.

Again with the participation of the government, the company granted most of these demands. The establishment of a disciplinary committee was perhaps the most fundamental concession made. This committee was given full power to decide upon disciplinary action to be taken in accordance with the Rules of Sanctions approved by the Department of Labor. Its composition was as follows: a representative of the Department of Labor as chairman, a representative of the legal section of the company, and a representative of the union.

Significance of 1952 settlements

These 1952 settlements, which were underwritten by the company, the Department of Labor, and the Army officer in charge of the area, established a new

framework of industrial relations at Kafreldawar. In brief, it provided the following: (1) the *right* of workers and employees to have annual wage increases according to a prescribed formula; (2) the *right* of workers and employees to upgrading and promotion on a systematic basis (in this case seniority); (3) establishment of formal grievance procedures whereby the union, along with the company and the government, is a party to control of disciplinary action; (4) full acceptance of the union as an institution functioning within the enterprise and as an agency for presenting demands on behalf of the workers and employees.

Changes in union leadership

Along with these changes, furthermore, there have been changes in the leadership of the union. The officers, by and large, are now members of the wage-earning group rather than management functionaries, and company influence in the election of candidates for office has been greatly curtailed. In short, the union at Kafreldawar is stronger than it was before 1952 and a great deal more independent of the company. Its effective power, however, depends not so much on its own economic strength as upon its ability to influence the representatives of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which plays a strategic role in industrial relations.

New directions in company policy

With this relinquishment of some of its unilateral authority over workers, the company has lately become much more conscious of the need for effective training of both workers and supervisors. It is beginning to think in terms of the development rather than merely the control of its wage-earning and salaried labor force. In the process of present expansion of the factories, the company hired a Swiss consulting firm to set up a program of work organization, job description, and job evaluation that would enable the company to make the best utilization of its labor force and operate its new facilities without hiring additional workers. The Managing Director is planning also to establish a program for training the managerial and supervisory personnel in the handling of human relations. It is apparent that the Kafreldawar Company, having recognized that labor problems are important, is now devoting both energy and resources to bringing its practices of manpower management closer to the levels of its advanced machinery and technology. If this trend continues, the company could be in the future one of the world's most efficient textile manufacturers.

BROADER INFERENCES

If we assume that our case analysis may be fairly typical of that kind of industrialization which utilizes modern technology on a large scale, we can make these tentative observations regarding some of the social consequences of economic development in a country such as Egypt.

Physical and technical resources

First, it is comparatively easy for an Egyptian company with adequate capital resources to build and operate very modern plants. The designs for the plant, the processes, and the machinery can be imported from abroad. It is also possible to develop a staff of Egyptian engineers and supervisors who are technically qualified to run the plant, although this may require expensive training in foreign countries in the early stages of industrialization. In this respect, an underdeveloped country has a great advantage in being able to make immediate use of processes and technology which the more advanced countries have taken decades to develop.

Technologists and human relations

Second, the recruitment and training of competent technologists does not necessarily lead to the development of an efficient managerial organization. Indeed, the preoccupation of engineers with technical problems may even cause them at the outset to neglect the human factors involved in building and running an effective organization. In this way, the foundations are laid for future labor protest and government intervention.

Behind high turnover

Third, in a country where there is an abundance of cheap labor, management may have very little incentive to spend time or resources in the initial selection, training, and development of its working force. Thus the initial high turnover and low productivity of the working forces may be more directly a result of underdeveloped management than the unavoidable and inevitable consequence of the adjustment of agricultural laborers to the routines of industrial employment. For example, if the Kafreldawar Company had used even some of the simplest modern personnel practices in selecting, inducting, and training its workers, it might have built a stable working force in five years rather than in fifteen.

Obedience vs. efficiency

Fourth, in a cheap labor country such as Egypt, employers are initially interested in developing an obedient rather than an efficient working force. They have an incentive to increase the productivity of machines but not of manpower. The very low productivity of labor, therefore, is in large measure a consequence of the lack of investment of time and resources by the employer in training and developing the productive capacities of workers and supervisors.

Outside pressures

Fifth, in the early stages of industrialization, the employer may be in a position to maintain his unilateral authority over the workers, and he may even be able to capture and dominate the machinery through which worker protest is channeled. Sooner or later, however, the intervention of the government in industrial relations and the development of independent unions which the state may encourage will force the employer to share his prerogatives with outside contenders for control over such protest. At this point, pressures may be generated which force top management to invest more time and energy in effective manpower management. Labor becomes more expensive, and the employer's freedom to hire and fire at will is closely circumscribed. It becomes necessary to develop administrators and supervisors who have skills in managing and developing labor resources. The human factor thus begins to match the technological as a major concern of top management.

Effect of increased productivity

Sixth, the ultimate consequence of these pressures is probably the development of better paid, better trained, and much more efficient working forces in industrial establishments; but at the same time it also tends to limit the expansion of employment in the industrialized sector of the country. Within the past two years, for example, the Kafreldawar Company and others like it in Egypt have been able to nearly double their output (through installation of additional factories, more machinery, and better methods of manpower management) without any appreciable increase in their total working

force. If the fruits of this increased productivity are widely shared through lower prices of manufactured goods for the consumers, the population as a whole may stand to gain. But if employers are able to maintain prices by collusive arrangements which are further bolstered by protective tariffs, industralization of this kind may contribute very little indeed to the general welfare.

Management problems

Lastly, our analysis indicates that the "labor problems" of industralization are really in large measure "management problems." The recruitment and training of a labor force is a managerial function. If a country wants to develop the productive powers of its people, it must thus plan for the careful development of its managerial resources. It cannot succeed by investing only in plants, machines, and technicians. It must make a substantial investment also in the education and training of human agents in general and in the development of organization builders in particular. And finally, it must create an environment in which management is under constant pressure to grapple effectively with the human factors involved in the introduction and use of modern technology.

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Social Consequences of Economic Development in West Africa

By PIUS OKIGBO

THE interaction of several economic changes in the first half of the twentieth century has transformed the economic structure of West Africa.[1] Railroad construction undertaken in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century links the northern and southern regions and enables the agricultural and mineral resources of the interior to be brought down to the coast for export. Trade and commerce have been developed within the territories and with the metropolitan powers,[2] and the foundation of financial institutions has been laid.[3] A few industries have been developed: first, mineral and extractive industries, and recently, light industries—soap, beer, textiles, shoes, tobacco, dairy, and timber. These developments have had tremendous consequences on the society and on the modes of living of the West African. We shall trace these consequences through the following indices of social change: family and kinship relationships, class and status relationships, social mobility, indigenous institutions for the maintenance of social cohesion. To simplify the analysis, we shall select a particular economic innovation and by working out its consequences show how it has affected the social structure of the region.

[1] Some of the early economic changes have been outlined in Allan McPhee, *The Economic Revolution in British West Africa,* London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1926.

[2] See P. T. Bauer, *West African Trade,* Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1954.

[3] See W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, *Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954), for a succinct history of the development of financial institutions.

An innovation introduces new factors into the social ecology. The society will adopt some of these factors and, in doing so, adapt itself both structurally and operationally in order either to resist the innovation or to accept its consequences. Social resistance may arise at the initial stage, giving rise to a re-evaluation of the economic change. The process involved will be seen clearly if we select the introduction of a new technique which is clearly a breach with tradition.

CHANGES IN PRODUCTION TECHNIQUE

Let us start with an example which has served to transform the peasant production of palm oil and kernels. All along the coastal belt of West Africa, the production of palm oil and kernels is one of the major sources of revenue and one of the main pillars of external trade. For the family, it constitutes a direct source of cash income. Since the family grows practically all its food, the fruits of the palm tree provide a cash income which helps the family to defray some of its cash expenses—school fees for the children, medical fees, other household expenses, and—most of all—the taxes collected by the government.

The method of production had, until just before World War II, been largely traditional. The trees grew wild.[4] Because of the diffuse and dispersed nature of land tenure, the family's palm trees were invariably scattered over wide

[4] The African oil palm (*Elaeis guineensis*) is indigenous to West Africa. The variety most commonly found is *macrocarya,* the fruits of which have a thin pericarp (the outer pulp containing palm oil) but a relatively large endocarp (the nut containing palm kernels).

areas. Collection of palm fruit thus consumed a lot of time and effort. The fruit was allowed to ripen for a time, then it was boiled and pounded with pestles in a wooden mortar. The oil was extracted by hand and so much of it was lost in the pulp.

The changes in the technique of production came in two stages. First, manually operated presses were sold to peasant proprietors. Normally, by traditional methods, from a hundred-pound weight of fruit thirteen pounds of oil had been extracted. The manual presses raised the oil yield from thirteen pounds to sixteen pounds and enhanced the quality of the oil by reducing the free fatty acid content. Introduced in the war years, by 1953 no less than three thousand of these presses were in use in the Eastern Region of Nigeria alone.[5] Each press could, however, handle only a small quantity of fruit at a time. The family organization of production was not disturbed by the manual presses. The husband continued to collect the fruit, and the wife took it to the press for extraction of oil. She continued to retain her interest in the kernels but turned over to the husband the proceeds of the sale of the oil.

The second stage came with the introduction of what were called Pioneer Oil Mills. These mechanized all the processes of extraction of oil and cracking of kernels and handled very large quantities of fruit. The early success which they received in Eastern Nigeria led to their rapid extension in Nigeria. They raised efficiency and nearly quadrupled the oil yield from a given weight of fruit as compared to the efficiency of traditional methods.

Increasing monetization

The economic consequences are easy to follow. With the increase in output made possible by the mechanized mills, economic activity would be more highly monetized in the area where this innovation was introduced. The traditional pattern whereby the husband collects the fruit and the wife takes it to the manual presses has now to be changed. The fruit is now sold in the market place where the agents of the oil mill purchase in small lots and then bulk the purchases for the mill, to ensure the mill's operating at near capacity for most of the time and not lying idle for inadequate supply of fruit. Purchasers, therefore, go far into the remoter areas and villages in order to maintain a steady supply line. In effect, the logistic problem of maintaining a regular flow of fruits to the mill means that an increasingly large part of the village's palm fruit will be bought for the mill. In this way, the erosion of the subsistence sector of the economy has been accelerated.[6]

Extended economic opportunities

In addition to the enlargement of the exchange economy, the increase in output may be expected to lead to the extension of economic opportunities, assuming that there are individuals who recognize the wider opportunities offered by the operation of the mills and who are willing to seize them in order to make a profit. In other words, it is assumed that there will be people (1) who will imitate the innovation by introducing similar mills in other areas, and (2) who will seek to make a profit by undertaking ancillary functions connected with, and widened by, the initial investment. That both processes are at work can be seen from the progress made by the mills in Nigeria.

[5] *The Nigeria Handbook* (London: Crown Agents, 1954), p. 135.

[6] United Nations, Secretariat, Department of Economic Affairs, *Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in Tropical Africa*, New York, 1954, UN Doc. E/2557, St/ECA/23. This booklet argues that the rate of economic development will depend on the rate at which the subsistence sector is absorbed by the exchange sector.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: THE FAMILY

The impact of the introduction of this new technique of production on the indigenous society can be seen from the effect it has had on family and kinship structure. The family system in Eastern Nigeria, where pioneer oil mills were introduced, can be readily described as patriarchal. The father is the breadwinner and head of the household. The family's income is derived from three sources: (1) agriculture—the production of food crops either for subsistence or for sale: (2) forest products—mainly palm fruit for oil and kernels; (3) home industry—the making of cloth, baskets, pots, household utensils, either for domestic use or for sale. In some families, these sources are supplemented by income from the retail of imported merchandise brought in from the neighboring towns and sold in very small lots in the villages.

Production of food is undertaken by the family as a unit.[7] The father does most of the heavy work, which includes tilling the ground and preparing the mounds. He is assisted by the wife and the children. The wife's function is to help in the planting. She attends to the weeding, and in addition to the work on the family farm, which is often far from their dwelling place, she may cultivate entirely on her own the little family plot adjacent to their dwelling. After harvesting the fruit of the season's labor, the family has clear rights to the harvest. The forest products require no cultivation. No effort is called for other than that spent in collection of the fruit. The wife arranges for the extraction of the oil and sells the oil, but retains a right to the kernels. The division of function is thus clearly defined.[8] The wife's title to the kernels, the auxiliary benefits which she derives from the traditional methods of production, the satisfaction that she derives from her independent income—these are some of the advantages that the indigenous and traditional form of production confers on the woman.

Consumption also involves the family as a unit. Most of the food is grown on the family farm. The surplus, where there is one, is sold for cash to meet the family's cash expenses. The sale of the forest products provides a ready source of income for contingencies. Children are entirely dependent on the family for their needs but when they attain adulthood, they help the family to maintain their consumption level by periodic contributions.

Such division of labor and function as existed under the traditional system of cultivation gave a stability to the family structure. The children were brought up within this system and taught the functions and the rights of the two sexes in the family. With the introduction of pioneer oil mills, new opportunities were opened for the children. They could obtain some form of paid employment at the mill; they could sell some of the family's fruit to the mill; or they could engage in petty trade in imported merchandise in the village, where money incomes were now rising. The dependence of the child on the family was beginning to weaken. The wife's position was threatened by the potential loss of an independent source of income. When the fruit was sold to

[7] Robert K. A. Gardiner and Helen O. Judd, *The Development of Social Administration* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 11–12.

[8] F. J. Pedler, *West Africa* (London: Methuen & Co., 1951), pp. 34–35. See also Diedrich Westermann, *The African Today and Tomorrow* (3rd ed.; London and New York: Published for the International African Institute by the Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 46–47.

the mill, the right to the kernels did not revert to the wife. More often than not, the proceeds of the sale would go to the husband. When the erection of a pioneer oil mill was mooted in the Ibibio area of Nigeria in 1951–52, the women led a violent demonstration that threatened order and peace in the area for several months. The vehemence of their resistance was a magistral demonstration of the lengths to which a society can go in resisting a change that fundamentally threatens the stability of the family. Such resistance cannot be explained purely on grounds of negative opposition to change. The mills may raise the family's income, but they disrupt the family organization. It may be remarked that in the controversy the resistance came only from the women, a fact suggesting that it was the woman's role and position, not the man's, that was threatened.

CLASS AND STATUS RELATIONSHIPS

Innovations that give rise to new opportunities are likely to give rise to a new plutocracy. If this happens, the innovation may be accompanied by a reevaluation of the traditional basis of authority. In most parts of West Africa, authority in the family is vested in the father; in the kin it rests with the elders; in the village and larger communities it is vested in the elders or some variant of such gerontocracy. Prior to the twentieth century, when land was the most important economic asset, the power to dispose of the land carried with it a power to impose sanctions against the infringment of local custom. Since the disposition of land was invalid without the positive consent of the elders of the community, authority was conferred by virtue of age. In the family, children were taught to respect their elders, and the sign of good breeding was the extent to which a child showed deference to his elders within and outside his family. Family disputes and marriage disputes were settled by the older members of the families concerned. Village disputes were settled by the elders of the village. Where chieftaincy existed, the chief was assisted in the execution of his office by the old men of the community, who were supposed to have acquired wisdom through long experience.

New statuses arise with the emergence of a new class, the rich who have made their fortune in trade either by selling the raw produce of the land or by retailing imported articles manufactured abroad. In social relations money talks. The growth of this new class of rich, divorced from the land that was so important a link in the chain that bound the society to the elders, has weakened the authority of the elders, especially if they happen to be, as is often the case, impecunious.[9] The new generation that made its money in trade has challenged the traditional basis of obedience. Where the traditional authority of the elders is set against the intrusion of new ideas from the younger generation, the conflict has been characterized by an extraordinary degree of vehemence.

The new plutocrat is likely to have traveled outside the village more frequently than the elders.[10] He has been exposed to the influence of new ideas, and tries to bring them to the village. The old statuses based on age are giving way to new statuses based on education and affluence.[11] The chiefs still retain,

[9] This would be true at the village level. The tribal chiefs often have vast resources of land and treasure accumulated through the tributes of their subjects.

[10] D. Westermann, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), p. 144.

[11] Kenneth Little, "Structural Change in the Sierra Leone Protectorate," *Africa*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (July 1955), pp. 217–34. What Little observes of Sierra Leone would be true of other West African territories.

and continue to exert, considerable influence over their subjects, but their position is becoming more honorific than functional. The local councils in which the chiefs and the elders controlled administration are now diluted with younger members of the society thrown up from the educated and wealthy groups, whose success in life gives them the ready ear of their fellow citizens. The chiefs themselves have found that, to retain their prestige and their influence, they will have to march with the times by identifying themselves with the aspirations of the younger members. This situation is clearly a symptom, not a cause, of the social decay which is occurring in the region as a whole.

OTHER INDIGENOUS INSTITUTIONS

When economic changes are occurring in many areas and in several spheres, the total impact on the society is greater. The disorganization of the family structure is but the beginning of a larger story. Sex roles have been upset, the division of functions has been disturbed, and the equilibrium of the family pattern has been superseded by a situation in which new balances have to be struck with the emergence of a vigorous individualism. The institutions that previously derived their strength from family and kinship relationships now have to find new bases. West African society had formerly been developed on the basis of a strong family link. Some of this link remains. The basis has not been static but it has been stable. The changes introduced into the social ecology by the changes in techniques and the accompanying attitudes call for a readjustment of social institutions and the development of those institutions which will minimize the cost of transfer to the new order.

The questions which we take up in this section are wider than the issues that arise with a single innovation. Not all the changes in the social structure can be attributed to a single technological change. Several economic changes have taken place in the economy, and these have repercussions on the indigenous institutions of socioeconomic security. The aged, the infirm and the disabled, the unemployed—these did not present special problems in the traditional society of West Africa. Most African peoples in the various regions had evolved their own peculiar systems of poor relief, old-age pensions, welfare schemes, all of which were operated through some social unit. Where this unit was the family, the income of the family was spread out to take care of its unemployed members, of the old, and of the disabled. Those who had an income just adequate to support themselves found that they had to maintain their less fortunate relatives, the number of whom grew as incomes rose. In some areas, the social unit was larger than the family, increasing the burden of the richer members of the unit by widening the circle of obligations. As Pedler so well put it: "A poor man may lose track of his brothers and cousins: a rich man is constantly reminded of their existence." [12]

Economic development means extension of the means of production and increase in the level of living. So long as the socioeconomic goals were designed to meet the requirements of mere subsistence, the demands of the aged, the poor, and the infirm were rudimentary. The social unit could, without gravely depressing the consumption level, meet this requirement. But the level of living has been rising steadily. The needs of the unemployed, the disabled, and the old have risen with the needs of the

[12] F. J. Pedler, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), p. 32.

wealthy, and the obligation to meet the needs of the indigent and nonproductive members of the household has become increasingly onerous. Even the expense of feeding the unemployed has become burdensome. Evasions of responsibility are, therefore, more frequent now than they were two decades ago. It would appear that indigenous institutions for the maintenance of social cohesion are breaking down and that something ought to be done to replace them if the social disorganization that is thus exposed is to be remedied. The more economic activity has become individualized, the more the institutions based on communal activity are likely to show signs of stress.

Should social security functions be transferred?

A fundamental question is at once raised by this situation. Should the indigenous institutions of socioeconomic security be used in this period of economic development, or should the function be transferred to the state? It must be realized that the concept of the welfare state is here to stay. In most African areas it is received as a fact. The question cannot, therefore, be framed as a choice between indigenous institutions or none at all. If the indigenous institutions are not suitable for the transition from the old to the new order, then the responsibility must be taken over by the state or some other agency. If the state is to take over, increasingly larger public expenditures will come to be devoted to social welfare.

It may be pointed out that one of the reasons why the level of private savings is low in most African areas is that the rich have to finance the consumption of the poor.[13] The level of consumption is thus maintained by the traditional system, while a large measure of "disguised" unemployment exists. It is often argued that if the functions of the indigenous social security institutions were transferred to the state, the unemployment would become overt and might shock the government into taking appropriate monetary and fiscal measures to combat it. So long as the unemployment remains disguised, it may tend to perpetuate itself. Since government relief is likely to be more stringently distributed than that under the pre-existing system, those persons who now maintain themselves on the largesse of their wealthy relatives but who would not qualify for government relief would be compelled to seek productive employment. No matter how little they contribute to production, it is argued, the system would be better than that in which they contribute nothing but live on the charity of the working members of the social unit.

Those who argue in favor of the indigenous system seem to share a mystical faith in the system of indirect rule, that is, they believe that the existing institutions must be used as a vehicle of change in order to minimize the social cost of change.[14] These institutions must be used unless it is unmistakably clear that they stand in the way of progress. If we do not share this mystical faith, it is difficult not to insist that these institutions constitute a serious gap in the capital formation process. The indigenous institutions are cracking. If so, a transfer of the welfare function to the state or some such agency would unquestionably accelerate their disintegration, and as disintegration proceeds, further state responsibility would become necessary. What is clearly called for is that social policy should be thought out carefully and unambiguously, so as to be able to take on the fresh problems that will inevitably arise as the old order breaks down at an increasing rate.

[13] F. J. Pedler, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), p. 33. See also the use made of this point in the analysis of the problems of capital formation by Ragnar Nurkse, *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), Chap. II.

[14] W. M. Macmillan, *Africa Emergent* (Penguin Books, 1949), pp. 259–63, shows an impatient view of these institutions, which are treated as inadequate for new tasks. On the other hand, see L. P. Mair, *Native Policies in Africa* (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1936), Chaps. I and III, for a very sympathetic view of the indigenous institutions.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Economic development in West Africa has shown how interdependent the various geographic sections are for the maintenance of a stable standard of living. Trade has grown between the segments of the region. Rail travel has linked up various parts of each country, and the demand for labor for several purposes has driven peoples that hitherto never left their home towns to distant parts of the region in search of paid employment. Nigerians are to be found in large numbers in the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Gold Coastians fill the ranks of the Nigerian civil service. Laborers are recruited from Nigeria and the Cameroons for the Spanish territory of Fernando Po. Such voluntary spatial mobility was a thing unknown in the nineteenth century and is likely to grow in size as communication improves and trade develops.[15]

Vertical mobility within the geographical areas did not raise serious problems. With the disintegration of the class groupings based on age, the society acquired a fluidity which made it easy for an individual to move up from the peasant status by acquiring some wealth or education. While job opportunities were restricted by the low level of income and by administrative fiat,[16] these obstacles have gradually been swept away. In postwar West Africa, especially in the British territories, the artificial obstacles to vertical mobility appear nonexistent; within the ambit allowed by the facilities for self-improvement, the individual seems to have boundless opportunities of moving to the top.

A discussion of the changes in class structure and class mobility is inadequate if it fails to touch on the development of a middle class. Discussions of this subject often postulate that the economic development of West Africa will proceed faster if a middle class is developed. The suggestion seems to be that a middle class has to be created independently of economic development, a position that is difficult to maintain in the light of either logic or history. It must be emphasized that the process of economic development by itself engenders the emergence of new classes in society. If the primary income-generating asset is land, as it was in the early part of the twentieth century, the disorganization of the social order may give rise to a new class divorced from the land. If the catalyst is derived from the development of trade, as is the case in West Africa, then the disintegration of the social structure may be accompanied by the emergence of a new commercial plutocracy. The accumulation of wealth in the first fifty years of this century in West Africa has come through trade, both in local materials and in internationally traded commodities. The new commercial classes that emerged as a result have given rise to a substantial measure of economic development which has only recently come to be recognized.[17] As West African development

[15] Spatial mobility existed in the period of the slave trade but was not free and voluntary.

[16] Until the postwar era, certain jobs in government and commerce were reserved for Europeans.

[17] Cf. F. J. Pedler, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), p. 46. See also P. T. Bauer, *op. cit.* (note 2

follows the path of industrialization, it is to be expected that an industrial middle class will develop. Though it has its origin outside the industrialization process, industrial development is the soil necessary to maintain it.

CONCLUSION

If we were asked what has been the most significant change in West African society in the twentieth century, the answer would readily be found in the individualization of activity which seems to have taken firm root in most sections of African society.[18] The production and consumption units in West Africa have traditionally been much wider than the European concept of family would suggest. In the fifty-five years of this century, the social unit in West Africa has been shrinking because of emergent individualism, a shrinkage revealed in production and consumption no less than in marriage and other social relationships.[19] Europeans commonly think of the family as consisting of a man, his wife, and their children. In West Africa, the concept has included the relatives of the man and the relatives of the wife, several branches up the genealogical tree on both sides.[20] The shrinking of the social unit has led to the shrinking of the wide circle of obligations that bound the individual to the family.

With the family structure showing signs of instability, other associations and relationships based on the family have shown signs of breaking down. Kinship structures have felt the impact of the growing individualism, and new alignments are springing up in the form of associations in which the base is similarity of outlook and education rather than age.

Some observers have viewed the social change with alarm.[21] It has been described as an unhappy development leading to social disintegration and chaos. Underneath this alarmist note is a nostalgic cry for a return to the good old days and a belief that the social cost of economic development has been exorbitant. The implication is that it is unfortunate that the pre-existing social system should be allowed to break down. It is easily forgotten that no social system is invariant in the face of external influences. At the other extreme is the view represented by Lord Hailey in a recent paper in which he asserts:

> That the modernist urge has led many African leaders to discard some of the most typical institutions of traditional origin, such as the chiefdom or the rule of tribal elders, is today a matter of no great importance.[22]

Lord Hailey argues that most African peoples have adjusted themselves to a change from barter economy to exchange economy.

Unquestionably, further development in the second half of the twentieth century will place greater strain on the indigenous institutions. The problem that will be faced will call for more than a mere lament over the disappearance of pre-existing institutions. What is required is that the emergent individual find in the new society some of what he has lost from the old. This requires, as Alport has pointed out,[23] that the individual be given those opportunities whereby he can re-establish some communion with his surroundings, find a status in his new position as a wage earner, and find some room for his ambition in politics. Social policy has, therefore, to assure that the individual in losing both the benefits and the burdens of the old society acquire no weightier burdens and at least as many benefits as he had in his previous station. If this assurance can be given through the development of private institutions, so much the better; if not, the emergence of a positive welfare state in the various West African areas will be inescapable.

supra), Chap. II. Bauer has rightly called attention to the fact that the distributive trades are not neutral in the capital accumulation process.

[18] D. Westermann, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), pp. 142–43.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[20] E. W. Ardener, "The Kinship Terminology of a Group of Southern Ibo," *Africa*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (April 1954), pp. 85–99. The child has to learn the appropriate addresses for all categories of relatives.

[21] Lorenzo D. Turner, "The Impact of Western Education on the African's Way of Life," in C. Grove Haines (Ed.), *Africa Today* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 157 et seq. See also the comment by E. Franklin Frazier, *ibid.*, pp. 168–71.

[22] Lord Hailey, "Introduction," *ibid.*, pp. xii–xiii.

[23] C. J. M. Alport, *Hope in Africa* (London, 1952), p. 108.

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Social Consequences of Economic Change in Jamaica

By William H. Knowles *

BEFORE examining the social consequences of economic change in Jamaica,[1] this paper will state briefly the reasons why Jamaica is an "underdeveloped" country and point out the causes of rapid postwar economic development. The Jamaican economy remained almost static from the end of slavery until the late 1930's because a culture based upon slaves and sugar estates did not provide an environment conducive to economic growth. With almost dramatic suddenness the riots of the late thirties, the growing nationalism, the influence of American military bases, wartime shortages, a change in colonial policy, and self-government brought about rapid economic change.[2] The social consequences of recent economic development are change in family structure, change in attitude towards work, change in union structure, increasing class-ethnic tension, increasing social disorganization of urban life, and a decline in extreme individualism.

* The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to Professor John Useem, Michigan State University, for his helpful suggestions.

[1] Jamaica is a British colony south of Cuba and west of Haiti. The island is 4,411 square miles in size and has a population of about 1,500,000.

[2] For a review of recent economic change in Jamaica see the report of the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Jamaica* (hereinafter referred to as International Bank Report) (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), and J. E. Hesterman, "Jamaica, Report on Industry," *The Caribbean,* Vol. 8, No. 6 (January 1955), pp. 109–11, 127–28.

Background to Economic Change [3]

Coincident with the end of slavery, England abandoned mercantilism for a laissez-faire economy, thereby dealing the sugar industry of Jamaica a nearly fatal blow, from which it has not yet fully recovered. Whether the cause was the change in economic philosophy or the attempt of the government in England to protect British industry at the expense of the colonies, the facts remain that the function of the British colonial policy was simply to maintain law and order; that it offered no positive program for economic development and failed to encourage private capital and private enterprise in exploiting the available natural resources.

Under the circumstances, private capital and an entrepreneurial class did not appear, and the planter class, carefully preserving the myth of the cultured country gentleman, was interested neither in the exploitation of possible business opportunity nor in the accumulation of capital. Instead, the planter concerned himself solely with his estate, continuing traditional methods of agriculture. Hampered by lack of incentive and by the urgency to maintain his own status within a feudal framework, he eschewed efficiency, science, and technological change in favor of the status quo. His thinking remained mercantilistic in nature, and he sought to solve his problems by relying on a government aid which was not forthcoming. Earnings from the estate were used either to acquire more land, thus bidding up land values, or to engage in prestige-building forms of conspicuous consumption, such as the grand tour of Europe.[4]

[3] For historical background, see Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Paul Blanshard, *Democracy and Empire in the Caribbean* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944); Annette Baker Fox, *Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948); and T. S. Simey, *Welfare and Planning in the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946).

The ex-slave had never accepted the European value system although he had been exposed to these values for some two hundred years, and freedom gave him no reason to change. The government did not prepare him for the transition from slavery to freedom and, more important, the economy provided no opportunities which would enable him to put into practice the European values. The freed slave had nothing very different to do with his freedom from what he had done with his servitude: he either remained on the estate, continuing to live under the quasi feudal conditions in which his freedom meant very little, or he took to the hills, settling on crown land in what became impoverished little peasant communities engaging in subsistence farming. To avoid utter frustration, the working class adopted a passivity towards the possibility of change and settled into a pattern of servitude. The Jamaican peasants were in no position to become a new entrepreneurial class.[5]

However, from the very beginning of the slave-powered plantation economy, there had been in formation a brown-skinned middle class, the progeny of white settlers and the more comely slave girls. These people, given freedom, given the education and the minor posts in government which apologetic paternity bestowed, became a buffer between the whites and blacks at a very early date. Emulating the patterns of their white superiors, they were apathetic to business, industry, and capital accumulation. Membership in one of the professions, usually law (and never engineering), was a major goal, with the civil-service treadmill a second alternative. If unable to enter these fields, the last alternative was a clerkship in a large mercantile or warehousing firm. Their precious though precarious social status prevented them from indulging in the hard work and parsimony which business pioneering entailed and forbade entrepreneurship as a way of life.[6]

[4] Blanshard, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 33, 87–88. See also the Earl of Listowel (W. F. Hare) and others, *Challenge to the British Caribbean* (London: Fabian Publications, Victor Gollancz, 1952), pp. 5–8.

[5] For an excellent analysis of the West Indian working-class psychology and accommodations to a static economy, see C. V. D. Hadley, "Personality Patterns, Social Class, and Aggression in the British West Indies," *Human Relations,* Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 1949), pp. 349–62. See also Major Orde-Browne, *Labour Conditions in the West Indies* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939), p. 16.

[6] See Fernando Henriques, *Family and Colour in Jamaica,* London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1953.

Immediate Causes of Economic Change

The years 1937–39 mark a turning point in West Indian history because the spontaneous riots which swept across the Caribbean brought dramatically to the attention of the colonial government and of the upper classes of Jamaica the need for a higher standard of living for the working class.[7]

The Moyne Commission appointed to study the cause of the riots reported

[7] Simey, *op. cit* (note 3 *supra*), p. 24; Fox, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 27–28, 47–50; Blanshard, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 21–28, 94.

that there was no single incident which caused the unrest.[8] Instead, the commission proceeded to condemn the entire economic, social, and political structure of the West Indies, pointing specifically to the chronic underemployment and mass unemployment, to the lack of social services and community amenities, to the rigid class structure and the subtle forms of racial discrimination, to superstition, disease, malnutrition, and some of the evils of colonial government as the root causes of the general disturbances. A strong positive program was advocated to overcome one hundred years of neglect.

Growth of nationalism

Until the beginning of the riots of 1937–39, the brown-skinned middle class of society generally assumed the values of the white upper class and were themselves outspokenly anti-Negro. Their position was, however, ambiguous. They were snubbed socially by the whites and denied real economic opportunity, and were heartily disliked by the black working class as lackeys for the white rulers. Over a period of time, however, this class had divided into many subgroups based upon a complex of family background, shade of color, education, and job status. As this middle class, which was neither pure Negro nor pure white, grew larger than available job opportunities, a cleavage developed between the upper middle class (light brown or of good family) and the lower middle class (dark brown or of uncertain origin). Being educated, having European values, and not being pure Negro, these "left-handed children" of the upper classes refused to humble themselves by suffering the indignity of becoming field hands.[9] While the upper middle class sought security through identification with the white upper class, the frustrated lower middle class became antiwhite. Part of being antiwhite is to be anticolonial and to identify one's self as a West Indian, a designation which included the black working class.

Consequently they became nationalists, demanding self-government in the belief that the colonial government had not concerned itself sufficiently with the economic development which would provide more job opportunities. Moreover, self-government would naturally lead to greater job opportunities at the higher levels of the civil service. Also, it appeared that self-government would eliminate white superiority and would remove the color bars which had been insurmountable obstacles to advancement of social status.

U. S. military bases

Another important factor in the change in West Indian attitudes toward economic development was the establishment of United States military bases in the Caribbean during World War II.[10]

American construction methods had a profound influence on the thinking of the working class and the lower middle class of West Indians. In the building of bases, American construction crews cleared swampy lands of malaria (with bulldozers) and opened lands for cultivation; built roads over rough mountains and through what heretofore had been called impenetrable jungle; and they developed water supply and sewerage systems, provided lighting and refrigeration, on a scale previously undreamed of by the inhabitants of the Caribbean. More than this, the employment opportunities on American bases created purchasing power which enabled development of a relatively prosperous middle class of shopkeepers. The lower middle class soon came to realize that a prosperous working class was necessary to its own welfare. Lastly, although Jamaican Negroes on American bases experienced some racial discrimination, West Indians learned for the first time that racial discrimination and manual labor were not inseparably linked together. They learned that a measure of dignity was inherent in work and craftsmanship, and that in fact a person could be treated as a human being and still be an employee. For the first time, they saw white men doing manual labor. Although the white upper classes complained bitterly of the "occupation" (by American troops) and although they deplored the spoiling of the lower classes by the Yankee dollar, the working class and the lower middle class learned that modern capital equipment could bring jobs, could promote dignity in work, and could provide prosperity to all.

Wartime shortages

Coincident with the appearance of these completely new influences on the Jamaican way of life came the period of wartime shipping shortages which cut off the supply of consumer goods on which Jamaicans had been accustomed to depend. Later, postwar inflation made the available goods almost unobtainable. By tradition, emphasis had been put upon agricultural production for export while the bulk of the colony's food supply had been imported. The local consumers' market was generally considered too small and unimportant to merit attention, since so few members of society had enough money to buy more than urgent necessities under any circumstances. When wartime strictures changed this pattern by forcing consumers to give up imported salt fish, wheat flour, and tinned meats and vegetables, agriculture had to shift to the production of food to supply local needs. A food-processing industry developed. Similarly, shoes, other wearing apparel, and construction materials had to be supplied locally. These infant industries, starting in sheltered markets, laid the foundations for industrial development, and although the stiff postwar competition has at times threatened the existence of these firms, awakened national pride has encouraged and protected them.[11]

Change in colonial policy

At the same time, acting upon the long-term recommendations of the Moyne Report, the British government set up a Colonial Development and Welfare Corporation to subsidize the economic development of the West Indies. The old laissez-faire economy was abandoned as colonial policy, and the government inaugurated a program which would create a favorable environment for industrial development. Colonial Development and Welfare funds were spent for the improvement of transportation, port facilities, communications, education, and roads.[12]

In accordance with the British postwar colonial policy of a movement towards greater self-government, universal adult suffrage was granted, the Jamaican legislative and executive councils were given a greater measure of authority,

[8] Great Britain, Parliament, West India Royal Commission, *Report,* December 21, 1939, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945. Hereinafter called "Moyne Report."

[9] Orde-Browne, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 35; Fox, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 87, 170; Henriques, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 44–45.

[10] American influence was also felt in the new outlook developed by Jamaican workers recruited by the War Food Administration and the War Manpower Commission for work in the United States; 18,794 recruited in 1944 and over 32,000 recruited in 1945. International Labor Office, *Labor Policies in the West Indies* (hereinafter called the ILO Report) (Geneva, 1952), p. 118.

[11] ILO Report (cited note 10 *supra*), p. 51; Listowel, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 13.

[12] Simey, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 26; Fox, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 47–67, 112, 185.

and a ministerial system was inaugurated. Although both major political parties have been severely criticized (one for alleged corruption and one for alleged naïve socialism) and although some people condemned the very idea of giving self-government to a colony whose masses are ill-prepared for democracy, there can be no doubt self-government has led to greater concern with promotion of economic development.

Recent economic development

While Jamaica has many difficult problems to overcome in its progress toward economic development, the new drive and new attitude of the people and the presence of a government that is actively striving to lay the groundwork for a vigorous economic development will no doubt lead to economic change at an increasing rate. Compared to the magnitude of the task to be done (the creation of 180,000 to 210,000 jobs by 1961),[13] recent economic growth is not impressive, but compared to the growth in the previous one hundred years a significant development has taken place in Jamaica.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

It would be inconceivable that these rapid economic developments should not be accompanied by correspondingly rapid social changes, whether cause or consequence. The economic patterns are changing and, with them, social patterns change.

Family structure

In the light of these factors we can anticipate a change in the family structure among the working class. As an outgrowth of slavery and because economic conditions offered few alternatives, a loosely jointed family structure has been almost an economic necessity among the working-class Jamaicans, who did not (and do not) marry. Unions between men and women of the working class tend to be temporary and often promiscuous, and the offspring of these unions are perforce reared by maternal grandmothers while all able-bodied men and women work in the fields. There is little family life in the form of group recreational and social activities, and "families" do not even eat their meals together. Children are left pretty much to themselves, reared with careless love mixed with violent language and beatings and allowed at an early age (fifteen or so) to leave home to live in hungry and undisciplined gangs.[14] Although extended family structures in some cultures provide love, affection, security, and training for children, the Jamaican peasant family structure is both extended and disorganized.

Yet it has been observed that where a worker was able to secure a job with sufficient and regular income to provide for necessities and with some tenure expectations, he frequently broke away from the old pattern and married, moved to a better neighborhood, and acquired a house with more than one room. That is, he aspired to middle-class standards, which had been impossible under the old economic order. He became concerned with the welfare and education of his children. As industrial development continues we may expect an increase in conjugal-type family structure, particularly among industrial workers.

Work attitudes

Extensive commentary has been written on the subject of the inefficiency of the Jamaican worker. The heritage of slavery was not inclined to make the Jamaican Negro look upon hard manual labor as anything other than degrading, and he not unnaturally chose to emulate the white upper class, which indulges in no such debasing activity. This alone might seem to be enough to have made the worker loath to sweat upon the job. In addition, chronic unemployment and underemployment are further incentives to inefficiency, for the purpose of sharing work and spreading the work opportunities. Moreover, agricultural workers traditionally work a six-month year during crop with a three-day week and a five- to six-hour day even during the harvests. Adjustment from the easy tempo of agricultural employment to the discipline and pace of industry is difficult. Consequently, Jamaican labor is noted for a high rate of turnover, absenteeism, tardiness, lack of incentive and responsibility, lack of skill. The absence of training, of incentive, and of willingness to assume responsibilities calls for close supervision.[15] The more serious sources of this economic failing are the inadequte school systems, malnutrition, small scale of industrial organizations, paucity of capital equipment, and poor management. Lacking the skills, the energy, and the opportunity for economic and social advancements, the workers have not been ambitious, but the working-class withdrawal from aspirations for status is often imputed to "laziness."[16] These reasons have been listed many times as serious obstacles to economic development in Jamaica.

It has also been observed, however, that when Jamaican workers do find jobs with substantially higher wages and with job tenure, their attitude towards work undergoes a complete change (it has been noted that both Irish and West Indian peasants have made good when transplanted to the United States where opportunity exists—a not unrelated fact).[17] If the wage is such as to make lower middle-class status possible or probable, they become ambitious, thrifty, sober, prompt, efficient, and fairly honest workers. As one writer has pointed out, the workers seem to want to assume middle-class values, but there has been no possibility of building a new culture on old working-class patterns.[18] Jamaicans prefer industrial employment to agricultural pursuits, and as job opportunities in industry develop, attitudes toward work will change.

Union structure

A classification of West Indian unions will reveal that where there is industry, there are unions with industrial structure. Where there is no industry, the union structure is of a "blanket" type, based upon geographical districts rather than upon skill or kind of industry. Study of the West Indian unions reveals that the industrial unions are less political, more stable, and more concerned with the immediate economic issues: They are usually rank-and-file led. The "blanket" unions are in most cases highly political; their leaders are usually middle-class intellectuals or ambitious self-seekers, not from within their own ranks. Field hands, who comprise the bulk of the membership, do not pay dues, cannot produce local spokesmen,

[13] International Bank Report (cited note 2 *supra*), p. 5.

[14] Simey, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 79–89; ILO Report (cited note 10 *supra*), p. 18; Blanshard, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 60–67; Henriques, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 109, 127, 151, 161.

[15] Fox, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–69; ILO Report, pp. 22–27; also Sir Frank Stockdale, *Development and Welfare in the West Indies* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945), p. 13; "Mission of the United Kingdom Industrialists on Productivity," *Jamaican Gleaner*, October 1953.

[16] International Bank Report, pp. 73, 211. See also William H. Knowles, "Supervision in the British West Indies: Source of Labor Unrest," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (July 1955), pp. 572–80.

[17] Simey, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 103.

[18] International Bank Report, p. 210.

and tend to be opportunists who follow any leader who promises the most. As a consequence, union leaders who are also politicians make wild promises as unionists in return for votes as politicians. Neither unions nor political parties can be stable where this particular situation obtains.[19]

In Jamaica, the two rival blanket-type unions, the National Workers Union (NWU) and the Bustamente Industrial Trade Union (BITU), were affiliated with rival political parties, the People's National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) respectively. In a seesaw struggle in which both sides alternately suffered gains and losses, the fact emerges that the NWU is based on the skilled and semiskilled industrial workers and is, therefore, stronger in local leadership and membership loyalty; the power of the BITU lies with weight of numbers of the estate workers. Sixteen years ago, the economy did not provide enough industrial workers to give the NWU great strength, but as industrial development took place, the NWU has grown, until now it is more accurately described as a federation of industrial unions.[20]

As we project this situation into the future, we may expect that as industrialization progresses, the union will acquire an industrial structure and will be more inclined to work toward collective bargaining to gain their objectives and will move away from the close connection and dependence upon political objectives and parties. Such a development should give greater stability to unions and to union-management relations. It should also give greater stability to political parties and the political picture, in that economic gains of any one set of workers does not become a matter of political expediency. More enlightened self-government must inevitably result.

Increasing class-ethnic tension

Certainly high among the concomitants in the changing economic and social patterns of Jamaica is the aggressiveness of the demands by the lower middle class for job opportunities, self-government, and social status. A characteristic that might be expected is the feverish insecurity which breeds hypersensitivity and quarrelsomeness. As a matter of fact, the lower middle class of Jamaica is the most aggressive of the lower middle classes of the whole West Indies, no doubt because it is at once the largest middle class in the West Indies and the hardest pressed for economic security and social status. In the short run, however, economic development will not improve the position of its members, because gross national product increases faster than it creates job opportunities.[21] For instance, although royalties and taxes from bauxite mining are large and the value of bauxite exported is considerable, the entire industry has created fewer than 1,200 permanent jobs.[22]

Of the job opportunities created in the new economy, the middle class is fitted for only a few. Instead, the factory worker, the new aristocrat of labor, has a better economic potential than does the lower middle-class clerk. Moreover, the demand for equal opportunity has made it possible for educated black people of the working class to compete with the brown-skinned lower middle class for the limited number of clerical jobs available. In the meantime, the government's program for improving the educational system is creating an ever larger group of people with senior Cambridge certificates (high school diplomas) which make them eligible for clerical positions.

Although self-government has created more jobs for the brown-skinned people in the higher levels of the civil service than ever before and has given them political jobs in the ministerial system, the upper-class whites still dominate the economy and the social life of the islands. The white man has been driven out of the political arena, but white is still the symbol of superiority compelling the brown-skinned middle class to a resentment bred by great insecurity. In the meantime, the black-skinned working class is beginning to compete with the brown-skinned middle class both in politics and for jobs. This precarious position of the brown-skinned classes produces an ambivalence toward the working class. On the one hand, the middle class with its European culture has a real contempt for the almost African culture of the workers and denounces the workers' obstruction to progress. On the other hand, the middle class, having espoused nationalism as a solution to the problem, must defend the worker. This dilemma it tries to solve by picturing the worker as the unfortunate victim of white colonialism.[23]

At the present time, many middle-class leaders look upon themselves as self-appointed guardians of the welfare of the working class. We may anticipate their disillusionment. The working class is not disposed to like brown-skinned benevolence any more than it was disposed to like white-skinned benevolence. Continued white supremacy in the minds of the people together with increased competition for political positions and limited job opportunities must inevitably increase racial tensions and develop a number of aggressive individuals who tend to cause additional unrest.

Social disorganization in urban life

In Jamaica, as elsewhere in the British West Indies, the cities have a disproportionately large share of the population for a predominantly agricultural economy.[24] The population of Kingston, the capital of Jamaica, has grown from 90,000 in 1931 and 200,000 in 1943 [25] to an estimated 250,000 in 1953.

Part of the reason for the urban growth is the drabness of life in the country and the attraction of the possibilities of life in the big city. More important, however, are the population pressures in the country and the utter lack of job opportunities. In spite of the share-the-work tradition on Jamaican estates, there comes a point where someone must leave. Consequently, people crowd into West Kingston slums. The more fortunate find jobs in the overcrowded fields of domestic service and portering, but most of them "scuffle" for a living, that is, they live by their wits—begging, stealing, running errands, or scavenging for the necessities of life. Without steady employment or the security of estate feudalism, without the house "spot" and the garden "spot" to which he was entitled on the estates, the slum dweller living in a money

[19] Orde-Browne, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 50; Fox, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 69, 81; International Bank Report, p. 225; Stockdale, *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 68.

[20] Into this picture has come the added element of American influence, for one of the leaders of the NWU was trained and is subsidized by the United Steel Workers of America, who are interested in all bauxite and aluminum workers. It is also significant that the American-trained personnel managers of the bauxite companies have influenced the pattern of collective bargaining in Jamaica. Union-management relations and the terms of working conditions are beginning to look more and more like that covered in the basic steel agreements in the United States.

Since the article was written, the NWU has edged out the BITU in size.

[21] Fox, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 87.

[22] International Bank Report, pp. 5, 65.

[23] Simey, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 19–20; Henriques, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 52–62.

[24] Stockdale, *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 11; Blanshard, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 39.

[25] Simey, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 5.

economy is worse off than his country cousin. In spite of the degree of social disorganization in the country, life is even worse in the city slums. Family structure is more disorganized. Petty theft is endemic. Ganja (marijuana) is an essential consumer good.

It is not an accident, therefore, that all forms of evangelical religion are more prevalent in the slum areas of the West Indian cities than in the rural areas and peasant communities. There is a positive correlation between revivalist religions and unemployment, insecurity, and social disorganization.[26] In Kingston, this takes the form of obeah (black magic—which is illegal), *pocomania* (white magic), and Ras-Tafari (a back-to-Africa movement looking to a rule by Haile Selassie, the living God).[27] Seeing the utter futility of life, the slum dwellers take refuge in an otherworldly evangelism, where salvation is to come to the deserving not through efforts of his own, but through the magic of a mystical leader with a divine principle. In Jamaica, this is described as the "Messiah complex." The populace look for a Moses to lead them to the promised land by his mysterious powers, without effort on their part.

With continued population growth and the inevitable technological changes in agriculture, employment opportunities on the estates will be further reduced. Although both unions and estate owners are reluctant to displace workers through technological change, the pressure for higher wages must inevitably increase the efficiency of estates at the expense of jobs. Even without industrial development, therefore, the problem of urban slums and attendant social ills will grow. Foreign Operations Administration officials in Italy report that the creation of new factories in Italian towns results in greater unemployment, because the underemployed farm workers, hearing of job opportunities in the cities, flock to urban areas, only to discover that there are not enough jobs to go around. Owing to the substantial differential between rural wages and city wages in Jamaica and the appeal of industrial employment to Jamaican workers, we may expect an even larger number of agricultural workers to turn to the cities as industrial development continues. We may anticipate, therefore, the growth of even larger industrial slums in West Kingston; all the social problems entailed will have to be recognized and dealt with. An unemployed and socially disorganized urban proletariat will probably turn to *pocomania,* which, unfortunately, is only a form of escapism; it costs a great deal of money and saps the strength of the believers with all night dancing and drinking in a "balm yard." [28]

Decline of extreme individualism

Jamaicans have been described as the most rugged of the rugged individualists in the world. The description is not meant to be a compliment: it indicates rather the irresponsibility of the individual towards society and the inability of society to discipline the individual.[29]

[26] Henriques, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 60–61.

[27] George Eaton Simpson, "Cultural Change and Reintegration Found in the Cults of West Kingston, Jamaica," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* Vol. 99, No. 2 (April 1955), pp. 89–92.

[28] Moyne Report (cited note 8 *supra*), p. 240; Henriques, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 117; Simey, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 37–39. That *pocomania* offers no solution to the problems of urban slum dwellers may be criticized as a value judgment, but only in the same sense that the statement that alcoholism is no solution to job failure is a value judgment.

[29] Madeline Kerr, *Personality and Conflict in Jamaica,* Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1952.

This individualism is expressed in lack of responsibility towards family; in praedial larceny, with each man stealing the others' crops to the point where the well-being of the economy is endangered; in the lack of neighborliness; in the absence of community pride or civic spirit. Individuals are unable to organize for the purpose of improving roads, water supply, or drainage. Attempts by religious or governmental services to organize social and recreational activities are still uphill struggles, and these efforts usually fail when outside support and leadership are withdrawn.[30] Slow progress is being made in developing local leadership for marketing co-operatives and labor unions, but once again, the initiative has had to come from outside the social group.

In a negative sense, Jamaican individualism has been a feeling of not belonging. In the past, the government belonged to the colonial administrators. The Negro did not come to the West Indies as a pioneer but against his will as a slave. He feels that the school system belongs to a government, which is not his, and the established church belongs to foreign white men. With self-government and with the populace wielding a very potent weapon—the vote—this general attitude may slowly shift. Respect for the power of the vote does not come all at once, but it will surely arrive as the voters find through experience that they have the means of controlling their own future.

With industrialization and the higher standard of living which accompanies it, the old asocial individualism is slowly being modified. Industrial occupations require a combination of self-discipline and teamwork, with greater individual initiative and responsibility, and this training, too, will carry over into civic affairs as it is now being carried over into labor union solidarity. The higher standard of living made possible by industrialization is allowing more workers to make a clean break from the nihilistic individualism [31] of the underemployed working classes and to assume the values of the lower middle class. The fact that better-paid workers with job tenure are likely to marry, assume lower middle-class values, and become *dues-paying* union members is an indication of this movement towards civic responsibility. With this change in status comes an interest in community affairs and in politics.

[30] Simey, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 15–20, 62.

SUMMARY

Jamaica is European in culture by reason of its government, law, language, religion, education, tradition, and history; but because of the particular configuration which historical accident took, these European values failed to take root and did not lead to economic development. Clearly, economic development is not self-starting, and there is no reason to suppose that economic development would now be taking place had it not been for the cumulative social pressures which finally broke out in the general riots of 1937–39.

By the same token, there are not the tribal, village, feudal, or religious barriers to economic change in Jamaica that exist in many other underdeveloped areas of the world. Racial-class tension, particularly within the middle class itself, is the one serious barrier to economic change, and it will increase as other social and economic changes take place.

[31] Agricultural workers returning from three years contract labor in the United States, for example, find it difficult to put their savings and new techniques in practice in peasant communities. The neighbors, resenting new ways, have been known to destroy crops, livestock, and fishing boats.

Most of the social obstacles to economic change will disappear in the process of economic development. With economic change we may expect a new class to develop, the aristocracy of labor, which will break from old working-class traditions to marry and establish middle-class families; to show more pride, initiative, and discipline in work; to form responsible unions with an industrial structure; and to assume more responsibility in civic and political affairs.

A serious consequence of economic growth is the social dislocation incurred by the estate workers and the lower middle class who are seeking to improve their status faster than economic growth will allow. The rising level of aspiration of these groups will continue with or without economic growth, and there is no turning back to the "good old days." Rapid economic development is the only rational course of action.

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Israel: Traditional and Modern Social Values and Economic Development

By S. N. EISENSTADT

IN many respects Israel can be studied today from the usual point of view of the problems of underdeveloped countries. This is especially true when one is interested in analyzing the social conditions and consequences of economic development. Close to half the population of Israel has recently come from various Middle Eastern countries, with a traditional social, cultural, and economic setting, with a relatively low standard of living and health, and with but little knowledge of skills required by a modern technical economic system.[1] Moreover, they came into the new state when its capital resources were greatly diminished after the War of Independence, without bringing with them adequate capital of their own. The import of capital generally lagged behind the influx of people. In this way the country was faced not only with relatively unskilled manpower but also with lack of the basic capital resources necessary to make this manpower rapidly productive and to utilize fully the relatively scant natural resources. In this setting the whole gamut of problems connected with economic development, such as adaptation to technical requirements, development of new entrepreneurial activities, the relation between raising patterns of consumption and raising productivity, urbanization of nonurban people, could be easily studied.

But this is only half the picture. True enough, all these problems do exist —but they exist and develop within a particular setting. This is the setting of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) and the institutional structure of the State of Israel. This setting differs greatly from other underdeveloped countries from two points of view. First, we find here the almost unique situation in which—instead of the various forces of modern economic and political processes impinging upon existing traditional groups from the outside (whether a foreign country or an urban center within the country)—groups of traditional people are transferred through the process of migration into a relatively modern setting. Secondly, it is important to keep in mind —and to analyze in greater detail—the fact that the institutional setting into which these groups are being absorbed has some specific characteristics from the point of view of the relation between modern economic developments and social forces, values, and ideology. Not only is it a relatively small, only semi-industrialized economy.[2] It is at the same time an economic system which has developed certain social directives and limitations of economic activities that are nearly unique. To some extent it evinces some of the most important characteristics of a welfare state but closely connected with a very strong colonizing drive and expansion. The relation between economic activities and

[1] For basic statistical data see "Jerusalem Statistical Appendices," *Government Yearbook*, 1949–1955, and for the general background of immigration, S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955.

[2] See, for a full description of the Yishuv's economic structure, A. Bonné, *Palestine: Land and Economy* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, 1936), and D. Horwitz, *Israel's Economy* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1955).

incentives on the one hand and social values and incentives on the other are patterned here in a manner different both from modern Western economic systems and from those of underdeveloped and colonial societies. The process of social and technical adaptation to a modern economic setting and framework is effected here through exposure of the different immigrant groups to these specific values and institutions. It would therefore be very interesting to see in what way this specific setting influences the process of modernization, to what extent it facilitates or impedes it.

BACKGROUND OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE YISHUV

In order to understand this specific institutional setting it is necessary to give a brief analysis of some basic historical and social facts about the development of the Jewish colonizing activities in Palestine since the end of the last century. As a full historical analysis would be out of place here, we shall point out only some of the most pertinent characteristics.[3]

The starting point of our discussion must be the set of values, social orientations, and ideologies which existed at the outset of the pioneering immigration to Palestine. Their main emphasis is on the establishment of a new collectivity, a new national community. Thus by their very nature they stressed diffuse relations and ideals and aspects of social life, such as "belonging to the Jewish people." Although these ideals could only be achieved in practice through specific activities of a new kind, their ultimate goal was the establishment of a new over-all pattern of collective life. But at the same time the basic value orientations were also directed towards establishing a modern economic and political structure. Such a framework necessarily meant a high degree of specialization and individualism in its system of allocating roles and facilities. Thus some inherent contradiction existed within the value system, and especially between that system and its basic structural implications. The social structure of the Yishuv which developed historically on the basis of these values had to deal with these internal contradictions, and it can best be understood through an analysis of the ways in which the resolution of that contradiction was attempted. The main way (both historically and logically) of resolving it was by setting the mechanisms of allocation of roles and rewards within the boundaries of the basic values.

In the economic field the manner in which specialization and achievement were tempered by a sense of general obligation, a concern with the welfare of the community as a whole and with the realization of the collective ideals, can be seen in several interconnected ways: (1) In the importance attached to agricultural settlements and the emphasis within them on fundamental human equality and on identification with the community. (2) In the wide schemes of social security affecting urban life. (3) In the strong encouragement given to cooperatives, including the extended chains of consumers' co-operatives, and generally in the great expansion of different types of public or semipublic enterprises—such as the various enterprises of the General Federation of Labor (Histadruth) and schemes of development and colonization. (4) In the emphasis initially placed within most sectors of the economy, not only on the provision of various facilities and securities but on the "pioneer" tasks of various branches of the economy—for example, on colonizing activities in agriculture, industry, and public works.

[3] See, for a fuller analysis, S. N. Eisenstadt, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 74 ff.

Thus we see that the most important characteristic of the Yishuv economy was the combination of a continuously expanding colonization—both agricultural and industrial—with a set of institutions and values which directed this expansion and limited the play of purely economic forces and motives. The basic driving force of this continuous expansion was largely noneconomic. There exists thus an economic motivation relatively strong, and yet not "pure." To achieve an economic motivation of this type is, as is well known, one of the main problems of underdeveloped countries, connected with the whole problem of the development of economic entrepreneurship. An analysis of the main types of entrepreneurship in the Yishuv would, therefore, be in order here.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE YISHUV

The strong emphasis on *social* values within the realm of purely economic activities might have hindered the development of economic entrepreneurship and stifled economic development. This problem could have been especially acute, since most of the colonizing expansion was financed by outside sources (money raised through the different national organizations) and there was but little direct economic risk and accounting involved, and since the internal market was developed and expanded only gradually and was greatly geared to and dependent on the colonizing activities, only in the late thirties becoming more autonomous in structure. What happened, however, was not a failure to develop entrepreneurship but rather the development of some very specific entrepreneurial types.

Perhaps the most important single type of new entrepreneur is what may be called the "institutional" entrepreneur colonizer. He is a man who has some key position in a settlement, in a co-operative enterprise, or in one of the public or semipublic economic enterprises (for example, some of the Histadruth-owned factories and the public water companies). His main concern has been to maximize the scope of economic activities, the assets and the profits of his own group and organization, through the best manipulation of both the market possibilities and the different sources of capital, credit, and so forth—especially from the different colonizing agencies. His conception of his role has not, however, been a purely economic one. He sees himself as furthering the general social values of the society, as helping the general colonizing movement and expansion through the enlargement and development of his own organization—an assumption which usually had some elements of reality in it. While very adept at economic calculations, he sees them as subsidiary to these goals and expects other people to see his activities in the same light. He is not in most cases a bureaucrat of the usual type—although gradually more and more purely bureaucratic managers did develop and from the beginning there was, in most of these groups, some lower technical and bureaucratic staff. He sees himself rather as an elected representative of his group or organization, its emissary, and in general as an economic pioneer.

In this type of entrepreneurship there could be found a very strong economic motivation, geared to and strengthened by noneconomic but not traditionalistic values.

Types of capitalist entrepreneurs

At the same time there developed in the Yishuv two general types of capitalist entrepreneur. One was a big entrepreneur who was able, through appropriate use of his own financial re-

sources, of some of the liquid capital in the country, and of some of the credit facilities extended by the main colonizing agencies, to exploit some strategic possibilities of the developing internal market, export outlets, and so forth, and to establish some relatively big industrial enterprises in such key areas. Good examples of this are the Ata Textile Industries and some of the industries dealing with the processing of different kinds of agricultural produce.

This type of entrepreneur, too, had to take into account many of the social values found in the semipublic enterprises, although in somewhat different ways. In the first place, most of these entrepreneurs subscribed to the basic tenets of the policy of social security, collective bargaining, family and cost-of-living allowances. Secondly, they found it sometimes beneficial to their interests to go into partnership—usually on a limited basis and in subsidiary companies—with some of the public or semipublic enterprises. This tendency has increased since the establishment of the State of Israel. Third, most of these enterprises did avail themselves of the various facilities (especially financial credit) of the colonizing agencies and later of the state and did share in some of the "pioneering" and colonizing ideology. This showed itself in their relative concentration in industries of strategic importance for economic development.

The second very general and heterogeneous type of capitalistic entrepreneur which developed in the Yishuv was the small industrialist, merchant, and businessman whose activities were mostly oriented towards the growing internal market. His range of activities was not very wide and on the whole he was rather conservative in his approach. He was not usually in close contact with the main colonizing agencies, although quite often he would enter into some competition with groups like the public cooperatives.

Economic problems

While all these characteristics of the Yishuv's economy made possible continuous economic expansion, they also gave rise, from the point of view of economic development, to several problems. The most important of these problems was the relative lack of emphasis on high standards of productivity as compared with world prices. Some of this is, of course, essential in any colonizing movement in its first stages of expansion. It was, however, accentuated by two basic factors already indicated above. First was the ability to draw on outside capital sources and in this way to maintain a relatively favorable ratio between the influx of people and capital. Second was the emphasis on social rights of different kinds ascribed to people and groups without any necessary relation to their rate of productivity. In the first stages of development there existed the implicit assumption—largely fulfilled in reality—that everybody would do his best in this respect. With the development of economic differentiation and more autonomous economic institutions this attitude could easily develop into one of a struggle of vested interests for their share in the total "cake" and for the maintenance—or even increase—of a certain standard of living without any relation to productive capacities.

All these problems existed in the period of the Yishuv but they became much more acute with the establishment of the State of Israel for the reasons mentioned at the beginning of this paper. We shall show how these various developments and problems embedded in the institutions of Israel affected the absorption of the various traditional groups and the processes of their adaptation to a relatively modern technology and economy.

ADAPTATION OF NEW IMMIGRANTS

As has been pointed out, the immigrants encountered an economic and social structure which, within its limited range, evinced most of the characteristics of a modern technological economy. It was based on specialization, technical division of labor, general universalistic orientations, and a market economy. It possessed most of the important institutional prerequisites for continuous economic development—adequate health services and standards, a relatively adequate level of technical skills, adequate public services and administration. At the same time, however, this institutional setting evinced some specific characteristics which distinguished it to some extent from other modern economies of similar range.

Most of the Oriental immigrants, who comprised about 50 to 60 per cent of the total immigration to the State of Israel, came from rather traditional settings, although they obviously differed from one another. Their main social and economic characteristics can be summarized in the following ways:

1. The existence of relatively wide extended families and kinship relations.
2. Traditionalism, manifesting itself in strong emphasis on traditional authority of the elders and on the collective responsibility of the members of family groups.
3. A relatively small extent of economic specialization and differentiation.
4. A relatively rigid occupational structure which seems to have been largely transmitted from generation to generation in the family.
5. The social differentiation existing among them was also mostly based on ascriptive criteria, where tradition, family, wealth, and standing in the community were the most important factors. The main elites were those of traditional family, wealth, and learning. Only among some of the North African groups do we find a more differentiated picture, especially with regard to ways of achieving wealth and the existence of more professional elites (teachers, lawyers, higher-grade clerks, etc.). But whatever the extent of specialization and differentiation—and in all cases this extent was rather small—these groups of immigrants were as yet largely bound by the "traditional" orientations, that is, particularism, ascription, and diffuseness, as well as a very strong collectivity orientation.

The main patterns of entrepreneurship existing among these groups were closely related to this structure. The merchant, the master artisan, the moneylender, and, in the more developed societies—like Iraq and to some extent urban North Africa—the financier, were the most common. Most of them were of the very traditional type, with relatively limited range of activities, economic vision, and scope of investment. Their main goals were in terms of maximization of immediate profits rather than of long-range investment. They were sometimes closely related to public bodies and state officials—not through common economic activities but rather through political protection, extortion, and the like.

Adjustment problems

As they were drawn into the economic structure of the absorbing society the immigrants underwent many changes and faced many problems of adjustment.

First, they were asked to adjust themselves to more mechanical types of work and to the use of different new types of mechanical appliances.

Second, this whole work was organized around a time perspective which

differed largely from that to which they were accustomed. It was much more future-oriented, extended over a longer period of time, and necessitated the establishment of social and economic organization based on relatively complex monetary calculations and arrangements. In this way various economic and technical activities lost their close connection with solidary daily relations. Their direct interweaving in the structure of various primary groups was greatly reduced, and they were divided into small, mechanical units.

Third, the small family unit in the economic sphere and the individual adult (man or woman alike) in the political sphere became the main units of social activity, instead of the extended family of old.

Fourth, a strong demand was made for the development of new social skills, especially in the management of different committees, both social-political and economic, skills which greatly differed from those of the older, traditional elites. In the economic sphere these skills were connected with demands for new time perspectives and organizational abilities, while in the political field—most prominent in the Moshavim—the necessity arose for somewhat more democratic internal practices on the one hand and for the ability to deal successfully with outside agencies of a new type on the other.

In general, it can then be said that the immigrants faced two interrelated problems. One was the problem of acquisition of new technical skills in industry, modern agricultural works, and some white collar and clerical jobs. They had also to develop a new type of economic and social orientation and activities, of motivation for economic activities, and also, within that setting, a new type of entrepreneurship. This last was especially important in those economic enterprises in which the immigrants settled as groups—in most of the agricultural settlements, in several cooperative urban enterprises, in many small-scale industries established by the immigrants themselves.

To what extent did the specific conditions of absorption and the characteristics of the absorbing society impede or facilitate development of these skills and patterns of activities?

Before proceeding to answer these questions it is necessary to dwell shortly on the obverse problem, namely to what extent the immigrants themselves were able, given their own traditional structure and value orientations, to achieve these skills and orientations. Two general remarks and conclusions are in order here. First, the simplistic view which holds that because of their inherent "primitivism" and "traditionalism," the Oriental immigrants would be incapable of learning the new skills proved to be false. A detailed investigation of some industrial plants, conducted by A. Bonné,[4] has shown that, given favorable social conditions, they are very able to acquire such skills. Many other researches have shown that there does not exist any direct relation between the acquisition of such different skills and the degree of traditionalism. Other variables of the social structure, such as the extent of family solidarity, the interrelationships between different elites, the flexibility of the status system and of temporal orientations, are much more important.[5]

[4] A. Bonné, "Economic Adjustment of Immigrants" (mimeographed), Jerusalem, 1954. To be published as a chapter in the report on the UNESCO tensions project in Israel, under the editorship of A. Brodersen, in the second number of the *International Social Science Bulletin* for 1956.

[5] See for fuller discussion of these problems the following papers by the author: "Remarks on the Sociological Aspects of the Problem of Productivization of Immigrants," *Information* (Paris: International Social Science Council, International Research Office on Social Implications of Technological Change), No. 5 (July 1955), and "Sociological Aspect of Economic Adaptation of Oriental Immigrants in Israel: A Case Study of the Process of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 4 (April 1956).

The same applied, to a large extent, to the development of different entrepreneurial and organizational skills. But in all these cases it was found that the impact of the absorbing conditions could be of immense importance in reinforcing, or impeding, some of the basic social conditions making for the development of these skills and types of activities. We are thus back at our initial question.

IMPEDING FACTORS IN THE ABSORBING STRUCTURE

We may perhaps best start by analyzing some of the impeding effects of the absorbing structure on the economic development and adaptation of the Oriental immigrants. The first, most general, impeding effect was due to the ascriptive allocation of various services, rights, and possibilities of consumption without basic relations to productivity. While this could at a certain stage provide a minimal security and various other prerequisites for the acquisition of new skills, such as certain standards of health and education, beyond this level it could easily—if no steps were taken to avoid it—impair productivization. This could happen in several ways. The immigrants could be unwilling to work more than was necessary for the maintenance of their present level of needs and especially would be unwilling to work so as to be able to pay taxes, and so forth. Or they might use their settlement, factory, and so forth, as a base from which they would then go into various unproductive activities in which it was possible to make easy money, such as various black market activities, peddling, small-scale speculation.

Closely connected with this was the problem of dependency on various bureaucratic agencies of absorption, which gave rise to passivity, to lack of interest in advancement, coupled with strong aggressive demands on the agencies on the part of the immigrants.[6] All these problems were likely to be especially acute if the capital available to the absorbing agencies was not sufficient to effect a rapid productivization of the immigrants—who for their part were unwilling to invest their own funds—and had to be spent on maintaining a given level of consumption. Obviously, all this could easily develop into a vicious circle.

A second major impediment was connected with certain tendencies inherent in a bureaucratic administration. Power and authority were concentrated in the hands of the absorbing sector, while the immigrants had only the more passive functions and were thus extremely dependent on the former. This state of affairs was particularly conspicuous in the various immigrants' reception camps, and it still persists today, to a considerable extent, in transitional work settlements and other places. Such a formal bureaucratic and authoritative relationship usually constitutes one of the decisive factors in the creation of social and vocational apathy and in the development of various other negative phenomena, such as peremptory demands, aggressiveness, and unwillingness to persist in any job seemingly "imposed" from above.

The importance of these social conditions was also stressed in several sur-

[6] See, for fuller analysis of these problems, S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Process of Absorption of New Immigrants in Israel," *Human Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (August 1952), pp. 223–46, and *Absorption of Immigrants* (Glencoe, Ill., 1955).

veys and studies dealing with immigrant youth, including the ways in which they were drawn to various occupations, and their perseverance in vocational training. Here, however, the importance of an additional social and ideological condition has been discovered, a factor which, though implied in the other studies, was not given sufficient prominence. It was found that among many of the absorbing agencies there exists the supposition that in order to attract the youth to various occupations, their strong ties with the family and ethnic group must be weakened; they should be taken out of this framework and attribute less importance to it. Much of the educational and training effort of Israel has indeed been guided by this assumption. Actual experience has demonstrated, however, that this way is not usually the best and most efficient. Such steps have often to be undertaken as a last resort, but in most cases they tend to increase social and psychical tension among the youth and to weaken their readiness for productive work. Many studies have shown that numerous forms of waywardness of youth, of Levantine "gilded youth," often spring, as an unforeseen result, from this type of absorption and the concomitant disintegration of the immigrant family units.

The last, most important, impediment was connected with problems deriving from the type of entrepreneurship that was most strongly favored by the absorbing structure. Quite obviously there existed many formal and informal pressures on the immigrants to produce types similar to those that existed in the Yishuv—and especially the more specific "institutional" type.

Types of entrepreneurs

Although no reliable statistical materials are as yet available, some general impressions can be given. Of the three main types of entrepreneur that have been found in the Yishuv only the first (the "institutional") and the third ("the petty capitalist") seem to be prevalent to any great extent among the immigrants. The second type, that of the large-scale colonizing capitalist, is rare —largely owing to the very small number of new immigrants with adequate capital resources of their own. The few who had such resources did not greatly affect the whole structure of development of the immigrants' economic activities. Moreover, some of them tended to use their capital in various financial ventures instead of in productive investments.

Many immigrants continued, to some extent, their old pattern of activities, becoming very small-scale entrepreneurs of the third type. Some continued to be artisans of the traditional type, while many others were drawn into the less productive sections of the economy which expanded during the inflation and the rapid growth of the population.

The most original development among the immigrants was the "institutional" type of entrepreneur—the secretary of a co-operative settlement, the small-scale agricultural organizer, the director of a co-operative plant, the foreman or official of one of the bigger existing agricultural or industrial enterprises, an official of one of the public or semi-public enterprises. This type was the most "original" one that has developed among the immigrants under the impact of the specific new conditions—although obviously the others were also able to develop as a result of facilitating factors in the absorbing setting. Truly enough but few of these new entrepreneurs attained top economic positions, but their very development was significant. It was also significant that, in a way, this type is being given greater chances for productive activity than the other types, although quite often a more mixed type of entrepreneurship may arise and develop. But within this framework many problems and difficulties also arose.

The basic problem here is the hidden, but nevertheless very real, competition existing between the channels of political mobility and those of clear vocational mobility. In many immigrant settlements we may often observe the following phenomenon: because of the pressure exerted by the various absorption frameworks—local government institutions, political parties, and so forth —many of the most active immigrants choose "public activity" as the "trade" affording greatest security and do not incline to learn any primary vocation or persevere in it. The influence of this attitude penetrates also beyond the active stratum into wide circles of immigrants, who regard office work in the public sector or political activity as the most important source of income.

FACILITATING FACTORS

But these impeding factors were offset by more favorable ones. Some of these were, in a way, but the other side of the impediments. Others were in large part developments of other possibilities inherent in the absorbing structure.

One basic facilitating factor was the social security given by the absorbing institutions. This security was able to reinforce some of the internal forces among the immigrants making for greater predisposition to change, for greater willingness to acquire new skills and to develop new attitudes to work, economic activities, and so forth. Very important in this context was also the fact that these various services—if properly administered—could quickly raise the general standard of health and physical ability. But this basic security was only the first step—and one, as we have seen, which had dangers of its own. It was only in so far as additional reinforcing factors did develop that the potentialities of this basic security could be maximized.

The second basic facilitating factor was the fact that the absorbing structure could sometimes provide *new social settings* in which the new types of skills, activities, and attitudes could be learned. The best examples of this are the agricultural settlements, the urban co-operative enterprises, and some of the more general social and political organizations touching on economic and labor relations, such as local trade union councils and local workers' committees.[7] In all these cases the immigrants were not entirely thrown into the "open" market with its impersonal relations and possibilities of disorganization, but were enabled to participate in new, relatively stable social groups which incorporated many of the new types of economic activities and motivations within a framework of new social values and incentives. In this way the immigrants could be spared some of the anomic experience of the total loss of social meaning and regulation of economic activities which quite often accompanies processes of detribalization and urbanization.

It was chiefly under these conditions that the immigrants were able to develop motivations for modern economic activities, even if these activities had some social characteristics of their own, and also that the new types of productive entrepreneurship could more easily develop.

Flexibility in appropriation of the traditional

But here another problem arose, namely, the extent to which these new settings were willing and flexible enough

[7] See the author's paper in *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (cited note 5 *supra*).

to take into account and incorporate some of the internal structure and organization and values of the immigrants. We have seen above that inflexible, authoritarian, bureaucratic attitudes which tended to disorganize the existing groups usually had totally disruptive results. It was only in so far as the existing and absorbing organizations were flexible enough to incorporate some of the traditional elements that the best adaptation and economic development took place. In so far as family and intergenerational relations were not purposefully disrupted, in so far as the agents of the absorbing society worked, at least to some extent, with the traditional elites and groups and tried to maintain the status of these elites in *some* parts of the social structure—for example, in the traditional spheres of religious activities and in some daily problems—the general process of adaptation and learning and of the development of new types of elites and entrepreneurs in the economic and political sphere was facilitated.[8] The interesting fact, from the point of view of our analysis, is that such a flexible approach was one of the possibilities inherent in the structure of the absorbing society and its institutions, with their emphasis on social values, on "ascriptive" rights of different groups, and with their need to incorporate the immigrant groups speedily both in the political and the economic spheres.

Obviously enough this means—perhaps somewhat paradoxically—that the best adaptation is made not when the traditional groups are completely disorganized and their traditional values disrupted but when they are to some extent transformed and incorporated as accepted, legitimate subgroups (or subcultures) in the new settings. This, however, poses one important problem —often mentioned in the discussion of these topics[9]—namely, whether the more traditional groups, with their somewhat larger emphasis on family and other particularistic relations, can behave at all successfully in a modern economic setting. The answer to this in our setting is twofold. The first lies in the nature of the specific type of entrepreneurship which has developed in the Yishuv and which contained some such orientations. Secondly, this very type of entrepreneurship could develop then, and even more now among some of the immigrant groups, because of some of the basic economic and absorption policies of the state—the effect of most of which is to minimize to some extent some of the risks to be directly borne by the enterprising unit.

Contribution of government

The government itself afforded some basic economic security within which the immigrants' development could take place. The immigrants could thus more easily find a place for some of their traditional social structures than if they were thrown entirely on their own resources in an open market. The government also minimized some of the graver risks of the immigrants by tying their investment to the broader policy of the various settlement agencies. This also enabled the maintenance of some "wider" economic relations within the family, as the small family unit is not entirely independent and at the total mercy of its own resources and the open market.

The government (or other public bodies) may also provide the immigrants through its various enterprises with guidance and help in their transition to new types of economic activities and

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] See for instance M. Levy, Jr., *The Rise of the Modern Chinese Business Class*, New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949.

time orientations. As most of the long-time measures and problems of economic development are closely connected with various state activities and policies, the adaptation of the immigrants to new organizational skills and the new time perspective may be greatly facilitated and made gradual.

CAPITAL

Both the impediments and the facilitating factors of the immigrants' adaptation to modern economic activities are closely connected with problems of capital formation and productivization. The facilitating factors can be greatly reinforced through the existence of adequate capital for long-term productivization. Their effects on productivization and full occupational absorption of the immigrants and on the productivity of the economy as a whole will be fully discernible only in relatively long-range terms. In any immediate future they may raise many problems and difficulties because of the outlay of capital they demand. The impeding factors use up, in the short run, less capital—but this is spent entirely on consumption. For a short term they may also seem to facilitate the occupational absorption of the immigrants, but for the most part in the less productive secondary and tertiary occupations.

CONCLUSIONS

We see thus that two major trends can be discerned in the social conditions and consequences of economic development in Israel. It is as yet difficult to estimate their relative strength, and the picture is continuously changing. From the point of view of our analysis the most important thing is that both these trends can be directly related to the impact of the specific characteristics of Israeli social structure on these immigrant groups. Some of the problems do, of course, exist in all situations of modernization and urbanization. But it seems that some of these problems are intensified, or thrown into a sharper relief, because of these specific characteristics of the absorbing society—and others can be fully understood only when these are taken into account. Yet their interest is not limited only to the specific problems of Israel. Many of the specific Israeli characteristics—the strong emphasis on public planning of economic activities, the combination of social welfare with economic development and the place of social values in economic activities—are the goals of many underdeveloped societies. In Israel there can now be found many of the social and political institutions which usually serve as basic prerequisites for economic development. These institutions are here geared to social emphasis and value orientations which constitute important assumptions as well as goals of many of the underdeveloped societies. At the same time there exist in Israel some of the basic problems of underdeveloped societies—capital formation, levels of productivity and productivization of traditional elements. Thus in Israel there exist and interact two different sets of social values and orientations—the "traditional" one and the more modern one focused on the welfare state of colonization. Thus the problem of productivization and modernization of the traditional elements, so often emphasized in the literature on the underdeveloped countries, is dealt with here within a very specific sociopolitical institutional setting and a very specific set of societal values. Such settings of values seem to constitute goals of many underdeveloped countries and they may be—and often are—established through political action of their governments, even if they lack some of the social and technical bases for their development.

While such bases do exist in Israel to a larger extent than in other underdeveloped countries, yet the Israeli experience may therefore be of interest in focusing on some of the problems of development which may exist and become intensified after some of the more formal, noneconomic institutional frameworks seemingly necessary for economic development, as well as some of the major social goals of these societies, are institutionalized and established.

S. N. Eisenstadt, Ph.D., Jerusalem, has been since 1949 in charge of the Research Seminar in Sociology at the Hebrew University and since 1952 head of its Department of Sociology. He conducted the first systematic research on absorption of immigrants in Israel, as well as other research projects of the Sociology Department—on youth movements, leadership and elite selections, and political participation, among others. He is author of The Absorption of Immigrants (1955) and the forthcoming From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure. Dr. Eisenstadt is at present at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California.

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ASIA, AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST

J. C. KUNDRA. *Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–1954: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc.* Pp. xi, 239. Groningen: J. B. Wolters; Bombay: Vora and Company, 1955. *Rs* 16.

The subtitle of this book is a more accurate description of its contents than the main title. It is not an over-all study of Indian foreign policy during the first eight years of independence. Instead, after two excellent chapters on the background and aims of India's foreign policy, it concentrates on India's relations with and attitudes toward the Western "bloc," with particular reference to the United States and the United Kingdom. As Dr. A. Appadorai points out in an Introduction to this volume, it is a "useful and documented study of one aspect of India's foreign policy." Because of its limited scope, it refers only in passing to such important subjects as India's relations with Pakistan, China, and other Asian states; attitudes toward racial discrimination in South Africa; problems of economic development; and policies in the United Nations.

All in all, this is an important and balanced account by an Indian scholar of certain major aspects of Indian foreign policy. It sets a standard which has all too seldom been attained by Indian or foreign commentators.

The introductory chapter contains some sage reflections on various factors and conditions which have a bearing on India's present orientation in world affairs. The theory of an "Indian mind," for example, is referred to, but it is described as an abstract concept which hardly serves to explain present Indian foreign policy. The survey of the pre-1947 views of the Indian National Congress is generally adequate, although no reference is made to the Madras session in 1927, which Nehru has called a parent of the foreign policy that India has been pursuing since independence.

A rather curious list of aims of foreign policy is presented in Chapter II, but here and elsewhere in the book the aims which are actually described in detail are clearly the important ones. "Only in the context of India's needs and her interpretation of the nature of the world conflict," observes Dr. Kundra, "can India's foreign policy be properly understood." A great deal of misunderstanding and working at cross-purposes could be avoided if this sensible and obvious reminder were more generally taken to heart.

In a long and excellent chapter on "Indo-American Relations" (pp. 99–158) the treatment of economic relations and of differences over Korean issues is particu-

larly good. To American eyes, at least, some of the statements seem unduly harsh. Is it true, for example, that "before the communist success in China the United States' policy towards India was cold or indifferent"? or that "in the Indo-Pakistan disputes the U.S.A. generally took the side of Pakistan"? Dr. Kundra believes that toward India the United States has taken "the second best policy . . . , that is to help India maintain democratic institutions."

The chapter on India and the Commonwealth is devoted largely to a discussion of the nature of the relationship among its members ("a peculiar relationship and without any precedent," declared Nehru in 1955), the reasons for India's association with the Commonwealth, and various Commonwealth conferences.

In his conclusion Dr. Kundra suggests that the trouble with India's policy of considering "each issue on its merits" is that such a policy "merely deteriorates into a mere verbal policy unless a country is prepared to back to the logical extent . . . a stand taken on 'merits'." Singling out this statement for comment in his Introduction, Dr. Appadorai remarks laconically: "Perhaps there is more to be said on this point." There is, in fact, much more to be said on any point of Indian foreign policy; but Dr. Kundra says a great deal, and he says it very well. It is a pleasure to welcome the appearance of a book on Indian foreign policy which, within its prescribed limits, begins to do justice to the subject.

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

W. G. BEASLEY (Ed. and Trans.). *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 1853–1868.* Pp. xii, 359. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955. $8.00.

It is always a pleasant surprise to discover that a book has a broader interest and is more significant than its title indicates. This careful work by Great Britain's outstanding scholar of nineteenth-century Japan is such a book. In reality, it is a political history, with a special emphasis on foreign relations of the decade and a half between the arrival of Commodore Perry and the beginning of the restoration to power of the Emperor Meiji in 1868.

The Introduction, which covers slightly less than one-third of the work, is an analysis of the chief events of this period. The main body of this important volume is composed of seventy-seven documents dealing with Japanese foreign policy. All but about a dozen of them are translations of primary historical material, which clarify and explain the strains and stresses within Japan caused by the ever-increasing contacts with the foreigners. The other documents are texts of the most important conventions and treaties with the Western powers. The detailed glossary of technical terms and the biographical section with information on about eighty key figures add to the value of the book.

The Introduction and the documents cover a wide range of subjects. For example, there is an important discussion on the organization of the feudal government and of the way decisions on foreign policy were determined. The diplomatic historian will be particularly interested in the material which reveals the maneuvers of each of the Western envoys to obtain a preferential position for himself and his country. Other important subjects covered by this study include the struggle within Japan for control of the government and policy-making powers, the problem created by the opening of the ports to foreign residents, the futile attempt of the pro-Imperial feudal barons to expel the foreigners, and the direct relationship between the foreigners and foreign problems and the restoration to power of Emperor Meiji. The detailed information on the London protocol of 1862, on the negotiations with the foreigners after they had forced open the Straits of Shimonoseki in 1864, and on the internal alliances just prior to the collapse of the feudal regime is particularly enlightening.

The author is to be commended on the accuracy of his work. Such slips as referring to the basic silver coin as *ichibu,* rather than *ichibu gin* (page 323) are rare. Professor Inobe Shigeo's *Bakumatsu Shi no Kenkyū,* which contains reprints of two of the items cited in the bibliography, plus additional pertinent material, might have been cited, rather than the articles themselves. Finally, while it is recognized that the publication of documents always presents difficulties, it is suggested that this volume might have been easier to use if the subheadings of the Introduction and the corresponding sections of the Documents had been identical. The breakdown of the documents from 1862 to 1867 into four sections with one set of headings makes it difficult at first glance to correlate them with the last two sections of the Introduction, which have another set of headings. But these are minor problems of organization, not of content. Thus the reader, whether he has an interest either in general history or in the details of Japanese history, will be richly rewarded by reading all or parts of this competent work.

HUGH BORTON
Columbia University

EARL HERBERT CRESSY. *Daughters of Changing Japan.* Pp. xi, 305. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1955. $4.00.

Dr. Cressy's approach to modern Japan may be said to rest upon the assumption that social history is primarily an accumulation of individual life experiences. Adapting the method of collaborative autobiography employed in his earlier *Daughter of Confucius,* he gives us significant portions of the lives of five young Japanese women ranging in age from twenty-two to thirty-four. All were old enough to remember prewar Japan, yet young enough to be profoundly affected by the social changes of the past ten years. Through the eyes of these women we see also Japanese men—their fathers, their brothers, their suitors, and husbands. Dr. Cressy argues persuasively that it is in connection with marriage and the family that "the basic conflict between feudalism and democracy become most clearly visible."

As a scientific study of national character, Dr. Cressy's book is of limited validity. By his own admission all of his informants were of one social stratum: the upper middle class of the urban areas. Any representative selection of Japanese womanhood would have to include the working girl of the factories as well as the daughter and wife of the rural areas, living in a new world of land reform and unaccustomed prosperity. In addition, each of Dr. Cressy's confidants apparently felt an intense personal dissatisfaction that made her willing to expose her life story in response to a public newspaper advertisement. Certainly there are many women in Japan who have been more successful and better satisfied in adjusting to social change. A third point of criticism is that by refusing to include what one of his subjects wanted to say about the American occupation, Dr. Cressy has practically omitted one of the strongest forces, constructive and disturbing at the same time, that has affected the life of modern Japan.

On the level of literary artistry the book is much more successful. Out of his forty years of experience as a missionary in the Far East, during which he made over twenty visits to Japan, Dr. Cressy has acquired a keen sense of the significant detail. Many aspects of daily life in Japan are skilfully and unobtrusively described. Unconsciously the reader absorbs a great deal of recent Japanese history. By an artistic selection and presentation of the raw materials of autobiography, Dr. Cressy does give us real humanistic insight into the lives of some daughters of changing Japan. There are other Japanese women with other experiences, but these life stories ring true.

ROBERT S. SCHWANTES
Asia Foundation
Tokyo, Japan

D. G. E. HALL. *A History of South-East Asia.* Pp. xvi, 807. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955. $10.00.

In setting out to write a detailed and scholarly one-volume history of Southeast Asia from prehistory to 1950, Professor Hall undertook a very large and difficult task. Although he issues a modest prefatory warning that his work can be regarded as only provisional because of the great amount of research currently being undertaken by both European and Asian scholars, there is good reason to think that this book is destined for long and useful life as a standard historical text. It will no doubt be corrected and superseded on particular points, but it skillfully establishes a solid framework of fact and interpreta-

tion. The major focus of the work is in the political sphere, but it by no means neglects other cultural, social, and economic aspects of the area.

The difficulties involved derive primarily from the fact that Southeast Asia, despite its increasing acceptance as a distinct region, has never remotely approached unity within itself but has always been characterized by a high degree of multiplicity and diversity. To compile its history is necessarily to engage in a complex juggling act with a number of balls in the air at the same time, and the balls, frequently colliding with each other in a chaotic pattern, are constantly dividing, coalescing, and changing their shape. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that what serves to establish it as a region is much less any intrinsic identity among its many peoples and cultures than that they have all in varying degree been impinged upon and influenced by their great neighbors, China and India. Where other writers have frequently placed their emphasis on these external influences and on the period of European dominance, it is a distinctive feature of Professor Hall's approach that he stresses the internal development and interrelations of the people themselves. Although he gives ample play to the significance of the Chinese and Indian contact with the area through the millenia, he warns against the "insidious tendency" to underrate the importance of the indigenous cultures and is insistent that the several peoples have their own strong cultural roots and "have developed on markedly individualistic lines."

The one point at which Professor Hall diverges from the customary interpretation of the countries which constitute Southeast Asia is in his omission of the Philippines on the ground that they stand outside the main stream of development of the region. An appendix contains a useful chronological listing of the dynasties and individual rulers in the different countries with which he is concerned, and the reader who wishes to pursue Southeast Asian affairs further on his own is presented with a select bibliography which runs to some twenty-five pages.

RUPERT EMERSON
Harvard University

J. C. DE GRAFT-JOHNSON. *African Glory: The Story of Vanished Negro Civilizations*. Pp. xi, 209. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $4.50.

The ever increasing attention which is being paid to the African continent by scholars is doing much to fill some most lamentable gaps in our knowledge. Prejudices are being dispelled, and where uncertainty or blank ignorance once reigned may now be seen broad outlines of factual information which, it is to be hoped, will soon be filled out in detail by painstaking scholars and research workers.

African Glory is not a work of scholarship, nor, indeed, does its author attempt to make any such claim for it. J. C. de Graft-Johnson has assembled, from a variety of sources, both conveniently, and in the main attractively, the astonishing story of Africa's past. The Egyptians, Romans, Vandals, Moslems, Arabs—each made his unique contribution to African history, and within that history, the African participated in greater or lesser measure.

But it is only when we come to the rise of the African Empires of Mali and Songhai in the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries that we arrive at a period of specifically African history. Dr. de Graft-Johnson, in dealing with African history prior to this period, rather erroneously gives the impression, by a kind of sleight of hand (African-Negro), that he has been dealing with Negro civilizations. This is a great pity for it tends to divert our attention from such great African leaders as Mausa Musa, and, above all, to cause us to miss the significance of the considerable achievements of the Mali and Songhai Empires. Most readers will wish that more space could have been devoted to these fascinating Empires, but unfortunately the author hurries on to consider the rise of the Portuguese Empire in Africa. In fact, too much of the book wears a breathless air as we travel swiftly from the Egyptians to the modern Gold Coast. It would have been preferable to have lingered with Mausa Musa than have attempted to bring the book up to date, since we stand too near recent events to judge them with detachment.

However, Dr. de Graft-Johnson has succeeded in his aim of showing how shallow

are the views of those who regard African history to have begun with the recent penetration of the white man into that continent. A bibliography and index are supplied.

GEOFFREY F. ENGHOLM
Makerere College
Kampala, Uganda

SYDNEY N. FISHER (Ed.). *Social Forces in the Middle East*. Pp. xvi, 282. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955. $5.00.

At a conference sponsored by the Social Science Research Council on "The Near East: Social Dynamics and the Cultural Setting" at Princeton University in October 1952, a number of papers were presented by specialists on topics embraced by the conference title. Fourteen of these papers, plus a concluding one written subsequently on "The Crisis in the Near East," a Foreword by the editor, and an Introduction by the chairman of the conference comprise the substantive contents of this publication. The scholarly character of the volume is suggested by the fact that, while the papers presented at the conference were not originally intended for publication and considerable time has passed since they were prepared, little revision—almost none in most cases—has been found necessary to add to their timeliness.

These studies deal with social forces in a far from uniform manner, however. The chapter on "The Nomads," for example, ranges uninhibitedly over the whole unsettled area from the western borders of the Sahara in Morocco to the wastes of Afghanistan. Other chapters on "The Industrial Worker" and "The Bazaar Merchant" deal principally with characteristic practices in Syria and Lebanon. That on "The Villager" only develops the theme that "the villager is the substance of the Near East." While the greater part of the volume is devoted to the treatment of cultural phenomena in the Moslem Middle East, Israel comes in for special attention, both as an exception to the Islamic rule and as the creator of two difficult social problems: those represented by the immigrant in Israeli Palestine and the Palestine Arab refugee—both topics being treated with noteworthy objectivity and competence. Other chapters deal with such matters as "Cultural Factors in Social Dynamics" (in which the term "ethneme" is offered as "the minimum distinctive political organism in its sociocultural setting"), entrepreneurs, economic planners, the Islamic clergy, Islamic intellectuals, minorities, and the army officer in the Islamic Middle East.

While most of the contributors to the symposium have preferred to think of the area under discussion as the "Near" East, the editor has chosen for the title of the book the currently popular appellation "Middle" East. If this should put the geographical sophistication of the American reading public slightly to the test, it will hardly detract from the utility of the book. In this regard, the reviewer joins wholeheartedly with the author of the Introduction, who concludes: " . . . this volume may have served its purpose well if it emphasizes anew the fact that so little is known about the social forces of the Near East. No man can rest easy when confronted by such ignorance, for not only is the Near East nearer, but the time is also later, than we think. Knowledge, sympathetic understanding, and active cooperation are prerequisites to the elimination of tensions and the maintenance of stability, without which peace cannot come in our time."

HALFORD L. HOSKINS
Library of Congress

MAJID KHADDURI and HERBERT J. LIEBESNY (Eds.). *Law in the Middle East;* Volume I, *Origin and Development of Islamic Law*. Pp. xviii, 395. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955. $7.50.

The current importance of the Middle East in world affairs is headlined daily in our newspapers. Yet the average American's ignorance of this region, its people, and its problems is monumental.

Law in the Middle East is intended to dispel some of this ignorance in one important area. Its authors seek to explain, in terms intelligible to the general reader, the sources, nature, and results of the Islamic blending of religion, ethics, law,

and government. No Westerner can fully appreciate Islamic society, or the way in which Islamic governments function, without some understanding of this amalgam. The book should be especially useful for Americans about to plunge for the first time into the Middle Eastern maelstrom, whether for purposes of business, diplomacy, or technical assistance.

In form it is a symposium, which seems to mean inevitably some unevenness in style, depth, and content. In the opinion of this reviewer, about half a dozen chapters, out of a total of fifteen, are clearly inferior to the rest. They are, however, by no means inferior enough to destroy the value of the book as a whole. Indeed, considering the nature of the subject matter, the heterogeneity of the contributors, and the fact that some chapters had to be translated as well as edited, the book as a whole is remarkably clear and readable. The contributors numbered fourteen, including the two editors, each of whom wrote one chapter. Seven are residents of the Middle East, including three Lebanese, a Syrian, an Egyptian, and two Turks; the others are variously British, German, Indian, and American.

The focus of the book, as the volume title indicates, is on the *origins and development* of Islamic law rather than on the present legal systems of the Muslim states of the Middle East. The attempted coverage is comprehensive, including chapters on the constitutional organization of the Muslim community and state; pre-Islamic background; the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence; the nature and sources of the *shari'a; Shi'i* legal theories, the *Shi'a* being the main heterodox sect of Islam; family law; transactions in the *shari'a;* the law of *waqf* (a peculiar Islamic form of charitable trust); penal law; judicial organization; conflict of laws; and the international law of Islam. Also treated are certain developments during the long period of Ottoman hegemony over a sizable portion of the Muslim world: the evolution of the *shari'a* under the Ottomans; the late nineteenth-century codification of parts of the *shari'a* (the *Majalla*); and Western capitulatory rights in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.

It is stated in one of the book's several introductions that the Middle East Institute hopes to complement it soon with a companion study of modern legal systems in Middle Eastern states. This is the logical next step, and one which should be taken with the least possible delay.

PAUL BECKETT
State College of Washington

GUSTAVE VON GRUNEBAUM (Ed.). *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization.* Pp. xii, 385. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $6.00.

In September 1953 a conference on unity and variety in Muslim civilization was held in Liége and Spa, Belgium cosponsored by the University of Chicago and the University of Liége. This was the seventh in the series of "comparative studies of cultures and civilizations," organized by Professors Robert Redfield and Milton Singer of the University of Chicago. The previous two studies on Islam dealt with the origin and development of Muslim civilization and with the cultural expressions of that civilization.

The present volume discusses the general character of Muslim civilization and how it came to predominate over the local cultures of the occupied territories. The editor, in stating the theme of the conference, pointed out that Muslim civilization is a compound of "The Great Tradition," representing the universal patterns, and of "The Little Tradition," representing the local and national patterns. Sixteen papers, mostly contributed by European scholars, dealt with the general character of Muslim civilization, the modes of expression of Islam's cultural tradition, and the regional approach to the study of Islam as it developed in Iran, Spain, North Africa, Tropical Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey. It is to be noted that Iran received two separate papers (Spuler and Minorsky), while Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia were not studied in similar fashion as regional patterns. Only one paper (Werner Caskel) dealt with the impact of the West on Muslim civilization, a subject somewhat thinly treated in comparison with the others.

Although the papers constituting this volume vary in quality, several of them are of a very high standard—in particular those contributed by Professors Brunschwig, Schacht, Cahen, Spuler, and Bernard Lewis. At the end of some of these papers summaries of the discussion are added which enhance the value of the book. Most valuable of these summaries is the last one containing the excellent remarks of Professor Le Tourneau on some problems of contemporary Islamic culture in North Africa. Both the editor and those who sponsored the conference are to be congratulated for a very valuable study on Muslim civilization.

MAJID KHADDURI
School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University

The Economic Development of Syria. Pp. xviii, 486. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press for The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1955. $7.50.

Another excellent economic development report has been produced by a mission of the International Bank. This survey is about Syria and it is the thirteenth in a series. All these volumes have dealt so far with the problems of "underdeveloped" countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The current volume is the third one to deal with the economic development of a Middle East country, the two previous ones having been about Turkey and Iraq. No authorship credit is given in the book, but the names of the members of the mission are listed. Whoever are the authors of this volume, they may justly take credit for their work in having provided a more thorough description of Syria's economic problems than may be found anywhere else. They have done this in chapters that throb with life even though they are completely factual and objective. More remarkable still, the report is packed not only with development projects but also implied criticism of the Syrian economic system without appearing to be critical of the government which, after all, had requested the survey.

The recommendations of the mission are realistic. The expenditure of about half a billion dollars within the five-year period up to 1960 is suggested. This amount is to be derived from increased taxes, improved tax collections, revenues from oil transit and utilities, domestic and foreign borrowing, outside aid, and growth of revenues.

Agriculture being Syria's bread, most of the recommendations deal with its improvement. Land is unequally distributed in Syria: nearly 50 per cent of the surveyed area consists of properties of over 250 acres, and only 19 per cent is in small holdings. Pump owners in the water-deficient regions of the country can extract as much as 60 per cent of the crop for water supplies, and frequently they are not even landowners. On the other hand, in the Jezirah area, where there is land and water, land may rent for no more than 10 to 15 per cent of the crop. The average annual per capita national income is about a hundred dollars,—much less in most cases.

The best way to raise the country's standards is through irrigation. The mission recommends several feasible and comparatively inexpensive projects, mostly along the Khabour river, tributary of the Euphrates, which cuts across the desert, and around the Damascus oasis, by utilizing the waters of the Barada.

It would be utterly unrealistic to recommend large new manufacturing plants, new Pittsburghs on the Euphrates, even though industries are the most abundant revenue producers. They would be mere desert mirages. The mission suggests the expansion of the existing processing and handicraft industries, mainly in textiles. Also, electric power and transport industry reforms are suggested. The problems of the country appear to the writers in their entirety, and therefore they pay close attention to the improvement of health standards and education.

While underdeveloped regions justly have prior claims on the attention of the International Bank's brilliant teams, it would also be interesting to see what they could do with the economic systems of more developed countries, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. The time may come when invitations to provide similar surveys will be extended also by the governments of these nations. It is comforting to know

that the great human resources of the International Bank are available for such surveys and recommendations.

EMIL LENGYEL

New York University

BENJAMIN SHWADRAN. *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers.* Pp. xii, 500. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $7.00.

It is altogether likely, as a recent survey has indicated, that the Middle East, with more than 30 billion tons of oil reserves, contains some three-fourths of the proved resources of the free world. The subject of oil in the Middle East has long attracted the powers of the world, and it has been the object of much attention of many writers attempting to ferret out the tangled story of oil exploitation in this area. Book after book, during the past several decades, has piled sensation upon sensation in attempting to tell the story. Mr. Shwadran's volume is almost certainly the best, most detailed, and comprehensive one-volume account of the oil problem in the Middle East. Essentially, the work is divided into seven basic sections, the first of which discusses the impact of the West on the Middle East and more particularly the social, economic, political, and international implications of the oil operation. Section II treats with comprehensive detail of the development of Iranian oil from the first prospecting in the late nineteenth century to the settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy in October 1954. The author tells the story, for example, of the Reuter and D'Arcy concessions and the beginnings of the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1909. The account then unfolds with all aspects of the Iranian situation with regard to oil in the interwar era of 1919–39, the Anglo-American Soviet interests in Iranian oil, the nationalization of the oil industry, and the ultimate settlement. Part III similarly treats, in very thorough fashion, of the development of Iraqi oil, largely under the Iraq Petroleum Company, although the author does not neglect the backgrounds and even has a very good discussion of the Chester concession. Other sections treat, somewhat more briefly, of the development of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia, largely under Aramco; oil exploitation in the British Protectorates of Bahrein, Kuwait and Qatar; and of the development of the oil industry in Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt.

The final section treats of "The Region and Oil," in which the author deals with the importance of the Middle East in world production and the basic impact of oil production and technology on the region itself. With certain exceptions such as in Kuwait, he is not very hopeful that wise use will be made of the rather fabulous oil royalties, although he is aware of the effects which are being made, especially in Iran and Iraq under national planning boards, in that direction. Mr. Shwadran also feels that the Western powers and the oil companies operating in the Middle East "have failed to utilize the oil resources to develop the peoples of the region for a real democratic life which would prepare them as a decisive force in the ultimate test" (p. 445).

The volume is very solidly based, and the author has provided the reader with a very useful and extensive bibliography (pp. 446–79), for further study and reference.

HARRY N. HOWARD

Arlington, Virginia

KHALIL TOTAH. *Dynamite in the Middle East.* Pp. xvi, 240. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.75.

This reviewer has read many books on the Near and Middle East, and most of them far more extensive than Dr. Totah's book of 234 pages. His work gives, in brief compass and vivid description, a clearer understanding of the critical problems of this distraught area than many other volumes.

A brief biographical note on Dr. Totah indicates why his *Dynamite in the Middle East* is such an effective portrayal of the Arab world. Born in Ram Allah, in present-day Jordan, he later became the principal of the American Friends School there. Returning to his native Palestine in 1952, after an absence of almost a decade in the United States, his adopted country, he sought to find an explanation of the riddle

of events in the Arab countries after World War II. He had the advantages of personal acquaintance with many of the leaders in the countries visited, and access to their highest officials. Furthermore, Dr. Totah could talk with them in their native tongue without any language barriers.

Of further advantage is the fact that Khalil Totah could compare the conditions in his native Palestine and surrounding countries when he lived there in his younger days with the present situation. An honest scholar, and quiet Quaker teacher, he recorded his comparisons with vividness, impartiality and restraint. Dr. Totah visited Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Jordan, —all of the states of the Arab League, except Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. The volume has a chapter devoted to each of the states visited, and a chapter each to Gaza, refugees, and communism. A brief Epilogue describes events which have occurred since the book was written. Unfortunately Dr. Totah died while the volume was in press.

Scattered through the volume are unusual descriptions and explanations of key situations in the Middle East, stated with impartiality, so that they contribute to a finer understanding of this vast and vital area with its complex problems. Among these may be mentioned: the influence of the development of Israel on the ports of Haifa and Beirut, the political disorganization of Lebanon; Egyptian hostility to England and the West, domestic misrule, and the awakening national consciousness among the Egyptians; the difficult position of Iraq, and hopeful signs of definite progress there; Syrian anti-American feeling; Jordan as a British satellite and police state; refugees as the supreme problem of the Arab world (the United Nations' choice to use force or "await" settlement through another war); the Communists' advantage in the Middle East.

The final chapter is particularly helpful in explaining why the Israeli army defeated the Arab forces in the Arab-Israeli war, and the tragic consequences of Arab disunity. Western blundering and Russian cleverness produce a fearsome brew! "First, Britain, then the United States, and through its pressure, the United Nations, are mainly responsible for what happened in the Holy Land." Only radically changed policies can prevent the dynamite from exploding.

EDGAR J. FISHER

Amherst, Virginia

CONTINENTAL EUROPE

GEOFFREY GORER. *Exploring English Character.* Pp. vii, 483. New York: Criterion Books, 1955. $8.50.

Exploring English Character by Geoffrey Gorer is a brilliant and meticulous piece of research, the intention of which was to "isolate and identify the shared motives and values and predispositions" which comprise the English national character. In contrast to his previously published national character studies, which were based primarily on intensive interviews and observations (*The American People,* 1948, and, in collaboration with John Rickman, *The People of Great Russia,* 1950), the present study uses written questionnaires to elicit and quantitative methods to analyze cultural data.

In this study the working sample of 5,000 questionnaires—randomly selected from a total of over 11,000—was, within carefully specified limits, a representative one for the English population. For comparison, the author had a field study of the Gallup type. The analysis, insofar as possible, takes account of region, class, income, sex and age and marital status, education, religious and social affiliations. Thus, for this national society, statements about differentiation could be made in some detail. The results—presented in 108 tables—are discussed with a wealth of illustration in chapters emphasizing institutional settings: the home and family, the neighborhood and friends, growing up, love and sex and marriage, the upbringing of children, law and order, religion and other beliefs, and, finally, self-estimation of character.

Gorer finds that, despite regional variations and the existence of clearly defined contrast groups (e.g. upper middle class and lower working class), the English are

"in attitude as opposed to circumstances" a homogeneous society. A major contrast is in the complementary character structure of English men and women. He finds also that there is a basic historical continuity in English character structure underlying enormous superficial changes—with one major reversal. For where 150 years ago the English were actively, uninhibitedly aggressive, today the central emphasis is upon the control—not the elimination—of aggressiveness, and the material suggests that this control, built into character through the training of the child and institutionally supported, has become generalized to all forms of self-expression.

Inevitably, because of the mass of detail to be assimilated, this is a laborious book to read. In this one shares the author's burden. Yet, fortunately, because of the underlying holistic conception and method of work by a single analyst, the study and the people studied achieve a coherence which the reader can also share with great enjoyment.

RHODA METRAUX
New York Hospital

MARK J. FITZGERALD. *Britain Views Our Industrial Relations.* Pp. ix, 221. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1955. $4.25.

An analysis of sixty-seven British union-management studies and interviews with some members of the influential teams (altogether 900 individuals) which have come to the United States since 1948 to visit about 2,000 plants make a very useful book for persons interested in British or American industry, comparative history, or intercultural relations. As the author, a professor of economics at Notre Dame University, correctly states, " . . . the team visits helped to foster a new form of international public relations."

The basic issue for Britain was how to make each operative more productive. These were no "junkets"—the teams sought to formulate recommendations to management, unions, and government and to diffuse them back home.

The British were impressed by the high degree of autonomy in departments of industrial relations in the United States, the rarity of joint consultations between managements and unions, the expeditious handling of grievances, and the relatively few workers necessary to operate machines in American factories.

The visitors commented on the generally constructive attitude toward labor-saving devices, the greater mobility of workers, and the broader spread of wage rates between unskilled and skilled occupations. "Incentive plans and piece-rate systems were found to be less prevalent in America than in Britain." Twenty-two reports listed cordial relations between management and workers as a main factor accountable for our high productivity; 15 teams felt the greater stress on local as compared with national bargaining to be a significant factor; 30 teams stressed the progressive attitude of American management; and 28 noted the impact of "belief in change."

While the author is very cautious in estimating the influence and change attributable to these visits, Chapter VI, "Following Up the Team Recommendations," contains clues drawn from British interviews. It is hard to tell whether he accepts Drew Middleton's observation that these reports and the severity of German and Japanese competition should be credited with the present efficiency of British production.

The Anglo-American Council on Productivity has been such a vigorous, vast enterprise that we tend to forget the repercussions of the visiting missions from 1900 to 1948. Reference to a little more of history might have helped the perspective.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL
University of Buffalo

GEORGES CASTELLAN. *D.D.R., Allemagne de l'Est.* Pp. 413. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955. 990 *fr.*

This is the first exhaustive, scholarly study of East Germany since Nettl's *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy.* A worthy successor to that important contribution, this book not only brings the West up to date on developments behind the Central European sector of the Iron Curtain but also contains significant projections and forecasts. Castellan's conjectures on the role and future course of Christianity in the two Germanys are most interesting and challenging.

Supporting his analyses with impressive and adequate documentation, illustrated by most informative charts and graphs, Castellan examines the various facets of Soviet policy in East Germany from 1945 on, placing particular emphasis on those aspects which most directly influenced the drifting apart of the two halves, and which ultimately resulted in the emergence of yet another satellite, the German Democratic Republic. Since 1948, the integration of East Germany into the Soviet orbit has been carried out with ever increasing intensity to the point of near total absorption. Only where purposes of propaganda, related to the broader requirements of the cold war, may be served, a semblance of independence and vestiges of German culture and tradition are allowed to flicker on.

Castellan subjects the process of sovietization to searching analysis, excluding no major sector of the eastern state. Those who may still entertain hopes of seeing Germany united in our life time will be disillusioned; independent in name only, the DDR is a Soviet Republic for all practical purposes. The two halves have drifted apart or have been driven apart, until they have assumed the characteristics of different cultures, different civilizations, yes even different linguistic orientations. Should the unlikely come to pass and representatives from East and West German regimes congregate at a round table, the ensuing conference will in all probability amount to little more than a "dialogue of the deaf."

In addition to the admirable coverage of the *extent* to which East Germany has been sovietized, Castellan deserves credit also for his incisive analysis of the *techniques* involved. To single out the most spectacular aspects of this: ten years after the most destructive and German-originated war in history, representatives of one of the victor powers consciously and deliberately encourage a revival of German military and nationalist tradition. In contrast to the cautious approach to the problems of rearmament in the West, East Germans are told that it is they who are the heirs of "Germany's glorious past," "carriers of the national conscience," and so on. Ancient symbols of Prussian militarism are trotted out to rally the sentimental among the East Germans to the side of an otherwise unpopular regime. For the benefit of those who simply cannot swallow communism, special rallying points are created in the form of front parties and organizations which espouse Prussian traditions as exemplified by Gneisenau, Blücher, Stein, and even von Seeckt. All of which is based on one theme, namely that of an allegedly ancient bond of friendship between Russians and Germans, a Soviet-German comradeship in arms. Tauroggen, an earlier locale of Russo-Prussian understanding, once again becomes a symbol; only the enemy has changed. Then it was Napoleon; now it is "American directed Western imperialism."

HENRY L. BRETTON
University of Michigan

B. RUHM VON OPPEN (Ed.). *Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945–1954.* Pp. xxvii, 660. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955. $10.10.

The allied occupation of Germany, as the Preface of this book issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs indicates, "represents a unique episode in international relations." Designed to illustrate the policy of the Allies in Germany during this period, this volume claims that "it is the first time that a collection of documents dealing with all four zones of Germany during the post-war period has been made available in English." The Sources listed at the end of the book, however, include a well-known American collection first issued in 1947 and revised in 1949 and widely used and cited, which seems to disprove this claim.

In collections of this sort, much depends upon the basis of selection and the arrangement and explanation of the material. The principles on which the selections were made, as stated in the Preface, are, first, that they deal with "the implementation of policies rather than their formulation at international conferences and in diplomatic exchanges." Second,

even within these restricted terms, omissions are made "to keep the volume within manageable limits and because they have already been fully documented elsewhere. For these reasons, documents illustrating the evolution of self-government from the level of local government through the institutions of the Länder to the level of the zone, as well as texts of Constitutions and economic plans, have been left out." Third, "it has seemed preferable to print the most important documents at length rather than to give short extracts from a larger number." A chronological arrangement is also used.

These are reasonable, if somewhat questionable criteria, but they have not been carried out uniformly or strictly. Documents explaining the organization of the British, French, and Soviet zones are given in abundance and these three zones are included in the index, but not one document deals with the American zone which was the amoeba out of which later West German governmental developments emerged. Although the British zone *Zonenbeirat* is dealt with, there is no mention either in the collection itself or in the Sources of the important American zone institution at Stuttgart, the *Laenderrat*. Further lack of balance or perspective or knowledge of the dynamics of the occupation is indicated by the fact that General Clay, the American Military Governor, is listed in the index (but no statement or speech) only three times; General Robertson, the British Governor, seven times; General Koenig, six times; and Marshal Sokolovsky, seventeen times! Similarly no less than 80 documents, some of them purely propagandistic, from the Soviet zone are included out of a total of 259 selections. In pages, the imbalance is even greater. Many of these Soviet-zone materials, however, are helpful.

Nevertheless, despite these and other shortcomings (such as the omission of the Saar Constitution of 1952, and the European Defense Community agreement) this book will be useful to students of German affairs who will take the trouble to hunt for what they want among 259 chronologically classified selections. Translations into English from German and Russian are made, but several French selections are rendered in French.

JAMES K. POLLOCK
University of Michigan

ERICH WELTER. *Falsch und richtig planen: Eine kritische Studie über die deutsche Wirtschaftlenkung im zweiten Weltkrieg.* Pp. 164. Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1954. No price.

For many years Dr. Erich Welter served on the staff of the distinguished *Frankfurter Zeitung*. More recently, he has combined the responsibilities of an editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* with a professorship at the University of Mainz. Because he remained in Germany during the Hitler regime and had the opportunity to examine closely the course of events, it seemed tempting to him to summarize his views on one of the most controversial chapters of Nazi economic policies, their scheme of economic planning developed during World War II. This critical review, however, is not the only subject of his book. As a professor of economics he felt committed to derive from his historical analysis some general ideas on the pitfalls and potentialities of economic planning. Apparently this broader objective was uppermost in his mind; otherwise he would have hardly selected the challenging main title of the book, "Wrong and Right Planning." Although in his presentation the two subjects are often intermingled, it will be better for our purpose to segregate his findings in the two areas.

At least to the American reader, the upshot of the historical analysis will seem less revolutionary than the author surmises. Instead of "making their hair stand on end" (p. 11), those sections will be regarded as confirming the most widely held views, for instance that the Nazi leaders were ideologically and technically ill prepared for mastering the problems of the Four-Year-Plan of 1936 and of its successor, the planned war economy. Yet the author's research in this area has not been in vain. He has enlivened the customary picture with fascinating details gleaned from primary sources.

One major objection, however, should be raised. Is the author correct in contending that this venture into economic planning proceeded in two distinct stages, one with a negative and the other with a positive sign? In his estimation, policies of the first and longer period, extending from 1939 through 1943, were nothing less than dilettantish, erratic, and unco-ordinated. They relied on improvisations and created endless conflicts. They made no progress until the establishment of a central planning board in September 1943. From this time on, the efficiency of the Nazi war machine increased considerably, but its results were disappointing because of the rapid pace of military and political disintegration. Even at the height of industrial production the system fell short of integrated total planning (p. 39).

Probably the contrast between the two stages as seen by the author is too dramatic to be true. Though the blunders and the confusion of the first war years cannot be denied, their accomplishment was more significant than the author believes. A perusal of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey should suffice to correct this opinion.

The author's second subject, the theory of economic planning, has not been treated with equal success. We miss a discussion of fundamental problems. To a reader familiar with the computations of input-output analysis the tools recommended by the author will seem too primitive to deserve attention.

While, as we already have noted, the author insists on the superiority of central planning over partial planning, he still rejects it from a general economic point of view. Taking a leaf from F. A. Hayek, he denounces it also on political grounds. This road—he warns—will lead to the "terminal station called Soviet System" (p. 149).

FRITZ KARL MANN
American University

ALFRED GROSSER. *The Colossus Again: Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament.* Pp. 256. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $4.75.

General works on postwar Germany are legion, but most of them are preoccupied with the sensational aspects of the German question and few are characterized by objectivity, balance, and scholarly care. The title of the present book, too, seems to indicate a sensational interpretation, but fortunately the contents belie the rather bombastic title. In this age of superpowers it would take rather oblique vision to view postwar Germany as a colossus (with due credit to the "economic miracle" and German efficiency), and it is perhaps significant that the English edition of this book by Allen and Unwin carries merely the restrained subtitle. In any case, this is a scholarly, fair, and eminently sane account, and probably the most satisfactory work on contemporary Germany in English.

Although Dr. Grosser, a well-known French expert on German affairs at the Sorbonne, shares the misgivings of James P. Warburg and other writers regarding the dangers of German rearmament, this theme does not become an obsession and does not distort the perspective. In seven chapters covering the main political, economic, social, and cultural developments the author gives a lucid topical survey and a critical evaluation of the most important problems. His account, based on published documents, memoirs, monographs, and special reports, but above all on personal experience, is well documented and furnished with exceedingly valuable bibliographical notes. The discussion of social problems such as German youth, labor unions, and refugees reveals a remarkable insight and familiarity with the German scene.

The final chapter on French policy and opinion regarding Germany is suggestive and frank, though one could wish that this aspect, an important part of the story, had received fuller treatment particularly in view of the author's special qualifications. French policy in the Saar, for example, is nowhere discussed, and the specific reason advanced (p. 238) for this omission, namely that a detailed discussion would "attribute to the Saar problem an importance which it does not possess," is not convincing. Although the Saar question has undoubtedly been exaggerated by political groups in Germany, the mere fact of this exaggeration and its impact on na-

tional and international politics has been of considerable importance. For unfortunately there are many Germans who do not share Adenauer's sane conviction that the Saar is too small to stand in the way of Franco-German relations and European unity. But this is a minor gap, and it should be pointed out that the negative effect of French obstructionist occupation policies in the early postwar period (involving many more vetoes in the Allied Control Council than by the Soviets) is freely admitted in another context (p. 33). Particularly refreshing also are the author's unprejudiced views on the origin of Hitlerism, the shortcomings of the Nuremberg Trials, and the merits of the German resistance against Hitler—especially as coming from a member of the French resistance. The spirit of international cooperation, of fairness toward the defeated and victors, and hope for a democratic Germany integrated in a unified Western Europe pervades the book. It concludes with an appeal to the Western nations to work actively and intelligently toward this end.

CARL G. ANTHON
American University of Beirut

GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK. *Switzerland in Perspective.* Pp. viii, 306. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. $3.40.

Here is a book which does well what it sets out to do: give the reader a fair idea of where Switzerland stands today, and how she got there. It is nice to hear tourists exclaim about the beauties of the mountains, the immaculate cities, the dependable trains, but here is an outsider—a Russian who fled to the West in 1918—who knows all these things and far more and can give the reasons for them. George Soloveytchik is an economist, a lecturer, and traveler who has known Switzerland and the Swiss since early childhood. He is now a British citizen.

Mr. Soloveytchik describes Switzerland from various angles: the personal, economic, historical, and political. He shrewdly observes both the admirable and the unlovely characteristics of the stubbornly independent Swiss. He points out their quarrelsome, pessimistic, suspicious, penny-pinching ways, but also their common sense, their loyalty, their honesty, their skillful and devoted statesmen, and their democratic government.

In a resumé of Swiss history the author shows clearly that the much envied and admired Swiss neutrality is not the product of pure chance but of a carefully worked out policy which has matured over the centuries. He traces it from its early beginnings in the sixteenth century through the guarantee of Swiss neutrality by the European nations at the Congress of Vienna, and the writing of a federal constitution in 1848. Perhaps most interesting is the description of Switzerland's sincere adherence to—and possible lapses from—her position of neutrality during the World Wars. This book does not attempt to give a history of Switzerland, but it does give a consecutive story of the country's difficult foreign policy. The provocative theory is advanced that the adhesion of the French, Italian, and German Swiss to one another stems not from a feeling of brotherhood but rather from their intense differences and jealousies. The reader may not always agree with the author's conclusions, but he will have a background of Switzerland's problems.

Of special interest to an *Auslandschweizerin* is the analysis of the Swiss personality. The ordinary Swiss who enjoy a reasonably good and honest government, who have a knack for regulating their industry in such a way that unusual prosperity has blessed their country for many years, and who live in some of the handsomest cities and awesome scenery, are likely to be remarkably gloomy, suspicious of their fellow citizens, and thoroughly discontented. Indeed, the author states that a correction of this paralyzing attitude of uneasiness is of vital importance if the nation is to remain alert and viable in today's world when opportunists can so easily sway a discontented people.

ALICE H. FINCKH
Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation

CHARLES DE GAULLE. *War Memoirs;* Vol. I: *The Call to Honour, 1940–1942.* Pp. viii, 319. New York: The Viking Press, 1955. $5.00.

GUY SALISBURY-JONES. *So Full a Glory: A Biography of Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny.* Pp. xii, 288. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $5.00.

These two volumes provide vivid character portraits of two great French patriots who, pursuing divergent courses at the outset of France's tragic travail in 1940, ended up fighting valiantly together for the liberation of *la patrie.* Both men had many qualities in common: ardent love of country, a strong sense of personal honor tinged with vanity, difficulty in co-operating with others, and a certain intellectual arrogance. Yet, as Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones trenchantly observes, "although their views had clashed and were to clash again, their respect for each other was considerable. How different they were! The one [de Gaulle] austere, unapproachable, and seemingly self-sufficient; the other, intensely human, always approachable, and, indeed, in need of companionship. . . . France needed them both, and of both she was to be proud."

De Gaulle's autobiographical account rises at times to heights of literary eloquence—even in translation—as he describes in poignant prose his brooding anguish over the tragedy of France, and expounds his high hopes for her regeneration after victory. In this his faith appeared never to waiver.

Some interesting footnotes for the history of the early war period are scattered through the volume: how, for example, most of the French people then thought that he and Petain were "secretly in agreement," and how "Churchill bitterly resented the tone of supremacy which the President [Franklin D. Roosevelt] adopted toward him." With Churchill de Gaulle admits that he himself was often near the breaking point: the British Prime Minister, he complains, "could not bring himself to admit the independence of Free France." More than once de Gaulle threatened to go it alone unless the "sovereign" rights of the true France were respected by his British associates.

Although this volume of memoirs ends before the Provisional Government at Algiers was set up, it contains significant clues as to de Gaulle's political philosophy. There is a dramatic account of a stirring appeal he made to the French colony in London in November 1941, in which he vows allegiance to "'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,' because our determination is to remain faithful to democratic principles." In the light of subsequent (though unwarranted) charges that he was at heart a "fascistic authoritarian," this is a revealing note. Likewise, his justification for accepting support from Communist resisters: "Communism," he confidently proclaims, "will pass. But France will not pass."

So Full a Glory, from the pen of the British military attaché in Paris after the war and a personal friend of de Lattre de Tassigny, is a sympathetic biography of a French general whose record as a field tactician was perhaps unsurpassed by any Allied officer in the European theatre of World War II. De Lattre's military career in fact spans both world wars and was ended only by sudden death from cancer during his final assignment as French High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Indochina. His personal loyalty to Petain and Weygand had prevented him from joining the Free French in 1940, but once he clearly understood the abyss toward which the Vichy regime was leading France, he swallowed his pride and decided to serve under Charles de Gaulle, his junior in rank. It was de Lattre who, in the fall of 1944, conducted the spectacular sweep of the First French Army from the shores of the Mediterranean to the foothills of the Vosges in three short weeks. Given to frequent outbursts of anger, and ever a perfectionist, he had his difficulties with the Allied command, yet high mutual respect always marked the relations of the proud Frenchman with his American superiors.

As Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones unfolds de Lattre's character, a fascinating picture emerges of a man intensely devoted to family and Church, a severe though warmhearted disciplinarian, with a penchant for fanfare and a sense of the dramatic, a man of superhuman energy impatient of mediocrity in any form, and, unlike de Gaulle, completely devoid of personal political am-

bition. In the words of Marshal Montgomery, "de Lattre was a brilliant soldier, but he was more than that, he was also a statesman"—as shown by how he managed to galvanize the French and Vietnamese forces against communism in Indochina during 1951. Had he lived the Indochinese *dénouement* might possibly have been different. For de Lattre had the faculty of winning admiration and support from men of divergent races and creeds. So it was that the anticlerical Georges Clemenceau, who shared with de Lattre the same village birthplace in La Vendee, remarked shortly before his death that "he wanted no soldiers at his funeral except Jean de Lattre de Tassigny."

WALTER R. SHARP
Yale University

MATTEI DOGAN and JACQUE NARBONNE. *Les Françaises face à la politique: Comportement politique et condition sociale.* Pp. xv, 192. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1955. 600 *fr.*

Ten tightly packed chapters deal with: the traditional mentality and stages of women's approach to politics; their economic and social status; their standing within the family; effect of women's religious sentiments upon their political horizon and behavior; distribution of feminine vote in elections; distribution of women and men among political parties; identity of vote of wife and husband; stability of feminine vote; women's attachment to ideologies; influence of prestige of candidates upon female vote; feminine organization and political parties; adherence to feminine cadres; women in the *Assemblée Nationale, Conseil de la République* and local assemblies; consequences of advent of women in political life; antifeminist movements in the light of experience; and marginal value of feminine vote.

The authors' deductions, based upon painstakingly established statistics, tables, and diagrams, are both circumspect and candid. The political comportment of women, they concede, is to be understood only if one weighs six fundamental aspects, to wit: wives' status in relation to their husbands; their fragile integration in active economic life; their attachment to religion; a low niveau of political information; the persistence among them, as among men, of traditional antifeminist prejudices; and last but not least, the existence of two million and a half widows, more than fifty years of age, who do not find equality on the masculine plane. In marriage too, the wife is still in a minor position, since her interests are generally subordinated to those of her husband. In professional life also, the woman finds herself mostly on a lower hierarchical level.

A fitting climax offers a parallel list of antifeminist claims countered by proven facts, such as: Women do not wish to vote —the majority wishes to vote; women will vote for extremist parties—the opposite is the case; women in politics will weaken the family unit—nine out of ten married women vote as their husbands do, thus cementing marital unity; women do not render military service—many braved resistance to wartime occupation.

The authors' study, modest in size, notable in content, originated in the setting of similar inquests into the status of women, undertaken in several western European countries. It was prompted by the International Association of Political Science, under the initiative of UNESCO. Quality of content earned the authors inclusion of their work in the *Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.*

JOHANNES MATTERN
Johns Hopkins University

ELINOR G. BARBER. *The Bourgeoisie in 18th Century France.* Pp. x, 165. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $3.50.

Most of us who have studied the background of the French Revolution have assumed that we knew what was meant by the 18th-century middle class. The present analysis of the French bourgeoisie by Mrs. Elinor Barber contributes to our understanding by breaking down this class structure along lines of the "class and caste" theory of the functional sociologists. One of the purposes of the study, as expressed in the Preface, was to learn whether this social class theory could contribute to historical study. It has been a rewarding experiment.

Any highly developed society has a system of stratification along functional lines. "This stratification integrates the evaluations of people . . . and thus provides the regularity and stability of expectation that is essential to all social action" (p. 3). People must know to whom to bow, into what social groups they may marry, and for what walks of life to prepare their sons. In some societies the caste system is strong; in others there is possible a great deal of mobility.

In 18th-century France there was a mixture of caste and open class patterns of stratification, with more of the former than of the latter. The middle class may be said to have included no one who did manual labor and no one with any degree of nobility, either of sword or robe. It encompassed the commercial, financial, and manufacturing people and those in the professions of law and medicine as well as the lower clergy and the intellectuals. The author notes that there were but two classes in France, and not three estates—those who were noble and those who were not. And within the bourgeois group the business men were lower in status than the professional people. Business was not held in high esteem; those given to it tried to escape to more respectable positions. The development of capitalism suffered as a result.

By bringing together many examples from the literature of the time, the author shows that the movement toward social class improvement was not to be achieved by seeking recognition for middle class occupations and professions, but by escaping them in an upward shift into the lower reaches of the nobility. This went well during the first half of the century under discussion, but by the third quarter it had become so difficult for the bourgeois to get noble status in any group of privilege that the middle class elements demanded mobility and universalistic society more and more openly. This brought revolution. The bourgeoisie were not out to destroy the upper classes but to be included within them. The movement toward revolution sociologically was one which can be described as an evolution from a caste structure to an open class society.

Thus viewed, the essential struggle in the Revolution was for social mobility so that the bourgeoisie might stand beside the nobility in political and financial extravagancies and displays, and so that they might reap the consequent social prestige. The great doctrines of Thomas Paine and many others were but the rationalizations for this ambition.

Evidently the middle class built better than they intended, for their influence was far wider than their outlook seems to have been, as here presented.

W. HENRY COOKE
Claremont Graduate School

MORTIMER WHEELER. *Rome Beyond the Imperial Frontiers.* Pp. xii, 192. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $7.50.

The extent of the interrelations between nations of the ancient world is still not widely known. We tend to think that the remoter areas of Europe, Africa, and Asia have only recently been brought into contact, with the development of colonial empires following the age of Exploration. For many people, then, this splendid book will come as a revelation.

Baltic amber, African ivory, South Arabian frankincense, Indian pepper, and Chinese silk: these five commodities, which were in one way or another essential to the imperial way of life, are shown to have formed the basis for Roman traffic with the lands beyond the Empire. In fact, the author points out that they determined the principal routes and markets, so that a map of their means of transport is substantially a map of imperial commerce as a whole. However, the Roman imports also involved various other goods, such as pearls and semiprecious stones, tortoiseshell, muslin, skins, and spices; which were included to supplement the principal cargoes. In return for these, the Romans sent out bronze and silver vessels, glass, and coins; and the finding of these in other countries has helped to determine the amount of trade and other contacts.

Using the principal trade routes as a

framework for the complex story which is still being revealed by archaeological research, the author takes up the three key areas of Northern and Western Europe, North Africa, and further Asia and discusses in some detail the evidence from excavations in each, citing in occasional footnotes and in a brief bibliography other sources for still more detailed information.

As a practicing archaeologist himself, Sir Mortimer Wheeler played a considerable part in tracing the Indian portion of the story. Particularly intriguing is his deduction, based in part on the testimony of classical authors, that the Roman emporia in India served as posts for permanent agencies of Graeco-Roman traders, organized very much like the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British "factories" in the Indian trade of more recent times; so that the Indo-European commerce of the first century A.D. could be logically compared with that of the seventeenth.

In the long, but intensely interesting, section on Roman finds in Northern Europe, the author points out that diplomatic presents, loot from raids, and cultural drift also helped to account for the wide distribution of Roman articles and wares; and he concludes that these things inevitably caused the "barbarians" to consider Rome as a source of wealth and treasure, which in turn served as a stimulus for the later barbarian invasions of the Empire.

In spite of all that has already been discovered by archaeology and through reinterpretation of ancient literary sources, Sir Mortimer makes clear that the story is still incomplete. More needs to be discovered by archaeological research in European lands now behind the iron curtain, particularly in the Black Sea region. Meanwhile, in both Indochina and Central Asia recent excavations have hinted at possibilities rather than producing definite information. Further information is needed from all these areas when political conditions make it possible to resume excavations and exchange information. But, as it stands, the story is a fascinating one, full of stimulating ideas for both laymen and scholars; and this book with its splendid illustrations and fine maps does full justice to it.

SCHUYLER CAMMANN
University of Pennsylvania

FEDOR BELOV. *The History of a Soviet Collective Farm.* Pp. xiii, 237. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Research Program on the USSR, 1955. $5.50.

To one searching for intellectual medicine against Soviet institutions this book may be disappointing. Bias is natural in an author who, discharged with the rank of captain from the Army in 1947, was chairman of his Western Ukranian kolkhoz from 1947 to 1949; but who displeased the authorities by refusal to co-operate and by his adamant service to what he thought were the interests of his kolkhoz rather than the state. He was recalled to the Army in Germany in 1949, revisited the farm on furlough in 1950, and then deserted to Western Germany in 1951; yet Fedor Belov does not have the purely emotional approach one might expect. When he avoids interpretation, he gives an on-the-spot picture in clear, readable form; although there is little data in this book not already known to any graduate student of Soviet agriculture.

The frequent absence of sources for statistical data is understood because the account is primarily based on a diary. After a reference to his childhood, in which, providentially, "food was always plentiful" (and) . . . "no one violated the traditions which had been established by the people and the church" (p. 4), Belov describes the famine of 1932–33. "The majority of the kolkhoz members in the Ukraine lived relatively well," however, from the mid-thirties until 1941 (p. 18). The situation changed with the nonaggression pact with Germany, where the kolkhoz's grain was sent. Then came the war. The pages covering "The Destruction of the Kolkhoz and the Occupation of the Village by the Germans" repeat the accusation that some Ukranians hailed the Germans as liberators. Villagers who did not flee or become guerillas set about with indecent haste to revert back to "free peasantry." At the beginning of the war most livestock had been driven east and never returned; what remained was slaughtered, and the meat distributed among the kolkhoz members. Later the Germans "took away all cows, chickens, pigs and beehives . . . and put them back in the kolkhoz."

Much of the text is devoted to the kolkhoz devastated by war, to criticism of the Party, to the persistent human problems of drunkenness, lack of co-operation, bribery, the overburdening of women. The book has value as an insight into the post-war situation in rural Russia; the chapter on the structure of the kolkhoz is meritorious as instructive and factual; but it would be a mistake to look to this work for any broad analysis of Soviet agriculture at present or to use it as a basis for prognostication.

V. J. TERESHTENKO
New School for Social Research

GEORGE BARR CARSON, JR. *Electoral Practices in the U.S.S.R.* Pp. vii, 151. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $3.50.

Every two years over 99 per cent of all Soviet citizens above the age of 18 go to the polls to elect some 1,200,000 members of the governing councils (Soviets) of villages, wards, cities, regions, and other territorial subdivisions of the 16 constituent republics of the Soviet Union; every four years members of the Supreme Soviets of the constituent republics and of the USSR are also elected. Nearly 10 million persons participate in the administration of these elections, and campaigning in public assemblies, in the press, and by other means is widespread. The Soviet election law scrupulously preserves all the forms of democracy. It is, in Mr. Carson's words, "a model election law" (p. 101). The only weakness of the system, from a formal point of view, is that in fact only one candidate is presented for each office to be filled.

Why does the Soviet government expend so much effort to have elections when the results are, for the most part, a foregone conclusion? And why does it preserve the forms of democratic campaigning and voting when the substance—the two-party or multi-party system—has been eliminated? The answer is neither so mysterious nor so farcical as many Westerners have supposed. Voting in the Soviet Union is a public rite, in which the citizen is asked to demonstrate his patriotism by endorsing the list of candidates presented to him. "The electoral system was never intended to provide representation for *differences of interest,* as the American is," Mr. Carson states (p. 86). "The only issue is patriotism" (p. 87).

In rare instances a candidate is not elected because he fails to receive a majority of the votes cast—that is, more than 50 per cent of the voters cast blank ballots. Pressures of various kinds are used to prevent this, as Mr. Carson shows, but the fact remains that the people of the Soviet Union could make a kind of revolution—of course, at the risk of serious reprisals—by refusing, on a mass scale, to return the candidates offered to them.

Mr. Carson's short but informative book suffers from the absence of more than a few casual references to the work of the Soviets. In this connection it should be noted that it is, by and large, *not* the Soviets but their executive committees (in the case of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, its Presidium) which in fact carry the main responsibility for the daily tasks of government. The candidates for whom the people at large cast their ballots are *honoratiores* who perform important social functions, but their political role is largely auxiliary.

HAROLD J. BERMAN
Harvard University

LUDVÍK NĚMEC. *Church and State in Czechoslovakia.* Pp. xi, 577. New York: Vantage Press, 1955. $5.00.

The title of this volume is misleading in regards to its contents and presentation. Specifically: Part I, Theological Bases for the Position of the Catholic Church (pp. 3–64) is a general statement which has hardly anything to do with the subject of the title; the rest of the book is devoted to the ideological arguments of the *Catholic* Church against the non-Catholic historians

and the treatment given to the Church by the Czechoslovak state. Only the last six chapters cover the least questionable portion of the book—the relation of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia to the Communist regime of that country.

In fact, the author would have done a better job by releasing only the last portion of his publication. Here he has summarized, in detail and quite ably, the Communist infiltration tactics, the Communist constitution and its effects on ecclesiastical affairs, the persecution suffered by the Catholic Church, and the reactions of the Vatican to the Communist attacks. The generous use of footnotes, citing widely scattered materials, is a real contribution to scholarship.

But the author can be severely criticized for his efforts to evaluate the relations between the Catholic Church and the Czechoslovak State (Part II). Even more liberal Catholic historians will probably shudder when reading: "In the period from 1918 to 1938, Rome was very severely tried by the actions of the Czech people who were unwitting instruments of progressive factions. Uniting themselves under T. G. Masaryk's slogans—Hussites, Žižka, Táborites, Prokop Holý, Jan Amos Comenius, Peter Chelčický, liberals, Socialists, freethinkers, Freemasons, Lutherans, and Czech Brethren—they strove to seize key positions in the state" (p. 143). Those historians who are realistically minded would question most seriously Němec' claims that "Catholics showed themselves to be exemplary national patriots . . . and time has given Catholics the opportunity to prove their stand toward their country" (p. 144). This was only true in regard to the Czech Catholic leaders. But Němec certainly passes over in a hurry the "national patriotism" of Msgr. Andrej Hlinka (mentioned only on p. 132) whose Slovak "separatism" helped the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia during the Munich crisis. This is also true of his follower, Dr. Josef Tiso, the first puppet Premier appointed by Hitler in Europe, who became President of the Hitler-sponsored Slovak Republic, declared war on the United States on December 12, 1942, and was executed in 1947 (the last fact evaluated by Němec thus: "The harshness of the trial and all circumstances connected with it made it very difficult for Slovaks to condone" (p. 202).

The author's treatment is unfortunate also in its persistent attacks on the great national figures of Czechoslovakia. Membership in Freemasonry seems to condemn several Czech leaders (including Dobrovský). Alois Jirásek, a great Czech historical novelist, whom even the Communists have not dared to attack, is taken to task for his "malicious and censorious treatment of the whole Baroque period and of the Counter-Reformation" (p. 67). Huss' followers were induced "to become ardent fellow travelers with the English (Wyclif's) and local reformers" (pp. 68–69). Masaryk is attacked here and there, in a hesitating sort of a way, because he "did not even refer to the fact that Catholics were a majority of the nation, and that this majority had always given the nation Catholic characteristics" (p. 145).

The bibliography (pp. 527–61) is quite extensive, but fails to note some well-known books. There are too many unnecessary footnotes, also. Some of the photographs reproduced here are certainly of ancient vintage. The book does not represent a verdict of an impartial judge; it is in reality a one-sided and often misleading argument of an enthusiastic and intensely biased advocate.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

AMERICAN HISTORY

ROBERT L. MORLAN. *Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League, 1915–1922.* Pp. 408. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $5.75.

This is a readable, well-documented, journalistic account of the Nonpartisan League, rather too much in its prairie fire aspects and too little in terms of its more permanent achievements and lessons for democracy. It has loose ends. For example, in its concluding (and inadequate) summary chapter, it briefly refers to the great power of Senator William Langer in the League after 1922. Yet prior to that reference, the author had left Mr. Langer in a relation of opposition to the League which the Senator assures me misrepresented his position. Oddly, Mr. Morlan who reports consultations with a great many survivors of the struggle he chronicles seems not to have consulted the Senator.

I was one of those Socialists who believed in working with the League. I was outraged by the wartime persecution of its leaders but resented the degree to which some of them tried to disown "socialism" of the big or little "s" variety under war pressures. Today the story of the League warrants certain conclusions which limited space compels me to state dogmatically.

1—The psychology and techniques of democracy make it easier for an able leader to organize successful mass opposition to gross evils than to carry on.

2—War increases the irrationality and cruelty of which large sections of the populace are capable when stirred up by self-interested men.

3—While vigorous action at the state level greatly helped North Dakota farmers, no state alone is a unit of sufficient strength to solve major social problems. Boundaries of states cut across lines of economic interest. Every politico-economic movement sooner or later finds it impossible to escape involvement with national politics and economics under conditions where the nonpartisan method of the League is hard to apply. This although on a single simple issue like prohibition the Anti-Saloon League made it effective—for a time.

4—Social ownership through the state or co-operatives depends for its value not merely on soundness in theory, but on its success in developing an efficient and democratic administration. Here the League's failures as well as its conspicuous successes can teach us lessons.

When all is said and done the League was a great force in that development which led to government intervention for farmers on the scale recommended even by a Republican president in 1956.

NORMAN THOMAS
New York, N. Y.

CARL FREDERICK KRAENZEL. *The Great Plains in Transition.* Pp. xiv, 428. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. $5.00.

Mr. Kraenzel's study of the Great Plains deserves highest praise for the clarity and definiteness with which it applies and extends the "multifactor" concept of the region developed by the late Howard Odum and others. A weakness of the Odum school of regionalists is that in their laborious overinsistence on a composite picture of a region, they often make an already confused subject still more confused. This charge cannot be brought against Mr. Kraenzel. His distinctions are always perfectly clear and exact; his patterns do not get in each other's way; he does not leave the reader to blunder through a wilderness of statistical excavations. All leads, in the end, to something quite positive. The book's crowning distinction is in the closing chapters, where Mr. Kraenzel reviews various regionalist types of solution for the problems of the Great Plains and advances a definite proposal of his own—a kind of administrative regionalism which, he argues, will bring governmental forms, Federal and state, into harmony with social and physiographic realities.

It could be said that Mr. Kraenzel, sharply alert to the details of Plains history, broadens and brings up to date the historical view first sketched by Walter Prescott Webb. It would be better to say that *The Great Plains in Transition* is a realization of labors which, though begun by historians, could only be completed by a sociologist with an historical conscience, like Mr. Kraenzel. Using the double vision of history and social science, he can very accurately relate the frontier history of the Great Plains region to its present social and economic condition. More clearly than in Webb's treatment, we can here understand how "homesteading" imposed a "humid area" type of agriculture upon a country to which it was not adapted; and how, if the northern Plains states had followed the land policy of Texas, more suitable to a semi-arid region, they would now be happier. Similarly, Mr. Kraenzel can explain how and why the plainsmen are "frustrated" by urban developments and,

lacking north-south communication, meet one another only in Los Angeles and Chicago. He can weigh judiciously the rival contentions of the Missouri Valley Authority and Pick-Sloan, as well as other regional plans, and emerge at last with plans of his own.

Mr. Kraenzel's proposals maybe reveal a little too much innocent faith in government as such—perhaps a Great Plains trait, unconsciously operative; but that does not much diminish the interest and usefulness of his very convincing book.

DONALD DAVIDSON
Vanderbilt University

JOHN HIGHAM. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925.* Pp. xiv, 431. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955. $6.00.

From Crèvecoeur to Woodrow Wilson, this country welcomed some 35,000,000 Europeans in the belief that the democratic crucible would smelt them down into Americans. Beginning in the 1880's, though, a handful of nativists denied both the capacity of the New World to create unity out of diversity and the credentials of strangers to become Americans. Forty years later, their denial found expression in legislation which virtually halted immigration and assigned priority to those whom Americans were then disposed to call Nordics.

In a fascinating book, John Higham traces the ups and downs and final triumph of this forty-year nativism to alternate periods of confidence and fear. Confidence generally outweighed fear, until World War I and its aftermath. In the most vivid section of the book, the author relates the xenophobia of the acts of 1921 and 1924 to such fear-inspired aberrations as the Red Scare, Henry Ford's anti-Semitic crusade, and the Ku Klux Klan, which fed, in turn, on the specter of Bolshevism, the postwar recession, the failure of prohibition, and the disillusionment with Europe following the Treaty of Versailles.

In such an atmosphere, Professor Higham's racists—an assortment of Yankee bluebloods, soured Populists and Progressives, labor leaders, and social scientists—finally had a field day. America's woes, they explained, dated from the time the "new" immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe replaced the "old"; for unpolluted by the minions of the Pope and the Elders of Zion, Nordic America had been homogeneous and Protestant, sane and safe and snug. In the name of science and patriotism, the gates were closed.

Professor Higham isolates in nativist thinking such patterns as Anglo-Saxonism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-radicalism, but he too schematically ascribes to their pre-Civil War manifestations roots for later xenophobias. He should have concentrated, moreover, exclusively on the restrictionist movement, as he first intended to do, for his treatment of prejudice in general requires a book in itself and sometimes blurs the major focus.

Although traversing ground brilliantly covered by Oscar Handlin, John Higham's *Strangers in the Land* is an impressive achievement. It is shrewd, readable, richly documented, and mined with fact. The author has deftly resurrected molders of racist opinion in sharply etched vignettes, and woven his chosen strand into the fabric of American history in general. His book illuminates a phase of American nationalism and at the same time sheds light on the nature of social classes, sectionalism, pressure politics, and social science.

ARTHUR MANN
Smith College

THEODORE C. BLEGEN. *Land of Their Choice: The Immigrants Write Home.* Pp. xx, 463. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $5.75.

"Then move your family westward,
Good health you will enjoy,
And rise to wealth and honor
In the state of El-a-Noy."

Many of the immigrants from Norway did exactly what the ballad advised, and many attained the promised success. Many others who moved on to the Middle West or Texas or California suffered the tragedy of swamp fever or of scalping by the Indians.

In the letters here assembled are reflected the multifaceted experiences of both the enthusiastic and the embittered. Some plead with relatives and friends to hurry

to the land of opportunity, where fertile land can be bought for $1.25 per acre, where pigs feed themselves in the woods, where taxes are almost nonexistent, where each man is the equal of his neighbor and is not asked about family or rank but only, what can he do? Others tell their friends to stay where they are, and relate sad tales of disillusionment, of shipwreck and death of dear ones, of deceit and the hard struggle for existence, of lack of churches, of the agony of the language barrier, of life on the crude frontier, of "the dull pain of loneliness." Some make fun of their own exaggerated dreams, like Frithjof Meidell who writes of "this highly praised Canaan, where the hedges consist of sides of bacon and tobacco."

Basically this book is a mosaic of varied hues and brilliance, one piece sparkling with vivid description, another dull in its pedestrian account of a trip or the building of a farm. The panorama is pieced together from fragments of scores of simple autobiographies with the repetitive and the extraneous pruned away. Its emphasis is on rural life in the Mississippi Valley.

Few items here will surprise the student of immigration, for many have been published before in scattered form. But here this raw material of history is brought together in meaningful organization, with chapter introductions by Dean Blegen who has been gathering letters and interpreting migration for several decades. He knows that "emigration was a transfer not alone of bodies but of minds and traditions and human ambition and hope" (p. 91). With knowledge and sympathy he makes of the Norwegian chapter of migration almost an epitome of that vast movement that peopled not only the Middle West but most of the United States, and that created a new blend of European culture. America was the "land of their choice," and they made it their land.

FRANKLIN D. SCOTT
Northwestern University

GEORGE R. BENTLEY. *A History of the Freedmen's Bureau.* Pp. x, 298. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955. $5.00.

Dr. Bentley has written a good book and a readable one. When I read a somewhat pompous and not very intelligible note about the notes on this book, and then discovered that there were some 1,300 notes, my blood ran cold. I am all for historical research work at the grass roots but boggle at being asked to look at each blade of grass. American history being by the nature of events a somewhat recent development in human affairs, American scholars, aided by the bounty of many foundations, are inclined to blow up a subject for the sake of research rather than research into the subject on a scale commensurate with its importance.

I hope this book will be widely read in Britain because it makes a contribution, and a very interesting and absorbing story it is, to the solution of a problem of considerable importance. The problem is that of the gross ignorance in Britain of otherwise well-informed persons about American history between the parting of the ways at the end of the eighteenth century and the entry of the United States of America into World War I. Between these two events the Englishman referred to above may be expected to know that there was a civil war in the U.S.A., and that those Red Indians who had not been slain were in reservations. He will not know the original reason for the civil war.

That it was fought to retain the Union and quickly provided an awkward by-product in the shape of thousands of emancipated Negroes; though as Dr. Bentley points out, President Lincoln was very chary at first of raising the slavery issue. However, when on January 1, 1863 the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, a vast problem became official and after various compromises had been rejected, a federal organization called the Freedmen's Bureau was established to deal with "all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen."

It lasted till 1872 and was directed by Oliver Howard. Dr. Bentley's book tells the story of what the Bureau attempted to do, where it succeeded, where it failed, how it was the instrument of good men and the tool of unscrupulous politicians. How it benefited the Negro, yet at the same time

"fed the flames of race hostility" which though now clearly on the wane is still alight in Virginia. The story of the Freedmen's Bureau has its lessons for all engaged in present-day efforts to create multiracial societies, and Dr. Bentley has written the last word in this chapter of the story of the Negro in the U.S.A.

COMMANDER SIR STEPHEN KING-HALL
Hansard Society
London, England

NORMAN GRAEBNER. *Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion.* Pp. ix, 278. New York: Ronald Press, 1955. $4.50.

"Who will, what can, set limits to our onward march?" cried John L. O'Sullivan, herald of "Manifest Destiny," on the eve of the "fabulous forties." But at the very same time that American ideals were coupled with expansionist zeal to promote the "Great Nation of Futurity," less emotional forces were at work to press for a planned territorial extension to the West coast. What these factors were and how they operated to gain for the republic a sure foothold on the Pacific is the theme of Professor Graebner's able monograph.

In eleven carefully documented, fact-packed chapters, the author convincingly develops the thesis that the Polk administration was the instrument of a fully understood design to secure Oregon and California, from the Strait of Juan de Fuca to San Diego, for commercial and maritime purposes. Pioneering effort, the lure of empire, and the conquest of Mexico did not shape the goals envisioned by Polk and his advisers, however much such circumstances may have dramatized the course of events.

The importance of this study lies in the thoroughness with which Professor Graebner unravels the diplomacy and politics of the mid-eighteen-forties, giving a new dimension to the Oregon and California questions and a new emphasis to the complexities of the war with Mexico. A systematic searching of private papers and public documents and of personal recollections and press accounts has uncovered much evidence pointing to commercial influences determining executive policy and legislative conduct. Democratic partisan though he was, President Polk achieved statesmanship in the settlement of the Oregon issue, giving the Whigs and the powerful metropolitan papers no real cause to complain. If he was not as adept in handling relations with Mexico, he, at least, withstood grandiose schemes for territorial aggrandizement and selected Nicholas P. Trist for a mission that required consummate skill in negotiation. All this is brought out in meticulous detail and summed up in a first-rate concluding chapter.

The strength of this monograph lies in its well-considered insights and in the massing of pertinent evidence in support thereof. The general preoccupation of most writers on the period with the dramatic highlights of the eighteen-forties has usually obscured some of the pointedly significant long-range pressures for expansion. Now, the author gives these due recognition. The study is excellent, but there is no striving for literary effect, with a resulting lack, at times, of sustained narrative interest. All in all, the book adds a good deal to our understanding of the conduct of foreign affairs at a critical juncture in the turbulent politics of an expanding nation.

SIDNEY I. POMERANTZ
City College of New York

OSCAR WILLIAM WINZERLING. *Acadian Odyssey.* Pp. xi, 224. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955. $4.85.

This volume deals with the wanderings of several groups of Acadian exiles who, though not made famous by the pen of Longfellow, experienced hardships and disappointments almost comparable to those of Evangeline and Gabriel before coming to a happy end of their journeying. These displaced persons of an earlier era were sent to France or reached France after vicissitudes in the British colonies or in England. The French monarchy, recognizing their worth and feeling an obligation to them, provided temporary support and promised resettlement under favorable conditions.

Many half-hearted and unsuccessful efforts were made to establish these people in various parts of France. But the monarchy, concerned with the weightier matters of European politics, staggering under a heavy financial burden, and already stumbling toward bankruptcy, was unable to carry through an effective program. Meanwhile the unhappy exiles gradually lost faith in French promises and developed a strong sense of solidarity which the author, for lack of a better term, calls "Acadian nationality."

After the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the Spanish government, anxious to strengthen Louisiana, conceived and executed a plan for carrying some of these people to that province. Between May 10 and December 12, 1785, seven ships carried approximately 1,600 Acadians to Louisiana where they were granted land and settled in desirable places by the local Spanish authorities. Thus happily ended an odyssey which is characterized as "the world's largest trans-Atlantic colonization project on the North American continent."

The book has the marks of research and scholarship. The author has not only worked with original sources in the archival collections of France, England and Spain, but he has visited many of the places which were important in the adventures of these Acadians. He has tried to orient himself in the setting of his story. His enthusiasm for the subject and his regard for the Acadians are obvious and even contagious. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the story has not been presented in a more attractive manner. Sentence structure, organization, and style leave something to be desired. The narrative which the reader gets is not easy to read and is at times repetitious. Nevertheless in the opinion of this reviewer, Dr. Winzerling has given an authentic account of these Acadian exiles and in doing so has thrown light on a hitherto unillumined bit of history.

CECIL JOHNSON
University of North Carolina

ALAN SIMPSON. *Puritanism in Old and New England.* Pp. ix, 126. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $3.00.

Simpson has penetrated to the marrow of Puritanism. He rightly discerns that this movement was rooted in religion, and those who seek to explain it in economic or sociological terms have not grasped what it was all about. Puritanism was not the religion of the *bourgeoisie* and as a matter of fact won converts in all classes of society. At the same time, the author recognizes that at certain points the sociological situation has a bearing. Puritanism was intensely Biblical, and only those who had the skill and the time to read could be enlisted. Hence, urban craftsmen offered more fertile ground than farm laborers. On the other hand, the high aristocracy was too linked with the monarchy and the Church to be attracted, and again Puritanism, although a religious movement at the core, almost of necessity when seeking power made an alliance with all of the elements disaffected toward the Stuarts.

The author then proceeds to delineate the essence of Puritanism which consisted in a philosophy of history. God had a great work to do through the elect in the course of the historical process. Then arose the question as to who were the elect. The answer was that the elect presumably—one could never be absolutely sure—were those who had been visited by the Lord with an experience of conversion and had a sense of assurance. The company of those thus designated by the Lord should erect his holy commonwealth.

Problems at once emerged and the solutions were diverse. The greatest initial problem was as to how the community of the elect should be perpetuated, whether by propagation or propaganda, and should any measure of constraint be employed? In England there was objection to coercion in religion primarily because the Independents were the victims of constraint at the hands of the Anglicans or the Presbyterians, but in the American colonies the saints dominated the strangers and dissent was not tolerated. But from the presuppositions of Puritanism, Roger Williams maintained that such constraint was intolerable. From the very doctrine of predestination he argued that the saints could never be the entire population, that the State should comprise all and should not endeavor to impose the will of the saints upon the strangers. The elect and the nonelect should be separate.

The word which Simpson writes over all the inner and outer battles of Puritanism is frustration and failure. One of the chapters is entitled "The Bankrupt Crusade." Nevertheless, he concludes that there is a Puritan heritage, and that from this tradition we have derived our system of limited government, a spirit of self-reliance in the body of the community, a great concern for education, and a strenuous morality.

I should be disposed to add several more points to this list, although the influence sometimes has been only indirect. Religious liberty does stem out of the Puritan movement despite the initial intolerance, because the loyalty to truth and the emergent diversity within Puritanism rendered religious liberty the only feasible solution. The separation of Church and State likewise is an indirect result, because the Puritans were not willing simply to be merged in the community at large. A still more significant result is that the very theory of the Church as a voluntaristic society has been transferred to the American commonwealth. In becoming an American today one subscribes to a creed, one endorses an ideal. Furthermore, the concept of the elect nation with a mission to all mankind has been appropriated by the United States, and whatever discrepancies there may be between ideals and behavior we are still in a great many respects a Puritan nation.

The style of this book is engaging with a flair for felicitous phraseology.

ROLAND H. BAINTON
Yale Divinity School

BRADFORD PERKINS. *The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795–1805.* Pp. xii, 257. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955. $5.00.

This thorough and enlightening study gives new significance to a relatively neglected period of Anglo-American relations. In 1795, the ratification of the Jay Treaty brought at least partial solutions to many of the disputes that had produced feelings of hostility between the countries since the end of the Revolution. In the spring of 1805, the decision of Sir William Grant in the *Essex* case renewed the drift toward a second Anglo-American war by renewing bitterness over the questions of American commercial aid to England's enemies.

In describing the intervening decade, historians have emphasized the American quarrels with France and have tended to ignore the first important period of effort at friendship and co-operation between the United States and England. Perkins analyzes the cultural and economic bases for this friendship, paints concise and striking word-portraits of the politicians and diplomats, and traces the problems and events of the negotiations, blending narrative and analysis in thorough and interesting detail.

The two nations were each others' best customers. France was giving the United States far greater provocation and anxiety during the years of the X. Y. Z. affair, the Quasi-War, and later Napoleon's ill-fated project for the reconquest of Santo Domingo and a new French empire in Louisiana. British commanders made gifts of captured French cannon and ammunition to the American government. American merchantmen sailed in British convoys for protection against French privateers. There was a fairly satisfactory agreement for American trade with British India, and a remarkably satisfactory agreement with Toussaint L'Ouverture in which the British and Americans secured a joint monopoly of trade with Santo Domingo.

There were, of course, several continuing disputes with England that could not be fully resolved. For example, the book provides interesting new data on the lively old question of impressment in a period when much temporary progress was made toward reducing the practice and toward releasing many Americans from forced service on British warships.

The documentation of the work is broad and intensive, yet unobtrusive. The writing is clear and precise, yet often colorful.

The book was awarded the honor of publication by the Albert J. Beveridge Memorial Fund under the direction of the American Historical Association.

WALTON BEAN
University of California
Berkeley

THOMAS JEFFERSON. *Notes on the State of Virginia.* Edited by William Peden. Pp. xxv, 315. Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Va., 1955. $5.00.

Notes on the State of Virginia is a valuable new edition of an old American classic. The *Notes* had their origin in the fall of 1780, when Jefferson, as governor of Virginia, undertook to reply to a questionnaire addressed to the several American states by François Marbois of the French legation in Philadelphia. Jefferson's replies to Marbois' twenty-two inquiries flowered not only in a general descriptive analysis of Virginia's geography, economy, and culture; but also in a series of illuminating excursions into the author's social and political philosophy.

The *Notes* were first published privately in Paris in 1785 and immediately attracted great attention in spite of the author's professed modesty. A rather poor French edition followed two years later. Dissatisfied, Jefferson then authorized John Stockdale of London to publish a carefully edited version, which appeared later in 1787. The present text is basically that of the Stockdale edition; however, it also contains Jefferson's very valuable notes and comments added to his own copy during the remainder of his life.

The excellence of the *Notes* derives in considerable part from the fact that Jefferson, like Franklin and other great men of the age, had a mind which ranged freely and eagerly over the whole known spectrum of human knowledge. Thus the *Notes* contain, among other things, acute observations on the growth of population; pertinent statistics and generalizations on the weather; a critical analysis of the Virginia constitution; a mass of detail on Indian culture including archeological materials gleaned from Jefferson's investigations of Indian burial mounds; detailed observations on Virginia's flora and fauna; commentary on the racial characteristics and cultural potential of both the Negro and the Indian; and animadversions on slavery, war, religion, commerce and agriculture, and the British empire. Jefferson's understanding, of course, suffered from the limitations of his own time. Thus, his physiology was incredibly naive by modern standards; he rejected the theory of evolution in favor of static creation; and he entertained ideas about the Negro hardly consistent with modern anthropological theory. Nonetheless, the *Notes* reveal an erudition and scholarship astonishing even by the standards of our own time.

The *Notes* show Jefferson characteristically as a true son of the Enlightenment in his faith in liberty, constitutionalism, humanitarianism, and human reason. Thus there is a beautifully written three-page argument for freedom of religion, based upon natural rights, the fallibility of governments, the desirability of diversity of religious faith, the futility of control and suppression, and the strength of truth and reason. Again, there is an attack on the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which Jefferson thought established "an elective despotism" because of its failure to recognize the principle of constitutional supremacy. There is a scathing denunciation of slavery for its violation of natural rights, a physiocratic defense of agriculture as the only valid way of life, an argument for peace and free commerce anticipating the author's First Inaugural, and a well-reasoned argument for the intrinsic intelligence, morality, and human equality of the American Indian. In short, the *Notes* are a valuable enough sourcebook on eighteenth-century Virginia, but they are an even more useful manual on the faith of an eighteenth-century liberal and of Thomas Jefferson himself.

ALFRED H. KELLY
Wayne University

GOVERNMENT AND LAW

BERNARD R. BERELSON, PAUL F. LAZERSFELD, and WILLIAM N. MCPHEE. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign.* Pp. xix, 395. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1954. $7.50.

This book on the long-awaited Elmira, New York study substantially adds to the knowledge of voting behavior, of the vot-

ers' perception of politics, and their attention to mass media, and of the role of class, friends, and religious affiliations in politics. Although it is embellished with over 150 charts and figures, and extensive materials on methodology, its style and fluid prose make it understandable to the layman who may be lacking in the vocabulary of the specialist. For the impatient reader and for those who "get lost" in the lengthy commentary, the authors have provided a summary of the main points at the end of each chapter. The statements are numbered and usually consist of a single sentence. There are, incidentally, 149 of these statements.

A few statements, chosen at random, are: "5. The people who change most during a campaign also change most between campaigns"; "25. The more interaction with other union members [within a single plant] the more Democratic the vote, especially among [less interested] women"; "51. People hostile to religious and ethnic minorities are more likely to assign them to the opposition parties"; "63. Much political talk is centered in the family; and married women report discussing politics in the family more than married men, especially in quiet times"; "76. People under cross pressures [between class and religion, between friends and co-workers, between friends and family] come to their final vote decision later than people in homogeneous circumstances"; "91. Only a minority of party workers seemed motivated by ideological concerns or civic duty."

The political theorists who predicate an effective democracy upon mass interest, knowledge, and enthusiasm for politics will find little comfort in this study. It was found that only about one-third of the Elmirans were greatly interested in the election, another third moderately interested, and the final third were not interested at all. As is confirmed in other comparable studies and polls, the better educated, older men have more political interest than the less educated, than women or younger people. Generally the more partisan the person, the greater the interest. Voters tend to follow the line of least resistance as shown by the "hereditary vote" where 75 per cent of the first voters sided with their father's political choice. Children seem to be brought up in a "one-party" climate of opinion, and environment provides strong pressures toward the perpetuation of political uniformities. "His environment does not provide the young adult with clear political alternatives on a more or less random basis but rather a 'natural selection' of the 'correct way of life' as applied to politics" (p. 93).

Again the figures show that people turn to others like themselves for political discussion and associate with people who think as they do. Political discussion " . . . consists more of the exchange of mutually agreeable remarks than of controversial ones . . . there is relatively little political exchange among the electorate in the sense of open differences of views" (p. 93). Also many voters engage in self-delusion and rationalization. They tend not to perceive differences with their own candidate or similarities to the opposition candidate. "Only about one-third of the voters are highly accurate in their perception of where the candidates stand on the issues" (p. 233).

The concluding chapter, "Democratic Practice and Democratic Theory," deserves to be carefully read and pondered. The authors deal with the political man in realistic but not pessimistic fashion and call for a revision of democratic theory which will not demnad too much of the citizen. Although the voter has some principles, some interest and information, and some rationality, does he have enough? And, this reviewer asks, can we reduce the amount to an irreducible minimum?

HUGH A. BONE
University of Washington

DANIEL BELL (Ed.). *The New American Right*. Pp. xii, 239. New York: Criterion Books, 1955. $4.00.

The seven contributors to this political study—all "liberals" in one sense or another, except for Mr. Peter Viereck—do not seem to be quite sure what it is they are writing about. By the new American Right, they do not mean the revival of a conservatism of reflection, now so active a movement in our serious journals and our colleges. So far as their subject can be described in a word, it is "McCarthyism"; yet, they recognize that the impulse of protest to which Senator McCarthy's name was attached by the press transcends the activities and influence of the senator from Wisconsin.

What are the origins of this indignation against communism and ritualistic liberalism? What are the sources of its strength? What are its aims? Messrs. Bell, Hofstadter, Riesman, Viereck, Parsons, Glazer, and Lipset are not in thorough agreement upon the answer to any of these questions, nor are all of the essays of the several contributors internally consistent. The "new American Right," by their estimate, seems to include old American families, Irish, Germans, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Jew-haters, some of the rich, some of the middle classes, some of the wage earners (a great many of these last, indeed), intellectuals, illiterates, Republicans, Democrats, established-interest elements, Populist elements, urban people, farm people, and Lord knows who else. The ingenious attempts of these political analysts to fit the "radical Right" into neat categories of status and interest are very interesting to read, but thoroughly unconvincing.

One simple fact is scarcely mentioned in this book: that we are in the midst of a natural reaction against practical communism; and that such a reaction from a social catastrophe, at any period in history, always has displayed intolerance and imprudence, together with healthy and necessary indignation against the authors of that catastrophe and their friends. Our present state of mind is very little different from that of the English after 1793; and we, like the English, have our Tory mobs, as well as our Pitts and Burkes. It would be astounding and even alarming if such a reaction were perfectly temperate. While endeavoring to restrain its excesses, we ought not to pretend to ourselves that we are dealing with some unique social phenomenon. Action and reaction are equal in politics as in mechanics, John Adams suggested (Mr. Bell quotes this remark, indeed); and we are fortunate that the now-shrunken Communist movement in the United States has not been followed by a more violent reaction. The more ardent anti-Communists in America simply do not fit, as a body, into any coherent social analysis; they are governed not by interest, for the most part, but by opinion.

Although there is much talk in this volume about "pseudo-conservatives," most of the contributors seem nearly as hostile toward "true conservatives"—who remain undefined. The sneer of Mr. Riesman and Mr. Glazer at "the soured high-principled reaction" of Senator Taft, "the 'colonial' conscience at its worst," suggests the general tone. The question of how far reaction against communism actually is justified is nowhere examined, perhaps merely from lack of space; but this omission seems to be reflected in the uncertain premises of most of the authors, who, unlike St. Paul, end in the doubt with which they commenced.

RUSSELL KIRK
Mecosta, Mich.

OREN STEPHENS. *Facts to a Candid World: America's Overseas Information Program*. Pp. 164. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955. $3.50.

Facts to a Candid World is a knowledgeable story of the moulding of international public opinion through propaganda as a vital function of government. It talks specifically of America's overseas information program.

It discusses in six chapters with clarity the search for a formula, the power and nature of public opinion, of American and world opinion, and of the climate of world opinion. It devotes seven chapters to the program itself, its organization, operations, content, propaganda in the news, perspective in propaganda, personnel evaluation, and allied propaganda. However, the book is unfortunately incomplete in that it does not deal fully enough with or raise enough questions on basic and fundamental problems of effective propaganda by the United States.

The first problem it fails to consider sufficiently is that any official overseas in-

formation program is only a minor part of a broad total activity conditioning the attitudes and actions of people throughout the world towards the U. S. Mr. Stephens recognizes that propaganda cannot be a substitute for diplomatic, military, or economic strength; but he makes little of the fact that it is impossible to differentiate between the effect of American foreign policy projected through official propaganda and the effect of American policy and practices projected through all other channels to the peoples of the world.

Nor does Mr. Stephens, it seems to me, give enough attention to the many forces besides American overseas information programs that affect the success or failure of our overseas information efforts.

Mr. Stephens gives only the most cursory attention to the million tourists who color the views of millions of Europeans, the 113,000 American civil servants abroad, and the Armed Forces of the U. S. scattered over all the world. Yet they play a most important part in the program. So, for that matter, does news reflected to other countries by the many non-American press services and foreign correspondents in our country.

In one other area, that of evaluation, Mr. Stephens, it seems to me, misses the real problem. He mentions, in passing, that he believes that fundamental research is primarily the responsibility of private institutions, foundations, and individual citizens. But is it? At the present time our government is proceeding to spend more than $100,000,000 on official information programs. Some slight portion of this money, of course, is spent on evaluation activities. But more than such evaluation is needed. Are the assumptions on which we as a government are carrying on our activities really valid?

Fundamental research on the assumptions on which the agency is proceeding needs to be made. With so much at stake it would seem that the government itself must continually carry on research in order to validate the assumptions on which the program itself is being carried out. What tone, for instance, in conveying information gives the greatest impact and on whom? Should information be couched in official or non-official language? What is the relative value of ideas that come through official sources as opposed to non-official sources? Do people like one another better because they get more information about us or what is the truth on this?

I am not advocating any cessation of activities. In fact, I am all in favor of a broader program in the light of the present-day menace to the U. S., but certainly while we are continuing to function we should at least try to affirm the assumptions on which we are functioning.

EDWARD L. BERNAYS
New York, N. Y.

JOHN BIGGS, JR. *The Guilty Mind: Psychiatry and the Law of Homicide.* Pp. xii, 236. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955. $4.50.

Closing the exasperating gulf separating psychiatry and law is a goal with more champions among the followers of Pinel and Ray than of Coke and Blackstone. For that reason alone, *The Guilty Mind* should be welcomed, for its author is a distinguished lawyer and presently Chief Justice of the Third Judicial Circuit of the United States. Based on a series of lectures delivered to a mixed audience of law and medical students, this brief book traces the respective histories of these disciplines with respect to the development of the concept of *mens rea* in criminal law and that of mental disease in medicine. The implicit thesis of the book is that law initially outdistanced medicine in viewing certain mental states as morally extenuating conditions, but finally bogged down in the M'Naghten Rules and has since failed to adapt to subsequent progress in psychiatry.

The Mosaic, Brehonic, and Anglo-Saxon tribal codes and customs reveal no indication that cognizance was taken of the mitigating circumstance of mental disorder in homicide, although each distinguished murder from manslaughter, as did most of the codes and edicts of the archaic civilizations. It was Mohammedan law, possibility reflecting the advanced state of Arabian medicine, that contained what may have been the earliest clear distinction between homicide by the mentally sound and by deranged persons. The Arabians, at the height of their civilization, divorced mental illness from demoniacal or religious notions, antedating progress in Europe by some centuries.

These earlier glimmerings were dimmed during the terrible centuries of the witchcraft mania as Europe emerged from its medieval cocoon. Briggs accepts the controversial scapegoat theory of witchcraft and feels that the period was one of legal and medical retrogression. That mental disease resulted from Satanic influences was a notion which died hard, and the enlightened counsels of men like Paracelsus, Vesalius, and Weyer went unheeded. Not until the first half of the last century, when France, England and certain German principalities began distinguishing legally between the criminally responsible and such "nonresponsible" individuals as idiots, psychotics and children, did real progress toward a rational view of responsibility begin.

In contrast with the usual interpretation, it is Judge Biggs' opinion that the famous M'Naghten Rules (1843) resulted as much from a confluence of political factors as from an attempt to reconcile law with existing psychiatric knowledge. M'Naghten's attempt to assassinate Sir Robert Peel (he killed Peel's secretary by mistake) was one of a long series of physical attacks on British officials. The acquittal of M'Naghten on grounds of insanity angered and alarmed Victoria and her advisors, moving them to request from the judiciary a clear principle to be applied in future criminal cases. The medically preposterous but politically conciliatory M'Naghten Rules were the result: "insanity" was assumed if the defendant was unable at the time of the offense to appreciate the nature and quality of his act, and did not regard it as wrongful. The rule persists to this day in most Anglo-American legal systems—"frozen, fixed, in a mold which [is] divorced from reality."

The final two chapters contain discussions of cases illustrating the legally awkward and medically ridiculous positions taken in criminal law because of these rules, and a plea for legal reform taking cognizance of the progress made in psychiatry since the 1840's.

The Guilty Mind is polemical rather than scholarly. Its historical portions are poorly organized and contain some generalizations and conjectures which this reviewer feels stand on very shaky ground. The tracing of legal opinions of the M'Naghten Rules since their adoption is highly interesting and informative, and the case for altering the rules is clearly and forcefully stated. The book leaves no doubt that among the influential ranks of the judiciary there sit some psychiatrically enlightened spirits.

RALPH W. ENGLAND, JR.
University of Illinois

ALFRED R. BEISEL, JR. *Control over Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal Law: Role of the Supreme Court.* Pp. viii, 112. Boston, Mass.: Boston University Press, 1955. $2.75.

Lawyers and social scientists alike will be interested in the subject of this study, the law governing police handling of suspected criminals. In giving the Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on the Constitution. Professor Beisel of the Boston University School of Law effectively summarizes for the period through 1952 the major Supreme Court decisions dealing with searches and seizures, wiretapping, illegally obtained confessions, and invasions of privacy by the police. He also suggests, though far less fully, the relation of that body of law to social considerations which have shaped it and which he feels should be taken into account in its future evolution.

Throughout the book, Beisel brings to the reader's attention the conflicting interests which law in this area must seek to resolve. On the one hand there is the necessity of protecting the rights of possibly innocent suspects from violation by the police. On the other hand protective measures must not prevent the police from apprehending criminals and obtaining evidence necessary for their conviction. Between these two considerations the law follows a zigzag course. The Court has been

most consistent and firm in excluding (even from state courts) confessions and evidence obtained through physical coercion. It has been less certain about confessions elicited by psychological pressure, tending to leave responsibility with the states, though applying a fairly stringent standard to federal police. In matters of evidence obtained without a search warrant (but incident to a valid arrest) the Court has given federal as well as state police fairly wide latitude.

Consistent with legal tradition, the author takes sides on these issues. He feels that protection of the person and his property are necessary to prevent abuse of the weak by the powerful. He contends that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is the most effective way of controlling "police lawlessness" since exclusion would undercut a major motive of such action, namely, easy attainment of convictions. Accordingly he would extend the exclusionary rule more broadly than the Court has done, arguing that the police would find subtler methods of securing convictions if they had to.

In presenting his materials and analysis, Beisel does not go far beyond the usual casebook or legal treatise. He does cover the ground in a readable way, which makes available to the nonlegal reader an area of law in which social scientific research could be of real value.

RICHARD D. SCHWARTZ
Yale University

ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT. *The Challenge of Law Reform.* Pp. 194. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $3.50.

Within the limits of its concept, this is a highly useful little book. It is in truth a veritable primer of American court reform. The author is a veteran in the field, whose distinguished services range from law professor and dean through active practice, political leadership, and bar presidency to his present position as Chief Justice of New Jersey, where he has demonstrated the practical utility of a businesslike direction and control of a fully integrated court system. Desirably this book should be widely distributed among all who share responsibility for improvement in the administration of justice.

Once we pass beyond this valuable, if utilitarian, aspect of the book, reader interest is likely to vary according to individual predilections. Unfortunately only a minority of the legal profession is actively interested in court reform. One can imagine that not all listeners to these lectures as originally given at the University of Virginia Law School were deeply stirred, whatever their protestations. The reaction of reviewers has seemed to vary from the torchbearers, who have hailed it extravagantly, down to carpers, who find it cliché-ridden and obviously unnecessary to all who share with them the felicity of already living in some juristic paradise. Neither attitude does justice to the sober values of the book. It does not propound new and original solutions; nor is it exciting except to those who already are enthusiasts of social advance. But it does tell what can be done and is being done by way of practical improvements in an area of ever increasing significance and concern as the court calendars of our cities become more and more congested and justice more delayed.

Of the four main divisions of the book, perhaps the middle two, dealing with Simplified Judicial Structure and Procedure and Effective Administration and Less Delay, are the most successful. They deal with such practical reforms—exemplified now in New Jersey and Puerto Rico—as the unified court in all branches under the directing administration of the chief justice; reformed and simplified court procedure regulated by rules of procedure, rather than statutes; and the modern devices for expediting court work, ranging from discovery to pre-trial conferences and the free interchange of judges where needed as ascertained by a central administrative office. The earlier discussion on the selection of judges, arguing for the American Bar Association's program of restricted appointment, shows the eternal dilemma of ways to obtain jurists at once technically skilled and liberal in outlook. And the final chapter on "Modernizing the Law through Law Centers" reflects a generous, if vague, aspiration toward a perfected substantive law.

CHARLES E. CLARK
United States Court of Appeals

FRANCIS O. WILCOX and CARL M. MARCY. *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations.* Pp. xiv, 535. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955. $5.00.

The Tenth General Assembly has clearly implied that it is not now "appropriate" for the Member states to review the United Nations Charter; it is, however, manifestly appropriate for all interested parties to acquaint themselves with this invaluable analysis of the existing proposals to change the Charter. It is a thorough, objective, and well-documented study, which contributes significantly to what will ultimately be a seven-volume series on the United Nations under the Brookings imprimatur.

Starting with an account of informal changes made in the Charter since 1945, the authors take a brief look at the organized movement to revise the document. They go on to consider in four successive sections proposals affecting: the basic character of the Organization, attempts to maintain international peace and security, efforts to promote the general welfare, and organizational and administrative matters. They conclude with a summary of some of the major problems involved in changing the Charter.

The authors' objectivity does not prevent them from carefully analyzing the proposals they describe. Their penetrating analyses stimulate the reader to weigh the available alternatives and resolve for himself the most controversial issues. They do not hesitate, for example, to point out that Senator Bricker's idea of amending Article 2(7) "would leave unanswered the important question of precisely what matters are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Member states" or to doubt that other proposals to clarify this troublesome article would "actually make . . . [it] any clearer than it now is." And they remind their readers that the San Francisco Conference "affords some evidence that the article was deliberately made ambiguous . . . [because] it dealt with an issue so difficult of solution as to be better left unsolved." Perhaps the greatest tribute to the authors' impartiality and comprehensiveness is that a reader, busily scribbling marginal rebuttals to one set of arguments, will consistently find his own views clearly and completely presented just a paragraph or page ahead!

The authors have kept to a minimum the overlapping that is inevitable in dealing with fundamental proposals that strike at every aspect of the United Nations. On the other hand, they supply a good index, table of contents, appendix, and useful cross-references which enable the reader to follow separate threads in the skein if he wishes to do so. The authors have enormously increased the book's value by using unpublished materials not ordinarily available to the general public.

Cautioning their readers that in evaluating proposals for change, "it is well to remember that what is impractical today may become practical tomorrow," Wilcox and Marcy have greatly helped to create the "better public understanding of the history and experience of the United Nations system," which is the goal of the Brookings Institution in publishing this series of volumes.

RICHARD N. SWIFT
New York University

ECONOMICS AND LABOR

WALTER ADAMS and HORACE M. GRAY. *Monopoly in America: The Government as Promoter.* Pp. xv, 221. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $2.75.

The main thesis of this little book is that the government fosters and promotes monopolies. Close behind is the conclusion that the government should desist from favoring big business and encourage smaller units, thereby making for greater competition.

It would have been helpful if the authors had given us specific examples to illustrate their points of view. We wonder why no

mention is made of the Bell Telephone Company, which is our chief example of a pure monopoly. It is true that this company charges the public fully for the services rendered, but it is dependable and progressive; and who would want a competing telephone line at the end of which was his family doctor or the fire station? It is obvious that public utilities generally serve the public better by being organized in large units.

It is not monopoly that is really at issue but oligopoly or duopoly. Where monopoly occurs the people have willed it so for their own advantage. Big business is to the authors economically unsound and socially disastrous. They see in the growth of what I call Mature Industrial Capitalism a system of monopoly. The big units diversify their products, integrate their functions, build up reserves or a surplus, and disperse their units over the country. The greatest competition the world has ever known comes from such big business units as General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, which the authors associate with monopoly. Indeed, competition has been most fierce between the industrial giants which have been more or less aloof from government. Actually, there is unprecedented competition today if we note only the great rise in installment buying. It is in such big business units as Sears, Roebuck and Company, F. W. Woolworth and Company, and the A. & P. that the poor man knows where he can buy most cheaply. Who would want to get rid of these?

Actually, the big units are coming to be owned by the small men who are the holders of pensions, as well as the owners of shares in mutual funds, common trusts, and the Monthly Investment Plan.

In the case of airlines and air waves the government must parcel out the right to use these publicly owned facilities to certain aviation lines and broadcasting and telecasting companies. Otherwise chaos would result.

The government turns to big business when it wants anything of importance done. In war time, it has leaned heavily on big business units to supply defense materials and it knows it can depend on these in war or other emergency. And so, after war, in the disposal of surplus materials it has been more economical for the government to deal with the giants.

The monopoly emphasis of the authors seems to reflect a nineteenth-century point of view and a New Deal eagerness to put the screws on business.

There is a strange championship in this book of rationalism over determinism. Actually, history shows that things first develop and that then the mind grasps them. So what we have is largely deterministic, somewhat modified by rational considerations.

N. S. B. GRAS

Cambridge, Mass.

W. A. JÖHR and H. W. SINGER. *The Role of the Economist as Official Adviser.* Translated by Jane Degras and Stephen Robinson. Pp. xii, 150. London: George Allen and Unwin; Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1955. $2.40.

The Role of the Economist as Official Adviser is the result of a published critical review by Dr. Singer of an earlier work by Professor Jöhr. Professor E. A. G. Robinson, who writes a Foreword to the present volume, suggested that the reviewed and the reviewer should join forces to publish what is now the present book.

In it Professor Jöhr's work was altered and expanded. These materials were supplemented by Dr. Singer, the latter dealing with the special functions and working experience of economists engaged in research staffs of international organizations.

This book, although the authors reveal a good grasp of their subject, is written in such general terms that its value may be severely limited for economists. There are chapters on "Delimitation of the Problem," "Sizing up the Problem," "Establishing the Aim," "Determination of the Situation," the "Appreciation or Judgment of Economic Measures," "Advice on Policy," "Putting Measures of Economic Policy into Effect," and a number of others. The second section of the book deals with the Problem of the Economic Order. Here we find rather brief analyses of questions of supply, demand, of perfect competition, socialism, varying types and degrees of intervention.

Attempts are made to say things that are relevant to individual nations as well as relations among nations via international organizations. The experienced government advisor is likely to find little that is new, and the well-trained economist who is interested in becoming a government advisor may find the discussion in such general terms that he will not gain a great deal of insight.

Had the book been organized around some specific problems, such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, tariff and trade policy, or economic growth and stability, perhaps more meat could have been put on the generalizations, thus making the book more useful.

While the authors have attempted to remain ideologically neutral, support for a free market economy is less evident than might suit the bent of many economists. A chapter on the difficulties of forecasting states that if a government has a public policy of a high and stable level of employment, the goal can be attained and this "eliminates those difficulties of forecasting business trends occasioned by business fluctuations. By keeping constant watch over the level of economic activity and influencing its course, the state can reduce the size of indeterminacy to a practically negligible size" (page 67). This seems to be a somewhat rosy view.

But then we are told that where international trade is important to a nation, the economist "cannot count on complete control of the course of business fluctuations, unless there is expectation of an effective international business cycle policy operated or inaugurated by the recently-established international organizations." This too seems to be somewhat premature.

EMERSON P. SCHMIDT

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A.

NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL. *Improving the Work Skills of the Nation.* Pp. viii, 203. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Cloth $3.50; Paper $2.25.

The present volume comprises the proceedings of a conference on skilled manpower held at Columbia University in the spring of 1955 under the auspices of the National Manpower Council. The Conference brought together representatives of education, industry, labor, government, the armed forces, and other agencies interested in the central problem of discovering ways and means of effectively augmenting the nation's resources of skilled workers.

The scope of the deliberation is revealed in the coverage of the volume. Part I, Introduction, is an analysis of the problem of skill development and the nation's investment in manpower. Part II, Secondary Education and the Development of Skill, discusses the relation of our secondary schools to national manpower needs and the function of vocational guidance in the discovery and cultivation of aptitudes. Part III, Industry and the Development of Skill, consists of a series of papers on the importance of automation, industry training plans, and the conservation of technical manpower in the armed forces. Part IV, The Community and the Development of Skill, presents the government's stake in skilled manpower, the community's responsibility for education and training, and the function of intelligent placement of industrial personnel.

A number of well-established conclusions emerged from the Conference. Education and training is clearly an investment in the economic strength and sustained progress of the nation. Central to the development of necessary manpower is our secondary school system, assisted by industry's vestibule schools, traditional apprenticeship programs, and training plans. The teacher is recognized as the foundation of an efficient educational and training program, hence the necessity of attracting well-qualified, competent personnel to the profession. Because of the essentially dynamic character of modern technology, adult education must supplement the education of adolescents. Industry, government, and the community must accept responsibility for the effective co-ordination of general and vocational education. Organized labor and the armed forces must

co-operate in implementing the general plans envisioned here. Informed, efficient counselling and guidance are indispensable.

While the formal papers presented at the Conference were, as is normally the case, of uneven quality, the general discussions, which are summarized with extraordinary competence in the volume, were uniformly thoughtful and penetrating.

The Conference indubitably met the formidable challenge presented to it by the National Manpower Council. Perhaps the most encouraging outcome of such deliberations is that the United States is giving intelligent, careful attention in a time of peace to problems which hitherto have commanded serious consideration only under the emergency stresses of a time of war. For this constructive result the National Manpower Council is primarily responsible.

GORDON S. WATKINS
University of California
Riverside

H. DUNCAN HALL. *North American Supply.* Pp. xvi, 559. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green, and Company, 1955. (Distributed by British Information Services, New York.) $6.30.

One might conclude from the title that this book is a dry statistical analysis of the supplies furnished from North America during World War II. It is neither dry nor statistical, but a broad treatment of production problems carefully written to hold the attention of the reader. The book deals with the impact of mobilization on the economy of a nation, and with political and economic problems arising in connection with the supply of machine tools, raw materials, ordinance, vehicles, ships and aircraft from the United States and Canada. It does not wrestle with the technical aspects of supply. Critical problems are traced from the beginning of mobilization by the United Kingdom to the conclusion of the war and demobilization. The author states that the history is based on the British official records preserved in London, Washington, and Ottawa. It, therefore, does not give the full picture of North American supply as an American-British-Canadian combination. Such a history must await publication of official accounts by the United States and Canada.

It is interesting to note the influence which supply from the United States had on British foreign and financial policy, size of the armed forces, export trade, and sea transport as well as the effect U. S. political conditions had on British plans for munitions procurement in this country. Although the British realized before the war that the production capabilities of North America must be utilized if the United Kingdom was to fully mobilize, little was accomplished until the repeal of the Neutrality Act in November 1939, nine months after the U. K. entered the war. Even after this hurdle was overcome, the volume of munitions orders placed in the United States was limited by the availability of dollars. Not until the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941 was it possible to develop, with the U. S., long term supply plans to support an all-out military buildup to defeat the Axis.

The author points out that while the United Kingdom was on a cash and carry basis, prior to Lend-Lease, actual deliveries from United States production were relatively small, although great progress was made in organizing the supply effort and placing orders. A noteworthy contribution to the U. S. war effort, during this period, was the stimulating effect British munitions orders had on the conversion of U. S. industry to a war footing. Of particular value was the allotment of millions of dollars by the British for capital assistance in building new plants or expanding old ones for the manufacture of explosives and aircraft.

A large part of the book is devoted to lend-lease aid and the functioning of the combined United States–United Kingdom machinery organized to implement it. On the whole, this operation is conspicuous as an outstanding example of international co-operation and demonstrates that nations can co-operate to their mutual advantage. Lend-lease aid to the British Commonwealth was about four times as much as the Reciprocal Aid furnished the United States during the war; however, both the United States and the United Kingdom contributed about 4¾ per cent of their national income to mutual aid.

In short, this is the story of a great partnership—the British Commonwealth and the United States—engaged in marshalling their combined resources effectively against a common enemy.

STANLEY L. SCOTT
Alexandria, Va.

DON D. HUMPHREY. *American Imports.* Pp. xviii, 546. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955. $6.00.

The days are long past when support could be rallied for radical changes in commercial policy by prophetic utterance such as those of Cobden, with his faith that "free trade is the international law of the Almighty"; and on balance it is all to the good that such issues should be debated in terms of sober analysis rather than of clarion calls and vehement denunciation. There is, however, more than a slight risk that in real life sober analysis may go too far in sapping our energy and diminishing our zeal in pressing for reforms accepted as desirable "in principle" by most "right thinking" people, but likely to provoke violent political opposition.

Dr. Humphrey's *American Imports* presents much up-to-date information and acute, if not always thoroughly convincing, analysis on the current problems connected with United States imports and import policy. In general, his position is similar to that of many of the general surveys of U. S. commercial policy made in recent years. He condemns the rigidity of U. S. customs law and the uncertainty and inequity of U. S. customs procedures, believes that laws requiring government agencies to buy American-made goods should be repealed, and describes discrimination against hauling American goods in foreign ships as an irrational method of supporting a fleet for national defense. He deprecates the exaggerated importance attached by both supporters and opponents to the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, which he describes as responsible for "a Janus-faced program which promised substantial benefits of trade without the injury which might be caused by increased imports to any interested group of producers." That such a program should not have had substantial effects upon U. S. imports is scarcely a matter for surprise. It is doubtful, however, whether the "general reader" for whom the study is said to be intended will derive from a perusal of Dr. Humphrey's book any strong sense of the urgency of the issues presented to him. He may rather be inclined to conclude that it is all very complex and confusing (as of course it is), and that as none of the possible changes is likely to matter very much, it is not really important to exert himself in favor of any one of them. It is certainly no use crying for the moon, but the doggedly persistent spirit that eventually produces is more likely to be evoked by pressing home the simple theme that "every little helps."

ALLAN G. B. FISHER
Washington, D. C.

TOM DALE and VERNON GILL CARTER. *Topsoil and Civilization.* Pp. xvi, 270. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. $3.95.

Topsoil and Civilization is a tract. Purporting to be an interpretation of history, it sets out to prove the thesis that, since the time of man, the world's great civilizations have fallen into decay, destruction, or oblivion only after the native topsoil had been misused or wantonly destroyed. The authors grant that virile enemies sometimes nudged tottering nations along the road to ruin and hastened their demise. But, they contend, a new civilization arose on the same spot if the topsoil remained rich enough to provide the surplus crop production that has always been the *sine qua non* of the strong nations. The thesis is illustrated and confirmed—at least to the authors' satisfaction—by conducted tours through Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Mediterranean history.

Like Knickerbocker in his famous history of New York, Messrs. Dale and Carter felt constrained to start with the beginnings of the earth, but they dismiss

the first one and two-thirds billion years as irrelevant because, in their book, no soils were formed prior to the Silurian period 350,000,000 years ago. To a reviewer who has studied pre-Cambrian and pre-Ordovician soils and weathering products, this kind of sweeping generalization had the unfortunate effect of arousing grave suspicions about the simplicity of the authors' major theme. He must conclude that, like any oversimplified theory that is applied to complex phenomena, their topsoil hypothesis falls far short of explaining history.

As an ardent conservationist, this writer has no wish to minimize the importance of judicious land use. The authors' brief treatment of the course of events in Lebanon and Palestine must convince the most skeptical historian that national decay and soil destruction were causally related in those two countries. But after exposing the inadequacies of Huntington's climatic theory, Dale and Carter, too, are lured into the same trap of applying a single explanation to the multiplex trends of world history. Their broad jump from antiquity to the United States is one that most readers will be unable to make. An industrial civilization depends, to be sure, on surplus food production, but it is industrial through the wise use of all its natural resources, of which energy is the most vital. The North American Indians lived with rich soils and unlimited mineral and energy resources without evolving a great civilization, whereas the Aztecs, with far less to support them, developed a powerful empire in a land that has not been successfully exploited since the Spaniards exterminated them.

No! It is not the topsoil, but human intelligence and ingenuity, that make history. Topsoil and energy and the rest of nature's bounty are adjuncts, but they are only as important as human beings make them. *Topsoil and Civilization* is not likely to send historians scurrying to their studies to reinterpret the past.

HOWARD A. MEYERHOFF
GeoSurveys
Washington, D. C.

MILTON J. NADWORNY. *Scientific Management and the Unions, 1900-1932: A Historical Analysis.* Pp. vii, 187. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $3.75.

It would be hard to think of two forces more likely to clash head on than scientific management, in its early forms, and American trade unionism. Frederick W. Taylor and his early associates in the management engineering field challenged the unions to open warfare by their insistence that the new techniques for plant and labor efficiency were outgrowths of science and hence allowed no room for the crudities of collective bargaining. This war continued from 1900 until the efficiency engineers, prodded on in large part by one of their own number, Robert Valentine, conceded that there was still ample area for honest debate and disagreement in the application of the new tools. Unions can scarcely be said to have embraced scientific management wholeheartedly since the open warfare ended. But they have accepted certain aspects of Taylorism, while management for its part has embraced only a much modified version of all that Taylor championed.

Milton J. Nadworny, associate professor of commerce and economics at the University of Vermont, has now written the story of this inevitable clash and of the limited reconciliation. His study is yet another valuable and welcome addition to the Harvard University series on Entrepreneurial History. Nadworny sees his book as a contribution to the history of the scientific management movement in American industrial development. He might equally well claim for his book its rightful place as an important part of the history of American managerial attitudes towards labor and unionism. Some readers will wish that the figures of Taylor, Valentine, Frank Gilbreth, and Samuel Gompers might emerge more as full blown characterizations than they do. But the author's interest in them is as protagonists of ideas, and this is essentially a book about ideas, not about men.

The basic theme of this history is nowhere better expressed than in a quotation from Gilbreth who ran into strong labor opposition when he sought to introduce Taylor methods in Gardner, Massachusetts in 1908. The enraged Gilbreth burst forth, "I have been a Union man and I know what is good for you." Here the issue is joined: on the one side stand the experts armed with omniscience and a panacea, on the other side stand the union leaders fumbling for their concept of a better way of life based on increased worker participation and dignity. The stop watch dramatically symbolized this struggle from the first, just as it symbolizes it today in some plants where its status remains that of demigod or devil. But elsewhere, as Nadworny suggests, time and depression have swept unions and management alike past the old events, and modified management engineering takes its place as one set of tools to be employed with others, within the collective bargaining framework, to promote more efficient labor utilization and more adequate labor compensation.

JOHN R. COLEMAN
Carnegie Institute of Technology

SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

A. IRVING HALLOWELL. *Culture and Experience.* Pp. xvi, 434. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955. $7.00.

Although this volume consists primarily of some of Hallowell's many rich and thoughtful published contributions to comparative psychology (in its broadest sense), it is much more than a mere compilation. Hallowell himself has arranged, edited and provided new materials so that we have for the first time in one place a coherent statement of his life work to date. Part I contains the most general and theoretic papers in the broad field of culture and personality. Part II stresses questions such as the world view, the personality structure, and the concept of the self as exemplified primarily by the Ojibwa Indians. Part III discusses the cultural patterning of human behavior and Part IV the psychological dimensions of culture change. Throughout empiric data based on Hallowell's ethnographic field work and his dedication to the Rorschach test as an instrument of investigation are stressed. The careful balance in his thinking between theory and data in that interstitial but crucial area between traditional anthropology and traditional psychologies emerges here fully. That Hallowell is a careful scholar is attested by sixty pages of notes to 366 pages of text. His own bibliography of some ninety items written from 1921 to 1955 attests his industry.

This is a scholar's book written for scholars. It is, therefore, not easy reading. Hallowell's style is dense, not so much because of unnecessarily technical language, but because of his close and explicit reasoning and his remarkable command of materials so that he explores minutely blind alleys and false problems before reaching the conclusion that this is what they are. Here is the best tradition of extensive library research, of careful and minute field work, of analytic reasoning, and of steady adherence to a developing line of thought. One emerges from the reading of these papers with the sense that the major theme and a predominant preoccupation in Hallowell's life work is not solely culture and experience, as the title suggests, but perhaps the even more profound problem of the nature of human nature.

We are indebted both to Hallowell and to the Philadelphia Anthropological Society for having so appropriately marked his sixtieth anniversary.

CORA DU BOIS
Harvard University

CHARLES F. PALMER. *Adventures of a Slum Fighter.* Pp. xi, 272. Atlanta, Ga.: Tupper and Love, 1955. $4.00.

This is an interesting story of a businessman's fight against slums. It is factual and authentic and is related in an informal manner which makes the book pleasant reading. These adventures in slum fighting began in Atlanta, Georgia in 1933. The author, a practical real estate man

concerned almost exclusively with central business properties, stopped one morning and for the first time walked through nine square blocks of squalor—"a human garbage dump"—that he had previously ignored twice each workday as he drove to and from his office.

The impression this slum area made upon this prominent realtor had far-reaching effects. First, he headed a movement that brought about the eradication of the Techwood slum in Atlanta and its replacement by the first federal housing project in America. Second, his adventures took him to England, Scotland, Austria, Italy, Russia and other countries where he visited both the wretched areas of urban blight and the great housing projects designed for their elimination. The story of these visits indicates how for many years other countries have tackled the slum problem, a problem too long neglected in most American cities and not now attacked with sufficient vigor.

Slum clearance, as the writer views it, is not merely the physical removal of slum conditions but provision in their place of decent housing at rents the tenants can afford. Even where this necessitates a public housing subsidy, it has proved more economical to the taxpayer than continued slum maintenance.

Other problems often presented by such programs include: location of low-cost housing areas that enable tenants to go to and from work without prohibitive transportation costs; development of housing units in relation to prevailing family sizes; construction that will require a minimum of maintenance; rehousing the people while the slum areas are undergoing reconstruction; housing for unsocial and incorrigible tenants. How these problems are met in various cities around the world is related with many concrete illustrations.

Possible long-range effects of slum clearance and rehousing, both here and abroad, are explored quite objectively. It is concluded that such a program promotes democracy since the slum is a fertile seedbed of malcontent; could help avoid depressions by stimulating employment; could be an international factor for peace by diverting efforts from preparation for war.

E. W. GREGORY, JR.
University of Richmond

ROBERT EZRA PARK. *Society: Collective Behavior, News and Opinion, Sociology and Modern Society.* Pp. 358. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $5.00.

With the publication of this third volume of collected papers, the student of society has an almost complete list of the papers by Robert E. Park in convenient form. What one finds here are not empirical studies or research monographs, but imaginative commentary on many aspects of urban society. Park's great influence derived to a large degree from his ability to raise key questions and his talent for helping students and readers to look at the facts of human association from fresh perspectives.

Park is often at his best in the papers that start out as book reviews or introductions but end as free-running observations on contemporary life. Thus he uses Mayo's *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* and Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* as points of departure for stimulating essays on urban society and the place of science in it.

It is in the material on the newspaper that Park most clearly exhibits the wide command of information that made his propositions convincing, even though they lacked formal and systematic testing. This lack of systematic tests was not, in my judgment, a strength, as some of his admirers make it out to be; but it was a weakness that was compensated for, to a great degree, by his keen sense of observation. His interpretation of news and the newspaper is a functional one—long before the word "function" began to play a key part in American social science. One sees the newspaper—whether it be a major urban daily or a foreign-language paper—springing from the life of the city. It is what it is because of the nature of the social processes in the society of which it is a part.

It was interesting to reread the first chapter of Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* which is reprinted here. Few books have had so large an influence on the development of American sociology. It is a text in the grand manner, introducing students to the central theoretical problems and major works of Comte, Spencer, Windleband, Tarde, Giddings, Durkheim, and many others. One wonders what would happen if more of the authors of introductory texts were to follow that course today, substituting the major theorists and documents on the contemporary scene for those used by Park and Burgess. Publishers would complain, teachers would call the results "good for advanced undergraduates and graduates" (i.e., unusable as a text), and our sophomores would scream. But I believe that all, even the publisher, would profit.

Many of the papers in this volume are of interest to the historian of sociology and to the person doing a special study of Park. There is bound to be some element of the "monument" in such collections and one should not try to rationalize their publication by excessive claims of their current theoretical and research importance. It must be added, however, that Park's work, even when it is most "dated," is a mine for the social historian, who can see much of urban America over a thirty-year period through the eyes of a most perceptive and acute observer.

J. MILTON YINGER
Oberlin College

J. ARTHUR HOYLES. *Religion in Prison.* Pp. 146. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.50.

It is not easy to do justice to a book in which deep religious feeling, a good deal of common sense, and knowledge of prison history and prison conditions are so closely mixed with platitudes and the somewhat indiscriminate and uncritical use of criminological literature. There is a rather incomplete bibliography at the end, but hardly any references are given to enable the critical reader to check the author's statements.

Apparently a prison chaplain himself, the author begins with some historical references to the "occasional ministrations" to prisoners provided in previous centuries by such great figures as George Fox, the Wesleys, Elizabeth Fry, and Sarah Martin. He then proceeds to describe the manifold difficulties confronting the first regular prison chaplains, notably John Clay at Preston Jail. The third chapter links the idea of individual religious ministration in prison to the development of the Pennsylvanian system of solitary confinement, whose dangers are stressed together with the opportunities it offers for the work of the chaplain. In the following chapter, one of the crucial problems of the whole subject is clearly formulated: "Either Christianity must challenge the bad conditions [in prison] or it must contract out of the whole business. . . . To its credit, let it be said, it chose the former alternatives. The Gospel did eventually secure prison reform." Naturally, those penal historians who place the main emphasis on the influence of economic factors on prison reform will not be ready to accept this thesis; and the author, without referring to the literature on this highly controversial subject, admits that "it may well be asked whether the humanitarian movement of the nineteenth century had anything to do with religion." In his answer, however, he tends mainly to rely on his own personal convictions. On another important problem in this field, whether attendance at religious services should be compulsory for prisoners, the author's answer is, rightly, in the negative. Is he equally right, however, in assuming that "the custom at present is to provide facilities for the observance of religious rites for those who desire them, but not to inflict them upon the unwilling"? The Chairman of the English Prison Commission, Sir Lionel Fox, much more cautiously, speaks of a "compromise" system.

In the remaining chapters, sound and humane views on capital punishment, "incorrigible" criminals, on crime and morality and similar subjects can be found side by side with moving, but rather naive stories of sudden conversions of hardened criminals, with the categoric statement that "every citizen can find the resources

to resist the temptations which arise in an imperfect society" and the complaint that "in the present century the tendency has been to regard *mental* welfare as the domain of the doctor. The chaplain has more or less been pushed out of the sphere in which he once had exclusive rights." The author is objective enough, however, to add that "possibly the chaplain is largely to blame for the usurping of his function by the medical officer." In the same chapter, "Religion and Psychology," the present reviewer is, to his surprise, approvingly credited with a rather odd statement of which he believes he is quite innocent, but as usual no reference whatsoever is given in this well-intentioned but thoroughly unscientific book.

HERMANN MANNHEIM
The London School of Economics
and Political Science

JEROME HIMELHOCH and SYLVIA FLEIS FAVA (Eds.). *Sexual Behavior in American Society: An Appraisal of the First Two Kinsey Reports.* Edited for the Society for the Study of Social Problems. Pp. xvii, 446. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1955. $5.00.

One may safely assume that these forty papers culled from various sources (many from *Social Problems*) will not end comments about the two volumes now familiarly known as the "Kinsey Reports." Seward Hiltner's four summary chapters help the reader to review and interpret some major findings in those two volumes. The other papers mostly tell him how sociologists, psychologists, statisticians, and psychiatrists feel about the way in which the report and its underlying research were executed. Some authors use the opportunity to publish new data; for example, the frequencies of premarital coitus in the United States, Scandinavia, and Germany are found to be quite close. Kluckhohn's contribution is in this category. He presents some quantitative, cross cultural comparisons of coital position, the value placed on premarital chastity, and tolerance of prostitution and homosexuality. His finding that at least one-fourth of a sample of world societies "accepts" adult male homosexuality while only one-eighth "rejects" it must *not* be interpreted (as a footnote also warns) to read that in the former group homosexuality is a common custom. Other original findings concern the impact of the Reports on college populations. Generally study of them changed students' attitudes, often in the more liberal direction.

Most of the book is occupied by connotative statements about the report. The social scientist contributors are remarkably uniform in deploring Kinsey's naturalistic approach to human sexuality. By implication, at least, they object to his definition. Sex is held to be more than genitality or orgasm. Psychological and social factors must be taken into account because man, these authors claim, cannot be studied as just another animal. Are they not also saying that "Sex is holy"? Resistance on these grounds to Kinsey's point of view is reminiscent of former opposition of studies of human evolution. Methodological criticism is abundant and often finely balanced, as, for example, in the statement of the American Statistical Association's committee which reviews the statistical methods of the first Report. Psychiatrists show concern with Kinsey's numerical concept of normality. Several writers point out that in both Reports value judgments (tinged with the normative fallacy) often intrude in what presume to be objective, descriptive propositions.

JOHN J. HONIGMANN
University of North Carolina

JOHN P. DEAN and ALEX ROSEN. *A Manual of Intergroup Relations.* Pp. xiii, 194. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $3.75.

This important study is the outgrowth of a six-year project of the Cornell Social Science Research Center. The study does not report specific research findings. Instead, it offers a guide to practitioners for the conduct of intergroup relations. (This is a cover term for interracial and minority relations.) In Part I the authors set forth twenty-seven propositions which pertain to the improvement of intergroup relations within community organizations. Under this heading they deal with staff

teaching, desegregation, integration, and the important problems of communication. Part II presents propositions designed for improving intergroup relations in the community at large. It includes discussion of realistic goals for community action and problems of strategy.

The propositions are statements in very general terms. For example: Proposition 7: p. 58. "Conformity with the practices of segregation and discrimination is often quite unrelated to the intensity of prejudice in the individuals who conform." Or Proposition 21: p. 127. "Community-wide action in intergroup relations is more often successful when strategic, influential community leaders participate at the outset in the planning and organization of the action effort." These are neither rigorous formulations of a scientific law nor are they precise enough to suggest specific action in concrete situations. However, whatever their deficiency, the study amply makes up for it in the discussion which follows each proposition. These elaborations contain a wealth of concrete illustrations and realistic analyses of specific problems which characterize intergroup relations in America today. Here, indeed, is the kind of manual in which anyone working in the field will find a rich source of valuable advice and suggestion. More than that, it seems to serve better than any textbook known to the reviewer as a guide for those who seek reliable and illuminating information on the interracial problem.

THEODORE ABEL
Hunter College

CLARENCE J. GLACKEN. *The Great Loochoo: A Study of Okinawan Village Life.* Pp. xvi, 324. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. $4.50.

The Great Loochoo is another in the series of reports resulting from the many postwar researches sponsored by the Pacific Science Board of the National Research Council. The study it reports was part of the program known as the Scientific Investigations of the Ryukyu Islands (SIRI). The author spent six months in 1951 studying three communities in southern Okinawa, two of them agricultural and the other specializing largely in fishing and stonecutting. Although he participated in SIRI as an associate in anthropology, the author is a geographer by profession and training. It is evident that he concentrated his attention on those aspects of community life which would be of most interest to a human geographer, though he clearly made an effort to get information on the standard topics reported by ethnographers. The result is a readable and useful introduction to Okinawan village life. Starting with the general geography and cultural history, it goes on to treat housing, trade, family organization, land tenure and use, agriculture, fishing and stonecutting, forests, infancy to old age, the community, religion, and recent environmental and social change.

The approach throughout is oriented toward describing the conditions of Okinawan life, the behavioral routines, and general standard of living from the standpoint of the interests and conceptual framework of the observer. Only here and there do we get glimpses of the conceptual framework of the Okinawan. While it is essential to have for Okinawa the type of description given, it cannot be regarded as anything but a superficial account of Okinawan culture, the things one must know in order to understand the events in their natural and social world as Okinawans understand them. It is, then, only the material aspects of Okinawan economic, social, and religious life (the manifest conditions, routines, and activities) along with their more obvious interrelationships which are described. The topics subject to careful analysis within this framework are the economy and ecology. It is here that the book has value as something more than an introduction or survey.

WARD H. GOODENOUGH
University of Pennsylvania

DOUGLAS L. OLIVER. *A Solomon Island Society.* Pp. xxii, 533. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $10.00.

This book is essentially three things. First, it is a comprehensive ethnography of the Siuai culture of Bougainville Island as it existed in the late 1930's. As such, it

provides a valuable portrait of a primitive people before its virtual decimation during World War II. More importantly, it represents a needed addition to the whole-culture studies through which the interdependence of culture traits and culture patterns can be heuristically illustrated. Performed with admirable comprehensiveness and clarity of presentation, Dr. Oliver's account cannot be ignored by any one interested in the raw materials of the behavioral sciences.

Second, it is a descriptive survey of leadership institutions in a stateless society, an object of social inquiry more often honored in the breach than in the observance. This essentially novel section of the book should prove useful for more than professional anthropologists. The portrayal of the role of ambition in Siuai society, the rewards and burdens of leadership, and the ways in which leaders must strike an often delicate balance between conservative and innovative activities suggests new general insights into the social functions of leadership in less exotic contexts. The civilized West could conceivably learn much about itself from this study of the relationship between wealth, especially as a symbol of economic success and shrewdness, and power. A central aspect of the process of acquiring renown in Siuai is the utilization of capital in such a way that loyalties are developed, obligations imposed, and authority asserted through traditionally acceptable avenues. Again, the interaction of the new and the traditional in this primitive setting is instructive for the contemporary West, puzzled by the irregular cycles of liberalism and conservatism in its moral and political values and its dynamic conceptions of leadership.

Finally, *A Solomon Island Society* is an attempt at cultural synthesis and evaluation. Here the book is at both its weakest and its most evocative. The field work was done before the author's theoretical interests were fully aroused, and his notes were not made with the kind of direct relevance to integrative ideas that is a prerequisite for either their testing or their illustration. Theoretically, therefore, the volume quite lacks significance. On the other hand, Dr. Oliver takes his stand with that minority group of behavioral scientists who hold that it is not only legitimate but obligatory to evaluate the objects of scientific study. His own attempt to assess Siuai culture under such headings as the insurance of societal continuity, the satisfaction of individual needs, and the utilization of human potentials is exciting. It represents an attempt to clarify the inescapable concept of value in the judgment of social processes and has parallels, for example, in the psychological quest for relevant operations defining such terms as personal "normality" or "positive adjustment." One could wish that this job had been attacked more boldly, but as Dr. Johnson remarked on another occasion, it is remarkable that it was done at all!

This book has the earmarks of a sound, stimulating, and widely useful contribution to man's understanding of man.

EDWARD JOSEPH SHOBEN, JR.
Columbia University

THOMAS R. FORD. *Man and Land in Peru.* Pp. ix, 176. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955. $4.00.

Since one conclusion which we seem to share with the Soviet Union is that feudalism comes out of the past and is evil, it is common to find in a certain type of book that what ails Latin America is her system of land distribution.

If Mr. Ford, too, lays much responsibility at the door of this institution, he does it with a judicial air and a documented argument and the superiority of one who in his academic virtue can refer to "emotionally charged subjects," "dogmatic assertions," and "unwarranted generalizations." He is also more immune than the school he is attacking to the belief that there is an easy way out; fully aware of the complexity and difficulty of Peru's problems, he distrusts the optimistic assumption that industrialization provides a quick solution and will go no further than the formula "it is possible, if . . . ", coupled with warnings as to the interconnection of the landholding system, the Indian heritage, backward agricultural techniques, low educational standards, and lack of capital. Strong sociopolitical movements and bold leadership do not seem to be in sight at the moment. If President Odria goes ahead with plans for an election and if it proves more than a passing of power to a favorite, one may at least observe with curiosity.

Soundly based on geographical data and personal acquaintance with land and people, buttressed by light from history and statistics, enlightened by familiarity with the blazing attacks of such intellectuals as González Prada, Mariátequi, and Haya de la Torre, this is an excellent, well-balanced handbook. It lacks some of the human warmth of George McBride's old classic on Chile and, *Gott sei Dank,* the rhetoric with a Latin author might treat the subject.

Notes, bibliography, and index are useful.

W. REX CRAWFORD
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J. MAYONE STYCOS. *Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico: A Study of the Lower Income Group.* Pp. xv, 332. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $6.00.

Despite a heavy out-migration, Puerto Rico is still growing rapidly because of its high birth rate and low death rate. This high birth rate persists despite governmental encouragement of birth control and despite the fact that most couples seem to have used contraception at one time or another. Thus the reasons for ineffective contraception represent a basic research problem in the study of Puerto Rico's population. The tendency of wives to marry young increases the consequences of ineffectual contraception. Hence another basic research problem is: why so many Puerto Rican women marry years younger than the ages which they believe to be ideal for marriage.

To study these and related questions the Social Science Research Center of the University of Puerto Rico has undertaken a program of research, the Family Life Research Project, under the directorship of Professor Reuban Hill. As part of the exploratory stage of this project, Stycos planned and supervised the interviewing of seventy-two low-income couples, with husbands and wives interviewed separately. He reports his findings in *Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico.* This readable book is the first volume to be published in the Project's final report.

The initial substantive chapters deal with the status ideologies of the sexes, childrearing practices, and courtship. These serve as background for a set of explanations for the young marriage age of wives and the high incidence of consensual unions. Chapters dealing with marital relations, fertility belief systems, and attitudes toward birth control provide a setting for Stycos' strongest chapter, in which he reviews a variety of reasons for the low acceptability of most methods of birth control. Heavy reliance is placed on the concepts of psychoanalysis and structural-functional sociology.

Because of the exploratory nature of the interviews, Stycos' hypotheses are necessarily provisional. Unfortunately this tentativeness is increased by certain deficiencies of his analysis. Typically, several explanations are advanced for a phenomenon without indicating the extent to which they occur together. Nor is the number of respondents to which an explanation applies always made clear. Too often a few brief quotes from three or four respondents are substituted for tables. Matters such such as childrearing, courtship, fertility beliefs, and use of birth control are treated each in a separate chapter with virtually no tables provided to give an idea of the correlations among these phenomena.

For these reasons the hypotheses remain quite hypothetical and the book, therefore, does not stand up well by itself. However, its many interesting ideas should make it a valuable introduction to subsequent volumes of the Project which will report about the verification stage.

ROBERT G. POTTER, JR.
Princeton University

PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

PIETER GEYL. *Use and Abuse of History.* Pp. vi, 97. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955. $2.50.

"Histories make men wise," said Bacon. "They would," seems to say the professor of modern history at the University of Utrecht in the Terry Lectures delivered at Yale University in the fall of 1954, "if

they are used in the cause of truth." And his small but very important book is a major contribution on the use and importance of historical truth. In it he surveys, briefly and admirably, the various philosophies of history from St. Augustine to Toynbee, Bossuet, Grotius, Hegel, Marx, Carlyle, Macaulay, Nietzsche, Spengler and a host of others. All of them he aptly and justly describes as system-builders and is very critical of them all because the systems they built are not founded on historical facts; they have as their base the writers' passion for unity, "a passion fundamentally antagonistic to history. . . . " Geyl finds that nearly all these writers have interpreted history in defense of a special cause, or in support of their particular beliefs. Sometimes this was done in order to have history suit their passionate politics; some writers had it serve as a weapon in party strife; and Macaulay compelled history to inspire "him to dispose of the past" with certitude and confidence. They all have roused the author's wrath, but he is eloquently indignant in seeing history presented by Toynbee "under the patronage of a scientific terminology." He states that Toynbee's system is the "Augustinian-Spenglerian scheme of the history of mankind he wants to pass off as the product of the empirical method, built up out of what he calls facts, without troubling to analyze their precise nature or test their reliability for the purposes of system construction" (pp. 65–66).

This Nestor of Utrecht states that he has "done battle with historical myths" in his time. But, as the most persistent and perhaps the most competent of Toynbee's critics, he is waging a battle royal with a Leviathan in behalf of historical truth. More power to him in his battle for a most worthy cause, "respect for the right of history to untrammeled investigation and criticism." This little book is a most eloquent testimony of the freedom of honest and intelligent inquiry.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
Library of Congress

ISAIAH BERLIN. *Historical Inevitability.* Pp. 79. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1954. $2.00.

Here is a much-needed twentieth-century declaration of the principle of freedom in history and the writing of history. Perhaps no professional historian could have done it with more discernment or more eloquence. Mr. Berlin repudiates the concept of historical inevitability in all its guises—metaphysical or theological, rational or mystical, naturalistic or scientific. Whatever form historical determinism takes, it points to impersonal forces whose sway can be demonstrated only by the most inadequate empirical evidence. By reducing man to an automaton these inexorable forces lead to the abnegation of human choice and of moral responsibility; the doctrine that to know all is to forgive all "is transformed into a mere truism."

Having revealed in these and many other ways the fallacies in historicism, Mr. Berlin attacks what appears to be the antithetical view that our involvement in the "human predicament" disqualifies us from making historical judgments. He finds that this kind of Socratic humility before the impenetrable intricacies of the historical process leads by another road to the same abnegation of human responsibility that results from historical determinism. He ends by assaulting those whom he holds responsible for "a quasi-sociological mythology."

Having previously cut off with inexorable logic the retreat to historical relativism with its anarchy of individual interpretations, Mr. Berlin leaves us with only one alternative—that the historian, by adhering faithfully to his complicated, well-established techniques, and by maintaining his personal integrity, is capable, though he must perforce make value judgments, of approaching objectivity, or of contributing to an ultimately solid structure of objective historical knowledge. Such a belief is not affirmed but it is clearly implicit in Mr. Berlin's argument.

I would not personally reject this conclusion, but it seems to me that Mr. Berlin does not sufficiently recognize the contribution to historical understanding of the theoretical systems he decries. He admits that they have "taught many admirable lessons in restraint and humility," and that their acceptance has had "exceedingly civilized consequences." Yet, he does not acknowledge the enormous expansion in our concept of the scope of history that has come from the distorted insights which he justifiably denigrates. Perhaps, moreover, he has allies which he does not recognize among his seeming enemies, for in the context of those trends in modern thinking which Mr. Berlin deplores, Toynbee's great work, through surely a theodicy, affirms the very principle of human responsibility.

It must be admitted, however, that had Mr. Berlin taken account of criticisms which his forthright thesis invites, he might have blunted his attack and tempered the intellectually exhilarating effect of his essay.

WILLSON H. COATES
University of Rochester

HERBERT MARCUSE. *Reason and Revolution.* Pp. xii, 440. New York: Humanities Press, 1954. $5.00.

As Nietzsche was blamed for the superman, so Hegel (1770–1831) finds himself today an involuntary ancestor of Marx, Feuerbach, Strauss, as well as Kierkegaard and Toynbee, Sartre and Dewey, also of Bergson among others. An "egghead" exponent of idealism, Hegel propounded a dialectical process, in which historical evolution is the result of opposing forces inherent in nature: each historical tendency (thesis) generates a counter-tendency (antithesis) which in due course will win out, thus issuing a new tendency (synthesis), a higher equilibrium. Of course Hegel extended this into the hypothesis that history consists of the unfolding of the spirit of genius of each state, culminating in the superiority of the Germanic peoples, since he attributed to them superior creativeness and leadership.

The second edition of this book, first published in 1941, "attempts to re-interpret Hegelian philosophy in its bearing on European thought from the time of the French Revolution to present day Fascism and National Socialism." The first section offers an analysis of Hegel's system, with emphasis on his earlier writings. The second demonstrates this relation through an analysis of fundamental principles of Marx's dialectical theory of society. The third section suggests verification of conclusions by examining post-Hegelian social and political theory, particularly the positivist opponents of Hegel. The concluding chapters deal with Neo-Hegelianism in the development of contemporary authoritarianism, making the point that the basic motives of Hegel's philosophy contradict the aims of present-day authoritarian states. A short epilogue (written in 1954) deals inadequately with Hegel and the Soviets' challenge of society and the individual.

Any scholarly elucidation is a contribution to such an obfuscated area of political thinking, but it does seem dubious to further stake an already apologetic interpretation of Hegelianism on Nazi attacks on his premises. True enough, Hegel condemns action for action's sake; his Reason implies the unity of men as rational beings. This the Nazis attacks, since that Reason, when fulfilled in freedom, would bring freedom to all men as their inalienable right. But did not Hegel also acknowledge that only within the confines of *the authority of the state* ("objectified reason"), superior to the individual, this fulfillment could occur? Perhaps it is fair to conclude that contemporary communism, fascism, nazism, existentialism, conservatism and socialism are all indebted to Hegel, each rejecting or neglecting one or the other element of the original concept. Hegel still influences us, and any interpretative exposition of his thinking is of value, since it contributes to our understanding of our own intellectual struggles. One cannot but agree with Carl Friedrich, who called the Hegelian polemics a "success philosophy"; as such it has its advocates and its disvocates.

BORIS ERICH NELSON
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CONSTANCE ROWE. *Voltaire and the State.* Pp. xiii, 254. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.00.

In her Preface Dr. Rowe states that "a coordinated report on [Voltaire's] theory of the nation and of international relations has heretofore been lacking." Her book is intended to fill this gap, first, by examining Voltaire's "personal patriotism"; and, second, by ascertaining "where in the scale of human loyalties he, as a philosopher,

would assign love of country." Actually her book divides into four virtually separate essays: one on an alleged deep, psychological struggle between Voltaire's patriotism and his humanitarianism; a second on his political theory; a third on his economic theory; and a fourth on his comments on war and foreign affairs.

As regards the latter topic: Voltaire was opposed to war (except for defensive reasons) and advocated a policy of balance of power. As regards economic theory, he shared many of the opinions of the physiocrats, though he did not assign so prominent and exclusive a role to agriculture. He agreed with them in approving free trade, but for the most part concentrated on recommending free internal trade, rather than international free trade, which he thought was "utopian." In some respects, however, he "held to some old-fashioned mercantilistic opinions," especially on the subject of import-export ratios and the values of overseas colonies.

By far the longest section of the book is devoted to what I have called the psychological struggle: I think the author tends to exaggerate what she calls the "bitter and unending conflict between a Frenchman infatuated with his native land and a philosopher whose first allegiance is to world-wide principles of human justice" (p. 17). In the first place, many motives other than patriotism surely entered into Voltaire's homesickness for France when he was in exile abroad. In the second place, as Dr. Rowe herself points out, his patriotism was less a love of French soil than of French culture. In her Conclusion she remarks that Voltaire's "cosmopolitan, humanitarian patriotism" (as she describes his position) "offers an example of how reason and sentiment can function together . . . in constructive harmony" (p. 192). This does not sound like a "bitter and unending conflict."

The section on political theory is, to me, the least satisfactory part of the book. Dr. Rowe has clearly performed an immense and careful labor in culling the huge mass of Voltaire's writings for his conception of the "principles of democracy." But the critical apparatus that she brings to bear upon this material is hardly sharp enough for the task imposed upon it. No one, I suppose, would deny that "the democratic way of life rests on the belief that the primitive equality of men as members of the human species should find the fullest possible social expression" (p. 99). But this is to state (or rather, to suggest) a whole complex of difficult problems in political theory, not to solve them. The fault here is certainly by no means Dr. Rowe's. Despite her loyalty to her subject (she writes of Voltaire that "he discussed with incomparable brilliance some of the most baffling questions of all time"), the Voltaire that emerges from these pages is a witty and eloquent publicist and propagandist—not remotely a political theorist.

W. T. JONES

Pomona College

F. C. GREEN. *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Critical Study of His Life and Writings.* Pp. 376. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $5.00.

Professor Green has undertaken to fill the need for a modern study of Rousseau. To a large extent, he has succeeded. Green has three outstanding assets: sympathetic insight into Rousseau's personality; a vivid, colorful style; and a subject who is intrinsically fascinating. One does have the feeling that the story could have been more dramatically told. Green is coolly intelligent. He is remarkably perceptive in all that deals with the relations between Rousseau's life and work. We must also credit him with adding some interesting facts from untapped sources.

While Professor Green has etched an unforgettable portrait of Rousseau, most of the figures around him are given only shadowy treatment. The analysis of Rousseau's relations with women, particularly Mme. de Warens, is somewhat naïve. In recounting the important quarrel with the encyclopedic group, Professor Green does not succeed in being entirely impartial. He brushes over Rousseau's faults and their whole psychological content. Mrs. Macdonald's findings on the falsification of Mme. d'Epinay's memoirs are mere facts, the meaning of which requires careful interpretation. Rousseau himself proved that his enemies had good reason to fear distortions in his revelations, and that they were right in their aspersions on his character. Professor Green misses Diderot's intention completely in the latter's remarks on Rousseau's inspiration for the first *Discours*. He wished not to claim its authorship, but on the contrary to tax Jean-Jacques with deliberate and systematic paradox; the context makes this clear.

Professor Green's exposition of Rousseau's thought is lucid, illuminating, coherent. Yet, it is not always sufficiently critical. His account of the *Contrat social*, and especially the *Emile*, is far too rosy. More serious, he fails to provide the intellectual background which is necessary to a proper evaluation. Rousseau's thought is isolated, without perspective. The important concepts of "state of nature" and "general will" are accorded only a shallow treatment. Furthermore, Green seems unacquainted with the most recent work on Rousseau, by Burgelin, Derathé, Strauss, Guéhenno and Cassirer.

Among the lesser criticisms: the excursions into psychology and anthropology (pp. 126, 130–31) that are (to quote specialists I have consulted) "gibberish"; the failure to trace a connection between the first two *Discours* and the *Lettre à d'Alembert;* the opinion that the eighteenth century materialists denied a "human nature" (p. 229); the hasty attribution to a reading of Leibniz of the common view that man's free will is responsible for evil. Finally, the medical diagnosis is neither adequate nor accurate.

Criticisms notwithstanding, this is a superb job. If Professor Green has not quite given us the definitive biography for our time, he has taken a giant stride in that direction. Any future biographer will be heavily indebted to him and will find in his book a high mark that will be difficult indeed to surpass.

LESTER G. CROCKER

Goucher College

BRIAN TIERNEY. *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought; New Series. Volume IV). Pp. xii, 280. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $5.00.

The present volume is a distinctive contribution to the study of a problem which has received considerable attention during the last twenty years. But whereas most scholars have been concerned with the publicist literature provoked by the Great Schism, Marsiglio, Ockham, Gerson, John of Paris, D'Ailly, and so on, with only brief excursions into the canonistic writings, Dr. Tierney has made a careful survey of all the canonical writings in which he finds most of the elements which were later exploited in putting together the fourteenth-century syntheses of the Conciliar Theory.

The author has divided his study into three parts. He first deals with the teachings of the twelfth-century decretists, logically extending this period up to about 1220. For his careful examination of this, in great part unpublished material, we cannot but be grateful. It is true that apart from the great *Summa* of Huguccio, the findings here are not quantitatively large, but they are significant and characterized by a freshness which is a trait of the smaller *summae* and other questions of this period. Patient and painstaking research into this literature on many problems hitherto studied proves rewarding. It is true, we do not find complete syntheses on many points; the relatively new science of canon law had not yet advanced so far. The canonists are conscientiously, even slavishly, attempting to interpret, each in its place, the mass of materials found in the *Concordia Discordantium Canonum*. However they are far removed from the controversies of the fourteenth century, though the later writers, well acquainted with the work of their predecessors, will exploit them and reinterpret them in the changed circumstances of their time and faced with the practical problem of a schism.

In the second part a special study is made of the corporation theories of the great thirteenth-century canonists. The third part treats the conciliar ideas of the fourteenth century canonists. Dr. Tierney has, I think, justified his use of John of

Paris among these because of his intimate knowledge of the canonistic teaching, though he is usually presented as a theologian and publicist. The nature of the papal monarchy is closely examined in the syntheses of Joannes Monachus and Gulielmus Durantis, both practical men of affairs. The teaching of the academic canonists is not neglected. A final chapter indicates how the elements of earlier teaching were incorporated in the synthesis of Franciscus Zabarella.

This interesting volume is well written and attractively presented. It provides a model as well as encouragement for others in the field of the history of ideas and institutions.

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LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

Your number devoted to *Higher Education Under Stress* departs, in my judgment, somewhat further from your usual standard of crosssectional representation of issues and viewpoints than its readers should allow without comment.

The article by Harry D. Gideonse on academic freedom, for example, is largely an exposition of the views of Sidney Hook —views with which many academicians are in sharp disagreement, just as they are in disagreement with the equivocal statement on academic freedom issued by the administrator-dominated Association of American Universities. Mr. Gideonse quotes this statement with complete approval, but fails to note explicitly that it continues to be at odds with the accepted policy of the American Association of University Professors, consisting of over 20,000 members. Perhaps other members besides myself will wonder whether Mr. Gideonse's reasoning is not infected by the fears and rationalizations of the cold war.

It is with the article by Gordon K. Chalmers, "The Purpose of Learning," that I wish, however, to take sharpest issue. Since it is included in your introductory section entitled General View, I assume that it is supposed to provide the reader with perspective upon the philosophic bases of the higher learning today. Mr. Chalmers fails to provide any such perspective. It is a lopsided argument against the experimentalist-progressivist movement in American educational theory and practice, and for a neoconservative restoration of educational theory and practice derived from such classic sources as Roman law. In terms of classifications familiar to educational philosophers, Mr. Chalmers is an "essentialist" in much the same way that Mr. Arthur Bestor, whom he admires, is an essentialist. This is his privilege, of course. But in no sense can he be considered to be an authoritative interpreter of alternative types of educational philosophy, nor can his article be regarded as representative of what exponents of any type would wish to have said in their behalf. As for his own plea for a "radical redirection of American education," it turns out to be little more than an earnest if rather beclouded retreat to traditional canons of learning that are, I believe, wholly unsuitable for an age caught in the throes of worldwide transformation.

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Yoruba, 4, 39, 48–50

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AFRICA AND THE WESTERN WORLD

Edited by

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FOREWORD

The papers presented in this volume are those read at the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, held on April 20 and 21, at the Warwick Hotel in Philadelphia. The general subject of the sessions, "Africa and the Western World," proved to be timely indeed and, although it was impossible to deal adequately with all the problems of importance in the vast and strategic continent of Africa, that the facets chosen for discussion were appropriate was evident from the large number of favorable comments by those in attendance. The meeting brought together about two hundred members of the Academy and about three hundred delegates and observers from government agencies, educational institutions, and international, national, state, or local associations.

The general subject of the sessions was selected by the Board of Directors of the Academy, and in the preparation of the program, several members of the Board were helpful, especially Professor Norman D. Palmer and Mr. Otto T. Mallery. Among others who rendered valuable advice special mention should be made of Professor William O. Brown, Director of the African Research and Studies Program of Boston University, Professor Benjamin Rivlin of Brooklyn College, and Drs. Ralph J. Bunche and Heinz Wieschhoff of the Secretariat of the United Nations.

The chairmen of five of the six sessions of the meeting, who deftly managed the discussion periods which followed all but the last session, were President Horace M. Bond of Lincoln University, Professor Douglas V. Steere of Haverford College, President Mordecai W. Johnson of Howard University, Dr. Ruth C. Sloan of Washington, D. C., and Dr. James C. Charlesworth, President of the Academy.

THORSTEN SELLIN

How to Approach African Problems*

By Fernand van Langenhove

CHANGES of great significance are under way in Africa. We are witnessing the awakening of this great continent. The problems that have thus arisen are the object of heated debates in the international forum. However, if we want to get a sound idea of their real nature, we should approach them with the objectivity of the scientific mind. This is why the American Academy of Political and Social Science should be congratulated for having chosen them as the topic of this year's session.

Geographical Distinctions

A scientific approach would guard us first against oversimplification. It would take due account of important geographical and historical factors. It would distinguish between the countries lying north of that huge barrier formed by the Sahara and the territories lying south of it, between the populations of the coastal regions, mainly those of the Mediterranean, where Western civilization was born or where contacts with it have lasted for centuries, and the forest dwellers of Central Africa, who, until a few decades ago, lived their primitive life in complete isolation. Indeed, the problems of the equatorial forests of the basin of the Congo may have much more in common with the problems of the equatorial forest of the Amazon and the Río Orinoco than with those of the Mediterranean coast.

* Address delivered at the luncheon for delegates to the Annual Meeting of the Academy, April 21, 1956.

Bandung Conference Definition of Colonialism

A scientific approach would also help us to beware of emotional approaches which might lead to prejudice and confused ideas. There is one word especially which should be handled very carefully. This word is "colonialism." It has a great emotional potential. For that very reason, while it is an efficient argument in political strife, it is inimical to that clarity from which the scientific mind should not depart. However, the Bandung Conference gave us, last year, a useful clarification on the subject of colonialism. What is meant, according to its final communiqué, is foreign domination and exploitation. The Russian neocolonialism having been brought into the debate, it was specified that colonialism should be condemned "in all its manifestations." This is surely a point to be kept in mind. We should in effect recall, just as an example of the complexity of the question, that, quite apart from the Russian neocolonialism, indeed in one of the most enlightened and democratic states of Asia, there are, at this very moment, ethnic minorities strenuously claiming their independence and even fighting for it.

For small countries like mine, the question is relatively simple. Being a realistic people, few Belgians in their senses would dream of trying to rule a huge country like the Congo against the will of the majority of the population. We have undertaken to develop self-government and, as far as exploitation is concerned, from the time when

Belgium took over responsibility, half a century ago, one of the principal aims of our policy has been the thorough elimination of exploitation.

ABORIGINAL POPULATIONS IN INDEPENDENT STATES

But an objective view of colonialism should not overlook the fact that the question does not arise only in classical colonies. History shows that in many cases the lot of the aboriginal populations did not at all improve when colonies became independent states under the rule of white settlers or of the more civilized class or race of the country. The American countries, which during recent years have done so much for their indigenous populations, know that very well: it has been said repeatedly by their statesmen and experts in the strongest words. One of the most outstanding of them went even so far as to say, a few years ago, that the conditions in which aborigines are living were "a disgrace to humanity" and constituted "a potential threat of revolution."

ILO STUDY AND PROPOSED ACTION

With the assistance of the states concerned, the International Labor Organization published, two years ago, a seven-hundred-page study of the living and working conditions of the indigenous populations in the independent countries of America, Asia, and Africa. To give an idea of its findings it suffices to quote one sentence: "The aboriginal groups in many regions stagnate in conditions of economic destitution." In agreement with the *Ad Hoc* Committee set up by the United Nations to study the question of slavery, it describes various forms of servitude which still exist in several of these regions. It lists at the same time several aboriginal populations in the course of complete extinction.

The question of international action to protect these aboriginal populations has been put on the agenda of the International Labor Conference, which will meet next June in Geneva. It should be mentioned, to the credit of the American and Asian countries concerned, that this decision was taken as a matter of urgency on a unanimous proposal made by a Committee of Experts belonging to these countries. In the pertinent report of the International Labor Office, thirty-seven independent countries of America, Asia, and Africa are listed, and their aboriginal populations are estimated to reach a total between fifty and seventy million, without taking into account Soviet Russia and China, for which official data are probably not available.

UN CHARTER

The action undertaken by the International Labor Organization is thus of great significance. This action is all the more gratifying in that the situation within the United Nations itself can hardly be considered satisfactory. Owing to a restrictive interpretation given to the relevant provisions of the Charter by most Member States, the aboriginal populations in the independent countries of America, Asia, and Africa have been denied the guarantees set forth in Chapter XI for the populations who have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. As a consequence, the tribesmen of Liberia, for instance, no longer enjoy the same guarantees as the tribesmen of the Belgian Congo, as was the case under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Here again we face the problem in its complexity and with its contradictions. The protection which is deemed urgently necessary in the ILO is deemed unnecessary in the UN. The conditions described by the International Labor Organization, and particularly those relating to the exploitation of aboriginal populations, would seem to fall well within the scope of colonialism, as defined by the Bandung Conference. Nevertheless, they are not considered to be of international concern under the Charter of the UN, while they are so considered under the constitution of the ILO. If colonialism should be condemned in all its manifestations, as was stated at Bandung, it could not be just a problem for France, Great Britain, and a few other Western countries. It should also be a problem of the highest significance for some fifty to seventy million aborigines living in many independent countries of America, Asia, and Africa.

Were this more generally understood and admitted, it would result in a more objective approach to these important problems, as well as an improvement in international relations. While giving to the Charter a more generous interpretation we should probably achieve more fruitful results for the peoples concerned.

Fernand van Langenhove, New York City, Ambassador of Belgium to the United Nations, has been his country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations since 1946, serving as the Belgian representative to the Security Council in 1947–48 and in 1955–56. In the Belgian government he was director of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (1917) and succesively director (1922), chief of cabinet (1927), and secretary general (1929) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a member of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations (1930) and represented Belgium at various international conferences, including the San Francisco Conference in 1945. He has been professor of sociology and social policy in the University of Brussels since 1920 and is the author of various books on economic and diplomatic questions.

Cultural Conflict in French North Africa

By Benjamin Rivlin

As has happened, or is about to happen, to most of the peoples of Asia and Africa, the people in French North Africa have reached one of the most crucial turning points in their history. They have emerged from periods of varying lengths under European colonial rule and stand now on the threshold of independence. The protectorate regimes over Tunisia and Morocco have been abolished, and in their stead independent sovereignties have been proclaimed.

As yet, a similar stage of development has not been reached in Algeria, for here a life-and-death struggle between nationalists and French troops grips the country. However, it can be expected that before too long in this area, also, fighting will cease.

In view of what has happened in Morocco and Tunisia, which flank Algeria on the east and on the west, it seems hardly likely that a return to the *status quo ante* will be possible; that is, a return to the situation as it was before the revolution, which started, in earnest, in November 1954. The one-sided administration in the interests of the one million Frenchmen, while keeping the vast majority of the eight million Muslims in a subordinate position, will somehow be changed. France, while it may insist upon adhering to the legal fiction of Algeria as part of France, will have to acknowledge in one way or another the rights and aspirations of the Algerian Muslims.

New Era in the Maghreb

Thus, in all three North African territories a new era is being ushered in, an era marked by the native population's assumption of rights and responsibilities in determining their own destinies. What perhaps is most significant about the old era which is coming to an end is that it brought the Maghreb ("West" in Arabic, the name by which French North Africa is known in the Muslim world) into contact with modern Western cultures, that is, the Western way of life. It is no secret that most cultures coming into contact with the dynamics of modern Western culture have been, to say the least, greatly affected by it.

Problems

The new era dawning in North Africa is by no means a cloudless one. Independence or autonomy, per se, does not solve fundamental economic and social problems. The nationalist upsurge was essentially generated by the economic and social changes introduced in the traditional way of life under the impact of Western technical and ideological influences, brought into the area primarily by the French. The problems emerging under this impact, such as the rise of an uprooted and dislocated proletariat, the pressures of steadily increasing population, the demands for more educational facilities, dissatisfaction with the existing political and social order, the introduction of new and conflicting values, established conditions conducive to the growth of nationalism.[1]

[1] These aspects of the North African situation have been treated by the author in "Context and Sources of Political Tensions in French North Africa," The Annals, Vol. 298 (March 1955), pp. 109–16.

The fact that independence has come, or is about to come, has not eliminated these problems. They continue to exist. In addition, new problems, directly coincident to the condition of independence, arise. Whereas in the past blame for all ills could be laid at the doorstep of the alien French overlords, this expedient will no longer be so simple. Certainly there will be those among the independence leaders who will continue to flog the dead horse of colonialism for a long time to come, but, inevitably, some criticism for failure to resolve problems will have to fall on their own shoulders. It can be expected that the coalition of varied tendencies which united under the nationalist banner and successfully brought an end to colonial rule will soon start to weaken under the strain of these unresolved problems. Thus, compounding the difficulties of the newly independent states will be political instability, internal disillusionment, and distrust.

It may be suggested that these difficulties are the unavoidable "shaky legs" of any newly acquired independence and that, given time and experience, they will be overcome. This contention begs the question, for it avoids probing at the root of the difficulties. A closer look at the situation will reveal that conflicts between cultural traditions and between conflicting values lie at the root of the difficulties in North Africa.

Muslim Social Change—Western Generated

Briefly, what is being suggested is that the nationalist upheaval and the problems of the newly emergent independent states in North Africa and, for that matter, in other parts of the non-Western world, are aspects of the underlying process of social change involving cultural adaptation and cultural symbiosis. The annals of history are filled with the clash of different cultures and civilizations and the resultant emergence of new, synthetic cultures. In the past, cultural interaction and adaptation formed part of a long-drawn-out process, extending for centuries, with changes taking place gradually—noticeable only over the long span of time. Today under the impact of Western technological influences the process of social change takes place at an accelerated pace and in such a manner as to make it difficult for a smooth culture adjustment to occur.

In non-Western lands, such as North Africa, the problems of independence are fundamentally the problems of adjusting traditional ways of life to the conditions of the modern industrial world—a process which inevitably leads to clashes in values, in social orientation, in the matter of goals, means, and techniques. In short, it leads to cultural conflict. Within this context, the French have merely been catalysts in North Africa, or mediators, through whom Western techniques and values have been introduced into Northwest Africa.

It may be belaboring the obvious to point out that nationalism in French North Africa, although Western-generated or inspired, is essentially Muslim in character. It is the Islamic tradition that has thwarted the assimilation policy of the French and has furnished the bonds of religion, language, common historical tradition, which, together with shared experiences, provide the mortar with which nationalism has been built.[2]

Unresolved Clash of Cultures

Now that independence for Tunisia and Morocco has been granted and some form of autonomous status seems to be in the offing for Algeria, it may

[2] See *ibid.*

be asked, "Has not the clash of cultures been resolved? Has not the primacy of the native Islamic culture been acknowledged? Are not the French on the way out?"

French influence

The fact of the matter is that the clash of cultures has not been resolved; French influence is by no means at an end; and the victory of the traditional Islamic culture is far from complete. It is essentially because this is so that the cultural conflict persists. The fact that French rule will be terminated does not mean that French influence or the imprint of the French presence can be erased. For one thing, French settlers will continue to be present physically in North Africa. Secondly, the formulas of independence, even for Morocco and Tunisia, provide for some permanent linkage between France and these countries. But even if the French settlers were eliminated and no linkage with France established, the influence of France—that is, the influence of Western culture—would be felt through the westernized natives who have become exponents of modernization.

The introduction of Western ideas and techniques into an area such as North Africa which boasted an organized and functioning society antecedent to the coming of the West, albeit one that did not have all the accouterments and manifold activities of the modern industrial state, leads to a clash between defenders of the traditional way of life and the exponents of modernization. The fact that the French pursued inconsistent policies which were, on the one hand, "assimilationist" and, on the other, "reservationist" (the term is borrowed from the American Indian "reservation") helped further this cultural cleavage. It is this modernist group around whom and within whom the cultural conflict takes place. One of the keenest students of North African society, Professor Roger Le Tourneau of the University of Algiers, pointed out concerning "the modernists, whom one can also call the 'advanced' ":

> Most of them have been brought up in European schools, and many have passed through a serious crisis of conscience there. Few, nevertheless, have abandoned Islâm, but most no longer feel at ease in it. . . .[3]

This is a most significant point. One of the ironical facts of the situation in French North Africa is that France, which brought Western culture to the area, has been unable to count on the support of the westernized elements of the native population. On the contrary, many of the leading antagonists to the French have come just from among these westernized North Africans. It is these most westernized elements that have been the greatest thorn in the side of the French. Why?

Antagonism to France of westernized elements

A good many reasons suggest themselves, including the notion that these persons, schooled in the tradition of *liberté, egalité, fraternité,* were unable to stand by and see their own lands and people denied these basic rights of man which they learned about in Paris. Under the impact of the Western liberal tradition it is not surprising that anti-imperialist nationalism should have impressed these people. But it must be remembered, anti-imperialism is not necessarily anti-Western or anti-modernization. Westernized North African nationalists have often been heard to remark, "We like French culture and the French people, in France, *not* in North Africa." How does one explain this? Perhaps Professor Le Tourneau's observation that this *avant-garde,* despite their acceptance of Western principles and ideals, has strong attachments and identification with Islam, gives us some clue.

[3] Roger Le Tourneau, "North Africa: Rigorism and Bewilderment," in Gustave E. von Grunebaum (Ed.), *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 245.

Islamic modernists and the mystic brotherhood

It is this fact—the attachment to Islam—which has alienated these "sons of the French spirit" (as some Frenchmen call these westernized nationalists) from France and has enabled them to join forces with less westernized elements in forming a common front in the nationalist movement. To be sure, they could not join with the most religiously conservative elements, such as are represented by the mystic brotherhood in North Africa. This brand of Islam was too much for their own Western rationalism and critical spirit, and they could hardly swallow it. Actually, they were never confronted with having to decide whether or not to join forces with such groups, because French policy in North Africa, by favoring the conservative religious groups, erected a barrier between these two elements of the Maghreb population. The modernists viewed this facet of French policy as one calculated to keep the North African population bogged down in the quagmire of superstition and ignorance.

The reformists

However, it was just this policy of the French that established the basis for the co-operation between the Western modernists and the group whom Professor Le Tourneau calls the reformists. This group can be described as religious purists and zealots. They are dedicated to a reform of the heterodox practices manifested by the mystical brotherhood and their replacement by a return to the pure orthodoxy of the teachings and practices of Mohammed, as revealed in the Koran and the Sunna.

As French policy openly supported heterodox practices among the Muslim population—a most notable example of this policy was the Berber Dahir of 1930 in Morocco [4]—it is not surprising to find the modernists and reformists joining forces in the nationalist movements. In Morocco, Allal el-Fassi, the leader of the Istiqlal party, represents the reformist elements in that party. In Algeria the Société des Oulémas constitutes this tendency, and in Tunisia it is to be found essentially within the Old Destour. Professor Le Tourneau makes the following observation about the reformists:

> [They] are obsessed with the past; they wish for a return backwards much more than for an adaptation, and do not try to envisage the future of the Muslim community in terms of modern realities. They are willing to use modern means of communication, like the press or radio, but in a spirit resolutely devoted to the past.[5]

Cultural schizophrenia

This attitude stands out markedly in contrast to the aspirations of the modernists, who would like to apply Western principles and ideas to their own society. Thus we have what can be described as a condition of cultural schizophrenia within the total nationalist movement in North Africa. Moreover, this schizophrenic condition can also be said to exist within individual nationalist leaders themselves, both modernists and reformists—but with inverse proportions of traditional and Western tendencies.

[4] Under this decree, Berber tribes were to be governed not by Koranic law but by traditional tribal law that predated the Islamic conquest of North Africa.

[5] Le Tourneau, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 253.

One has but to look at the pronouncements and writings of the leading figures in North African nationalism to understand the validity of this thesis. In each there is identification, not only with Islam, but also with Western progress. Typical of this position is the following statement by Ahmed Balafrej, Secretary-General of the Moroccan Istiqlal (Independence) party:

> The Moroccan people are eager to learn and progress in every field. We know that while we must remain true to our Moslem identity, we have to build a State on western political principles. . . . We are Moslems; we cling to our Moslem identity as an essential element of ourselves.[6]

As far as Balafrej is concerned, there seems to be no inconsistency between remaining true to the Muslim past and achieving Western progress, for he says further:

> Some people might wonder whether religious leaders or certain groups in Moslem universities—even the Moslem religion itself—might not form an obstacle to modernization in the political and institutional field as well as in economic and social affairs. I should like to point out that Islam has no clergy and the Moslem religion is not hierarchical. It is true, of course, that the Koran and the *Hadith* (the tradition of the Prophet), the written foundations of the Moslem religion, cover secular problems, but they do so by laying down general principles which are susceptible of evolution. These principles are in no way incompatible with the development of the world or with modern trends. On the contrary, they are conceived in the spirit of progress, of equality, social justice, tolerance and peace among men. More than that, the *Ijtihad*—the interpretation of these principles—allows the commentators in any case to adapt the principles of the Koran to the requirements of evolution and progress.[7]

Here Balafrej is talking as a modernist. No one among the westernized nationalists would quarrel with him, but the question is whether the reformists would go along with him. Would they agree with his flexible concept of *Ijtihad?* Orthodox Islam teaches that the gate of *Ijtihad* was closed many, many centuries ago, never to be reopened.[8]

THE MASSES AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Furthermore, there is the added question as to whether the new interpretations of the modernists could be easily absorbed by the North African masses. As Le Tourneau points out, the modernists "experience serious difficulties . . . because the troops that follow them are not on the same level as they. . . ."[9] In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the modernists and the reformists constitute a relatively small proportion of the population and that both these elements are essentially intellectual in character. The vast majority of the North African population have not acquired Western values and Western cultural habits to the extent of being able to follow the modernists, nor can they easily overcome ignorance and superstition enough to accept the fine reasoning of the reformists. This, however, has not ruled out mass mobilization into the nationalist movement. In this area French policy unwittingly lent a helping hand. The deposition and exile of the Sultan of Morocco in 1953; the arrest of the pronationalist Tunisian Prime Minister in 1952, and the policy of harsh repression gave the nationalists *causes célèbres* with which to rally the masses of the people. On the other hand, the fact that the masses were mobilized by the modernists and reformists does not mean that they threw off their old ways. Le Tourneau points out further:

> Whereas modernists and reformists carry out a dialectical attack and use their *ratio rationans*, the mystics offer to the simplest believer the exaltation of feeling which he hopes for to escape for a moment the miseries of life, transcend himself, and enter into a spiritual and magnificent world. This is the reason why the mystics, in spite of their faults and their anachronism, keep the hearing of an important part of the masses; to supplant them, modernists and reformists would have to furnish food for the feelings which they do not possess and of which they do not seem to dream.[10]

WHAT DESTINY?

Thus we are confronted with the following situation in the Maghreb: With the victory of nationalism, the destiny of the area lies in the hands of its people and its leaders. What destiny will it choose? Modernists, such as Balafrej, Habib Bourguiba, and even the Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed ben Youssef, proclaim that its destiny lies in progress, in transforming itself into a modern, twentieth-century society, benefiting from the material progress and achievements of that society. But side by side with this aim is another aim, to be true to the Muslim heritage of North Africa. Given a population which has been so little penetrated by Western ideas and values, in whom old traditional ways have a tenacious hold, the question is, Will the modernists be able to achieve their dual aims? It is no simple task to accomplish this feat—witness the experiences of other non-Western societies, India, for example. It is no simple task to arrange a marriage between tradition and progress, although this marriage is essential, for no progress can be achieved in North Africa that is not built on tradition. But herein lies the cultural conflict in the Maghreb. How much tradition and what traditions? How much modernism? It is conflict over these questions that looms before North African leaders as they wrestle with the destiny of their lands and causes factions to fall out of the coalition that successfully accomplished the nationalist victory. It is the resolution of this conflict that stands out as the challenge to the people of North Africa and their leaders.

[6] Ahmed Balafrej, "Morocco Plans for Independence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 1956), p. 488.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 487–88.

[8] See H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), Chap. I, particularly pp. 10–14, for a discussion of classical and modernist conceptions of *Ijtihad*.

[9] Le Tourneau, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 245.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

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The Aspirations of the People of French North Africa

By Muhammad H. el-Farra

IT is indeed a great privilege for me to be with the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. To know that you are aware of the problems of the Arab world is gratifying in itself. With general awareness comes knowledge; with knowledge comes understanding; with understanding, one hopes, problems may be solved on the basis of justice and truth. Indeed, we have an Arabic maxim which says: "Knowledge breeds love."

Having kindly invited me to come and talk to you, I am sure you expect me to be frank. I hope you will excuse my frankness. I have received my education here in this country. I have acquired along with my education a high admiration and a real affection for the American way of life and tradition, so, if I do speak with frankness, it is because I have our mutual interest at heart.

I have been asked to discuss with you today "The Aspirations of the People of French North Africa," a topic which means, to me, the aspirations of the people of North Africa which is not French but part of the Arab world. It would be difficult if not impossible, therefore, to speak about the liberation movement in North Africa without referring to the Arab nationalist movement as a whole.

Arab Nationalist Movement

The Arab nationalist movement had its birth when the Arab people struggled to free themselves from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire, it continues today in Arab action to throw off the yoke of Western imperialism, whether French, British, or other. The movement is inspired by a common language, common history, and a common set of values and principles which have united the Arab world for hundreds of years and which the present state divisions have not been able to destroy. It would be extremely surprising if the Arabs did not aim at the ultimate unity of the Arab world.

Only after World War II did Syria and Lebanon, after long struggle and much sacrifice, gain complete independence from the French. The Syrian Constitution expressly states that "the people of Syria are part of the Arab nation." Libya, the victim of Italian imperialism, gained its independence through the United Nations in 1950. We now also have the Sudan, an Arab country "sharing with other Arab nations their feelings and sentiments," which gained its independence this year and was admitted to the League of Arab States on January 19, 1956.

Egypt, a North African country which gained its complete independence after long British occupation and imperial influence, took the initiative in forming the League of Arab States in 1945. Today, Egypt is the guiding star of Arab unity. In their new Constitution the Egyptian people expressly stated that they form an organic part of a greater Arab entity and are "aware" of their "responsibility and obligations towards the common Arab struggle for the glory and prestige of the Arab Nation." Article I of the Egyptian Constitution reads: "Egypt is a sovereign independent Arab state; it is a democratic republic; and the Egyptian people are an integral part of the Arab nation."

Even before the new Egyptian Constitution was written, the Arab League in co-operation with the Asian-African group brought the question of Tunisia and of Morocco before the United Nations General Assembly, in 1952, at the seventh session. And although France boycotted the Assembly during the consideration of the questions of Tunisia and Morocco, two resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly calling upon France to take measures compatible with the aspirations of the Tunisian and Moroccan people. France ignored these recommendations and, in fact, adopted repressive measures which seriously worsened the already acute situation. The struggle therefore continued, and the liberation movement became stronger than ever.

Very recently, however, France has agreed to revoke the unequal treaties which she had with both Tunisia and Morocco and has declared the complete independence of these two North African countries. We cannot but give France credit for this wise decision. I want to say with all sincerity and frankness, however, that we should have liked to see a decision adopted earlier. A more prompt and liberal recognition of the sovereignty of these North African countries and their nationalist claims would no doubt have averted much bloodshed and bitterness and human suffering.

Now that Tunisia and Morocco are gaining complete independence, I do not deem it necessary to bring before you a detailed picture of the tragic history of these two countries. We prefer to look to the future, since our only desire is to see peace and harmony prevail in North Africa. All that I should like to emphasize at this stage is that this whole movement is one movement. It cannot be divided. It is wrong to call it a Tunisian movement or Moroccan or Algerian or Libyan or Egyptian. It is an Arab liberation movement. Therefore, you cannot call the support given by Egypt or Syria or Iraq or any other Arab country the intervention of a foreign state. It is wrong to call this support "external influence at work trying to undermine the French position throughout North Africa," in the words of the United States Ambassador to France. Such a charge amounts to an intentional denial of history and facts, a denial of the movement of reawakening which had begun earlier in the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire. Arabs fought hard to emancipate themselves, first from Ottoman rulers and then from those Western powers which inherited Ottoman imperialism. Their war was a revolt against domination and exploitation. They wanted to save the Arab homeland from foreign conquest. They were inspired by common cultural and spiritual values.

"Algeria Is France"

These values were among the strong forces which have since the conquest in 1830 defeated all attempts to assimilate and integrate Algeria into France. One hundred and twenty-six years have passed, and this integration continues to be mere fiction. When the Asian-African group brought the question of Algeria before the United Nations and the matter was inscribed on the agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly, the main French argument was that Algerians were Frenchmen and that Algeria was an integral part of France. This argument was not accepted by the United Nations, who decided by a majority of 28 votes to 27, with 5 abstentions, to inscribe the question of Algeria on the agenda of the United Nations—a decision which caused France to withdraw from the United Nations General Assembly.

Although France was unable to convince the world that Algeria is France

and that Arabs are Frenchmen, she is still using force and repressive measures to achieve a goal which she could not achieve during the past 126 years. It is hard, however, to resist the tide of nationalism. No power, no matter how mighty, can hold it back or slow it down. In spite of 126 years of French teaching and preaching, the people of Algeria continue to resist this fiction of integration and assimilation. For 126 years France has been telling the Algerian Arabs, "You are Frenchmen," and for 126 years these people have been answering, "No, we are not, we cannot be; we are Arabs having our own language and heritage and traditions and culture."

You may be interested to know that the first offer of integration and assimilation was made immediately after France had conquered the sovereign state of Algeria. It was made by France in 1849, through Field Marshal Bugeaud, to the great Algerian leader, Prince Abd-el-Kader:

> I want you to decide to adopt France as your country, and to ask the Government to make you a grant of property, with right of descent to your heirs. . . . your children would enjoy cultivating the soil; they could hunt. . . .

To this Abd-el-Kader answered:

> If all the treasures in the world could be laid in the skirt of my *burnous* and set in the balance against my liberty, I would choose my liberty. I ask neither grace nor favor; . . .

The year before, in response to a similar suggestion, he had said:

> Remain in France? Why, we do not speak your language, we do not share your customs, your laws, your religion. . . . Cannot you understand—this is *death*.[1]

[1] Wilfrid Blunt, *Desert Hawk: Abd el Kader and the French Conquest of Algeria* (London: Methuen & Co., 1947), pp. 243, 228.

Similar offers have been made to the Algerian people from time to time up to the present. They still have the same answer. "We refuse to be French. We are Arabs having our own heritage and religion and language and customs." And today France, in spite of its admitted failure, comes before the United Nations to repeat the same old record: "Algeria is France. These people are Frenchmen."

"As If the Natives Were Shadows . . ."

With this background, you may want to know what are the other reasons for the failure of integration and assimilation. Or you may wonder why assimilation and integration is successfully achieved here in the United States in a very short period of time, while France spent a century and a quarter without reaching such a result.

The answer is simple. In the first place, France attempted to integrate the whole nation of Algeria, which until the French invasion had been an independent and sovereign state with its own entity and character and statehood. Secondly, France never treated Algerians as equals or Algeria as an integral part of France. Evidence of this unequal treatment is very clear. After 126 years, Algerians are still second-class citizens, not only in France but in their own homeland as well. They enjoy no equality anywhere, or in any sphere. This fact was made clear in the report on Algeria of the special mission designated by the French Parliament under the Commission for Control of National Defense Allocations[2] and consisting of the following French leaders: Christian Pineau (present Foreign Minister of France) and Max Lejeune of the Socialist party; Jean Moreau, Independent Republican; Pierre de Chevigné, Popular Republican Movement; and Marc Jacquet, Social Republican.

[2] Published on June 30, 1955, in *Le Figaro*, an independent daily newspaper.

The report includes the following admissions:

> Everything has gone on, according to the formula of a high official of the administration, as though the natives were shadows, the background against which the French of metropolitan origin lived and prospered in an artificial security. . . . No man of any feeling can fail to be struck by the poverty which still prevails in many regions of Algeria, increasing more and more the farther south one goes.

The 850,000 French settlers in Algeria, composing less than one-tenth of the population, are guaranteed representation totaling one-half of all representatives in the principal Algerian elected bodies. Algeria has thirty seats in the French National Assembly, but only half of the seats are reserved for Muslim deputies and even these few Muslims are not the true representatives of the people.

You may be surprised to know that the inhabitants, who are Arabs, are denied the right to learn their own language, Arabic. France refused to teach Arabic in the government schools. Only in a few Islamic schools and in three secondary schools attended by five hundred students are Arabic studies pursued. In the French secondary schools, Arabic is taught as a foreign language. Not only this, but no Algerian is allowed to teach Arabic unless he obtains a certificate that he has mastered the French language.

You may be surprised, also, to know that teaching Algerian history is a crime. In October 1954, one Sheikh Zarrouki was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for teaching Algerian history. This may sound strange but it is a fact. The French believe that teaching Arabic and Algerian history would be an obstacle in the way of integration.

Ever since the invasion the French colonists who exploit the country and enjoy its wealth have done their best to keep the Algerian Arabs illiterate. Today only 50,000 Muslims out of 11 million have grammar school certificates.

In the economic field, Algerians still have to turn to the French market to satisfy their need of manufactured goods and are still exporters of raw material to the advantage of the French business interests.

This may explain why France walked out of the United Nations. She could not face with pride the United Nations and say, "The Algerians, after 126 years of my rule, are enjoying equal citizenship." France could not come before the United Nations and say, "The Algerians have become an inseparable part of France, having everything in common with the French." France has failed to show that Algeria is France and that the Arabs are French.

Military Force

Instead of negotiation, France resorted to repression and intimidation. Since November 1954, over 17,000 Algerians have been killed and acts of reprisal continue. Whole villages were wiped out. Hostages were taken and executions were performed without trial. An army of over 350,000 soldiers is now trying to suppress the Algerian liberation movement. Quoting Mendès-France, "It is a military force larger than the total of the French troops engaged in Indochina on the eve of Dien Bien Phu."

Attitude of U. S.

Now let us examine the attitude of the United States with reference to the North African problems. Analysis of the stand of the United States with reference to Arab problems is very impor-

tant. It explains why neutralist tendencies in the Arab world are gathering more strength every day. It should be clearly understood that the Arabs, like any other people, Asian, Near Eastern, or whatever, do not judge United States democracy by its practice within the United States. They can judge American democracy—I believe with justification—only by its practice in their own lands vis-à-vis Arab problems and rightful Arab aspirations.

Algeria, until 1830 a sovereign and independent democratic state, with its own entity, character, and statehood, was together with Morocco among the first countries which recognized the United States of America after the War of Independence, and she entered into a formal treaty with the United States in 1795. Algeria at that time was one of the strongest naval powers in the world, and made treaties with various sovereign states such as England, Holland, Sweden, and Norway. It is unfortunate that in spite of this traditional pledge of friendship and this relationship of mutual alliances, the United States government today hesitates to give the national liberation movement in North Africa its moral support. It is unfortunate that the United States, and here I am quoting the American Ambassador to France, Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, "responded promptly and favorably" to France's request for American-made helicopters [3] —helicopters used by France to suppress a struggle for liberation and to kill innocent Arabs whose only sin is their love of liberty and freedom. It was very disappointing to the Arabs to learn that Ambassador Dillon, speaking on behalf of the American people, has endorsed the French fiction that the "four departments of Algeria are French territory," although this fiction has no legal or equitable foundation, and although the United Nations refused to accept this French theory when it decided to inscribe the Algerian question on the agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly.

The French position, endorsed by the United States, amounts exactly to what Great Britain claimed during your War for Independence. Strictly speaking, you were at that time legally a part of the British Empire. As such, your rebellion was illegal, but surely it had every justification.

United States endorsement amounts, therefore, to a recognition of the right of conquest—a recognition of the theory that might makes right. It attributes validity to unilateral French decrees which were never accepted by the people directly concerned and which the Algerian people have been resisting ever since the conquest of Algeria. That the United States did not vote in favor of the resolution recognizing the right of the people of North Africa to self-determination was unfortunate, in view of the impact this abstinence will have on the minds of millions in the Middle East who in the past used to look to the United States as the guiding star of freedom and liberty. It was unfortunate likewise that only the other day Ambassador Dillon stoutly announced that the United States "consistently supported France when North African subjects have been discussed in the United Nations." "The most recent instance," he said, "was our strong support last fall of the position that Algeria is an internal French problem and therefore not appropriate for discussion by the United Nations." [4]

Foreign policy should be inspired by legitimate rights and mutual interests with its aim maintenance of world peace and prosperity for all. Achievement of this ideal requires patient perseverance and foresight. Now let us examine how farsighted American policy regarding North Africa was.

In 1952, during the seventh session of the General Assembly, the United States did not vote in favor of a mild resolution on the question of Morocco and Tunisia, the text of which was taken from the very words of the United Nations Charter. Today, less than three years later, France herself has recognized the legitimate rights of the peoples of Morocco and Tunisia. Faced with these facts, the question arises, Was there any farsightedness? What effect did this policy have on the people of the Arab world?

As It Looks to the Arab

Your modern Western culture and its values and thoughts have penetrated our lands. They had meaning for us since they are rooted in the same traditions in which our own culture is rooted. Today cultural institutions of the West function all over the Arab world, and with this advance of Western thought, the Arab has had increasing confidence in these values. Therefore it is very disappointing to him to see the West preach one thing and practice something else, to see the knowledge, thought, and ideals which the West advanced with one hand being destroyed by the other. The practice of colonialism and imperialism in North Africa and the Middle East perforce reflects on the authenticity of the ethical values the West preaches. Is it surprising, then, that many an Arab is inclined to reject, with disappointment, the values of Western culture as insincere and false?

The Arab cannot understand why the United States—the country that was never imperialistic, the country that fought for its liberation, the country that was the first to champion true democracy and recognize the right of self-determination, the country that knows the value and worth of the liberation movement—why this same country does not give expression to all these noble American traditions when the problem of North Africa is discussed in the United Nations. Why does the United States side with France on the North African problem, both within and outside the United Nations?

The Arab who faces the complex problems of exploitation and foreign domination wants to rid himself of these evils. When he asked the United States for help he was denied it. Yet the Western powers call upon him to join their alliances and treaties and defensive measures. They want him to become part of the free world but, paradoxically enough, they do not give him the means to do so. The problem of many an Arab is not how to preserve his cherished freedom as you do but how to attain it.

In North Africa and the rest of the Arab world, so far, wise leadership has kept the situation from further deterioration. But to what extent can the moderate nationalistic leaders keep the masses in check? What happens if France continues in its obstinate stand of repression and torture and if the matter gets out of control? What if the leaders of Algeria remain either in prison or in exile?

In their joint statement the other day, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden "upheld the basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice." How do you expect the North African to interpret this statement when he is still a victim of nineteenth-century colonialism? How is he to reconcile with it other official statements, such as the one by Ambassador Dillon which I have quoted?

[3] *New York Times*, March 21, 1956.

[4] New York *Herald Tribune* of March 21, 1956.

The question of mutual interests may be raised. But I submit that United States support of France is in the interest neither of France nor of the United States because the policy of France is not in her own interest.

A LESSON NOT LEARNED

Peoples, governments, and nations learn from experience; as a rule, they benefit more when the experience is a tragic one. The French attitude, however, is sometimes an exception to the rule. Recent events have shown that France walks behind history.

In 1936, the French government demonstrated some sympathy towards the Syrian liberation movement. Agreement was reached on a draft treaty very similar to the treaty entered into between England and Iraq in 1930, but it immediately faced strong opposition in France and failed of ratification in the French Parliament. This obstinate and uncompromising attitude on the part of France met with an obstinate and uncompromising attitude in the leaders and people of Syria. The struggle continued, and in the end Syria was given full independence. Thus France had to leave Syria and Lebanon unconditionally in 1946. Not even a cultural treaty was entered into with France.

In the same year that England granted Pakistan and India full independence and thus won them as members of the British Commonwealth, France kept resisting forcibly the national movement of Indochina, which, I hope you agree, had at that time nothing to do with communism. France could have secured a very favorable solution, but her obstinacy and uncompromising attitude cost her, after the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the loss of Indochina. The United States, as the leader of the Western world, was directly involved in this loss.

Today we have the question of North Africa. The people of Algeria are now extending their hands to France and begging her to find an equitable and just solution to their problem. They are determined to put an end to the policy of French subjugation and exploitation. They are ready to negotiate with France a reasonable and practical treaty provided that France recognizes the fact that assimilation and integration are impossible between two nations which have nothing in common. It is up to France to remember that the time of nineteenth-century colonialism is over; that the policy of divide and rule is no longer workable; that only a new approach to the question of North Africa and all the problems of the Middle East can bring back the prestige of the Western world; that the real interests of the West can be best served by a change in the foreign policy of the Western powers.

The United States, I am sure, can play a leading part in this change. Good will and wise statesmanship on the part of the French government and the United States will still help to avoid bloodshed and decrease tension in the Arab world. The door is still open for understanding and mutual co-operation.

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The Role of France and the French in North Africa

By ROGER VAURS

IT is essential not to forget that Morocco has among its inhabitants a substantial number of French citizens who have contributed to its general development and more particularly to its economic prosperity."

Thus spoke His Majesty Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, Sultan of Morocco, on November 18, 1955, in his Speech from the Throne, in which he further declared:

> Our wish is to see Moroccans and Frenchmen working together for the prosperity of Morocco and the welfare of all, with a view to consolidating their relations and safeguarding the friendship of our two countries.

I quote again:

> No Tunisian fails to recognize all that has been achieved by France in both the material and the cultural fields. . . .
>
> Passionately devoted as we are to all our national aspirations, we know that independence must adapt itself to the imperatives on which the progress of human societies depends. We know that independence must be reconciled with interdependence between countries bound by permanent and higher interests.

These words, as you may have guessed, were spoken on the eve of his return to Tunis on May 30, 1955, by Mr. Habib Bourguiba, the undisputed leader of the Tunisian nationalist movement.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL SETTING

These two quotations serve as a fitting introduction to this talk on "The Role of France and the French in North Africa," in which I shall deal first with the work accomplished by France and by French settlers in that part of the world up to the present time and second with the role which they still have to play—precisely on account of those very accomplishments—within a system of co-operation freely accepted by both France and the Maghreb on a basis of equality.

A few preliminary remarks are necessary, however, in order to place in its geographical and historical context the relationship between France and the countries of the Maghreb.

Geographically isolated on the east and south by the vast stretches of the Sahara, and on the west by the Atlantic, but open on the north to the influences of the Mediterranean basin, birthplace of our modern civilization, the Maghreb is closer to Europe than to Asia. It was not merely by chance that the Arab historian and philosopher, ibn-Khaldun, called this region *Djeziret-el-Maghreb*, which means "Island of the West." It was because, in fact, present-day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia each have their own distinctive features.

From the ethnical point of view, the first inhabitants of this region have been known from the earliest times under the name of Berbers, although ethnologists distinguish among several Berber types. In spite of the influence of multiple racial strains—Phoenician (Carthage), Greek, Roman, Vandal, and finally Arabic—the population has remained basically Berber. To be sure, following the Arab invasions of the seventh century a new religion, a new language, and a new culture were brought to these regions, drawing them closer to the Arab Near East. Yet certain authors estimate the number of

persons of Arabic stock between the seventh and twelfth centuries at about 400,000. And this figure takes into account the Hilalian invasion, launched by the Fatimids of Cairo in the eleventh century to punish the Maghreb for its secession from the Arab world. Only Morocco, well sheltered by its mountains, escaped the ravages of those turbulent tribes from Arabia, which, to quote ibn-Khaldun, "brought the desert with them." Even today, in fact, the greatest proportion of Berbers who have preserved their language and ancestral customs are to be found in the Atlas Mountains: 40 per cent in Morocco, 30 per cent in Algeria, but only 10 per cent in Tunisia, unquestionably the most arabized in that region.

Situated at the crossroads of several civilizations, Tunisia, separated from Europe only by the Strait of Messina, distinguished itself very early by its intellectual curiosity about the West.

Morocco, for its part, separated from Europe only by the Strait of Gibraltar, had developed a refined civilization, influenced by the Ommiad culture of Andalusia, which it had conquered and dominated under the Berber dynasty of the Almoravides (twelfth century).

Only Algeria has practically no history of its own, having always been divided among tribal chieftains.

Dissidence and division

There is no geographical center of attraction in the Maghreb, and it was only during the second half of the twelfth century that a Berber sovereign of Morocco, Abd-al-Mumin of the Almohade dynasty, succeeded in unifying it for a very short period.

The Maghreb, always restless, as you may remember, seceded from the Arab Empire in the eighth century, very shortly after its conquest had been completed. This chronic spirit of dissidence in the great federations of Berber and Arab tribes, which used to make and unmake the empires of western Islam, made it impossible for nations—in the sense in which we understand the term in the Western world—to come into being.

Just before the French went into Algeria, in 1830, the Maghreb consisted of the Sherifian Empire, or Morocco, and of Tunisia and Algeria, which had been Turkish provinces since the seventeenth century and were divided into a series of principalities, some of which engaged in piracy, especially those on the Algerian coast. The peoples of the hinterland were virtually free from the control of any central authority and were periodically decimated by famine and epidemics, a result of the constant warfare between tribes. Thus in Morocco, when Sultan Mulai Hafid appealed to France in 1911, he controlled little more than the region around Fès.

France and North Africa

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the French and English launched several unsuccessful expeditions against the Barbary pirates of North Africa in an attempt to stop their raiding. The United States, also, waged two wars against them: against Tripoli from 1801 to 1805 and against Algiers in 1815. France struck the finishing blow to the Barbary power in 1830 when she took Algiers, thus finally breaking the isolation which had prevented the Maghreb from advancing at the same rate as the Western world. At much the same time, France became allied with Mehemet Ali, the creator of modern Egypt, a rival Muslim power to the Ottoman Empire.

Once France had established herself on the Algerian shores of the Mediterranean, with a view to bringing about a lasting and fruitful peace, she realized that, in order to succeed in this, none of the countries of the Maghreb could be allowed to remain in a state

of anarchy. This explains the setting up of the French protectorates, in Tunisia in 1881 and in Morocco in 1912.

However different from this sort of thing the historical trends of today and tomorrow may be, there was a reason for the direction taken by the history of yesterday. No doubt the policies of those days may be characterized as "colonial," but as His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Mechelen said at the time of the annexation of the Belgian Congo: "Sometimes colonization is confused with colonialism. By and large, colonialism means inhuman exploitation. Colonization is less an opportunity for profit than a source of duty." The attitude of the great French colonizers was undoubtedly the second one, the greatest exemplar of which was Marshal Lyautey, our first Resident General in Morocco. This sense of duty was felt equally by Metropolitan France, whose taxpayers spent, between 1949 and 1954, the equivalent of four billion dollars of public funds for the economic and social development of the overseas lands, for which France has been financially responsible up until now.

FRENCH MODERNIZATION OF NORTH AFRICA

What, in the last analysis, is the task which France has performed in North Africa? It can be summed up in one word, "modernization." This task of modernization has been accomplished on three levels—political, economic, and cultural.

Administration

On the political level, France, while introducing a Western-type administration, succeeded for the first time in the history of the Maghreb in establishing the territorial and political unity of each of the three countries on a firm foundation. In particular, she set up all sorts of technical services which had never existed before, such as a public works administration, financial services, a conservation department, and departments of commerce and industry. In Algeria, in which not even the embryo of a state existed, the whole administrative structure of the country was created from the ground up, based on that of the departments in France.

France did not, however, do away with all indigenous authority. On the contrary, her Officers of Native Affairs secured the support of the traditional tribal chieftains. In Tunisia and Morocco, which already had a central government under the authority of a sovereign—the bey in Tunis, the sultan in Rabat—the protectorate system was adopted, which limited itself to supplementing the traditional government by a group of "technical departments."

Public health and population increase

The first result was on the human level, the end of famine and epidemics and a marked increase in the population. The 400 hospitals and infirmaries which have been built in North Africa, the 700 dispensaries and consultation rooms which are open free of charge to all without discrimination, are responsible, along with an improved diet, for the soaring population curve. Counting from the arrival of the French, the Algerian population has quadrupled in 120 years, that of Tunisia has more than doubled in 70 years, and that of Morocco has doubled in 40 years. Altogether North Africa has a population of 22,000,000, including 19,500,000 Muslims, 500,000 native-born Jews, and 2,000,000 Europeans.

Economic gains

The second result, on the economic level, was the creation of a basic infrastructure. You are already familiar with its scope. I shall confine myself

to refreshing your memories with a few obvious figures: 5,000 miles of railroads, 85,000 miles of roads, 33 modern ports, including Casablanca which was only a small fishing village at the time of our arrival. This port now ranks first on the African continent with an annual traffic of 8 million tons and a population of 700,000. The cities of Algiers and Tunis each have about 500,000 inhabitants. Finally, a dense network of airlines has been created as a result of the construction of almost a hundred airfields, among which those of Casablanca, Algiers, and Tunis are classed as international airports.

The mining resources, principal source of wealth in these lands which are too dry for intensive cultivation, have been developed by French engineers and capital, especially such strategic ores as iron, lead, and manganese. I shall remind you, for example, that Morocco is the second-ranking producer of phosphates in the world, and I shall add that the phosphate mines are exploited, in their entirety, not by a private company but by an agency of the Moroccan state.

The relative shortage of coal has led the French to undertake the construction of vast hydroelectric works, which serve a double purpose, the extension of the area of cultivable soil through irrigation and the production of electric power for budding industries. There are some fifty modern dams in French North Africa at the present time. I shall call your attention only to the Bin-el-Ouidane Dam in Morocco, one of the largest in Africa.

The area of cultivated land has until now kept pace with the growing population. In Algeria, land in grain has risen by 500 per cent in a century. Some of the land now considered the best in the country is found in the formerly swampy and unhealthy region of Mitidja, which owes its fertility to the strenuous work of French pioneers. I could give you similar examples for Morocco and Tunisia.

In spite of the shortage of sources of power, a number of conversion industries have already sprung up in the large cities. In view of the constantly growing population of North Africa, there is no doubt that industrialization will be expanded during the next few years.

There is still a substantial difference between the average purchasing power of a European and that of a Muslim. A fact that is less well known, however, is that the average income of a European living in Algeria is lower than that of a Frenchman in Metropolitan France. Experts agree that the two million European settlers in North Africa contribute as much to local budgetary resources as the twenty million Muslims.

Education

In the cultural field, France has introduced certain features of Western education which have unquestionably played a decisive role in awakening Tunisian and Moroccan nationalism. Many members of the present governments of these two countries did their graduate work at the University of Paris. Out of the eighteen ministers in the present Moroccan government, there are six lawyers, one magistrate, two doctors, two engineers, and three professors, all former students at French schools and universities.

It should be recognized, nevertheless, that until fairly recently modernization in both the educational and production fields encountered some resistance from the traditionalist section of the Muslim community. During recent years, however, 17 to 20 per cent of the local budgets have been allotted to public education, to which should be added the aid granted by the Modernization and Equipment Fund of Metropolitan France; it has thus been possible to build new schools in which there is no racial discrimination. Finally, we must remember that within the Muslim world the three countries of North Africa were the last to open their doors to Western influence.

As a result of an educational program introduced by the French, it is hoped that illiteracy in Tunisia will be wiped out within the next decade. In Algeria, 1,200 new classrooms were to be built in 1955–56. In Morocco, in ten years, the number of Muslims attending modern schools has increased eightfold.

Moroccan and Tunisian statements

Are French accomplishments in North Africa recognized by the Moroccans and Tunisians? The statements by the Sultan of Morocco and Mr. Bourguiba, quoted earlier, indicate that they are.

I have stressed past events because they explain the role that France will have to continue playing, in full agreement with the Moroccans and Tunisians, in the development of their own personality. This necessity was underlined by Habib Bourguiba in an interview in *Le Figaro* on June 14, 1955:

> The French and Tunisian peoples are too closely bound—intellectually, economically, and even geographically—not to live together in freedom and equality. On one side there is friendship, on the other interest. How, then, is it possible to doubt?

As recently as last April 9, His Majesty Mohammed ben Youssef, in a talk in Tangiers, stated:

> We wish at this time to express our thanks and all our consideration to our French and Spanish friends who have contributed to the evolution of Morocco. May they continue their activity. . . . We extend them a hand of friendship and invite them to co-operate with us in the development of an independent Morocco.

INDEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Today, Morocco and Tunisia are independent states. France's recognition of this independence is not a sign of failure nor is it a sign of weakness, as some people would think. France, which had realized as early as 1944, at the Brazzaville Conference, that the end of colonialism was at hand, interprets Moroccan and Tunisian independence as the beginning of a new era in her relations with those two countries and is ready to continue playing a part to which she is impelled not only by her past and her whole culture, but also by the course of world events. For national isolation is impossible, not only in the economic field, but also in the political and strategic fields.

Mr. Henry A. Byroade, former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, recognized this fact when, on October 31, 1953, he declared before the World Affairs Council of Northern California at Asilomar:

> Statehood in the 20th century is more than a matter of independence. It must include recognition of the obligations of interdependence. It is our earnest hope that the movement toward independence in Asia and Africa will achieve the results expected of it without interfering with a still greater and longer-term trend, the movement towards increasing association and cooperation among all free nations and races.[1]

Without attempting to give an exact definition of the word interdependence, I should like merely to point out that it was because of a growing need for interdependence that the United States was compelled to relinquish its geographical and political isolation, to in-

[1] "The World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America," *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 29, No. 751 (November 16, 1953), p. 657.

tervene in two world wars, to assume leadership of the free world, and to face the responsibilities devolving on it as a result of its material strength. It was interdependence between countries sharing the same way of life which gave birth to the Marshall Plan, designed to enable a Europe devastated by rival nationalisms to regain its rightful place in the world. It was also recognition of this moral obligation based on human brotherhood which led to Point Four, foreshadowed by the Modernization and Equipment Plan of the French Union (the equivalent of four billion dollars between 1949 and 1954).

We also find this notion of interdependence in the more advanced countries of Europe, which have been led to accept successive relinquishments of sovereignty in favor of a community of nations, a community which is more or less extensive, depending on whether the organization of great economic units, common markets, or collective security is concerned. This regional concept of interdependence, however, cannot be merely that of a club, all the members of which enjoy a certain standing. Quite the contrary, interdependence necessarily exists between the more advanced countries and the underdeveloped countries, for it gives the latter the hope of one day attaining the same standard of living as the former.

Consequently, nothing could be more opposed to the irreversible current of history than the romantic notion of an independence stifled by isolationism or neutralism. For certain seemingly neutralist ideological concepts are trying to assert themselves in the underdeveloped countries, which thus threaten to become a stake in a new system of power politics within the framework of a so-called uncommitted force, whose strings would be pulled by the Soviet.

In order to overcome these dangers, and also in the interest of the underdeveloped countries and of the more advanced Western countries, France is attempting to reconcile the reality of nationalism and the modern imperatives of interdependence. The French government resolutely followed this course, with the full support of Parliament, in order to define France's new relations with Morocco and Tunisia. Nothing is more significant in this respect than the impressive majority obtained by the government in the ratification of the Franco-Tunisian Conventions (538 votes to 44 in the National Assembly). It was also by a sizeable majority that the Assembly approved the government's Moroccan policy on October 9, 1955 (477 votes to 140).

This policy of independence within a system of interdependence was also approved by responsible nationalist elements in Morocco and Tunisia, as shown by their recent agreements with France. Yet the fanatic elements have not stopped outbidding each other and are striving to undermine future relations between France and North Africa. What is more serious still, fanaticism and the excesses it gives rise to have cast the shadow of anarchy over two countries which need all their strength to face the heavy burdens of independence. Thus the democratic evolution of Morocco and Tunisia and their membership in the free world are threatened.

French assistance needed

Mr. Bourguiba, arriving in Paris on February 2, 1956, recognized that "young Tunisia needed France, in order to overcome the obstacles with which she is faced, simultaneously, on the psychological, political, and economic levels." Undoubtedly Mr. Bourguiba was thinking of Mr. Salah ben Youssef and of the social problems that will be exploited by the demagogues.

The French government agrees with Mr. Bourguiba and is determined to assist the young Moroccan and Tunisian states. In the opinion of the Moroccans and Tunisians themselves, in what field is this assistance most urgently needed?

1. First of all, in the field of technical assistance. I shall give you only two examples: one of the officials of the Tunisian civil service has recently been sent to Paris to work for a while in the offices of M. Chatenet, Controller of the French civil service, where he will study and familiarize himself with French methods; in Morocco, the government, most of whose members belong to the Istiqlal, has asked a French Councilor of State, M. Fougère, to act as Secretary General to the Sherifian government. In order to do so, M. Fougère will have to resign from the French administration, since he will have to attend the meetings of the Moroccan Council of Ministers.

2. On the economic and social plane, the framework of France's financial aid to Tunisia has already been outlined in the Franco-Tunisian Conventions of June 1955. With regard to Morocco, the modalities of this aid will be worked out during the negotiations that are about to open. In his speech broadcast on December 13, 1955, the present Moroccan President of the Council, Si Bekkai, has already stressed the need for this aid:

> Bread, schools, and hospitals are necessary, not only for those who need them today, but also for those who are born each year. Without the economic and technical assistance of a friendly country, France, we would be unable to meet all the problems that confront a young country like ours.

In other words, plans for equipment will be continued, private investment will be maintained and increased, and, above all, the advice of technicians will still be sought.

3. On the cultural level, although Islamic culture remains as strong as ever, Western culture is attracting the younger people, and the contacts established in the common task of modernization are the surest guarantees that ties of interdependence will be maintained.

In this connection, it is interesting to read the interview given to the newspaper *Le Monde* on April 10 by one of the champions of Islamic culture, Mr. Allal el-Fassi, in which he declared:

> The future of Moroccan culture necessitates contact with all the Western and Eastern cultures, in order that it may draw inspiration from the best that they contain and adapt this to give it a national character of Morocco's own. French culture, which is honored in our country, will continue to hold first place among foreign cultures.

4. As for political co-operation, let us hear what the Moroccans and Tunisians have to say. In his speech broadcast on December 13, 1955, the Moroccan Premier, Si Bekkai, declared:

> It is not only economic considerations which compel recognition. The geographic position of our country is of prime importance and the safeguarding of our liberty and independence in the present world situation still implies a defensive alliance with a friendly country. So we will be the allies of the French people, because they are a democratic people, fundamentally anticolonialist, and because we are certain of faithful, fruitful, and close Franco-Moroccan co-operation.

The Tunisian Protocol of Independence of March 20, 1956, specifies, as does the Franco-Moroccan Declaration of March 2:

> With due respect for their sovereignties, France and Tunisia agree to define or to perfect the modalities of a freely effected interdependence between the two countries by organizing their co-operation in the do-

mains in which they have common interests, particularly in matters of defense and foreign relations.

WHAT OF ALGERIA?

Up to now I have spoken to you about the role that France and the French have played in North Africa in the past; as for the future, I have purposely limited myself to the role they are ready to play in Morocco and Tunisia. I shall now take up the special case of Algeria and shall first cite a few essential facts.

Out of 9,000,000 inhabitants in Algeria, 1,200,000 are Europeans, 94 per cent of French nationality. Among these Frenchmen of European stock, almost 90 per cent were born in Algeria and the families of most of them have been settled there for generations. This means that they consider Algeria their native land, just as much as France. They created modern Algeria and still supply most of the country's technicians.

Furthermore, Algeria is a poor country, especially in agricultural resources, and as a result of the continued growth of the Muslim population, there are still many unemployed; but, on the other hand, 300,000 Muslim Algerians have been free to settle and work in France. Each year these Muslim Algerians send to their families the equivalent of a hundred million dollars which they have saved out of their wages.

The Algerian budget is now about 425 million dollars, supplied for the most part by the French in Algeria and by Metropolitan France; and out of 871 million dollars in public funds spent under the 1949–53 equipment plan for Algeria, 714 million were furnished by Metropolitan France. Finally, Metropolitan France also makes up the deficit in Algeria's trade balance, which amounted last year to about 220 million dollars.

What would become of Algeria if it were suddenly and abruptly separated from France? Without even considering the fate of the 1,200,000 Europeans settled in Algeria and of the 300,000 Muslim Algerians working in France, on what economic foundations could Algeria subsist?

It was on the basis of these facts that the French government defined its position, which M. Guy Mollet has outlined on several occasions. In a televised program on April 13 he said:

> The solution of the Algerian problem will be found only within the framework of indissoluble ties between Algeria and Metropolitan France. The men who have been called back into service must know that their mission in Algeria is one of peace.

On January 31, he had declared before the National Assembly: "France's goal is at one and the same time to recognize and respect Algeria's individuality and to establish full political equality among all its inhabitants." On February 16, on his return from Algeria, he repeated the assurance he had given once before: "Algeria's ultimate fate will never, in any case, be decided unilaterally."

By what means does the French government intend, under the present circumstances, to achieve this goal? By negotiations with the valid representatives of the Algerian people, chosen through free elections which will be held on a single-college basis, and whose fairness will be guaranteed by observers from Metropolitan France. To hold such free elections, we must have peace, and law and order.

It is not possible, however, to negotiate at a time when 15,000 rebels, instigated by foreign agents, have been trying since November 1954, through the use of terror, to mobilize and incite the masses to exterminate the million and a quarter Frenchmen of Algeria. Is it possible to hold elections while these rebels are massacring and mutilating not only the Europeans but their co-religionists as well, while they are burning crops and destroying farms and schoolhouses?

As M. Guy Mollet stated in the interview which he gave to *U. S. News and World Report,* a few irresponsible guerrillas cannot speak in the name of the eight million inhabitants of Algeria in negotiating the country's future status. Only freely elected representatives could do that.

This policy the National Assembly approved on March 13, 1956, by 455 votes to 76, when it gave a vote of confidence to M. Mollet's government and granted special powers to M. Lacoste, Minister Residing in Algeria.

THE DOUBLE TASK

In North Africa we French have a double task. On the one hand, we intend to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the local populations to whom, through enlightenment and education, we have brought national consciousness and a sense of responsibility. That is what we have done in Morocco and Tunisia, both of which now enjoy all the prerogatives of sovereign governments. Although the problem of Algeria greatly differs from those of Tunisia and Morocco, since Algeria has been linked to France for a much longer time and by much closer ties, including a much larger French population, France is making every effort to find an equitable solution.

In the second place we are trying to maintain between these countries and France the closest ties possible of co-operation, alliance, and friendship.

It is thus that the forty-five million Frenchmen, together with the millions of Muslims in North Africa, will work side by side to further the aims and goals of the free world.

Roger Vaurs, director of the Press and Information Services of the French Embassy since 1952, entered the French Foreign Service in 1944, became a member of Foreign Minister Georges Bidault's staff in 1947, and was appointed to the Economic Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948, serving as a member of the permanent French delegation to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. Between 1948 and 1952 he was entrusted with various missions in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons, Madagascar, Indochina, and New Caledonia. He has attended in an official capacity numerous international conferences, including the San Francisco Conference (1945), the Geneva "summit" conference (July 1955), and all the Big-Four Foreign Ministers' conferences. He served as a member of the French Delegation to the United Nations from 1945 to 1948 and from 1952 to 1955.

Apartheid

By John E. Holloway

THE wordy war between integrationists in the world at large and segregationists or proponents of *apartheid* or separate development in South Africa is like a skirmish at long range. Seldom do the missiles launched by one party even fall into the camp of the other, much less strike a vital objective.

Advocates of integration do indeed visit South Africa from time to time. Usually this is a flying visit. Usually they condemn the policy of South Africa. Next day their words are forgotten and the long-range ineffectual duel resumes its inconclusive course.

The reason for this is that so many of the see-quick visitors are concerned only with the question whether there is discrimination, and if so, how far it goes. When they find far-reaching discrimination they have learnt all they want to know. They are not interested in the real problems. Their only concern is that discrimination should play no part in the solution of these problems. They proceed immediately to pronounce judgment, for (they reason), is not discrimination admitted, and is it not evil under all circumstances?

They very seldom pause to consider the question how a multiracial, multiculture, multistandard community can be governed at all when one disregards the far-reaching differences or discriminations which Nature itself has made an inherent part of the whole problem. Yet this is the problem which as a stark, exigent, and practical daily issue faces the Union of South Africa.

Dogma of Nondiscrimination

It can well be understood that any kind of discrimination is deeply disturbing to the moral comfort of people who have elevated nondiscrimination to a dogma. We are here, however, not so much concerned with the moral comfort of people living thousands of miles away, *au dessus de la melée*, as with the daily lives of the millions to whom these differences in race, religion, civilization, and standards and ways of living are the very climate in which they have their being.

There are some who found the dogma of nondiscrimination on the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America. They can, however, hardly overlook the fact that the famous words "all men are created equal" were accepted by men who still upheld slavery and that the doctrine of absolute nondiscrimination as the law of the land dates back only to the Supreme Court judgment of May 17, 1954.

Others base their dogma on the New Testament. They slide lightly over the fact that they are condemning their ancestors who have practiced the principles of absolute discrimination or slavery, of separate and unequal treatment, and up to two years ago of separate but equal treatment.

Likewise, they overlook the fact that if the teachings of the New Testament were to be applied absolutely without regard to the limitations of time and place, all the Christian world and almost all its members would stand condemned, and a large number of public problems would take on a shape that would make it extremely difficult to fix even a handhold of reform on them. Should, for example, a country which believes in the sacredness of human life spend billions of money in forging weapons for the better mass destruction of human beings? Should Christians who believe that the body is the temple of the Holy Ghost drink alcohol? What would the score of Christian nations be at the United Nations if measured by the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount? Yet all nations prepare for war and make war. Millions of Christians drink alcohol. Almost all Christian states want to be members of the United Nations. Clearly there is some rationalization which reconciles them to a balance between principle and practicality in an imperfect world and in a community of sinful men.

This insistence on the minor premise, on the sequelae rather than on the basic issue, this muddying of the waters of controversy, is largely caused by concentration, not on the main issue immediately at stake, but on other values which are of more immediate concern to the contestants.

Ignorance of local issues

In the Union of South Africa itself a good deal of the fight about *apartheid* concerns the issue of political power. There is actually not a great deal of difference between the thinking of the members of the National party, now in power, on the one hand and that of the United party Opposition on the other, in their approach to the question of discrimination. They are both so close up against the facts of the situation that it gives them little room to maneuver in terms of absolute principles. They have to live from day to day and, like the members of the United Nations, they cannot afford the luxury of acting solely *sub specie aeternitatis*. It is a natural consequence that attention is concentrated on small matters of detail. The usual rough-and-tumble of party politics inevitably follows. This point is usually missed by foreign observers, who have little understanding of the political finesse which characterizes the movements of South African politicians putting on their acts in the presence of a politically highly conscious electorate. Many foreign reports of the South African party struggle miss the point completely, and the reporters frequently follow a trail which leads them far away from the real scene of battle.

Those foreign commentators who are ignorant of the South African scene frequently find themselves in a similar entanglement in side issues. They interpret the South African scene in the light of what a fight on similar issues would be in their own country or in a setting of international problems. To an American who takes a decided stand one way or another on the subject of racial integration or segregation, the factors in South Africa are regarded as equivalent to similar factors in the United States. The absence of a historical perspective is the more remarkable if one considers the history of the practical application in the United States of the doctrine of nondiscrimination to which I have already referred.

It seems to occur to few commentators in the United States that the stage of historical evolution at which the racial components of the problem have arrived might be a decisive factor in the selection of the instruments with which it can be handled.

In the wider sphere of world affairs people seem to have been even more oblivious of the basic question.

By what route?

The basic question is that of working out a pattern in South Africa into which several racial groups can be fitted, groups of widely divergent levels of civilization and culture, of basically antagonistic spiritual approach to their problems, and of widely differing standards of living. It is not enough to say: "Integration as quickly as possible and

removal of all obstacles to speedy integration." Even the politician who feels that integration must be his ultimate objective cannot disregard the time factor. If hasty integration would create more problems than it solves, it might be wisdom even for him to search for a way round the Serbonian bog. This in fact is the dilemma of the small integrationist group in South Africa. They know where they want to be in the twenty-first century. They do not know what to do in the twentieth century without getting themselves engulfed.

The tendency in international institutions is to expect South Africa to fit into their pattern. They are multiracial and are therefore opposed to all forms of racial discrimination. They have not stopped to consider whether South Africa, in following their single nostrum of no discrimination, might not quickly find itself in the seething cauldron of internal racial conflict which only Communists could welcome. They say in fact that nondiscrimination is an absolute value in human relations and South Africa must introduce it right now.

Universality of discrimination

Yet all countries employ some form of discrimination. In countries of homogeneous stock, majorities discriminate against minorities in the sacred name of democracy. In many countries containing population groups which are racially different but culturally equal, there are enduring minority problems. This in fact gives rise to one of the most intractable problems in the application of the right of self-determination. In many countries there are far-reaching discriminations based on differences in religion. In one vast country these discriminations were so marked that its population could not accept their political independence until they agreed to solve this problem on the basis of—*apartheid!* The division of the vast Indian peninsula into the states of India and Pakistan is perhaps the biggest and most costly exercise in *apartheid,* or separate development, which the world has ever known. And this separatism sprang primarily from irreconcilable differences in religion which may indeed be related to atavistic racial differences.

Whatever may be one's views on the ethics of discrimination, it must be clear to every unprejudiced observer that the governments and peoples of all the world make much use of this weapon, fashioned on different patterns, to meet their own peculiar problems.

Easy criticism of others

South Africa has been sharply attacked for doing the same thing. The reason is fairly simple. American integrationists and Indian antiuntouchables find it a useful adjunct to their own internal political struggles. It is an additional—and cheap—weapon in their armories. Others, in an attitude of self-satisfied impartiality or even of moral arrogance, consider that they are speaking with the voice of divine reason, keeping their eyes fixed on some distant star and disregarding the stumbling blocks which lie at their feet.

But while it may be meet and proper for persons not directly concerned to maintain a high-minded abstraction from the realities, this attitude is unfortunately not possible for people who bear the responsibility for the everyday conduct of affairs.

If discrimination is damned as being inadmissible on any grounds whatever, the argument ends there. There is then no common ground between the antidiscrimination school and those who believe that an intractable and highly complicated problem may be made less intractable and more capable of solution by using discriminatory measures.

There remains nothing to debate. There remain only the unedifying and unsatisfying processes of fulmination and vilification. It might, however, be wise for the contestants to lay aside the self-tailored, ill-fitting garments of self-righteousness and examine the problems in the light of common day.

Basically, discrimination is a method of sorting out the constituent parts of a problem. The sorting-out process is an essential prerequisite of the process of classification on which all solutions of problems are based. The opponents of discrimination do not resist discrimination as such. All methods of public control rely on some measure of discrimination. What they object to is discrimination based on race or color.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH

The gist of the difference between South Africans and foreign antidiscriminationists is that most South Africans maintain: (1) that their racial problems not only cannot be solved on a basis of nondiscrimination but, on the contrary, can only be further complicated and exacerbated by indiscriminate scrambling of all the constituents; and (2) that discrimination or *apartheid* is necessary to place the greatly varying constituent parts in such positions as to make possible a constructive approach to the major problem of the large Bantu population as well as to the lesser problems of the minority groups.

There is therefore envisaged an essentially practical approach, which for the present disregards aspects temporarily only the fringe of the problem in order to get at its core. On the other hand there is no disregard of the fact that in time what is now at the fringe may move nearer to the center. The stage must therefore be so constructed as to provide adequate space for movement when this happens.

This approach, based on discriminatory treatment of the various elements in the racial problem, has been called *apartheid,* which means consideration of each problem as a problem "apart" while forming part of a whole; in other words, "separate development."

To these two theses which I have enunciated I will devote the rest of my paper.

POLICY NOT DOGMA

I will commence by stressing the point that *apartheid* is not a dogma but a policy. No doubt zealots who favor *apartheid* have on occasion elevated it to the position of a dogma. It is also true that opponents wish it to be regarded as a dogma, since that approach greatly simplifies the task of attacking it. A great deal of ink has been spilt and useless verbiage expended in the task of proving that total *apartheid* is an impossible goal. There is, however, no point in attaching importance to the views of subordinates when the views of the principals are available for quotation.

The two Prime Ministers who have committed themselves to the policy of *apartheid* have said very explicitly that while total *apartheid* may be an ideal it is not realizable in practice. By calling it an ideal they mean that the avoidance of racial friction could best be attained by avoiding all racial frictional surfaces. This is never possible in real life. That fact, however, need not inhibit a policy of reducing racial frictional surfaces to a minimum, which is one of the objectives of *apartheid.*

If *apartheid* is considered as a dogma it will, like so many dogmas, involve one in untenable positions. It is, however, not intended to

. . . push the logic of a fact
To its ultimate conclusion in unmitigated act.

Apartheid is a policy. A policy to which a political party has committed its fortunes must be made to work, must be adjusted to the changing complexion of affairs, unless the responsible party is prepared to disregard the realities and to take the consequence of such disregard.

Apartheid must therefore be viewed as a development changing its complexion from time to time as its successes or its failures necessitate a new orientation.

PRESENT SITUATION

Before dealing with some of the improvements on present conditions which the proponents of *apartheid* expect from it, a few words are necessary about the present situation.

In the first place I would stress the point that as things stand now there exists in South Africa a very marked degree of *apartheid,* or separation between the various races. This is an inevitable result partly of history and partly of basic sociological conditions, which will change but slowly and only after the passing of generations of human beings. It is a natural outcome of the extreme diversity in levels of civilization, education, and culture, in the standards and modes of living, and in the historical origin of the various racial components. Except in very small fringes the desire for social integration is completely nonexistent even among the Bantu. With the exception of domestic servants the Bantu live in communities segregated from the whites. There is practically no admixture between these two groups in hotels, theaters, churches, sports fields, railroad trains, and so forth. Economic factors largely account for this segregation. It should be remembered that until a generation ago the Bantu who could earn a living by brain power or special skills numbered scarcely a thousand persons. All the others had to offer in the labor market was the strength of their muscles. Although this situation is changing under the impact of education, the fringe of educated and skilled workers is still remarkably thin, and the whole of this class work among their own people as pastors, doctors, nurses, clerks, teachers, and policemen.

It is important that Americans should realize this fact, since the majority of them tacitly assume that the South African Bantu are on the same level of development as American Negroes.

There is, however, this small fringe of educated Bantu, and while in numbers they are a relatively insignificant part of the population, they are very vocal and succeed in impressing foreigners with their importance. In America and in Europe the impression has thus been created that the really important problem in South Africa is to remove obstacles to the further progress and integration into the white community of this small class.

The problem is, however, much vaster and more complicated, and to give precedence in its solution to this limited group might well create conditions impossible for the large mass of the Bantu. This vaster and more important problem is how best the Bantu "can be led onward step by step in an orderly march to civilization."[1] It concerns millions of Bantu in or in close proximity to the Union for whom the advent of white men in large numbers has made civilization the inexorable driving force in life. Gone for them is the *dolce far niente* of a primitive life supported by the labor of their women and embellished by the charms of the chase and the excitement of war. They must pay what John Stuart Mill called the real price of civilization, "continuous

[1] *Report of Native Economic Commission* (1930–32) (U.G. 32, 1932; Pretoria: Government Printer), par. 14.

labour of an unexciting kind." The bulk of them, however, have not as yet reached that stage. They regard voluntary unemployment as one of life's blessings, and involuntary unemployment is still unknown to them. If the time comes when the latter condition afflicts the daily life of the Bantu, the effects will be little short of revolutionary.

ALTERNATIVE TO APARTHEID

Now the Union may follow the policy of maintaining and canalizing the *apartheid* which already exists naturally and using it as a means for lessening frictions, while at the same time making room in the body economic and politic for those who are now in ever greater numbers crossing the threshold between the primitive and the civilized life. It may on the other hand follow the policy of removing obstacles to the integration into white society of the emergent members of the Bantu race, thereby increasing rather than removing the frictional surfaces.

It is noteworthy that in the not inconsiderable volume of discussion in the foreign press the tendency has been to condemn the first policy and to avoid meticulously an examination of the immediate consequences of following the second. I can examine only a few aspects of this question, but I think it is important that people who glibly condemn *apartheid* should consider the implications of the alternative policy.

Let us assume that a policy is adopted of gradually but purposefully eliminating the discriminations which now apply, and examine what is likely to happen.

The most direct way to eliminate discrimination would be the removal of the color bar in skilled occupations. Positions in these fields are now held by, and with limited exceptions reserved for, people who live according to the standards and have the material, educational, and spiritual needs of people of advanced civilization. The people in whose interest the color bar would be removed lived but recently on a subsistence economy and with limited exceptions have not advanced very far beyond that stage. Inevitably, therefore, there would be an immediate clash of standards. The civilized craftsmen would fight hard for the maintenance of their standards. For the emergent Bantu even a much lower level of wages would be a notable advance. It requires little imagination to realize the amount of friction, of ill feeling, of racial conflict, that would be set up by such a policy. It would not help to ameliorate frictions. It would introduce into the working parts of the social mechanism not the smoothing oil which reduces friction but hard abrasives which wear away both surfaces. If a way could be found to avoid this while giving the Bantu a road on which to advance, a great deal could obviously be gained by following it. The proponents of *apartheid* claim that such a way can be found, a point to which I shall refer later.

Or let us assume that the way is opened for Bantu doctors or dentists to practice among the white community, for Bantu teachers to teach white children, for Bantu lawyers and other professional men to have white clients. Does anyone who appreciates the width of the gap between civilized men and emergent primitives imagine that such doctors or teachers or lawyers would, save in very exceptional cases, obtain the employment in the white community which would give them the higher standard of living to which they aspire? If these products of the high schools and the universities were lured by these prospects, the only result would be frustration when they find that they have been fobbed off with gilded po-

tatoes. Inevitably this would induce more friction.

Now the moralist will argue that the fault for this lies with the white man. Let him but accept the Bantu as a brother and cast out from his soul and social system the inhibitions which now cause this state of affairs, and all will be well.

Such a course would no doubt give great moral contentment to those people living far away in sheltered, homogeneous, civilized communities who do not need to make the necessary adjustments in their own lives because they are not in touch with the problems. For them it would be easy. But would such an idealistic, wishful-thinking, living-in-the-clouds attitude solve any workaday problems? I go further. Has not the emergence of a racial problem where none existed before quickly shattered such daydreams? I refer to the difficulties created by the migration of colored people in appreciable numbers into parts of the northern states of the American Union or into the British Isles. Yet in numbers they are but as locusts in Iceland compared to the swarms in Dixie or in South Africa. There is some point in Edwin R. Embree's remark: "Negroes unfortunately offer a less romantic call to uplift when swarming about one's own city than they did when picturesquely imagined as suffering innocently in the rural South!" [2]

What is required is not an ideal suited to nonexistent ideal conditions, but a solution which takes full account of the hard, ugly, and intractable realities of everyday life.

Political Problems

Now let us turn to the political field. This is a field of prime importance, because it can influence all others, a field endowed in the nature of things with a sufficiency of frictional surfaces, a field in which none would desire to sow dragon's teeth. In discussing matters appertaining to this field, too, there is an obstinate tendency to stray into the region of the absolute rather than to climb the mountains of stern reality.

The democratic form of government was developed by peoples whose populations were marked by a high degree of homogeneity. Some of its main features—one man one vote, equal manhood or womanhood suffrage, and secret balloting—are comparatively recent developments even in many advanced democracies. In others they have not as yet been fully developed.

Much depends on the homogeneity of the population and on its adjustment to a long and equal heritage of civilization. In countries where there are sharply divergent groups, whether based on religion, race, or previous nationality, the introduction of an unqualified democracy has for the most part been beset by refractory problems. Such factors have hitherto militated against the creation of a united Ireland and a united India. The turbulence created by them in Algeria and in Cyprus is known to all. Clearly these problems have not yielded to one simple, absolute rule. They cannot. Oil and water will not mix.

In many ways the political problem in South Africa is more complicated than that in any of the countries mentioned. Only three generations ago it was almost absolutely true that there were no civilized Bantu. At the present day a huge percentage of this race is still steeped in primitivism—a difference, in relation to civilized life, of kind and not of degree. A vast adjustment in regard to the most elementary things in life is required before the Bantu will be attuned to the strains and stresses,

[2] *Brown America: The Story of a New Race* (New York: The Viking Press, 1931), p. 67.

the rigors and the disappointments, the frustration and the achievements, of civilized life. Meanwhile the whites, though a minority, are an essential element for the survival of civilization in this part of the world.

In areas like the Gold Coast and Nigeria a small group of foreigners have brought so much of civilization as can be grafted on the native stock. When a sufficient number of Africans have been trained to take their places, they can move out and leave the task to their African disciples. We need not consider here the problems which will arise when the disciples are faced by conditions requiring the inspiration of the age-long memory of a civilized people. No doubt these will be solved when they arise.

Industrial Civilization

In South Africa a different situation exists. The climate has been changed permanently by the civilized minority. Civilization sets the pace. It does not merely ameliorate. It is exigent, inexorable, and all-embracing. The standards of living of the Bantu, already much improved from those of their ancestors, and educational and medical services which their ancestors never knew are dependent on the maintenance of a high level of industrial and technical development. This is true of the Bantu of the Union, and also of millions beyond our borders who not only benefit from these developments but are frequently dependent on them for their daily bread. The millions of Bantu in southern Africa can no longer be fed unless the high level of industrial technique introduced by Western civilization is maintained intact and in sound working order. This is a stark reality frequently disregarded by theorists from abroad. It will take many generations even at the most favorable rate of educational progress before the Bantu can direct the power stations, the ways of communication, the mines, the industries, and the farms which now provide their daily bread.

Bantu Education

A further powerful motive force is the growing influence of Bantu education. At the present time the Bantu who are sufficiently educated to make of knowledge a source of income represent but a fringe of the great mass. Their numbers will, however, grow. The fringe will widen until it becomes a powerful belt. The white people of South Africa are committed to a policy of educating and civilizing the Bantu. The Union of South Africa has done more and is doing more to raise Africans to civilization than any country in sub-Saharan Africa.

We have been asked: Is this wise, judged from a purely selfish point of view? The question whether it is wise for the white men to raise to their own level the millions by whom they may be swamped is beside the point. Such a policy is inherent in the fact that in the Union civilization sets the pace. A civilized and a primitive community cannot indefinitely coexist without the one disintegrating the other. The white people do not want the civilized community to be disintegrated. We prefer to civilize the primitive community, colossal as is the task. But we also do not want to be swamped in the process.

The Way of Apartheid

Is there a way out? The proponents of *apartheid* answer in the affirmative. But they say at the same time that if you start by scrambling the constituents at this stage there is no way out. Therefore, they say, at this stage when the constituent parts are still almost completely separate, one should on the one

hand maintain such separateness or *apartheid* as exists and on the other seek out all practical measures for creating a community in which there is a separate sphere for development of each of the groups. To mix them at this stage in the political sphere, which controls all other spheres, closes the door to the proposed line of development.

Now a number of highly intelligent observers from abroad have expressed very grave doubts whether such a development can ever be successful. But they have hardly given deep and serious study to the underlying factors. Many people, even in South Africa, have thought in terms of one single and ultimately separate "Bantustan." They see many difficulties in this concept because of the lack of contiguity of the Bantu reserves. But Americans, accustomed as they are to the existence of forty-eight states in a single Union, should find no difficulty in envisaging a number of separate groupings in the South African Union. There are, indeed, natural characteristics of tribal background, language, and customs which point to the desirability eventually of creating separate groupings.

There is a prevalent fallacy that all black people are the same and that there is a common Bantu national consciousness. This is, however, far from being the truth. The Bantu are divided into tribes, which might be arranged in four general linguistic groups, but frequently the lingua franca of any two Bantu groups is either Afrikaans or English. Before the white man imposed the rule of peace three generations ago, the Bantu were often at war among themselves. These wars took place not only against tribes of different groups but also between tribes inside the same group. Even today there are recurrent intertribal skirmishes, and on the mines no prudent-minded manager will house large numbers of Zulus and Pondos together. The result would be bloodshed.

Another factor of importance is that the traditional policy pursued by the white man in South Africa—that of reserving the lands first occupied by the Bantu for their exclusive occupation—has left large compact areas where all the land, with insignificant exceptions, belongs to the Bantu tribes. In size these areas are larger than many American states or than many independent countries in other parts of the world. There is nothing to prevent these from being developed into areas in which all productive and governmental functions can ultimately be exercised by the Bantu themselves. They are in fact now being used, and some have for many years been used, as training grounds in Bantu self-government. They are compact, and they are inhabited by peoples of related tribes, speaking the same language and observing the same customs.

A sorting out, bearing in mind the factors in South Africa which still make such a process possible, will give to the various Bantu groups separate areas in which they can exercise all the qualities which education and civilization will develop in them, in which they can rule themselves, live their own lives, and avoid most of the friction which is unfortunately inevitable when widely different peoples live close together in the same community.[3]

[3] Since the above paragraph was written, a résumé has been published of the *Report on the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas*. This report recommends the creation and consolidation of seven Bantu areas based largely on tribal and linguistic groupings. These would incorporate the High Commission territories, which would in any case have no economic viability apart from the Union, and would comprise the following groups: (1) Tswana, (2) Venda-Tsonga, (3) Pedi, (4) Swazi, (5) Zulu, (6) Southern Nguni, and (7) Sotho.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT

There remains one important aspect of the question to which I must briefly refer. It deserves a paper to itself, because the Western world will have to take account of it in its dealings with the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. I refer to the question of capital investment.

What bearing has the question of capital investment on the policy of *apartheid?* I must say at once that it presents a further difficulty. That difficulty, however, is not inherent in *apartheid* but in the African himself. All other approaches to the problem would meet with the same obstacle.

The sub-Saharan African has never by himself produced any capital goods worth mentioning. The famous anthropologist Raymond Dart maintains that the African did not invent even his primitive artifacts—spears, bows and arrows, pottery, basketry—but that the knowledge of all these came from Asia.

Under the stimulus of a modern economy, limited numbers of Bantu have saved up small accumulations of money. There is, however, the stark fact that the nature and the institutions and the mode of living of the African have never made of him a conservator or a saver. If the Bantu areas are to be developed on a basis of *apartheid,* or on any other basis, where is the capital to come from? There is the further question of safety for long-term investments in areas where individual land tenure is still very exceptional.

As I have said, these problems apply not only to *apartheid.* There are reforms which have still to be introduced to make the Bantu survive at all in a civilized environment. This is one of them. A totally improvident race will never become a civilized race.

Inevitably therefore a long time will have to elapse before the Bantu areas can be fully developed. Just as in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, so in the South African Bantu reserves capital will have to come from outside to create a basis for civilization.[4] This also means that for a very long time to come the Bantu will be dependent on the capital investment which has already been made and is increasingly being made in the white areas.

BANTU DEVELOPMENT

Must, then, the hopes of the Bantu to practice their own skills in the professions, in industry, in self-government, be delayed for generations?

The answer is in the negative. Inasmuch as it is clear that large numbers of Bantu will live in close proximity to the whites in the industrial areas, a fine opportunity is offered for reserving to them the skilled trades, the commercial occupations, the clerical, administrative, and professional services to be rendered to their own people. Large, compact Bantu urban areas are being organized as part of the big cities. As far as possible these are being run for and by the Bantu. Their own schools, run by their own school committees, can make provision for the fact that children but a few generations removed from barbarism require to learn much at school of the knowledge with which the civilized child grows up in the home. Their towns are being built chiefly by Bantu builders under the supervision of Europeans. This has already opened up a large sphere for Bantu craftsmen. In time, as adequate numbers are trained, the whole of the policing, the postal

[4] The *Report on the Socio-Economic Development of Bantu Areas* recommends an initial development program estimated to cost about $300,000,000 in the next ten years. The greater part of this would come from the white community by way of aid rather than by way of capital investment.

services, the urban transport, and the local administration will be handed over to the Bantu. Under a system of integration it would take them a long time to reach this level, and such progress would inevitably be accompanied by friction. Under *apartheid* these activities will be increasingly reserved to them, and their training in, and enjoyment of, these occupations will in no way conflict with the living standards of the white man.

Apartheid, therefore, visualizes a development in which, as civilization grows among the Bantu, there will be an ever increasing demand for the employment of the skills which it generates among their own people. Even as things stand today, the demand for trained Bantu teachers, parsons, nurses, and doctors considerably exceeds the output of the colleges and the universities, the training hospitals and the medical schools.

It is a long row which the Union is setting out to hoe under a policy of *apartheid.* Much reclamation has to be done to restore the reserves, long worked according to primitive and wasteful methods of soil robbery, to their pristine fertility. The people who but recently had only the elementary explanations of their barbarous ancestors to account for natural cataclysms, disaster, sickness, and death must be weaned from the terrifying legacy of functional superstition, incantations, belief in evil spirits, and even the still surviving vestiges of human sacrifice. Most of the problems which beset a civilized community in its political organization touch them hardly at all. They are concerned with what happens round them and about them, not with problems of a monetary economy and inflation, of balancing budgets and foreign payments, of international peace, or the other manifold problems of the Great Society. They require to be taken by the hand and led aright on the steep upward paths of civilization.

It will be the task of the white man to advance the education of the more promising among the Bantu and thus to enable them to serve their own people in their own areas and to provide the stimulus of example and leadership. As warriors and cattle owners the Bantu tribes developed dignity and pride of race. Shall this be preserved or shall the Bantu be reduced to the status of proletarians in an integrated community?

Integration or Separate Development

Integration of peoples of European and Negro stock in large numbers and on a community basis has nowhere been successfully achieved. In the northern part of the United States conditions would be most favorable for such an experiment. Its Negroes are much further advanced in education and in adjustment to a civilized environment than any African Negro community. The huge preponderance of whites makes the problem a relatively simple one in comparison with that obtaining in the southern states and in the Union of South Africa. Yet nowhere in the northern United States does there exist a completely integrated white-black community in which people of both races are normally seen living together, eating together, playing together, and intermarrying. The interracial contacts are exceptions, and the bulk of the Negroes naturally congregate together in separate residential areas. Where attempts have been made to force such community integration, they have frequently been accompanied by riots and sharp friction.

Owing to the stage of development of its Bantu population and other historical factors, the Union of South Africa is in a position to choose between separate development and ultimate integration. Is it surprising that the Union is not prepared to let this opportunity pass in favor of a solution which has made so little progress even where the conditions are most favorable to its success?

His Excellency John E. Holloway, D.Sc. (Econ.), Washington, D. C., has been Ambassador of the Union of South Africa to the United States since 1954. He was professor of economics in the Transvaal University College, Pretoria (1919–21), dean of the Faculty of Commerce of the University of South Africa (1922–25), director of the Office of Census and Statistics, Union of South Africa (1925–33), economic adviser to the Treasury (1934–37), and Secretary for Finance (1937–50). He was a delegate to the Bretton Woods Conference and the International Conferences on Trade and Employment in Geneva (1947) and Havana (1948). He has just been appointed as High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London.

The Consequences of Apartheid

By Gwendolen M. Carter

In considering the consequences of *apartheid* it is important to know what type of *apartheid* we are speaking about. There are, in fact, three, or even perhaps four, kinds of *apartheid*. There is the traditional type, which has always been characteristic of South African society and is often spoken of as traditional racial segregation. Building on this traditional type but with a new form because of its embodiment in legal enactment and the much greater precision of its definition is the type of *apartheid* established by the Nationalists since 1948. This type goes beyond the customary rules of racial segregation in South Africa—to sharpen them in different areas, to make them more logical, and to give them an over-all ideological slant. Beyond this again is a third type, the type that we call "ideal" or "total" *apartheid,* which has at its base the notion of two geographically separate societies, a white society and a black society. And it is this latter, long-range objective which has often been used as the rationale for the measures undertaken by the Nationalists.

If I speak of a fourth type of *apartheid,* it is the one embodied in the Tomlinson Report presented to Parliament shortly before its recess for Easter. This report is the result of a vast investigation, undertaken under the chairmanship of Professor Tomlinson, into the socioeconomic conditions of the reserves. Its proposals come closer to the notion of ideal, or total, *apartheid* than has any other plan which has been advanced as a practical scheme. They involve the establishment of a genuine national home for the Bantu, in the present reserves of South Africa, to which are to be joined, say the Tomlinson Commission hopefully, the colonies and protectorates known as the High Commission Territories—Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland. In suggesting that these areas be added to the present South African native reserves in order to make a reasonably large area for a future "Bantustan," the Report does not mention, however, the strong public opinion in the United Kingdom against ceding these territories to South Africa, particularly so long as the latter country maintains the Nationalist type of *apartheid.*

The distinction between the first two and latter two types of *apartheid* is very wide indeed. The Ambassador has told you that *apartheid* is the traditional way of separating Europeans from non-Europeans in a society in which they have become increasingly intermingled as the result of economic development. That development is constantly drawing Africans in from the reserves to fill the new opportunities presented by the economy. But those Africans are also coming off the reserves because these no longer provide them with even a precarious subsistence. Part of the task of the Tomlinson Commission was to see what could be done with the reserves to make them more productive. As far as agriculture is concerned, the Commission found that only half the present number of peasant African farmers can make a living within these reserves. In effect, although today more than one-half of all South Africa's nine million Africans are outside the reserves at any given time, a further half of those still in the reserves, that is about two million Africans, cannot secure a

livelihood from agriculture there. Thus a real economic revolution would be necessary if the reserves are to provide subsistence not only for their present population but for a substantial proportion of those now outside their boundaries; and another revolution would also occur, perhaps more gradually, if African labor should be withdrawn progressively from the European economy. If it is not so withdrawn, the problem is that these people, who provide the great unskilled labor force of South Africa, will all be on the plane of migratory labor, with everything that expression implies in terms of the disintegration of tribal structure, of traditional discipline, and of family solidarity.

Cost of Apartheid

Let us now consider the consequences of *apartheid* not in moral terms but in terms of what *apartheid* actually costs the South African community. Even traditional *apartheid,* the most moderate though still far-ranging type of racial segregation, means an extraordinary proliferation of separate facilities: schools, buses, railway carriages, separate entrances, and so forth. In the Cape there are even separate telephone boxes in certain places for the use of non-Europeans. Some of these separate facilities may be essential in terms of public health so long as so many Africans are relatively primitive, but many of the separate facilities are being added today because of ideology rather than need.

Beyond the actual cost of providing additional facilities is the wastage of not using fully the economic resource represented in the labor of the increasingly skilled African. In many instances the African may not yet be sufficiently well trained to assume all the responsibilities of the economic process, but anyone who has been to South Africa will realize that there are many skilled jobs which Africans can increasingly assume, and in fact are assuming, in some of the newer industries like cotton manufacturing, though they are rated as unskilled or semiskilled. One of South Africa's greatest problems today is that it has one of the smallest proportions of skilled labor—in fact, I believe, the smallest proportion—of any industrial economy in the world. Greater mobility to use the skill which is available would have an excellent effect upon the operation of the South African economy.

English South Africans

Perhaps this *apartheid* might be worth while, despite the cost that it involves and the restraints on economic mobility, if in practice it were solving the problems of human relations in this highly complex racial situation. But in fact is it? On the contrary, everything that I can see indicates that it is causing fresh racial tension, not only between European and non-European but also between the European groups. Nothing has disturbed English-speaking and some Afrikaans-speaking South Africans so much as the efforts which the Nationalists have made to remove the Colored from the common roll, and thus eliminate the last non-Europeans to cast their votes side by side with Europeans. The earlier expedients may have seemed justified to the Nationalists by what they felt were the provisions of the Statute of Westminster, though the Appeal Court declared them unconstitutional. But when the Nationalists pushed through the 1955 Senate Act, they changed the balance of the Constitution solely to achieve this particular purpose. As a result, we have the new Black Sash Movement as the counterpart to the earlier Torch Commando, both of them signaling the intense distress of the Opposition and, in particular, of English-speaking South Africans at what they consider to be a

violation of the Constitution, not only the Constitution in its formal mechanistic sense but constitutionality in the broadest sense as an agreed basis of political action.

AFRICAN NATIONALISM

There is today very little indication of non-European resistance in South Africa. I find it hard to believe, however, that absence of resistance indicates general satisfaction with what is going on. I remember keenly the passive resistance campaign of 1952. I realized that it petered out, partly for lack of funds, partly because of harsher penalties, but I cannot believe that the deep sense of bitterness which underlay it has lessened to any appreciable degree. Perhaps the only way to transform African nationalism from its present bitter, frustrated form of demanding a fuller share of the returns of the European community would be, apart from satisfying this demand, to assure the Africans that they are indeed to have a home of their own, in which they can have self-development as West Africans now have. This, I realize, is the ultimate objective of ideal *apartheid* and, to a lesser degree, of the kind of program which the Tomlinson Commission has proposed. Only a program so far-reaching in its possibilities could produce a reversal of the economic integration which is the result of present economic developments, and could thus divert the African nationalist aspirations which represent so ultimately explosive a force in South Africa.

IS TOMLINSON APARTHEID PRACTICABLE?

Is it then complete or total *apartheid,* or even the very substantial territorial *apartheid* of the Tomlinson Report, which offers the best hope in South Africa? Even if this is the case, is Tomlinson *apartheid* practicable? Is there a possibility, an economic possibility, of building the reserves into an area capable of supporting the African population? Is this program not merely leading to an intensification of the problems of migratory labor? I am not prepared to say that it is not a good and a healthy thing to build up industry in the reserves; I think it is excellent, particularly if it can command the support of the African. And even though the progress of Zwelitsha—the textile mill in a model native suburb of Kingwilliamstown, administrative center of the Ciskei native reserve—is not particularly encouraging for a belief that industry in the reserves will necessarily secure the support of the African, yet I believe this support would come in time. But when I think of the enormous expense of establishing the necessary amount of industry in the reserves I wonder where the funds are coming from. One of my American friends, after going over plans, partly those of the Tomlinson Commission and partly those which he heard from Nationalists, said that it seemed to him their implementation would need a new Marshall Plan, not so much less proportionately to the vast amounts poured by this country into the postwar development of Western Europe. But in Western Europe there were trained workers and traditional lines of industry to build upon. None of this exists in the present reserves, none of it exists in the High Commission Territories, even if these might be transferred by the British, unlikely as that is. And so, where does the money come from?

The Tomlinson Commission proposes that its program should be financed half from public funds, that is, funds raised by South African whites for the most part, and half from Africans. I find it hard to see how substantial funds can come from Africans, if we take into account their present standard of living.

Moreover, I find it hard to believe that white South Africans are going to contribute the vast amount necessary to provide even half from public funds. It is said today that one of the major sources of discontent within the Nationalist party is over using so much white South African money for the aid of the African. Thus there seems little chance that a program of total *apartheid,* or even of Tomlinson *apartheid,* will be tried as an answer to the situation.[1]

What have I ended with? On the one hand, I have said, and I believe, that to move wholeheartedly towards the program outlined by Professor Tomlinson's Commission would offer an opportunity for better relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. My doubts are not about the program as such but about the possibility of carrying it out. Yet to be constructive the program must be carried out in full. If the program is carried out only in part, as seems to me probable, then it will do two things, both of which are likely to make relations not less but more difficult. It will place a further fear of displacement in the minds of those Africans already domiciled more or less permanently in the European areas. Moreover, it will make the South African economy still more dependent on migratory labor, which is a wasteful kind of labor because it tends to interfere with the building up of experience, tradition, and *esprit de corps,* all of which are enormously valuable in any labor force.

And what is being thrown away in the process? It seems to me that strains are being put on the white population which will intensify the bitterness between groups within that population. I do not anticipate that the Nationalist party will break asunder under such strains. It may be that in practice, if African nationalism becomes more intense, English and Afrikaner will draw closer together for mutual protection. But it is not the kind of outgoing, spontaneous, active co-operation and unity on which a sound national spirit should be based.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

There is one other answer: to welcome rather than to impede economic integration. Very few South Africans are prepared to take integration as their slogan. The Liberals have done so with vast courage, but they have relatively little support among either the Europeans or the non-Europeans. Yet the whole dynamic of the economic situation is pushing the country towards integration, not social, not residential, but economic integration. If this continues, it seems to me that the stability of the country depends on giving the non-Europeans a sense of permanence, and the

[1] The South African government in its White Paper, issued after this article had been presented, accepted the findings of the Tomlinson Commission as a basis for future policy decisions. The Commission recommended a ten-year plan involving the expenditure of $290,000,000 for industrial and social development of the Bantu area. The White Paper neither specifically accepted nor rejected this obligation but declared that the necessary appropriation of funds would be sought annually in accordance with growing needs, the plans submitted, and the country's capacity in each phase of development to meet the costs. The White Paper specifically rejected the idea that private European industrialists be permitted to develop industries within Bantu areas and declared that "Bantu enterprise, unimpeded by European competition, should be enabled to develop its own industries." It appears, therefore, that the government will keep the direction of development in the native reserves in its own hands, stimulating it by use of public funds and, possibly, through tapping native savings. It remains to be seen how substantial a plan can be carried through under these conditions. Under any circumstances, of course, it will need to proceed slowly at first.

opportunities within the economic structure to which their capacities entitle them.

I do not know if there is still time in South Africa to build a community which is based on a very considerable degree of separateness but which is also unified in terms of the common economic enterprise in which all its people are joined. I do believe that the only hopeful alternatives are either some such clearly stated objective for all of South Africa's people or else a very clear opportunity for real separateness. The latter would mean giving the African the opportunity to develop a society of his own with political as well as economic and social rights, and a society, moreover, which is not dependent on the returns of migratory labor. Unless one or the other of these is done the consequences of *apartheid* may be a continued economic drag on the country and intensified bitterness between Europeans and non-Europeans, leading perhaps ultimately to a final break.

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Labor Relations in Northern Rhodesia

By HAROLD K. HOCHSCHILD

THE critical sector of labor relations in Northern Rhodesia has been its copper mining area. Recent developments there may radically affect the future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, of which Northern Rhodesia is a part.

The population of the Federation is about 7,000,000, of whom 235,000 are Europeans and the rest Africans with a sprinkling of people of Asiatic and mixed origins. The territories that joined in 1953 to form the Federation were the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in which the Africans were the wards of the British government, and Southern Rhodesia, a partly independent country in which the Africans were subject to the local white settlers' government. The Articles of Federation offered concessions to allay misgivings in England and African opposition in the protectorates. They provided for an African Affairs Board which may appeal to the British government against legislation deemed discriminatory. In the thirty-five man Federal Assembly, in addition to three European members representing African interests, six places were given to Africans, an innovation startling to Southern Rhodesian whites. And the Articles state that the Federation is to work toward a partnership between the European and the African.

THE COPPERBELT

The most striking economic development in the region has been in that strip of land in Northern Rhodesia, roughly 75 miles long by 35 miles wide, which extends in a southeast-northwest direction along the border of the Belgian Congo pedicle and has become known as the Copperbelt.

Thirty years ago some African villagers and a handful of Europeans made up the population of this area. There was no industry of any kind. Today it is the site of a copper-producing industry of world importance. The industry employs approximately 6,000 Europeans and 35,000 Africans, who, with their families, constitute a population of at least 125,000 people on the properties of the mines. Including other Africans and Europeans who find employment in the area as an indirect result of the industry, there are probably 250,000 people living on the Copperbelt because of the mines.

Copper was first discovered on the Copperbelt in 1902 by a prospector named William Collier. The story goes that Collier, walking along the wooded banks of the Luanshya River in the stillness of evening, saw a herd of roan antelope grazing in a clearing in the forest. He stalked and shot a buck. Approaching his kill, Collier found the curved horns of the antelope lying on a rock stained green with oxidized copper. The reason for the clearing was that the outcrop of a copper ore body at this place had prevented the growth of trees. There today is the site of the great Roan Antelope mine.

From the start the development and operation of the four large Copperbelt mines have been in the hands of two groups of mining companies, the Anglo-American group and the Rhodesian Selection Trust group, generally referred to as RST. The Anglo-American group, despite its name, has practically no American participation; its properties

are mainly in the Union of South Africa and its headquarters are in Johannesburg, although its capital is largely British. It operates the Nkana and Nchanga mines and has a third mine, the Bancroft, coming into production next year. The RST group, with headquarters in Salisbury, is financed largely by British and American investors. It operates the Roan Antelope and Mufulira mines and it, too, has a third mine, the Chibuluma, which is just now coming into production.

The Copperbelt is the source of 15 per cent of the world's copper supply. Through the taxes it pays and by other means it has had a great effect on the economies of Northern Rhodesia and the Federation—an effect heavily accentuated by the high prices for copper of the last few years. In 1921 the revenue of the Northern Rhodesian government was £279,000, then equivalent to about $1,000,000. This year the estimate is £14,000,000 ($39,000,000). Last year the value of the copper produced by the Copperbelt mines was £114,000,000 ($319,000,000), which accounted for five-eighths of the Federation's exports.

Wages and Working Conditions

The establishment of so great an industry in the middle of the African bush, where most of the natives had never even seen a wheel, has brought not only prosperity but social problems. One of them has been the disparity between the European workman's pay and the African workman's pay. Until last September the most an African miner on the Copperbelt could earn in cash was about £30 ($84) per month, whereas for European employees cash earnings and bonus average about £170 ($475) per month, with some getting much higher pay. And this is not the whole story. Working in a climate where the hot season is cool compared with New York or Philadelphia, the European miner lives at nominal rent in a comfortable modern house with one, two, or three African servants. He enjoys subsidized amenities and other substantial perquisites. His living standard is higher than that of any other group of workmen I know of anywhere in the world.

This condition had its origin in the late 1920's, when preparations for mining began. The natives were utterly primitive. The companies therefore needed Europeans for every job of any degree of skill. The Copperbelt, now an unusually healthful place, was then an undeveloped, unknown corner of Africa with no amenities and with great risks of malaria and blackwater fever. To persuade white workmen to expatriate themselves from Southern Rhodesia, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States the companies had to offer extraordinary inducements. Without these men the mines could not have been opened. Under these circumstances even jobs that required little skill became exclusively European jobs at high pay and perquisites.

But the African mineworkers, too, have for many years enjoyed pay and living and working conditions which, by African standards, are so high as to attract them to these mines without any recruitment. Contrary to the practice in South Africa, where native wives and children are not allowed to live with their husbands and fathers at the mines, the African coming to work on the Copperbelt can bring his family to live with him in a rent-free brick house equipped with electric light, running water, and modern sewerage. The Africans are fed by the companies or reimbursed for the cost of their food; they have medical facilities as good as those serving most people in the United Kingdom; and for their entertainment there are well-built

inemas, libraries, recreation clubs, and sports grounds.

African Progress Toward Industrial Efficiency

With rare exceptions the African's progress toward European standards of industrial efficiency will inevitably be gradual. Before he can take the whole of a European job and give the same value as the European he needs the intermediate training and experience that until recently were denied him by the color bar. And, for better or for worse, he must undergo certain psychological and physiological changes. For instance, because his Copperbelt pay is high compared to his needs the African has tended to work only long enough to save enough money to enable him to return to his native village to live there in relative idleness for a year or two, at the end of which he returns to the Copperbelt to repeat the process. Another handicap is that the equalitarian tradition of the tribes makes Africans reluctant to accept promotion to positions with disciplinary responsibility over fellow Africans. A third drawback is that the African is generally better at repetitive work than at a job requiring resourcefulness.

A process of slow change has set in. The African has begun to find living conditions back on the reserves unattractive compared with those on the Copperbelt, and he has begun to want bicycles, radios, European clothing, and other things for which he needs money, with the result that his average period of continuous employment on the Copperbelt is steadily lengthening. And more Africans are now willing to accept supervisory responsibilities. Coming generations of African mineworkers will no doubt develop the faculty of thinking independently and apply it to their work problems. But this evolution will take time.

Subject to such limitations the Africans have shown themselves adaptable to industrial processes. On the Copperbelt it has long been clear that many of them, if given adequate training, would become competitive with the lower grades of European workmen. As early as 1935 this trend had become sufficiently evident to alarm the Europeans. The latter were also aware that in the Belgian Congo mines, just a few miles away across the border, Africans were doing most of the jobs done by Europeans on the Copperbelt. At a timely stage in the development of the Congo mines their owner, the Union minière du Haut Katanga, had abolished the color bar in accordance with the Belgian government's policy not to let Belgian workers and peasants settle in the Congo.

Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers' Union

In 1936 the fears of the European employees of the Copperbelt mines led them to form a union. It was started as a branch of the South African Mineworkers' Union and it took its lead from the Johannesburg mines, where the color bar has been reinforced by government statute since 1926. Later, when it was discovered that the South African Mineworkers' Union was precluded from operating outside its own country the Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers' Union was founded. It was recognized by the companies in 1937.

When war broke out in 1939 the copper companies undertook to supply their total production to the British government. In 1940 the union, taking advantage of these wartime conditions when every ton of copper was important to the Allied cause, sought to impose upon the companies a condition that European jobs as they existed then could not be given to Africans. Under pressure of the British government to avoid a strike at any cost, the com-

panies reluctantly conceded this demand. Some months later, for the same reasons of necessity, the companies conceded the principle of a closed shop. Thus the color bar was created on the Copperbelt. To break it took fifteen years.

Ironically, in that same year 1940 a government commission headed by Sir John Forster had recommended an examination of the jobs into which the Copperbelt's African workers might be encouraged to advance. In 1947 a second commission, headed by Mr. Andrew Dalgleish, made more positive and concrete recommendations along the same line. Both reports fell on deaf ears so far as the European union and the government were concerned.

AFRICAN MINEWORKERS' UNION

In 1949 the African Mineworkers' Union was formed. Parenthetically I may say that although this union, particularly as to its finances, has not always been responsibly run in the interest of its members—a state of affairs of which we here have seen instances closer to home—it has at times negotiated for them with considerable skill, and it conducted two strikes in most orderly fashion with exemplary control over its members. In 1950 the European union, changing its tactics, cajoled the African union into an agreement whereby the Europeans undertook not to oppose African advancement and the Africans undertook not to accept European work except at European pay. This meant that upon advancement an African would at once have to receive the same pay and all other conditions of service (including housing and pensions) as a European even if the African could do only part of the European job. It was not long before the Africans realized that they had let themselves in for a commitment that was designed to perpetuate the color bar.

GOVERNMENT AND BRITISH TRADE UNION ATTITUDES

In 1952 Mr. C. W. Guillebaud, appointed by the Northern Rhodesian government to settle a wage dispute between the African union and the companies, said in his report that the color bar was "a dark cloud hanging over the industry." This was the third time that an investigatory commission or official appointed by the government had challenged the principle of the color bar. Government, however, would do nothing about it. The attitude of the Colonial Office, under both Labour and Conservative governments, and of the British Trades Union Congress had throughout been to oppose any color bar in principle but to refuse to take any steps to abolish it. The Secretary of State for the Colonies often spoke publicly against the color bar, but the Northern Rhodesian government took the line that in the mining industry it was a matter between the companies and their employees. The TUC, equally reluctant to grapple with this thorny issue, took shelter behind the "equal pay for equal work" principle. It became obvious that if this color bar was to be broken the initiative would have to come from the companies themselves and that they could count on no effective support either from government or from British trade union leaders.

COPPER COMPANIES INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS

By 1953 the companies felt themselves strong enough to force action. Bulk buying of copper by the British government had just come to an end, leaving the companies free at last to take up controversial labor matters without the risk of having to yield to government pressure if stoppage of production were threatened. And the new Federation was being incorporated on the promise of partnership between the European and the African. The companies were of the view that there could be no sounder first step toward partnership than the dissolution of the color bar.

In May 1953, at the initiative of the Rhodesian Selection Trust group and its chairman, Mr. R. L. Prain,[1] talks began between the companies and the European union. There followed fifteen tense months of intermittent negotiations, in which the African union and the European Salaried Staff Association later joined. From the start the companies pointed out that the normal European turnover would take care of African advancement, and they offered to guarantee that no European then employed would lose his job or otherwise suffer thereby. This guarantee did not satisfy many European workers who wanted to maintain the color bar in order to assure the preservation of their own highly privileged and protected status to their sons and grandsons. Another point of difference was that the companies demanded the right to break up a European job between two or more Africans at correspondingly reduced pay, pending the time when one African became capable of equaling the European's performance. The European union strongly opposed this so-called right of fragmentation and demanded equal pay for the African.

A FOURTH OFFICIAL REPORT

The negotiations broke down in July 1954 with threats of a European strike, whereupon the government appointed still another commission, under the same Sir John Forster who had headed the first. This commission found that the abolition of the color bar had become imperative, and it upheld the companies on fragmentation. The European union promptly rejected the Forster report. This led the RST companies in November 1954 to give the union six months' notice of termination of the operating contract between them and the union. Startled by this proof that RST was ready to risk a strike on the issue, the union, in January 1955, polled its members. Surprisingly the ballot showed 60 per cent in favor of conceding some jobs to Africans and only 40 per cent against fragmentation. Thereupon RST, at the union's request, withdrew its notice of termination, and the negotiations proceeded.

With the publication of the Forster report a sharp difference of policy arose between the Anglo-American and RST groups. Anglo-American did not join in giving notice of termination. Furthermore, it told the European union that in return for an advancement agreement satisfactory to its companies it would undertake never to implement any further measure of African advancement without the European union's consent. Before the negotiations ended, Anglo-American wrote the union a letter conferring upon it this perpetual veto right.

THREE-YEAR AGREEMENT

Gradually the companies and the union resolved their differences on other points. RST's refusal to join in granting the veto right became the final and dominant issue, but at the last moment the union gave in. In September 1955 a three-year agreement was signed between the European union and both groups of companies. It transferred twenty-four categories of jobs to the Africans at differential pay, leaving the companies free to give any remaining

[1] I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Prain for access to the records of the RST companies in the preparation of this paper.

European job to an African at European pay. It gave the European workers the safeguards mentioned above that they would not suffer through African advancement. A job survey is to be conducted by independent consultants to determine which of the remaining European jobs may suitably be opened to Africans on the basis of fragmentation. Upon conclusion of the survey, negotiations are to be resumed with the object of finding a permanent solution before the end of the three years.

The color bar in the Copperbelt mines is broken. As the African acquires more skill, the gap between his earnings and those of the European will narrow progressively until, at the top level, he will achieve parity with the white man.

CURRENT RESULTS

Results are already evident. Of 136 Africans who have been promoted, 63 have been placed in new advanced jobs and 73 have been given jobs previously done by Africans at one or more but not all of the mines. At present 129 Africans are undergoing training for advancement. It is estimated that by the middle of this year 230 Africans will be in advanced jobs and 250 will be undergoing training. The rank and file of Africans have also benefited. By a recent revision of wage rates and labor classifications in the purely African categories some 6,000 of them have received pay increases.

By contrast with the previous maximum African pay of £30 ($84) per month the companies have fixed pay rates for the advanced jobs ranging up to £47 ($132) per month. After some initial complaints that the new wages were too low and the educational qualifications too high, the African Mineworkers' Union and the recently formed African Staff Association appear to be becoming satisfied with their new opportunities. The European union is, of course, watching events closely. Its official newspaper has counseled the European miners to use patience and understanding with the African workers. It is too early to tell whether this laudable spirit will prevail.

In an editorial survey of events in British Africa during 1955, *The Times* of London said on January 3, 1956:

> The agreement by the European trade unions to allow Africans to advance to skilled and semi-skilled employment on the Copperbelt removes one of the great potential sources of friction between races in British Africa. Industrial colour bar in the copper mines and agrarian colour bar in the White Highlands of Kenya have been since the war the two most likely points of inter-racial explosion in the British African colonies. Unhappily that explosion occurred in Kenya before it could be averted. In Central Africa averting action appears to have been taken in time. The Federal Government, the Northern Rhodesian Government, the Copper Companies—particularly Mr. R. L. Prain—and the European and African unions all deserve great credit for their achievement. The Federation is still suffering from growing pains, but it has won a victory in its first two years.

COLOR BAR IN OTHER FEDERATION INDUSTRIES

Those who have detailed knowledge of the history of the advancement negotiations may question that the two governments are entitled to the credit accorded them by *The Times*, but no one would deny the immense potential value of this achievement to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The value is potential because it depends on how soon other employers follow its example. In the Rhodesias alone (figures for Nyasaland are not available) there are about 500,000 Africans now employed in government services, construction, manufacture, mining (outside the Copperbelt), commerce, transport, and communications—all subject to a color bar. In the face of the shortage of competent white labor that prevails in all these fields this is a grave handicap to efficiency. It is also a social anachronism and a repudiation of the partnership principle. Will the employers of these Africans take the initiative in bringing about a peaceful end to the color bar and will their European workers co-operate? Or will the European employers and employees delay until it is too late for voluntary action? As the English journal *The Economist* put it on February 11, 1956: "The pressure in the boiler is rising even though the European artisan is leaning against the pressure gauge dial."

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The International Position of Africa Today

By Harry R. Rudin

AFRICA'S role in world history has been a changing one, from that of relative insignificance to one of critical importance in the past thirty years. During the era of geographic exploration five centuries ago Africa attracted nothing like the attention that the Americas and the Far East enjoyed. The lack of good harbors, the failure of rivers to invite explorers into an unknown interior, the unfriendliness of peoples in alliance with depressing climates, tropical fevers, and lands rendered impenetrable by jungle and desert postponed the attention of explorers for three centuries. The other continents of the world were far more attractive and to them Europeans gave their time and devoted their attention.

Adventurers in Europe interested in getting at the wealth of the Far East found themselves almost barred from getting there. In the western Atlantic they discovered two great continents holding hands in Central America to keep the curious from reaching Asia through the Pacific. The rivers, the climate, and the wealth of the Americas proved inviting and attractive. The one shortcoming was the unfitness of native populations for the kind of work Europeans needed to extract America's wealth; cheap labor had to be found elsewhere. Africa had such labor and became the supplier of slaves for an America that was to suffer from a shortage of manpower until the twentieth century. In this respect Africa's role was large, but subordinated to that of America.

Those who sought eastern routes to Cathay found themselves blocked by Africa. This forbidding continent forced explorers into so long and devious a route to the Far East that the voyage had to be broken half way at the Cape of Good Hope, where the first white settlement in Africa was founded by the Dutch a little over three centuries ago. As "the Tavern of the Seas" this colony underlined the fact that Africa was as subordinate to the Far Eastern interests of Europeans as it was to American interests. For generations Africa had to play this minor and secondary role, her great and unknown natural resources remaining in a kind of tropical deepfreeze until the twentieth century. Today, because of metallurgical advances, Western industry has a greater need than ever for Africa's minerals, especially the ferroalloys. Since Europe does not possess them at home and since difficulties have arisen in getting them from former colonial territories in Asia, Africa has become a most important supplier. The indispensability of these minerals to defense industries has thus made Africa essential to the security of the Western world at a most critical period of history.

European Nineteenth-Century Economy

No one can come to a full appreciation of Africa's importance in modern times if he does not comprehend what happened to the European economy in the nineteenth century. The Industrial Revolution has had profounder consequences in the life of the world than any other revolution. In the nineteenth century it enabled Europe almost to eliminate famine, to more than double its population, and to raise its standard

of living, significant achievements made possible only because of the opportunity that arose for bartering manufactured goods for the food and resources available in foreign lands. Some of these lands were situated far from Europe, with thousands of miles of ocean distance separating Europeans from the sources of essential food and other necessaries. By trade with all parts of the world and by the extensive colonial empires built up in Asia, the South Seas, and Africa the European economy became a world-wide economy. During this period of temporary internationalism Europeans had the most prosperous time in their history.

This was the time when Europeans acquired a sense of general economic well-being which has had no equal earlier or later. Famines that had occurred in European history on an average of every ten years now almost disappeared. When economic distress or political oppression existed in Europe to make life difficult for people, they found the world of the nineteenth century eager to have European immigrants. Grievances that might have developed into explosive pressures found a convenient safety valve in the mass migration possible during this time. This possibility has now vanished. People who could take their few belongings with them to whatever country appeared to be the land of opportunity and promise must now remain at home, to write their grievances into political platforms and to put their trust in new leaders and political systems for a solution of their problems.

Respite from Major Wars

Accompanying this sense of economic security was a feeling of security against the threat of external aggression. Between 1815 and 1914 Europe experienced none of those continental and world-wide wars so devastating and revolutionary in their consequences prior to 1815 and since 1914. The wars that occurred after the defeat of Napoleon were local wars as their names indicate, limited in time and confined to relatively small areas. Europe saw in the nineteenth century the temporary disappearance of the pressures that had led to those great struggles typical of European history in other times.

Intellectual Emancipation

Thus it happened that Europeans were liberated from a constant preoccupation with war and with the problems of famine and overpopulation; at last they were free to fulfill the dreams and to give constitutional reality to the hopes and ideas of earlier times—the elimination of famine, the extension of the franchise, the legal toleration of Jew and Catholic, the emancipation of serf and slave, mass education, recognition of labor, the freedom of scientists and philosophers to think their boldest thoughts about man and his universe. No longer did government find it necessary to regulate the affairs of its subjects as in the days of mercantilism; men were permitted to manage their own affairs with a minimum of governmental interference. The nineteenth century was a time of emancipation for Europeans, a time when the European world became safe for democracy.

Africa's Economic Contribution

At the end of the century Africa became a part of the international base that made possible these great achievements of European history. It should be made clear that neither Africans nor peoples in other colonial territories enjoyed the freedoms that Europeans were acquiring. In a very real sense the economic security of Europe rested in part on the insecurity of peoples in other parts of the world, peoples who found themselves suddenly transformed into

involuntary servants of European economies of which they understood nothing. The instruments are lacking that would give us the measure of Africa's contribution to European prosperity and to what happened as a consequence of that prosperity. The significant thing to remember is that, contrary to the Leninist interpretation of such matters, empire and trade benefited great masses of Europeans, and not only a handful of finance capitalists.

DIPLOMATIC PAWNS

It is easier to indicate Africa's contribution to the peace and military security of Europe. In general, Africa after 1880 has been thought of as a place of bitter imperialist rivalries, where the powers of Europe opposed one another in an atmosphere of conflict that often threatened to develop into open war. The diplomatic history of the two decades before and after 1900 records many such crises. The fact, however, is that such crises did not lead to war; actually, Africa contributed to European peace and friendship by enabling countries to reach imperialist agreements at Africa's expense. France and England based their 1904 Entente Cordiale on a deal that recognized the special interests of each in Morocco and in Egypt. There were many other agreements involving Africa—between France and Italy, France and Spain, Italy and Britain, Germany and France, Germany and Britain, as well as the secret treaties made during World War I to keep the Entente powers together.

From the point of view of Africans this subject is not a pleasant one; these diplomatic arrangements were possible because Africa had territories that could be bartered in this fashion without any consultation with the peoples affected. The Africans were the innocent victims sacrificed on the altars of international friendship. There can be no question of the fact that the disappearance in our present world of the possibility of bartering peoples and territories is one of the factors making the conduct of European diplomacy very difficult. While the Hoare-Laval agreement concerning Ethiopia and the Munich accord on Czechoslovakia maintained the tradition in the 1930's, both were accompanied by consequences that made this hallowed practice a hazardous one. People no longer submit to being shifted about from one sovereignty to another without being consulted; no longer are they willing to be the involuntary workers in a white man's economy.

AFRICA'S WESTERN-TAUGHT NATIONALISM

Things have happened in the world to give these people a will of their own. Christian missions, education, contact with the white man's culture, the Western emphasis on the right of peoples to govern themselves—these and other influences have somehow had the effect of taking from the peoples of Asia and Africa that intense preoccupation with religious matters which made them unconcerned and fatalistic about what happened to them in this world. They have become aware of a security to be attained in this world and now they are demanding a right to good health, shelter, food, employment, education, with self-government as the means for the achievement of these ends. The propaganda of victor powers in World War I in favor of self-government and self-determination, propaganda whose target was the dissolution of the empires belonging to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, has started a chain reaction of stubborn nationalism that is forcing open the seams of empire for all European countries. Impetus has been given to the process by the promises of the Atlantic Charter and of the United Nations Charter.

SOVIET UNION AND COLONIALISM

Because of the cold war with the West, Russia appears to be the only major power expressing a public concern for the emancipation of colonial peoples. The Communist doctrine of empire states that imperialism is a stage in the development of capitalism, the highest one. In 1917 and during the years immediately thereafter the Russians appeared to possess a degree of idealism in their desire to aid the so-called victims of capitalism outside Europe. Nowadays, Russians appear much more concerned with bringing about the collapse of Western capitalist states than with aiding peoples in the colonies. While one may criticize Leninist dogma on imperialism as superficial, the fact of the matter is that the removal of the imperial foundation of the powers of the West will have most serious consequences for the security of the West.

CONTRACTION OF WESTERN ECONOMY

The outstanding feature of Western economy in the last hundred years or so has been its world-wide character. Since World War I this international base has been shrinking steadily. The shrinkage began with the decision of the victor powers in 1919 to break up the empires of the defeated Central Powers, a process which has spread to all empires as countries in Asia and Africa have sought to sever their connections with the economies of the West and their warring governments. As Asian peoples have become independent, the powers of Europe have been compelled to lean more heavily on Africa than in times past.

While colonial empires have been shrinking, the world-wide base of the European economy has been undergoing further contraction as a result of the restrictions placed on trade by quotas, exchange controls, tariffs, and other devices interfering with the free and easy movement of goods from country to country. In this same period the extra-European world has ceased to be the asylum it was for centuries, with the result that the surplus populations of Europe no longer have the freedom to migrate enjoyed in the nineteenth century.

EUROPEAN NEEDS

These trends away from internationalism come at a time in history when European countries have a greater need than ever for the world outside Europe. Never before has the defense industry required so many ferroalloys, and Africa is the area where Europeans have the greatest freedom to acquire such minerals. Africa has become home for many Europeans—French North Africa, Kenya, the Rhodesias, the Union of South Africa. There has been an increase in the number of white settlers going to Africa in recent decades, although their numbers are not to be compared with the mass migrations that occurred in the nineteenth century. Portugal is planning to settle many thousands of Portuguese in Angola. Some European countries have tried to produce food in their African colonies for consumption in Europe, because their lack of gold reserves and the commercial policies of other countries made it difficult to get food by the normal process of trade. African territories are indispensable to Europeans in one other respect, for the military bases required in modern war.

AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE AT HAND

The picture we get of Africa today is that Africans are making their most strenuous fight for independence at the very time that Europeans have their

greatest need of African labor and lands. Until fairly recently, Liberia, Ethiopia, and the Union of South Africa were the only self-governing territories in the continent. Within a few years Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco have been added to the roster of independent states in Africa. The Gold Coast and Nigeria do not seem very far from achieving their independence. In 1960 Somalia will get its independence under the terms of its trusteeship in the United Nations. Surely, the time is near at hand when the majority of Africans will be governing themselves.

There is nothing that the world of the West can do to block this tidal movement. The day is here when the security of Europe can no longer be based on the insecurity of Africans or of anybody else. Peoples not yet independent can count on the support of Russia and of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia that met a year ago in Bandung. Colonialism and imperialism are vanishing rapidly, and their going places a large black period at the end of a very significant chapter of European history. Europe cannot turn the clock back. Efforts to do so could have serious consequences for European security at this time. By refusing to work, Africans can keep the Western world from getting its strategic minerals and thus inflict on the West an injury comparable to that resulting from the use of atomic bombs against defense industries.

Co-operation a Present Need

Independence cannot be withheld from Africa regardless of how essential Africa is to our security. This fact the West must accept. To get what it needs in Africa Europe will have to work out some system of economic co-operation with independent African governments. Without such co-operation Western Europe must achieve and maintain its security with whatever means are afforded by the inadequate resources within its narrow borders. The history of Europe has shown since 1920 that this kind of economic nationalism leads directly to the regulatory state, even to totalitarian dictatorship, just as the world-wide base of trade and of empire in the nineteenth century gave Europe the sense of fundamental security which enabled Europeans to have the greatest measure of freedom they have ever had. If the history of the past hundred years has any meaning, it shows that the democratic institutions of the West will depend on the re-creation of an economic internationalism through close co-operation with independent states throughout the world. Instead of an economic relationship based on the imperial one of ruler and ruled, there must be one based on that voluntary economic relationship between equals we know as commerce.

For Africans also the history of the last century is important. When they get their independence and if they wish to remain independent, they will have to learn that they cannot get along without the West, which can assist them in developing their resources and in acquiring the technical knowledge and skills essential to economic and political survival in our strenuous industrial age.

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The United Nations and Africa

By W. F. COTTRELL

IN general, the purposes of the United Nations provide the basis for its relationship with Africa. Among others, these are: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; "To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." [1]

In the carrying out of these general purposes Africa provides sufficient grounds for the concern of and action by the United Nations. In fact, if we judge by past performance, it will continue to provide plenty for the United Nations to concern itself with for many a long day to come.

It is only necessary to mention names such as Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, South-West Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, the Ewe problem in the Gold Coast and Togoland, the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, to draw your attention to some of the generally better-known problems with which the United Nations has already had to deal. There are, of course, many others, less publicized, which occupy the attention of the United Nations, particularly of its specialized agencies—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization—and the United Nations Children's Fund, all of whose activities relate in one form or another to what is commonly known as technical assistance.

[1] Charter of the United Nations, Art. 1, pars. 2 and 3.

UN Organs Concerned with Africa

In general, all organs of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, including the International Court of Justice (as, for example, when it was consulted regarding the status of the former mandated territory of South-West Africa), are concerned with questions arising in Africa. Naturally, the relationship to Africa of the specialized agencies is determined by the functions they were set up to perform, and the matters with which they deal are self-explanatory according to the agency concerned. With regard to the organs of the United Nations proper their relationships vary from close to merely incidental. To range, however lightly, over the whole field of the work in Africa of the specialized agencies would require more time than my allotted span. I will therefore confine my remarks more specifically to the organs of the United Nations proper.

The Trusteeship Council

The organ with the closest, if somewhat limited, connection with Africa, is the Trusteeship Council. I say closest because, through Trusteeship Council powers to visit the trust territories and to accept petitions, its members, in addition to dealing with governments and official information, are brought into direct contact with individual inhabitants of these territories.

Visits to various political institutions, agricultural and livestock stations, farms, housing schemes, public works of all descriptions, factories, medical establishments, and educational institutions enable a visiting mission to assess, in a more realistic manner than can be done in a council chamber in New York, the progress of a territory towards the objectives of the trusteeship system. In addition, a visiting mission, by its presence in a territory, not only is a tangible part of the far-away United Nations but gives to the many people devoting their lives to the advancement of the territory encouragement and recognition of their work. Oral hearings and petitions are equally important in affording a mission and the Trusteeship Council the means of ascertaining the aspirations, requests, and grievances of the people of the territories.

Of the total of eleven trust territories, seven are situated in Africa, namely, British and French Togoland, British and French Cameroons, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, and Somaliland under Italian administration. These seven territories have a population of 19,735,000, compared with a total population of 1,356,000 in the four remaining trust territories situated in the Pacific.

As the eleven trust territories fall into three more or less convenient geographical groupings, it has been the practice for a mission to visit each group once every three years. Normally, the four trust territories in West Africa, namely, the two Togolands and the two Cameroons, are visited by one mission. Last year, however, owing to the question to be decided regarding the future of British Togoland, a special mission visited the two Togolands while another mission visited the two Cameroons. At present, a mission is visiting the four trust territories in the Pacific, and in 1957 a mission is due to visit Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, and Somaliland under Italian administration.

The report of a mission is submitted to the Council at the same time that it has before it the annual report of the territory visited, and the two reports are discussed with the assistance of a special representative of the administering authority concerned.

Perhaps one of the most interesting events with which the Council has been connected is the one which took place recently in British Togoland. There, a special mission supervised the preparations for the holding of the plebiscite on May 9 by which the people decided on their future status. Two alternatives were put before the people, integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast or continuance of their status as a trust territory. The United Kingdom had already stated that it would be very difficult for it to continue to administer the territory under trusteeship if the second alternative were to be adopted. Should the decision for integration into an independent Gold Coast be accepted, it will mark the ending of the first trusteeship agreement.

A second plebiscite will probably be held in the near future in French Togoland to enable the people there to decide on their future status. Naturally, the decision which they will have to make will depend to a great extent on the final outcome of the present plebiscite.

Looking still further ahead, following the proposed conference in September this year on the revision of the Nigerian constitution, the future status of the Cameroons under British administration will come up for decision. Once that has been settled, then, no doubt, the future of the Cameroons under French administration will have to be decided. In 1960, Somalia (Somaliland under Italian administration) is scheduled to become an independent sovereign state.

COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Following its role of promoting the peaceful evolution of dependent peoples towards self-government and a place of equality in the world, the United Nations is brought into contact with a large segment of the African continent by reason of the functions derived from Chapter XI of the Charter. By this chapter, entitled "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories," the members responsible for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the attainment of certain objectives. These objectives are, "to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement"; to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and with the specialized agencies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific objectives. Furthermore, by Article 73 e, the administering members undertake to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General information on the economic, social, and educational conditions in their non-self-governing territories; not, it may be noted, information on the political conditions in these territories.

Chapter XI is a most noteworthy section of the Charter. For the first time in history the so-called "colonial" powers placed on record in an international treaty the principles of policy which govern the administration of their dependent territories. By so recording these principles they made the whole colonial system a subject for international consideration. Chapter XI is also a challenge to other Member States. By it, they recognize that the metropolitan governments are entrusted with administrative responsibility. Accordingly, in the decisions which they can take by their majority votes in the General Assembly, it is for them to see that their recommendations are realistic in view of these recognized responsibilities. The chapter is also a challenge to the leaders of all communities which are striving for self-government. It indicates that progress is not only political but must also be achieved in the economic, social, and educational fields.

To examine the information that is transmitted annually to the Secretary-General under Article 73 e, the General Assembly in 1946 established a subsidiary committee. For the first three years, this committee was on an *ad hoc* basis and had to be renewed each year. Starting in 1950, however, it has been renewed for periods of three years, with special attention being paid each year in turn to a particular functional field, for example, economic conditions one year, social the next, and educational conditions in the third year. This special attention to one field is, of course, without prejudice to the consideration of the other fields each year.

The annual transmission of information is in accordance with a standard form and consists of a wide range of most recent material from the territories, supplemented by authority to the Secretary-General, with the consent of the Member State concerned, to draw on other official information. Thus the information, exclusive of any on political conditions, is the widest and most detailed ever placed under international consideration.

African non-self-governing territories

Of the fifty-seven territories on which information under Article 73 e has been currently transmitted, nineteen are in Africa, namely, the Belgian Congo, French West and French Equatorial Africa, French Somaliland, Morocco and Tunisia, and Basutoland, Bechuanaland, British Somaliland, Gambia, Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zanzibar. Together the inhabitants of these territories number approximately 101 million; with the nearly 20 million people living in the seven trust territories in Africa added, the total of non-self-governing peoples is about two-thirds of the estimated population of that continent.

Self-liquidating functions

A characteristic of Chapter XI, and equally of the next chapter of the Charter, on the International Trusteeship System, is that they are what may be called "self-liquidating." Since the foundation of the United Nations, Libya, Eritrea, and the Sudan have attained self-government; just recently, agreement was reached on an independent status for Morocco and Tunisia; and in the near future, the Gold Coast and Nigeria will follow suit; and, as has already been mentioned, probably the two Togolands, the two Cameroons, and Somalia will cease shortly to be trust territories. As time goes on, it is to be hoped, other territories will attain self-government or independence, until, as far as Africa is concerned, Chapters XI and XII will no longer apply.

Committee operation

To return briefly to the work of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. By its terms of reference the Committee is authorized to submit to the General Assembly substantive recommendations relating to economic, social, and educational matters. This authorization is subject, however, to the reservation that the recommendations should deal with the functional fields generally but not with respect to individual territories, a concession which recognizes the fact that with regard to non-self-governing territories, the United Nations has not the detailed powers of supervision which exist in the case of trust territories.

The operation of the Committee has not been without its difficulties. From the beginning, the very establishment of the Committee was objected to on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, since no specific provision for such a committee was contained in the Charter and furthermore, according to the text of Article 73 e, the information to be transmitted is "for information purposes" and thus not for discussion. However, Article 10 of the Charter empowers the General Assembly to discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter, clearly giving it competence in respect of Chapter XI, while by Article 22, the General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary. All attempts, however, to establish the Committee on a permanent basis have failed.

Another difficulty lies in the fact that Article 73 e does not mention information on political conditions. Some members maintain that political, economic, social, and educational conditions are so interrelated that the whole of Article 73 should be reported on and therefore political information should be included. Some administering members, including the United States of America, supply such information voluntarily; others refuse, while one administering member because of the attempts made to discuss political matters refuses to sit in the Committee.

Still another difficulty is that the information is exclusively from governments, and the argument is raised that petitions and information from unofficial sources should be receivable. Other proposals have been made for the representation in the Committee of indigenous inhabitants from the territories, and even for the dispatch of missions to visit the territories. The administering members, basing their stand on the provisions of the Charter as well as on the probable resentment on the part of those people in the non-self-governing territories who have already achieved a large measure of responsibility for their own affairs, have countered all attempts to assimilate the powers of the General Assembly in respect to non-self-governing territories to those with which it is constitutionally endowed in respect to trust territories.

In spite of these difficulties, the Committee on Information has functioned for ten years; through its labors not only has an appreciable body of detailed information been built up but the progress of these non-self-governing territories towards self-government has been kept constantly under international consideration.

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Another organ of the United Nations in which matters relating to Africa are discussed is the Economic and Social Council, with some of its functional commissions. It may be noted that while there is an Economic Commission for Europe, for Latin America, and for Asia and the Far East, there is, as yet, no such commission for other economically homogeneous regions, among which is Africa, at least with regard to the area south of the Sahara. In fact, in 1950 a proposal emanating from the World Federation of United Nations Associations for the establishment of a regional Economic Commission for Africa was discussed by the Economic and Social Council. It was considered at the time that the establishment of such a commission should be deferred and that, instead, a special section relating to economic conditions in Africa should be prepared in conjunction with the *World Economic Report*. At the same time, however, a Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara and a Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara were set up by six of the governments having responsibilities for territories in that region, namely, Belgium, France, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Portugal, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom. The formal Agreement, issued in January 1954, for the establishment of the Commission contains an Article (XII) entitled "Relationship with Non-Member Governments in the Area and with International Organizations," which states:

> The Commission shall bear in mind the desirability of co-operation with other Governments in the area, not members of the Commission, and with international organizations, on matters of mutual concern within the terms of reference of the Commission.

In practice, co-operation has taken place with certain of the specialized agencies of the United Nations rather than with the United Nations proper, since political questions are outside the Commission's terms of reference.

Naturally enough, the matters relating to Africa dealt with by the Economic and Social Council pertain, as its name implies, to the economic and social fields, including human rights, employment, transport and communications, population, statistics, fiscal matters, and the status of women.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Some matters, particularly those of a political nature and connected with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, are discussed in the first instance by a committee of the General Assembly, normally by its First Committee (Political and Security) or by its *Ad hoc* Political Committee, without first passing through a council or a subsidiary committee.

Perhaps the most significant of the questions so discussed by the General Assembly were those dealing with the future of the former Italian colonies, because the resultant decisions set off a chain reaction. In particular, to the decision reached regarding Libya, namely, to grant it the status of an independent state, may be traced the subsequent movements for a similar status in Tunisia and Morocco.

Other cases of a political nature, but which may have elements likely to affect peace and security, have, in the past, been brought to the attention of the Security Council instead of first being put on the agenda of the General Assembly. This happened in the case of the dispute between Egypt and the United Kingdom over the Sudan in 1947. Of course, the Security Council submits annual and special reports to the General Assembly, so that ultimately all questions within the purview of the United Nations come before the General Assembly.

SECRETARIAT WORKING PARTY

From the foregoing account it will be seen that the United Nations has been concerned with many of the problems of Africa, but on a rather piecemeal basis. This fact has already been realized, and the Secretary-General in his last annual report stated:

> In the preoccupation with more immediate problems, too little attention has been given to planning and study that may help the international community to meet the emerging problems of the continent of Africa in a spirit consonant with the aims of the Charter.
>
> The great changes that are under way in Africa present a challenge to the rest of the world—a challenge to give aid in guiding the course of events in orderly and constructive channels. It is apparent that in the next ten years the peace and stability of the world will be strongly affected by the evolution in Africa, by the national awakening of its people, by the course of race relations and by the manner in which the economic and social advancement of the African peoples is assisted by the rest of the world.[2]

The Secretary-General went on to state that this was an area of concern to the United Nations in which the Secretariat might prove helpful, and that as a first step in the Secretariat approach it was essential to bring together and into focus the many problems concerning Africa with which the United Nations is already dealing or will have to deal in the years ahead. Accordingly, he established a Secretariat working party to advise him. Too little time has yet elapsed for any results to emerge from the studies of this working party.

SUMMARY

All in all, in fulfilling its principal purposes the United Nations is brought into close contact with Africa and many of its problems. But as the Secretary-General has pointed out and as is illustrated by this account, these contacts are somewhat diffused.

Africa today presents a patchwork quilt of some forty-one territorial units ranging from vast areas like French West Africa to tiny Spanish Ifni, or from Nigeria with a population of nearly thirty-two million to French Somaliland with only sixty-three thousand. Five European powers are responsible for the administration of the non-self-governing territories. Within most of these arbitrarily demarcated territories there are to be found other divisive forces of a religious or ethnological nature, and history, even the history of our time, affords many examples of how these fissiparous tendencies are apt to succeed once the power of a central authority weakens or withdraws. At the same time, the necessities of economic development are forcing some of these territorial units into larger groupings. For instance, there are the East Africa High Commission covering Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and the recent Federation comprising the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Currently there are plans for the reintegration of the Moroccan units.

This then is the Africa that is emerging into a world in which no national sovereign state can exist in isolation, and in which political, economic, and social progress becomes more and more dependent on intergroup, interregional, and international co-operation and unity.

The age of the partition of Africa by outside powers is over. But if the latent resources of the continent are to be developed to the full, if the present balkanization is to be changed into wider groupings, the establishment of a co-ordinating body of an international character would seem to be called for.

It may well be that the most important role the United Nations can play with regard to Africa is to see that the progressive attainment of full self-government is not left to stagnate into an out-of-date national sovereignty, by providing the African peoples with encouragement and the opportunity to co-operate and join together into wider loyalties for the mutual benefit of themselves and of the world at large.

[2] UN Document: *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, 1 July 1954–15 June 1955.* General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/2911), pp. XIII–XIV.

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Obstacles to Self-Government

By William Bascom

DISCUSSIONS of the obstacles to self-government are usually concerned only with such problems as African "tribalism" and the "cultural gap" between Africa and the Western world. Important as these problems are, they are only one side of the picture. I shall attempt here to put them into their proper perspective by considering them along with obstacles to self-government which arise not from the Africans, but from the European powers that rule Africa, and their nationals. Let us, however, begin conventionally with a consideration of the cultural differences which separate Africa from the West.

Cultural Adaptation the Basic Problem

There is no question that the basic problem in Africa is one of cultural adaptation—not only in Africa south of the Sahara, with which the present remarks are concerned but, from what Dr. Rivlin has said, in North Africa as well. Either the cultural differences between Africa and Europe must be decreased or some pattern of accommodation must be worked out, if Africa is to deal effectively with the rest of the world and to take its rightful place in international affairs. At the moment it seems likely that the greater part of the cultural adjustment will be on the part of the Africans, and that this adjustment will involve increased literacy and education, economic and technological development, political and social change, new goals and values, and other Western innovations and modifications. In fact, this process is already going on at a tempo which is startling in terms of prewar predictions. But there are still parts of Africa where colonial administrators are confronted daily with the problem of stimulating social, economic, and political change.

Exaggerations and misapprehensions

The extent of the problem of cultural adaptation, however, is often exaggerated. Too many observers have repeated the false cliché that Africa today is making in a few centuries or a few decades the transition from the Stone Age to civilization which took the countries of Europe thousands of years to accomplish. This statement is patently untrue because, except for a few groups such as the Bushmen and Pygmies, some of whom obtained iron tools through trade with their African neighbors, Africa was not in the Stone Age even at the time of its discovery. Iron working was practiced throughout Africa south of the Sahara, and most of Africa's mineral deposits were worked by Africans before contact with Europeans.

It is also misleading to imply that Africa is confronted by the necessity of taking over Western civilization in its entirety. India certainly retains its Indian character, and yet is able to interact with the other countries of the world. Nor is it necessary for the peoples of Africa to reject their traditional cultural heritages in order to participate in world affairs.

What really confronts Africa is a transition from the Iron or Metal Age to the Machine Age, which is only two hundred years old. The Industrial Revolution had far-reaching effects on European culture, and probably will have in Africa also within an even

shorter span of time. There is no reason to assume that it will take Africans as long to learn industrial techniques as it did for the Western world to invent and develop them, as is shown by the competence of Africans in the industrial skills that are available to them in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, or the Congo. Nevertheless even in these areas there is a clear need for still greater competence in technical skills if Africans are to run the affairs and enterprises of their own countries. No good end is served by either exaggerating or minimizing the cultural differences which stand between Africa and effective participation in world affairs.

New patterns must be built on the old. The only question is how much change is necessary, and which African institutions and traditions can survive this transition. I fear that our own ethnocentrism often leads us to exaggerate the degree of change that is necessary.

Diversity of African cultures

Because of the diversity of African cultures, the extent of these differences and of the consequent problem of adaptation varies from one area and one people to another. One of the reasons why the Gold Coast and Nigeria lead other parts of Africa on the road to self-government is based on the differences between African cultures. West Africa had a greater degree of economic specialization than East Africa, for example, and, even before contact, a pecuniary orientation and profit motive remarkably similar to our own, as well as markets, money, and middlemen. Export trade with Europe began immediately upon contact, with João de Aveiro, the first explorer to reach Benin, taking back a load of peppers as well as an ambassador to the court of Portugal. Although trade in spices soon gave way to trade in slaves, the historical records of early contacts confirm the ease with which the export trade was established and the fact that as late as 1875 the Europeans dealt with African chiefs as heads of sovereign foreign powers. In terms of their economies, political structures, and legal systems, the West African kingdoms were remarkably similar to those from which the European explorers came.

"Tribalism"

"Tribalism," as the second problem is known, is an unsatisfactory term, both because the African groups referred to are not "tribes" according to the usual definition and because educated Africans increasingly resent it. Yet acceptable substitutes for tribe and tribalism are difficult to find. "Nation," which has been proposed, has different implications, while "nationalism" is the very opposite of tribalism. Whereas nationalism signifies an identification with a political and geographic entity such as Nigeria, tribalism refers to identification with such cultural and linguistic groupings as the Yoruba in Western Nigeria, the Ibo in Eastern Nigeria, and the Hausa in the North. The question here is how much tribalism will interfere with nationalism and the development of national unity. How much of an obstacle are these loyalties to cultural and linguistic groups, by whatever name they be called, to the development of identifications with broader, supertribal units?

The problem is very real, and to beg the question by quibbling about terminology is unrealistic. For many Africans tribal stereotypes and hostilities, often sharpened by four centuries of slave wars financed and munitioned by Europeans, are still strong. It would be a mistake, for example, for Nigeria's future political leaders to underestimate the strength of these cultural and linguistic loyalties. Their importance is

witnessed by the present constitutional division of Nigeria into its three regions, dominated by the Yoruba, the Ibo, and the Hausa. This partition provides a modus vivendi for the three major peoples of Nigeria who constitute about half its total population, but what about the other half, and what about such large groupings as the Fulani, the Ibibio, the Kanuri, and the Tiv? Are they to be subjected to the three dominant groups? Recently a similar problem seems to have arisen in the Gold Coast in the National Liberation Movement's opposition to Nkrumah's Convention People's Party.

The course of political developments in Nigeria has reached a point where it will not be affected by our speaking frankly about this problem, and again it will not help either to exaggerate or to minimize its importance, although many educated Africans find it an embarrassing subject. As unpleasant as it may be for them to hear, I can say from personal experience that in Yoruba country my own servants have been refused hospitality by the Ibo servants of Europeans and Americans I have visited, and they have had to eat in the market and sleep in the automobile. And my wife and I have had to threaten to share our own quarters with the Ibo servants of our guests before our own Yoruba servants would provide them a place to sleep. On a still deeper level, there are hostilities and suspicions between the inhabitants of different Ibo villages and of different Yoruba kingdoms. It is often as much a problem of building a sense of unity within, as between, these cultural and linguistic groups.

Undermining of barriers

Several forces are at work undermining these intertribal and intratribal barriers. The end of the slave wars removed an important cause of friction, and the increased mobility made possible by peace has brought increased contacts between African peoples. Intertribal marriage is increasing. Education provides English, French, Portuguese, or another common language by which Africans can communicate with members of other tribes in their own country. In school, even at the lower levels, children learn that they are Nigerians and are taught something of their country's geography and history. On higher levels education is increasingly bringing different peoples together, and Africans who go abroad for university training find common cause regardless of tribal origins. They consider themselves first as Nigerians and are often made uncomfortable by references to them as Ibo or Yoruba. Finally, the nationalist political movements for self-government have done perhaps as much as anything else to create a sense of identification with the country as a whole. Although tribalism has by no means ceased to be a problem in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, Azikiwe's recent victory in both the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria and Nkrumah's two sweeping victories in the Gold Coast show that it, like the other obstacles to self-government, is not insuperable.

EUROPEAN-DRAWN BOUNDARIES

Turning now to the other side of the picture, we find that one of the obstacles to self-government is the heritage of the European partition of Africa and its pattern of political boundaries, which are senseless in terms of ethnic groupings, politics, or economics. Some of the territories that were carved out are too poor to support themselves, and some like the Gambia are so small that political independence may never have any real meaning. Yet very little attention is being paid to the possibility

of establishing larger, sounder units, except in the case of British Togoland, which is being given the opportunity to choose whether or not to join with the Gold Coast. The separation of the Ewe people by the boundary between Togoland and the Gold Coast, which has received so much publicity in this connection, is only one of hundreds of such cases repeated in all parts of the continent. The Yoruba, to take another example, are found mostly in the Western Region of Nigeria. Yet there are many Yoruba in Dahomey under the French, in the Northern Region of Nigeria, and in the Colony, while recently those in Lagos, which is over 70 per cent Yoruba, have been set apart in a Federal District. Even within Nigeria, the Yoruba cannot function effectively as a unit in national politics.

I doubt if there is a single international boundary in Africa south of the Sahara which does not divide ethnic groups into two or more parts, each of which may be administered according to different principles of colonial rule, taught different European languages, and proselytized by competing missions. A patchwork of what may be called European tribalism, with linguistic, religious, and other cultural differences, has been superimposed on the already complex pattern of African tribal and subtribal groupings. The Azande are split between French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the Bakongo between French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo, and Portuguese Angola.

Nigeria

If tribal ties are still stronger than national ties, it should not be surprising. The political entities with which Africans are expected to identify themselves are as artificial as their boundaries, and relatively recent. Nigeria, for example, began as three separate units: the North under the Royal Niger Company, the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos in the west under the Colonial Office, and the Oil Rivers Protectorate, later named the Niger Coast Protectorate in the east under the Foreign Office. In 1906 the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos and the Niger Coast Protectorate were merged, with the former constituting the Western Province and the latter the Central and Eastern Provinces of the newly created Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. It was not until 1914 that the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria were amalgated as the Southern and Northern Provinces of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Since 1947, when Nigeria received a new constitution based on Regional Councils for the North, West, and East, there has been a reversion to the earlier pattern of three different units. The question now is whether they will remain unified on some sort of a federal basis or will divide into three separate countries. Fortunately the likelihood is that Nigeria's leaders will maintain a federal unity, but the problem facing them when they meet this year to decide whether or not to choose separate independence for their three regions derives as much from the historical heritage of the European partition of Africa as it does from African tribalism.

EUROPEAN STAKES IN AFRICA

Secondly, Europeans who have made their careers in Africa constitute at least potential opposition to any form of self-government which threatens their careers, although the extent to which they prove obstacles to self-government will depend upon the arrangements made for their future. Colonial officials clearly fall into this category, and it would not have been surprising to find them post-

poning the end of their careers by whatever means lay within their power. Yet in Nigeria and the Gold Coast a number have proved able to make a remarkable adjustment to the increased tempo of political developments and to work devotedly for the goal of self-government. By thus working themselves out of their own jobs, they have done much to disprove another cliché, that England keeps its colonies to provide employment for the younger sons of her aristocratic families. At least there is reason to hope that the colonial civil servants will prove less of an obstacle to self-government than might once have been expected, and that a successful pattern has been established if other countries choose to follow it.

Missionaries

European and American missionaries have also left their homelands for careers in Africa. Missionaries have been accused by Africans of entering into local politics and of taking stands in opposition to nationalist leaders. Although these were isolated, individual cases, together with the other criticisms of missionaries they led at one time to the suggestion that missionaries be excluded from Nigeria after self-government is achieved. Such talk is little heard today, largely because of the Africans' recognition of the role that missions have played in education in Nigeria, and indeed throughout Africa. Unlike the colonial official, there is no reason why the careers of missionaries must end with self-government, nor any reason why missionaries should oppose its coming.

Traders

Traders have also gone out to Africa to make their careers. As in the case of the colonial servants and missionaries, there has been a considerable africanization of the staffs of the major trading companies in West Africa without apparent difficulties. Africans are holding increasingly high positions formerly held by Europeans, and the largest company, United Africa Company, has been shifting from the role of retail distributor to that of wholesaler to African traders. Despite these changes, there is nothing to suggest that the trading companies will cease to serve in their dual capacity as importer and exporter, selling goods from the world market to Africans and buying African produce for shipment abroad.

Settlers the greatest problem

Of all the Europeans in Africa, the group which presents the greatest problem is the settlers who have made their homes, as well as their careers, in Africa, and who think not only of their own careers, but of those of their children. They constitute a formidable opposition to any form of self-government which endangers their privileged position, and as a group support measures which discriminate against Africans, whether this be on the basis of a racial bar or a cultural bar, as represented by the principle of "equal rights for civilized people." In the Union and South-West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, Angola, and Mozambique, where the concentration of Europeans is highest south of the Sahara, the road that lies ahead is a difficult one. Although the Union has already attained dominion status, it is clearly not an example of self-government for the Africans. The white settlers of Kenya and the Rhodesias would also welcome dominion status, but can be counted on to obstruct any plans for self-government in which their influence would be proportionate to their numbers. In the Portuguese territories the settlers are only one of a number of European obstacles to self-government. Fortunately, throughout most of the rest of Africa south of the Sahara, non-Africans constitute only a fraction of one per cent of the population. In Nigeria and the Gold Coast the white settler presents no problem because of the government's long-standing policy of discouraging colonization by prohibiting the ownership of land by non-Africans. Beyond any question, this is another important reason why these two countries are moving so rapidly towards government of the Africans, by the Africans, and for the Africans.

Investors

The individuals in Europe who have invested in African mines and industries must also be considered, since they are concerned lest their investments be threatened by self-government. But since Africa is in such need of capital for economic development, the African territories must be careful both now and after self-government not to discourage investment from abroad through either expropriation or excessive taxation. However anxious Africans leaders may be to increase their country's share of the income from its mines and industries, however much they may desire to attain economic as well as political independence, and however tempting these measures may seem in terms of political expediency, they would have serious economic consequences. The political leaders in the Gold Coast and Nigeria are aware of this fact and are giving their assurances to investors in the hopes of attracting additional capital. Their first major test is in the Gold Coast's negotiations for the Volta River hydroelectric project.

European manufactories

Also concerned with the question of self-government are the companies in Europe which manufacture goods for sale in the African market and which process or manufacture Africa's raw materials. Although self-government may imply a potential threat to their industries, it is likely that their economic relations with Africa will continue after self-government, as in the case of the traders.

NATIONAL INTERESTS OF COLONIAL POWERS

A third obstacle arises from the national interests of the colonial powers, including strategic, political, and economic factors. Africa's increasing strategic importance since World War II as the result of the developments in the Middle East has made the African territories essential to the national defense of the European powers and to the security of the Western world. Her production of strategic materials has become more vital as the result of the political developments in India and Southeast Asia. Politically, the loss of their African territories can only further reduce the rank of England and France as world powers. The factor of national pride is perhaps epitomized by Churchill's famous statement about refusing to preside over the dissolution of the Empire, which only goes to show that none of the obstacles to self-government are insurmountable.

Economic factors

There are times when the protection of private investments in Africa becomes a matter which affects the national economy. Although the European powers do not benefit directly from the taxes raised in their African territories, as some Americans mistakenly assume, the private profits from trading, mining, and other economic activities contribute to their national incomes and to the taxes they collect in Europe. European industries have been geared to a certain extent to the African trade. Even where there are

no protective tariffs, a large share of the trade is with the mother country, because of currency restrictions or in some cases only because of such factors as language and established contacts. These economic bonds may not be destroyed by political independence, but if they should be the effects would be severe. The economic blow to Belgium, for example, if she were to be cut off from the Congo, would be almost incalculable. One of the decisions facing the Gold Coast and Nigeria when they become self-governing will be whether to remain within the sterling area, as Britain is anxious to have them do, if only because they earn dollars. At the moment it seems unlikely that the Gold Coast will decide otherwise, or that Britain could, even if she wished to try, long postpone self-government on these grounds.

National interests dictate that the goal of colonial policy be to strengthen the political and economic bonds so that when self-government has been granted, access to strategic bases and raw materials shall not be denied or political and economic relations severed. To this end self-government needs to be postponed, if not as long as possible, at least until these bonds are sufficiently strong—unless a point is reached at which independence is inevitable and imminent and further delay may cost good will and endanger future relations.

U. S. foreign policy

Here American foreign policy faces a dilemma and becomes contradictory and inconsistent with American tradition. Confronted in the present world situation with the possibility of having our Western allies weakened through the loss of their colonies, we have officially lined up with the colonial powers in urging caution and warning against haste. In so doing we have abandoned our traditional policy of sympathy and support for peoples seeking their independence, and in our desire to strengthen our European allies we have lost prestige in Africa and other parts of the world. Russia has not been slow to exploit this situation, and to take over our traditional role as the champion of oppressed colonial peoples. Whatever they may think of communism, many African nationalists feel that they have been deserted by the United States and that Russia is the only country which speaks up for them in world politics today.

Africa and communism

There exists a fear, more often expressed in the United States than in either Africa or Europe, that when the African territories become independent, Russia will move into the political vacuum left when the former rulers withdrew. But again, the Communist threat, another aspect of national interest to the Western powers, has often been exaggerated as far as Africa is concerned. Outside the French territories, which south of the Sahara are still some distance from self-government, the Communist party is of negligible importance. It has been alleged, of course, that the Mau Mau movement was Communist inspired and that Nkrumah was a member of the Communist party before he became Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, but these charges have been discredited by the governments of Kenya and the Gold Coast. Effective obstacles to self-government might be raised by smearing nationalist leaders as Communists, but this has rarely been done except in South Africa, where self-government is not an issue.

BY WHOSE STANDARDS?

A fourth obstacle imposed by Europeans is the standards they have set for judging when a country is "ready for self-government." These involve such criteria as efficiency, stability, honesty, and responsibility in government; national unity; democratic representation; and economic stability. These standards relate to the broad problem of the cultural differences between Africa and the West, but it is clear that they are both European imposed and arbitrary as far as the question of ability for self-government is concerned. The peoples of Africa, after all, did govern themselves for untold millenia before European contact, and in many cases far better than is generally admitted. The question of the cultural gap between Africa and the West can only be evaluated in these terms. When one stops to examine the arguments that any group of African peoples are not ready for self-government, it becomes apparent that what is really meant is that they are not ready to govern themselves according to European standards of good government.

There may be many reasons—ethical, ideological, practical—why we, as outsiders, might wish to see African self-government based on a democratic form of representation, but it is worth noting that the hereditary system of West African kingdoms provided for both a choice between candidates for the throne and a means of deposing rulers who proved undesirable to the people. Although offices were restricted to members of a given clan or lineage, there were avenues for the expression of public opinion, and popular opinion could overrule the wishes of even the king and his family.

BELATED PREPARATIONS

A fifth European obstacle has been the inadequate provisions made for achieving these standards. In 1937 when I first visited Nigeria the opportunities for progress were extremely restricted and the rate at which these standards were being achieved was pitifully slow. It is no wonder that government officials expressed, as their personal opinion, that it would be two hundred years before Nigeria could become independent. Since there appeared to be so much time to prepare for self-government, haste did not seem to be needed. There were not enough schools for the children who wanted an education. Opportunities for the few Africans who had advanced education were inadequate, and only timid steps were being made in the direction of giving them a voice in local government by appointing them to town councils. In this period one discussed with detachment whether or not it was good policy to employ Africans as District Officers; it was seriously maintained that there were none adequately trained to serve in the higher posts in government and business.

Handwriting on the wall

All this has been markedly changed in both Nigeria and the Gold Coast, and the Africans themselves have been largely responsible for the new developments, both by financing their own education in British and American universities and by strikes and riots which led to investigating committees and constitutional revisions. Things which were considered impossible twenty years ago are accepted policy today. Education at the lower levels has been markedly expanded, and Africans are increasingly filling high positions in government. Although still more trained Africans are needed, government scholarships are being provided for university work abroad. As early as 1951 officials were saying that self-government might be only five instead of two hundred years away. There is a realization that little time is left to prepare for what is so clearly imminent and inevitable. The Gold

Coast, Nigeria, and the Sudan are handwriting on the wall for the rest of Africa, but one wonders whether the sense of urgency that dominates officials there is shared by many in other territories. As long as it is not, as long as things are allowed to coast along at their old, slow rate, a serious obstacle to self-government remains to be overcome.

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Political Preparedness for Self-Government

By HAROLD COOPER

I AM glad that I am billed, quite nakedly, on the program as a retired Imperialist, although that, in these days, is much the same as saying a reformed criminal. I am glad, because an appreciation of my true identity may lead you to agree that, while I am perhaps poorly qualified academically to stand on this rostrum, at least I can claim some entitlement to a hearing as one who has had the dubious honor of helping to create the problems which this conference, I presume, is designed to unravel. There is, of course, a concomitant threat to my credentials, since you may wonder whether my judgment on matters related to the subject chosen for me is not likely to be blemished by a sour awareness that, in West Africa at any rate, Othello's occupation's gone.

But even my most distinguished partners in past crimes have shown of late a wondrous facility in adjusting themselves to the accelerating tempo of our age. Lord Milverton—certainly one of the doughtiest Knights of the British Empire ever to joust with the erstwhile dragon of colonial nationalism—recently issued a dictum which I might well take as a text for my remarks this morning:

> Whether Africans are ready or not for self-government, whether independence is reasonable or not, has become irrelevant. Africa is in a hurry and in no mood to wait. . . . The nascent nations of Africa do not accept Western timetables of the proper or prudent timing of independence, and when we talk of the premature grant of self-government, the adjective presupposes a point of view which is not admitted by Africans.

Nothing that I propose to say, I hope, will give the impression that I look back nostalgically on the days—from which less than a decade of ferment divides us—when we who ruled in Africa saw stretching before us a wellnigh illimitable vista of continued trusteeship and could not believe that the cloud on the horizon, no bigger than a child's fist, heralded a tropical storm already on the point of drenching our own Palm Beach suits. There is no longer any truth in the assumption that, in the colonial sphere, the sole British concession to the leftward trend of our times is a desire to turn the political clock (for a change) to the left—which, in the case of clocks, happens to be a comforting direction—or even to halt it momentarily for the purpose of determining why the confounded thing is beginning to tick so fast. We realize that for us to question the "political preparedness" of the Gold Coast or Nigeria for self-government would be as futile as for the Governor of New York to say to the river Niagara, on the eve of its arrival at those predestined falls, "Don't go over yet, old chap. It's a pretty big drop, you know."

What, therefore, I am chiefly concerned to do is to examine the extent to which the British have failed to contribute adequately to that "political preparedness" which we could all wish, at this late hour, was complete and unassailable. There is no reason why I should shrink from such a task at a time when stark self-criticism is so much in fashion. If Stalin, thanks to his petulant misuse of the otherwise respectable Soviet device of judicial murder, is now regarded as having been wrong throughout most of his thirty-year regime, what harm can there be in

the British admitting that, during the same period, they were wrong in one or two instances? This acknowledgment of fallibility should not surprise my present audience, for I know I do not need to tell the citizens of a country which was the aggrieved party in one of the most sensational political divorces of all time that the discarded spouse has since displayed a readiness to recognize, and thus profit from, his subsequent matrimonial blunders.

May I say, in parenthesis, that the dizzy switching into high gear of the previously rather mincing gait of West African history has surprised the nationalists just about as much as it has surprised the colonial powers. In Nigeria and the Gold Coast the nationalists began huffing and puffing as soon as World War II ended, but they scarcely expected the house which John Bull (usually a reliable contractor) had built to be blown down so easily. Our own reaction, of course, was to exchange guilty glances with each other and ask, "Who put too much sand in the concrete?"

Actually, what we had failed to grasp was that historical forces are apt to operate with the same silent and invisible efficiency as a nest of termites. Walls which stand erect and still look strong may be as hollow and flimsy as an inflated paper bag. Wordsworth had a good phrase for this quiet and unobtrusive decay. He attributed it to the "unimaginable touch of time." (If this digression has a purpose, it is to emphasize the fact that some of the political unpreparedness observable in West Africa today derives from too early a triumph in a battle which both adversaries believed would involve much more knocking down and dragging out than was actually the case. The nationalists—to vary the metaphor—won the series in four straight games, largely because of the unaccountable collapse of our pitching.)

INDIRECT RULE

Where did we go wrong? What happened to our shrewd foresight and our stolidly benign intentions? It is my own perhaps misguided theory that we might have been better prepared for the shattering events which began with the Gold Coast riots of 1948, and which changed our mood from one of supreme confidence to utter dismay overnight, had we not chosen to rely on the chiefs —the feudal overlords—of West Africa as intermediaries in most of our dealings with the people. Our adoption of the device of "indirect rule" had its origin in two worthy enough motives: to reduce the cost of administration and to preserve what was good in the institutions which had been built up, before our coming, by the Africans themselves. Where we made our mistake was in preserving those institutions like specimens in a bottle rather than as living plants which needed to be given elbow room for healthy growth. Even Lord Lugard, who is widely credited with being the inventor of indirect rule, repeatedly warned those who sought to copy his system that many of the African chiefs did not fall into the category of "the people's choice" but were "alien conquerors and despots."

The Hausa serfs of Northern Nigeria —and let us not forget this revealing and, in retrospect, rather pathetic piece of history—welcomed Lugard's troops as liberators and were, we must presume, disappointed (to use a mild word) when the Fulani emirs who had first insolently defied Lugard and then retreated in confusion before his Maxim guns (Providence's special gift to our righteous cause) were put back on their thrones. As time went by, the chiefs leaned more and more on the administration as the buttress of their power, while the administration turned more and more to the chiefs for comfort and reassurance in face of the gathering unrest among the detribalized elements in the urban centers (which is colonial officialese for "towns"). Something very much like a Mutual Admiration Society came into being. We told the chiefs that they were doing a good job. They courteously replied that we were doing even better. The nationalists denounced us. The chiefs (frequently and lustily in private, less frequently and with due caution in public) denounced the nationalists. The result was that the chiefs—even those who were "alien conquerors and despots"—remained in their palaces, while some of the nationalists wound up in jail and others became politically untouchable. To translate the situation into an Indian idiom, we were on excellent terms with the maharajahs, but we scarcely spoke to the Gandhis and Nehrus, except to chide them for their willfulness and folly. And when we introduced parliamentary reform, we were careful to ensure ("in the best interests of all") that whatever power we surrendered passed into the safe and sane hands of the "moderates"—that is, the chiefs and their supporters—rather than into the "selfish grasp" of those whom we called "professional agitators." We were living in a dream world until the disorders of 1948 catapulted us into wakefulness.

POLITICAL EDUCATION RESTRICTED

All this was bad for the British. It was equally bad for the African. It is desirable, though it is rarely possible, that the political education of all segments of a backward community should proceed *pari passu*. (That is a Latin tag which I have inserted to lend an air of academic respectability to my discourse.) In West Africa, we allowed, and indeed at times encouraged, the revolutionary ideas borrowed from our own democratic teachings to break through in strength on certain narrow sectors of the front—in the municipalities, the professions, the trade unions—while seeking to stem their advance in the villages by putting up parental signboards reading: THIS BATTLEFIELD RESERVED FOR ADULTS ONLY. Thus "preparedness for self-government" burst out in ugly red patches (suggestive of political scarlet fever) instead of as a warm adolescent glow suffusing the whole countenance of the nation.

By limiting the power of nonconformity to the detribalized rebels, we in effect reserved to them the whole range of power. They had only two or three elected members in the legislature, but those members *were elected* and for that reason, if for no other, became the recognized spokesmen of the masses. Prestige depended not on affluence or eminence but on the manner and the vocabulary in which you talked back to the British. We made courtiers and aides-de-camp of the chiefs, who were our friends, and politicians of the nationalists, who were our foes. I can think of many a chief of my acquaintance who could have snatched the ball of popular agitation and done some spectacular broken-field running with it, had he been given the chance. But his rather drab assignment was to catch occasional short and strictly lateral passes tossed to him by the white man who was playing quarterback.

INADEQUATE HERITAGE

You may have deduced from these timidly oblique remarks (I have my pension to consider, you know) that in my view the British, as they pack up their polo helmets and get ready to pull out of West Africa, are leaving a good deal of unfinished business behind them. Operation *Exeunt omnes,* in which we

are now engaged, reminds me of a cornered monster cutting off its head as an act of obedient and remorseful suicide but doing nothing to prevent the nervous twitching of its limbs which will persist long after the brain needed to control them is stilled. Imperialism at the center is being dismantled, but lesser imperialisms formerly tributary to it survive. The subservience of one race to another is at an end. The subservience of one tribe to another is not. There are boundaries to be redrawn, allegiances to be transferred, minor tyrannies to be broken, and a host of clashing interests to be brought into imposed or negotiated harmony before the peoples of West Africa—the Kofis, Abioduns, and Abudus wielding their hoes in the depth of the bush—can enjoy the full savor of freedom. I believe we could have left a more helpful, a serener, pattern of social and political life if we had crusaded for democracy from the start, with something of the zeal of Livingstone, instead of peddling it to selected customers like a manufacturer who can afford to wait for new markets. I am strengthened in this obsession by the example of the swift disintegration of the caste system among Indian communities transplanted to other parts of the Empire in the nineteenth century. It is sometimes better to fell the obstructing tree with one bold stroke than to draw out its roots an inch at a time as though solicitous that it should feel no pain.

The political heritage bequeathed by the British in West Africa is thus more ramshackle and cringing than it need have been. To guide the eager but bewildered electorate, and to compete for its favors, there are today, in many areas, amorphous "parties" which, to the unfriendly observer, seem to fly no banners but those of revolt or of tribal supremacy—two equally barren ideologies. When the Nigerian masses, suddenly enfranchised, went to the polls in 1951, they were called upon to vote for candidates who had to pass through a mazelike series of electoral colleges before they could gain Revlon's first plateau—membership of one of three Regional Houses. Many of the candidates, anticipating the vicissitudes of this long trek to glory, preferred to choose their party affiliations after the struggle was over and the returns from other constituencies were in, lest they should hitch their modest wagons to an ineffectual star. Apostasy, often followed by recantation and then by apostasy again, became a commonplace. Only the highest leaders remained steadfast in their loyalty to party machines which would have wheezed to a standstill without the compelling motive power of their personalities.

THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

It was easy for the skeptic to draw ribald comparisons between this frantic free-for-all and the nicely regulated thrust and parry of the traditional tournament of Ins versus Outs which enlivens the political scene at recurrent intervals in the United States or the United Kingdom. But who could have been expected to create immediate order in this seething, formless void? Not the British, to whom its very formlessness had been so long almost an article of faith; not the chiefs, who had looked upward to the administration and not downward to the people for the source of their authority; not the nationalist groups, denied all training in the responsibilities of government and often reduced virtually to the wraithlike status of underground resistance movements. The marvel was, not that the democratic process worked so oddly, but that it worked at all. (There were even, here and there, little outbursts of democracy in its purest form —as when one village headman, after assuring the Returning Officer that the formality of an election was unnecessary since he was the only suitable candidate, was compelled nevertheless to observe the formality and emerged at the bottom of the poll, with only one vote—that presumably self-inflicted—to his name.)

NATIONALIST RESPONSIBILITIES

At this point I wish to stray from the path of self-criticism and venture to lay a fraction of the blame for "political unpreparedness" on the nationalists themselves. It has always seemed to me that, in their natural preoccupation with the prime objective of shaking off foreign rule, colonial politicians tend to oversimplify important domestic issues or even stubbornly to deny their existence. "Get rid of the British and tackle other problems when they have gone," is too often the cry. The attraction of this policy, however shortsighted, is understandable, and by no means every leader who adopts it does so merely for the sake of arming himself with an inflammatory slogan calculated to keep the excitement of his followers at fever heat. But it is exasperating for the British, when they seek nationalist co-operation in wrestling with grave economic and social ills, to be told, "These things only exist because we are not free. If you want to end them, clear out of the country." The presence of the alien master becomes the origin of all evil, all backwardness, all misfortune, and his withdrawal the single and certain panacea.

The result of this concentration on the British target is that opportunities to lay the foundations for successful nationhood are neglected. The promotion of unity, for example, is attempted not by the positive method of removing religious or tribal misunderstandings, but by the negative device of blaming disunity on the British. For years it was contended that Hindu-Moslem friction in India was kept alive, as a matter of deliberate policy, by the imperial power, but when the time for liberation came the gulf between the two communities was found to be so deep and real that partition had to be accepted as inevitable. Who knows whether this greatest surgical operation in recent political history could not have been avoided if some of the energy devoted to driving out the British had been turned to the task of ending internal quarrels? It is, I think, a happy augury that in Nigeria the assumption of responsibility by African Ministers has led many of them to a realistic (and slightly agonizing) reappraisal of the true extent of the problem posed by conflicting tribal loyalties. There is reason to hope that, by the very act of acknowledging the danger of partition, the Nigerians may succeed in averting it. Nothing is more likely to produce an explosion than to bottle up forces which might spin themselves into quiescence if given free play.

INDUSTRIALIZATION OVERNIGHT?

"Self-government" to many colonial leaders is a door on the other side of which lies an immediate and ample paradise. Some of their pronouncements on industrialization give the impression that, once the British loose their hold on a colony, it will flower overnight into a forest of smoking chimney stacks. Automobiles and electric refrigerators will start rolling off the assembly lines, and the need to import manufacturing goods from the predatory nations of the West will rapidly disappear. Those who decry this as a senseless vision would be wise to study the conditions which have given rise to such unrestrained daydreaming. It is foolish to pretend that

the people of Africa have not the slightest excuse for supposing that the development of secondary industries in their continent has been impeded by colonial rule. The British, by their postwar enthusiasm for industrial projects, have admitted that their previous indifference to such projects was a mistake. The Africans sensed this indifference, and resented it. A young Gold Coast schoolteacher once told me that he used to hold up an ordinary lead pencil before his class and say, "We cannot even make *this* for ourselves. We must send money overseas to buy it. Isn't something wrong?" Something *was* wrong, and so long as the schoolteacher confined himself to the display of simple articles such as a lead pencil, he was not arousing false hopes of the better days a "new order" might bring. But to say "We cannot even make a four-engined bomber" is to take too venturesome a peep into the future. Detroit, like Rome, was not built in a day.

PARTING ADVICE

By way of conclusion, I cannot forbear to offer one word of advice to my friends in the nationalist movements of West Africa, who are the men by whom, from now on, the grave decisions formerly reserved for the nabobs of the Colonial Office must inexorably be taken. I have tried to make it clear that, because of my record, which I have freely confessed, and my nationality, which I do not disown, I count it no function of mine to hang out storm signals or prate of the virtues of prudence. But I am sure we shall hear, later in these discussions, that it is the desire of the United States—which is striving to play the role of honest broker or, if you like, Universal Aunt—to see the aspirations of African nationalism brought to fruition in an orderly manner. Caution may be a badge of shame at a time when the fight against the oppressor (too strong a word in this case, I think, but we will let it pass) is still at its height. When the battle has been won, however, and the oppressor is demonstrably and helplessly on his way out, caution can be an attribute of wisdom. When I read, in the newspapers of West Africa, of the schisms which threaten to rive the victorious armies of nationalism asunder in the very moment of their triumph, I am reminded of a sentence which illumined the history books of my youth and which the limping memory of middle age ascribes, perhaps erroneously, to the Elder Pitt: "Those counsels to which Time is not called, Time will not ratify."

MAN AND BEAST

As there are a few seconds to spare before the break for the commercial, may I read, by way of commentary on yesterday's proceedings, a piece of verse I wrote quite recently after finding myself somewhat disturbed by an article which appeared in the Washington *Daily News* under the name of Robert Ruark? It was at the time when Queen Elizabeth was paying her very successful state visit to Nigeria. Mr. Ruark expressed the hope that while the Queen was there, somebody would draw her attention to the fate that was threatening the wild life of Africa. What had happened in Asia was bad enough. In India tigers had been officially listed as vermin and anybody was entitled to shoot at them. There were only *six* rhinoceros left in the whole of India. But even worse catastrophes impended in Africa. In the great reserve of the Serengeti (in Tanganyika) marauding tribes from the north were slaughtering animals in order to supplement their meat diet. Did the Queen realize that the British were in danger of losing one of the world's greatest natural zoos?

Now all this seemed to me to indicate a sorry misplacing of emphasis. I thought we were in danger of losing, in Africa, something far more important than a great natural zoo. So I wrote this poem and sent it to the *Daily News*, which was good enough to print it:

What news is this that comes from far?
  My underwear I squirm in
To hear that India's tigers are
  Today described as vermin.

What government could be so vile?
  Hot rage within me kindles!
Nehru, like Nero, fiddles while
  His stock of rhino dwindles.

By Niger's side the Queen's immersed
  In pompous things or petty,
While meat-devouring black men burst
  Into the Serengeti.

Protect the antelope? Egad,
  It's time that we began to.
Perhaps it's also time we had
  Some feeling for the Bantu.

Yes, let us mend our ways, and then
Preserve both wildebeeste *and men.*

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Prospects for Democracy in the Gold Coast

By St. Clair Drake

THE Gold Coast is a small West African country of some 91,843 square miles, with slightly over four million inhabitants. The population is predominantly rural. It is a country of family-size farms and there are no European agricultural settlers. The main export crop is cocoa. Considerable quantities of gold, manganese, diamonds, and timber are also exported. Plans are being discussed for a large hydroelectric development—the Volta River project—which will furnish electrical power, some of which will be used for smelting aluminum from the extensive bauxite deposits and some of which will be used for general community needs.

British influence in the Gold Coast began over three centuries ago when trade relations were established, and was strengthened when the Fanti and Ga tribes of the coast sought British protection against the expanding, warlike Ashanti kingdom in the near hinterland. Formal British rule was established in the coastal areas in 1850. After seven wars against the Ashanti, their area was brought under British administration in 1901, along with a sparsely populated area in the far hinterland—the Northern Territories. In 1919, a portion of German Togoland came under the administration of the Gold Coast government as a League of Nations mandate. It was not until 1946 that all of these areas were administered as a unified Gold Coast.

In traditional Gold Coast society there was considerable political democracy. Chiefs were chosen from families with ritual status ("stool families"), but they could only be "enstooled" with the consent of the commoners, who could "destool" them if they exceeded the bounds of authority or compromised their ritual status. The British government transferred sovereignty from the people to the British Crown, released the chiefs from many of the popular checks, and substituted a system of "bureaucratic tutelage" for one based on "traditional authority." A Legislative Council, composed mainly of chiefs appointed by the Governor, served as an advisory council to the British government until 1946, when it became an elected legislature.[1] Recent Gold Coast political history can only be understood if viewed, in part, as a struggle between local and provincial chiefs against new, educated, westernized African leaders for the allegiance of the people.

The Gold Coast Revolution

In 1947, exasperated by postwar inflation, a group of African chiefs and businessmen in the Gold Coast led a successful boycott against high-priced foreign goods. That same year some of them allied themselves with a group of British-trained nationalist leaders and formed a United Gold Coast Convention to press for self-government within the Commonwealth.[2] The new nation was to be called "Ghana" after a once powerful Sudanese kingdom, some of whose people had allegedly immigrated

[1] For a succinct account of the manner in which British rule was extended in the Gold Coast and of traditional political institutions see Martin Wight, *The Gold Coast Legislative Council* (London, 1947), Chap. I.

[2] Nationalism in the Gold Coast has a history which antedates the postwar years. An account of earlier movements is given in Wight, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–28.


to the Gold Coast many years ago. An American-educated young African, Kwame Nkrumah, was invited home to serve as secretary of the UGCC.

In 1948, as a result of some violence surrounding an ex-servicemen's demonstration, six of the UGCC leaders, including Nkrumah, were jailed. A British commission of inquiry later suggested far-reaching reforms. The British Labour government decided to appoint an all-African committee to draft a constitution. The committee included some of the UGCC leaders, but not Nkrumah. The younger nationalists began to look to Nkrumah for leadership and eventually broke away from the UGCC to form the Convention People's party (CPP), a more militant group whose slogan was "Self-government *now*."

In 1950, under Nkrumah's leadership a nonviolent campaign for immediate self-government was launched, and Nkrumah and some of his coleaders were jailed. An election under the new constitution was held while he was in jail. His party won. Nkrumah emerged a national hero. Britain gracefully bowed to the will of the people and made him "Leader of Government Business." A year later he became the first African to be appointed a prime minister by the British government.[3]

The Gold Coast Experiment

In April of 1954, an Order in Council was issued by the British Crown providing for an all-African cabinet in the Gold Coast, under an African prime minister and responsible to a unicameral Legislative Assembly composed of 104 persons to be elected by secret ballot under conditions of universal adult suffrage. Complete legislative, judicial, and executive authority was to be granted to this African government, except for matters pertaining to public order, defense, and external affairs which were reserved to the Governor.[4]



Gold Coast Administrative Areas (exclusive of Togoland)

Adapted from D. T. Adams, *A Gold Coast Geography* (London: University of London Press, 1951), p. 205; reproduced by permission of the publisher.

Later in the spring, the political parties went to the people. The Ghana Congress party, representing middle-class moderates, ran under the sign of the blue elephant. The Convention People's party (CCP), under the militant younger leadership, campaigned with a red cock as its symbol. A number of other parties selected the palm tree, boatmen's paddles, fish, and similar

[3] For an account of political activity in the Gold Coast between 1947 and 1951, written by a confidant of Nkrumah's and a serious student of African problems, see George Padmore, *The Gold Coast Revolution*, London, 1953.

[4] See *The Gold Coast (Constitution) Order-in-Council*, 1954, Statutory Instruments, Gold Coast, No. 551, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954.

symbols by which a member of the predominantly illiterate electorate could identify the party of his choice.[5]

The CPP ran on its three-year-old record and Kwame Nkrumah's reputation, promising to secure complete independence. Opposition candidates charged the CPP with having set the youth against their elders, with having been hostile to the traditional rulers, the chiefs, with being inefficient and wasteful, and with having protected bribetakers. Nkrumah, himself, was charged with having "dictatorial ambitions." The Opposition promised to save the country from "CPP degradation and ruin."

The CPP won the election under the "Nkrumah Constitution," which had been extracted from the British by a shrewd blending of pressure (Positive Action) and negotiation (Tactical Action). The Gold Coast stood on the threshold of complete independence. The CPP promised to secure it before its four-year tenure of office was over.

The imagination of politically conscious Africans everywhere has been fired by what is happening in the Gold Coast. European settlers in eastern and southern Africa have been disturbed, and the extremists among them have reacted with hostility and disgust to what they contemptuously disparage as "Gold Coastism."

TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY

The Gold Coast is in the process of blending indigenous political institutions with those derived from the West. CPP policy has been one of adopting Western parliamentary forms in their entirety at the national center, and of introducing a form of local government which leaves economic and political power in the hands of the electorate but gives the traditional rulers (chiefs) ritual and advisory status. Councils of provincial chiefs also have the status of advisers. This process of "institutional transfer" has recently been described and analyzed with scholarly insight by the American political scientist, David Apter.[6]

A distinguished leader of the Opposition, Dr. Kofi Busia, head of the Department of Sociology at University College in the Gold Coast, himself a member of a family which includes traditional rulers, has stated that the demand of the people upon their leaders is ". . . that they should establish simultaneously a parliamentary democracy and a welfare state."[7] British civil servants, the mission schools, the mass media, and the Gold Coast intelligentsia, over a hundred-year period, have brought the people to the point of conceptualizing their goals in these terms. How deep the desire for *parliamentary* forms, per se, is, however, it would be very difficult to assess. There is no doubt about the desire for a welfare state.

In countries with high rates of illiteracy where the society has been a sacred one, when Western styles of democracy are being introduced there is a tendency for leadership of the charismatic type to inherit the authority once vested in traditional rulers.[8] But such leaders are by no means "all-powerful."

[5] Less than 25 per cent of the Gold Coast population has been educated beyond the third grade.

[6] David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition,* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955.

[7] Dr. Kofi A. Busia, "The Gold Coast and Nigeria on the Road to Self-Government," in C. Grove Haines (Ed.), *Africa Today* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 294.

[8] The authority of a charismatic leader rests neither on his place in a traditional order, as does that of chiefs, nor on the role of office in a bureaucratic organization, as does that of civil servants. It rests rather on the devotion of people to ". . . the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him." Quoted in Apter, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 228 n., from Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic and Social Organization,* translated by Parsons and Henderson (London, 1947), p. 301.

[9] For an analysis of the 1954 election see W. B. Birmingham and G. Jahoda, "A Pre-Election Survey in a Semi-Literate Society," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 19, No. 2 (1955), pp. 140–52.

Election of 1954

The election of 1954 is a case in point.[9] Only 59 per cent of the electorate went to the polls. The CPP at the peak of its power won only about 54 per cent of the popular vote. Under the British system, a citizen does not vote for a chief of state, but rather for local candidates to the Assembly. There is considerable evidence to indicate that if the Gold Coast people had been voting for Kwame Nkrumah directly, he would have run far ahead of his party. But even Nkrumah's considerable prestige and charm cannot pull a candidate through if local sentiment, or pressure from the local traditional structure, is strongly set against him.

The CPP secured slightly over half of the popular vote, and nearly 70 per cent of the seats—71 out of 104, thus giving it a comfortable majority. Of the 33 members of the Opposition, 12 represented the expression of regional sentiment, through the Northern People's party. Sixteen were "Independents," some of them former CPP members who had not been designated as official party candidates by the central committee, but who persisted in running nevertheless and were expelled. (Over 1,000 persons applied for CPP endorsement to contest 104 seats!) One member of the Assembly was voted in from a Muslim area in the capital city, and another member represented an area in southern Togoland. Only one member represented an Opposition party which was national in its orientation—Dr. Kofi Busia of the Ghana Congress party.

Whatever the interpretation of the close vote and the variegated opposition—whether evidence of political maturity or parochialism or lack of party discipline—the result was that power was distributed rather than concentrated entirely in the hands of the most vigorous nationalist party. But the party which won did secure enough seats so that it could govern with confidence. According to Western norms, this was a healthy portent for democracy.

Nature of the Opposition

Many observers have felt that the regional and pluralistic nature of the Opposition is a weakness, for there is little hope of a well-organized group being ready and able to form an alternative government should the present party in power fall. It is quite possible, however, that under conditions of transitional democracy it is to be expected that a powerful nationalist party with charismatic leadership, once it comes to power (and adds patronage to patriotism), may frequently be elected again and again. The low degree of economic differentiation and the absence of clear-cut issues also inhibit the formation of unified Opposition parties on the Western model.

Dominant nationalist parties not necessarily undemocratic

If such dominant nationalist parties continue to maintain full civil liberties; *if* they will respond to various sorts of extraparliamentary pressures and advice; and *if* the constitution provides for periodical dissolutions of the elected body and new elections, there is no rea-

son for calling the political situation "undemocratic" even if it does not fit the Western model.

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

David Apter, whose recent study of Gold Coast politics has been previously referred to, holds the view that the success of parliamentary democracy in the Gold Coast, to date, has been due primarily to the fact that Dr. Nkrumah has used his immense personal appeal and symbolic status—the source of his charisma—to invest democratic institutions with authority. Apter makes an impressive case for the success of what he calls "institutional transfer" during the period of Nkrumah's leadership—a legislature that functions well despite its youth, a judiciary not influenced by politics, a civil service relatively free from favoritism, and the protection of civil liberties. Most outside observers seem similarly impressed. He feels that "there is little doubt that Nkrumah wants desperately to have parliamentary government succeed."

But Nkrumah is also keenly conscious of what he considers a mandate from the people, expressed at the polls, to remain in office for four years. Dr. Apter, therefore, is also sure that "there is little doubt that if faced with a loss of authority, the possibility of alternative political practices to those of parliamentary democracy would be utilized."[10] (Presumably he is referring to a declaration of a state of emergency and the use of extraparliamentary party organizations to counter attempts to overthrow his government by anything other than a vote of no confidence in the Assembly.)

Within a few months after the election of 1954 and before the opening of the new all-African Assembly, a National Liberation Movement arose in Ashanti designed to "liberate the country" from CPP influence.[11] It began, as most Gold Coast political movements have begun, around an economic issue. The Gold Coast depends upon the export of cocoa as a major source of revenue. The new government has continued a system introduced by the British under which all cocoa for export must be sold at a price set by the government to the Cocoa Marketing Board through authorized agents. In the fiscal year 1953–54, 40 per cent of the total revenue of the government came from the buying of cocoa from individual farmers at a fixed price and selling it abroad at the world market price, a sum of some $50,000,000 dollars. It so happens that in recent years the people of Ashanti have been producing an increasing proportion of this vital crop. In 1953, over half of all the cocoa grown in the Gold Coast was produced by the Ashanti. Less than one-fourth of the people in the Gold Coast belong to this ethnic group.

In 1954, a group of Ashanti farmers and youth organizations complained that the price set for the year was too low and that Ashanti was being forced to bear the brunt of the levy for financing national development. Gradually, this protest was organized by leaders close to the ruler of Ashanti (the Asantehene) into a general critique of CPP policy and a call for new leadership.

A number of Opposition intellectuals and ex-CPP followers were attracted to the National Liberation Movement (NLM), and it began to take on some aspects of a broader movement than mere Ashanti tribalism. Two basic demands finally crystallized: (*a*) insistence upon a federal form of government

[10] Apter, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 314.

[11] This account of the National Liberation Movement is based upon observations in the field and newspaper content analysis made by the author during 1954 and 1955.

in which Ashanti, Togoland, the Northern Territories, and the Colony would each have its own political machinery and considerable control over its own finances; (*b*) a plea for a bicameral legislature in order to give the chiefs and older, more moderate groups some power in the national government.

The National Liberation Movement has never secured a base outside Ashanti and some closely related areas; it is, furthermore, very difficult to gauge the extent to which it has a mass appeal even in Ashanti. The CPP charges that intimidation through the power wielded by the Asantehene in his role as custodian of the Golden Stool—the sacred symbol of Ashanti ritual life—has brought many people "into line" who do not really believe in the NLM.[12] They point to the fact that nineteen of the twenty members of the Legislative Assembly from Ashanti who were elected in 1954 were CPP. The NLM retorts that if an election were held today they would all lose their posts. Sporadic violence has broken out here and there in Ashanti from time to time. Police power has been used to curb extremists on both sides, but it has been used with restraint. Leaders of both sides have asked their followers to refrain from violence. The democratic process has not broken down.

Nkrumah's reaction

Nkrumah's reaction to the demands for a federal state was to insist categorically that the CPP mandate from the electorate was to establish a *unitary* state and that the Gold Coast was too small to support four federated governments. As to the price of cocoa, he pointed out that it was open to revision during the next season. He invited the NLM leaders and members of the Asanteman Council to confer on methods for securing greater regional autonomy short of a federal state. All invitations to discuss this matter have been rejected, the NLM contending that a constitutional convention should be called immediately to frame a new *federal* constitution before the army and police and external affairs are transferred to the Gold Coast.

British government position

The British government has taken the position that these are matters for the Gold Coast legislature to settle, and that a constitutional convention is not in order. The NLM insists that the Assembly is "packed with CPP people." The Legislative Assembly appointed a Select Committee to take testimony on the merits and demerits of federalism and a bicameral legislature. The NLM and the Asanteman Council refused to co-operate. The Select Committee finally recommended against the NLM suggestions. It suggested that considerable regional autonomy be granted, however, and that the question of an upper house be raised again after independence.[13]

Bourne Report

Sir Frederick Bourne was subsequently invited out from Britain as a constitutional adviser, and he made detailed recommendations for the setting up of bicameral regional assemblies, each with a House of Chiefs, but with no such

[12] One of the most surprising developments in Gold Coast politics occurred in the summer of 1955, when the Minister of Agriculture, an Ashanti, ridiculed the whole concept of the Golden Stool and refused to present himself for "purification" when the Asantehene demanded that he do so. A CPP newspaper subsequently carried a series of editorials "From Grace to Grass," warning the Asantehene not to carry the pressure too far in his support of the NLM.

[13] See *Report from the Select Committee on Federal System and Second Chamber of the Gold Coast*, Accra: The Government Printer, 1955.

house in the national legislature. Such regional assemblies would be consulted on certain legislation and would be given grants for development, which they could administer in the fields of agriculture, animal health, forestry, education, communications, health services, housing, and town and city planning.

In February of 1956 a meeting was held at Achimota to consider these proposals. The Joint Council of Chiefs of the Colony attended and suggested certain amendments. The Asanteman Council and the NLM, however, boycotted the conference.[14] Thus, government and the NLM are deadlocked. There have been threats of Ashanti secession. Should this happen, the validity of Apter's prediction will be tested. Nkrumah, the Gold Coast's George Washington, might find himself facing Abraham Lincoln's dilemma.[15]

[14] For details of the Bourne Report and conference proceedings see *Report of the Achimota Conference,* Accra: The Government Printer, 1956.

[15] Since this article was written, the CPP government has agreed to a test of strength at the polls, and the election is set for July 1956. The British government asked the CPP government to have such an election before Parliament acts on the Gold Coast government White Paper, *Constitutional Proposals for Gold Coast Independence and Statement on the Report of the Constitutional Adviser and the Report of the Achimota Conference,* Accra: The Government Printer, 1956. Nkrumah's acceptance of the British request has significant implications in view of the fact that he has always stressed the legal right of his government to remain in power until 1958. A month before this decision, one of the most prominent members of the Gold Coast Cabinet was quoted as having said that if the British government used the Ashanti crisis to delay independence "the people of the Gold Coast—not the Government—might be forced to declare themselves independent" (*Venture,* April 1956, p. 2). The NLM replied that it would resist any such unilateral action. It is obviously impossible to know what factors entered into the CPP decision, but it is relevant to note that under Part IX, Article 73, Her Majesty's government reserves the right to revoke the whole 1954 Constitution if it sees fit. The principle of Tactical Action, as well as a sense of responsibility, no doubt suggested giving in on this point (see Hansard, May 11, 1956, and *Manchester Guardian,* May 15, 1956).

Two concepts of democracy

The NLM affair is, in one of its aspects, a conflict between two conceptions of democracy, the older, traditional concept that considerable power should be vested in chiefs and that *delegate* bodies are more democratic than *representative* bodies opposed to the belief in speedier representative processes handled by westernized elite groups. It also represents a conflict between ethnic loyalties and national loyalties. Certain political and economic interests among Africans, and perhaps some among Europeans, have also encouraged the traditionalists.

PRESSURES OF "PROGRESS"

Whatever the merits or demerits of the present constitutional arrangements, or of the specific price set each year on cocoa, there have been a series of changes in Gold Coast life since the CPP came to power which the masses of people, including those in Ashanti, have experienced subjectively as "freedom," and which if measured against Western models are objective indices of a degree of democracy in its *economic* and *social* dimensions which never existed under the political democracy of the traditional order [16] or during the period of British "bureaucratic tutelage."

[16] Data for analyzing these changes may be found in such documents as *Report of the Select Committee on the Lidbury Report, 1952; Economic Survey, 1954; Development Progress Report, 1955;* all available from the Government Printer, Accra, Gold Coast. A recently established weekly publication, *The Gold Coast Today,* also summarizes development trends from time to time. (It is distributed without charge by the Information Section of the Gold Coast Office, 13 Belgrave Square, London.)

Elementary schools have expanded at a rate which has put a strain on economic resources and outrun availability of qualified personnel. The number of children enrolled in elementary school has increased from 235,000 in 1951 to 430,000 in 1955. About $1,500,000 has been spent on scholarships for advanced training from one government fund alone. Jobs and positions have multiplied with an expanding bureaucracy and economic development. Women have been drawn into public life on a widening scale. People are participating in mass education and community development plans which give small but measurable results.

Paradoxically, the very success of the CPP in extending economic and social democracy does not *necessarily* strengthen Western parliamentary processes and general civil liberties. Masses of illiterate people experiencing for the first time the possibilities of a rise in their economic and social status do not always make the preservation of civil liberties a prime value. Matters like freedom of the press and the niceties and subtleties of the parliamentary process, or of academic detachment, may strike them as less important than getting ahead with the job of building schools and clinics, piping water into the villages, or industrializing the country. In such situations, a popular leader can sometimes stifle his Opposition, should he wish to do so, with widespread approval from the masses.

Apter, as stated above, feels that the Prime Minister wishes to retain and expand Western democratic forms. But Nkrumah is under pressure from the "masses" to deliver the goods—fast. Apter feels that the very possibility of failure of the Gold Coast experiment in parliamentary democracy . . . imposes a responsibility upon the United States as well as the United Kingdom, to continue to supply technicians, equipment and investment funds which will be needed in increasing quantities if the standards of life which the Gold Coast people have striven for can be supplied. *In the long run, only if subsistence demands can be met will the Gold Coast be able to "afford" the luxury of parliamentary political organs.*[17]

AFTER INDEPENDENCE WHAT?

At the moment, control of police power and military power is in the hands of the British Governor. The next constitutional advance will place it in the hands of Africans. As to how it will be used there can be no certain answer, only a balancing of probabilities under various conditions. The CPP, with two more years in power (barring the very unlikely defection of twenty or more of its Assembly members), will be the custodian of that power. It will very probably be used, *with restraint,* to preserve the unity of the nation and the degree of public order necessary to carry out a program which involves some of the following elements: [18]

1. The knitting together of the Colony, Ashanti, and the Northern Territories (and perhaps British Togoland) into a unitary national state.[19]

2. The strengthening of local coun-

[17] Apter, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 302 (italics not in original).

[18] Whatever the results of the impending election referred to in note 15 *supra,* any Gold Coast government would be faced with this same set of problems, with the exception of the first two, where the Opposition would try to institute a federal state and would vest more power in the traditional rulers. There is no reason to suppose that an Opposition government would show any less restraint than the CPP in its exercise of power.

[19] On May 9, 1956, in a plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices, a majority of the voters in British Togoland expressed their preference for union with an independent Gold Coast.

cils and regional assemblies with emphasis upon increasing the power and influence of westernized elements, while at the same time protecting the ritual and ceremonial functions of the traditional rulers, the chiefs.

3. The channeling of the dynamism of the youthful masses into projects of social welfare and development in order to prevent it from erupting into violence when internal political crises occur.

Economic problems

These are political problems, but they are functionally related to a number of basic economic problems among which are the following:

1. How to siphon off a sizeable proportion of the national income to prevent inflation and to provide funds for development, in the face of a constantly rising desire for larger individual and family incomes to buy consumption goods.

2. How to lay down, rapidly, a framework of government services—schools, clinics, roads, sanitary improvements, and so forth—both to meet the demands of the people, and to make an attractive situation for investment capital.

3. How to attract investment capital for a modest program of industrialization, at the same time protecting the country from domination by outside economic interests.

4. How to keep a steadily rising level of real income both in order to expand consumption and to keep a jump ahead of the pressure of organized labor and farm organizations.

5. How to increase man-hour productivity in agriculture and industry, without which there can be no eventual rise in standards of living.

Richard Wright, the American Negro novelist, has called upon Nkrumah to be "hard" and to proceed ahead "full draft" to wipe out all vestiges of animism and tribalism, and to secure unified action. Wright suggests that "African life must be militarized"—not in the sense of a military dictatorship, but in the form of "a temporary discipline that will unite the nation. . . ." [20] It is problematical, however, that even Nkrumah could carry out such a "hard" policy, even if he desired to do so, and there is no evidence that he does.

Western orientation

An increasing number of people in the Gold Coast are taking pride in the fact that their revolution has been nonviolent and democratic. Press, film, and radio have made large segments of the population conscious of what the world hopes for and expects from the emerging nation. The people of the Gold Coast are also constantly in contact with democratic culture-bearers, the so-called "expatriates" who work beside them in offices and workshops, and the school teachers and missionaries with whom they have been in contact for many years. All the members of the Cabinet are Western oriented. The younger leaders are constantly traveling to Europe and America as delegates to meetings and on business. A growing number of Gold Coast youth are studying in Britain, Europe, and the United States. The older, conservative nationalist leaders, who are respected even when they are not followed, secured their education in Britain and have traveled widely. Most of the leaders, whether CPP or Opposition, are concerned to safeguard the reputation of Ghana. The words of Mr. Justice Coussey when he opened the first constitutional sessions in 1949 are often repeated either verbatim or in paraphrase. He quoted Burke, "We are on a conspicuous stage and the world marks our demeanour."

[20] Richard Wright, *Black Power* (New York, 1954), p. 347.

The prospect for democracy in the Gold Coast is made more secure by the fact that the leaders, whatever their differences of opinion among themselves, all have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.

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Liberia: An Appraisal

By Daniel F. McCall

WHEN one looks at the continent of Africa these days and considers the number of territories moving toward self-government, it is natural to wonder what lessons the emergent states can learn from the experience of established African governments. Can Nigeria, the Gold Coast, or Sierra Leone benefit from the example of the Republic of Liberia?

I am afraid that this yearning to "learn from history" may be misleading for two reasons:

1. Although there may be many similarities in climate, ethnic groupings, and history of the independent and the presently dependent countries, nevertheless it may be that the differences are more critical. Thus it would be dangerous to draw inferences; for example, Liberia does not have within its boundaries any tribe which had established a stable political power over an extensive region, as had, say, the Hausa, the Yoruba, or the Ashanti, and the relationship of the central governments to the tribes may be different for that reason.

2. The kinds of problems that African states had to face in the nineteenth century will perhaps not recur in the second half of the twentieth, which it seems will present different problems. Liberia had to contend with an expanding colonialism, which was then the *Zeitgeist* in this region of the world; the Gold Coast and Nigeria, on the other hand, will come into a world in which colonialism is receding. Therefore the things of value which Liberia learned from its experience may not need to be applied by its neighbors. The problems of the present are economic development to satisfy the aspirations of the electorate, and international diplomacy in a world divided by a cold war.

A more fruitful inquiry might be, what role can Liberia play in a present day comity of African nations?

Before this question can be pursued, it will be necessary to assess the achievements and failures of Liberia and see them in their context,[1] in order to know its strengths and weaknesses and what resources it could bring to a regional bloc.

Preconceptions and Prejudices

In attempting to make this assessment we are handicapped by the fact that although much has been written about Liberia, remarkably little of it is the result of serious, impartial study. Two main issues cloud the air:

1. Colonial powers have considered independent Liberia a "thorn in their side" because its mere existence might give hope to colonial Africans to aspire to independence.[2] If Liberia had been located in Latin America it would have escaped much of the criticism heaped upon it; in fact, it would have been praised for the orderliness of its political process and for the lack of revolutions.[3]

2. Liberia, like Haiti, has been taken as an illustration in the argument over the ability of members of the Negro race. It is usually ignored in these polemics that the country had certain economic and political givens and that whatever the race of the citizens these conditions would have a powerful influence on the possibilities of action. If Liberia were to be accounted a failure it would not prove that the Negro race has not produced individuals of ability, nor does prosperity in a Negro country, of itself, wipe away the arguments of the racist point of view.

Of course not all comments on Liberia were written under the influence of these two issues, and some of the criticisms were valid. But we need to be on the alert for bias.

Liberian Goals

So many charges and countercharges have been made and reargued that it is difficult to begin without confirming or refuting lurid tales of corruption or inefficiency. Yet I do not believe that an understanding of France begins and ends with an exposé of the Stavisky Affair or of the United States with the "5 percenters." One has to look at the goals the nation has sought to attain and the obstacles that impede that attainment to get a preliminary evaluation of the country, after which one may, if one wishes, study the particular charges.

Jeffersonian agrarianism

The first goal toward which Liberia set its face was one chosen for it by the American Colonization Society, which ruled the settlement for the first two decades of its existence. The goal was the Jeffersonian agrarian ideal of a country of independent small farmers. Settlers were to cultivate no less than two acres and no more than ten; no one would be too rich or too poor, and the community would be reasonably self-sufficient. This goal was never realized in Liberia, nor in Jefferson's own country either, but it seems that this ideal was sought less by the settlers than by the agents of the Colonization Society.

Era of prosperity

Cash cropping on larger farms with hired labor, commerce, and a maritime carrying trade quickly replaced the earlier goal and was successfully achieved. An early traveler wrote that forty years previously this coast had been "almost deserted" owing to the ravages of the slave trade, but that "towns have arisen with their shops, hospitals, and other public utility buildings; and a number of little farms carry on between themselves an active trade and exchange the products of their own industry."[4] In 1832, "exports sent out of the colony amounted to $125,549.16"; one Liberian trader "sold goods to the amount of $70,000 in one year," and another in seven years had "accumulated property to the amount of $20,000." "Large sea going vessels" were built, one of "more than thirty tons in capacity" and another of "more than forty."[5] Sugar, coffee, camwood, and other crops were exported. For a few decades expansion and prosperity gave Liberia hope of a comfortable and stable future.

[1] It was long ago recognized by ibn-Khaldun that one of the major sources of misunderstanding is "the inability rightly to place an event in its real context." Quoted by Rollin Chambliss, *Social Thought from Hammurabi to Comte* (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), p. 294.

[2] As a former high official once wrote: "Too often Liberia has suffered at the hands of the great powers; from the pin-pricks of casual observers; from the wounds of those who came with prejudiced minds, and with their own axes to grind." Gabriel L. Dennis, "Foreword" in H. Greenwall and R. Wild, *Unknown Liberia*, London: Hutchinson & Company, 1936.

[3] See Raymond L. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), Vol. II, pp. 712, 715. Only on two occasions, in 1871 and 1923, were there disturbances accompanying the change-over of administrations, but these did not approach a state of revolution.

[4] M. Casimer Leconte, quoted by George W. Brown, *Economic History of Liberia* (Washington, D. C.: Associated Publishers, 1941), Section D, note 129.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

Economic difficulties

Steamships with steel hulls began to displace wooden sailing ships, and Liberia had neither the industry nor the capital to compete in the new conditions. World markets became organized with specialization of certain crops in certain areas, and Liberia's smaller amounts of many crops did not fit the new conditions of trade.[6]

Liberia sank into the doldrums of an economic slough from which it did not emerge until the present generation. As trade declined Liberians turned more toward government as a profession, until Monrovia took on something of the aspect of a one-industry town, government being the industry. Many citizens felt it was their prerogative to find employment in the government, but it is also true that when the treasury was in difficulty officials went regularly to their offices despite enormous arrears in pay. Most of the adverse comments were written during this period, but one should note the early success as well as the later misfortune.

It was possible to achieve this early prosperity by self-help in the simpler economy of the time. But under the expanding and encompassing network of world trade based on an accelerating utilization of inventions and fossil fuels, the only alternatives were to modernize the Liberian economy under Liberian auspices with capital obtained from foreign loans or eventually to be absorbed into one of the colonial empires.

Foreign loans

As early as 1870, and without well-formulated plans of development, Liberia borrowed money. As a result of its poor credit rating, lack of previous experience with banking procedures (particularly the heavy prediscounting of interest), and favoritism in the management of the funds, exceedingly little benefit accrued to Liberia. The political commotion which followed the news of the unfavorable terms of the loan further complicated the situation.

Trade and revenues continued to fall off; Liberia borrowed again to refund the first loan and found itself, like Egypt and Tunisia, threatened with the possibility of annexation by the creditor nation on the charge of bankruptcy. Diplomatic ingenuity, the friendly attitude of the United States, and luck preserved her from that fate, but the problem of modernizing the economy remained.

Barclay plan

The fiasco of the first loan and its subsequent refinancing made many officials wary of foreign indebtedness. Thus, although President Edwin Barclay had a program of reform and development [7] which he could not implement effectively because of lack of money, he stated his attitude toward loans in these words: "Only such loans as may be utilized for purposes which are almost immediately productive will be given a cautious acceptance." [8]

The Barclay plan was to foster craft industries, aid co-operatives, develop a civil service, and recruit young men into an organization resembling the Civilian Conservation Corps which was to be oriented more toward construction, however, than toward mere conservation. For the depression years this plan was feasible, but the war and the postwar world have seen developments more grandiose than could have been considered then.

[6] Liberia has an indigenous variety of coffee which became for a time the mainstay of the economy; it has a taste somewhat more bitter than other varieties and, taste being subject to fads, demand later fell off drastically.

[7] Greenwall and Wild, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 64, compares the program to both the New Deal and the Soviet Five Year Plans.

[8] Quoted by Brown, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), Section D, note 256.

Recent economic development

American loans for a harbor which has both commercial and military advantages and other war measures gave a boost to the Liberian economy, which had been reviving since the arrival of the Firestone interests. The export of rubber provided a steady source of revenue, and the corporation's plantation stimulated private farms of rubber trees, which revived sagging family fortunes. Since the war the excavation of iron ore has begun. Industries other than extractive have yet to appear, but transportation has been greatly improved and that is one of the necessary preconditions for industrialization.

The present administration has been willing to face the danger of increasing outside indebtedness because rising revenues give some assurance of meeting the payments; and not to take the chance would mean worse dangers from stagnation. Also, the new international agencies like the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization provide services that formerly would have been financed solely by the Liberian government. Arrangements with the United States under the Lend-Lease Act and Point Four are made in an atmosphere that is vastly different from that in which the loans were acquired in the nineteenth century. The old caution is still evident in the policy of paying off the debt at a faster rate than stipulated.

Independence

Another eagerly sought goal has been maintenance of the country's independence. Indeed, independence is a possession so greatly cherished by the Liberian citizen that it might well have been listed first. The greater part of Liberian diplomacy has been devoted to survival in a period which saw scores of other countries, often with greater resources, lose their sovereignty.

> All Europe wanted Liberia but no country was sure of America's claims and attitudes. Liberia early realized this, and acted accordingly. . . . She catered to German trade and made Germany the watchdog against aggression in which Germany had no part. France and England were skilfully played off against each other and America was always a shadow in the background.[9]

Because of its own internal color problem the United States did not officially recognize Liberia until decades after Western European powers had done so, but an American Secretary of State wrote that "this Government regards it (Liberia) as occupying a peculiar position, and as possessing peculiar claims to the friendly consideration . . . and that it [the United States government] would be very unwilling to see it despoiled. . . ." [10]

There was plenty of scope for Liberian statesmanship: of the several examples of courageous action and wisdom by the Republic's officials, two must suffice.

As a result of British pressure, Liberia had appointed a British officer as commander of the Liberian Frontier Force; he took over police functions as well, filled the Force with former soldiers from Sierra Leone, and then made further threatening demands upon the government. He was dismissed from his command, an action concerning which the American Commission the next year admiringly wrote: "But for the prompt

[9] W. E. B. Du Bois, "Liberia and Rubber," *New Republic*, November 18, 1925, quoted by Brown, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), Section E, note 96.

[10] Buell, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), Vol. II, p. 707.

and judicious action of the Liberian Executive [the situation would have been] nothing short of what the French Government termed 'the British Army of Occupation.'" [11]

The League of Nations presented Liberia with a "plan of assistance" which would have seriously infringed upon the country's sovereignty and imposed heavy expenses for salaries of European advisers; it was presented in terms that made its acceptance almost mandatory. President Barclay and Secretary of State Grimes patiently and skillfully negotiated modifications of the proposals.[12]

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

An important question is whether Liberia is a nation. Liberia has been called a colony in both senses of the word, first that the founders of the country were colonial settlers, and secondly that the whole country is a colony of the United States. Sometimes it is pictured as a black colonialism, a poorer version of its neighbors, exploiting just as much, or even more, the aboriginal inhabitants. An African writer, Azikiwe, now a nationalist leader in British West Africa, once charged: "The Fathers of the Country . . . in their Christian idealism and American mis-education preferred to travel the route to statehood in Africa alone, and without the aborigines." [13] So it looked to one African in the thirties of this century.

In the preceding century, Liberian society was even more divided. Abayomi Karnga says:

> Society therefore became divided into four distinct orders: the official class (including the big traders), the common people, the Congoes, and the natives. Social intercourse and marriage amongst these groups were by custom forbidden.[14]

The first two "orders" were the immigrants from the new world who came with varying advantages; "Congoes" was the local designation for the melee of numerous tribes landed in Liberia from captured slave ships. The immigrants are often referred to as "returning Africans," but there were also "a large number of mulattoes and many who showed an admixture with the North American Indians. In short they were biological products of the heterogeneous new world; ethnically they were truly Americans." [15] Ideas as well as genes had been mixed in the melting pot:

> They brought with them a western name for their country; a western form of land domination; western political and juridical control; western language and education; western social and religious ethics; western methods of employment in agriculture, commerce and industry.[16]

All individuals did not carry equally this cultural endowment. The social structure of ante bellum America determined to what extent a given individual could be exposed to such intellectual influence. There were two types of Negroes, slave and free; the latter were few, and the former were divided into field hands, artisans, and house servants. At the time of the settlement of Liberia, probably less than 5 per cent of the slaves in the United States were literate; a somewhat higher percentage of free Negroes had acquired some education.[17] "Literacy is not an asset in a plantation economy, and it is not only discouraged but usually forbidden." [18] Individual effort in the pursuit of learning was important, as the example of Lott Carey testifies: he taught himself to read from the New Testament.[19] One could progress more easily with the help of the dominant class, the planters, and there were many people, born as slaves, who had this help because they were related, on the paternal side, to the great planter families:

> . . . house servants . . . seem largely to have been drawn from the group of mixed bloods. . . . The fair skinned house girls were more frequently used as mistresses by the planter class than the plantation hands. They became the mothers of successive generations of even whiter children. Many white fathers freed their illegitimate mulatto offspring. . . . Some were helped to education and sent to free states in the North.[20]

Thus education and a light shade of color tended to go together, and these two features distinguished the first of Karnga's "orders." "Men of light complexion," he wrote, "were preferred to their brothers in ebony." [21]

Immigrants and Congoes

The immigrants had no tribal identification, and the Congoes were too fragmented to reconstitute viable units on their old patterns. If the settlement were to survive it would have to be on the basis of the Western ideas that the immigrants, especially the educated ones, brought with them; Liberia would have to be a nation, not a tribe. The task of providing leadership for the uneducated and absorbing large numbers of Congoes was a formidable one, but the challenge of the pioneering conditions seems to have brought out the best in many individuals. A Commander of the United States Navy wrote in 1854:

> Notwithstanding the heterogeneous population of Liberia, a commendable degree of order, quiet, and comparative prosperity prevails. With such men as President Roberts, Chief-Justice Benedict, Major-General Lewis, Vice-President Williams, and many other prominent persons in office and in the walks of civil life, the government and society present an aspect altogether more favorable than a visitor, judging them from the race when in contact with a white population, is prepared to find.[22]

The first four presidents were of this light-complexioned elite, but during this time integration proceeded, especially on the lower levels of society where immigrants, Congoes, and aborigines worked as hired hands, apprentices, or on shares for the larger farmers and merchants.[23] And out of this mass of the commonalty individuals rose to demand, by virtue of success, access to the elite. Edward J. Roye, an unalloyed black man, owned the ship that was "first to display the Lone Star in the ports of Liverpool and New York." [24]

Roye became fifth president. His support, the True Whig party, had grown by "accession from the poorer classes," [25] that is, immigrants who had

[11] Cf. Buell, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 787 ff.; Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Liberia in World Politics* (London: A. H. Stockwell, 1934), p. 115.

[12] R. Earle Anderson, *Liberia: America's African Friend* (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), Chap. VIII.

[13] Azikiwe, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), p. 76.

[14] A. Karnga, *History of Liberia* (Liverpool: D. H. Tyte & Co., 1926), p. 45.

[15] Brown, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), Section C, note 2.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[17] G. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. 887.

[18] Charles S. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation* (1934), p. 129, quoted by Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 894.

[19] Stanley A. Davis, *This Is Liberia* (New York: The William-Frederick Press, 1953), p. 78.

[20] Myrdal, *op. cit.* (note 17 *supra*), p. 696.

[21] Karnga, *op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*), p. 45.

[22] Andrew H. Foote, *Africa and the American Flag* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1854), p. 192.

[23] Karnga, *op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*), p. 41: "My steam mill has for its engineer a Vai boy. My sugar maker, cooper, and fireman are Congoes. . . ."

[24] Brown, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 134.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

been field hands and Congoes. The overthrow of the monopoly of leadership by the first "order" was phrased not in terms of color but in economic measures intended to help the common people; the issues were paper money and a foreign loan.

Even if he had been so inclined, Roye could not have been a racial demagogue because his predecessor, James Spriggs Payne, had already proposed "the passage of an act recognizing as Liberian the entire aboriginal population." [26] Payne's campaign platform had been:

> . . . to bring about a closer and more friendly intercourse between the citizens of the republic proper and the more advanced interior tribes, with a view toward having the latter incorporated into the Liberian political institutions, and forming one people in Liberia.[27]

INDIRECT RULE

Payne had sent explorers [28] into the interior, and it was partly to open up this territory that Roye wanted a loan. The decline in the economic fortunes of the country prevented the carrying out of these plans, a failure which caused the loss of much of the territory claimed through Anderson's explorations. Colonial powers had dropped claims based on exploration for the criteria of "effective occupation." To prevent further losses of their Hinterland, Liberia instituted an "effective occupation" modeled on the indirect rule of the British; district and provincial commissioners were appointed from Monrovia.

Thus outside pressure caused a change in internal policy, for the imitation of colonial organization affected the earlier integrationist plans. The absorption of tribal elements into the settlements had already taken place to a greater extent than is generally recognized. Wars between tribes in which the settlers did not even participate sometimes sent remnants of the vanquished tribe to the settlement looking for refuge; thus Governor Buchanan in 1837 gave the Deys land near Millsburg after their defeat by the Golas. Sometimes a war between the settlers and the tribes led to an extension of control over indigenous peoples; for example, in 1840 Colonel Elijah Johnson defeated Chief Gutumba, who had attacked Heddington, and "as a result, many powerful chiefs voluntarily entered into a treaty with the government, pledging themselves to abandon the slave trade, live in peace with their neighbors, and submit their quarrels to the Liberian government." [29] The President's annual message in 1868 recorded that "the natives are responding well to taxation. . . ." [30] Negotiations with tribes continued, and land rights were purchased: "The Liberian Government recognized in an act defining the boundaries of the Republic, that its jurisdiction was based on treaties made with the chiefs." [31]

GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

This development toward unification was slowed up by indirect rule, which regularized indigenous organization and tended to preserve it.[32] The Hinterland

[26] Davis, *op. cit.* (note 19 *supra*), p. 95.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

[28] T. C. Brownell, J. B. Dennies, Governor Harmon, Dr. Fletcher, and B. J. K. Anderson. The latter's account, *Narrative of a Journey to Musardu, the Capital of the West Mandingoes* (New York: L. W. Green, 1870), ranks with the great chronicles of exploration but is much neglected.

[29] Davis, *op. cit.* (note 19 *supra*), p. 71.

[30] Quoted by Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[31] Buell, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), Vol. II, p. 706.

[32] "A system of tribal government and authority has been worked out for the hinterland.

"The districts of the hinterland are divided into chiefdoms, headed by paramount chiefs. The chiefdoms are divided into clans, each headed by a clan chief who is elected by the tribesmen. Clan chiefs are responsible to the paramount chiefs, who are also elected officers. Paramount chiefs are responsible to the district commissioners. . . ."—Bureau of Information, Department of State, Republic of Liberia, *Liberia* (Monrovia, 1952), p. 10. Cf. Buell, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 740, A Law for Government of Districts Inhabited by Aborigines, enacted in 1905; and a "system of native administration installed in 1921" (p. 746). See also *ibid.*, Chap. 96, Part 5.

[33] Buell, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), Vol. II, p. 710.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 747.

[35] Bureau of Information, Department of State, Liberia, *The National Unification Program of Liberia* (Monrovia, 1954), p. 12.

Jurisdiction is legally differentiated from the Organized County Jurisdiction of the coastal region. Counties are run by superintendents, appointed by the President and reporting to him. District commissioners are appointed in like manner but report to the Interior Department; thus in regard to the executive branch there is perhaps not a very great difference in governmental structure, but the actual functioning appears to diverge. In regard to the legislative branch, the counties elected Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, but the Hinterland, at first, had *no voice* in the Legislature. However, "upon deposit of a hundred dollars a tribe may send a Referee to watch legislative proceedings." [33]

TOWARD UNIFICATION

With returning prosperity, the dreams of Payne and Roye began, gradually, to be implemented. President King had already begun the practice of regular personal visits to the Hinterland and "hearing complaints of native tribes." [34] President Tubman amplified this policy and "managed to push through the National Legislature an Executive Measure approving the Government's policy for National Unification." [35] In 1946, three seats were added to the House for elected representatives of the three Hinterland provinces. Later, five more seats were added for the tribes residing within the five counties.[36] In 1947, a further law "extended this franchise to women and now all male and female citizens possessing real estate, are eligible to vote at the age of twenty-one." [37]

Not only the Legislature saw an influx of aborigines but the other branches as well:

> For the first time a man of aboriginal background—a member of the Grebo tribe—has been appointed to the high office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Grebos also serve as Secretary of War and Assistant Postmaster General. A member of the Vai tribe has been made Under-Secretary of State. Aborigines . . . today . . . hold many other responsible positions in Government.[38]

At the present time the four "orders" of Karnga have disappeared; Congoes can no longer be distinguished; complexion is no longer an index of education or status; and even the most prominent families have married individuals of tribal origin. The two designations locally used now are "civilized" and "uncivilized," which correspond roughly with the two systems of administration, county and Hinterland. There are distinctions within the "civilized": the distance between rich and poor is palpable, and family connection is important. Nevertheless, an amazing amalgamation has been achieved.[39]

[36] Bureau of Information, *Liberia* (cited note 32 *supra*), pp. 9–10.

[37] *Liberia Today* (published by the Liberian Embassy in Washington, D. C.), Vol. 1, No. 2 (February 1952).

[38] Bureau of Information, *Liberia* (cited note 32 *supra*), p. 10.

[39] Buell, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), Vol. II, p. 750, discussed the custom of adoption of children from aboriginal families into the families of Americo-Liberians, another important mechanism of unification.

Some people are skeptical that the National Unification Program will be carried out. It must be recognized that the job is more difficult than the absorption of the Congoes because of the relative numbers involved (about 50,000 "civilized" and about a million aborigines) and because of the living cultures of the tribes. If it can be accomplished it will take time; the advancements made seem to be earnests of intention.[40]

Azikiwe's criticism, which would be less applicable after 1946, emphasized the gap between "civilized" and "uncivilized" and resented the pejorative designation. Liberia's early integrationist policy was a kind of "cultural imperialism," although based on racial equity; indirect rule in the form with which Azikiwe was familiar recognized the validity of each culture but permitted the practice of racial snobbery.[41]

The doctrine of indirect rule implies that there is something worth while in indigenous cultures; in Liberia, however, the system was adopted not from infatuation with its philosophy but as a practical means to provide "effective occupation" and to prevent further loss of territory, so that attitudes toward unacculturated peoples were unchanged. Paradoxically, now that the days of indirect rule seem numbered, recognition is being given to local cultures in a recently established Bureau of Folkways. The discriminatory terms "civilized" and "uncivilized" ought to be replaced by neutral terms such as "citizen" and "tribesman."

[40] Unification is closely related to other needs of the country such as education and economic development. Liberia devotes a larger part of its budget to education than most other countries at the present time; in 1952 it was 15 per cent. Education is necessary to train people in order to make development possible; development will require so much labor and specialization that tribal peoples will be merged into the same web of relationships as the "civilized" people.

[41] Buell, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), Vol. II, p. 746: "When a Liberian District Commissioner is conscientious—and this is often the case—he seems to be able to get closer to his subjects than does a European Commissioner, because of the element of race"; and p. 729: "One doesn't find in Liberia the bitterness between Creole and the aboriginal native which exists in Sierra Leone. . . ."

LIBERIA AND U. S.

As to the assertion that Liberia is not independent but a colony of the United States, suffice it to say that Liberia, like many another small nation, has suffered infringements upon its sovereignty at times but has maintained its independence. The foreign influences which have borne most heavily upon Liberia have come not from the United States but from Britain and France. America's economic stake in Liberia has been growing for the last two decades, and the United States has now definitely replaced British influence. That subservience has not resulted can be seen in the fact that Liberia, while retaining its traditional friendliness to the United States, has sometimes voted differently in the United Nations, and that it sent a representative to the Bandung Conference upon which at the time the United States State Department frowned.

LIBERIA IN THE COMITY OF AFRICAN NATIONS

To come back now to the question of the role that Liberia can play in a comity of African nations; our assessment is that the exercise of sovereignty has produced a Liberian tradition and developed a distinctive Liberian personality. Buell commented on this in 1928, saying the Liberian has a *"savoir faire* which is unique throughout the continent of Africa. The very fact that the inhabitants of Liberia have been called upon to carry the full burden of government has developed in them qualities

which have not yet appeared among natives elsewhere."[42] The characterization is as true of Liberia now as when it was written in 1928, but it is out-of-date for other parts of Africa; administrative experience and *savoir-faire* are much commoner commodities in Africa these days.

Liberia will not necessarily be the pacemaker simply because of its priority in independence, for it will be joined by neighbors with larger areas, populations, and resources, whose development has benefited, in some respects, by the colonial connection.

The problems which beset the emerging states are the same as those with which Liberia is grappling: unifying ethnic groups into a nation and building a modern economy (including medical and education programs) to provide the citizenry with a higher standard of living. Since Liberia has not completed the process it cannot, as it were, lead the way; but it has set the example of dogged perseverance despite fluctuations of fortune.

Prime Minister Nkrumah said during his visit there, "Liberia is the pioneer in the freedom movement among Africans." The motto of the country is "The Love of Liberty brought us here"; with the continent in ferment, the world is interested in watching what the love of liberty will cause the present generation to do.

[42] Buell, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), Vol. II, p. 729.

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The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Problems of Democratic Government*

By Carl G. Rosberg, Jr.

After nearly three years of intense controversy and debate in Africa and in Britain, which in turn followed a half century of unsuccessful attempts to achieve amalgamation of the Rhodesias, closer union of the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia with the two protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formally accomplished by federation in August 1953.[1] A major argument advanced for this change was that it would provide a superior framework for the economic development of British Central Africa. Federation, it was said, would help to attract investment capital and to facilitate a diversification of economy. The result would benefit all inhabitants since this would not only raise the standards of living of the European colonists but would also greatly aid the material and social advancement of the African. On the other hand, it is worth recalling that the Federation was imposed in the face of widespread African opposition, for the African was quick to realize that federation could mean greater settler control. Despite these circumstances, however, federation was regarded in liberal circles as politically advantageous. In principle, at least, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was committed to the goal of racial co-operation. To establish it meant the creation of a bulwark against the race policies of the Union of South Africa. It was this feature of the Federation, the goal of racial co-operation, which aroused the most attention and speculation. It is fair to say that the achievements of the Federation will be largely judged in terms of its ability to develop democratic parliamentary government in such a manner that its multiracial population can find a common involvement. In any analysis of the future prospects of the Federation, whether the focus be on its ultimate political organization or its future role in Africa, major consideration must therefore be given to the question of race relations and to the political theories put forward for the solution of this problem.[2]

* The author is grateful to the Ford Foundation for a research grant which enabled him to visit British Central Africa in 1955.

[1] See Kenneth Kirkwood, "British Central Africa: Politics Under Federation," The Annals, Vol. 298 (March 1955), pp. 130–41, for a short excellent account of the federation movement and post-Federation political groups and issues.

Characteristics of the Federation

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is not a sovereign state, and yet it markedly differs from a normal British dependency. It has control over its defense, finance, and trade policies —all areas in which dependent British territories lack full authority. Although it does not have equal status with the members of the Commonwealth, it enjoys virtual responsible government, its affairs are the concern of the Commonwealth Relations Office, and its Prime Minister attends the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. Nevertheless, in at least three particular ways, the Federation is constitutionally subordinate to the British government. The first two instances of dependency reflect the unevenness in the constitutional status of the three territorial units. Southern Rhodesia, now described as a "self-governing state," possesses full responsible government which is limited only by the authority of the British government to reserve any legislation which discriminates against Africans. Despite the enactment of a body of law based on the principle of segregation, this veto, exercised on the initiative of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, has never been employed since Southern Rhodesia received self-government in 1923. The two northern territories, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, are protectorates and continue to be administered on behalf of the British government by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Their colonial governments have, however, lost about 60 per cent of their powers to the Federal government. Finally, all Federal government legislation which discriminates against the African in favor of the European, or which seeks to amend the present Constitution, is subject to veto by the British government.

[2] The most recent estimate of the population of the Federation is 7,070,000, of which 234,000 are European and 6,810,000 are African. Figures for the three territories are: Southern Rhodesia: Europeans, 166,000; Africans, 2,220,000; other races, 12,700. Northern Rhodesia: Europeans, 62,000; Africans, 2,060,000; other races, 6,300. Nyasaland: Europeans, 5,600; Africans, 2,530,000; other races, 9,000.

Federal Constitution: Trends and Issues

The Federal Constitution provides that a conference to discuss its revision must be held not later than 1962 nor earlier than 1960. This has not prevented increasing dissatisfaction among European leaders with their present dependent status. Proposals to achieve dominion status and to amend the Constitution in favor of a unitary state are arousing more and more attention in the Federation. It seems logical that the fulfillment of their objectives would have the effect of increasing colonist control and of freeing the Federation from British colonial government in the two northern territories. These ambitions have particular appeal to Europeans in Northern Rhodesia who fear that a future British Labour government might try to accelerate the political advancement of the African. The Federal government appears to recognize, however, that the attainment of dominion status will be markedly influenced by its ability to demonstrate to the British government that African advancement will not be hindered and that African land rights will be protected.

Africans in the northern territories are opposed to these European ambitions. It is not difficult to interpret their opposition, which is rooted in a lack of confidence in the colonists and in an unwillingness to exchange their protectorate status for a vague concept of "partnership." Africans recognize that they are not as yet equipped to participate adequately in the political process of a Central African dominion, and that they need time and opportunity to do so. They have resisted federation for fear of white domination and for fear that social and political progress would be denied. With the increasing strength of their political organizations, they would probably resist more effectively any further constitutional changes which they felt would limit their eventual opportunity of full political participation. If Africans seem to prefer protectorate status, at least for the time being, it is primarily because they feel that it would give them a better chance for ultimate fulfillment of their demands.

Specific dislike of the present constitutional arrangements and proposed changes emanates from roughly four

different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, groups in the Federation: the Federal party, which is in power and which is primarily responsible for Federation; the European opposition parties with their policies of white domination; the African National Congresses, which remain mainly opposed to Federation; and the moderate African and liberal European groups, which stress the need for the implementation of a clearly defined partnership doctrine.

Federal party

The Federal party, having a majority with twenty-three of the twenty-six territorially elected seats of the Assembly, is committed to the political theory of partnership. It was on this platform that they contested the Federation's inaugural election in December 1953,[3] winning approximately 69 per cent of the votes. This political theory, as interpreted by Federal party leaders, is essentially defensive and lacks a precise set of principles. It recognizes the economic integration of the African into the market economy of the Federation, but within the limits of customary racial segregation. To meet the changing economic and political situation in Central Africa, it leans towards practical modifications of Southern Rhodesia's traditional territorial and residential segregation policy. Rejecting rigidity and emphasizing gradualism, the Federal party stresses economic solutions to the problems of race relations. Politically, the Federal party's partnership doctrine recognizes that the African should have greater participation, but that he can never hope to dominate the partnership. "He can," said the Deputy Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, "achieve equal standing, but not go beyond that."[4] This pragmatic policy of partnership does not deny the development of a limited common voters roll, but it lacks definition regarding the eventual place of the African in the political process.

In their statements about constitutional revision and advancement, Federal Cabinet members avoid theoretical arguments and stress proposed changes in terms of increasing governmental efficiency which, if achieved, would consolidate the three territories into a unitary system. Four separate governments for a population of about 7,000,000 is considered to be inefficient in the use of a limited source of personnel and unreal in the division of responsibilities. Sir Roy Welensky advocated last February increasing the Federal Assembly from thirty-five to sixty members.[5] Not only were the constituencies too large, but also the number of members available for cabinet portfolios was restricted to twenty-six. If at the next general election the European Opposition parties return a fair number of members, there would be that many fewer men available to form a government. In the same speech, Sir Roy expressed the hope that Great Britain would not cause unnecessary delays in the attainment of full Commonwealth status. Recognizing the need for a common native policy as a prerequisite for gaining Commonwealth status, the Federal government has already sponsored talks on a civil service level between the three territorial governments,

[3] Of the 35 seats in the Federal Assembly, 9 are reserved for African representatives—one European and two Africans from each of the territorial units. There are 26 ordinary elected members of the non-African races, 14 from Southern Rhodesia, 8 from Northern Rhodesia, and 4 from Nyasaland. In the inaugural election of December 1953, the Federal party won 24, the Confederate party obtained one seat, and one Independent was returned. See Eugene P. Dvorin, "Central Africa's First Federal Election: Background and Issues," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 1954), pp. 369–90.

[4] *The Rhodesian Herald*, March 2, 1956.

[5] *The Rhodesian Herald*, February 13, 1956.

even though African affairs are solely a territorial responsibility.

European Opposition parties

The European Opposition parties repudiate the doctrine of partnership and appeal to the electorate to maintain and extend the principle of white domination. Initially, the Confederate party was the vehicle of this ideology. In the inaugural Federal election it gained over 30 per cent of the vote, but won only one seat in the Federal Assembly. The Opposition support now appears to have increased with the re-election of Mr. G. F. M. Van Eeden in the Kafue constituency, a former Federal party leader who rejected the Federal party partnership doctrine and who won his constituency a second time advocating *apartheid*.[6] His newly formed Commonwealth party incorporates elements from the old Confederate party which lost its leader when Mr. Dendy Young resigned from the Federal Assembly to accept a judgeship to the Southern Rhodesian High Court. Another party which has momentarily emerged is the Dominion party, which combines all the main Opposition groups outside the Commonwealth party. Its leaders have been prominent Opposition members in the two Rhodesian legislatures. Both parties plan to contest future territorial and Federal elections.[7] While the Commonwealth party has a decided policy of partitioning the country into black and white areas, the Dominion party, with a less defined policy, emphasizes separate racial development, the employment of separate electoral rolls for Africans and Europeans, European self-government for Northern Rhodesia, and the early achievement of dominion status for the Federation. While it is difficult to assess the strength of these parties, it can hardly be denied that they present serious difficulties for the development of democratic parliamentary government and political stability in Central Africa. Their rejection of partnership and adoption of the ideology of white supremacy provides little scope for an alternative government within the structure and spirit of the Constitution. Yet the Federal government must give serious consideration to these Opposition groups, for their policies have appeal to many Europeans who fear African advancement.

The two northern territories provide the greatest difficulties in any movement towards dominion status. African leaders state that the protectorates are not conquered territories, but became British protectorates through treaties between their chiefs and peoples and the British Crown. It is argued that the transfer of African affairs and land by the British government to the Federal government or to a territorial unit in an independent Central Africa would be legally difficult without the consent of the African. While this is debatable, African ownership of land is guaranteed not only in the preamble to the Constitution, which may not be legally binding, but also in Orders in Council.

The protected status of the African poses a critical problem for the Federal government, for it is directly linked to the establishment of a Federation citizenship and franchise.[8] In view of

[6] Mr. G. F. M. Van Eeden, as a Federal party candidate, polled 441 votes against 197 registered by the Confederate candidate in December 1953. In the by-election in October 1955, standing as an independent candidate advocating *apartheid*, he polled 560 votes against the Federal party's candidate who advocated partnership. The constituency, however, has a strong Afrikaner vote.

[7] The Federal party, the Commonwealth party, and the Dominion party each have candidates in the April 1956 by-election of Sebakwe constituency.

[8] Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are British protected persons unless they have become British subjects as a result of

their attitudes, it seems unlikely that Africans would agree to a change in status unless they were offered substantial opportunities for political advancement in the Federal and territorial governments.

African National Congresses

In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the heritage of trusteeship runs deep, and the policy of political education which accompanies economic and social advancement differs markedly from that of Southern Rhodesian paternalism. African political consciousness is more developed north of the Zambezi and does not hesitate to challenge the dominant influence of the European colonist. To judge from the statements of the African National Congresses and the recent results in the Nyasaland elections, the African's avowed dislike and distrust of the Federation have not diminished. The African National Congresses seem somewhat ambivalent regarding the continued participation of the four African representatives in the Federal Assembly. It would be fair to say that their continued attendance does not necessarily denote approval of Federation, but rather that they are holding "a watching brief." Both African Congresses have persistently demanded major territorial reform; [9] but it has remained to the Nyasaland African Congress to emphasize firmly that Nyasaland is an African state, should be politically developed as such, and should sever itself from the Federation. This separatist movement is viewed with some alarm by the small European agricultural community of Nyasaland, which has sought to have European agriculture made a Federal responsibility and to have a political status quo imposed. Neither has met with success. On the other hand, the position of the African National Congress has been enhanced by its winning four of the five available African seats in the newly formed territorial legislature.[10] The case for declaring Nyasaland an African state is persuasive, but the economic gains of Federation need to be considered, as they were when the protectorate was included in the Federal scheme. The Federal government, in association with the British government, could conceivably declare Nyasaland to be primarily an African state and still allow it to be a member of the Federation. But it would then be necessary to allow this change to be reflected more and more in the character of its representation in the Federal Assembly. The Federal European representative of Nyasaland Africans recently declared that nothing less will win the confidence of the African in federation.[11]

European liberal and African moderate groups

According to European liberal opinion and what may be called moderate African opinion, the Federal government has not taken decisive steps against racial discrimination and has not defined recognizable goals for the attainment of partnership. This disagreement with the basic inaction of

individual naturalization; Southern Rhodesian Africans are, however, British subjects.

[9] The Northern Rhodesian African National Congress has demanded the extension of the franchise to all British protected persons who have an income of £50 or more a year and the ability to read and write in their native tongue. While willing to accept as a first step separate electorates for Europeans and Africans, and as a second step a common roll with reserved seats for minority interests, they ultimately want a common voters roll with no minority protection.

[10] The Constitution of Nyasaland was revised in 1955. The Legislative Council is now composed of 12 official members and 11 unofficial, of whom 6 are elected from a non-African common roll, while 5 are Africans elected from the Provincial Councils.

[11] *Africa Digest,* Vol. 3, No. 6 (January–February 1956), p. 14.

the Federal government arises from a conviction that partnership cannot be approached primarily through economic development, but must at the same time be accompanied by social and political advancement. Implicit in the dissatisfaction of the moderates is the need to develop a constructive racial policy which can find widespread acceptance among Europeans and Africans, and which will meet the challenge of race politics. In the Federal Assembly these views are supported by the European Representatives of African Interests, the Independent member for Lusaka, and five of the African representatives. In a recent article, Mr. Lawrence Vambe, Chief Editor in the African Newspaper Group, expressed the moderate African opinion when he wrote:

> I expect partnership to mean that, in this great Federation, human values must influence all political, economic and social considerations. We must forge a common citizenship, a common loyalty and a system in which no individual, be he White, Black, Brown or Yellow, is handicapped by reason of his colour, race or creed.[12]

The Federal government, however, rejected in the fall of 1955 the motion of Sir John Moffat for an inquiry into the principles of a united interracial nation. The motion also sought for an inquiry into the parliamentary and electoral system best calculated to serve the Federation in the present period of transition. Sir John argued that without an acceptable partnership policy, the Federation must look forward to having its political parties divided by race alone.

The African representatives of the two northern territories have not hesitated to indicate to the Federal government how they think partnership should be implemented. They have attempted, by means of motions in the Federal Assembly, to end the policy of racial discrimination on the Rhodesia Railways and to gain equal opportunities for all races in the civil service. The desire of the Federal government to encourage and seek immigrant white workers for the railways rather than to train and further employ Africans has met with African and liberal European criticism. Doubt has been raised as to whether the African Affairs Board, designed to protect African interests, has been very effective. The Board is a standing committee of the Federal Assembly and is composed of six Representatives of African Interests. It has the authority to draw attention to any bill which discriminates against the African and to have it reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure. On one occasion it had the wording of a bill altered, but at no other time has its power been invoked. The Board did not, for example, cause the Defence Bill to be reserved. While that bill was undoubtedly discriminatory, its wording did not make this obvious.[13]

PROGRESS IN INTEGRATION

Despite all these considerations, it can be said that some progress has been made towards a firmer interracial basis. The establishment of the Rhodesia University College, which is open to all races, is an encouraging step forward. Southern Rhodesia, despite white extremist opposition, has made minor modifications in its segregation laws by amendment to its Land Apportionment Act. The leadership of its Prime Minister, Mr. Garfield Todd, has been constructively active to an increasing extent in the sphere of African welfare.[14]

[12] Lawrence C. Vambe, "An African's View of the Federation," *Optima,* December 1955, p. 113.

[13] *Africa Digest,* Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1955), p. 19.

[14] Provisions have been made for an African lawyer to have chambers in Salisbury,

One result of federation has been the increased attention given to African affairs in the Southern Rhodesian Assembly, with the transfer of the majority of its responsibilities to the Federal government.

Of immense importance have been the achievements made in African industrial advancement on the Copperbelt, and the possibilities of the eventual elimination of the industrial color bar. The major industrial concerns in the Federation, the copper companies, have been active in this respect. The leading role of the Rhodesian Selection Trust group in these negotiations has also been extended in other areas of African advancement through loans to the territorial governments. In its expressed desire to help redress the unbalanced economy which the copper companies in Northern Rhodesia have been instrumental in creating, it also fostered exploratory investigations into new agricultural potentials in Northern Rhodesia. Through increasing identification with the Federation and a broad view of its duties towards the African, it offers strong support for the Federation and for the practical achievement of partnership.

FEARS OF RACIAL DOMINATION

It would appear that the major difficulty in the development of parliamentary democratic government in the Federation arises from the uncertainty and fear on the part of both Africans and Europeans of political domination by the other in a future sovereign Central African state. This insecurity as to the nature of future political authority contributes to the inability of Europeans and Africans to agree and to adhere to a common political ideology. It encourages racial nationalism and political instability, and fosters suspicions of any proposals for constitutional reform. To provide opportunities for the ideology of partnership to develop, and to mitigate the fears of racial domination, it is necessary to find some interim institutional arrangement which will grant time for confidence to mature and which will permit peaceful political and social change to occur. Such a transitional political arrangement is concerned primarily with the question of representation and the franchise. To be effective it must be acceptable to the majority of the European voters who now hold the initiative for racial co-operation, and must at the same time be accepted by the African to secure his identification with the political process. It needs to take into consideration the social, economic, and political growth of the African population, and to declare a set of common qualifications for the African and European for political participation.

The present system of representation in the legislatures of the two northern territories and in the Federal Assembly fails to provide for the common involvement of the African with the European in the decision-making process. African representation is primarily communal, and while it gives the African a means of voicing his views, it has all the disadvantages of its racial character. In Northern Rhodesia, where the Constitution is more advanced than in Nyasaland, it seems to be less effective because of the dominant influence of the elected Europeans in the legislature and executive. The existence of communal representation in both territories encourages race politics and prohibits the growth of multiracial political parties. With responsible government in the Federal Assembly, special representation for African interests is essentially outside the parliamentary party system. They are unable to exercise effective influence on legislation or to provide an alternative government. While it is possible that they could hold a balance of power if there were a fairly even distribution of seats between the European parties, it would be an invidious system for good government. Only by having the African share a significant part in a common Federal franchise with the European can his participation become effective in a democratic government. At the present time the Federal government must be primarily conscious of the strength of the European Opposition vote advocating white supremacy and not of the vote of the African. There is no African vote from which it can obtain support, except for a few hundred on the Southern Rhodesian common roll and a negligible number in Northern Rhodesia. The question of the franchise, together with the creation of a Federal citizenship, is the most pressing political problem facing the Federation today, and one which government must solve if it is to achieve not merely dominion status but a democratic form of government that would be truly acceptable to the ideology of the Western world.

African trade union recognition has been considered, and African security in urban tenancy has been established.

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Ethiopia Today: A Review of Its Changes and Problems

By Edward C. Jandy

ETHIOPIA is in the eastern horn of Africa. It is about the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined. Approximately one-half the area is a rugged triangular plateau, 6,000 to 9,000 feet high, with its base to the south. The Rift Valley extends northeast across the country from Kenya to the Red Sea. There is a cool area in the northern half of the plateau at 7,500 to 15,000 feet. A temperate to subtropical land, 5,000 to 7,000 feet high, lies to the south, east, and west of the cool area. Hot deserts fringe the north, northeast, and south. The western area slopes gently into the heated Sudan plain.

The People

The population is estimated at 12 to 16 million. Its greatest densities are on the high plateau from Magdala south to Addis Ababa, north of Lake Tana, and in the southwestern lake region. The capital city, Addis Ababa, has a population of about 350,000; the main towns are Harar (45,000), Dessie (36,000), Gore (25,000), and Diredawa (20,000). Ethnically, the people are a mixture of Semitic, Hamitic, and Negro stocks, who speak thirty languages and many dialects. In the northwest are the Amhara and Tigrina peoples who constitute 32 per cent of the total population. They speak a Semitic tongue and are Coptic Christians. The largest ethnic group is the Gallas, 42 per cent, in the south and south central area. They are Hamitic, and are Muslim, pagan, and Copt as to religion. The desert nomads with a goat-and-camel culture are the Somalis (6 per cent) and the Danakil (2 per cent). Both are Hamitic and pagan. The Negroid elements (6.5 per cent) extend on the western fringe from Eritrea to Lake Rudolf.

The foreigners in Ethiopia number about 18,000: Indians, 8,000; Armenians, 750; Greeks, 2,300; Italians, 6,200; and other Europeans, Americans, and Canadians, 750. The Indians control most of the warehouses; Greeks own nearly 90 per cent of the private industries; and the Armenians most of the small shops. The Italians, though expropriated, provide most of the skilled labor.

Standards of Living and Health

Most Ethiopians engage in agricultural or pastoral pursuits. Farming is primitive, simple, and mainly of subsistence variety. Living standards are equally simple, and hence such purchasing power as exists covers mainly food and clothing. Hunger is relatively unknown, but there is malnutrition. Diseases include malaria (endemic below 6,000 feet), typhus and relapsing fever, pneumonia, amoebic dysentery, smallpox, leprosy, yaws, elephantiasis, rabies, and numerous eye diseases. The amount of tuberculosis is unknown, but venereal diseases are estimated as infecting from 50 to 80 per cent of the population. Medical care for the general population is virtually nonexistent. The medical assets of the whole country are: eighty foreign and two Ethiopian doctors; some hundred trained nurses; and forty-one hospitals with 2,425 beds, most of these being located in Shoa and Harar provinces. In addition there are a leprosarium, fifty-eight clinics, several nursing and medical-assistant schools, and one government laboratory for chemicals and research.

The Government

The government is a constitutional monarchy with authority vested in the Emperor, who is also head of the Ethiopian (Coptic) Church. The constitution granted the people in 1931 set up a bicameral legislature, but its function is purely advisory. To aid and advise the Emperor, there is a Crown Council, an extraconstitutional group made up of the *Ichegé* (administrative head of the church), several powerful *rases,* and a few ministers.

Another body is the Council of Ministries, which came into being by a law of 1943. Because this council with its bureaucratic structure and climate is so crucial to the present rate of social change and progress, it needs detailed examination. The ministers are all chosen by the Emperor. Frequently, they have been older men who represented great family names, and all too often, they have known little or nothing about the purposes and functions of a ministry. Some have used their office only for personal enrichment, to such an extent that reports of their venality and greed have reached the palace and required their removal.

There is a consensus of opinion among competent foreign observers that Ethiopian officialdom is, in general, ignorant of the art of government, with little conception of public service and shunning responsibility, yet with a great love of authority and power. Subservience is noticeable, as are the outworn ritual and ceremony that accompany it. Subordinates are at times dealt with ruthlessly. There is but little co-operation or communication among the ministers in areas of mutual interest. Each minister is too conscious of his own prerogatives and dignity to call upon another for anything. To do so would be to lose status and prestige.

The cult of the Emperor is still strong in government and in public life. Its almost religious fervor is glaringly evident in the newspapers, which are filled with repetitious photographs and news of the doings of the imperial family, however trvial and routine, and in the bureaucracy with its strong distaste for individual initiative, decisions, or even the delegating of a modicum of responsibility and authority. Worship of the written paper or document with its numerous rubber stamps is incredible: nothing can be decided, no action taken, without papers, and procrastination thus becomes a fine art. There is a constant trek to the *Gibbi* (palace) for the Emperor's approval of the most trivial and elementary matters. How much of this is encouraged by His Majesty and how much is a traditional hang-over is a question.

Occasionally one will find a vice-minister or director-general with the ability and capacity to get things done. But if the subordinate's ability makes the minister feel insecure in his authority, he may complain to the *Gibbi,* and even though effectiveness on the part of younger men is just what the Emperor wishes to see and encourage, he must often decide in favor of the minister.

The extent to which this kind of bureaucratic atmosphere paralyzes governmental effectiveness and slows the rate of social change and progress is evident. The following excellent summary of this from Margery Perham, in my judgment, would be the opinion of most of the sympathetic foreign observers. She grants that the Emperor has been almost the sole source of a long list of reforms in his country, but adds:

> . . . full mutual understanding and sympathy between the Emperor and his European associates and advisers seem very

rare and many of them have suffered from the subtlety and procrastination of his methods which drive the more ardent first to despair and then to resignation. He, upon his side, seems to have deduced from history and his own experience that no one outside a very small number of his own people can be fully trusted. With regard to Europeans he shows a settled purpose against falling under the influence of any one man, or any one nation.[1]

Attitude of young Ethiopians

What do young Ethiopians feel and think about their country and its officialdom? As Public Affairs Officer, I had ample time and opportunity to observe and talk with them. Every Saturday evening, a group of them came to the Reading Room for lectures that I either gave or arranged. This group was made up of the younger bureaucrats, police officials, teachers, and students.

Most of them were intelligent, ambitious, and eager to learn. Their devotion and loyalty to His Majesty, their high regard for his leadership and progressive ideas were unquestionable. In many ways their thinking reflected the limitations of an underdeveloped country, especially its lack of economic, political, and social freedom, and its subservient deference to authority. It was always easy to get them interested in, and to criticize and discuss, the social problems of any country but their own. Interest they had in their own, but not the freedom to analyze and criticize. Public, or open-group, discussion of religion, politics, and government was forbidden.

Ethiopians have a fierce love of their country without knowing a great deal about it. They are proud and sensitive, though their pride is ill-defined and their sensitivity often reflects the feeling of inferiority resulting from their country's backwardness. They believe firmly in Ethiopia's future, but they are somewhat uncertain as to their own role in it; conscious of the country's inability to develop much on its own, they are somewhat irritated, resentful even, of its need of foreign capital and technical assistance. Thus, in common with officialdom, they were excited by the Point Four program. Like other people of the Near and Far East, they were suspicious of both our generosity and our good intentions, despite any attempt to disarm them.

Over coffee cups, in private conversation, these young men were often bitterly critical of some of the ministers, nor could they understand why the Emperor tolerated officials so manifestly inefficient and corrupt. Especially they resented the fact that it was so often family status or past loyalty to the Emperor that was rewarded. Themselves entangled in the bureaucratic web, they found the lack of freedom to criticize and protest extremely frustrating. They had, however, a surprisingly clear conception of the power line-up in their government, defining it as a struggle between the semifeudal forces of reaction and privilege and those of change and progress.

Like hopeful young men (and women) the world over, they need and want heroes to worship. The Ethiopian culture affords an abundance of symbols of authority, but it has yet to develop a social milieu hospitable to representative men of good will and capacity to work for the common weal.

[1] Margery Perham, *The Government of Ethiopia* (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), Chap. XXII, p. 381.

In addition to this work and those cited in subsequent footnotes, the following books on Ethiopia may be mentioned: David Mathew, *Ethiopia: The Study of a Polity, 1540–1935* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1947); F. Quaranta, *Ethiopia: An Empire in the Making* (1939 [Source of publication unavailable]); Christine Sandford, *Ethiopia Under Haile Selassie* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1946) and *The Lion of Judah Hath Prevailed, Being a Biography of H.I.M. Haile Selassie I* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955).

ITALIAN OCCUPATION

In estimating the Italian impact on Ethiopia during the 1936–41 occupation, we must avoid two extremes—on the one hand, the exaggerated claims of the Italians, and on the other, the denials of the Ethiopians. The record is sufficiently impressive to anyone who knows the country. Such a judgment need not presuppose approval of aggression as an effective instrument of progress.

Italy was determined to exploit its conquest with energy and dispatch, supported by a capital outlay without equal in colonial Africa. Basic to such a plan was a system of roads and communication. The Italians built both. The roads alone were a magnificent achievement. Some 4,300 miles, 2,145 of which were tarred or macadamized, were built at a cost of nearly a quarter billion dollars.

Over and beyond these, any list of assets left behind by Italy would have to include the following: paved streets and numerous residences and villas in all the main cities and towns; administrative buildings; many small factories, such as cement works and tanneries; a few hydroelectric stations; public buildings for police and so forth. In addition, the Italians left a foundation for the further development of Ethiopia's agricultural and industrial economy. They provided the Ethiopian workers with more job opportunities, better wages, and standards of living; they set an example for Ethiopians of modern residential living, with its comforts and conveniences. Moreover, the importation of immense quantities of goods and their frequent display in the shops accustomed Ethiopians to seeing these things and to desiring them for improvement of their own living. Under the Italians, many Ethiopians learned to work and to acquire some skills such as mortaring and bricklaying, garage mechanical work, simple plumbing, and road repair work.

Impressive as is this list of assets, some caution is now necessary. Ethiopia is a large country. Once an observer gets away from the few main cities and off the main roads, the evidences of Italian influence are no longer visible. The occupation was not long enough to leave any appreciable impress on the general culture and society of Ethiopia. Italians had no intention of educating any of the natives, except the children of a few chiefs. Some Ethiopians, especially the young, learned to speak Italian, but for the most part local languages, customs, mores, and institutions were relatively unaffected. English has already become the second language of the country.

THE CHURCH

The unifying influence of the Coptic Church in relation to the throne has continued almost unbroken for fifteen hundred years. The Emperor has always been its recognized head. The Patriarch at Alexandria appointed the Abuna (Father), or Bishop, who was thus a foreigner, and although he could crown a new emperor, he could not himself appoint native bishops. Next to the Abuna was the *Ichegé*, invariably an Ethiopian, "an assistant at the throne," whose power and influence were sometimes even greater than that of the Abuna. Next in the structure were the priests, deacons, and *debteras* (choristers). The number of churches and monastaries in Ethiopia has few parallels anywhere: some 18,000 are spread over the countryside. (Occasionally, one sees a church perched atop a mountain so precipitous as to seem accessible

only to an errant goat!) The number of clergy appears almost incredible, some estimating it at 200,000, or about one male in five of the population!

For centuries, however, the Church has been extremely backward and most travelers in the country characterize its clergy as woefully "superstitious, ignorant, and illiterate." The low state of the clergy reflects the almost static culture. The isolation of the entire country militated against fresh and leavening outside influences' coming in; hence the clergy had no models to emulate. The Church had become ossified and thoroughly insulated against social change.

Even while he was still Regent, the present Emperor was suspected of reformist ideas. He was quite aware of the Church's shortcomings, but he always showed admirable restraint and patience. What he could not do now, he would accomplish when he became its head. Any opportunity for enlightenment of the Church and its clergy, direct or indirect, the Emperor acted upon. He encouraged the publication of an Amharic New Testament and its use in the churches, so that the gospel might go to the people. Later he had the entire Bible translated. In 1944, a theological school was opened in the capital. It offered English and some secular courses. At present, three hundred students are enrolled. The Emperor further encouraged some students to go to Cairo for their theological training, and only three years ago, he himself sent thirteen to Greece for the same purpose.

On several occasions the Emperor had sought the appointment of an Ethiopian Abuna. That a foreigner had always held this high church post irked the Ethiopians. In 1950, after seven years of negotiations, the *Ichegé* went to Alexandria to be consecrated as the first Ethiopian Abuna in fifteen hundred years! The Emperor's tact, patience, and quiet zeal had paid off.

There are other signs of change, many of them very simple, but nonetheless portentous, if projected against the future. After the Italian occupation, missions were allowed to return, to build schools and hospitals, and to hold services. To allay the suspicions of the Coptic clergy, missions were not allowed to proselytize among the Amharas. The Emperor even endeared himself to the Muslims by receiving their leaders at the palace after the Feast of Ramadan. They asked for and received more land for a mosque. In short, the ferment of these modest reforms is already beginning to be felt in the Ethiopian Church.

LAND TENURE PRACTICES AND REFORM

All over the Near and Far East, as well as in Africa, few problems are more crucial for governments than those of land tenure practices and their reform. Ethiopia is no exception. Not only are land practices extremely complex, but they vary from province to province, so that as one authority puts it, "There are seldom two places where the same terms are used for similar description of land tenure." [2]

Most land is unmeasured and unregistered. Boundaries are likely to be natural landmarks. Titles are "carried in the head," though occasionally plots may be registered at a local church. Three principal forms of tenure are fairly general. The peasant cultivator is the *gabar*—the word comes from *gibr,* meaning tribute. He is more often a tenant, though sometimes a freeholder. The *gabar* may have tilled a certain plot for generations without being able to claim ownership.

[2] Nathan Marein, *The Judicial System and the Laws of Ethiopia* (Rev. ed., Rotterdam: Royal Netherlands Printing and Lithography Co., 1951), Chap. VIII, p. 195.

A second form of tenure is the *rest,* which implies hereditary claim. *Rest* land may be held communally by a kinship group, although individual and family holdings are not unusual.

The third tenure is *gult* land—that on which the Emperor has relinquished his right to tribute. For centuries, the tenant farmer supported everybody above him in the class hierarchy: the village chief, the governor and his soldiers, the Church, and even the Emperor. His onerous burden was payment in kind, plus tax to the government, plus services.

Land reform aims at lifting some of this burden off the *gabar* and at creating greater equity and security in tenure. During the past twenty years a few modest reforms have taken place. The ultimate aim is to make taxes payable in money rather than in kind or tribute service. Civil servants are now paid salaries, and the military receive salary, rations, and lodgings so as to obviate their being saddled upon the tenant farmers. Government decrees have strengthened the laws of inheritance on land held for fifteen or more years. Land is being classified and taxed on the basis of its fertility.

Two other stubborn problems still face the government regarding land tenure. Some policy will need to be adopted relating to the vast holdings of land by local churches and monasteries. There is no lack of good land available in Ethiopia, so that at present the problem is not pressing.

The second problem, lands so overgrazed as to be unable to support the large herds that forage them, is a common one in Africa and is difficult because cattle are a symbol of status even more than of wealth. But in Arussi province, east of the capital, Galla herdsmen are being offered land to farm, and some have given up their nomadic culture for a settled life.

The reform of ancient land tenure practices will always meet with resistance from vested interests. More reform must come as better roads and communication, increased commerce, and greater industrialization change the Ethiopian folk culture.

EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS

In the whole institutional complex of modern Ethiopia, nothing is more portentous for change than education. It is not without significance that the portfolio of this ministry is in the Emperor's own hand. In few ministries has there been a more devoted, hard-working group of officials. From 1920 until the occupation (1936–41), educaton came through the Church, missions, and the state. Church education was for priests, who learned only to read in the dead language, Geez. The missions did a much more effective job, but for a limited number only. From this number came a supply of civil servants and a surprising group of outstanding leaders. The state schools were only seventy-five in number over the entire country. They taught in Arabic.

As of 1950, there were five hundred government schools and a hundred church and mission schools. Some 60,000 pupils were enrolled, of whom less than 10 per cent were girls. Coeducation is still new. There are eight secondary schools, of which six are in the capital; one commercial school, two teachers colleges, one technical school, and one college (University College). The teachers in the whole system are about 2,000, 306 of them from the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Egypt, France, Switzerland, and the United States. Some 350 students are abroad for higher education, most of them now in England, Canada, and the United States. More and more are coming to the United States, largely because of the Emperor's pleasant visit here and

the help of our Point Four program support. There are two hundred Ethiopians in the United States and Canada already. The large number sent abroad suggests that the University College in Addis Ababa probably has no more than seventy students.

The development of education in the provinces is spotty, because many communities are isolated and inaccessible to transportation and communication. Budget plays a part, too. The physical plant varies throughout the system from primitive huts and buildings to the most modern buildings with fully equipped laboratories. Naturally, the best schools are in the capital and provincial cities. Only 3 per cent of the total number of children of school age are now in school. The education budget is almost $5,000,000 a year, or about 20 per cent of the gross annual budget for all public services.

Needs and problems

Despite this high percentage, at least fifty years will be required to bring the goal of universal education within sight. To give education proper direction and control its rate of development requires careful planning. For example, the Ministry of Education has already learned that it has more facilities at the higher level than there are students ready to use them.

More emphasis is needed on vocational training and development. Ethiopian youth has yet to learn to work with its hands to any great extent. The country needs more and more skilled workers—carpenters, plumbers, mechanics, builders, bricklayers, and masons. At present, too many still want to be white-collar bureaucrats in the ministries; there is a limit to how many can be absorbed in government. But there is no limit, yet, to the need for the vocationally trained.

Already crucial and even painful problems are showing up in education. The number and quality of teachers are inadequate. In some of the provincial schools, the teachers are frequently in their own training but a few grades above the levels of their own pupils. The training of new teachers is not only slow, but inadequate as well. To complicate matters further, the dropout rate of teachers is almost 5 per cent—a disturbing number. Inadequate salaries and the competition of other government units and of business organizations take their toll. How to replace the dropouts, how to attract more young people to teaching posts, present real difficulties. Many of the teachers show a reluctance to go into the remote provinces. There is likewise a dearth of trained and skilled administrators for the jobs of headmasters and provincial inspectors. Sound curricula and appropriate and adequate teaching materials also need more attention.

Western model

Education, more than any thing else, is bound to accelerate the rate of cultural change. It cannot remain within the confines of the classrooms. What will happen to the old Ethiopian cultural heritage? Consider for a moment some of these facts. From the fourth year on, each Ethiopian youth will learn the English language. Thereafter, it becomes increasingly the main instrument of socialization, thought, and communication. The educational system will be of a Western type—English to a certain extent, but more and more American. All the student's text books will reflect Western civilization—its ideas; its literature, including poetry, novels, and drama; its moral codes and philosophies; and its scientific concepts and values. The child's learning in arts and crafts and even in music will be similarly conditioned. His very character is bound to be affected by the heroes and models placed before him, not only in books, but in the persons of his teachers who themselves reflect Western civilization and outlook.

Furthermore, the Ethiopian youth is being educated in an atmosphere that reflects the institutions and spirit of democracy. His curiosity is aroused about scientific and social problems. He learns to ask questions, to participate and discuss freely. On the playing fields, the students take on the folkways and mores of sportsmanship and fair play. They also acquire the competitive spirit and get a chance for self-assertion and the development of leadership. In short, democratic institutions and practices in education now constitute a milieu within which Ethiopian youth will move and have its being from childhood, through adolescence, and for those who go into higher education, through early man- and womanhood.

The effect of all this educational ferment on the old Ethiopian society and culture will be both profound and disturbing. There is, in fact, something paradoxical in the whole situation. Let us present some questions without trying to answer many of them.

How suitable to Ethiopia's own needs are Western educational models, ideals, and practices? In a country still somewhat backward, with semifeudal cultural overtones, where will the most serious cultural conflicts develop, and how crucial and disturbing will they be? For instance, some Ethiopian young men have already returned from institutions of higher learning abroad. Is there an intelligent policy set by officialdom for their welcome and ready absorption into the various ministries? Are they given opportunities to function commensurate with their abilities, education, and training? How difficult are their own personal problems of readjustment to the backwardness and slower pace of their own country, now that they are home? How many of them become disillusioned, frustrated, resentful? What are their feelings and attitudes toward bureaucratic authority, its manifest incompetence, its gross inefficiency, and its fearful capacity to resist change? What can be done to accelerate the higher education of women to provide suitable and congenial wives for these educated young men?

These are all serious questions, especially in a regime and society still fundamentally authoritarian. For Ethiopia is still a land where political and social freedoms are promissory notes rather than realities; where there is not a single newspaper worthy of the name; where open and free discussion of political and social issues is still forbidden. It will take a lot of able leadership to guide intelligently the transition now beginning, in the interest of all of Ethiopia.

PRESENT STATE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Ethiopia's economy is mainly undeveloped. Agriculture and animal husbandry have been its mainstays, but the hand of science and technology has not yet really touched either. The chief exports are coffee, hides and skins, oilseeds, and cereals. Because of their unrefined quality, however, few of these exports (except perhaps coffee) are able to compete with higher quality goods in the world price market. Attempts have been made by the government to impose higher standards of cleaning and grading, including a proclamation in 1952, but the country lacks organization and skilled personnel for proper marketing. A further obstacle is the prohibitive cost of shipment to the sea. It costs as much to ship hides from the capital by rail to Djibouti as from this port to New York by sea!

A Food and Agriculture Organization survey in 1948 revealed the following distribution of the country's land surface: 1 per cent forest, 5 per cent mountainous (9,000 feet or over), 28 per cent semidesert, and 66 per cent cultivable. Under actual cultivation were some 27,000 square miles, with more than 96,500 square miles used for grazing, yet this was but half the total of cultivable land. There is an average annual rainfall of 40 to 45 inches over the country as a whole.

The chief products exported in 1951 were as follows: [3]

Coffee	303,492[a]
Cattle hides	103,145
Sheepskins	1,832,000
Goatskins	2,333,000
Cereals and pulses	432,206[a]
Oilseeds	225,379[a]

[a] In quintals. One quintal = 100 kg. (220.46 lb.).

Minerals

Ethiopia is alleged to be rich in mineral resources, but they still need to be discovered and exploited. Gold and platinum appear to be more abundant in the south and southwest than public reports indicate.[4] Vast quantities of salt and cement are known to be in the Danakil depression. Low-grade lignite, mica, mercury, copper, sulphur, potash, phosphate, and uranium are evident, but in quantities unknown. Oil prospecting in the Ogaden has been undertaken with high hopes for rich strikes. Thus far, Sinclair Oil has had no success, though geological evidence suggests the presence of oil. What such a discovery would do for the country may be imagined!

Forestry

An FAO forestry expert reports that abundant hardwood forests exist for the country's internal use and possible Middle East export. More study is needed to discover what role overgrazing and burning over of the land would play in any afforestation.

Power and industry

The government both produces and sells electricity. In 1951, the output was about 17.6 million kilowatt hours. Few of the large cities and towns have all they need, and breakdowns of equipment are frequent. Point Four technicians are now building a dam on the Hawash River, less than a hundred miles from Addis Ababa, to step up power output. The Blue Nile at Lake Tana is a vast potential for a more distant development in the future.

As regards the postwar situation and prospects of industry, the State Bank of Ethiopia reports:

> There are approximately 126 manufacturing establishments employing 9,700 workers and having a total capital investment of a little over Eth$32,500,000.[5] An alphabetical listing would include such varied enterprises as manufacture alcohol, beer, bricks and tile, canned tomatoes, cement, cigarettes and tobacco, cotton yarn and sheeting, felt hats, flour, glassware, leather shoes, lumber, electric light and power, soap, vegetable oils, vaccines and serums, wines, wheat paste and biscuits.[6]

A Dutch concern has lately developed a large sugar plantation and refinery with a production capacity of 8,000 tons.

[3] From a report on total products exported, 1945–51, *Economic Conditions and Market Trends*, Vol. 2, No. 11 (May 1952), put out by the State Bank of Ethiopia.

[4] An American mining engineer suggested to the writer in 1952 that over $2,000,000 worth of gold is mined annually, but that at least $10,000,000 could be if scientific mine engineering methods were used.

[5] To convert to U. S. dollars, multiply by .4.

[6] *Economic Conditions and Market Trends* (cited note 3 *supra*), p. 5.

This is one and a half times the country's present use.

Transportation and communications

After a decade of neglect, Ethiopia's 17,890 kilometers of roads are now undergoing repair and reconstruction, made possible by an initial International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan of U.S.$5,000,000. Nine times this amount will be necessary during the next twenty-five years. This program will make for greater development of the country by facilitating internal and external trade. Benefits to health, education, and governmental administration and service are also likely to accrue from improved roads.

Like the roads, the telecommunication system suffered from neglect and even bungling. Another IBRD loan and foreign technicians are modernizing and extending the system. These developments should show favorable effects upon commerce and the unity of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The Franco-Ethiopian railroad (486 miles from Addis Ababa to Djibouti) expended 3 billion francs for rehabilitation and new rolling stock. It has ninety locomotives (wood-burning and diesel) and about nine hundred cars, mostly on a single track. Its traffic load is a half-million tons annually, or three times the prewar volume.

Ethiopian Air Lines, a TWA (Trans World Airlines) subsidiary, since 1946 has been one of the finest (some maintain the finest) in Africa. Ethiopian government owned, but American staffed and operated, it has united the main provinces of Ethiopia and carried freight and passengers regularly to Cairo, Khartoum, Athens, Aden, Nairobi, and even to Karachi. Perhaps no joint operation between the Ethiopian and a foreign government (in this case the United States) has been more efficient, profitable, and generally beneficial than this airline service.

Trade, finance, and investments

In few underdeveloped countries is the present and immediate future outlook more favorable than in Ethiopia. In the past decade this has been made possible by the introduction of a sound and stable currency, better transportation and communication, and improvements in agriculture and marketing. Thus, as of 1952, exports stood at Eth$116.8 million, or triple that of 1945; and imports Eth$73.4 million, or 42 per cent above 1950. Excellent crops, increased building construction, increased commercial activity, all reflect the healthy condition of the economy. The Ethiopian State Bank has played an increasing role in the financial life of the country, both within and externally. It has branched out to a number of provinces.[7] An American has been head of the bank for most of its postwar years. Some forty other Americans are advisers to the Emperor on economic planning, and to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Education, and Finance.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT CLIMATE

Financial authorities abroad regard the Ethiopian economy as not only sound but having a vast potential for development and expansion. The budget of the government appears balanced and its internal and external debts are small and well serviced. However favorable these factors are, the Ethiopian government has yet to create a climate both suitable and encouraging to foreign investors. A government decree of 1950 ostensibly intended to do just this. It provided that (1) new enterprises would

[7] A Comparative Consolidated Balance Sheet is annually published in the Bank's *Economic Conditions and Market Trends*.

be exempt from taxation for the first five years; (2) all capital equipment imported would be duty free; (3) Ethiopian participation would be imposed in new enterprises only when suitable and then in minor degree; and (4) profits could be remitted abroad in foreign currency in fixed relation to capital expended.

Various foreigners—American, Swiss, Greek, Egyptian, and others—have visited the country, were greatly impressed by its economic possibilities, and showed a willingness and readiness to invest even large amounts of capital. There is, however, still too great a divergence between the precept implicit in a decree and the practice of it. Ethiopian officialdom shows little real disposition to grant approval when the chips are down. Such a policy, if continued, will slow the country's rate of economic development and progress to a snail's pace.

Finally, there is no question of Ethiopia's present political stability. The Emperor has given the country sound leadership and guidance. There are no conflicting political parties. Minor tribal disorders in the far south pose no real threat. Eritrea does present some serious problems, inasmuch as this country has been more advanced in some matters than Ethiopia, especially in better and freer journalism.

One moot question among foreign advisers has been the problem of the successor to the throne. Primogeniture has never been followed absolutely in the matter of succession. The Emperor has three sons and numerous grandchildren; his death might lead to considerable confusion were any prolonged dispute over the succession to develop.

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United States Foreign Policy in Africa

By GEORGE V. ALLEN

THE problems confronting United States foreign policy in the vast continent of Africa are at least as varied and manifold as the different stages of evolution of the various countries making up that continent. I would not presume to add to the information about Africa which has been proffered by the specialists in this field in the preceding articles. Instead I believe the most useful contribution I can offer to this symposium is to attempt to place the policy problems confronting the United States in Africa in perspective as we see them—and then to analyze for you briefly and in broad strokes the unique aspects of the problems confronting us in Africa and the basic principles from which we approach their solution.

A responsible foreign policy toward Africa requires of the United States a deep understanding of the aspirations and problems of the individual African countries, both in their relationship with the European powers and in their urge toward self-determination, so that we may lend our good offices and assistance in promoting an orderly progress toward independence and nationhood.

AFRICA IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE

In recent years the principle that the developed countries have a moral obligation to aid the less developed countries, such as those of Africa, has become more and more widely recognized. It is easy to demonstrate that the national self-interests of the developed countries require them to aid the underdeveloped. In a world wherein all countries and continents are becoming next door neighbors, glaring disparities in living standards can produce tensions and animosities easily fanned into conflict. In its postwar policies the United States has been actively pursuing peace by trying to mitigate such tensions. More recently the Soviet Union has begun belatedly to make gestures of co-operation and assistance toward certain underdeveloped countries. While this constitutes an important change in Soviet tactics, it remains to be seen whether the change is consistent with the basic Communist objective of world domination.

All this is highly pertinent to the consideration of African problems. Besides the much-talked-about Soviet offers of economic aid to Egypt and the Czech arms deal with Prime Minister Nasser, the Soviet Union, either directly or indirectly, has recently made overtures to Libya, Ethiopia, and Liberia. What does all this mean? We have long taken it for granted that communism thrived on misery and poverty. Does the Soviet Union really mean to help elevate standards of living? A Soviet official in Geneva recently claimed, I believe, that Russia will spend the equivalent of five billion dollars—at the official rate—outside Soviet Russia. Whatever the amount may be, it will go mostly to Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China of course, but the point is that even the Soviet Union appears to accept the principle that some kind of assistance to less developed countries is in Soviet national interests.

But what about the moral obligation I mentioned earlier? Even the Soviet government can sell the "national interests" line to the long-suffering Russian people. And we can do likewise. But

beyond that, do we have any obligation, particularly towards the African colonies of European powers? Speaking entirely personally, I for one say, "Within reason, yes," simply because we have the strength and resources to do it, and they need it.

COLONIALISM

The terms "imperialism" and "colonialism" can be correctly used to describe a relationship which existed more in the past than at present between the metropolitan powers and their colonies —a relationship which most of the free world powers have already rejected in principle. Hardly a day passes that some further evidence of the passing of colonialism does not appear in the press.

Morocco and Tunisia both obtained their independence last month. A Moroccan government is now operating in Rabat, and an all-Tunisian government in Tunis. This month Tunisia held its first national elections. As for Morocco, the United States has never ceased to recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan and the United States alone has always maintained a diplomatic representative in Tangier.

The United States attitude toward colonialism is known. In the light of our historical origins and our traditions this attitude could hardly be different. But the application of this principle to present-day problems of foreign policy all over the world requires patient understanding and a high sense of responsibility, including regard for the ultimate and basic security interests of the United States. No one but a demagogue would deny that basic advantages were brought to the African territories by European powers. In fact, the impetus toward modern nationhood grew out of African contacts with the liberal thought of Western civilization. Furthermore, in the course of this relationship between the metropolitan powers and the African territories, there grew up interlocking economic relations, the violent disruption of which would seriously weaken both Africa and Europe. A sudden break of these lifelines would create conditions of political and economic instability most harmful to all concerned. It is more largely a question of transforming existing relationships into a co-operative endeavor by which the newly emerging states in Africa can achieve, and *maintain,* their national self-respect and apply in their own way the benefits of their national resources to improving the lot of their own people. A strong, free, and friendly Africa and a strong, free, and friendly Europe are alike extremely important to United States security. We need friendly and co-operative relations with Europe and Africa, just as their own interests require the maintenance of intimate ties with each other.

In Africa our allies are aware of the basic attitude of the United States toward colonialism, but they are equally aware of our intention to follow a responsible policy in working toward an orderly solution of these problems. We can achieve more for the African peoples themselves in that way. Great Britain has publicly announced its policy of helping its territories in Africa toward independence, and its record in Asia gives an earnest of its sincerity. In line with its policy as a responsible power, however, it does not wish to bring about the perhaps greater problems which the granting of immediate independence might precipitate. This is a time when political vacuums are a great danger to world peace.

In North Africa, France, which as I noted above last month recognized the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, is engaged in trying to find a liberal solution to the problem of Algeria. Spain has also recognized the independence of its zone of Morocco, and that country has now the opportunity to become unified. Both Spain and France are engaged in working out arrangements by which the mutual economic benefits derived from their past association with Morocco can be continued in the light of the new relationship. In other areas of Africa, France is also looking toward creating a new relationship with the groups which are gradually developing a higher degree of political consciousness. The Belgians have recently established two universities in the Belgian Congo to meet the educational needs of the Congolese.

NATIONALISM

The United States attitude toward nationalism is not so easily definable. After World War II, when the threat of international communism endangered our security, United States opinion was inclined toward promoting a greater faith in federations in Europe which cut across, and we hoped would eventually obliterate, nationalistic rivalries. But in other areas of the world we recognized the strength of nationalism in resisting the threat of international communism. Communism has often cynically exploited the passions of revolt for the sole purpose of creating unrest, chaos, and revolution, so that a small organized minority might seize power and permanently bury the instincts of healthy nationalism under the requirements of blind and absolute obedience to Moscow. This issue assumes a special importance in Africa, where the varying degrees of political experience, the large amount of illiteracy, and the insecurity of the individual in the process of exchanging his old loyalties for new ones make the population particularly vulnerable to exploitation of this issue by unprincipled demagogues.

Again the principle of understanding and responsibility in the conduct of foreign relations should guide us and other nations in relations with the countries of Africa, so that the elements of nationalism which contribute toward genuine independence and stability will be encouraged and those which tend to be purely negative, anarchic, and disruptive be curbed.

RACIALISM

In the light of experience which the United States is undergoing domestically in developing harmonious race relations, I think it behooves us to approach the problem of race elsewhere in the world in all humility. Relations between people of different races living together in multiracial states involve deep-seated emotions and prejudices which can be overcome only gradually. The principle for which the United States stands and is known throughout the world is perfectly clear: it is embodied in our Constitution and in our Bill of Rights. But it is equally clear that the application of either force or oppression can only exacerbate the issue.

The vast continent of Africa illustrates this problem in all its facets, from countries in which the intermingling of races on an equal basis has become an accepted and unquestioned fact to countries in which an attempt is being made to legislate segregation down to its last consequence. The problem is infinitely complicated in Africa by the presence of a few groups (some colonial administrators and industrialists) who wield political and economic power, but who are not otherwise identified with the country and people among whom they live. This tends to confuse the issue of racialism with questions of political, economic, social, and cultural discrimination and makes the approach to a solution of the problem more difficult by making it virtually impossible to isolate the issue from all the other problems.

Again it behooves us, while preserving our adherence to our own basic principle of racial equality, to attempt to exert a moderating influence upon the extremists of both sides and to oppose those who are exploiting these tensions for ulterior purposes.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the problems of foreign policy which confront the United States on the continent of Africa are extremely diverse, there is a unifying factor in this diversity: the entire continent is undergoing simultaneously, even if in varying degrees, a transformation along political, economic, sociological, and racial lines. The substitution of new ties for old tribal or family relationships in order to assure security for the individual, the exchange of old values for new ones in the attempt to obtain social and economic status, the growing desire for political self-expression, and the need for developing new approaches to produce stability in multiracial groups devoted to common economic and political goals —all these combine to create a condition of ferment and potential progress which is a real challenge to American diplomacy. The United States, as a nation, has no selfish interests in Africa except the preservation of our own security and the fulfillment of our moral obligations as a great power and a good people. Because of our origins and traditions, we are basically in sympathy with the desire of independence and nationhood of the emerging states, but we are also friends and allies of the powers who must help to shape this new status. This places us in a position from which we hope and believe our influence can be exerted to make the transformation of Africa a process of orderly evolution and not one of violent revolution.

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A View of Africa

By FRANCES P. BOLTON

YOU have been hearing from people who know Africa far better than I; many of them have spent years there and in those years have made their particular contributions to the Africa of the future. I hesitate to speak, for my journey in Africa was short, and my assignment was long—over long. Yet the reactions to a first exposure to Africa may not be altogether amiss.

Perhaps I had best begin by telling why I came to make this long trip and how. Long a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa, I was in 1953 appointed a delegate to the eighth General Assembly of the United Nations and served on the Fourth Committee, concerned with trusteeship and non-self-governing territories. This was almost prophetic, for all the problems of Africa were literally dumped into my lap. The seed of desire was planted so well that when it was evident, early last summer, that Congress would adjourn in August, I began making my plans. Then I found that no one on my Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa felt that he could be away until well into December. But I realized at once that I must find professionals who, each in his own field, would give weight and substance to the picture.

With the help of the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, Mr. James P. Richards, I secured a photographer from the Signal Corps, and a Defense Transportation Officer who had lived out there for some years, working for a shipping company, and who had served some of his military years building airfields there. Through the Medical Division of the Foreign Service I learned of a physician who had had five years in Peru; I was fortunate in securing his release. So our little company of four was well equipped to bring back at least thoughtful observations and impressions.

In spite of our being on an official trip, we were able to go about it very simply—fortunately, as I wanted to meet as many people in as many areas of living as possible. Without the friendly understanding and gracious help of the many in top government positions and the countless numbers of just everyday people who gave so generously of their time and ideas, I could not have experienced so much in so short a time. To them all I feel a deep sense of gratitude and wish it were possible for me to express adequately my thanks and appreciation. I deeply appreciate the patience with which the three young men who were with me put up with me, and the extent of their contribution.

SCOPE OF THE TRIP

Our all-too-short three months south and east of the Sahara was by way of being a marvelous adventure and I was happy that it came not out of the taxpayers' pockets, but out of mine. Through the use of commercial air travel, trains, boats, cars, and jeeps, we went to twenty-four countries and territories, stopping to see every United States Consulate, Embassy, and Liaison Officer in the area, talking with such heads of nations as President Tubman of Liberia, Sir Arden-Clarke, Governor of the Gold Coast, and his Prime Minister Dr. Nkrumah; Prime Minister

Strijdom in South Africa, His Imperial Highness Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, and several of his Ministers, and many consecrated missionaries all along the way in addition to so, so many just people—men and women in Africa, facing an unknown future.

BACKGROUND GEOGRAPHY

If you will permit me, I should like to give you a slight picture of Africa as background for what I want to say, certain aspects of this great continent—just reminders of what so many of you know a great deal better than I. One forgets that, geologically, Africa is one of the oldest of all the continents, its coastline worn smooth by millions of years of pounding seas, leaving it few harbors. Most of Africa can be visualized as a vast plateau, some three thousand feet high, with an escarpment dropping abruptly to the sea. A large part of the high land has been washed clean of fertile soil. Because of this escarpment the rivers are not highways to or from the sea; rather they are barriers. The vast expanses of wasteland, infertile to a degree, and the extensive areas of marshland, give little encouragement to human beings, nor is life much easier in the area where rains are seasonal and torrential. Another effective natural barrier is the insect and marine life; the mosquitoes that carry malaria and yellow fever, the tsetse flies that carry sleeping sickness, the snails that serve as a temporary hospital to a parasite that causes all kinds of diseases, including blindness. It is not difficult to understand why only the hardy and the daring risked their lives to enter, nor is it difficult to understand how it has come about that the African has been cut off from his brother.

Yes, Africa is a country of great extremes and many emotions. Of pygmies and men seven feet tall. Even the climate runs the gamut from driest desert to tropical rain forests, from snow-capped Kilimanjaro practically astride the Equator to the great basin of the Congo—and, in addition, in certain marvelously beautiful areas a temperate climate unsurpassed anywhere.

One can readily understand why for so many centuries Africa was "a coast line but not a continent." One can appreciate why well into the nineteenth century there was so little accurate information to be had, and why even today not too much is available. In searching for information, one is reminded of the four lines written by Jonathan Swift:

> So geographers, in Afric maps,
> With savage pictures fill their gaps,
> And o'er unhabitable downs
> Place elephants for want of towns.

NEW DAY

But those days are over. Modern inventions, highways, and airfields, big and little, begin to find their way, even into the jungles. Railroads are being built, work is under way to develop hydroelectric power, the attack on disease is slowly but surely winning the battle for health. Education is being made increasingly possible. Today's Africa has come a long, long way since yesterday.

Those of you who have been to Africa know something of its vastness, its insensibility. You have felt its mystery, you have been stirred by its almost incredible possibilities. You have, perhaps, found your own emotions shaken, as never before, by the power, the force, that seems to well up out of the very earth. You have been faced with the reality of Africa's awakening. It is as if a great giant stirred for the first time in many centuries, stretching himself, opening his gentle eyes upon an unknown and very disturbing world. Perhaps you, too, have found your own world somewhat shaken by direct contact with this awakening, and all it can mean to the future of mankind.

ESPECIALLY PEOPLE

It was that Africa of contrasts that we saw: its jungles and deserts, its granite mountains, its indescribable beauty, its cruelty, its ruthlessness; and we glimpsed its vast wealth, its unbelievable possibilities. But especially we saw the people: Indians, Lebanese, Syrians, and above all Africans, whose awakening will have such a bearing upon the future of the world.

We were told over and over again that there was no use trying to give an African any degree of authority, yet we saw many who were high in factory management, some managing successfully their own plantations and businesses. After watching many hundreds of girls undergoing meticulous hand training in nursing techniques with no opportunity for advancement, we came to a hospital where an American ran multiracial medical and nursing schools. There all the nurses but one were African! We saw many Africans relegated to inferior roles in their communities but we met also many in important positions because their true intellect and capacity had been recognized and their talents developed by wise leaders.

Their achievements are the more remarkable when one realizes the primitive background from which many of them have sprung. They start so far back and have so far to travel! It should not surprise us, therefore, to see an occasional regression among them—rather should we marvel that there are not more. Their eagerness to learn breaks one's heart. Increasingly prevalent among African men who have had education is the belief that only as their women can be brought out of tribal, traditional ignorance and given education can they hope to hold their hard-earned level of attainment.

Surely if we are to further Africa's development we must proceed on the understanding that the African has the latent ability to become a responsible citizen and a contributor to life.

Disease and malnutrition

Perhaps the greatest hazard of all in Africa is health. The number of decimating diseases is impossible to describe; the extent of malnutrition is appalling. Among the rural people malnutrition is the rule. Often it is due to lack of food, but sometimes superstition and taboo play their parts, too. For instance, one sees fields of cattle, which, to our American eyes, mean milk and meat, but not in Africa where a man counts his wealth by his cattle, so of course he does not slaughter them. In one area, however, there is an age-old custom of inserting something like a porcupine quill into the neck of the animal, getting the blood, cooking it with their basic millet or manioc, and eating it. But, by and large, the protein lack is very tragic. Kwashiorkor, the protein-deficiency disease, is common. Unless taken care of early, it causes a mortality of from 20 to 80 per cent. We saw little children, their color changed to a reddish hue, their hair going gray and losing its curl, lying limply in their mothers' arms. One hopes for the education which will bring new life, new strength, new health to the people in that vast continent so filled with raw materials that all the world needs, so pregnant with possibilities for its well over 150 million people—200 million, one sometimes reads. It is indeed well named "the Continent that God has held in reserve"; a land where we of the West

must demonstrate our belief in man as part of the being of God, as we have never demonstrated it before.

COLONIAL POLICY

Thanks to the great courtesy of the Washington representatives of the metropolitan countries in alerting the various government heads, we were made very welcome and were given opportunity to study what the European countries are doing in their separate areas—what they are feeling the moral need to do. Unfortunately, we could not go to Spanish Africa, but we were able to visit the French, Portuguese, Belgian, and British areas. Thanks again to our many gracious hosts, it was made possible for us to see and feel what it is they are doing and trying to do. All four countries are, most definitely, trying to raise the standard of living of the people for whom they are responsible. It is a far cry from the horrors of Leopoldian slavery in the Belgian Congo to the general school system of today, beginning with primary education and now reaching university level—from slave labor to well-paid, well-housed employees. It was good to see the tremendous housing programs everywhere, the hospitals, the dispensaries, the clinics, and the maternity homes, and, of course, in every country, the missions, both Catholic and Protestant, which have been responsible for a great deal of the education and the staffing of the health work. It seemed to us that each country had its own special methods, its own program, but all were moving along roads that will increase development and techniques.

French Africa

Technically the French consider the French Africans as French citizens. The Africans elect their own representatives to the Paris government; they have equal standing with the French deputies and senators. Socially, there is a tendency toward color separation, but it is not at all rigid. We had several dinners with mixed groups where there was no embarrassment, no difficulty at all.

Portuguese Africa

The Portuguese consider their African territories an integral part of Portugal, where there is no color bar, nor any attempt at separation. By an interesting legal process a native, after proving himself literate in Portuguese, a Christian, and financially responsible, may become an *assimilado*.

Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi

The Belgian Congo and the trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi are governed directly from Brussels. Local representation is virtually nonexistent. Somewhat in compensation, however, the Belgians have been expanding programs for education, health, social welfare, and economic advancement. They are attempting to educate the masses rather than to take a few of the more intelligent and give them special opportunities.

We participated at the opening of the first university college in Léopoldville, and were told that a second, more technical, university college is being built in Elisabethville. They, too, have a system whereby an African can evolve into a Belgian.

British Africa

Britain seems to have faced the inevitable—that Africans are going to take over—and is attempting to train as many as possible in methods of government, appointing them to actual positions to give "on-the-job" experience. Especially is this true in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, where the anticipation of like treatment in the near future is mounting. In the Gold Coast the Prime Minister faces serious opposition from the powerful Ashanti, who do not propose to abandon their traditional tribal power. Who can prophesy the outcome? Yet if this anticipated freedom should mean a return to tribal wars, it would be tragic for all of Africa. I believe everyone in the Gold Coast is aware of that. They know that all Africa is watching them closely and that much hangs in the balance.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is moving more into the field of common responsibility and common work. It is here that the Capricorn Society is trying to bring the races together for mutual benefit. You can well imagine that there are many problems which must be worked out before the separate provinces really become one well-functioning federation, but also it is here that we Americans can give our know-how, to an extent possible in few other areas.

Kenya is far from being out of its Mau Mau troubles. I spent the night in the very heart of the Mau Mau country in a charming little house, whose windows were covered with barbed wire, with rockets ready to go off at the touch of a cord on its roof and my host and hostess never without a gun. Yet, bit by bit, the many Kikuyu under suspicion in the prison camps are being released.

Metropolitan efforts

Yes, three months is all too short a time to spend in Africa. But during those fall and early winter months, we saw the tremendous efforts being made by the metropolitan countries to raise the living standards of the many millions for whom they have taken the responsibility. Not only do they pour their gold into these areas, but their young men and young women are giving of themselves, unstintingly, as doctors, nurses, teachers, missionaries, to cure disease, to do away with bad living conditions, to build a new Africa.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

And beautiful South Africa, so rich, so full of misunderstanding and fear. Everywhere there is the cloud of anger, of indignation, too well known to be discussed here. Yet because it moved me so deeply, I must mention a development of the *apartheid* policy that has come about recently—the black-sashed women, these sober, unemotional-seeming women, who have as their emblem black sashes of mourning, who daily stand in a double row at the entrance of the Parliament building, with their heads bowed in prayer as government officers and ministers pass between them. On Constitution Day they march in long columns through the streets of South Africa's five large cities, praying silently that the conscience of the Parliament be awakened and the Constitution restored.

But much is being done in South Africa in the war against disease. Education is a complicated and expensive matter, for there are four separate school systems: the white, the Colored, the Indian, and the African.

One cannot but be impressed with the sincerity of the opposing points of view. Indeed, one weeps with each. Certainly no one can prophesy what the results will be. One can but hope that God, in his mercy, will find a way to bring about understanding and peace in that beautiful country.

ETHIOPIA

Most of the countries of Africa are still dependencies of one kind and another, where freedom is as yet only a dream. But we went also to Ethiopia, where His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie has recently accepted a new constitution, which will build a more democratic government that, as the years pass, will be taken over more and more by the people.

LIBERIA

In the free Republic of Liberia we found a nation beginning to take up its own destiny. There is no metropole to teach them the way, but this way they are determined to find. The Firestone Rubber Plantation and the smaller, but no less successful, privately-owned plantations provide an ever increasing income. To this has been added the Liberia Mining Company's Bomi Hills Mine with its fabulous iron ore, and soon, in five or six years, the Goodrich Rubber Plantation will have come into production. A labor problem may result, but Liberia feels equal to whatever comes. There should be better days ahead for the Republic of Liberia.

We have some projects there; we help with the schools where teachers will be trained; we help to find personnel for the School of Nursing and to do all we can to speed them on their way.

AFRICA AND THE U. S.

But what of America? What part will Africa play in our future? Does Africa have anything we need? Otherwise, you know, some day they may say, "Thanks very much; we are grateful for what you have done, but we want a two-way street."

I have spoken of the fabulous wealth of Africa, her cobalt, copper, gold, diamonds, rubber, cocoa, coffee—all the raw materials of inestimable value to us. I have not spoken much of the vast market she will be, as her people move into tomorrow's world. Just let your imaginations play with that a while! The women over there pound their manioc four and five hours a day. Think what it would mean if they had a little machine to do it for them! Some of the men say it would give them too much idle time! But we shall have to find a way to compete with the lower prices of the world markets; prices that the African can pay. To do so is not simple, but a solution must be found for this very real problem. Surely there must be a way by which our need of their raw materials can be balanced against their need of what we have.

Perhaps there is a still more important area in which we must improve, the area of the human mind and heart. We must come to an understanding of the heart and of the mind that we may establish confidence, for without confidence there can never be mutual esteem or lasting friendship.

It seems to me that the first thing for us to do, and we must do it now, is to understand better the dreams and the hopes and the fears that are welling up in every corner of that tremendous continent. If we are to be useful as evolution proceeds over there, we must find roads hitherto undiscovered across the bridges of time and space.

We must remember always that this is not a moment for us to attempt to impose our methods upon the African. He wants our know-how; he wants roads, dams, and power, but the time is past when he will rest content with being told what to do and how to live, as we of the West have been too prone to tell him. Africa is a mysterious continent, rich in raw materials and potentials, and we have gone over there, we Westerners, rather ruthlessly, to get rather than to give. Now we must turn in a different direction. We must make it come from our hearts.

Awakening to hope

What I should like to leave with you is that there is a terrific force in Africa that is being born, a tremendous urge. It has been called "nationalism." It is that, but it is deeper than that. It is a desire to be part of the world as it is going to be. It is something that is irrepressible, something that is new to the African. It is not so new to some of the whites who live there, some of the Lebanese, some of the Syrians, some of the Indians, but it is new to those people who have been, perhaps we might call it sleeping, but who are now awake. There is no telling what their influence is going to be in the world of tomorrow.

And what of this war that is going on between those who believe in God and those who deny God? The African, of himself, is deeply religious. He wants to be on the side of those who believe in God and who live by his laws. I think that all we have to do, and I say it simply—too simply, perhaps—is to make them confident that we believe in a God who considers them part of his very being. If they can believe that, if they can feel beyond a doubt that we honestly feel them to be our brothers and our sisters, I do not believe any ideology or any representative of any other way of life can get between them and us. What they want to be certain of is what they instinctively feel—that all men are of one family, the children of one Father. They dream that their children may be well, may grow up in decent homes, play, study, find work they can do, and take their part in building their own nation.

Yes, we have a moral responsibility, a very great one, because here in America we have a freedom that does not exist in the same way anywhere else in the world.

Nor shall we be doing all the giving, for Africa has much to give. She must cope with the tragedies of poverty, ignorance, disease, but there is a quality in the African that the world needs: there is rare adaptability, a capacity of quick comprehension, an eagerness and a hunger to learn, to know, to do, that is both stimulating and challenging.

Africa, a continent of contrasts, and above all a continent of new life, new faith, new hope.

Frances P. Bolton, LL.D., L.H.D., Washington, D. C., has been United States Congressman since 1940. She has served for fifteen years on the House Committee in Foreign Affairs and for ten years (since its creation) on the Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa, at different times both as chairman and ranking member. In 1953 she was appointed a delegate to the eighth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the first woman so to represent the Congress of the United States, and served on the Fourth Committee, concerned with trusteeship and the non-self-governing territories. In the summer and autumn of 1955, as ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa, she made the trip to Africa which the article describes.

Book Department

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AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

H. C. JACKSON. *Behind the Modern Sudan.* Pp. xv, 227. London: Macmillan and Company, 1955. (Distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York.) $4.75.

Behind the Modern Sudan is a very readable story of the developments which have made possible the Sudan of today. The author, H. C. Jackson, spent most of his life in the Sudan; he saw it change from an almost impenetrable area, separated by natural and tribal barriers, into a relatively peaceful state. A dilapidated motor car can now travel as a bus or taxi, from one end of the Sudan to the other, carrying within it the peoples of different tribal origins who previously preyed upon each other across natural boundaries or shifting battle lines. The earlier battle cries, in the main, have changed to the present musical Arabic greeting, "Peace be unto you."

This vast change did not come about, however, without a great amount of suffering and a great deal of persistent courage combined with an unshaken faith in a primitive people. It was chiefly the British who organized and brought into being the present governmental system in the Sudan. Mr. Jackson saw many of his intimate companions lose their lives in this endeavor, alone and far from home. He has recorded a total of 1,080 British graves in the Sudan as mute testimony of the sacrifice which this progress did entail.

The Sudan falls into two general divisions, the Arabic speaking north and the Negro, or Negroid, south. Almost inseparably connected with these is Egypt, which lies still farther to the north. The long record of relationships between the Sudan and Egypt varies from co-operation to enslavement.

The book is written with a keen sense of appreciation for the values of the Sudanese people. The author has had the ability to endure and to relate experiences of tremendous hardship with a continuing and active sense of humor. Consequently, as he depicts what lies behind the modern Sudan, he continuously brings to the fore the humorous incidents which were tied in with the business of trying to organize, civilize, and teach modern government practices to a very interesting and lovable people.

Naturally, the book is written from the viewpoint of a colonial officer. Moreover, it is written from the standpoint of the British. He quotes the words of various Sudanese, who say they do not wish to see the *Inglisi* (English) leave the Sudan. This type of testimony always is to be received with some question, since it is usually spoken to an *Inglisi,* not to another Sudanese. Mr. Jackson is convinced that if the governing of the Sudan could be left to the Sudanese, it would be a good and a just step, but if it is left to the Egyptians and the Sudanese jointly, it will very likely place the Sudanese under the very strict and unsympathetic overlordship of the Egyptians within a short time. He quotes Sir Harold MacMichael in *The Sudan,* "Egypt has been the bane of the Sudan for more than a century."

The book is well written. It is fascinating throughout. It will be more palatable to the Sudanese than to the Egyptians.

Since the book has been written, the events transpiring in Egypt and the Sudan seem to indicate the correctness of Mr. Jackson's fears and predictions for the Sudan once the British forces had been withdrawn.

DESMOND W. BITTINGER
McPherson College

A. LESLIE BANKS (Ed.). *The Development of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries, With Particular Reference to Africa.* Pp. xvi, 217. London: Edward Arnold, 1954. (Distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York.) $3.75.

This is a 200 page report of the proceedings of an informal four-day seminar on the development of Africa held in July 1953 at Caius College, Cambridge, England. Thirty-two invited guests including members of the faculties of Cambridge, London, and Manchester Universities, as well as a sprinkling of active and retired colonial administrators and representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation, participated. A majority had had experience in some phase of African life, and the others were specialists in one or another of the subjects under discussion.

It may have been unavoidable, in that "the conference was made possible by a generous grant of the Rockefeller Foundation," that there should be throughout the discussions a subtle appeal for funds from abroad (preferably Rockefeller Foundation funds) to finance the possible improvements indicated.

The discussions cover problems such as: power and water; food production; health, welfare, and education; and a concluding chapter on "Possible Lines of Action." The vexing problems of Colonial administration, race relations, and Native self-expression in government which bulk largely in the current interest of native Africa come in for only incidental mention.

The report necessarily shares a weakness common to all conference reports, viz.: the lack of integration, direction, and focus. It is extremely difficult to deal with the problems of 200 million people scattered over an area larger than U.S.A., China, India, and Europe combined. The problems discussed can only be a sample of highly complex problems of a vast heterogeneity of groups. Even the suggestions offered at the implementation session were vague and general, captioned "possible lines of action."

There can be no quarrel with such aims for Africa as improving the soil fertility, improving agricultural techniques, reducing endemic and epidemic diseases, balancing production and reproduction, improving the systems of communication. These are among the aims of every people in the world, however advanced or retarded their culture. The significance lies in the particularistic application of these suggested improvements to each local African group. This requires a pinpointed rather than a shotgun approach, especially when one remembers that there are 100 different languages in Tanganyika alone and 200 among the peoples of the Congo, each representing a variation in traditions, usages, environment, climate, and general culture.

The last session of the conference was given over to a discussion of "the possible lines of action." The chairman asked two questions of each delegate: if you had the money what would you do and what would you do first?

The answers vary with the particular interest of each delegate. Apparently nobody's mind had been changed during the four days of conferring. The suggestions for expenditures range by easy gradation from endowing a native African university to improving the health of men and animals and include: research, correlation of effort, industrialization, transport, trade and storage, land reclamation, food production, population control, modifying family patterns, establishing small-scale industries, and the improvement of communication. Throughout the session there runs a wist-

ful, idealistic (and one suspects) messianic hope for more millions to improve the lot of the African.

If the report has value to the lay reader interested in Africa, it lies in the cataloguing of the problems of those working with the African in their attempt to improve his culture. Most of the general problems are indicated in one context or another.

CHARLES W. COULTER

Dade City, Fla.

JOHN GUNTHER. *Inside Africa.* Pp. xxiii, 952. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. $6.00.

This latest of the "Inside . . ." books is also John Gunther's best. He has managed to flood more than nine hundred pages with the milk of human kindness. Not once does he let his reader forget that, in spite of its vast herds and fields and mineral wealth, the greatest resource of Africa lies in its manpower. The tragic waste of this manpower forms the basic preoccupation of *Inside Africa.* Just as *Inside Europe* was inspired by Mr. Gunther's strong rejection of totalitarianism in all its forms, so the present volume has been inspired by his premonition of catastrophe through the collision of imperialism with the growing need for self-expression and even self-government among the Africans.

Africa is the richest prize on earth, yet except for a few local garrisons, a few naval bases, and the air fields which America is building more with an eye for the defense of the Western Hemisphere than for Africa itself, this vast continent is defenseless. The author concedes that Africa is not high on the Soviet list of priorities at present, but his book was written before the full impact of the Bandung Conference could be appraised, before new Soviet military agreements with Egypt, and before new Soviet diplomatic missions like the Embassy at Monrovia were established. Africa is perhaps entering a period when new imperialism may threaten the old.

As to this threat of communism, Mr. Gunther inclines toward the conviction that having had more than enough of one set of imperialisms, few Africans want to become subject to another. He adds that Russia is as remote from Africa as the concept of communism itself is remote from most Africans. Although industries are springing up and mining employs more and more laborers, the African industrial proletariat is scant and hard for Moscow to reach. Poverty in the bush is not as grave a problem as poverty in the great industrial centers and cities about which Marx wrote. Mr. Gunther demonstrates that just as most Africans do not have to work to eat, so too most Africans find communism promises them nothing new. The author indicates that there is nothing dangerous about the red threat which could not be removed by education, political democracy, and reform.

Part of the impact of *Inside Africa* lies in the good will with which Mr. Gunther has set about hunting for things to reform. He has not had to look long. The book bristles with indignation and with the warning that certain groups in Africa, like the 5,000 Indians in Southern Rhodesia, could not be much worse off than they are. The plight of colored or mixed offspring is so poignant that the author quotes one man, "whose daughter is almost white," as stating that he will give her the best education possible, "and then plead with her to get out of this country forever and forget us." The infamous system of Africans being forced to buy from a store through hatches in the wall, of being subjected to racial discriminations "among the most barbarous, shameful, and disgusting in the world," makes Mr. Gunther fear for the moment when inevitable readjustments take place. He even despairs of education when at a Native purchase area near Salisbury he visits a school where the squalor and "the sheer inhuman primitiveness" were bad enough, but "what really hurt was that our white escort, a senior government official, refused ostentatiously to shake hands with the perfectly decent, prefectly respectable, and perfectly humble black schoolmaster."

WILLIAM L. SMYSER

Elkins Park, Pa.

H. WOOD JARVIS with assistance from WALTER W. SKEAT. *Pharaoh to Farouk.* Pp. viii, 299. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. $4.50.

In brief and succinct fashion, the author attempts to tell the story of Egypt from the most ancient of days to the downfall of King Farouk in July 1952 and the establishment of the Egyptian Republic. Briefly the volume moves in broad sweep through great achievements of the ancient Pharaohs down to the period of Cleopatra and the coming of the Romans, thence to the coming of the Arabs, Mamelukes, and the Osmanlis, and down to the "transit of Napoleon Bonaparte" in Egypt and his eclipse. The latter part of the book is devoted, perhaps properly, to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in view of the author's primary interest in the development of "modern Egypt." There is a cursory account of Mohammed Ali, for instance, and the rough foundations which the Albanian laid for the Egypt of today, both in a dynastic and in a broader sense, and an equally cursory account of the building of the Suez Canal under the inspiration and leadership of Ferdinand de Lesseps, with all that that waterway was to mean both to Egypt and the world. The last chapters tell the story of the British occupation, beginning in 1881, and administration of Egypt, and the names of those who played so great a role in the valley of the Nile: Gordon, Kitchener, Cromer, and a host of others parade before the reader. Ultimately, as Mr. Jarvis points out, came the period of Egyptian independence beginning in 1922 and culminating in 1936, and finally the end of the monarchy and the advent of a republican form of government, first under General Naguib and later under Premier Nasser. The story is told from a pronounced British point of view, but with a broad familiarity with the Egyptian scene and history.

This is a useful work and very well written, although it is by no means based on profound research at any one point in the history of Egypt. Nor does the author's account, either of Egypt's past or its present, rest on a broad or deep analysis of the social or economic factors involved in the evolution of the country. Although annotated, there is no bibliography. The historical panorama is painted with bold strokes even if it is lacking in depth.

HARRY N. HOWARD

Arlington, Va.

MELFORD E. SPIRO. *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia.* Pp. xii, 266. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $4.50.

The modern co-operative community that developed in connection with the Zionist resettlement in Palestine continues to exert its attraction as an object of study for social scientists. Known originally by the Hebrew name of *Kvutza* or "group," but generally identified today as *Kibbutz,* which approximates the English "assembly," it applies the most extreme type of comprehensive co-operation to all spheres of life—to consumption as well as to production, to leisure activities and education, to administration and management. It does so not so much because of an intention to demonstrate the truth of a specific political, ideological, economic, or social tenet but, essentially, because in the circumstances out of which it originated extreme co-operation offered the only practicable way for survival. At the given time, no viable alternative appeared to exist to this way of life; and the resort to it was facilitated by certain convictions, that still prevail, with regard to the relation between individual and society. A quotation from a *Kibbutz* statement of principle offered by the author indicates the nature of these conditions: "The strength of the Kibbutz," we read, "lies in its essential social nature which strives for the complete harmony of the individual and the group in every sphere of life, for the maximum development of each individual . . . and for the constant deepening of human ethical relations" (p. 10).

As he states in the Preface, Mr. Spiro's own interest in the *Kibbutz* was prompted by his desire "to explore, in a modern society, the nascent and barely formulated notions concerning cooperation and aggression" he had derived from his anthropological studies among the "cooperative people of Ifaluk, an atoll in the Central Carolines in Micronesia" (p. 7). In true anthropological field-study fashion he subsequently spent, as an active "participant observer," the better part of a year, from February to December 1951, in one of the *Kibbutzim* whose true name he disguises under the fictitious one of Kiryat Yedidim. The result is a description of the social, economic, and "political" structure and of

the life in the *Kibbutz* that, although it adds little that is new, deserves credit for its vividness, lucidity, and readability.

It is the more regrettable, therefore, that the author in his attempt at a proper classification of the *Kibbutz* falls back on some quite antiquated notions. As described above the *Kibbutz* like all "normal" society grew out of the basic need for survival. In this sense it can hardly be considered as "utopian" or sectarian. The discussion of the *Kibbutz* as a "political community," in the light of Ernst Troeltsch's definition of the sect, proves to be misleading to a point where the author himself admits that it "is not easy to explain" in this light the actually realistic attitude of the *Kibbutz* towards society in general (p. 172). These notions mar also his assessment of the significance of what, by some, is being called the "crisis in the *Kibbutz.*" If the *Kibbutz* is seen as what it actually is, an outgrowth and constituent part of the co-operative movement—to which by the way hardly any reference is made in this study—this "crisis" reduces itself to the stress and strain natural to any "special social movement."

We can only hope that the author will not allow these unfortunate notions to inject themselves into his announced study of the *Kibbutz* children, to which the present volume is intended to serve as a "brief historical and ethnographic introduction" (p. 7).

H. F. INFIELD
Group Farming Research Institute

EUROPE

LOUIS P. LOCHNER. *Always the Unexpected: A Book of Reminiscences.* Pp. viii, 339. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. $5.00.

A substantial part of the information the American people had on the downfall of Germany's Third Reich and the rise of Hitler's nazidom came to them through Louis P. Lochner. From 1924 to 1941 he was a member and then chief of the Associated Press' Berlin Bureau. He was accredited, so to speak, to the successive governments of Germany. He had to maintain access and tolerable professional relations with them. That he was able to do so is a tribute to his restraint. The American people were the gainers.

Mr. Lochner gives a clear and circumspect story of his life in this volume. And he adds a few footnotes to history. He was active in the peace movement before World War I, was on Henry Ford's staff before and after the Peace Ship venture, and during World War II knew of two unofficial and abortive efforts to bring about a negotiated peace.

Between these sad and tantalizing moments, Mr. Lochner spent nearly a quarter of a century in the task of telling Americans what was happening in the life of the nation which then and now is the focus of strength in middle Europe. By his zeal and discretion, his knowledge of the German language and people, his German wife, and many other notable assets, Mr. Lochner became a very valuable foreign correspondent. With none of the flamboyance of Richard Harding Davis, none of the passion of William L. Shirer, none of the careless irresponsibility of many another who might be named, he served the cause of public information well.

In these swift-moving days, there is danger that American foreign correspondents will shift from capital to capital and continent to continent without sending down the roots through which real understanding alone can flow. Those responsible for assigning correspondents, and young men and women eager to enter this profession, should note the advantages of specialization exhibited in the life and work of Louis Lochner.

It takes a good many years for an observer to understand another people and their motivation. Knowledge of language, culture, folk-ways, history—and much else—is essential. Our universities are today producing many area specialists. Few of them are turning toward journalism. To practice it, they must also have the aptitude and learn the techniques of the correspondent's trade. Their home work might well include Louis Lochner's reminiscences as a text.

ERWIN D. CANHAM
The Christian Science Monitor

JOSEPH TENENBAUM. *Race and Reich: The Story of an Epoch.* Pp. xvi, 554. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1956. $7.50.

The title of this book is misleading. Rather than telling "the story of an epoch," Joseph Tenenbaum concentrates on one chapter of that story, while he disregards, or glosses over, many other chapters. Although he promises "a total picture of the Nazi totalitarian ideology and the Reich" (the *Third* Reich, that is), he presents mainly, if not merely, a picture of persecutions, crimes, and mass murder committed by Nazis against Jews in the later war years. While this is surely a consequential, meaningful, and shocking facet of the "total picture" of the Nazi epoch, yet it is only one of its facets. To identify a single part with the whole and to neglect or ignore other parts, unhappily leads to a wrong image of the "total picture." One cannot understand nazism, let alone totalitarianism, if he looks only at the events that culminated in the extermination camps from 1942 to 1945 and at the unspeakable horrors that took place inside their walls.

But for a few sketchy and uninformed pages claiming to cover history, science, churches, and thought of Germany, the bulk of the voluminous book presents material dug up in major and minor war crime trials by the prosecution. Names, organizational workings, and some acts of a number of Nazi leaders, concentration camp commanders, and other bureaucrats of murder are given in great detail, though not without factual errors. For instance, Dr. Tenenbaum names leading anti-Nazis in his list of the Nazi Reich leadership. In what amounts to a denunciation contradicted by every evidence, he lists among the Nazi Reich leaders Colonel Count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg and General Hans Oster—who were executed by Hitler's hangman for their heroic attempt to kill the Fuehrer; or General Adolf Heusinger and Fabian von Schlabrendorff, a lawyer drafted as ordnance officer, one of the participants in the conspiracy to overthrow nazism, and identified in the book only as "staff officer, headquarters, German Army Group Center in Russia, February 1941–44." In fact, the far-flung anti-Nazi conspiracy, the bomb attempt on Hitler's life of July 20, 1944, the ensuing execution of 4,000 anti-Nazi plotters are mentioned in this "story of an epoch" in altogether two lines, while an International anti-Semitic conference planned at the same time by some Nazis—and which never took place!—is dealt with in seventy-six lines.

As Dr. Tenenbaum makes clear in his Preface, the purpose of his book is to counteract a tendency "to minimize the menace of a 'second coming'" of Nazi Germany. Whether books of that kind contribute much to counteract such a danger which does not exist today, and does not seem likely to arise tomorrow, is open to debate. What appears less debatable is that the manner in which the author deals with the subject lends the character of an oversized propaganda pamphlet to his book, notwithstanding its claim to scholarship.

NORBERT MUHLEN
New York, N. Y.

ADOLF LESCHNITZER. *The Magic Background of Modern Anti-Semitism: An Analysis of the German-Jewish Relationship.* Pp. x, 236. New York: International Universities Press, 1956. $4.00.

This is truly a remarkable book. Its very existence is testimony to one of the author's main theses—that the Jews have been representative of all those who lack greatness in terms of power, of the downtrodden, and conquered, who are never wholly conquered.

Dr. Leschnitzer himself was a victim of the tragic events in Germany, but his analysis of the German-Jewish relationship is dispassionate, clear, penetrating. In a series of compact, beautifully written chapters, he succeeds in throwing light not only on the specific problem of anti-Semitism but also on some of the most critical problems of history, especially its deplorable magic and paranoid motivations.

The author shows that in the world of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was a notable collaboration between the majority and the Jewish minority in Germany, resting on interdependence and characteristic of genuine symbiosis. The wedding of spirits was blessed with singu-

lar fruitfulness, as evidenced by great common achievements.

But the symbiosis was disturbed by the breakthrough of a new witchcraft mania. Antipathy was always there, smoldering beneath the surface, but the flame was kept alive and nourished until, finally, in 1933, the devastating arson was started. "On the German side the hostile mood prevailed; with many it became madness, and an obsession too strong to be held in check, occasionally breaking out in violence. On the Jewish side there was blindness, an inability or unwillingness to see, at any rate a fatal misinterpretation of the situation. Such were the attitudes of the partners in the final decades of the symbiosis" (p. 102).

Dr. Leschnitzer shows how the rise and breakdown of the German-Jewish symbiosis constitutes a great and tragic evolution taking place in the increasing shadow of secularization, identical with the crisis of Western civilization. In early modern times the persecution of witches replaced the persecution of Jews, both forms serving the same instincts and anxieties. In a reverse process the terror formerly attached to the witch was transferred to the Jew in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

It is to the author's credit, however, that he does not limit himself to a monistic interpretation. His approach is pluralistic, in the best traditions of superior historical scholarship. In eliciting the reasons why the Jew was made the villain by Germans he considers economic and social changes, the psychological reaction to such changes, the formation of an appropriate ideology, and the interrelationship and cross-fertilization of all three. It is all superbly organized and presented.

It is a ghastly picture—5.7 million Jews murdered and burnt to ashes in giant slaughter houses. But, say Dr. Leschnitzer, while for millions of Jews nazism was a catastrophe, it was no catastrophe for Judaism. "It was German civilization that collapsed, burying, along with many of her own, the adopted children who had loved her so much" (p. 168).

Heinrich Heine made a remarkable prophecy in 1835, a little more than a century before the slaughter: "If ever the taming talisman, the cross, should shatter, primitive fury will be loose once again. . . . The old stone gods will then rise from their long-forgotten rubble and wipe the dust of a thousand years from their eyes; and Thor will leap up in the end and shatter the Gothic cathedrals with his giant hammer."

LOUIS L. SNYDER
City College of New York

JAMES K. POLLOCK (Ed.). *German Democracy at Work: A Selective Study.* Pp. viii, 208. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955. $4.50.

This volume is a brilliant study of German democracy at work at the national level in the first free and secret *Bundestag* elections of 1953. The authors went to West Germany at the height of the political campaign waged by a number of political parties to test the sincerity and viability of German democracy, to observe the techniques of the left and right extremists, to evaluate the policies of the world powers toward the German question, and above all to observe the German aspect of this general election. The authors, James K. Pollock, Henry L. Bretton, Frank Grace, and Daniel S. McHargue, covered such important subjects as majority party, opposition party, how the voters decide, voting machinery, electoral closeup, and U.S. foreign policy and the election.

Professor Grace wrote a comprehensive history of the Christian Democratic Union and its background in social and political Catholicism, especially in the former center party of the empire and the Weimar republic. He asserts that this party was the only German one prior to 1945 that had a Christian orientation. He concludes that the majority party, the C.D.U., although it drew its strength from major Catholic areas, had a more general appeal than any other, and that the Catholic-Protestant percentages within the C.D.U. vote were 57–41 respectively.

The history of the opposition party, the Social Democratic party, is traced by Professor Bretton from its organization in 1869 to its present position in Western Germany. He has written an excellent summary of its history developments after 1945 and especially of the party's varying position in foreign policy. While the present is possibly a period of relaxation, the party has before it the task of steering between the Communist alliance on one side and the coalition of Western powers on the other.

Dr. Pollock analyzes the national election of 1953 and shows how for the first time in German party and parliamentary history one party, aided by proportional representation, secured a majority in the German parliament. The German compromise law also controlled the splinter parties, which had been the curse of German politics, but did not weaken either the rights of minorities or the progressive principles of representation. Dr. Bretton's detailed study of local politics and of one electoral district as a mirror of the Federal Republic throws new light on German voting behavior of the principal age groups. Dr. Pollock and all his associates have made a scholarly contribution to our knowledge of German politics.

The social and economic philosophy of the present governing coalition indicates an almost certain perpetuation of democratic processes of government, the development of the national resources of Germany under free enterprise, and the maintenance of international accords with other democratic states. Under the handicap of a multiparty system, the German voters elected a representative parliament, and gave it a mandate to strengthen German democracy.

Germany is apparently approaching a viable two-party system as several of the minor parties tend to disappear. The Social Democratic party, which has generally held its own against the present coalition of Adenauer, is obviously the opposition party waiting for a mandate to take over the government. A change in the present electoral law in favor of a single district plurality system would however greatly strengthen the Christian Democratic Union and weaken the Socialist position. The authors conclude that the German movement toward democracy is sincere and that this movement is destined to survive. General Lucius D. Clay, who read the manuscript, states, "I do hope that this report by a particularly competent group of observers will be read by many Americans. . . ."

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ
Stanford University

HERBERT LUETHY. *France Against Herself: A Perceptive Study of France's Past, Her Politics, and Her Unending Crises.* Translated by Eric Mosbacher. Pp. xi, 476. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $6.50.

The original title of the book, *In Frankreich gehen die Uhren anders,* conveys the basic idea of Herbert Luethy's new book much better than either the title of the British edition, *The State of France,* or that of the American edition, *France Against Herself.* The basic thesis of the author is not so much that France is against herself, but that she is out of tune with the rest of the world. This thesis is, of course, no original discovery, but has been stated and often reiterated, with varying degrees of approval or disapproval, by generations of French writers, and particularly in the last thirty years. Mr. Luethy writes from the vantage point of a Swiss journalist, who has lived in France for many years, and who knows France intimately, her institutions as well as her thought. Yet knowledge, while indispensable to understanding, is not always identical with it; and Mr. Luethy in many places displays a lack of proportions and balance which is rooted in his failure to understand France as a civilization, as distinct from any particular aspect of France, such as her economics, politics, her position in the world, or her imperial problems. Also, there is frequently a tone of shrill impatience in the author, based, perhaps, on the complacency and condescension of a student of France who looks at her from the viewpoint of smug, self-confident, bourgeois Switzerland. The standards of Swiss success and prosperity, worthy of the highest admiration in themselves, cannot quite serve as a reliable guide to appraise and criticize the key problems of French life. Therefore, while the reader of Mr. Luethy's book will often agree with his analyses of specific French shortcomings, he is often left with the feeling that there is more to French life and civilization than the catalog of defects and illnesses marshalled by the author in defense of his basic thesis. Moreover, in order to prove his thesis the author often exaggerates. As in some aspects of French economic reconstruction in recent years, and

in others, as in the case of the colonial problem, events subsequent to the writing of the book have proved his fears and criticisms exaggerated. Finally, if France has hesitated to step in line with the rest of the Western world with the necessary enthusiasm expected of her by Mr. Luethy and other critics, this fact alone does not necessarily prove that she is wrong in doing so. It is not inconceivable that the rest of the world may be moving in the wrong direction, in some respects at least; and it may ultimately prove a gain to the world that France stubbornly refuses, probably too stubbornly, to become another version of Britain or the United States.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN
Princeton University

ROBERT E. DICKINSON. *The Population Problem of Southern Italy: An Essay in Social Geography.* Pp. xi, 116. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1955. $3.00.

Southern Italy, a long forgotten country notwithstanding the flow of immigrants to these shores, was put on the American map by World War II and is there to stay. Epic books by Ignazio Silone and Carlo Levi have interpreted for us the deeper feelings of its taciturn peasantry, and its very landscapes have supplied the background for some of the most successful Italian movies. But the prose underlying this poetry, the economic problems of the present and the prospects for the future, albeit debated at length in a large number of Italian publications and lately in a book of F. Vöchting, have not been adequately presented to the American public. Professor Dickinson's little book aims at filling this important gap. It is not particularly original or well written, but its honest, careful, minute description of geographical and economic conditions makes it a tool of great value to the political scientist and—if he will read it—to the newspaperman. At last the complex difficulties besetting Southern Italy are not marshalled together in one oversimplified class, such as (depending on the bias of the writer) communism, Catholicism, landlordism, ignorance, or corruption. The only bias Dickinson has not entirely escaped is that against Northern Italy, which is indeed widespread in the Italian South. (But not even the most chauvinistic Southern Italian will claim with Dickinson that "about 1850 . . . the degree of industrialization . . . in the South was in no way inferior to the rest of Italy.")

One hesitates to extract a few generalizations from a book whose greatest merit consists in its constant awareness of necessary qualifications. Southern Italy is an overwhelmingly agricultural country, with a low productivity, a tendency of property to be either too large or too small, and an underemployment that can be placed at about 35 per cent of the total man-units. The annual growth of the population, far greater than in more prosperous Northern Italy, threatens to offset any gain that may be hoped for through investment in redevelopment plans. To assure for the Southern Italians a minimum income of 300,000 lire per family of five (500 dollars, which would be regarded wretched destitution in America but is acceptable on local living standards), it will be necessary to work in many directions simultaneously, for no single measure will be feasible and useful everywhere. Birth control (not so much through deliberate policies as through an increasing standard of living), emigration (both beyond and within the country), changes in land tenure (here by expropriation of the larger estates, there through contracts giving greater security to the tenant), improvements of agricultural techniques, public works and investment, promotion of local initiatives, industrialization (to which the reviewer would like to add, better schooling) will gradually bring Southern Italy in line with the more advanced countries. Action ought to be adapted to specific regional contexts rather than to abstract general principles. The steps already taken are in the right direction, but the ultimate success of the plan will require much time, patience, and wisdom.

ROBERT SABATINO LOPEZ
Yale University

G. E. KIDDER-SMITH. *Italy Builds: Its Modern Architecture and Native Inheritance.* Pp. 264. New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1955. $10.00.

Mr. Kidder-Smith has demonstrated in his previous parallel volumes on Brazil, Switzerland, and Sweden an outstanding capacity to convey both through photographs and words the impact of modern architecture and its relationship to social forces. (See *Sweden Builds,* THE ANNALS, July, 1951.) Italy has given him richer material than any of these other countries, and he has risen to new heights of perceptiveness in organizing it and to maturer skill in portraying it through hundreds of photographs. This book is a joy!

Aided by fellowships, the author wandered through Italy for two years. The first section of his book relates the architecture to the land—the high mountains, the foothills, the plains, the seacoasts—across millennia. The second section portrays the inheritance of the urban setting. The most engaging element he finds in the square or *piazza,* which, "in Italy is far more than so many square feet of open space; it is a way of life, a concept of living" (p. 47). Kidder-Smith knows the "finest graphic documentation of Italian towns and squares" in Sitte's "electric" *The Art of Building Cities* (see THE ANNALS, May, 1946) and the discussion in CIAM's *The Heart of the City* (see THE ANNALS, September, 1953). By the co-ordinated use of picture and word, this book shows more vividly than these classic statements how "local man, with that creative sensitivity typical of so many Italians, has worked hand-in-hand with the local . . . configurations of the landscape, moulding and adapting his buildings to a delightful harmony with their setting" (p. 62).

The "inheritance" of the modern architect in Italy portrayed in the first half of this book is incomparable. (In what other country has living water been so effectively used in the urban setting? See Tunnard, *The City of Man,* THE ANNALS, March, 1954.) The second half of the book shows that in Italy "the architects with the greatest understanding of and ability in modern work possess the greatest understanding of their inheritances" (p. 121). They have "integrated architecture with painting and sculpture to a degree unknown outside Italy"; and they have combined the old with the new. The author relates the new architecture to the general *risorgimento* after fascism.

"Whereas Sweden has the highest general level of architecture in the world . . . Italian architecture is studded with stars in a morass of mediocrity" (p. 129). Important defects are lack of consideration for the occupants—windowless servants' rooms and shoddy construction behind "façadism and the palazzo complex"; and the "chewing up" of the countryside around the big cities "without proper planning, without effectual controls."

The volume closes with presentations of the breath-taking and dramatic new structures (markets, exposition halls, hangars) of Nervi and others, using new light and cheap concrete forms; and the interrelation of streamlined business machines, streamlined factories, and streamlined labor relations in the Olivetti enterprises.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
Brooklyn College

DINO ALFIERI. *Dictators Face to Face.* Translated by David Moore. Pp. x, 307. New York: New York University Press, 1955. $4.95.

The memoirs of former leading Italian Fascists and German Nazis continue to pour forth from the presses. Dino Alfieri, Minister of Popular Culture in Mussolini's government (the same job that Goebbels held in the Hitler regime), served as Italian Ambassador in Berlin from May 1940 to the summer of 1943. While the author disclaims in his Preface any "attempt at self-justification" and claims that his attitude in the book is "strictly objective" (p. ix), he certainly makes every effort to portray himself, more by indirect than by direct methods, as an essentially humanitarian, liberal, Christian man of the world who only wanted to serve righteous justice. If Italy and Germany had won the war, the Alfieris in both countries would probably be writing memoirs today glorifying the Fascist and Nazi aggressors and criminals. Nevertheless, while *Dictators Face to Face* may have little to contribute in terms of serious historical knowledge and scholarship, it is a book which students of totalitarianism in general and of fascism in particular should not miss. Alfieri knew in-

timately the leaders of Italian fascism, from Mussolini downward, and also had many personal contacts with the leaders of German nazism, from Hitler downward, as well as with leading military personalities in both countries. His accounts of the leaders of fascism in Italy and Germany show to what extent Hitler and Mussolini were willing to gamble the future of their countries in pursuit of personal ambitions. The brutality and megalomania of fascism is fully confirmed by Alfieri's chronicles; above all, Alfieri shows, more perhaps than he realizes even now and much more than he realized while he was a close confidant and personal representative of Mussolini in Berlin, the mediocrity of the Fascist leaders in Italy and Germany. The first reaction of the free world to the Fascist leaders has been, understandably enough, one of anger and hatred provoked by their barbaric savagery. As time goes on, this attitude is likely to be replaced by one of contempt for the smallness of the would-be Fascist world conquerors. In retrospect, it seems unbelievable that the statesmen of Britain and France, and even of Russia and the United States, cringed for so long in dealing with the Fascist dictators. Alfieri rightly points out that this supine attitude of the Western Powers, willing to accept any and all humiliations from Hitler Germany, was one of the key factors which induced Mussolini to enter the war in 1940. Mussolini made a fatal error in thus writing off the moral and material fibre of the Western nations, but he was almost right.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN
Princeton University

ALEXANDER VUCINICH. *The Soviet Academy of Sciences.* (Hoover Institute Studies, Series E.: Institutions, No. 3.) Pp. vi, 157. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1956. $2.00.

Alexander Vucinich, author of a previous study of the Hoover Institute, *Soviet Economic Institutions,* has again written an informative description and analysis of another significant aspect of the Soviet Union. This time, it is a study of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the largest and most important scientific institution in the USSR. Commencing with the founding in 1724 of its predecessor the Russian Academy, Dr. Vucinich takes the reader through an account of the Academy in its almost two-hundred-year history before the Russian Revolution. Impressive as the Academy was in pre-revolutionary Russia, it has developed into something different from the scholarly organization of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. The Academy has become the main intellectual arm of the Soviet economy, the government, and most important, of the Communist party.

In the summer of 1917 before the Bolsheviks took power, the Academy was staffed by 45 regular members and 220 associates. In mid-1949 the Academy had 6,053 "scientific workers." This enormous increase did not come immediately after the revolution but as the policies of the Soviet government became more inclusive of all facets of life, the activities of the Academy increased in number and function. By 1929, which was the landmark of Stalin's accession to complete power, the Academy, as the author writes, "was not only fully Sovietized but also Bolshevized." Its members were purged and its program formulated to meet the needs of "socialist construction." State Planners found their way with the engineers into the ranks of the Academy, and party theoreticians also were elected to that august assemblage. By that time the party was in fact electing members to the Academy. Soon a purge was directed in the Academy in 1929–31 against the non-Communists.

In 1935 the Academy was reorganized and its statute which is still the present by-laws of the Academy was passed. The Academy was formally placed under the Council of Peoples Commissars (now Ministers). Shortly thereafter in 1936–38, a purge of the party members in the Academy was carried on. In this period the trend of complex research projects rather than individual research endeavors was emphasized. These projects were associated mainly with technical and scientific problems of the day. The period of World War II found the Academy's work curtailed by the demands of the war situation, but from 1946 until the death of Stalin in 1953, the Academy, in addition to its scientific and technical research, went in for "intellectual ethnocentrism," extolling Stalin's linguistic theory of nationalism, showing how inventive the Russian scientists were—claiming every important invention and calling for the purging of the Western influences from Russian thought.

The author gives a very exhaustive description of the internal organization of the Academy and points out the close relationship between the party and the Academy in selection of members, controls over staff, and formulation of policies. He also discusses the demographic and social backgrounds, the salaries, the government positions, and even the eating and recreational facilities of Soviet academicians.

In his concluding chapter he summarizes three major developments of the Academy. One he calls "ideological purification," another "technological supremacy," and the third "total planning." To a Western scientist there is a certain repugnance to the subservience of research to ideology, the extolling of technology over pure scientific thinking, and the superiority of a total planning over independent research. This indicates the weakness of Soviet scientific research and in the words of the author, "In this game of inherent conflict between official action and scholarly reaction, at least one significant thing stands out: Soviet scholarship finds itself in a major crisis."

No only scientists who personally feel these problems, but corporation executives and government officials would profit from reading this monograph in order to get a clearer picture of what has happened to science and scientists in the USSR.

The work closes with several valuable appendices containing lists of leading institutes, departments, branches, academicians, and periodical publications of the Soviet Academy of Science.

WILLIAM B. BALLIS
University of Washington

ERIC L. PRIDONOFF. *Tito's Yugoslavia.* Pp. vii, 243. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. $3.75.

Composed of supposedly remembered conversations, the record of the author's experiences as an official of the State Department while stationed in Yugoslavia during and after World War II, running commentaries on Yugoslavia's past and recent history, bitter comments about Washington's (and particularly Roosevelt's) policies toward Tito, and exhortations to "get rid" of communism (and thus of Tito, pp. 239–40), Pridonoff's tract will not attract the scholarly mind. Although the enthusiastic Introduction by Brodie E. Ahlport claims that "what [Pridonoff] says in these pages is not only based on his personal observations and knowledge but also upon documentary research and information . . . obtained by correspondence from friends in Eastern Europe and refugees from the Balkans," no documentary proofs can be found here. In fact, if anything, the author has discarded entirely the rather extensive documentary evidence now available in regard to Tito's rise. The book gives the impression that it was written some time ago, looked for a publisher for some time, and finally was published so that Pridonoff would be able to join the currently fashionable critics of Tito.

Those who like such a personal and biased approach will, however, enjoy the portions dealing with the author's experiences when the Russians were the rulers of Yugoslavia. They will also like the description of the role that Louis Adamic and Stojan Pribicevich played as "grease monkeys" (p. 204) because of the attitude toward Tito of the White House and the American people during World War II. If, also, what the author says about the use and misuse of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is true, then we have here another proof of how international good-will gestures by the American people are wasted for goals that are unappreciated or even incomprehensible abroad.

But the claim that "wittingly or unwittingly Roosevelt and Churchill did more to advance the cause of communism in Yugoslavia than Stalin" (p. 263) is pure *naivité.* Although, as the Introduction claims, Pridonoff might have "keen power of observation," it is obvious that his book does not "report the truth without equivocation."

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

D. E. BUTLER. *The British General Election of 1955.* Pp. 236. London: MacMillan and Company; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955. $5.00.

The British General Election of 1955, together with the Nuffield studies of the election of 1945 1950, and 1951, provides much material for the study of political behavior in a modern democracy. This particular election did not arise in the usual British way out of a clash of opinion upon an issue of major importance. There was a background of prosperity, not of burning grievance; the major parties fenced on minor issues, but both talked peace abroad and welfare at home. The press was restrained and not sensational. The public was passive. Meetings were poorly attended; the audience for sound broadcasts was less than half that in 1951; even television did not make the expected impact, although the author warns that this fact does not disprove its immense possibilities in a more bitter battle. In spite of this apathy it testified to British political responsibility that over three-fourths of the electors actually cast ballots. The way they divided between the major parties confirms the accuracy of modern polling techniques; the British Gallup poll erred by only 1.1 per cent on the Labour result and 1.3 on the Conservative.

An appendix on Trade Unions and the Election provides a valuable account of this aspect of their activity. Although basically pro-Labour the Conservatives have sought with some success to meet this challenge. Mr. Ray Mawby, a working electrician, is the first Conservative to enter the Commons directly from a manual occupation; it may be a portent. Somewhere between one-third ond one-fourth of the membership votes Conservative. In spite of the Labour majority, however, it is a myth that in the constituencies the union branches are the active Labour party; it is actually unusual to find them organized into electoral activity.

There is much statistical material on candidates, votes, and "swing" from one party to another. Two maps illustrate the distribution of seats but their value is vitiated by being based on counties. If future studies would provide a series of maps showing coal fields, industrial areas, and density of population, the close correlation with one of election returns by constituencies would be most impressive. The masses of Labour red in London and along the lower Thames, South Wales, Birmingham, southern Lancashire, the West Riding and a strip down to Nottingham and Derby, coastal Cumberland, Durham and Tyneside, and central Scotland would make a vivid contrast to the conservative blue of more rural England and Scotland, comfortable suburbia, and fashionable seaside places. Some large minorities would be concealed, but it would emphasize the importance of economic factors and social classes in British party politics.

CARL F. BRAND
Stanford University

E. J. KINGSTON-MCCLOUGHRY. *The Direction of War: A Critique of the Political Direction and High Command in War.* Pp. 261. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $4.00.

The Direction of War presents several theses. The Air Marshal points out that the focus of war has changed: there is now a far more intimate interrelationship between the military and political direction of war. But the lesson of history, unfortunately, is explicit: so far, political leadership usually has failed to provide the tools, manpower, and organization adequate to win a war without incurring undue risks and, more important, to prevent violent conflict. The difference between what is and what ought to be is measured in human blood, a commodity which is rather in short supply. It could be added that this difference also is measurable in terms of freedoms lost.

The author explains that strategic decisions, regardless of institutions and bureaucratic procedures, are made by human beings, and that they reflect the strengths and foibles of individuals. This hazard could be accepted at a time when war was relatively simple. As war grew more complex and as even strictly military decisions become increasingly involved with economics, technology, psychology, and politics, the intricate, unwieldy, and often heterogeneous command institutions of our modern military forces had to be created. But these organizational monstrosities still are dominated by personalities—and their rivalries—and decisions still reflect both individual genius and folly. The author decries the fact that ambitions, service interests, competing concepts, and subservience to expediency have been causing terrible casualties. Free from utopianism, the Air Marshal believes that less personal, matter-of-fact, and efficient command organizations and planning procedures are feasible.

Marshal Kingston-McCloughry discusses that inevitable topic, military-civilian relationships. Objective scholar that he is, he eschews black-and-white answers by showing that in some cases the civilians were right over the military, while in others the civilians almost prevented the military from doing their job. Thus airpower and tanks were forced upon the British armed forces by political leaders, while the illusions and business-as-usual attitudes of the politicians before 1914 and 1939 jeopardized Britain's very existence.

This is primarily a book about British problems (although the discussion is quite pertinent to the U.S.). According to the author, markedly "new circumstances of war" have rendered Britain's military power marginal, since she no longer can start, fight, or finish a major war unaided. For the first time in history, *peacetime* forces could destroy the United Kingdom. The Air Marshall advocates that Britain maintain "scientific lead over any enemy war potential. By this means we can also maintain maximum influence with out allies." He adds that the British chiefs of staff suffer from manpower shortages and financial starvation and are not set up to deal with long-term research and development planning "which may be decisive in a future war."

The author calls for vigorous preplanning to achieve technological superiority and *to prevent war.* He also suggests the need for a more adequate machinery to direct the "cold war." He proposes a new and, in this reviewer's opinion, useful concept of security which should be contemplated earnestly on both sides of the Atlantic.

On the negative side, it must be admitted that the author's comments on international problems are not always fortunate or accurate. There are the usual British barbs against American policies. It is even more remarkable that the Soviet Union and communism hardly are mentioned. Yet this is a minor point. *The Direction of War* is a first-class book, informative and stimulating, honest and professional. It occupies a unique place in current military literature. The careful study of this volume is recommended.

STEFAN T. POSSONY
Georgetown University

CHARLES LOCH MOWAT. *Britain Between the Wars, 1918–1940.* Pp ix, 694. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $6.00.

Mr. Mowat has written an eminently readable account of twenty crowded and critical years in Britain's history. The "coupon election" of 1918, the Versailles Treaty, the Anglo-Irish war, the first Labour government, the General Strike, the economic depression, the formation of the national government, the abdication of King Edward VIII, the dismal years of appeasement with their Munich climax, the outbreak of war and the end of an age when in those lovely early summer days of 1940 Britain and the Commonwealth found themselves fighting alone against the massed might of the dictators. Nor does Mr. Mowat confine himself within the traditional frontiers of history. Like the Modern Greats School at Oxford established, as he records, in 1921 to the great misgiving of more conservative dons, Mr. Mowat seeks to combine political history with economics and a not too exacting philosophy. He writes knowledgeably of the gold standard, the problems of the mining industry and the new Keynesian economics; understandingly of the life of the great army of the unemployed; divertingly of feminine fashions and male distractions. In the crossword puzzle he sees a symbol of the age, a way of escape from its problems, "an inexpensive and ostensibly harmless amusement leading—nowhere. Utopia in seven letters."

Mr. Mowat's book is described on the cover as the first major history of Britain during the period. So far as the present

reviewer is aware there is nothing of equal range and reliability to challenge it. Nonetheless Mr. Mowat's work is historically of uneven merit. On many points on which he writes the evidence is necessarily incomplete, and any historical judgment from them must therefore be tentative. Of this he seems insufficiently aware. Mr. Mowat has read extensively, he draws upon secondary works usually with discrimination but at times again without assessing their authority or discounting their bias and without seemingly attempting to weigh the available evidence himself. In design his work is admirable but like most English historians, Mr. Mowat is curiously indifferent to the Commonwealth connection and has given no more than a cursory account of its influence on Britain's policies throughout the period. But these things apart this is a book, original in construction if not in content and of outstanding usefulness and interest.

NICHOLAS MANSERGH
Cambridge University
Cambridge, England

ROBERT BLAKE. *Unrepentant Tory: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858–1923, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.* Pp. 556. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. $9.00.

The author adds another to the list of official biographies which have by now left few dark corners in the political history of the generation following 1900. After reading this long and competent account of British politics from within, we are still left wondering a little how such a somber, self-effacing man could ever have risen, not merely from obscurity, but from a foreign background, to become prime minister. Like Disraeli, he was chosen as a kind of outsider to lead the Conservatives, but he resembled his dazzling predecessor in no other way. Cautious, almost retiring, willingly second in the war-time coalition, he yet knew how to gain the confidence of his party, backbenchers as well as frontbenchers, and rally them at times of crisis. He was the kind of man, convincing in debate, redolent of personal integrity, who, returning from a brief retirement, could bring the coalition government to the ground by a well-timed letter to the press and a speech at the Carlton Club. His own Conservative ministry, formed in 1922, however, was admittedly one of "second-class intellects," though of first-class characters.

To the proposed inclusion of Ulster in a Home Rule Ireland (1912–14) Bonar Law offered a determined and bitter opposition. In this connection he sent to the king, July 31, 1913, a memorandum propounding the highly dubious constitutional doctrine that the king in order to avert civil war should, if necessary, dismiss the Liberal ministry and install a government which would be willing to dissolve parliament and call a general election.

In 1923 at the time of Bonar Law's resignation because of ill health he refused to advise the king on the choice of his successor. Colonel Waterhouse, his private secretary, in presenting the prime minister's letter of resignation to the king, undertook on his own initiative to accompany it with his version of what he claimed were Bonar Law's real views. This officious and misleading maneuver may possibly have had some part in the choice of Baldwin for the premiership.

Our author has for the most part avoided the pitfall of partisanship and has written with admirable objectivity and insight. He has not made Bonar Law a hero—no one could do that—but he has made sure that Bonar Law can no longer be referred to, in Asquith's unkind words, as "the unknown prime minister."

CHESTER KIRBY
Brown University

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

W. S. WOYTINSKY and E. S. WOYTINSKY. *World Commerce and Governments: Trends and Outook.* Pp. lii, 907. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955. $10.00.

The present volume is a sequel to one published two years earlier on the topic of *World Population and Production.* Like its predecessor, it discusses world trends from the earliest times to the present and includes an attempt at presenting also some

indication of future prospects in the fields of its main concern. The subject matter is divided into three parts. The first is devoted to a discussion of trade, the second to transportation, and the third to political and public finance aspects of government. Though the first two portions have much in common, both in terms of over-all approach as well as in subject matter, the last part on governments treats of matters which are sufficiently different from the rest of the volume to have deserved publication in a volume of its own.

The main value of the book consists in its comprehensiveness and wealth of statistical and other factual information which reaches encyclopaedic dimensions. For the scholar the book has little usefulness, except in presenting a large amount of data in convenient form. For the layman it is of significance in bringing materials which can normally be found only in scattered sources and discussing the trends observed in the data in lucid and simple language. Professor and Mrs. Woytinsky who have assumed the very useful function of collecting statistical data and presenting them in clear and intelligent form for the last thirty years, have again shown their superior skill in this type of performance.

The purpose of the first two parts of this volume is to survey the changing patterns of trade on a worldwide scale and the systems of transportation that support it. The rapid development of international trade under the prevalent liberalism of the nineteenth century and its gradual destruction since the first world war are well exhibited. The support of this development by the technical progress in transportation in the last hundred years also emerges clearly. In the section on governments, the spread of republican forms of government, the increasing appeal to voters, the decline of colonialism, the growth of international organization, and the changes in tax structures with growing reliance on direct taxation, and especially the income tax as a chief source of revenue, are the best documented recent trends.

This book has somewhat less unity then its companion volume, perhaps because the authors present in it all those problems which are the necessary complements of what had been discussed in *World Population and Production.* Its usefulness is, therefore, considerably enhanced if the two volumes are used together. But even by itself, this is a work which is an indispensable reference tool to anyone interested in the past development, present stage, and chief future prospect of world trade, transportation, governmental structure, and public finances.

BERT F. HOSELITZ
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Behavioral Sciences

J. E. MEADE. *Trade and Welfare.* (*The Theory of International Economic Policy,* Vol. II.) Pp. xiv, 618. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. $7.20.

This is the second and final volume of Professor J. E. Meade's monumental work on *The Theory of International Economic Policy.* Like the first volume, entitled *The Balance of Payments* and published in 1951, it is a highly theoretical, closely knit analysis based on mathematical models. But these are published in a separate *Mathematical Supplement* (Pp. viii, 128, $4.00). and only simple arithmetical illustrations are used in explaining the arguments in the main text. This should make the book attractive to the nonmathematical economist; he should have no undue difficulty in following the "verbal argument," especially as it is presented with remarkable clarity and in an easy and fluent style.

The Balance of Payments dealt with the problems involved in reconciling economic policies for the maintenance of full employment within countries with the preservation of equilibrium in the balances of payments between them. *Trade and Welfare* assumes that this double equilibrium is in fact continually maintained by methods of price adjustment. With this as point of departure, it undertakes to consider the question of "whether economic welfare can be increased by direct controls over international movements of commodities or of factors of production"; more specifically, whether there are "cases in which some direct intervention in international markets

is desirable in order to promote a more efficient use of the world's resources or in order to improve the distribution of income."

The book is in effect a series of arguments for and against various forms of direct control based on The Theory of Economic Welfare (Part I), which is developed in a way that makes it suitable for application to the aforementioned problems of international economic policy. This elucidation of the theory constitutes a notable contribution to the existing general theory of economic welfare. The criterion of economic welfare (that is, "maximization of total welfare") is then applied to the arguments for The Control of Trade (Part II) and for The Control of Factor Movements (Part III) in the economic relations between two nations. In both parts consideration is given to the effect of trade controls upon the distribution of income inside the countries concerned and between the countries, as well as the effect of the economic policies on the total size of real income available for distribution among the factors of production. In Part IV (Multilateral Trade) the arguments developed in the relations between two nations are extended to "the world trading system," including "the problem of the formation of a preferential trading area or, in the extreme case, a full customs union between a limited number of trading countries."

The conclusions of the study point to the desirability of a liberal domestic and international economic system for maximizing total welfare. "Indeed," says the author, "the only practical type of 'welfare' policy would seem to be one in which efforts were made domestically to move as nearly as possible towards policies of . . . 'modified laissez-faire' and internationally to remove barriers to trade." He emphasizes, however, that the restoration of a liberal economic order in the modern world not only requires a considerable development of international, if not supranational, economic organization, but also a careful selection of those domestic economic policies which would be compatible with a liberal international economic system.

Though, as was the case with the first volume, *Trade and Welfare* will generate discussion and criticism among economists, Professor Meade's *Theory of International Economic Policy* will long remain the most authoritative and comprehensive treatise on the subject.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER
Washington, D. C.

R. N. CHOWDHURI. *International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative Study.* Pp. xv, 328. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955. Guilders 16.50.

Analytical and documentary studies of the functioning of the organs of the United Nations are welcome. If comparisons can be made with an antecedent international agency, the value of a study is enhanced. Mr. Chowdhuri's comparison of systems for international mandates and trusteeships, based on documents, lets us understand what has been accomplished and also the reasons for the often acrimonious discussions of the idea and practice of international supervision and control over retarded peoples.

Comparisons are made of the drafting of the mandates and trusteeship articles, of the establishment and territorial application of the two systems, and of the actual day-to-day work of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Trusteeship Council. The present system, like that for the mandates, lays down broad principles for the guidance of the trustee powers. The most significant change is the provision for periodic visits to the trust territories. Another new provision, whereby any member state may voluntarily place its territory under trusteeship, is and will be little utilized.

Is the new system more powerful and effective than the mandates system? The author ventures a conditional affirmative, at the same time demonstrating that most of the resolutions by the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council respecting trust areas are not being effectively implemented: the administering powers hold that they alone must discharge the moral and legal responsibility given to them. The United Nations Charter does not provide for any action against trustee states. Hence their active co-operation is needed if the numerous recommendations—resulting from study, debates, considering petitions, and visits—are to be implemented.

Many unanswered general questions are posed, for the system itself and for the peoples of trust areas. The trusteeship system thus demonstrates both satisfactory and unsatisfactory results of international supervision and control.

The documents reveal that international supervision and control have resulted in the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the peoples of the trust areas. On the other hand there is constant controversy between the trust powers and their adversaries respecting the rate of progress of the trust peoples. There is no provision in the Charter establishing procedures for determining when the objectives of international trusteeship may be regarded as attained. Notably, there is tension between the administering and non-administering powers among members of the Trusteeship Council.

Little attention is given the trust areas classified as strategic (and not subject to supervision), although the author is critical of the use of such areas for atomic bomb experimentation.

VERNON J. PURYEAR
University of California

HAROLD GUETZKOW. *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization.* Pp. 62. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. No Price.

This fourth pamphlet from the Center for Research on World Political Institutions is written by a professor of industrial administration and psychology at the Carnegie Institute of Technology. Effective governments depend upon a society where people share certain common attitudes, and these in turn reflect an integrated communications base. A conceptual framework for measuring the international communications base has been developed by Karl Deutsch in his *Political Community at the International Level.* Mr. Guetzkow as a behaviorist now considers the problem of developing common attitudes in support of international organization.

The author defines loyalty in the broadest possible terms: it is a predisposition, an articulation, and a pattern of action which indicates the individual's positive orientation towards certain ideas, people, or groups. Seven sources of loyalty are outlined—as means, as ends, and as conformity. Patterns of action based on these loyalties are not easily predictable—they depend upon the individual's perception of the object of loyalty and the degree of abstractness represented by the object (that is, nation-state or international organization).

Conflicting loyalties need be no barrier to international organization. Mr. Guetzkow notes that loyalties may reinforce each other under certain circumstances, and on other occasions, their conflicting nature may not be perceived or may be redefined or restricted so there will be no overlapping. The author also presents a hopeful case for building loyalties without the use of outgroups which the United Nations lacks.

Withal, the pamphlet presents an essentially conceptual analysis of the many faceted nature of loyalties and suggests the empirical testing of the author's hypothesis by measuring the attitudes of the general citizens, leaders, and international secretaries. In creating international loyalties, he would build upon those attitudes which would find personal, material, or psychological satisfaction in the United Nations and would then appeal to those loyalties which could be directly attached to the United Nations as an end in itself.

Mr. Guetzkow has rendered a real service in dramatizing the complex nature of loyalties. Their multiple sources and their variety of action patterns are no less simple than the creation of an international society itself. By emphasizing the time consuming means-loyalties as the basic approach to international organization, he has not only shown that the loyalty-building process is no quick panacea; but he has indirectly highlighted the essentially political problem of maintaining short-run order so that the desired long-run international stability may be attained. Sanctions are necessary for the short-run, and while Mr. Guetzkow has pointed out they are least desirable for the loyalty-building process, they nonetheless may instill a necessary de-

gree of conformity in the habit patterns of potential aggressors.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.
Stanford University

G. L. ARNOLD. *The Pattern of World Conflict.* Pp. vi, 250. New York: Dial Press, 1955. $4.00.

After prolonged immersion in American writings about world affairs which with few exceptions have the warmed-over quality of clichés that have simmered too often on the same fire, it is a bracing experience to come across the thoughts of non-Americans, from London to New Delhi. Compared with the increasingly stale and unrewarding discussions about "massive retaliation," "free world" coalitions which embrace such devotees of democracy as General Franco, King Saud, and President Trujillo and plaints about the naiveté or downright stupidity of the uncommitted nations in failing to challenge Russia and Communist China, the comments of the English and Swiss, the French and the Indians, sound as if they and we are talking about two different worlds. And it may be necessary, as well as pertinent, to ask: Are we? And if we are, how should we go about achieving or restoring free world unity?

Mr. Arnold does not try to pose as a prophet or an all-knowing expert. He simply tells us what he thinks. His analysis of the problems of the non-Western nations and of their relations with the West is particularly stimulating.

To those of us who wonder why the non-Western peoples sometimes find communism more attractive than democracy, he answers that "there is obstinate resistance to the idea that nationalists may actually prefer communism *because* it is totalitarian, i.e., calculated to destroy all traditional obstacles to rapid modernization," which is the principal goal of non-Western nationalism. "Revolutionary despositism," he goes on, shattering our fond illusion that all right-thinking peoples must immediately adopt the ideas and practices of Western democracy, "is in the Eastern and Islamic tradition; democracy emphatically is not." In his opinion, "liberalism is an acceptable way of life for the plural society of the West, where religious wars came to an end centuries ago. It does not answer the needs of societies in transition from medievalism to modern conditions."

At the same time, he does not spare the feelings of British Labor which, he contends, "has, if anything, proved less adventurous than American liberalism" in meeting the world problems of the atomic age. The West, he says, should take seriously the Communist myth, which has real power to move human beings to act, but should not believe it. Instead, the West must meet the challenge of Communist revolution not by efforts to maintain existing conditions everywhere, but by "libertarian revolutions." We should not regard communism as "an *incomprehensible* monstrosity," but as "a stunted development of *something* that in its origins was not so very different from the drive for a rational world order that underlay democratic thinking in the West."

Over the long run, Mr. Arnold believes, democracy and communism may find a common ground by admitting that no single system can apply to the entire world, and that there can and should be room for a variety of experiences in democracy, socialism, and communism—a theme that might receive the plaudits of Marshal Tito and other uncommitted leaders who have been trying to draw on the contributions of both East and West.

In this fluid situation, when it is essential that spokesmen of democracy should not succumb to the historical determinism of which they accuse Communists, Mr. Arnold suggests that "the political analyst can best assist the planner and the politician by reducing his concepts to the sort of methodical order that corresponds to the world we actually live in"—and skillfully illustrates his own prescription.

VERA MICHELES DEAN
Foreign Policy Association
New York, N. Y.

C. TURNER JOY. *How Communists Negotiate.* Pp. xiii, 178. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $3.50.

For ten months Admiral Joy served as senior United Nations delegate in the Korean armistice negotiations, in almost daily meetings with the Communist negotiators. His book automatically becomes a major document on the history of the Korean war as well as on the even broader subject of Communist diplomatic tactics in general.

It is to this latter subject that the work is chiefly addressed, as the title indicates. From his long and intimate experience at Panmunjom, Admiral Joy has developed an analysis of Communist negotiation devices and a set of conclusions intended to serve as guides for any future negotiators who may face a task similar to his. Some of these lessons have apparently become more or less official American doctrine on the subject, as evidenced by the conditions set for the summit talks at Geneva.

Among the major points made by Joy, certain ones may be codified into principles:

There should be a fixed time limit set in advance, within which progress must be made or the talks called off.

The site of negotiations should be outside the combat area, and certainly not in enemy territory.

A truce bid should be given careful and leisurely consideration before acceptance. Hurried acceptance gives the enemy the idea one *needs* a truce.

Scrupulous attention to the agenda is required. Agenda manipulation is an important Communist tool for delay and for substantive advantage.

Hard bargaining on both large and small points is required. Freely conceding small points merely confirms the enemy in his intransigence on major issues.

Once a final position is reached, it should be put before the enemy firmly, and long protracted talk in defense of it avoided. Only by silence at this point can one convince the enemy the position is really final.

In frequent passages the author reflects his essentially military views in support of the MacArthur position on carrying the war into China and on unabated continuance of military activity during the negotiations. Acceptance of the truce agreement finally reached he considers a mistake. These views color his handling of the political backdrop to the negotiations, and it may be inferred that they unconsciously influenced his judgment of substantive issues which arose during the talks. Within the domain of his experience and competence, however, the author has supplied an eminently useful and highly readable report.

OLIVER BENSON
University of Oklahoma

MAX BELOFF. *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process.* Pp. 134. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. $3.00.

In four chapters constituing the Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History for 1954, the author discusses the problem, presuppositions, institutions, and the new dimensions of foreign policy. A Briton, he makes frequent comparisons between the British system and our own.

Capitalism having declined more rapidly elsewhere, there are deeper traces in America of its influence when confronted with noncapitalistic pressures from abroad. But these foreign impacts are not new. The French Revolution was reflected in the Alien and Sedition Acts; Irish-Catholic immigration sparked the Know-Nothing movement. Rather arbitrarily the author denies that European socialism motivated the New Deal. But he compares the closing of Southern ranks in defense of the peculiar institution to the feeling of Americans today (less justified he thinks) that our country is "a beleaguered garrison around whose crumbling ramparts the enemy were assembling in ever greater strength" (p. 7).

Americans, he rightly says, still are shocked by their own initiative in atomic warfare. And appreciation of the cataclysmic power of the new weapons leads to a fresh analysis of the fabric for defense, diplomatic as well as military, with a resurgence of Congressional interest in matters formerly left to the Executive.

Bolshevik publication of the secret treaties of World War I is called their most successful bit of propaganda. It created a demand for public participation in diplomacy and contributed to the League of Nations and the United Nations, the failure of each of which is stressed (p. 35). An open forum, the author holds, can damage friendships; toward enemies it spells psychological warfare, useless unless backed by power. Nonrecognition, also popular with

democracies, leads to war by degrees imperceptible to the uninformed majority.

The cost of military budgeting brings foreign policy closer to the House of Representatives, now committed along with the Executive to European integration. Also it furthers centralization. The author denies the contention of Dr. Charles Callan Tansill that "the main objective in American foreign policy since 1900 has been the preservation of the British Empire" (pp. 81–82). Be that as it may, military-civil relations assume a growing importance of which American institutions must somehow take account. These relations incidentally are basic to the Bricker Amendment, believed by the author to be permanently unacceptable to the Executive.

It is impossible in a brief review to indicate the sweep of ideas in this highly philosophical study, ideas so compactly expressed as to constitute a challenge to the reader.

LOUIS MARTIN SEARS
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ASIA

HUGH BORTON. *Japan's Modern Century.* Pp. xii, 524. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955. $7.00.

For years the scholarly and general public has awaited a history of modern Japan —not too long nor too short. Now Professor Borton has written a concise, teachable work which can be used as the companion to Sir George Sansom's *Japan: A Short Cultural History.* The latter interprets Japanese civilization down to the Meiji Restoration. *Japan's Modern Century* treats a much more complex society and world milieu; therefore less space is allotted to literature and the fine arts.

Social scientists will be pleased with the number of themes which are clearly organized and treated in this volume. Economic development and problems are especially stressed, but military history is minimized. In his excellent treatment of the consolidation of conservative government during the early and middle Meiji period, the author explains that the basic conservative principles had been determined before Ito Hirobumi became Minister of Constitutional Affairs in 1882.

Professor Borton has refrained from overloading the text with Japanese terms. The book is well indexed, and there are a number of other aids: brief chronological tables at the beginning of each of the five parts, vital dates for mentioned personages and biographical notes on many leaders, careful introductions and summaries for chapters (though their sentence structures are monotonous) and annotated bibliographies organized according to parts. Also there are documentary appendices, the chief one being a convenient parallel arrangement of the Constitutions of 1889 and 1946–47.

Readers benefit from the author's use not only of some of the well-known earlier works by Japanese social scientists, but also of numerous postwar memoirs and studies. Passages concerning the planning and direction of Occupation policies in postwar Japan are enriched by the writer's own experience as an official in the Department of State who was active during and right after World War II in helping to formulate policies to be applied in Japan. Nevertheless, the treatment of the actual administration of policies during the Occupation is somewhat thin.

In the flyleaves of his complimentary copy the reviewer has two pages of notes suggesting improvements which might be made if further editions are to be printed. For example, the emergence of new social classes could have been more clearly depicted; the desire of Saigo Takamori's faction to use the anti-Korean crisis also for domestic power could have been mentioned; the shift with respect to xenophobia by Queen Min and the Taewonkun in Korea was fairly important; in Chapter XIV, there could have been a brief description of the growth of provincial industries and cognizance paid to the importance of Japan's domestic markets; there was no mention of the rather important Grew-Arita talks in 1940. Moreover, Dr. Borton would have been specially qualified to describe when and how it was decided (actually long before the Potsdam Conference) to retain the Japanese imperial institution after defeat.

However, in general perspective the few errors are minor, and most of the omissions probably were the deliberate results of compression dictated by imperious limitations of space. They do not greatly detract from this comprehensive and useful book on which much thought and care have been expended.

ALLAN B. COLE
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OWEN LATTIMORE. *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia.* Pp. xii, 186. New York: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1955. $4.75.

This slim volume is an interesting documentation of methods of advancing Communist hegemony in eastern Asia. Part I, by Lattimore, first reviews the status of the Mongols under the Manchus and the patterns of modern Chinese influence in the Mongolias, here summarizing some of his own earlier writing. In a series of short units he then reviews the Outer Mongolian moves toward liberation from Chinese control and discusses the personal history of two native leaders Sukebatur and Choibalsang in the years during which Outer Mongolia was moving into the Soviet orbit. Interspersed among these short sections lie others that comprise the real message of the volume. The old feudal dependency of a minor state upon a strong neighbor is contrasted with the modern position of a Communist satellite state alongside Soviet Russia, the anatomy of satellitism is briefly examined, and the political orbit of a satellite is studied. Though these latter sections are brief, they afford an outline of how and why Outer Mongolia now lies within the frame of Russian political regionalism rather than within the Chinese world. This is a real contribution to the understanding of political processes and political history of eastern Asia.

Part II of the volume is a translation by American Owen Lattimore and Mongol Urgungge Onon of a Communist prize-winning biography of Sukebatur, an early Mongolian nationalist who died young in 1923. Sukebatur perhaps was a natural native hero to the Mongols; in this biography he emerges as a great political revolutionary hero who liberated his people from the bondage of Chinese and Mongol exploiters and who, incidentally, properly aligned his people with the peoples of Soviet Russia. The biography was used in the first part of the book to illustrate the political processes of the orientation of Outer Mongolia toward Russia and to point up Outer Mongolia's role as the trial horse in the development of satellite states.

This volume is unduly brief in some sections, but one can hope for more on the same subject. Lattimore, distracted by other matters while preparing this study, gives evidence of his distraction both in the text and in the footnotes; the latter often are more than explanations of a point of text. I was instructed by the text; I thoroughly enjoyed the footnotes, and I was led to read every word of the text, if for no other reason, than by my curiosity as to how far afield the next footnote might lead me.

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The Economic Development of Malaya. Pp. xix, 707. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1955. $7.50.

This excellent report was prepared by a general survey mission organized by the International Bank. The mission found in Malaya much the same problems as in other underdeveloped countries, although some problems were much more severe than others. Malaya's population is growing at one of the fastest rates in the world, the rate being more than 3 per cent a year in the federation of Malaya and more than 3½ per cent a year in Singapore. The economy's dependence on external trade is extreme. Exports of rubber, tin, and other primary products account for one third of Malaya's gross national product. Imports of food, textiles, petroleum products, and other manufactured goods account for one third of its gross domestic expenditure. Fluctuation in export earnings is extreme also.

On the other hand, the Malayan economy

has in some ways been faced with less severe problems than other underdeveloped countries. Levels of living are the highest in Asia. The structure of the economy is relatively advanced, with a good deal of commerce and light industry to balance the extractive industries. To date, there has apparently been plenty of private capital for most needs. Until recent years, a good deal of this came from abroad. In the few years of the Korean war, a good deal was available from Malaya's very high export earnings. Private initiative is reported to be abundant, although apparently evidenced primarily by the Chinese, Indian, and Pakistanis, who together comprise more than 50 per cent of the population. Suitable labor has been available. Land tenure and agricultural credit have been minor problems, not nearly as bad as elsewhere.

For the future, these appear to be the critical problems of Malaya:

1. Integration of the almost equally balanced Malayan and Chinese (and Indian) populations (hardly mentioned in the report but obviously a very significant problem).
2. Lowering the very high birth rate.
3. Financing of the wide range of public investment proposed in the report, and of the private investment which this public investment program and other recommended activities are intended to foster. As political uncertainties now prevent and are likely to continue to prevent substantial new private capital from flowing into Malaya, and as the government is being pushed into using more and more governmental revenues for expanded education and other social services, private domestic capital will need to play a large role in investment. Yet the inadequacy of institutions to mobilize savings and the absence of traditions of investment of private capital in other than family enterprises combine to make unlikely any substantial increase in the present rate of private investment. Gross investment has apparently been about ten per cent of gross national product in recent years, with gross savings somewhat less. As the report points out, this is probably not enough to keep up the recent growth in employment opportunities and production (much of which has been due to the Korean boom). Unless this level of investment is substantially expanded (which seems unlikely) per capital levels of living will decline.

Although generally excellent, the report hardly discusses labor at all (there being no technical report and apparently no specialist in this field in the mission). It avoids any discussion of family planning measures. It presents no broad program to increase private saving, although some attention is given to improving the market for government bonds and for utilizing savings deposits more aggressively. Finally, the index is less useful than the generally good text deserves.

The Bank and its missions have an enviable record of objective and competent economic studies of selected underdeveloped countries. It would seem desirable, however, for future missions to give more specific attention to the particular elements and problems, such as those noted above for Malaya, which are not ordinarily stressed in conventional economic analyses, but which are likely in each case to be key factors determining the rate of economic development.

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J. C. VAN LEUR. *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History.* Pp. xix, 465. The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955. (Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.) $4.00.

The volume consists of the English translation of the major works of a young Dutch historian, whose untimely death deprived Holland of one of her most promising scholars. It includes van Leur's dissertation, a study of historiography, an essay on the social and economic conditions of Southeast Asia in the period 1500–1650, and three reviews, with voluminous notes, extensive bibliography, index, and cover maps.

The theme is Asian sea trade with particular emphasis on Indonesia. Sharply critizing the practice of employing categories of modern industrial capitalism and of theoretical economics in research into the social and economic history of other ages and places, van Leur depends on Max Weber for a methodology and sociological background of early Asian history. In reports of travelers and officials he finds conclusive evidence of age-old international overseas trade, carried on by masses of foreign travelers as pedlars plying their "splendid but trifling" trade, together with great magnates exercising a dominant control and at times venturing huge sums in fostering political capitalistic enterprises. Indonesia, van Leur maintains, falls wholly within the pattern of this Asian sea trade, with no appreciable variation in its nature from pre-Hindu times to the arrival of the Dutch. In fact, he discounts the value of the setting periods such as pre-Hindu, Hindu-Javanese, and Islamic epochs in a history of Indonesia.

In the essay on "The World of Southeast Asia, 1500–1650," van Leur demonstrates that the Portuguese and Spanish voyages were military in nature, and intra-Asian overseas trade continued unimpaired. Dutch voyages were trade ventures relatively insignificant in the amount of capital, the number of ships, or the quantity of goods. What footing the Dutch had gained by 1650 was, at most, political rather than economic. There was no question of West versus East, for both in trade and capital Asians were supreme.

In one review van Leur carries the story to the eighteenth century, sharply criticizing the view of a languishing, retarded Indonesian world. Rather, economic activity expands and the "closed continuity" of the international sea trade is still in evidence. The fact that the Dutch Company had fallen to maritime impotence in the face of British competition has no bearing on the total picture.

Throughout, van Leur emphasizes an Indocentric point of view for Indonesian history rather than depicting "from the deck of the Dutch ship, the ramparts of the fortress, the high gallery of the trading house." Yet his material stems from contemporary notices, the official records, and voluminous reports of the Europeans penetrating the Southeast Asian scene. The story he unfolds is in direct opposition to that portrayed by earlier Dutch scholars, but his well-documented presentation seems indisputable. A history centered on the Indies rather than an account of Dutch colonial enterprise is both novel and intriguing. Voices have been raised in opposition, but van Leur provides provocative incentive to further research along lines he laid down. Translators and printer have done an excellent job in presenting this valuable work.

A. ARTHUR SCHILLER
Athens, Greece

GEORGE MCT. KAHIN. *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955.* Pp. vii, 88. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956. $2.00.

The author was lucky enough to be engaged on a research project in Indonesia at the time of the Bandung Conference. In addition, he was given press status and had exceptional opportunities both during the Conference and later to talk with many of the principals. Bearing this in mind, as well as the high quality of his previous writings on Indonesia, the book is disappointing. More than half of the eighty-five pages of text are devoted to reprints in whole or in part of the addresses given at the Conference by President Soekarno, Chou-en-Lai, and Nehru, all easily obtainable elsewhere; and the remaining thirty-eight pages contain so many summaries and excerpts from the same type of material that little space is left for critical comment and analysis.

For the reader who does not have easy access to other sources, however, the book provides a compact running account of the Conference with interesting sidelights on the leading participants. The backgrounds are sketched and the achievements noted.

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THE AMERICAS

THOMAS JEFFERSON. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,* Vol. XI: *1 January to 6 August 1787,* Vol. XII: *August 1787 to March 1788.* Pp. xxxiii, 701; xxxviii,

701. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $10.00 each.

Of all the volumes published so far in this historic series, these two are among the finest. Covering the whole of 1787 and the first quarter of 1788, their contents embrace the most stirring events on both sides of the Atlantic. In America, the Articles of Confederation are becoming increasingly unworkable and the weakness of the Union is dangerously evident. Disorders break out in Massachusetts and occasion a fascinating exchange of contrasted attitudes between Jefferson in Paris and the Adamses in London. Then come the constitutional convention and the tense struggle for ratifications. The most illuminating of the letters that Jefferson receives from home are those written by Madison, who, because he was so well aware of the difficulties in achieving agreement, is naturally disposed to defend the new Constitution against criticisms. For his part, Jefferson has mixed feelings. He approves strongly some of the major changes that have been incorporated—especially the decision to create proper organs of government at the center and to separate the three branches. However, he is much alarmed by the indefinite re-eligibility of the President, which he considers can lead along the road back to monarchy and will invite foreign intervention in the elections. Equally, he is perturbed by the absence of a Bill of Rights. The Articles, he concludes, are too weak a government; but the Constitution is too strong. A balanced position has yet to be found. In fact, what Jefferson comes to hope for is that nine states will adopt, and four reject, the document—as a caution that amendments are necessary.

But he who is a constructive critic in private letters about domestic politics is a vigorous defender of American institutions abroad. Frequently he writes back to his correspondents that, whatever difficulties the United States may encounter, the governments of Europe are considerably worse off. He takes pains to point out the defects he discovers in the monarchies and courts and religious intolerance of European countries, and takes pride in the birth of a republic "conceived in liberty." As an independent observer he regards the government of Britain as the one with the least objectionable institutions. But, as a Francophile, he watches eagerly and anxiously for the course of development in Paris. At first, high hopes are raised by the actions of the King and his summoning of the Estates General. Later, a rising crescendo of alarm dominates his comments. The King lacks judgment and devotes half his day to drinking. The Queen is too powerful. The finances are in a bad state and measures of reform are quite inadequate. The need for a representative system is obvious, but it is not introduced, and a revolutionary temper begins to fill the air.

Admiring the philosophy, the culture, and the scientific inventions of Europe, Jefferson is not at home in the social order of the Continent. He takes trips—such as an extended one through the south of France and northern Italy—for the purpose of historical study and an agricultural and commercial survey. But he is homesick for American air, and lonely. Lonelier still, and envious, when John and Abigail Adams depart from London. Nevertheless, through all the trials, Jefferson clings to his original faith. He remains an optimist and a rationalist. He believes that men can be improved if their reason is applied to the reform of their social institutions, and he is supremely certain that it is the opportunity and destiny of the United States to set an example to the world.

LESLIE LIPSON
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Berkeley

DONALD R. SHEA. *The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy.* Pp. xv, 323. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $5.50.

Professor Shea is doubtless right in stressing the practical importance of the Calvo Clause, which he attributes to "the increasingly large number of aliens, many of them United States citizens, who reside [in Latin America] in order to pursue business interests and aid in the development of natural resources." Yet most people in the United States are so ignorant of the Calvo Clause that, if forced to guess its meaning, they would be most likely to identify it as one of those clauses you read about in books on rhetoric.

In one sense the answer would not be completely wrong, for much rhetoric has been expended by our Latin American friends in their efforts to establish the validity of the Calvo Clause and its parent, the Calvo Doctrine. They have been much more successful with the former than with the latter. The Calvo Doctrine, named for the nineteenth-century Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo, was intended to prevent all kinds of intervention, including even diplomatic protection, by amending international law. Today, Professor Shea tells us, the doctrine "has been pretty generally discredited."

On the other hand, many Latin American countries have achieved much the same end by employing the different approach on the Calvo Clause—that is, by requiring foreigners, as a condition of doing business in those countries, to agree to accept the judgment of the local courts as final and not to invoke or accept the diplomatic protection of their own governments. Certain governments, however, including that of the United States, hold that they are not bound by such renunciations since no act of a private person can divest his government of its right and duty to protect its citizens abroad against treatment that fails to measure up to "minimum standards of justice."

The many facets of the important problem thus raised are examined in Professor Shea's learned and enlightening book. Successive chapters deal with the origins of the Calvo Clause, governmental attitudes towards it, discussions of it in Inter-American Conferences, the legal issues involved, and relevant arbitral decisions. In the closing chapter, "The Future of the Calvo Clause," he reaches and explains the paradoxical conclusion that the ultimate success of the Latin American effort to validate the Calvo Clause (which he thinks probable) will "result in its demise."

One minor but nagging question is left unanswered: Why is it that Calvo's own country, Argentina, is "one of the few republics of Latin America that does not adhere to the Calvo Clause" (p. 275)?

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER
University of Pennsylvania

GEORGE PENDLE. *Argentina.* Pp. x, 159. London, New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955. $2.50.

This is a rapid survey of Argentine history, from the arrival of the Spanish to the overthrow of Juan D. Perón, written by an Englishman who resided in the country intermittently from 1930 until 1950. Printed in small type, the book is larger than its size might indicate on first impression. Stress is given to the period of Perón's dominance, but a well-balanced summary of the long years preceding 1943 is included. The author has endeavored not to be too severe with Perón or other political leaders and has generally succeeded. Perhaps he has dealt too mildly with their faults and cruelties. The political and economic phases of the nation's history are emphasized; its cultural life is rather neglected, although some attention is given to the story of popular education. The sections on the foreign relations of the country seem inadequate. Despite these defects, however, Mr. Pendle has presented a valuable summary of the history of Argentina, one of the best that has appeared in the English language. Especially valuable is the ten-page bibliography, which lists several works in Spanish along with many rare books in English and includes a section on Argentine culture.

J. FRED RIPPY
University of Chicago

ORLANDO FALS-BORDA. *Peasant Society in the Colombian Andes: A Sociological Study of Saucio.* Pp. xii, 277. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955. $5.00.

This volume constitutes a highly significant landmark in the sociological study of Latin America. It is the work of a brilliant young sociologist who has maintained the most intimate contact with the people and institutions of his native land and who has at the same time, through prolonged study in the United States, mastered the frame of reference and the research procedures of contemporary North American sociology. Thus equipped by intensive work in one small community, interviewing with the aid of prepared schedules, administering tests, and participating in the daily

activities of the people Fals-Borda was able to observe and record the details of societal structure and processes among the country folk of Colombia in an unparalleled manner. These materials were supplemented by a careful examination of the historical materials and a thorough exploration of the archival materials relating to this part of the world. The net result is a book that deserves careful consideration by everyone genuinely interested in Latin America. Among the most interested readers will be those North American and European sociologists, who themselves have attempted to study Latin American society, and who have realized their own inability to penetrate deeply enough into many of the subtleties and nuances involved.

The book is conveniently and logically divided into four parts, including fifteen chapters and three appendexes; and a glance at these gives an adequate view of the nature and scope of the study. Part I, the Introduction, includes two chapters. The first of these, "From Suna Hamlet to Whistlestop," contains a thumbnail sketch of the history of the community; and the second, "The Place Where the Willows Grow," gives the pertinent detail relative to the physical setting and geographic environment.

Part II, The Social Organization, constitutes the bulk of the study, with chapters devoted to each of the following subjects: "The Morphology of a Neighborhood"; "The Population"; "Man and the Land"; "The Settlement Process"; "Characteristics of Intensive Agriculture"; "Coal Mining, Brickmaking, and House-building"; "The Level of Living"; "Stratification and Social Status"; "Social Institutions"; and "Three Diffused Institutions." Part III, Culture and Personality, is the section which the reviewer believes makes the greatest contribution to knowledge. The three chapters of which it is composed are entitled "The Development of the Peasant Individual," "The Role of Religion in Peasant Life," and "The Ethos of Saucío," respectively. Part IV contains the three appendexes, "The Method and the Field Work," "Natural History," and "Glossary." An excellent bibliography and index complete the volume.

The author has made judicious use of seventeen tables, three maps and one chart, and 24 excellent and highly pertinent photographs. The book itself is carefully designed, beautifully printed, and attractively bound. The author's valuable materials, written in a clear and concise style, are presented in a manner consistent with their importance.

T. LYNN SMITH
University of Florida

A. CURTIS WILGUS (Ed.). *The Caribbean: Its Culture.* Pp. xxvi, 277. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955. $4.00.

This is the fifth volume in an annual series incorporating the papers delivered at the University of Florida's Conferences on the Caribbean. *The Caribbean: Its Culture* is the product of the Conference in Gainesville of 1954. A Curtis Wilgus, historian, and director of Florida's School of Inter-American Studies, is and has been the general editor of this series.

The Caribbean Conference of 1954, like its predecessors, brought together men and women of many fields of endeavor with a common interest in things Hispanic, especially in things Caribbean. Among the participants were found statesmen, writers, journalists, physical and social scientists, academicians, artists, even a dancer. Needless to say, the modes of expression of such individuals vary—from the academic, to the poetic, to the breezy journalistic. The frames-of-reference, the jargon, the thoroughness of exposition would also understandably change from writer to writer.

The book is divided into six parts dealing with the arts, music and drama, literature, education, religion, and cultural concepts of the Caribbean area (loosely delineated as any of the countries touching upon the Caribbean Sea or the Gulf of Mexico). A Foreword by J. Wayne Reitz, new president of the University but old friend of Hispanic affairs, an Introduction by the editor portraying the evolution of Hispanic educational patterns (a first step in understanding Caribbean culture), and a helpful Index prepared by Walter Payne (one of the unsung heroes of these Conferences) completes the volume.

Among the contributors are such well-known persons in the Hispanic area as Federico de Onís, Jaime Benítez, Aníbal Sánchez-Reulet, Kenneth Holland, and Benjamin Cohen, as well as fifteen others known chiefly in their own countries or in their own specialties.

Although many of the contributions to this volume would be of value to the individual with more catholic interests, it should be of especial interest to the student of Caribbean *belles lettres* or humanities. In this light, such chapters as Lisa Lekis' "The Dance as an Expression of Caribbean Folklore," and Luis Vera's "Man and Landscape in Caribbean Architecture," are both interesting and instructive. Joaquín Nin-Culmell in "Contemporary Caribbean Composers" not only surveys the area effectively but also includes a most helpful "discography." David Easton's "Sources for the Study of Caribbean Culture" is an invaluable addition to the bibliographical literature on the region. Sánchez-Reulet's "Essayists in the Caribbean" provides a "rapid inventory" of the scope of this oft-neglected literary genre.

In all, this collection of papers (like the other volumes in the same series) is a credit to Florida's efforts in behalf of Inter-American understanding.

SAM SCHULMAN
Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College

LABOR AND ECONOMICS

JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY and others. *The Challenge of Automation: Papers Delivered at the National Conference on Automation.* Pp. v, 77. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. $2.50.

In the spring of 1955 the Committee on Economic Policy of the Congress of Industrial Organizations arranged a Conference on Automation in Washington, D. C. Several persons not connected with the CIO presented papers. This volume contains the four principal papers and supplementary comments by seven leaders of the CIO.

The four papers were prepared by Joseph C. O'Mahoney, United States Senate; John Diebold, editorial director of *Automatic Control;* Donald P. Campbell of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Walter S. Buckingham, Jr. of Georgia Institute of Technology.

As might be expected from their varying connections, the four authors differ considerably. Most important, perhaps, they do not agree upon the meaning of "automation." To Buckingham "automation is a new technology based on communications and control" (p. 36). Campbell maintains that "the new technology is no different from the old" (p. 24). O'Mahoney feels that automation "represents a problem which came into existence with the first machine tool or even the first wheel" (p. 1). Diebold says, "automation has two quite distinct meanings," and that "automation has come to mean so many things to so many people that I suspect it is losing its usefulness" (p. 13).

Walter P. Reuther of the CIO holds that "automation brings in a new element which marks the beginning of the second phase of the industrial revolution." He and other spokesmen for the CIO offer a number of facts which indicate that through automation we are currently getting large increases in production with decreases in employment.

This reviewer finds himself especially in agreement with the position taken by Buckingham and separately by Reuther. In summary: that automation is different from mechanization and that there is a need for the word; that automation employs new means of control which are beginning to receive widespread application; that along with economic abundance it may bring much technological unemployment; that by forethought and planning it should be possible for man to enjoy the abundance and minimize personal, family, and community dislocations.

Subsequent to the CIO Conference on Automation, the Congressional Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report held extensive hearings on the subject which have been published with the title *Automation and Technological Change.*

It appears that technological unemployment and community dislocation related to

automation will not differ in kind from those produced by mechanization, *but they may differ in extent*. Also, mechanization has come slowly over a period of two or more centuries. Automation may develop ten times as fast. The threat of technological changes to worker, family, and community vary directly with the suddenness of their introduction. In view of the *possible* extent and speed of automation, current attention to the matter is none too soon.

The CIO is to be commended for encouraging thoughtful consideration of this subject, and the Public Affairs Press is to be commended for making the considerations of the Conference available in this volume.

JOHN B. KNOX
University of Tennessee

JOHN P. WINDMULLER. *American Labor and the International Labor Movement, 1940 to 1953*. Pp. xvi, 243. Ithaca, N. Y.: Institute of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1954. $3.00.

Following a short Introduction which demonstrates the increasing interest of trade unions in foreign affairs and their growing active participation in the various American economic and technical assistance programs, the author goes on to describe labor's own foreign affairs, especially its relations with international organizations of trade unions and with national trade union federations. A short survey of labor's international relations before 1940 is mainly based on Lewis Lorwin's outstanding book, *Labor and Internationalism*. Mr. Windmuller's main story starts with the description of the situation in which the international labor movement found itself at the outbreak of World War II. Step by step, the author traces the development which led to the formation of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) which was joined by the Congress of Industrial Organizations while the American Federation of Labor stayed out to follow a vigorous foreign policy of its own—to the quitting of American unions of the WFTU. The step to dissolve world labor unity which the WFTU pretended to represent was finally caused by the latter's rejection of the Marshall Plan. During this period the AFL going alone had established for itself international reputation and, in fact, had been the only real labor spokesman in the United Nations committees where both WFTU and AFL had been represented. The foundation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) which both CIO and AFL joined, and the co-operation of both in the international field, have contributed in the preparation of American labor's unity.

The book goes on to give the detailed history of the ICFTU until the Stockholm Conference in 1950 with emphasis on the activities of the two American federations in this international body.

The author emphasizes that the same forces of aggression which made the American government abandon isolationism had hastened the return of the AFL into the international labor movement, thereby making it impossible for the CIO to join because at that time the International Federation admitted only one federation from each country. It was American foreign policy, especially the Marshall Plan, that forced the CIO and the transportation workers to review their international relations, to sever their ties with the Communist unions and to join the AFL in a new endeavor. According to the author the goals of the American labor movement are to stand up for freedom against the part of the world which spreads slavery, to stand up for democracy as against dictatorship, and to create conditions on the international scene somewhat as they are on the domestic scene: to help bona fide unions to secure a fair share of the fruits of progress. How far the ICFTU will be able to help reach these goals, how far it will be able to play a world role, is the great question.

The painstakingly accurate history of events in the international labor movement in the last period fills a great gap. The book leaves the reader with the strong impression that in the field of international politics American labor's actions reflect accurately the opinions and attitudes of the nation. Not disguised by diplomacy or interpertations of political philosophy, these actions have taken a very simple course, and for just that reason are a very forceful expression of the spirit in this period of American history.

FRIEDA WUNDERLICH
New School for Social Research

DONALD L. MCMURRY. *The Great Burlington Strike of 1888: A Case Study in Labor Relations*. Pp. x, 377. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $6.00.

This is the story of a strike which was, in its way, more important to the eventual course of labor relations in the railroad field than any other. Because it was less spectacular than other strikes in this period, it has not attracted its just share of study in the labor history of the country. In the highly effective use of the injunction against the strikers, it foreshadowed the much more publicized later use of this weapon by employers. And for its size, in this era, it was remarkable for the absence of protagonists of the "public-be-damned—"robber baron" type on the one side and radical ideologists on the other.

All this is set forth admirably by Professor McMurry, with an excellent balance of detail against the broad sweep of events. Having had access to the personal and corporate papers of the employer participants, it would have been easy to overload the narrative with detail from that side. This the author avoids, despite the relative lack of similar material for the union principals in the struggle. It is this lack which prevents the reader from becoming privy to the real thoughts and feelings of the union leaders. Thus, it is Charles E. Perkins, president of the Burlington system, who comes most alive in the drama as it unfolds. Peter M. Arthur, head of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, remains, despite Professor McMurry's best efforts, a figure in but one dimension.

The volume is subtitled *A Case History in Labor Relations*, but it is more than that, for it is also a story of inter-union conflict —of the craft-proud BLE which, in a sense, caused its own downfall by its policy of "going it alone," antagonizing or disregarding the other unions in railroading and, perhaps most of all, forgetting the many engineers and would-be engineers, union and nonunion, who willingly took the place of BLE strikers because of real or fancied grievances against the BLE arising out of previous strikes.

The book is very well organized along combined topical-chronological lines, but avoids the overlap and confusion which often attend this method. Starting with a description of the Burlington system, the author then presents personal material on the Burlington management and, of necessity, gives a somewhat briefer treatment on the union personalities and structure. Data on the economic and total labor movement background is woven in neatly and effectively and then comes, of course, the strike itself. Here little need be said except that a remarkable clarity is achieved to make an absorbing story of these tangled events. Both sides, understandably enough, made their mistakes. Management was, up to the first day of the strike, convinced that the walkout would have much less than the wholehearted support of the engineers on its lines. The union was equally sure that it would be impossible for management to run the trains—that nowhere could be found more than a handful of men to take the places of the striking engineers. Both were wrong, but the union suffered most from its mistake.

Though a reviewer is sometimes thought of as honor-bound to say at least some little thing in a derogatory vein, this reviewer is happy to forego such small opportunity as this admirable volume permits.

HERBERT J. LAHNE
Silver Spring, Md.

MARGARET DEWAR. *Labour Policy in the USSR, 1917–1928*. Pp. viii, 286. London, New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. $6.00.

Scholars rely on documents and "original sources." Journalists rely on first-hand observation and interviews with celebrities. Each tends to be contemptuous of the methodology of the other. Truth can perhaps be approximated, particularly as regards so baffling a phenomenon as the Soviet Union, only through some synthesis of the two techniques. Mrs. Dewar's pro-

cedure in studying the role and status of workers in Russia during the first eleven years of the Soviet regime is limited exclusively to "scholarship." She has apparently never been to Russia and never seen a Russian worker, manager, or commissar on the scene. Her study is based exclusively on published laws, decrees, and ordinances, all of which are neatly summarized chronologically in an appendix of 116 pages, followed by a helpful bibliography of works in Russian relevant to the matters dealt with.

This method has its uses. Mrs. Dewar has made the most of them. The result is a valuable contribution, productive of many new insights and deserving the careful attention of all students of post-1917 Russia. She pin-points, for example, the outlawry of strikes (January, 1918), the transition from "workers control" to "labor discipline," and the origin of compulsory labor in the code of December, 1918. She quotes Lenin in 1920: "Talk of equality, freedom, and democracy in the existing conditions is nonsense. We are waging a class war and our aim is to abolish classes. As long as there are workers and peasants, socialism cannot be achieved." With meticulous documentation, she traces the transitions of Soviet labor policy from pre-Revolutionary aspirations through the initial phase of the regime to "war communism" and then to the development of the New Economic Policy. Scholars, and even reflective journalists, will find here significant new light on Soviet history. Yet the import of the contribution is obscured by lack of perspective and by unfamiliarity with human realities—which usually find expression in governmental decrees only as through a glass darkly.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

DANIEL CREAMER with the assistance of MARTIN BERNSTEIN. *Personal Income During Business Cycles.* Pp. xlii, 166. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. $4.00.

The National Bureau of Economic Research and the U. S. Department of Commerce have been diligently collecting data on national income and business cycles for many years. We are now enjoying the fruit of this patient research in the form of special analytical studies making use of the vast store of accumulated data. Dr. Creamer, working as a staff member of the National Bureau, has provided us with an excellent example. He has explored the relation between personal income and the business cycle within the limits of data currently available. Aggregate personal income has followed a steady long-term upward trend, with considerable fluctuation for shorter periods. What happens to the income structure during the swings in personal income? How do the important segments of personal income (farm, nonfarm labor, property, and so forth) vary in relation to each other? Does the movement of aggregate personal income coincide, lag, or precede turning points in the business cycle? Have the high, moderate, or low income levels gained most over the years? These are the type of questions investigated by Dr. Creamer. The statistical analysis is very thorough and skillfully handled. The small volume is filled with some fifty-five tables and twenty-five charts, but the reader never loses sight of broad meaningful generalizations.

After a short introductory chapter, the long-term shifts in the personal income structure are examined in Chapter II. The relation between the turning points of aggregate personal income to those of the business cycle is presented in Chapter III, and Chapter IV makes a similar analysis for the major types of income within the aggregate. This is followed by several chapters giving more detail for types of income, and Chapter VIII contains a most interesting analysis of the effects of "built-in" government stabilizers. Dr. Creamer summarizes his findings in Chapter IX.

It is impossible to list all the conclusions reached by Dr. Creamer in a short review. However, this reviewer was especially interested in the evidence that in the period 1909–51 labor's share of aggregate personal income has increased from about half of the total income to about two-thirds. Perhaps more significant is the finding that the gain is almost entirely in the lower income brackets, and property incomes have suffered the most loss in relative position. Economists will also be interested in the attempt to measure statistically the effect of government "built-in" stabilizers on aggregate income. Dr. Creamer concludes that agricultural payments, unemployment compensation, and federal personal income taxes have been effective in offsetting something over one-fourth of the loss in disposable income as a consequence of business contraction. There appears to be a basis for the hope that our new techniques may result in a more stable economy after a longer period of experience with their operation.

WILLIAM W. HEWETT
University of Cincinnati

F. ZEUTHEN. *Economic Theory and Method.* Pp. xii, 364. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $6.00.

First written in 1942 when Professor Zeuthen was fifty-four, *Economic Theory and Method* was revised and then translated from the Danish by the author's wife twelve years later. Professor Zeuthen is a respected economist and it is good to have this, his most important work, available in English.

This book is primarily about economic theory rather than being economic theory. Thus Professor Zeuthen does not state axioms and prove theorems, but instead surveys in panoramic fashion the world of axioms and theorems (models) which has been created by economic theorists to "explain" real world phenomena. The book may thus be compared with the *Survey of Contemporary Economics* recently published by the American Economic Association (Vol. I, 1948; Vol. II, 1952). Of the two, Professor Zeuthen's is in some ways more complete; the *Survey,* written by a number of specialists, is more meaty and satisfying. Neither book, however, provides the non-economist with the rounded view of economic theory which may be gained from a first-rate textbook nor with the historical and philosophical background material required to place in perspective the work of contemporary theorists.

In terms of audience, then, Professor Zeuthen has written for the student of economics who needs a series of brief reminders of what he has learned or is supposed to have learned. With this purpose in mind, the book's sixty-four brief chapters are well organized and labeled. Deficiencies are mainly those of definition and rigor—perhaps not too important in a survey volume which is designed to supplement rather than replace the customary text and periodical literature. In this connection, it is exceedingly interesting to notice the marked parallelism between the knowledge of economic theory presumed of a student in Denmark and in this country. As a matter of fact, for this reason Professor Zeuthen's book is a less important event than one might have supposed, that is, the book is not "new" either in terms of Danish or American audiences. It must be emphasized, however, that this judgment would have been somewhat different had the translation been accomplished in 1942 rather than in 1954.

JOHN BUTTRICK
University of Minnesota

WALTER A. WEISSKOPF. *The Psychology of Economics.* Pp. viii, 266. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $4.00.

The Psychology of Economics is more limited in its contents than the title suggests. It examines the psychological foundations of the economic theories of Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Marx, and Marshall; the approach is largely that of psychoanalysis. The minds of men (including those of the economists) are seen as areas of conflict from which escape is sought, partly through conscious rationalization, partly through the subconscious.

According to Professor Weisskopf, Smith, Ricardo, and Malthaus accepted the moral standards of Puritanism, which by their time had become middle-class virtues. The concern of these writers with the labor theory of value is interpreted in terms of their ethics, their other economic theories being tailored to fit. The economists sought a justification of the society in which they lived. Essentially, they were apologists. Yet, with the same basis in the labor theory of value, Marx was antagonistic to the prevailing system. To explain the difference, Professor Weisskopf has recourse to Freu-

dian psychology. Ricardo and Malthus were pro-male. In their production theory, labor was the father and land the mother. Of the two, it was land that appeared inadequate. With population, women were fecund and it was to men that an appeal was made for moral restraint. On the other hand, the labor with which Marx was concerned was the son and not the father of the Oedipus triangle. The son (labor) was hindered from access to the mother (the means of production) by the father (the capitalist). Hence, Marx's attitude was pro-female.

Marshall's significance is found in his providing an economics which made the social system bearable. Rationality in our time performs a socio-cultural function. The "non-rational aspects of the human personality are continuously knocking at the door of our consciousness. They strive for realization. They cannot attain it, because under the present system personality traits which do not conform to the rationalistic and acquisitive ideal of modern industrialism cannot be developed successfully."

This book exaggerates but it contributes something to the understanding of classical economics. The most unsubstantial part of the argument seems to be the sex conflict interpretation. It appears fanciful to see a similarity between the sex investigations of children and Marx's search for a standard of value. On as good grounds, the same parallel might be drawn between child behavior and all research.

EDMUND WHITTAKER
Colorado Agricultural and Mechanical College

HARVEY O'CONNOR. *The Empire of Oil.* Pp. xii, 372. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1955. (Distributed by Citadel Press, New York.) $5.00.

In *The Empire of Oil* Mr. O'Connor, author of *Mellon's Millions, Steel: Dictator, The Guggenheims,* and *The Astors,* continues his study of American big business and has written a book on one of the largest industries in the United States—the petroleum industry.

The former editor and publicity director for the Oil Workers International Union (Congress of Industrial Organizations) and author of an official *History of the Oil Workers International Union* paints a large and broad picture of the industry, domestic and foreign. The first 247 pages and 23 chapters are devoted to many domestic aspects of the oil industry—the character of the major and minor oil companies, the law of capture, leasing methods, conservation, oil reserves, transportation, refining, marketing, prices, profits, jobbers, public relations, advertising, service stations, cooperative oil companies, unions, the relations of the industry and government, offshore oil lands, depletion allowances, and imports and exports. The last 89 pages and 9 chapters relate to the struggle for the world's oil supply in Venezuela, the Middle East, and Mexico, and the need for international control of the petroleum industry. In referring to oil companies and personalities such words as "moguls," "colossus," "shenanigans," "prime fat-cats," "titans," "maverick," and others are freely used.

Samples of the author's generalizations are: that "the political control of the important producing states of Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and California is a simple matter for the great corporations"; that "Secretaries of States seem mere birds of passage and the rise and fall of Presidents are incidents in the prosecution of Jersey's [Standard of New Jersey] destinies"; that "the first important legislation by the Eisenhower regime was the payoff to the oil interests, removing the threat of federal control from offshore resources"; and that "in the free world straddled by the international cartel, the small but steady light of Petróleos Mexicanos shines as a beacon of hope for the oil-rich but poverty-stricken lands of Latin America and the Middle East."

Since the author believes that the oil resources of the United States and the world are controlled by a few giant and greedy corporations, that the oil resources of this country and the world are being squandered under the prevailing law of capture, that federal leasing of public oil lands resembles a racket, that conservation laws are a means by which the major companies control prices, that there is enormous waste in the marketing of oil, and that many other aspects of the oil industry are equally bad, he builds up a case from the beginning of the book to the end for the nationalization of the petroleum industry. "To other countries Pemex [Petróleos Mexicanos] is proof that there is an alternative to domination by Standard, Shell, and Anglo-Iranian."

No effort is made by the author to point out or evaluate the accomplishments of the American petroleum industry or the contribution it has made to the development of this country.

PAUL H. GIDDENS
Hamline University

RALPH W. HIDY and MURIEL E. HIDY. *Pioneering in Big Business, 1882–1911: History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey).* Pp. xxx, 839. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. $7.50.

This is the first of three volumes which are to be published on the history of the Standard Oil. Other histories of this giant corporation have been written but none so scholarly as this one appears to be. The authors have done eight years of meticulous research for this volume. There are eighty-nine double-columned pages of notes, some fifty-two tables, numerous illustrations and maps. If the other two promised volumes compare favorably with this one, the history will approach the definitive standard.

Although the Standard Oil of New Jersey is the central theme of the book, it is not the only corporation discussed. The Standard Oil of New Jersey, organized in 1882, was, by 1892, one of the three largest units of Standard Oil. By 1899 it became the parent corporation of the entire group.

The authors state that the various corporations made available records and documents for their research, and that they submitted the manuscript for accuracy not for advice on interpretations or conclusions. Naturally this is no Ida Tarbell muckraking history, nor should it be.

Early in the life of Standard Oil a group of able business men placed themselves at the head of the group of corporations. The secret of Standard Oil's success, claim the writers, lay in the absolute harmony which existed among the leaders. By 1881 their practices were well established and became precedents for later action. Within five years the functioning organizational pattern of the Standard Oil combination had been set for twenty-five years. During the last twelve years the Standard Oil of New Jersey was the parent corporation. For the first time in America a group of men had effected a system to manage an integrated business for the domestic and foreign markets.

A very significant innovation, aver the authors, of the nine directors of the Standard Oil Trust was their dividing themselves into committees so that they could specialize in various phases of the business. This led to the construction in New York of a large building for the central staff. Among other things which this staff created was an intelligence system which covered the entire United States. The lessons learned, the reader is told, had far-reaching effects on American business.

Throughout the years of building Standard Oil, Rockefeller and his associates were continuously attacked by the public and the press. These men failed to realize the aversion to monopoly and the general association by the public of bigness with monopoly. The actions of this corporation, judged by the standards of the heroic age of big business, were no worse than many others. They reflected the age in which they lived.

The authors treat Standard Oil's foreign expansion during the period when Russia was its chief competitor. As early as 1897 Russia produced 45 per cent of the world's oil and the United States 48 per cent. Changes in market demands and the corporation's adjustment to meet these demands are interestingly discussed.

The phase of Standard Oil's history which is given least attention is labor relations. Certainly some readers will want to know more about employee-employer relationships than can be found in this book. This is a definite contribution to our increasing knowledge of American big business. This reviewer looks forward with pleasure to reading the two forthcoming volumes of the *History of Standard Oil.*

GEORGE C. OSBORN
University of Florida

MURRAY R. BENEDICT. *Can We Solve the Farm Problem? An Analysis of Federal Aid to Agriculture.* Pp. xix, 601. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955. $5.00.

A decline in prices and income for agriculture and an increase in income for both labor and industry make a volume on the solving of farm problems a very timely and interesting one. It is part of the Twentieth Century Fund's comprehensive study of government's farm programs and is well documented with some 700 references. The author realizes the national interest requires that agriculture be in a position to expand output substantially and quickly to meet offshore needs in times of war, but it seemingly cannot reverse the process when the abnormal needs recede. The inelasticity in both demand and supply are considered important factors in quick adjustment.

The author emphasized the highly competitive position of agriculture as compared to the larger industrial enterprises and the larger and stronger labor unions. The book contains sections that praise agriculture's contribution to society; the author sets a pace for the industry's publicists who are concerned about agriculture's public relations.

Mr. Benedict devotes the first eleven chapters to explaining the causes of the conditions of agriculture during the last half century and the diverse and far-reaching efforts that the federal government made to relieve the unfavorable agriculture situation that followed war inflations. He describes two depressions and the various agencies adopted to offset them. He emphasizes that our program today is an outgrowth of depression and war coupled with a shift to mechanized farming brought on by an increased demand for manpower and increased production during World War II. He suggests that if it had not been for the war, America would have remained in a relatively depressed condition up to 1950 and beyond, probably in spite of government efforts to better its situation.

But of special interest are the recommendation of the Twentieth Century Fund's Committee on Agriculture Policy in answer to the question of the title, "Can We Solve the Farm Problem?" The Committee makes suggestions involving the situation of wheat, cotton, corn, and butter. It discusses the rate of government credit programs, how export markets can be strengthened, and the conservation of soils.

The Committee urges that the future agricultural programs adopted should look to positive and constructive aid in bringing both supply and demand into better balance. It believes ". . . the most urgent problem before us now is to establish a sound basis for continuing progress in dealing with the longer-term problems in agriculture and for meeting special problems as they arise."

In a way, Mr. Benedict's book is a history, but it is comprehensive enough that policy makers can learn much from it that perhaps they do not already know.

A. F. VASS

University of Wyoming

SOCIAL WELFARE AND PHILOSOPHY

CHARLES LIONEL CHUTE and MARJORIE BELL. *Crime, Courts, and Probation.* Pp. xv, 268. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. $4.75.

Charles L. Chute was "Mr. Probation" to many of us to whom probation and probation officers were a daily concern. This quiet and dedicated man knew the futility and wastefulness of imprisonment. He had faith in individualized treatment of the offender outside prison walls. He devoted a lifetime to setting standards, expanding services, and winning support for probation.

Crime, Courts, and Probation, begun by Mr. Chute and finished after his death by his associate and co-worker, Marjorie Bell, is the story of the development of probation.

The opening chapters tell of the barbarity of ancient criminal law. "For centuries death inevitably followed conviction of any serious crime—death by hanging, stoning, disemboweling, flaying alive or burning." It neither deterred the criminal nor protected society; the pickpocket plied his trade at public hangings when pocketpicking was a capital offense. To soften the brutal severity of the punishment, judges

invented devices such as Benefit of Clergy, Judicial Reprieve, Recognizance, and Prison Reform.

Probation seems to be the last step. "Rudimentary ideas of individual social treatment began to appear in cases of children . . ." early in the nineteenth century in England. Even the lustiest of the "punishment" school must have had some misgivings about the effectiveness of executing a nine- or ten-year-old child on the gallows or throwing him in prison. And in 1841, in a Boston court, John Augustus, a cobbler with a charitable heart, asked that a ragged, wretched drunkard be entrusted to him for supervision.

This was the beginning. The end, if by end we mean general acceptance by courts and legislators of probation, was long in coming. Witness the fact that probation was not finally extended to the federal courts until 1925, forty-seven years after enactment of the first state probation law, and not until thirty states had followed suit. It is difficult at this time to conceive that once learned judges and legislators were vigorous in their opposition to probation.

The book is more than history. There are chapters devoted to the techniques of probation, standards, training, case loads, salaries, all pointing to an implied thesis of the book—that probation has now attained the status of a profession and deserves better treatment.

The book concludes with a chapter by Judge Louis Goldstein, of Brooklyn, entitled "My Six Probationers." He tells of a crime wave started by seven young men, their ultimate arrest and conviction, and how six of them were saved from a life of crime by the use of probation. Here is probation technique at its best.

The book should prove valuable to students, probation workers, judges, and editorial writers who are often critical of probation and parole. It answers all questions about the profession except one: How can courts obtain the necessary funds to get trained workers who will be paid decent salaries and not be overburdened by impossible case loads? Another book will have to be written to answer this one.

NOCHEM S. WINNET

Crime Prevention Association of Philadelphia

HERMANN MANNHEIM. *Group Problems in Crime and Punishment, and Other Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law.* Pp. x, 309. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955. (Distributed by Grove Press, New York.) $5.75.

This present volume is a collection of articles, lectures, reports, and reviews written by Professor Mannheim over the past twenty years. The book apparently takes its title from the lectures on two widely separated problems; one is the problem of petty pilfering by otherwise honest people and the other is the place of the open camp in penal reform. From a theoretical viewpoint, the first is closely related to Sutherland's concept of the white-collar criminal and the hypothesis that crime is often due to group influences rather than to any personal characteristics of the offender. Consequently, those who are concerned with the offender's punishment or treatment should draw the inescapable conclusions. The second reports on the Hawkspur Camp experiment, also known as the Q Camps, based on the principle of shared responsibility by inmates and staff. This particular camp was discontinued because of the war, but the work is being carried with adaptations in other places.

American readers will be especially interested in the chapters on American prisons and American criminology. Based on Professor Mannheim's visit to this country in 1953, he comments on the size of American prisons, the prison riots, and prison programs. While some of the details are now a bit out of date, Mannheim's observations are pertinent and sound. The chapter on American criminology praises the self-criticism of criminological research which has led to unpopular conclusions, that is, that the foreign immigrant is no longer blamed for our high crime rates, that American society and not the Negro must bear the

blame for much of crime among Negroes, that "white-collar criminals" are in fact "habitual criminals."

A lengthier chapter, devoted to the "Sociological Aspects of the Criminal Law," was originally prepared in 1949 as a lecture at the University of Utrecht. The substance of this chapter is the attempt to differentiate the sociology of law from the sociological study of crime as a social phenomenon. One point which Mannheim stresses is the argument that the criminal law must pay more attention to the mass character of modern society and to the fact that most human effort is now dependent on team work, or at least influenced by the mass atmosphere.

In the chapter on "The Sociological Study of the Adult Offender" Professor Mannheim deplores the absence of the sociologist in the penal institutions, particularly in view of the growing evidence of the relationship of the changes in values and attitudes to group membership. Deserving special attention are the three lectures devoted to methodological problems of criminology, the central question being the possibility of experimental research in criminology. The scope of the controlled experiment in criminological research, he believes, is probably more limited than in most areas of social science.

This collection of many of Professor Mannheim's scattered writings within one volume is a welcome addition to his more systematic treatises in particular and to our store of criminological literature in general.

JAMES V. BENNETT
Federal Bureau of Prisons

MILTON GREENBLATT, RICHARD H. YORK, and ESTHER LUCILE BROWN, in collaboration with ROBERT W. HYDE. *From Custodial to Therapeutic Patient Care in Mental Hospitals: Explorations in Social Treatment.* Pp. vii, 497. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955. $5.00.

In 1792 Philippe Pinel struck off chains used to control the mentally ill whose raving minds were beyond the comprehension of their fellow men. The Paris Lunatic Asylum became less of a bedlam. The dramatic consequence of this act of kindness led to the abolition of the odiously visible method of restraint throughout the world. But hospital administrators quickly developed more subtle forms of psychological and physical restraint. At Boston Psychopathic Hospital there were many months during which one-quarter to one-third of the patients were either locked in seclusion at one time or another or subjected to physical restraint for disturbed behavior. In August 1947 patients were in seclusion for a total of 996 hours. Seventeen months later this method of restraint was reduced by 95 per cent. The methods used to accomplish this were later introduced at the much larger Bedford Veterans' Hospital with even more spectacular results. Within a ten month period the number of patient hours spent in seclusion dropped from 2,900 to 26.

This was one of the many changes following the planned introduction of a program of *sociological* or *administrative therapy*. It is based on simple principles: Patients are admitted to a mental hospital because they are unable to communicate effectively with their fellow men. Often they are too sick to be reached therapeutically on an individual basis. The hospital therefore needs to be organized to create minimal stress for them and encourage them to become resocialized.

In line with this theory, patients were treated more thoughtfully in more cheerful surroundings. The formerly commonplace trauma and struggles of admission became a rarity. Steps were taken to motivate the hospital personnel to take an interest in patients at all levels of responsibility. Attendants were allowed to read the charts of the patients under their care and responded by doing more for them. They understood more. The rigid and demoralizing caste system among the staff was mitigated. "Patient government" councils were set up and many inmates responded by becoming more active, more socially responsive, and more helpful to each other.

The reader will find this book to be an exciting account of how social theory about mental disorders and institutions was translated into a specific treatment program. It has great practical potentialities. It requires no great outlay of additional funds. Much can be done without recruiting more personnel, especially psychiatrists, whom the medical schools cannot supply. The book does not belittle the existence of obstacles to such changes, but it shows how many of them were overcome in two hospitals. The hope and promise for the improvement of mental patient care implied in this sociological treatment approach have not yet received the publicity of *Serpasil* and other new drug therapies, but they warrant it.

JOSEPH W. EATON
Western Reserve University

DANIEL S. ROBINSON. *Crucial Issues in Philosophy: Studies of Current Problems and Leading Philosophers From the Standpoint of Philosophical Idealism.* Pp. 285. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1955. $5.00.

Here is a well-matured sheaf of essays from Daniel Robinson's workshop that have been prepared for a variety of occasions. They reflect the ripe reflection of a respected American idealist who has held some distinguished chairs of philosophy.

As director of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California, Dr. Robinson was known as an influential associate editor of *The Personalist*. He has a list of five other books to his credit and has edited a half-dozen more. This plus numerous articles and reviews that have been appearing in leading philosophical journals for the last twenty-five years.

These essays were given as lectures in many instances before the Philosophy Forum at the University of Southern California and before the Institute of Philosophy held by the College of the Pacific at Lake Tahoe. Most of the rest were written for philosophical journals. There is in consequence a scattering of reference in them and some considerable spread in the "crucialness" they manifest. A few are more interesting to the historian in philosophy and to the specialist than to the uninitiated reader. Part I is of interest to the general reader, but Part II holds the attention only of those who have sufficient knowledge of the particular philosopher in question to profit from domestic warfare among scholars over interpretations of him.

Robinson invites most all comers to drink from the deep spring of idealism before they get off the premises. His belief that philosophy is a critique of existing social organization and a supplanting of current cultural values by a more ideal social order (cf. pp. 96–97) ties philosophy too close to social experience. Man's puzzles and achievements lie in other phases of his experience too, as indeed Robinson's own thought implies when he is not defining philosophy. He insists quite properly, however, that the right and duty to philosophize can be escaped by none (p. 140).

For the nonprofessional philosopher, there is good nourishment in "The Ethical Foundation of Democracy" (Chapter IV), "The Ethical Treatment of Dependent Peoples" (Chapter VII), "Optimism in a World of Crises" (Chapter IX), and "The Right to Be Wise" (Chapter XV). Evaluation two generations later of Royce (Chapter XVI) and Spengler's *Downfall of the West* (Chapter XX), is also rewarding. As for the rest, one may feel he is learning a little more about penguins than he wants to know about penguins.

Robinson is an able scholar. It is reassuring to know that he has been invited to continue his trade as a Whitney Scholar after the normal age of retirement.

LOUIS WILLIAM NORRIS
MacMurray College

EUGENE PYZIUR. *The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin.* Pp. viii, 158. Milwaukee, Wisc.: Marquette University Press, 1955. $4.20 cloth; $3.00 paper.

The exhilirating personality of Michael Bankunin has been a source of study for many students of history. Monumental works have appeared in recent years. Suffice to mention the two-volume work of A. A. Kornilov, the revealing volume of V. O. Polonsky, and the four-volume study of Yu Steklov. In 1937 Edward H. Carr published an outstanding volume on Bakunin, not to mention the earlier works abroad of Nettlau, Masaryk, and others. Simultaneously there appeared in print the extensive personal papers of Bakunin carefully edited by Soviet and other scholars. More recently G. P. Maximoff compiled the

selected writings of Bakunin (Glencoe Press, 1953), which despite the negative criticism of Mr. Pyziur add a useful sourcebook for the English-reading students. Now comes the present slender volume which is devoted to a study of the doctrine of Bakunin's political faith.

The motivation for undertaking a new work is sound. A closer examination, however, reveals that little has been added to the already known facts. The sources employed by the author are well known. Strangely enough, the very sources which the author often criticizes as inadequate constitute the basis upon which his thesis is constructed. After analyzing Bakunin's revolutionary surge at securing human liberty, Mr. Pyziur concludes that at best it leads to unrealizable ideas, at worse it is bound to lead to a dreadful tyranny. Granted. Regrettably, however, he fails to develop a far more prophetic aspect of Bakunin's doctrine, namely, that any state, even a proletarian dictatorship, spells tyranny.

One can not fail to agree with Mr. Pyziur's conclusion that "Bakunin came very near to realizing that this authority of [future anarchist] society itself may be so tyrannical as that exercised by the state. . . . This assumption shakes the very foundation of his doctrine as based on the simplified formula of liberty versus government, which holds that the state is the sole and unconditional enemy of liberty." In the light of recent experience this could be driven far more effectively.

The relations of Russian bolshevism to Bakuninism is also a subject that deserves more extensive treatment. One often hears the assumption that Bakunin could serve as the symbol of the "Russian soul." It is a well established fact that the "soul of Bakunin" left a much deeper imprint and inspired much more profoundly revolutionary thought and action in the Latin countries than in Russia, notably in Spain.

Mr. Pyziur's study is provocative and irritant because of its brevity and because his most challenging views casually scattered throughout this slender study cry for lengthier discourse.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR
Stanford University

SUZANNE LABIN. *The Secret of Democracy.* Translated by Otto Albrecht. Pp. 258. New York: Vanguard Press, 1955. $5.00

Suzanne Labin's *The Secret of Democracy,* translated from the French, is one of the most thoughtful tracts of our time. Miss Labin has the happy facility of seeing the essential and finding rich and forceful expression. She asks the important questions about both democratic and totalitarian rule. Armed with acute use of the most penetrating literature on politics, and her own searching probes, she demolishes the dictatorships and demonstrates the calm realities of democracy. Political judgment, a use of psychoanalytic insights, and historic perspective join forces in Miss Labin with an ability to write memorable language.

The simplicity of many of the chapter headings whets the appetite for this book. "Every man bears within himself a dormant fascist." "Is democracy stagnant and totalitarianism dynamic?" "Are democracies more corrupt than dictatorships?" "Is democracy essentially weaker than dictatorship?" "Do transcendent causes justify the sacrifice of freedom?" The author deals both with Marxist criticism of bourgeois democracy and the criticism of conversatives. She closes by considering the causes of the modern outbreak of totalitarianism and with a defense of progress. The essential horrors of totalitarianism are spotlighted, and the most important characteristic of democracy: perfectibility, not perfection. In dealing with conservative critics of democracy, she demonstrates that the self-consecrated élitists are not well-educated, and she challenges systems of education which are more interested in filling minds than in teaching minds to think.

The riches of Miss Labin's book defy summary. In dictatorships, she explains how a people which refrains from criticism refrains from thinking. Then, whatever the crimes, it "remains innocent in the eyes of the masses." Neutralists judge tyrannies by their intentions and democracies by their results. Remorse over one miscarriage of justice keeps the neutralist from seeing the crime of ten thousand executions.

Democracy has proved the truly dynamic form of government, and dictatorships have been static and regressive, dynamic only in eliminating opponents. The *auto-da-fé* of book-burning by modern totalitarians exceeded a thousand years of suppression by religious groups. If democracy has corruption, the dictatorships reek with it and extortion. Totalitarians have deluded the people about their strength. The democracies have been really strong because they have provided effective government. "The chief virtue of democracy lies in the faculty of self-correction, totally lacking in totalitarianism."

Miss Labin strikes a mighty blow against nationalism, wherever found, against the imposture of historicism, against transcendent causes. She reasserts faith in democracy by demonstrating that it has achieved real progress. Her faith is tempered and thus provided with an immunity to fanatics by recognizing "that the slow geological toil of human societies, like those of the earth, form only impure ores." The mote in Miss Labin's eye is that she overlooks some areas of progress in dictatorships. Also, the new shift in the Soviet Union may require new judgments about the future of that dictatorship.

DALE PONTIUS
Roosevelt University

CARL W. GRINDEL (Ed.). *Concept of Freedom.* Pp. xii, 512. Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. $10.00.

The comment of one author respecting his own contribution exactly describes this volume as a whole: it is neither "exhaustive" nor "original." To those who know Roman Catholic doctrine, this is "old stuff." Aquinas and the Roman Catholic Church have the answers to all problems in particular and general. Where the *particular* answer is not available, there is always the general.

Personally I have no objection to such absolute certainty. After all, it is logically possible that some of the things said may be more right than wrong. However, for myself, I apply two tests as to whether the logically possible is really significant: do the given "truths" or "formulae" solve problems men face today; and are opposing points of view stated so that opponents will agree they have been fairly stated? Unfortunately I am compelled to say that this volume does not pass either test. The Church, in its long history, has nowhere achieved in practice a solution to human problems satisfactory to even the Christian world. The contributors, on the other hand, consistently misinterpret opponent philosophies. For example, instrumentalism and dialectical materialism, in their own particular fashions, stress "objectivity of truth" and the presence of "novelty," "creativity," and "contingency" in the world. Again, it is sheer misinterpretation or ignorance to say that "midcentury materialism" opposes "any type of restraint."

The originality of the contributors can be assessed by the following sort of aphorisms liberally sprinkled through the pages of the volume: "Education is better than revolution"; "wisdom is better than folly"; "the state is really permanent"; "no man is free to do whatever he wishes under any circumstances"; "the answer to all problems is to believe in God."

One is certainly left with the impression that the failure of the contemporary world to solve its problems follows from its stubborn refusal to embrace Roman Catholicism and Aquinian philosophy. One almost obtains the impression that the American Bill of Rights was a Catholic invention.

The best paper in the volume, "Freedom in the International Society," could have been written by a non-Catholic. Only in the introductory pages does the Roman Catholic intrude but hardly noticeably. This paper is an excellent description of the efforts which have been made and are being made to establish an international charter of human rights.

One last comment! I find it difficult to understand why this volume was given a special award.

RUBIN GOTESKY
University of Georgia

MORTON GRODZINS. *The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason.* Pp x, 320. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. $4.00.

The Loyal and the Disloyal is a thoughtful analysis of the nature and development of loyalties, and it is highly relevant to

many political and social problems of our time. Our survival and that of our institutions may depend upon understanding the issues involved and developing reliable cues to guide us. We must neither blind ourselves to the threats of subversion nor mistake all social criticism and deviation to be signs of disloyalty. The question of who is loyal is as complex as it is important. Professor Grodzins, chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, writes with an earnestness which reveals his concern and seriousness.

The book is divided into five sections. In Part I, the author develops his concepts and discusses in a very neat chapter the rise of the national state and national loyalty as the supreme loyalty. Part II contains a keen analysis of loyalty in democratic and totalitarian states. In support of his thesis that loyalty is withdrawn when a group or institution ceases to provide satisfactions, Professor Grodzins describes in Part III the repudiation of America by large numbers of Japanese-Americans who were detained in Relocation Centers during World War II. Part IV presents a model and raises questions for further research. In Part V, Some Policy Conclusions, the author is severely critical of our loyalty investigators.

Professor Grodzins contends that loyalties are "given to institutions and persons that provide life satisfactions." Patriotism depends upon "the prospect of some reward." One is not loyal to abstractions but "to specific groups, specific goals, specific programs of action. Populations are loyal to a nation as a by-product of satisfaction achieved within non-national groups, because the nation is believed to symbolize and sustain those groups. One fights for the joys of his pinochle club when he is said to fight for his country."

Even if one accepts this view of loyalty, the question of how to measure life satisfactions remains unanswered. Why do many persons with apparent plenty turn disloyal and the disinherited remain steadfast? This dilemma becomes apparent with the analysis of disloyalty among Japanese-Americans. If deprivation and rejection prompt disloyalty, one is hard put to explain why the great majority of Japanese-Americans undergoing the same experiences remained loyal. The author is quite aware that personal factors are involved here, but these are not explained and may well be decisive.

We are told that the intent of this book is to "bring the methods and insights of modern social science to grips with a crucial national problem." Social scientists seem to be under some compulsion to proclaim this even when science has little to say about the issue and when the methods used bear little resemblance to those usually labeled "scientific." Such is the case with this volume, which does not detract from its being a well-written and important book.

DONALD P. KENT
University of Connecticut

ADAM YARMOLINSKY (Ed.). *Case Studies in Personnel Security*. Pp. ix, 310. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1955. No price.

This is a compilation of 50 case histories, taken from a current total of 230, collected in the course of a study still in progress, of several hundred such cases arising under various Executive Branch federal personnel security programs.

Financed by the Fund for the Republic, Inc. and prepared under the direction of a Washington attorney assisted by a large staff of lawyers throughout the country, the study, according to the Director's introduction, is designed "to provide useful and . . . essential material for an understanding of how the security programs operate from day to day."

It is pointed out by the Director that the case histories were collected, with the consent of the employees involved, from the files of the lawyers who advised or represented them, and that government files were not available to the interviewers, with the result that the reports are incomplete.

Although the cases studied are classified under five categories (government civilian employees, industrial employees, military personnel, port security, and international organization employees), major emphasis has been placed upon the first two categories which include 46 of the 50 cases presented (31 government civilian and 15 industrial).

In general, the case studies follow a uniform pattern, beginning with the Executive Order or Public Law under which the proceeding was brought, followed by a brief statement of relevant facts, and additional pertinent background material. There is then set forth a statement of the charges, the employee's response, a summary description of the hearing, and a summary statement of the result. This usually includes the amount of time elapsing between the service of charges or suspension (if any), the final disposition, the approximate amount of time devoted to the matter by counsel, and the fee charged.

The factual patterns of the case histories vary from direct allegations of membership and participation in organizations cited by the Attorney General or the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or participation in related activities, to vague generalizations regarding the employee's associations and beliefs, or those of his wife, family, or close associates.

The results vary considerably, with some boards ruling in favor of the employee in some cases, on information or materials similar to that upon which the same board or boards in other cases have based a ruling against an employee.

Taken at its face value, this study appears to reveal that there is either a lack of uniform standards in personnel security proceedings or a lack of uniformity in their application; that trained and qualified personnel is needed to staff the initial and appellate bodies handling these cases; that action is needed to speed up the consideration and disposition of these proceedings so as to eliminate time lags of three months to three years between the filing of charges, or suspension, and final disposition; and that some attention should be given to the need of either providing counsel for employees involved in security proceedings, if they so desire or are unable for financial reasons to retain counsel, or providing for the award of a reasonable sum of money for counsel fees in those cases where an employee has been cleared.

All in all, the volume adds nothing to what is already well known concerning security personnel proceedings. Most of the revelations of the study have been fully explored by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations in its hearings, a year ago, on Senate Joint Resolution 21, to establish a Commission on Government Security; and by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service in the hearings on the administration of the Federal Employees' Security Program, held last summer. Furthermore, the entire subject is now under intensive examination by the newly created Commission on Government Security.

For the most part, the case studies are cumulative and make boresome reading. When one has examined five or six, one learns nothing by reading further. More important, however, is the fact that since government records were not available to the investigators, no light is shed on the merits of the cases, and a true cross section appears to have been precluded because of the necessity of obtaining the employee's consent to the inclusion of his case in this collection. Therefore, there is serious doubt as to whether this study has any value at all. Finally, and perhaps most important, is the fact that according to the latest available figures from the United States Civil Service Commission, firings for cause in security proceedings, between May 1953 and March 1955, totaled 3,432; resignations by employees whose files contained unfavorable information, against whom charges had been filed, but who had resigned prior to the determination of their cases, totaled 5,447 (See Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, United States Senate, pursuant to S.Res. 20, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 407). This raises a serious question as to whether or not a study of fifty selected cases is really indicative of anything.

In the last analysis, the difficult problem of how to protect the national security, national defense secrets, and public and private defense facilities from subversion without impairing the basic rights of federal employees and others involved remains to be solved. It is hoped that the Commission

on Government Security will supply the authoritative materials upon which to base further appropriate governmental action.

ELI E. NOBLEMAN

Washington, D. C.

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE. *Fraternities Without Brotherhood: A Study of Prejudice on the American Campus.* Pp. xii, 159. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955. $1.95.

Three years ago the National Committee on Fraternities in Education was formed by a group of well-known educators, clergymen, and civic leaders. Among its several purposes was that of determining the extent to which college fraternities and sororities practice racial and religious discrimination. This book is a product of the committee's investigations.

Here, in brief, is what the book says: the chief defect in the social fraternity is "Aryanism"—the acceptance and rejection of persons for membership on grounds of race, religion, and national origin. To the extent that Aryanism persists in them, fraternities represent "a basic threat to democracy." Their continued existence depends upon their willingness to eliminate such discriminatory policies. The fraternity can be a valuable social experience for young men and women, affording them an approach to problems of human relations different from that of the classroom and other noncurricular activities. As a matter of fact, the great majority of undergraduates are opposed to the exclusive, undemocratic, discriminatory policies imposed upon them; but student pressure for change has been stalled because "college administrators have proceeded with great caution and national fraternity leaders have dragged their feet." Even so, certain fraternities and certain campuses (Amherst, Dartmouth, Columbia, and Princeton, for example) have become more democratic in their methods of selection. "If wise desegregation decisions are not worked out, the list of colleges without social fraternities will probably continue to grow."

The author, says the book's jacket, is a member of five fraternities. This reviewer must confess to membership in six, and in years gone by he has wasted as much time with them as the next man. He does not regard them as sufficiently important to constitute "a basic threat to democracy," nor does he share the author's faith in their potentialities.

The book offers abundant evidence in support of the thesis that fraternities practice racial and religious discrimination. It describes the various measures which have been taken here and there to counteract such bias. On the other hand, one may question many of the assumptions and generalizations found here. This reviewer thinks "the chief defect" of fraternities is not "Aryanism," but infantilism and anti-intellectualism. He doubts that elimination of discriminatory clauses from their constitutions, adoption of "deadlines for democracy," and the various other devices proposed, will have an appreciable effect upon actual practice. He agrees, rather, with the university president who is quoted in the book as saying, "Education and personal and group convictions will bring us forward faster, and on a sounder basis, than the proposed methods of coercion."

BREWTON BERRY

Ohio State University

EVERETT C. PARKER, DAVID W. BARRY, DALLAS W. SMYTHE. *The Television-Radio Audience and Religion.* Pp. xxx, 464. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. $6.00.

All over Britain, the clergy, distressed by the intellectual lethargy of industrial workers, have been blaming television for the listeners' apathy and their demand for entertainment (Manchester *Guardian,* March 15, 1956). Though extremely critical of television, these clergymen's discussions are based on the impressionistic accounts of clerical observers, who are usually singularly innocent of statistical description.

In the United States, a similar concern among the clergy led to a more typically systematic effort. The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. sponsored a project, supervised by the Yale Divinity School, on the study of the television-radio audience and religion. Everett C. Parker, who administers the Office of Communication of the Congregational-Christian churches, and David W. Barry, of the New York City Mission Society, directed the project, and the professional researcher was Dallas W. Smythe, probably the most experienced and skilled of the social scientists who have engaged in content analysis of television, and former research director of the Federal Communications Commission.

But now I must stop this leisurely, discursive reviewing. Strict space limitations require succinct summary.

This study attempts to understand the effects of religious programs, broadcast by radio and television, on the inhabitants of New Haven, Connecticut. But I should say that it also reveals a great deal in general about these mass communications processes. Part I describes New Haven, its people and churches. Part II contains chapters on what the clergy think about television and radio and an excellent quantitative and qualitative content analysis of selected religious programs. Part III provides information on the diffusion of the radio and television facilities, the availability of programs, the audiences for programs and for specific religious programs. Part IV reports on intensive, lengthy, nondirective interviews carried on by the authors with eighty-nine adult respondents in fifty-nine interviews. This sample is inadequate to provide an acceptable probability sample, but the authors chose to emphasize sensitive analytical procedures rather than assured representativeness. There are chapters on the personality types and traits of the listeners and viewers of Protestant programs, of the Fulton Sheen audience, and of the nonusers of religious programs. The analysis of these extended, tape-recorded interviews is skillfully organized, and those preoccupied with attitude and opinion study have much to learn therefrom. Space limitations have prevented an adequate detailed review of a study in which the skilled research direction of Dallas Smythe and his colleagues is exhibited in qualitative analysis and also in a mass of quantitative materials (there are over 100 tables). All communications experts, religious educators, and many students of American culture should read this.

WILLIAM ALBIG

University of Illinois

DAVID B. DREIMAN. *How to Get Better Schools: A Tested Program.* Pp. xvii, 267. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. $3.50.

This "Story of the National Citizens Commission for the Public Schools" is more a guide book for those persons and groups in individual communities who are ready to follow the trail the Commission blazed than it is a history of the work of a challenging group of devoted citizens.

A three-page initial chapter states the Commission's credo "that school problems are faced and solved (or *not* solved) every week of the year in thousands of communities throughout the nation—but only to the degree that the citizens themselves contribute their thought and energy." There follow five chapters describing dramatic community action for education in as many communities.

Now that the credo has been illustrated by these five examples, twenty pages are given to the story of the Commission. It is largely the story of the Commission's decision to stimulate thousands to think rather than wring out of its own collective experience clear guidance for the American people in adapting their schools to the tremendous transformations in living.

Most of the remainder of the book presents a series of twelve manuals grouped under three headings: The Mechanics of Citizen Participation, The Tools to Use, and Areas for Citizen Action. They are splendidly done. They reflect an all-too-rare awareness of the unique character of the American government system as it applies to public education. They are full of sagacious suggestions and sound advice, drawing upon the rich professional skills of the Commission. Active citizens' groups who follow this guidance will save many headaches for themselves and for the legally responsible school officials.

As an addition to the growing mass of books useful for the general public as well as for educators, this book deserves a high place. As a report of one of the ablest aggregations of men and women who have given much of their time over a half-dozen years to the problem of American education, it seems inadequate. Great as has been the Commission's contribution in its

field of chosen emphasis, this reviewer cannot but believe that an additional volume expanding the insights of its members into problems of our day that transcend the community would be of equal or greater value. This book drops hints here and there that, illuminated with the rich experience of this group of men and women, could well provide much needed guidance for us all.

PAUL R. MORT

Columbia University

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

On the back of THE ANNALS publication is a statement under title of Origin and Purpose as follows: "The Academy was organized December 14, 1889, to promote the progress of political and social science, especially through publication and meetings. *The Academy does not take sides upon controverted questions, but seeks to gather and present reliable information to assist the public in forming an intelligent and accurate judgment.*" Your issue of March 1956, *Racial Desegregation and Integration,* is one of the most biased, prejudiced, slanted pieces of propaganda I have ever read. The article entitled, "The United States Supreme Court and the Segregation Issue," is written by a Doctor of Philosophy at Howard University, a Negro school. If you really wanted to present the facts in this case, why did you not assign this subject to some outstanding constitutional lawyer? Actually, for more than sixty years the law of this land was that segregation was legal. Without changing one word in the Constitution or adding one comma, nine men decided that they would change the meaning of words in the Constitution and rewrite it according to their own political and social philosophy, without the people having any voice in the change of their Constitution. This makes our Constitution, which is the foundation of our government, like the shifting sands of the desert and is a matter which is of grave concern, not only to all the lawyers in the United States, but to a great segment of our population. Nowhere in this article are these facts presented to the people. Furthermore, the same Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment also passed a segregation law for the District of Columbia which would clearly indicate to any thinking person that at no time did they consider the Fourteenth Amendment as taking away the rights of the States to regulate their schools under the "separate but equal doctrine for both races."

The moral or social issue of the segregation of Negroes and whites is also very slanted and biasly presented. What is it in the character of the Negro that makes him sit by a white man in a public conveyance when there are vacant seats available where he could sit by himself? Is it the fact that he wants to show the people that by law he is the equal of the white man? At no place in this issue do I find the question fairly presented. The Negro will never be accepted as the equal of the white man by legislation until he becomes the equal of the white man in character, morals, manners, and intellect. Let's not forget that prohibition was a moral issue, and we tried to solve it by legislation and made a dismal failure. I, for one, am willing to give the Negro equal opportunity with the white to gain an education but, thereafter, it will be up to the Negro race to determine whether they want to elevate their character, manners, and morals to that of the white man; otherwise, they will never be accepted as such. If the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People would start out on a campaign to educate the Negro race that in order to be accepted as the equal of the white man, they must, in effect, become his equal, they would do their people much more good than they can ever accomplish by trying to make of the Negro the equal of the white man by legislation.

I have watched with a great deal of pride the betterment of the Negro race in the South, both from an educational standpoint and from an economic standpoint. I know of no race which has made as much progress as the Negro race has made here in the South with the sympathetic help of their friends of the white people. To drive a wedge between the white and the black in the South is to do the black considerable harm and irreparable injury, and I think it would have been wise if the American Academy of Political and Social Science had presented this matter in such a way as to help the Negro race for a better place in life rather than to pour oil on the fires of animosity and prejudice that are raging throughout our land.

ARCH H. ROWAN

A. H. & C. L. Rowan
Fort Worth, Texas

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FOREWORD

Alexander the Great once asked his architect, Dinocrates, to pick a site and then to draw plans for a new city worthy of Alexander's name. The imagination of the architect seemed equal to the commission. For in proposing Mount Athos in Greece as the site, Dinocrates noted that the contours of the place had a human form and that a city built on such grounds would necessarily have the same. Thus it would forever draw the admiration of later generations and would forever recall the glory of the man who inspired its building.

"But," said Alexander, recalling the barrenness and remoteness of Mount Athos, "on what will the people live?"

"That I have not thought of," said Dinocrates.

Whereupon, the city of Alexandria was built in Egypt. To be sure, it lacked the heady terrain of Mount Athos. But it had an excellent harbor, an interior plain of rich soil, and the irrigating waters of the Nile. People could make a living there.

What passed between Alexander and his architect in this matter can be read as a parable that has its application to American presidential campaigns. For in these campaigns, what holds our attention is the grandiloquent question of *who* shall be President, and what policies may be expected of the victor. What we overlook is of a piece with Alexander's prosaic but crucial point. It is that whoever is chosen as the President, and whatever things are promised in his name, upon his election he will have to live with the Presidency itself and work his purposes through it.

This number of THE ANNALS is addressed to that prosaic and crucial point. It is addressed to the Presidency as an organ of decision, divorced from the present political moment when men and parties are bidding to have the rule of it. The "issues" to the fore are these: First, what place does the Presidency hold in the life of America and the world? Second, what things are expected of the Presidency? Third, are its powers and its structural forms equal to the things expected of it? Fourth, if they are unequal, should any organic changes be made in the present structure of the Presidency?

Each one of these questions invites a full-scale debate. Each encroaches on the others. All, moreover, branch and flare in so many directions as to demand an arbitrary limit to what might be included for comment within the small canvas of these pages. Many topics and many viewpoints that are germane to the leading questions have, of regrettable necessity, been laid to one side from the vetoing force of time, space, and printing budgets. Yet it is hoped that what has survived these imperious no-sayers may commend itself to the thoughtful attention of the reader.

The hope is all the more fervent when one senses how much of modern political history can be written in terms of the quest among nations for an executive that is strong and responsible in the manner of its dealings with social challenges. Strength without responsibility has all too often led to tyranny. Responsibility

without strength has all too often led to social disintegration. Nor is the effect of the quest for responsible power in an executive limited to the territory of the people involved in it. We have the recent reminders of how Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and Stalin's Russia, each sharing the common trait of an executive that picked itself, extolled itself, rewarded itself, and knew no law except itself, became an ambassador of death to neighboring states if not to the world.

If survival power alone is a gauge of merit, then the American executive has a clear title to distinction. For it is the oldest and most continuous form of executive extant among the world's major powers. The authors whose comments appear in this issue of THE ANNALS are keenly aware of that fact. They may and do differ in their views of Presidents. But the Presidency itself is their common hero. And if they intersperse their comments with criticisms, they do so to the end that the hero may be better equipped to play his part in the tremendous world drama in which he is now a leading actor, for upon his motions many things depend.

SIDNEY HYMAN

The Art of the Presidency

By SIDNEY HYMAN

THE worlds of sculpture and music provide the metaphors to describe the dual nature of the American Presidency. For the Presidency is, first of all, a sculptured constitutional *office*, created in a self-conscious way, to hold a specific place and to do predictable work within a fixed system of government. Moreover, it is generally measurable in the person who holds the Presidency, in the scope of his legal powers, in the count of his aides and their power and work.

The Presidency as an *institution* begins where the plastic office ends. In this aspect, the Presidency, like music, is style, key, tempo, and theme. It is a sum of invisible things. It is a repository of wills and ineffable nostalgias, of race memories and expectations, of the spectral past and the limitless future. Here, in the Presidential institution as nowhere else in the stretch of our society, the nation may find an idealized (or licentious) image of what it thinks it was, is, or ought to be.

If this Presidential dualism is fairly drawn, it sets the terms of the President's artistic problem. It is to help meet the boundless expectations of the people, centered in the institution, from within the hard forms of the law centered in the office.

If the President fails to meet those expectations in this way, two results may follow. First, the Presidency may fall from its magic role as the hand guiding national unity and decision. Second, since there is no alternative hand to steady the wheel, the nation, caught in a storm, may answer to the rock. Or if the Presidency meets the nation's expectations but does so outside the law, two added results may follow. First, the President in his own person may be cut down by the courts. Second, the habit of obedience and reverence for the law may give way to a naked willfulness where the law of force supersedes the force of law.

PROBLEMS OF PRACTICAL INTERPRETATION

It would simplify matters if the President's oath of office told him how to deal with this artistic problem. Instead, it compounds his difficulties, for it binds him most solemnly to uphold, protect, and defend the Constitution to the best of his abilities but does not tell him how to uphold, protect, and defend and does not state a standard of "the best." Nor does it permit him a free hand in asserting his version of the best beyond challenge by vetoing agents in the formal organs of the government, in political parties, in allied or enemy nations, or in the massive network of America's private associations—each of these last being a subgovernment in its own right.

Nor is this all there is to his difficulty. Consider a further matter. Consider the President's need to reconcile two opposite principles of representation involving the popular will. The first (to paraphrase John C. Calhoun) can be stated as *the legal rights of the majority based on the rule of numbers.* It holds that 50 per cent of the people plus any fraction of one per cent or more has the right to shape the policies and choose the managers of the government. The second can be stated as *the political rule of interests.* It holds that 50 per cent of the people less any frac-

tion of one per cent or more are also entitled to a voice in the government, or at least to a suspensive veto over the legal majority.

Yet what seems plain enough when put this way becomes treacherously difficult in practice. Is a legal majority of one per cent or more, even if it lends itself to a physical count, sufficient to back an act calling for great sacrifices? In August of 1941, for example, when Congress agreed by one vote to keep the Army in being, was that vote big enough to invigorate President Franklin D. Roosevelt's hand in the field of foreign affairs? It certainly passed the test of what it is that makes for a legal majority, yet it was clearly not a sanction for audacity. By how many degrees, then, must a legal majority be raised before it can presume to be a permissive agent for social effort involving great risks and sacrifices?

Or take the opposite rule of representation. How large must a minority of one less than 50 per cent be before its political interests merit respect? In a specific recent case, it proved very small indeed. President Eisenhower, as part of his foreign policy, offered America and the world the concept of "trade not aid." Yet when an American bicycle industry, employing a little less than 3,000 men, felt itself imperiled by the import of a competitive British product, the industry, representing less than a two-thousandth part of one per cent of America's population, managed to have a tariff slapped on the British product. The effect was perilously near to a torpedoing of the "trade not aid" program while it was still moored in port.

Multiply these two cases many times over, and they form the cross pull to which the President is daily exposed and which he must daily time and negotiate. When a decision is urgently called for, how long should the suspensive veto of a political minority be respected? When should the legal majority conquer and yet spare? When should its triumph be made absolute—even if it is won over the minority by no more than a single vote? Where is the weather vane to distinguish a sudden breeze of popular passion from a prevailing trade wind of deep conviction? When do the people at large or the managers of the government have a better grasp of reality? When is it wise to comply with public opinion and when to defy it? Or can nothing here be known except through 20–20 hindsight?

HISTORICAL PRESIDENTIAL STANDS

The attitudes Presidents themselves have taken toward this artistic problem of meeting the people's boundless expectations within the framework of limited government is inseparable from their general outlook on the meaning of the place they hold in our society. Here, on the historical record, three positional stands are visible.

Buchananism

The first stand, for purposes of identification, bears the name of James Buchanan, not because he invented it, but because he was its starkest exponent. A Buchanan Presidency is legalistic in emphasis. Its concern is more with form than with substance, more with the preoccupations of a civil service reformer and a chief of state than of an innovator in social policy. What it aims to bring the country at large are the virtues of order, decorum, piety, efficiency, honesty, and one hundred cents out of every dollar that is spent.

It sees the Presidency almost exclusively in terms of an office built to the specifications of a written constitution. It has no vital extralegal instruments like a political party to use or to contend with. It is divorced from the argumentative earth. It has little taste for conflict and little humor about it. Its center of gravity and the movement of its parts lie almost wholly within a tight legal circuit involving the Congress and the Court. Nor within that circuit does Buchananism conceive of the President as the main powerhouse of national energy. The President, rather, merely administers the objects and situations which the Congress defines for him. He has no duty first to turn himself into a party pro tem for the whole nation, and then to fight for the right to administer those objects and situations which he, on his own, defines for the Congress. His duty, rather, is discharged when he plainly "tries to get along with the Congress."

Lincolnianism

At the other end is the positional stand bearing the identifying name of Abraham Lincoln. Once again, it was not because he invented it, but because he was its starkest exponent. Political in emphasis, concerned more with substance than with form, a Lincolnian Presidency suggests a patriot king leading troops in battle. What it aims to bring the country are new political readjustments, a rekindling of social hopes, and a will to resolve what is in dispute. The manner of such a Presidency is highly articulate and argumentative, often spendthrift, often passionate, shot through with a will for battle, and always open to the charge that the President is bent on a naked usurpation of power.

It is open to this charge principally because Lincolnianism sees the Presidency as being something more than an office rooted in law, and something more than the name of the Chief Executive. Its center of gravity is in the Presidency as an institution. It views itself as the temporary custodian of the nation's political instincts, just as it imposes on itself the mission of giving those instincts an external and self-aware expression. This is not to say that it raises the President over the Congress. It accepts the constitutional proposition that the President and the Congress must be strong each in its own right; that each has a duty to preserve its own integrity against invasion by the other; that neither can surrender its organic powers to the other even by a voluntary act; that in each case, too, the strength exercised must be proportioned to the work that properly falls to the President as an executive and to the work that properly falls to the Congress as a legislature.

Further than this, it knows that there is a natural ground for strife between the Congress and the Executive by virtue of their structural natures. For the Congress is but a sum of local and regional parts whose expressions are exaggerated or muted by the force of the committee system and the rule of seniority. Moreover, its personality is split between a House representing the people according to their population and a Senate representing the states as sovereign equals. Even so, its composition changes every two years, and in the interval of the years it is often in a state of adjournment.

Lincolnianism recognizes that the Presidency, on the other hand, is national and international. Though the President and the Presidency may be two different things, it is the President, as one man, who is ultimately held accountable for what the many subdivisions of the Presidency do. Nor does this one man ever adjourn. He is always in session, always bound to the task of pursuing America's mission in human history. Above all, Lincolnianism sees the President as the connecting link among many worlds: in the divided world of the government itself; between the world of the people

and the government; and between the United States and the world beyond its shores. And since it is this sort of link, in any dispute with the Congress a Lincolnian Presidency asserts that it has a positive duty to appeal to the people over the heads of the Congress; to gain from the people the political right to confront the Congress and extract from it those legal expressions the President needs if his work is to proceed under the sanction of the law.

Clevelandism

In between the Buchanan and the Lincoln stand lies a middle ground that is hard to name, but we may not be too far off in calling this positional stand Clevelandism. Its traits are a mixture of the two positional stands that flank it. Now it seems to place the center of its gravity in the legal circuit of the office, now in the institution. Now it seems to give Congress its head, now to stop it in its tracks. Now it talks of moving on to new horizons; now it matches every forward step with a backward one. Yet if there is any distinctive trait about Clevelandism, it is the fact that in this type of Presidency the essential power lies in defensive directions—in the veto, in disengagement, in the negation of what others have put in motion, or in the use of executive energy only sufficient to maintain an existing kinetic equilibrium.

PRESIDENTIAL PREDISPOSITIONS

If the positional stands are fairly drawn, we can go on to ask: Is a President free to choose between them? The answer seems to be that he does have a measure of freedom in the matter. That is, he will be a Buchanan, a Lincoln, or a Cleveland President depending in part on his personal temperament, his earlier experiences, the quality of his imaginative and intellectual faculties, and what the pressure chamber of the Presidency itself arouses in his latent capacities. For it is part of the glory and terror of the Presidency that the men fated to embody the place are themselves changed by it: that some men, when put to the test of its powers and responsibilities, show themselves suited for every high station except the Presidency, while others show themselves suited for no high station except the Presidency.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PARTIES

Yet this eccentric human factor to one side, whether a President will associate himself with a Buchanan, a Lincoln, or a Cleveland positional stand will depend on which of three psychological parties are dominant in the land during his administration—and what he can do to change the order of their dominance. The reference here is not to institutional parties like the Republicans or Democrats, nor is it to parliamentary terms like the right, center, or left, or to liberal, radical, and conservative. The reference is to three states of mind with which the institutional parties, like the Republicans and Democrats, in the exercise of their own art must make their peace.

Party of memory

What are these three states of mind that form the stuff of the three psychological parties? First of all, there is the *party of memory*. It can prevail in the land at three contradictory moments. One is when the country faces no acute internal or external threat and is reasonably content with things as they are. The second is when the country has been subjected to a sustained hammering by a problem for which there is no easy solution, though great exertions were made in its name. In this state of affairs, the whole order of politics and existing political leaders can come under a cloud of suspicion. The people then, in imitation of the

Plains Indians after meeting the White Man, fly to one of two extremes: either they flagellate each other, as if in this way they could drive an eccentric devil from their midst, or they take to smoking opiates, to banish all awareness of reality from their minds. Thus the party of memory gives itself over to a politics of revenge or loses itself in hedonistic fantasies about a Golden Age where all men, without effort, are like gods and all women, without censure, are like woodland nymphs.

Party of hope

At the other end from this, there is the *party of hope*. It can be dominant in the land during an hour when the people face grave dangers, know that they face it, and would ease the tension of nerve in the act of doing something. How best to deal with the danger is never quite clear. Yet the object to be sought out is plain enough. In the divine madness of the hour, the party of hope, fortified by a sense of what shall be, holds to the view that the will to decide, by its own force, can force the proof that the decision hit upon was right.

Limitist party

In between these two is the *limitist party*. It is most plainly visible when the nation has passed through a time of acute domestic or foreign crisis. It may sense that more trials lie ahead but need a respite in which to consolidate such gains as it has made or to survey what still remains to be done. Those who are drawn to this party are a mixed lot. They can be the surviving heroes of the recent crisis who wish to enjoy some sense of well-being without exposing themselves to new ordeals. They can be the people who in one or another way climbed the social or economic ladder while the crisis was under way, who have not yet grown used to their new altitude and who fear that any sudden jar will upset what they hold so tenuously. All, therefore, would limit further motions except those moderate adjustments necessary to preserve an existing balance of forces.

Psychological parties and Presidential stands

If these three psychological parties do exist, then they can be matched with the positional stands for a Presidency in the following manner. First, the dominance of the party of memory is a natural precondition for a Buchanan type of Presidency. For this kind of a Presidency makes no new demands on the people. It diminishes its own size in the eyes of the people. It permits power and responsibility to wander around on the horizon like a displaced person, to alight where it can. And because Buchananism does this, it invites not Presidential government, but a kind of Congressional government where local men, acting from local bases of strength, are at liberty to do what they will. The more they cut down the Executive, the more they prove their antipolitical and antigovernmental bent. And the more they do so, the more they are applauded by the party of memory.

The dominance of the party of hope, on the other hand, is a natural precondition for a Lincoln type of Presidency. For this kind, as has just been said, asserts the paramount standard of the national interest over all local considerations. It makes the Presidency an apotheosis of the national will to survive every trial. It makes it the commander in chief of the nation; the secretary in charge of every burning question at the focus of attention; the staff and command agency to which all look for the order of battle, the pace and the route of the march. Under this kind of Presidency, the President holds

himself to a primary responsibility for the consequences of his administration. For as he lays down the ground rules for all his civil, diplomatic, and military officers, so does he stand between them and the people, drawing away from those officers and on to himself all hostile opinion their actions might arouse.

As for the limitist party, its dominance is a natural precondition for a Cleveland type of Presidency. For this kind, while it manages to keep the Executive before the nation as a potential source of action at some future if indefinite date, makes no great demands on the people in the immediate moment. It bends the weight of its effort to the end that events shall not occur; or if they do occur, of bringing all lines of force back to dead center. Preferring as it does the glory of passivity to the glory of action, such a Presidency tends toward a transcontinental checkmate, or a motor "idling" but going nowhere.

WHAT THE HOUR DEMANDS

A Buchanan, a Lincoln, or a Cleveland Presidency, divorced from all other matters, is not absolutely better or worse one than another. Each is better or worse in the measure to which it corresponds to what the hour demands. It may therefore be asked, What does the present hour demand of a President? Or better, What kind of psychological climate must a President in the exercise of his political art create for himself—by first creating it for the nation—so that he can do what needs doing?

The question comes into urgent focus if we assume that the central issues before the nation lie in the area of peace or war. Here, in this area, we can observe previous moments in American history when a Buchanan or a Cleveland Presidency may have been sufficient for the day.

Continental diplomacy

One such period ran from the winning of independence to the close of the Civil War, when our military and diplomatic impulses were chiefly continental in scope. As such, they permitted the Congress a good deal of initiative in formulating, shaping, and even managing the various elements that make for national security. For in this period, though access to international trade was no small matter, the principal concern of our external relations was land and interior waterways as we pressed forward to span a continent. What was won or lost, what was threatened or promised, took on a measurable shape that fell within the day to day experiences of the Congress.

When foreign affairs often began an inch away from the border of a congressional district, the Congress had one fact uppermost in mind. It was that each acquisition of territory would soon lead to the formation of new states. And this in turn would force a vital shift in the balance of congressional forces as they were divided between the commercial East and the agrarian West, between the slave South and the free North. The conduct of our external affairs, therefore, was indivisibly linked with the internal contest of those who were bidding for political ascendancy inside America proper.

As an incident to that struggle, waged within the Congress, legislators picked foreign friends and enemies one at a time. Moreover, they could argue on domestic grounds why one power should be regarded as a friend and the other as an enemy. For the controlling factor on both sides of the argument was whether this or that nation might impede or quicken the expansionist lunges on the North American mainland. While the concept of "manifest destiny" was to run its course, the expansionists invariably won out—and we are now grateful that they did. But as a factor in that victory, the role of the Executive as the directing agent for our external relations was turned into that of a handmaiden to what the Congress decided.

Thus, in 1812, it was the expansionist "war hawks" in the House, eyeing Canada to the north and the Floridas to the south, who forced a reluctant President Madison to declare war on England. Once again, it was the expansionists in the House who bestirred President James Monroe, at the risk of war with Spain, to recognize the new Latin American republics that were emerging from the crumbling ruins of the Spanish Empire. Then, too, it was the expansionists in both the House and the Senate who circumvented the threat of a senatorial veto (represented in the two-thirds vote required to ratify a treaty) by annexing Texas in 1845 through a joint resolution of the Congress—though this meant war with Mexico. Finally, when the continent was spanned, the northern and southern expansionists in the Congress turned on each other. In this hour, the ascendancy of Buchananism proved fatal.

Toward oceanic diplomacy

But in the immediate post Civil War years, as we moved gradually from a continental to an oceanic diplomacy, a resurgence of expansionist tendencies in the nation once again enabled the Congress to reassert its strong hand in the management of our foreign affairs. In the agitation over Cuba, the congressional will for war against Spain met a momentary check from President Cleveland when he let it be known that if the Congress declared war, he could not be counted on to manage it. But in a different direction Congress was more successful. By joint resolution, it annexed Hawaii in 1895; and after that, it brought President McKinley to heel in the matter of Cuba. By joint resolution, it called on McKinley to affirm the fact that the people of Cuba were and by right ought to be free and independent. The same resolution, in whose drafting the President had no hand, was also tantamount to a declaration of war, in that it authorized and directed him to employ land and naval forces of the United States to expel Spain from Cuba.

Executive leadership in foreign relations

It was under Theodore Roosevelt, the first of the modern Presidents, when America found itself heavily involved in an oceanic diplomacy, that the initiative and management of our external affairs gravitated more and more into the hands of the Chief Executive. In this sense, we began to witness a vital shift from within the Constitution, leading to a general result that approaches the arrangement in England. That is, as in the case of the British Cabinet, the Executive began to lead in national security matters, while the Congress, from below, vetoed or revised. And we have continued to witness this shift from an interplay of forces, whose effect was prophesied by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830's.

> It is chiefly in its foreign relations [he wrote] that the Executive power of the nation finds occasion to exert its skill and its strength. If the existence of the Union were perpetually threatened, and if its chief interests were in daily connection with those of other powerful nations, the Executive Department would assume an increased importance in proportion to the measures expected of it, and to those which it would execute.

Since the end of World War II, in particular, the measures expected of the Executive are all related, in one or another way, to the strengthening of the United States and its allies as they have

been brought under various forms of Communist attack. We have of necessity entered into alliances without a terminal point. Some of them are designed to prevent the outbreak of war. Others are designed to shore up the domestic life of foreign nations to reduce the chances of internal subversion. Still others are designed to win a war if it should come. But in all cases, land, the old measurable aim of our external relations, has been replaced by the imponderable factors of interests—moral, social, political, religious, economic, and strategic—common to most members who belong to the complex federation of peoples that revolve around the central federation of the United States, and around the President who must act as the manager in chief of the whole friction-laden apparatus.

THE DILEMMA AND THE RISK

There is, however, an acute constitutional dilemma—or, to return to the opening theme, an acute artistic problem involved in this historical development. On the one hand, we want the President to move swiftly and effectively to quell any danger or to seize any opportunity that may be of advantage to us. And we want him to do this within the four corners of the law. On the other hand, we have to face the explosive threat that the President on his own recognizances, on his own version of "the best," can present the Congress with a fait accompli in the diplomatic field which would force it, against its own wishes, to declare war. How then can this problem be solved? How can we locate resilient strength in the Executive, and yet keep it under some sort of constitutional control?

As it happens, every constitutional system must pay some price in weakness for the element of strength it has. Not everything is soluble. Not everything can be controlled in advance. Some risks have to be lived with in the conscious knowledge that they are risks. And the problem just put is such a risk.

For today, when our friends and enemies come in bulk lots, when the tides of diplomacy make unexpected shifts, and when threats and opportunities suddenly loom up and just as suddenly recede; when our generals command foreign troops and our own troops are under foreign command; when we sit at the head of a complicated set of alliances; when all the people who stand with us are battered by a sustained Communist assault—when all these things and more are our daily lot, it is regrettably the case that the President alone, and no one else inside or outside the government, can be the proper seat of the indispensable discretionary power that is needed.

For no one else is structurally organized to be that center. No one else has the means to assess on an hour-to-hour basis the outcropping of events in remote places, the quick means of relating a happening in one part of the globe to another one ten thousand miles away; no ambassador or military officer is in the continuous contact with foreign leaders everywhere. The President alone is on a spot to appraise, formulate, and propose what ought to be done so that all parties can move forward toward goals they have in common. He must bear the awful burden of his discretions—in matters of timing, in particular—knowing at the same time that because he is one man, he is the object of the concentrated attention of the world.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The Congress, meanwhile, has every right to protest at the way historical events have reduced it in security matters from a concurrent and co-ordinate partner of the President to one that must make good what he does. Indeed, if the Congress did not protest, its silence might reflect a dangerous relaxation of its own constitutional sensibilities. So, too, does the Congress have an unassailable right to investigate the course of administration, and to share wherever possible in the shaping of national security policy as it is being formulated—and not merely after it has been formed. Yet if the Congress has the right of investigation and the right of consultation, the Congress does not serve our national security when it is a party to legislative abuses that are defended in the name of being a check on the Executive; when it tacks on crippling administrative riders that defeat the aims of the national security programs which the Congress has ostensibly approved; when it conducts legislative trials of foreign service and military officers for offenses that are not criminal and which the Congress could not constitutionally declare are criminal.

THE DANGER AND THE NEED

If the President holds the sword—and a radioactive one at that—the Congress holds the purse. And if what the President holds seems more dangerous, it is simply because our position in the world has become dangerously great. It will not become less so if the Congress allows its individual members to shatter that sword. Nor will our position become less dangerous if the President, for whatever reason, refuses to risk his partisan political position whenever any great interests of the nation are at stake; or if, from a fine legalistic respect for the spirit of Buchananism, or from a bias for the easy popularity of a vetoing Clevelandism, he fails to put himself at the head of troops committed to our dark, dim, weird, and afflicted contemporary battles.

In my view, at least, what we need is a Presidency whose artistic sensitivity—though it may lead eventually to a failure—is in the Lincolnian tradition: a Presidency that will find and state the generating principles of that which is; a Presidency that will seek and state the generating principles of that which shall be; a Presidency which recognizes that, as it must reflect in part the going values of the average America, it possesses in equal part the power to alter those going values and to have them registered in the laws which the Congress will enact. For it is this power, more than the actual state of the laws at any one moment, which is the heart within the heart of what goes under the name of Presidential powers. And as an artist alone knows how to effect the transformation in the going values of the average American, so, too, does an artist-President alone know that this is the chief creative work of a President. Especially must this be his work in periods when the people, for one or another reason, would imitate the lemmings and race to the sea as if to seek salvation from a harsh present by blotting out awareness itself.

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The Man and the Institution

By Louis W. Koenig

ALL executive posts are part institution and part man. Yet the Presidency differs from all other major political executives in the balance it strikes between the parts. Far more than the French Premier and substantially more than the British Prime Minister, an incumbent of the Presidency has opportunity for personal self-expression.

This is a mixed blessing. Minimum institutional development both helps and hinders the President's affairs. At the helpful end of the scale, he enjoys exceptional freedom of action in dealing with his Cabinet. He can, if he chooses, abstain from calling it into session. He can drastically reduce the measures which come before it and blithely ignore its strongest recommendations. The British Prime Minister, in contrast, must consult his Cabinet at almost every turn and through precisely delineated procedures.

But the minimum institutional development also works to the disadvantage of the President. He has, for example, strikingly fewer and far less consequential means than the British Prime Minister for eliciting his party's support, especially in the legislature. In consequence, the President suffers in his proposals to Congress defeats that are inconceivable in Great Britain. Witness Truman's Fair Deal and the very minor percentage of it which Congress got around to approving—though, to be sure, his recommendations in the field of foreign affairs were more favorably received.

The relationship between the man and the institution has been an enduring problem of the Presidency. The Founding Fathers, in their act of creating the office, were much preoccupied with it, being haunted by George III and his system of "personal government," with its blunders, extravagance, and corruption. As they sought through institutional means to diminish the hazards of the Presidential personality, several variations of a council were considered to share in the President's decisional activity. Only after extended consideration was this general formula dropped. The electoral college was established presumably to "screen" the "safest" personalities from among the aspirants to office. Under the principle of the separation of powers, a strong legislature was established so that although the President might propose policy, Congress would dispose of it. The list of measures could be extended. Yet there were also strong forces at Philadelphia pushing for an executive of independent strength, and to a large degree these forces prevailed.

Throughout our 167 years of experience with the Presidency, the problem of the relationship between the man and the institution has reappeared in various forms. Today it deserves to be regarded as one of the central problems of the Presidency. The problem may be stated thus: How can the Presidency of the future, occupied as it will be with men of uneven talents, be continuously able to meet the challenges of the times? It is assumed that the military, diplomatic, and economic problems of the country will be of such urgency as to require a continuously effective executive.

The record of the Presidency raises a serious question concerning its capacity to provide continuous leadership of high caliber. Although there are the striking accomplishments of Washington, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and the Roosevelts, there are, too, the disastrous failures of Buchanan and Coolidge. Are the institutional resources of the office of today strong enough to sustain the Executive when as a person he falters or falls short of the demands which are made upon him? Before facing this question, we must look more closely at the role of the man in the workings of the Presidency.

The Presidency As Personality

"What the presidency is at any particular moment," writes Corwin, "depends in important measure on who is President." [1] Any Presidency is stamped primarily with the personality of its incumbent, above all with his "style"—his gesture, his articulateness, his values.

For one thing, the President has unlimited power to make proposals for action. He can, if he chooses, espouse any cause from simplified spelling to the soil bank. He is under various influences and pressures to utilize his freedom. He is elected by and responsive to a national constituency. He is the only figure in public life whose prestige and power make anything he says and does sure-fire material for the front page. His appearance on television commands a Trendex rating that will swamp the best of the entertainment world's professionals. Not only does the President have great opportunity to propose, he is *expected* to make proposals. Early in his administration, President Eisenhower, for example, was criticized by legislators of both parties for not coming forward more opportunely with a fully developed program of legislation.[2]

The President also commands what are by far the best resources for action available in the governmental mechanism. In a classic description in the Federalist papers, Hamilton listed the prime qualities of the proposed Presidency as "energy . . . unity . . . Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch." The Constitution and statutes confer upon the President powers of great scope in foreign, military, and domestic affairs. He has available immense financial resources and the skills and energies of millions of civil and military experts. He has what Corwin calls "plasticity of method," [3] enabling him to indulge his special talents and policy predilections. The daring ingenuity of Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy in the year or more just before Pearl Harbor strikingly illustrates the importance of this attribute.

The President works in the arena of accommodation. He pursues the difficult quest for consensus among competing sections of the country, among economic, national, and racial groups. George Washington was quick to discern this phase of the Presidency when at the outset of his administration he said that the new government was to be one "of accommodation as well as a government of laws." [4]

In the arena of accommodation the arts of influence and persuasion hold sway. These are infinitely more demanding upon the talents of the man who is President than are simple exertions of power. Most Presidents have, however, seen the problem of accommodation as one deserving of their best effort, as a prerequisite to winning reelection or keeping their party in power. Washington was solicitous of achieving

[1] Edward S. Corwin and Louis W. Koenig, *The Presidency Today* (New York, 1956), p. 28.

[2] Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (December 1955), p. 981.

[3] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York, 1948), p. 1.

[4] J. C. Fitzpatrick (Ed.), *The Writings of George Washington* (Washington, 1932), Vol. XXX, p. 495.

a general acceptance of his administration in all sections of the country. William McKinley labored mightily to unite the sectional factions of his party. F. D. Roosevelt carefully established his electoral invincibility on a combination of big labor, southerners, city bosses, New Dealers, and independent voters.

Some Presidents have found their best opportunities for self-expression by taking on the role of moral and social censor of their country and their times. Franklin Roosevelt envisaged the Presidency as "preeminently a place of moral leadership," and his New Deal can rightly be interpreted as in large degree a moral crusade. The political genius of F.D.R.'s cousin-predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, lay in capturing the attention of the country and shaking it out of its placid acceptance of the evils of the trusts, the waste of natural resources, and other abuses.

RECENT TRENDS

In the twentieth century, the crises of depression and war expand and enlarge the President's personal role. Crisis or emergency serves to unshackle the President from a great number of the usual institutional restraints to the gain of his personal freedom of action.

Thanks to technology, the President has become a household presence, friendly and familiar. This is strictly a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Nineteenth-century Presidents, because of the infancy of communications, could reach and shape public opinion on relatively few issues in the course of a four-year term. Theodore Roosevelt, the first President really to exploit the rallying of public opinion, had the enormous advantage of press services of nationwide circulation. Franklin D. Roosevelt perfected the press conference and mastered the radio with his forte, the Fireside Chat. President Eisenhower has derived inestimable strength and political security from his impact as a television personality.

Foreign affairs have given new scope to the play of the President's personality. Twentieth-century Presidents have operated in an era of personal diplomacy, witness Eisenhower at Geneva, Truman at Potsdam, F.D.R. at Yalta, Wilson at Versailles. The propaganda struggle with the Soviet Union requires the projection of a pleasing image of Presidential man. In the United Nations and in military alliances around the globe, the President operates in realms where his personality as much as any factor may determine the success of United States policy.

In domestic affairs, various forces serve to highlight the President's personality. With government so deeply involved in the concerns of business and labor as regulator, promoter, and mediator, the President is brought increasingly into personal competition with the leaders of private groups for public attention and support. The chief sources of competition and conflict in the administration of Harry S. Truman, apart from the men in the Kremlin, were John L. Lewis and railway union leaders A. F. Whitney and Alvanley Johnston. It was not uncommon for the President to be blazing away with all his cannon of political showmanship in struggling with these oligarchs for public support.

DANGERS OF PERSONALITY

Of the thirty-three men who have occupied the Presidency, at least several rank among the world's great statesmen, and six or more deserve ranking as "strong" Presidents. None of our Presidents has represented the more extreme forms of political vileness. No dictator or despot, no scoundrel or profligate has appeared. Yet as we well know, we have had men who pursued folly, were naïve, indolent, or blind to reality while the storm clouds of tragedy gathered. The country might have been spared untold havoc and suffering had better men been in their place.

The present-day setting of the Presidency invites a return of this mediocrity to the office. Television puts a new premium on affability. The winsome grin and mellifluous tonality do wonders for the presidential candidate. The uncertainties of our nuclear age bring new mass stirrings of the father complex which makes anxious people overvalue the President as he appears and undercritical of him as he really is. These and other forces contribute to a major danger of the modern Presidency, that personality will become a substitute for policy. As a step toward reducing this danger, we must look at the institutional side of the Presidency. To what extent can the institutional resources of the office assure that we shall have a policy regardless of the kind of man who occupies the post?

USES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

"Institution" is a catch-all term which, as applied to the Presidency, includes the legal resources of the office; the practice, precedent, and protocol; the staff and the bureaucratic skills, physical plant, and finance; the place of the office in society and in the culture as a medium for confronting and responding to challenges and problems.

It is through the institution that the man is kept responsible. The discerning Washington saw this as a primary purpose of his office. Time and again his own contribution to the Presidency was directed toward establishing practice which would keep himself and his successors responsible. For example, in considering the procedure he should follow in making nominations to posts which required the advice and consent of the Senate, he made this comment:

> Nominations ought to be made by written messages; so that the acts of the President and the Senate will stand upon clear, distinct, and responsible ground.[5]

In various ways the institution provides help to the man. The authority which adheres to precedent and practice has worked to convert the achievement and advance of "strong" Presidents into an enduring legacy for their less gifted successors. Responsibility, we are told, is a great developer of men. The Presidency, with its superabundance of responsibilities, has prompted unexpected growth in more than one incumbent. Polk and Lincoln, to take two notable examples, grew strikingly in stature after brief exposure to the trials and tribulations of office.

CHANGES IN THE INSTITUTION

Like all institutions, the Presidency undergoes growth and change. The electoral college, after brief importance, becomes perfunctory. The Cabinet is a body of fluctuating fortunes. So extensive, however, are the institutional changes in the Presidency that we properly speak of the "modern Presidency" as dating from the era of Theodore Roosevelt.

Of the many elements of our latter-day Presidency, at least several are particularly important. One is the rise of a substantial Presidential staff. This can be traced from the creation of the Bureau of the Budget in 1921, through expansions of the White House staff from the era of F.D.R. on. The years since World War II have seen the rise of such agencies as the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Resources Board (succeeded by the Office of Defense Mobilization). The Truman and Eisenhower administrations have also experienced a certain resurgence of the Cabinet. Approximately 1,200 people staff these agencies, some of them personal and political ap-

[5] Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 377.

pointees, most of them career civil servants. They exist solely to serve the President, to see that he is adequately and currently informed, to assist him in foreseeing problems and planning future programs, and to ensure that matters for his decision reach his desk promptly and in condition to be settled intelligently and without delay.

Accompanying this growth of staff has been the establishment of certain more or less stated occasions on which the President is expected to present proposals of policy and programs to Congress. The chief of these are the Budget Message and document, the Economic Report, and the special messages to Congress. The latter type of message has been used extensively by modern Presidents to supplement the more general State of the Union message by setting forth the President's plan for individual fields of policy.

STAFF ACHIEVEMENT AND PROMISE

It is generally agreed that the President's staff has played a central part in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Anthony Leviero of the *New York Times*, in the course of the Truman administration, observed that never before had a President relied so much upon collective advice in making his decisions.[6] Leviero was referring particularly to the role of the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the White House staff. Nor is the staff to be forgotten in Sir Winston Churchill's comment crediting President Truman "with great and valiant decisions which make us, I think, all feel better today than we did two or three years ago." In the Eisenhower administration, the staff has played an even greater part, owing to the willingness of the President to delegate large amounts of authority. Something of the ability of the staff to sustain the Presidency was demonstrated in the smooth functioning of the executive branch during President Eisenhower's illness.

In both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the Budget Message, the Economic Report, and other messages have been extensively used as sources of policy proposals. The staff has processed great numbers of Executive orders, policy statements, executive-originated legislative proposals, and comment on proposed legislation. One of the chief uses of these several activities is the opportunity they afford the departments to set systematically before the President extended proposals of policy. This is to say, then, that the inaction of a Buchanan or of a Coolidge would nowadays be challenged by a variety of staff sources, that the President would be expected to come forward with policy on a considerable number of more or less stated occasions, and that, therefore, it would be far more difficult for a present-day Calvin Coolidge to count apples and serenely wear out his rocking chair while the country raced into economic doom.

Staffs, of course, are far from perfect. They can balk, dawdle, fall into excessive routine, and commit a hundred other sins.[7] They ought to be studied and improved at every opportunity. Perhaps they will be if we are as alert to the burdens of the staff as we are to the burdens of the President.

[6] "How the President Makes Decisions," *New York Times Magazine*, October 8, 1950.

[7] See especially "Mechanising the President," *The Economist*, April 16, 1955, p. 199.

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The Bureau of the Budget As Part of the President's Staff

By ROBERT E. MERRIAM

ALL too rarely does a discussion of the Presidency focus attention on his official "family." As all of the living men who have occupied, or occupy, the office of President have stated in one way or another, the responsibility and the decisions are and must be one man's. But the President, whoever he may be, is not without help in this process. First, of course, there are over two million civilian employees of the federal government. There are the ten great departments and many other agencies. There is the Executive Office of the President, which includes, among others, the Bureau of the Budget, the National Security Council, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Council of Economic Advisers. And finally, there is the White House Office staff itself. All of these entities are in one way or another a part of the President's "family." The latter two categories—the Executive Office of the President and the White House staff specifically—are distinguished from all other executive agencies in that they exist only to serve the President directly in the complicated process of decision making.

It is not an easy job to describe in simple terms the role of the Bureau of the Budget as a part of the institution which we call the Presidency. Its activities are intimately connected with methods of operating and personal dynamics. But the growth of this agency is clear indication of the development of what we can call the institutional side of the Presidency. The Bureau does everything it does for the President's support and assistance. The decisions it makes independently are at his direction, and the recommendations it submits are for his consideration. This staff organization of some four hundred persons is his largest single personal staff group. Its growth is a good history of the developing tools which have been invented to assist one man in his awesome task as head of the world's largest organization.

Each President has used these institutional aids somewhat differently, but all modern Presidents have found them to be of immeasurable assistance. And nobody could long work for the Bureau of the Budget without finding that its professional staff are acutely aware of their part in this institution we call the office of the President. It is with these thoughts in mind that I analyze the history, development, and activities of the Budget Bureau.

THE BUDGETARY LEVER

Usually, the Bureau of the Budget is thought of as the budgetary agency of the federal government, a group of men with pencils and slide rules (or Univacs, now), who deal in figures and dollar signs. While development of the budget document and preparation of material on which the President bases his budgetary decisions are an important part of the Bureau's activities, both are only a part. But even in this area, the attention given during recent years to the general effectiveness of the national budget system has placed disproportionate emphasis upon the strictly fiscal responsibilities of the Budget Bureau. Sometimes the impression is created that these fiscal responsibilities are self-contained concerns, only loosely

linked, if at all, to the constitutional duties of the President. There have been suggestions, for example, that the Budget Bureau might profitably be shifted to the Treasury Department, where it was placed by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 until in 1939 it was made a part of the Executive Office of the President, though without ever being under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury. There have even been suggestions that the Budget Bureau ought to be made part of the legislative branch, as if under such auspices the Bureau could stay in sufficiently close touch with the executive establishment and come forth with budgetary proposals suited to the needs of the President as the responsible manager of that establishment.

Speaking realistically, the controlling fact about budgeting in the federal government is that even the technical aspects, let alone the chains of decisions involved in it, are deeply affected by the constitutional functions of the Chief Executive. In truth, therefore, the primary importance of the Budget Bureau lies in its role as a key element in the staff organization which over the years has been built around the President. The whole effectiveness of the Bureau's budgetary work stems from this relationship. If one were to tear the Bureau from the President's staff organization, the foreseeable result would be a drastic change both in the character of budgetary planning and control in the federal government and in the operating performance of the Presidency. The result of such change would be a very serious loss.

GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENCY

There is no question that the budgetary lever is a basic factor in the contribution which the Bureau of the Budget can make as part of the institutional staff of the President. One thing that needs to be said right away, however, is that the Budget Bureau runs its fingers over only part of the seam of the President's mantle. The office of the President is the greatest single executive office in the world. His mantle is therefore extraordinarily wide. We must keep in mind the several dimensions of the Presidency to see the limited range within which the Budget Bureau can have impact.

Dimensions of the Presidency

Besides being the nation's chief executive, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the director of our foreign affairs. He is further a pre-eminent participant in the legislative process, charged with recommending measures to Congress and with reviewing bills enacted by it for his approval or veto. As chief of state, the President performs a variety of ceremonial and social duties. No less importantly, he is the accepted leader of his political party. And finally, transcending all of these functions, the President is an indispensable source of national leadership.

Elected by the whole people, and speaking for the whole people with a single voice, the President is expected to point the way for the nation in its attempts to deal with the problems thrust upon it by its destiny. Increasingly Americans have turned to the President as their spokesman. He has come to be looked upon as the maker and promoter of the governmental programs. The obligation to provide national leadership, although referred to nowhere in the Constitution, is perhaps the most important aspect of the Presidency.

Institutional staff work, based upon professional analysis of data and lining up alternate courses of proposed action, can give additional strength to the exercise of all these functions. For it is clear that the President can play his strongest hand when he is not only fortified with the best political advice available to him but also in command of the pertinent facts. However, the institutional staff work of the Bureau of the Budget is concentrated on fairly well-defined spheres of action. It is geared most immediately to the President's concerns in the fields of executive management, program planning, fiscal policy, and administrative control. These concerns, it is true, have greatly expanded in our century, as the President became the modern Chief Executive.

Institutional development

In the course of time, the duties and responsibilities of the President have experienced a growth as healthy and striking as the growth of the entire country—and the growth of each has been at least in part the result of the growth of the other. One reflection of the growth of the President's office is the number of agencies over which he exercises directly some form of control and supervision. In 1790, under President Washington, the number did not exceed nine, each performing fairly simple duties. The number increased slowly at first, old agencies being abolished at about the same rate that new ones were added. In 1864, under President Lincoln, there were still only eleven. During the twentieth century, however, the increase in agencies has been rapid. Now we have in the executive branch fifty-six agencies administering large and diverse programs, many of which dwarf the entire federal government of Washington's day.

With this increase, and what it tells indirectly about the changing role and size of the government, the workload on the President and the importance of his doings have grown enormously. For instance, in 1789 Washington approved 27 laws and 3 executive orders, while in 1955 President Eisenhower signed 390 public laws, 490 private laws, 65 executive orders, and 42 proclamations. Similarly, in 1789 Washington transmitted 20 military and 65 civilian nominations to the Senate, while in 1955 President Eisenhower transmitted 37,467 military and 3,219 civilian nominations. To pick another index, there were less than 1,000 civilians and 1,300 military personnel in Washington's time. On March 31, 1956, the grand total was no less than 2,366,500 civilians and 2,879,000 military personnel.

Although the passage of time has not required a basic change in the office of President as originally conceived by the Founding Fathers, events have made necessary many adjustments in the conduct of the office. These demonstrate that the Presidency is a dynamic institution, adapting to the changing demands made upon it. One far-reaching adaptation occurred with the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, mentioned earlier. In terms of the office of the President, the most significant contribution made by that act was the recognition of Presidential responsibility for the formulation of an integrated executive budget. This budget was to be the President's budget, providing Congress with the proposed annual plan of operations for the federal government.

Another large step in developing the President's office was taken in 1936 when President Roosevelt established the Brownlow Committee (President's Committee on Administrative Management). Its recommendations emphasized the need to build up the President's staff so that he might better keep in touch with the widespread affairs of the government and thus more readily obtain information of use in making his decisions. The Brownlow

Committee also recommended that the agencies responsible for fiscal affairs, administrative improvement, personnel, and planning be developed into management arms of the Presidency. Thus a blueprint was provided for the present-day Executive Office of the President, first acted upon in Reorganization Plan I of 1939.

After World War II, the Employment Act of 1946 gave fresh significance to the President's duty to make appropriate proposals for assuring a stable and expanding national economy. This act created the Council of Economic Advisers, placing it in the Executive Office of the President. Next the National Security Act of 1947 provided further sources of advice to the President in the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board. Both were later placed formally in the Executive Office of the President; the functions of the National Security Resources Board were eventually vested in the reconstituted Office of Defense Mobilization.

An important contribution to the development of the President's office was also made by the first Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. On the strength of its recommendations, a Staff Secretary and a Cabinet secretariat were established in the White House Office. Provision was made for the Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission to serve also as the Presidential Adviser on Personnel Management. In addition, the authority of the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers as its spokesman was made more explicit.

Relieving pressure

So sharp has been the pressure of the modern Presidency upon each incumbent that relief from direct responsibility for some decisions became one of the most urgent necessities. A step in this direction was taken in 1950 when the Congress enacted the so-called McCormack Act on Presidential delegations (64 Stat. 419). That act made it easier for the President to delegate to other officers functions vested in him by statute. Since then, some sixty executive orders have been promulgated, assigning hundreds of Presidential duties to other officials. The Bureau of the Budget shares in the responsibility of reviewing and developing such orders.

Relief has been attempted further by use of en bloc signing procedures for various Presidential signatures required in the performance of functions which cannot or should not be delegated by the President.

BLUEPRINT FOR INSTITUTIONAL STAFF

Only in recent decades have we finally come to recognize that no man can be equal to the demands of the office of the President without resourceful and diversified staff support; and also that such staff support, institutional as well as noninstitutional, must be fitted closely into the President's own concepts of operating.

Basic guides

With respect to institutional staff, the needed working formula must go beyond the old logician's rigmarole about whether politics and administration are separate or not. As the President functions in the political context, all professional staff work must be conducted in awareness of this decisive fact. As to politics and administration, there must be therefore both separateness and union. How to achieve that combination institutionally is one of the issues of our time.

Congressional design

It is useful to bear in mind that the Bureau was envisaged from the very start as a Presidential staff agency. In fact, the whole doctrine of Presidential staff organization was first developed in the course of the congressional deliberations of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. In these deliberations there emerged the concept of the Budget Bureau as a working team of technical competence headed by a staff leader of the President's entirely free choice. Much attention was given to assuring that there would be intimate understanding between the President and his "chief budget man," as the staff leader was then referred to in Congress. As a result, the legislative sponsors of the Budget and Accounting Act allowed the President to pick the top man and his second in command without senatorial confirmation.

Equally relevant, the Budget and Accounting Act assigned to the President's first civilian staff agency the duty not only of helping him prepare and execute the budget but also of studying for him the state of organization and management throughout the executive branch. Thus the Budget Bureau was launched with a dual type of responsibility. Its functions were to be administrative as well as budgetary, in full appreciation of the different extensions of the President's role as Chief Executive.

In addition, as early as 1921 the Bureau undertook to examine for the President legislative proposals for their fiscal implications. This arrangement went back to a suggestion made by the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. As mentioned above, far from subordinating the Budget Bureau to the Treasury Department, the Budget and Accounting Act required the Secretary of the Treasury to submit, like all other agencies, his own budgetary requests for review to what was nominally one of his bureaus.

Test of practice

The basic concept of the Budget Bureau, fashioned by Congress as a generally useful arm of the President, proved readily convertible into institutional practice. At the very outset Charles G. Dawes, the vigorous and tough-minded Chicago banker who took charge of the Budget Bureau during its first year, defined its mission as the application of "executive pressure" to all agencies to achieve economy and efficiency. In his relations with the Cabinet and the departments—and with Congress as well—he saw to it that he was recognized as the President's general agent. In this capacity he undertook himself to convey a perspective and to apply a power that was the President's.

Dawes found ways to dramatize the necessity of bringing a government-wide point of view to bear upon the activities of the executive branch. He was equally concerned with winning for the Budget Bureau the reputation of what he called a "nonpolitical, nonpartisan" orientation. The Bureau was to be a technical staff prepared to bring forth the pertinent facts and figures. But Dawes also demonstrated that in the determinations he proposed to the President, the difference between professional examination and political decision was inevitably fluid. The main task of the professional staff was to spot and come up with problems and issues, to line up the needed factual data, to reach informed conclusions, and to propose practical courses of action. It would then be the task of the Director of the Bureau, as "the President's man," to assist in picking the most suitable political choice.

Resurgence of the Dawes formula

The Dawes formula of institutional staff work for the President has not been applied uniformly throughout the past thirty-five years. The variations for the most part were the natural consequences of changes in the spirit of the period, and to a lesser extent of the personalities occupying the Presidential office and the office of the Budget Director as well. Obviously, the national drive for "normalcy" after World War I and the reverberations of later emergencies would create fundamentally different governmental settings. At times, indeed, the actual conduct of the President's office and the operations of the Budget Bureau became noticeably disengaged.

However, with mounting pressure of public business upon the Presidency, in peace as well as in war, the Dawes formula has come to the fore time and again. It was applied in fullest measure during World War II when Harold D. Smith shaped the outline of the present-day Budget Bureau as part of the new Executive Office of the President. With the full backing of the President, he was not in need of the flourish and the saber rattling of executive power of which Dawes had been fond in creating a new institutional reality. After the war, determined efforts were made by James E. Webb to make the resources of the Budget Bureau fully available to the Presidency. And despite the first change in political complexion since 1939, when the reorganized Bureau became a part of the Executive Office of the President, the first Budget Director of the Eisenhower administration, Joseph M. Dodge, held the exercise of the Budget Bureau's responsibilities as close to the needs of the President and the White House Office as any of his predecessors.

REALITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL STAFF WORK

One of the great advantages of a consciously reinforced link between budgetary activities and the President's executive functions has been the saturation of the budget process with co-ordinating decisions that reach deeply into the conduct of administration in the federal government. Budgeting was guarded against the danger of deteriorating to the level of paper shuffling by bookkeepers. Without being embedded in the political responsibility of the President, the preparation of the budget could not have become the critically important formulation of the federal government's comprehensive work plan that it is now. Nor could it have prompted the recurrent review of programs as well as operations throughout the executive branch that it sets in motion year by year.

In return, the staff relationship between the Budget Bureau and the President has made for a substantially strengthened type of executive control. This control was based upon knowledge of conditions and developments within the various agencies. On the other hand, in effecting control the Budget Bureau transmitted a continuing sense of the Presidential outlook upon the decisions made at lower levels. Thus the Budget Bureau was able to influence a considerable range of determinations focused on budgetary needs, proposed legislation, organizational alternatives, and administrative performance.

Use of working relationships

One of the elementary operating requirements for the Bureau of the Budget has been to develop and maintain satisfactory channels of continuing contact with all of the agencies of the executive branch. After all, to budget means to appraise needs, which in turn means to make sure of adequate knowledge. Short of such knowledge flowing in as a day-by-day process, budgeting is bound to become a formalistic exercise, perhaps even a ritualistic one. Action becomes divorced from the living necessities of administration.

For its own sake, the Budget Bureau must therefore equip itself with many eyes and ears, the eyes and ears of its staff. Instead of looking at money totals put in neat columns, it must aim to get at the essence of what is being done in the executive branch, within the continental United States and even abroad. The Bureau's examiners must have great familiarity with their particular agencies. In this way alone can the Bureau render full service in its work of probing, prodding, and proposing.

But the budgetary contact with the various agencies represents only one of the Bureau's working channels. In preparing reorganization plans for the President, in improving administrative procedures that wind their way throughout the executive branch, in evaluating legislative proposals advanced by individual agencies, in obtaining their views on other proposed or enacted legislation—in all of these activities the specialists of the Bureau develop their own working relationships which open up additional lines of information to the President as well as to the Bureau itself. These examples do not exhaust the range of contacts the Bureau has developed over the years as part of its regular working approach. It is thus in possession of several independent networks of two-way communication with the agencies of the executive branch.

As an accumulation point of operating knowledge, the Bureau has become a natural feeder of information, not only to the President but also to the other elements of the Executive Office. That is true especially of the White House Office, in its developing character as the actual co-ordinator in the handling of the President's immediate business. But this is taking as well as giving. For the Budget Bureau has gained a surer touch, in its own work, from what it receives in its close collaboration with the components of the Executive Office of the President—the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in his capacity of Presidential Adviser on Personnel Management. Participation of the Budget Director in the Cabinet and in the National Security Council during the Eisenhower administration has added further to the informality and continuity of exchange of information and proposals on the highest political level, with real benefit to the Budget Bureau in the performance of its institutional staff work.

Organizational continuity

One of the striking things about this institutional support to the Presidency is the almost unwavering line of the Budget Bureau's historic evolution. True, for want of adequate organizational elaboration the shrewdly conceived premises on which Dawes erected the guiding principles for the Bureau's effectiveness remained submerged for some years following his departure. The organizational elaboration came only after 1939, with the urgency of the national defense supplying a forceful incentive.

Despite shifts in emphasis, the basic structure used by the Bureau in the deployment of its staff has changed very little. Essentially, the Bureau represents a staff pool in which one finds a considerable range of specializations. Small groups of staff members have

charge of functions that for efficient performance must be given specific organizational focus. But the heart of the matter is the freedom of co-operative relationships between all members of the Bureau's staff.

Sensitivity of action

The chief tenet in the working doctrine of the professional staff is sensitivity in three different directions. First, for effective work in the Bureau one must be alive to the danger of getting locked up unwittingly in a particular activity. Instead, there must be a tireless search for all points of relevant information. In the conduct of each individual assignment, a product should emerge which combines the best knowledge available at various places, inside and outside the Executive Office of the President, inside and outside the executive branch, and even inside and outside the government. Second, there must be sensitivity toward the factor of time. Even in the timing of action to meet momentary emergencies, one should not sweep aside longer-range considerations. The demands for action must be related to a timetable that connects the past with the future. Third, sensitivity must exist toward the broader frame of reference, the whole political situation. Staff members in the Bureau of the Budget know that political advice comes to the President from many quarters. They know further that the Bureau is not meant nor staffed to amplify such political advice. But they appreciate that it is the Bureau's function to develop as clear a picture as possible of what ought to be done, to be put before those giving political advice.

Hence, in everything that a staff man does in the Budget Bureau he must always keep in mind the larger context in which the Budget Director as well as the President would have to act. The technical recommendations of the Budget Bureau are intended to stand on their objective merit. But that is not enough. For they will not amount to much if they are not carefully fitted into the basic political frame of reference in which the Presidency operates.

Criticisms

A mere listing of these practical guidelines demonstrates the opportunities for the Budget Bureau to contribute to significant accomplishments. But the listing also outlines the chances of blundering into serious failures. There is no remedy here short of keener awareness of the implications of each action proposed or taken. In this matter, the Budget Bureau, ever since it came of age, has had the benefit of alert criticism both from within the government and from the outside.

Some of this criticism obviously represents viewpoints of particular interests. For instance, the Bureau has been censored for making arbitrary decisions when it held to a policy line which affected the interest adversely. Simultaneously, the Bureau has been blamed for acting in cahoots with particular agencies when the line of action was not to the liking of the interest advancing such criticism. There have been those, in addition, who have demanded of the Bureau that it get out and fight the political battles of the President in the forum of public opinion. Conversely, there have been others who have deplored the degree to which the Bureau was used or conducted itself as a political agency.

It has also been argued that the career man's point of view—the good protective instinct of a bunch of bureaucrats—induces the Bureau to stay timidly in its institutional shell. In opposite terms, it has been argued that the stubbornness of the small man in big shoes makes the Bureau cling tenaciously to policy positions of its own. Finally, some critics have expressed resentment at discovering that the Bureau seemed to have its nose in everything. The counterpart has been supplied by other critics who have taken the Bureau to task for refusing to be drawn into matters not clearly related to its general functions.

In part, these lines of criticism attest to the effectiveness of the Bureau of the Budget in accomplishing its purpose. A budget agency which never hears such criticism must either lead an undesirably sheltered life or do little of any consequence. But it would be presumptuous for the Bureau to regard itself as beyond reproach and above error. Its very role, above all the special nature of the relationships between a body of civil servants and a relatively fluctuating leadership keeping it politically on the right track, is bound to generate occasional instances where things go conspicuously wrong. The cure does not lie in any one thing. In good measure it lies in an appreciation of the longer-run record of institutional staff work for the President, as it is actually performed, coupled with a determination to do a good job better.

These are perhaps somewhat random thoughts about a vital part of the office of the President. They are meant to convey a theoretical belief, supplemented by direct experience, that the concept of a Budget Bureau as staff eyes and ears for the President, in budgetary and management matters, is one which provides a good opportunity for the President, whoever he may be, to be better prepared for the tremendous responsibilities which, in the last analysis, he alone must bear.

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The President and His Political Executives

By Stephen K. Bailey

NICHOLAS I, the "Iron Czar" of Russia, was reputed to have said shortly before his death, "I do not rule Russia; ten thousand clerks do."

Nicholas, unfortunately, was silent on the extent to which he ruled the ten thousand clerks. For if the ten thousand clerks were *his* clerks, then *he* ruled Russia. If they were not *his* clerks, he did not.

More than time and space separates nineteenth-century Russian Czars and modern American Presidents. But time and theory are great solvents. Czars, presidents, pharaohs, kings, business executives, labor leaders, prime ministers, popes, military commanders—all have been forced by occupational necessity to consider the question of how (and to what extent) they should attempt to control a sizable bureaucracy. And the answer has invariably been conditioned by the number of "clerks" who could be induced, by discipline or free response to leadership, to consider themselves loyal to the Chief Executive.

The federal government of the United States today employs more than 2,300,000 persons. These employees exist to recommend and to carry out a bewildering array of national policies.

The Executive Branch—Range and Variety

These policies have developed over time in response to a variety of needs and demands. Responsibility for their execution has been lodged in nearly seventy departments and agencies and over two thousand component units—some old, some new; some big, some small; some single-purposed, some multi-purposed; some concentrated geographically, some widely scattered; some highly responsive to Presidential influence and control, some almost totally immune to Presidential influence and control.

These federal departments and agencies, and their component units, are managed internally by a strange admixture of careerists (civil, diplomatic, and military) and political appointees (department secretaries, under secretaries, assistant secretaries, deputies, administrators, directors, commissioners, special assistants, etc.). Functionally, except at the highest levels, it is rarely possible to separate the roles of careerists and political appointees. At the levels of middle management, both categories are "political executives" in a policy sense. Attempts at differentiation on the basis of degrees of political responsibility are at best difficult in a governmental system which is marked by intentional constitutional ambiguities and by a signal lack of party cohesiveness.

The executive branch of the federal government is, in short, a many-splintered thing, and short of subjection to the kinds of instruments of conformity available to Czar Nicholas, particularly the dreaded Third Section of the Emperor's private chancery, it is bound to remain so.

But how much so?

Surely some unity of direction is necessary. Our Constitution provides for it; our national safety and welfare demand it. It is true that some administrative anomalies may be little more than unaesthetic, as when in President Wilson's day brown bears were placed under the Department of Agriculture, black bears under the Department of Commerce, and polar bears under Interior. But in the modern grand strategies of national security and economic stabilization, resource development and human welfare, absence of central direction can be dangerous if not catastrophic. In a day when the dumping of surplus agricultural commodities abroad can have a direct impact upon the cohesiveness of our diplomatic and military alliances, somebody, in Paul Appleby's felicitous phrase, has got to make "a mesh of things."

Presidential Responsibility

In our form of government, that somebody must ultimately be the President of the United States. "Ultimately" is inserted because in quantitative terms most "meshing" is effected in the federal government without any reference to the President. If this were not so, the President and his assistants would drown in a sea of paper clips and telephones. The two phrases "You boys should get together on this" and "Joe, what are you doing for lunch tomorrow?" are heard at all levels of government every hour of the day. Without the will to co-ordinate and co-operate which these expressions reflect, government could not function at all.

But it is precisely because there are limits to this will, or to the practicability of its expression in a democratic society such as ours, that Americans have tacitly or explicitly agreed to two cardinal administrative principles: first, that much of the total governmental enterprise must remain highly atomized and, in over-all terms, unco-ordinated; and, second, that where co-ordination is imperative and possible, ultimate responsibility for effecting it must reside in the President of the United States.

"The President's Men"

Unfortunately, the second proposition raises some uncommonly difficult problems. Not only are Presidents busy with a swarm of nonmanagerial functions; [1] not only does Congress have a constitutional and compulsive mandate to compete with the President in the field of executive management; not only do many important policy-making agencies revolve in independent orbits outside the Presidential solar system; not only have the guild professionalisms of the various career services and the historic autonomies of specialized bureaus produced momentums which are difficult to bend, let alone contain or reverse; but—and here is the major rub—rarely in our history have the visible political executives in the federal bureaucracy been solely and continuously "the President's men." Even when they have started out as "his" men, personal fealty has often been weakened or destroyed by lateral pressures from Congress, by subterranean pressures from clientele groups or from within the bureaucracy itself; by the corrosive acid of personal ambition; or by honest differences over what was best for the country or the party. And many of our political executives have not even started out as "the President's men."

Indeed it would be next to impossible to draw a chart for any period in our history which would give a coherent picture of the number of federal officials who could be labeled with confidence "the President's men." The most recent attempt to identify the number of "political executive" positions in our federal government set the figure at approximately 750. But aside from a de-

[1] For an excellent survey of the President's many roles, see Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), pp. 3–27.

claratory statement that through these 750 men, ". . . the President directs and controls the administration," and that "they are the necessary expendables who give flexibility to the machinery of Government and who make it possible for the Chief Executive to adapt his management team to changing circumstances," [2] no evidence is produced to prove that these particular executives are in fact "the President's men," that they actually control what they sit on top of, or that most of them are distinguishable in function from the various top-level military, diplomatic, and civil service careerists who share with the "expendables" the management of the various federal enterprises.

It is actually possible that in terms of effective power most of the noncareer officials are inferior to the careerists. An assistant secretary who occupies his political executive post just long enough to last out a Washington social season is hardly a match for the weather-beaten military, diplomatic, or civil service careerist who has been around since Coolidge. A high turnover rate among political executives is nothing new in our history (the average tenure of assistant secretaries in some of our key departments now averages less than eighteen months), but we should not delude ourselves that we pay no price for this rapid turnover—a price in the lack of managerial continuity at a critical level of political responsibility; a price in the heightened independence of those policy executives whose career status enables them to stick around and to develop lasting associations with "career" legislators from one-party districts.

[2] *Report on Personnel and Civil Service,* Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government by the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service (February 1955), p. 39.

Nor should we delude ourselves into believing that the executive transients at the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet levels are automatically and necessarily the loyal instruments of Presidential direction and control over the executive departments and agencies. One of the most tortured themes in the history of the United States has been the search of our Presidents for friendly and able political subordinates, and for ways of keeping them loyal to Presidential policies.

WASHINGTON'S ADMINISTRATION

The success of Washington's administration was impressive in this respect, but it was virtually unique. Partly because of Washington's extraordinary personal prestige, partly because the business of the federal government was limited in scope,[3] partly because the heads of the "great departments" were able men who worked "down the hall" from the President, executive management was an intimate, almost familial, affair. There were family rows and official resignations, but Washington demanded and received loyalty and deference from his incumbent political executives. As Leonard White has pointed out, "The President looked upon the secretaries . . . as *assistants,* not as rivals or as substitutes." [4]

NINETEENTH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

In the long century which followed, however, Presidents became increasingly unhappy about their managerial responsibilities and the nature of their relationship to their political subordinates. From 1800 to 1860, nonmilitary federal employees jumped from 3,000 to

[3] When the United States Capital was moved to the District of Columbia in 1800, the entire record of the executive branch was sent in seven packing cases.

[4] Leonard D. White, *The Federalists* (New York, 1948), p. 27.

50,000. By 1849, the bureau system had become sufficiently entrenched to lead Senator John M. Niles to declare that the bureaus were already "substantially independent of the departments." [5]

The patronage problems of the nineteenth-century Presidents made matters worse. As Presidential opportunities to appoint federal "clerks" mounted into the thousands per year, self-protection forced the Chief Executives to delegate appointing responsibilities to department heads. This development limited still further the number of "President's men" in any given administration and caused a then obscure lawyer-politician from Illinois to write:

> This must be arrested or it will damn us all. . . . The appointments need be no better . . . but the public must understand . . . they are the President's appointments.[6]

The devolution of the appointing power to department heads failed to ensure even intradepartmental harmony. President Polk, who held as tight a rein on the details of federal administration as any President in our history, wrote bitterly in his diary:

> My secretaries have a constant struggle with the Heads of Bureau[s], who are charged with preparing the detailed estimates, to keep down the expenditures to a reasonable point.[7]

And Polk was one of the few nineteenth-century Presidents who could speak with any assurance of *"my* secretaries." With the growth of parties and of regional pressures, Cabinet positions were increasingly used to placate political factions or satisfy regional demands. Few Presidents heeded the advice of James Buchanan to Franklin Pierce:

> A cabinet ought to be a unit. . . . He who attempts to conciliate opposing factions by placing ardent and embittered representatives of each in his cabinet, will discover that he has only infused into these factions new vigor and power for mischief.[8]

Congressional influence

The long years of "congressional government" following the Civil War only helped to splinter the bureaucracy further. Presidents had little or no control over executive expenditures. The "official households" of the President (first established by congressional action in 1857) were pitifully inadequate. In so far as departments and bureaus were "managed" at all, they were managed as the baronial estates of powerful congressional committees.

There was little incentive for Presidents under these circumstances to search for loyal political subordinates or to attempt to use the Cabinet as a "co-ordinating mechanism"—even if the phrase had been known or understood. It is small wonder that President McKinley had no qualms about picking his Secretary of the Treasury blindly upon a friend's advice that the candidate was a nice fellow and had "white whiskers."

Grafted onto the underbelly of this federal hydra was the whole civil service reform movement. Starting in a modest fashion with the Pendleton Act in 1883, the movement gathered force—ironically aided and abetted by the calculated actions of political leaders who wished to "blanket in" their nonclassified appointees before crucial elections.

[5] *Congressional Globe,* 30th Cong., 2d sess., p. 671 (March 3, 1849), quoted in Leonard D. White, *The Jacksonians* (New York, 1954), p. 538.

[6] Abraham Lincoln in Holman Hamilton, *Zachary Taylor: Soldier in the White House* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1951), p. 217, quoted in White, *The Jacksonians,* p. 75.

[7] Quoted in White, *The Jacksonians* (cited note 5 *supra*), p. 81.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 90.

And, of course, the United States Civil Service Commission was responsible not to the President but to the Congress.

The nineteenth century, then, established a pattern of habits, expectations, and reforms which bore little relation to the idea of the President as the responsible manager of the federal bureaucracy. Perhaps there was no real call for such a manager. At any rate, by the end of the nineteenth century the executive branch was a loose confederation of feudal estates—most of them nominally responsible to the President, but in fact responsible to powerful figures in the Congress and to partisan and economic interest groups outside the formal structure of government.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The importance of these nineteenth-century developments rests in the fact that the traditions, autonomies, reforms, and nonhierarchical habits of that period have carried over with irresistible momentum into the revolutionary era of the twentieth century.

And what a century this has been!

Managerial revolution

In 1913 the federal government passed its first billion-dollar budget. In that same year President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency made its historic report calling for the introduction of business methods and an executive budget into the federal establishment. In that same year a student of administration entered the White House.

The recognized need and the needed response seemed to appear simultaneously. The federal establishment which had "growed like Topsy" for over a hundred years was now to be streamlined—and just in time too. The timetable was a little delayed by World War I; but in 1921, with business efficiency as its watchword, the Harding administration witnessed the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act. The managerial revolution had begun. A Bureau of the Budget housed in the Treasury but responsible to the President and a General Accounting Office responsible to Congress were to bring order out of chaos in the executive branch. The new budget was to be the President's major instrument of co-ordination, efficiency, and discipline. Reading militant words (penned presumably by the forceful first Director of the Budget, General Dawes), President Harding admonished his political executives and bureau chiefs on June 18, 1923:

> The administration officials who are operating under the Executive are expected to subscribe cordially and loyally to the budget estimates and I do not hesitate to say that the repetition of an advocacy of an estimate before the congressional committees in excess of the Executive recommendations will be looked upon as sufficient reason to give consideration towards severance of employment with the Government.[9]

If only the world had stayed put! If only a century of habits and momentums had been capable of being exorcised by the creation of a single (if internally inconsistent) law like the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. But neither was to be the case.

Proliferation of federal agencies and programs

During the 1930's and 1940's under the impact of convulsive economic and military eruptions, the federal establishment exploded. In twenty-five years federal expenditures jumped over 2,000

[9] Presidential Address at the fifth regular meeting of the Business Organization of the Government.

per cent. Federal employment tripled. New agencies sprang up, flourished, and died. Many were reincarnated. Many were fused. Although much of this activity was due to the insistent demands for economic and national security, new expectations about the general role of government in our society produced startling increases in activity across the board. The federal Office of Education which now has an annual budget of two hundred million dollars spent three and a half million in 1929. "The public health service and the Bureau of Reclamation which in 1929 were spending little more than 10 million dollars a year each . . . now are spending a quarter of a billion a year respectively." [10]

This rapid proliferation of programs and agencies added powerful centrifugal forces to the already whirling executive wheel.

Co-ordinating mechanisms

The pressure of these apocalyptic events forced a series of massive reappraisals of the machinery of executive management and control. The attempts during the past twenty-five years to create countervailing, centripetal mechanisms are too well known to need anything more than brief reference here:

1. The National Emergency Council of 1933 "to coordinate and make more efficient and productive" the work of the numerous emergency and field agencies of the government.

2. The National Planning Board of 1933 (and its successors) "to advise on preparation of comprehensive program of public works, through development of regional plans, surveys and research, and correlation of effort among Federal, State, and local agencies."

3. The Reorganization Act of 1939, following the recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, establishing the Executive Office of the President and its constituent units. (Of particular interest in view of recent developments was the establishment in 1939 of the short-lived Office of Government Reports, within the Executive Office framework, with a mandate "to prepare reports concerning programs of Federal agencies, check on accomplishments, and recommend steps to overcome obstacles.")

4. The Office for Emergency Management created by executive fiat in 1940 to provide a flexible framework within the Executive Office for the establishment and administrative servicing of defense and war agencies.

5. The Office of War Mobilization (created by Executive order in 1943) and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (created by congressional action in 1944) "to develop unified programs" for the efficient conduct of the war and for planning and co-ordinating reconversion policies.

6. The Council of Economic Advisers, created by the Employment Act of 1946, to aid the President in gauging economic trends and in planning national economic policies aimed at effecting maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.

7. The National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent acts and Executive orders aimed at co-ordinating the policies of the several armed services and establishing the National Security Council (with its subsidiary Central Intelligence Agency), the Operations Coordinating Board, and the Office of Defense Mobilization within the Executive Office of the President to effect interagency co-ordination on matters of national security.

8. The extension under Truman of the legislative and programmatic clear-

[10] Harry Flood Byrd, "The Size and Cost of Our Government," THE ANNALS, Vol. 292 (March 1954), p. 13.

ance functions of the Bureau of the Budget.[11]

9. The Reorganization Plans following the report of the first Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government—particularly the ones creating the General Services Administration in 1949, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1953.

10. The establishment under the Eisenhower administration of a Cabinet secretariat, of a powerful chief of staff in the person of Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, and of a number of top level Presidential assistantships in such areas as disarmament, government reorganization, foreign aid, and national security affairs.

Eisenhower administration

These are high lights only. The whole period has been marked by a rapid increase in the number of people required to carry out the managerial and policy responsibilities of the Chief Executive. President Hoover's White House had 42 employees. President Eisenhower's Executive Office has over 1,200—and even this number does not tell the whole story. Eisenhower has relied more heavily than most Presidents upon the advice of *ad hoc* Presidential commissions, and the number of interdepartmental and interagency committees—*ad hoc* and standing—which either have emerged as the result of Executive Office initiative or are of direct concern to the President in his managerial role is staggering.[12] Finally, like every President before him, President Eisenhower has turned to individuals outside the formal structure of government for advice, guidance, and supporting influence over the bureaucracy. There is perhaps no one man outside the official family comparable in power to an Amos Kendall, a Colonel House, or a Harry Hopkins, but at various times men like the President's brother, Milton Eisenhower, General Lucius Clay, and the Republican National Chairman, Leonard Hall, have served as a kind of "Kitchenette Cabinet."

SUPERDEPARTMENTAL POWER AND STRUCTURES

We have scarcely begun to ponder the implications of the revolution in executive management which has occurred in our own lifetime. But some of the superficial results are interesting:

1. As of this writing, roughly 50 per cent of those attending Presidential Cabinet meetings are not the heads of federal departments.[13]

2. With the exception of two or three department heads, the most powerful topside policy determiners and co-ordinators in Washington are found not at the departmental level at all but in the White House Office and in the other constituent units of the Executive Office of the President. (It is interesting to note that the building which once housed the Departments of State, War, and Navy combined is presently inadequate to house the personnel in the Executive Office of the President alone.)

3. The entire Presidential apparatus has become so huge, so institutionalized, and so remote from the day-to-day activities of many of the operating federal departments and agencies that a whole bevy of co-ordinating units are now operating at the White House level including a new and rather carefully concealed office called the "Executive Branch Liaison Office" (*sic*).[14]

4. Topside, the distinction between "staff" and "line" has been muddied to the point of meaninglessness. "The Rock," as Sherman Adams is ruefully called around Washington, may be "staff" to the President, but he is "line" to almost everybody else in Washington including most department heads.

Some of the present uses of the new apparatus of executive management undoubtedly reflect President Eisenhower's military background, but it would be a serious error to explain away the apparatus itself in terms of the peculiarities and habits of the present incumbent. Mr. Truman's office entourage was nearly as large as President Eisenhower's and even the Eisenhower innovations of a chief of staff and a Cabinet secretariat have their roots in managerial experiments under recent Democratic administrations.[15]

The pendulum, then, seems to have swung with a vengeance. A massive mechanism is now in operation, above the departmental level, designed to overcome the centrifugal heritage of the nineteenth century and to control the explosive proliferation of programs and agencies which has occurred during the past twenty years.

Clinton Rossiter in his remarkably lucid and provocative study, *The American Presidency*, states that Mr. Eisenhower "has done himself and the Presidency a great service by carrying the process of institutionalization at least a step and a half farther than Truman."[16]

DANGERS OF TOPSIDE ELEPHANTIASIS

But has topside elephantiasis really been so benign? Has it really clarified and facilitated relationships between the President and the bureaucracy? Are not some of the following questions at least worthy of consideration?

1. To what extent has the institutionalization of the President's office, with its elaborate clearance mechanisms, reduced the creative role of agency officials and stifled, in Harlan Cleveland's phrase, "the vigorous advocacy that overcomes inertia in our big bureaucracy"? In other words, to what extent has it deprived the President of exposure to vigorously stated and powerfully based competitive advice?

2. To what extent has the growth in power of the Executive Office (particularly the White House staff) lowered the prestige and influence of all but two or three department heads and caught the remaining political executives between the autonomies and specializations of subordinate (or coequal) career officials and the frequent indifference of the new topside configurations of power?

3. To what extent has the institutionalization of the President's office increased the amount of "paper" and the external harmony of the executive branch without effecting real co-ordination of policy?

[11] See Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (December 1955), pp. 980–1021.

[12] As early as 1948 I counted over a thousand such committees.

[13] Those besides department heads who have had, during the Eisenhower administration, standing invitations to attend meetings of the Cabinet include: the Vice President; Arthur S. Flemming, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization; Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., United States Representative to the United Nations; Percival F. Brundage, Director, Bureau of the Budget; Philip Young, Chairman, United States Civil Service Commission; Sherman Adams, The Assistant to the President; Major General (USA, ret.) Wilton B. Persons, The Deputy Assistant to the President; and Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President; in addition, a number of other Presidential advisers and assistants in the Executive Office attend sporadically, so that in any one Cabinet meeting department heads are likely to be outnumbered.

[14] It is of considerable interest that Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton had charge of Presidential liaison with a number of executive agencies before his appointment to cabinet rank. See *Time*, January 9, 1956, p. 19.

[15] See Neustadt, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), *passim*.

[16] *Op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 131.

4. To what extent has the problem of recruiting and holding able sub-Cabinet executives (never an easy problem in our history) been made even more difficult by the imposition of an increasing number of layers between the appointees and the President?

5. To what extent have the constituent units of the Executive Office become so large that they are in danger of creating their own centers of power vis-à-vis the President and each other, and of building external alliances which might ultimately trap or immobilize a weak Chief Executive?

WHO ARE THE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL EXECUTIVES?

Surely the evidence is insufficient to deny that these dangers exist. And the question then poses itself, Who really are the effective "political executives" in the federal government today? Is the Hoover Commission Task Force realistic in constructing an image of a political executive class composed of 750 noncareer officials at the department and agency level?

Professor Wallace S. Sayre has suggested that our political and constitutional system would seem to require at least four recognizable types of executive appointments:

1. Presidential executives, that group of appointments who are initially and can be expected to remain Presidentially oriented;

2. Patronage appointments, the group of positions which the President must give to others to use; some to members of Congress, some to interest groups, some to other centers of support (past, present, or future), and some to those who must be persuaded into a lesser degree of hostility;

3. Program executives, those appointments who are competent at developing and executing programs to which they are committed and which are congenial to the President's policies; and

4. Career executives, who provide the centers of continuity and cooperation for the on-going work of the government.[17]

Following Professor Sayre's useful classification, must we not redefine the term "political executives" to include *all* those policy-oriented executives who have the power to determine the direction, scope, and speed of legally authorized bureaucratic activity?

If so, then a meaningful list of "political executives" in the federal government would have to include at least the following: (1) The President; (2) many of the career as well as the politically transient "staff" officials in the Executive Office of the President; (3) department and agency heads; (4) career and noncareer officials at the under and assistant secretary levels; (5) many military, diplomatic, and civil service career officials at the bureau level and below—in Washington and in the various field establishments and missions at home and abroad; (6) the commissioners of the independent regulatory agencies.

If these are the real centers of power in the executive branch and if our concern is to make as many of these diverse officials as possible sensitive to Presidential direction—both in order to focus political responsibility and to effect necessary programmatic co-ordination—where do we go from here? Are we trapped? Is there no escape from the Scylla of "overinstitutionalizing the topside" on the one hand and the Charybdis of administrative anarchy on the other?

ASSUMPTIONS OF POLITICAL NAVIGATION

I think there is; but safe passage must necessarily rest upon certain assumptions about the art of political navigation in the turbulent waters of a democratic society.

[17] "The Political Executive in the National Government: The Constitutional and Political Setting," an address delivered before the Woodrow Wilson Centennial Conference, Princeton, N. J., March 2–4, 1956, pp. 23–24.

Some of the following assumptions may be worth considering:

1. That many swirls and eddies of power cannot be eradicated and should be negotiated only when they are in the direct path of the ship of state.

2. That in perilous waters the captain needs a number of responsible and able "lookouts" who can report to him swiftly and directly without first having to clear everything with each other or with the captain's first mate who can checkmate fresh information.

3. That the technicians in the engine room and at the navigation table should be trained to be responsive to the captain's judgment and needs.

4. That the captain must have the authority to shift the assignments and general organization of the ship's company as necessity demands.

Like most analogies this one has its limitations and absurdities. But the fact remains that we can solve our toughest managerial problems only if we construct some kind of meaningful vector which will take into account these kinds of general working propositions and the variety and subtlety of the forces which play upon them.

Much of course depends upon the qualities of leadership of the President himself—his strength with the public, his ability to dominate his own party, his skill in negotiating effectively with the fractionalized power centers in Congress and in the society at large. The stronger the President is in these relationships, the fewer executive appointments he will be forced to give "to others to use."

But these relationships at best only establish a permissive framework within which the President can play his managerial role. Even if he succeeded in fashioning such a framework, he would still be faced with the twin problems of finding and holding loyal political subordinates and of increasing the number of top-level, nonparochial careerists.

CAREER CIVIL SERVANTS

Whatever the weaknesses of the recent Hoover Commission Task Force *Report on Personnel and the Civil Service,* it did attempt to address itself imaginatively to these two questions. Issue can certainly be taken with the Report's attempt to draw too neat a boundary between political executives and career civil servants; with its failure to deal with the implications of a highly institutionalized Presidential office; with its failure to treat more systematically the relation of the military and diplomatic services to the career civil service and to the problems of executive management generally; and with its strange image of a projected senior civil service made up of men who would presumably live in an uncertain and emotionless limbo.

But if the issue is that we need an increased number of capable and broadly gauged men responsive to Presidential direction in *all* the top managerial posts of the government—political and career—the Task Force Report has made a number of important and constructive suggestions.

Certainly a vigorous executive development program is needed for career administrators; certainly off-the-job as well as on-the-job training opportunities for careerists should be stressed within the departments and made uniformly available to all the agencies by congressional action; certainly improvements can and should be made in recruiting able talent for the career services.

In addition, attention might be given to the establishment of an administra-

tive staff college [18] and to the rotation of certain kinds of assignments among the three major career services—military, diplomatic, and civil—with special attention to temporary assignments in the Executive Office of the President.

RECRUITMENT OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES

But even if these reforms take place, even if we look pragmatically rather than dogmatically at the question of where the line should be drawn between "career" and "political" positions, the ability of the President to maximize responsible and flexible control over the bureaucracy depends ultimately upon his ability to recruit and hold an increasing number of dedicated noncareer executives. These men, like their career counterparts, must be able administrators, capable and honest advocates of particular causes, and ultimately loyal to the general program of the President. They must also be capable of absorbing risks and punishments usually spared their colleagues in the career services.

Recommendations of Hoover Commission Task Force and Woodrow Wilson Centennial Conference

Both the Hoover Commission Task Force and the Woodrow Wilson Centennial Conference flagged the importance of these noncareer political executives in our federal structure. Both groups recognized that the needed skills were rare, and that there were uncommon problems in identifying a sufficient number of talented men and women to fill the sensitive posts which require political incumbents. Both groups recommended steps to overcome the present difficulties. Some of the most interesting suggestions, abstracted from the recommendations of both groups, follow:

1. That the President, and every four years the President-elect, create a staff to develop inventories of the potential sources of political executive talent in American life and to develop rosters of particular names.

2. That the President and his subordinate recruiters make every effort to be positive and imaginative in their appeals, and realistic in the descriptions of the jobs to be performed.

3. That expectations as to length of tenure for political executives be extended in order to make their incumbency sufficiently long to be useful.

4. That in order to keep open the channels between the various career services and the political executive posts, department and agency heads—under appropriate safeguards—attempt to identify a limited number of imaginative and resourceful career servants and encourage them to assume the risks and responsibilities of political executive posts.

5. That the ablest university graduates be encouraged to enter the public service with the eventual goal of political executive posts in mind as possible capstones of their careers.

6. That a greater effort be made to draw into political executive posts a limited number of the younger members of Congress as well as those officials holding elective or appointive positions in state and local government.

7. That leaders of both major parties at all levels use every opportunity to recognize publicly the vital role of public service in our society and to counsel against generalized attacks upon government officials and employees.

8. That educational institutions and media of mass communication promote a wider and more accurate understanding of the importance of, and satisfactions to be gained from, governmental and political service in our society.

9. That there should be a careful exploration of possible ways to institute a system of awards, honors, and distinctions—compatible with the democratic habits and expectations of our society—to help raise public respect for distinguished public service.

10. That professional firms and organizations, business firms, labor unions, universities, local and state governments, and other institutions from which political executives may be drawn be encouraged in every possible way to lend such personnel without adverse effect on their careers, and to regard such service as a mark of achievement in the original organization.

11. That laws and practices restricting transfer or maintenance of pension rights and other fringe benefits be modified, and new pooling devices explored, to permit a greater occupational mobility in our society. Existing government pension programs at all levels should be carefully co-ordinated with the federal Society Security program.

12. That moving expenses, termination payments, and other nonsalary inducements be studied as possible ways of attracting political executives and easing their transfer to and from public service posts.

13. In view of frequent comments about the deterrent effect of conflict of interest statutes and practices on recruitment of political executives, that these statutes and practices be reviewed systematically, perhaps by a select body of private citizens designated by the President. This review should include suggestions for a code of conduct to guide public officials and employees and for ways to clarify public understanding of the complex issues involved.

14. That the salaries for most political executive positions be substantially raised.

Additional suggestions

And I should like to make five additional suggestions:

1. That attempts be made to increase the interest of our national party organizations and the four party campaign committees in Congress in compiling and suggesting *top-grade* names for possible Presidential appointment.

2. That department heads be given the right to choose their own political subordinates, but with the understanding that these appointments are subject in fact as well as in theory to Presidential scrutiny and possible veto.

3. That the size and mechanical complexity of the Executive Office of the President (and its counterparts in some of the larger executive agencies) be selectively reduced in order to increase the direct relationship of the President to his "line" political executives. (This suggestion necessarily bears with it a call to the President to reduce to the barest possible minimum consonant with constitutional and political necessity his ceremonial and routine functions, in order to increase the time he can spend with his line political subordinates.)

4. That department heads be chosen with maximum consideration given not to unanimity of views, but to an ultimate sense of deference to Presidential authority.

5. That a full-time Director of Executive Personnel in the Executive Office of the President replace the existing Presidential Adviser on Personnel Management (who doubles as the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission), and that this director work with the President and his agency heads in developing names and programs for staff-

[18] See Marshall E. Dimock, "The Administrative Staff College: Executive Development in Government and Industry," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March 1956), pp. 166–76.

ing top-level political and career positions.

NONCONFORMITY AND CO-ORDINATION

In a free society governed by gigantic and complex institutional arrangements and made insecure by unparalleled domestic and international problems, we cannot and should not ask that our federal bureaucracy be arranged as a tight pyramid designed to produce rigid conformity. We must expect, value, and provide the channels for, the vigorous advocacy of new ideas. In some areas we must be prepared to accept only the loosest accommodation of diverse opinions and practices. Policy frictions and administrative disparities are the price of freedom and the condition of imaginative responses to pressing issues in a large bureaucracy.

But we do have an obligation to strive for a system of relationships between the President and his executives —political and career—which will facilitate intra-agency and interagency co-operation and co-ordination on the big issues of our time, stimulate competitive rather than monolithic advice to the Chief Executive, and above all ensure the probability that after the tumult and the shouting dies, most at least of the top managers of the government will continue to consider themselves "the President's men."

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The Executive and the Public Interest

By HARLAN CLEVELAND

ABOUT eleven years ago, I was sitting against the wall of a Senate committee room, watching two political executives sell a lend-lease appropriation to the greatest, or at least the most deliberative, body in the world. My capacity on this occasion was as a briefcase carrier—one of those anonymous civil servants who sit behind government witnesses at these affairs, handing them scribbled calculations and bits of advice on bits of paper. The witnesses were Leo Crowley, the Wisconsin politician who headed the Foreign Economic Administration, and his deputy Oscar Cox, who as one of the New Deal's brightest lawyers had drafted that extraordinary piece of legislation, the Lend-Lease Act.

The scene was a study in contrast. Crowley seemed more senatorial than the Senators, a languid, paunchy man with a mane of white hair, a florid complexion, and a deceptively benign expression. Cox was thin and efficient, his jerky gestures matching his crisp and factual eloquence. He was easy to carry a briefcase for: he already knew its contents by heart.

Most of the questions were taken by Cox. Before a Senator had finished asking his question, Cox was way ahead of him, guessing what was on his mind and starting to reply in impressive, uncompromising detail. Crowley leaned back, utterly relaxed, sometimes putting in a comment or telling a joke to keep things moving. Finally a Senator asked Crowley a question about one of the most intricate features of the lend-lease program, and I learned an important lesson.

"Well, I'll tell you, Senator," Crowley said in his Middle Western accent, "I've always wondered how that works too. Let's see if Oscar can explain it to us."

Soon the hearing was over, the lesson complete. Two or three of the Senators were clapping Crowley on the back, saying what a fine presentation he had made. Cox, who had made it, was alone at the other end of the room, stuffing his papers back into his efficient-looking briefcase.

ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS

A discussion of that political animal, the government executive, should start with some picture of the jungle in which he lives and works and, if he is fit enough, survives. From the requirements of survival in this jungle, the talents needed by the top political executives can readily be deduced. Beyond this we need to consider the civil servant as a political executive.

Let us start with the proposition that government is a mixture of politics and administration, accommodation and logic, consent and decisions—a blend, in short, of Crowley and Cox.

We instinctively demand that our Presidents be "double firsts"—that they be great politicians and great administrators too. Of course they usually do not succeed on both counts. Franklin Roosevelt, who is possibly unsurpassed in this century as a builder of consent in war and peace, was as casual an administrator as ever hit Washington. Harry Truman, whose reputation and training were in politics, proved himself an able and orderly administrator, but when it came to building consent for a government program he can hardly be rated better than fair. President Eisen-

hower, whose forte was military administration, has combined a remarkable talent for evoking consent with an equally remarkable tendency to appoint as administrators of his policies men who disagree with them.

Yet if we seldom or never get quite the perfect Presidential blend, we continue to pine for that rare amalgam—the man who can run the executive branch and still get along with most of the other Americans, in and out of Congress, who think *they* are anointed to run the government too.

What is not so clear in much of the literature of public administration is the fact that *every* official of the executive branch must in some measure combine the two qualities we look for in a President, the ability to manage and the talent to build political support for what is managed. In my own limited experience and observation, I have yet to encounter a government official with any responsibility at all who did not have this dual function. Mark this proposition well: it is bedrock to everything I have to say on this subject. Government is a mixture of administration and politics all the way up and down the line, *not* merely at something called the political level where people called political executives get jobs by a process called political appointment. As Peter Odegard puts it, "Policy and administration are the Siamese twins of politics and are associated at virtually all levels of the administrative structure." [1] Or, as Paul Appleby wrote back in 1945, "So long as the people vote and have unrestrained the right to complain, the whole process of administration is in a sense political on every level." [2]

Does this seem obvious? Does it go without saying that, in a free society, government is politics? I shall be glad if you agree so quickly. But I should give fair warning: if you take seriously what I have just said, you will, I think, have to disagree with much of what the second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government has said in its 1955 Report on Personnel and Civil Service.

[1] Peter H. Odegard, "Toward a Responsible Bureaucracy," THE ANNALS, Vol. 292 (March 1954), pp. 25–26.

[2] Paul H. Appleby, *Big Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 123.

THE DIFFUSION OF POWERS

What is it about our government that makes it so political a jungle? The standard explanation is the constitutional separation of powers, the built-in checks and balances, the fact that everybody is in every act but nobody seems to be in charge of the performance.

Woodrow Wilson called this "administration by semi-independent executive agents who obey the dictation of a legislature to which they are not responsible." He was sure that Congress ran the show, described legislation as "the originating force," and complained that the "blind processes" resulting from the division of power made that power irresponsible.[3] But Wilson was too pessimistic about the ability of the government to function in spite of this division of power and purposes—or better, perhaps, because of it. He was certainly overimpressed with the power of the legislature in his academic days, though as President he later underestimated its veto power when it came to getting the League of Nations ratified. The legislature is powerful and can do a massive wrecking job, as we know from our own recent history. But the men who wrote our Constitution were clear about the "dangers from legislative usurpations." "One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one," Madison said in one of the Federalist papers; ". . . an elective despotism was not the government we fought for." [4]

[3] Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1885), pp. xvi, 273, 280.

Despite the periodic flurries of legislative usurpation, we do not have an elective despotism. But we do have a Congress that participates with appalling vigor in the task of running the executive branch of the government. We have, indeed, a system that not only separates the general constitutional powers but diffuses the power of decision on quite specific matters. One of the very first things I ever had to do in Washington, as an "intern" in the office of Senator "Young Bob" La Follette, was to stand in for the Senator at a hearing in the Veterans Administration on a compensation case. I recall being struck at the time by the distortion of functions thus dramatized: here I was, a legislative bureaucrat horning in on the efforts of executive bureaucrats to perform a judicial function.

Each official in each branch of the government has a chance to exercise two (and occasionally even three) of the constitutional powers at once; and by the same token, each of the three branches sooner or later gets a crack at nearly every major public issue.

The result of this diffusion of power is not merely, as Peter Odegard says, that "Congress has . . . found ways and means for interposing itself between the President and his executive subordinates and thus confusing the clear line of bureaucratic responsibility." [5] Each executive official, whether politically appointed or not, has to spend an unconscionable amount of his time and energy telling Congress what he is doing, and why. In my last year with the Mutual Security Agency, I spent the equivalent of six months out of the twelve preparing and presenting on Capitol Hill the detailed exposition of the program I was supposed to be helping "administer."

[4] *The Federalist* (Modern Library Edition), No. 48 (1778), p. 322.

[5] Odegard, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 20.

CONGRESSIONAL COALITIONS

Nor is it enough for an administrator to defend a program from political attack. He finds himself actively promoting a political coalition in its support. For our Congress, which I have heard described to a group of visiting Frenchmen as a model of party discipline, is of course as choice an example of coalition government as the notorious French Assembly.

If there is any doubt that Congress is managed by complex, *ad hoc* coalitions which shift with every issue, look for a moment at the record of the Eighty-third Congress. In this supposedly Republican Congress, the fluctuating balance of power swung against the administration on foreign aid and public housing, but supported the President on farm price supports and (by one vote) the Bricker Amendment. A coalition majority could be put together for confirming the New Deal, reducing taxes, cutting slightly the funds for defense, continuing the 1950 version of United States foreign policy, and allowing some of its committees to trample on Executive toes. On hardly any of these issues could one party get its way solely with the votes it could deliver from its own side of the aisle.[6]

We see the same pattern operating in the Eighty-fourth Congress, which is theoretically led by the Democrats. There was an excellent example in the Senate last spring, when thirty-one Republicans and twenty-two Democrats beat twenty-four Democrats and fourteen Republicans and sent the natural-

[6] See "The Eighty-third Congress—Government by Coalition," *The Reporter*, September 14, 1954, p. 24.

gas bill to Thomasville, Georgia, to be vetoed by a Republican President.

Because Congress is the way it is, every executive must help splice together the particular coalition that will pass *his* appropriation and protect *his* program and *his* reputation from damage. (His coalition may be very different from another one being fashioned for a different purpose by a colleague in the next office.) If every executive has congressional relations as an important segment of his duties—even though he may not himself carry a bulging briefcase up Pennsylvania Avenue to "the Hill"—every executive has to have some of the instincts of a politician. In this sense, the "political executives" in the government are not just the holders of those seven to eight hundred "noncareer executive" posts to which the Hoover Commission Report refers.[7] The number of officials who are involved in this kind of politics is actually well up in the thousands. Under our constitutional diffusion of powers, the federal government would hardly operate at all if they were fewer.

THE INSIDE TRACK

Many distinguished writers have pondered whether the American Congress adequately represents the American people, but this is an academic question about which I have never been able to get excited. For the American people do not limit their representation in Washington to electing half a thousand Congressmen. The people are directly represented in the executive branch, too.

When I say "the people," I mean what David Riesman intends by the phrase "veto groups." In *The Lonely Crowd,* Riesman observed that political leadership has passed from businessmen as a class to

> . . . a series of groups, each of which has struggled for and finally attained a power to stop things conceivably inimical to its interests and, within far narrower limits, to start things. . . . Among the veto groups competition is monopolistic; rules of fairness and fellowship dictate how far one can go.[8]

The tidelands group refrained from going too far; the natural-gas lobby, consisting of some of the same people, so outraged the public conscience that a President thought to be favorable to its objectives had to turn against the natural-gas bill. The farm group's effective power is enormous; the smaller effectiveness of the labor group may be traced, at least in part, to the fact that it overplayed its hand during the New Deal.

What Riesman did not mention is the fact that the power of these new-style lobbies can be roughly measured by the strength of their surrogates within the executive branch of the government. The Department of Agriculture has long been regarded, by both the farm organizations and the rest of the government, as a farmers' defense league inside the federal bureaucracy. Organized labor, particularly the Congress of Industrial Organizations, substantially controlled the National Labor Relations Board during the period (in the 1930's) when the Board was clearing the way for the rapid expansion of the CIO. The housing program, created by the New Deal for the purpose of getting houses built, placed itself in the hands of the speculative builders and the savings and loan associations to such an extent that moral corruption shaded over into pecuniary corruption. The organized veterans have their own preserve in the Veterans Administration. The Commerce Department has for some years had a Business Advisory Council whose function, in effect, is to bring to bear on internal government decisions an organized business opinion. Defense contracts are habitually given out by men recruited from the businesses that are getting the business, and regulations are drafted by surrogates of the industries to which they apply. The National Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional early in the New Deal, but "self-government of industry" is an established practice with a venerable tradition behind it.

During the Korean War, John Corson has said,

> . . . the Office of Price Stabilization official in charge of price regulations for the apparel industry (in 1951) was borrowed from a leading firm in this industry. His aide, who specializes in women's woven underwear, is "on loan" from Barbizon, one of the principal competing manufacturers in this field. A succession of five or more chiefs of the Iron and Steel Division in the National Production Authority have been loaned by their companies, the major companies in the steel industry. The acting director of the Equipment and Materials Division of the Defense Transport Administration for most of 1951 was on loan from the American Car and Foundry Company. He actively promoted, for the Defense Transport Administrator, a plea that the NPA make available sufficient steel to build ten thousand freight cars a quarter; his firm meanwhile is engaged in the production of freight cars.[9]

From time to time this sort of thing gets out of bounds, as in the recent cases of Air Force Secretary Talbott and Chairman Hugh Cross of the Interstate Commerce Commission, both of whom admitted error in using their official positions to advance their private interests.[10] Much more often, there is no formal "conflict of interest." It is considered normal and natural for a steel man to lubricate with government contracts the growth of steel production; for a housing man to get more housing built by having the government absorb a good part of the risk; for a farmers' representative to promote aid for farmers from inside the Department of Agriculture; for a labor organizer temporarily in the government to promote the right of labor to organize. We have institutionalized the inside track.

Outside interests and the public interest

The political executive consequently has to do more than run his shop and deal with Congress. He has to maintain a complex network of horizontal relations with the veto groups whose interests his actions may affect, with others who think their interests might be affected, and with the surrogates of these groups in *both* the executive and legislative branches of the government.

I am trying hard not to pass any moral judgment on this system, but merely to describe how it seems to work. Given the nature of our society, it is almost bound to work this way. The government is, after all, the least bureaucratic of the major interest groups with which it has to deal. Turnover of government personnel is high, especially at the top.[11] Even if this were not true for other reasons, we make sure of it by having reasonably frequent elections. The same is not true of the major aggregations of veto

[7] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Personnel and Civil Service: A Report to the Congress* (February 1955), p. 34. Hereafter cited as "Hoover Commission Report."

[8] David Riesman, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd* (abridged version, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955), p. 247.

[9] John Corson, *Executives for the Federal Service* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 50.

[10] *Annual Report of the Committee on Government Operations Made by Its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,* 84th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Report N. 1444 (January 25, 1956), pp. 16–24, 28–34.

[11] See Hoover Commission Report, p. 26.

power outside: in business, labor, agriculture, and a good many other categories, elections are merely a façade for maintaining the same leadership from year to year and even from decade to decade. If you do not like the President of the United States, you can vote against him every four years. If you do not like the President of General Motors or the head of a labor union, you can only wait for him to die.

This difference in tenure between government and outside interest groups is critical. If the outside leaders know more about the subject than their opposite numbers inside the government, if they are providing key experts, advisers, and sometimes even the political executives themselves, the views of the regulated are likely to be pretty influential with the regulators. In the United States, the road to the riskless society that Europeans call *socialism* is paved with the incestuous intention of nearly every major economic interest to bring the government into its affairs as the risk-taking partner.

Where, in this picture, does the "public interest" appear? Not, certainly, through the organized political parties, which inflate like balloons at election time and are of small consequence in governmental decision making the rest of the time. No, the defense of the public interest rests in the hands of the people as a whole, who cannot do anything much about it, and of the President they elect, who can.

THE BUCK PASSES UP

Whether, under our system, the government ultimately serves the public interest or merely obliges the private and sectional Trojan horses encamped inside the walls of the federal bureaucracy, depends on the President to an extraordinary and alarming degree. He is the chief mediator among the veto groups, the one political executive whose whole job is to consider the situation as a whole. He is the one remaining safety man available to stop a specialized interest which breaks through the normal line of checks and balances and threatens to gain too much yardage at the expense of other groups.

In a revealing passage of his autobiography, Mr. Truman regarded it as quite natural that nobody should consider the public interest but the President:

> I was always aware of the fact that not all my advisers looked at the problem in the same manner I did. This was nothing unusual, of course. It is the job of the military planners to consider all matters first and always in the light of military considerations. The diplomat's approach is—or in any case should be—determined by considerations of our relations to other nations. The Secretary of the Treasury thinks in terms of budget and taxes. Except for the members of his personal staff, each Presidential adviser has and should have a departmental outlook.[12]

Though we sometimes make gods or supermen of our Presidents, they have not generally been more moral than most of us. The difference is that in the White House they are compelled to stand a little higher on the mountain than anybody else, and they consequently see farther at the horizon. It is this unique and lonely vantage point that lends grandeur to the American Presidency.

Not more decisions

Yet the President's high rank does not necessarily mean that he makes more "decisions" than other political executives below. Indeed it is arguable that in our government the higher one's rank the fewer decisions one makes. The man who buys paper clips

[12] Harry S. Truman, "Years of Trial and Hope," Installment 9, *New York Times,* January 31, 1956, p. 18.

makes a number of unreviewed decisions without consultation—what size and shape of paper clip, from whom to buy, at what price. As you go up the ladder of authority each official is beset with more committees, more horizontal clearances, more veto groups and political personalities whose views must be reconciled or discounted before the "final decision" is reached.

I once tried to get this important idea across to a very bright businessman who had just been appointed a division director and had promptly started to operate as if he were solely responsible for the program co-ordinated by that division. One day, months after he had taken office, I knew he would survive the transition to becoming a public servant, for he came to me and said: "I'm director of this program, but that doesn't mean I direct anybody, does it? I mean I don't make any *decisions*. I'm really a sort of broker, I guess." [13]

The President's role as chief broker makes possible a certain order in the bureaucratic jungle. It is no accident that matters which frequently get to the White House are so often better handled than matters that do not. The Housing Agency worked off in a corner by itself for years, dealing direct with the housing industry and hardly ever creating a crisis requiring Presidential attention. As a result corrupt practices like "mortgaging out" under Section 608 came to be regarded by some as the natural order of things until Congress finally made a political scandal of it. The foreign aid program, on the other hand, has spent more than fifty billion dollars since World War II, with hardly a trace of scandal. Why? Could it be because so many departments and agencies were always fighting for the right to manage foreign aid that the program was a matter of monthly, even weekly, concern to the President himself?

The saving grace of our executive bureaucracy, then, is that nearly everybody in it works for the President. To be sure, each political executive is also responsible horizontally to four or five congressional committees; he has to deal with several outside interest groups whose leaders feel the executive is answerable to *them;* and within the executive branch he is constantly evading his own responsibility by burying it in collective decisions by interdepartmental committees. But when the chips are down on any one issue, all political executives are accountable to the President—which is another way of saying that if they get into a tight spot, they can generally pass the buck to him.[14]

[13] Compare what Paul Appleby said shortly after completing twelve years of government service:

"The danger that our liberties are being lost because Federal executives possess too much power and because they can use it arbitrarily exists almost entirely in the imagination of persons without perspective. It is my observation that no one in Washington, not even the President, is impressed with his own power. Rather the contrary: the average 'high official' is so conscious of the restraints and limitations under which he is obliged to function that his strongest impression is likely to be that of a very restricted power. Indeed, this sense of a lack of power is what drives people out of Washington. To have to 'think of everything in terms of everything else' causes many men to think that they are so hedged about by restrictions that they 'can't do anything,' with the result that, after a while, they simply give up with a feeling that they might as well go back home. The orders and statutes in our big democracy do not invest persons with power; they invest organizations with responsibility."—*Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 38.

[14] "Not the least of the heavy burdens the President must bear is political responsibility for the conduct and misconduct of the executive establishment. Insolence, inefficiency, incompetence, and corruption in any executive official or agency are properly chargeable to him. He ought not to escape this responsibility, as Grant and Harding, and others too,

The King can do no wrong

The buck passes *up:* many of the most serious crises in our government's operations come from temporary lapses in following this first law of the jungle. Many elements of the present federal security system—a major subject in itself when it comes to considering why it is so hard to get and keep good political executives—are a travesty of this principle. For the system legitimizes the downward passing of the buck, and even prepares ahead of time an endless file of scapegoats for administrative error and sacrificial lambs for periodic congressional slaughter. It encourages a reversion to the old English principle that the King can do no wrong: if the government errs, it must be some spy in the ointment. One lesson of our recent madness is clear—legislative usurpation generally takes the form of trying to find the disloyal official down the line on whom the blame for bad policy can be laid. The depth of the Army-McCarthy crisis was revealed when it became clear that Secretary Stevens, Counsel John Adams, and General Zwicker were to be left standing out in the rain without the umbrella of Presidential backing. The natural-law reply to that insistent question, "Who promoted Peress?" was always plain: "The President did. Want to make something of it?"

Perhaps the Hoover Commission Task Force had this in mind when it declared: "Public servants who are unfairly attacked deserve to be defended, and the public interest also requires it. . . . Defense is the corollary of discipline. Both are essential." [15] Government is politics, but the executive branch has to be run by executives. And in government as in other hierarchies, the buck can travel in one direction only—up.

QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP

The habitat of both political executive and civil servant is thus a political government. To be successful every government official needs to be aware of outside considerations, available to the concerned committees of the Congress, willing to work in a goldfish bowl, earnest in cultivating his public relations—because his personal public relations are the relations between the people and their government. He must be adept—increasingly so as he rises in rank and responsibility—in helping to build the coalition of outside forces which will provide a "political base" for the program in his charge. He must therefore not be afraid to advocate new policies if he thinks the old ones are worn out, nor can he flinch from becoming identified with the administration of which he is a part and defending his program in public. Since every government executive is something of a political executive, these are to some extent the conditions of work for bureaucrats at every level. They are the *main* conditions of work for an executive near the top of the heap, whether he is appointed from the outside or lifted out of the civil service from within.

In this jungle of close decisions, openly arrived at, the political executive must have certain natural talents and certain acquired tastes. Everybody who has given any thought to public administration has his pet list of these qualities. Here is mine.

Imbued with the public interest

First, he must be imbued with the public interest.

When I was a child, I was told to ask myself three questions before opening my mouth to say anything: "Is it kind? Is it true? Is it necessary?" If I had remembered this advice very often, silence would nearly always have overtaken speech.

Whenever a political executive says, does, or decides anything, he also needs to ask himself a question: Where does the public interest lie? The public interest cannot of course be defined in general. But in our society we have a pretty fair index ready to hand, if we approach each action or decision with the following query in mind: Would this decision—and the procedure by which it was made—stand the test of detailed public scrutiny?

Asking this question must be second nature, automatic, instinctive. It was not automatic, perhaps it was not asked at all, in many a famous political scandal. In our own time General Vaughan did not have it on his mind during the deep-freeze affair. The men who tried to slip Dixon-Yates in through the back door (when they could have carried out the Eisenhower power policy by less circuitous and more durable means) must surely have forgotten to ask themselves what would happen if somebody wanted to know what was going on.

There are, of course, a few public officials who never do get the word, even when forcibly reminded. Several days after resigning as Secretary of the Air Force under a conflict-of-interest cloud, Harold E. Talbott turned up at a Southampton, Long Island, hotel in an Air Force vehicle and was helped in with his baggage by two or three Air Force officers.[16] The action raised the question whether Mr. Talbott had any idea at all what had hit him in Washington.

General Matthew B. Ridgway, in a recent article in the *Saturday Evening Post,* revealed a different kind of fuzziness.

> As Chief of Staff [he wrote] I quickly learned that though my own recommendations were made on a purely military basis, the decisions of the Defense Department were based on considerations other than clear-cut military needs. They were based on budgetary considerations, political considerations, on the advantage to be gained in the field of domestic politics by a drastic reduction in military expenditures. . . .[17]

How does one get to be a four-star general without learning that at the government level there is no such thing as a decision which is "purely military" or purely anything else, whether the public official making the decision is in or out of uniform?

The retort of President Eisenhower, who had one more star and a little civilian experience to guide him, was right to the point:

> His responsibility for national defense is, you might say, a special one, or, in a sense, parochial. He does not have the over-all responsibility that is borne by the Commander in Chief, and by him alone, when it comes down to making the recommendations to the Congress.[18]

Leader of men

Second, the political executive must be a leader of men, with a "sense of action." [19] The very size of the government, and the complexity of the

have sought to escape, by talk of 'betrayal' by 'faithless men in high places.' These men are his agents and for better or worse their deeds are his."—Odegard, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 21.

[15] Quotation is from the Hoover Commission Report, p. 78, summarizing a larger section in *Report on Personnel and Civil Service,* Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government by the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service (February 1955), pp. 117–19. The latter publication is hereafter cited as "Task Force Report."

[16] According to an eye witness report—by a Democrat, of course.

[17] "My Battles in War and Peace," Part I, *The Saturday Evening Post,* January 21, 1956, p. 46.

[18] "Transcript of President's Press Conference," *New York Times,* February 3, 1955.

[19] Paul Appleby's phrase in *Big Democracy.*

horizontal clearances required to make anything happen, create the temptation to assume that somebody else has the initiative, that it is the other fellow's move. For the effective bureaucrat, it is always his own move.

Chester Barnard has written that a leader needs five qualities: vitality and endurance, decisiveness, persuasiveness, a sense of responsibility, and intellectual capacity—in that order of importance. He points out that only the last, intellectual capacity, can be increased by training. For the rest,

> . . . there is no substitute for the experience of recognizing and seizing opportunities, or for making one's own place unaided and against interference and obstacles; for these kinds of ability are precisely those that followers expect in leaders.[20]

I suspect that Mr. Barnard would agree that for the political executive intellectual capacity should rank higher on his list than last place. A political executive, unlike a business executive, cannot possibly delegate his thinking to a vice-president for ideas. It is a condition of survival in the jungle that he do his own homework and be in intellectual command of the subject matter of the program for which he is responsible. When a congressional committee or an important "veto group" wants to know the story and asks embarrassing questions, no understudy with a mimeographed statement will fill the bill.

His own public relations man

Third, it is obvious from our earlier survey of the jungle that the political executive must be his own public relations man. One reason businessmen get into trouble in government is that many of them are accustomed to delegating to others the task of dealing with the public. In January 1953, toward the end of two long days of senatorial hearings on his General Motors stock holdings, Charles E. Wilson revealed how much he had learned about public relations at the age of sixty-two.

> The thing that perhaps I overlooked myself [he mused] was that not only did I have to operate honestly and fairly without prejudice, but all the people should also think that that was the way I was operating, and that part of it I did not quite appraise.[21]

Where had he been? Presumably producing cars and trucks while somebody else worried about what the public would think.

The contrasting case is of course that of Paul Hoffman. By handling his own public relations from the start, he sold the Marshall Plan and himself in the same package: to millions of people in the early days of that singular project, he *was* the Marshall Plan. And his ideas about public relations permeated the organization he built to administer the European recovery program. I remember his telling us once in a staff meeting that we should answer every letter the day it came in, even if all we could say was that we would reply in detail later on. "When I ran a filling station," he went on, "I found that a man wouldn't wait for gas more than two or three minutes if nobody paid any attention to him. But if you gave him a big hello and explained that there were several cars ahead of him, he would sit there quite happily for a quarter of an hour!"

A mixed career

Fourth, the political executive should, preferably, have a mixed career. It has often been a mistake to bring into the government, especially in very high posts, men who have never before worked with or in a public bureaucracy, who have never had to live with the "public interest" from day to day. But it is also true that a lifetime public servant lacks something if he never leaves the bureaucracy; he loses track of the concerns which most of the people think about most of the time. Indeed, the very experience of dealing, year in and year out, with matters of great scale and moment can be a narrowing one; I am sure I am not the only ex-government person to whom the thousands looked like millions for a few months after leaving Washington.

It is beyond my scope in this paper—and probably beyond my powers anyway—to set forth a neat procedure to make sure that prospective political executives in the civil service get some private experience and budding Assistant Secretaries now in private business or universities or foundations try the bureaucracy for a while. But I would be willing to bet that an objective study of political executives over the last generation would reveal that men with mixed careers behind them had been more effective and lasted longer in their jobs than those less favored by variety in their lives.

A rare combination

That is the list. Our political executive must be imbued with the public interest; he must be a leader of men; he must do his own thinking and be his own public relations man; and he should preferably have had some public and some private experience. As the Hoover Commission's Task Force noted:

> The combination of abilities is relatively rare. . . . His foresight must equal the hindsight of a host of critics, both amateur and professional, who are free to be as narrow in their point of view and time perspective as they care to be. The rules of the game of national politics allow no margin for error. . . . To lead the life of a political executive of high rank amidst the asperities of American politics is a test of toughness, of intelligence, and of devotion to the public interest.

"Such talents," the Task Force concluded with classic understatement, "are valuable to the Nation but hard to find."[22]

"DRAWING A LINE"

How far down from the President should political appointment and political expendability be the rule? On this, the perennial question in discussions of civil service reform, the Hoover Commission and its Task Force were very clear: A sharp line must be drawn between political and administrative functions.[23] And when they draw it, what a curious boundary it turns out to be!

The second Hoover Commission must be seen as a recession in the seventy-year drive to have civil servants take over the government. From Wilson's professorial days until a few years ago, the general idea has been to reduce to a minimum the number of jobs with a tinge of politics. Wilson himself was not sure, when he published *Congressional Government* in 1885, whether the Secretaries in the Cabinet should be regarded as political or nonpolitical officers. The idea of a strong civil service has been so powerful in this country—even if the prestige of the actual civil service has not—that as late as December 1952 a National Planning Association report seriously suggested that most or all of the President's own staff

[20] Chester I. Barnard, *Organization and Management* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 106, and *supra*.

[21] "Excerpts from Two Wilson Hearings Before Senate Committees on Defense Appointments," *New York Times*, January 24, 1955, p. 8.

[22] Task Force Report (cited note 15 *supra*), p. 40.

[23] Hoover Commission Report, p. 30; Task Force Report, pp. 1–38.

should be drawn from the career service.[24]

But the reformers overshot their mark. More and more people, especially those who had to run the executive branch of the government, became concerned about the short supply of political executives good enough and knowledgeable enough to manage the government of our big democracy. The second Hoover Commission therefore kept its enthusiasm for civil service reform within bounds, and sought to enlarge the number of political executives, now about seven or eight hundred by Hoover Commission count—though it prudently did not say how many more political executives there should be.[25] Then it added a proposal for a senior civil service of 1,500 to 3,000 individuals, a special tribe of career men and women who have demonstrated their ability to survive and advance in the bureaucracy and are rewarded with personal rank and the permission to serve in any agency that will hire them.[26]

Task Force definitions

The Task Force wisely abandoned the traditional idea that you can distinguish between two kinds of people, those who determine policies and those who carry them out. But firm in their resolve to separate the political transients from the permanent boarders, the experts laid out a more complicated boundary line, more appropriate to the uneven terrain. Political executives should, they said, be appointed to:

(*a*) All positions filled by Presidential appointment, with or without confirmation by the Senate;

(*b*) All positions having vested in them statutory authority or executive delegations of authority requiring the incumbents to make final decisions in the establishment of governing policies, programs, objectives, and in the enunciation of principles which will control the action of subordinates in the implementation of the foregoing;

(*c*) All positions, the duties of which require the incumbents to act publicly in advocating new policies and in justifying or defending the governing policies or the basic principles or philosophy which controls their department or agency policies. Such duties would include direct participation with, or representation of noncareer executives in public debate, evaluative discussions, and justifications of departmental policies, programs, or activities.

(*d*) Most positions of a personal and confidential nature, such as personal aides, confidential secretaries, and personal chauffeurs. . . .[27]

Article of faith

I confess that all this enthusiasm for drawing a sharp line between politicos and careerists leaves me very cold. It is, I know, an article of passionate faith that pervades the literature on this subject. Hardly a month goes by without a scholarly admonition about the "rigid protection of bureau chiefs from political connections and duties";[28] or a civil service advocate making the misleading analogy between a lawyer's advice to his client and a civil servant's advice to his politically appointed boss; or an expert viewing with alarm the fact that government, the product of politics, is political. In a recent book, Dr. Leonard D. White argues the point so vigorously that in one passage about the making of decisions he draws a rather unattractive picture of a civil servant:

> At the highest levels, only the confidence that comes from an inner conviction of the "rightness" of a course of action and the moral support that comes from the representative capacity of the man who must act can sustain the strength to decide. The career service does not normally breed this type. Its decisions are based primarily on the logic of efficiency rather than on the calculated risks of an uncertain future.[29]

How government works

Of course a line does have to be drawn, in the sense that you have to distinguish which jobs are going to be filled by political appointment and vacated by political action, and which jobs are going to be filled by civil servants and vacated under Civil Service safeguards. For this purpose the Hoover boundary is as good as any. What I object to is the Commission's quite unrealistic picture of what will be going on below that line: the image of an executive branch with a few political chiefs making policy and publicly defending it, while the drones below are carefully screened off from the ugly realities of the world of politics. But is this truly the way the government works, or the way a government under our Constitution can possibly work?

The Hoover group draws its line between "departmental management" and "bureau management." Thus in the New Deal Department of Agriculture, the heads of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Farm Security Administration, and the policy-making Bureau of Agricultural Economics, all of whom ran highly controversial programs, would have been career men. Could Congress be kept from summoning such men as witnesses to explain their actions? Should such men as these be protected from the effort to explain to farm groups and business groups and labor groups and the press why they think their innovations are in the public interest? If a ranking bureaucrat cannot help build public support for the segment of the government's work for which he is responsible, is he even the right man for the job? Is there really this clear distinction between "factual material" and the policies which rest on them, between diagnosis and prescription, between "government" and "politics"?

SOURCES OF CONFUSION

The Commission's vision of how the government should work "below the line" strikes me as so exotic that I have tried very hard to think how this dreamworld came into being. There are, I think, three sources of confusion. One may be a misreading of British experience. Another source of confusion is the idea that the erection of defenses against the spoils system is still the cardinal item on the good-government agenda. And a third derangement stems from a concept of "political neutrality" which confuses party politics with the politics of national policy. We might look briefly at each of these confusions in turn.

The false British analogy

It is easy for a student of American government to be dazzled by the eminence and prestige of British civil servants compared to the low opinion generally expressed about our own bureaucrats in Washington. It is, none the

[24] Bradley D. Nash, *Staffing the Presidency* (NPA Planning Pamphlet No. 80, December 1952), p. 45. But see the dissent on this point by James Rowe, Jr., on page xiii: "I must disagree wholeheartedly with Mr. Nash's suggestion that the President's office be staffed with career men instead of non-career expendable individuals. This disagreement certainly includes the top men and should, with some technical exceptions, include most of the staff. When the country wants a new policy, it picks a new President. It is hard enough to change governmental policy when he brings into the Office of the President his own men. It is impossible if he is surrounded by career men."

[25] Hoover Commission Report, p. 34; Task Force Report, pp. 39–48.

[26] Hoover Commission Report, pp. 37–44; Task Force Report, pp. 49–58.

[27] Hoover Commission Report, Recommendation No. 2, pp. 31–32.

[28] Leonard D. White, "The Senior Civil Service," *Public Administration Review*, Autumn 1955, p. 239.

[29] *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 197–98.

less, faintly ridiculous to make the British model our own. In Britain the Civil Service has an aristocratic tradition; it was the preserve of an upper class. Moreover, the political character of Cabinet Ministers and their immediate staffs was clearer from the outset; since they had to be politicians to get into the House of Commons to begin with, no British scholar is recorded as having asked, as Wilson did about American Cabinet officers, "Are the Secretaries political or non-political officers?"

Apart from their class origin, from what comes the prestige of a British permanent under secretary? Surely not from any system that divorces him from formulating policy or becoming identified with a policy in the public mind. The reverse is true. Indeed, I would suggest that nowadays British civil servants derive much of their prestige from the general knowledge that the civil servants run the government and the political Ministers are left with little room for political deviation from the "nonpolitical" advice they get from their permanent staffs. In many Ministries an independent study would I think reveal that almost the only function performed by the political Minister is the rather specialized task of explaining to his fellow parliamentarians what the civil servants are doing in his Ministry, and why they say they are doing it.

When Hugh Gaitskell gave way to R. A. Butler as Chancellor of the Exchequer several years ago, I was privileged to watch the civil servants in the Treasury put on a routine demonstration of their power. Shortly after the Conservatives took over, Mr. Butler went to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council meeting and publicly agreed with the American Secretary of the Treasury, John Snyder, about the need for early convertibility of sterling—a policy which his predecessor Mr. Gaitskell had been resisting with the enthusiastic backing of the Treasury staff. I was in London not long afterwards, and I vividly remember the quiet strength with which the Treasury civil servants assured me, "Don't worry about it, the Minister will be taking a different line in a few months, after he learns the facts." And indeed, after he learned the facts which the civil servants gave him to learn, nothing more was heard from the Chancellor's office about making sterling convertible with the dollar as soon as possible. It is, in fact, not convertible yet. Either the facts or the civil servants—or possibly both—have produced an impressive continuity of policy.

The British model is not for us. Our Constitution does not exactly encourage the legislature to lie down and be walked on by an executive of its choice, an oversimplified but not too inaccurate description of British politics. Congress does not choose our President, and it therefore is not beholden to him and cannot be bullied by him. The separation of powers forces us to have the open government which is natural for our open society. With us, civil servants have to be not only responsible to the public interest but responsive to Congress, a myriad of popular organizations, and the press. In our political government there is no room for a bureaucratic manager who is "above politics."

Civil service: stifled by reformers?

Because every program has a political origin, and every public manager must also be something of a politician, the spoils system seemed the natural way to run our national government a hundred years ago. A hard fight has long since reversed Senator William L. Marcy's famous dictum, "To the victors belong the spoils of the enemy." Yet the descendants of the original civil service reformers are still fighting the battle to protect and enlarge the place of the civil service in the scheme of things. In the process they may stifle the growth of the service itself.

Why do I say this? Because I think back to the days when I first joined the government, fresh out of school. In those days there were a good many examples of "government people" reaching high positions in the government. Daniel Bell, a civil servant who became Under Secretary of the Treasury, was held up to us as a model. Joseph Grew, a senior Ambassador and an Under Secretary of State, similarly has served as a symbol of the summit for young Foreign Service Officers. Now, sixteen years later, I find the Hoover Commission telling me that civil servants should not aspire to any post in which they make final decisions, enunciate principles, publicly advocate new policies, justify or defend existing policies, basic principles, or philosophy, or participate in something called "evaluative discussions." That sounds to me like retrogression in the kind of top position a junior civil servant can aspire to.

For purposes of comparison, consider the State Department. Of its ten statutory Assistant Secretaries today, seven are for practical purposes career men who also served under Democrats. There are 75 Chiefs of Mission (72 Ambassadors, 3 Ministers); of these posts 43 are held by career and 32 by noncareer people. Of the most important ambassadorial posts, four—Moscow, Tokyo, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro—are held by career Ministers. A Foreign Service Officer or departmental official can, therefore, get to be an Assistant Secretary and an Ambassador—perhaps a Chief of Mission in several different countries in turn—before he completes a distinguished career.[30]

The best civil servants should be able to look forward to comparable rewards of rank and prestige. They cannot do so today, by and large, and they will never be able to aspire beyond the Bureau level if the Hoover Commission prevails.

But, it will be said, let them become political executives and you make them expendable. This may not necessarily be so; it does not always work that way even in the State Department, which is surely as politically sensitive an agency as we are ever likely to have in the United States government. But even if it be true that the road to glory is strewn with turnover statistics, all is not lost. At this level a senior government official can often find an equally useful job outside the government; it is my impression that the political executives had nothing like the difficulty getting relocated that civil servants had in the 1953 exodus from Washington.

To get the best young people into the civil service, civil servants need to be encouraged to cap their careers by becoming political executives, with the glory as well as the risks that choice entails. I see no other course that will enable the government to compete successfully for the very best talent coming out of college.

Party politics and policy politics

The Hoover Commission's passion to separate politics from administration takes its most extraordinary form when the Commission gets to talking about "political neutrality." When I first read the Commission's report I could not believe that a body predominantly composed of practicing politicians could possibly have meant what the Report

[30] Basic information from U. S. State Department.

said. For the Commission has built into its remarks on this subject an appalling confusion between party politics and policy politics.

Most of the policy questions which come up in the executive branch of the government, of course, have little to do with party politics. They are nevertheless highly political. As we have seen, each high administrator uses up a good part of his time and energy building and maintaining a political base to support the program for which he is responsible. In the early days of the Marshall Plan, Paul Hoffman spent nearly all his time successfully promoting the plan, in the United States and in Europe as well. Douglas McKay, until recently Secretary of the Interior, spent a good part of his time defending the Eisenhower administration's electric power and conservation policies, and the defense of his farm views seems to be almost a full-time job for Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson. The higher one goes in the executive hierarchy, the less time there is for internal decision making, the more effort goes into the politics of getting outside groups (including other agencies of the government) to support the segment of the government for which one is responsible.

Policy politics of this kind is not at all the same thing as party politics, though there is of course some overlap. The party in office has to run generally on the issue of what it thinks and what it is doing. But the campaign issues are often very different from the real issues, because the campaign oratory generally has to do with what may be done rather than what is being done. And sometimes, as in the case of Secretary Benson at this moment, the demands of policy politics may run counter to the short-run interests of party politics. Chairman Leonard Hall of the Republican National Committee would probably settle for a little less rigorous honesty in looking at the farmer's plight; certainly the Democrats, veterans of their own many confusions between party and policy, are making the most of this one.

A "neutralist" service?

Bearing in mind this distinction between the two meanings of the word "political," I invite your attention to the Hoover Commission's description of the neutrality required of senior civil servants:

> They should keep clear of all political activity, preserve their neutrality in matters of politics. . . .
>
> . . . This means that they must avoid such emotional attachment to the policies of any administration that they cannot accept change and work in harmony with new leaders. Senior civil servants would necessarily refrain from all political activities that would affect adversely their ability to perform their official duties fairly, or that would tend to identify them personally with a political party or its policies. . . .
>
> The senior civil servant should make no public or private statements to the press except of a purely factual nature. He should make no public speeches of a political or controversial character. . . .[31]

The civil servants described in these quotations unquestionably exist. But few of them reach, and none of them should reach, the seniority and rank which would otherwise qualify them for membership in the Hoover Commission's senior civil service.

How can a senior government official, whose touchstone is the public interest, be expected to be "neutral" in dealing with a Senator who is plugging for some private interest that happens to be important in his state? Reading the Hoover Commission Report, I tried to picture myself, during the time when I was presenting the Mutual Security program to the Congress, being "neutral" about the reactions of Congressman John Taber, or about whether the bipartisan coalition which always wanted to cut foreign aid would have its way that year. Far from being "neutral" and avoiding emotional attachment, a bureaucrat in that position has the responsibility—not just the obligation to his administrative superiors but the duty to his own concept of the public interest—to be very active in the effort to build a congressional coalition in support of his program.

[31] Hoover Commission Report, pp. 39, 41.

Avoid emotional attachment?

And how on earth can a senior government official "avoid emotional attachment to the policies of any administration"? To begin with he has to help make them. Correction: he "provides facts and background data." But by a curious coincidence he usually provides just those facts and background data that support the adoption of what becomes the administration's policy. Even if he had nothing to do with establishing the policy, the Hoover Commission wants him to be "neutral" and to "avoid emotional attachment" on such questions as these:

Whether the federal government or the Idaho Power Company should preempt the Hell's Canyon power site.

Whether the federal government should aid schools in states that have not complied with the Supreme Court's desegregation decision.

Whether the federal government has any responsibility to assure a supply of polio vaccine for every child.

Whether the farmers need more subsidies or more competition.

Whether accused subordinates should be allowed to face their accusers and know the charges against them.

Whether we should or should not aid the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa.

Whether we need to be ahead of the Russians in the production of guided missiles.

Whether, in a particular situation, we should or should not go to war.

In the case of each of these issues, and dozens more, there are political executives and senior civil servants working side by side to develop the policy and sell it to the Congress and the public at large. For grown men working on matters like these, the avoidance of emotional attachment is nonsense.[32]

Certainly a man who is protected in his job should avoid party work. There are plenty of examples even of top political executives who have operated on that basis. Republicans Robert A. Lovett and William C. Foster ran the Defense Department without getting into politics in the party sense of the word, and General George Marshall, who stayed clear of party politics in spite of extreme provocation, furnishes another notable example. But the Hoover Commission's ban on controversy and emotion goes far beyond party politics into the politics of national policy.

A senior civil service that took literally what the Hoover Commission has said about "political neutrality" would be a pool of eunuchs, a special breed of

[32] The sharpest comment I have seen on the question of political neutrality was made by Herman Miles Somers in a recent article about the senior civil service: "It is easy [he said] to disapprove of 'emotional attachment.' But how about 'intellectual attachment' or 'professional attachment' or perhaps even 'moral attachment'? Are these also bad for a civil servant? Such a picture of a proper civil servant is rather lacking in charm as well as of dubious validity. To identify 'good management' in the civil service with indifference to the objects of management and unconcern with the social consequences of policies is to make of public administration a barren, if not nihilistic, affair which seems unlikely to attract the kind of imaginative competence which the Report hopes for."—Herman Miles Somers, "Some Reservations about the Senior Civil Service," *Personnel Administration,* January–February 1956, p. 11.

Americans who stay out of trouble by staying out of sight. No political executive in his right mind would want one of them assigned to his office. A government staffed with people who "avoided emotional attachment" would be like a hospital full of doctors and nurses who did not care whether their patients lived or died, just so the proper professional procedures were followed.

As anyone knows who has worked in Washington, it is not "neutrality" but vigorous advocacy that overcomes inertia in our big bureaucracy. Too much emphasis on neutrality would shift the whole government into neutral.

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The President and the Press

By DOUGLASS CATER

THE study of the interaction between policy and news, between the government and the press, is a subject which has been long neglected and yet is one of primary importance. It is hardly overstating it to say that the American fourth estate has become a de facto, quasi-official fourth branch of government, its institutions no less important because they have been arrived at informally and, indeed, almost haphazardly. The twelve hundred or so members of the Washington press corps, who bear no portfolio other than accreditation by a newspaper, wire service, network, or other, are part of the privileged officialdom in the nation's capital. The senior among them hold a prestige commensurate with their continuing power. Presidents come and go but bureau chiefs are apt to remain awhile. One small indication of their influence: the government has built within itself a corresponding paraphernalia for handling press relations which employs, it has been estimated, nearly twice as many persons as the press itself.

The real power, the continuing daily influence of the press, is in its role as the articulator of those events of government which it deems worthy of note. The substantial power of the press is in its selectivity—its definition of "news."

At his regular press conference, held weekly when he is in good health, the President of the United States presents his views on a countless number of matters. The press, in the first instance, determines by its questions which matters are brought forcibly to his attention and in what way. The press determines which of the President's utterances are headlined on page one, which are buried inside the paper, and which, in certain instances, are ignored altogether. It has been a source of amazement to me how slipshod, occasionally, are the methods of interrogating our head of state.

THE PRESS CONFERENCE

For the President of the United States his weekly press conference, which continues to be his primary and most systematic effort to communicate with the people on a variety of major and lesser matters, offers a tremendous challenge. It provides a major measure of his leadership if, as Sidney Hyman has argued in *The American President*, the distinction between "strong" and "weak" presidents can be drawn in terms of "how they manage the slippery imponderables of public opinion."

It is an awesome opportunity. As James Reston, correspondent of the *New York Times*, has commented about our latest President's use of the news conference:

> So great is the power of the President to make news and such is the charm of the Eisenhower personality that his mood greatly influences and sometimes even dominates the national attitudes towards great events. . . . Not only his statements but also his expressions, his mannerisms, his humor and disposition are faithfully recorded on the TV screen and transported across the land.

Some time ago, Erwin D. Canham termed the President's press conference "the fifth wheel of democracy." For Arthur Krock it has been "the American counterpart of the question period in the House of Commons." Certainly,

applying Hyman's concept of the President as an artist, it could be regarded as the easel on which he can work with broad brush strokes. There, more regularly than in any other way, he can indicate "the problems he chooses to bring to the national attention, the time when he does it, the degree of gravity he attaches to the problem, the sense of lassitude or urgency he creates when he defines alternative solutions to it."

Any President who may lightly consider abolishing the press conference, as Eisenhower reportedly did during the hectic months before his inauguration, must soon come to value it as a device for keeping public attention focused on himself as the single most important man in the United States. By having the floodlights thus fixed, the President can give his words and gestures subtle gradations of meaning and avoid the stark black and white they would acquire if, each time he wished to make an announcement, all the paraphernalia of publicity had to be hauled out afresh. In the press conference the President can converse with the public rather than preach to it.

AUDIENCES

There are other, more immediate audiences with whom he is communing. There is the Congress to whom he can, if he chooses, address words of intercession or exhortation which would not be altogether fitting for him to speak in his weekly conferences with congressional leaders. There is the vast federal bureaucracy spread out beneath him and in some ways less manageable even than the Congress. A casual word at his press conference has often broken log jams that were threatening the enactment or the administration of important programs.

There are the various organized pressure groups standing eagerly by to seize each precious word and use it as chisel or bludgeon with which to dislodge their programs from the rut of inattention. Finally, there are the foreign governments for whom in a time of American leadership of the free world his slightest nuance may cause untold joy or consternation. To each of these audiences and to all of them collectively, the President must address himself when he speaks to the gentlemen of the press.

There must be times, however, when the President, hearing such grandiloquent theories about his press conference, must wonder if they are not a bit too finely spun to conceal its obvious blemishes. To a large extent, its ritual has been shaped by the specialized needs of the press.

CONDUCTING THE CONFERENCE

The President and his aides must give considerable thought to anticipating the questions that will be directed to him. He can never be altogether certain that one will not come hurtling his way catching him completely unawares. The press, not he, controls the pattern, the flow, and, to some extent, the mood of the conference. The press even controls, within limits, its duration. It is the prerogative of the senior wire service man to call out "Thank you, Mr. President," in order to terminate it. Merriman Smith, of the United Press, who has regularly performed this function since the Roosevelt era, would doubtless argue that it is a limited power. Nevertheless, on one occasion when he allowed the conference to run seven minutes past the customary half hour, he remarked afterward on a radio discussion program, "I understand from a high authority that the President feels we owe him that time. Well, maybe we'll pay it back next time we go to Georgia." It was a scarcely veiled hint of press displeasure over President Eisenhower's lack of contact with reporters during his vacation jaunts. Smith, too, has been known to terminate the conference well ahead of the half hour when, in his judgment, it had gone long enough, even though he evokes rage from reporters left with unanswered questions.

The President must occasionally suffer torment as he watches the wire service reporters seize his careful phrases and rush in a mad stampede to the telephones outside the conference room where, within seconds, they transform these phrases into the bulletins that create headlines all over the world.

For him it is something akin to a command performance while the various reporters may or may not attend at their individual choosing. A number of the more prominent Washington reporters and columnists rarely appear and, even among those who do, a sizable contingent have never addressed a question to the President, in this writer's observation.

For a brief time the President is exposed. Of course, he can refuse, he can evade, or he can angrily rebuff an impetuous questioner. But he must do it before curious eyes. Frequently what he does not say may prove just as newsworthy as what he does say. He must endure the stupid question and maintain his composure:

REPORTER: Mr. President, Mr. Seaborn Collins, the national commander of the American Legion, was criticized by Mountbatten, the British Lord of the Admiralty, for speaking against communism to the British Service Empire League—British Empire Service League, it is—and he said he was setting forth what the American Legion believed should be done to defeat communism and not what the United States Government thought, and he said he was not presuming to tell any other Government what to do, but it seems that Mountbatten said that this was talking about politics at a veterans meeting. I wonder if you would say what you think about the fitness of veterans everywhere considering communism as an issue of aggression. (Laughter.) [1]

He must be prepared to leap from a penetrating query about a most delicate policy matter to one about the appointment of a district judgeship, and then leap back again without growing rattled. His questioner may serve him false or misleading information on which to comment. He may suddenly find himself confronted with a diplomatic question from a foreign correspondent whose relation to his own government may be considerably less independent than is the case with American reporters:

Joseph Chiang of the Chinese (Nationalist) Service [At the time Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai made his appeal at the Bandung Conference]—"Do you think Chinese Communists now realize America sincerely believes in peace so that she humbly came to America for help to seek peace?" [2]

The President finds himself serving as an unwitting backboard against which the opinions of even the most insignificant Congressmen may be bounced so they may achieve a prominence they would never merit on their own. A large portion of the grist of the conference while Congress is in session is devoted to matters of congressional opinion. A major problem for the President is to maintain the publicity initiative which his congressional competitors are attempting to seize from him.

Almost as irritating to him are the questions for which he has prepared an answer and then not been asked. After one of President Eisenhower's conferences, a White House aide listed for me six major questions involving events, policies, and programs which had gone

[1] President's Press Conference, June 8, 1955, official transcript.

[2] President's Press Conference, April 27, 1955, official transcript.

unnoted at that week's conference despite their prominence in the news. He remarked wryly that the conferences would be considerably improved if the reporters did their homework as well as the President. It is an observable fact that few of the reporters appear to devote much time to perfecting the phraseology of their questions even though the wording ofttimes influences markedly the President's response.

AMERICAN CONFERENCE AND BRITISH QUESTION PERIOD

Comparison of the President's press conference with the question period in the House of Commons has been overdone. The dissimilarities are numerous enough to obscure their common purpose as a means of interrogating the executive. With the British, of course, the elected representatives, principally of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition, ask the questions while the press performs merely a recording function. It is a time-consuming business occurring each day Monday through Thursday, with occasional Fridays, and lasting usually from three o'clock until a quarter to four. Here, furthermore, there is a referee—a function unthinkable at the President's press conference—in the person of the Speaker, whose decisions on procedure and admissibility are final.

The mere listing of the rules governing procedure and admissibility would offend the freewheeling Washington pressdom. A Member of Parliament must post notice of his question at least the day before an answer is desired. He is limited to three questions to which oral answers may be required. Although he is then permitted a number of supplementaries in response to each oral answer, it is always at the discretion of the Speaker. His questions must be directed to the Minister primarily responsible, although the Prime Minister can be asked if the statement of a Cabinet Minister represents the policy of the government.

The area of permissible questioning is much circumscribed by precedent. Questions should relate to the "public affairs" with which Ministers are officially connected, either to matters pending in Parliament or to matters of administration for which they are responsible. An explanation can be sought regarding the intentions of the government but not an explanation of the Minister's opinion upon matters of policy. An answer cannot be insisted upon if refused by a Minister on the ground of "the public interest." The purpose of a question, according to May,[3] is to obtain information or press for action, and it should not be in effect a short speech or framed so as to suggest its own answer or convey a particular point of view. The facts of a question may be set forth briefly. But where the facts are sufficiently important the Speaker has been known to request prima facie proof of their authenticity.

Among the examples of inadmissible questions cited by May are the following: asking for the solution of a hypothetical proposition; seeking, for purposes of argument, information on matters of past history; raising questions of policy too large to be dealt with in the limits of an answer to a question; repeating in substance questions already answered or to which an answer has been refused; being trivial, vague, or meaningless. The Speaker has also requested that questions on purely local matters or dealing with individual cases should be turned over for printed answer.

The Washington correspondent, pondering these exclusions, might well wonder what there is possibly left to ask. But the Britisher appears to regard this institution as one of the most effective in his Parliamentary system.

For the up-and-coming member of the Opposition the question period is a prime opportunity to display skill and prowess in putting Her Majesty's Ministers on the spot. The care in phrasing of the supplemental questions is one of the more scintillating pastimes of the House of Commons and the exchanges are reported at some length and read with lively interest in the British press. The power of pursuit, lacking to Washington correspondents, is the M.P.'s capacity to carry over a misleading and evasive answer into the regular Parliamentary debate and, if the matter be serious enough, to threaten to topple the government itself. The British Cabinet Minister thus feels a more immediate consequence to his responses than the American President.

CONCEPTS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE

Reporters differ widely in their concepts of the way the President's press conference should be conducted. There is a basic conflict of attitudes going directly to the dichotomy between the President who reigns and the President who rules—the leader who symbolizes our national purpose and the leader who is to be held accountable for the acts of his lowliest subordinates. The press uncertainly treats him first one way, then the other. At times, the President can be shamelessly evasive without having the reporters point up that fact. There have been other times, however, when they have moved in like prosecuting attorneys on a hapless criminal. One such occasion was the press conference on November 11, 1953, when the reporters took President Eisenhower to task for Attorney General Brownell's speech accusing ex-President Truman of knowingly promoting a Communist spy in his administration. From abroad, Harold Callender of the *New York Times* cabled an account of the astonished European reaction to this Presidential interrogation:

> Few would believe that the reporters would dare address the President with the challenging questions asked or that their editors published the questions and answers. No European Premier or even a foreign minister would dream of according to the press the privileges accorded by President Eisenhower. Few European Members of Parliament and fewer reporters would venture to treat even a minor minister as American reporters treated the President.

In retrospect, one might add that few press conferences could be as emotional as this one with any expectation that the institution could survive. Also, few reporters today would earn much approval from their publishers if they sought to turn the press conference into a game of President baiting.

The occasional exception only serves to highlight the comparative gentleness that has descended on the President's press conference in recent years. For the most part questions involving high policy matters are asked with the broadest kind of hook on which the President can hang any answer he likes. It is doubtful, for example, whether a British Cabinet officer could have continued for so many months to display the ambiguity on a critical foreign policy issue that President Eisenhower maintained in regard to defense of the offshore islands in the Formosa Strait. This was a case in which substantial members of the press and the Opposition party felt serious qualms, but failed to develop an effective interpellative arrangement. The Presidential "no comment" was in this case quite final.

HISTORY OF THE CONFERENCE

The growth of the modern Presidency has brought with it increased inter-

[3] Thomas Erskine May, *A Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament*, 15th ed. (London: Butterworth & Co., 1950).

course and at the same time lessened intimacy between the President and the press. The young reporter in Washington today reads with some amazement about the experience of another young reporter, Henry Adams, who arrived in Washington during Andrew Johnson's administration, later remarking: "The first step, of course, was the making of acquaintance and the first acquaintance was naturally the President, to whom an aspirant to the press officially paid respect." [4] Few reporters have had such a personal introduction to President Eisenhower.

The pioneer of modern press relations was the ebullient President Theodore Roosevelt who, according to legend, one day saw several reporters standing outside the gates of the White House interviewing departing visitors and promptly ordered an anteroom set aside for them. Woodrow Wilson, the political scientist, believing in the value of "pitiless publicity," inaugurated the regular press conference. But Wilson never managed to accommodate himself to its rough and tumble and in his latter days in office withdrew completely. Warren Gamaliel Harding, the ex-newspaperman, proved exceedingly inept in dealing with the press although one reporter of the period, Oswald Garrison Villard, has commented that "no President will ever be more carefully and more generously protected than he was." Perhaps Harding's main fault was in his indiscreet disclosures to the reporters which served to publicize his personal inadequacy. It was Harding who once made a blundering interpretation of the Four Power Treaty in response to a press conference question. It created dire repercussions abroad, and thereafter the requirement was laid down that written questions had to be submitted in advance.

[4] Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918), p. 245.

Curiously enough, the supposedly taciturn Calvin Coolidge apparently understood well the press's compelling need for copy and utilized this need to project a public image of himself not altogether in keeping with the facts. "Silent" Cal was in reality quite vocal in his press conferences, but on all but the most trivial matters imposed a strict rule of attribution to the mystical "White House spokesman." He surrounded the Presidency with a variety of inconsequential episodes which served to strike a warm chord in the heart of the average citizen. As Jay Hayden of the Detroit *News* noted, because Coolidge was willing to pose for almost any picture at almost any time in almost any costume, and because he was so basically colorless, the press, having a desperate need for colorful copy, manufactured the Coolidge legend. Raymond Clapper, who was United Press bureau chief at the time, wrote that "the Washington correspondents worked with their tongues in cheek."

The late Henry Suydam, then Washington correspondent for the Brooklyn *Eagle* and more recently press chief for Secretary of State Dulles, once summed it up disgustedly:

> Mr. Coolidge, with an art that almost defied description, used his press conferences for the dissemination of trivia, which, under the deft, inflating touch of correspondents, became important and significant. Mr. Coolidge would observe, with respect to a certain bill, "I'm not in favor of this legislation." The next morning Washington despatches began as follows: "President Coolidge, in fighting mood, today served notice on Congress that he intended to combat, with all the resources at his command, the pending bill, etc."

One wonders how successful Coolidge would have been in his press relations if really substantial problems had arisen to test his leadership. Certainly Herbert Hoover, who had been immensely popular with the reporters as Secretary of Commerce, found that the press conference became a wearisome burden when he moved into the Presidency and faced the dismal depression years. Hoover's conferences were, by all accounts, sterile affairs often cited by oldtimers in the Washington press corps as the dark ages of Presidential press relations. But it is noteworthy that he felt an obligation to continue them right to the bitter end of his term.

President Roosevelt

It was more than the stark contrast with his predecessor that made Roosevelt's arrival on the Washington scene seem like the age of enlightenment to the Washington correspondent. Roosevelt, as one reporter has fondly commented, was a "newspaperman's President" no matter what you thought of his policies. He promptly scrapped the old rules requiring written questions and all answers attributed to a "White House spokesman." The reporters were summoned into his office on the average of twice a week and permitted to fire questions as freely as they liked. He had four categories of answers: direct quotations on special occasions, indirect quotations but with attribution to the President himself, background information which had to be written under the reporter's own authority, and off-the-record comments which could not be used at all. Roosevelt played the various categories with tremendous skill, keeping the correspondents informed even when it did not suit his purpose to inform the public. He approached the press conference with the same initiative and assuredness that he brought to the Presidency in general. He did not hesitate to deliver long lectures on economics or other matters to the hard-pressed reporters. He took delight in composing their stories for them and, many have admitted, had a sure eye for the news lead.

A good many newspapermen look back with nostalgia to the Roosevelt press conferences. The reporters crowded into the President's own office in those days, the laggards obliged to stand on tiptoe to peer over the shoulders of the early arrivals so they might get a glimpse of the crippled President seated behind his desk. Despite the visual limitations, there was a spirit of informality and directness about the whole affair. The reporter shot his question at the President and received a quick retort, then hurried to get it down on the back of an envelope before the next round. There was no officially released transcript to challenge the reporter's own notations. He and he alone conveyed information about top governmental policy from the White House conference to the public. There were no short cuts except, of course, when the President took to the air to deliver one of his Fireside Chats.

President Truman

Under Truman the press conference took on new formality. The President's office had long been inadequate for the large number of reporters who flocked there. In the spring of 1950, President Truman moved the conference, which he was holding on a weekly basis, to the ornate, high-ceilinged treaty room on the fourth floor of the old State Department building next door to the White House, which is now used to house the President's executive offices. Instead of being ushered into the President's presence, the reporters were henceforth to gather ahead of time, whereupon he would enter from an anteroom and address them while standing behind a desk at the front of the room. The reporters regularly rise to their feet when the President enters and remain standing until he has directed them to be seated, an act of homage they pay no one else in Washington. They sit row on tightly packed row in steel folding chairs, rise for

recognition when desirous of putting a question, and identify themselves and their publications. The press conference has taken on aspects of a classroom seminar.

No President has enjoyed his press conferences more and none fared worse than Harry Truman. He seemed to regard them as a contest of wits between himself and the reporters. He loved to interrupt the reporters in mid-question, to taunt them jovially if they slackened the pace of the conference, to give brusque answers, and sometimes to ridicule a particular questioner though usually without venom. He had a curious habit of delivering an angry retort and then bursting into a wide smile. When troubles resulted, as they sometimes did, he was wont to blame the reporters and then, when challenged by them, to pass it off as the fault of their editors and their rewrite men.

But the major fault was that Truman never was able to comprehend both the culling process of the press and the printed impact of his words. More than this, he suffered, as Joseph C. Harsch of the *Christian Science Monitor* once commented, from a habit of "thinking . . . not consistently aware of the general implications of the specific." Harsch felt that Truman's preoccupation with the specific tended to cloud rather than clarify the general picture. One aspect of this: the President frequently picked up and repeated phraseology suggested by the questioner.

Truman's vulnerability led to some major bloopers. His famous "red herring" remark in 1948 provides a prize example of the vagaries of the conference. This statement, which returned to haunt him as a symbol of supposed "softness" toward Communist infiltration in the government, was made in answer to the following question: "Mr. President, do you think the Capitol Hill spy scare is a red herring to divert public attention from inflation?" The questioner, according to legend, was attending the President's press conference for the first time. He never came back. But certainly his phraseology, which the President dutifully repeated in giving an affirmative answer, should have earned him Republican immortality.

The most celebrated press conference fiasco occurred in November 1951, when news stories reporting that the President was considering use of the atomic bomb in Korea caused wide repercussions, bringing Prime Minister Attlee flying to America for consultation and, indirectly, hastening the death of the President's press secretary, Charles Ross. John Hersey has provided a masterful account of this ill-fated conference in *The New Yorker*. Having been present at the White House during this particular period to gather research material for a *New Yorker* profile of President Truman, Hersey was able to describe in detail the development of this communications failure. The Chinese Communists had just entered the Korean War and the situation was admittedly grave. Several days before the conference a number of top United States policy planners had worked to prepare the statement which the President dutifully read at the beginning of his press conference. At no time, according to Hersey, had there been any mention of using the atomic bomb.

But Truman's statement, expressing general determination to remain steadfast in the face of the new peril, was not particularly newsworthy and the reporters probed the subject for "hard" news. They got it when, in response to a question, the President affirmed that the use of the atom bomb was "always under consideration." The resulting headlines dropped the "always" and played heavily the "under consideration."

Hersey's analysis, tending to lay all the blame at the reporters' feet, could be criticized as the work of someone who was not accustomed to the routine of the press conference. The reporters could legitimately argue that there was no way for them to know what had gone on in the minds of those who had planned the President's statement. They could only assume, in the light of the President's vague intimations, that he deliberately intended to raise the specter of the atom bomb at this critical time. They could argue that by their recurrent questions—there had been five or six—they had sought to alert him to the significance of his utterances. A final definite warning had been sounded by Anthony Leviero of the *New York Times* when he asked if the President's remarks could be quoted directly. The President refused, but made no effort to clarify his remarks until after the conference when the first wire-service bulletins began to move.

More than a specific finding of guilt, however, Hersey's documentary constitutes a damning indictment of the slipshodness which underlies the press conference as an institution for conveying vital information. It gives meaning to the judgment of Charles Beard who declared that a statesman

> . . . should make his public utterances under a sense of responsibility as grave as the occasion which elicits them. The license we allow ourselves in our irresponsible moods should be put aside when we become responsible. . . . I believe no President should be encouraged or forced to speak offhand on any grave question of national policy. I would have every President follow the example set by Washington and Jefferson, mature his convictions for public declaration, express them carefully, weigh his words, under the sense of responsibility that ought always to be attached to his exalted position as executive head of our nation.[5]

[5] *The Republic: Conversations on Fundamentals* (New York, 1943), p. 55.

On the press's side, it illustrates the unspeakable folly of measuring the President's utterances with the same yardstick of newsworthiness as that used on a minor news event. It borders on complete irresponsibility to take his words and edit them for the sensational headline and the startling lead paragraph, which was the way Mr. Truman's atom bomb remarks were handled. All the qualifying details were left out of the early bulletins. The President's remarks were shaped by the inexorable pattern of the news.

President Eisenhower

Mr. Eisenhower, both by temperament and by training, has veered in the opposite direction from Mr. Truman in his press conference practice. He steadfastly shies away from the personality conflicts which furnish the largest headlines. Matured in the practice of conducting military briefings for the politicians, he is a master at the art of saying little while talking a great deal. In apparent obedience to the Harsch doctrine, he almost automatically translates the specific into the general and shows a propensity for harking back to first principles. As one reporter commented wryly: "If you ask Ike the time of day, he will tell you all about the history of watchmaking."

One had the feeling, even before the television camera was introduced to the press conference, that the President was talking beyond the reporter directly to his larger audience. The absence of controversy in his pronouncements has kept his press relations orderly if not especially exciting.

As a result, Eisenhower, who was reportedly hostile to the press conference before his inauguration, has permitted its further flowering. Shortly after he took office, his obliging press secretary, James Hagerty, permitted reporters to hire a stenotypist who could produce a

nearly perfect transcript of the conference within two or three hours for sale at a nominal fee to anyone who wanted it. The *New York Times* promptly began printing the entire transcript. Thus the requirement that the President be recorded only in the third person lost a great deal of its validity, since anyone could easily figure out exactly what he had said simply by changing "he" to "I" and making appropriate changes in syntax. It put an added premium on the President's preciseness in expressing himself since it created an accurate file of his views from week to week. Malapropisms could no longer be attributed to faulty reporting.

PRESS CONFERENCE AND OTHER MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION

To accommodate radio correspondents, Mr. Hagerty began to release large sections of the transcript for direct quotation, thus permitting tape recordings of the President's voice to be broadcast. The entry of the television and movie news cameras into the conference room in the spring of 1955 was one more step in the process of extending the press conference. Its actual timing was determined in large part by the development of the remarkably fast Eastman Tri-X film, which eliminates the necessity of great numbers of kleig lights. It had been the lights more than the cameras that had concerned Press Secretary Hagerty.

For a few gloomy critics this latest development has been the final straw, the final debasement of the conference as a profitable opportunity for communication with the President. Assuming that the reporter can get himself recognized, his question and the accompanying answer are formally transcribed, recorded, taped, and filmed. Almost before he can file his own copy both he and the President have been viewed on television screens all across the country. He has become, say these critics, an unpaid extra in a gigantic publicity show.

The contrary view stresses the effect of these innovations in improving this important institution of government. The press conference was never meant to be simply a special preserve for reporters. By accommodating all the mass media, the President can more easily communicate with the citizenry. The camera has as much right in the room as the reporter himself. To him still belongs the job of weighing and comparing, and of developing the whole story—a responsibility he was prone to duck when he served as the exclusive conduit of news. Now that he is less of a mere recorder, he can become a more creative interpreter.

PRESENT STATUS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE

President Truman could be compared to the backwoods Baptist laying down a personal testament of God and Mammon to the congregated reporters. President Eisenhower has preferred to be the high priest, whose utterances contain less fire and more theology. It is to this, in part at least, that one can attribute his success in the conduct of press relations without the damaging flare-ups that marked Truman's course. Only on rare occasions, as with his recent remarks on neutrality, has he been obliged to issue a post-conference "clarification."

One can speculate whether this even tenor which has descended upon White House press relations might survive should genuinely stormy events shake the nation. Undoubtedly, President Eisenhower has sacrificed a degree of effectiveness in leadership by his disinclination to be specific at his press conferences on many important affairs of state. He has maintained well the image of the President who reigns, but

there has been a blurring of the image of the President who rules, of the man who stands for specific things and against specific things, who likes certain people and, yes, hates certain people. His restraint can be measured in terms of programs won and lost on the floor of Congress.

At the moment of writing, Mr. Eisenhower's intestinal operation has for a second time transferred the conduct of the acting Presidency so far as the press is concerned to Press Secretary James Hagerty. There is not time or space to examine here all the implications of this type of regency, particularly if it should ever be adopted as a continuing method of government.

"Democratic government may indeed be defined as the government which accepts in the fullest sense responsibility to explain itself," Justice Felix Frankfurter has written. "In the years between the wars few things were more disturbing than the number of citizens who gave up the effort to understand our problems." As a device for explanation on a regular and fairly systematic basis the President's press conference holds a high responsibility. To the extent that it fails in this explanation, either through the failure of the President to bring to it his "mature convictions" or through the failure of the press to transmit a clear and meaningful account of what the President has said, it can be judged a failure of democratic government.

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Presidential Leadership and Party Responsibility

By Peter H. Odegard

In spite of vast powers, the office of the Presidency can become a mere masquerade of power if Congress chooses to make it so. It is not only that many of the powers of the President are derived from acts of Congress, and what Congress gives it may also take away. Even those Presidential powers derived directly from the Constitution depend in large measure for their effectiveness upon congressional co-operation. Without congressional approval of men and money, the President may be Commander in Chief, but of a phantom force. Even the President's foreign policy requires congressional support if it is to succeed, particularly in the period since World War II when economic and military assistance to underdeveloped areas and the associated powers of the free world have loomed so large. Thus it is literally true that, while the President proposes, Congress ultimately disposes. Hence the importance of good relations between the President and the legislature if an administration is to succeed. In this respect the governments of the United States and Great Britain stand in sharp contrast.

Party Unity in Great Britain

The Prime Minister of Great Britain is not only a Minister of the Crown but a Member of Parliament, as is every member of his Cabinet. If the Prime Minister derives his constitutional authority from his appointment as a Minister of the Crown, he derives his *political* power from his membership in, and control of, the majority party in Parliament, that is, the House of Commons. Elected as a simple member of the House of Commons at the same time his 620-odd colleagues are chosen, he becomes the Queen's Prime Minister solely because of his party leadership in Parliament.[1] This integration of the executive and legislative branches of government ensures control of both by the same party. Party discipline and unity are inescapable requirements of such a system. Without such unity the government falls; with it, the Prime Minister and his government are in complete command, not only of the executive branch but of the legislature too.

In one sense the Prime Minister and his Cabinet are creatures of Parliament, since they must resign when they lose the confidence and control of a majority of that body. But it is also true that Parliament is at the mercy of the Prime Minister, since, if his policies are defeated in the legislature, he may ask the Queen to dissolve Parliament before the expiration of its term. Thus the Prime Minister, "standing at the apex of a disciplined party machine, holds the power of political life and death over his followers." So great is the power of a Prime Minister that Ramsay Muir in his book on the British government describes this office as a "dictatorship."

Parochial Tendencies in Congress

Contrast this with the situation under our government. The President is, as we say, independent of Congress, elected for a term different from that of either house and from a different constituency. But Congress is also independent of him. Of all the 433 elected officers of the United States the President and Vice President alone are chosen by all of the voters, from coast to coast and border to border. Senators and Congressmen, on the other hand, are essentially local officers responsible to the voters of a single state or congressional district. Only once in four years do members of the House of Representatives and the President "go to the country" together and even then only one-third of the Senators go with them. At the so-called midterm elections, both Representatives and Senators must in effect "go it alone" without support from the booming guns of a presidential campaign. They must win or lose not so much in terms of national issues, as these issues relate to the general welfare of the country as a whole, but as they relate to the dominant interests of their state or district.

Hence the tariff is viewed in the light of its effect not on our total economy or our international relations but on the woolgrowers of Montana, the sugar interests of Utah and Idaho, the textile mills of New England, and so forth.

These parochial tendencies are increased by the vast scope and diversity of the economic, ethnic, and sectional interests in the United States. What pleases the Democratic Irish voters of Boston and New York may be anathema to the Democratic Negro voters of Chicago or the nativist Protestant voters of the South and Middle West. And a policy designed to please Republican hard-money bankers and investors in New York and Chicago may displease Republican farmers in Iowa, Maine, and North Dakota. The overriding sectional cleavages between North and South, East and West, cut across party lines on many important issues. The Republican party of Oregon or Nebraska is consequently not the same as the Republican party of New York or even of Maine and Vermont. And the Democratic party of New York certainly differs on many vital issues from that of Texas and South Carolina.

At midterm elections these sectional differences are likely to be paramount, and every Congressman or Senator runs on his own platform. When in 1941 the Republicans looked forward to the midterm elections of 1942, Senator Taft

[1] It is important to distinguish between the Prime Minister's position as leader of his parliamentary party and his leadership of the party in the country. In both major parties in Great Britain the leader of the party in Parliament is also the leader of his party in the country. Nevertheless the relations between the leader (and, for the party in power, the government) and the parliamentary party on the one hand, and the parliamentary party and the party in the country on the other hand, are by no means as integral as their common leadership would imply. Moreover, there are important differences between Labour and Conservative party practice. In general, and for both Labour and Conservatives, the parliamentary party is in large measure independent of the party organization in the country on matters of public policy. "The leader of the Conservative Party," says Herbert Morrison, "possesses powers much beyond those of the leader of the Labour Party. He is responsible for the elaboration of and statements on party policy. He appoints the Chairman of the Conservative Party organization at Central Office; this gives him a special authority over the party in the country." Although "neither party when in power would . . . accept the view that its Parliamentary party could instruct or control the Cabinet," my impression is that a Conservative government has greater independence in this respect than a Labour government. Similarly, the Conservative parliamentary party has apparently greater independence of the party outside Parliament than has the parliamentary party of Labour. As Mr. Morrison observes, "the standing and authority of the Labour Party Conference and the National Executive of the party in policy matters are stronger than in the Conservative Party, particularly on policy declarations at general elections."

These extraordinarily important and subtle aspects of British politics have been systematically explored in R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London, 1955), and Herbert Morrison, *Government and Parliament* (Oxford, 1954), especially in Chap. VII.

was asked what Republican policy would be on foreign affairs in the campaign. He said:

> No Republican National Convention can be held to make any binding declarations regarding policy before next year's elections (1942) and the party's National Committee clearly has no authority to make such declarations. *I see no reason why each senator should not run on his own foreign policy.*

Obviously such a system places a premium not on party unity but on diversity, not on discipline but on independence—independence not only of the President but also of the party organization of which the President is the formal leader.

PARTY LEADERSHIP

The President's position as party leader, moreover, is strikingly different from that of the British Prime Minister. His leadership of his party derives from his position as President, or as presidential candidate, rather than the other way around. In the United States, with the possible exceptions of Jefferson and Jackson, American Presidents have become party leaders only after their nomination and election, whereas in Great Britain the party leader becomes Prime Minister. Even after his election the relations between a President and his party are largely informal, irregular, and tenuous. As for the party in opposition, we indulge in the fiction that the defeated candidate for the Presidency is the party leader. But normally, with no official position either in the government or the party, his "leadership" is but a shadow of that represented by the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament. Even the President's influence as party leader is vitiated by the generally loose character of party organization in this country.

PRESSURE GROUPS

Candidates for Congress or for state elective offices are often more dependent upon powerful pressure groups than upon the party of which they are nominal members. There is many a congressional district in which support of organized labor or of the Farm Bureau Federation or the Chamber of Commerce is more important than the support of the regular Republican or Democratic organization. The American Legion with its ten thousand local posts throughout the country, the American Farm Bureau Federation reaching into thousands of counties and into most congressional districts—these, and hundreds more, constitute political forces often more powerful than the parties themselves. And most of them are better financed. In 1951, for example, the officially reported political expenditures of the American Medical Association alone exceeded $1,500,000; those of the Farm Bureau Federation a similar amount. In 1952 the National Association of Electric Companies reported expenditures of nearly $350,000 and the Association of American Railroads, $182,000. During the first quarter of 1954 alone total expenditures of $1,429,917 were reported by 161 registered groups. During a period of four years (1948–51) groups registered under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act reported expenditures in excess of $33,000,000, more than was officially spent by national party organizations even though the period includes a presidential election year.

TEMPORARY PARTY UNITY

Although one or both of our two major parties reach into every town and hamlet, they function as effective national organizations only every four years, when control of the White House is at stake. During these quadrennial campaigns sectional differences and factional cleavages are temporarily submerged in support of the party's presidential candidate.[2]

These differences often burn with an incandescent fire before and during the nominating conventions. But once the convention has picked the party candidate, the party hosts close ranks at least until the votes are counted. It is thus only around the President, first as candidate and later as Chief Executive, that our major parties achieve any substantial degree of unity.

Normally, too, a presidential election will sweep into office not only a President but a majority in Congress of the same party. Under such circumstances, the President can, if he is a strong man and understands the party system, enforce some degree of party unity and discipline on major administration measures. By consultation and co-operation with the Big Four in Congress (the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, and majority leaders in the House and Senate) such a President can often have his way.[3]

But this honeymoon period is normally short-lived, and by the time of the second Congress in a presidential term the familiar pattern of factional conflict reappears and the discipline of pressure groups tends to displace that of the parties. The counterfeit of party unity and discipline enforced during the honeymoon period weakens and falls away.

PATRONAGE

It falls away first because it is enforced as much by a judicious distribution of patronage and party favors as by any basic agreement on matters of policy. With thousands of appointments to be made, appointments for which every Congressman has a candidate or two, the President is in a good bargaining position, and he uses jobs and other patronage to buy support for his legislative program.[4]

[2] Note that a two-party system operates effectively in only some twenty-six states. Twenty-two states are more accurately described as "one party" or "modified one party" states. See A. Ranney and W. Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York, 1956), pp. 162–64.

[3] The legislative record of the first New Deal Congress in 1933 indicates how swiftly Congress can move under a combination of dynamic Presidential leadership, effective party organization, and the pressure of a national emergency. Nearly a dozen important administration measures were passed during the first six weeks of the session, some with a minimum of debate. See P. Herring, *Presidential Leadership* (New York, 1940), p. 44.

[4] Apparently the Republicans in 1952, returning to power after twenty years of Democratic control of the White House, were optimistic concerning the patronage available for the new administration. "One hundred and fifty thousand patronage jobs are available in the Federal Government, it was estimated here today by a group of thirteen prominent New Jersey Republicans who met in a three-hour session at the Princeton Inn. They included Governor Alfred E. Driscoll and Senator H. Alexander Smith. . . . The patronage estimate was based on a study being conducted by the Republican National Committee. . . . Estimates on the number of jobs New Jersey would receive ranged from 1000 to 4000."—*New York Times*, December 12, 1952.

Various estimates have been made of the total number of federal jobs available for appointment outside the competitive service. Herbert Kaufman has recently estimated the number to be over 315,000, or 14 per cent of the total number of federal employees. Many of these, however, are not available for political appointment. This is true, for example, of more than 20,000 Foreign Service employees, some 75,000 or more Defense employees in foreign countries, over 30,000 doctors, dentists, and nurses in the Veterans Administration, more than 20,000 employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 13,000 in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and nearly 7,000 in the Atomic Energy Commission. Although not covered by the competitive civil service these employees are nevertheless normally selected on the basis of merit rather than partisan politics. See The American Assembly, *The Federal Government Service* (New York, 1954), p. 20.

Yet even under the best of circumstances it would be easy to exaggerate the influence of Presidential patronage as a "big stick" in securing congressional support for administration measures. The gradual extension of the merit system, "senatorial courtesy," and an emerging tradition of nonpartisanship even in the appointment of officials not formally covered by civil service rules have had a corrosive effect upon this weapon of Presidential leadership.[5] In any case, once the appointments have been made and the favors distributed, the honeymoon cools and Congressmen tend to revert to their local, sectional, or other special loyalties.

In this mood they bargain not so much with the President as party leader as with other members of their own party and even with members of the Opposition. We call this process "log-rolling" or "back scratching." Thus votes in Congress after the honeymoon rarely show Republicans and Democrats lined up solidly on opposite sides, but rather conservatives of both parties joining against liberals of both parties, or high-tariff representatives, Republican and Democrat, united against those of both parties who seek to reduce or abolish protective rates. Indeed, differences within the party on some issues are almost as sharp as the differences between Republicans and Demcorats. So numerous are these various groups and blocs that emerge in the process of legislation that on most measures party loyalty is meaningless and party discipline nonexistent.

"Like dancers in a vast Virginia reel," writes Professor Burns, "groups merge, break off, meet again, veer away to new combinations." There is an almost continuous crossing and recrossing of party lines, so that it is not unusual for a Democratic administration to rely on Republican votes to save its program or for a Republican administration to rely on Democrats.[6] Obviously under these circumstances it is difficult to know which party is really responsible for any given policy.

[5] President Eisenhower's establishment of a new category of "policy officers" (Schedule C) to be exempt from civil service or other formal merit restrictions or procedures was, in part at least, an effort to regain some of this lost ground. See The American Assembly, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 71.

"Traditionally, a new President holds up nominations until he has secured support for his programme from Congress. But this was much easier to do in the past, when mere jobs played a greater part in building up political strength. . . . But such pressure is not likely to be enough in itself to coerce Congress today and a President may wonder, as members of Congress are beginning to wonder, whether patronage is not more trouble than it is worth."—Denis W. Brogan, *Politics in America* (New York, 1954), p. 299.

Professor Brogan quotes the late Senator Jim Reed as saying, "I never had but two personal enemies in my life. One of these (he) pardoned out of the penitentiary and the other (he) appointed Collector of the Port of Portland (Maine)."

[6] Even in the famous first session of the Seventy-third (New Deal) Congress, Republican and Democratic votes were badly scrambled. For example, 63 per cent of the Democrats and 58 per cent of the Republicans in the House of Representatives voted for the drastic Economy Act and actually more Democrats than Republicans opposed it. Nearly twice as many Republicans voted for the Beer Bill as against it (73 to 39) and more Democrats than Republicans were in opposition (58 Democrats to 39 Republicans). Even on the highly controversial National Industrial Recovery Act, the so-called "heart" of the "Roosevelt revolution," there were more Republican votes for than against, and 61 per cent of Republican Senators voted with 80 per cent of their Democratic colleagues in favor of emergency bank and gold embargo legislation.

Compare President Eisenhower's reliance upon Democratic votes for the enactment of a number of crucial "administration" measures in the Republican-controlled Eighty-third Congress, e.g., on the St. Lawrence Seaway, Reciprocal Trade Extension, Foreign Aid Authorization. And in the first session of the Democratic Eighty-fourth Congress President Eisenhower "received greater support from the Democrats than he had received from the Republican 83rd Congress" on foreign policy measures.—*New York Times*, August 3, 1955.

MIDTERM CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

A second reason for the falling off of party unity after the honeymoon is the fact that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives and of one-third of the Senators expires midway in the term of the President. This fact compels Representatives even of the President's own party to give their attention to their local or sectional political fences, often to the subordination or disregard of national interests. "I glory in the fact," said one Congressman, "that men who come from Peach Tree Creek have Peach Tree Creek at heart." And of course the midterm elections not infrequently return a Congress controlled not by the President's own partisans but by the Opposition.[7]

If the members of the House of Representatives served terms coextensive with the President the possibility of a unified administration under united party leadership would be improved. The party in control of the White House would also be in control of the legislature, with two consequences: (1) the President would be able to compel or induce greater unity among his own party in Congress since they would have to stand or fall together; (2) the voters could then force on the party some semblance of responsibility for public policy.

And for a classic illustration of "scrambled" voting, see the vote on the controversial natural-gas bill in February 1956, when 31 Republicans and 22 Democrats were aligned against 14 Republicans and 24 Democrats.

[7] "Of the 44 Congresses beginning with that elected in 1868 and ending with that elected in 1954, thirteen (or 29%) have confronted the President with at least one house controlled by the other major party."—Ranney and Kendall, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 402.

LACK OF PARTY UNITY AND DISCIPLINE

As matters now stand, the separation of powers, the staggered terms of the President, House of Representatives, and Senate, the decentralization of powers under the federal system, plus the growth of powerful pressure groups outside the party system, all combine to prevent the kind of party unity and discipline characteristic, for example, of the English parliamentary system. Short of certain unlikely and probably undesirable basic changes in our constitutional and social system, this situation is not likely to change, and the President will continue to be plagued by conflicts within his own party as well as by the official party in opposition.

Presidential efforts to enforce party discipline under existing conditions have never been conspicuously successful. Indeed there are no very clear standards by which to measure party loyalty in the American political system. Adherence to the party platform is one possible standard. But the separate planks that go to make up the platform are either too vague to mean very much or too narrow to allow for that diversity of interpretation required by the extent and variety of interests included in both major parties. Besides, there is no effective machinery for interpreting or applying this test in practice. Compliance with the decisions of the party caucus in Congress has been another test of party loyalty. But except on matters of organization and patronage, selection of the Speaker, appointments to committees, and ratification of Presidential nominees for federal jobs, the party caucus rarely takes a stand. Nor have the steering committees of the two major parties been any more effective in enforcing party discipline on matters of policy. As someone has said, "They

seldom meet, and never steer." Furthermore, the President has no very effective control over these and other agencies of party government in Congress; indeed those who compose the ruling clique in the House (the Speaker, the Rules Committee, the majority floor leader, the party whip, the chairmen of important standing committees) are less dependent on the President than he is on them. The fact is that the reins of party discipline rest lightly on most members of Congress. President Truman's attempts in 1949 and again in 1951 to "enlist the support of national committeemen and state chairmen in an attempt to bring Democratic Senators and Representatives to the support of administration measures" were not conspicuously successful.[8]

Both major parties contain members who can be classified as Republicans or Democrats only by the most generous interpretation of the party label. In general, everyone who calls himself a Democrat or a Republican, whatever may be his principles or his behavior in electoral campaigns or in Congress, is normally regarded as a member of the party with which he inscribes himself. Yet even this test is not too easy to apply, as, for example, in California, where candidates for nomination customarily "cross-file" in the primaries and may thus be elected on both party slates. Hiram Johnson was elected as the candidate of at least three different parties. Earl Warren was elected Governor of California as the nominee of both Republican and Democratic parties, and at least up to 1954 Congressmen were frequently "elected" in the primary by winning both the Republican and Democratic nominations.[9]

[8] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (3d ed.; New York, 1952), p. 714.

[9] In 1952, for example, out of thirty Congressmen elected, fourteen were in effect elected in the primary by winning both Republican and Democratic nominations. Beginning in the 1954 elections candidates who "cross-file" in both primaries are now identified by the label *Rep.* or *Dem.* beside their names. This simple change reduced the number who won both nominations from fourteen in 1952 to only two in 1954.

Or take the case of Fiorello La Guardia, who in 1924 was elected to Congress as candidate of the Republican, American Labor, and Socialist parties. Or that redoubtable Marxist and fellow traveler, Vito Marcantonio, also from New York. In 1942 he succeeded in winning the nomination for Congress not only of the American Labor party but of the Democratic and Republican parties as well.

If one cannot be sure just when a Republican is a Republican and when he is a Democrat, Socialist, or Mugwump, how can a President enforce any great measure of party discipline upon those who march under his banner? Unless he can pick up considerable support from the opposition party, the average President must be content to see his policies falter and fail.

Democratic party

The conflicts within the Democratic party are well known. Every aspiring Democratic candidate for President and every Democratic President must "walk on eggs" if he is not to offend some important and militant minority within the party, be it the Negro voters in the North or the Dixiecrats of the South, the Catholic voters of the northern cities or the nativist anti-Romanists of the West and South.

Republican party

But the Republican party, too, has been torn by internal conflict and dissension. During the Civil War, Lincoln's agony as President was increased by the continual harassment to which he was subjected by congressional guerrillas bearing the Republican label. I pass over the Reconstruction period when the Republican factions in Congress made life miserable not only for that ambivalent Republican President, Andrew Johnson, but also for his successor, General Grant. During Grant's administration, smoldering rebellion within the party broke into open revolt in the so-called Liberal Republican party of the early 1870's. Some of the names now most honored among Republicans—Lyman Trumbull, Charles Sumner, Carl Schurz, Francis P. Blair, Jr.—were, in December 1872, formally read out of the party by the Republican congressional caucus. In the turbulent eighties and nineties Greenback and Populist revolts broke out in both Democratic and Republican ranks. Most of us remember Bryan's attack on the gold-standard wing of the Democratic party in 1896. But not so many remember that a similar fight took place in the Republican Convention that year when Senator Teller of Colorado, leading a goodly number of so-called Silver Senators and Representatives, bolted the convention and campaigned against McKinley. And the Teller rebellion of 1896 was mild by comparison with the revolution of 1912 led by Theodore Roosevelt.

Republican Presidents were plagued with these insurgents for over thirty years. Even when the party returned to power in Congress in 1918 and in the White House in 1921, they faced the continuing insurgence of La Follette Progressives and their successors. In 1924 many of them followed La Follette into a new Progressive party, and when Mr. Coolidge was re-elected with a fairly strong majority in Congress, the rebels who survived were promptly read out of the Republican party.

Although the caucus could thus exclude them, it could not silence them or their numerous friends and allies who remained in the party. Borah posed the problem of party discipline in terms not easy to answer:

> I would not know where to establish the line of loyalty or party devotion under conditions as they have prevailed in this country for the last ten or fifteen years. I do not know what the test is. . . . The fact is that about 90 per cent of the present Republican voters are sons and daughters of renegades. . . . These are times . . . of wide differences of view as to what constitutes Republicanism. . . . Let us recognize these conditions and deal with them as broadminded leaders and not as narrow partisans.

In the saddle and riding hard, Mr. Coolidge and the Old Guard paid scant attention to Borah. But by 1926 when Republican control of the Senate was in danger and every vote counted, all the rebels then serving, including Senator Brookhart, and Senator Frazier, were invited back into the fold. Even in the years of "prosperity" from 1926 to 1929 there was serious thunder on the Republican left as Borah, Bob La Follette, Jr., Norris, La Guardia, John M. Nelson and Schneider of Wisconsin, McFadden of Pennsylvania, and William Lemke of North Dakota continued to snipe at Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, the titular heads of their party. And in the 1928 campaign three Republicans, Norris, Blaine, and La Follette, came out openly for Al Smith as against Hoover. It was this action that inspired Senator Moses to describe the rebels as "sons of the wild jackass."

After 1930 when the Democrats took control of Congress, the "sons of the wild jackass" in the Republican ranks began to multiply. Indeed so unstable were the Republican ranks that the Chicago *Tribune* said of the Eightieth Congress, "The so-called Republican majority in the Senate isn't a majority, because it comprises half a dozen different brands of self-styled Republicans."[10]

[10] March 6, 1947.

If this was true of the Eightieth Congress it was no less true of the Eighty-third, in which a narrow Republican majority included "half a dozen different brands of self-styled Republicans."

Presidential difficulties

The complex, almost chaotic, character of American political parties, the intensity of intraparty as well as interparty conflicts, make the President's position as party leader extraordinarily difficult. No President who hopes to see his legislative program succeed can safely rely exclusively upon his own partisans in Congress, not even when they comprise a "safe" majority in both houses. During the honeymoon period the prospect of federal patronage may help to firm the wavering ranks. But what Cleveland once called the "cohesive power of public plunder" is no longer the "big stick" it once was. And even the so-called coattail effect of presidential leadership in a national campaign every four years, however important it may or may not be, has been weakened.[11] The adoption of the Twenty-second Amendment limiting a President to two terms will inevitably impair this aspect of his leadership during his second and last term. Moreover, the seniority rule in Congress, by awarding key committee posts to members who come from "safe" districts or states, in effect gives control to those who are least dependent on such Presidential support. These factors, plus the tradition of congressional independence inherent in the separation of powers and resentment against being a "rubber stamp" for the White House, help to explain why as party leader the President's lot is not a happy one.

[11] I realize that the "coattail" effect of presidential leadership in a campaign is by no means as clear as tradition would have it. Presidential candidates often, although not always, run ahead of congressional candidates, and there is undoubtedly some considerable advantage in being on the presidential ticket. But there are some skeptics. See, for example, Malcolm Moos, *Politics, Presidents, and Coattails,* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. "Coattailing," says Moos, "often involves a reversal of mount and rider . . ." and he concludes that "few Congressmen depend for their reelection on the popularity of their party's Presidential candidate."

PRESIDENTIAL VETO

There are, however, other weapons in the Presidential arsenal that help to fortify his position. His power to recommend to Congress "such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient" together with his power to veto measures sponsored by forces hostile to his own aims gives him a control of public policy that no other officer or officers of the government can match. Indeed the mere threat of a veto may serve to stifle Opposition measures "in the cradle" and prevent them from reaching a vote on the floor. But the veto, as a political instrument, reaches beyond merely stopping "bad" legislation. On important matters of policy it serves as a dramatic device for appealing over the heads of Congress to the people. To be sure, it requires great political "savvy" to use the veto well, for it is a two-edged sword. The Opposition can and, not infrequently, does seek to embarrass the President by presenting him with legislation which he can veto only at the cost of offending factions in his own party as well as powerful interest groups upon whose support even his own adherents may depend.[12] Legislation dealing with farm benefits, veterans' pensions, tariff rates, general appropriations, immigration, education, and welfare lends itself to this kind of political maneuver. Nevertheless, an astute President can use his veto power to provide campaign material for himself and his party and to strengthen his own power and prestige in the country. It is not surprising, under these circumstances, that "political" vetoes are more frequent where the White House and Congress are controlled by rival parties.[13]

[12] A politically wise President will know when to yield to and when to defy these pressures. Even though he may know in advance that Congress may, under pressure from powerful lobbies, override his veto, he may by his veto not only increase his own stature with the nation but do so without seriously endangering Congressmen who vote to uphold him. V. O. Key has fairly well demonstrated this in his analysis of the political effects of Presidential vetoes of veterans legislation. "The American Legion," says Key, "succeeded in persuading the House of Representatives to override Presidential vetoes before the elections of 1922, 1924, 1928, 1930, 1934, and 1936." If the Legion, as it threatened to do, used its influence to defeat Congressmen who had voted to sustain the veto, and to elect those who had voted to override, a significantly greater number of the first group than of the second should have suffered defeat at the subsequent elections. "The figures show that 80.8% of those who voted to override the Presidential vetoes were reelected . . . as against 77.4% of those who had voted to sustain the Presidential vetoes." Even if we assume that this difference is wholly accounted for by Legion opposition (an unlikely assumption), it tends to support the political judgment of the Presidents who defied the veterans' lobby rather than that of the Congressmen who yielded to it.—V. O. Key, Jr., "The Veterans and the House of Representatives," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 5 (February 1943), pp. 27–40.

[13] As Katherine A. Towle has shown in her analysis of "The Presidential Veto Since 1889," the veto was used more than one and a half times as often "in the 12 years of politically divided or adverse Congresses . . . as in the 33 years of politically controlled Congresses. . . ." Moreover, successful attempts to override the President's veto were made four times as frequently "in the years of politically divided or adverse Congresses as in those controlled by the President's party."—*American Political Science Review,* Vol. 31 (February 1937), pp. 55–56.

THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

Beyond his power to initiate and to veto legislation, beyond the political power arising from patronage and a place on the presidential coattail at election time, the President as a political leader has other sources of strength. As the sole official voice of the nation in foreign affairs he can, particularly in times of emergency or crisis, command support, even from the Opposition. But to do so he must give more than lip service to the belief that "politics stops at the water's edge." The President, and those who speak for him, cannot plead for "nonpartisanship in foreign policy" with one breath and denounce the opposition party as a compound of incompetence, corruption, and disloyalty in the next. The President must himself assume leadership in defining his policies with clarity and firmness and in resisting with all the vigor he can command those in his own party who seek to sabotage or subvert not only foreign policies to which the President is committed, but the Presidency itself, as the sole official voice in this vast field.

ACCESS TO THE PEOPLE

On the domestic front also the President as party leader enjoys advantages over any opposition leader. He more than any other person in the nation, perhaps in the world, has access to the eyes and ears of the people. The press, radio, television, are, if not at his beck and call, ever alert to report what he says or does or proposes to do. Nowhere is his skill as a political leader more clearly revealed than in the use he makes of these facilities to mold and mobilize public opinion.[14]

[14] Franklin Roosevelt was extraordinarily successful in the use of these media. "His messages to Congress," says E. Pendleton Herring, "were strategically timed and positive and specific in character. Disagreement with his proposals was interpreted by the general public as obstructionism. . . . His radio talks to the nation served the double purpose of reassuring the people and breaking down re-

LEADER OF THE NATION, LEADER OF THE PARTY

In final analysis of the President's strength as a party leader derives from his power and prestige as President, and the office of President can exalt a man of character and vision as it can inflate a man of mean dimensions. "The President is at liberty," said Woodrow Wilson, "both in law and conscience to be as big a man as he can." For weal or woe the American President is the spokesman, sign, and symbol of the American people. He is an image both of what the nation is and of what it aspires to be, a father image, if you please, but one in which most of us see ourselves revised, enlarged, and illuminated.

His best success as a party leader thus will often depend on his success in rising above party in the service of the nation. As Wilson said:

> Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him. His position takes the imagination of the country. He is the representative of no constituency, but of the whole people. . . . He cannot escape being the leader of his party, except by incapacity and lack of personal force, because he is at once the choice of the party and of the nation. He can dominate his party by being spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of the country. . . . He may be both the leader of his party and the leader of the nation, or he may be one or the other. If he leads the nation, his party can hardly resist him.[15]

These comments of Woodrow Wilson, like Cleveland's aphorism that "he serves his party best who serves his country best," are not simply copybook generalities. They harbor political wisdom of a very practical sort. Jackson added to the strength and prestige of the Democratic party as much by defying the nullificationists within its ranks as by his war on "Nick" Biddle, the Whigs, and the Bank. Who can say that the Republican party would not have been better served had Lincoln lived to win his war on the Radicals with their demand for a Draconian peace? The fact is that those Presidents who have translated the slogans of Cleveland and the counsel of Wilson into maxims of practical politics have not only been our great Presidents but also our great party leaders.[16]

Party drag

To be sure, a President, and still more a presidential candidate, is a creature of his party, for the party nominates and elects him. But if he is shaped by the party as President he can be the instrument for shaping the party in turn, for giving it direction, for leading it, as Walter Lippmann might say, from Drift to Mastery. As President he derives great strength from his position as party leader. But the party can be a source of frustration as well as strength. Lesser party leaders will admonish him, as Professor Rossiter says:

> . . . [to] be careful not to plunge too far ahead or lag too far to the rear of his allies in Congress . . . [to] select his chief lieutenants from [party] ranks, act as "honest broker" among its squabbling wings, and endure silently attacks upon his integrity, by men who roam the outer reaches of party loyalty. In doing all these things for the sake of harmony, and for the sake of victory in the next election, he cannot help losing some of his zest for bold experiment. . . . The party, as we know from the history of a dozen administrations, is more likely to tame him than he is to reshape it. Franklin Roosevelt, supposedly the most dominant of political leaders, felt the drag of his own party through most of his years in office. . . . And even Mr. Eisenhower, who has little taste for adventure, has been hampered rather than invigorated by his leadership of the Republican party.[17]

Whatever may be true of Mr. Eisenhower and the Republican party, the Democratic party of 1956 bears the unmistakable marks of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, just as at an earlier date it reflected the influence of Jefferson, Jackson, and Woodrow Wilson, and as the Republicans felt the impact of Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt. And in Franklin Roosevelt's case, when the Democratic leaders in Congress, notably on the House Rules Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee, blocked his program, he did not hesitate openly to ask for their defeat at the polls. Most Presidents unfortunately have been content either to ignore the intraparty battles of their own party by refusing to take sides or to compromise them on terms that kept the party at dead center on the theory that "if we cannot all move together, we'll not move at all." In other words, most Presidents have not been conspicuously successful as party leaders, being content at best to be party managers and at worst party hacks. Those who, on the contrary, have been dynamic party leaders have also been our most conspicuously creative Presidents. In fairness one should, I suppose, add that great Presidents and great party leaders are as much products of crisis as they are of personality or ideology. Yet crisis alone is not enough, as the examples of Madison, Buchanan, and Hoover show, nor is lack of crisis a bar to great leadership, as Jefferson and Theodore Roosevelt testify.

IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL PARTY LEADERSHIP

All that I have said points to the importance of the President as a party leader. Father image he may be, symbol of the state he surely is, but being these is not enough. The President of the United States is no constitutional monarch, he is not Queen Elizabeth, away from and above the battle. He is at the heart and center of both policy and administration at a time and in a place fraught with grave significance not only for America, but for the human race. To avoid or to evade his responsibilities as party leader is in effect to abdicate his leadership as President. For neither of our major parties deprived of a strong hand at the helm is fit to govern. Neither is a united party. Both are torn by internal conflict. The issues between them are real and of far-reaching significance. On taxation, conservation, welfare, education, labor, business, and agriculture, even on foreign policy, Democrats and Republicans represent sharply different points of view. But these interparty

sistance in Congress. Legislators were made only too well aware of the temper of their constituents."—*American Political Science Review*, Vol. 28 (February 1934), p. 67.

[15] Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York, 1908), pp. 67–73.

[16] A President may not only serve his country but even strengthen his own party by appointing to high positions prominent members of the Opposition. Franklin Roosevelt's appointment of Henry Stimson as his Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy added stature to his Cabinet and prestige to his party, as did the many Republicans whom President Truman appointed. These included Robert Lovett as Secretary of Defense, Robert Patterson, Secretary of War, Paul Hoffman as Economic Cooperation Administrator, John Foster Dulles as Consultant to the Secretary of State and Special Representative of the President, with the rank of Ambassador, no less than four Assistant Secretaries of State, two Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and a half dozen major Ambassadors; also General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Hiram Bingham as Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board. Indeed, I have heard Mr. Truman criticized by leaders of his own party for carrying nonpartisanship too far.

[17] Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), p. 44.

differences are too often obscured by intraparty battles. If our two major parties are to offer the voters meaningful alternatives of men and measures they need spokesmen who can translate and clarify these issues. If the President fails to do this for the party in power, he will fail in what is probably his most important task. God knows it is not an easy task. A brief look at some aspects of Presidential party leadership since 1952 will serve to bring the problem into focus.

1952 election

The Republican party that met in convention at Chicago in June 1952 was not a united party. The heated contest between the forces of General Eisenhower and those of Senator Taft in that convention was an expression of more than transient differences over who should be the party's nominee. Those who watched on television while Senator Dirksen openly denounced Governor Dewey and his colleagues will recall some of the bitter words then spoken. Nor were experienced observers misled by the truce proclaimed immediately after the convention or the armistice later signed on Morningside Heights.

The "unity" of the party in the campaigns of 1952–54 was no more than the usual closing of ranks, to which I have already referred. The platform was sufficiently vague on most issues to permit rival factions of the party to stand together, at least until specific measures appeared to translate the generalities of the platform into workable legislation.

Mr. Eisenhower, emphasizing the importance of Republican control not only of the Presidency but of Congress as well, pledged himself to support the election of Republicans whatever their views might be.

The results, however, must have been disappointing in spite of the magnificent personal tribute to Mr. Eisenhower which his own vote implied. For the landslide was obviously a personal triumph rather than a clear mandate for Republican rule. In all but five states Mr. Eisenhower ran ahead of his ticket and snatched many a marginal candidate from defeat to victory. Even the redoubtable Senator McCarthy was low man on the Republican totem pole in Wisconsin, ranking sixth in a list of six Republican candidates. Stevenson, on the other hand, lagged behind his own ticket in thirty states.

Ten of the states which gave Mr. Eisenhower their electoral votes elected Democratic Senators. And although the Republican presidential candidate polled 55 per cent of the total vote cast for President and had a popular plurality of over six million, the total vote for Democrats in congressional races exceeded the Republican vote by nearly one-half million.

President Eisenhower's party troubles

As a consequence, the Republican margin in the new Congress was dangerously small. When the Eighty-third Congress met on January 3, 1953, the Senate was composed of 48 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and 1 independent —a Republican margin of 1. In the House there were 221 Republicans, 211 Democrats, 1 independent, and 2 vacancies—a Republican margin of 10. Not since Zachary Taylor in 1849 had a newly elected President confronted a Congress in which the opposition party was so strong. And Senator Taft's death in July 1953 not only deprived the President's party of its most dynamic and respected leader in Congress but undermined its slender margin in the Senate.

To add to the President's difficulty as party leader, control of many important committees in both houses went to leaders identified with the Taft wing of the party. In any case, the margin was so narrow and the division in both parties so sharp that little major legislation was enacted on a party vote. On matters of foreign affairs and national defense and even on many questions of domestic policy, Mr. Eisenhower's program found as much support from Democrats as from Republicans.

It was not surprising that Mr. Eisenhower ran into rough water within his own party. Indeed, his opposition in Congress came almost as much from Republicans as from Democrats. For example:

1. Senator Taft openly and sharply criticized the President for his appointment of Mr. Durkin as Secretary of Labor.

2. The Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, Daniel Reed, criticized the President's tax program in general and his recommendation on the excess profits tax in particular.

3. Senator John Bricker, aided and abetted by some of his isolationist colleagues, endeavored to strip the President of his power over foreign policy.

4. Republican Senators and Congressmen from farm states were restless in the face of Secretary Benson's program of flexible farm supports.

5. Disagreement between the White House and the isolationist Republicans in Congress over the so-called Yalta resolution was so sharp that the administration finally abandoned it.

6. An open break between Harold Stassen, Director for Mutual Security, and Senator Joseph McCarthy over trade with Communist China and Senator McCarthy's attempt to determine United States foreign policy on this matter and even to negotiate "treaties" with foreign shippers caused embarrassment to both the State Department and the President.

7. It was Republican Senator McCarthy who led the attack on the President's nominee for Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. Charles Bohlen.

8. To these and other tensions within his own party the elections of 1954 added further complications by throwing control of both houses to the Democrats.

Available weapons

Such situations combine to make the Presidency the "compound hell" Herbert Hoover said it was. Whether the next President is Eisenhower, Stevenson, Kefauver, or someone else, the problem of party leadership and responsibility will remain. If one might venture a bit of advice, it would be to suggest a more effective use by the President of the weapons available to him as President and party leader.

1. He should make full use of the big stick of patronage among his own partisans by holding up appointments until major bills are passed.

2. He must make his own position clear on major matters of public policy and not hesitate to use his veto power to stifle or turn back legislation inconsistent with these aims.

3. He must be respectful but firm in dealing with Congress and congressional leaders on policy matters.

4. He dare not abdicate control of foreign policy to any one and he must resist congressional intrusion in this field.

5. He must discipline and indoctrinate his own Cabinet members to treat Senators and Representatives with respect if not deference and to clear with him before making public statements on matters of policy.

6. He must never forget that it is he and he alone who speaks for all the people, and that the Presidency is the greatest sounding board and pulpit in

the world for a man with vision and courage.

INTRAPARTY DICHOTOMY

The problem of Presidential leadership and party responsibility in 1956 is not essentially different from what it has been since the days when Jefferson and Jackson created the prototype of the Presidency as we know it today. It involves leadership in a free, open, pluralistic society in which intraparty conflicts are second in importance only to the interparty battles themselves. Essentially this struggle in both parties may be described as one between liberals and liberal-conservatives on one side and right-wing conservatives and reactionaries on the other. Let me explain what I mean by these terms.

By liberals or liberal-conservatives I mean:

1. Those who believe the world is round and the United States a part of it. That however much we want to avoid or evade it, we cannot escape the heavy burdens of world leadership.

2. Those who take an affirmative view of government rather than a negative view; who believe government can play a positive role in promoting a good life and not merely a negative role as policeman and censor.

3. Those who believe that in all public affairs the individual must be regarded as an end and not a means, and that a basic responsibility of the state is to protect, preserve, and expand those civil and personal liberties without which no life is tolerable.

Against these liberals or liberal-conservatives in both parties are aligned the right-wing conservatives and the reactionaries, among whom are:

1. Those who believe that in spite of the steamship and airplane, the telegraph and radio, in spite of the demonstrable interdependence of all nations and of all people, America can still live in splendid isolation; that we can sell to everyone and buy from none, that we can, in the words of General MacArthur and Mr. Taft, "go it alone."

2. Those who believe that all government except as it protects property is evil, who cherish Tom Paine's belief that "government like dress is the badge of lost innocence"; who believe that the use of government to promote the general welfare, to provide schools and hospitals and parks and highways, to ensure bank deposits, protect the aged and infirm, conserve natural resources, develop public power, is at best a necessary evil and at worst a sign of the "coming slavery."

3. Those, finally, who believe that freedom of speech and association is dangerous; that agitators should be censored, suppressed, or jailed; that the so-called white or Caucasian race, preferably dolichocephalic and English-speaking, is naturally superior to all other "races" and as such ordained to rule.

This struggle within the major parties of the United States is similar to that going on in many forms elsewhere in the world. At the risk of oversimplification, it is a struggle between the politics of the future and the politics of the past—the politics of hope and progress and the politics of fear and nostalgia.

Nor is the conflict very new except in the detailed terms in which it is expressed. It was fought within and between the Federalists and Jeffersonian "Republicans"; the Whigs and the Democrats before the Civil War. It was continued in the Republican party of Grant and Carl Schurz, W. H. Taft and Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge and Robert La Follette, Sr. It was reflected in the struggle which destroyed the Democratic party of 1860 and which nearly tore it apart in 1924 and 1928. It reappeared after the devastating Republican defeats of 1932 and 1936 and it has reappeared in both parties in 1956.

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP FOR PARTY UNITY

No one who cherishes the American passion for freedom will want a President who can enforce party unity only at the price of uniformity. The Communist and Fascist parties achieve unity by harsh internal discipline, and those who dissent are destroyed. This is the unity of the slave pens. Yet stable and effective government in these days cries out for greater unity in our major parties. And we must look to the President if it is to be achieved.

Our two great parties are in many ways like Tweedledee and Tweedledum. They agree on vastly more issues than they disagree on. Yet fundamentally they differ not only in detail but on important matters of public policy. Out of the internal struggle within them as well as the struggle between them the parties will find their direction in the days to come. In what direction will they move? The answer to this question will depend primarily on Presidential leadership.

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The Presidency and Labor

By Gus Tyler

WITH the help of a Democratic Congress, President Wilson succeeded in pasing the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914. Samuel Gompers, then President of the American Federation of Labor, hailed the measure as the Magna Charta of labor. Labor, by law, was no longer a commodity. Unions could not be subjected to the restrictions and penalties of trusts.

Two years later, in a political repayment for a debt of gratitude,[1] the AFL departed from tradition by endorsing Wilson for his second term. This 1916 endorsement marked the high point in the AFL's political *démarche* initiated in 1906 with the campaign against the Sherman Antitrust Act. After 1916, the AFL's political efforts at the presidential level diminished. In 1920, a three-man platform committee of the AFL's nonpartisan Political Campaign Committee suggested its preference for Cox over Harding, but with none of the vigor behind the Wilson push in 1916. In 1924, the AFL Executive Council expressed its frustration with both Republican and Democratic parties in a protest vote for La Follette. This 1924 endorsement ended for the AFL the great "political" push at the national level. From 1928 to 1952, the AFL made no official endorsement of a presidential candidate. It was not until 1952 that the AFL finally and officially endorsed a candidate for President; namely, Democrat Adlai E. Stevenson against Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower.[2] For the first time in history, the endorsement was made by the convention itself and not by some less authoritative committee.

Mr. Stevenson, unlike Woodrow Wilson, was not an incumbent President bidding for re-election. Nor, in contrast to Wilson, could he claim a debt of gratitude for Presidential services rendered to American labor. What is more, Mr. Stevenson, unlike Wilson, was not the front runner against his opponent, the recognizedly popular General Eisenhower.

The difference between the Wilson endorsement in 1916 and the Stevenson endorsement in 1952 is the difference between the relationship of labor to the Presidency today as compared with forty years ago. The Stevenson endorsement was the culmination of two trends: first, the growing politicalization of American labor; second, the growing importance of the Presidency to American labor.

These two trends are interlaced. The political development of the American labor movement is intertwined with the development of the President as legislative leader and administrator of the welfare state. Chronologically, this double-stranded thread runs from 1932 to 1956; ideologically, from the republicanism of Hoover through Roosevelt and Truman to the republicanism of Eisenhower; in trade union terms, from the AFL of Gompers through Green, Lewis, Murray, and Reuther to the AFL-CIO of George Meany.

Politicalization of American Labor

The politicalization of American labor—one of the oldest labor movements in the world—is a case of belated and crammed maturation. From 1886 to 1932, the official American labor movement, firm in the mold of Samuel Gompers, eschewed political action for socioeconomic reform.[3] Gompers believed that wages, hours, and security were the proper province of collective bargaining and union self-help, and not of legislation. He—and the AFL—opposed legislation for legal minimum wages, maximum hours, and unemployment insurance. As late as 1930, the AFL convention—meeting in the depth of the depression—voted its disapproval of an unemployment insurance law. "The American workman, proud of his freedom and his liberty, is not yet willing to make himself a ward of the state and a ward of the Government," declared AFL President William Green.[4] This negative attitude toward the welfare state—the labor version of rugged individualism—did not change until the first term of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

By 1932, however, the convention of the American Federation of Labor was officially on record for unemployment insurance—by law. In each succeeding convention, the AFL committed itself to more and more of the welfare state. And as its long range programmatic commitments grew, the AFL began to evolve a political strategy to parallel its new ideology. The methodology grew out of current program and past habits. Some of the unions, especially those with traditional Socialist ties, were ready for the new hour, with handy ideas, clichés, and politically disciplined rank and file. The majority of the unions, however, had to galvanize their membership politically. And, in doing so, they turned to the old master, Samuel Gompers.

Gompers' leadership.

Gompers himself believed in a limited and sporadic type of political action where it was needed to preserve the legal status of the unions and where it was needed to deal with labor problems that were outside the reach of collective bargaining such as prison labor, government employees, women and children, import of coolie labor, or even immigration in general.[5] For these limited planks, Gompers insisted upon absolute nonpartisanship by labor, a policy of rewarding friends and punishing enemies. Between 1906 and 1916, Gompers proved that a nonpartisan political policy, pursued with vigor, can be effective even if applied to a limited objective and over a comparatively brief period.[6] In this decade, the AFL, warring against the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to labor, applied nonpartisan tactics to both congressional and presidential contests. When labor, after 1932, found itself wedded to a full, complex, and long-range program of reform, it dusted off the Gompers technique to apply it to a broader program of social legislation.

Labor turns to the President

In the two decades that followed—from 1932 to 1952—labor looked to the President of the United States to be the most consistent spokesman for its point of view in government vis-à-vis both Congress and the courts. When the Supreme Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), labor

[1] Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1925), Vol. II, p. 282.

[2] *Report of the Proceedings of the Seventy-first Convention of the American Federation of Labor,* published by direction of the AFL (New York, 1952), pp. 510–12.

[3] Gus Tyler, "The Gompers Heritage," *New Republic,* May 8, 1950. Reprinted in *Gompers in Retrospect,* published by the Samuel Gompers Centennial Committee of the American Federation of Labor, pp. 33–37.

[4] *Report of the Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor,* 1930 (Washington, D. C.: The Law Reporter Printing Company), p. 317.

[5] Tyler, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*).

[6] Selig Perlman, *The History of Trade Unionism in the United States* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1950), pp. 203–7.

turned to the President to hurdle the roadblock. When, after 1938, congressional leadership slipped out of the hands of F.D.R. into the hands of a more conservative coalition, labor turned to the President to carry on the New Deal. To realize the program to which it had become belatedly committed, American labor sought out every aspect of the President's strength: his appointing power in the courts; his legislative power before Congress as party leader; his veto power; his influence as patronage dispenser and as tribune of the people; and his personal charm before the firesides of America.

But not to endorsement of presidential candidates

Paradoxically, as the AFL and its regional affiliates met in convention to make endorsements, they put the official stamp of approval on congressional candidates, senatorial candidates, mayors, and town councilmen—but not on the President. The reason was traditional: an endorsement of the presidential candidate—the "head of the ticket"—might be interpreted as endorsement of a *party*. To preserve its nonpartisan character, the AFL avoided endorsement of Roosevelt through all four contests.

Operationally, labor politics in the Roosevelt years was more a series of endorsements than campaigns. Although the CIO had set up a Political Action Committee in 1940 to give grass-roots substance to its endorsement, the American Federation of Labor was hesitant to do likewise. The decisive turn for the AFL—the decision to set up a permanent political organization—came after and as a result of the Taft-Hartley Act. In the winter of 1947, the AFL set up its Labor's League for Political Education, with separate funds, separate personnel, and state and local organization. What "progressive trade unionists" could not accomplish over half a century, the late Senator Taft was able to accomplish in a year: the Taft-Hartley Act goaded the AFL into full-time politics.

The first test of the combined power of LLPE and PAC came in the Truman campaign in 1948. Although Mr. Truman's campaign manager credited organized labor with a major role in the Democratic victory, and although the Truman vote in urban industrial centers matched the congressional Democratic vote,[7] it should be noted that even in this campaign the AFL's political organization did not *officially* back Mr. Truman. The traditional view still tethered the AFL to its nonpartisanship.

Up to 1952, then, labor in America found its basic patterns of ideology and method revolving around the election and program of the President, yet officially the main body of labor in the AFL remained apart from the presidential contest. The Roosevelt years precipitated labor's *commitment to the New Deal;* the Truman election crystallized labor's *commitment to permanent political action.* By 1952, labor's political chick was ready to hatch. But to crack the old shell involved the passing of William Green and the ascension of George Meany; the quiescence of Republican forces in the AFL leadership and the realization that labor—in effect—had really been behind Roosevelt and Truman anyhow.

LEGISLATURES AND LABOR

Labor's turning to the President is an act of mass intuition, the instinctive response to a succession of experiences. American labor, long a foe of ideologies, could hardly do other than follow the lead of its practical nose—ratifying in resolution what it does in practice. Yet a careful examination of the President's position in the American constitutional system—as it has evolved into the twentieth century—readily reveals that labor's intuitive reliance upon the Presidency has sound structural underpinnings.

Somewhere around the turn of the century, in state after state, the number of urban dwellers began to surpass the number of rural dwellers. This rapid growth of the towns and cities was largely a result of America's equally rapid industrialization. It appeared that in one state after another the urban areas would become the majority force in the state legislature—a reasonable and logical development in the light of the population trend.

Faced with the rise of the urban power, two forces joined hands in state after state to halt the march of the industrial worker, to prevent his enjoying a fully representative voice in the state legislature. The dual forces were the rural politician and the wealthy urbanite. They joined hands, either in a party or across party lines, to freeze existing apportionment of seats in the state legislature or to carve up the state into calculated designs to make improbable, if not impossible, any urban majority.[8]

Although this reversal of the democratic process—in effect, the disfranchisement of millions of city dwellers in America—is often blamed exclusively on the rural areas, a closer look at the politics of many states quickly reveals that the rural politician, holding disproportionately great power, is often the cat's-paw of the big propertied interests of the metropolis.[9]

This artificial weighting of the state legislatures against labor has, willy-nilly, driven labor to turn to the federal government for the action it needs. This process was neatly summed up by the American Assembly at its 1955 session on the Forty-Eight States:

> Most state legislatures do not accurately represent the people. In most state legislatures one or both houses are elected by a system of apportionment that represents acres or towns or counties, rather than people as individuals. In many states this has been carried to the point where legislative action very frequently reflects minority rather than majority opinion. This has encouraged the majority to turn to methods that bypass a legislature so inequitably apportioned. The majority often looks solely to the governor who has been elected on a statewide basis; it adopts constitutional amendments that are in effect statutory measures; it writes into the constitution detailed restrictions on the scope of the legislature's powers; it displaces the legislature through excessive use of the initiative and referendum; or, it turns too often to the national Congress for relief. These are some of the results of a bad apportionment system.[10]

As labor turned to the federal government, it found repeatedly that when the President of the United States put forward a program somewhat to labor's liking the Congress of the United States would either reverse or deny the program in toto or at most grudgingly yield some particle. In effect, labor was

[7] Louis H. Bean, *The Midterm Battle* (New York: Business Press, 1950), p. 11; George H. Gallup, *The Political Almanac, 1952* (New York: B. C. Forbes and Sons Publishing Co.).

[8] "The rise of cities in the nineteenth century caused the emergence of a large class of property-less laborers, whose enfranchisement alarmed men of substance, both rural and urban. After losing the battles over an extended suffrage, conservatives in a number of states sought to neutralize its effects by controlling the apportionment of state legislatures."—Gordon E. Baker, *Rural Versus Urban Political Power* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955), pp. 9–10.

[9] Dean McHenry, "Urban Versus Rural in California," *National Municipal Review,* Vol. 35, No. 7 (July 1946), pp. 350–54.

[10] *The Forty-Eight States,* published by the American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, p. 139.

faced with the fact that the federal legislature, composed of representatives from districts carved by the state legislatures, reflected the same kind of antilabor bias as the state legislatures—and for the same reason.[11]

Where then can labor find a representative voice in government? Surely not in the typical state legislature, the gerrymandered product of antilabor elements. Scarcely in the federal legislature, the gerrymandered product of the gerrymandered state legislatures. By a process of elimination, the President stands alone, until such time as he, too, may be elected through some gerrymandered scheme set up by our unrepresentative state legislatures.[12]

Because of this built-in handicap against labor in our legislatures, labor finds itself turning to the executive—Governor and President—for both legislative and administrative voice, with necessarily greater reliance on the President because he wields far more power than most Governors, many of whom cannot even appoint their own cabinets.

HISTORICAL DETERMINANTS

Three major historical circumstances, during the last quarter century, have served to define labor's attitude in politics and, consequently, toward the President, namely, (1) the Great Depression; (2) World War II and its aftermath, the Korean War; (3) totalitarianism, both Fascist and Communist.

FULL EMPLOYMENT

The Great Depression turned labor's mind to the campaign for full employment through legislative and administrative action. It was the Great Depression that shattered the monumental stand of Gompers. The collective bargaining on which the old labor movement had depended to win wages, hours, and security could only operate in an economy of employment. A union speaks for employees and, axiomatically, there must be employment before there can be employees. The fuller the employment, the better the bargaining position of the employee—and the union. The greater the unemployment, the fewer employees and the weaker the union. Labor's central socioeconomic goal today is full employment.

In the Employment Act of 1946,[13] wherein the President and his Council of Economic Advisers are charged with the responsibility for preserving a sound economy, it is extremely difficult to separate the President's legislative from his executive powers. Some steps to maintain full employment can be taken by the President without consulting Congress; other steps require legislation, perhaps on the recommendation of the President; still other areas of action require a congressional grant of authority to the President to be used at his discretion.

The pivotal point for labor, in its pursuit of full employment, is the maintenance of purchasing power. To labor, high wages means high purchasing power and, in consequence, a busy and sturdy domestic market.

[11] See the series of articles by Gus Tyler in *New Republic* on the subject of representation in state and federal legislatures, *New Republic*, June 21, 1954, June 28, 1954, January 31, 1955, and August 22, 1955.

[12] *Congressional Record*, Eighty-fourth Congress, second session, Proceedings of the United States Senate, March 20 through March 27, 1956. For a full explanation of the issues involved in the debate held during this period on the question of changing the presidential election system, see remarks of Senator Paul Douglas (D., Ill.), in *Congressional Record*, Eighty-fourth Congress, second session, March 26, 1956, pp. 4939–78.

[13] The Declaration of Policy for the Employment Act declares, in part, that "it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . . to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power."—United States Code Annotated, p. 261.

KEY ROLE OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES

The National Industrial Recovery Act was the first nationwide attempt in modern times to set floors on wages and ceilings on hours on an industry-by-industry basis. The role of public members, appointed by the President, as guides and administrators of this program gave as much substance to the National Recovery Administration as the basic legislation. NRA proved to labor that the President of the United States, through legislative initiative and through executive action, could take whole industries and "organize" them. To many unions, this had been an old dream; now it happened.

This happened, moreover, without destroying or weakening the unions. American labor had long been haunted by the fear that economic action by law would wipe out the ground for economic action by unions.[14] Under NRA, however, the unions were made a vital part of the government-employer-labor partnership. Almost overnight, the unions doubled and trebled their membership.[15] They became the recognized bargaining agents for whole industries; they became unpaid agents of Uncle Sam in the enforcement of the NIRA codes.

Section 7a of NIRA and the subsequent National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act of 1935) brought labor into even more intimate contact with the President. It was the President of the United States who appointed the members of the National Labor Relations Board and, through them, chose and assigned the field staff, the regional officers, the attorneys, the trial examiners—the vast army of industrial police and courts. Millions of trade unionists—and virtually every trade union leader in the nation—came into close touch with these appointees. And every trade unionist knew, as every employer knew, that no matter how the law was written, the kind of man who was sitting on the case for the NLRB, whether examiner or board member, could do much to make the law read one way or the other. If the power to interpret is the power to legislate in the courts, it is likewise the power to legislate under Section 7a of NIRA, under the Wagner Act, and under the Taft-Hartley Act.

The kind of man the President of the United States appoints to the National Labor Relations Board can have as much meaning for American labor as a thousand organizers—plus or minus—in the factories and in the field.

Just as labor's fate depends greatly on the kind of men sitting in the industrial courts, so too does labor's fate depend upon the kind of men sitting in the federal courts, especially in the courts of appeals. Appeals from the National Labor Relations Board go directly to these courts. Other cases directly affecting labor, arising under the Walsh-Healy Government Contracts Act, the Davis-Bacon Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Norris–La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act, and the Railway Labor Act, have gone to the courts. The President's power to appoint the judges, at all levels, is in the area of labor concern as meaningful for the trade unions as the legislative power of Congress.

Although NIRA—and the National Labor Relations Act and the Taft-Hartley Act that evolved out of NIRA

[14] An inverse ratio between union strength and political action characterized American labor for well over a century. See Perlman, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 276–77.

[15] Total membership in all unions in the United States in 1933 was 2,857,000. By 1938, it had climbed to 8,265,000. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1955*, published by the U. S. Department of Commerce.

—have played and now play a central role in labor's attitude toward government, and especially toward the President, these monumental pieces of legislation by no means define labor's full interest in legislation and Presidential action in the realm of maintaining full employment.

Out of the ashes of NIRA arose the Wagner Act; out of the same ashes arose the Fair Labor Standards Act. An original minimum wage set at twenty-five cents an hour has now become a dollar an hour. In each change, the President, either directly or through his Secretary of Labor, played a decisive part in determining the new level of legislation.[16] But the President, through the Labor Department, can do and has done much to shape the character of the minimum—after legislation. The Department of Labor grants learner and handicapped worker permits. The Secretary of Labor can issue homework permits. For industry in Puerto Rico, the Secretary of Labor appoints industry committees to determine minimum wages. Enforcement of the entire act—the policing of the mills and factories—is in the hands of the Labor Department.

Closely allied with the minimum wage law is the Walsh-Healy Act, empowering the Secretary of Labor to set industry-wide minima for work done under government contract. A single act of a Presidential appointee, under this law, establishes the minimum wage for government work in an industry.

Presidential Disposition of Funds

In the pursuit of full employment, the federal government has relied heavily on public works. Here as elsewhere the President has combined legislative and executive responsibilities. The basic appropriation for public works comes from Congress. But the President finally decides what to do with the money, where to do it, and when to do it. His use or withholding of the funds at a given time, his allocation of the money to one area or another, his decision to replant a forest or build a hospital, can have as much effect on the nature of employment both nationally and in a given area as the legislation itself. During the last four years, distressed areas of the nation—with their unions forming an always vocal part of the delegation—have been running to the President of the United States to get funds applied for public works or to get government contracts for industries in their areas.

Bureau of Labor Statistics

The Bureau of Labor Statistics, a division of the Department of Labor, has been integrated into many trade union agreements. Millions of workers are covered by agreements containing an escalator clause geared to the cost of living, as officially certified by BLS. The manner in which the Bureau sets up its index, gathers its data, weights the ingredients, directly affects the wages of American workers, either upward or downward.[17]

Government Action and the Economy

The areas indicated above are those in which the government, in pursuit of full employment, determines wage rates and employment. But there are the many other areas where governmental action affects the economy, for example:

1. Unemployment insurance. Through federal action, the minimum standards for the states can be elevated to mandate higher payments for longer periods, to make allowance for dependents.[18]

2. Social security. Through federal action, the regular payments to the aged can be increased, retirement age lowered, permanent disability allowed payment in full.[19]

3. Housing. Through federal action, the number of federally financed dwellings can be increased or decreased. Through executive action, the allocations of the money are determined.[20]

To labor, these three lines of action are closely associated with full employment, either because they mean greater purchasing power to the jobless or aged or because they mean direct employment, as in housing. Funds for educational institutions fall under the same heading as funds for housing and public works.[21] In each of these cases, labor has the additional interest of wages paid to workers on these projects, an administrative determination.[22]

There are still other areas, however, apparently further from labor's direct interest in labor-management relations, that deeply concern the modern union. These are the areas that touch the worker as consumer.

What a trade union family must pay for natural gas, for electricity, for telephone, for goods shipped across state lines, for a pack of tobacco, for a bottle of Scotch, are all affected by the action of regulatory agencies—appointed by the President of the United States.[23]

Finally, there are the areas that seem furthest removed from labor, yet hold a continuing interest for the American labor movement in its pursuit of a sound economy. These include such areas as the interest rate, the rediscount rate, the tax rate (and the kinds of taxes), installment buying regulations, the budget, farm parity. They interest labor because, as the Council of Economic Advisers repeatedly points out, these items affect employment in America. And virtually all of these areas involve Presidential action—both legislative and administrative.

War Emergency Powers

To repeat: If the greatest impetus to labor's foray into the area of political controls over the economy stems from the Great Depression, a further involvement of labor with government—and here even more especially with the President—arises from World War II and the Korean conflict. Even before World War II, America had set up a system of price and wage controls. Price controls affected the worker as consumer; wage controls affected the worker as producer. The double set of controls gripped the worker tightly both at home and on the payline.

Although basic authority to establish these controls—plus quotas and rationing and manpower—came from the Con-

[16] *Report of the General Executive Board to the Twenty-ninth Convention of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union* (May 1956), pp. 50–54.

[17] Among unions with "escalator clauses" geared to the BLS Index are United Shoe Workers; International Association of Machinists; International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union; International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers; United Glass and Ceramic Workers; Boot and Shoe Workers Union; International Chemical Workers Union.—*Collective Bargaining and Contracts*, published by the Bureau of National Affairs.

[18] Paul Douglas, "The General Welfare," in *Voting Guide, 1956* (Washington, D. C.: Americans for Democratic Action, 1956), pp. 42–53.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 160–62.

[20] 1955 Constitutional Convention Proceedings, published by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, pp. 44–46.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 160–62.

[22] *Report of the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor to the Seventy-fourth Convention* (December 1955), p. 75.

[23] *1955 Convention (AFL-CIO) Proceedings* (cited note 20 *supra*), pp. 132–33. For a wide range of subjects used by labor to judge federal office candidates, see *Voting Records of Senators and Representatives, 1947 through May 1954*, published by Labor's League for Political Education (Washington, D. C., 1954), pp. 2–3, 12–13. See also *1954 Handbook*, published by CIO Political Action Committee, Washington, D. C.

gress of the United States, it was the President who implemented the congressional decision. It was the President who named the key personnel, who could remove the key personnel, and who could, through the power of appointment and influence with appointees, carve the character of the controls.

By edict, the President could—through the administrative agencies—fix wage levels and fix the cost of living. In wartime, our "legislated economy" became an "administrated economy," with the President in charge of the "administration." And what was true for the war period applied with only slightly less force to the pre- and postwar economies.

During these emergency periods, the President has another authority, now both written and implied—the power to maintain industrial peace. Under the Taft-Hartley Act the President has the power to "cool off" for eighty days a strike which threatens the health and safety of the nation.[24] In wartime, the President's emergency powers have been used to seize industries—although the extent of this power in war and peace remains a moot question, still to be determined by the vigor of a future President and the nature of the courts.

During the last twenty-four years, about half the period was stamped "emergency," with the President wielding extraordinary powers in addition to his considerable ordinary powers. These powers to set wages, fix prices, control manpower and materials, suspend strikes, and seize industry represent the power of life and death over labor.

Through a skillful relationship with the administration, labor found during World War II that it could grow in size and gain ground economically.

As Joel Seidman points out:

> This review of labor's experiences during World War II, while it has both debits and credits in abundance, yields a balance not unfavorable to the labor movement. Trade-union membership in the United States, under 9,000,000 when the defense crisis developed in 1940, had risen to approximately 14,750,000 by the time hostilities ended, and remained at approximately that figure through the reconversion period. In terms of living standards workers showed gains through the defense period, as earnings rose more sharply than living costs; and even more rapid advances during the early war years, as workers moved into better paying jobs and as overtime earnings continued high, while price control kept living costs from rising too rapidly.[25]

During the same period (World War II), labor saw the President of the United States use his executive power to set up a Committee on Fair Employment Practice. To no small degree, this action was due to the prodding of a labor leader, A. Philip Randolph, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. This Presidential action dramatized the fact that progress in civil rights could be made by Presidential action as well as by legislation and court decision.

At the merger convention, the AFL-CIO committed itself "to encourage all workers without regard to race, creed, color or national origin to share in the full benefits of union organization." The same convention set up a Committee on Civil Rights to implement the decision to end discrimination. Consequently, in this area, too, the labor movement finds itself turning to the President of the United States as an instrumentality for the realization of its program.[26]

[24] Section 208, Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 1947.

[25] Joel Seidman, *American Labor from Defense to Reconversion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 270.

[26] *1955 Convention (AFL-CIO) Proceedings,* cited note 20 (*supra*), p. 109.

TOTALITARIANISM PUSHES AMERICAN LABOR TO WORLD-MINDEDNESS

Finally, and not the least of the factors that have come to influence labor's political outlook, the rise of totalitarianism has converted American labor into a highly world-minded agency. Both fascism and communism, as political movements and as systems of government, have come to represent the ultimate evil for the trade unions of the United States. And, in consequence, labor has a profound and abiding interest in American foreign policy.

Prior to World War II, the AFL eschewed participation in the world labor organizations, predominantly Socialist in character. After World War II, the AFL and the CIO became top-level participants in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Through its ICFTU contacts, the American labor movement enjoys both a source of information and an agency for action below official government and news channels.[27]

Because American labor has a real commitment to the maintenance of free trade unionism everywhere and because it has direct sources of information and because it is active on a world-wide labor and political front, the trade union's involvement with foreign policy, with the work of the State Department, Defense Department, United States Information Service, and so forth, is complex and continuing.

[27] David Dubinsky, "Rift and Realignment in World Labor," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1949.

Here, once more, it is to the President and his appointees that labor turns as the central and driving force in foreign policy.

LABOR LOOKS TO THE PRESIDENT

In summary, labor has no narrow construction of Presidential power. Labor sees the President as candidate, making the platform for his party as he speaks off the back of a train or in Madison Square Garden. Labor sees the President as the man who tells Congress about the State of the Union, keynoting and highlighting a legislative program for America. Labor sees the President as party leader, able to elect many a Congressman who rides to power on the presidential coattails. Labor sees the President as the Chief Executive, appointing department heads and bureau chiefs who, by administrative action, make, unmake, enforce, or close their eyes to law. Labor sees the President as holder of the patronage whip and as the man who appoints the federal judges who, though few in number, have made almost as much American history as the federal legislature. Labor sees the President finally as the man who helps set the intellectual fashion of the times, by his words, his associates, and his daily deeds.

Because labor thinks of the President in these terms, it is not unusual or shocking or alarming that labor should want a Chief Executive who will truly be the President of the United States, fulfilling both his constitutional and extraconstitutional duties as they have evolved to our day.

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The President As Chief Legislator

By Wilfred E. Binkley

WHERE can one find a finer example of the natural history of our political institutions than the way in which the dynamic forces of American society have transformed the Chief Executive of the written Constitution into the Chief Legislator of our unwritten constitution? Apparently the framers of the document expected the President to be most of all a co-ordinator of the political organs of the federal government, and it is by no means certain that they intended him to be even the administrative chief.[1] In picturesque metaphor the late Samuel P. Orth probably came close to recovering the conception of the Fathers as to what the President was intended to be:

> The "Fathers'" idea of leadership [of the President] was modest. It was . . . the leadership of a conductor directing his orchestra, every member—including the conductor himself—bound to follow the music, and the principal duty of the leader being to insure tempo and harmony—not too fast, not too slow, and all together.[2]

Twentieth-Century Version of the Presidency

Certainly the contrast is striking between the prescriptions for the Presidency in our fundamental instrument and the functioning reality of the great office in mid-twentieth century. No matter what misconceptions the typical American citizen may have picked up in his secondary school study of governments, in due course, when a voter, he seems to sense intuitively the patent realities of the legislative function of the President, as his conduct at the ballot box almost always reveals. In fact the citizen, as a voter, scarcely shows any consciousness whatever of the President's executive function, but instead manifests a quadrennial concern as to the legislation the presidential candidates if elected may promote or prevent. "Popular demand for the appearance of the President in lesser parts leaves him little time to star as Chief Executive," observed the late Professor McBain. "Politics has transformed his minor into his major role."[3]

What will the presidential candidate, if elected, do about taxes, farm support, the welfare of labor, and all the other issues that constitute the subjects of congressional legislation? What can he induce Congress to do or keep it from doing? Look at the dominant issues of presidential campaigns over the decades. In 1884, 1888, and 1892 it was the tariff; in 1896 and 1900, the currency and insular expansion; in 1912, a progressive versus a "stand-pat" program; in 1932, depression relief; in 1936, the New Deal policies; in 1940, isolationism versus national defense preparation; in 1948, farm support; in 1952 "creeping socialism" and state rights—but never once what kind of executive the candidate is or may turn out to be.

Even in the midst of the administration of President McKinley the late Henry Jones Ford perceived "that the only power which can end party duplicity and define issues in such a way that public opinion can pass upon them decisively, is that which emanates from presidential authority. It is the rule of our politics that no vexed question is settled except by executive policy."[4] Then he proceeded to point out that even Presidents repudiated by their parties—Tyler, Johnson, and Cleveland—furnished the issues on which party action turned.

[1] See Frank J. Goodnow, *Comparative Administrative Law* (New York, 1893), Vol. I, Chap. II.

[2] Samuel P. Orth, "Presidential Leadership," *Yale Review*, n. s. Vol. 10 (April 1921), p. 454.

[3] Howard Lee McBain, *The Living Constitution* (New York, 1927), p. 115.

Nineteenth-Century Conception

The twentieth-century version of the President as chief legislator was consequent upon a revolution as marked in the transformation it effected as the Jeffersonian and the Jacksonian revolutions. The latter-nineteenth-century conception of the Presidency which the current one displaced was concisely epitomized in the notorious Wade-Davis Manifesto of 1864, in which the Republican majority leaders of the House and Senate respectively published a furious blast at President Lincoln for his pocket veto of a Reconstruction bill.

> He must understand . . . *that the authority of Congress is paramount* [declared the irate congressional leaders] and must be respected; that the whole body of Union men in Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash and unconstitutional legislation, and if he wishes our support [Lincoln was a candidate for re-election then] he must confine himself to his executive duties—to obey and execute, not to make the laws.[5]

The Presidential Message

As a consequence of the prevailing Republican dogma of Presidential subordination to Congress the typical nineteenth-century Presidential message to Congress was so perfunctory that James Bryce in the 1880's observed: "The expression of his [the President's] wishes conveyed to Congress in messages has not necessarily any more effect on Congress than an article in a prominent party newspaper."[6] Presidential messages then tended to be innocuous scissors-and-paste assemblages of departmental reports to the President constituting poorly integrated miscellanies. Customarily, within Congress, various parts of the message were assigned to appropriate committees, where they were likely to be pigeonholed. When, in the very midst of this era, President Cleveland loaded his message of December 1887 with an earnest plea for tariff reduction such a partisan uproar resulted that Cleveland failed to be re-elected, the Democrats lost both houses of Congress, and the new Congress drastically revised the tariff upward.

Theodore Roosevelt

Once when a friendly critic asked President Theodore Roosevelt the reason for the interminably long mélange of topics constituting his messages he got the reply, "Are you aware also of the extreme unwisdom of irritating Congress by fixing the details of a bill concerning which they are very sensitive instead of laying down a general policy?"[7]

Despite his professed precaution as to specific demands in his messages, President Theodore Roosevelt was a pioneer in initiating the twentieth-century trend of Presidential leadership in legislation and, in fact, he "gave the presidency an organic connection with Congress."[8] "In theory," wrote Roosevelt years after

[4] *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* (New York, 1898), p. 283.

[5] Quoted by John J. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History* (10 vols.; New York, 1890), Vol. IX, pp. 125–27.

[6] *American Commonwealth* (Commonwealth Edition; New York, 1908), Vol. I, p. 230.

[7] Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time Shown in His Own Letters* (New York, 1920), Vol. I, p. 233.

[8] Samuel Eliot Morison, *Oxford History of the United States* (London, 1927), Vol. II, p. 449.

retiring from the Presidency, "the Executive has nothing to do with legislation. In practice, as things now are, the Executive is or ought to be peculiarly representative of the people as a whole." [9] With the perceptive eye of the practiced politician President Roosevelt saw the then well-nigh omnipotent Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon as a medium through whom he might exercise his legislative leadership of the House if not of Congress, since in those days even the Senate could be bent repeatedly to the will of Speaker Cannon.[10]

No sooner had Joseph Cannon been elected Speaker than President Roosevelt asked him to call at the White House, and their conferences became frequent. Thanks to Roosevelt's own experience as a legislator he and Cannon came to a working understanding of their respective roles in lawmaking. Years later Cannon admitted:

> We did not always agree; in fact we more often disagreed but seldom on principle and usually as to practical methods. Roosevelt had the outlook of the Executive and the ambition to do things. I had the more confined outlook of the legislator who had to consider ways of meeting the expenditures of new departments and expansions in government.[11]

Since the chairmen of the committees conferred with the Speaker, his office was a clearinghouse of majority opinion to be relayed to the President, who conferred with Speaker Cannon on all important proposed legislation throughout his administration. "He was a good sportsman," said Cannon, "and accepted what he could get so long as legislation conformed even in part to his recommendations." [12] Cannon no doubt idealized the relationship somewhat, but here was the earliest attempt to systematize the function of the Chief Legislator.

Sometimes President Theodore Roosevelt could resort to audacious stratagems not at all free from considerable guile in accomplishing a legislative objective. Thus in February 1903 the Elkins Act forbidding rebates by the railroads was passed without difficulty. But the President was pushing a bill to establish a new Department of Commerce and Labor containing a Bureau of Corporations "to investigate the operations and conduct of interstate corporations." This proposal alarmed big business, and John D. Archbold, who had become the presiding genius of the Standard Oil Company, wrote to a Pennsylvania Congressman in opposition to the Bureau. Getting wind of this fact, Roosevelt conveyed to Washington correspondents that he understood six Senators had received telegrams from John D. Rockefeller opposing any antitrust legislation. This proved to be a bombshell, as was intended, and although none of the six Senators was ever identified the public reaction was effective. "I got the bill through by publishing those telegrams and concentrating public attention on the bill," said the President somewhat later.[13]

President Taft

President Roosevelt's immediate successor, Taft, had none of the Roosevelt flair for dramatizing Presidential leadership. Taft did however astonish conservatives and the constitutional purists by collaborating with his Attorney General, George W. Wickersham, in preparing the draft of the first corporation tax bill, which he sent to Congress along with a message. This action was resented as an encroachment upon the legislative function of Congress.[14] Somewhat later Attorney General Wickersham submitted to Congress the bill to extend the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission which evolved into the Mann-Elkins Act.[15]

[9] *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography* (New York, 1913), p. 306.

[10] See Blair Bolles, *Tyrant from Illinois* (New York, 1951), pp. 76, 77.

[11] L. White Busbey, *Uncle Joe Cannon* (New York, 1927), pp. 217, 218.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 219. See George Rothwell Brown, *The Leadership of Congress* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1922), pp. 122, 123, 127.

[13] Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1931), p. 341.

[14] See Harold Martin Bowman, "Congress and the Supreme Court," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (March 1910), p. 20.

[15] 36 Stat., 539.

[16] Art. II, sec. 3.

Wilson's theory of Presidential initiative in legislation

In contrast with President Theodore Roosevelt, whose legislative leadership was that of pragmatic opportunism, Woodrow Wilson brought to the Presidency the matured theory of a would-be prime minister. He was prepared to give a startling new interpretation and practical application of the innocent-looking direction of the Constitution to the President to "give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." [16] It should be noted that the Constitution here imposes upon the President a duty rather than a power. He is the absolute judge of what the message shall contain and consequently is free to withhold whatever information he does not choose to impart. Moreover Congress has no means of extracting from him anything he decides to withhold.

It was Woodrow Wilson's great contribution to the Presidency to have made the provision of the Constitution for the Presidential message to Congress the basis of dynamic legislative leadership. The extraordinary significance of the State of the Union message today owes much to the imagination and initiative of the only political scientist to have become Chief Magistrate of the United States.

Woodrow Wilson's dogma of Presidential initiative in legislation, based on the message to Congress, had been maturing during the long generation since the publication of his first article.[17] One President after another, as the years passed, had failed to measure up to Woodrow Wilson's hopes until Theodore Roosevelt, concerning whom he wrote, "We must admit that he is an aggressive leader. He led Congress —he was not driven by Congress." Essential to Wilson's dogma was his conviction that the President must be a party man "who has the personality and initiative to enforce his views upon the people and upon Congress." [18] Persistent in the pattern of Wilson's conception of the Presidency is the analogy of the prime ministry he read into the Constitution's provision for the Presidential message to Congress. As he conceived the position, the President as party leader and quasi prime minister should resign if one of his major legislative proposals to Congress was voted down. Thus he would have resigned had the repeal of the exemption of American vessels from payment of Panama Canal tolls, contrary to a treaty agreement, been defeated when voted on in the early days of his Presidency:

> In case of failure in this matter, I shall go to the country, after my resignation is tendered, and ask whether America is to stand before the world as a nation that violates its contracts as mere matters of convenience, upon a basis of expediency.[19]

[17] See Woodrow Wilson, "Cabinet Government in the United States," *International Review*, Vol. 6 (August 1879), pp. 46–163.

[18] *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York, 1908), p. 65.

[19] David Lawrence, *The True Story of Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1924), pp. 310, 311.

Wilson's legislative achievements

In keeping with President Wilson's formula of the prime ministry was his dramatic appearance in person before Congress on major proposals for legislation, instead of sending a written message to be read by a clerk according to the century-old custom. Under his dynamic leadership the first consistent revision of the tariff since the administration of President Polk was achieved after an effective co-ordination of the parts played by President and congressional committees and a Wilsonian blast at the tariff lobbyists that sent them scurrying.[20] The grist of the congressional mill became the most consistent since the Hamiltonian program of the first years under the Constitution—a program put through the First Congress by one who also insisted on being considered a prime minister. In addition to the Underwood Tariff Wilson put through such statutory landmarks as the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

So cordial was the relation of the President to his party organization in Congress that the considerable opposition to the Federal Reserve Act was overcome and on the final vote every Democratic Senator voted for the bill.[21] Here was a perfect fulfillment of the Wilson dream of party government under the leadership of a "prime minister." Herein was his realization of the full possibility of the Constitution's provision for the Presidential message. Circumstances provided the opportunity, but whatever hopes Wilson may have had of institutionalizing this peculiar pattern of Presidential leadership were doomed to disappointment.

[20] Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters* (5 vols.; New York, 1927–33), Vol. IV, pp. 123, 124.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 174 ff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The three Republican Presidents between Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt made no contribution to the trend toward the chief legislatorship that Theodore Roosevelt had initiated. Franklin Roosevelt revived the Wilsonian pattern of Presidential leadership in legislation. "Without leadership, alert and sensitive to change, we are all bogged up or lose our way," he said only a week after his first election.[22] Not in a dozen years had such a note been struck by a President. Two months later he was guest of honor at the annual dinner of the Harvard Club of New York City. Former President of Harvard A. Lawrence Lowell, an outstanding political scientist under whose tuition the President-elect had studied, was the principal speaker. Discoursing on the Presidency, Lowell turned to Roosevelt to say that the most important principle for the Chief Executive is that he must always take and hold the initiative in his dealings with Congress and with his Cabinet, and generally with the public. He declared that if Roosevelt would always apply this principle there would be little doubt of his success.[23]

The crisis of March 1933, when Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated, provided the greatest crisis since the Civil War for exploiting the peculiar political aptitudes and talents of Franklin Roosevelt. Thus he reassured a perplexed and almost despairing people: "In every dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and of vigor has met with that understanding and support of the people themselves which is essential to victory." [24]

[22] *New York Times,* November 13, 1932, Sec. 8, p. 1.

[23] Louis B. Wehle, *Hidden Threads of History* (New York, 1953), p. 134.

[24] Franklin D. Roosevelt, *On Our Way* (New York, 1934), pp. 255–56.

Then followed the "Hundred Days" during which President Roosevelt, avoiding clashes, collaborated with amateur Congressmen who without executive leadership would have been bewildered by the gargantuan crisis. Confronted by an undisciplined Congress and an inchoate public sentiment the President nevertheless managed to control the situation. As E. Pendleton Herring said:

> By great fortune a skillful politician was in the White House who knew how to handle the public and how to negotiate with Congress. The President was able to out-maneuver his opponents and to compromise when a clear victory was impossible. His leadership supplied the unifying force.[25]

After the "Hundred Days" leadership became more systematic. Former legislator Roosevelt knew that lawmaking is a tedious process, that committee hearings are required so that groups concerned about pending legislation may appear. Congressmen must estimate the strength of conflicting constituent interests concerning bills and calculate the balance of social forces impinging on pending measures. In time President Roosevelt developed a procedure of his own for promoting legislation. Preliminary studies were made by outstanding specialists in the field of a proposed piece of legislation. Meanwhile information was disseminated to inform the public and bring constituent pressure to bear on legislators. He took pains to have administration bills assigned to favorable committees when possible and seldom did one reach a hostile committee. When, in the committee stage, hearings were held, the specialists were ready with answers to the questions propounded. A prepared bill usually accompanied the message proposing the legislation.[26]

Congress was surely listening to a disciple of Woodrow Wilson when, in his second State of the Union address, Franklin Roosevelt said:

> Out of these friendly contacts we are, fortunately, building a strong and permanent tie between the legislative and executive branches of the Government. The letter of the Constitution wisely declared a separation, but the impulse of common purpose declares a union.[27]

Such was the theory implemented frequently by a 9:45 meeting of the Secretary of State, the Budget Director, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Speaker of the House. "In practice," as E. P. Herring observed of the President, "he evolved informally a 'master-ministry' of congressional leaders, cabinet officers, and executive officials working through the White House." [28] No doctrinaire, President Roosevelt frankly avowed he employed the play-by-play tactics of the football quarterback.

Pliable though President Roosevelt might be as to means employed, he was, in his first term, inflexible as to his "must" legislation. The confusion in Congress early in 1935 led to a rumor that the President was in poor health and his leadership seriously impaired, but by the time Congress had adjourned even so critical a commentator as Charles A. Beard concluded:

> . . . the victory of President Roosevelt all along the line was beyond question. . . .
>
> After the democratic processes of debate and confusion were given a free rein lead-

[25] "The First Session of the Seventy-third Congress," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 28 (February 1934), p. 82.

[26] See "Congress' Reasons for Delay in Passing the President's Bills," *United States News and World Report,* January 18, 1946. The "Delay" in the title refers to events in the administration of President Truman, who was less systematic in promoting his measures.

[27] *Op. cit.* (note 24 *supra*), p. 209.

[28] "Second Session of the Seventy-third Congress," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 28 (October 1934), p. 854.

ership emerged in the end. When results were surveyed at the conclusion of the discussion and uproar, it could be truly said that seldom, if ever, in the long history of Congress had so many striking and vital measures been spread upon the law books in a single session.[29]

Preparation of the Presidential message in Truman's administration

How far we have gone since the day when a President sat down at his desk and scribbled out his longhand messages to Congress! The elaborate organization of the Executive Office of the President has now practically institutionalized the preparation of the messages or addresses on the State of the Union and the Budget and the Economic Report. Let us take President Truman's State of the Union message to the Eighty-first Congress in January 1949. As early as the preceding July the Bureau of the Budget had received from the various agencies the replies to its requests for the budget estimates and for suggested items of legislation. The Legislative Reference Division of the Budget Bureau then prepared from the replies a tentative list of eighty-three items of possible legislation, divided into those considered certain to be recommended and those less certain. Then teams of experts from the White House staff, the federal agencies, and the Budget Bureau began long-range drafting of tentative legislation and preparing supporting data and arguments. Meanwhile White House staff members sorted out and analyzed the proposed items of legislation and began work on the State of the Union message. As tentative drafts were completed they were circulated among Cabinet members and other top officials.

President Truman himself laid down the outline of the message before a word was written. The message evolved through several drafts under the supervision of the President's legal counselor and his personal legislative assistant and then went back to the President for comments. President Truman went over the final draft, sentence by sentence, determining final choice of words and of emphasis. Twenty-five of the eighty-three legislative items gathered by the legislative service of the Budget Bureau appeared in the finished draft of the State of the Union message.[30]

President Eisenhower

In President Eisenhower's State of the Union message of 1955 could be perceived the perennial search for recommendations of legislation that would represent the translation of the aspirations of our complex society into public policies. The list was impressive: higher minimum wages, lower tariffs, reduced draft calls, higher federal salaries, more irrigation dams, flexible farm price supports, subsidies for medical schools and for health insurance, Taft-Hartley Law changes, relaxing immigration restrictions, votes for eighteen-year-olds, aid for public schools, more public housing, and aid for small-scale farmers.[31]

"Principle of plain politics"

Concerning almost any recent President's legislative program, would it not be appropriate to recall the "principle of plain politics" enunciated by a former Congressman, Professor T. V. Smith: "Nobody is to get nothing; nobody is to get everything; everybody is to get something."[32] And if, in the practical application of this broad and generous formula, the President hopes to fortify the group combination constituting the majority that elected him with a weather eye on the next election, so much the better. The grist of the legislative mill depends upon the competition of our political parties for the good will of the elements of American society with superior Presidents as chief engineers of the process. By and large the better a shrewd State of the Union message exemplifies the application of the formula the better for the nation.

[29] "The Labors of Congress," *Current History,* Vol. 43 (October 1935), p. 64.

[30] Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel, *Congress at Work* (New York, 1952), pp. 84, 85.

[31] "What Eisenhower Wants for Everybody in 1955," *United States News and World Report,* January 21, 1955, pp. 28–29.

[32] "The Political Way of Life," address delivered at Santa Barbara, California, September 16, 1948, on the Alexander F. Morrison Lectureship Foundation at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of California.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO CONVENE CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION

The power which the Constitution vests in the President "on extraordinary Occasions [to] convene both Houses, or either of them" is exclusively his power. Congress cannot of its own volition convene itself, much as Congressmen have from time to time wished that they might. The President can convene Congress when it does not want to meet, as President Truman certainly did with the Eightieth Congress in the summer of 1948. A resolute President cannot be pressured into convening Congress. President Johnson was under such pressure during the eight months in 1865 between his assuming the Presidency following the assassination of Lincoln and the convening of Congress in the regular session required by the Constitution. During those eight months President Johnson was proceeding with reconstruction under the lenient terms initiated by Lincoln.

Meanwhile the congressional leaders who had resisted Lincoln's generous policy were determined to compel Johnson to impose severe terms for restoration of the governments of the states of the late Confederacy. "Is there no way to arrest the insane course of the President in reorganization?" inquired savage old Thaddeus Stevens. "If something is not done the President will be crowned King before Congress meets," declared Senator Sumner.[33] As a precaution against Johnson's ever again exercising his power not to call a special session, Congress at its next session passed a law "for the meeting of the Fortieth and all succeeding Congresses immediately after the adjournment of the next preceding one."[34] By this legislative stratagem Congress remained in continuous session throughout the remaining three years of Johnson's Presidency.

Congress was not in session when the attack on Fort Sumter confronted Lincoln with the problem of armed resistance to federal authority. The experience of Presidents who had called special sessions of Congress at the beginning of their administrations had generally been disastrous. Half a century later President Taft and still later President Hoover called special sessions early in their administrations to revise the tariff. In both instances the move started intraparty strife that seriously impaired Presidential prestige. In Lincoln's time a special session in May was regarded as symbolic of political disaster and Secretary of State Seward warned Lincoln particularly against that month.[35] There was then no telegraph line to California to notify Congressmen there of a special session, and they could not have traveled quickly to Washington after receiving notice of the call. As it turned out Lincoln set July 4, eleven weeks after the fall of Sumter,

[33] *Johnson Papers,* quoted by Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, *History of the United States Since the Civil War* (New York, 1917), Vol. I, p. 41.

[34] *Statutes at Large,* XIV, p. 378.

[35] James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress* (Norwich, Conn., 1884–86), Vol. II, p. 55.

as the date of the special session. Meanwhile Lincoln had a free hand and exercised half a dozen powers that the Constitution vests in Congress. Lincoln's and Johnson's delays in convening Congress underscored the extraordinary power inherent in the President's exclusive discretion as to whether or not to call special sessions.

The threat of a special session has been used by a resolute President to bring a sitting but dilatory Congress back under his legislative leadership. Thus President Wilson warned his first Congress, which was planning to postpone action on the Federal Reserve banking bill to a later session, that if they adjourned without action on the bill he would promptly convene Congress in special session—a threat which produced the desired effect.[36]

President Truman and the Eightieth Congress

President Truman's calling the Eightieth Congress with its Republican majority into special session in the summer of 1948 and urging it to enact into law some of the just-adopted Republican platform pledges show how the power to convene a special session can be used as an instrument of party strategy by a President who has the audacity to do it. In his speech of acceptance delivered to the Democratic Convention that had just nominated him, Truman reviewed the measures he had recommended to this Eightieth Congress only to have them rejected. Now the recently adjourned Republican Convention had pledged the party to the enactment of some of the measures their own party had turned down in the recent session. In the midst of his acceptance speech President Truman declared:

> My duty as President requires that I use every means within my power to get the laws the people need on such important matters and I am therefore calling Congress back into session on the 26th of July.

The call when made recommended measures the Republican platform advocated. The Republican Congress was "put on the spot" as it were, but so infuriated were the majority Congressmen that no legislation was enacted quite as the President must have expected and possibly even desired. This move of President Truman's, which he made the most of in the ensuing campaign, no doubt contributed somewhat to his generally unexpected election to another term.

Other Presidents have used the power to call special sessions to their detriment and even that of the public. But a President equipped with a shrewd understanding of party strategy and endowed with imagination, sufficient self-assurance, and a sense of timing—when to and when not to—can utilize his discretionary power to call special sessions as a potent instrument of his legislative leadership.

THE VETO

The veto power has developed into a potential instrument of the President's leadership in legislation. It had been the unrestrained conduct of the popular branch of the "omnipotent" state legislatures of the 1780's that, by and large, had brought together the framers of the Constitution of the United States. Might not the popular branch of a national legislature, Congress itself, also run riot? So the framers adopted the executive veto, lifting the provision from the constitution of Massachusetts which contributed so largely to the national Constitution. The first half-dozen Presidents used the veto power sparingly, mainly to strike down legislation they considered unconstitutional.

[36] J. P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him* (Garden City, N. Y., 1921), p. 170.

New tendency of President Jackson

A change came with the inauguration of Andrew Jackson, the first President to have been elected by practically universal white manhood suffrage. Thus fortified by what he considered the mandate of the American people, Jackson initiated the practice of the President's deliberately passing independent judgment on the wisdom as well as the constitutionality of acts of Congress. His veto of the legislation rechartering the Bank of the United States, for example, was based upon the assumption that it was bad legislation. The Whigs denounced this as executive usurpation of the legislative power of Congress. The Jacksonians defended it as "the tribunative voice of the people speaking again through their executive." [37]

Thus Jackson started the trend which has converted the President into a potential, when not actual, one-man third house of the national legislature. Let those who fret over whether what he did was right and proper be reminded that the forces in American society that shape and reshape our unwritten constitution, like the mills of the gods, grind slowly but grind exceeding small—and care not a whit for such ethical abstractions.

Compromise of 1850

It was during the debate preliminary to the most important legislation of the mid-nineteenth century—the Compromise of 1850—that the supreme significance of the veto power became evident. President Zachary Taylor was determined to veto the Omnibus Bill, as he dubbed it, which constituted the heart of the Compromise. His sudden death, however, brought to the Presidency Vice President Fillmore, who represented the other wing of the Whig party; he was known to be ready to sign the bill, and did so as soon as it was enacted.

Presidential and congressional constituencies

The President's veto power has become extraordinarily important during the present generation, President Franklin Roosevelt having vetoed almost as many acts of Congress as all his predecessors. This recent development can be attributed to the fact that the President and Congress came to represent two different constituencies, two opposing sets of electoral power. Organized labor, for example, is weak in Congress because it tends to be concentrated in relatively few constituencies. Not only labor but certain ethnic and religious groups also are largely concentrated in great metropolitan centers where they can, when so disposed, swing the weight of their voting power in great pivotal states in such a way as to determine which presidential candidate gets a majority in the electoral college.

Congress on the contrary is heavily weighted with members so distributed in more sparsely settled districts as to overrepresent agrarian, suburban, middle-class interests with property-conscious and entrepreneurial biases. Considerably more than a majority of Representatives in Congress represent districts with no city of as many as 50,000 inhabitants. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations the President came to be peculiarly the champion of the consumer-conscious urban voters whose interests he protected more than once with the weapon of the veto and whose votes kept the Democratic party in power until the magic of the formula was broken by the glamor of a candidate who had just doffed a five-star uniform.

The tug of war between the congres-

[37] Levi Woodbury, *Writings* (Boston, 1852), Vol. I, p. 571.

sional and Presidential constituencies is illustrated by the Taft-Hartley legislation. The bill was overwhelmingly favored by both houses—320 to 79 in the House of Representatives and 54 to 17 in the Senate. Two months before its passage Democratic leaders, including former National Chairman Ed Flynn, were already urging the President to veto. So was the Executive Committee of the American Federation of Labor, while the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) was holding rallies to that end in a dozen cities. By June 18 the White House announced the receipt of 157,000 letters, 460,000 cards, and 23,000 telegrams, most of them urging veto. The Democratic National Committee announced that a poll showed Democratic party officers favoring the veto 2 to 1. President Truman vetoed the Taft-Hartley Act, but it was promptly passed over his veto. One year later he was elected to another term after a campaign in which he made the Taft-Hartley Act an issue.

Such is the congressional constituency in contrast with the Presidential, however, that neither Truman nor Eisenhower, who also was elected pledged to revision of the act, was able to get a single amendment made by Congress.[38]

The veto message institutionalized

In the hundred and forty years before the organization of the Executive Office of the President a President might prepare a veto message in person or ask a Cabinet member to do it. Thus President Johnson asked Secretary of War Stanton to prepare the veto of the Tenure of Office Act in 1867.

The establishment of the Executive Office of the President in 1939 led to the literal institutionalizing of the preparation of veto messages. For example, in 1950, Congress passed an act designed to clarify uncertainties in the Federal Trade Commission's duties as affected by a Supreme Court decision.[39] This Basing Point Bill would have legalized certain price-fixing practices obnoxious to small business and consumer interests. When the Bureau of the Budget received the engrossed bill from the President it turned it over to its Division of Legislative Reference for scrutiny by the staff. The Bureau functions like a congressional committee and holds hearings to get the consensus of the interests affected by the legislation. In this case it prepared a tentative veto which President Truman used after the Democratic National Chairman had polled the constituencies of the Truman administration's strength.

Senators who had been unsuccessful in opposing the bill resorted to the White House to urge veto. President Truman's decision to veto the bill signified a choice of the left instead of the right. Had Truman signed the bill he would have risked alienating the very base of his political power—labor, farmers, and small business. He would thereby have repudiated his own supporters and given aid and comfort to his bitter enemies, the Dixiecrats. It remains for some researcher eventually to ascertain what percentage of vetoes of the last quarter of a century has been determined by similar political calculation.[40] In that period, at any rate, the vetoes have, from time to time, reflected the clash of the "haves" with the "have nots," of the agrarians and their suburban allies with the urban masses.

PARTY LEADERSHIP

To a degree impossible to measure objectively the legislative leadership of

[38] See Bailey and Samuel, *op. cit.* (note 30 *supra*), pp. 435–38.

[39] Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).

[40] See Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1952), Chap. VI.

the President is a consequence of the usage that has made him the titular, and when he has the capacity and aptitude also the actual, leader of his party. Thomas Jefferson saw to it at the very beginning of his Presidency that a Jefferson man was chairman of every congressional committee. Jefferson, who might be said to have been the first politician to attain the Presidency, was already accustomed to use the press to achieve his purposes, and he continued that practice as President. During his administration appeared the first newspaper recognized as an administration organ, a practice not uncommon with Presidents in the generation before the Civil War.

President Jackson held the House of Representatives in the hollow of his hand from the very beginning of his Presidency. Insurgent Senators were picked off one by one as their terms expired, and Jackson managed replacement by faithful partisans so that eventually he had a Jackson Senate also.

The erudite Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts expressed the opinion that no President except possibly Jackson had such influence over the Senate as McKinley,[41] and another Senator, Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois, wrote: "We have never had a President who had more influence with Congress than McKinley." No one can doubt the actual party leadership of Theodore Roosevelt or his use of it in getting legislation he desired. President Wilson's effective party leadership was a corollary of his conception of the President as a prime minister who was implicitly head of the party in power. Franklin Roosevelt's party leadership as an effective instrument of legislation is unparalleled in our party history. The President who in this era isolates himself from Congress and party leadership may have the experience of a Coolidge, of whom an editor wrote, "Congress has devoted itself to bloodying the President's nose, boxing his ears, and otherwise maltreating him." [42]

PATRONAGE

The judicious distribution of patronage among the party faithful was long a potent factor in the legislative leadership of the President. At the peak of the spoils system in 1864 President Lincoln could send Charles A. Dana on a mission to win the support of two obdurate Congressmen whose votes were necessary to get Nevada admitted to the Union in order to have the Thirteenth Amendment ratified by the one more state still necessary. "Whatever promise you make to them I will do," declared Lincoln, and it turned out eventually just as Lincoln had planned it.[43] President Cleveland, in 1893, resolutely set out to obtain repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchasing Act which was exhausting the "gold reserve" of the Treasury. When a Senator told the President that hell would freeze over before the Purchasing Act would be repealed he got the President's prompt reply, "Then Hell will freeze over in exactly twenty-four hours." Cleveland knew, because he had used patronage to that end.[44] Thereupon the prolonged filibustering came to a sudden end.

President Wilson suspended distribution of patronage during the extra session of his first term until his remarkable legislative program had been en-

[41] *Autobiography of 70 Years* (New York, 1903), Vol. II, p. 47.

[42] Claude M. Fuess, *Calvin Coolidge* (Boston, 1940), p. 342.

[43] Charles A. Dana, *Recollections of the Civil War* (New York, 1898), pp. 174 ff.

[44] Harry Thurston Peck, *Twenty Years of the Republic, 1885–1905* (New York, 1906), p. 349; James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850* (9 vols.; New York, 1893–1922), Vol. VIII, p. 403, and *Historical Essays* (New York, 1909), p. 224.

acted into law. During the "Hundred Days" of emergency relief legislation President Franklin Roosevelt would now and then whisper to an importunate Congressman, "We haven't got to patronage yet." The result of this coyness led Pendleton Herring to the conclusion: ". . . the session indicated that the consummation of a national program of legislation is greatly aided by transmuting through patronage the localism of our politics into support of the Chief Executive."[45] Patronage is a means by which a President may, when it is available, persuade Congressmen to risk the displeasure of important constituent interests by strengthening their position among influential and "deserving" party leaders at home.

Declining value

The federal patronage available to the President has been declining ever since the Pendleton Civil Service Act became law in 1883, and with extraordinarily accelerated speed in recent years. Nor is this decline altogether regretted by Congressmen: more than formerly they feel the burden of participating in its distribution, and they are increasingly aware also of the President's power through patronage to coerce, cajole, and seduce them to support his program of legislation. The first critical shortage of patronage upon the succession of a President of one party to that of another party was experienced by President Eisenhower. So scarce indeed was the unclassified personnel subject to patronage that only a meager fraction of one per cent was available for the faithful who had been waiting twenty long years for "the day."

Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration's reduction of the payroll by 10 per cent eliminated about as many positions without as within the classified service. Only a strong President with the flair of a Roosevelt can utilize the patronage still available to his own advantage. Because of Eisenhower's inexperience in the game of politics Congressmen were sometimes able to use the patronage accorded them to the detriment of the administration, one Senator even managing to plant a personal partisan in the State Department, where he was able to embarrass if not harass the administration.

[45] *Op. cit.* (note 25 *supra*), p. 83.

OTHER PRESIDENTIAL DEVICES

In the absence of adequate patronage as an instrument of managing passage of party measures the Eisenhower administration turned to other devices. Thus in 1955 even a Democratic Congress was prevented from passing a $20 individual tax reduction despite its extreme attractiveness to Members of both parties representing districts where elections are close. The trick was turned by mobilizing political and business forces back in the districts to support the administration's pressure on wavering Congressmen. It was believed at the time that these tactics would assure almost solid party support on most administration measures except reciprocal trade.[46]

Publicity

Technology itself seems to be conspiring to publicize the President more and more at the expense of Congress, to the frequent frustration of our national legislators. In our day the President's power in shaping policy and getting policy translated into statutes is chiefly the power of publicity rather than the power invested in him by the letter of the Constitution. "His slightest utterance is headline news," wrote Howard Lee McBain, before broadcasting had become commonplace and had enabled the President to speak to the people of the nation face to face. Governor Franklin Roosevelt had invented the "Fireside Chat" that he carried to the White House. During the "Hundred Days" with which his exceptional leadership was ushered in it is said that he had only to glance at the microphone in the presence of a delegation of protesting Congressmen to have them drop the matter. They dreaded the flood of letters from constituents that every Fireside Chat had been bringing.

Today the President need only request that the nation's broadcasting systems be cleared to catch the ear of a listening nation. Every top member of the administration likewise has access to the broadcasting channels at will. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower in turn adopted and adapted the Fireside Chat, enhanced by television.

[46] *News Week,* March 28, 1955, p. 19.

Congressional disadvantage

Congress is always at a disadvantage in its competition for public attention because of its very plurality when pitted against the incomparable singularity of the President. When President Truman broadcast his reason for the veto of the Taft-Hartley Act Senator Taft followed with his broadcast reply, but "Mr. Republican" could never quite be "Mr. Congress" and could speak for only part of the legislative branch, even if a major part.

Franklin Roosevelt converted the press conference into a powerful instrument to which Congress had no comparable counter instrument. Now that the performance is televised for nationwide viewing and the President learning to make the give and take with news correspondents extraordinarily effective, a disconcerted Congress has more reason than ever for frustration.

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The Supreme Court and Presidential Power

By Joseph Tanenhaus

ON April 8, 1952, President Harry S. Truman, in order to forestall a strike which he felt would imperil national defense and United Nations action in Korea, directed his Secretary of Commerce "to take possession of and operate" most of the nation's steel mills. In the absence of statutory authorization for his seizure order, the Chief Executive relied on his powers under Article II of the Constitution.

Truman's bold move touched off a hotly contested constitutional debate, though the broad questions at issue were old ones. Is the President restricted to those powers specifically granted to him by the Constitution and laws? Or is he, in Theodore Roosevelt's words, "the steward of the people," obligated and entitled "to do whatever the needs of the people demand, unless the Constitution or the laws explicitly forbid him to do it"? [1] Despite the importance of these questions, there is, as the late Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out, a "poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves." [2] The steel dispute reached its culmination in early June of 1952 with the Supreme Court's decision in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer*. As the most searching discussion of Presidential power in the annals of the Court, the steel seizure case is a good point at which to begin this analysis.

[1] Theodore Roosevelt, *An Autobiography* (New York, 1914), p. 479.

[2] Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 634 (1952).

The Steel Decision

The Supreme Court divided 6 to 3 in ruling Truman's seizure of the steel industry *ultra vires*. Each of the six voting against the President found it necessary to explain his position in a separate opinion, while the dissenting justices joined in a single statement authored by Chief Justice Vinson. Actually there was much greater agreement on fundamentals than the large number of opinions might suggest.

Survival in crisis, the entire Court was well aware, may depend upon speedy, effective executive action. The Court was not sanguine, on the other hand, about the risks inherent in placing the vast powers of the national government in the hands of the President alone. All the justices fully realized that "emergency powers are consistent with free government only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them" [3]—and that the elsewhere must be Congress.[4] The area of disagreement was narrow, but important: What kind of control must Congress retain?

Congressional intent

Two members of the Court, Black and Douglas, felt that the only way to balance adequate power with meaningful responsibility is to restrict the President to those powers specifically granted to him by the Constitution and by legislation. Their seven colleagues thought this too inflexible. They preferred not to preclude every possible exercise of inherent Presidential power. For the seven the nub of the matter lay in this question, Had Congress forbidden seizure as a method of handling industrial disputes? If it had, the only route open to the Court was plainly marked, for it is a well-established principle that the President is bound by valid congressional enactments, irrespective of what he might be entitled to do in their absence.[5] Moreover, it is the desire of Congress that is stressed far more than technical violations. These have been overlooked in the past,[6] and none were involved here.

But whether Congress had intended to prohibit seizure in disputes of this kind was debatable. Certainly the legislative histories of the two major laws applicable, the Taft-Hartley Act and the Defense Production Act of 1950, show that seizure had been considered and rejected. Congress had not, however, specifically enjoined the President from resorting to plant seizure. Four justices who believed Truman's action illegal, Burton, Clark, Frankfurter, and Jackson, concluded that Congress had made patent its opposition to seizure as a method for handling industrial disputes. The dissenters, Vinson, Minton, and Reed, thought Congress had offered more than one possible course of action, none mandatory, and had not manifested a clear intent to bar plant seizure in every conceivable situation. Its utilization in this instance they defended by stressing the magnitude of the emergency facing the country. Wrote the Chief Justice:

> Those who suggest that this is a case involving extraordinary powers should be mindful that these are extraordinary times. A world not yet recovered from the devastation of World War II has been forced to face the threat of another and more terrifying global conflict. . . . Secretary of Defense Lovett swore that "a work stoppage in the steel industry will result immediately in serious curtailment of production of essential weapons and munitions of all kinds." . . . Affidavits of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of the Interior, defendant as Secretary of Commerce, and the Administrators of the Defense Production Administration, the National Production Authority, the General Services Administration, and the Defense Transport Administration were also filed. . . . The affidavits emphasize the critical need for steel in our defense program, the absence of appreciable inventories of steel, and the drastic results of any interruption in steel production.[7]

Other factors

Burton, Clark, Frankfurter, and Jackson, of course, had no need to face the question of what they would have done had they agreed with the dissenters about the intent of Congress. Speculation, while intriguing, is hazardous because of the many factors peculiar to this case. Consider, for example, the following:

1. The President was not acting on behalf of a united people anxious to have him exercise extraordinary executive power in meeting the crisis.[8] Editorial opinion almost unanimously condemned the seizure order. Public ap-

[3] 343 U. S. at 652 (Jackson concurring).

[4] In a recent essay, Robert S. Hirschfield argues that limitations on Presidential power should be institutionalized, preferably by constitutional amendment. Robert S. Hirschfield, "The Problem of Crisis Government in the United States," *Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration of Harvard University*, Vol. VI (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), pp. 66–84.

[5] Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (U. S. 1804). More than one justice, it should be noted, implied that there might even be circumstances under which the wishes of Congress could be ignored.

[6] United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459 (1915).

[7] 343 U. S. at 668, 678.

[8] John P. Roche, "Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (December 1952), pp. 615–19.

prehension was widespread, though often irrelevant as Vinson implied when he testily observed, "One is not here called upon even to consider the possibility of executive seizure of a farm, a corner grocery store, or even a single industrial plant." [9]

2. The political overtones were hard to ignore. The President's prolabor orientation and his hostility to the Taft-Hartley Act were well known; the unions had been heavy supporters of the Democratic party in the past; and the 1952 presidential campaign would soon be getting under way.

3. Upholding seizure might set a precedent for carrying the President's wartime authority as Commander in Chief undiminished into a world that seemed likely to be plagued with quasi wars for an indefinite period of time.

4. Alternative means for dealing with the crisis were available at the time. The President could have further postponed the threatened strike at any time by invoking the Taft-Hartley Act. Congress, furthermore, was in session. Truman could have gone to it before acting, rather than present it with a fait accompli. When he did finally ask the legislature's pleasure, on the day following his order to the Secretary of Commerce, his message was far from appropriately deferential.

One suspects that more than one justice soberly evaluated such factors as these before reaching a firm conclusion about the intent of Congress to preclude seizure.

Relativity of President's power

In the steel case the Court formulated an important new theory: the relativity of Presidential power. It is best expressed in Jackson's profound concurring opinion, but the theme also runs through the opinions of Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and the dissenters. The availability of inherent Presidential power, according to this doctrine, depends upon both the seriousness of the emergency and the consent of Congress (whether explicit or implicit) that the President should draw upon the resources of his office to face the crisis. No one can know with exactitude what the Court will do in future cases. Supreme Court rulings, like Presidential actions, reflect a subtle intermingling of personality, constitutional doctrine, and the felt realities. But of this we may be sure: Presidents hereafter will think a little longer and a little harder than Mr. Truman did before relying on inherent power. At the same time they will know that if the need is grave and the Congress behind them, the use of inherent Presidential power carries no taint of illegality. This assurance, in Sidney Hyman's phrase, is of "historic importance." [10]

[9] 343 U. S. at 679.

[10] Sidney Hyman, *The American President* (New York, 1954), p. 307.

DELEGATED AUTHORITY

An unusual aspect of the steel dispute was that it reached the Supreme Court at all. Conflicts between the President and Congress are generally confined to the political arena and only rarely present justiciable issues. A President, though he may fight bitterly against the enactment of a bill he opposes, is not apt to take lightly his constitutional duty faithfully to execute the laws. Nor is he likely often to risk dissipation of needed congressional support by a wanton disregard for this obligation, as Franklin Roosevelt in a brasher moment once did. Roosevelt threatened to ignore a section of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 if Congress proved unwilling to repeal it. He was no doubt bluffing, but Congress took offense and had its revenge shortly thereafter by refusing to pass the proposed Third War Powers Act.[11] In periods of crisis, moreover, as developments during the First and Second World Wars and the Great Depression document, Congress is generally more than eager to delegate to the President all the power he wants and needs.

A fundamental doctrine of constitutional law holds that Congress does not possess an unlimited right to delegate its powers to the Executive. The legislature, if it had such a right, could abdicate its function to the President and thereby give him dictatorial powers. This principle of limited delegation has not prevented Congress from transferring vast authority to the executive branch. In fact just what the limitations on delegation are is not entirely clear. Valid delegation, according to the Court, requires a legislative declaration of policy broadly outlining the action that may be taken to attain a given objective and the circumstances under which such action would be warranted.

As long as an intelligible guide has been set forth by the Congress, the Executive (or his subordinates) may be given great latitude in filling in the details of the policy, or in determining when all or part of it is to go into effect. Yet the Court takes such a generous view of what constitutes an adequate guide for executive conduct that the administrator may be left pretty much to his own devices. "Public interest, convenience, or necessity," in establishing rules and regulations under the Federal Communications Act; prices yielding a "fair return" or the "fair value" of property; "just and reasonable" rates for the services of commission men; "excessive profits" on war contracts, and "unreasonable obstructions" to navigation have all been held satisfactory standards by the Court. Sometimes, it is true, such vague phrases as these may have a fairly precise meaning when read in the light of their legislative histories, but this is not always the case.[12]

[11] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (3d ed.; New York, 1948), pp. 303–6, 494–95; Edward S. Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution* (New York, 1947), pp. 62–65.

[12] Kenneth Culp Davis, *Administrative Law* (Minneapolis, 1951), pp. 43–50.

Excessive delegation of legislative power

On only two occasions have attacks upon the delegation of legislative power to the Executive proved successful.[13] Both occurred during the years when the Court was riding roughshod over the New Deal. In one the Court invalidated a section of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President to prohibit the transportation through interstate commerce of oil produced in violation of state law. Congress, concluded the Court, had established no criteria for determining the circumstances under which the President could ban the shipment of "hot oil." As precedent the hot-oil case carries almost no weight because less definite standards have been upheld before and since.

The second case, *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,* also grew out of the NIRA. Section 3 of the Act contained perhaps the most expansive powers Congress ever attempted to transfer to the President—sweeping authority to establish codes of fair competition governing all business subject to national regulation. This, as Cardozo said, was "delegation running riot." Here again the standards were not exceptionally vague. What really differentiates the Schechter case from the hot-oil case, and from every other case involving delegation, is the tremendous

[13] Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).

scope of the powers transferred. The only delegations reviewed by the Court which have even approached Section 3 of the NIRA in breadth were the price control and renegotiation acts passed during World War II. In these cases the Court made it obvious that any successful challenge to wartime delegation was most unlikely.

The Schechter case may still be good law. But in any case it is not difficult to dream up hypothetical delegations which would most certainly be struck down—for example, a law stating that Congress is bored with regulating interstate commerce and authorizing the President to relieve it of the chore, or an enactment confessing complete confusion about fiscal problems and requesting the President to lay and collect such taxes as he thinks in the public interest.

In fine, anything much short of Congress' complete abdication of its legislative function is not apt to be overturned by the Court as a delegation violative of the separation of powers.

PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVE

Other than the steel case, Court decisions involving the use of Presidential prerogative (powers stemming from the Constitution itself) are few. For one thing, little Presidential action is based on prerogative alone—Lincoln's eleven-week "dictatorship" and the "Undeclared War" of 1940–41 are the periods of major exception. For another, some Presidential actions do not easily lend themselves to litigation. Franklin Roosevelt's determination to build an atomic bomb, Truman's decisions to order American troops into Korea and to dismiss General MacArthur, and Eisenhower's reluctance to go to war in Indochina simply do not raise justiciable questions. And when discretionary actions do end up in legal controversies the Court tends to consider them political questions beyond its competence. Finally, wherever possible the Court tries to base its holdings upon the joint authority of the President and Congress, rather than on the President's powers alone.[14]

Square challenges to the exercise of prerogative, when they do reach the high Court, almost always result in victories for the President. By all odds the most important ruling was made in *The Prize Cases*. The narrow issue in point was the validity of Lincoln's proclamation of a blockade of the southern ports, though Congress was out of session and war had not been declared. In sustaining the blockade order, the Court by implication endorsed Lincoln's belief that as Commander in Chief he had extraordinary powers to wage an undeclared war:

> If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is nonetheless a war. . . .[15]

The Court has also upheld the President's constitutional right to appoint a deputy marshal to guard a Supreme Court Justice, to seek an injunction breaking a strike because it interfered with the mails and interstate commerce, to keep confidential relations between himself and his subordinates immune from judicial and legislative inquiry, and to have his executive agreements treated as the law of the land. In addition, the President's unrestricted right to remove exclusively executive officers appointed by him has been held inherent in Article II.[16] All of these rulings underwrite power. The limitation side of the ledger is virtually bare. Except for the steel case, only Ex parte *Milligan* stands out.

[14] See, e.g., *Ex parte* Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943).

[15] *The Prize Cases*, 2 Black 635, 668 (U. S. 1863).

In 1862 Lincoln without statutory authority suspended the writ of habeas corpus for all persons arrested for disloyalty to the Union and authorized their trial before military commissions. These commissions were not restricted to the areas of hostilities but operated even where the regular courts were open. Lambdin P. Milligan, a prorebel agitator living in Indiana, had been tried and sentenced to hang by a commission. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Lincoln had acted unconstitutionally in establishing military tribunals where civil courts were functioning. In so ruling, the Court, through Justice Davis, delivered itself of some well-intentioned if unrealistic lines:

> The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.[17]

These noble sentiments seem a bit less impressive when the case is considered in context. Undoubtedly Lincoln's institution of military trials for civilians when the regular courts were ready and willing to do business was a gross violation of the Bill of Rights, and it is not difficult to question the necessity for his action. But the Supreme Court neatly side-stepped an excellent opportunity to do so while the war was still in progress and its ruling might have done some good.[18] By the time the Court got around to publishing its homily on constitutionalism in wartime, the rebellion had been long crushed and Lincoln eighteen months in his grave.

[16] For details and references see Edward S. Corwin and Louis W. Koenig, *The Presidency Today* (New York, 1956), pp. 29–61.

[17] *Ex parte* Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 120 (U. S. 1866).

OTHER LIMITING DECISIONS

Lest Ex parte *Milligan* be judged too harshly, it would be well to look at the handful of other cases which symbolize, at least indirectly, judicial limitation on Presidential power in time of emergency.[19] None, it should be added, turned on the exercise of prerogative.

Hepburn v. Griswold

In 1870, the Supreme Court divided 4 to 3 in judging the acts of 1862 making paper currency legal tender beyond the powers of the national government even in time of war. (Grant's appointment of two "right-thinking" judges reversed the holding a few months later.) The same issue came before the Court in the midst of the Civil War, when *Roosevelt v. Meyer* was docketed. A large majority undoubtedly believed the Legal Tender Acts invalid, but refused to place its conviction on record. As Charles Warren tells the story:

> By curious mischance, the question was not decided, owing to the fact that the

[18] *Ex parte* Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (U. S. 1864).

[19] For greater detail and incisive analysis see Clinton Rossiter, *The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief*, Ithaca, N. Y., 1951. Citations for the cases discussed below are as follows: Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (U. S. 1870); Roosevelt v. Meyer, 1 Wall. 512 (U. S. 1863); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921); *Ex parte* Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944); Steuart and Brothers v. Bowles, 322 U. S. 398 (1944); *Ex parte* Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946); Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).

Court held that it had no jurisdiction of the case (although nine years later, it was obliged to admit that its decision had been wrong, and to overrule it).[20]

United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.

Chief Justice White, for the Court, found the section of the Lever Food Control Act making it unlawful willfully "to make an unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries" unconstitutional. "The mere existence of a state of war," intoned White, "could not suspend or change the operation" of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and warrant legislation so vague as to delegate to the judiciary the power to define crimes. The decision came more than two years after the Armistice and only three days before the act was repealed. In view of modern developments in administrative practice and the Court's decisions in the Yakus, Lichter, and Steuart cases, Cohen Grocery now seems rather quaint.

Ex parte *Quirin*

Eight German Nazis came to the United States by submarine in 1942 for the purpose of committing sabotage. Soon apprehended, they were tried before a military commission established for the purpose by Presidential proclamation. The Supreme Court, moving with uncharacteristic haste, announced that it would meet in special session to consider petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Hear them it did, only to find the commission properly constituted by virtue of the President's authority under the articles of war.

Ex parte *Endo*

Mitsuye Endo, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, was evacuated to a relocation center from one of the military areas established on the West Coast under authority granted by Executive Order 9066 of February 19, 1942. Congress ratified this order, a month later, providing criminal penalties to aid in its implementation. Conceded by the government to be loyal, Miss Endo was nevertheless retained against her will, first in Tule Lake and later in a camp at Topaz, Utah. On December 18, 1944, at a time when the relocation centers were already being disbanded, the Court unanimously agreed that as a loyal citizen her detention had been unlawful all along.

In a separate decision delivered on the same day (*Korematsu v. United States*), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation itself with these words: "We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified."[21] Justices Jackson, Murphy, and Roberts dissented.

Duncan v. Kahanamoku

Immediately after Japanese planes struck at Pearl Harbor, the Governor of Hawaii, invoking his powers under the Organic Act, suspended the writ of habeas corpus and declared martial law. President Roosevelt upon notification confirmed. The state of martial law continued until the fall of 1944, even though the civil courts were ready to function. Two civilians tried and convicted by a military court in March of 1944 brought their case to the Supreme Court. Late in February 1946, nearly six months after hostilities had ended, the Supreme Court announced a 6 to 2 decision that the military governor had exceeded his authority under the Organic Act in requiring military trials for civilians under the circumstances. This finding, Justice Burton and Frankfurter pointed out in dissent, required the Court "now that the war has been won and the safety of the Islands has been again assured,"[22] to use hindsight in evaluating the wisdom of decisions made by a military commander in time of war—something the Court had been unwilling to do in 1944 when reviewing the much more vulnerable Japanese evacuation program.

Significance

In this brief analysis of cases limiting Presidential power two things stand out. One is lack of timeliness. The Milligan, Legal Tender, Cohen Grocery, Endo, and Kahanamoku decisions all came too late to do much good. Reaching the Supreme Court under normal circumstances is quite properly an obstacle-laden and time-consuming process. But when the need is urgent, and the Court so disposed, it can move with commendable alacrity—as *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer* and Ex parte *Quirin* well demonstrate. The Court clearly avoided opportunities to decide the questions raised in Ex parte *Milligan* and the *Legal Tender Cases* during the Civil War, and would have experienced no insuperable difficulties in bringing Miss Endo's cause to bar a full two years earlier than it did.

Second, the Court has not always displayed a realistic attitude when dealing with limitations on Presidential power, as Ex parte *Milligan* and *Duncan v. Kahanamoku* illustrate. It is extremely risky, it is true, to go behind the facts presented and assess in mid-crisis the discretion exercised by the President or his military commanders—though the risk may on occasion be worth taking. Whenever the Court feels that it must accept the judgment of the Executive at face value and cannot take the risk, then the best it can do is to salvage what it can as soon as the crisis passes. This is as it should be. But little is gained, then or later, by lofty and misleading pronouncements about the inviolability of civil liberty in emergency. Of what value is Ex parte *Milligan* as precedent when in World War II the Court sustained the interning of 70,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry without prior governmental inquiry into their loyalties?

CONCLUSIONS

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer advances a new constitutional doctrine—the relativity of Presidential power. According to this theory, the President normally possesses only those powers specifically granted to him by the Constitution and laws. He can exercise prerogative in time of grave emergency, however, if Congress acquiesces. This is a noteworthy and welcome departure from the unrealistic position expressed in some earlier cases that the Constitution is one and the same regardless of the circumstances. By recognizing the relativity of Presidential power, the Court has made it a bit easier for itself to insist that extraordinary power be reserved strictly for extraordinary occasions. It has also reminded Congress that the primary responsibility for the control of Presidential power rests with the legislature.

[20] Charles Warren, *The Supreme Court in United States History* (Boston, 1926), Vol. II, p. 387.

[21] 323 U. S. 214, 224 (1944).

[22] 327 U. S. 304, 357 (1946).

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The Modern President As a World Figure

By Paul H. Nitze

DEAN Acheson tells a story about President Roosevelt, who having once served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy preserved a special affection for that service, and General Malin Craig, who was Army Chief of Staff before General George C. Marshall took over in 1939. General Craig used to go over to the White House from time to time to advise with F.D.R., to get his approval of budget requests for the Army, and to discuss his worries about the indifferent state of our military preparedness in those days. During these discussions the relative size of Army and Navy appropriations and the superior readiness of the Navy would come up from time to time. After one somewhat heated exchange which ended with F.D.R.'s rejection of General Craig's pleas, the General concluded the discussion by saying "Sir, I accept your decision, but I wish that when you refer to the Navy you could find some pronoun other than 'we' and that you would not always refer to the Army as 'they.'"

This story illustrates the problem of duties of the American Presidency in terms of the "we" for whom the President speaks and to whom he bears a direct responsibility and the "they" whom he must take into account but to whom he does not have a clear responsibility. The confusion between the "we" and the "they" is potentially present in all aspects of the President's duties as Chief Executive of the United States, but this confusion is particularly acute and fraught with danger in the President's inescapable role as a world figure.

Within the United States the Presidential "we" must on differing occasions embrace one or more of the following groups—the Cabinet, the executive branch, the entire government, the President's political party, and the American people as a whole. Only great political skill will prevent the President from omitting from a particular "we" reference a group or groups of Americans who feel they should have been included. Statesmanship consists, in part, in a wise and judicious use of the terms "we" and "they."

In *The American Presidency* Clinton Rossiter lists two types of duties or roles of the President. Functions of the first type flow directly from the language of the Constitution and define his primary responsibilities to the citizens of the United States. These constitutional functions include his duties as Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief Diplomat, Commander in Chief, and participant in the legislative process. Responsibilities of the second type which fall upon the President are those which are not provided for explicitly in the Constitution. The clearest example of a nonconstitutional function is that of chief of his party, Republican or Democratic. The Presidential function as party leader is the result of historical development within America and is now regarded as a wholly legitimate function.

Leader of the Western Coalition

The nonconstitutional responsibility of the President which produces the greatest difficulties is that of being the leader of the Western coalition. World developments have thrust this function on the American President, and for the most part its legitimacy has been accepted by the American people. But it raises serious questions for the President himself.

The President bears a primary responsibility to the American electorate and a less well-defined responsibility to the larger nonvoting constituency of the "free world." The tension between the primary and the more inclusive "we" groups is illustrated when the President deals with allies like Britain and France. In dealing with them he is at the same time the Chief Diplomat of the United States seeking to uphold the national interest and the leader of the Western coalition seeking to strengthen it against a common external threat.

When the President speaks or is quoted his words are news throughout the world because he is the leader of the Western coalition. Statesmen and common people weigh his words and try to figure out whether they are included in his "we" or his "they." When he discusses matters of war and peace are they included in the "we" group? Are their lives and interests being considered as part of the "we," as a potential "they," or merely as counters to be used to promote the interests of some other "we" group of which they are not a part?

It is probably impossible for the President to reconcile the conflicting claims of all the various "we" groups to which he bears responsibility to the complete satisfaction of the more extreme members of any of them. But it still should be possible to have an opinion as to some of the better and some of the less satisfactory ways in which the problem of the "we" can be dealt with by a modern President.

Toward Definition

The President's responsibility to his broader constituency has been described in different terms. Clinton Rossiter calls him the "leader of a coalition of free nations." Others have referred to him as "leader of the coalition of the free" or "of the free world." Sidney Hyman calls him the leader of "a concert of allied powers." Some simply refer to the President as "world leader."

What is the group and what is the relationship to which these phrases refer? Do they all refer to the same thing or do they refer to different things? Historically the words "coalition" and "alliance" have been used almost interchangeably. In so far as there has been a difference it has been that the word "alliance" more often has implied an arrangement between independent states involving treaty agreements, while the word "coalition" has tended rather to emphasize a consensus of attitude and approach to a common problem. In today's context the terms take on a sharper meaning. In my view, a significant distinction can today be drawn between "coalition of the free," "concert of allied powers," and what is implied in the phrase "world leader."

When the President talks about "the coalition of the free," whom should he include in the "we"? Who are the "they" threatening the "us"?

Some people tend to emphasize the inner-community aspects of coalition and to denigrate the external-defensive aspects. Among the inner-community aspects they include common religion or ideology, common cultural heritage, common aspirations or ambitions, or common interests in security and progress. Others assert that historically coalitions have generally arisen as the result of a common reaction to a serious and direct common external threat. They refer to the great coalitions which overcame France's drives for hegemony over Europe under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and those which overcame

Germany's drive for hegemony under the Kaiser and under Hitler. Today they emphasize the defensive origins of the free-world coalition in the face of the Soviet Union's drive for world hegemony.

Obviously both inner-community and external-defensive elements are combined in some proportion in any international coalition, in any consensus or pulling together of people beyond national lines. But the weight of historical evidence favors the greater force of the defensive element in evoking the type of "we" consensus to which the word coalition is usually applied.

"Coalition of the free"

If we accept the analysis thus far it suggests the following meaning for the "coalition of the free." The "coalition of the free" refers to the common element in the attitude of all those people who feel threatened by the drive of the Soviet leadership for world hegemony and therefore feel that they are part of a common "we" seeking, perhaps by very diverse means, some other answer to their political future than acquiescence in this Soviet drive. If one accepts this answer, the term coalition has a broad but reasonably precise meaning. It then refers to an attitude of mind. It does not refer to alliances, treaties, blocs, or membership in any particular organization. It does not refer to governments or nations as entities but to one aspect of the attitude of people in those governments and nations. It may even include bodies of men and women in countries governed by Soviet satellite regimes who hate and fear those regimes and what they imply.

The term "coalition of the free" is not, of course, always used in this sense but neither is any other term dealing with political matters ever used consistently in any one sense. To this extent all terms used in discussing politics are ambiguous. If we are to communicate broadly we still must use them, trying to make our meaning as precise as the context will allow.

If one accepts the definition here suggested, it is obvious that the word "free" contributes meaning to the phrase in only a limited sense. Until last year we certainly would have included the Yugoslavs within this meaning of "the coalition of the free," even though the Yugoslav government was under Communist leadership. Perhaps they should still be included today. We would include the Spaniards under General Franco, colonial powers such as England, France, and Belgium, dictatorships such as the Dominican Republic, and various other groups politically organized in a great diversity of ways. The common denominator, the special meaning of "free" in this context, is freedom from Soviet control and a desire to work out a political future in some other way than subject to Soviet hegemony.

Obviously any such "we" group, any such consensus, is fluctuating. It depends in large measure on the immediacy and overtness of the threat posed by the "they" which has called it into being. If that threat relaxes, or appears to relax, then the multitude of other issues, contradictions, or diverse loyalties normally tending to divide the "we" group come to the fore and weaken or break the consensus.

Today there is real doubt as to whether the members of the Asian-African bloc now consider themselves really threatened by the Russian drive for hegemony and therefore have any substantial feeling left of constituting a "we" consensus with the West. Other issues and other "we" and "they" divisions have now come to the fore. Asian statesmen like Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon find that domestic political support is withdrawn if they follow a foreign policy consistent with an attitude of "we" consensus with the West which thereby underemphasizes other locally more appealing issues.

In emphasizing the defensive element, the element of fear, which calls the consensus underlying a coalition into being I do not want to slight the opposing element—the feeling of hope that the "we" group has some chance of resisting or defeating the force that is threatening it. When Macedon in the days of Demosthenes had so grown in strength that there was real doubt that a coalition of those threatened by Macedon could successfully resist, all Demosthenes' eloquence was of no avail in bringing the Greeks into a working coalition in time. They delayed getting together; they attempted to make deals. When some of them, the Athenians and the Thebans, finally did unite to make a stand it was too late. They were defeated and forever lost their freedom.

"Concert of allied powers"

It is in this context of the elements offering hope that if the consensus of the free-world coalition is maintained, this coalition (or some smaller "we" group within it) can successfully resist or defeat the common threat, that we may, I suggest, consider the problem of alliances, of a "concert of allied powers." Here we are dealing, however, not with an attitude of mind but with the relations between governments—treaty commitments and regional special-purpose organizations. Before considering the President's functions and responsibilities with respect to leadership of a "concert of allied powers" a few words may be appropriate on the subject of the purposes of alliances and some of the more difficult questions of alliance diplomacy.

Professor McGeorge Bundy has pointed out the variety of purposes and objectives which alliances can serve. Alliances can define a mutuality of strategic interests. Alliances can serve notice on the "they" that encroachment beyond a certain point will elicit a common response. Alliances can provide a legal foundation for planning and for action. Alliances can provide a symbol around which a pre-existing or developing consensus can be organized and strengthened. And they can be effective, or they can be ineffective, in accomplishing the purposes for which they are created.

Professor Bundy stresses the importance of a fundamental community of political interests as a precondition to an effective alliance. He also stresses the importance of a common harmonious over-all strategic concept.

An alliance to be effective must be based on something more than the changing and possibly ephemeral attitudes which characterize a coalition as broad and inclusive as "the coalition of the free." To accomplish any of the purposes suggested for alliances a degree of permanence and stability would seem to be necessary. If they really are to serve notice against encroachment or constitute a legal basis for longer-term planning or action or provide a symbol of real political force, alliances should not be dependent upon short-term variations in the immediacy or form of the external threat, they should not be subject to drastic amendment if there is a normal overturn in the domestic political leadership within one or more of the member countries, and they should not be based upon ephemeral or misunderstood considerations.

The fostering of the "coalition of the free" and the building of an effective "concert of allied powers" are then two separate and very different although related operations.

U. S. ALLIANCES

As we survey the system of alliances of which the United States is a member or to which it is giving its support, we find a very complex structure indeed. I suggest that this complexity does not come from accident or necessarily from lack of foresight or clear thinking. I suggest that this complexity springs from the complexity of the political situations which are inherent in "the coalition of the free."

At one extreme we find the alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At least as to its principal member countries it is based upon a very great community of political interest. The strategic concept behind NATO has evolved with the evolving military situation. Today this concept is subject to a considerable strain resulting from the rapid evolution of weapons technology and changes in the relative balance of forces. But basically one can say that the criterion of a common strategic concept is met in NATO.

The purposes of NATO are reasonably well understood not only by those in the member governments but by the mass of informed citizens. The alliance has constituted a legal basis for common planning and action which could not otherwise have been undertaken. And, most important of all, NATO is a symbol of the furthest and deepest commitment of the power of North America to the support of Europe.

The ANZUS alliance (Pacific Security Treaty, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) is similarly based on a community of political interests. Its underlying strategic concept is less clear and compelling but still adequate to the political burden it is called upon to support.

The Organization of American States is based upon a community of political and strategic interests of long and tested standing and on solid considerations of geography. The weight which it can carry may not be very great, but the pressure upon it is also not very great.

The situation becomes less satisfactory as one contemplates the remaining elements of our alliance structure. Questions can be asked as to whether or not the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty reflects any solid community of political and strategic interests. It can be argued that both it and the Baghdad Pact had their origins in what appeared to be the expediency of short-range situations, that there is not today any clear understanding or agreement on the part of the peoples involved of the purposes and objectives of these treaties or clarity as to the means by which these purposes are to be accomplished. It is at least subject to doubt, for instance, whether the opposition parties in Pakistan, were they to come to power, would see sufficiently substantial Pakistani interests being served by these treaties to warrant continued membership in them. Alliances which are not solidly based on adequate political and strategic foundations present opportunities for disruption and division to the opposing bloc.

Our treaty arrangements with Formosa and South Korea are basically related to immediate war or quasi-war situations and fall into a separate and distinct category. And our treaty with Japan springs from the necessity of modifying a victor-vanquished relationship; it may have to be revised before a firm community of political and strategic interests can be achieved.

ALLIANCES AND THE COALITION

I would suggest that the system of alliances of which the United States is a member or which it supports is primarily a technique by which we and our allies have attempted on the one hand to give hope to the coalition that the Soviet threat can in fact be resisted or overcome and on the other hand to bind some of the members of the coalition more tightly together. The Swiss and the Swedes, for instance, who are certainly members of the coalition, though Switzerland and Sweden are not members of the alliance system, have benefited as much as any from the strength and hope which NATO has been able to generate. India and Burma, though they would perhaps be more reluctant to admit it, have similarly benefited from the strength which the United States and its allies have been able to provide as an offset to Russian and Chinese strength.

In spite of articles which deal with the co-ordination of nonmilitary matters, such as Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, it still remains true that a central function, if not the central function of the alliance structure, is military. We consider that an important portion of the threat presented by the Soviet bloc is military. We believe that it requires joint planning and organization to provide the co-ordinated forces which will give the necessary hope and assurance that the Soviet military threat can be resisted and, if necessary, overcome. But not all members of the coalition share that view.

The Indian, the Pakistani, the Burmese, and even the Japanese people see little danger of direct military aggression against themselves in the immediate future. The government leaders in those countries would be faced with very great internal problems if they were to make very substantial sacrifices of what their people consider to be their national interests in order to support a greater common riposte to the Soviet military threat. The very words "treaty" and "alliance" are to Asians Western words with connotations of capitulations, extraterritoriality, and colonialism. From many points of view it would be highly desirable if the community of political interests and agreement upon a common strategic concept were sufficiently widespread so that a firm alliance structure coterminous with the coalition of the free could be constructed.

But those preconditions do not exist. The President is therefore faced with a choice among three possibilities: (1) he can concentrate on those who share our political interests and strategic concept and ignore those who seek some other solution to their political fate than Soviet hegemony but who do not share the full range of our political interests and our strategic concept; (2) he can play down our alliance structure and concentrate on fostering a "we" consensus among all those who fear Soviet hegemony; or (3) he can continue both to build our alliance structure into a firm military shield and symbol of hope and to foster the development of a looser but still real "we" consensus, including those outside our alliance structure. I believe the two efforts are basically compatible, although all kinds of superficial dilemmas and difficulties obviously have to be dealt with if the efforts are to remain compatible.

COALITION DIPLOMACY

Some have suggested that the conduct of coalition diplomacy is largely a matter of engaging in prior bargains and achieving prior agreement in "cloakrooms." I am a firm believer in the virtues of quiet, frank, secret, and informal discussion as one of the techniques of diplomacy. It seems to me to be improvident and stupid to go into a formal meeting or to issue a public statement without the help of all the prior feelers, conversations, explorations, and even tentative agreements which

can possibly assist the formal meeting to move forward with dispatch to a sound conclusion or assure that the impact of the public statement will be helpful rather than harmful. But this is a far cry from saying that such feelers, explorations, or prior bargains are the totality or even the main part of coalition diplomacy. If the problem of coalition management is the fostering of a "we" consensus sufficiently strong to overcome the blandishments of the opposing bloc and the natural and inherent diversities of interest and attitude within the coalition, then the requirements of coalition diplomacy are far greater than these informal explorations, discussions, and agreements, and involve a far wider range of activities.

The successful management of a coalition requires that, on balance, the sum total of the actions taken and the impressions formed tend to strengthen the "we" consensus. Tolerance, and understanding of diverse approaches to the host of problems not basic to the main conflict, assist in building this "we" consensus. Confidence in the efficiency, courage, and military strength of the principal nations supporting the coalition helps the consensus. Success in the resolution of issues and in the attainment of objectives important to the members of the coalition builds the consensus. Intelligibility of purpose and consistency of action also help. Beyond these specific points are the less specific but equally important ones of honesty, character, and tact. Successful coalition diplomacy involves all these things.

So far as our part in coalition diplomacy is concerned, the speeches, statements, and press conferences of the President and the Secretary of State are probably the most important single group of actions. They are addressed to two audiences simultaneously. On the one hand they are addressed to the domestic audience whose understanding is necessary if public opinion is to support, and the Congress give lawful authorization for, the actions the President thinks necessary. On the other hand they are addressed to the foreign audience whose understanding is similarly necessary if adherence to the coalition is to be maintained. From time to time the President must reappraise the nature of the common threat to the coalition and propose the common actions which seem to him to be indicated if the threat is to be met. He must also give expression to the sentiments which will build a sense of community and of common action on some broader base, if possible, than mere defense.

ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY

But how about alliance diplomacy? Should a substantial portion of the economic and political decision making affecting the NATO countries, for instance, be channeled through the formal machinery of NATO? The answer to this question is not easy or obvious.

On the one hand neither we nor the British are really prepared to delegate decision making on important political issues to NATO as an organization. The British would see in any such delegation a serious, even impossible, contradiction to their system of Cabinet responsibility. We should see in it a serious contradiction to our constitutional system of executive responsibility within a balance of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For both the United States and for Britain, NATO decisions are decisions only if we agree with them. Perhaps the short answer is that great powers will not and should not delegate their major responsibilities. If this is so, other members of NATO can scarcely be expected to permit much broader delegations.

On the other hand, the community of political interests on which NATO is based cannot long survive if we, the British, and other NATO members continue to make important policy decisions affecting the interests of NATO as a whole without taking into account the views of the other members.

One way out of this dilemma may be to recognize that a degree of separation is possible between analysis and decision. We and the other members of NATO could make available some of our top political and economic staff personnel to the staff of NATO. These men would have the responsibility for analyzing political and economic problems from the viewpoint not solely of their own country but rather of the NATO countries as a group and with due regard to the interests of non-NATO members of the coalition. Their analyses would be analyses, not decisions or recommendations for decision. Decisions, other than in the specific military fields where NATO already enjoys true delegation of authority, would still be by governments. Obviously analyses may imply recommendations for decision. But it is still true that there is an important difference of degree, if not of kind, between analysis and decision.

The British would never tolerate any serious discussion of the Cyprus issue in NATO if they thought that thereby their responsibility for decision with respect to a part of the British Empire would be prejudiced. We should hardly permit full discussion of Quemoy and Matsu if we thought NATO would presume to decide how our President should exercise the discretion and responsibility put upon him by congressional resolution. But both the Cyprus issue and the Quemoy-Matsu issue can vitally affect the interests of a number of NATO countries, the NATO countries as a group, and the coalition as well. If the distinction between analysis and decision is kept clear, NATO as an organization could play a useful role in these areas as well as in its original field.

PRESIDENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS AND COALITION INTERESTS

Some have asked whether coalition and alliance diplomacy limits or enhances the capacity of the President and his Secretary of State to deal and negotiate with the adversary. Again the answer is not simple. It depends in large measure on what the President wishes to negotiate about. If the purpose is to negotiate with the adversary on matters that are of general concern to the coalition in a manner consistent with the interests of the coalition as a whole, I see no basic limitations arising from the requirements of either coalition or alliance diplomacy.

Certainly the President, as the leader of the most powerful member of the concert of allied powers, must take care in such negotiations that the other members either know what he is negotiating about or have confidence that whatever it is he would not think of trading their interests down the river in order to seek some special advantage for the United States.

The matter would, of course, be quite different if the President proposed to negotiate with the adversary a spheres-of-influence agreement or some other arrangement of possible interest to the United States but not to other members of the coalition. If the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Union is in any way comparable to what I have been talking about in this paper—in other words, if what we are engaged in is in fact coalition warfare—I can imagine no circumstances under which, in negotiating with the adversary, our interests and those of the coalition would be in conflict. We negotiated the lifting of the Berlin blockade in the greatest secrecy directly with the Soviet Un-

ion. This secret negotiation was clearly to the benefit of the coalition as a whole and involved us in no recriminations.

Obviously, if we were to meet defeat in the coalition war in which we are engaged and were to end up in a position of isolation, the President and his Secretary of State could then negotiate with the Soviet Union solely in the interest of the United States—but they would have little to negotiate about other than the terms of our acquiescence in Soviet world hegemony.

WORLD LEADERSHIP

So far we have discussed some of the problems concerning Presidential leadership of a "coalition of the free" and of a "concert of allied powers." We have said nothing about the concept "world leader."

To some extent the people of the United States, the countries participating in the alliance system, and those beyond the alliance system who feel themselves to be part of the coalition of the free, all look to the President of the United States for some clarification of ideas and policies which look beyond and over the current East-West conflict. Granted that we may today be engaged in a vast politico-military-economic-psychological chess game with a very dangerous and capable opponent for the very highest stakes, still there is the hope that somehow the rigors of the game can be mitigated, that it need not be played out to an ultimate decision with all the loser's, and many of the winner's, pieces swept from the board. And we look for a leader to express this hope for mankind, to suggest a general policy by which it may be realized. To a certain extent the ability of the modern President to give effective leadership at home and to the alliance and coalition depends on his fulfilling this additional function concurrently with his other responsibilities.

The group which the President has in mind when he addresses himself to this function must include mankind generally. The ideas and proposals he puts forward in this context must plausibly provide for the basic interests even of those on the other side of the East-West struggle. When the President addresses himself to this function it is natural for him to refer to the United Nations, the organization which symbolizes this aspect of people's aspirations.

Obviously, in expressing ideas which apply to a world-wide group, the President must expect to run into opposition both at home and from the Communist leadership. To some at home this is the furthest possible departure from single-minded devotion to the exclusive group constituting the people of the United States, before whom, in effect, the President has taken his oath of office. To the Soviet leaders pretensions on the part of the President to world leadership are pure bombast, since they consider themselves the natural spokesmen for mankind.

President Eisenhower's speech "The Chance for Peace," delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, 1953, was probably the most effective recent effort to fulfill this function of "world leader." But many other statements of modern Presidents and Secretaries of State are understandable only in this context.

THE PUSH OF FACTS

It can be argued that the entire conception of a function for the President in the field of foreign affairs other than that of Chief Diplomat is artificial or wrong or based upon a temporary emergency, an emergency created by the two World Wars, and that it should be the object of policy to get away from such a function as rapidly as possible. Certainly the theory of the Presidency would be clearer and neater if the functions and powers of the President could be kept within the strict framework of the Constitution and related solely to the United States as a united and exclusive group.

But the facts of the domestic political scene seem to have made necessary the involvement of the President in what the framers of the Constitution considered perhaps the greatest danger to the Republic, faction and party. It is today hardly possible to conceive of the President in terms other than as leader and chief of his political party. Indeed many believe that the evolution of our system of government should be in the direction of further party organization and discipline and a closer tie between the President and his party, in order to ensure both more effective limitation of the power of the President and greater responsibility on the part of the party.

Similarly, the facts of the international scene may require that the President continue to further a consensus of those determined not to surrender their liberties to the Communists, continue to provide leadership to a concert of allied powers, and, in order to do these things effectively, continue to associate himself with the aspirations of mankind.

If so, the task of handling his actions and his words in such a way as to give simultaneous leadership to an expanding circle of "we" groups, to manage the conflicts of interests and loyalties that necessarily arise among them, will continue to be one of the modern Presidency's greatest burdens.

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Special Diplomatic Agents of the President

By Maurice Waters

THE location and extent of authority for the conduct of American foreign affairs has been a subject of long standing debate. My aim is to deal with one aspect of this debate, the question of the President's power to use diplomatic agents to carry out foreign assignments without restrictions by Congress. In addition, the activities of one such agent will be briefly examined.

Almost 170 years ago one of the authors of *The Federalist* pointed out that although the Constitution deliberately does not concentrate authority, it does provide the office of the President the means to gather information with an efficiency, speed, and thoroughness that Congress could not hope to match.[1]

However this may be, many arguments have been raised that the executive and the Senate must work together in much greater harmony than they in fact have. In this centennial year of Woodrow Wilson's birth it may be well to recall some pertinent observations of his:

> . . . the relations of the President and Senate were intended to be very much more intimate and confidential than they have been; . . . it was expected that the Senate would give the President its advice and consent in respect of appointments and treaties in the spirit of an executive council associated with him upon terms of confidential cooperation rather than in the spirit of an independent branch of the government, jealous lest he should in the least particular attempt to govern its judgment or infringe upon its prerogatives.[2]

[1] John Jay, *The Federalist* (E. M. Earle ed.; Washington, D. C.: National Home Library Foundation, 1938), No. 64.

[2] Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), p. 139.

The Regular Diplomatic Agent

What these "prerogatives" are has not yet been defined to the satisfaction of all authorities. In the early period of the country's history it was generally accepted that diplomatic offices were provided by the law of nations which the United States Constitution not only recognized but considered as a part of the law of the land. Therefore the President was given a free hand with regard to the diplomat's grade and the country to which he would go. This state of affairs did not last long, and Congress slowly but surely began to restrict the Executive's freedom. In acts passed in 1792, 1855, 1856, and 1893 the President's right to define the duties of consuls and diplomats, and to assign their posts and grades, was removed. Congress henceforth arrogated to itself the right to establish the definitions of duties for United States consuls and diplomats.[3] Not only was the President's authority in these matters denied, but it was even held that the President's choice of agents was not as great as he had thought. The Act of 1855 required that the President use only citizens as diplomatic agents. And prior to this the Executive was attacked when he showed too much persistence in attempting to have a particular nominee approved. The attack was made by Henry Clay in 1836 and was issued because President Jackson twice sent the name of Andrew Stevenson to the Foreign Relations Committee for

[3] For a discussion of these moves by the Congress see Henry M. Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), pp. 129–53.

the post of Minister to Great Britain. In Clay's words ". . . the President has no right to require the Senate to confirm any particular nomination. When the Senate has once decided upon a nomination, there ought to be an end to the matter."[4] The nomination was thereupon tabled.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the great freedom that was considered in the early period to be a part of the President's office, namely, the right to appoint anyone he chose, to go to any country he chose, was not upheld very long. At various times and in various ways members of one or both houses of Congress expressed views that finally led to great restrictions upon this initial freedom.

The Special Diplomatic Agent

The really big controversy, however, has been with regard to the President's right to use personal agents to carry out any special missions he may wish to assign them. Do such persons have to receive senatorial approval as would regular Ambassadors? May the President confer upon them any particular rank he desires, using if he so wishes the grades established in 1818 by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and accepted by the United States? Many arguments have been raised throughout our history on this score, and it may be of value to examine a few of them.

Madison and the Ghent Treaty Commissioners

One of the first controversies arose over the appointment by Madison of a commission to negotiate the Treaty of Ghent. Since the appointments were made during a Senate recess, the argument was voiced that they were not valid because the office itself could be created only by act of Congress and the President could not appoint to a nonexistent office. Madison's position as to whether he had a right to appoint, without confirmation, the Ghent Treaty Commissioners was that since the office of public minister existed by virtue of international law the President did not have to await the creation of such office by the Congress.[5]

The same conclusion, but for different reasons, has been put forth by a number of authorities, namely, that the separation-of-powers concept implies that each branch has an inherent right to appoint its subordinates. In the case of the executive this right is reinforced by the fact that the appointing power results from the obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed.[6] Attorney General Cushing was most forceful in his opinion that the appointing power "is a constitutional function of the President, not derived from, not limitable by, Congress."[7]

Although under the law of 1855 only Congress was empowered to define the duties, prescribe the grades, and determine the posts of the Foreign Service, Cushing vitiated the force of this law by declaring it was merely permissive and could legally be ignored. Since the Act of 1893, however, it has finally been left to Congress to decide these matters. But this act concerned only regular diplomatic agents, and it has not been considered binding with regard to special agents.

[4] Senate Document 231, 56th Congress, 2d Session, part 4, p. 33, quoted in John M. Mathews, *American Foreign Relations: Conduct and Policies* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938), p. 425.

[5] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers 1787–1948* (New York: New York University Press, 1948), pp. 249–50.

[6] See Quincy Wright, *The Control of American Foreign Relations* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 315; *Opinions of the Attorney General*, Vol. 4, p. 248.

[7] *Opinions of the Attorney General*, Vol. 4, p. 193.

Senate resolution of 1883

Numerous other citations could be made which reveal a narrow view of the President's powers, many of which indicate a misinterpretation of the Senate's right to pass upon Presidential appointments. An example may be found in a Senate resolution adopted in 1883.

While the upper house was considering the commercial treaty negotiated by Commodore Shufeldt with Korea, Senator William Windom of Minnesota introduced a resolution which attempted to whittle down the President's power more than ever. Windom's resolution stated that the Senate

> does not admit or acquiesce in any right or constitutional power in the President to authorize or empower any person *to negotiate treaties or carry on diplomatic negotiations* with any foreign power unless such person shall have been appointed for such purpose or clothed with such power by and with the consent of the Senate . . . [my emphasis].[8]

The resolution was speedily adopted by the upper house, but ignored by the President.

Cleveland's "Special Commissioner" to Hawaii

In this same vein the Senate criticized President Cleveland in 1893, in connection with the Hawaiian affair. Cleveland had withdrawn the treaty of annexation and had sent James H. Blount to Hawaii as a "Special Commissioner" with authority paramount to that of the regular American minister, John L. Stevens. The situation was unusual and its fine constitutional points were not easy to comprehend: nevertheless, the minority members of the Foreign Relations Committee were unequivocal in the terms they used to denounce the President. Blount's appointment was held to be unconstitutional because his nomination had never been sent to the Senate, and the latter, in turn, had never given its advice and consent.

Defenders of Presidential power

Many of these arguments have been answered by proponents of the executive power, who have not been lacking in numbers. For example, when Jackson was criticized for using agents who were not first approved by the Senate a number of Senators rose to his defense. The agents in question were used to negotiate a treaty with Turkey in 1830. Senator Edward Livingston argued that the President had the right to use anyone he wished to carry out negotiations for him, including secret agents. Senator Brown likewise supported the President, holding that his right to exclusive choice of agents rested upon his constitutional responsibility to direct foreign affairs.

Senator Littleton Tazewell remarked, "It is only because secret agents are not officers of the United States, but the mere agents of the President . . . that I disclaim all participation in their appointment." And Livingston, soon to become Secretary of State, supported this view:

> Sir, there are grades of diplomacy which give different rank and privileges—from an ambassador to a secret agent. The lowest of these may have, for the purpose of binding the party he represents, the same powers that are usually vested in the highest.

Furthermore, he concluded, any of these may be commissioned for his task by the President *alone* (my emphasis), who may use his signature and the seal of the United States.

At a still later date in our history Senator John T. Morgan upheld Cleveland's use of James H. Blount in Hawaii with the view that not only has the Executive the right to send special missions to countries where there are already regularly accredited diplomats, but to do so is a proper exercise of his diplomatic power. And furthermore, he maintained, the Senate does not have to be consulted regarding such appointments.[9]

The constitutional argument

The main constitutional argument which may be put forth to support these views is that such agents are not officers of the United States, and that therefore the President has the utmost freedom regarding his choice of and assignments to such men. Senatorial approval is unnecessary and congressional appropriations may not even be required. The reason that they are not officers is that their assignments are temporary, their performance transient, and their duties limited. They clearly are not officers of the United States in the constitutional sense. Even Senators have taken such assignments, a thing they could not legally have done had acceptance been interpreted as holding an office.[10] Aside from expressing disapproval through resolutions, which may be ignored, Congress can in no direct fashion impede the President in this situation. It may, of course, refuse to appropriate necessary monies or to ratify treaties negotiated by such agents. But even here it may be possible to use the executive agreement and the contingent fund to circumvent such impediments. The President's right to use such agents can, therefore, not be qualified by the Senate's right to give "Advice and Consent" to the appointment of "Officers of the United States."

Secret as well as special

Therefore, it may be concluded that not only may the President use such agents and appoint them without Senate approval, but also he does not have to inform Congress of their activities or in fact even of their existence. Much will necessarily depend upon the assignment given the agent. If, for example, to fructify his work appropriations of money are required, or a treaty is to be written, there can be no possibility of secrecy. But Congress' approval may not be required for many activities, such as acquiring data, exploring solutions to international controversies, and representing the President at special celebrations.

COMMON USE OF SPECIAL AGENTS

Have many such agents played a part in American diplomatic history, or has their use been of such rarity as to merit little interest on the part of the student of the Presidential office? Although no survey has been made which could accurately reveal the number of such agents throughout American history, it is this writer's feeling that one could safely put the figure in the thousands. The beginning of this practice actually antedates the history of our government.

When the British began to pass legislation which aroused the ire of many of the colonists, the Proclamation of 1763 and the Stamp Act of 1765, they did not realize with what bitterness these increasing restrictions would be viewed. But the colonists, fearful lest the growing alienation with Britain would also produce an estrangement with the rest of Europe, created a secret committee of correspondence to prevent this eventuality, as well as to gather information. One of its first acts was to commission Arthur Lee to

[8] Graham H. Stuart, *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice* (New York: D. Appleton–Century Co., 1936), p. 48.

[9] For a more detailed discussion of the above see Wriston, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 239–95.

[10] U. S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 6, par. 2.

act as its agent. Silas Deane, in 1776, was also given an assignment to carry out in France. Soon others took up the task of seeking aid and gathering intelligence information.[11]

Once independence had been obtained, the practice of using a special agent became commonplace. Washington sent Colonel David Humphreys to Portugal in 1790 to conduct negotiations preliminary to establishing regular diplomatic posts in the two countries. In the period from 1820 to 1830 a number of such agents were sent to work out a commercial treaty with the Porte. The same procedures were followed with regard to Paraguay, Sardinia, and Ethiopia.

Washington also used Gouverneur Morris as a private agent in 1789 to try to resolve important frictions between Great Britain and the United States. Restoration of relations with Mexico in 1858 and with Turkey in 1923 were begun by executive agents.

After World War I Ellis L. Dresel, Arthur Hugh Frazier, and U. Grant-Smith were sent as commissioners for the United States to Germany, Austria, and Hungary respectively until official American diplomats were duly appointed. In the 1920's Presidents Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge continued to follow the tradition of using personal representatives and sent them to numerous postwar conferences regarding European and South American problems. Not to be omitted is the name of Colonel Edward M. House, perhaps the most controversial of all agents because of the almost unlimited range of authority bestowed upon him by Woodrow Wilson.[12]

[11] Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (4th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), pp. 9–11.

[12] For a detailed study of these agents and many others, with the exception of Colonel House, see Wriston, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), *passim.*

House was sent on a number of missions by Wilson to Britain, France, and Germany in the period from 1914 to 1920. Senators David Reed and Joseph Robinson were sent to the London Naval Conference by Herbert Hoover in 1930. Franklin Roosevelt used Sumner Welles on a secret mission to numerous European capitals in 1940 and sent Harry Hopkins on several trips to England and one to Russia in 1941. Of the large number of missions authorized by President Roosevelt, the last were those undertaken by Judge Samuel Rosenman and Bernard Baruch in early 1945 to work on certain postwar economic problems. Harry Truman likewise sent out agents, including the famous last mission of Harry Hopkins to Moscow in May 1945. Similarly, President Eisenhower has used personal representatives. He sent his brother Milton to Latin America on a good-will and fact-finding mission in April 1953, and Vice President Nixon on a good-will visit to the Caribbean in February 1955. Two recent appointments serve to illustrate the range of the practice. In April 1956 President Eisenhower sent Conrad Hilton to Monaco as his personal representative to the Prince Rainier–Grace Kelly wedding. The following month he appointed Senator Walter George to represent him on the North Atlantic Treaty Council.

HARRY HOPKINS AS A SPECIAL AGENT

The outstanding example of the special agent in this generation is Harry Hopkins. His was a long and very controversial career in government service even before he became an executive agent. There has undoubtedly been no other person who filled this role in quite the way that Hopkins did.

Hopkins was born and educated in Iowa. At the start of his career he worked for private and public social agencies in New York State. In the

mid-1930's he headed various aspects of the federal relief program and at the end of the decade for a short time was Secretary of Commerce. Critical illness at this juncture cut short any political plans he might have had. With the seriousness of the war in Europe growing more acute Roosevelt launched him on his career as a special foreign affairs agent in January 1941. He continued with this job and others during the remainder of the war.

Two of the most apt metaphors to describe Hopkins were used by colleagues during widely separated periods of his life. He was called a "catalyzer" by a fellow social worker,[13] and many years later Sherwood referred to him as the "Generalissimo of the Needle Brigade."[14] Both these terms imply a philosophy of administration in which the administrator is able to visualize the scope and appreciate the complexity of a job and utilize his talents as a prime mover of others.

Extended tasks and influence

Hopkins worked and lived for the moment and found great theoretical plans and schemes which would bear fruition in the far future alien to his nature. Thus while he could appreciate the need of immediate action he had little sense of vision. His training seemed to produce an impatience with social ills, while his own illness encouraged a selfless attitude in his work for Roosevelt. As he set about resolving problems, new problems would arise which would result in new avenues of approach. Therefore he frequently went well beyond the original scope of his task. His very inability to accept limitations and restrictions made him extremely valuable during the war when all problems were so intricately intertwined.

Inasmuch as the financial remuneration Hopkins could receive for his kind of work was limited, it seems possible that he sought reward in the form of authority and widespread influence. The very way he defined his tasks continually increased his contacts and hence his influence. At the same time, his devotion to Roosevelt was a factor that seemed to keep self-aggrandizement in check.

His work in the foreign field far eclipsed the prestige and power he had enjoyed until then. In a column for the *New York Times* Arthur Krock wrote:

> [Hopkins'] power as the Presidential liaison with all the Allied governments, his influence as chairman of the group that allocates and re-allocates the flow of lend-lease munitions, and his unparalleled intimacy with the President makes his lightest word an event of moment.[15]

Hopkins moved into this situation despite his lack of training in transportation, production, raw materials, and diplomacy. It is interesting to note that he did not seem to comprehend the seriousness of the events in Europe in the latter part of the 1930's, or their potential effect upon the United States. In October 1939 despite the great interest in Washington circles in the war he wrote to his brother, "I believe that we really can keep out of it."[16]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS WORK

In 1941 Roosevelt wanted to send a representative to London who would have easy access to top British officials. He announced to a surprised press on January 3 that Hopkins was going to London "as my personal representative

[13] Geoffrey T. Hellman, "Profiles," *The New Yorker*, August 1943, p. 26.

[14] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. This book undoubtedly gives the most thorough description of Hopkins' career of any single published source.

[15] *New York Times*, May 27, 1943.

[16] Quoted in Sherwood, *op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*), p. 124.

for a very short trip—a couple of weeks —just to maintain . . . personal relations between me and the British Government." He denied that he would have any special mission, declared that only his expenses would be paid, and said he would "have no powers." [17] His mission was described in the following letter from the President which he carried:

MY DEAR MR. HOPKINS:

Reposing special faith and confidence in you, I am asking you to proceed at your early convenience to Great Britain, there to act as my personal representative. I am also asking you to convey a communication in this sense to His Majesty King George VI.

You will of course communicate to this Government any matters which you may feel will serve the best interests of the United States.[18]

With as casual and uninstructive a letter as that, Hopkins undertook his first mission of the war. From the comments of Herschel Johnson, American chargé d'affaires in Britain, he was neither given nor had any clear-cut plan as to how to proceed. But the objective apparently was to try to determine how the British were standing up against the Axis onslaught and what they might need in the way of assistance.

He seems to have worked very hard to familiarize himself with the situation in Britain. In reporting to Roosevelt he painted a disturbing picture—not altogether bleak, however, and alleviated by the conviction that the people would fight. But Hopkins was still unschooled enough to believe that "if we act boldly and promptly on a few major fronts we can get enough material to Britain within the next few weeks to give her the additional strength she needs to turn back Hitler." [19]

Mainly because he was so close to the President, Hopkins was quickly taken to the bosom of British officialdom. He was permitted to see reports on the military situation which were of the utmost secrecy and was informed of important government plans and expectations.

Hopkins and Churchill

Churchill frequently took advantage of his presence and introduced him to the public wherever they went. Naturally this built up the impression of a closer relationship between Britain and the United States than Roosevelt was yet willing to imply here, an impression that Churchill wanted to create to improve morale.

There soon developed a personal relationship between Hopkins and Churchill. The latter began to use Hopkins' services just as Roosevelt did. Frequently when the Prime Minister was uncertain about a diplomatic move regarding the United States he would seek Hopkins' advice. Thus the agent became, in effect, a special adviser to the leaders of both of the English-speaking democracies. In this way his position of importance vis-à-vis officialdom of both these countries was greatly enhanced.

In addition to sending back urgent pleas for immediate aid, Hopkins dispatched detailed memoranda on the supplies that were needed.[20] While on tours with Churchill he spoke to groups of people about the sympathy felt by Americans, and in other ways attempted to create a feeling of solidarity. During his second visit in July 1941 he even gave a radio address over the British Broadcasting Corporation system in

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

[18] Harry L. Hopkins MS., Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

[19] Sherwood, *op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*), p. 257. This same optimism was reflected in his later reports from the Soviet Union.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 257–58, 333–44.

which he spoke of America's sympathy with Britain's cause.

With each public appearance or address it is quite likely that he led some of his audience to infer that American aid was coming in great quantities, and it is even possible that they concluded that the United States would soon be marching with Britain. To some extent this inplication may have been unavoidable, but quite probably the matter did not greatly concern Hopkins.

While in England Hopkins spent several week ends at Churchill's home and had long talks with him. He inspected units of the British fleet, addressed a meeting of newspaper editors, and of course had conferences with the King and Queen.[21]

July 1941—from England to Moscow

In July of the same year he again went on a mission to Britain, this time to work out some agreement on the shipping problems, especially critical now that the Soviet Union was in the war. Plans for the Argentia (Atlantic) Conference were also discussed.

It appears that while he was in Britain—though this part of the story requires verification—Hopkins decided that a trip to the Soviet Union would be of great value. In any case, he cabled Roosevelt for permission, which was immediately granted.

He went to Moscow in July 1941. Because of his special position he was again able to get vital information that was not made available to either the American or British officials who were stationed there. Roosevelt asked Stalin "to treat Mr. Hopkins with the identical confidence you would feel if you were talking directly to me." [22] The information he gathered considerably aided America and Britain in getting a clear picture of Russia's needs and determination to fight. His interpretation of the situation was at variance with that of many other officials in Moscow, but his proved to be correct.

Problems

Hopkins was a valuable aid to Roosevelt in other matters, too. When relations with Britain were strained in the winter of 1944–45 over differences in attitude toward the new Italian government and toward the situation in Greece, Hopkins was sent to see Churchill to reduce the friction. He did.

At other times he took up problems before Roosevelt even became aware of them. For example, when Admiral King's order prohibiting the use of American LST's (landing ships, tank) in the Greek imbroglio aroused strong protest from the British, he managed to get the matter straightened out without its being brought to the President's attention. And when Churchill would not agree to Roosevelt's and Marshall's position for a unified command in the Pacific, he arranged a private session between Marshall and the Prime Minister at which the latter finally gave in. At Teheran Hopkins' prestige was at its zenith. He played a role in his discussions with Eden and Molotov which would normally have been taken by a Secretary of State.[23]

Keeping au courant

To fill his role Hopkins always had to keep abreast of events. At times it was the President who made available sources of information, sending him directly to confer with leaders such as Churchill and Stalin. At other times his great information seemed to come from the way he operated. Numerous memoranda can be found among his papers such as the one he sent to the President's secretary, Grace Tully, September 2, 1942, in which he wrote:

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 237, 353.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 318–22.

[23] *Ibid., passim.*

I understand the army is going to send the President a recommendation to take over the British end of the Persian Railroad. I wonder if I might see that memo before the President approves it.[24]

In part it was the vagueness of his status, and in fact of the whole war program, that enabled Hopkins to have great latitude in his actions. This in turn increased his authority, caused his value to the President to appreciate, and made him sought after by more and more people. Foreign government leaders like Churchill and Stalin, military leaders like General Marshall and Admiral Leahy, active citizens like Grenville Clark and Vannevar Bush frequently used him, to quote Bernard Baruch's expression for it, as "a transmission belt to the President." [25]

Hopkins, of course, also gained information in other ways. He would frequently call on, visit, or eat with many of Roosevelt's economic, military, and scientific advisers. He was never above asking for suggestions or advice from others. On the other hand, many people came to him at the suggestion of the President. There are numerous memoranda and letters among the Roosevelt Papers from people who wanted to talk to the President about an idea. Quite often the notation at the bottom would say, "See Harry."

ADVANTAGES OF USING AN AGENT

Let us now examine some of the effects which stemmed from Hopkins' missions and from the way he operated. In both Moscow and London Hopkins' special relation to the President gave him an opportunity to gather much information that was needed regarding morale, war production, and governmental views, information that was badly needed. It is quite likely that the information Hopkins sent to Roosevelt would not have been available to anyone other than a Presidential agent. Both foreign governments during wartime were naturally most reluctant to reveal their true predicaments unless they felt assured of two things, (1) a receptive and understanding audience and (2) a transmission of their information to the President without leaks. Both of these desiderata could be satisfied in Hopkins. One or the other could not be found in the official representatives. Ambassadors Kennedy and Standley did not have the confidence of the governments of Britain and Russia. Winant and Steinhardt both suffered from the disadvantage that they had to report through State Department channels, which were not considered completely sympathetic. Furthermore, information transmitted through the regular channels had to pass through several hands, and the risk of leaks increased proportionately. Hopkins' reports went directly to the President—on the basis of speed alone a decided advantage.

Hopkins also made a number of public statements while in Britain which would surely have brought rebukes from Secretary of State Hull had Hopkins been an Ambassador. As he was not a public officer his freedom was much greater, yet as he was so close to the President inferences were permissible which might be desirable.

To Roosevelt the advantages were obvious. He could communicate through an agent in whom he had the utmost confidence and one whose views were quite similar to his own. And the fact that he was using one agent instead of several Ambassadors made it possible for the agent to develop an integrated view of the situation that several men working on separate phases could not have had. Furthermore, the agent's files and information would be less likely to come under the scrutiny of congressional investigators, an immunity which might have been considered desirable.

[24] Roosevelt MS., Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

[25] Personal interview with the writer, New York, April 5, 1956.

DISADVANTAGES

There were, of course, numerous disadvantages that arose from the use of Hopkins as a special agent. State Department leaders were often ill informed or completely ignorant of Hopkins' accomplishments. He sometimes wrote to the President on his own stationery and either sent the reports by special messengers or delivered them himself. Frequently he would use the cables, but not the State Department's because of a strong feeling on the part of many, including Roosevelt, that they could not be trusted.[26] Even when, as was true during the first Russian mission, some of his discussions concerned political matters the Department of State was not fully informed.

This procedure was naturally very disturbing to the State Department. At one time Hopkins received a strong protest from Winant,[27] but apparently it did little good. Although morale and efficiency certainly suffered, it was the President's job and not the agent's to see that appropriate government leaders were informed of his accomplishments.

[26] Sherwood, *op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*), pp. 134–36, 269.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 754–55.

CONCLUSIONS

In many matters Hopkins undoubtedly was of material assistance to the President. At the same time it is probably true that much information which should have been circulated among various government leaders was not. In terms of morale, efficiency, and the diffusion of authority usually considered essential in a democracy, the use of an agent was not always wise.

But in this century and especially during wartime the burdens upon the President often become exceedingly great. The Executive needs an aide who can untie tangled problems, carry out special missions, and serve as a sympathetic critic. This admission does not mean that no serious risks are involved for the operation of democratic and efficient government. The problem does not appear to be one that can be solved by a "legalistic" approach. Certainly one must be very careful that any restrictions placed upon the President do not prevent a freedom of action that is essential to the security and well-being of the country.

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The Delegation of Presidential Functions: Constitutional and Legal Aspects

By Eli E. Nobleman

THE tremendous burdens which rest upon the incumbent of the office of President of the United States have long been a matter of serious concern to Presidents, Members of Congress, and students of governmental processes. Presidents from Washington to Eisenhower have commented upon these burdens, and from time to time various proposals designed to lighten the task of the Chief Executive have been proposed and examined.[1]

A review of historical events reveals that since the birth of the Republic, virtually every President has, of necessity, relied upon subordinates for the performance of many of his duties, and the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently upheld Presidential delegations of certain functions and duties to specified classes of individuals.

The delegation device and various institutional and staff aids, made available to him from time to time, have provided the President with some measure of relief. However, the burdens of the office have continued to increase, and the President has been constantly required, either by statute or because of his constitutional role, to perform duties and functions which far exceed the capacity of any single individual.

An examination of historical aspects and available precedents may provide clarification with respect to which of the President's duties may be delegated, and the extent to which delegation may provide relief from the crushing burdens of office.

Presidential Complaints

It is, of course, apparent that the burdens of the Presidency during the past twenty years cannot be compared with those borne by Presidents during the formative years of the nation. Nevertheless, complaints and observations voiced by our early Presidents appear to confirm the fact that they considered their burdens very substantial.

"A peck of troubles"

Thus, in 1789, Washington complained that he had no leisure to read or answer the dispatches that were pouring in upon him from all quarters, and a year later, he confided to a friend that "These public meetings . . . with the references to and from the different Departments of State . . . is as much, if not more, than I am able to undergo. . . ." [2]

John Adams wrote to his wife:

> The business of all kinds, and writing particularly, out of the habit of which I have been so long, press upon me very severely. . . .
>
> To reconcile you to your fate, I have a great mind to give you a detail of mine. A peck of troubles in a large bundle of papers, often in a handwriting almost illegible, comes every day from the office of—, office of—, office of—, &c., &c., &c. Thousands of sea letters, Mediterranean passes, and commissions and patents to sign. . . .[3]

Jefferson is reported to have complained frequently about the pressure of business, and in 1806 he observed, "It is not because I do less than I might do, but that I have more than I can do." [4]

Help needed

Monroe appears to have been much bothered by the petty responsibilities of attending to the Presidential household. As he was about to leave the White House, he sent Congress "a few remarks . . . founded on my own experience in this office." Beyond a certain limit, he wrote, no one can go, and if inferior details are forced upon the attention of the President he loses time to devote to matters of higher importance. The higher duties of his office "are sufficient to employ the whole mind, and unceasing labors, of any individual. . . ." Among these duties, he cited the message to Congress, the replies to calls for information, personal contact with Members of Congress, and the "supervision and control of the several departments so as to preserve the efficiency in each, and order and consistency in the general movement of the Government." He suggested the desirability of aid to the President, perhaps the first statement of this need.[5]

In 1848, Polk wrote:

> The public have no idea of the constant accumulation of business requiring the President's attention. No President who performs his duty faithfully and conscientiously can have any leisure. If he entrusts the details and smaller matters to subordinates constant errors will occur. I prefer to supervise the whole operations of the Government myself rather than entrust the public business to subordinates, and this makes my duties very great.[6]

A fantastic job

In more recent times, we have two classic observations concerning the Presidency from Wilson and Truman. Writing in 1908, some five years before assuming the Presidency, Wilson observed that the President was

> the most heavily burdened officer in the world. No other man's day is so filled as his, so full of responsibilities which tax mind and conscience alike and demand an inexhaustible vitality. . . . Men of ordinary physique and discretion cannot be Presidents and live if the strain be not somehow relieved. . . . We shall be obliged always to be picking our chief magistrate from among wise and prudent athletes,—a small class.[7]

Former President Truman sums up with the statement that:

> The President has an executive job that is almost fantastic. There has never been one like it. I think no absolute monarch ever had such decisions to make or the responsibility that the President of the United States has. It is really fantastic. That may not be a good word to use in respect to the Presidency, but after all, every final important decision has to be made right here on the President's desk, and only the President can make it. Nobody else can do it for him, and his decisions affect millions not only in his own country but throughout the world. No one man can really fill the Presidency. The Presidency has too many and too great responsibilities. All a man can do is to

[1] Various aspects of these problems are dealt with in Louis Brownlow, *The President and the Presidency* (Chicago, 1949); Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (3d ed. revised; New York, 1948); Edward S. Corwin and Louis W. Koenig, *The Presidency Today* (New York, 1956); James Hart, *The American Presidency in Action, 1789* (New York, 1948); Sidney Hyman, *The American President* (New York, 1954); Robert S. Rankin (Ed.), *The Presidency in Transition* (Florida, 1949); Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York, 1956). See also Nathan Grundstein, "Subdelegation of Administrative Authority," 13 *George Washington Law Review* 144 (1945); Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., "Judicial Review of the Subdelegation of Presidential Power," 12 *Journal of Politics* 668 (1950).

[2] Leonard D. White, *The Federalists* (New York, 1948), p. 31.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[4] Leonard D. White, *The Jeffersonians* (New York, 1951), pp. 71–72.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[6] Leonard D. White, *The Jacksonians* (New York, 1954), p. 69.

[7] Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York, 1917), pp. 79–80.

try to meet them. He must be able to judge men, delegate responsibility and back up those he trusts.[8]

SOURCES OF PRESIDENTIAL FUNCTIONS

An examination of the President's functions and responsibilities reveals that they involve a tremendous range, varying from minor technical duties to the making of the most momentous decisions. Some of the President's functions are conferred upon him either expressly or impliedly by the Constitution; others result from specific acts of Congress.

CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS

It appears that the President's constitutional functions may be divided into three categories: (1) those which he derives directly from the Constitution and which he may not delegate; (2) those which are derived directly from the Constitution, but have, nevertheless, been the subject of delegation, although action is taken in the President's name; and (3) those which are imposed by statute in implementation of constitutional authority, and which are customarily delegated.

In the first category are such functions as reporting to the Congress on the state of the Union; convening either or both Houses of Congress and adjourning Congress; signing and vetoing bills; receiving ambassadors and public ministers (recognition); appointing and removing ambassadors, ministers, and certain other public officers; nominating federal judges; and making recess appointments.[9]

In the second category are such functions as the negotiation of treaties, and certain of the President's duties as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. Although the President can never divest himself of his constitutional power and authority with respect to these matters, he has customarily delegated their performance to designated officials. Thus, it is quite usual for the President to delegate to designated individuals the authority known as "full power," to negotiate, conclude, and sign treaties, conventions, and other agreements on behalf of the United States.[10] It is also customary for the President to delegate to subordinates many of his functions as Commander in Chief, notably his function as supreme commander of the national forces in active service.[11]

The third category includes a large number of statutory duties which are imposed upon the President by the Congress because they involve the performance of express constitutional duties and functions;[12] or because the President, as *the* Chief Executive, required under the Constitution "to take care

[8] William Hillman, *Mr. President* (New York, 1952), p. 10.

[9] United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 7; Art. II, secs. 2 and 3.

[10] Examples of Presidential delegation of so-called full powers to designated individuals will be found in Walter H. Zeydel and Waldo Chamberlain, *Enabling Instruments of the United Nations, Part I: The United States of America* (New York, 1951), pp. 112–15.

[11] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (cited note 1 *supra*), p. 314. See also United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291 (U. S. 1842); United States *ex rel.* French v. Weeks, 259 U. S. 326, 333 (1922). In the latter case, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the findings of a board established by a statute which provided that the board's findings would be final except upon the order of the President, required the President to take final action. The Court said: "The exception plainly enough was inserted, not for the purpose of imposing a great burden upon the President, but rather as a congressional recognition of the right in him as the Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the Army (a right which he probably would have had without it) to interfere in such cases at his option. . . ."

[12] United States *ex rel.* French v. Weeks, 259 U. S. 326, 333 (1922).

that the laws be faithfully executed," exercises general administrative control and direction over the executive branch.[13]

The leading example of statutory duties arising out of the performance of express constitutional functions may be found in statutes establishing the military departments and the Department of State. Thus, from the beginning of the Republic, the Congress vested in the President the direction over these agencies by providing that their heads shall "perform such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined or entrusted . . . by the President . . ." and "shall conduct the business of the department in such manner as the President shall direct."[14] These statutes have been interpreted as implying authority in the President to delegate "the administration in his name or by his order of much of the general executive power reposed in him as Commander-in-Chief of the Army."[15]

From the foregoing, it appears that except for obviously nondelegable functions, the determination of whether or not the President may delegate a particular function or duty is not necessarily governed by the fact that such function is expressly vested in him by the Constitution. As stated by Attorney General Caleb Cushing, in a celebrated opinion reviewing the relation of the President to the executive branch, prepared at the request of President Franklin Pierce:

> . . . the question, whether a given duty is to be the immediate deed of the President, or to be performed by delegation, does not seem to depend, at least in all its degrees, upon the fact of its being expressly enumerated in the Constitution. . . .[16]

STATUTORY FUNCTIONS

It appears that the major administrative functions and duties of the President are conferred upon him by statute and may be divided, for the purposes of this inquiry, into two categories: (1) statutes which specifically authorize him to delegate functions and duties imposed; and (2) statutes which confer functions and duties, but are silent as to delegation.

Delegation authorized by statute

Delegations of functions in the first category have been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. In a leading case on the subject, *United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc.*,[17] the Court upheld the validity of a statute which vested certain authority in the President and authorized him to "exercise any power or authority conferred by this act through such officer or officers as he shall direct." In rejecting the contention that this was an unconstitutional delegation, the Court stated that "obviously all the functions of his great office cannot be exercised by the President in person."[18]

[13] "The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of power to execute the laws. But the President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates. This view has been repeatedly affirmed by this Court. . . ." Taft, C. J., in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 117 (1926).

[14] Act of August 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 49 (Department of War); Act of April 30, 1798, 1 Stat. 553 (Department of the Navy); Act of July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. 28 (Department of Foreign Affairs).

[15] Weeks v. United States *ex rel.* Creary, 277 Fed. 594, at 598 (App. D. C. 1922), *aff'd.* United States *ex rel.* Creary v. Weeks, 259 U. S. 336 (1922); United States *ex rel.* French v. Weeks, 259 U. S. 326, 333 (1922).

[16] 7 *Ops. Att'y. Gen.* 453, 465 (1855).

[17] 272 U. S. 1 (1926).

[18] *Ibid.*, at 13. For additional citations, see Grundstein, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*). It may be noted that the Grundstein article and that by Glendon A. Schubert, Jr. (cited note 1 *supra*) are the only comprehensive treatments of the entire subject.

Delegation implied

With respect to the second category, where the statute vests functions and duties solely in the President but is silent as to delegation, the Supreme Court since 1839 has held that the President's authority to delegate their performance will be implied.[19]

The general rule which it has stated and followed is that when any duty is imposed by law solely on the President, it may be exercised by him through the head of the appropriate department, whose acts, if performed pursuant to that law, thus become the President's acts.[20] Furthermore, the Court will *presume* the approval and direction of the President to support the exercise by the heads of departments of authority which is vested by statute in the President.[21] Consequently, there is no requirement that the delegation of authority from the President to the appropriate department head be effected through any particular procedure or document. Furthermore, it has been held that the official document or order issued by the department head on behalf of the President requires neither the signature of the President nor any statement that it is being issued by his direction.[22] Finally, because of the legal presumption of Presidential approval and direction, the act of the subordinate is valid, despite these omissions.[23]

The rule that there is an implied power in the President to delegate statutory functions to department heads appears to be based upon necessity and practicality. Thus, in an early leading case, where a statute prohibited the advance of public money in any case to disbursing officers of the United States, "except under the special direction of the President," the Supreme Court held that the statute did not require the President to perform this function in person.[24] After observing that the object of the Congress was undoubtedly to secure economy and regularity in public disbursements by limiting the discretion of subordinate agents over public money, the Court stated that "it would be unreasonable to ascribe to them [Congress] a conduct which must defeat every beneficial end they could have in view, and render the Government an absolutely impracticable machine."[25] Continuing, the Court said:

> The President's duty in general requires his superintendence of the administration; yet this duty cannot require of him to become the administrative officer of every department and bureau, or to perform the numerous details incident to services which, nevertheless, he is, in a correct sense, by the Constitution and laws required and expected to perform. This cannot be, first, because if it were practicable, it would . . . absorb the duties and responsibilities of the various departments of the Government in the personal action of the one chief executive officer. It cannot be, for the stronger reason that it is impracticable —nay, impossible.[26]

This principle has been stated in more modern terms in a 1936 opinion of the Attorney General. In advising the President that statutory authority would be required to enable him to delegate to the Secretary of the Interior the authority vested by law in the President to designate the Acting Governor of Puerto Rico, the Attorney General stated:

> It is manifestly impossible for the President to execute every duty, and every detail thereof, imposed upon him by the Congress. The courts have recognized this and have further recognized that he usually and properly acts through the several executive departments. Every reasonable presumption of validity is to be indulged with respect to the performance by the head of a department of a duty imposed upon the President and executed by the department head, ostensibly on behalf of the President. Nevertheless, the authorities indicate that the President cannot, without statutory authority, delegate a discretionary duty relieving himself of all responsibility, so that the duty when performed will not be his act, but wholly the act of another (*Williams v. United States,* 1 How. 290, 297; *Runkle v. United States,* 122 U. S. 543, 557; *United States v. Fletcher,* 148 U. S. 84, 88; *French v. Weeks,* 259 U. S. 326, 344).[27]

Discretionary duties

At this point, it should be noted that in the decisions reviewed and cited in which the Supreme Court implied Presidential authority to delegate statutory functions, the Court characterized such functions as executive or administrative. These decisions do not indicate the category of duties which are considered to be discretionary, although some of the functions appear to have involved the exercise of discretion. Thus it appears that the general rule concerning the delegation of statutory functions must be qualified to the extent that the President's implied power to delegate his statutory functions to department heads applies only to executive or administrative duties, and it is solely with respect to such duties that the heads of departments act for the President in the regular course of business.[28] This distinction appears to be well established and was referred to in the last sentence of the opinion of the Attorney General quoted in the preceding paragraph.

These considerations give rise to an additional problem, namely, which functions and duties are executive or administrative and which are discretionary. This issue was raised and discussed, but not determined, by the Supreme Court in 1880. After discussing the general rule, the Court said (Harlan, J.):

> These propositions open up a very broad field of inquiry as to what exceptions there are to the general rule that the direction of the President is to be presumed in all instructions and orders issuing from the proper department concerning executive business, notwithstanding they may contain no express statement of any direction from him as to the matters to which such instructions or orders refer. There are undoubtedly official acts which the Constitution and laws require to be performed by the President personally, and the perform-

[19] Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 513 (U. S. 1839); Williams v. United States, 1 How. 290, 297 (U. S. 1843); United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291 (U. S. 1842); United States v. Page, 137 U. S. 673 (1891); United States v. Fletcher, 148 U. S. 84 (1893).

[20] Cases cited note 19 *supra*. "There can be no doubt that the President, in the exercise of his executive power under the Constitution, may act through the head of the appropriate executive department. The heads of departments are his authorized assistants in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts. That has been many times decided by this court. . . ." Waite, C. J., in Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, 557 (1887). This doctrine of implied delegation has been held inapplicable to acts of officials below secretarial rank. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Mitchell, 208 Fed. 469, 472 (E. D. Wash. 1913), *writ of error dismissed,* 213 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 9th 1914).

[21] United States v. Page, 137 U. S. 673 (1891); United States v. Fletcher, 148 U. S. 84 (1893).

[22] Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore & Tierney, 265 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 2d 1920), *cert. denied,* 253 U. S. 498 (1920); *In re* Brodie, 128 Fed. 665 (C. C. A. 8th 1904). See also Grundstein, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 146–47, and cases cited therein.

[23] Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 513 (U. S. 1839).

[24] Williams v. United States, 1 How. 290 (U. S. 1843).

[25] *Id.* at 297.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] 38 *Ops. Att'y. Gen.* 457, 458 (1936).

[28] See Grundstein, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 148–49, 151–52, 188–90, and cases cited and discussed therein.

ance of which may not be delegated to heads of departments, or to other officers in the executive branch of the government. It is equally true that, as to the vast multiplicity of matters involved in the administration of the executive business of the government, it is physically impossible for the President to give them his personal supervision. Of necessity, he must, as to such matters, discharge his duty through the instrumentality or by the agency of others. *Whether a particular act belongs to one or the other of these classes may sometimes be very difficult to determine, and we shall not attempt now to lay down any general rule on the subject.*[29]

It may be observed that although the distinction between ministerial and discretionary duties is an old one, it does not appear to have validity in the situation under discussion. The rule implying authority in the President to delegate statutory functions to department heads is based upon the established fact that it is impossible for the President to perform personally all of his various functions and duties. Department heads to whom such delegations are made are subject to Senate confirmation and may be presumed to be capable and responsible individuals. Thus, merely because a particular function is characterized as discretionary rather than administrative does not alter either the fact of the tremendous burden on the President or the capability and reliability of officials of secretarial rank who, in any event, would be acting on behalf of the President.

DELEGATION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 673

In 1950, the Congress enacted Public Law 673, Eighty-first Congress, which authorized the President to delegate to executive-branch agency or department heads, or to any official of that branch whose appointment is subject to Senate confirmation, any function vested in the President by law, or authorized or required to be performed by such officers subject to Presidential approval, unless the vesting statute affirmatively prohibits delegations or specifically designates the persons to whom delegations may be made. It was further provided that the President was not to be relieved of the responsibility for the acts so delegated, and that nothing in the act was to derogate from any existing right in the President to delegate the performance of functions vested in him by law.[30]

It may be noted that although this statute was designed to relieve the President of the performance of some of his duties without relieving him of the responsibility therefor, its language is necessarily broad and general and does not furnish any guidance with respect to the precise nature of the delegations which may be made. This lack of specification is undoubtedly due in part to the diverse nature of the President's statutory duties and in part to the fact that many of them arise directly out of certain constitutional powers which the Congress has implemented by legislative action. In any event, of necessity, the statute left to the President the determination of the duties to be delegated.

An examination of the reports of the Senate and House committees which handled this measure does not shed any light on the subject, since they, in effect, state only that the purpose of the bill was to lighten the President's burdens by permitting him to delegate those which, in his judgment, he should delegate.[31] However, the debate on the floor of the House of Representatives during consideration of the matter indicates that its purpose was "to authorize the President to delegate some of his many minor duties and less important functions. . . ." [32]

Without attempting any further determination of the legislative intention, it appears that if the act was designed to limit the President's authority to delegate statutory functions to those which are executive or administrative in nature, its enactment appears to have been unnecessary, in view of the long line of decisions of the United States Supreme Court implying such authority and sustaining its exercise. If, on the other hand, the Congress intended to authorize the delegation of so-called discretionary matters, such intention would seem to be strongly supported by the specific provisions of the statute.

In any event, this would appear to be a distinction without a real difference, since the statute in question, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the historical development of the Presidency all make it abundantly clear that in no event can the President divest himself or be divested of his powers, authority, and responsibility for the performance of delegated functions so long as he remains in office.

Since the enactment of Public Law 673 in 1950, the President has issued sixty Executive orders delegating the performance of hundreds of Presidential statutory functions to subordinate officials in the executive branch.[33] An examination of these delegations reveals that they seem to include not only so-called administrative functions but also those involving the exercise of discretion. It thus appears that regardless of the intent of the Congress, Presidents have interpreted the delegation statute to include both categories of functions.

ADMINISTRATIVE VICE PRESIDENT

The most recent examination by the Congress of the delegation device as a means of relieving the Presidential work load occurred early in 1956, following a proposal by former President Herbert Hoover that the Congress establish the position of Administrative Vice President to whom the President might delegate the performance of various of his administrative functions. This proposal was examined by the Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Following extensive hearings and careful consideration, the subcommittee concluded that (1) no further statutory authority is presently required to enable the President to delegate the performance of those administrative functions which may be an unnecessary burden on him; (2) there are appropriate officials to whom statutory functions suitable for delegation may be assigned; and (3) the administration has not indicated any existing need for the creation of a position of Administrative Vice President in the Executive Office at this time.[34]

CONCLUSIONS

With respect to the constitutional and legal aspects of the delegation of Presidential functions, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. The President may not delegate those of his express constitutional functions and duties which, by their very nature and the plain language of the Constitution, must be performed by the

[29] McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426, 436 (1880). (Italics supplied.)

[30] Act of August 8, 1950 (3 U. S. C. 301–303).

[31] *H. R. Rep.* No. 1139, 81st Cong.; *Sen. Rep.* No. 1867, 81st Cong.

[32] Representative Sabath, 95 *Cong. Rec.* 11389 (1949). See also remarks of Mr. Dawson and Mr. Hoffman, at 11390, and the general debate at 11389–96.

[33] *Sen. Rep.* No. 1960, 84th Congress, p. 13.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

President alone. He may, and customarily does, delegate the performance of certain other constitutional functions, which are performed in his name and on his behalf.

2. Except for those functions which are obviously nondelegable, it appears that the determination of whether or not the President may delegate the performance of a particular function or duty is not necessarily governed by the fact that such function is expressly vested in him by the Constitution, and numerous statutory functions, which he customarily delegates, are imposed upon the President by the Congress because they involve the performance of express constitutional duties, or in recognition of the fact that as *the* Chief Executive, required under the Constitution to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, the President exercises general administrative control and direction over the executive branch.

3. When a statute vests functions and duties solely in the President and makes no provision for delegation, the general rule, established by the Supreme Court of the United States, is that authority to delegate their performance to appropriate department heads will be implied, and acts performed by such officials, if pursuant to law, will be presumed to be the President's acts.

4. The general rule stated above appears to be subject to the qualification that the Supreme Court will only imply the President's authority to delegate the performance of his statutory functions with respect to what it has characterized as executive or administrative acts, and it is only with respect to such duties that department heads are presumed to act for the President in the regular course of business. Thus, it appears that if the functions vested in the President by statute are discretionary in nature, the Court will not imply authority to delegate. However, there is no definite indication in the reported cases as to which functions the Court will consider discretionary and which will be treated as administrative, and the Court appears to have deliberately avoided a determination of the question in a leading case.

5. Since the rule implying authority in the President to delegate statutory functions to department heads is based upon the established fact that it is impossible for the President to perform, in person, all of his various statutory functions and duties, and even those functions which may be classified as discretionary are usually performed, in fact, by department heads, there appears to be no valid reason why a distinction should be made between administrative and discretionary functions.

6. Public Law 673, Eighty-first Congress, which authorized Presidential delegation of statutory functions, subject to stated limitations, does not distinguish between administrative and discretionary functions. Despite some indication that the Congress may have intended to limit the President's authority to the delegation of so-called administrative functions, the plain language of the statute appears to support an intention to include discretionary functions as well. An examination of Presidential delegations pursuant to the statute indicates that Presidents have interpreted it to include both categories of functions.

LEGAL AUTHORITY ADEQUATE

The foregoing review may serve to clarify the categories of Presidential functions which may be delegated. It also reveals that the President has adequate legal authority to free himself from the performance of the multitude of functions and duties which may impair the proper discharge of his vital historic constitutional powers and obligations. History has demonstrated conclusively, however, that no President can ever free himself of the enormous responsibilities which are inherent in the Presidency, so long as he remains in office. Since it is these responsibilities, and the momentous decisions and accompanying stresses and strains which they entail, which really constitute the so-called crushing burdens of office, no President can ever obtain relief through delegation, regardless of whether the functions delegated are administrative or discretionary in nature.

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Presidential Disability

By Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr.

> In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
>
> —The Constitution, Art. II, sec. 1, par. 6

IN a case of Presidential disability, what is it that devolves upon the Vice President? Is it the "powers and duties" of the office, or is it the office of the Presidency itself? Furthermore, who is to determine whether the President is unable to discharge the responsibilities of his office? Who raises such a question? Who decides when a disabled President is capable of reclaiming his powers?

Prior to the shooting of President James Garfield, scant attention was given to these questions. When they were eventually asked, the point at issue was clouded by precedents ruling a succession due to the death of the incumbent. On each of the seven occasions when this took place, the procedure followed by Vice President John Tyler in 1841 after President William Henry Harrison's death was adhered to: the Vice President took the Presidential oath and was recognized as President of the United States; that is, he succeeded to the office as well as to its powers and duties.

That this procedure was consistent with the intention of the framers can be challenged on the evidence of the records of the Constitutional Convention and those of the state ratifying conventions, as well as of the Federalist papers and the Constitution itself. They point to the view that the antecedent to the words "the Same" in the Constitution would appear to be "Powers and Duties" rather than "said office." And each of the original plans presented to the Convention, as well as the notes and reports of the Committee on Detail to whom the styling though not the substantive content of the text of the Constitution is due, used language which reinforces this view.

Nevertheless, even if it was meant that the Vice President should succeed merely to the powers and duties of the Presidency in the case of the death of an incumbent, it is overly late to reverse the practice by which he now succeeds to the office as well. What needs to be done is merely to give formal recognition to the legitimacy of that practice.

Of more immediate concern is the construction given to the Constitution in a case involving not a President's death, but his disability. Here, Senator Allen of Ohio in 1841 warned his colleagues that the recognition of Tyler as President would lead to serious complications in cases of disability, a point of view reinforced by the position of Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who is said to have argued that even though a President recovered from his disability during the term for which he was

elected, he could not displace the Vice President who had assumed the duties of his office.

It was this theory—that the powers and duties of the Presidency were indivisible with the office—which acted as a major deterrent to any action designed to clarify the question of Presidential disability when President James Garfield was shot, and again when President Woodrow Wilson was stricken.

Past Indecision

Consider these two events in closer detail.

President Garfield lived eighty days after he was shot, much of the time in a coma. During the entire period the only official act he performed was the signing of one extradition paper. Though the entire Cabinet agreed that it would be desirable for Vice President Chester Arthur to act as President during the period of Garfield's illness, the majority also believed that once Arthur assumed the Presidential power, Garfield lost his claim to it. At the same time, the Cabinet would not agree to assumption of this power by the Vice President without the knowledge and concurrence of the crippled President, and since his condition was so serious that no matters of importance could be discussed with him, no action was taken. The government drifted along without effective leadership during this period. Fortunately no serious crises arose.

Succession Act of 1886

Nor did the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 clarify matters. Despite the earnest requests of Chester Arthur calling on the Congress to eliminate all future grounds for the embarrassment he as Vice President had faced, the Succession Act of 1886 evaded the disability issue. It was concerned solely with determining a succession to the Presidency whenever the office was vacant because of the death, resignation, or inability of both the President and Vice President.

President Wilson's illness

And so the stage was set for the dramatic complications that arose in connection with President Wilson's disability. Wilson's condition was such that he was unable to pass on legislation for about six weeks: twenty-eight acts of Congress became law because of his failure to act upon them within the ten-day limit. For nearly eight months he did not attend a Cabinet meeting although, without his permission, Secretary of State Robert Lansing called twenty-one Cabinet meetings during that period.

Throughout the long period of his illness, President Wilson's condition was seldom appreciated by the public or even by members of his administration. An aura of mystery surrounded the President. For weeks at a time no one but his family and closest friends were permitted to see him. The Vice President and the Cabinet were not provided with adequate information regarding the state of his health. It was widely recognized that Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Grayson, the President's personal physician, were determining many issues of public policy and selecting carefully the matters which could be discussed with the President.

There was general recognition that the President's protracted illness had an adverse effect on the progress of the Versailles Treaty discussions in the Senate. There was a time when the Democratic leader in that body, Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, thought it would be possible to achieve a compromise settlement with Republicans with respect to the treaty, but at the time he was unable to see Wilson, and his fellow Democrats were unwilling to

agree to a compromise on any other basis. The hand of the Executive was also sorely missed in the handling of a critical coal strike and other domestic matters.

In view of the President's condition Vice President Marshall was urged to assume some of the duties of the Presidency. Like Arthur before him, however, he refused to act. It appears that the full Cabinet never did get around to asking Marshall to serve, but the matter was discussed. According to J. P. Tumulty, the President's secretary and friend, Secretary of State Lansing mentioned the matter to him.

In a statement which one writer on the subject has referred to as having personal loyalty rather than the welfare of the country as its frame of reference, Tumulty told Lansing:

> You may rest assured that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the White House on the broad of his back I will not be a party to ousting him. He has been too kind, too loyal, and too wonderful to me to receive such treatment at my hands. And I am sure Dr. Grayson will never certify to his disability.

Those were strong words. If Dr. Grayson never would certify to his disability there was little likelihood that anyone would.

Cabinet meetings called by the Secretary of State

The Cabinet sessions called by Secretary Lansing during President Wilson's illness later resulted in a request for the Secretary's resignation. The first meeting was held about two weeks after the President was stricken. At that time there was genuine concern about the President's condition, and there was some talk about the advisability of calling upon Marshall to assume the Presidency. Members of Congress were especially active in consulting with members of the Cabinet about this possibility. The *New York Times* reported later that the Cabinet meetings were held with the knowledge of the President and that members supposed that Wilson was kept fully informed regarding them. Dr. Grayson attended the sessions occasionally, as did Mr. Tumulty.

Later President Wilson sharply reprimanded Lansing for calling the Cabinet sessions. He wrote the Secretary of State:

> Under our constitutional law and practice, as developed hitherto, no one but the President has the right to summon the heads of the executive departments into conference, and no one but the President and Congress has the right to ask their views or the views of any one of them on any public question.

Lansing replied that the action had been instituted because the Cabinet was "denied communication" with Wilson and it seemed wise to confer together informally on interdepartmental matters and matters which could not be postponed until Wilson's medical advisers would permit him to pass on them. The President did not accept this explanation and retorted that he found nothing in Lansing's reply which justified his assumption of Presidential authority. He pointed out that the Cabinet could take no action without him. At the same time he requested Lansing's resignation.

Like Tumulty, President Wilson appears to have held the view that succession of a Vice President had the effect of removing a disabled President. This explains to some degree his attitude towards Secretary Lansing who, as mentioned earlier, had discussed the possibility of requesting Vice President Marshall to assume Presidential duties. In his book, Tumulty quotes Wilson as saying:

> Tumulty, it is never the wrong time to spike disloyalty. When Lansing sought to oust me, I was upon my back. I am on my feet now and I will not have disloyalty about me.

When Lansing's resignation was requested public sentiment clearly sided with the Secretary. The *New York Times* sharply criticized President Wilson for attacking Lansing on the Cabinet meeting question. Its editorial stated that if Lansing and his colleagues had proceeded on the theory that the Cabinet could do nothing without Wilson's presence, government would have been at a standstill and Congress might have felt it necessary to ascertain whether in respect to the President the condition described in the Constitution as "Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office" actually existed.

THE WARNING SOUNDED

Wilson's illness dramatized many of the weaknesses of the "inability" clause. The uncertainty which had been expressed in Garfield's time concerning the right of a President to regain his office upon recovery from a disability found expression again. The reluctance of a President and his advisers to chance a temporary transfer of power was evident. The devotion of the intimates of a President and their tendency to view actions of others in terms of the effect upon the President, rather than the impact upon the welfare of the nation, are revealed. The hesitation of a Vice President to initiate action is again demonstrated. The power of a disabled President to prevent meetings of the Cabinet to discuss national problems is also made clear.

In all of this there is a lesson which President Eisenhower's disability points up. We are fortunate that he recovered quickly and that no crisis developed during the period when he was disabled. Had conditions been different the results might have been far more serious.

If our past experience with Presidential disability should provide sufficient warning to the American people of the dangers in failing to deal with the problem, how should the problem be solved?

SHOULD THE VICE PRESIDENT DECIDE CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY?

First of all, should the Vice President determine whether or not a President is disabled? He is under a constitutional mandate to assume the responsibilities of executive power under certain circumstances. He automatically takes office as Chief Executive upon the death or resignation of the President, or his removal from office. Perhaps he is the most obvious "fact-finding" agent in such a case. Could he not logically be expected to take the initiative in questions involving the disability of a President?

No one will dispute the fact that the Vice President holds the most important elective office in our government next to the President himself. The Vice President, furthermore, is the only other official elected by the people of the entire nation. Those favoring the Vice President's taking the initiative maintain that he is in at least as good a position as any other individual, or group, to make what might well be a difficult decision.

Danger of vice-presidential usurpation

However, to argue that a Vice President himself should act, it seems to me, asks too much of human nature. A Vice President having such power might find himself in an extremely awkward position. If he makes the initial determination of inability, he opens himself up to the charge of being overly ambitious, if not a usurper. Such au-

thority, unquestionably, could in fact lead to a usurpation of Presidential power by a Vice President.

Two former members of Congress who exhibited particular interest in the problem of Presidential inability—Senators George F. Hoar of Massachusetts and Charles W. Jones of Florida—are among those who have declared it would be dangerous to vest the power of determination in the Vice President.

The danger of usurpation, it has been claimed, could be guarded against by Congress' power of impeachment. The Constitution provides specifically for this possibility. The impeachment power, however, has been used very seldom and is not an easy weapon to use against an unduly ambitious Vice President.

Reluctance a greater danger

To date, of course, the problem has been the reluctance of Vice Presidents to act rather than excessive ambition on their part. If the danger of usurpation on the pretext of inability is slight, the danger that a Vice President will fail to assume the duties and powers of the Presidency in cases of real Presidential disability cannot be ignored. Recently former Vice Presidents Barkley and Wallace have been reported as saying they would not have attempted to make the crucial decision themselves had a situation arisen requiring such a determination.

Most Vice Presidents would have a natural reluctance to open themselves to the charge that by making a determination of inability they were seeking to advance their own political futures.

It must be remembered, too, that under the system for electing vice-presidential nominees which has customarily been used by national nominating conventions there is no assurance that the person selected will enjoy a good working relationship with the nominee for President, or even be in sympathy with his views. Increasingly, of late, demands are heard that political parties select their vice-presidential candidates on the basis of sympathy with the philosophy and policies of their presidential running mates. Traditionally, however, despite the fact that one-fourth of our Presidents have died in office and been succeeded by the Vice President, other factors have been foremost. These have included such considerations as the desirability of obtaining geographical balance on a ticket, the necessity for placating a party faction which failed to put over its choice for the presidential nomination, and the wish to grant some measure of solace to a man who sought, but failed to obtain, the top spot on the ticket. Thus we have had such winning combinations as Garfield and Arthur, Wilson and Marshall, Lincoln and Johnson, Coolidge and Dawes, McKinley and Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt and Garner.

Although lack of accord between the nation's two top officials might conceivably lead to an attempt by the one to succeed the other under circumstances of doubtful validity, it is more likely to increase the reluctance of the Vice President when the need actually arises to assume the duties and powers of an incumbent President with whom he has not been closely identified. Indeed, this factor, as has already been suggested, was said to have been an important consideration in the decision of Vice President Arthur to refuse to accede to requests that he assume these obligations during the incapacity of President Garfield. Arthur was a "stalwart," selected as a vice-presidential candidate to pacify Roscoe Conkling and his allies in the face of the selection of Garfield, a "half-breed," for the presidential nomination. Accordingly, he feared that any action on his part to assume the duties and powers of the Presidency during Garfield's incapacity would be misinterpreted as an attempt to seize power.

Earlier I mentioned that Congress' power to impeach has been cited as a deterrent to an overly ambitious Vice President. Yet existence of the power might also serve to make a Vice President excessively cautious. If he alone were to determine questions of Presidential inability he might, in effect, be gambling his political future upon the likelihood of impeachment proceedings. If such proceedings were initiated his future would rest on their outcome. It is likely that he would be as cautious as Vice Presidents Arthur and Marshall in the Garfield and Wilson cases. If such were the result, of course, the proposal to have the Vice President make the determination would not solve the problem. We should be back where we started. What we are seeking is a safe and effective means for having disability determined.

Furthermore, specific authorization for action by the Vice President would not resolve the conflict which is likely to result between the Vice President and the President's close associates in cases where the latter wish to hide or minimize a President's disability. Should such a conflict occur, a Vice President might well feel that to further his own political ends it might be wise for him to defer to the President's official family or lieutenants. This would be especially true if he felt that the President, upon recovery, might support the view of his own entourage as against the Vice President.

Seeking congressional support

Another danger of giving the Vice President this authority, with the impeachment power as the only check, is that it would tend to put the Vice President in the position of being obliged to "lobby" in Congress in order to ensure himself of support for his determination of Presidential disability. Once again, this seems too much to ask of a Vice President. In the case of Presidential illness, a Vice President is expected by the public to act with dignity and sympathy. He must not appear to be seeking additional power. It will be recalled that Vice President Nixon won widespread praise last autumn for his awareness of the delicacy of his position.

CONGRESSIONAL PROVISION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY?

Has Congress the power to make provision for the disability of a President? I believe it has.

Article I, section 8, of the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

Furthermore, since the Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to take action to name a successor if both the President and Vice President are not available,[1] it can be argued that Congress has equal authority to remedy the problem under discussion. On three separate occasions—in 1792, in 1886, and in the Presidential Succession Act of 1947—Congress has passed legislation dealing directly with Presidential succession.

The question here, it seems to me, is one of wisdom, not of law. Is it wise to have Congress alone make the inability determination? I do not believe it is.

[1] Art. II, sec. 1, par. 6.

Congress is inevitably embroiled in partisan political disputes. These are frequently an essential part of its functioning processes under our political system. However, given the nature of Congress and the character of the inability question, I do not believe that Congress is the appropriate body to make the final decision. Were Congress to be given exclusive power to make the inability determination, I fear the decision might frequently be dependent upon the outcome of a political power struggle. The procedure could well prove disorderly. Stalemates could develop. Passions might easily be inflamed.

It should also be borne in mind that on numerous occasions Congress has been controlled by a political party or coalition hostile to the Executive. It is not difficult to envisage a politically hostile Congress employing the disability determining device to unseat—or perhaps merely to embarrass—a healthy and competent President.

WHAT ABOUT THE CABINET?

A number of observers have advanced the suggestion that the President's Cabinet might be best qualified to determine disability. Various proposals have provided that one or more members of the Cabinet be officially designated to pass on any question of a President's disability. Such solutions, in my opinion, are of doubtful merit.

Under ordinary circumstances most members of a Cabinet possess a strong devotion to, and sense of identification with, the President. To ask that they view questions relating to their President in an entirely objective manner is asking a great deal. If they are friendly to the President—and their primary loyalty is clearly to him rather than to the Vice President—they will be reluctant to make a decision displacing him even temporarily from the seat of power. Their very loyalty to their chief would ensure, it is true, that any decision by them that Presidential disability existed would not be suspect as having arisen from animosity or a desire to obtain power for his substitute. But this same loyalty would deprive the Cabinet of its value as a fact-finding body.

Cabinet members, by reason of their devotion to the President, are likely not to be closely identified with the Vice President. It is not difficult to think of past administrations in which at least a majority of the Cabinet members would not welcome the transfer of power from the President to the Vice President. They might fear their own removal from office by the acting President. In such an eventuality, incidentally, a determination of when inability has ceased might be improperly influenced.

At the very least Cabinet members might recognize that, were they to raise the disability question, their influence in the administration would be lessened. Whatever their private thoughts, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they might attempt in various ways to play down pressure for a determination of inability. For example, the initiative of Secretary of State Lansing in calling the Wilson Cabinet together apparently had the effect of reducing the likelihood that the constitutional issue would be pressed.

If, on the other hand, the Cabinet was not particularly devoted to the President, an attempted but unsuccessful unseating of him might well lead to their summary dismissal. Even a Cabinet able to view the matter of disability apart from considerations of loyalty might, mindful of Wilson's treatment of Lansing, refuse to act if even a measure of doubt existed as to disability.

Further, if the Cabinet was divided into factions, as might easily be the case, a stalemate might develop which could prevent any action from being taken on the disability problem. Above all, it is well to keep in mind that the Cabinet is not a constitutional branch of the government; from this standpoint, it should not be given the same status in our considerations as constitutionally established bodies.

DECISION BY MEDICAL EXPERTS

It is my belief that as impartial a body as possible should be given the responsibility for determining inability. Some persons who agree with this general concept have suggested that the determination be made by a committee of medical experts appointed by the Chief Justice.

This suggestion does, in part, meet the test of impartiality. However, the proposal does not appear to offer as much assurance in this regard as would a determination made by the full Court. Though it may be remote, there is always the possibility that a Chief Justice, were he so inclined, could appoint medical experts who would decide the question as he wished them to.

The full Court would always be free to, and probably would, hear testimony from medical experts. But some important testimony could be of a nonmedical character. For example, it might be valuable to hear testimony concerning a President's activities immediately prior to or during an illness. Such testimony would in all probability come from White House staff members and executive officials. A board made up of medical experts would not necessarily be competent to pass on such testimony. Nor is it likely that it would be sufficiently aware of the multitude of factors which must enter into a proper decision in this matter. It would be safer if the full Court, rather than the Chief Justice alone, were to judge such matters.

AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

Bearing in mind all the objections set forth above, on January 3, 1956, I introduced a proposal in the House of Representatives which would amend the Constitution so as to clarify the disability question. The House Judiciary Committee has since recommended a different solution: By its key terms, the Vice President would take the initiative in the matter. He would declare the disability of a President who could not declare it himself. And the Vice President would also convene the Congress to inform them of what he had done. Yet, for whatever contribution it may make to a meaningful debate on the whole of this momentous question, a brief summary of what I recommended is here presented as an alternative to the Judiciary Committee recommendation.

Constitutional ratification of precedent

Section I of my proposal provides that the Vice President shall become the President in the case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation. This provision would merely give a constitutional ratification to the precedent established by Vice President Tyler when he successfully established himself as President rather than as *acting* President following the death of President Harrison.

Presidential admission of inability

Section II states that "if the President announces he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall devolve upon the Vice President." This

provision is included in order to provide a simple method for determining Presidential inability. If a President finds that he is unable to carry on his duties, it seems proper that his own determination of inability should be sufficient.

But, some may ask, suppose a President were to pretend he was disabled in order to evade his constitutional responsibilities? In such a case, surely, he should not be expected to continue to exercise these powers and duties. The American people would not be likely to want a President to continue to employ them were he opposed to doing so. Furthermore, should a President feign inability merely as a means of shirking his duties while retaining title to his office, the Congress could always, should it so desire, institute impeachment proceedings.

For the difficult cases

Sections III and IV cover the more difficult cases of Presidential disability. Section III provides that the Congress, by a concurrent resolution approved by two-thirds of each House, may "suggest" that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. For the purpose of considering such a resolution the Vice President may convene the Senate, and the Speaker the House of Representatives.

If the Congress makes such a suggestion of Presidential disability, Section III continues, the Supreme Court "shall determine whether or not the President is able to discharge such powers and duties." If it so finds, these powers and duties shall devolve upon the Vice President.

In view of the confusion which has existed in the past, it seems important to specify that a Vice President does not become President and thus cannot oust a disabled incumbent from his office. It should be made explicit that he remains Vice President and discharges the duties and powers of the Presidency only for the duration of the inability. I submit that if it were clear that such would be the case, the matter of inability might often be settled by the disabled person inviting his next ranking subordinate to act for him during the period of his incapacity, safe in the knowledge that he (the disabled) remained President. Certainly the President's advisers would be more likely, under such circumstances, to look favorably upon the temporary changeover.

These sections contain the heart of the constitutional amendment. Their purpose is to provide an orderly procedure for determining disability which will be as free as possible from partisan political pressures.

Final determination by the Supreme Court

It is of the utmost importance that the final determination of disability be received by the nation as an objective finding not motivated by partisan consideration. Anything less might be disastrous to national unity and to effective leadership. The Supreme Court, in my judgment, is the body most removed from the stresses of partisanship and the one most likely to undertake an impartial consideration of the facts. Probably no other institution enjoys the respect of the nation to so great a degree. The prestige accorded the Court should aid in securing the public's acceptance of the required transference of power.

One particular objection is frequently raised against the proposal to have the Supreme Court make the disability determination. It is argued that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over only a few specifically enumerated types of cases and that it could not, therefore, handle a question of this type. The answer, however, is clear. It is the Constitution which governs the Court's jurisdiction, and a constitutional amendment obviously could give the Court the necessary authority to deal with cases of Presidential disability.

That in assigning this duty to the Court we are asking it to undertake a new type of responsibility does not appear to constitute a fatal objection to the proposal. A more valid criticism would be made if it could be shown that the procedure would upset the constitutional system of checks and balances. Such, however, is not the case. On the contrary, the proposed procedure itself incorporates all of the proper checks and balances.

All three branches involved

It can be seen that this proposal embraces all three branches of government. Where the President himself makes the determination of inability the executive is, of course, involved. The executive, through the Vice President, is also involved in calling the Senate into session to pass on a disability resolution. The Vice President is also presiding officer of the Senate, but it is reasonable, for our purpose, to classify him as at least partially a representative of the executive.

The legislative branch would enter the picture when a President was either unable or unwilling to declare his disability and when a resolution "suggesting" that the President was disabled was introduced in Congress.

If the Congress, by a two-thirds vote, passed such a resolution, it would then be up to the Supreme Court to make the determination of inability. This provision for a two-thirds vote has been inserted in order to minimize any likelihood that the device might be employed by Congress merely for the purpose of causing political embarrassment to a President who was actually in good health.

When called upon to make a determination of a President's ability to carry out the powers and duties of his office, the Supreme Court would hear all testimony bearing on the matter, including that of medical experts. It would then render its decision as to whether the President was unable to carry out the powers and duties of his office.

It can be seen that all three branches of the government are involved in the procedure in one form or another. Before a final determination of inability, the appropriate agent in each branch must make its own determination. Before calling Congress into session both the Vice President and the Speaker of the House must decide there is at least a doubt that the President is able to carry out his duties. Even after the Congress has taken formal action, the Supreme Court must make its own determination before a final disability decision is made. Thus the system provides fully adequate checks to make certain that the procedure is not misused.

Some individuals who advocate that inability be determined by the Vice President or the Cabinet have argued that to place the responsibility in either the legislative or judicial branch would be to violate the concept of separation of powers. Several considerations lead me to believe that such objections are not well taken.

In the first place, the division of government into three branches does not imply three watertight compartments. Our system of checks and balances clearly illustrates this point.

Further, it is important to note that

the Congress already is involved in the selection of the President and Vice President under certain circumstances. The Constitution provides that in the event no candidate for President and Vice President receives a majority of the electoral college vote the election of these officials shall devolve upon the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively.

It should not be forgotten, either, that the Congress is the representative assembly in our governmental system.

Resumption of Presidential duties

Section IV provides that if the powers and duties of the President devolve on the Vice President, pursuant to Sections II and III, the exercise of these powers and duties shall not be resumed by the President until the Supreme Court, on the request of the President, "determines that the President is able to discharge the powers and duties of his office."

This section was included in order to provide an orderly means whereby a President, upon recovering from his disability, would be sure of a means of recovering his powers. In both the Garfield and the Wilson case there was fear that the President might not be able to regain his special powers once he had relinquished them and this uncertainty undoubtedly had much to do with the reluctance to permit a transfer of power to the Vice President. Provision for reinstatement of the President is designed to remove such fears.

Congressional implementation

Section V provides that "the Congress may by law implement the foregoing sections of this article." The purpose here is to enable the Congress, should it see fit, to attempt further to define "inability" and to establish additional and more detailed procedures for determining inability. It was felt that detailed provisions should not be included in a constitutional amendment. At the same time, it seemed wise to leave the door open for congressional action.

The further provisions of the proposal I submitted may be waived, except to say that they relate to the mechanics of the amendment process, or to the retention of the congressional right to legislate in the whole of this field.

IMPORTANCE OF A BASIC SOLUTION

A final word, however, is in order.

Some persons, in their desire to achieve a quick solution to the disability problem, have opposed the idea of a constitutional amendment. They feel that it would take too long to secure its passage.

There is little doubt that it would take at least two or three years before such an amendment could be passed, although the value of the support which a proposed amendment probably would receive from President Eisenhower might shorten this period. The question, however, is essentially whether the problem could be handled effectively by ordinary legislation. I do not believe it could. An effective solution to the problem requires the formality of a constitutional amendment. Halfway solutions are likely merely to perpetuate the difficulty.

I do not contend that the adoption of this proposal will solve all the problems associated with Presidential disability. Nor do I think it wise to attempt to incorporate in a constitutional amendment solutions to all aspects of the problem. I do believe, however, that my proposal attempts to meet the basic issues which must be resolved.

It makes the law of the land the custom by which a Vice President who has assumed the powers and duties of the President as a result of the latter's death has been recognized as succeeding to the Presidential office itself. It facilitates the devolvement of the powers and duties of the office of the President upon the Vice President in case of disability by making it clear that such powers and duties revert to the disabled President once he has recovered. It further protects the President by making it explicit that in cases of inability it is the powers and duties which devolve rather than the office itself. It clearly designates the agencies to be entrusted with deciding whether inability exists.

Whatever solution is deemed best able to remedy the inability flaw in our Constitution is, of course, the one which should be adopted. The important thing is that Congress continue to consider the problem until an effective remedy is found. Our nation's very survival may well depend upon our devising an answer to this critical problem.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

Clinton Rossiter. *The American Presidency.* Pp. 175. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956. $2.95.

Professor Rossiter's little book, based on six lectures given at the University of Chicago, states a most provocative case for appreciating and understanding the Presidency. It outlines the staggering number of duties which the President must assume and the many restrictions placed upon him to prevent misuse of his powers. This done, the volume spotlights the historical forces and personalities which contributed to the power and prestige of the modern Presidency, focusing closely on developments since 1932. It includes an exercise in measuring the greatness of our Presidents based on a discussion of criteria which should be required reading for presidential aspirants, and concludes with a survey of the current problems and weaknesses of America's highest office. The result is a vivid image of the Presidency, highlighted by the author's shrewd critical powers and enriched by incisive commentary.

The reader can find in this volume stimulating discussions on almost any subject relating to the presidential office. Fitted together these blend into Rossiter's main theme, which is that the Presidency is the key institution in the American body politic, an institution which must be kept strong in order to carry out the mandates of the Constitution and the public. To have it any other way, Rossiter contends, would be to ignore the drift of American history and drastically impair the effectiveness of our form of government.

In a book of this sort, where the author so boldly mixes his personal value-judgments with the material under discussion, any critic could have a field day with the opinions that result. One tempting target for this reader is Rossiter's assertion that the final test of presidential greatness is "to be enshrined as a folk hero in the American consciousness" (p. 113), as though greatness and adulation are always synonymous. A close second to this exception is this reader's skepticism regarding Rossiter's incidental implication that domestic, administrative, and political affairs are not as important in the struggle for national survival as diplomatic and military activities. Certainly, a nation can die from internal causes as easily as from foreign assault. Many readers will question the author's intensity in pleading the case for presidential strength, and his conservatism in viewing proposed changes in the office. The over-all impression, however, is that Rossiter's superb skill in organizing and interpreting basic facts and concepts has created a work that will long be standard

reading for anyone seeking to understand the many facets of the American Presidency.

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Clark Spurlock. *Education and the Supreme Court.* Pp. xv, 252. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1955. $3.75.

This volume is primarily a compilation of excerpts, some of which are lengthy, from decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States pertaining to education. The cases treated are followed by a brief comment which usually does no more than to state the rule applied by the Court or the impact of the decision upon existing law. No attempt is made either to analyze the decisions critically or to trace the development of constitutional law in education within a historical or doctrinal context. Indeed, the author's stated purpose precludes any such analysis or treatment. His aim, as he states it, "is to present Supreme Court decisions touching upon education in a form that will be readily useful to school administrators, school boards, teachers, and publicists" (p. 5). In fulfilling this purpose Mr. Spurlock treats thirty-seven decisions under three major divisions—state and federal powers, the limitations of the Bill of Rights, and the protection of the rights of persons by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the first major part, the cases deal with such miscellaneous subjects as the Dartmouth College charter, the incidence of federal taxation upon publicly supported educational institutions, and the protection of teacher tenure and retirement systems by the contracts clause. The second part contains case materials dealing with freedom of religion, the prohibition of an establishment of a religion, and the freedom of speech of teachers as affected by so-called antisubversive legislation, the requirement of loyalty oaths, and censorship of teaching materials offensive to religious groups. The final section is concerned exclusively with the application of the equal protection clause to educational institutions with the major emphasis upon segregation in the public schools.

Other than providing a readily accessible collection of case materials concerning education to those who are interested in the subject, it is doubtful that Mr. Spurlock's volume will be of vast use either to teachers or to the omnipresent layman for whom he writes. Isolated as they are from the main body of constitutional decisions, the materials selected present only a portion of the subject, and sometimes only a minor portion. Thus in dealing with the "equal but separate" doctrine which served as a constitutional support for segregation for nearly sixty years, the author provides only a scanty treatment of *Plessy v. Ferguson* (163 U. S. 537), apparently because it was a transportation case, yet most of the segregation cases are meaningless without an understanding of Justice Brown's spurious reasoning in that misbegotten decision. Similar omissions characterize other portions of the volume and arise from the difficulty of grouping cases about a governmental activity without at the same time setting forth the constitutional context in which the case was decided. Such a difficulty by judicious comments and notes is surmountable, but Mr. Spurlock has made little effort to overcome it. A second deficiency is presented by the style and form of the presentation which stamp the book as a manual. Finally, those publicists to whom the book is directed will be frustrated by Mr. Spurlock's rather odd manner in citing references and by the absence of an index.

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Howard E. Wilson. *American College Life as Education in World Outlook.* Pp. xvii, 195. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1956. $3.50.

This is a wise, helpful book which analyzes what is being done and can be done in college life to nurture the world outlook. At least to this reviewer, the gap revealed in unsentimental terms by a person long identified with this area should not make us complacent.

Six years ago, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace launched a program which produced institutional self-analysis in sixty widely varied campuses. Specialists are preparing a series of eight volumes to be published by the American Council on Education on topics of particular importance. Dr. Wilson's volume deals with the informal forces and influences which condition the education of college men and women.

"There is no implication in the volume," states the present secretary of the Educational Policies Commission, "that extra-curricular activities are more influential than is the curriculum; indeed, the basic thesis . . . is that curriculum and extra-curriculum are, *or ought to be,* closely interrelated." (My italics.) However, plenty of deductions can be made about the interrelatedness.

There is a striking lack of unanimity among students in estimating the factors that have most influenced their ideas and attitudes about international affairs. Two items most frequently included in the top five influences—newspapers and college classes—were each listed by only about three-fifths of a fair sample of college seniors (p. 98). Dr. Wilson also points out that, "in view of the fact that in most institutions the study of international relations lies within political science, the interest expressed by students in economic, cultural and sociological aspects of world relations needs particular attention" (p. 96). In my opinion, the next major trend or improvement in the curriculum (or teaching) needs to take place, and is taking place, in this sector.

But, as Dr. Wilson warns, if we are to reach the great body of students, it is not sufficient to improve courses alone.

I have no quarrel with what seems to me to be the major conclusions reached by Dr. Wilson, as embodied in these quotations:

". . . Many of the nonclass activities in college life are intellectually and aesthetically legitimate as well as challenging, and that, by taking thought, their importance may be enhanced to the benefit of higher education. . . . The cultivation of activities which elevate the life of the campus is fully as much the responsibility of a faculty which is sensitive to the teaching function as it is the responsibility of students. . . . There is reason for hope in the developments of current years that the college and university of the future will reintegrate "the life of the institution and cultivate its potentialities, formal and informal, in such fashion as to give wisdom greater prestige in its mores and traditions" (pp. 186, 189).

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WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN (Ed.). *Military Policy and National Security.* Pp. viii, 274. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. $5.00.

Seldom does one encounter a selection of essays on military policy which demonstrates such consistency in outlook as do the contributions to this volume. This can be explained, perhaps, by the fact that all the authors are associated with the Center of International Studies at Princeton and tend to influence one another with a common view, a view which is rooted so firmly to universal aspirations for peace that perhaps some unpleasant realities are overlooked.

According to the common view expressed in these essays, the United States can and should eschew nuclear weapons as a military policy. The concept argues for the re-emphasis of older forms of war, both at home and abroad, which include numerous infantry divisions, largely military reserves, extensive mobilization programs, and increased budgets and taxes to achieve these ends. By adopting a military policy of this sort, it is concluded, wars might be kept limited, and should these limited wars get out of hand, the general wars would at least be nonatomic.

The authors concede that Strategic Air Command is a prime necessity as a deterrent which will enforce the nonatomic nature of future wars. Yet they suggest that SAC is overemphasized. Since approximately 5 per cent of the national security budget is devoted to SAC, this conclusion may warrant further analysis. At the very least, if SAC provides the deterrent force, it should remain superior to its opposing like force.

What seems to raise a question in the logic presented is the implication that the United States, by adopting a nonatomic military policy, will somehow cause a like policy to be established by her rivals. This is reasoning akin to that used in arguing unilateral disarmament—or disarmament by example. Experience has shown us that rivals who look for advantages seldom heed the example.

Nonetheless, this anthology makes good reading, even for those who do not subscribe to the concept. One chapter is particularly well drawn: the one on passive air defense by Klaus Knorr. He accurately reasons that improvements in passive defense will provide an additional deterrent to nuclear war.

Although the articles generally run counter to present national security policy, dispassionate inquiries such as these are a healthy sign. No progress is achieved without criticism and inquisitive discussions. This is the "war gaming" of policy development, and it is absolutely essential if an optimum strategy is to evolve. It is particularly heartening to find scholars tackling problems which formerly were reserved, by default, to those in the military profession. Handicapped as they are by not being exposed to military intelligence, these authors nevertheless courageously approach the most grave military considerations. In so doing and in continuing to pursue military knowledge, they are acquiring a military sophistication that few modern scholars have achieved. Their mission to foster military study as an integral part of international politics can only be applauded and encouraged. It is hoped, however, that their search for military knowledge does not lead them into narrow schools of military thought to the exclusion of others, for they would be the first to affirm that true scholarship follows no party line.

DALE O. SMITH
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STANLEY KELLEY, JR. *Professional Public Relations and Political Power.* Pp. 247. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. $4.50.

This is a carefully documented description and analysis of a recent arrival on the political scene—the professional public relations man with his kit of mass communication ideas and techniques. The author sees the public relations man, despite his brashness and occasional departures from ethical norms, as an emerging strong competitor with the political "boss" for a central power role in the political process.

The core of the study is a series of four competently executed case studies: the political public relations work of the firm of Whitaker and Baxter in California, a firm which in twenty-five years has conducted more than seventy-five campaigns for candidates, and for and against referendum issues; the American Medical Association's 1948–51 campaign against President Truman's health program, a campaign conducted by Whitaker and Baxter; the 1950 campaign of John M. Butler against Millard E. Tydings for U. S. Senator in Maryland, a campaign conducted by Chicago public relations man Jon M. Jonkel; and the public relations methods of the two parties in the 1952 presidential campaigns. These case studies are clinical in tone and detail, main attention being centered upon the role of the public relations professionals, their major techniques, and their distinctive contributions to the political process.

In a summary chapter, the author attempts to define and appraise "the political role of the public relations man." The new significance of the mass media in politics makes the public relations specialist essential to the effective use of a costly communications system. As this indispensable specialist, the public relations professional brings major new impacts to the political campaign; he works for heavy voter turnout, he emphasizes issues as simple black-and-white alternatives, he introduces the "build up" of candidates after the pattern of the Hollywood "star" system, and he encourages political party centralization by his insistence on control over issues, literature, speeches, and by the pressure on party finances which his use of media creates. These are perceptive observations, supported by data from the four case studies. One may anticipate,

however, that the party leaders will prove to be durable competitors: they can hire public relations men themselves (Carmine De Sapio, for example, has already done so); and there is the further likelihood that competition between public relations men, arrayed on both sides of the battle, will tend to cancel out or reduce their importance—especially as voters become more sophisticated about public relations techniques.

This study is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the political process. If it does less than its title implies (it is a study of only one segment of political power) and if it ignores some earlier works of importance, Pimlott's, for example, it is nevertheless a trenchant and thoughtful exposition of an increasingly important political phenomenon.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
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I. P. CALLISON. *Courts of Injustice.* Pp. 775. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1956. $6.00.

The author of this lengthy study of American courts—a newspaper editor—ends his acrimonious book with the sweeping accusation that our "system of justice is a complete and tragic failure." The blame for this state of affairs he lays squarely at the door of the American lawyer who, he asserts, is a member of "a debauched profession" which has, for private gain, debased the judiciary and seized all effective political power. For "strangling" the judges and "disenfranchising" the electorate, Mr. Callison recommends, facetiously, I hope, hanging enough attorneys to teach the survivors a lesson.

As a lawyer, I am, I guess, inclined to be somewhat self-protective when my profession is so bitterly and unfairly attacked.

What seems to disturb Mr. Callison most is his conviction that the lawyer class has assumed control of government. This has been accomplished, he maintains, by stripping the judge of all but his formal functions and transferring his lost powers to the attorney. As one who has spent a good part of his adult life in courtrooms, I have yet to see any evidence of this alleged usurpation. Most judges effectively control their courtrooms and the conduct of trials before them, and as for those few who do not, the fault lies with them rather than the system.

Mr. Callison states that the best courts are those in which the lawyer does not appear such as the small claims tribunals. Without attempting to argue the merits of this generalization, it might be pointed out to Mr. Callison that only the co-operation of New York lawyers who serve as unpaid special referees has made that city's Small Claims Court the success it has been.

In another place, he refers to a trial as a "tragi-comico opera-bouffe where two ill-equipped unethical, more or less unlettered gladiators cut and parry and thrust . . . and justice is trampled in the dust." He conveniently forgets that most of our essential liberties have been won in courtrooms where sensitive, educated, and articulate lawyers—frequently at great personal peril and expense—have put their principles before their pocketbooks. If examples are necessary, Mr. Callison might re-read the reports of James Hamilton's defense of Peter Zenger.

In all fairness, it must be pointed out that Mr. Callison, intemperate though he may be, does put his finger on many defects in our judicial system such as the political selection of judges and the failure in most states to have integrated court structures administered by competent judicial executives. However, much of the strength of his position is lost by his utter intolerance of the lawyer, his problems, and his accomplishments. Vindictiveness and blind hatred have never been constructive ingredients, a truism, it would seem to me, a newspaperman should have learned long ago.

WILLIAM KUNSTLER
New York, N. Y.

ROBERT MOSES. *Working for the People: Promise and Performance in Public Service.* Pp. x, 283. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. $4.50.

"Probably no man living has grown grass to ease urban eyes, 'streeted' more wide waters, made more bricks climb skyward to replace wretched slums or opened the gates of half so many parks and playgrounds," wrote Cleveland Rodgers, Robert Moses' biographer. These exertions leave little time for writing an autobiography or textbook. Instead, Mr. Moses has released a selection from his prolific writings. Spliced together by Mr. Rodgers, they offer more than a scrapbook, but less than a systematic treatise. They comprise a kaleidoscopic exposition of Moses' views on public administrative work.

His basic tenet is that big government is here to stay—"the minimum planning, financing, and administration demanded in the atomic age is something different from the laissez-faire theory of the nineteenth century." Given the premise that social progress demands an expansion of governmental operation, one of democracy's major problems is to persuade the right kind of people to enter public service. The Russians, who are outstripping us in training scientists, also do a better job in attracting capable people into their government, asserts Moses. In this country, however, public service requires "strong nerves, ability to argue a case by the written and spoken word, instinct for combat, the hide of a rhinoceros, and a willingness to work like a dog for an occasional rain-washed bone."

The chapters touching directly on Moses' work are the most significant. A man who is called in only when there is a "remote disputed barrier beach, an abandoned salt meadow, or a rundown, ragged, misused shorefront to be reclaimed, or a forlorn gas house slum to be carved out" deserves a respectful hearing for his views—particularly when he writes from first-hand knowledge on subjects like planning, conservation, power development, highways and traffic relief, and civil service.

Moses the builder loves man in the abstract. Dealing with flesh-and-blood man, however, is another matter. "Those who have guts are rarely gifted with diplomacy," he writes. No one has ever doubted his courage. In his long career, comments his biographer, Moses has fought a running battle with "politicians, do-gooders, 'longhaired' planners, crackpots, and political evangelists." Traces of these conflicts stud the volume. Moses' pet aversions inevitably come in for their share of caustic comments. These include splinter parties, proportional representation and other "gadgets" in municipal government, the commission and manager plan in big cities, performance budgets, planning on a state or federal scale, "metropolitan supergovernments," and the planned dispersion of metropolitan population. The work reflects the man.

Moses is one of America's foremost public servants and this volume offers some of the fruits of a lifetime of labor. Start with a candid and forthright exposition of ideas, add a trenchant and pellucid style, and season with vitriolic assaults against people the author considers smug and stupid; the result is a book that will be quoted for a long time to come.

FREDERICK SHAW
Board of Education of the
City of New York

ROBERT E. BROWN. *Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution."* Pp. 219. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. $3.50.

In the pleasant academic world of security and seniority, some blithe irreverent figure, utterly oblivious of the courtesies and niceties of the profession, occasionally intrudes. Robert E. Brown and his wife, B. Katherine, have as little respect for the accepted authorities as did their predecessors in the age of rationalism. In taking on one of the giants of the profession, Professor Brown did not come armed with a slingshot; his weapon has more the characteristics of an atom bomb. Seldom if ever has a classic work suffered so heavy a frontal assault.

Dr. Brown begins his work of dissection by briefly reviewing the history of Beard's study of the Constitution—the attitude of the early reviewers, Beard's reappraisal of his work in 1935, and Beard's impact upon history and historical writing. Having demonstrated that the Beard thesis has become firmly entrenched in the writing of American history, the author points out that, as a graduate student, he had accepted the fact that colonial society was

undemocratic, that the American Revolution "was a dual revolution for independence from England and for democracy for the lower classes in the colonies," and that the Constitution represented "a conservative counterrevolution on the part of the upper classes to protect their property."

Fortunately for Robert Brown, his research led him into a study of the franchise in Massachusetts, one of the neglected fields to which Beard had pointed in setting forth his thesis. Here Professor Brown states: "Instead of a colonial society of upper and lower classes, rich and poor, enfranchised and unenfranchised, I found a predominantly middle-class society in which most men owned property, most men were farmers, and most men could vote."

With this background Dr. Brown systematically takes up Beard's study of the Constitution, chapter by chapter, and accuses Beard, with considerable justification, of using only such evidence as supported his views, of relying on secondary works rather than source materials, and finally of generalizing on scant and faulty evidence.

Professor Brown's thesis is not completely new. Rather it stems from a steadily widening knowledge of the Colonial and Revolutionary periods. Nor does his study in any sense detract from Beard's very real claim to fame in American historiography. Despite the faults and inadequacies, which Beard himself recognized in 1913, his economic interpretation of the Constitution served to focus historical interest on economic matters. Professor Brown has produced a work which should be almost as controversial as Beard's. If it generates as much light as it will heat, American students of government and history should get a much better picture in the future.

JOHN DUFFY
Louisiana State University

ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND. *The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776–1791.* Pp. 243. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1955. $5.00.

This is the first detailed historical account of the process whereby the Bill of Rights became the first ten amendments of the Federal Constitution. The origins of the Bill of Rights in English common law have been explored by numerous authors, past and present. The significance of the first ten amendments to the Constitution has been recognized and interpreted anew by each generation with decisions often balancing on the meaning of a single word or phrase. It may seem surprising that so little attention has been given to the hard-fought, fifteen-year struggle by which this vital section of the common law became written American Constitutional law.

Professor Rutland confines his summary of the English and colonial backgrounds of individuals' rights to the first two chapters of this book, a total of twenty pages. A third of the text is devoted to the highly significant formulation of these principles, word by word, into the basic law of state after state. Virginia first contributed much but successive conventions in other regions each added to or refined the phraseology, and at times even modified and developed basic concepts. Finally, in speaking of the New England antecedents of the Bill of Rights section in the Ordinance of 1787, it could truly be said that "the road from Virginia to the Northwest had passed through Boston." The analysis of the reasons given for omitting the Bill of Rights from the Constitution, and the author's revealing examination of the arguments in the various states for and against demanding a Bill of Rights prior to ratification, occupy another third of this book. Thirty pages are devoted to the fight to initiate the amendments during the first session of Congress and to the relatively prompt ratification of these amendments by the states. In the final twelve pages of the text the author considers the significance of the Bill of Rights during times of crisis, such as the late 1790's, during the war between the states, World War I, and since World War II.

The simple language of the Bill of Rights expressed ideas which seemed basic to Jefferson, Madison, and their contemporaries. The need "for fixing every essential right on a legal basis" would appear as vital to such minds today as in 1789. The reasoning of the majority has frequently held that "to preserve our state and save our liberties . . . we must restrict certain liberties during a period of crisis." Each crisis seems to be judged to be a little more pressing and potentially more catastrophic. The hope of the founding fathers was that an enlightened and responsible citizenry could uphold the enduring values of the Bill of Rights regardless of the circumstances.

CHARLES M. THOMAS
Air University

JOHN A. MUNROE. *Federalist Delaware, 1775–1815.* Pp. xiv, 286. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954. $5.00.

Professor Munroe has written an excellent analysis of Delaware politics during the years from the beginning of the War for Independence to the end of the War of 1812. His book explains how the Delaware Federalists obtained control of the governmental machinery of their state, and how they retained control of it even when the Jeffersonian tide had swept Federalist politicians out of office elsewhere in the United States.

The prolonged tenure of the Delaware Federalists was due to a number of causes which Professor Munroe has examined in detail. These causal factors were deeply imbedded in the economy, social structure, and religious backgrounds of the people of Delaware. The author has had to be an economist, sociologist, student of religion, historian, and political scientist in order to discover the roots of Federalist control of Delaware. The present reviewer believes that Professor Munroe has been strikingly successful in each of his scholarly roles!

Personalities and closely knit family alliances played an important part in Delaware politics during most of the period under consideration. The Federalists had the good fortune to have in their ranks a number of forceful, able men who were able to establish and maintain their leadership in the state's government. These men were able to campaign successfully for election or re-election to office, and they were also able to give effective support to their relatives, in-laws, or friends when the latter ran for public office.

The closely knit group of Federalist leaders enjoyed long-continued and well-organized support from the farmers of Kent and Sussex counties. The rather conservatively inclined inhabitants of the two rural counties were usually able to muster enough votes to defeat the candidates supported by the industrial workers of New Castle County. In general, the Downstate farmers were suspicious of and were hostile to the political ideas of the New Castle County industrial workers. Moreover, Downstate farmers of basically English stock were opposed to newly arrived Scotch-Irish, German, French, and other "foreign" groups. The Downstaters, most of whom were Methodists or Episcopalians, were also suspicious of the Presbyterians, Catholics, and other "outlandish" religious groups in New Castle County.

The growing population of New Castle County enabled the Jeffersonians to win a victory at the very beginning of the nineteenth century, but the Federalists soon returned to power because their leadership was flexible enough to borrow ideas from their opponents. Thus, the Federalists succeeded in splitting the New Castle County vote and in dominating Delaware politics during most of the years from 1775 through 1815.

GEORGE W. KYTE
Lehigh University

EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples,* Vol. I: *The Birth of Britain.* Pp. xxii, 521. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1956. $6.00.

One cannot but marvel at the intellectual energy to which this book testifies. The second volume of the Marlborough biography appeared in 1938. In 1939 Winston Churchill, then 65 years old, at the very moment when his "leisure" as a political outcast came to an end, delivered to his publishers a manuscript of 450,000 words,

containing the *History of the English-speaking Peoples*, in four volumes, of which this is the first.

This first volume deals with the Middle Ages. The problem of the relations between England and the English-speaking countries across the seas, which it is suggested by the title will be the central theme, does not therefore come up for treatment yet. What the author tries to bring out in the story of this remote period is the formation of the state in which English-speaking people first came to national consciousness, and in which the institutions of law and government were developed which may still be regarded as belonging to the Anglo-Saxon race as a whole. There is a somewhat Whiggish air about the satisfaction with which wars and constitutional changes are assigned their contributory function in that process, but that does not mean that the events and the men have not in themselves aroused the author's imagination. On the contrary, the story throbs with life, and it is told with a communicative zest.

In a general way it may be said that what interests Churchill in history is government and war. The condition of the people? Government after all affects the condition of the people, and so does war: in this way the condition of the people enters into the purview. But what he is concerned to show us is the rulers grappling with their task and struggling to assert themselves, and the spectacle and the art of war—he refers to its "magnetism" himself (p. 227)—fascinate him. All the great actors in the drama, kings, priests, and ministers, are firmly and vividly sketched. He has nothing but ironical contempt for contemplative or pious men who made a mess of the stern job of kingship. It is the strong, manly, even ruthless characters that appeal to him; Henry V, although in the end he knows that the "empire" built by the warrior king was "hollow and false," he extols no less than did Shakespeare; and indeed, he has a loving reference to the "magic" of Shakespeare's history. At the same time he is fully and profoundly aware of the necessity for moderation, for restraint, for compromise.

Judgments like these may be valid contributions towards an interpretation of history. Scholars, however, are likely to turn to the book primarily for what it reveals about the workings of the mind of its remarkable author. One priceless instance of what it gives in this respect is his final comment on Joan of Arc, whom he has treated with the profoundest sympathy throughout: "All soldiers should read her story and ponder on the words and deeds of the true warrior."

PIETER GEYL
University of Utrecht
The Netherlands

THOMAS WILSON (Ed.). *Ulster Under Home Rule: A Study of the Political and Economic Problems of Northern Ireland*. Pp. xxiv, 229. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955. $3.40.

Forty-three years ago the Ulster Unionists and their allies in England kicked the constitution aside, brought the United Kingdom to the verge of civil war, and defeated Home Rule, or such measure of Home Rule as the Irish Nationalists would accept. The results of that victory for minority intransigence were that the Irish Revolution was made inevitable, that the Ulstermen had home rule forced on them, and that they in turn were saddled with an obstinate, nonco-operating minority who wanted union with the rest of Ireland. Ireland continues to maintain its gift for intricate irony.

There have been a few good monographs on special aspects of the Northern Irish situation, but as for general studies, little more than propagandistic bellowing back and forth across the border. This book is the exception. All ten of its writers seem to be Six County Ulstermen who plainly prefer the present setup, despite its admitted drawbacks, to reunion with the South; but they write sensibly and without noticeable rancor, and they sketch a convincing picture. They make it clear that Northern Ireland is a going concern. They also admit that it is a very limited concern with little free choice as to large-scale future development. One gathers, too, that if the price of such development is amalgamation with the Republic of Ireland, development can wait.

The most impressive evidence adduced is that relating to the improvement in social welfare, free public education, and agricultural marketing made since the war. All these seem to be well-adapted to local conditions and administered fairly; and when one adds to them the vital statistics and the lack of censorships, the contrast with the Republic is, to say the least, interesting. It ought to force the usual anti-Partitionist publicist to re-examine the facts or change his tone.

Yet, for all these good achievements, one cannot say that the picture presented is an inspiring one. The conditions are all too cramped; everything seems to have been done the hard way, like a man exercising in a barrel; none of the insistent dilemmas can be held even at arm's length. It was about *all* Ireland—thirty-two counties—that Yeats wrote: "Great hatred, little room, Maimed us from the start." Divide thirty-two into six and twenty-six, and there is less room still, and if not more hatred, certainly more provinciality. That, too, is well documented here.

It is my own opinion that the Northerners have done a good job. I think they could do a lot better one if they took all Ireland for a field of endeavor. They could come in on their own terms. They could run the country. And I wish they would.

JOHN V. KELLEHER
Harvard University

J. F. S. Ross. *Elections and Electors: Studies in Democratic Representation*. Pp. 480. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955. (Distributed by Essential Books, New York.) $6.75.

After twelve years the author of *Parliamentary Representation* has produced another invaluable study of parliamentary government. Students of the British system will find this volume a mine of information. Moreover, there are some enlightening cross references to the Third Republic in France and to the Weimar period in Germany. The author says in the Preface that the preparation of this book occupied almost the whole of his time and energy for three years despite the fact that the planning and some of the work had been done several years earlier. This is not surprising in view of the masses of statistical material involved and the obvious care taken to secure accuracy. Moreover, the studies here discussed represent much meditation with many fresh lines of thought and argument on electoral problems.

The twenty-seven chapters cover a wide variety of topics. They range all the way from essays on the functions of the voter and of the electoral system through voting methods (including a discussion of the single-member district system and proportional representation), the nomination of candidates, proposals for election reform, and so forth, concluding with a detailed analysis of the personnel of the House of Commons.

Comments on reform proposals are frequent. The author has strong convictions concerning the need for reform in many respects. The deposit system, for example, should be abolished. In his opinion it was "a silly idea" from the start "that a financial barrier would sort the sheep from the goats amongst the candidates. Not all 'freaks' are poor—nor all rich men models of wisdom and virtue. Money cannot measure merit" (p. 224).

The droop quota system for parliamentary elections is warmly supported. Contrary to the opinion held among many political scientists that it would lead to parliamentary instability Mr. Ross believes that it "would make for political stability and continuity in more ways than one" (p. 187). His point of view is implemented by great quantities of statistical analysis and argument. Naturally not everyone will find his case completely convincing.

The mass of material which Mr. Ross has collected and presented makes the volume seem somewhat encyclopedic in character. It is not easy reading. Nevertheless, it is tremendously informative and enlightening.

E. ALLEN HELMS
Ohio State University

ROBERT WALCOTT, JR. *English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century*. Pp. 291. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $3.50.

Ever since 1929 when Sir Louis Namier published his monumental two-volume work entitled *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, there has been considerable activity among the historians of the British Parliament who have tried to bring our understanding of Parliament into line with Namier's findings. Robert Walcott, Jr. in his *English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century* has followed both the tradition and methodology of Namier and has done for the first ten years of the reign of Anne what Sir Louis did for 1760.

Professor Walcott holds that the traditional picture of British government in the early eighteenth century, with two parties contesting for power, needs to be placed under the lamp of historical scrutiny, and in this work Professor Walcott has done just that. The electoral procedure of that time is explained, and it is pointed out that in its operation the local grandees had considerable more trouble with the independent country squires than was true later in the century. By 1760 such differences were compromised by the "peace of the county," which saw one seat going unopposed to one group and the second to the other. Next, Professor Walcott makes an analysis of William III's last Parliament and considers the members according to their occupations, social status, and political connections. The political groupings are described without party labels and are traced through both the general election of 1702 and the parliamentary session of 1707–1708.

The political structure of Parliament is divided into eight groups: the government interest, the Marlborough-Godolphin, the Nottingham-Finch, the Hyde-Granville-Gower-Seymour, the Harley-Foley, the Junto, the Carlisle-Stamford-Radnor-Somerset-Pembroke, and the Newcastle-Pelham-Townshend-Walpole connections. These eight groups, according to Professor Walcott, do not fit into the traditional "Whig" and "Tory" labels which have dominated historical thinking on British politics in the eighteenth century. Except on such issues as the Exclusion, the position of the Anglican Church, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, it was found impossible to use traditional terminology, for "on specific issues in parliament and particularly during the intervals between the great debates all the groups followed distinctly individual, though sometimes parallel, courses" (p. 156).

The essential foundation for any Parliament was the solid nucleus of regular government members to which were added recruits from among "Court Whigs" and "Court Tories." The chief task of any government was to gain enough adherents to its policies from both parties, and it was with this in mind that Godolphin constructed his ministry in 1702. These Court elements were the heart of any administration. The tendency to overstress political parties has caused many historians to overlook the similarities between the political structure of England in the first decade of the century and the structure of fifty years later. "The more one studies the party structure under William and Anne, the less it resembles the two-party system described by Trevelyan in his Romanes Lecture and the more it seems to have in common with the structure of politics in the Age of Newcastle as explained to us by Namier" (p. 160).

Professor Walcott has dug deeply into the sources and his findings are lucidly presented. Historians will be grateful to him for substantiating what some only surmised. The index is adequate, and the long appendices and the bibliography will be of assistance to subsequent workers in this phase of parliamentary history which Professor Walcott has re-plowed. All in all this book adds much to our understanding of British politics as they were in the early eighteenth century.

JOHN J. MURRAY
Coe College

S. MACCOBY. *English Radicalism, 1786–1832: From Paine to Cobbett.* Pp. 559. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955. (Distributed by The Macmillan Company, New York.) $11.50.

Mr. Maccoby has produced another thick volume. It is the second within the year, and fifth in a series on the history of English Radicalism from John Wilkes to Lloyd George. This will end the series unless, as the Preface suggests, there may be a final volume to carry the story of the British "Left," from 1914 to 1945. This would be good material, but perhaps, as yet, difficult to quarry.

Mr. Maccoby's books have grown in bulk, and in price (the latter not his fault); but not proportionally in quality. At any rate, this reviewer considers the first two volumes, published in the thirties, the best of the series. The increased bulk may be explained by the author's growing predilection for the long source extract with which he interlards the text. I am less troubled by this than some readers apparently are, though in a good many spots a judicious trimming of the excerpts would sharpen up the points they were meant to illustrate. Also one wishes that Mr. Maccoby would quote more from the relatively inaccessible sources which he lists in his excellent bibliography. The *Annual Register* (in this volume the *New Annual Register*), Cobbett's *Political Register*, the *Parliamentary Debates*, and other standard works from which the majority of extracts in this volume are taken, are in most good college libraries; hence their story is pretty well known to scholars in the field. As for undergraduates, the earlier they learn to go to the fountainhead for themselves, the better they will like history.

But more disappointing than the long excerpts, which, after all, can often be very useful, is the scarcity of any really penetrating analysis in the author's text connecting the excerpts. If the historian's task were merely descriptive, Mr. Maccoby and the participants in the story, whom he makes his allies, would have made quite a good job of it. Who said what, and when, and what followed that, is accurately recorded year by year, month by month, sometimes almost day by day. But if the student is searching for a more critical handling of the issues involved, if he is trying to grasp the changing trends in social, political, and economic life and thought which influenced political agitators, and were in turn affected by them, he will be disappointed. Several final chapters break loose from the strictly chronological narrative and deal in a more comprehensive way with certain contemporary conditions and movements that furnished a background for its action. Were this done earlier, and the story of political agitation treated in less isolated fashion, the book would gain much. But then, every author must be allowed to tell the tale in his own way.

MILDRED CAMPBELL
Vassar College

RICHARD ALDINGTON. *Lawrence of Arabia: A Biographical Enquiry.* Pp. 448. Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. $5.00.

There is more to the controversy over Richard Aldington's *Lawrence of Arabia: A Biographical Enquiry* than appears on the surface and in the numerous reviews of this book. Aldington frankly stated his purpose of attacking "the legend of Lawrence . . . built up by nearly all those writers who have taken Lawrence as their subject. . . ." Actually he proceeds to destroy the man as well as the legend. Consequently Aldington's book has aroused the indignation of those devoted admirers of T. E. Lawrence, whom I shall refer to as the Lawrence cult.

This group published, shortly after the death of T. E. Lawrence in a tragic motorcycle accident, a book edited by his brother, A. W. Lawrence, entitled *T. E. Lawrence by His Friends.* It is a compilation of eulogistic, and in some cases exaggerated, appreciations of T. E. Lawrence by many notable and prominent persons in England, some of them outstanding personages in British political, military, and literary circles. In addition to this volume and the books written by Lawrence and his letters, there are several biographies of him and other books about him. From this literature Aldington has drawn copious materials for his *Biographical Enquiry.* He supports his critique of Lawrence with references to the writings of T. E. Lawrence and of those well-known people who helped to foster the Lawrence "legend." Consequently Aldington's book involves a number of prominent persons in England.

Aldington, with the aid of his staff, compiled a factual record buttressed with meticulous care by some 1,216 "footnotes" given as a List of Sources, in addition to

a bibliography, in toto some thirty-three pages. It would be a rather formidable task to check all these references.

Liddell Hart, who is the author of a biography of T. E. Lawrence, has an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* of November 1955 entitled "T. E. Lawrence: Man or Myth?" in which he questions the authenticity of statements in Aldington's book. I have been reliably informed that Captain Hart has collected a number of what are said to be misstatements in Aldington's book. The fact remains, however, that there has been no thorough attempt by the Lawrence cult to refute Aldington's statements. Much of the strictly factual materials in his book probably cannot be refuted. Aldington was not content to allow the factual record to demolish the "legend." The reader finds throughout the book intimations of dishonest practices by T. E. Lawrence and implications of guilt through association, of sexual perversion, Fascist as well as Communist leanings. To the reviewer the effect appears to be that of poisoning the mind of the reader, of destroying completely Lawrence's character.

Certainly a reassessment of T. E. Lawrence and his achievements was long overdue. The exaggerated image of T. E. Lawrence created by the Lawrence cult and others needed closer scrutiny than it had been given. An impartial, critical analysis of Lawrence and his accomplishments would have been fully justified. Aldington's *Lawrence of Arabia: A Biographical Enquiry* is not such a book.

WILLIAM YALE
University of New Hampshire

CATHERINE GAVIN. *Liberated France.* Pp. 292. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955. $5.00.

Here is a remarkable little book, a "must" for every student of contemporary French history and politics, also one that ought to be required reading for all would-be writers of sensational articles about France, a suggestion which, to judge from the recent crop of such articles, should make Mrs. Gavin's book a best seller. And well it deserves to be. For here we have, in compact, yet solidly documented—with footnotes, itemized references, and index—and highly readable form, the detailed and fascinating story of the "liberation" months, the difficult beginnings of the Fourth Republic, the problems and triumphs of reconstruction, the heartaches of Indochina, the first rumblings in North Africa, the dilemma of the European Defense Community and German rearmament, the resuming of the old quarrels between State and Church. But, through it all, the French people themselves, weary and gay, proud and humiliated, easily stirred yet skeptical, bent on recapturing, as soon as possible, the *joie de vivre* lost under the German occupation; yet stoutly capable also of amazingly repairing "in seven years . . . and for the second time since 1914 . . . the physical destruction of a great war."

The book, conceived in the dark summer of 1940, in answer to the double impact of the fall of France and the emergence of de Gaulle, reads almost like a dramatic dialogue between the wartime hero of French resistance—quickly grown to legendary size in his own eyes and those of a diminishing band of partisans—and the French people. The strange personality of the fighting French leader is well analyzed, though one might take issue with Dr. Gavin for not recognizing sharply enough that the General's famous intransigence might have stemmed from a sense of political necessity (*he* was nothing, and yet *France's* voice had to be heard) as much as from his bristling touchiness. One might find an occasional doubtful assertion, such as the characterization of the Moroccan demagogically nationalistic Istiqlal as "Communist." On the whole, however, historians, students, and lovers of France must be grateful to Dr. Gavin for an extremely valuable, fact-packed, and fascinating, narrative; one in which the skillful interweaving of literary, artistic, and even sports events, lends a feeling of vivid reality, at times reaching into the heights of poetical re-creation. Truly, Dr. Gavin's patient and deliberate work of understanding of "the brilliant and indestructible French people" can also be termed an act of faith, an expression of hope, and a labor of love.

CLAUDE L. BOURCIER
Middlebury College

ALISTAIR HORNE. *Return to Power: A Report on the New Germany.* Pp. 415. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. $6.00.

Books by newspaper correspondents about peoples and governments whose problems they have been reporting are standard fare in the field of serious political writing. Written by the Bonn representative of the conservative London *Daily Telegraph*, this is one of the best current books on Germany. Sharply reflecting British interests, standards, and judgments, it is more thorough and scholarly and considerably less impressionistic than the average correspondent's after-action report.

Alistair Horne served two years in Germany, from 1952 to 1954, and by subsequent visits has extended the scope of his report to the "Summit Conference" at Geneva in July 1955. Opening with the ceremonial signing of the abortive European Defense Community treaties at the end of May 1952, the author's main themes are the ups and downs of West Germany's relations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization states, rearmament and industrial decartellization, with special reference to the Krupp case, relations between occupiers and occupied, the Saar problem, the Naumann plot, the June 1953 uprisings in the East Zone, the Bundestag elections of September 1953, economic recovery and the present state of technology and industrial research, the bizarre defection and redefection of Otto John, and the final determination of Germany's relation to the West by recovery of sovereignty and admission to NATO. Altogether the proportions are good, the coverage excellent, the facts abundant, and the judgments sane and balanced.

One of the strengths of this book is the economic coverage. Stationed at Bonn, the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent followed developments in the nearby Ruhr with close attention. Frankly and admiringly, but with an undertone of concern, he records the facts—full employment in 1955; 11 million refugees integrated into the economy; motor ships weighing 12,000 tons constructed in six months; 500,000 housing units per year and three-fifths of the rehousing task completed; the ugly duckling Volkswagen; and crude steel production up from 6 million tons in 1948 to 23 million in 1955. Two consequences of all this are apparent: the sharp export challenge in former British, French, and American markets, and for the West Germans "the greatest prosperity in living memory."

Chancellor Adenauer is a main point of interest in Horne's "general view" of German developments. His name occurs on 147 of the 405 pages of text. The author's admiration for *Der Alte* is manifest, but he is not uncritical in his appraisal of specific policies and actions. In a final chapter, "The Dangerous Way Ahead," the author is particularly pessimistic with regard to reunification, the impasse that has been reached, and the consequent impairment of Adenauer's internal political position.

ORON JAMES HALE
University of Virginia

JOHN L. SNELL (Ed.). *The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power.* Pp. xiii, 239. Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 1956. $3.75.

Only a decade after Yalta, and we already have a considerable body of literature on the subject. But the endless series of memoirs and biographies, apologias and documents, impartial studies, and documented histories have not dispelled the firmly held popular belief that Yalta was the graveyard of the many ideals officially proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter and in the United Nations Declaration. And this book by a group of professors, consisting of three papers read at the 1955 meeting of the Southern Historical Association and three chapters by Forrest G. Pogue, is not likely to alter the course of current thinking on Yalta. In the Foreword Professor Clyde of Duke University states that the authors "have tried to describe not only *how* and *what* and *when*, but also *why* the main decisions were made or, in some cases, postponed. What concessions were made? Who made them? Why?" The writers measure up well to their assignments; they

all have their neat answers to the questions raised, and seem to make a working team in their attempt to show "the times and circumstances which made Yalta possible." The upshot of their interpretations is that concessions had to be made in order to sell the future world organization to Stalin. Besides, they seem to be saying in unison, on European territorial questions we had to accommodate him because his forces were already in possession of nearly all areas in question. We had to have Soviet military aid, and this was another reason why our statesmen had to curry Stalin's favor. Moreover, there was the fear that Stalin might make a separate peace with Hitler.

There is nothing novel, revealing or convincing in these extenuating explanations. If the idea of world organization could have served Stalin's purposes, he would have had it; and if he did not care for it, no amount of sugar-coating could have endeared it to him. The enlisting of Soviet military aid has been seriously questioned by some high in authority and close to President Roosevelt. The late Fleet Admiral King, for one, thought "the Russians will come in with us in their own time." As to the "phony" notion that Stalin might have made peace with Hitler, Hanson Baldwin seems to be on solid ground when he says that Stalin knew the suicidal nature of such a peace. The plain, unvarnished, and unpalatable fact is that some ten years ago we were outwitted and outstripped at Yalta.

In the presidential campaign of 1952 one of the candidates underscored the truth that "America is great because America is good." For a long time our greatness was coupled with goodness and pureheartedness. We had been regarded until recently as the upholders of lofty ideals, champions of lost causes, spokesmen of the rights of the oppressed and the downtrodden. It seems that at Yalta our leaders were too anxious to maintain our wartime greatness without much regard to the inherent goodness in greatness. That is the meaning of the diplomatic tragedy of Yalta.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
Library of Congress

FRANCIS R. PREVEDEN. *A History of the Croatian People,* Vol. I: *Prehistory and Early Period until 1397 A.D.* Pp. xii, 134. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. $7.50.

This is the first volume of a comprehensive historical study of the Croatian people. This volume deals with prehistory and early period until 1397 A.D., that is, the date of the Ottoman victory over Emperor Sigmund (Nicopolis, September 25, 1396) which consolidated the Turkish power on the Balkan peninsula for several centuries. In the present volume, the author discusses the physical and cultural background of the area which was invaded by undifferentiated Slav masses and later by Croatian tribes (first half of the seventh century A.D.) who formed their independent kingdoms on the eastern shores of the Adriatic sea (ninth century, A.D.) The Roman culture and the Roman Church which had been well established in this area before the coming of the Croatian tribes were to exert fundamental and perhaps decisive influence on these people and their whole future historical development, as contrasted to the influence stemming from Byzantium. It is the discussion of these influences as well as the struggle for political independence and finally the loss of independence that is discussed in most of the chapters in this volume. A special attention is paid to the problem of Christianization and the fight of the Croatian clergy against the Latin clergy for Church Slavonic ritual and for the control of the bishoprics. Loss of native Croatian clergy to Latin clergy led to the loss of political independence when Croatia formed a union with Hungary (twelfth century A.D.). Several chapters are dedicated to an analysis of Hungarian-Croatian relations in their common kingdom. There is also a discussion of the structure of the Croatian state during the national dynasty, particularly social organization, religious life, political organization, civil affairs, fiscal matters, armed forces, the life in latinized urban centers along the Adriatic coast, and education and culture.

The author has been well prepared to undertake such a valuable and ambitious study. He has been trained at European and American universities and has a good command of a number of languages in which the written sources on Croatian history can be found. He has attempted also to apply a sociological approach to the study of history as seen for instance in his distinction between the warlike and nonwarlike Slavs, even though this cultural dualism is not carried sufficiently far in the interpretation of the early history of the Croatian kingdom which was founded by warlike Croat tribes who imposed themselves on the nonwarlike Slav population in the north-western areas of the Balkans. Nevertheless this is a very thorough and detailed study, perhaps a unique one in the English language. It will be therefore an indispensable work for all students of history. The volume has a number of maps and reproductions which illustrate the geographic relief, prehistory, early history, as well as early architecture and present physical types of the people. It is regrettable that the author did not include in this volume some of the reproductions of sculptures of Ivan Meštrović which deal with the early Croatian history, but it is hoped that this will be done in the forthcoming volumes. These, to judge from present work, should be of equal value to people interested in a crucial area which, since the fall of the western Roman Empire, has been located at a crossroad of religion, civilizations, and political systems.

D. A. TOMASIC
Indiana University

ROBERT LEE WOLFF. *The Balkans in Our Time.* Pp. xxi, 618. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $8.00.

Mr. Wolff's is the most extensive work to appear on recent Balkan history. It deals almost entirely with the four Balkan Communist states—Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. The first 188 pages treat Balkan history before 1939. Here the author discusses such topics as geography, ethnography, and Byzantine, Ottoman, and Hapsburg influences; the national awakening; and the economic development of the Balkan peoples. In these introductory pages there are certain errors and ambiguities, perhaps because the author was limited in the space he could give the Balkan history before 1939. This, coupled with peculiar organization, in some degree deprives the Introduction of effectiveness. Indeed, had the Introduction been shortened to about thirty pages little would have been lost. No attempt will be made to list all points the accuracy of which the reviewer questions. One wonders, for example, what Croats will think when they learn that the Axis quisling Slavko Kvaternik was the son of their national hero Eugen Kvaternik!

Most of the book is devoted to the war years and the postwar period. The description of the fragmentation of Rumania and its consequences during 1940 is excellent. On the other hand, the description of the Belgrade coup d'état of March 27, 1941 adds little to what we know. To conclude that this popularly backed coup d'état—directed against an undemocratic and pro-Axis government—was carried out "in the best tradition of Serbian plotting" is to substitute a cliché for analysis.

After the Axis destruction of the Yugoslav armed forces there followed the occupation and partitioning of Yugoslavia. In order to control dismembered Yugoslavia effectively, the Axis powers resorted to "cleverly manipulating Croat-Serb antagonism" (204). The author minces no words in describing the ensuing "forced conversion" and "massacre" of the Serbs by the Ustashi and "some members of the Franciscan order" (205). Archbishop Sharich of Sarajevo "endorsed the butchery" and Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb "belonged to the commission for the conversion of the Orthodox" but deplored Ustashi excesses. The author explains how this Axis policy of rousing religious and racial hate was one of the major reasons for Communist success in Yugoslavia.

Tactfully and accurately Mr. Wolff clarifies the conflict between Tito and Mihailovich and gives reasons for the former's success and the latter's failure. Unfortunately, the author does not provide the documentation which is so sorely needed when discussing a conflict immersed in so much bitterness and controversy. The generous space given to Albanian-Yugoslav

Communist relations seems hardly warranted considering the relative importance of this episodic problem to the whole history of modern Balkans.

The best parts on Rumania and Bulgaria are those sections dealing with the wartime situation and the secret negotiations with the Allies. The founding of Communist states is ably discussed, and the author explains convincingly the inherent weaknesses of the Communist regime.

A special chapter was properly given to Yugoslavia since its break with the Soviet Union. There is a good account of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, based on the notes exchanged between the central committees of the two Communist parties. The changes which have taken place in Yugoslavia since 1948 are treated cautiously and soberly.

Mr. Wolff's synthesis of major political developments in recent Balkan history is well-written and the subject matter is presented objectively and dispassionately. Considering the complexity of the Balkan picture, the author accomplished a job of which he can be justly proud.

WAYNE S. VUCINICH
Stanford University

SVEN RYDENFELT. *Kommunismen i Sverige: En Samhällsvetenskaplig Studie.* Pp. 351. Lund: Gleerupska Universitetsbokhandeln, 1954. 18 kr.

This study of communism in Sweden was begun in 1948 by Sven Rydenfelt under the auspices of the Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle, a conservatively oriented institute for the study of the social sciences, and later completed as a doctoral dissertation under the guidance of Professor Johan Åkerman, one of Sweden's distinguished younger political scientists—who has also achieved an enviable reputation in several cognate fields.

Dr. Rydenfelt's expressed aim is to answer the question, why do certain persons in Sweden identify themselves with the Communist party? He acknowledges his indebtedness to such pioneers in the quantitative study of politics as Rice, Siegfried and Heberle as well as to his mentor, Åkerman. In developing a framework for his study, Rydenfelt makes frequent reference to Borkenau, Einaudi, Hästad, Lundberg, Record, and Tingsten. But his approach is more nearly that of the contemporary French school of political statisticians, whose best-known representatives are Duverger and Goguel.

Rydenfelt has used every possible method of gathering his materials, drawing upon census data, regional and town histories, monographs on industrial enterprises, correspondence, interviews and telephone inquiries. He notes that the "tolerance level" in Sweden is quite different from that of the United States. Sweden has the secret ballot, but those who vote Communist are not particularly reticent about disclosing this fact. He has therefore been able not only to establish statistical correlation between measures of electoral behavior and other social characteristics, but also to confirm his quantitative conclusions by personal inquiries.

Following some introductory paragraphs, Rydenfelt presents a county by county (*län*) analysis, from which he concludes that the "reddest" counties are the forest and mining areas (first place and second place), the metropolitan cities of Stockholm and Gothenburg (third and fourth), and the northern counties with a mixed economy. There is one interesting variant. Västerbotten is a northern forest county, but radicalism in this area has expressed itself in religious dissent; it has the largest number of members of the Pentecostal faith.

In other words, Rydenfelt's study discloses some significant areas of concomitance between geographic, economic, and social factors on the one hand, and *atypical* behavior on the other. Swedish Communists are definitely localized in certain regions. The proportion of males is high, as is the proportion of persons under fifty years of age. There are Communists among the forest workers and certain kinds of industrial workers, but practically none among farmers or fishermen. With respect to income, Communists are more frequently found in the better-paid occupations, but not in the higher "social classes." There is no clear relation between preference for Communist candidates and the Communist press, or property owned. Quite obviously there is a connection between the current prestige of the Soviet Union and Communist party membership. When the Russians are favorably regarded the world over, the number of Swedish Communist votes rises—and when the Soviet Union is universally condemned, the Swedish Communist vote declines.

On the whole, this is a very satisfactory study. Rydenfelt has succeeded better in what he set out to do than have Stouffer and others who have undoubtedly tried to do too much. Of lasting importance is the observation that regional and group standards of "normal" behavior are more authoritative than "national" standards.

ROY V. PEEL
University of Utah

DAVID J. DALLIN. *The Changing World of Soviet Russia.* Pp. ix, 422. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1956. $5.00.

The passing of Stalin and the resulting post-mortem over that erstwhile demigod have raised a number of questions that both plague and fascinate the student of Soviet affairs. Does, for example, the just begun reaction away from Stalinism indicate a more tolerant society is evolving? Does it augur more maneuverability for foreign Communists? What effect will it have upon Soviet policies at home and abroad?

These are some of the general problems that David Dallin has attempted to probe in this, his latest book. The result is an arresting and vivid contribution to the spate of material dissecting the era of the "thaw." Mr. Dallin's treatment of the Soviet community—the privileged upper classes, the urban worker, and the depressed peasantry—is a skillful summation of what has occurred. It is supplemented with thoughtful generalizations on events since 1953 and marred only by his overemphasis on the political direction he accords the intelligentsia. He has also included several interesting sections on forced labor, the secret police, the party and what he refers to as "main issues," namely Germany, Yugoslavia, Communist China, and the Near and Middle East.

There are, however, some elements that give evidence of too much wisdom after the event. Is it "almost certain," as the author suggests, that had Trotsky assumed Lenin's mantle he would have acted as Stalin did? It is quite true that Trotsky frequently betrayed the callousness and impetuosity of his chief enemy. Granted, too, that he supported the formation of corrective labor camps, forerunners of Karaganda, Magadan, and Vorkhuta, and that he urged an early party congress to outlaw, ironically enough, factionalism within the party. Yet, Trotsky was also a fanatic tempered by a catholic taste and cosmopolitan interest, both totally alien to the provincial Stalin.

Furthermore, it is easy to repeat a truism of 1956 ("one of the greatest wartime errors of the United States was to permit unilateral Soviet occupation of Manchuria in 1945—had it been placed under temporary four-power occupation the postwar history of East Asia would have been very different") p. 355, but somewhat more difficult to have put into action eleven years ago. Moreover, is it a statement of absolute fact that "China's dependence on Moscow has been dangerously underestimated in the West" (p. 356) or that Peiping is excessively subordinate to the dictates and whims of the Soviet Union? A growing number of skeptics are beginning to doubt the earlier, widely held assumption of China as simply another satellite country. Perhaps had Mr. Dallin used more than the only listed bibliographical source on China—Richard L. Walker's *China Under Communism*—the over-all outcome might have been better balanced.

These minor qualifications aside, *The Changing World of Soviet Russia* is surely one of the best-informed, most readable and richest analyses of Russia under Stalin and his successors to appear in quite some time. It is all the more valuable because it is a Russia largely cleansed of many myths and falsehoods.

MURRAY POLNER
New York, N. Y.

ASIA

LOUIS FISCHER. *This Is Our World.* Pp. ix, 522. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. $5.00.

Louis Fischer has a well-deserved reputation as a journalist of insight and imagination. *This Is Our World* is an account of journeys over the past ten years which took him from Tokyo to New Delhi and from Manila to the Middle East. In between he has journeyed through Europe, and the chapters on Yugoslavia, which include an account of two interviews with Tito, are particularly illuminating. This is a diffuse, somewhat discursive book which would have read more incisively were some of the debris of unnecessary detail eliminated. Fischer has a compact, tidy mind, but his writing bears traces of a curious indiscipline.

With his formidable background of knowledge and experience he is able not only to assess contemporary events but to evaluate them in a historical setting. That, to this reviewer's mind, is the peculiar value and strength of Fischer's writing. The chapters on India and Yugoslavia are particularly interesting, and since both countries economically and politically represent a not dissimilar synthesis—attempting internally to reach out to a new pattern of democracy and externally to eschew international entanglements—Fischer's analysis and observations carry considerable significance. "During my five weeks in Yugoslavia," he writes, "I frequently thought of Asia, particularly of India and Burma. It seemed to me that Titoism, as it slowly evolved, might be a new social and economic form applicable to progressive Asian nations which reject Western capitalism yet do not want to go the way of Soviet Stalinism. And Titoism is just that: not-capitalism plus not-Sovietism."

On India, which he knows well, Fischer writes with candor and friendliness, but he is less than just to Pandit Nehru who for some years now has been among his principal *bêtes noires*. He talks of "the halo he effects" and indulges in several large generalizations spiced with more than a soupçon of malice. "Persons close enough to Nehru to know him well," writes Fischer, "believe that he has never loved power, he loves himself too much. He wishes to be loved and is loved by many but he does not love." Such sentiments seem slightly petty, even absurd. On the other hand, Fischer writes with deep admiration, respect, and love for Gandhi and for the principles for which the Mahatma labored and died. The book incidentally is dedicated "to the Gandhians of all countries."

Fischer's firm opinions, his strong predilections and prejudices are reflected in this book and make it a melange of many moods and moments but it is an interesting, thoughtful, and purposeful book and as such will be read with respect by students of contemporary events.

FRANK MORAES
The Times of India

HAROLD M. VINACKE. *Far Eastern Politics in the Postwar Period.* Pp. xii, 497. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956. $5.00.

This latest volume by one of our leading authorities on the modern history of East Asia is clear and to the point. In describing the intricacies of politics, internal as well as international, controversial topics are presented objectively, with adequate documentation and bibliographical references.

The coverage extends somewhat further back than the title would indicate. For example, a chapter on "Korea Between Wars" starts with events as early as 1876. Although such sections are useful for the beginning student, their inclusion adds little for those who wish information on this specific subject. This book deals with all of the Far East including Southeast Asia and brings the history down to the end of 1955.

Details of East Asian politics are taken up in part country by country and in part by broad topics. All phases of recent developments are considered in their relationships to world politics.

In discussing the complicated events in and concerning China from the 1930's to 1955 the treatment is generally clear, although there is some duplication in first dealing with the Kuomintang and in the succeeding chapters with the Communists. In the analysis of Communist success in China this reviewer notes a tendency to avoid statements of fact such as are used in other chapters. Some pages are devoted to explaining contemporary views of controversial details. Criticism is implied in regard to those whose "understanding" of the situation was incorrect without however making clear just what happened.

When Korea and Formosa are discussed the author is at his best with the use of many pertinent quotations and presentation of diplomatic detail. But there is some lack of order when prior events are described after later ones, as in the case of early postwar Formosa (pp. 234–35). Also, diplomatic agreements tend to be stressed and little attention given to the human relations involved.

Five out of seventeen chapters summarize the politics of Southeast Asia. Minor criticisms: the part on Malaya lacks any analysis of Chinese communism in that country. On page 351 "Jakarta" should have been "Djogjakarta"; and page 373 should state that President Soekarno was about to go out of the country.

Good chapters on Japan are followed by a summary of the situation, "At the End of the First Postwar Decade." The conclusion emphasizes: the end of Western colonialism, the importance of the world-wide cold war, the new place of India in the Far East, and the increased power of China which involved that country in opposition to the United States.

WOODBRIDGE BINGHAM
University of California
Berkeley

THEODORE SHABAD. *China's Changing Map. A Political and Economic Geography of the Chinese People's Republic.* Pp. x, 295. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. $7.50.

A member of the *New York Times* foreign news desk has written an account of the political, social, and economic transformation of China since the establishment of the Communist regime in Peking on October 1, 1949. By studying the effect on the landscape of the concerted drive for all-out industrialization, the author tries to indicate the results of the revolution through this geographic approach. That he concludes that too great a measure of success has not yet been achieved is evidenced from his statement that the Chinese Communist rulers themselves anticipate that it will take fifteen more years to collectivize agriculture, complete the nationalization of industry, and establish a socialist society; and it will take fifty more years to achieve a high degree of industrialization and transform China into a world economic power.

Part I surveys China as a whole, although both Outer Mongolia and Formosa are excluded; and political geography is treated with specific reference to the new administrative structure, the present state of the population, and the national autonomous areas of the non-Chinese ethnic minorities. Part II provides a regional treatment and, in addition to a systematic survey of minority areas, there is a separate discussion of 170 major cities. From the geographic point of view, the book is quite good because it contains many excellent maps and much interesting and pertinent information. The index of place names is particularly helpful because the names are not only written in the traditional Wade-Giles manner but also in the style used by the postal authorities.

There are numerous statistical tables, but unfortunately there is no way of checking their accuracy since the bibliography is inadequate. Although the reader is told that the material is derived mainly from Chinese and Russian newspapers, one is left with the feeling that it would be extremely unwise to rely on these tables without also consulting confidential material usually available only in government files. For example, a mere comparison of the table on cotton lint production with the one found in the book *An Economic Survey of Communist China* by Dr. Yuan-li Wu discloses variations which are not too serious, but Dr. Wu in more scholarly fashion refers to the specific documents from which he took his figures and thus allows the reader to place his own evaluation on them. Furthermore, Dr. Wu analyzes the facts while Mr. Shabad is usually content to present the bare facts.

However, it is evident that a great deal of time and effort was spent in the procurement of the data which is presented in a very concise and readable style, and the book may be considered worthwhile not only in and of itself but also as a starting point for further specific economic research.

ALBERT E. KANE

Washington, D. C.

YUAN-LI WU. *An Economic Survey of Communist China.* Pp. x, 566. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. $12.50.

In a very readable manner, this book discusses such problems as economic stabilization and fiscal policy, land redistribution, agricultural production and self-sufficiency, forced industrialization under centralized planning, forced labor and mass labor projects, transportation and domestic trade, monetary and banking control, labor organization and wages, and foreign economic relations. A fairly successful attempt has been made to be objective in approach and to indicate where the Communists have attained a limited measure of success, although value-judgments are avoided as much as possible. The author has well highlighted the conflicts caused by the dual objectives of the economic transformation of the society and of greater political power for the Communist party, the former often calling for the loosening of controls, and the latter for their tightening. He has also clearly demonstrated the manner in which self-perpetuation of the party has generally taken precedence over the people's welfare.

Dr. Wu points out that the Korean adventure did not cripple the country's economic life only because fighting was limited to relatively short periods, and the domestic economy was not subjected to any physical destruction. However, on the basis of his research, he concludes that Communist China is in no position to engage in any foolhardy adventure that might provoke an external adversary into retaliatory action which could easily throw the economy into chaos, and, consequently, he foresees no real trial of strength with the West in the near future.

Extensive use has been made of official Communist Chinese statistics because of the absence of other independent sources of first-hand information. Therefore, as the author admits, there must be some question as to the reliability of his conclusions based on these sources, and he is quick to point out that technological changes may radically alter his present assessment of the status of the different industries; and that with adequate assistance from the Soviet Union, the accelerated pace of industrialization may change the Chinese economic structure within a relatively short period of time. Nevertheless, the study is closely documented, there is an extensive bibliography, and the book must be considered of first-rate importance for the present-day understanding of Communist China's industrial and military potential. Congratulations are due to Dr. Wu who has proved himself a most worthy alumnus of the London School of Economics.

ALBERT E. KANE

Washington, D. C.

A. M. DUNLAP. *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: The Experiences of an American Doctor in China.* Pp. viii, 208. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. $3.75.

As former Ambassador Stuart states in his Introduction, the history of modern medicine in China is largely the life story of Dr. A. M. Dunlap. For forty years this representative of the most successful of Western missionaries—the medical teachers and practitioners—served the people of China, first in Peking and later in Shanghai. Dr. Dunlap first worked in China from 1911 to 1916. There followed a thirteen-year assignment in the Peking Union Medical College, private practice, and teaching in St. John's Medical School, Shanghai. Dr. Dunlap was interned by the Japanese and repatriated in 1943. He returned to Shanghai in 1946. After the Communists took over in 1949, he was not permitted to leave China until October 1952.

Dr. Dunlap was thus a first-hand witness to all the modern crises which have torn China since 1911. Although the other great events provide a backdrop to this narrative, the conquest of Shanghai and the slow but inexorable strangling of that great city, observed between April 29, 1949 and October 23, 1952, dominate these memoirs.

Some readers may find the style disconcerting. Dr. Dunlap's experiences were originally related in episodic and necessarily cryptic letters written to family and friends. At the time of writing, the doctor had no intention other than private communication. Fortunately he later collected the letters and added brief, italicized explanations.

The result is a surprisingly complete, occasionally homey, but always vivid description of a political disease which struck down the Chinese people and foreign residents of Shanghai. There emerges a graphic description of the polyglot city. One feels the first tentative hopes on the occasion of the orderly capture of Shanghai by the Communists. Then he frustrates under the false starts, confusion, terror, and plain monotony of oppression.

Perhaps it would be expecting too much to hope that the doctor could do more with the political disease than he was able to do with the relatively simpler diseases of the eye, ear, nose, and throat. Like many recent emigrees from the mainland, people who knew and served the older China well, Dr. Dunlap comes out frustrated and baffled. He is able to describe the symptoms of the patient's disease; he offers little to explain the cause of the disease or to prescribe a cure. At least he honestly admits confusion.

To give one example, Dr. Dunlap quite plainly felt that an early recognition of the People's Republic, after the first days of the Communist rule, might well separate Chinese from Russian communism and keep China open to the West. His italicized comments added after the Korean conflict reject this earlier thesis, which was widely held, it might be pointed out, by many respectable Old China experts. Certainly recent evidence, contributed by the new rulers of the USSR itself, indicates that Stalin *was* at the point of driving the Chinese out of an alliance.

ARDATH W. BURKS

Rutgers University

KYUNG CHO CHUNG. *Korea Tomorrow: Land of the Morning Calm.* Pp. xxv, 384. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. $5.95.

Mr. Chung deserves much credit for contributing to a seriously neglected field a book filled with useful basic geographic, cultural, economic, and political data on Korea. Such background facts must first be assembled and understood before any intelligent attempt can be made to perceive the seemingly undiscernible pattern of a future Korea capable of realizing its potential as a free, united, peace-loving nation. The author has included the following useful appendices: a chronology of significant historical and contemporary events relating to Korea; an extensive collection of basic documents including the 1919 Declaration of Independence, the Cairo Declaration, and eight significant post-World War II documents; a list of Korean weights and measures; and a glossary (with ideographs) of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese proper names, geographical names, and special terms used in the book. The bibliography contains a very comprehensive annotated compilation of bibilographies, general works, and official and periodical publications, in Western and Far Eastern languages.

In the opinion of this reviewer the organization of the book reduces its readability and usefulness by requiring the author to repeat certain material. Since the repetitions are seldom of the same scope or in the same context as the original reference, the result is often confusing and perhaps misleading. This is true, for example, with respect to the very brief, incomplete statement on page 186 concerning the US–USSR Joint Commission in Korea following World War II, and the comprehensive treatment of this subject on pages 197–200. Similarly, on pages 234–37, there are four overlapping figures for United States and United Nations aid to the Republic of Korea; one presentation, rationalizing the time periods and aid categories, might have been more effective. Many of the footnote references are too abbreviated to permit ready identification of the source. Korean terms are sometimes used in the text

without explanation. In a number of instances, confusion is caused by the association of facts not directly related. For example, on page 177, in the midst of a discussion of the 1919 independence uprising, the establishment of the Independence Club (formed in the period immediately following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95) is referred to as though the two events were contemporary. There are a few factual errors. For example, the statement on page 189 that on August 31, 1948 General Hodge requested the military governor, Major General Archer L. Lerch, to turn over top administrative functions to Koreans is in error with respect to the date. General Lerch died in 1947 and the Republic of Korea assumed the powers of government on August 15, 1948.

The bibliography, appendices, and textual data in Mr. Chung's book should prove to be extremely useful guides to other scholars who may be inspired to conduct additional research on one or more of the important topics which he has presented. It is to be hoped that Mr. Chung will have an opportunity to publish a revised edition of his welcome and useful book.

BENJAMIN WEEMS
Arlington, Va.

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY and JOHN E. TURNER. *The New Japan: Government and Politics.* Pp. viii, 456. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. $5.00.

The student of Japan must be grateful to Dr. Quigley and his associate, John E. Turner, for having brought together so much information, hitherto available only in scattered sources, within the covers of a single book. For Dr. Quigley, who has been a devoted observer of Japanese politics for twenty-five years both as a student and as an Occupation advisor, it is in a sense an opportunity, such as is not often given to scholars, to rewrite an earlier work, his own by now standard *Japanese Government and Politics,* first published in 1932.

Arguing that "the Japan of 1956 is a new Japan, [it is] not by revolution but by quickened evolution [that] it became a different political entity during the decade that followed World War II." The authors set out to appraise each element of the political structure of Japan, as it was in the past, as it has been acted upon by the war and the Occupation, and as it gives prospects of becoming in the future. Rejecting both the extremes—that nothing has changed and that everything has changed—they arrive at the seasoned verdict that there have indeed been important changes, but that these have been after all steadily accumulating since the Meiji Restoration and that the Occupation reforms have only "quickened" them.

With this conclusion it is difficult to quarrel, because to some extent it is a matter of degree, or even better, a matter of temperament. For some the bottle is half full, for others it is half empty. One may choose to put it that the enfranchisement of women was bound to come anyway; or that it was only the "extra push" of the Occupation that brought it into existence when it did. Both statements are probably correct.

But the specific conclusions of the authors are less important than the balanced way in which they have brought together materials from official Supreme Commander Allied Powers sources, from the Japanese government, from Japanese scholarship and journalism, and from personal observation and experience, to reach the conclusions. It would be as ungenerous as it is easy to take issue with many items in the first edition of a work so encyclopedic and preliminary in character. One would like to debate many points with the authors, but in the nature of the case these will continue to be debated for many years ahead.

It is to be hoped, however, since the book is intended as a textbook, that later editions will exercise a degree of care commensurate with its importance. The present edition is marred by many petty errors and infelicities of expression that seem to arise from a haste to cover ground or an assumption that the reader knows more of the subject than he is in fact likely to. There is also a tendency to include too much administrative detail of a transient kind, like tables of organization of government departments, better left to appendices, that might very well change at any time.

But with all the criticism that may be made, the student now has available for the first time within the covers of a single book comprehensive accounts of the development of Japan's new Constitution, of her postwar political party situation (although slightly outdated by the recent unification of factions on both the conservative and the socialist sides), and the postwar changes in the main institutions of government.

The reader will be particularly grateful for the intelligent selection of important documents, translated in full, in the appendices.

HERBERT PASSIN
Ohio State University

DOROTHY WOODMAN. *The Republic of Indonesia.* Pp. ix, 444. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $6.00.

The Indonesian government, through its Ministry of Information, has for some years invited certain journalists and writers to visit its new Republic and to observe the functioning of life and society there. Naturally the Indonesian government hopes that its visitors will be favorably impressed and will convey their impressions to the world at large. Miss Woodman, who was such a visitor in 1951, has probably surpassed the wildest hopes of her Indonesian hosts. In fact she was so impressed by all that Indonesians told and showed her that her book may prove slightly embarrassing to those Indonesians who are sensitive to having every shred of their propaganda so uncritically exposed to world view.

Miss Woodman believes, rightly enough, that Indonesia has been concentrated too much about Djakarta (Preface) and sets as her aim in this book the discovery of how far the Republic has moved toward its goal of unity in diversity (p. 14). Four hundred pages later, and after losing sight of her original purpose completely, she startles her reader by announcing that Indonesia's current problem is one of maintaining diversity in unity (p. 423). So much for all that.

In the intervening four hundred pages, Miss Woodman has surveyed the major islands of the archipelago, filled in historical backgrounds up to 1942 when the Japanese invaded the East Indies, provided a grapping story of the Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence, and dipped into current developments in the fields of education, culture, social welfare, politics, and economics.

The only parts of the book which have a raison d'être are those parts in which Miss Woodman describes her trips to and impressions of the various islands. Her descrpition of Sumatran landscape as "Green jungle, green mangrove swamps, green plantations; the colour never changed, only the shade" (p. 37), shows a certain flair for descriptive prose. Unfortunately, however, Miss Woodman is not content to write a travelogue for which she would be eminently suited, but has instead felt the need to produce a book that is "scientific." The results are deplorable.

The historical sections of the book are laden with factual errors. Most of these are undoubtedly due to carelessness. But some, such as underestimating the Christian Bataks at 80,000 (p. 56) rather than more accurately estimating them at 600,000, and placing the number of pupils in Dutch-aided schools in 1940 at 66,000 (p. 144) instead of about 2 million for all schools or about 150,000 for Dutch-language schools, are errors which serve to heighten Miss Woodman's tendencies of deprecating all non-British colonialism, judging all matters by current standards, and accepting anything told by an Indonesian as the Gospel.

The Japanese occupation and struggle for Indonesian independence read like a third-rate "Western." Good and bad characters are clearly distinguished, and they never once step out of line until in the end good triumphs. This reviewer would like to see a little more footnoting in this section.

In describing developments in the independent Republic, Miss Woodman is factually more accurate than in her earlier historical sections, but she is short on interpretation. The surface phenomena, be they political, educational, or economic, are all that catch her eye and imagination. She remains throughout oblivious to many

of the deeper processes that make up Indonesian life.

ROBERT VAN NIEL
Russell Sage College

M. PHILIPS PRICE. *A History of Turkey from Empire to Republic.* Pp. 224. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956. $4.50.

This is a brief, succinct work dealing with the development of the Turkey from the days of the Ottoman Empire through the great revolutionary transformation which has occurred under the Turkish Republic. The author, a member of the British Parliament and a journalist, has had a long acquaintance with the Turkish scene and treats his subject with a discerning intelligence and understanding; he has written a work which should attract the general reader with a particular interest in the Near East.

Essentially the work is divided into three basic parts: the first treats of the Ottoman period in very broad sweep, tracing developments from the Osmanli beginnings, through the period of Ottoman greatness in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and thence into the era of decline and the nineteenth-century attempts at reform. Similarly, he treats of the era of transition, largely under Ataturk, after the founding of the Republic; this is also true of the final portion of the book, which deals with modern Turkey and sketches its constitutional system, analyzes political developments, discusses the evolution of the Moslem religion in its modern setting, makes note of the great economic problems, and traces the basic position of Turkey in its Near Eastern setting and in relationship both to the West and the Soviet Union.

This is not an exhaustive work and it does not pretend to be. The reader is not likely to find a basic treatment, therefore, of any aspect of the Turkish drama. Nor will he find more than a very few basic works listed as bibliography at the end of specific chapters. But it is well-written and well-illustrated, and the general reader will find study of it well worth the while.

HARRY N. HOWARD
Arlington, Va.

PHILOSOPHY

R. M. MACIVER (Ed.). *Great Moral Dilemmas in Literature, Past and Present.* Pp. viii, 189. New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1956. (Distributed by Harper & Brothers.) $3.00.

Teachers of logic are fond of exhibiting the dilemma as an example of spooky wizardry. In a classical dilemma, they pontificate, you wave a wand over two premises characterized by ifs, ands, and buts, and you produce—presto, a conclusion which is definite and categorical. Thus:

First premise (purely hypothetical). If a is true, then x is true; and if b is true, then x is true.

Second premise (purely contingent). Either a is true or b is true.

Conclusion (categorical). x, inescapably, is true.

Each of the thirteen moral dilemmas displayed in MacIver's volume can, by judicious stretching and chopping, be fitted into the standard form, somewhat in this fashion: when faced with a choice between a and b, if I choose a, my conscience will pinch; and if I choose b, some other part of me will pinch. But I must choose between a and b. Hence, inescapably, some part of me will pinch.

The thirteen crucial forks in the road selected for the book from moral and literary history are mapped out and explored by the discussants with imaginative analyses, comparisons, and syntheses. Antigone's choice between filial duty and a tyrant's edict, Socrates' between the bitter cup and his friends' offer of an escape plan, Job's between humility and rebellion, Faust's between transcendent but all-too-temporary joy and eternal salvation through self-denial, and Hamlet's between impetuous spontaneity and deliberate proving of the rightness of his purpose are among the earlier battles of the human psyche which are chronicled in this volume, with sympathy, humor, and depth.

Moral crises in more recent literary masterworks, selected as "great" for the purposes of the volume, include Caponsacchi's, in *The Ring and the Book;* Captain Vere's, in Herman Melville's *Billy Budd;* Gregers Werle's, in Ibsen's *The Wild Duck;* and Lieutenant Maryk's, in *The Caine Mutiny.* The remaining topics, completing the thirteen, are Euripides' *Bacchae,* Shaw's *Major Barbara,* the *Ethan Frome* of Edith Wharton, and Mann's *Death in Venice.*

These scintillating discussions were presented at a series of luncheon meetings sponsored in the winter of 1954–55 by the Institute for Religious and Social Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York. Best known among the participants are Richard McKeon, Whitney Oates, Lionel Trilling, and George N. Shuster.

Several of the thirteen authors weave their tales about the Kantianly rigid question, What is right? But Charles Frankel, in his comments on *Major Barbara,* sounds a call for humanistic flexibility. We do not, he says, "have to make the choice between Efficient Power and Inefficient Virture. . . . Political reform does not follow moral regeneration nearly so much as moral regeneration follows social reform. . . . Power is not something inherently immoral . . . it is only when it is cheapened to worthlessness for some and made impossibly dear to others, that it becomes a curse." In other words, the second premise (either a is true or b is true) is seldom a complete statement of the alternatives.

WILLIAM GERBER
Washington, D. C.

PAUL EDWARDS. *The Logic of Moral Discourse.* Pp. 248. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $4.00.

Children have no special trouble in learning to use such words as "good" and "should." Linguists have not felt it necessary to devote special attention to such terms. Why, then, have philosophers for several decades been making such a stir over the meaning of value terms and the nature of value-judgments? And why has so little objective agreement been reached?

Part of the answer lies in the fact that no really comprehensive theory of signs (or theory of meaning) yet exists. Considerable clarity has been attained as to the nature and uses of the scientific and mathematical forms of expression. But the senses in which such value terms as "good" and "should" signify, and the ways in which they function and are controlled, are still largely matters of dispute.

Paul Edwards' *The Logic of Moral Discourse* is one of a number of recent books which mark genuine progress in this difficult domain. The strategy he follows is to analyze with care common speech in which value terms occur, in the endeavor to see what is going on when something is said to be good or when it is said that a certain action ought to be performed. He is thus led to distinguish various senses of such expressions as "means" and "follows from." It is then argued that "ethical terms are convenient ways of doing several things at once. They serve to refer to certain qualities or features, to express the speaker's moral attitude, and in several cases also to recommend a certain attitude or certain conduct to one's audience" (p. 221). In maintaining that such a term as "good" has both referential and emotive meaning, Edwards combines the emotive and objective naturalistic points of view—Sidney Hook in the Foreword calls it "the soundest and most systematic fusion" of these traditions. Imperatives are not regarded by Edwards as having referential meaning (in the sense of being true or false), but they are assigned a type of meaning which makes them subject to justification. And a class of imperatives (those containing "ought") are said to "follow from or are implied by certain factual statements" (p. 133) in certain commonly employed senses of "follow from" and "imply."

The book shows affinities with the positions of John Dewey, C. L. Stevenson, and Stuart Hampshire. The argument, however, is novel, and the analysis is penetrating. In my opinion the book is, in Edwards' sense of "good," a good book.

CHARLES MORRIS
University of Chicago

IRIS WESSEL MUELLER. *John Stuart Mill and French Thought.* Pp. viii, 275. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956. $4.00.

This scholarly monograph is a substantial contribution to the history of economic, political, and social thought during the second third of the nineteenth century. It is, perhaps, even more useful and valuable as a history of French thought in these fields than it is as an explanation of the influence of French thinking on the intellectual and doctrinal evolution of Mill's own views, although the latter responsibility is completely executed. The study can be regarded as really definitive. The author has not only made use of the conventional sources but also of Mill's unpublished letters and of articles only recently shown to have been of Mill's authorship.

The book covers the genesis of Mill's interest in French thought and the impact made upon his opinions by the Revolution of 1830 and its reactionary aftermath, by the Saint-Simonians, by the social science and reform program of Auguste Comte, by Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of democracy, and by the Revolution of 1848. It ends with an enlightening discussion of the manner in which Mill absorbed, digested, and evaluated the totality of this French thinking in his later years.

Space permits only a scanty and rather superficial summation, for the book is closely knit and highly factual. It is, in itself, a summary of the results of wide reading and careful reflection. The main thesis of the book is that, next to English classical economics and the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, with which Mill started his intellectual development, French thought exerted the greatest influence upon his mature system of economic and political doctrine.

The reactionary and selfish class-interest in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1830 provided Mill with disillusionment relative to the dogma of inevitable, orderly, and rational progress through political agencies. This made him the more receptive to the views of the Saint-Simonians, notably their dogmas of historical and planned social progress; but he was repelled by their fanaticism. Yet, they also led him to investigate the positive social philosophy of Auguste Comte and the latter's plan of social reorganization. Mill was especially impressed by Comte's original methodology, but he rejected the notion that the moral improvement of mankind can be brought about by imposing a totalitarianism of the intellectual élite upon society. Dr. Mueller believes, however, that Comte exerted a greater influence upon Mill than any other French theorist.

De Tocqueville's study and appraisal of democracy, especially American democracy, undermined Mill's confidence in any uncritical eulogy of democracy, stressed the need of a relativistic and qualified approach to any type of government, and suggested a truly scientific attitude toward political problems. If Comte led Mill to recognize the dangers in a government by an all-powerful intellectual élite, de Tocqueville revealed with equal clarity the menace of "an all-powerful government by the majority of the mediocre and suspicious masses." This impelled Mill to seek a compromise which would solve the dilemma.

De Tocqueville had suggested that voluntary associations might protect mankind against the main evils of democracy in the political field. The Revolution of 1848 appeared to vindicate comparable relief through voluntary associations in the economic area—a "means by which to protect the individual from economic exploitation by a privileged few and as the means by which the individual might develop his powers of economic organization and self-direction." The Revolution also convinced Mill that "a man's economic life could not be considered apart from his political and social life." This led Mill to espouse in at least a moderate degree democratic socialism—"as long as Mill defended democracy, however qualified his defense might be, he was inevitably led to an acceptance of the fundamental concepts of the socialists."

In his later years, most of them spent in France, Mill digested what he had learned from the French. Essentially this was, as well stated by the author, ". . . to guarantee the fullest expansion of the capabilities of each man, all men had to be restricted and regulated," and ". . . a society could be so organized both as to keep its members from afflicting each other and to permit its members to help each other and themselves."

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Malibu, California

FRANCIS M. MYERS. *The Warfare of Democratic Ideals*. Pp. 261. Yellow Springs, O.: Antioch Press, 1956. $3.50.

Aware that many of the dominant philosophies and faiths of our time profess to be consonant with democracy, to lead to it, and to provide foundations and support for it, Professor Myers deemed it desirable to analyze their claims that confusion may be overcome by showing what social doctrines and institutional practice will follow from each of them, by revealing what democracy means and implies for each of them, and by examining the consonance of such meaning with any tenable definition of democracy. It is his conviction that on the one hand traditional empiricism, which is essentially positivistic, and both Neo-Thomism and modern Protestant Absolutism on the other, while otherwise poles apart and radically antagonistic, have in common a monistic, dogmatic, and a priori doctrine of truth, and of the meaning of knowledge thereof. For they create an unbridgeable dualism between scientific fact and moral and spiritual value, though the former insists that values are undemonstrable, while the latter argues that the former's so-called knowledge is ultimately erroneous and untrue, unless at least indirectly tied to a revealed faith. All of these views end ultimately in the arbitrament of force, overt or covert. All support, proclaim, or submit to final authoritarianism. None is ultimately democratic for those who reject or combat its premises. All are enemies of the open society, the open mind, and the human adventure conducted on the basis of lasting uncertainty, lasting seeking, and lasting creation.

By contrast, instrumentalism, which rejects value-freeness and a priori and unexaminable moral dogmas alike, creates no such dualism. It rejects the whole basic contrast between fact and value; rejects oppositions between pure individual and transcendent society; and rejects transitionalism and futurism. It emphasizes life as present, continuous, experimental. It insists that valuation, value-making, and value testing, with different values appropriate to different areas of experience, are everywhere involved in the processes of life as it is and must be lived by man, the finite and social animal. Men fulfill themselves in developing and expressing their personalities, at once unique and social. Such a doctrine implies and supports democracy. It leads to tenable definitions and uses of such concepts as equality and liberty. It avoids the errors of radical egalitarianism and of the alternatives of liberty as the absolute absence of restraint or as absolute conformity and priorly and authoritatively imposed obligation.

Mr. Myers succeeds extraordinarily well in relating fundamental philosophical positions to implications for and applications in social theory. He is particularly successful both in expounding and in revealing the weaknesses of the positivist position. His statement of Neo-Thomism is excellent, though he would have been fairer to its social-political implications had he supplemented the teachings of Maritain with those of Yves Simon. To represent the Protestant point of view by the idealists Royce and Hocking rather than Reinhold Neibuhr or some other contemporary Protestant philosophers interested in social thought results in systematic clarity, but also in some uncompensated losses of breadth and insight. Nor is Myers completely fair to *the whole* of Royce's position.

The sympathetic exposition of instrumentalism and his relating of M. C. Otto's concept of Creative Bargaining to Dewey's philosophy, from which it derives, should do much to restore the prestige by clarifying the actual meaning of this viewpoint, which today is too often the subject of unfair caricature or facile dismissal.

Myers' major fault is his use of the term "conservatism" both loosely and pejoratively. Nevertheless, the defects in this book are minor; the undertaking and the accomplishment alike major.

THOMAS I. COOK

Johns Hopkins University

From Alexander to Constantine: Passages and Documents Illustrating the History

of Social and Political Ideas, 336 B.C.–A.D. 337. Pp. xxiv, 505. Translated by ERNEST BARKER. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. $8.00.

This volume, which the distinguished author regards as his last contribution to the study of ancient political thought, completes a trilogy of which the two earlier parts are his *Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors* (1918) and his *Politics of Aristotle* (1946). As its subtitle indicates, the present work is a collection of readings selected from ancient authors and documents of the Hellenistic and Roman periods with interpretative essays, Introductions, and Notes which give unity and cohesion to the collection and raise it from the level of an ordinary source book to that of a first-rate interpretation of the subject.

The selections are grouped in five periods: The Hellenistic Period, 336–146 B.C.; Hellenistic Jewish Thought, 200 B.C.–A.D. 50; The Period of Latin Thought, 100 B.C.–A.D. 100; Later Greek Thought: from Posidonius to Themistius; The Social and Political Ideas of the Christian Church down to the Age of Constantine. Each period is provided with an explanatory essay, and there are shorter Introductions to the individual selections which with the essays furnish the necessary background for their understanding. As is obvious, the periods overlap chronologically, and they are not treated as mutually exclusive intellectually, the interrelation of their ideas being well brought out by the author. Actually, the Latin period does not end with A.D. 100 but goes on to include extracts from the Roman jurists up to A.D. 235.

One central theme running through all the periods is the development of monarchy in the Hellenistic Roman world. This is treated in three essays, one on the Hellenistic kingdom, the second on monarchical ideas at Rome from the beginning of the second century B.C. to A.D. 37, and the last on monarchy in Rome from the death of Augustus to the reign of Constantine I. There is little that one can criticize in the selection of passages or the interpretations of the author. He writes with the sure touch of a ripe scholar and, although he dispenses with a bibliography and elaborate footnotes, he reveals a complete mastery of ancient sources and the more pertinent modern authorities. It is unfortunate, however, that the selection from the *Res Gestae* of Augustus on page 229 follows E. G. Hardy's translation and thus ignores the all-important correction of the reading "dignity" to "authority." On page 89, the date for Philo should be A.D. not B.C.

A detailed Table of Contents, a list of important dates, an Index of excerpts, and another of persons and subjects add to the usefulness of the book.

A. E. R. BOAK
University of Michigan

SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

FRANKLIN FRAZIER. *Bourgeoisie Noire*. Pp. 235. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1955. 870 *fr*.

Although Frazier's main concern here is the Negro middle class, actually this work is a concise account of the experience of Negroes in the United States.

In brief, the predicament of the Negro middle class is this: it has rejected its social heritage, it has cut itself off from the Negro masses, and it has been rejected by the white world. As a consequence of living constantly under the domination and scorn of white men, Negroes have come to believe in their inferiority. Middle class Negroes have sought to compensate for their isolation by ostentatious spending. Money enables them to create a false impression of their place in American society. According to Frazier, they live in a world of make believe, "a world of bluff" in which they themselves have come to believe.

One of the main aspects of the "world of masks" is the myth of Negro business, that is, the belief that Negroes will own factories, banks, and stores in large numbers and that they will employ many Negroes. Incorporated in this myth is the belief that economic success will bring the respect of the white population. Frazier takes this myth apart and exposes Negro business for what it is, an insignificant segment of the American economy.

The Negro press, one of the most prosperous of Negro businesses, is one of the most important influences in creating and perpetuating the "world of bluff." Negro newspapers and magazines, according to the author, are conservative and have no principles or values except those of a material and social ("society") nature.

The failure of whites to take Negroes seriously and their attitude that Negro activities are unimportant encourage a spirit of irresponsibility and an attitude of "play" among middle-class Negroes. Frazier concludes that education, business, the professions, art, politics, and religion are not taken seriously by the majority of this class. Their main preoccupations are said to lie in sports, metaphysics, spiritualism, and games of chance.

Frazier asks, but does not answer except by implication, the question of what meaning the fate of the Negro middle class in the United States has for the middle classes of other racial and cultural minorities created by the expansion of European capitalism and European civilization. To the reviewer it does not necessarily follow that Negro middle classes elsewhere will reach the same destination. In some colonial areas, as Frazier points out, the middle class plays a role in the economic organization of society. In many cases, it will renounce parts of its cultural heritage, but this abandonment may not go as far as it has in the Negro middle class in the United States. The acculturative process in African societies may resemble Caribbean developments more than those in the United States. Social stratification may occur along lines of education, color (not necessarily light), and party. The quasi-pathological separate (*racial*) community will be absent. There will be no memories of *racial* slavery within the new independent African countries, and Negro peoples will constitute 90 to 99 per cent rather than 10 per cent of these populations. Finally, subordinated racial groups elsewhere are being exposed to non-Western and non-European, as well to European and American, influences.

This excellent study is a clinical analysis of the Negro middle class in the United States, but, at the same time, it is an enlightening portrayal of the white population vis-à-vis the Negro group.

GEORGE E. SIMPSON
Oberlin College

CARL WITTKE. *The Irish in America*. Pp. xi, 319. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956. $5.00.

"This book cannot be regarded as a definitive study, but it will help fill a gap in the literature of the history of immigration, and it is an honest attempt to deal objectively, yet sympathetically, with a group whose history is both a colorful and controversial chapter in the total story of American immigration" (p. vi). So the author defines and describes the purpose of his work. Carl Wittke has indeed provided a warm and sympathetic treatment of the Irish immigrant, his life in Ireland during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, his emigration from Erin, his arrival in the United States, and his social, economic, and political adjustment in his adopted land. The book is a rich source of facts on the individual accomplishments of Irish-Americans. At times, it is almost a Who's Who of the more successful Irish immigrants: Civil War generals, journalists, business, professional, and labor leaders, actors and figures in the world of sports. Because of this emphasis the unwary may conclude that most Irish were highly successful.

The author, however, has not entirely neglected the struggles of the Irish immigrants with Nativism, and the unfortunate draft riots in New York City. His chapter on the Irish and the Negro is exceptionally well done. Students of minority-group relations will find much here to ponder over as they will too in the discussion of Irish-American relations with other ethnic groups. The Fenian fiasco will amaze those unaware of the fact that the Irish actually attempted an invasion of Canada.

The weak point of this work, if it may be so termed in view of the writer's purpose, is an overemphasis on facts and description and an underemphasis on thorough analysis of the factors at work. Depth

has been sacrificed for breadth. Irish-Catholic immigrants, and this means most Irish immigrants after 1840, were characterized by a religious-nationalism or a nationalistic-religion. Nationalism is treated at length and religion is not neglected, but the full pervasiveness of the latter in the lives of most Catholic immigrants has perhaps not been thoroughly explored. The author concludes his story with the independence of Erin in 1932, but another chapter on the controversy over partition of Ulster would have brought it up to date.

JOHN J. KANE
University of Notre Dame

UNESCO. *The Positive Contribution by Immigrants*. Pp. 199. Paris: UNESCO, 1955. $2.25.

The third book in the series, *Population and Culture*, published by UNESCO, this little volume, cheaply bound in paper cover, is a symposium prepared by the International Sociological Association (Oscar Handlin *rapporteur*) and the International Economic Association (Brinley Thomas *rapporteur*). It consists in the main of five national studies by well-known students of the subject: the United States, by Oscar and Mary F. Handlin; the United Kingdom, by Julius Isaac; Australia, by W. D. Borrie; Brazil, by Emilio Willems; and the Argentine Republic, by Jorge Hechen. In this reviewer's opinion, the ones on Australia and Brazil are the best.

The purpose of the symposium was to examine the positive contributions that immigrants have made to the economic, social, and cultural life of the receiving countries. Actually, most of the material relates to the history and characteristics of the various movements. There is no systematic conceptualization or analysis of what a "contribution" in these fields would be. In the economic aspect the term "influence" or "effect" is more frequently used. Here, most of the writers agree, the "contribution" has been greatest (or is it more measurable?), such as addition to the labor force and introduction of special skills, new crops and agricultural methods, and new business enterprises. In the social and cultural field the influence appears negligible, in that the organization and structure of life of the receiving countries have not been fundamentally altered except temporarily where the immigrants have formed relatively isolated communities perpetuating their old culture. Is this latter condition a contribution or an addition to social and cultural complexity? In the long run, assimilation has been the rule in the cases presented here, with the major effect on the culture and social organization of the immigrants, not the host society. Frequent reference is made to individual contributions by scientists, artists, inventors, of foreign birth; but as Willems point out, it is difficult to determine the degree to which such achievements may be attributed to their ethnic background. At any rate, there has been an appreciable number of gifted individuals among immigrants, especially it would appear among the recent refugee type. Most immigrant-receiving countries would probably report out of their experience that immigration has had beneficial as well as harmful effects. They would tend to put limits on its volume and show preference for certain ethnic groups, but they would regard the net result as good. The case for immigration could be put much more strongly than has been done in this volume.

MAURICE R. DAVIE
Yale University

DANIEL M. WILNER, ROSABELLE PRICE WALKLEY, and STUART W. COOK. *Human Relations in Interracial Housing: A Study of the Contact Hypothesis*. Pp. xv, 167. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $4.00.

This book summarizes one in a series of studies surveying attitudes of white residents in public interracial housing towards Negroes. Previous research is summarized briefly in the appendix. The general hypothesis was "that equal-status contact between members of initially antagonistic ethnic groups under circumstances not marked by competition for limited goods or by strong social disapproval of intergroup friendliness tends to result in favorable attitude change" (p. 4).

It was predicted that in these rather self-contained and noncompetitive situations proximity to Negroes would lead to contact and neighborly interaction with them, perception of social norms favorable to such interaction would be more likely, and more favorable attitudes toward Negroes would result.

Data were obtained from housewives living nearby and far from Negro residents through sampling, interview, and coding procedures of survey research. The study plan was ex post facto rather than longitudinal. Initial attitudes were inferred from background factors, residence data, and recall.

The housing projects differed from those studied previously in that the proportion of Negroes was lower (approximately 10 per cent) and projects were located outside of metropolitan New York. Two of the four projects were in New England and two were in Middle Atlantic states. In each locale, one project was segregated and one was integrated.

The data indicate that higher proportions of white housewives living near to Negroes, rather than far from them, had friendly interaction with Negro residents, considered norms favorable to such interaction, and reported more favorable evaluations of Negroes within and outside of the projects. Attitudes were most favorable among residents who both engaged in neighborly interaction with Negroes and perceived norms approving such associations. Perception of favorable norms was conducive to favorable attitudes even in "the absence of contact beyond casual greeting" (p. 111). Data do not support explanation of the differences between "near" and "far" residents on the basis of differences in initial attitudes.

The authors note that sheer proximity and contact of Negroes and whites are insufficient conditions for attitude change (p. 146). Among the "multiplicity of other factors" noted are initial attitudes, situational factors within the project, the intentions of the planners, project policies, community norms, and the norms of the residents' other reference groups. Doubtless, future research may profitably concentrate on more intensive analysis of such factors, particularly upon the relative contribution of influences producing favorable norms for interracial association.

MUZAFER SHERIF
University of Oklahoma

PETER H. ROSSI. *Why Families Move: A Study in the Social Psychology of Urban Residential Mobility*. Conducted under the joint sponsorship of the Bureau of Applied Social Research and the Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing Studies of Columbia University. Pp. x, 220. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $4.00.

Why Families Move represents an important step in extending demographic research into the study of the sociopsychological factors affecting mobility. Rossi does so through his efforts to carry out his twofold goal of producing "an example of how modern social research methods can be employed in the study of residential mobility" and of drawing upon his findings for "generalizations concerning the social psychology of residential mobility." Since the investigation was restricted to four census tracts of Philadelphia (each tract representing an extreme combination of high or low residential mobility and high or low socioeconomic status), the findings on the social psychology of residential mobility are, of course, limited and cannot be generalized to other types of urban areas or to urban places in general without further testing. Worthy of such testing would be Rossi's findings that changes in stages of the life cycle and the subjective evaluation of the adequacy of dwelling space resulting from such changes are the significant factors for explaining mobility behavior.

The unique feature of Rossi's study is the research design by which he proceeds from the measurement and analysis of mobility inclinations and intentions, as derived from survey data, to the measurement and analysis of actual mobility behavior as ascertained in a recheck eight months after the initial survey. In analyzing mobility inclinations, two indices were devised: the Mobility Potential Index, based on age of head of household, size of household, and tenure preference of the family; and the Complaints Index,

based on complaints about dwelling unit space, cost, and social and physical environment. Together, these indices provided a good basis for predicting those households whose inclinations to move would be converted into intentions to do so. By employing expressions of mobility intentions, Rossi, in turn, found that accurate predictions of mobility behavior could be achieved in about nine out of ten cases.

In addition to this predictive scheme of mobility behavior, Rossi devised an accounting scheme for analyzing the reasons why households moved, and why they chose the particular new home into which they moved. This scheme further demonstrates the possibility and the value of examining the sociopsychological aspects of both the "push" and the "pull" factors that account for mobility.

In providing us with these analytic techniques for probing the sociopsychological dimensions of the mobility process and in presenting the substantive results which led him to conclude that the major function of residential mobility for individual families is to bring the family's housing into adjustment to its housing needs, Rossi has rendered an important service to researchers and social planners. The methods of analysis employed here could have application in fields other than residential mobility. The more significant contribution of this work, therefore, will be the stimulus that it may provide both for improving these techniques so that their analytic and predictive value is increased, and for adapting them and the goals which they attempt to achieve to other areas of demographic research.

SIDNEY GOLDSTEIN
Brown University

JESSIE BERNARD. *Remarriage: A Study of Marriage.* Pp. xii, 372. New York: Dryden Press, 1956. $3.75.

No brief review can do justice to this rich contribution to a neglected area. The book is intended for textbook use, but contains valuable research material largely derived from 2,009 cases of remarriage reported by informants.

In Part I remarriage is clearly designated as a common and important type of marriage with implications for first marriages. In Part II, comparative institutional aspects are considered and a statistical overview is given. Part III considers the remarriageable population, selection mechanisms, and courtship in remarriage with insight and with good judgment; thus correcting the youth-centered bias in previous writings. In Part IV, Bernard considers the achievement of solidarity in remarriages, with and without children. A chapter each is devoted to competition and conflict. Part V deals with success in remarriage from the point of view of parents and children and concludes with an impressive statement concerning the implications of a study of remarriage. The four appendices analyze in detail the findings from the 2,009 cases of remarriage, representing an hypothetical community called "Utopolis." The data reveal marital, class, attitudinal, and relationship or "team" factors favorable to success in remarriage. In general, selection of superior people from the remarriageable population and a weeding out of the divorce-prone make for substantial success in remarriage.

The merits of this fine book include a refutation of stereotypes concerning the divorced as basically maladjusted, stepchildren as hostile, and so forth. There are very practical findings, for example, facts concerning the ill effects of alternating custody of children. Illuminating distinctions are made, for example, those between divorce and marital madadjustment, the divorced and the divorcing, and personality and "team" factors. Much needed contributions are made to the typology of family relationships and useful devices such as the success ratios are developed for comparative analysis of marital adjustment data.

The hypothetical assumption that the 2,009 cases of remarriage represent a community (Utopolis) inferred from the characteristics of remarried subjects may contribute to methodology. One might, however, better label it, with Butler, "Erewhon" or perhaps reason more from characteristics of informants in contrast to those of subjects. It is possible, too, that halo effects in the reporting of informants are not fully considered. Case materials as used contribute more to the textbook goal than to the sociological goal.

At times, sex differences in operation of class factors seem unappreciated, as for example, the differential divorced status of educated women as compared with educated men. One would appreciate further explanation of the "team" factor in terms of satisfaction and needs acquired from prior experience. This reviewer does definitely question Bernard's proposition that age is favorable to women (p. 146).

Minor reservations and criticisms do not affect the over-all judgment that the book is a comprehensive, scholarly, lucid, and uniquely original contribution to the sociology of the family.

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK
Indiana University

MORRIS S. SCHWARTZ and EMMY LANNING SHOCKLEY. *The Nurse and the Mental Patient: A Study in Interpersonal Relations.* Pp. 289. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1956. $3.50.

The authors—Dr. Schwartz, a research sociologist, and Mrs. Shockley, a psychiatric nurse and teacher—have drawn on their experiences and research to present one aspect of the nursing care of the mentally ill, the interpersonal relations between patients and nurses.

Part I describes the various problem situations commonly found in a mental hospital and the part played by the patient and the nurse. It is made clear that the nurse, as well as the patient, may have feelings of fear, anxiety, hostility, and inadequacy. In the patient these feelings are manifested by behavior which frequently is bizarre. The nurse must not only learn to interpret the patient's needs and feelings; she must also learn to understand and accept her own reactions to patients and to problem situations. The interaction of nurse and patient and the way each may affect the other, either positively or negatively, are well illustrated. For example, in a particular situation the nurse may have "legitimate" reasons for being afraid. Her fear may serve to increase the patient's fear, the patient may express his fear by combative behavior, the nurse becomes more afraid, and so on. Because the patient is sick, and the nurse is not, this circular process can be broken only when the nurse develops an awareness of her own feelings and of the part they play in the total picture. She can then understand that the basis of the patient's behavior is his own fear, and a more positive relationship can be developed.

In Part II examples are given of ways in which the nurse may relate to and communicate with the patient and develop a better understanding of him and his behavior. The authors do not pretend to give all the answers; the nurse must often find her own solutions. As the authors state: "Nursing the mentally ill is a complex, difficult and demanding task if it is to result in therapeutic benefit for the patient." The nurse who uses this book as a guide will find her assignment less difficult and more rewarding, though no less demanding and complex.

Nursing education is only beginning to understand the importance of the concepts so ably presented in this book. With its clear presentation of the importance of interpersonal relationships in the area of psychiatric nursing, it may point the way to a keener awareness of the nurse's role in all areas of patient care.

ELIZABETH S. BIXLER
Yale University

HERMANN MANNHEIM and LESLIE T. WILKINS. *Prediction Methods in Relation to Borstal Training.* Pp. viii, 276. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955. (Distributed by British Information Services, New York.) $3.15.

The results of the first study of the prediction of criminal behavior to be made in England are presented in this book. As its title suggests the study represents a successful attempt to predict that criminality of boys and young men after undergoing an experience with the Borstal System of England. The central purpose of the study was to determine whether data contained within the Borstal files and in other official records could be systematized and utilized to predict the likelihood of recidivism of offenders released from a Borstal institution. As will be noted, this study is essentially similar in rationale to all studies

designed to predict criminal behavior. It, like all other such studies, attempts to employ the experiences gained in the past with different categories of offenders in forecasting the behavior of other groups of offenders who possess similar specific characteristics related to behavior predicted.

The sample used to develop the prediction or experience table contained initially 748 individuals selected randomly from a list of names, all boys admitted to two Borstal reception centers (one located at Wormwood Scrubs and the other at Latchmere House) during the period August 1, 1946 to July 31, 1947. The sample, constituting approximately one out of three cases received by the two centers during the period, is considered by the authors to be completely representative of all the boys committed to a Borstal institution during the period of the study. Twenty-five cases were dropped because they failed to meet certain requirements, and three more cases were later excluded since it was found impossible to classify them as success or failure.

Following the steps taken by many previous investigators in this area of research the sample of 720 youths was classified into two groups, those who failed and those who succeeded after release from a Borstal institution. Success was defined as "the absence of further conviction (other than simple fine) up to the 31st of August 1951 (p. 39), while failure was defined as one or more convictions during the indicated period. Once these two categories of offenders had been established, the information on each individual available within Borstal and other official files was analyzed to determine what factors were associated with after-release conduct. These analyses revealed that the following ten factors were most highly associated with behavior after release: total number of convictions; job changes during license; whether ever at Home Office School; longest period in any job; average duration of jobs; number of misdemeanors in Borstal; number of convictions resulting in fines; evidence of drunkenness; with whom the boy was living; age at first finding of guilt (p. 143).

The next step in the analysis involved the selection of the factors to be used in the prediction and the assignment of weights to these factors. This task was accomplished by utilizing the technique of multiple regression. Seven factors with their appropriate weights were employed in the prediction table. Limited as they were by the fact that official administrative records were the only source of data, the authors were compelled to base their prediction table upon 385 cases. Complete data upon the selected factors for prediction was available for only 385 cases.

In order to test the efficiency of their experience table (based upon pre-Borstal experience) all boys admitted to the Latchmere House Reception Center from July to December 1948 were scored and their probable behavior in release was predicted. A total of 338 boys were involved. The follow-up period for this validation study was three years in contrast to an average period of three and one-half years for the original group of boys. The results of this second study indicate a striking similarity between predicted and actual conduct.

The book is well worth serious study by all persons interested in this field of research. It should prove to be especially useful to penologists. The book is a significant addition to our growing body of knowledge in the field of prediction of recidivism.

ELIO D. MONACHESI
University of Minnesota

World Population and Resources. Pp. xxxvii, 339. London: Political and Economic Planning; New York: Essential Books, 1955. $4.80.

It is impossible to give an adequate account of the contents of this book in a brief review, but the chief factual material must be noted. The revolution in the control of contagious and infectious diseases which has taken place during the past several decades has already begun to show its effects, although in varying degrees, in most of what are now called the underdeveloped countries. Since the reduction in the death rate that has thus been attained has not yet been accompanied by any significant change in the birth rate, the immediate effect is to widen the gap between the birth rate and the death rate in most of these underdeveloped countries whose populations constitute 60 per cent or more of mankind. Hence today the actual increase in man's numbers is greater than ever and seems quite likely to become still greater before there is any decrease in the birth rate which would lessen this growth gap.

Naturally the question arises whether the large and probably more rapid increase of world population during the next three or four decades can be fed at a level which will insure better health and general welfare. The answer given is that significant improvement is problematical, that there is no assurance that this can be done in spite of the fact that a rapid application of the best agricultural knowledge now available would enable the world as a whole to increase its food faster than population is likely to grow. There are very serious obstacles to achieving a rapid application of good agricultural practices in these underdeveloped areas.

At present rates of use certain minerals are already short in some areas and in the world as a whole some of the most important of them will be relatively scarce by the year 2000 A.D. Furthermore, if the underdeveloped areas achieve the rapid industrialization most of them are striving for, many minerals will soon become scarce and costly because of the rapid increase in the use of those of better quality.

A general conclusion is: "If the population of the world were stable and if peace prevailed, the prospects of an improving standard of living would be excellent. If the underdeveloped countries continue to increase their populations by from 1 to 2% a year or even more, then the problem of improving standards of living seems likely in many cases to be beyond human power" (p. 104).

This report recognizes the fact that the problem of providing a better living for the growing population of the next few decades is not a world problem in the sense that the world is or is likely to become a well-integrated economic unit during that period. In other words, it is recognized that each national state has a problem peculiar to itself. But in spite of this recognition the reviewer feels that the emphasis is too strongly on world conditions. The rather casual treatment of the distinctive conditions in each of nineteen nations which constitutes Part II seems to the reviewer quite inadequate to counterbalance the emphasis on world conditions in Part I.

The air of having made a great discovery that there is a serious problem facing the world today because of the relatively rapid growth of population in the underdeveloped areas, which crops out in several places, seems a little naive in view of the considerable amount of attention various aspects of this matter have received during the past twenty-five to thirty years. This is probably due to the report's actually being put together by a secretary to whom the collation of the relevant data seemed to lead to new conclusions which were both somewhat surprising and alarming.

On the whole this is a very good report, and the reviewer hopes that it may reach a large number of people and start them to thinking seriously about the relations between population growth and the betterment of economic conditions in all parts of the world and to a much wider discussion of the effects of these relations on world politics.

WARREN S. THOMPSON
Oxford, O.

ROBERT REDFIELD. *Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization.* Pp. vii, 163. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. $2.75.

As anthropologists turned from exclusive concern with small, primitive communities and claimed interest in culture of no matter what degree of complexity, they became dissatisfied with the model of the *isolated* social system. Previously they had studied each tribal group as though it lived in a society without neighbors. Gradually the invalidity of this assumption became apparent as communities began to be studied which were clearly not self-sufficient. The degree of a community's participation in the larger societal whole is now seen to vary. That is, "scale" may

differ, as Godfrey and Monica Wilson express it in their important theoretical synthesis. But few ethnic groups can satisfactorially be understood without some reference to conditions beyond their boundaries. The peasant village is certainly a case in point.

A peasant is defined as a person who controls land and practices agriculture as "a way of life, not a business for profit." Many problems must be met in the study of such "part societies." How is the anthropologist to conceptualize adequately the inextricable network that binds the peasant to the national whole? Redfield offers a number of suggestions. He comments on the importance of the elite, or intelligentsia, as a link between the peasant village and the larger civilization. Through the local priest, teacher, or educated man the village receives intimations of the societal "great tradition" to which its own "little tradition" adjusts itself. Another problem confronting the anthropologist working in the peasant world is the study of philosophy and religion on a level hitherto reserved for different specialists. Redfield also suggests that peasant communities can generally be identified by a few dominant attitudes, like a reverent attitude to land, the idea that agricultural work is good, and emphasis on "productive industry." Exceptions to these attitudes are noted and explained, for example, in terms of the dominance which town life exerts on the peasant's value system.

The reviewer suggests that the concept of peasant culture is useful to the degree that it marks off a significant and distinctive sociocultural phenomenon. Redfield would probably agree. The book suggests that study of peasant life is peculiarly suited to enable the anthropologist to deal with the complex civilizations of modern times. Is this so? Why not rather collective farms, which are presumably excluded from the definition? The smaller scale Indians and Eskimo of northern Canada are trappers and hunters, but they also offer a perspective for studying involvement in a large society. Most are already converts to the latter's great tradition. The uniqueness implied for peasant communities is not clear. At best we are left with a not very significant economic basis of distinction.

JOHN J. HONIGMANN
University of North Carolina

LOUIS WIRTH. *Community Life and Social Policy.* Edited by Elizabeth Wirth Marvick and Albert J. Reis, Jr. Pp. xiv, 431. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. $6.00.

Friends and former students of Louis Wirth will be glad that the University of Chicago Press has published a posthumous collection of his more significant papers. Those who never had direct contact with Louis Wirth will find in this book a sort of landmark showing where American sociologists had arrived by World War II, particularly in their study of urbanism and of ethnic groups. Those who enjoy clear and simple exposition will be especially pleased with this array of twenty-five papers. Only four were never previously published; the other twenty-one appeared in various places over a period of twenty-five years, hence the usefulness of this collection.

No doubt some readers will say that this book contains nothing which is not already well known by those who have studied social science in general and sociology in particular. Perhaps they will be right. But this reviewer feels that, if the contents of these papers represent common knowledge of the American intelligentsia, it is precisely because of the writing and teaching of such men as Louis Wirth. In other words, we have here not a display of new findings from the latest research. Rather we have a clear and vigorous presentation of what social scientists—or at any rate sociologists—are pretty well agreed on.

To be sure there have been recent developments not reflected in this book. The ecological pattern of American cities is being altered by slum clearance and urban redevelopment. We are not only rid of the old rural-urban dichotomy, but are suspicious of the folk-rural-urban-metropolitan continuum. Moreover, we are no longer content to accept social disorganization as the usual concomitant of the transition from folk to cosmopolitan society. Finally, we are disposed to drop the term "minority group" as an appropriate label for all population elements with distinctive biological features, or cultural traits, or both, who receive differential treatment and conceive themselves in terms of prejudice and discrimination.

To return to an earlier comment about this book as representing the achievement of American sociology, at least in certain areas, it is in order to note that these papers are interrelated, but do not constitute a system of thought. In this respect too they represent the discipline. It has been experiencing a convergence of "theory" and "research"; but even today it displays conceptual schemes unsupported by empirical evidence and great quantities of data unorganized by any unifying frame of reference.

So the work of Louis Wirth stands rather truly and properly representative of the development of one of the social sciences, sociology, down almost to the present.

STUART A. QUEEN
Washington University

HOWARD BECKER. *Man in Reciprocity: Introductory Lectures on Culture, Society and Personality.* Pp. xx, 459. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. $6.50.

This textbook consists of twenty-nine chapters of approximately the same length, each one apparently a fifty-minute lecture. They are the variously edited composite of three different recordings of lectures by Becker in the introductory course in sociology at the University of Wisconsin, given to freshmen as well as on the air.

The title is derived from the fact that for the purposes of the course, "sociology represents the scientific analysis of man in reciprocity." The analysis falls roughly into three parts. Chapters I–XV are concerned with the nature and function of sociology, general modes of social organization, the over-all value-systems of the different types of societies, the peculiar nature of human nature, the types of personality reciprocally related with these modes of societal organization and value-system, and some of the reciprocal changes that personalities undergo with a shift from one kind of societal organization and its accompanying value-system to a contrasting kind. Chapters XVI–XXV are devoted to the major *functioning* parts of society, the closely interlaced network of its institutions, with attention to certain features of the family, political, economic, religious, and educational institutions. Chapters XXVI–XXVIII—the most strictly "sociological" of all—treat social contacts, certain social processes, and mention the (for Becker) major types of structures.

The whole work is pure Becker. The great bulk of the conceptual content is drawn from Becker's well-known contributions to social science in his published works (some thirty-four are cited, pp. 451–53). The breadth, the diversity, and the charm of the treatment are also typically Becker. Here are case and illustrative materials from cultures of all eras and levels, a host of apt colloquial expressions, the use of proverbs and *bon mots,* right-out-of-life experiences, and particularly Becker's special *forte,* the extensive use of poetry. Doubtless, many listeners became Becker "fans."

At the same time the treatment is occasionally abstract and esoteric and assumes a breadth of cultural background that freshmen from three-room rural high schools do not have.

Unlike most introductory texts, this is not an effort to synthesize the recent and current formal sociological theory and research reports. Relatively little of the standard sociological terminology and conceptualization appears. A limited number of select ideas are developed, sometimes at considerable length. The humanistic aspects of men in reciprocity are frequently stressed. The usual instrumental paraphernalia of tables, charts, graphs, are lacking. Also, due to its nature as oral exposition, the presentation is often less close-knit, "lean," and definitive than most textbooks try to be. However, the co-ordinated use of these lectures with any one of eight widely used introductory texts is indicated.

J. O. HERTZLER
University of Nebraska.

ECONOMICS

SIDNEY SCHOEFFLER. *The Failures of Economics: A Diagnostic Study.* Pp. xiii, 254. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $4.75.

Early in 1956 the magazine, *Newsweek* (January 30, 1956, pp. 78 ff.) carried a story entitled, "What's Wrong With the Top U. S. Economists," and answered, in effect, that their predictions (which varied greatly from economist to economist) failed to be confirmed by the subsequent course of events; that economists refused to predict more than six months ahead; and that, if they did, the predictions were so hedged about with "gobbledygook" that a business man could not make use of them. Apparently most of the economists referred to were those connected with banks, newspapers, business organizations, and so forth. About the same time the *New York Times* (January 1, 1956, Section 3, pp. 1 ff.) carried forecasts of the probable course of the stock markets in 1956 which differed greatly. Today there is a great deal of surveying of the intentions of business men and consumers, which commonly are not carried out, and a great deal of fiscal planning based on the unconfirmed notion that at present governmental income as well as expenditure can be accurately foreseen. In fact there is probably as much interest in soothsaying today as in Graeco-Roman times. Upon all of this the author of the present book (described by W. Leontief as "the best critical study dealing with broad methodological problems of economics, and social sciences" to appear in years) pours ice water much as St. Augustine did upon the work of his soothsayer contemporaries.

Professor Schoeffler, having posed his problem, reviews explanations of the economist's incapacity for prediction and then proceeds to argue that the concepts, analytical tools, and investigative instruments used by the economist "are basically incompatible" with the subject matter he studies. Analysis of a series of economic models and approaches in current use discloses a number of methodological weaknesses, while consideration of the economist's conception of economic system reveals him to be utilizing systems that are in some fashion closed even though economic systems are "essentially open." Schoeffler then assesses and finds wanting sixteen recently used investigations and models, together with what he calls "story-telling," in light of the principles he has earlier laid down.

Having disclosed the methodological shortcoming of economics, the author makes a few recommendations respecting the orientation of work in economics in the future: that general decision theory become an independent area of specialization; that economists interested in policy making "self-consciously adopt the attitude of doctors and . . . learn the things they should know to do their job well"; that economists interested in institutional analysis, national-income accounting, labor, and so forth, "frankly acknowledge themselves to be historians"; and that many economists concentrate upon the methodology of economics, making use of the procedures, and so forth, of relevant noneconomic disciplines. In a closing chapter a model of prediction suitable for economic analysis is formulated. There are two appendices, one on the use of information for rational decision-making, and a second on A. Lowe's work on the role of economic theory. A useful bibliography is appended.

Schoeffler's analysis of the role of prediction may be contrasted with that of Friedman (in *Essays in Positive Economics,* pp. 8–10, *passim*). My colleague, Professor H. E. Jensen, has called my attention to Schoeffler's misapplication of the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent from the antecedent to a criticism of the hypothetico-deductive method (p. 38).

JOSEPH J. SPENGLER
Duke University

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. *Policies to Combat Depression.* A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. Pp. x, 417. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. $8.50.

This volume consists of fourteen papers which were presented at two conferences in the fall of 1953 and the spring of 1954. The purpose of the conferences was "to survey the existing state of readiness to deal with the problem of depression, in terms both of understanding the problem and of the availability of instruments to deal with it." A wide variety of subjects is covered, ranging from general analyses of depressions and a review of the 1948–49 recession, to Federal, state and local expenditure and tax policies, with special emphasis on social security, housing, public works, and farm price support programs. The volume ends with two studies on international commodity prices and international currency and reserve plans.

Throughout the papers there is a heavy emphasis on the currently fashionable subject of "automatic stabilizers," which in some ways serve as a modern substitute for the yearning for the gold standard. These stabilizers include, among others, the progressive income tax, social security, agricultural price supports, and insurance of bank deposits. Perhaps the most interesting essays on this subject are David Lusher's "The Stabilizing Effectiveness of Budget Flexibility" and Samuel Cohn's lengthy comment on the same topic. Lusher's important conclusion is that in case of recession, the decline in gross national product would be 30 to 40 per cent less than it would be without the stabilizing effect of Federal, state, and local budgets. This compares with a 10 to 20 per cent aggravating effect of government budgets in 1930. Lusher also finds that the automatic stabilizing potential of reduced revenues is far greater than that of increased governmental expenditures.

There runs throughout the book a tone of pessimism, which is perhaps not altogether consistent with the high hopes for automatic stabilizers. Benjamin Caplan, in "A Case Study: The 1948–1949 Recession," finds that "the record of government was poor on recognizing the turning point, very good on appraising and prescribing for the malady, and fortunately quite inconsistent on actions to implement the desired policy." He believes that this was not a mere accident, but lies in the nature of democratic society; if policies are to be accepted, the situation must plainly require them, but by that time the underlying factors may already be changing. While much of the pessimism is justified, some of it arises from a limited viewpoint on only one of the many areas of governmental activity.

The volume is an admirable contribution to economic literature by highly competent economists, who even write well. It deserves the special attention, not only of economists, but also of political scientists and public administrators concerned with ways of meeting the next depression.

HANS A. ADLER
McLean, Va.

HOWARD M. TEAF, JR. and PETER G. FRANCK (Eds.). *Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation.* Pp. 579. The Hague: Universities Foundations for International Cooperation, 1955. (Distributed by Cornell University Press.) $5.50.

This volume contains histories written by eleven hands (including the editors) of ventures in "technical co-operation." Every "case" is forty to sixty pages long. Each one covers a whole "project" or "program," extending over some years. "Each author was asked to devote the major part of his study to descriptive treatment of the participating organizations, their operational experience, and the problems encountered. About one-fifth of each study . . . is given to evaluation of the agency's approach and operational method" (p. 9).

The editors have used these cases in courses at Haverford College, at the American University in Washington, and at the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague. (Hence, presumably, the publication of the volume in The Netherlands.)

The cases record programs in Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, Africa; they record "co-operation" by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, the United Nations, the United States government, the American Friends Service Committee, the Rockefeller Foundation, the United Kingdom Colonial Office, the Arabian-American Oil Company. The forms of "co-operation" include national economic planning (UN in Afghanistan), rural village improvement (the Quakers in India), regulation of land tenure (Interna-

tional Co-operative Alliance, Taiwan) and employment practices (SCAP, Japan); providing mechanized form services for profit (Rockefeller Brothers' International Basic Economy Corporation, Brazil); agricultural extension (Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Peru).

The volume may be viewed as an extension of the "case" method from its familiar use in the teaching of law, medicine, business, and public administration. The editors invite the reader to play the role of a project administrator or policy-maker and offer him a score of questions to put to himself as he reads the histories. Perhaps in a well-established discipline, it is good teaching technique to omit the answers and to let the student extract principles for himself. But in so new a field, it seems a serious deficiency that "in only one case had enough time elapsed to permit full evaluation of the project's final result" (p. 9). The "case" about technical assistance through the United Nations in Afghanistan, written in 1953, records questions raised about the Helmand River Valley scheme in 1951 in memoranda by the UN economic adviser; in 1956, the Streits now tell us that the executed scheme is an incubus that threatens to choke the country's whole economy (*New York Times,* March 18, 1956).

Curiously, the problems of cross-cultural adjustment—the distinguishing complication of most technical co-operation—are presented tangentially; there is casual comment in nearly each case on the personality needed for effective technical co-operation. The only case reported by a well-schooled anthropologist after a field visit reads like a consulting engineer's report to an investment banker. The best rounded "case" is built up almost entirely from the records of the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation of its campaign against hookworm in Ceylon in 1916–22.

As a teaching tool, the collection of "Case Studies of Public Reactions to Health Programs," *Health, Culture and Community,* edited by Benjamin Paul for the Harvard School of Public Health and the Russell Sage Foundation, seems greatly superior: those cases are grouped in a more systematic framework and are written from a *parti pris* that gives meaningful order to the examples.

Again, Mr. Sandelmann's panegyric "case" on "Agricultural Extension Work Through the Servicio in Peru" offers the *servicio* as a model for the world. It is a well-deserved eulogy of the remarkable work of John R. Neale, but there is a better setting for generalization about the transferability of this device in the systematic appraisal of *Ten Years of Technical Cooperation in Latin America* by Philip M. Glick for the National Planning Association.

Dr. Hertha Kraus, author of one of the present cases, was senior training officer for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in 1944, so that clearly orientation and briefing for "technical co-operation" are not just of this moment. Whatever the weaknesses of the current collection, its real significance is that there appears to be a market for it: that in more than one country there are being organized programs of educational preparation for persons ready to make a career in aiding the social and economic development of the less developed areas of the world—including the United States.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
Brooklyn College

JAMES G. MADDOX. *Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America.* Pp. xi, 139. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. $3.50.

Numerous American religious organizations carry on missionary activities in the Latin American republics. The basic aims of these operations are the spread of the word of Jesus Christ and the interpretation of the Christian doctrine. In effecting their objectives they have encountered obstacles in the form of lack of learning, disease, and undernourishment. These problems have resulted in the foundation of schools and colleges, the establishment of hospitals, clinics and schools of nursing, and the conduct of farming and other agricultural work. These endeavors comprise an important phase of the missionary program.

This small volume is a survey of the activities of missionaries who afford valuable technical assistance in their fields of labor. A list of the posts of the various agencies which were reviewed at first hand is given. Then chapters are devoted to the cultural characteristics of the Latin American countries and to the scope of the missionary functions performed in them by the American religious bodies. Chapter IV, the most extensive, is devoted to selected case studies, which serve to illustrate mission activities in the fields of education, medicine, and agriculture. For each post treated there is a brief description of the work undertaken and the facilities and personnel available. In order to present a realistic picture of the problems and accomplishments, the strong features and the weaknesses in every case are indicated. A final chapter presents the conclusions and the recommendations of the author respecting the value of the work accomplished and the modifications which he believes would serve to afford greater contributions in the several countries. There is a statement by the Special Committee on Technical Co-operation of the National Planning Association, regarding the work of the missionary organizations, their programs, and their progress, together with suggestions for enlarging and improving their work and activities. There are also lists of the members of the Special Policy Committee and of the officers and Board of Trustees of the National Planning Association. The volume is an interesting and suggestive presentation of the missionary efforts in Latin America.

ROSCOE R. HILL
Washington, D. C.

PAUL H. GIDDENS. *Standard Oil Company (Indiana): Oil Pioneer of the Middle West.* Pp. xx, 741. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. $7.50.

Within the last decade we Americans are becoming increasingly conscious of the significant part many large corporations have played in the development of our capitalistic economy. Numerous histories of our industrialization and many biographies of individual corporate businesses have been written. This book is of the latter type and is, moreover, a very good one. For more than twenty years Dr. Giddens has been doing research in and writing books about the oil industry. In this special phase of American history, he is a recognized authority.

Very soon after the Standard Oil of Indiana opened its headquarters and refinery at Whiting in 1889, it began to dominate the Midwestern market. Standard Oil was the first and only large oil company in this area. It developed the retail market. Located strategically, its transportation costs were economical. It pioneered in putting petroleum products in reach of rural as well as city people. Producing goods of a uniform quality, it early developed expert salesmen.

The period 1900–1911 was one of expansion for Standard Oil of Indiana. During these years, refineries in Illinois and Missouri were added, a pioneering employee pension plan was effected, wages were increased, and retail sales were extended. All of these activities resulted in much larger net earnings. Although financially the company prospered during this period, there were cases for alleged violations of the Elkins Act. The most famous of these cases was the Alton case in which Judge K. M. Landis fined the Standard Oil of Indiana more than $29,000,000 for violating the interstate commerce laws. In 1911, the United States Supreme Court dissolved the Standard Oil Holding Company through the so-called "rule of reason." Since 1911 the Standard Oil of Indiana has operated as an independent company.

There was an immediate reorganization of Standard Oil of Indiana with an increase in stock values. According to the author, motor tank trucks were purchased to deliver gasoline to the increasing number of stations. Other innovations of this period were advertising and selling products on credit. With World War I there came shortages of labor and coal for the refineries with rising costs of production.

Of the many unusual men who are portrayed in this book, the most dramatic is Colonel Robert W. Stewart. A man of dynamic energy and magnetic personality, he was chosen as chairman of the Board of Directors in 1918 and for years was the spokesman for the company. During

Colonel Stewart's regime Standard Oil expanded greatly in the West and, through Pan-Am, in Mexico, Argentina and Iraq. Through Stewart's energy and foresight, the company controlled the petroleum products market to over one-third of the United States population, over one-half of the motor vehicles and tractors. Stewart's expansion created competition with other Standard Oil Companies in several states. His transactions led him very close to Teapot Dome. Called before the Walsh Committee, he was not frank. Whereupon Rockefeller denounced him and began a movement to oust him. In the struggle of the Eastern stockholders against the small stockholders from the West, the East won.

Edward Seubert became president in 1927 and remained until 1945. He retreated by selling the interest in Pan-Am to Standard Oil of New Jersey for $140,000,000. By concentrating on the domestic market, Standard Oil of Indiana has continued to prosper. Many trying adjustments have been made during the last twenty years to meet the requirements of New Deal laws and the demands of World War II.

From 1945 to 1955, while A. W. Peake was president, this company has been completely reorganized. It has greatly increased research facilities, has expended much money in the role of good citizen, has improved public relations, and has become the fourth largest corporation in the United States with over $1,800,000,000 in assets.

This is an ably written book, thoroughly readable. Its length is necessary for the telling of the complete story. There are many illustrations, graphs and maps.

GEORGE C. OSBORN
University of Florida

LABOR

GLADYS L. PALMER. *Philadelphia Workers in a Changing Economy*. Pp. xiv, 189. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956. $6.00.

Philadelphians and non-Philadelphians alike have reason to be grateful that Dr. Gladys Palmer, throughout her career, has never allowed her national assignments to interrupt for long her study of the Philadelphia worker. Residents of that area have had the opportunity, matched in no other city, to learn about the complex and changing patterns of making a living in their community. For economists and statisticians everywhere, Dr. Palmer's studies and those of her fellow staff-members at the Industrial Research Department of the University of Pennsylvania have established models for studying labor market problems and have provided a substantial share of what is now known about the behavior of the labor force.

In the present volume, Dr. Palmer has done a masterful job of bringing together the findings of these years of research and interpreting them in the light of her own rich knowledge of the area and its people. The result is the story of the development of Philadelphia from early colonial times to the present, showing how the character of the area's labor force has changed with population changes, with the rise and fall of various industries, and with shifts in economic functions performed in the area. Trends in the mobility and skills of the Philadelphia worker, his attitude toward various types of work, and the way in which he adapted himself to the changes in demand are discussed.

Two chapters on the effects on labor market operations of the depression and of war prosperity should sharpen many readers' vague impressions of these years. The generation which entered the labor force after the start of World War II, in particular, should read the chapter on "The Effect of a Severe and Prolonged Depression on the Labor Market." During the thirties, much information was collected on the impact of unemployment, and much of it related, as it happens, to Philadelphia. For example, because of the work at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia had an annual series of measurements of its unemployment problem ten years before there were such data for the United States. In this chapter, that and other information is summarized to remind us vividly of a time when one out of every three workers in a large city was jobless, and the average unemployed worker out of work for almost two years. Dr. Palmer concludes that unemployment is "a process as well as a status" that has "self-perpetuating features, if prolonged." In those years, she points out, we learned how to distribute relief but not how to increase the total demand for labor in an area. Public attitudes toward the importance of preventing serious unemployment have undoubtedly changed, but, except for emphasis on better statistics, our policies to combat prolonged mass unemployment have probably remained at the stage of development reached at the end of the depression decade.

The final chapter discusses the broad problems of the growth and changing functions of cities and the type of planning that may be effective in preventing industrial decay. Throughout the volume the Philadelphia story is told in perspective, so that in the end the reader has a sense of what is peculiar to this area and what may be typical in the growth pattern of all large cities or of the United States as a whole.

A vast amount of work which will be of interest to the technician has gone into the preparation of the statistics for this volume. The details are largely relegated to the twenty-three appendix tables and to the technical appendix, however; the text, which is written for the general reader, is a model for all who would bring statistics to life.

GERTRUDE BANCROFT
Bureau of the Census

G. R. BARKER. *Some Problems of Incentives and Labour Productivity in Soviet Industry: A Contribution to the Study of the Planning of Labour in the USSR*. Pp. vi, 129. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956. 14s.

Mr. Barker's study of the problem of the role of incentives under Soviet conditions of economic and social planning is the first essay in a new series of "Monographs on the Soviet Economic System," which is to be produced under the auspices of the Department of Economics and Institutions of the USSR, University of Birmingham, and the editorship of A. Baikov. This series will be a welcome addition to the rapidly growing literature on the Soviet economy.

Mr. Barker's essay is devoted to a consideration of the general problem of the interrelation between productivity and incentives. Part of the essay focuses on theoretical and methodological questions, on a specific case study of operational effectiveness, and inadequacies in planners' choices of incentives. These incentives are designed to stimulate productivity of labor under conditions of a market mechanism entirely or partially suppressed as is found in the process of Soviet economic development. The essay presents a considerable amount of descriptive factual information, which, though by and large familiar to students of Soviet affairs, is cast in a new and specific frame of reference. The statistical evidence, which is limited mainly to the interwar period (1917–40), is used primarily for illustrative rather than analytical purposes in support of what appear to be the following chief findings.

The growth of productivity of Soviet industrial labor was attained primarily by the expansion and improvement of objective factors of production (increased capital stocks, improved technology, industrial organization and management), although various alternative sets of incentives have proved to be an important supplementary factor. In regard to incentives although Soviet planners began to rely increasingly on a set of incentive measures common to capitalist economy, all of which emphasize the direct differential material rewards, they still have to rely upon an elaborate system of mass persuasion and certain instruments of compulsion. This situation—which emerged as a result of protracted scarcities of consumer goods caused by the prevailing objectives of Soviet planners to build up producers goods industries—made it necessary for the regime to limit the acquisitive motivations of labor, substituting for them contributive motivations stimulated by persuasion whenever possible and fostered by compulsion if necessary.

The discussion of these complex social phenomena brings Mr. Barker's presentation outside the shell of economics proper to the periphery of other social sciences, all

of which enhances the interest of the book. This rather brief, though inquisitive and stimulating, essay provides background information and suggests problems for further analytical inquiries into Soviet policies toward labor, especially in the light of more recent developments not covered in the book.

NICHOLAS DEWITT
Harvard University

NICHOLAS DEWITT. *Soviet Professional Manpower: Its Education, Training, and Supply.* Pp. xxviii, 400. Washington, D. C.: National Science Foundation, 1955. $1.25.

On June 7, 1956 the publication of a statistical summary entitled *The National Economy of the USSR* was announced in Moscow, the first new official figures and indexes related to the economic, demographic, and cultural processes in the Soviet Union—including data on education and professional manpower—since 1940. When copies of this latest release become available to Western students of Soviet affairs, some important corrections will be made in their estimates of Soviet statistics; it has been already reported, for instance, that the recently published document places the 1955 population of the Soviet Union at 200.2 million, some 10 per cent *lower* than the current Western estimates.

At least in one category of social statistics, however, that dealing *quantitatively* with the Soviet educational system and the professional labor pool, this new Soviet document will surprise no one familiar with Mr. Nicholas DeWitt's *Soviet Professional Manpower: Its Education, Training, and Supply.*

Mr. De Witt has brought together and consolidated the findings of two studies independently initiated in 1952: first, his own extensive research on the growth of the professional labor force; second, a pioneer study initiated by Dr. M. H. Trytten of the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, which produced Mr. Boris I. Gorokhoff's unpublished report, "Materials for the Study of Soviet Specialized Education."

Statistically, Mr. DeWitt's work bridges the gap in the relevant Soviet data which has existed since 1939. He has rearranged and categorized a multitude of statistics appearing piecemeal in the Soviet press and organized them in a number of time series showing the matriculation, enrollment, graduation, and other pertinent data at different levels and kinds of training. From these series and other more direct sources, he derives estimates of the numerical strength and the rates of growth in the various categories of trained specialists in the Soviet Union. Thus, for instance, the author concludes that in 1953 the Soviet Union had about 500,000 trained professional engineers (versus some 530,000 in the United States). The official figure just published by the Central Statistical Board of the USSR places the number of engineers, as of 1955, at 585,900—a figure wholly consistent with the current rate of growth estimated by Mr. DeWitt.

While a substantial part of the present volume is devoted to statistical details, explanations of difficulties encountered in handling these details, and most elaborate documentation of statistical data, the main body of the text gives a comprehensive description of the entire educational system of the Soviet Union, with comments upon many qualitatively important and significant characteristics of the Soviet educational system and practices as they operate to train specialized and professional skills.

The author has not addressed himself specifically to the next set of questions which necessarily arises from his assessment of the trained manpower potential developed by the USSR: namely, *to what ends* and how efficiently this potential is being directed under Soviet conditions as compared with the employment of the greater scientific, technological, and industrial potential in the free societies, especially the United States. Nevertheless, having shown the magnitude of the effort mobilized by the Soviets and the impressive results achieved in their training specialized skills, Mr. DeWitt has paved the way for and implicitly invited examination of means whereby the capabilities of American scientific, technological, and organization superiority can be maintained and more effectively translated into material, political, and spiritual gains for the free societies in the face of the growing power in the dictator's hand.

ALEXANDER G. KOROL
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

J. H. STEWART REID. *The Origins of the British Labour Party.* Pp. 258. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $4.50.

Professor Reid has been very industrious. To produce this book of 250 pages he has read three or four hundred other books, reports and minutes of Royal Commissions, reports of Labour Party, Trade Union, and other conferences, *Hansard* and files of newspapers, and held many conversations with many people. Unfortunately the result shows that industry is no substitute for historical understanding and knowledge. Careless copying or proof correction may account for some of the verbal inaccuracies. But it is no verbal slip to say that the Amalgamated Engineering Union was set up to emulate the Triple Alliance—which collapsed in its first trial; that the "Factory" Act of 1802 made any reference to women; that the Factory Acts in general did not apply to pieceworkers—what Professor Reid *means* is "outworkers"; that the Webbs decided, at a time when they were friends with Grey and Haldane, to "permeate" only the Tory Party; that the Labour Party after the 1931 betrayal was a rump, when in fact only a tiny handful stayed with MacDonald.

These are a few only of the misstatements and misinterpretations, of which perhaps the most startling is to be found in a single paragraph on page 20, from which it would appear that industrial harmony was characteristic of the 1850's—the decade of the engineering strikes and the great builders' lockout—that this harmony was not disturbed until the Civil War; the cotton famine produced "bitter disputes in the textile trades," of which the "Sheffield outrages," which have nothing whatever to do with textiles, are given as an example. Confusion could hardly go further.

The main fault of Professor Reid's treatment of the subject, apart from his errors, is that he has accepted the stereotype of British "compromise," and "muddle-through," and believes that because the Labour Party did not adopt a statement of Socialist policy until 1918, therefore the theories and policy of the Socialist societies which in effect brought it into being were of no importance. It is symptomatic that in all his references to the Fabians, whom obviously he admires, there is no mention of *Fabian Essays;* that most important book is listed in the bibliography under "G. B. Shaw (ed.) London. *1932"!* The only description of Fabian philosophy says it was "based on a conception of society as a living and growing organism," which comes not from any Fabian document but from a cloudy book by MacDonald; and there is nothing to indicate what Morris, Blatchford, or Hardie were really advocating. What is studied at length are conference and parliamentary debates of the pre-1914 years, and these in relation to national politics without any reference to local affairs; the result being duly restricted.

It is no pleasure to write in these terms, for Professor Reid is both sympathetic and hard working. But it must be said that many of the books he cites are of much greater value, for his own purpose, than his own.

MARGARET COLE
Hendon
England

GEORGES FRIEDMANN. *Industrial Society: The Emergency of Human Problems of Automation.* Pp. 436. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $6.00.

This thought-provoking book is more than just a translation of Professor Friedmann's *Problèmes Humains du Machinisme Industriel.* Professor Harold L. Sheppard (Wayne University) and his associates have done a beautiful job of editing and interpreting. They have succeeded in presenting Professor Friedmann's thoughts in the context of American thinking and speaking. Nevertheless, a great advantage of this text is that it provides American readers with scholarly reports on European research. Professor Friedmann also provided a useful link between industrial research in Europe and America. He has carefully ap-

praised the experimental work done on both continents. In doing this from the point of view of a social scientist, Professor Friedmann performed a great service. But perhaps the chief value of the book lies in its concern with the future.

The timeliness of Professor Friedmann's volume is underlined by the following news item in the *New York Times*, Tuesday, May 22, 1956. "The world-wide automobile empires of Ford and General Motors will soon be faced by an attempt at coordinated international action of their employees.

"A decision to set up workers' coordinating councils to 'harmonize upward' collective agreements and conditions of work in countries where Ford and General Motors have plants was made at a conference here [Paris] of automobile unions affiliated with the International Metal Workers Federation.

"The three-day conference that ended today was attended by representatives of 3,000,000 employees working directly in or connected with the automobile industries of eleven countries of the free world."

Professor Friedmann examines problems of technological development and change in their historical context. He shows that automation is the inevitable consequence of mechanized production process. In itself, automation is neither good nor bad. Its effects on society will depend in large measure on what management and union leaders make of it.

Certainly, automation is a sign that we have already embarked on the second industrial revolution. However, there is every indication that forward-looking leaders in management, unions and government, are keenly aware of the need for an orderly introduction of automation in order to avoid widespread hardship for displaced personnel. Furthermore, there are forces which act as automatic brakes on headlong introduction of change. Economic consideration (automatic machines are expensive to build and to maintain) and the fact that it takes time to develop and to install them, will help to slow down the transition process. There will be time to think and to plan. Another decelerating factor is the great diversity of modern industrial operations. Not all business enterprises are equally well suited to change over from mechanized production process to the exclusive use of machines that operate and control other machines.

Professor Friedmann, even in his scientific detachment, permits himself to express the following cautious hope: "Automation carried to its ultimate conclusion and expressing all its potentialities *may* tend towards the humanization of large-scale industry. Not only does it give birth to new skills and inject into them a new concept of work, through the creation and regulation of this delicate and precise equipment, but the worker entrusted with the simple task of supervising a group of these machines, *if he enjoyed an adequate general and technical culture,* might recover a function of an intellectual quality clearly superior to that imposed today on semiskilled labor in the phase (semi-automatism, and assembly-line labor) which precedes and prepares the way for automation."

PAUL PIGORS
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

JAMES S. YOUTSLER. *Labor's Wage Policies in the Twentieth Century.* Pp. 344. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1956. $5.00.

This volume begins with a brief review of wage theory, and continues with an account of official American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations pronouncements on wages since 1900. The major part of the book is devoted to an historical review of union wage policies in seven industries: ladies' garments, men's clothing, pulp and paper, steel, autos, textiles, and electrical products. The author concludes with a chapter on the guaranteed annual wage.

Despite its promising title, this book does not offer any substantial fare. The chapter on wage theory is naive, and contains many loose and dubious statements, for example, ". . . as Professor Phelps points out, there is little competition among the buyers of labor" (p. 25). "Anyone who is at all familiar with the labor market realizes that labor is very immobile" (p. 27). In the author's view, marginal productivity theory "has proved to be false and entirely inconsistent with the pricing of labor in the short-run period" (p. 28). It is clear that he has not delved very deeply into wage theory.

Unfortunately, matters do not improve in the historical section (the author never makes clear, incidentally, on what basis he selected the seven industries with which he deals). Here we are given a rather dull catalogue of trade union wage actions, culled mainly from union periodicals. There is virtually no attempt at evaluation; the author generally contents himself with quoting union sources on the rectitude and economic validity of wage policies, which gives the work a highly tendentious flavor. What is particularly annoying is the failure to follow up statements of union contract "gains" with any assessment of their practical import. Such statistical materials as are employed are largely abstracts from Bureau of Labor Statistics tables with no manipulation to point up the argument.

The author's stated purpose was to "make some contribution to the understanding of the *role of need* in influencing wage demands." The lack of precision in defining this goal is reflected in the complete lack of focus which characterizes his work. It would appear from the Preface that the volume was originally prepared as a Ph.D. thesis. With a considerable additional amount of work, and sharpening of the issues, a real contribution to trade-union history might have been forthcoming. But as things stand, those who advised Professor Youtsler to publish the book in its present form rendered him no great service.

WALTER GALENSON
University of California
Berkeley

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

Mr. Roberts and I have read with appreciation the review of his *Foreign Affairs Bibliography,* covering the years 1942–52. While the reviewer says kind things about the scholarship and usefulness of the volume, he leads the reader to believe that Mr. Roberts' restrictions on listing government publications was more drastic than is the fact. Of the four government publications which the reviewer notes as missing, three actually are included—*Foreign Relations of the United States,* see page 212; *Documents on British Foreign Policy,* see page 395; and *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* see page 503.

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Foreign Affairs

Dear Sir:

Thank you for sending me Mr. Armstrong's letter in which he commented on my review of Roberts' *Foreign Affairs Bibliography.* He said that of the four government publications which I had noted as missing, three are actually included; and he cited the pages where they are listed. He was certainly right, and I was wrong, about two of the three (*Documents on British Foreign Policy,* listed on page 395, and *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* listed on page 503). He cited page 212 for the other one (*Foreign Relations of the United States*), but I do not find it on page 212 of my copy of the book.

In extenuation of my error, I might observe that, as indicated in the review, my method in studying the book was "probing and poking . . . —here and there; head, feet, and torso; front, back, and middle." In other words, I did not lay claim to having read every one of the 9,000 entries. But this is a poor excuse, and I regret the error.

WILLIAM GERBER
Washington, D. C.

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FOREWORD

How much has Japan changed since the official termination of the Allied occupation on April 28, 1952? Is the process of democratization being undone? How much of it will "stick"? Can the economy sustain preparations for self-defense? And which way is Japan heading in domestic politics and foreign relations? Thoughtful individuals may well have these and other questions in mind as they read this volume of seventeen articles written by both Japanese and American contributors.

This volume was not, however, designed simply to answer such litmus-test questions. Rather the articles emphasize Japanese domestic development, particularly the social and institutional changes modifying or describing the character of Japan since recovery of sovereignty. Space limitations have necessitated concentration only upon selected phases of these problems and prohibited treatment of cultural changes or even important fields such as local government. Nevertheless, the attention focused on the major developments within the seventeen areas of Japan's national life offered in this volume will, it is hoped, chart the major milestones on the course Japan has followed in the four and one-half years since April 1952.

In perusing the combined insights of this volume, the reader may be struck by the remarkable stability Japanese political, economic, and social institutions have displayed throughout the titanic tremors of military defeat, foreign occupation, "democratic revolution," and reassertion of independence in all types of policy decisions. The same Showa Emperor who traveled abroad as a Crown Prince during Japan's "liberal" period following the first World War and who later in a period of aggression reviewed the imperial troops on their way to war in China and Southeast Asia still reigns from his sprawling palace in Tokyo, preserving silence on the hotly debated question of his position in respect to the locus of sovereignty. Although the overseas empire is done and the nearest archipelagoes to the north and south remain in dispute, Japan proper has escaped the fearful divisions of Germany, Korea, and other occupied lands or those subsequently torn by clashing ideological armies. The central administration, like the proverbial French bureaucracy, remains relatively intact. For the most part, political and business institutions have retained their similarity to prewar forms, while a number of those that had been altered are reverting in varying degrees to former patterns.

At the same time, the fact that so many contributors note the cry for "revision" of occupation reforms, on the one hand, and the challenge to any such "backward course," on the other, indicates that within the fields covered in this volume the process of digesting and assimilating the changes wrought by six and one-half years of occupation control still continues. Transition seems to be the characteristic not only of political development but of the economy, education, the family, and the full gamut of Japanese life. That so many writers eschewed dogmatic statements as to the future course of a nation with the established culture and the lengthy

historical traditions of Japan indicates the forceful impact of the defeat and occupation. Almost every contributor has found it necessary to stress occupation reforms and policy shifts in order to explain present trends.

One may note that no one group or class in Japanese society appears to have either endorsed or rejected totally the heritages of the occupation. That the various occupation policies brought both advantages and hardships to almost all sections of society, though at different times and in different ways, is apparent, as is the fact that the benefit of one was often the disadvantage of the other. While no foreign occupation has ever been exactly loved by the occupied and many have left nothing but hatred behind, the Allied record in Japan, as viewed by the authors of this volume, appears destined to rate high in good will in the light of history.

Finally, one cannot but sense the growing desire among the Japanese people to achieve a fuller independence and to assume a greater initiative in international affairs. Not only the difficulties encountered in peace treaty negotiations with the Russians but also the continued presence of American troops and military bases on Japanese soil and restrictions on trade with Communist China impart a certain impatience to this desire. As to the steps toward achieving this fuller independence, opinion within Japan remains divided, though not polarized. Through the pages of this volume one can glimpse a vital and dynamic society whose future course is not as easy to predict as the hitherto apparent stability of many of its institutions would tend to suggest.

The writing of this volume has been an adventure in binational collaboration across the Pacific among nine Japanese, eight Americans, and one American-trained British subject. One Japanese wrote his contribution while in the United States as a visiting scholar; two Americans and the lone Britisher did their writing on the spot in Japan. Most of the Japanese submitted their contributions in their own language, giving us in all probability a fuller expression of frank judgments but raising problems of accurate rendition into English. This long-distance, bilingual collaboration made necessary the plural coeditorship, with one special editor serving on the American side of the Pacific and two in Japan.

The editors like to believe that the nature of this volume suggests both the growing body of American "expertise" on Japan and a further advance of Japanese social scientists into the international academic arena. Both to a degree are the result of the war. The opportunities given by wartime language preparation and occupation administrative experience have served to stimulate Far Eastern area emphases within the traditional disciplines offered by American universities. A growing group of Americans are already sufficiently trained and familiar with the Japanese scene to consider it in terms almost equal to those of their intellectual colleagues in Japan. Simultaneously, Japanese scholars and statesmen whose training has been supplemented by contact with the high and low among "occupationaires" and further travel and study in postwar Europe and America have gained a greater facility in international and intercultural communication. If the fruits of these developments continue to be shared more and more widely by the educated American public, the United States may indeed retain its lead as the best informed non-Asian nation on the affairs of present-day Japan.

The special editors would like to thank the Asia Foundation for helping to make this international collaboration possible by aiding us in covering the costs of translations and in providing modest honoraria for the nongovernmental Japanese contributors, who in the financial straits and traditional practices of the Japanese academic world might otherwise not have been able to contribute of their time and talents as freely as the American authors have done.

GEORGE O. TOTTEN
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Biographical data on Hattie Kawahara Colton appear at the end of her article on "The National Diet After Independence"; on Kenneth E. Colton at the end of his article on "The Conservative Political Movement."

Constitutional Trends and Developments

By Nobushige Ukai *

THE birth of the Japanese Constitution of 1947 was celebrated as "the birth of freedom and peace in Japan." At that time Japan was under Allied occupation. The possibility of revising the new fundamental law arose when Japan acquired independence in April 1952. On May 16, 1956, a bill to establish "a research organ to carry out a complete examination of the present Constitution of Japan from a new national viewpoint" passed the Diet. This may mark an important turning point in the life of the nine-year-old Constitution.

What are the real political implications of the revisionist tendencies since independence? In order to evaluate them correctly we have to understand first of all the fundamental principles of the new Constitution in contrast to those of the old Constitution of 1890.[1] Only in this context can we judge the significance of the new Constitution and understand its ontology. To reach such a judgment and understanding is particularly important in Japan, where in the past institutions of so-called advanced countries have sometimes been transplanted without due consideration of social and political actualities.

* The author is indebted to Professor Kurt Steiner of Stanford University for valuable criticisms and suggestions in the preparation of this paper. Sole responsibility for what is said in it rests with the author.

[1] The former Constitution, often called the Meiji Constitution, promulgated in 1889, became effective in 1890. The present Constitution was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and took effect on May 3, 1947. While it was adopted as an amendment of the Meiji Constitution, it is usually referred to as the "new Constitution," and this usage has been followed in this article.

Principles of Japanese Constitutions: 1890 and 1947

The new Constitution differs radically from its predecessor in three fundamental principles: popular sovereignty, renunciation of war, and fundamental human rights.

Popular sovereignty

According to the old Constitution, sovereignty was located in the Emperor, who succeeded to the right to rule on the grounds that he belonged to the family which had the inherent right of ruling—a right theoretically justified by the Shinto belief that the forefathers of the imperial family were gods and goddesses who created the land and the people and declared that this "rich country of rice" shall be reigned over forever by their descendants. This mythical principle, which was solemnly declared in the Preamble of the 1890 Constitution, is now denied. The new Constitution of 1947 states in Article 1: "The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." [2]

[2] In addition, the Preamble proclaims the "universal principle of mankind" that "government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people." This is in accord with the statement of the Potsdam Declaration of the four powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, later joined by the Soviet Union—which calls for removal of "all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people" and the establishment

Legally, this is of course a radical change. But in political actuality the situation is more complex. Even under the principle of sovereignty of the Emperor the people could not be entirely excluded from participation in the governmental process. There existed, after all, a progressively enlarged suffrage system, parties, and a Diet elected at least in part. Yet even on the institutional level there were such legal and extralegal roadblocks to a real parliamentary democracy as the Privy Council, the Lord Privy Seal, the Supreme Command, the Elder Statesmen (Genro), and, later, the Council of Senior Statesmen (Jushin Kaigi). In addition, the principle of *kokutai*—the national polity according to which Japan was to be ruled by a sovereign emperor of a dynasty unbroken for ages eternal, together with the ethical ramifications of this idea—could always be used to thwart effectively any attempt on the part of democratic forces to claim a stronger place in government. The theory of the Emperor as an organ of state, propounded by Dr. Tatsukichi Minobe, was once considered heretical because of its disguised democratic nature.[3]

The 1947 Constitution not only removed the institutional roadblocks but also acknowledged the people's right to participate in matters of government without interference by the mythical theory of a monarchical right given by the grace of God.[4] However, legal recognition of a right does not necessarily mean that it is actually being used to its fullest extent. The Japanese people now have to learn how to utilize their new political rights. The new constitutional framework permits them to acquire the necessary experience, and from this viewpoint, the establishment of a viable democracy depends on the continued existence of this framework.

Renunciation of war

Through Article 9 the Constitution of 1947 occupies a unique position among modern national constitutions. In the first place, in accordance with the general view at the time of its adoption, Japan not only renounces wars of conquest or of offensive action against the liberty of other peoples, as do the French, Italian, and Brazilian Constitutions,[5] but also wars of self-defense. In the second place, Japan also declares that it will not maintain any war potential.

Of course, there are theories in present-day Japan which attempt to justify the retention of forces for self-defense—not only police but also military forces—under the present Constitution by asserting that the constitutional interdiction is directed only against forces for aggression. Since the recovery of independence, a theory known as the "Ashida-Kiyose theory" or "Progressive party theory" has been advanced.[6] According to this theory, a group of lower house members sought to circumvent the clear intention of the occupation, as shown in the original MacArthur principles of February 1946, that "Japan renounces [war] . . . even for preserving its own security." They were successful in this attempt without arousing any objections from occupation officials by inserting two skillfully chosen, innocent-looking phrases into the original draft of the constitution.

Article 9 as adopted reads as follows:

> *Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,* the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
>
> *In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,* land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The italicized phrases are those added by the Diet members, supposedly with farsighted but hidden intention. First, according to this theory, the phrase in the second paragraph changes the whole meaning of the article. The pledge not to maintain war potential is now no longer absolute, but qualified by the aim mentioned in the first paragraph, namely, the renunciation of war as a sovereign right and of the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. War potential for countering aggressive or threatening action on the part of other states would be excluded from this pledge.

Second, so this theory continues, the Diet group tried to hide their real intention of making the above interpretation possible by adding the high sounding clause italicized in the first paragraph.[7]

Ingenious as it may seem, this new type of "conspiracy theory"—which has its counterpart in the United States in a theory advanced by Roscoe Conkling regarding the Fourteenth Amendment[8]—hardly suffices to uphold even a historical interpretation of the article, since the mental reservation, if existing, was known only to a small group of legislators whose own statements at the time were entirely opposite.

The then prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, explaining the draft to the House of Representatives Constitution Committee on July 4, 1946, opposed the idea of distinguishing between wars of self-defense and wars of aggression and pointed out that most wars in the past had been started in the name of self-defense. Dr. Ashida, when reporting in his capacity as chairman of the same committee to the plenary session of the House of Representatives on August 24, 1946, stated that the new Constitution was the first one in the world to abolish armaments and to renounce all kinds of war, not merely aggressive

"in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people [of] a peacefully inclined and responsible government."

[3] Dr. Minobe's *Kenpo Seigi* ("Commentaries on the Constitution") was translated by Professor Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University with the help of Professor Ikuo Oyama, then a refugee in the United States, but the translation was neither finished nor published. On the organ theory see Kazuo Kawai, "Sovereignty and Democracy in the Japanese Constitution," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 49, No. 3 (September 1955), pp. 663–72.

[4] The question whether the new Constitution actually altered the national polity (*kokutai*) was discussed at great length in both houses of the Diet. The occupation insisted that the amendment procedures of the former Constitution be followed in adopting the new one. But constitutional lawyers pointed out that this could not be done when the two documents were contradictory on the basic question of sovereignty. In this situation the government was forced to take the position that the national polity had not been changed. The attempts to reconcile this view with Article 1 of the Constitution were vague and unconvincing.

[5] Preambles of the French Constitutions of 1791 and 1946; Article 11 of the Italian Constitution of 1947; Article 4 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1946.

[6] Hitoshi Ashida was chairman of the House of Representatives Constitution Committee in 1946 and prime minister in 1948. Ichiro Kiyose was defense counsel for former Prime Minister Tojo, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 1946 to 1948, and is now Minister of Education in the Hatoyama Cabinet. Both held prominent positions within the Progressive party (Kaishinto).

[7] For a more complete description of the various interpretations of Article 9, see John M. Maki, "Japan's Rearmament: Progress and Problems," *Western Political Quarterly,* Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1955), pp. 545–68 at pp. 558 ff.

[8] Howard J. Graham, "The 'Conspiracy Theory' of the Fourteenth Amendment," in *Selected Essays on Constitutional Law,* edited by the Association of American Law Schools (Chicago, 1938), Book I, pp. 236 ff.

wars, as do the French, Italian, and Brazilian Constitutions.

Fundamental human rights

Under the 1890 Constitution the people, or rather the "subjects" as they were called in that document, had no fundamental human rights, since whatever rights they were given were guaranteed only within the orbit of the laws made by the Emperor with the assistance of the Diet. The Constitution of 1947 has a chapter on Fundamental Human Rights and because it omits the limitation of the former Constitution this term is not without justification. To clarify the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the laws and other acts of state, the Supreme Court is granted the right of judicial review in Article 81. If there is any limitation on human rights, it consists in the general admonition in Article 12 that "the people shall refrain from any abuse of their freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare." Similarly Article 13, while declaring that "the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs," couples this statement with the proviso "to the extent that this right does not interfere with the public welfare."

According to one interpretation, the proviso applies only to certain economic and social rights such as those of choosing one's residence or occupation (Article 22) or owning property (Article 29), in which cases the consideration of public welfare is specifically mentioned in the Constitution. According to the other interpretation, the limitation by this consideration applies to all human rights.

As for the substance of the human rights, they include not only political but also economic and social rights. Of particular interest within the Japanese context is Article 24, dealing with marriage and the family. Because the principles enunciated there—marriage based only on the mutual consent of both sexes, equality of the sexes, and so forth—run counter to traditional ideas, conservative Japanese aim at a revision of this article among others.[9] Their argument is, in this and in other cases, that the Constitution is not in accord with the actual national circumstances. However, not all Japanese would agree with their picture of these circumstances, which is based on an excessively static view of Japanese society.

While there is yet only one exceptional case in which the Supreme Court declared any law or act of state unconstitutional, there is a fair degree of popular political awareness in regard to the chapter on human rights, and a revision is not likely to be achieved without major repercussions. Thus when the intention of revising Article 24 became known, meetings and demonstrations of protest were immediately launched by women's organizations.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION CONSIDERED IN 1948 AND 1949

In line with the policy of the Far Eastern Commission that the Japanese Diet be given an opportunity to review the Constitution not earlier than one year but not later than two years after it took effect, a reconsideration of the occupation-drafted fundamental law was in order in 1948 and 1949. Unofficial groups, such as the Tokyo University Constitution Study Group—the members of which are the coauthors of the authoritative commentaries on the Constitution of Japan[10]—made public a detailed study of the problematical points of the Constitution and concrete proposals for revision. Another group of scholars, called the Public Law Study Group, also published proposals for revision.[11] The proposal by the members of the former group contained such items as strengthening the guarantees of fundamental human rights, as in the United States Constitution, by adding a phrase like "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . ," and by clearly limiting the application of the public welfare clause to social and economic rights, or changing terms like *Daijin* (literally "great subject," the traditional term for Minister) into *Kokumuiin* ("Secretary of State Affairs"). The latter group proposed, for instance, changing the term which characterizes the position of the Emperor from "symbol" to *"gisho,"* a newly coined word which is devoid of any mythical connotation and which means roughly "ceremonial emblem," and deleting the phrase "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph" from Article 9, Clause 2, which later became a source of heated controversy as mentioned above. It will be noted that none of these revisions implies a deviation from the spirit of the Constitution.

Ironically enough, those who are now most vociferous in their desire for constitutional revision remained silent in 1948 and 1949. The absence of any official demand for reconsideration was taken by the Far Eastern Commission as evidence that the Japanese people were satisfied with the new Constitution, and no further directive on the question was issued.

POSTINDEPENDENCE REVISIONISM

The independence of Japan since 1952 has naturally brought forth among some of the conservative Japanese politicians the desire to cast off all the new clothes tailored by the occupation authorities and to don once again the time-old prewar fashions of political conservatism.

They proclaimed the reasons for their desire to revise the Constitution in the draft proposal of the Constitution Investigation Committee of the Liberal party (Jiyuto), dated November 5, 1954, as follows:

1. When the Constitution was made, Japan was under the occupation of foreign troops; thus the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people," as required by the Potsdam Declaration, did not exist.
2. The original draft was written by a few foreigners and imposed in exchange for a guarantee of the personal safety of the Emperor.
3. The formal process of revision of the Constitution of 1890 was followed, but the substance of the revision contradicts this procedure.
4. Some of the articles are clearly aimed at weakening a defeated nation.
5. Some of the articles have only transitory significance and are clearly "extreme and unreasonable."
6. Some of them actually do not fit the national character of Japan.
7. There are obvious mistakes of phrasing, contradictions and repetitions, and, in particular, the whole tone shows the clear mark of translation.

The fact that some pressure was exerted on the Japanese government, when the original draft constitution was handed to its representatives by General Whitney on February 13, 1946, is reported officially and is thus not open

[9] Regarding the political significance of Article 24 and of the reform of the Civil Code, see Kurt Steiner, "The Revision of the Civil Code of Japan: Provisions Affecting the Family," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (February 1950), pp. 169–84.

[10] *Chukai Nihon Koku Kenpo* ("National Constitution of Japan Annotated"), Tokyo, 1948. A revised edition appeared in 1954.

[11] The first-mentioned proposals can be found in *Hogaku Kyokai Zasshi* ("Tokyo University Law Review"), Vol. 67, No. 1 (June 1949); the second proposals are in *Horitsu Jiho* ("Law Times"), Vol. 21, No. 4 (April 1949).

to doubt.[12] However, this does not necessarily characterize the Constitution as entirely alien and unwanted by all Japanese. There was, after all, a political tendency existing in Japan which vaguely was in accord with the aims of the occupation in this regard, while the Japanese government of the day represented another political tendency. Those who are now in favor of a revision are those who were then reluctant to accept the fundamental principles of the 1947 Constitution.

POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Compared with the preindependence revisionism, the movement today has entirely different connotations. The main purpose of the present-day revisionists is to go back to the "good old days" when the conservatives held a virtual monopoly of party politics. The gist of the proposed plan in this respect may be summarized by the following three points: (1) to place the Diet over the people; (2) to place the cabinet over the Diet; (3) to place the Emperor over the cabinet.

Diet over the people

This proposal, starting from the present Constitution, would take a step in the opposite direction from that of the other revisionists already mentioned. It would clearly state that laws, based on the necessities of general welfare and social order, may restrict fundamental human rights. This would not exactly recreate the situation existing under the 1890 Constitution, under which all laws restricting the citizens' rights were intrinsically constitutional. Under the present proposal only laws which are necessary for maintaining general welfare and social order could effect such a restriction. It could, of course, be said that the citizens' rights are still protected as long as the Supreme Court has the power of constitutional review. However, it is also necessary to consider the lack of experience of the Japanese people in using this judicial guarantee, the record of the Supreme Court in this matter up to now, and the vagueness of the concept of general welfare. In this context, the apprehension appears justified that the lawmakers would in actuality be placed in a position above the people, who then could enjoy only a freedom restricted to the will of the Diet. At the same time, it is proposed to strengthen the provisions dealing with the duties of the people and to add the duty of national defense, the duty to observe the laws, and the duty of loyalty to the state. To provide more in terms of duties while diminishing rights would impress on the people those attitudes which were implicit in their being called "subjects" rather than "citizens" in the old Constitution.

Cabinet over the Diet

The relationship between the cabinet and the Diet would be altered, first of all, by the adoption of an emergency decree system. This would enable the cabinet to issue emergency decrees in place of law and to spend money without a Diet-approved budget while the Diet is not in session. The tendency towards the supremacy of executive power reached its extreme during the Fascist era in some formerly democratic countries. The danger in Japan is of a similar magnitude. The Meiji Constitution contained provisions for emergency decrees and emergency fiscal measures, and prewar politics in Japan cannot be understood without reference to the abuse of these provisions. This abuse tied in with traditional attitudes of the Japanese bureaucracy, stemming in part from the notion of a hierarchical division of the body politic into those who govern and those who are to be governed. There is little reason to assume that these attitudes have disappeared or, in fact, that they are not behind the present proposals.

A lack of clarity in the present Constitution (Articles 7 and 69) permitted the creation of a precedent allowing the cabinet to dissolve the Diet at any time regardless of whether or not there has been a no-confidence vote. It is now proposed to state this power clearly in the Constitution. In addition, the cabinet would be given the power to suspend the Diet, although the formal power of suspension would be put into the hands of the Emperor, as in the Meiji Constitution. This change would return Japan to the prewar situation when the exercise of the suspension and dissolution powers always hung as a sword of Damocles over the head of the Diet.

Emperor over the cabinet

This three-layer formula would not be complete without putting the Emperor at the apex. As in prewar days the Emperor would of course not really rule. Rather the elevation of his position would have a twofold purpose: it would recreate or strengthen the Emperor myth, and it would permit conservative cabinets to utilize this myth, as they have done in the past, to perpetuate their political power.

It is proposed to change the position of the Emperor from "symbol" to "head of the state" (Article 1). At present, all acts of the Emperor in matters of state require the "advice and approval of the cabinet" (Article 3). The revisionists want to eliminate the word "approval." The Japanese word for "advice" used in the present Constitution—*jogen*—would be replaced by another word—*shingen*—which implies the offering of an opinion to a superior and which has definite feudal connotations. Together these two changes would indicate a reversal of the roles of the Emperor and the cabinet. In the same category of subtle change is the proposed replacement of the colorless term "attestation" in Article 7 by the word "award" in regard, for instance, to the appointments of various high officials, including ambassadors. The Emperor would also ratify treaties, rather than merely attesting a ratification by the cabinet.

Other proposals

Aside from these three important points the proposal would add a chapter on national security and defense to the Constitution. Interestingly enough the renunciation of war would not be eliminated but only relegated to the Preamble. The Constitution would also state clearly that the renunciation applies only to wars of aggression. The creation of armed forces "compatible with the strength of the nation" would be provided for.

EVALUATION OF PROPOSALS FOR REVISION

It would go beyond the scope of this article to discuss all the provisions of the Liberal party's proposal. Some are mere clarifications of present provisions and some, in fact, show greater circumspection or caution than others. But there is clearly an essential difference between the two sets of proposals for revision: those of 1948 and 1949 aimed at strengthening the democratic character of the Constitution; those of 1954 aim at weakening it. In large measure this difference may be explained in terms of the conservative predilection of those who advance the latter proposals, since Japanese conservatives have hardly been known for their dedi-

[12] General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government Section, *The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948* (Washington, D. C., 1949), Vol. I, p. 102.

cation to democracy as defined or practiced in the West.

In this connection the "depurge" of prewar politicians should be mentioned. Conservative politicians and bureaucrats who had escaped the purge were quite willing, when given a chance, to "depurge" their former colleagues. It is noteworthy that the chance occurred before the occupation ended. The shift in occupation attitude was based on the unstable international situation which culminated in the tragedy of the Korean War in 1950. And here we are led to the other reason for the tendency of the postindependence proposals, which we find outside the domestic realm.

The dilemma: strong and/or democratic?

Some occupation measures were clearly aimed at eliminating Japan as a strong military power; others were aimed at Japan's democratization, possibly under the assumption that a democratic Japan would be a peaceful Japan. However, in the view of some Japanese even measures ostensibly aimed at democratization tend to weaken Japan. In the present international constellation the need is for a strong Japan. The idea of strengthening Japan by undoing the democratization measures and by a return to a status quo ante easily suggested itself to Japanese conservatives.

The dilemma of the present situation is evident. On the one hand it is necessary to get rid of all those elements which made Japan strong but aggressive in the past. On the other hand, the newly born democracy should be strong enough to defend itself, if it is to survive. Can it be made strong enough only by destroying its own character as a democracy?

Logically the defense of democracy is meaningless if there is no democracy left to defend. It could be objected that the building up of a democracy is only possible if Japan stays free. If Japan were to disappear behind the Iron Curtain through conquest by a Communist power, that chance would be lost. This would be a telling argument, if one agrees that the external threat is of primary importance at the moment. However, the opponents of the proposed revision do not believe it to be so. They see the primary threat to democracy arising from internal forces. To them the logical order is therefore to build up democracy first of all. In this sense they find that all attempts to revive the old constitutional concepts should be carefully guarded against. Then, too, many do not consider it a foregone conclusion that a democratic Japan cannot also become a strong Japan.

At any rate the attempts to revise the Constitution do not represent a Japanese consensus. In 1954 a National League for the Defense of the Constitution was founded under the chairmanship of Tetsu Katayama, a moderate Socialist, who in 1947, was Japan's first Christian prime minister. This League embraces a wide segment of non-Communist progressive opinion. Immediately after the occupation the conservative revisionists were reluctant to push the revision, because they did not feel sure of the majority in the plebiscite which is one requirement for constitutional amendment. At present such an amendment is not possible because the revisionists have less than the required two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet.[13]

[13] To overcome this difficulty, a revision of the election law for the lower house which would decrease the electoral chances of the Opposition, the Social Democratic party of Japan (Nihon Shakaito), is being proposed. On this, see Robert E. Ward, "The Constitution and Current Japanese Politics," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1956), pp. 49–58.

FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION

Whether the conservative proposals for revision will materialize in the near future or not rests solely on the attitude of the Japanese people. The chances for a revision of the Constitution in line with the conservative proposals should not be underestimated. Notwithstanding the increasing tendency toward urbanization, the overwhelming majority of the voters are still suffering under the thralldom of the premodern status hierarchy of a rural society, where independence of decision on the part of the voters is hardly expected and where apathy toward questions of political importance prevails. This situation accounts for the predominantly conservative atmosphere of present-day Japan,[14] but whether it justifies a return to the past remains highly problematical.

One can hardly discuss the question without considering the function of a constitution. Communist countries claim that their constitutions are simply mirrors of political and social reality. Democratic constitutions, however, come into being as an ideal scheme for the political activities of the people and their representatives. The scheme is democratic when it gives an equal chance to all political views, conservative or progressive, to achieve prevalence. No constitution which either thwarts or imposes social change can be democratic.

In the sense that the present Constitution does neither, but permits peaceful social change, politicians who remain loyal to the fundamental philosophy of democratic government have the task of maintaining it as an ideal scheme for the future of Japan.

[14] See my article "Japanese Election Results Reconsidered," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1953), pp. 139–45; also Robert E. Ward, "The Socio-Political Role of the Buraku (Hamlet) in Japan," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 1951), pp. 1025–40.

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The Cabinet, Administrative Organization, and the Bureaucracy

By KIYOAKI TSUJI

SINCE the Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952, changes have appeared in the executive branch of the Japanese government. The transfer of power from the Yoshida Cabinet to the Hatoyama Cabinet in 1954 symbolizes some of these changes.

As a result of the 1949 general elections, the Yoshida Cabinet, which held power through the last half of the occupation period, became the strongest cabinet in Japanese history since the Meiji era. Backed by the Democratic Liberal party (Minshu Jiyuto), which won an absolute majority of 264 out of 466 seats in the House of Representatives, its program was certain of support in the lower house. Differing from the separation-of-powers principle in the United States, the parliamentary system adopted in the 1947 Constitution makes a cabinet responsible to the Diet.[1] A cabinet supported by a political party with an absolute majority in the Diet, therefore, is all-powerful in deciding administrative policy.

THE CABINET—CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS

Throughout the history of forty-one cabinets formed under the old Constitution adopted in 1890, only three were supported by absolute majority parties in the House of Representatives: the Hara Cabinet (1918–21), the Hamaguchi Cabinet (1929–31), and the Inukai Cabinet (1931–32). Under the Meiji Constitution, however, the Emperor appointed each cabinet, and each minister was individually responsible to him for administrative affairs under his jurisdiction. The cabinet thus had no collective responsibility. Together with the House of Representatives, various other legal and extralegal forces, such as the Privy Council, the House of Peers, the military commands, civilian ultranationalists, and powerful bureaucrats had great direct influence upon individual cabinet ministers. Even a cabinet supported by an absolute lower house majority found it difficult to secure unity in deciding administrative policy on its own responsibility or within its competence. Twenty-one of the forty-one prewar cabinets fell from power as a result of division of opinion in cabinet meetings. Not without significance is the fact that the three prime ministers backed by an absolute majority party were assassinated. The position of the prime minister under the Meiji Constitution was far weaker than that of the President of the United States, who wields strong power over his cabinet.

To correct this weakness, new provisions governing the formation and functions of a cabinet were inserted in the present Constitution.[2] First, the prime minister is nominated by the Diet. Secondly, a majority of the cabinet members must be members of the Diet. Thirdly, a cabinet assumes collective responsibility as one body for all administrative affairs. Fourthly, the prime minister has the right to discharge members of his cabinet at will. The leader of a majority party who wields tight party control can form a strong cabinet which can take a firm attitude in formulating administrative policy.

[1] The particular articles involved are Articles 41, 60, 63, and 66–69. For an explanation of this principle see Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, *Nihon Koku Kenpo* ("The Japan National Constitution"), 2 vols., Tokyo, 1955.

[2] Articles 66, 67, 68.

YOSHIDA CABINET

Displaying a leadership almost absolute, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida succeeded in maintaining solid unity in his cabinet for several reasons besides the powers accorded by the Constitution. In the first place, he was a man of stubborn individuality whom no party man dared oppose. Moreover, during the occupation period, he had the strong support of SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), both in carrying out the Dodge deflation plan of 1949–50 and in co-operating with United Nations forces in the Korean War. Further, as a result of the purge of wartime leaders, the Diet was filled with "new faces" who exerted little influence upon the political world. Yoshida became so powerful that his cabinets formed after 1949 came to be called "one-man cabinets."

With the conclusion of the Peace Treaty in September 1951, the Yoshida Cabinet, considered a symbol of occupation administration, gradually began losing its former firm control over policy and, inevitably, party. Three reasons may be suggested for this development.

Return of wartime leaders

The first reason was the change of political leaders. The depurging of wartime leaders begun in 1950 paved the way for their return to political life. Inevitably there developed a keen struggle for party control in the majority Liberal party (Jiyuto) between the postwar faction led by Prime Minister Yoshida and the prewar faction centering about a reinstated Ichiro Hatoyama. To maintain his leadership Prime Minister Yoshida dissolved the Diet in August 1952 in a surprise move.[3] In the October 1952 elections, the Liberal party was reduced from 285 seats to 238, while as many as 140 former wartime leaders, nearly one-third the members of the Diet, were elected. The number of Yoshida's supporters decreased in proportion to the number of revived politicians. In March 1953 a vote of no confidence against the Prime Minister passed the lower house with even some Liberal party support. The subsequent April elections reduced Liberal strength to 199, indicating the trend toward further weakening of administrative power.

Unpopular policies

A second reason for the decline of Yoshida's power lay in the rise of a general protest against his policies. At first, bitter criticism was directed against his economic policy. The cease-fire on the Korean front had led to the disappearance of a wartime boom based on United States special-procurement purchases. As a result, a depression settled over factories, especially small- and medium-sized subcontract enterprises. As the government continued its deflation policy, small and medium entrepreneurs began to show their dissatisfaction with a government they had formerly supported.

There was also cutting criticism of the Cabinet's public peace policy. With the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, a combination of conservative politicians, former soldiers, and leading financiers began advocating a revision of the Con-

[3] The Diet was dissolved by means of Article 7 of the Constitution, and gave rise to considerable public criticism because it avoided use of Article 69, which provides that dissolution follows a no-confidence vote in the cabinet. See below, Kakiwa Gokijo, "The Judicial System of New Japan," under the heading "Jurisdiction of the Courts," for an account of the Tomabechi case on this issue.

stitution and a program of rearmament which invited opposition from the intelligentsia, trade unions, and housewives. To maintain order, the Yoshida Cabinet placed curbs on freedom of thought, education, and the labor movement.[4] Those steps led to resistance and protests, since they gave the people an impression that they threatened a revival of meddlesome bureaucratic control.

Foreign policy also became a target of criticism. After independence, there was a reaction against Yoshida's foreign policy, which was labeled "one-sidedly pro-American," partly because he was in power during the latter part of the occupation. The depurged conservative politicians also showed their antipathy to it, claiming that Japan's weakness was due to American occupation policies. The Socialists and leftist forces, who were dissatisfied with the contents of the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty, attacked the Yoshida Cabinet. The H-bomb test in the Bikini atoll in March 1954, which sprinkled radioactive ashes over Japan and for a time practically paralyzed a part of Japan's fishing industry, produced a growing dissatisfaction with the Yoshida regime. Despite such damage, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Katsuo Okazaki, was so thoughtless as to declare on the floor of the Diet that the government would continue to co-operate with the United States on H-bomb tests. Consequently, national feeling grew even worse.

Corruption

A third reason for the loss of the Yoshida Cabinet's former position was that toward the end of 1953 and the beginning of 1954 a number of scandals came to light. The Yoshida Cabinet, as is not unusual with a long-lived administration, was not immune to corruption. Among others, a "shipbuilding scandal" allegedly disclosed the fact that the Liberal party had asked steamship companies to contribute political funds in return for government subsidies; and a number of government officials, Diet members from the Liberal party, and businessmen were arrested. The secretary-general of the party escaped arrest only by the intervention of the Minister of Justice on orders from the Prime Minister. Many arrested eventually were acquitted on grounds of insufficient evidence.

These events gave rise to the people's distrust of the government and led to the fall of the Yoshida Cabinet in December 1954 and the crushing defeat of the Liberal party in the February 1955 elections.

[4] These laws included the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, July 1952; revision of the education laws, May 1954; and revision of the Police Law, June 1954.

APPEARANCE OF THE HATOYAMA CABINET

On December 10, 1954, the Hatoyama Cabinet replaced the Yoshida regime. In contrast with Shigeru Yoshida, who is aristocratic and secretive and a man of strong individuality, the new prime minister, Ichiro Hatoyama, is of weak character, compromising, extremely frank, and often so democratic as to speak directly to the people in "fireside chats." The majority of the people welcomed the advent of Hatoyama, however, and a "Hatoyama boom" gained currency. Promising three major policies—development of friendly relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union, revision of the Constitution, and revision of laws enacted during the occupation—the Hatoyama government went into the February 1955 elections with high hopes, but won only 185 seats, not even a majority in the lower house. The total number of votes gathered by all the conservative parties was less than two-thirds, the Diet strength necessary for revision of the Constitution. Moreover, the Liberals opposed the Hatoyama government in the Diet, even joining forces with the Socialists. Under these circumstances, the Hatoyama government could not display strong leadership in steering proceedings in the Diet.

In October 1955 the two Socialist parties merged into a single party, the Social Democratic party of Japan (Nihon Shakaito), an occurrence which prodded the conservatives to bury their differences and unite for the purpose of checking possible Socialist advance and stabilizing the conservative regime. The new Liberal Democratic party (Jiyu Minshuto) had 299 seats in the House of Representatives in contrast to the Socialists' 154. Backed by this majority, the Hatoyama Cabinet seemed basically stable, but Prime Minister Hatoyama, himself no more than a puppet resting on a balance of power of many forces in the new party, could not co-ordinate the factional groups in the party. Consequently, he has continually suffered from conflicts of opinion among members of his cabinet, whether on foreign policy, compilation of the budget, or administrative organization.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Besides these political realities, the Hatoyama government, as well as other postwar cabinets, inherited an executive personnel with traditions deeply rooted in the past. The most conspicuous characteristic of the Japanese administrative organization has been its deep-rooted "departmentalism." This condition stemmed from the fact that under the Meiji Constitution a minister as the head of a ministry bore separate responsibility to the Emperor. In addition, because of the low position of the Diet and because almost all legislation was government sponsored, administrative officials almost always drafted and prepared the bills, thus enhancing their position as policy makers. For example, in the period from 1890 to 1920, of 3,126 bills introduced into the Imperial Diet, 2,856 were "government bills," and only 270 were initiated by members of the Diet itself. Besides, since the status and tenure of administrative officials were protected, they could cope successfully with political parties and the Diet. Sometimes they had even more influence than either the Diet or the political parties. Finally, the Diet had no control over the establishment and reorganization of administrative agencies; the Meiji Contitution provided that these changes should take place by executive order, not by law.

Despite the enactment of many postwar laws,[5] administrative officials have held fast to departmentalism in their respective ministries: their traditional influence is still alive. The occupation, which adopted a formula of indirect rule rather than direct military government, fostered this tendency, for SCAP turned to the bureaucracy for execution of its policies. It is acknowledged that the method of indirect rule helped the trend toward democracy and checked friction that might have developed even more than it did between the occupation authority and the Japanese people. But as far as the bureaucracy was concerned, no ministry was democratic enough to subject itself to control by the cabinet, and each sought self-preservation through the authority entrusted to it by SCAP. More important, whereas the zaibatsu and the military structure were dissolved, the bureaucratic machinery was preserved. Within SCAP,

[5] For example, the various administrative organization laws, particularly that of 1949; the Cabinet Law of 1947; and the National Public Service Law of 1947 and as amended in 1948, 1949, and subsequent years.

too, there were many conflicts over administrative policy. All of these served to preserve the departmentalism traditional in Japanese government.[6]

CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

The departmentalism of each ministry made it impossible for succeeding cabinets to reform administrative organization. Before the Peace Treaty, the Yoshida Cabinet attempted to improve the mammoth administrative organization that had swollen as an inevitable consequence of strict and extensive control over economic and social life during the war and postwar periods. The Hatoyama Cabinet also undertook such a program. These efforts ended in failure. Certainly the time-honored saying that "administrative reorganization always proves fatal to a cabinet" reflects the real situation.

In 1951, the Government Ordinance Advisory Committee, a brain trust formed by Prime Minister Yoshida, submitted a plan for reform, to adapt the administrative organization to the needs of an independent state, but because of interministry rivalry the plan was pigeonholed. Again in 1955, the Hatoyama Cabinet took up administrative reorganization as one of its major policies and ordered the Administrative Council to draw up a concrete plan. In February 1956, the Council submitted a report which proposed the creation of a top-management agency, the establishment of a cabinet ministers' committee on the budget, the creation of an independent board of trade, the re-establishment of a Home Ministry by combining the Local Autonomy Board and the Construction Ministry, and the abolition of the National Personnel Authority. Opposed by many Diet members from the Liberal Democratic party and bureaucrats, the watered-down plan finally framed by the Hatoyama government in late March 1956 called only for abolition of the National Personnel Authority, establishment of a Home Ministry and a cabinet ministers' committee on the budget, and an increase in the number of parliamentary vice-ministers.

The present administrative organization consists of twelve ministries and two independent agencies, the National Personnel Authority and the Board of Audit. The twelve ministries are the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Health and Welfare, Agriculture and Forestry, International Trade and Industry, Transportation, Postal Services, Labor, and Construction. Attached to the Prime Minister's Office are the Procurement Board, the Administrative Control Board, the Local Autonomy Board, the Defense Board, and the Economic Planning Board. Other administrative commissions are also attached to the various ministries, without, however, having quite the same autonomy as the independent regulatory commissions in the United States.

In addition to the administrative agencies noted above, there are three "public corporations": the Japanese National Railways, the Japan Monopoly Corporation, and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation. Aside from those employed in the three public corporations, as of May 1956 there were employed in the twelve ministries, plus the two independent agencies and the five boards attached to the Prime Minister's Office, a total of approximately 654,500 persons.

[6] Kiyoaki Tsuji and Yoshisato Oka (Eds.), "Leadership in the Postwar Government," *The Annuals* [*sic*] *of the Japanese Political Science Association* (Tokyo, 1953), pp. 29–53, especially pp. 42–44 (in Japanese).

RECENT CHANGES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Four important changes in administrative organization have taken place in the postindependence period.

Defense Board

Not least among the four has been the emergence of the Defense Board. Replacing the National Safety Board on July 1, 1954, it is now one of the largest administrative agencies, administered by a director-general who is also a Minister of State Without Portfolio. In charge of the Defense Force itself is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, modeled on the United States pattern, which as the top agency for formulating defense plans is composed of a Chairman in uniform and the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Since 1955, the Board has begun employing as "advisers" to the director-general more than a dozen former generals and admirals who were active in the Pacific War. Before this, many former soldiers had also been taken into service. Naturally, sharp criticism has been voiced that not only is the principle of civilian supremacy provided for in the Constitution endangered but also there threatens the revival of vigorous departmental conflict between civil and ex-military officers and likewise between Army and Navy groups.[7]

National Personnel Authority

A second major change concerns the reduction of the staff of the National Personnel Authority. This office was established in 1949 according to a SCAP directive, to democratize the privileged bureaucratic system, introduce scientific personnel administration, unify personnel management, check evils caused by the spoils system, and put a job classification system into operation. Resistance to these changes came from top bureaucrats who wished to preserve their status and from public officials' unions fearful of a possible freeze in working conditions. Under the guise of improving the system initiated under SCAP, the Hatoyama Cabinet reduced the personnel of the Authority in March 1956 and hopes to abolish its status as an independent agency by placing it under the Prime Minister's Office as a small personnel committee merely to judge complaints about state examinations.

Police system

The reform of the police system constitutes another important postindependence change. In 1947, a letter from General MacArthur to Tetsu Katayama, then prime minister, suggested the democratization of the police who had played an active role in building militarism in Japan and had long violated personal dignity and freedom of thought.[8] As a result, the old police system was revised with the establishment of the Public Safety Board system and the separation of local autonomous police from the national police system. A 1954 revision of the law deprived the Board of its purely administrative character by appointing a Minister of State as its head. Secondly, another 1954 revision weakened the local autonomy of the police system and accelerated a trend toward centralization by abolishing the local autonomous police of cities, towns, and villages and by limiting the top officials of the retained prefectural autonomous police to bureaucrats in active service.[9] The amendment of the

[7] Cf. *Japan Times* (Tokyo), July 31, 1956, p. 4.

[8] Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), Vol. 2, pp. 703–6.

[9] When this amendment was being pushed to a vote, a melee occurred in the lower house as a result of the Socialists' drastic ob-

police law may help to lighten the financial burden on a local governmental unit, but it may also spur the recent tendency toward centralization.

Local government

A fourth change in government administrative organization relates to the practice of local government. The Local Autonomy Act of May 1946 made Japanese local bodies adopt an autonomy system on the British and American pattern. Released from the strict control of the Home Ministry, prefectures, cities, towns, and villages came to have far more autonomy, and the citizens were accorded rights of direct election, recall, initiative, and referendum in matters of local government.

In fact, however, since top bureaucrats of the dissolved Home Ministry and other central government offices frequently occupied the chief positions in local autonomous bodies, their course of action was governed by the central government. Also administrative affairs entrusted to local bodies for execution by central government agencies amounted to 80 per cent of all the work handled by local government units. Of 967.7 billion yen spent by all local governmental units in 1955, 50.7 billion yen represented "red ink" finance. Local units in the red that year numbered 39 prefectures, 368 cities, and 1,885 towns and villages.

As compensation for contributing to meet these deficits, ministries at the national level are pressing for greater control over local affairs in their respective fields. Already central government agencies, especially the Local Autonomy Board, are exerting strong pressure through the allocation of subsidies and by influencing personnel changes and recruitment. The trend toward centralization is also indicated by the reinforcement of central control over education by abolishing local elective boards of education in 1956. The conservatives also desire to return to the former practice of having governors of prefectures appointed by the central government, thereby abolishing the present system of popular election. At present, both public opinion and local governments are opposed to such a policy of central control.[10]

CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY

A conspicuous characteristic of government in the twentieth century is the increased function of bureaucracy. As has been pointed out by Max Weber, Carl Friedrich, Paul Appleby, and others, democracy in the present day cannot be maintained without dependence on a bureaucratic system. This world-wide tendency is apparent, likewise, in Japan. The bureaucratization and centralization noted above may be said to reflect such a tendency.

In nations with a long democratic history, this new bureaucracy must take the form of "responsible bureaucracy," many political scientists contend.[11] But generally speaking, the experience of the Japanese people with democracy has been brief and incomplete. In the Meiji era, a strict hierarchy with the Emperor at its apex was dominant in government, and bureaucrats, who considered themselves the embodiment of the Emperor's authority, assumed a privileged superior air towards the common people. The lamentable attitude of "reverence for the government and disdain for the people" penetrated into every nook and corner of Japanese society, and bureaucratism was as dominant in this country as in Prussia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[12]

structionist tactics. Because of the procedures adopted by the Speaker of the House of Representatives in directing the business of the chamber, not a few scholars doubt the legality of the amendment subsequently passed.

[10] This problem was discussed by Kurt Steiner in a paper entitled "The Japanese Prefecture: A Pivot of Centralization," read and distributed at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in Washington, D. C., September 6–8, 1956.

[11] THE ANNALS, Vol. 292 (March 1954), *passim*.

An important cause of this feeling is easily understood when it is recalled that, in the early days of the Meiji government, former samurai comprised 80 per cent of the officials in all central administrative organs. In a written opinion handed to the government in 1887, Tateki Tani, former Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, stated:

> In looking into the actual circumstances in which prefectural and sub-prefectural officials and the police are treating the people, they act as if they were suppressing the people of conquered clans . . . and they regard the people as their slaves.[13]

This statement gives an idea of the state of the bureaucracy at that time. Under the Meiji Constitution, only government officials, regardless of their actual merits, were granted honors, such as court rank, and orders of merit. In addition, they had many material perquisites, owing, as Max Weber says, to "the traditional custom of thinking of public office as private property." From these circumstances came the bulk of corruption.[14] Indeed bureaucracy in Japan offered a minority a special "reserved seat" in society.

Japanese bureaucracy, which grew up in this environment, has been democratized to some extent by the new Constitution. But its former privileges are now being sought again by those leaders who advocate curtailment of democratic institutions and revision of the Constitution. Even more dangerous to Japanese democracy is the fact that the bureaucracy peculiar to Japan is reviving along with the inevitable expansion of governmental administration that characterizes world society today.

Let me give here an interesting episode recounted by Walter Bagehot. A practical joker, seeing a discharged veteran carrying home his dinner, suddenly called out "Attention!" Instantly the man brought his hands to his sides while his mutton and potatoes dropped to the gutter. The drill gone through so often had become imbedded in the man's nervous structure.

In order to carry through the democratization of administration in Japan, it is necessary for the people not to lose the degree of democracy now in their grasp the moment a shout of "independence" is heard. The return of wartime leaders in both politics and administration, however, is increasing the danger of that loss.

[12] Kiyoaki Tsuji, *Nihon Kanryosei no Kenkyu* ("Studies on Japanese Bureaucracy") (Tokyo, 1952), *passim*.

[13] Quoted *ibid.*, p. 186.

[14] Cf. Kiyoaki Tsuji, "Oshoku to Kanryosei" ("Scandals and the Bureaucratic System"), *Horitsu Jiho* ("Law Review"), May 1955.

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The National Diet After Independence*

By Hattie Kawahara Colton

Of all Asian countries, Japan has had the longest parliamentary record. From its beginning in 1890 to the end of World War II, parliamentarism provided a curtain behind which legal and extralegal forces besides the Imperial Diet wielded effective power. The objectives of SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) were to provide a system of government that would guarantee popular control. The new Constitution of 1947 established a National Diet designated as the "highest organ of state power," and local autonomy, including the popular election of local governmental officials from the prefecture to the village. At the national level, the Diet controlled the cabinet by selecting the prime minister and by its power to topple a government. All legislation, including the budget, and treaties required Diet approval.

The political milieu within which the elected bodies were to function was freed from past controls. The electorate was expanded by extending the franchise to women and lowering the minimum voting age to twenty. By 1955, with the natural increase in population of voting age, there were over 48.2 million registered voters for the House of Representatives elections, compared with a little over 14 million in 1937, the last prewar normal election. Pressure or interest groups, such as labor unions, which in prewar Japan had had a disproportionately smaller share of influence, were favored by postwar reforms, and business-industrial groups cut down in strength. Political parties, allowed to organize freely and to compete for public support and to take control of the government, mushroomed in 1946 to well above three hundred, of which only thirteen could be called national parties.[1] By 1955, the National Diet had the makings of a two-party system with a cluster of minor parties ideologically grouped around the two.

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The Diet Record

Independence came to Japan in April 1952, in the midst of the thirteenth Diet session under the new Constitution, when the Yoshida government commanded 285 out of 466 seats in the House of Representatives. On October 1, 1952, the first post-occupation elections cut this majority to 238. These elections also returned to the Diet depurged politicians, many with prewar experience in the Imperial Diet. Mostly in the conservative parties, they were newcomers to the postwar legislature with its greatly expanded powers and with drastic changes in both organization and procedures, including a standing committee system based on the American pattern. They were unprepared for the complexities of this new system, which called for talents of constructive policy making, as well as protest, political intrigue, and maneuver. The prewar politicians also found that new forces, such as the Socialists, severely curtailed and repressed in prewar years, were now legitimate competitors for power and influence, though

[1] Asahi Shinbunsha ("The Asahi Newspaper Company"), *Minshu Senkyo Taikan* ("Democratic Election Review") (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1946), p. 13.

with greater ascendancy at the national than the local level, where conservatism still predominated.[2]

The prewar and depurged politicians saw, too, that power lay in the hands of postwar politicians reluctant to surrender it without struggle. There ensued a conflict, involving primarily the conservative parties, as the prewar and depurged politicians sought to recapture positions claimed as rightfully theirs. Much of the post-occupation record of the Diet is colored by that strife.

Fifteenth Diet Session

In the majority Liberal party, non-occupation figures, rallying around a reinstated Ichiro Hatoyama, concentrated their efforts in the Diet, beginning with the first vote taken for officers of the newly elected House of Representatives. During the fifteenth Diet session, which lasted from October 1952 to March 1953, they forced passage of a no-confidence motion against Minister of International Trade and Industry Hayato Ikeda for a slip of the tongue and brought about his subsequent resignation, the first time that such an action had been taken against an individual cabinet minister in Japanese legislative history. In exchange for their support of the Yoshida government's supplementary budget, they won positions on and recognition of the executive board and policy research committee of the Liberal party as party agencies influencing governmental legislation and party control. In March 1953 the contest took the form of supporting a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Yoshida in an effort to unseat the regime. Yoshida replied by dissolving the House of Representatives.

[2] Conservatives or independents control the governorships of the 46 prefectures; conservatives also hold a majority in all prefectural assemblies.

There were no legislative accomplishments in the second post-occupation Diet,[3] although Yoshida had begun the session with promises to initiate changes looking toward modifying SCAP-sponsored reforms to fit Japanese history and traditions.

The resulting elections of April 1953 reduced the Liberal seats to 199, the Progressive to 76. The Hatoyama Liberals who seceded from the Liberal party and organized their own splinter Liberal party won only 35, and the two Socialist parties elected 138.

Sixteenth Diet Session

The lack of a parliamentary majority in the newly formed fifth Yoshida Cabinet affected subsequent Diet and cabinet management. Yoshida was forced to rely upon Progressive votes. Prior to the sixteenth Diet session, called in accordance with constitutional requirements after an election, Yoshida attempted to secure an agreement with Mamoru Shigemitsu, president of the Progressive party, on Diet policy, strategy, and organization. The Progressives chose to handle each issue of policy and Diet tactics on a case-by-case method. Although the Liberals formed a single-party cabinet, the speakership and vice-speakership of the lower house went to a Progressive and a Left Socialist, respectively, and the chairmanships of the standing committees were divided according to party strengths.

The sixteenth session had an important legislative program, including the annual budget that had not been passed in the previous session. Other measures comprised an antimonopoly revision bill and a bill to curtail strikes in the coal and electric power industries. The most controversial issue was national defense,

[3] Yoshida dissolved the first post-occupation Diet session on August 28, 1952, the third day after convening.

as Japan sought to partake of United States MSA (Mutual Security Agency) aid without violating the Constitution. The national defense issue was to plague succeeding Diet sessions.

The beginning of MSA talks between Japan and the United States in July 1953 provoked a series of lengthy interpellations in the Budget Committee of the lower house, as opposition parties prodded to ferret out from the Yoshida government its intentions on defense. Scenes in the Budget Committee were stormy, and at one point the chairman of the committee was forced to resign. The Socialists presented a no-confidence motion against the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Katsuo Okazaki, for his allegedly contradictory statements on defense; it did not pass because the Progressives, while not approving of Okazaki, basically disagreed with the Socialists on the defense issue.

The government's want of a parliamentary majority and the prolonged debates on defense aided the Socialists in their fight against other contentious legislation. The award of the Labor Committee chairmanships to the Left Socialists afforded opportunities for delaying tactics against the antistrike bill in both houses of the Diet. After two extensions of the session amidst confusion and incidents bordering on violence, the Liberal party with the support of the Progressives and the Ryokufukai (Green Breeze Society) passed a motion requesting an interim report from the Labor Committee of the upper house. After withdrawing the bill in this manner, they promptly passed the bill. This marked the first time that such a procedure, permitted by the Diet Law in case of "special urgency," [4] was invoked, although the situation could hardly be called of "special urgency." Another precedent was established in this Diet session when for the first time in Japan's parliamentary history the budget bill was amended as the result of Progressive pressure.

[4] Article 56, Diet Law of 1947.

NINETEENTH DIET SESSION

Similar problems repeated themselves in the nineteenth Diet session that opened in December 1953. The return of the Hatoyama Liberals, with the exception of a few die-hards, boosted Liberal Diet strength to 227, but still left them short of a majority. Political scandals touching top leaders of the Liberal party dominated the session until April 1954, when the two Socialist parties sponsored a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet, to be defeated only by the abstention of twenty Progressives.

The main issues preoccupying this session were bills calling for changes in Japan's defense setup to qualify for MSA aid. Tortuous government interpretations of self-defense as not constituting rearmament and persistent Opposition interpellations continued to typify Diet debates. Finally, on June 2, 1954, after three extensions of the session, eighty-four days after the subject was introduced, there passed the Diet bills providing for a three-service military establishment beginning on July 1, 1954, an increase in its size, and a Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on the American model.

Disputed legislation consisted also of the twin education bills, designed to secure "neutrality in education," and a police revision bill, aimed at recentralizing the police system. Because the scandals and the defense issue had taken up so much time, the police bill remained on the legislative docket on June 3, 1954, the last day of the third extension of the session. The Socialists were determined to adjourn the Diet and block passage of the police bill by preventing another extension, by force, if necessary. That night, the Socialists, in protesting against the ruling of the House Management Committee for a two-day Diet extension, attempted to prevent the Speaker from entering the halls of the plenary session. The result was a massive riot that led to the calling of the Tokyo metropolitan police for the first time. The Speaker managed to fight his way inside the plenary session chamber and announced a two-day extension. The Socialists claimed it to be invalid, because the notice had been made from the floor, not from the Speaker's rostrum. They subsequently boycotted the session, and the police bill passed in their absence on their insistence that the Diet session had closed on June 3. The session finally ended on June 15, amidst Socialist apologies, threatened discipline measures, and a joint party resolution of self-remonstrance.

In the meantime, the Diet had been the setting for the interparty and intraparty negotiations looking toward Yoshida's downfall, partly a continuation of the prewar-postwar conflict of generations, a conflict dating back to 1952. These maneuvers persisted during the summer and fall of 1954, while Yoshida went on a world tour. Upon his return, 39 dissident Liberals with Ichiro Hatoyama at their head joined with the Progressives to form the Japan Democratic party (Nihon Minshuto) in November 1954. On the basis of an understanding with the Socialists that an election would be called in early 1955, the first Hatoyama Cabinet came into existence. In January 1955, fulfilling this pledge, Hatoyama dissolved the Diet. The February 27, 1955, elections returned 185 Democrats, 112 Liberals, and 154 Socialists.

TWENTY-SECOND DIET SESSION

The twenty-second Diet session met on March 18, lasting until July 30. The events of the first day revealed that the problems of ruling with less than a Diet majority were no different from those which Yoshida faced in 1953. The Liberals, like the Progressives in previous Diet sessions, co-operated at times with the Socialists. Hatoyama candidates for Speaker and Vice-Speaker of the House of Representatives were turned down in favor of a Liberal and a Right Socialist, respectively; and his choice for chairman of the House Management Committee, responsible for steering Diet proceedings, was also challenged. The session was characterized by long speeches, noisy interpellations, but few legislative accomplishments. The annual budget was not passed until July 1, after a series of strategems that at times threatened the life of the Hatoyama Cabinet. Important legislation, including a bill to establish a national defense council and a bill to set up a Constitution revision committee, were left pending. The Diet, however, provided the stage for discussions that led to the merger of the Socialist parties in the Social Democratic party of Japan (Nihon Shakaito) and the conservative parties in the Liberal Democratic party (Jiyu Minshuto), in October and November 1955, respectively, changing the party composition of the lower house to 299 Liberal Democrats and 154 Socialists.

TWENTY-FOURTH DIET SESSION

Unification of the parties had its impact upon the Diet. Formerly, the multiple-party character of the Diet had made possible co-operation even among parties ideologically opposed on tactics and strategy. Since merger, party polarization has made Diet politics more intense, with the confrontation of two distinct blocs. The rivalry between the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists is illustrated by the record of the twenty-fourth Diet session,

which opened on December 20, 1955, and ended on June 3, 1956, in time for the scheduled House of Councillors election campaign.

The absolute conservative majority, the numerical impotence of the Socialists, and the impending House of Councillors elections made this a noisy and tumultuous session. While election of lower house officials proceeded without much difficulty, the conservative legislative program aroused deep Socialist bitterness and animosity. Among the most controversial of the revisionist measures proposed by the third Hatoyama government, formed after merger, was the small election district bill that would have increased election districts for the lower house from the present 118 to 495, with 475 being one-seat districts, and the remaining twenty, two-seat districts. These newly created districts were to be gerrymandered to conservative advantage to assure conservative hegemony for years to come, as well as to aim at giving conservatives a two-thirds control of the lower house to initiate constitutional revision. Severely attacked by the Socialists, whom observers pointed out would be reduced to less than a hundred seats, the Socialists sought to delay Diet proceedings by filibuster, holding up committee sessions, lengthy interpellations on a wide range of issues from Prime Minister Hatoyama's slip of the tongue on defense to the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations. They even resorted to a series of separate no-confidence motions against individual cabinet ministers, for these parliamentary moves take precedence over other matters. The Socialist strategy was calculated on the fact that the terms of one-third of the members of the upper house would expire on June 3, 1956, and hence the Diet session would have to close for the election campaign. In the end, with the hesitation of some Liberal Democratic members, the bill was emasculated and then dropped from the conservative schedule. For the first time, a minority party had succeeded by parliamentary means in defeating a bill sponsored by an absolute majority.

The program of this session numbered some of the most contentious revisionist measures that the conservatives could have martialed for Diet introduction just prior to a critical election campaign. They consisted of a national defense council bill, a Constitution revision committee bill; an administrative reform bill, to re-establish a Home Ministry and to abolish the National Personnel Authority; and a bill to replace elective boards of education at the prefectural, city, town, and village levels by boards selected by an indirect process assuring central government supervision.

With the abandonment of the election district bill, the conservative leadership made the boards of education bill "must" legislation. Aimed at the political power of the Japan Teachers Union and the Socialists, the bill passed the House of Representatives by being withdrawn from committee only after an interim report. This move established a lower house precedent similar to that in the House of Councillors over the antistrike bill in 1953. The Socialists then concentrated all their efforts in the upper house education committee, for once a bill is favorably reported out of committee, its chances for passage are certain. After a series of dilatory maneuvers, involving interpellations on reported scandals and other issues, the Socialists finally resorted to organized violence and planned tumult to stop the bill. Part of their reason for this action lay in the fact that the upper house leaves less room for parliamentary moves that had proved successful in the lower house. A no-confidence motion against the cabinet has only the effect of a censure, for the upper house cannot create and unseat governments. Under police protection, the conservatives rammed the bill through the upper house plenary session, and with their energies dissipated, the Socialists acquiesced in the passage of the bill to create a national defense council in the closing days of the session. Other measures, less controversial but still significant, such as the textbook revision bill and a health insurance bill, were shelved.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

This brief resume of postindependence Diet sessions suggests some of the main problems confronting the Diet. No post-occupation government has found it easy to steer a legislative program through the Diet. The growth of sufficient Socialist power to prevent constitutional revision, a goal of every government since 1952, has led the conservatives to seek ways of assured dominance. There are proposals to decrease by constitutional amendment the position of the Diet and its powers.[5] Instead of the Diet as the "highest organ of state power," some advocates would establish executive control over government, with the Emperor at the apex, by giving only the cabinet power not only to dissolve the Diet but also to suspend Diet sessions.

Another key change under discussion is whether the cabinet should have power to enact budgets by emergency decree, subject to later Diet confirmation. A problem of which Diet members complain is the almost year-round sessions, due in part to the frequency of special sessions to appropriate funds for flood relief, for necessities created by other natural calamities, or for other requirements. Diet members find little time outside sessions to mend political fences in their constituencies, and many maintain "offices" or "caretaker" relatives in their districts to look after voters and supporters. Before election campaigns, there is a great demand by incumbent legislators to return to their districts. While there may be a desire by some conservatives to restrict Diet sessions, others question whether the surrender of power over the budget is the way out.

There are also suggestions for changing the powers of the two houses of the Diet in favor of the House of Councillors. With constitutional amendments impossible at present because they lack majorities of two-thirds in both houses, the conservatives have sought to buttress their position by legislation. The frustrated attempt in 1956 to establish the small election constituency system in the lower house had this objective. It is expected that a similar proposal will be introduced again.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN UPPER HOUSE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

With regard to the House of Councillors, conservatives are seeking to secure a two-thirds majority by changing the basis for electing members. At present, 100 of the 250 member body are elected in a nationwide constituency, and the other 150 from multiple-member prefectural districts, apportioned on the basis of population and with voters casting a separate ballot for each class of candidates. Some conservatives would recommend abolition of the national constituency and distribution of the 100

[5] Toshiyoshi Miyazawa *et al., Kenpo Kaisei* ("Constitutional Revision") (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1956), *passim*. See especially pp. 225–45 for draft ideas and proposals of the various political parties before merger. See also Jiyu Minshuto, Senkyo Taisaku Honbu ("Election Strategy Headquarters, Liberal Democratic Party"), *Kenpo Kaisei no Hitsuyo to Mondai Ten* (The Need for Constitutional Revision and Points of Controversy) (Tokyo: Jiyu Minshuto Seimu Chosakai, 1956), pp. 23–25.

seats among the prefectural districts; others propose an appointive system to prevent the growth of Socialist power.

In 1946, during the debates on the new Constitution, there were advocates of an appointive upper house, resembling the House of Peers, or a functional chamber representing various occupational, professional, and cultural groups. While SCAP had proposed a unicameral legislature, the Constitution and the Diet Law conceded to these interests by establishing the present system. It was believed that this arrangement would safeguard the election of nationally prominent individuals, whose talents would lie in their knowledge and experience, not in their political ties, but it was expected that they would tend to favor conservatism.

The hoped-for nonpartisanship according to party lines was doomed from the beginning. Popular election of members inevitably drew them into political controversies and political alignments. With a House of Representatives based on political parties controlling the cabinet, and the necessity for these party-led cabinets to secure upper house approval of legislation, political groups naturally formed in the upper chamber. The trend toward political coloration was hastened after 1949 by the voter's preference for party identification. The development of a two-party pattern in 1955 further extended the process of "politicizing" the House of Councillors.

This tendency is also apparent in the decline of independent and minor party winners in upper house elections, especially in the national constituency.[6] In 1947, out of the 100 seats, 63 independent and minor candidates won; in 1950, 12; in 1953, 15, and in 1956, only 5. The record of the Ryokufukai, organized in 1947 to represent nonpartisan upper house members, shows the trend even more precisely. In 1947, with over 90 members, it was the largest single bloc in the upper chamber. Owing to defections to other parties and a steady record of electoral defeats, by June 1956, on the eve of the elections, the number had been diminished to 43. In the 1956 elections, only five candidates won; together with incumbents, the Ryokufukai now hold only 31 seats. Whereas in 1947 it had been a moderating influence in the upper house, even by 1953 it no longer held the balance of power and became indistinguishable from the conservatives. The 1956 elections confirm this fact.

An election system allowing more than a hundred candidates among whom voters are asked to designate one tends to foster uncertain electoral showings. Party polarization has, however, caused a decrease in the number of candidates in each election. In 1950, there were 331; in 1953, 234; and in 1956, only 151. The reduction in number of candidates and an increase in the voting population mean an enlargement in the number of votes a candidate needs to win. There develops a premium on organized electoral support and party affiliation. As a result of their nationwide labor union connections, the Socialists are expected to increase their seats from the national constituency. Already in 1956 they won 21 out of 52 posts, compared with 11 out of 53 in 1953. Socialist gains were due as much to their superior election strategy, minutely dividing areas of support among candidates, as to their stand on issues and the dismal conservative Diet record prior to the election.

Problems of the Standing Committee System

The internal operations of the Diet are also under scrutiny.[7] Some conservatives desire to weaken the standing committees of the Diet, conceived by SCAP to be the heart of Diet processes. This system is criticized as being more suitable to a presidential system like that of the United States, where the legislative body controls the administration by investigation and questioning. In a parliamentary system, as in Japan or Great Britain, it is alleged that the standing committees represent a bar to smooth legislative management. A government in power encounters as many possibilities of obstruction as there are Diet committees. Opposition parties have a large area within which to attack a government and to frustrate its legislative program, if not to lay the basis for toppling it from power. Since committees often refuse to meet unless the prime minister and cabinet ministers attend, on grounds that only they can be held accountable for a government's policies, it is claimed that an extremely heavy and often unnecessary burden is placed upon them in defending a government's stand from committee to committee. In 1955, the number of standing committees was reduced from 22 to 15, as a partial answer to this problem.

Some Diet members also complain that the standing committees foster narrow specialization, with many members having no idea of bills being considered in other committees, except for the major ones explained in plenary session prior to committee attention. Critics also contend that committee members tend to develop into protagonists or advocates of special committee interests, without taking into account the overall legislative program. They become also the pleaders of pressure groups desiring particular favors or legislation. Prewar politicians familiar with the committee of the whole system of the Imperial Diet find the new arrangements too confining, so that many no longer appear in committee sessions. While their absence from committee assignments may mean that their influence in the Diet may decrease, it also suggests that main legislative decisions may tend to be made outside the committees. For new Diet members, experience on key committees such as the Budget is invaluable as one step on the rung to party leadership. Such opportunities might be more fruitful were the staff aids to the committees more effective. A SCAP objective in providing staff to committees was to raise the caliber of discussions and to aid members in their legislative work, but no committee staff is a match for the bureaucracy.

Members' Bills

The standing committees have developed into liaison agencies with the ministries, particularly for members who serve continuously and work closely with bureaucrats. The power of individual Diet members to introduce legislation on their own facilitated this relationship. In 1955, however, after the growth of members' bills requiring budgetary outlays not provided for in the budget, the Diet placed restrictions upon their introduction, necessitating the prior approval of fifty members for bills needing appropriations, and twenty signatures for those not involving monetary expenditures. Under the third Hatoyama Cabinet, a procedure has developed whereby the political affairs research committee and executive committee of the party and the cabinet approve such legislation, so that, in effect, individual members of the Liberal Democratic party are curbed from introducing private bills.[8] Members' bills

[6] *Nippon Times,* June 10, 1956, p. 8.

[7] See my article "The Working of the Japanese Diet," *Pacific Affairs,* Vol. 28 (December 1955), pp. 363–72.

[8] Based on information provided by Yasuhiro Nakasone, deputy secretary-general, Liberal Democratic party, August 1, 1956; and Mikio Mizuta, chairman, political affairs research committee, Liberal Democratic party, August 3, 1956.

of the log-rolling or pork-barreling variety, catering to special interest groups, can thus be prohibited by party and cabinet.

ORDERLY PROCEEDINGS

A problem in every Diet session has been the latent and more often than not overt possibility of riots and physical disturbances. The public disgust with acts of violence in the Diet has been evidenced in the electoral defeat in 1955 of many of those most prominently involved in the June 3, 1954, riot in the lower house. Were it not for the highly revisionist legislative program of the conservatives in the 1956 Diet session, and their soft-pedaling of the controversial defense, rearmament, and constitutional questions, the Diet violence perpetrated by the Socialists in 1956 might have had more adverse effects on Socialist election results.

To deal with the problem of order, there are proposals for extending the powers of the presiding officers of both houses. At present, they act as neutrals, with decisions on steering proceedings in the hands of Management Committees, composed of members according to party strengths in each house. Conservatives argue that such questions as opening of plenary sessions or the order of business in plenary sessions, now resolved by the Management Committees, should be decided by the presiding officer.

Basically, there has not yet developed a tradition of parliamentary behavior that eschews violence and insists upon orderly processes. Diet committees, where vital decisions are made, have not become arenas for compromise. With few exceptions, a bill is reduced to an "either-or" proposition. The overwhelming conservative dominance has tended to increase Socialist frustration at the tyranny of the majority and to create tendencies toward violence. The frequently heard condemnation of an absolute majority for steam-rolling legislation merely because of numbers reveals a lack of understanding of the relations between a majority and a minority in a democratic system.

All parties share responsibility for riotous behavior in the Diet, but the major acts of violence, including the June 3, 1954, affair and the May–June 1956 situation, are not spontaneous eruptions, but well-planned, organized strategy. Special responsibility may be laid at the door of the Socialists who, goaded by their labor allies, have turned to organized tumult and forcible obstructionism to stop what they consider obnoxious legislation. A question may well be raised whether Socialists believe in orderly, parliamentary processes. Yet the seriousness with which they conduct Diet tactics suggests that they value the Diet as their main governmental channel through which to influence policy and public opinion. The Socialist party announcement of July 25, 1956, that they would abandon emphasis upon a class party thesis and aim at control of government by becoming a national party catering to and recruiting from the public as a whole also implies that they regard control of Diet seats as the way to power, rather than the coup d'état and violence.

CONCLUSION

Like many other aspects of Japanese society, the Diet system is still in transition. Many new precedents, some auguring well for the development of a parliamentary tradition, others ill, are continuously evolving. Despite an apparent gap between the democratic political institutions constitutionally established and public and Diet political behavior, the longer the period of time for habituation to the responsibilities of the new system, the greater the chance for its continuance. No one can deny

the raised status of the postwar Diet, compared with its predecessor, not only in terms of powers and functions, but also in the position of Diet members, paid salaries equivalent at least to top bureaucrats and entitled to perquisites of office previously the privilege of the bureaucracy and the military services. Few Diet members would favor a diminution of their present situation. There is also a growing political consciousness and sophistication among the people, evident in their frequent verdicts against extremists of the right or left, violators of election laws, or participants in Diet riots. The conservative defeat in 1956 suggests that there will be no dissolution of the lower house until 1959, when a fresh popular mandate may determine for or against fundamental alteration of the present distribution of power in Japan's government.

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The Judicial System of New Japan

By KAKIWA GOKIJO

SINCE the Japanese judicial system was completely revised during the occupation period, the record of the past four years has been largely one of building upon the foundations laid between 1947 and the recovery of sovereignty in 1952. The present function, organization, and operation of the Japanese courts, therefore, can be best seen by first observing the differences between the prewar and postwar patterns.

OLD COURT STRUCTURE

The Meiji Constitution promulgated in 1889, which established Japan's prewar governmental structure, gave marked predominance to the executive over the legislative and the judiciary. It was inevitable, therefore, that the judiciary should have had subordinate and limited powers.

Prewar courts had no power of constitutional review. Whenever the government proposed a bill affecting the Constitution, before presentation to the Diet it was referred to the Privy Council, a consultative body provided for in the Constitution and appointed by the Emperor. The Council thus performed some of the functions of a third house to the national legislature and some of the judicial functions of a court in determining the constitutionality of a proposed act of government, legislative or administrative.

Moreover, the courts, under the Meiji Constitution and related laws, had no power to pass judgment upon disputes between the government and citizens. One could sue in the Administrative Tribunal, but this was essentially an administrative office concerned with the correction or remedy of administrative measures. Since it was under the control of the executive, one had no recourse other than to wait for a voluntary correction by upper-level government officials.

The body of law applied by the courts consisted not only of legislation passed by the Diet, but also law promulgated in the form of Imperial Ordinances, which had the binding force of law when issued by the Emperor and the cabinet, though they had to be ratified at the next session of the Diet.

Administration of the courts was under the direct control of the Minister of Justice as a member of the cabinet. By the Court Organization Law of 1890, a Supreme Court of final appeal was located in Tokyo. Composed of approximately forty-five justices, it rendered judgment in collegiate bodies of five justices. Below the Supreme Court were seven Courts of Appeal, or High Courts, located in as many major regional cities. Decisions were rendered on appeals from district courts by a collegium of three judges. Fifty-two district courts were located with at least one in each prefecture, including one in Okinawa and another in Sakhalin. The district courts were not only courts of original jurisdiction, but also served as the first appeal court for 283 local courts. The latter were courts of original jurisdiction only, and handled smaller issues not normally tried in district courts. The some one thousand judges who served the local courts heard cases individually and not in collegial form.

POSTWAR STRUCTURE

The present court structure was established by virtue of the new Constitution which came into force on May 3, 1947, and supplementary legislation enacted pursuant to its provisions.[1]

Among the reforms in the structure of government and the courts was the abolition of both the Privy Council and the Administrative Tribunal. All persons became equal in the eyes of the law, and any judicial dispute could be settled by a decision of the courts. The courts were given the right of constitutional review of Diet legislation, based upon a concrete suit of law. Through a similar specific suit the courts may also declare a government action illegal.

The courts were made equal to but independent of the executive and the legislative powers. As the guardian of the Constitution, the courts had as a major mission the protection of the fundamental rights of the people.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE COURTS

The new duties imposed on the courts required a thorough reorganization of the judicial system. The present, post-1952, court structure was created by the Court Organization Law which went into effect simultaneously with the new Constitution, on May 3, 1947, and abolished the earlier statute of 1890. The present court system is shown in the accompanying table.

JUDGES AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE COURTS

Because the courts under the new Constitution have such greatly enhanced powers, from the start the qualifications required of a judge and the formalities

[1] For a comprehensive survey of the problem of court reform as seen by SCAP and the steps taken to support that reform under the occupation, see Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September, 1945, to September, 1948* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), Vol. I, pp. 186–245. The basic laws enacted to reform the judicial system may be found in *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 885–1283 (*passim*).

COURT SYSTEM OF JAPAN

	SUPREME COURT	HIGH COURTS	DISTRICT COURTS	FAMILY COURTS	SUMMARY COURTS
Number of courts	1	8	49	49	570
Location	Tokyo	Tokyo; Osaka; Nagoya; Hiroshima; Fukuoka; Sendai; Sapporo; Takamatsu	Tokyo-to; each of 44 prefectures, plus 4 in Hokkaido (Hakodate, Sapporo, Asahikawa, Kushiro)	Same as district courts	Situated in principal cities, towns, and villages
Type and competence	As the third trial court (the last resort) adjudicates appeals from decisions of the second trial of a High Court and decisions of the second criminal trial of a district court.	As the second trial court adjudicates appeals from decisions of the first trial of a district court and a family court and decisions of the first criminal trial of a summary court.	As the first trial court adjudicates cases excepting cases of a summary court. As the second trial court adjudicates appeals from decisions of the first civil trial of a summary court.	As the first trial court adjudicates domestic and juvenile cases.	As the first trial court adjudicates comparatively minor civil and criminal cases.
Number of judges	15 Chief Justice, 1 Associate Justices, 14	About 220 Presidents, 8 Judges, 212	About 990 Judges and assistant judges	About 290 Judges and assistant judges	About 660 summary court judges
Organization of court	Grand Bench, 15 Petty Benches, 5	A collegiate body consists of 3 or 5 judges	Single judges or collegiate body of 3 judges	Same as district courts	Single judges

of his appointment have been far more rigorous than those applied to general administrative officials.

Justices of the Supreme Court

The president, or chief justice, of the Supreme Court, is appointed by the Emperor upon nomination by the cabinet. Together with the prime minister, the only other government official "appointed" by the Emperor (after being designated by election by the National Diet), the chief justice receives the highest salary of any official of government, ¥ 110,000 (about $300) per month. Other justices of the highest court are appointed by the cabinet, and "attested" by the Emperor. They receive the same salary, ¥ 88,000 ($245) monthly, as cabinet ministers.

The chief justice and justices of the Supreme Court are required to be highly intelligent, well grounded in law, and over forty years of age. In addition, more than ten of the fifteen judges must have a career of more than ten years' experience as president of or judge in a High Court or more than twenty years' experience in one or more of the following posts: judge of a summary court, public prosecutor, lawyer, professor or assistant professor in a law college.

Following appointment to the Supreme Court, the chief justice and all others must submit to a review by the people at the first general election of the House of Representatives after their appointment, and the process is repeated every ten years thereafter. Aside from this qualification, all justices of the Supreme Court have permanent tenure until they reach the statutory retirement age. Plebiscites have been held in conjunction with the general elections of 1949, 1952, and 1955. In every case the vote endorsed the incumbent. While this provision for a periodical review has been questioned in some quarters as meaningless, there has been no concerted move by any responsible group to eliminate this provision from the present Constitution.

When established in 1947 the Court consisted of fifteen members chosen equally from three fields, current judges of the courts, members of the bar, and men of learning and experience. Owing to retirement, age, and death, only eight of the original fifteen still serve the Court. The present chief justice, Kotaro Tanaka, was appointed to his present post in 1950.

Judges of the lower courts

Judges serving the lower courts are divided into the following categories: president of a High Court, judge, assistant judge, and judge of the summary court. All receive their appointment from the cabinet, drawn from a list submitted by the Supreme Court. Appointments of presidents of the High Courts receive imperial attestation. Appointment to the lower bench does not involve the plebiscite required in the case of a justice of the Supreme Court. The term of office, however, is limited to ten years, subject to reappointment.

Presidents of the High Courts, and judges, as a rule, are appointed from among those who have made a good record as assistant judges, public prosecutors, or lawyers of ten or more years' experience. Qualifications for the summary courts do not require so lengthy an experience on the bench or at the bar, and even a layman of learning and experience may be appointed to sit on such courts.

No assistant judge may render a judgment by himself or serve as a presiding judge. Nor may more than two assistant judges participate in any one collegial judgment, with the exception that when approved by the Supreme Court those with five or more years' experience may be given a temporary status equal to a judge.

Candidates for appointment to the courts must be university graduates who have completed prescribed studies or who have passed written examinations at the same level. Both classes of candidates must pass an examination prescribed by the Judicial Examination Law of 1949. From among those so qualified the Supreme Court selects judicial apprentices who receive two years' training in the Judicial Research and Training Institute administered by that court, with expenses paid by the government. Only those who pass a final examination at the end of such training may become an assistant judge, public prosecutor, or lawyer, as they elect.

Other officials of the courts

Other officials of the courts consist of investigators, family-court investigators, clerks, ushers, and bailiffs. In addition there are also court secretaries assisting in the administrative operations of the courts. All told these subordinate officials total nearly 19,000 in 1956.

Public prosecutors, who are not included in the court personnel, number some 1,600 at the present time, a number which remains relatively stable. Practicing lawyers for the whole of Japan number 5,900.

Tenure

Apart from the plebiscite provisions for justices of the Supreme Court and the ten-year term for judges of lower courts, no judge of any court is subject to dismissal, change of office, transfer, or suspension save by impeachment or other limiting causes. Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of summary courts retire at the age of seventy; others at sixty-five.

A judge who has wantonly acted against or neglected his duty or has been guilty of gross misconduct degrading the dignity of the court may be tried by an Impeachment Court consisting of fourteen members elected equally from both houses of the Diet. The Impeachment Court, however, can only dismiss a judge through a legal action taken by the Impeachment Committee of the two houses of the Diet, also selected from its members. Three judges have been subjected to impeachment since 1947, but only one has been dismissed from the service, in 1956.

The "limiting causes" referred to above include physical or mental disabilities or discipline taken against a judge who has acted against or neglected his duty and impaired the work or dignity of the court. Matters of this nature pertaining to judges of the district and summary courts are handled by the High Courts; those of the latter and the Supreme Court, by the Supreme Court itself.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

The great new grant of power vested in the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or act of government is a power held by every court, with the Supreme Court as the court of final determination. In determining the constitutionality of laws, ordinances, regulations, or other measures in the Supreme Court, the approval of *more* than eight judges, not a simple majority, is required.

Questions of constitutionality were not slow in coming before the nation's highest tribunal.

In March 1948 the Supreme Court rejected an appellant's contention that the imposition of a death sentence violated Article 36 of the Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.[2] The Court held that while life is "more solemn and precious than the whole earth," the Constitution rec-

[2] *Kuni tai Murakami* ("State vs. Murakami"), *Saiko Saibansho Hanreishu* ("Supreme Court Reports"), 2: 191 (1948).

ognizes that people may be deprived of rights in behalf of the public welfare, and also, by Article 31 of that document, that they may be deprived of life itself by due process of law.

Four months later the Supreme Court rendered a verdict in the case of a plaintiff who claimed that his conviction for theft of a bag valued at less than one dollar was invalid because it rested upon a confession given after too long a period of confinement. The Court declared in favor of the appellant and sent the case back to the district court after revoking the first and second trial judgments.[3]

A third case, which also reached the Supreme Court before the Peace Treaty went into effect in 1952, involved an appeal of a public procurator, who objected to the lower court's applying Article 14 of the Constitution, which declared that all men are equal before the law. He contended that Article 205 of the Criminal Code, which provides for heavier punishment of one guilty of inflicting injury upon a member of his own family than upon others, should have governed the case. On October 1, 1950, in a majority decision, the Supreme Court sustained the appeal of the public procurator.[4]

Less than six months after the recovery of sovereignty in April 1952, Mosaburo Suzuki, chairman of the central executive committee of the Left Socialist party, filed a suit in the Supreme Court seeking annulment of all acts relating to the organization and support of the National Police Reserve instituted since April 1, 1951. Suzuki charged these acts were a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution, since the Police Reserve constituted "war potential" barred by that article.

[3] *Kuni tai Imai* ("State vs. Imai"), *ibid.*, 2: 944 (1949).

[4] *Kuni tai Yamamoto* ("State vs. Yamamoto"), *ibid.*, 4: 2037 (1950).

The Court rejected the suit because it was not a concrete judicial dispute between or among particular persons and further declared that it was not empowered to judge the constitutionality of laws and ordinances on the basis of abstract problems.[5]

Another suit, filed by a member of the National Diet in a lower court in 1952, sought to test the constitutionality of an act of the government by asking confirmation of his status as a Diet member.[6] The issue involved a question that had been much in controversy since the second Yoshida Cabinet was formed in 1948. The plaintiff, Gizo Tomabechi, a leader of an opposition party in the National Diet, claimed payment of his salary from September 1952 to January 1953 as due but denied him because of the procedure used by the government in dissolving the Diet on August 28, 1952. Tomabechi contended the dissolution was invalid and unconstitutional because it had not been based upon a vote of no confidence as required by Article 69 of the Constitution. He further charged that the dissolution, made by Imperial Rescript, had been made without proper "advice and consent" of the cabinet as required by Article 7 of the Constitution, the article used by the government.

The Tokyo District Court decided in his favor in October 1953, declaring that while dissolution is not restricted to measures defined in Article 69, full advice and consent of the cabinet had not been obtained as required by Article 7. The state appealed to the Tokyo High Court, which reversed the lower court in 1954. The plaintiff took an appeal to the Supreme Court, where

[5] *Suzuki tai Kuni* ("Suzuki vs. the State"), *ibid.*, 6: 783 (1952).

[6] *Tomabechi tai Kuni* ("Tomabechi vs. the State"), *Gyosei Saiko Saibansho Reishu* ("Administrative Cases Reports"), 4: 2540 (1953).

the case was still pending as of August 1956.

Administrative suits

Under the new judicial system the courts may determine the legality of government administrative measures. As of the spring of 1956, some 15,000 cases have been tried since the new system was established in 1947. Approximately 63 per cent involved suits related to the purchase of farmlands under the Agrarian Land Reform Law of 1946, and about 12 per cent suits over assessments. Approximately 30 per cent of the plaintiffs won their suits.

Rule-making powers and judicial administration

The new Constitution gives the Supreme Court power to draw up legal procedures and rules for the operation of the courts and the management of judicial business. Supervision of the judicial system rests in the Supreme Court by virtue of Article 80 of the Court Law, instead of with the Minister of Justice, as formerly. These administrative powers and the ordinance rule-making powers of the highest court are exercised by a Judicial Assembly composed of the fifteen judges of that court, assisted by a secretary-general.

Jurisdiction over foreigners

All persons residing in Japan are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of its courts, with the exception of the foreign diplomatic corps who receive traditional extraterritoriality privileges. Officers, men, and civilians attached to the United States Security Forces are also subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts for offenses committed while not engaged in official business, according to terms of an amendment in 1953 to the Administrative Agreement of 1952. United Nations Security Forces are subject to the same jurisdiction by an agreement signed in 1954.

A civil suit involving a foreigner may not be rejected unless the foreign plaintiff has neither residence nor office in Japan and neglects to give surety for court costs. Japanese courts, however, have no jurisdiction if both foreign litigants live abroad. A foreign government may become a plaintiff, but cannot be sued in court as long as it does not file a countersuit of its own accord.

CLASSIFICATION OF COURT ACTIONS


Court actions as of 1956, and traditionally since 1947, generally comprise two types: lawsuits, which concern all varieties of judicial disputes, and non-lawsuits, which, if not disputes in the strictly legal sense of the term, must also be decided according to law.

A lawsuit generally means the procedure by which the judgment of the court is given in a dispute over the existence of rights or legal relations. Hearings are held in open court and both parties concerned are heard, evidence is taken, and the judgment of the court pronounced. Lawsuits involving punishment are termed criminal suits; those concerned with other legal relations are classed as civil suits.

A non-lawsuit is the process for settling or modifying or nullifying legal relations. In this form of trial the judge renders a verdict after examination of filed papers and documents and hearing oral statements in closed court. As a rule there is no confrontation of the two parties to the dispute.

The different types of suits tried in Japanese courts or under judicial controls are illustrated in the accompanying chart:

TYPES OF CASES IN JAPANESE COURTS



CRIMINAL CASES

There has been considerable change in the present operation of the court in criminal cases from that followed before the war. The prewar Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted in 1922, had an authoritarian tinge, especially in its preliminary examination system. Similar to a formal trial, it began with the charge of the public prosecutor and was presided over by a judge, who conducted the examination in closed court by means of questions from the bench without the presence of a lawyer. A confession by the accused and testimony of witnesses before the preliminary judge were accepted as evidence in the formal trial in court. Although arrest and detention required a judge's warrant, judges granted it, almost automatically, whenever the public prosecutor declared it necessary and claimed the warrant. Aside from such felonies as murder, robbery, and arson, the accused in ordinary cases could not secure the assistance of state counsel even when without the means to defend himself. During the formal trial the judge examined witnesses; the accused had no right to cross-examination and occasionally was even ordered to withdraw from the court during such an examination by the court. The trial judge was obliged to take evidence even when it was clear that the public prosecutor had insufficient grounds to prove the existence of a crime. The court could render a guilty verdict when the defendant's confession before the preliminary judge or even before indictment was the only evidence against him. The accused, be it noted, was not infrequently forced to confess to a crime.

Postwar modification

Simultaneous with the enforcement of the 1947 Constitution, emergency temporary legislation revised the most inapplicable or unacceptable provisions of the former criminal code. Subsequently the code was thoroughly revised; at the same time Supreme Court Rules adopted detailed procedures in criminal hearings. Both the new code and the rules went into effect on January 1, 1949.

The new code and rules abolished the preliminary examination system. Proceedings are now carried out in open court, and judgment is never given save on evidence offered in court. Rigid requirements have been instituted for taking depositions out of court by the judge or public procurator. The police are prohibited from arresting any person without a warrant from the judge except in instances of a flagrant violation, and even then due formalities must be complied with at the earliest possible moment. In no case can there be detention without a warrant from the court. If the accused cannot afford counsel, a lawyer is appointed for him and paid for by the state. Either the accused or his lawyer has the right both to attend the examination of a witness and to conduct cross-examination. The procedure for taking evidence by the court, however, remains unchanged.

Implementing Article 38 of the Constitution, the new code and rules provide that no person may be compelled to give testimony against himself. Confession by compulsion or by torture or after long-term detention is not acceptable as evidence, nor can the court convict the accused of a crime if his confession is the only evidence against him. Despite the drastic change these provisions made in procedure, only a few instances have arisen whereby decisions of the lower courts have had to be reversed because of it. In March 1952, just prior to Japan's recovery of sovereignty, the court rejected an alleged voluntary confession when it was proven that the defendant had been struck by a policeman in the course of his examination.[7]

In 1950 preparatory procedure was adopted in full, and rules revised to ensure the continuity of trial. In 1951 court rules governing court records were revised.

[7] *Kuni tai Yoshida* ("State vs. Yoshida"), *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), 6: 387 (1952).

Revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure after 1952

In 1953, further revisions were made to adapt the so-called "summary" court trial to provide for a more prompt and speedy application of justice. Since the Meiji era (1868–1912), there had been no institution in Japan comparable to the arraignment system in Great Britain and the United States. Even when the accused admitted in court the facts set forth in the indictment, the trial proceeded as though there had been a denial of guilt. After 1953, if the accused fully admits the facts in the bill of indictment, the process for taking evidence is cut short and the requirements for added evidence eased. Although these new reforms have helped to give the court far more time for other cases, court dockets remain relatively congested despite these and other reforms aimed at speeding the judicial process.

CIVIL CASES

Ordinary civil actions concern disputes between private persons; administrative suits involve private persons and the state or government agency. Actions involving personal status relations are almost always handled as family-affair cases, while divorce and dissolution of adoption are admitted as ordinary civil actions only when conciliation has failed.

The original Code of Civil Procedure enacted in 1890 was sweepingly amended in 1926, and further revision was made in 1948, when an over-all democratization of the judicial system took place. Further minor revisions occurred in 1950 and 1954.

Revision of the prewar code was necessary because it was somewhat authoritarian, like the Code of Criminal Procedure, in that the courts also ex-

amined ex-officio evidence and in that as a rule the presiding judge himself examined witnesses. The 1948 revision abolished the former arbitrary use of evidence, and the right to examine witnesses was granted first to the party who summoned the witness, though later the latter could be cross-examined by the other litigant. As occasion demanded, however, the court could accept in evidence matters pertaining to the public interest. The presiding judge can still put questions to the witness if and when questions and answers given are vague or inadequate.

The 1950 revision provided for greater speed and continuity in the conduct of a trial. Since the court formerly heard several cases daily, a case normally came to trial at intervals of several weeks and even months, and usually no more than one or two witnesses could be examined at a given hearing. In consequence the court was extremely slow in rendering judgments, and frequently had great difficulty in coming to a verdict in a given case. The revised code provided that the court should sit on a case in as close a succession of fixed dates as possible, with as many witnesses examined on each fixed date as agreed upon by the parties concerned.

In 1954 a revision placed restrictions on appeals to the higher courts against provisional disposition of cases, and authorized the first appeal court to reject final appeals that were patently illegal. The purpose was to speed up further the process of justice by eliminating unnecessary burdens upon the time, attention, and thought of the court.

In addition to the code establishing court procedures, Supreme Court Rules established standards for handling civil suits by the courts. On June 1, 1956, new Rules for Civil Suits went into effect, providing a comprehensive standard for all the courts. The new rules place restrictions on leading and irrelevant questions and regulate picture taking and broadcasting permitted in the court room; they also revise the procedure of recording the procès verbal in court.

Civil jurisdiction extends over all civil disputes, and as a rule no suit may be rejected in so far as it is legal. To be accepted, however, the litigant must be properly qualified as a plaintiff, the court must have jurisdiction, and the case must not be under trial in another court.

By a major postwar reform, a citizen may file a suit against the government for annulment of illegal action. An example of such a suit is the so-called "national indemnity case," where indemnity is sought for sickness resulting from severe examinations or treatment by the police, for false or mistaken arrest, for seizure of property, and so forth. Over two hundred cases of this character have been accepted, and not a few have resulted in judgments in favor of the plaintiff.

Habeas corpus

The principle of habeas corpus did not exist in Japanese law before the war. Copied from British and American practice, the newly established principle is enshrined in Article 34 of the Constitution. Actions of this variety follow procedures provided for in the Law Protecting the Human Body and the Rules for Protecting the Human Body, both enacted in 1948. Such actions must be filed with the High Court or the district court having jurisdiction over the region where the detainee, detainor, or claimant lives. The Supreme Court may demand that the competent court transfer the hearings to the highest court, and the litigant himself may also appeal to the Supreme Court against a decision of a lower bench. The number of such actions has been small, amounting to no more than 130 since 1948.

Compulsory execution of judgment and bankruptcy

Provisions regarding compulsory sale or removal, or other actions affecting property as determined by the courts, are governed by the Civil Procedure Code of 1890, as amended by Supreme Court Rules of 1952 and 1953. The amendments provide for cases involving the automobile and airplane. Action falls within the jurisdiction of the district court, but execution of judgment falls within the province of the bailiff of the district court.

Bankruptcy cases come under the original jurisdiction of the district court and follow the law of 1922. The courts have power to declare a private or legal person bankrupt upon application and after examination of the reasons claimed. By decision of the court the bankrupt's whole property may be divided among all creditors; and on application for a composition among creditors, the court may decide after submitting its judgment to a creditors' conference. The court also can examine proposals of administrators to continue operations of a bankrupt firm and may issue a court order to that effect after conference with the parties concerned.

Civil and commercial non-lawsuits

Procedures for non-lawsuits have undergone the least postwar revision of all, and remain based upon the law of 1898. The judge collects the evidence and tries the case without applying the "litigant first" principle.

Civil conciliation cases come within the jurisdiction of both the district and summary courts, and are designed to reach a reasonable settlement by mutual consent of the parties concerned without taking the issue to formal trial. The conciliation system was inaugurated in 1922 in a peaceful settlement of a dispute over a lease. It was later extended to include all kinds of civil affairs during the recent war. After 1945 civil conciliations of personal relations were treated as family-affair conciliation cases as provided for in the Domestic Relations Law. Present provisions rest upon the codification of the Civil Conciliation Law of 1951 and three Supreme Court Rules adopted the same year.

Composed of one judge and two lay persons selected from the public at large, who form the conciliation committee, civil conciliation has been so successful in settling civil disputes before formal lawsuit is begun that approximately 70,000 such cases are recorded annually. In nearly 60 per cent a successful settlement is reached.

FAMILY COURTS

Actions under the jurisdiction of these courts involve status relations among relatives, including adoption of a minor or partition of an estate when successors fail to reach agreement. As stipulated in the Domestic Relations Law of 1947 and two Supreme Court Rules adopted the same year, a single judge conducts such trials and examines all evidence behind closed doors.

A significant activity of this court is the so-called Family Conciliation Committee system. Like the Civil Conciliation Committees, these consist of a judge and two intelligent persons chosen from among the people; they may summon the parties concerned, examine the causes of dispute, and attempt to effect a reasonable settlement by mutual consent. While there is also no obligation to accept conciliation, once a decision has been accepted it has the same effect as a judgment of the court.

Although family quarrels of all kinds may be handled by conciliation procedures, disputes between relatives must,

as a rule, be submitted to conciliation before suit is filed in court. Divorce or dissolution of adoption must also go through this procedure before action is taken to court. The number of conciliation actions taken in family courts amount to 40,000 annually, about 50 per cent of which are settled successfully.

JUVENILE PROBLEMS

In prewar days juvenile cases came under the jurisdiction of Juvenile Adjustment Institutes, but they are now under the control of the family courts. Governed by the provisions of the Juvenile Law of 1948 and the Supreme Court Rules of the same year, these cases include protective measures for juveniles under twenty years of age.

If a juvenile over sixteen is judged guilty and his offense is sufficient to merit standard punishment, then common criminal procedures are applied. Whether or not he is over sixteen, if his crime is not too serious, the juvenile may be committed to a juvenile institution or reformatory or placed under the care of a protective institution. The same measures may be applied to juveniles who, if not guilty, are judged apt to commit a crime.

Juvenile cases are tried in closed court, with the judge taking evidence, including results of findings of court investigators and physicians assigned to the case.

LAY PARTICIPATION

Private persons, besides being litigants or witnesses in lawsuits, have opportunities to participate directly and indirectly in the operations of the courts and the administration of justice. The jury system, however, adopted in 1928 and suspended during World War II, has not been revived.

The chief role given the public is in the two conciliation committees established for settling civil and family disputes. They play a most vital role in helping to clear the dockets of the lower courts, as we have seen. Composed of one judge and two intelligent laymen in both instances, and appointed by the court, the number of conciliation committee members (conciliators) in both groups total more than 30,000.

Private citizens also participate in Judiciary Committees which deal with civil suits in the summary courts. In addition, there are counselors who deal with cases of domestic relations in the family courts. These individuals assist the court and the judges by attending trials and expressing themselves in court. Members of the first group number approximately 6,500, while the counselors total some 5,900 individuals.

In addition to the groups already cited, there are Councils for the Examination of Criminal Prosecution, composed of eleven members. Chosen by lot by the Election Management Committees on the village, town, and city level from the roster of those eligible to vote in the election of members of the House of Representatives, they serve in the district served by the district courts for a term of six months, after which a new Council is chosen. The function of a Council is primarily to advise the prosecutor to proceed against a suspect when it believes there has been a failure to prosecute a proper case. It seems that these Councils bear some resemblance to the grand jury system in the United States. Members of the Councils total around 8,900 as of 1956.

CONCLUSION

The new Japanese courts have consolidated their foundations in the past four years, with the major marked difference between the present and the prewar past being the devotion given to protecting fundamental human rights. Much remains to be done, such as increasing the efficiency of legal proceedings, granting more power to courts of the first instance, and greater unification of the bench and the bar. The record of the past four years gives assurance that the court system and its administration is moving in that direction, while maintaining its position as the ultimate resort of human rights.

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The Conservative Political Movement

By Kenneth E. Colton

When Japan achieved independence in April 1952, the conservative movement which had dominated the political life of Japan since the early Meiji era (1868–1912) was still the major force in politics. The overwhelmingly superior of the two conservative parties was the Liberal party (Jiyuto), with a clear majority of 285 members of the 466 member House of Representatives. Since October 14, 1948, that party under its president, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, had ruled the government and the Diet. The second conservative party, the Progressive party (Kaishinto) was distinctly a minor force, with only 68 members in the lower chamber. Although both parties could trace their lineal descent from postwar organizations established on November 9 and 16, 1945, respectively, and beyond that to the two major conservative powers of the prewar years, the Minseito and the Seiyukai, neither party by 1952 was wholly the projection of its earlier shadows. The twelve intervening years since both parties had dissolved in 1940 included the war and six and one-half years of the occupation, during which postwar parties had begun to evolve their own traditions and patterns.

Prewar and Occupation Influences

The prewar legacy in 1952 included the practice and tradition of a parliamentary party system. Both major parties had organizational structures similar to those possessed by the Minseito and Seiyukai. Each had tested areas of electoral strength that paralleled prewar centers of political power. In both parties local figures managing local party elections frequently had been actively identified with the prewar political rivals.

The prewar heritage contributed less in personalities, because the sweeping "purge" program inaugurated by SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) in January 1946, expanded in 1947 and applicable during the eighty months of occupation rule, had barred nearly 200,000 individuals from public life, including most of the major pre-surrender political leaders. Since most of the remaining veterans had never held major party posts or served in a cabinet, new faces and leadership arose. Shigeru Yoshida, head of the Liberal party since May 1946, was a former career diplomat without previous experience in elective public office. From 1950 to 1952, leadership of the People's Democratic party (Kokumin Minshuto), predecessor to the Progressive party, was held by three men, all essentially postwar politicians who had evolved a political pattern suggesting the image of the Fair Deal.

Depurgees

In April 1952 the personnel legacy of the prewar past sharply raised its head as a result of a mass rescinding of purge bans in June–September 1951.[1] Many with previous political experience sought

[1] The first depurge action in 1947–48 released 148; the second, in 1949–50, released 14,862. The mass action in 1951 released a total of 177,261 by October 31. This information is based on informal memoranda received by the author from Government Section, SCAP, and the Inspection Section, Prime Minister's Office, November 1951. Depurge actions continued up to the end of the occupation.

to re-enter the political arena after Japan's recovery of independence. The initial post-occupation period was marked by a struggle between depurgee and occupation-era men over public office and party leadership. Most depurgees had affiliated with the Liberal party, including some who had originally belonged to its conservative party rival; nevertheless, in April 1952 their influence in that party was less than in the Progressive party, because of the small size of the latter's Diet delegation.

SCAP influence

Occupation policy and administration had a decisive influence on postindependence politics too. Besides direct influence in its role as the supervisor and often the initiator in extensive institutional reforms affecting the Constitution, the Diet, and local government, SCAP had a powerful indirect influence because it was clearly the final arbiter of political power and policy between 1945 and April 1952. SCAP's role tended to give the National Diet and parties represented therein official responsibility but not the free exercise of independent power to match it; thus it perpetuated the prewar condition wherein government and parties remained subordinate to a power and authority not itself officially responsible for legislation and administration. By the same token, SCAP's acknowledged power tended to preserve, paradoxically, an unstable party system because of the temporary nature of the occupation and the hopes of political groups in the post-occupation period for revival or change.

SCAP's role in directing the host of legislative reforms in many fields, which the conservatives felt they could not safely oppose, left a problem in the post-1952 conservative movement in the drive for revision, to make those reforms "more fully consonant with Japanese practice and tradition." SCAP also left behind the popular belief that these reforms, despite some mistakes in emphasis or form, sought the establishment of "democracy" and "freedom" from "feudal" restraints.

Shigeru Yoshida

Also important to the development of the four years after independence were the internal party developments of the occupation period, particularly within the Liberal party. When the founder of the Liberal party in 1945, Ichiro Hatoyama, was purged by SCAP on May 3, 1946, just as he was about to be designated prime minister of a plurality party cabinet, he quickly named Shigeru Yoshida as his successor. The problem of 1952 lay in the terms of agreement posited by Yoshida in accepting this role. He had asked that he have a free hand in selecting his cabinet, that he be not responsible for party management, and that he retire as soon as Hatoyama again became eligible for public office. In 1952, following his depurge in August 1951, Hatoyama expected and sought Yoshida's retirement and a resumption of his former position as party president and the logical right to be named prime minister.

In the interval, Yoshida had risen to independent, almost autocratic power in the Liberal party by recruiting a favored group of ex-bureaucrats in 1948–49, by forming his second cabinet in October 1948 against the will and even expectation of many party members, and most importantly, through a smashing electoral victory in January 1949 which returned him 264 seats in the lower house. He then controlled a party the majority of whose membership owed more political allegiance to him than to Hatoyama. Not until 1948 had Yoshida tried to assert himself as the real leader of his party. By 1949 he had won that recognition and held that power.

Yoshida was also supported in 1952 by four props to a popular reputation. He was felt to be the man most capable of preserving political stability, a public objective after 1949 revealed in the decisive rejection of weak coalition governments. Business groups favored him for the same reason, for it enabled more effective industrial planning. He was believed to be personally honest, unambitious for public office, and desirous only of the national welfare. He was further esteemed as a skilled diplomat and a friend of the United States. In addition, Yoshida's firm rule over the majority Liberal party was abetted by changes in SCAP policy that coincided with his rise to power. In 1948–49, SCAP policy changed from an emphasis upon reform to economic recovery, and beginning in 1950–51 the United States sought the rearmament of Japan for self-defense. On both counts the United States appeared to rely upon the conservative power of Yoshida's Liberal party leadership.

Despite these elements of strength, Yoshida had also developed areas of political weakness which in the post-occupation period were to prove his Achilles heel. His political opponents in rival parties, as well as many within his own Liberal ranks, felt that in apparently striving to follow an essentially British pattern of party and Diet management Yoshida had missed the essentials. Opponents within the People's Democratic party and within his own felt he demonstrated a lack of understanding of the role of the party within the political process and the function of the Diet as an agency of government, and underestimated public opinion in ways that Churchill, who seems to have been his model, would never have countenanced. Such traits inevitably tended to alienate the professional party man, born and bred in party and parliamentary wars.

Another weakness to plague Yoshida in later years was his failure to develop a cadre of leaders skilled and trained in the political arts. One of the features of the very years when Yoshida ruled most supreme, between 1949 and 1952, was that the minority conservative block of the People's Democratic party possessed by far the greater number of acknowledged younger men of talent, imbued with and experienced in political party and parliamentary traditions. While Yoshida succeeded in recruiting a large number of ex-bureaucrats to run in the January 1949 elections, he never repeated the process in subsequent years,[2] and by a too partial reliance upon these earlier recruits, so new and inexperienced in party life, he further tended to estrange members within his own party.

POST-OCCUPATION DEVELOPMENTS

Against this brief background the conservative political movement after April 1952 can be sketched. The outstanding features of that record were the collapse of Yoshida's long unquestioned authority over conservative politics in December 1954, and the achievement of a single united conservative party the following year. Closely related to these developments were the problem of rivalry or assimilation of occupation-era and postindependence leaders and the failure of the Progressive party to become a major political force. Less spectacular but no less significant were changes in conservative party organization, function, power, and policies; the continued existence of factionalism; the threat of an invigorated and growing Socialist movement; and the development of party color in local governmental jurisdictions.

[2] It should be pointed out that in subsequent years an equal supply was not so readily available.

BITTER STRUGGLE AGAINST YOSHIDA'S RULE

It is a commentary upon the nature of occupation politics that whereas Yoshida had had no significant challenge to party control in the forty-three months between his second cabinet, formed in October 1948, and April 1952, he enjoyed no more than five months of relative political peace from April 1952 until his fall from power on December 7, 1954.

An important factor in the subsequent record was that members of the lower house in April 1952 had been elected in January 1949. The approach of the constitutional limit of their four-year term made an early election all but certain and tensed all political elements for a battle for political survival and control.

The challenge to Yoshida in the Liberal party centered on a struggle for party control, focused in the bid of Ichiro Hatoyama to reclaim his original position as party president. The contest involved more than just a fight between occupation era "ins" and non-occupation "outs." Although this fact was the dominant overtone of the fight, each principal had supporters in both groups. It was also a struggle by party-bred men and professional politicians who sought to end Yoshida's personal rule that seemed to ignore the party and minimize the Diet. Likewise involved was the opposition of essentially party-minded men to the ex-bureaucratic group and other intimates upon whom Yoshida relied for government and party management.

In the thirty-two months' struggle to maintain his position, Yoshida changed but little his accustomed habits of party management. He remained aloof from rank and file, communicated his directions through lieutenants whose power depended primarily upon their closeness to him, and continued to evidence a dislike for the hurly-burly of parliamentary war and for the political uses of publicity. In previous years he had been able to reshuffle cabinet and party posts to maintain discipline and recruit support. Although this device was not entirely abandoned during the ensuing period, it had limited influence.[3] The fight now was with an experienced and popular political challenger for complete control of the party rather than a personal contest for an individual position. Weaknesses or failure in Yoshida's methods swelled the ranks of his opponents and solidified the opposition.

A key to the intraparty battle lay in control of the party organization. That Yoshida's once unquestioned power was vulnerable was suggested in the fight over appointment of the party's secretary-general in July–August 1952. In July, Yoshida nominated from among his own inner circle a freshman Diet member with limited party experience. The choice suggested to other party members and non-occupation-era political hopefuls that Yoshida had no other better qualified supporter for the post or was completely indifferent to the other interests of the party or was prepared to wage an all-out war against them. The opposition forced Yoshida to withdraw his nomination and accept a compromise. The struggle possessed significance because the revolt came from elected Diet members who had won seats in January 1949 and who previously had docilely accepted his rule.

[3] Between October 1948 and April 1952 Yoshida named a total of 43 individuals in 62 appointments during his second and third cabinets, not including temporary dual assignments due to illness or absence from the country. In his fourth and fifth cabinets, total appointments numbered 44, involving 3 changes in his fourth and 6 in his fifth cabinet.

October 1952 elections

A major challenge, and important in Yoshida's later difficulties, was the October 1, 1952, general elections for the House of Representatives. The campaign was a contest for control of the Liberal party as well as a war waged against rivals; both the Hatoyama and Yoshida camps conducted separate campaigns. Yoshida emerged with a majority, though Liberal representation was reduced from 285 to 238. Hatoyama was forced to capitulate in mid-October, but posed "four principles" aiming at greater party "democracy."

The elections gave the party a precarious Diet majority which made Yoshida's position further vulnerable, because Hatoyama's supporters held the balance of power in party parliamentary struggles. Although he won the right to form his fourth cabinet, the number of Yoshida's most reliable supporters had declined. Out of 127 incumbent Liberals who entered the Diet in 1949 under his banner, 79 failed to return to the lower house.[4]

Hatoyama's drive toward party control

The Hatoyama group drove hard at Yoshida's control of the party and the Diet, and succeeded out of proportion to their numbers. In November 1952 they forced Yoshida's Minister of International Trade and Industry, Hayato Ikeda, to resign on a no-confidence vote. In December they threatened the government's supplementary budget bill and got a reallotment of seats in the party executive committee and the designation of a skilled Hatoyama tactician and bitter Yoshida foe as chairman. Under such leadership the committee proceeded to compel the cabinet to submit all legislative proposals to party organs for consideration prior to submission to the Diet, altering a practice that had long been established. The struggle, reaching white heat in January–March 1953, forced Yoshida to utter negligent remarks suggesting a derogation of Diet and party powers and led to the famous *bakayaro* ("fool") incident, which in turn resulted in a party bolt by Hatoyama followers and a successful no-confidence vote against Yoshida on March 14, 1953.[5]

General election of April 1953

Yoshida retaliated by calling a general election for April 19. The ensuing campaign translated the party struggle into a contest for control of the government by the formation of the splinter party under Hatoyama.

Yoshida won a Diet plurality and the right to form his fifth cabinet, but lacked a parliamentary majority by precisely the thirty-five seats won by the splinter Liberals. The election demonstrated that success against Yoshida required a political combination with reasonable prospects of forming a government, and that opposition to Yoshida was more effective from within than from without the party. Recognition of these facts of political life led Hatoyama and all but eight of Yoshida's most implacable foes back into the party fold in November 1953.

[4] Figures used here of party strength and percentages, including party affiliation of depurgees, are based upon analyses of the *Senkyo Taikan* (*"Election Review"*) (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1949, 1952, 1953, 1955). No completely reliable information exists for depurgee status of candidates after 1952; figures for those years are based on the *Senkyo Taikan* of 1952 and the author's personal files.

[5] The "fool" incident came in the Prime Minister's reply to a baiting Right-Wing Socialist in the Budget Committee, February 28. On March 2, the Diet voted to refer the problem of the Prime Minister's remarks to the Diet Discipline Committee.

Political scandals

What might have begun a period of relative political peace was interrupted by the outbreak of a series of scandals in December 1953, which did not completely disappear until twelve months later. Most damaging to Yoshida were charges of political kickbacks to party coffers from government subsidies to the shipbuilding industry. Since his appointees held party office, the allegations touched the personal seam in the party garment. They robbed Yoshida of a major weapon against the opposition parties, for it had been charges of corruption that had brought the final collapse of the coalition government in 1948. Yoshida refused to accept cabinet, party, or personal responsibility and remained away from Tokyo during the peak of the controversy. When he failed to make an adequate public distinction between allegation and proven guilt, and particularly when he caused his Minister of Justice to exercise legal authority to prevent the arrest of the party's secretary-general, Yoshida created an impression that the government was ready to use questionable means to retain power.[6] This brought into challenge his reputation of not being politically or personally ambitious and of being concerned only with the national welfare.

Yoshida's waning influence

By the middle of 1954, the record of continuous political strife over two years had already destroyed the belief that Yoshida alone was most capable of preserving political stability. Business and industrial circles began to cast about for another leader than Yoshida to preserve a stable, conservative government.

The legislative record of the government had not added to Yoshida's strength. In November 1952 the government proposed an abortive plan which would have revived potential government control over press and information media. In mid-1954 the government revised the police laws to reintroduce centralization, amended the antimonopoly law and education laws to curb the political power of the Japan Teachers Union. Earlier public statements by Yoshida and Taketora Ogata, deputy prime minister, had indicated a desire to abolish by legislation the public election of prefectural governors in favor of their appointment. These developments, plus Yoshida's parliamentary dance with logic in his strained defense of Security Pact commitments to speed self-defense and public statements that his government would not rearm, tended to separate the government from the public.

While Yoshida was taking a delayed trip abroad in October–November 1954, his opponents girded for a final struggle. They were helped when Yoshida showed less than brilliant success in Great Britain and failed in the United States to secure the large "gifts" hoped for, suggesting that his reputation as a diplomat and the favored friend of the United States had been overestimated.

FINAL ASSAULT AND PROGRESSIVE PARTY FAILURE

Since the final assault upon Yoshida's rule required a political combination that could form a cabinet or win control in a subsequent election, the co-operation of the Progressive party was essential for any anti-Yoshida drive lacking outright Liberal party control. That co-operation was finally obtained after the Progressive party had failed

[6] See *Asahi Shinbum* and *Nippon Times* (Tokyo), April 18–25, 1954. Because the Diet was in session the police could not immediately arrest the secretary-general, Eisaku Sato, without its consent. The Minister of Justice resigned April 21, immediately after exercising his legal authority.

to develop into a major political force after 1952.

When organized on February 8, 1952, the Progressive party (Kaishinto) had but 68 seats in the lower house. Its hopes of recovering from its minority status lay in the large number of experienced former Minseito figures who joined the party on its establishment, expectations of the effectiveness of personal and organizational efforts to revive the Minseito influence, and hopes for the popularity of the party's new president, Mamoru Shigemitsu, chosen by ex-Minseito depurgees in June. The supporters of Shigemitsu expected that the prominence of his name, sympathy for his role at the war crimes trial, and his reputation as a skilled diplomat and a friend of the Western democracies would provide an effective challenge to Yoshida.

In the October 1952 elections, the Progressives won 85 seats, but dropped to 76 in the April 1953 elections. Of the 60 incumbents who stood for reelection in 1952, 24 lost, and 35 out of 87 were defeated in 1953. The hoped-for magic in Shigemitsu was never realized. The party's reliance upon the ex-Minseito connection and its fund of related candidates was also disappointed; although 90 depurgees were designated as candidates in October 1952, only 32 won. Two elections demonstrated that the Minseito prewar traditions as well as those of the Seiyukai had been effectively blurred by postwar developments in the Liberal and Progressive parties.

The two elections also showed a dwindling of the areas of Progressive support in former Minseito territory. The party consisted of individuals politically strong in their own right, but its organization was weak. Two major party splits during the occupation period and failure to expand served to weaken its support among locally elected government officials and to produce a steady shifting of their allegiance to the stronger Liberal party. Public opinion polls showed a percentage of popular support for the Progressives below that of either wing of the Socialist party and far below the Liberal figure.[7]

Move towards conservatism

The party steadily discarded the "progressive" label prized by its occupation predecessor and moved towards conservatism. After the April 1953 elections, Shigemitsu stated that the party would no longer co-operate with the Socialists to fight Yoshida and the Liberals, but would adopt a "case by case" approach. The power of the Diet Strategy Committee to bind the party to Diet positions which its former head, the occupation veteran Hideji Kawasaki, had exerted was curbed. On September 15, 1953, the party formally announced its policy that rearmament for self-defense was no violation of the Constitution, thus removing still another issue that had so long ranged the two parties in opposite camps.

By the fall of 1954 the Progressives were separated from the Liberals by a tradition of political opposition to Yoshida that stemmed from 1947 and the personal hostility between Shigemitsu and Yoshida's favored heir, Taketora Ogata. Although the Progressive party had failed to establish itself as a major force and had moved towards conservatism, union with the Liberal party required a substitute for Yoshida and his immediate coterie of supporters. Despite rejection of an election front with the splinter Liberal party in April 1953, the Progressives were ready to grasp Hatoyama's hand in November 1954, when he led another bolt from the Liberal party. The two groups combined to form the Japan Democratic party (Nihon Minshuto) on November 23. In union with the Socialists they had enough votes to pass a no-confidence vote against the Yoshida Cabinet. Faced with his own declining popularity and certainty of defeat, Yoshida chose to resign as prime minister on December 7, rather than call for new elections.

[7] Shigeru Yoshida and Eisaku Sato did not join the party. See *Asahi Shimbum*, November 16, 1955.

CONSERVATIVES ACHIEVE UNION

The fall of the Yoshida Cabinet set the stage for perhaps the most significant development in post-1952 conservative politics, a union of the long-divided movement. That goal had been frequently discussed and urged in postwar politics, and abortive attempts to accomplish it had been made each year from 1945 to 1950. Prewar traditions, the temporary rule of SCAP, the perennial optimism of politicians, and the establishment of the third Yoshida Cabinet with its absolute majority in February 1949 made such efforts futile. At the end of 1954, prospects revived when Yoshida had fallen, the Progressive party and one wing of its traditional Liberal foe had already united, and many remaining in the Liberal party, with Taketora Ogata as Yoshida's successor, were anxious for a union.

Pressures for conservative merger mounted after the February 27, 1955, general elections. The Liberal party fell to 112 seats, and the threat of third place among Diet parties if the Socialists combined. Its position was analogous to that of the Progressives prior to November 1954: it faced prolonged frustration in opposition or eventual oblivion if its numbers dwindled more. A collapse of the Hatoyama Cabinet would probably bring to power the Socialists rather than the Liberals. The new Japan Democratic party with 185 seats lacked a Diet majority, which the Liberals could easily provide. Both parties wanted, above all, to prevent a Socialist government from coming to power.

In January 1955 the two wings of the Socialist movement had pledged a union after the February elections, a promise fulfilled on October 13. With the Social Democratic party of Japan (Nihon Shakaito) thus only 31 seats short of the Democratic strength in the lower house, the Liberals and the Democrats hastily merged on November 15, 1955, to form the Liberal Democratic party (Jiyu Minshuto) with 299 members and an absolute majority in the Diet. The two mergers, scarcely a month apart, produced a two-party system representing the conservative and Socialist camps for the first time in Japanese parliamentary history.

PARTY COLOR AND FACTIONALISM

The relative balance of power between the uniting factions of the conservative parties is suggested in the affiliation of the top party officials in 1956. The Hatoyama Liberals who bolted in November 1954 hold the presidency, the secretary-generalship, and the chairmanship of the national organization committee. The Yoshida faction gained the chairmanship of the political affairs research committee, an important body in determining party policy and party support on legislation. The Ogata faction obtained the chairmanship of the executive committee. The ex-Progressives received a nod of recognition in the naming of Shigemitsu as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new executive committee, which combined the two equivalent groups in both parties but pared the total number down to 40, shows a division which retains the same relative balance. The ex-Progressives, again, were notably underrepresented.

The general color and structure of the new party follow more closely the

pattern of the old Liberal body than the former Progressives. Although the party rules in their vagueness suggest haste as well as compromises, they reflect the Liberal rather than the Progressive practice. The dominance of the old Liberal strain is further indicated in the four names most frequently mentioned in the fall of 1956 as possible successors to Hatoyama. None come from the ex-Progressive wing, two from the current Hatoyama-Liberal wing, a third is a quasi Hatoyama Liberal, and the fourth the leader of the Ogata faction. Three of the four were purgees.

Although widely hailed, achievement of a two-party system of conservative and Socialist forces emerged from political necessity more than persuaded agreement. The new conservative party began and remains a coalition of not fully harmonious factions. Some party members even refer to the third Hatoyama Cabinet formed after the merger as a coalition, rather than a single-party government.

Causes of factionalism

The factionalism remaining in 1956 results from the nature of the 1955 union as well as the history of the conservative movement. Hatoyama had been named to head the Democratic party and the new Liberal Democratic party because he had less opposition from major party factions than any other leader. In that sense he was essential to the accomplishment of Yoshida's fall and the union of the conservative parties. He had a prominent political name, he was party bred in the Diet, he had sympathy as a purgee deprived of the prime ministry the day it was to be offered. His age, seventy-two in 1955, and his crippled left arm and leg, the result of a paralytic stroke in 1951, also favored him, for they suggested that his tenure of office would be short. In anticipation of his retirement, the struggle to select his successor has dominated party activity since 1955 and has helped to perpetuate the former factions, which hesitate to become assimilated fully during this transition period.

One reason for the rather stable nature of the factionalism in the conservative movement is that the struggle against Yoshida required thirty-two months, and the issue to choose a successor to Hatoyama has lasted nearly twelve. Although divisions are not hard and fast, the main characteristic of the major factions is that they tend to cohere around leaders who represent occupation-era groups and non-occupation groups and to consist mostly of members from the same periods of political experience.

Groups and subgroups

Within the old Liberal party bloc, the small Yoshida faction centers primarily in his chief lieutenants during his reign of power, mostly ex-bureaucrats recruited in 1948–49. The Ogata faction lost its leader when Taketora Ogata died in January 1956 but continuing under a close associate, it consists mainly of postindependence figures and those related personally to Ogata. Some former party professionals of that faction have joined the "main stream" bloc of which Hatoyama is the nominal head. This group is characterized by the dominance of prewar political figures and the strong color of the party professional. Nobusuke Kishi, secretary-general since the party formed, heads a loose group composed primarily of fellow members of the "new bureaucracy" which dominated the last years before the war, its inner core from the defunct Home Ministry and economic ministries.

The group from the former Progressive party shows the same basic divisions which existed prior to the establishment of the Democratic party in November 1954. The ex-Minseito group is clustered largely around Kenzo Matsumura; the occupation-era group is represented by a larger bloc led by Takeo Miki and another led by Tokutaro Kitamura.

Other factions, plus some "mugwumps," exist in both wings of the former major parties, but are small in size or even single-member "independents."

Factionalism has a long tradition in Japanese politics, stemming from social and cultural traditions and from the prewar period when parties were denied the substance of power by extrapolitical forces. Since power so often depended upon the will, preference, likes and dislikes, of such forces, personalities were inescapable factors in politics. The occupation era tended to sustain factionalism for much the same reasons. Yoshida's long tenure and his notorious whims, fancies, likes, and cordial dislikes, making of party offices positions of personal award and of only nominal power and small substantive value, also encouraged it. Moreover, since Yoshida's personality came to color the multibased fight against his rule and since the leading prewar political figures were trained in the earlier patterns, factionalism continued to retain its personal character. In addition, Hatoyama has given only minimal guidance to the party and exercises almost no party control, further encouraging factionalism. Factionalism often colors party disputes on policy. Because of personal rivalries, leaders of factions occasionally take positions on personal grounds, then seek to discover some plausible "policy" reason to support them, for example, as over the reparations agreement with the Philippines or negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1955–56. Factionalism is not ignored in the management of the party; the present eight deputy secretaries-general, positions now considered stepping stones to even a cabinet post, have been named precisely to represent and to balance party factions.

Non-occupation leadership and influence

As indicated in the leadership of the "main stream," the chief political influence in the party in 1956 lies with the prewar party veterans and secondarily with the depurgees, wherever there remains a distinction. Four of the five top party offices, including the president, are filled by depurgees; only one is an occupation-era political figure, a Yoshida-faction man. This distribution reflects the fact that the depurgee group led the fight against Yoshida and possessed the skilled strategists most effective in accomplishing union in 1955.

The role of non-occupation figures in the party can also be seen in the proportion of conservative members representing that era. They fall into two classes, depurgees and newcomers after 1952. Largely because of their greater political experience, the more significant of the two is the depurgee bloc. The first post-occupation general election, that of October 1, 1952, was almost as much a fight between conservative occupation figures and depurgee claimants as a battle against rival parties. Of the 314 conservative incumbents elected in 1949 who stood for reelection, 122 Liberals and 24 Progressives lost. The depurgees returned to the Diet numbered 141 in 1952 and 126 in 1953, a drop largely due to the "comeback" efforts of former 1949–52 members; in 1955, because of the drive by the new Japan Democratic party for candidates among prewar veterans, the number climbed back to 133. In these elections, conservative party depurgee winners numbered 112, 95, 106, respectively. The depurgees have already passed the peak of their strength and

are sure to decline steadily as a result of age, death, retirement, and the hazards of elections. Their significance in post-1952 politics, however, was never in numbers, but in the caliber of their leadership, as seen in the fight against Yoshida and the depurgee dominance of the Liberal Democratic party.

The three post-occupation elections have served to establish the relative strength of the individuals of both groups. This period has also aided the process of assimilation. Of the 185 Democrats who won in 1955, those whose post-occupation electoral experience equaled or exceeded the occupation, prewar, or combined periods numbered 138. Owing to the big upsurge of party strength in 1949 and the nature of the party split in 1954, the proportion was higher in the Liberal party, the ratio being 95 to 17.

In addition to leadership and numbers, the impact of the non-occupation group in post-1952 politics has also been notable in the development of party policy. That shift within the old Progressive party and the Liberal party under Yoshida has been noted. The general trend towards conservatism continued in the Liberal Democratic party, spurred by the party's parliamentary majority. In domestic politics, the trend is characterized by efforts to "correct" occupation reforms, including the 1947 Constitution. The heavily revisionist program supported by the party in the twenty-fourth Diet session which adjourned on June 3, 1956, was devised, planned, and directed in the main by the prewar leadership. Not all prewar members or occupation-era conservatives were enthusiastic about the program. The trend towards revision in domestic party policy—a return to patterns and forms of regulations, controls, and administration familiar to the pre-surrender period—is likely to continue as long as current party leadership remains in the hands of prewar figures, or until electoral experiences reveal it too risky.

The emphasis upon revision and conservatism may well reflect the transitional stage of current conservative politics and a feeling that revision will be more difficult when full assimilation or adjustment of occupation and post-occupation periods has been completed. The trend may slow down or alter its course as prewar leadership retires and new men assume party control. This is one of the points upon which the Socialists count in opposing current revision of the 1947 Constitution, believing that if revision can be held off for five years or more, any changes that may then occur will be more in keeping with the spirit of that document and less motivated by an emotional longing for the ancient regime.

GROWTH OF PARTY POWER

A major impact on conservative politics of the returned prewar veterans has been to emphasize the power of the party vis-à-vis the cabinet. Many non-occupation veterans, though by no means all, spent their prewar political careers fighting the bureaucracy and the government. This tradition had a considerable part in the bitterness with which Hatoyama men fought Yoshida from 1952 to 1954. In 1956, party leaders are in the main party-bred men, not ex-bureaucrats. Only one ex-bureaucrat holds a leading party office, Nobusuke Kishi.

The creation by the merger of a party with 299 seats in the Diet has further encouraged the rise of party influence. Furthermore, the third Hatoyama Cabinet gives evidence of political debts paid to men without strong roots in party experience. With Hatoyama's slack party rule, party officials wield an influence never enjoyed under Yoshida in his prime.

The chief party officer is the secretary-general, who manages the party, directs the general election strategy, guides Diet programs, advises the president on internal party affairs, and acts as the customary spokesman to the press and as the normal representative in negotiations with other parties. Nominally his position is second to that of the chairman of the executive committee. In 1956, since that committee represents a concession to factional strength rather than individual party influence, it wields less power than might otherwise be the case.[8] Before the war the executive committee was, it is generally considered, more influential because it was smaller and more select. Even in 1956 it possesses potential power, for its decisions, aside from a party caucus of Diet members or a party convention, govern party policy. Government legislative proposals are referred to it after review and scrutiny by the political affairs research committee. Nominally its power extends to the appointment of the secretary-general and the chairman of the political affairs research committee, for by party rules it submits several nominees to the president, who then selects one.

Political affairs research committee

The political affairs research committee today is more powerful than its prewar predecessor, a situation traceable to the increased power of the Diet and the party in the Diet to control legislation and the cabinet.[9] Organized with subcommittees paralleling the ministries of the cabinet and with a staff that includes approximately ten research specialists, the committee reviews proposed government legislation and frequently participates with the government in drafting legislation to reflect party opinion. With a monthly budget of at least 1.2 million yen (about $3,333) and with permanent offices in party headquarters, it possesses the means and facilities for effective work. Suggestive of the spirit of party superiority over the cabinet is the feeling of some party members that the cabinet should curtail its thirty-odd "councils" established to study and recommend legislation in various specialized fields and that the committee should undertake that responsibility.

National organization committee

Another development in party organization after the merger is the increased importance of the national organization committee. Although such an organ existed before, not until 1955–56 were the chairmen ever referred to as among the top four party officials next to the president. Like the secretary-general and the chairman of the political affairs research committee, the chairman of the organization committee is in theory directly responsible to the president, though in practice all are co-ordinated through the secretary-general or the chairman of the executive committee. The organization committee has succeeded in establishing a permanent prefectural branch office in each of the forty-six prefectures, staffed usually with five members.[10] This achievement is a new development in conservative politics. It has aimed chiefly at recruiting young men and women, but like similar drives in the past, demonstrably impressive results have so far been lacking.

[8] Based on an interview with Takeo Miki, member of the executive committee, August 1, 1956.

[9] Interview with Mikio Mizuta, chairman of the political affairs research committee, August 3, 1956.

[10] Interview with Shigemasa Sunada, chairman of the national organization committee March 21, 1956.

Local organization

The local organization of the conservative party is still weak, highly personalized, and plagued by difficulties in merging on the local level rival party workers of Progressive, Hatoyama, and ex-Yoshida Liberal affiliations. Remnants of the Minseito and Seiyukai still exist, though translated into the feuds of their postwar counterparts. Lack of local party harmony contributed to the defeat of several conservative candidates in the House of Councillors elections on July 8, 1956.

PARTY BASE IN LOCALLY ELECTED OFFICIALS

Perhaps more important to local party strength than the existence of prefectural branches or local subbranches is the growing trend towards political coloration in prefectural assemblies and prefectural governorships.

When the local elective government system was inaugurated in 1947, the overwhelming number of governors and prefectural assemblymen did not carry a party label in their campaigns. The trend towards party identification has been clear in the two succeeding elections of 1951 and 1955 and should increase now that the conservative movement is united. By October 1955, six months after the local elections in April, only 548 remained as independents out of 2,613 prefectural assemblymen in all Japan.[11] Of those affiliated by party, 1,218 were Liberals or Democrats.

The importance of the locally elected official is seen in the number of ex-governors elected in the July 1956 House of Councillors elections, and in the frequency with which press analyses speculated on a candidate's chances by reference to the degree he was supported by prefectural assemblymen. The conservative dominance of local politics is shown in the fact that the party holds a comfortable majority in every prefectural assembly.

[11] Local Autonomy Board, Election Bureau, "Chiho Kokyo Dantai no Gikai no Giin oyobi Cho no Tohabetsu Kazushirabe" ("Heads and Members of Assemblies of Local Government Units, Listed by Parties"), mimeographed report, October 1, 1955.

GROWING SOCIALIST CHALLENGE

The most important question in conservatism in 1956 is the future status of the Social Democratic party. The Socialists have made steady electoral gains in the three post-occupation general elections to the House of Representatives and matched that record in the July 1956 upper house balloting. Formerly Socialists had their chief strength in the largest, five-man, multiple-member districts into which the nation is carved for lower house elections, but in 1955 they began to penetrate deeper into the three-member constituencies, and to win, not the last place, but as often as not second place. The Socialists have advanced beyond the point where they must rely upon the proportional representation characteristic of multiple-member districts. They have established themselves as a major threat to conservative dominance in the larger urban-industrial districts. Whereas in the last free election before the war, 1937, the Socialists won 9 out of 31 seats in Tokyo, in 1955 the conservative margin was but 15 to 12. Similar proportions exist or appear in the making in other major centers such as Osaka and Fukuoka.

Growing Socialist power appears to have reached the point where it is about to invade the conservatives' traditional agrarian constituencies. The loss in urban centers suggests inroads into former Minseito-Progressive territories. Socialist encroachments in the rural areas attack former Seiyukai-Liberal "kingdoms," long considered safest of all.

The threat of Socialist power affects not only electoral strategy and such programs as gerrymandering election districts in reducing five-, four-, and three-member districts to single and two-man constituencies. It also affects issues of policy. The July 1956 general elections suggest that while the Liberal Democrats have been bidding for the more conservative vote, the Socialists have made gains among the moderate or uncommitted voters in the center. The issue for the conservatives is that its leadership favors the revisionist program with conviction, but too ardent an advocacy may lose still further the voting support essential to retain safe powers of government. The summer campaign of 1956 is reported to indicate a decline in the former ratio of conservative support among the traditionally conservative middle-aged and elderly. Since the conservatives retain an unassailable margin of 64 seats above a parliamentary majority, with their rivals just barely retaining one-third strength in both houses of the Diet, it may well be that by the time the Socialists develop to the status of a real challenger for governmental power, the prewar political leadership among conservatives will be replaced by younger blood, less committed by experience or emotion to the current revisionist program.

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The Social Democratic Movement

By Cecil H. Uyehara *

THE Social Democratic party of Japan (Nihon Shakaito) [1] may henceforth receive more serious consideration abroad as a result of the reorganization of the Japanese political world in October and November 1955, which produced a much-heralded "two-party system," with the conservative Liberal Democrats on the right and the SDPJ on the left. The Socialists, therefore, represent the only feasible alternative to continued conservative governments, although presently outnumbered in the National Diet two to one by their Liberal Democratic rivals, and despite the fact that the party is still factious and deficient in mature responsibility, in organizational development, and in the broad appeals of a genuinely national party.

Western observers, perhaps in part from wishful thinking, predicted after the elections of October 1952 that, having recovered most of their losses in the previous four years, the Socialists would probably be able to advance no further. Yet in four subsequent elections (from 1953 to 1956), two for each house of the Diet, winning SDP candidates continued to grow in number. So efficient and successful was their campaign in June and July of this year that in the face of the conservative intraparty strife, lack of clear policies, and involvement in scandals, the prospect of a Social Democratic administration's coming to power has become a possibility.

Before World War II, Japan's politics featured several power groups and two principal parties; since both parties were conservative, the electorate was offered no fundamental choices. As Japanese capitalism and industrialism progressed, however, struggling labor and farmers' unions developed and became allied with proletarian parties. But sharply split in bitter battles over doctrinal purity, small in numbers, operating in what was to become essentially a police state hostile to its ideas, policies, and ways of thinking and action, and under severe disabilities imposed by laws and the police, the Socialist movement remained factious and weak.

Socialists' First Taste of Power

During postwar democratization, the context of Japanese politics shifted. More than six million laborers were swiftly organized, and, especially until after the agrarian reforms, peasant demands were expressed through farmers' unions. Though "social democrats" had been the first "voluntarily" to disband their political organizations in 1940, they were the first to reorganize in 1945. Despite an adverse revision of the Election Law in March 1947, they achieved a slim plurality in the elections that followed in April. But this vote was in protest against the old oligarchy, not a clear Socialist mandate. As a result of a tripartite coalition, Tetsu Katayama, a right-wing Socialist, was named prime minister in the first cabinet formed under the present Constitution. Socialist leadership, composed in the main of prewar career reformers, was completely inexperienced in the management of the state. The coalition with two conservative parties precluded the enactment of any true Socialist program. Also because of the economic conservatism of the Allied occupation, it would have been difficult for the Socialists to inaugurate their policies. Furthermore, the voters were more intent on surviving the depressing confusion of the postwar period than on digesting the ideas of Socialist planning. Ineptitude, factional strife, and the involvement of certain leading right-wing Socialists, including some cabinet members, in scandals, were principal causes of defeat at the polls in January 1949. Nearly four years were required to rebuild party strength and public support, and during this slump, the party split into two mutually critical alignments.

Schismatic Tendencies of Social Democratic Party

When Japan's leftist parties were reconstituted after the war, their leaders renewed, with modifications, their previous cliques, ideological traditions, and positions in the political spectrum. Evident even since 1952 has been the characterization of the party made in 1945:

> . . . a heterogeneous alliance of all socialist groups . . . the intellectual Utopians and the religious idealists, the hard-boiled laborites who have come up through the rough and tumble mill of union activities . . . the opportunists who swerved from socialism during the war but who are now trying to come back into the fold like repentant prodigals, and the uncompromising and unforgiving orthodox materialistic Marxists who have always been single-mindedly devoted to the "Cause." [2]

However, they all advocate a planned economy according to Socialist principles; they propose some degree of nationalization of selected basic industries; and they urge much broader social welfare legislation.

Until the electoral disaster early in 1949, the party leadership was chiefly held by the right wing, part of which was temporarily purged for past ultranationalism. The labor movement became the best organized core of support, and the left wing was by far the stronger. The dissatisfied rank-and-file Socialists strengthened the position of the protesting left wing when Socialist aims, methods, and policies were reevaluated in the ensuing national conventions after the 1949 elections. Was the party to be revolutionary or gradual and reformist in strategy and policies? Was it to be strictly a class party or to have a national base somewhat like the British Labour party? The right wing accused the left of flirtation with the Communist united-front strategy and with tendencies toward "direct action" instead of staunch support of parliamentarism. The leftists called their intraparty rivals disguised conservatives and opportunists. The two groups disagreed about the degree of political emphasis which organized labor had been coupling with economic offensives. To this day this controversy has not been definitively settled by the Socialists.

Foreign policy issues

Contributing to such disagreements was the altered balance of power in Asia when communism swept and uni-

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[1] A literal translation of Nihon Shakaito would be "Japan Socialist party," but the party has adopted as the official English translation of its name "Social Democratic Party of Japan" (SDPJ), to suggest its relationship to the international Socialist movement. "Socialist" and "Social Democratic" have been used more or less interchangeably in the text. "SDPJ" indicates the present united party; "SDP" has been used for the period prior to October 1955.

[2] *Nippon Times*, November 3, 1945.

fied China, intensifying the cold war. Occupation policy for Japan became more conservative, and the Japanese Communist party apologized to the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) for past moderation and temporarily became more militant. Early in 1950, the Social Democratic party broke in two, but the rift was temporarily patched. A more lasting split in October 1951 was precipitated by divergent emphases regarding foreign policies.

The acceleration of the cold war in the Korean War and Japan's role as principal base for United Nations forces there added to the controversy among the Social Democrats. By hastening the long-postponed Peace Treaty, the nearby conflict caused the future of Japan's foreign policy to assume an even larger shape on the political horizon. The draft of the Peace Treaty, announced in the summer of 1951, and a peace conference scheduled for September that year forced the Socialists to determine their attitude toward ratification of that treaty and related security agreements.

Smoldering embers quickly flared. Under the influence of the left wing, the party had for more than a year adopted as its policy the "three [soon raised to four] principles of peace": for a peace treaty with all belligerents, including Communist China and the USSR, for a policy of neutrality in the East-West conflict, against the retention of United States military bases after the treaty, and against rearmament. The three possible combinations of Socialist policy towards the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty found the party divided. The right wing advocated accepting the two treaties; the leftists and their labor supporters demanded the rejection of both; the center group favored acceptance of the Peace Treaty and rejection of the Security Treaty.

Influence of Socialist International

The right-wing and centrist elements, encouraged by the resolutions of the Second Socialist International and the Committee of the Socialist International Conference adopted in the summer of 1951 in Germany, strengthened their demands for a fresh review of official party policy. The international support given the resolution on democratic socialism's rejecting Marxism offered theoretical support to right-wing Socialists in Japan in their opposition to their left-wing Marxist rivals. When the Socialist International adopted the resolution on peace, stating that the Cominform had caused the free, democratic countries to give top priority to rearmament and that peace could only be maintained by strength through armament, the Japanese delegate, Mosaburo Suzuki, chairman of the party and a leading member of the left wing, abstained from voting.

October 1951 split

Faced with such complications, a special party convention was convened in October. During this historical session, which lasted for seventeen hours, the party factions failed to agree on a unified policy toward the Peace and Security Treaties; the consequent organizational schism which resulted was to endure until October 1955. As time progressed, however, the two treaties were accepted as fait accompli even by the Left Socialists, who recognized that diplomatic negotiation was the means for revision or abolition of Japan's treaty arrangements.

LEADERS AND FACTIONS

Superimposed on the difference in world outlook and points of common agreement were the bitter struggle for control of the party organization and

the very nature of the party cliques themselves. Three particular lineages have persisted in the SDP since the war. In the initial postwar period, party councils were dominated by the so-called Social Democratic clique (Shaminkei), veteran politicians having ties with the more conservative unions of laborers and farmers and with certain circles of small- and middle-sized enterprises. Sharply contending with this group was the Labor-Farmer faction (Ronoha), a Marxist group which steadily gained in influence and party control after the debacle of the Socialist-led cabinet in 1948. The third group, the Japan Labor clique (Nichirokei), was temporarily eclipsed by both rivals during the occupation period as a result of the application to many of its leaders of the purge program of SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). With the depurge of these veteran leaders in 1951, the Japan Labor clique came to dominate the Right-Wing Socialist party after the formal split of 1951. In cooperation with certain leftists, this leadership worked to reunite the party and today, together with the Labor-Farmer faction, holds a dominant position in the united party.

Thus the Japanese Socialists are not immune to the factional ills suffered by their European brothers; their difficulties are further complicated by the cliquishness that permeates Japanese society. The Socialists are generally regarded as being more "modern" and more immune to personal leadership than other parties, but this distinction is a matter of degree only, for often the ties of personal loyalty are more persuasive in the end than the merits of substantive issues. Even on such a fundamental policy issue as the Peace Treaty there were those who chose sides according to personal ties and for electoral considerations rather than according to personal beliefs. Each faction, made up largely of people lacking firm convictions, remains unstable.

Age divisions

Another readily observable cause of friction is the age brackets into which Japanese Socialists can be divided. The top leaders are largely veterans of the prewar movement. Seventy per cent of all the Right- and 40 per cent of the Left-Wing Socialist Representatives are over fifty, and all except one of the top-rank Right Socialists are close to, or over sixty.[3] The initial impetus and source of leadership were supplied by the student movement immediately after World War I. This group, whose members now form in general the top rung of the postwar Socialists, was well trained in mass meetings, theoretical controversy, strikes, demonstrations, organization, agitation, and political compromise. Differences between the more elderly and "realistic" right and the younger and more idealistically militant left affect all types of activities and all levels of party organization.

Whereas the student movement provided a fund of capable leadership for the prewar movement, its importance declined in the postwar period because of the re-emergence of the prewar labor union leadership, the initial occupation policy of encouraging unions, and the consequent rise of a new generation of leaders, as a source of leadership recruitment. This younger, more vigorous group in general supported the Left-Wing Socialists. Consequently, the Right-Wing leadership was continually blocked in its search for younger, potential replacements. This trend was apparent in the last general elections in February 1955, when most of the new Left-Wing candidates were in their thirties and forties, while the new Right-

[3] See George O. Totten, "Problems of Japanese Socialist Leadership," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1955), pp. 160–61.

Wing candidates were in their forties and fifties. Whereas ten new Left Socialist Diet members came from the ranks of organized labor, the Right Wing elected but one.[4]

Rural communities

The agrarian movement supplied voting support and a source of Socialist leadership before the war. It was easier to mobilize the backing of poverty-stricken farmers in the 1920's and 1930's, as they recognized an immediate and concrete "visible" enemy in the landlord. But since the enforcement of the land reform program in the early years of the occupation and the establishment of land committees and farmers' co-operatives, the radical farmers' movement seemed to evaporate. The movement was less able to deliver votes to the Socialists or create new leadership. Until recently, Socialist leaders tended to ignore the agricultural community and to adopt the path of least resistance by relying upon the collective vote of organized labor. The leftists, recognizing the political importance of the farmers, who comprise slightly less than one half of the population, have begun to organize the rural vote. Such attempts, however, so far have been concentrated far less upon the peasant farmer than upon organized groups such as railway workers, teachers, and post office employees living and working in rural communities.

The bureaucracy

The bureaucracy, a powerful political force in Japan, is the newest source of Socialist recruitment. Because of the skill, knowledge, and executive experience of members of this group, their influence in the party has become disproportionately great. The rapid rise of the few former administrators and state planners to top party positions attests to the dearth of capable party leadership experienced in formulating and supervising the execution of public policy. If, in the future, the Socialists should form a cabinet, the number of leading bureaucrats entering the party would probably increase. Even now the middle and lower ranks of civil servants give undoubted but unobtrusive electoral support to the Socialists.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 165, note 12.

PARTY ORGANIZATION

A common structural pattern of organization has marked the postwar Japanese Social Democratic parties. Since reunification, former Right Wingers and Left Wingers have been balanced in the distribution of posts in the national organization, but adherents of the latter, stronger, faction hold a majority of the chairmanships of most of the strategically more important functional committees, such as the committees on Diet strategy, election policy, and policy planning. The party chairman, Mosaburo Suzuki, was the leader of the Left Socialists; the former Right Socialist chairman, Jotaro Kawakami, is but an adviser. The secretary-general of the recombined party is Inejiro Asanuma, a Right Winger. The central executive committee includes several leaders with long experience in the labor movement and continuing unofficial labor connections. Though discipline has increased in some labor federations, especially in the largest, the leftist General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), these still cannot count on being able to direct the vote of all their members. Furthermore, many of the less organized and most of the unorganized workers vote conservatively. To become a major party, the Socialists must count on massive support from unorganized and floating votes (the latter estimated in 1956 to number as many as eight million); but the salient fact remains that industrial and governmental workers constitute the main organized core of SDPJ support.

CO-OPERATION WITH LABOR FEDERATIONS

The party's actual membership is small, and probably labor union members form a disproportionately large sector. The overlapping of union and party elites is striking, particularly in the leftist faction. At the prefectural level, the executive personnel of Socialist organizations is literally an interlocking directorate of party and local labor union leaders. The same situation tends to exist in municipal ward organizations and in the campaign apparatus for city assemblies.

More than four million workers belong at least nominally to the two major leftist federations, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), and the Government and Public Workers Union of Japan (Kankoro). Less than three-quarters of a million are members of the more conservative All-Japan Trade Union Congress (Zenro Kaigi).

The leftist federations are far more active in political support of the left wing than the All-Japan Trade Union Congress and its major component, the Japan General Federation of Labor Unions (Sodomei), are on behalf of the right-wing Socialists. Unions can mobilize members not only for popular strikes with political implications but also in special demonstrations against such policies as revision of the democratic "peace" Constitution and extension of American-garrisoned military bases in Japan. On the other hand, Socialist Diet members will be dispatched to mediate at a scene of conflict between a union and the National Police Reserve. "Joint Diet struggle committees" are formed during almost every session to co-ordinate Socialist-labor activities both within and outside the Diet. An example of such co-operation occurred in 1952 when the party and unions launched five waves of "struggle" against the passage of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, which they branded as a new edition of the prewar Peace Preservation Law.

Throughout the postwar record of the Socialist movement, each party disagreement has reacted on the labor movement, and each schismatic movement in the ranks of organized labor has affected the Socialists. The most recent example of obvious union influence in Social Democratic councils was reflected in the alternative budget the Socialists presented to the Diet in the spring of 1956. As a gesture of responsible planning, the policy planning committee and the central executive committee of the party compiled a "realistic" substitute budget which included a large defense allocation while postponing a pay raise sought by the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), the backbone of the party's labor support. Sohyo brought so much pressure to bear upon Socialist leadership that the greater part of the defense budget was eliminated. Although the SDPJ budget proposal was condemned by the press as "unrealistic," one leading member of the party declared: "We prefer united and strong labor backing to editorial praise for realism from the bourgeois press and amorphous support from vague public opinion."

During election campaigns, unions frequently nominate candidates, subject to approval by SDP national headquarters. They also raise and contribute significant political funds, provide campaign personnel, and distribute propaganda. There have been attempts to add to the pro-Socialist votes of union members those of their family and of small retailers in areas where customers are mostly workers.

The heavy reliance upon the labor unions as a source of Socialist party leadership has become a self-imposed limitation, not only as regards the choice of candidates but also in narrowing the base of potential Socialist support among the electorate. The party is cognizant of this problem, but only recently has it begun to evolve a program aimed at making inroads into the strongholds of conservative support.

POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Because of the motley forces in the Socialist camp, not until 1954 was there a general platform enunciating basic Socialist principles, other than a short vague, three-article statement of obvious ideals. In January 1954, three years after the split, the Left Wing drafted a lengthy platform full of economic Marxism.[5] Although the Left Wing had steadfastly rejected Communist overtures for co-operation in Diet struggles, in demonstration against military bases, and in election campaigns, the platform makes not a single direct reference to communism despite its wordy length. Yet it is strongly anti-American in tone, claiming that all vital economic and political points of Japanese monopoly capitalism are controlled by, and completely subservient to, the United States.

In contrast to the Left Socialists, the Right did not draft a platform until 1955, and then with reunification in mind. While critical of the nation's relations with the United States, which it characterized as "very disadvantageous," the attack on communism was much more severe, the latter being damned as the instrument of a new imperialism subjugating individuals and groups to the centralized dominance of the Communist party and trampling on freedom and democracy.

The new party platform adopted at the unification convention in October 1955, after many months of tedious negotiations seeking to "clarify" the areas of obvious agreement and disagreement, was inevitably a compromise of many philosophies and contained a number of contradictory statements. It showed little of the traditional revolutionary punch.

Even this moderate statement is being further modified, especially regarding domestic policies, as a result of several factors. These include continued relaxation of bipolar tension and greater freedom for uncommitted, neutralist policies; the growth of deterrent military power in Japan and its tacit acceptance, together with the reduction and perhaps later withdrawal of American forces from Japan; the balancing of Japanese payments since 1954, enabling greater freedom of economic and political choice; the almost irresistible demand for normalizing economic and political relations with neighboring Communist countries; and pressures on the SDPJ to achieve power by means of an electoral majority, which impels broader policy appeals.

The foreign policies advocated for Japan by the SDPJ can be briefly summarized. The party urges neutrality between the two main coalitions, co-operation with the peace-preserving efforts of the United Nations, abrogation of the military alliance with the United States, and restoration of diplomatic and commercial relations with Communist China and the USSR. It proposes nonaggression pacts, either bilateral or collective, especially between Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. It is hoped that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid would then be abrogated. The party also advocates the recovery of Japan's "original territories," but it appears little headway along this line will be made in the current negotiations with the Russians.

[5] For topically arranged translations of the three Socialist party platforms mentioned here, see C. H. Uyehara, M. and S. Royama, S. Ogata, "Comparative Platforms of Japan's Major Parties" (Medford, Mass.: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1955); mimeographed.

ELECTORAL SUPPORT

Whatever their merit, these policies and other political exigencies have attracted increasing electoral support for the Social Democrats. Left Socialist seats in the House of Representatives numbered 56 before its dissolution early in 1953; in the ensuing elections this party advanced to 72 seats, and in February 1955, to 89. The Right Socialists gained more slowly: from 59 seats before dissolution in 1953 to 66 in the elections of April, and still upward to 67 in early 1955. The combined party thus controls a fraction under one-third of the 467-member lower house. As a result of gains in the July 1956 elections for the House of Councillors, the party needs the support of other left-wing splinter elements, including the Communists, to hold one-third of the 250 seats in the upper house. The negative power of that one-third control of the Diet is demonstrated by the fact that this is sufficient to block any immediate conservative effort to revise the 1947 Constitution.

From the younger generation and from women comes strong support for the Socialists; they are attracted by the party's opposition to scandals charged against the conservatives, and to rearmament, a revision of the "peace" Constitution, and military bases. The SDPJ also attracts intellectuals, professional and highly trained technical people, white-collar workers, junior bureaucrats, and a minority of small merchants and manufacturers. Many in these strata are "floating voters" who make late and sometimes shifting political choices.

FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Although apparent quiet rules the surface of the party, factional struggles continue and a split may be possible over a crucial issue. Compared with the impressive array of specific goals and individual policies upon which all factions agree, factional differences seem still to be more significant and to have a more decisive role in the future of the party. Because of the strong divergences in the political philosophies held by the various factions, it is conceivable that if the cold war became hot again, the present party unity would be severely tested.

According to views expressed by some national and local leaders of the Social Democratic party, it appears that the Socialists are as yet unprepared to accept the responsibility of the reins of government. Because the party has headed a government only once, and then under abnormal and disadvantageous circumstances, it lacks a reservoir of administrative and executive ability. Some pro-Socialist gazers into the crystal ball consider it likely, however, that Prime Minister Hatoyama will soon have to retire and that in the elections, which thereafter cannot be long delayed, the SDPJ will make spectacular gains but still be short of a majority. If the conservatives do not succeed in placing crippling legal disabilities on leftist movements, the Socialists hope to win a majority in the second or third general election from now.

Considering the present policies and composition of the party, the Western world would face a more difficult situation should the Socialists take over the government of Japan. But it will not necessarily be cause for despair. The

neutralist group of nations would be strengthened, and the anti-Communist allies would have to readjust their policies vis-à-vis Japan. This process would be mutual, for there are also many responsible leaders in the Social Democratic party who would realize the necessity of reshaping their party's policies in the light of their increased responsibilities.

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Japanese Communism and the Moscow-Peking Axis

By RODGER SWEARINGEN

THE signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the United States–Japan Security Treaty at San Francisco in September 1951 was the occasion for an unprecedented shift in the Communist party line on Japan. A little more than one month before Stalin's historic 1952 New Year's message to the Japanese people in which he wished them "success in their courageous struggle for independence," the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) recast the erstwhile imperialist state in the role of colonial appendage of foreign imperialism, thereby placing Japan for the first time in history in the category of the anticolonial nations of Asia.[1]

Significantly, the "1951 Thesis," as the new party program came to be called, remained the basic policy guide for post-treaty strategy and tactics of the Japanese Communist party (JCP) at least up to the party's national council meeting in July 1955. It is perhaps still too early to know whether the great changes signaled by that meeting should be regarded as tactical changes within the colonial-area-formula strategy laid down late in 1951 or whether the new policy will ultimately lead to an entirely new "thesis" or strategic framework. This issue is likely to be decided at a seventh party congress—the first since 1947—scheduled for late this year.

[1] For origin and development of the Japanese Communist movement see Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, *Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919–1951* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952); and Toshio Tsukahira, *The Postwar Evolution of Communist Strategy in Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954).

OCCUPATION HERITAGE—"PEACEFUL REVOLUTION"

The period from Japan's surrender in 1945 to the Cominform criticism of party strategist Nozaka's moderate policies in January 1950 may be characterized as the era of "peaceful revolution." Lest there be some misunderstanding on the nature of this strategy, it may be well to recall that Nozaka wrote in 1948: "Although at times the possibility of a peaceful revolution may exist, peaceful revolution is no more than a type of tactics. With changing conditions, the approach must also change."[2] A year later, Nozaka, in clarifying his position, stated: "If pursued skillfully this policy will facilitate the development of conditions for direct revolution and make possible the seizure of power."[3]

Two tactical considerations, both studied reversals of prewar Japanese Communist policy, governed Communist statements and activities during the period of peaceful revolution: (1) *moderation,* expressed in terms of the slogan "a lovable Communist party" and designed to develop a broad, popular, mass party, which might "ride on the crest of the wave of occupation reform"; and (2) *autonomy,* that is, the concerted attempt to stress the party's independent, Japanese character and to play down or to deny any international ties, especially those with the Soviet Union.

[2] Sanzo Nozaka, *Senryaku, Senjutsu no Shomondai* ("Strategy and Tactics") (Tokyo, 1949), p. 99.

[3] Sanzo Nozaka, "Do the Basic Work," *Zenei* ("Vanguard"), October 1949.

With such a moderate strategy, in an occupation atmosphere of total reform, if not of revolution, the new legal party made substantial progress. By the spring of 1949, Communists dominated the strong postwar Japanese labor movement; registered membership in the party stood at almost 100,000; thirty-five Communists had been elected to the Diet; perhaps 40 per cent of all university students in Japan supported the Communist party's program; and there were more than 3,000,000 sympathizers and an indeterminable number of secret party members throughout the nation.

Although the Japanese party, in line with the new postwar policy, deliberately attempted to reduce its formal, visible ties with the Soviet Union,[4] there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the basic relationship remained unchanged.[5]

Even during the period of "peaceful revolution," then—from 1945 through 1949—the Communist party of Japan was, intrinsically, neither peaceful nor independent.

MORE MILITANT POLICY, COMINFORM INSPIRED

Suddenly, in January 1950, Moscow "suggested" a shift to a more positive policy with an anonymous editorial in the late official Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy*. Nozaka's policy was branded as "antidemocratic, anti-Socialist, antipatriotic and anti-Japanese." The Japanese party would have to improve its discipline and ideological level, become more militant and "active," stop toying with the occupation and with "unreliable social democratic elements" and publicly declare its dedication to the Soviet cause. If because of the unique occupation circumstances the Japanese Communists had been given special dispensation when the International Communist line became more militant in 1948, the honeymoon was over.[6] Nozaka admitted that grave mistakes had been made, concluding on the note which was to become the keynote of future strategy and tactics: "We must . . . fulfill," he said, "the important mission assigned to the Communist party of Japan as a link in the international revolutionary movement."[7] Nozaka was not removed from any of his posts in the party.

The two-year period from the Cominform criticism in January 1950 to the publication of a new party program in November 1951 was confused and transitional. In the course of adjusting a major and often violent factional dispute within the party between the left wing, the Internationalists (Kokusaiha),[8] and

[4] During this period the party made repeated statements such as Secretary-General Kyuichi Tokuda's statement of 1946: "We have no ties whatsoever with the Soviet Union. I should like to state here that in the future as well, our party will never have relations with the Soviet Union." Kyuichi Tokuda, *Naigai Josei to Nihon Kyosanto no Nimmu* ("The Domestic and Foreign Situation and the Tasks of the JCP") (Tokyo, 1949), p. 247.

[5] See Swearingen and Langer, *op. cit.* (note 1, *supra*), for evidence and illustration of Soviet ties and influence.

[6] Some of the documentation on the Cominform criticism and its aftermath is available in a useful compilation of some eight hundred pages by the non-Communist Nikkan Rodosha Tsushinsha ("Daily Worker Press"), *Nihon Kyosanto no Bunken Shu* ("Japanese Communist Party Documents"), Vol. 3, Tokyo, 1952. Vols. 1 and 2 of the same series, equally substantial, contain the documents of the period of peaceful revolution. Vol. 4, published at the end of 1952, included many of the documents on underground and military activities. Referred to hereafter as NKBS.

[7] Sanzo Nozaka, "My Self-Criticism," *Zenei*, March 1950.

[8] An anti-Tokuda doctrinaire group headed by the then third and fourth ranking party leaders, Yoshio Shiga and Kenji Miyamoto.

the more moderate elements, the Main Stream Faction (Shuryuha),[9] and while thrashing out differences over theory and tactics, the orientation of the whole party moved steadily to the left. This shift to a more radical and internationally oriented policy can be identified by a study of the Japanese party press of the period and by the increasing number and scope of Communist incidents in Japan, and of sabotage and other acts of violence.[10] Two party documents—the "1950 Thesis" and the "1951 Party Rules and Regulations"—form the principal link between the old line of "peaceful revolution" and the new post-treaty concept of a "liberation revolution" in a colonial, or dependent, area. Taken together, in terminology, emphasis, and specific content, these two documents reveal the direction of the reorientation in progress: from a moderate to a more radical approach, from peaceful to violent revolution, from an ostensible position of autonomy to a frankly international orientation, from a position of neutrality to outspoken alignment with the Soviet bloc.[11]

On the eve of the Korean War, most of the Communist party leaders disappeared. The Japanese government and private industry initiated a series of measures designed to control the now openly radical and frankly foreign-oriented organization.[12] Almost immediately, the party set up an interim central directorate as its overt headquarters to carry on openly for the "purged," or outlawed, central committee, and soon Japanese government reports and the Japanese press were describing a vast new Japanese Communist underground structure, including military committees, special units, labor unification committees, and an expanded clandestine press.[13] Meanwhile, the party's popularity with the general public dwindled markedly as it moved underground and to the left.

"NATIONAL-LIBERATION DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION"

By the summer of 1951 factional strife had been virtually eliminated; the reorientation seemed complete. Shortly after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese Communist party announced a new policy, the "national-liberation democratic revolution." The basis and nature of the new line are contained in three documents published by the Cominform.[14]

[9] Centering around Kyuichi Tokuda, Sanzo Nozaka, and Etsuro Shiino. See Tsukahira, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), for an excellent discussion of the issue.

[10] A whole series of special reports on Japanese communism put out by several private research groups in Japan treats the period in some detail. The organizations, which are reported to be in touch with the Japanese police authorities, are identified and discussed in Peter Berton, Paul Langer, and Rodger Swearingen, *Japanese Training and Research in the Russian Field*, Los Angeles: School of International Relations, University of Southern California, 1956.

[11] Full text of both documents included in the forthcoming *Documentary History of Japanese Communism*, by Rodger Swearingen, Paul Langer, and Peter Berton, Los Angeles: School of International Relations, University of Southern California, 1957.

[12] The suspension of the party newspaper *Akahata* ("Red Flag") and its successors, June 26, 1950; dissolution of the Communist union Zenroren (abbreviation for Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Renraku Kyogikai [National Labor Union Liaison Conference]), August 30, 1950; 1,171 persons dismissed from government service as Communists, November 18, 1950; propagandists arrested by the hundreds throughout Japan.

[13] On June 6, 1950, General MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to remove and exclude from public service the twenty-four members of the central committee.

[14] "Immediate Demands of the Japanese Communist Party—New Program," *For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy*, November 23, 1951; "Basis of the New Program of the Communist Party of Japan," *ibid.*, February 15, 1952; "Thirtieth Anni-

The theoretical justification for the new approach, as given in the party documents, may be summarized as follows: Owing to the exploitation by United States monopoly capital and military imperialism, Japan has been transformed—economically, politically, and militarily—into a country completely under the control of, and dependent on, the United States. And what is the fundamental standpoint from which the Marxist-Leninist approaches the problems of the revolutionary movement in the colonial and dependent countries? Here, Stalin's authority is invoked to underline the difference between revolution in an imperialist country and revolution in a colonial or dependent area. The principal point is, of course, that only in colonial or dependent countries is it possible to utilize the national *bourgeoisie* "at a certain stage and for a certain period . . ." (to quote Stalin) in support of the revolutionary movement of its country "against imperialism and for emancipation."

Relating this theory directly to post-treaty Japan, the "Basis of the New Program" goes on to define the future revolution in Japan as a "national-liberation democratic revolution" and to call for a coalition government to represent the interests of all "progressive and liberation forces" in the country. This is to be based on an alliance of workers and peasants, but is not to exclude many capitalists who, we are told, will support the struggle for a free and independent Japan or at least will maintain a friendly neutrality.

The abandonment of the slogan "peaceful revolution" is evident in this passage from the "New Program": "It would be a serious mistake to think," the document warns, "that a new national-liberation democratic government will arise of its own volition, without difficulties, in a peaceful way. . . ." The earlier line on autonomy is equally cast aside in the "Basis of the New Program," which develops the theme that neutrality is impossible, that American imperialism is in the nature of a paper tiger, as is shown by its weakness in Europe and by the example of Korea, and that, therefore, any attempt to rely on American imperialism would be as disastrous for Japan as was her ill-fated alliance with the imperialists Hitler and Mussolini. "The international situation shows most clearly," the document asserts, "that the international peace camp is a powerful ally in our national-liberation democratic front." "Most harmful for us at present," it concludes, "is fear of the threats of the occupation troops, the illusions about the 'free world,' and the attempt to maintain a position of neutrality."

IMPLICATIONS OF THE POST-TREATY STRATEGY

What were the tactical implications of this new Soviet line in Japan? First, the abandonment of the tactic of "peaceful revolution," which specifically rejected the "peaceful way of liberation," seemed to suggest that the Communist line in Japan in the winter of 1951 and the spring of 1952 moved one stage closer to the final objective, the attempt to seize political power. The Korean War must be regarded as an important motivating factor. The party's ability and intention to employ violence in line with the new post-treaty policy was amply demonstrated, notably in February 1952, when Communists in Tokyo and other cities throughout Japan staged the biggest series of riots and anti-American demonstrations since the outset of the occupation, and again during the alarming 1952 May Day riots. Subsequent incidents involving the use of acid bombs, Molotov cocktails, and "action squads" armed with pistols and bamboo spears were numerous enough to suggest a definite plan. Further, discussions of the party's "military policy" and of guerrilla activity were included regularly in the Japanese Communists' principal underground publications.[15] Consequently, the initial post-treaty emphasis on violence and underground activity appears to have been party policy and not simply a series of isolated, unrelated incidents. This precise point, as we shall see, is very much at issue in the July 1955 sixth national council meeting, where the party's "militant policy" comes in for rough treatment as "left wing adventurism," in a sort of Japanese Communist anticipation of the current anti-Stalin line.

A second implication of the new line was the increased use of the anti-American theme as the common appeal to rally all "progressive forces" against "United States imperialism" and for "liberation." Why are the worker's conditions no better? Because of the exploitation by United States monopoly capital and its agents, the Yoshida—later the Hatoyama—government who are turning Japan into a colony! What accounts for the increasing plight of the Japanese farmer? The American-inspired land reform program, which was "a fraud from beginning to end," designed only to preserve the domination of the reactionary forces. Similar appeals have been tailored to the needs and demands of the intellectuals, the white-collar workers, and even the businessmen, whose desire to trade with Communist China goes unfulfilled because, they are told, of United States control over Japan. No event is too remote, absurd, or unlikely to be linked for propaganda purposes to "the American imperialists." Thus by devious logic the party recently sought to show that the tragic sinking, with great loss of life, of a Japanese ferry boat really came about as a consequence of the American occupation.

A third implication of Communist post-treaty policy is perhaps the most intriguing: Japan's official reclassification as a semicolonial, dependent area placed that country, at least for propaganda purposes, essentially in the category to which China was assigned until 1949. This suggests that a share of the theory, strategy, and tactics employed successfully by the Communists in China may have been authorized for post-treaty Japan.

Moscow versus Peking

The question of the orientation of the Asian Communist parties—Moscow versus Peking—is one of the most difficult (and certainly significant) issues faced by the student of Soviet and Far Eastern affairs. The Japanese Communists have been most circumspect on this point.

The party secretary-general, Kyuichi Tokuda, in his July 4, 1952, article entitled "The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of Japan," after speaking of the need both to arm the party with the theory of Marxism and to follow unswervingly the ideas of Stalin (Tokuda died in 1953, so this "unfortunate" reference need not concern us), concluded: "The ideas of Mao Tse-tung, who applied Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese Revolution and blazed a new pathway for China, must also be our constant guide."

It is to be recalled that early in 1949 Nozaka, who spent nine years in Moscow and then five years in Yenan, had

versary of the Communist Party of Japan," *ibid.*, July 4, 1952.

[15] For detailed documentation see NKBS (cited note 6 *supra*), Vols. 3 and 4. Day-to-day underground developments are recorded in Kyokuto Jijo Kenkyukai ("Institute of Far Eastern Intelligence"), *Kyokuto Tsushin* ("Far Eastern Intelligence"), a biweekly which regularly contains an analysis of JCP activities of the period.

said: "We are learning valuable theoretical and political lessons from the great Mao Tse-tung and from other Chinese Communist leaders." Of further significance is the fact that during 1950 and 1951 the Chinese Communists exhibited an increasingly active interest in developments in Japan. Articles bearing such titles as "To Our Japanese Comrades" appeared regularly in the Peking *Jen-min Jih-pao,* were reprinted (significantly) by *Pravda,* and were apparently designed to guide the Japanese party over the difficult transitional period. The nature of the Japanese party's reaction to this guidance from the mainland, as well as the increasing volume of publications in Japan about and from Communist China, suggests strongly that the JCP may be prepared to accept Peking as the new ideological focal point in Asia. The sheer size of the new power center in China might alone make such a development inevitable, but the ideological factor appears at least as important as geopolitical considerations.[16]

The JCP interpretation of the significance of the Chinese Communist success is nowhere expressed more clearly than in Nozaka's widely read book, *Atarashii Chugoku to Nihon* ("The New China and Japan"), in which he writes:

> The victory of the Chinese Communists has a deep spiritual and ideological influence upon the Japanese working classes.
>
> The working people have by their own strength gained a great victory in China—a country which has been more reactionary, more feudalistic, and more of a colony than Japan. This has given unbounded encouragement to our workers and inspired them with confidence in victory. Our workers had looked on people's democracy and on socialism as something in faraway Europe, but now it has happened in China, only an ocean away, in the country with which we have had the oldest and closest relations. If such was possible in China, why should it not be possible in Japan?

[16] According to a survey by the Cabinet Research Office, the number of Japanese visitors to Communist areas was 2 in 1951, 34 in 1952, 225 in 1953, and 249 in 1954. This number suddenly increased in 1955 to 898—209 to the Soviet Union, 464 to Communist China, and 225 to other Communist countries. *Yomiuri,* March 24, 1956.

Post-Stalin Period

The period after Malenkov's assumption of power in the Soviet Union witnessed another modification of the Communist tactical line in Japan.[17] JCP policy during 1953 and 1954 [18] showed a conspicuous absence of the violence characteristic of the riots of the previous year, a general mellowing, and an increased emphasis on peace, on the anti-United States and antirearmament themes, and on the need to regularize relations with the Soviet Union and with Communist China.[19] At the same time the party sought to develop its underground structure and to intensify its labor offensive.[20]

[17] Discussed in more detail in "The Communist Line in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey,* April 1954.

[18] For a commentary on the situation during 1953 see Rodger Swearingen, "Japan: An Uneasy Ally," and "The Red Underground in Japan," *Christian Science Monitor,* August 31 and November 9, 1953, respectively. In January 1954, the Japanese government reviewed the situation in a forty-six-page report, Koan Chosa Cho ("Public Security Investigation Division"), *Nihon Kyosanto no Doko* ("Trends in the Japanese Communist Party"), Tokyo, 1954.

[19] A survey of the party publication *Akahata* ("Red Flag") for the period June 1952 through December 1953 shows 85 articles on the USSR (many of them devoted in part to relations with China) as against 168 articles exclusively on Communist China.

[20] See *Koan Joho* ("Public Security Report"), published monthly by the *Shakai Undo Kenkyukai* ("Social Movement Research Group") since the fall of 1953. A regular section entitled "Reports on the Japanese Communist Situation" included in the periodical often contains useful data.

Party strength

The numerical strength of the Japanese Communist party appears to have decreased measurably during the uncertain years which followed the Cominform criticism. According to official registration figures party membership reached a peak of 100,000 in March 1950, but it dwindled gradually to 65,000 in January 1951, 59,000 in May, 56,000 in August, and 48,000 in June 1952. Its actual strength including nonregistered members, which was once thought to be several times the registered membership, was estimated early in 1954 to be between 60,000 and 70,000. The number of members who actually pay dues to the party was at the same time said to be between 20,000 and 30,000.[21]

A comparison of Communist results in the elections of 1949, 1952, 1953, and 1955 offers another indication of trends in post-treaty Communist strength. On October 1, 1952, a national election was held after a lapse of nearly four years. The Communists campaigned vigorously, puting up one candidate for each constituency throughout the country. Whereas thirty-five Communist candidates had been elected in the preceding election, not a single seat was won by the Communist party in the new House of Representatives. The aggregate vote declined from 2,980,000 (9.7 per cent) in the 1949 election to 890,000 (2.5 per cent) in the 1952 election. In the general election of April 19, 1953, the Communist vote decreased to 660,000 (1.89 per cent) of the total votes cast, and the party managed to win one seat in the House of Representatives. The February 1955 elections to the House of Representatives show the first slight reversal in the downward trend in JCP popularity. Two JCP members were elected, both of them from Osaka; the party polled 773,120 (2 per cent) of the total votes cast.

[21] Figures given by Kinya Niizeki, Chief, Fifth (Soviet) Section, European and American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Postwar Activities of the Japan Communist Party," in *Japan's Problems,* Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1954.

JCP and the Socialists

During 1954, the Communist party continued to woo the Socialists, but the latter remained largely unconvinced of the necessity, value, or wisdom of accepting Communist bids for "joint action." To be sure, certain of their objectives coincided with those of the JCP, and the Communist party "used" the Socialists when and wherever possible.

Propaganda themes

The principal Japanese Communist propaganda campaigns of 1954–55 revolved around themes of opposition to rearmament, military bases, and mutual security aid, while the most sensational issue which the party was able to exploit was the "Bikini incident," involving atomic fallout on the Japanese fishing vessel *Lucky Dragon.*[22]

The labor front

The party has been most active on the labor front, with the 3,000,000 member General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) an identifiable target. By 1954 Communist influence on the Council had become substantial, but it appears to have declined somewhat since that time.[23] The party has

[22] The most useful account of the Communist propaganda campaign is the Kokumin Bunka Chosakai ("National Culture Institute"), *Sayoku Bunka Undo* ("The Left-Wing Cultural Movement") (Tokyo, 1954), which also contains charts showing the principal JCP legal and underground publications. A substantial, up-to-date work is Nikkan Rodosha Tsushinsha, *Sengo Nihon Kyosanshugi* ("Postwar Japanese Communism"), Tokyo, 1955.

[23] A good review of JCP labor policy may

made relatively less headway with the farmer and fisherman, and redoubled efforts have recently been called for.[24]

SIXTH NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING

After the Geneva "summit" conference, the JCP began to display aspects of the Soviet "new look." This was in line with the world-wide Communist policy and was not an unexpected development. Certain other related domestic developments also appear to have influenced the transformation in JCP policy, especially the evident failure of the party's militant underground policy and the replacement of the Yoshida government by the Hatoyama government, with the increased strength of the Socialist parties (and union as the Social Democratic party), which, in turn, tended to create what the JCP apparently regarded as a more fluid political situation.

The new modified policy was adopted at the party's sixth national council meeting in July 1955, and was published almost immediately in *Akahata*. After commenting on "favorable" developments on the international scene (such as the Geneva and the Bandung conferences) and noting that "the American imperialists are still supervising and controlling our industry, agriculture, and finances and trade, and exploiting and plundering our people," the document takes up several fundamental problems and errors, identified as failure to overcome factionalism and to unify the party, the tactical error of leftist adventurism, and the inability to strengthen the ties between the party and the people. Each of these is elaborated in some detail with the appropriate "lessons the party must learn." The document concludes by pinpointing specific target areas or groups and suggesting that there is an appropriate tactic towards each in the national-democratic liberation revolution.[25]

The new tactical line as outlined by the Resolution, reminiscent of Mao's New Democracy, may be summarized as follows: (1) Win labor and farmers by "correcting the error of leftist sectionalism," by paying more attention to the laborer's and farmer's daily needs, by not forcing "mechanically the party's program on groups" but by "winning them ideologically." (2) "Eradicate existing prejudice in the party against intellectuals" and channel the political consciousness of the intellectuals, youth, and women toward the correct cause. (3) Correct mistakes such as supporting Shigemitsu and attacking the Socialist party—fight for the unity of all democratic forces. (4) Be ready to exploit dissatisfaction with the Japanese government on the part of small- and medium-sized businesses, while realizing at the same time that various types of governments, though reactionary and pro-United States in large measure, can nevertheless contribute to the revolution. (5) While the party must not ally itself with monopoly capital, which supports traitors and reactionary governments, certain "dissatisfied big bourgeois" may be "encouraged" to take a neutral position. (6) Expose and block the revival of anti-Communist, Fascist, terrorist, rightist groups. (7) Organize a broad peace movement among people of all walks of life who are against atomic war—the party must, in effect, stand publicly for neutralism while not being itself neutral. (8) The party must raise its ideological level.[26]

be found in Nikkan Rodosha Tsushinsha, *Rodo Kumiai no Shidoken o Nerau Nihon Kyosanto* ("The JCP Aiming at the Control of the Labor Unions"), Tokyo, 1954.

[24] See, for example, Shunichi Hayashi, "Liberal Democratic Party's Agricultural Policy," *Zenei*, March 1956.

[25] The most recent version of the "colonial area formula" was set down by party leader Yoshio Shiga in December 1955: "Lenin said in 1920 that the oppressed nations 'are either in a state of direct colonial dependence or comprise semicolonial states such as Persia, Turkey, and China, or else, after being conquered by the armies of a big imperialist power, have been forced into deep dependence upon it by peace treaties.'

"After the Second World War Japan, which was not formerly a backward state of the colonial or semicolonial type but a developed capitalist country, found itself occupied by the armies of U. S. imperialism, and, as a result of the San Francisco Treaty, dependent on the U.S.A.

"Based on the Marxist-Leninist teaching on imperialism and the national and colonial question, our party's Programme is a beacon, a guide for making a correct analysis of the situation in Japan."—Yoshio Shiga, "Communist Party of Japan in Struggle for Interests of the Japanese People," *For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy*, December 23, 1955.

Open political activity and united-front tactics

What are the practical implications and observable effects of the new line? In the first place, the reversal in policy has resulted in a renewed emphasis on open political activity and united-front tactics. The JCP announced October 7, 1955, that 2,000 party members had emerged from the underground during the preceding month.[27] This trend is confirmed by the Japanese government and by other observers in Japan. By the summer of 1955, the principal party leaders, including Nozaka and Shiga, had re-emerged. Indeed, on February 27, 1955, only two months after coming out of hiding, Shiga was elected to the House of Representatives. Parliamentarian activity and a united front with "all democratic groups" have become the watchwords. "Co-operation with the Socialists" changed from a slogan to an actively pursued campaign, though the Socialists have so far formally rejected such Communist overtures. Clandestine publications and secret activist organizations have been discontinued or more deeply hidden, and on December 31, 1955, the JCP's clandestine radio station, Radio Free Japan, which started broadcasting anti-American propaganda on May Day 1952, announced that "its mission having been fulfilled, broadcasting would be suspended." Party spokesman Shiga made it clear early this year that the change represents a tactical shift rather than any basic modification of Communist objectives. "The discussion about revolution by parliamentary means or revolution by force," he told reporters, "is of only secondary importance. The choice between the two depends entirely upon the situation."[28]

Party leadership

A second observable effect has been the further reshuffling of the party leadership.[29] With the death of long-time

[26] Reporting on the organization and the strength of the JCP following the sixth national council meeting, Police Board Chief Eizo Ishii gave the following information: 100,000 members and 300,000 sympathizers would be a very rough guess; present party organization consists of 10 regional committees and 54 prefectural committees; in addition there are 235 group committees made up of several cells. Under the committees are 6,600 cells; the party is receiving substantial financial support from Communist China.—*Kyodo*, August 11, 1955. The previous June, Japanese Diet interpellations were held regarding the *Life* article by former Soviet Intelligence Chief in Japan, Yuri Rastvorov, in which he had told of giving 160,000,000 yen to the Japanese Communist party. Numerous articles in the Communist press since that time have deplored the party's lack of adequate funds, poor record on the collection of party dues, and the "difficult financial situation" of many party publications.

[27] Information from Japanese security authorities, *Mainichi*, September 28, 1955.

[28] *Yomiuri*, March 26, 1956.

[29] JCP leadership and organization following the sixth national council meeting is reflected in the following roster: central committee permanent executive council (presidium)—Sanzo Nozaka, Yoshio Shiga, Kenji Miyamoto, Satomi Hakamada, Shigeo Shida, Yojiro Konno,

Secretary-General Tokuda in Peking in 1953, the matter of succession—if not a real struggle for power—faced the Japanese party. The parallel to developments in the Soviet party is not difficult to draw. Ritsu Ito, a Tokuda man, was soon linked with Beria and ousted from the party as a traitor. Among the principal contenders for the top party position, Nozaka with nine years in Moscow and five years at Yenan had the inside track, except for his brief skirmish with the Cominform in 1950. With the softening of the Soviet line, Nozaka's re-emergence as number one comes as no surprise. Yoshio Shiga, one of the "big three" until the factional dispute of 1950–51, after recanting and reconsidering, came out of the underground to assume, in effect, the number two post in the party. To judge from the official party roster order of listing, Kenji Miyamoto, former control commission chief, would seem to be next in line, though his former record as an "internationalist" and present exclusion from the important control commission suggest that he may have slipped a notch in prestige and power. Two important leaders of the earlier period of peaceful revolution are conspicuous by their exclusion, Ritsu Ito and Shigeo Kamiyama. Asked by reporters about Ito on December 14 of last year Nozaka said he knew nothing of him, as the party has "no relations with ousted members." [30] On the other hand, Nozaka was reported to have visited ousted leader Kamiyama (long-time supporter of a moderate line) a few days earlier and to have then suggested that he might soon be back in the party. "Kamiyama's troubles with the party," Nozaka said, "have been amicably settled." [31]

Meanwhile, rumors persist that the leaders responsible for or deeply involved in the "militant, bureaucratic policy" are in trouble, despite their inclusion in the latest party roster. Shigeo Shida, another underling of the late Secretary-General and reportedly the principal engineer of the May Day riots of 1952, is said to have been urged to resign from his party post. His long absence from party headquarters, as well as Nozaka's characteristic reply to reporters that Etsuro Shiino and Satomi Hakamada—similarly involved—are "convalescing in Tokyo," [32] quite naturally gives rise to speculation as to their future. It seems likely that all of the repercussions of the policy change have not yet been felt by the party leadership.

Foreign relations

A third effect of the new policy concerns foreign relations. Two aspects appear to be involved: the party's relations with Moscow and Peking and Japan's relations with the Communist bloc. The JCP, no doubt, sees them ultimately as one and the same. While a detailed analysis of the JCP's relations with Moscow and Peking is not within the scope of this consideration, a further comment on the significant differing emphases of Shiga's and Nozaka's recent articles in the late Cominform journal seems appropriate.

Shiga's treatment, entitled "Communist Party of Japan in Struggle for Interests of the Japanese People," [33] emphasizes the "world-historic experience of the Communist party of the Soviet Union," the experience of the "great October Revolution," the significance of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union and Marxism-Leninism are mentioned no less than twenty-seven times in the course of the article, while Communist China is mentioned only eight times, usually in connection with the Soviet Union or Japan's need to regularize relations with the two countries and always with a conspicuous lack of emphasis.

Nozaka's article, entitled, "Vital Points in Resolution of Sixth National Conference of Japanese Communist Party," [34] for whatever reason, has a rather different complexion. After mentioning Stalin once and Marxist-Leninist theory somewhat in passing, Nozaka ends on this note:

> In 1942 the Communist party of China organized a movement . . . for the ideological re-education of its members, and this was one of the major reasons for the great victory it won in the revolution. Conditions in China and Japan are certainly not the same, but ideological education is a matter of vital importance for a Communist and in this matter the experience of the Communist party of China gives us rich lessons to study.

Perhaps what is involved is no more than the Marxist-Leninist theorist versus the more experienced party politician, or perhaps Shiga's lack of foreign travel and experience contrasts in this way with Nozaka's vivid impressions of Yenan. The issue could, of course, be assigned to the realm of coincidence into which there is always danger of reading unwarranted meanings. Yet the nature of the situation in the party and in Japan suggests that something more may be at stake, while the whole question of the future character of the Moscow-Peking axis is involved by implication. Whatever the case, there is no doubt that the past year has seen an intensification in the party's campaign to heighten Japanese interest in and relations with the Soviet Union and with Communist China on all levels. This is, of course, the positive aspect of the anti-American campaign, which likewise in somewhat more sophisticated form remains a major program. This double-barreled strategy takes the form of organizational and propaganda effort linking to American pressure [35] the failure of the Hatoyama government to reach accord with the Soviets in London. While organizing all kinds of associations for the promotion of trade and closer cultural relations with the Soviet Union and with Communist China, the party lays the responsibility for Japan's economic problems at the feet of the government of the United States, "which is preventing our nation from normal relations with the continent." Trade missions and trade fairs have come and gone to and from Moscow and Peking, each adding to the impressions that Japan could have prosperity and peace but for the designs of Washington. Diet members, scientific personnel, profes-

and Ryuji Nishizawa; control commission—Shoichi Kasuga (chairman), Iwao Iwamoto, Koreto Kurahara, Soichiro Matsumoto; central committee—Bunkichi Okada, Shoichi Kasuga, Shojiro Kasuga, Kenji Kawada, Koreto Kurahara, Yojiro Konno, Etsuro Shiino, Yoshio Shiga, Shigeo Shida, Tsunesaburo Takenaka, Ryuji Nishizawa, Sanzo Nozaka, Satomi Hakamada, Ichizo Matsumoto, and Kenji Miyamoto; central committee candidates—Yashiro Ii, Ichizo Suzuki, Susumu Mizuno, Sukeharu Yoshida, and Sho Yonehara.

Members of the former politburo, central committee, and interim central directorate, are listed in Swearingen *et al., Japanese Communism* (cited note 11 *supra*). Biographical information on the principal party leaders may be found in Swearingen and Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (cited note 1 *supra*). Sketches of fourteen second echelon party leaders are included in *Koan Joho* (cited note 20 *supra*), October 1955.

[30] *Kyodo,* December 14, 1955.
[31] *Ibid.,* December 11, 1955.
[32] *Mainichi,* December 14, 1955.
[33] *For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy,* December 23, 1955.
[34] *Ibid.,* January 13, 1956.
[35] See, for example, "For the Restoration of Normal Relations with the Soviet Union and with China," *Akahata,* October 16, 1954; "Success of Japan-USSR Talks Vital," *ibid.,* January 23, 1956; and "U. S. 'Taint' Ruined London Talks," *ibid.,* March 22, 1956.

sors, writers, and "cultural delegations," have also gone to the continent in the past two years to see for themselves. Having seen what the Communists wanted them to see, many of these visitors appeared genuinely impressed. All this is buttressed by a gigantic cultural offensive and peace propaganda campaign which is no doubt taking its toll of the innocent. One of the major designs of the new policy, then, is to break Japan loose from her Western moorings and draw her gradually but inextricably into the Soviet sphere.

Finally, what of the new policy's impact on the rank-and-file party member and sympathizer? Again, the parallel with the anti-Stalin line in the Soviet Union comes to mind. Instances of anger, regrets, and confusion resulting from the new policy are too numerous to record. The pattern is clear. Several examples may serve to convey the significance and flavor of the situation.

Impact on rank and file

According to Japanese security authorities, open conflict occurred at Nagano, where on November 14, 1955, the North Shinetsu regional party council held a meeting at the Education Hall. A young party leader remarked that the party should reject its former violent actions since it had liquidated ultraleftist adventurism. At his remarks, the captain of a group who had been arrested on charges of disturbing the peace asked the speaker if he wanted to leave in the hands of the police those comrades who had followed such directives of the party. Furious arguments ensued and chairs were thrown about. Central Committee member Shida is said to have had to calm the outraged members.[36]

[36] *Mainichi,* December 14, 1955.

Students from ten Japanese universities contributed to an article in the Tokyo *Asahi* entitled "Student Movements in Transition," in which student Communist leaders are reported expressing "deep remorse over the wrong [militant] policies of the party in the past" and members of the student cell at Tokyo University are pictured as "sobbing, regretting their past activities."[37]

Perhaps the most amusing and telling grass-roots reaction is revealed in a letter to the editor of *Akahata* and the party's answer. The letter read:

> At a certain Communist meeting, over a hundred comrade debaters barked at the presidium as if they believed that the louder one yells and cries, the abler he is. I think it is about time we ended this type of discussion and fostered ways of expressing ourselves calmly. . . .[38]

The party's reply is a classic fully worthy of a letter to the lovelorn column in an American newspaper. It reads:


> Those who are calling for discussion free from unnecessary excitement are right, and this demand has been gaining ground gradually, to our satisfaction. The recent discussions and criticisms of the decisions of the sixth national council meeting are most welcome, and this trend must be further fostered. But there are some deep-rooted evil practices of discussion that have yet to be liquidated. To our astonishment, even such remarks as "You idiot" and "Drop dead!" were heard during a discussion meeting. On other occasions even worse remarks have been made. This kind of behavior is, of course, serious misbehavior that does not become a Communist. It has nothing whatsoever to do with "real criticism." It is rather characteristic of militarists.[39]

[37] *Asahi,* October 3, 1955.
[38] *Akahata,* October 11, 1955.
[39] *Ibid.,* December 22, 1955.

One recalls Gandhi's penetrating criticism of Communism to the effect that violent means can never be relied upon to achieve peaceful ends, that class war and violence are self-perpetuating. It is not easy to convert shock troops into diplomats—for the Japanese Communists any more than for those in the Soviet Union.[40]

[40] After a long silence, the JCP on March 23, 1956, expressed wholehearted admiration and support of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party.—*Kyodo,* March 24, 1956.

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Nationalism and the Ultraright Wing

By Hirotatsu Fujiwara

TO explain the state of the ultraright wing after 1952 it is necessary first to trace the impact made by military defeat and an unprecedented alien occupation on the once flourishing movement which had held a firm grip on prewar society. Second, one must examine the relationship between ultranationalism and the political temper of Japan today. A synthesis of these two analyses will then suggest the probable future of the right wing.

General Postwar Character

The postwar ultraright-wing movement can be divided into four rather distinct periods—each with its own peculiar characteristics. The first, extending from August 1945 to February 1947, was one of utter depression. During the second, from 1947 to the eve of the Korean War in 1950, the movement appeared to revive when the so-called *après-guerre* leaders raised their heads. The third period, from the Korean War to the implementation of the Peace Treaty in April 1952, saw what appeared to be a fairly active ultranationalist movement, though in reality it was a period of confusion. Each of the first three periods contributed to the fourth, which began with the recovery of sovereignty four and one-half years ago and includes the present. During this period the ultrarightists achieved a united front, but while the contemporary movement appears full of spirit, it is an external manifestation only.

Initial Collapse

In the first period, the collapse of the former Emperor system robbed the right wing of much of its appeal for support, action, and even existence. The demotion of the Emperor from god to human being destroyed much of the ultrarightist's spiritual foundations, and the abolition of state support for the Shinto religion destroyed a major prop which sustained it. Defeat in war, complete demobilization and prohibition of military forces, and the dissolution of all general staffs in the first months of the occupation, enforced by provisions in the Constitution of 1947, deprived the ultraright wing of an important source of moral, financial, and material support to which it had long been accustomed.

Moreover, the chaos of defeat, plus the economic restrictions enforced by SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) in the first period, including the dissolution of the zaibatsu (economic industrial oligarchies), eliminated sources for funds customarily tapped. Further, the revolutionary agrarian land reform, in particular the law of 1946, drastically altered the old system of land tenure. A slow social and economic revolution got under way which gravely affected the rural areas, the traditional citadel of conservatism, anticapitalism, and anti-Westernism which had provided the movement with so many of its recruits in prewar years.

Not least among the causes for the depressed state of the ultrarightist movement was the "purge directive" (SCAPIN 548) issued by occupation headquarters on January 4, 1946, which specifically sought to eliminate the organization and leadership of prewar and wartime ultrarightist bodies. The leaders were barred from public office, the

organizations dissolved, and restrictions enforced against the continued rightist activity of either.

All of these actions were the result of occupation orders or of government action taken to conform with their objectives. This fact, plus the occupation which remained in effective control of Japan for six and one-half years, made the will and policy of SCAP a major influence in the postwar rightist movement.

Save for the very few individuals and groups who resorted to riots and suicides in protest against the surrender in mid-August 1945, no ultrarightist group attempted direct resistance against the occupation forces in the first period. Some went so far as to curry favor with occupation authorities to escape either the "purge" or punishment as war criminals. A very few, such as the East Asian League Brotherhood (Toa Renmei Doshikai), headed by the late Kanji Ishihara, a former general, tried to preserve their organizations by disguising themselves as democratic bodies. Almost all surviving ultrarightist organizations, including Ishihara's, converted themselves into land-development or agricultural enterprises or engaged in fund-raising activities, such as operating public works, restaurants, theaters, and gambling establishments and even smuggling. Without exception, however, the ultraright wing disappeared completely from the political horizon.

Anti-Communist Revival

The second period began with General MacArthur's order banning a projected general strike scheduled for February 1, 1947. To the ultrarightists, this revealed the clear-cut anti-Communist attitude of the occupation authorities, and in this they found, for the first time since the end of the war, a permissible sphere for action. But already almost all the prominent ultrarightist leaders had been purged; there remained only minor prewar figures who had held no important positions in the earlier period. Thus, when the postwar movement was launched with the organization of anti-Communist activities, it was led primarily by a new and younger group of men. Four of the older and larger of the postwar groups organized at this time and under such leadership were the Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthemum Flag Brotherhood (Nihon Kakumei Kikuhata Doshikai), Japan Anti-Communist League (Nihon Hankyo Renmei), the Greater Yamato party (Daiwato), and the Racial Purity Movement (Minzoku Shinsei Undo).

While their titles suggest a common union of anti-Communism and a residual nationalism which identified itself with the traditional "national polity," paradoxically the ideology, especially the method of appealing for mass support, of a number of the groups formed in this second period seemed to be considerably influenced by communism. Their theoretical position may be said to have been like "reversed communism." Their efforts to achieve a forced fusion of "respect for the Emperor" with the principles of a "democratic revolution" were extremely illogical. Though supported by those who bitterly opposed communism and by those who longed for the old order and the prewar Emperor system, the movement attracted only negligible numbers. The rightists could do little beyond sporadic propaganda. Some argued that Koreans should be expelled. Others planned and perpetrated acts of violence against Communist leaders, but found such actions vigorously condemned by public opinion.

Suffering from the continued impact of defeat and a hostile occupation control which identified ultranationalism as one of the prime causes for the recent war, the ultrarightists lacked recog-

nized and established leadership, were opposed by a critical public, and plagued by a confused jumble of ideology and program. Many organizations spawned in this period lapsed into almost complete inactivity before the period came to an end. They reflected the transitory character common to many postwar movements.

CONSERVATIVE TRENDS

The period which followed the outbreak of the Korean War was dominated by the shadow of the Communist action in Korea and the opposition of the United Nations forces. As the anti-Communist policy of the occupation became more vigilant and vigorous, the earlier anti-Communist emphasis of the ultraright-wing movement also intensified. Some of the anti-Communist ultrarightist groups, however, protested that the policy of the occupation went further than permissible in the name of democracy.[1]

Characteristic of the trend which gave the ultraright a new lease on life was the establishment, at the suggestion of SCAP, of the National Police Reserve in July 1950. Designed to cope with any major internal disorder Communists or Communist sympathizers might create while Japan was denuded of occupation forces by the Korean conflict, the Police Reserve was the forerunner of a series of measures which appeared to open the way to a return to the *ancien régime*. After an earlier purge of top officers of the Communist party by SCAP, a "red purge" of the press and the ranks of labor got under way in 1950. In October 1950, SCAP authorized the release of many prewar rightist leaders from the purge and approved an even more extensive rescinding of purge designations in the period from June to September 1951. A large number of the prewar rightist groups promptly resumed open activity. Many of the currently existing postwar rightist societies were reorganized or stem from new ones formed at this time, such as, for example, the East Asian League Brotherhood, the Constitutional Righteousness Association (Rikken Yoseikai), the Greater Japan Patriotic party (Dai Nihon Aikokuto), the Eight Thousand Spears Society (Yachihokokai), the Japan National Polity Society (Nihon Kokutai Gakkai), and the Fatherland Defense Brotherhood (Sokoku Boei Doshikai).

Occupation policy, which sought security and stability while spurring economic recovery, was supported in the main by the government. The conservative trend and the obvious aid it gave to the right helped to create a sharp split in public opinion as the peace conference approached in 1951. The phrase "reverse course" began to appear to describe the trend.

Besides hostility to communism, rightist groups in the third period shared in advocating restored reverence of the Emperor (a traditional prewar premise) and in supporting rearmament, revision of the Constitution, and close co-operation with non-Communist Asian countries. A greater emphasis on support of prewar patterns and practices also appeared.

Although the objectives of the ultrarightists became more specific, their organizations failed to develop any major popular support. The greater part of their program had already been taken over by the pro-American conservative parties, especially by the then Liberal party. The ultrarightists could only demand that the program be accelerated. The movement also remained

[1] The anti-Communist policies of the occupation authorities threatened to hamper their own anti-Communist activities. See Nihon Jinbun Kagakkai ("The Japanese Society of Humanistic Science") (Ed.), *Shakaiteki Kincho no Kenkyu* ("A Study of Social Tensions") (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1953), p. 308.

divided and fragmented. While there was a complete accord in hostility to communism, the fact that Japan depended so obviously upon the United States and that the United States openly favored rearmament and co-operation with non-Communist nations created many complicated problems, especially in those groups which sought to maintain their position as nationalists. Some of the younger postwar rightist leaders, influenced by the democratic movement at the end of the war, even opposed rearmament. The gulf that divided the two generations of rightist leadership was a phenomenon also seen in other sectors of the national life. Moreover, even among the elders of the movement there were not a few who reflected upon and even questioned their activities of the past; for example, a difference of opinion over rearmament caused a split in the East Asian League Brotherhood.[2]

Although supported by the so-called "reverse course" of the times and despite the fact that it seemed to have recovered its feet, the ultraright movement was still in utter confusion and thoroughly ineffective.

AFTER RECOVERY OF SOVEREIGNTY

Efforts first for rearmament and then for revision of the 1947 Constitution gradually spread following the enforcement of the Peace Treaty in April 1952 and created a political climate which in outward appearance steadily favored the right wing. In reality, however, the scope of the movement's political activity continually narrowed, until by 1956 it has been driven to almost hopeless futility.

Initially, however, the ultrarightists were in high spirits with the advent of independence. Early in 1953, Kozaburo Tachibana, a leader in the 1932 attempted coup d'état which brought death to Prime Minister Tsuyoshi (Ki) Inukai, called a meeting of right-wing groups in Mito, a traditional center for prewar rightists and ultranationalists. Attended by 180 well-known prewar figures including even terrorists, the meeting proved to be the spark which later that year launched a united front of all ultrarightist organizations, the National Conference for the Restoration Movement (Ishin Undo Zenkoku Kyogikai).

The difference between appearance and reality, however, was great. The Conference was a united front in name only. Although linked with prominent and often notorious names of the prewar movement, the Conference had no common platform and won no public support. The ultraright-wing movement remained atomized, both in size and in unity. In this one can note a similarity to the prewar days.

The continued void in concrete policy, common to all ultraright-wing groups, and their lack of discipline became increasingly evident as time went on. A number of groups, such as the Young Men's Corps of National Martyrs (Junkoku Seinentai) and the National Protection Organization (Gokokudan), showed a general tendency to engage in acts of violence. This development indicates a change in direction or policy of the ultrarightist groups from programs of a traditional political nature to antisocial, shameless offenses which lack any substantive content at all. A number of current ultrarightist groups find it difficult to maintain even the discipline of the prewar days in their self-styled patriotic activities.[3]

[2] See Hirotatsu Fujiwara, "Uyoku Nashiyonarizumu ni Okeru Sengoteki Tokushitsu no Shozai: Sono Shisoteki Tachiba no Mondai" ("Postwar Characteristics of Right-Wing Nationalism: The Question of Their Ideological Basis"), *Shiso* ("Thought"), No. 340 (October 1952), pp. 964–82.

[3] See Hanji Kinoshita, "Sengo Uyoku Undo no Henbo" ("The Transformation of the Right-Wing Movement in Postwar Japan"),

In an effort to gain a wider forum and to increase their scope of action a number of rightist leaders sought seats in the National Diet in each of the general elections following the Peace Treaty. Although few ultrarightists held seats in the Diet during the war years, this effort to win seats in a body so often derided, condemned, and intimidated in prewar years marks a notable difference between the prewar and post-peace groups. Significantly, with extremely few exceptions, they were ex-soldiers who later joined an existing political party; yet all failed of election. In effect, in 1956 the ultrarightist movement's political influence remains nil.[4]

MILITARISM

While the so-called "patriotic" ultranationalist groups are weak in numbers, leadership, program, and influence, and even without an apparent future, a more significant latent force in the right-wing movement is the appearance of organized ex-soldier or veteran groups since 1952. These civilian organizations of veterans are more important to the movement than the ex-military personnel who resumed professional military careers in the National Police Reserve and successive groups. Because formal organizations and meetings of veteran groups were sharply restricted during the early occupation period, their rise only began with the change in occupation policy to encourage rearmament and self-defense. Ranging from organizations which aim to restore pension rights or to secure relief for war cripples, they include those which pursue political ends, such as Masanobu Tsuji's Self-Defense Federation (Jiei Domei), which seeks to create a grass-roots organization to give moral and physical support to the Defense Force. The solidarity of these organizations is fairly strong, and there is no denying that their continual activity has helped spread the germ of revived militarism to some extent. They have not yet demonstrated any significant power as a major political bloc or lobby, but they provide an organized body of supporters or potential supporters which the ultrarightist movement lacked in the three previous periods after 1945.

The ultrarightist movement remains committed to an acceptance and defense of the anciently traditional and retains as its core a support of militarism and reverence of the Emperor as head, symbol, and chief of a family-state. There are differences, however, in kind and degree from the prewar movement.

The character of its militarism is different. While supporting rearmament, a militant advocacy of armed aggression has yet to be heard above a scarcely audible whisper. No ultrarightist group openly advocates an "irredentist" policy towards Taiwan, Korea, or any other wartime and prewar sphere of influence Japan held in Asia. Even the rightists appear to recognize that Japan does not possess sufficient means to be a weighty counter in the game of international power politics at this time. With the increased industrialization of modern times, there is small prospect, short of an era of nuclear power, that Japan will be able again even to aspire to an expansionist goal.

There is a difference also in the degree of influence, the postwar movement being vastly the inferior of the two.

PROSPECTS

Prospects for a recovery of prewar influence are not favorable. Former rightist symbols are no longer as effective as they were. Discredited in 1945 and still suffering from the impact of the first postwar years, they evoke but little enthusiasm among the younger and perhaps more sophisticated post-war generation. The 1947 Constitution bars an easy recapture of political influence by the armed services. The elimination of the old system whereby a small group of elders largely shaped major policy decisions makes it difficult for the postwar ultrarightists to focus effectively the limited power they have. The enhanced power of the Diet, including its power to control, at least to fight, any militant ultraright offensive, offers little prospect for the successful intimidation of prewar years. The movement as a whole also lacks easy access to ready funds. It remains split, inactive, and confused. If one can say that the prewar ultranationalist groups were socially rootless, that they engaged in intimidation, blackmail, and assassination, one can say too that post-war successor bodies are even more rootless and antisocial in character, although no successful or even attempted assassination of public leaders has yet besmirched the postwar scene.

In addition to the factors noted above, there is almost no attractive issue that is not already the property of organized political groups other than the ultra-right wing. The latter has nothing with which to attract and rally public support. The reconstruction of post-Peace-Treaty Japan by a return to more traditional patterns, for example, is being carried out by the conservative Liberal Democratic party. Any attack the rightists might make upon the corruption of that or other political parties, including a resort to terrorism as in the old days, has small possibilities of success: the ultrarightists have scant influence over the selection of a successor government, and if they drive the present conservative cabinet from power, it would only increase the likelihood that the Socialists, even more their enemy, would come into power.

There is little room for maneuver on the international front either. While opposition to the expansion of United States military bases and to continued experiments with the hydrogen bomb make effective appeals to the patriotic sentiment of Japanese, this opposition is almost a monopoly of the left! If the ultrarightists attack Chiang Kai-shek, they attack a dedicated fellow anti-Communist. The same is true if they seek to fan discontent over the "Rhee Line," a unilateral extension by Korea of its territorial-waters boundary line some sixty miles off shore.

The most effective block against any likely revival of effective ultrarightist influence is the fact that not only has the conservative Liberal Democratic party pursued policies supported by the rightists, such as rearmament and constitutional revision, but it has also been extremely cautious in co-operating with the notoriously reckless ultraright wing. The Liberal Democratic party, which controls the cabinet, has even formally declared that precautions should be taken against the extreme right as well as the extreme left. It has become increasingly difficult for the ultrarightists to establish and maintain the close liai-

Shiso ("Thought"), December 1955. Some rightists, like Tatsuo Tsukui, have come to admire developments in Communist China. A candidate for the House of Councillors in July 1956, Tsukui was badly beaten, though some leftists had been apprehensive that his combination of rightism and appreciation of Communist China would make him a dangerous candidate.

[4] Over a score of candidates in the House of Councillors elections, July 8, 1956, ran with the expected support of the ultraright and former military elements. They were almost all totally defeated. Although a former general who had headed the army's presurrender press and information service and a former admiral won, Kingoro Hashimoto was decisively defeated. Hashimoto had been an early member of the prewar young officers' clique, and a long-time, loud, and effective agitator identified with presurrender ultranationalism. He had been a member of the Imperial Diet in 1942. A defendant among the Class A war criminals sentenced in 1948, he was released early in 1956, along with many others serving long-term sentences.

son with top political party officials which so many had had before the war.

Finally, ultrarightist programs are too outmoded and stereotyped. In short, having lost the magic charisma of aggressive nationalism, the movement is today almost wholly impotent.[5]

NATIONALISM AND PUBLIC SENTIMENT

In prewar years Japan was noted for the cohesiveness of her people and for the unity with which they supported the family-state and its symbol, the Emperor. Pride in their past, claims to a unique "national polity," and ambition for the nation's future were part of the common faith of her people. The militarists achieved considerable popular support during their era of aggressive expansion by appealing to that pride and that spirit. Ultranationalist right wingers justified their acts, even when they brought blood and death, by appealing to the same spirit of nationalism. And there can be little doubt that without the wide diffusion of nationalistic feeling Japan's history in the prewar period would have been impossible. What then is the state of that nationalism today?

Briefly, one can say that the confusion and stagnation of the ultrarightwing movement derives from the state of nationalism in the sentiment of the people at large.

The forces which weakened ultrarightism in postwar Japan have also served to shake the base upon which nationalist sentiment rests. The unity which characterized prewar nationalism has been lost. The destruction of the national mythology has swept away the basis of state Shinto, including Emperor worship. Atheism and newfangled religions of a doubtful nature sprang up, a number of which still continue in a relatively flourishing state. Pride of racial purity surrendered itself to the dollar and the boastful use of a species of Japanese-American speech. Gambling and the use of narcotics became widespread. Some excesses in sexual emancipation evidently spoiled the nation's sound thinking. The shock of surrender and of the disintegration of the Empire of Greater Japan upon the Japanese mind was stupefying, as the people had placed almost complete confidence in the state. This shock partially explains why the United States occupation experienced almost no resistance in imposing upon old Japan a series of democratic reorganizations which dismembered much of the prewar system. This shock also explains why the Japanese people, ten years after the end of the war, still reflect the attitudes of occupation days. The people appear to be indifferent to the problems of national independence, in spite of the recovery of nominal independence at the San Francisco Peace Conference. The majority of Japanese know well that that independence is nominal. Yet the spontaneous will to win back réal independence is almost nowhere to be found. It is not too much to say that concern with one's private affairs and indifference to politics are still the dominant tendencies of today.

Though the concept of a national community has some validity even today, the basis for such a unifying feeling seems to be missing. Some ascribe this lack to the general purposelessness of present-day Japan as a state. Of this there can be no doubt, but our daily life, too, is full of similar symptoms. In place of the vibrant, sensitive nationalism of prewar years, the mood of resignation and helplessness—the feeling that war-defeated Japan must follow the United States since she cannot stand on her own feet—is universal. Like the air itself, it extends even over the areas where opposition to United States military bases is being fiercely carried out. Compared with the war-loving national spirit of prewar days, Japanese people have become astonishingly spiritless and passive. Probably rearmament and the gradual build-up for a revision of the Constitution by the pro–United States conservatives is passively accepted only in this sense. This seems to have been recognized by former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida when he declared during his travels abroad in October 1954: "Though the United States urges us to rearm, it is unlikely that a majority of our people will support it; a national referendum may prove our defeat." Even the conservatives lack confidence in themselves.

The current mood of passive indifference is extremely disappointing to both right and left, for each wants to make full use of nationalism to achieve a decisive victory over the other. Because the mood is free from aggressiveness, either revolutionary or militaristic, it is deplored by the left as a symptom of feudalistic stagnation and by the right as the degeneration of national morals. Both judgments only half hit the mark. The disdain of revolutionary rebellion against the existing order constitutes the last defense line of national morality, and the hatred of nuclear weapons and rearmament puts a heavy brake upon an all-out support of antirevolutionary forces.

The bond of ultranationalism which once united everyone to the state and nation having been broken, the former spirit of nationalism has become dispersed and diffused, shifting down to the subculture. It is unlikely that ultranationalism will easily crystallize on the political plane, even though the left and the right are trying to fuse the scattered sentiments for their own support.

While the popular mood appears divided, it is always at one in its cynical skepticism toward all varieties of extremism. It cannot be denied that this tendency stems from the peculiar internal and external situation of postwar Japan, as well as from the tragic experience of being the first victim of the atomic bomb. Shrinking from political polarization in any form which might possibly bring about war or social convulsion, the public mood seems to be solely directed toward seeking security. If this desire is only to reconstruct a happy life under conditions of political stability, it is evidently proceeding in a different direction from that which the two camps of nationalism, left and right, are aiming at.

It is extremely difficult, therefore, to find in public sentiment today a common denominator which could be called nationalism. The popular will aims, it seems, to be neither revolutionary nor militaristic.

If, as Hans Kohn has said, nationalism is essentially an abstract passion and does not like to be dispersed and submerged in the subculture because of its political nature, the prevailing mood of the Japanese people may be said to represent an attitude of prenationalism. If the nationalism of historical significance today is that of Asia, then the nationalism among the Japanese people is in marked contrast to it in its nonpolitical nature. In postwar Japan, nationalism, including that of Asia, has been discussed frequently, not only by right wingers but by progressive thinkers as well, yet its political influence on Japan has not been significant.[6] This fact may also prove the inadequate nature of Japanese nationalism today.

[5] See Masao Maruyama, "Nationalism in Postwar Japan," in *Asian Nationalism and Western Policies*, Institute of Pacific Relations, Eleventh Conference, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951.

[6] During 1954–55, for example, many Japanese extolled the "people's revolution" in Communist China and even talked about emulating such Chinese Communist campaigns as the extermination of flies.

In postwar Japan the mood of the people at first inclined to the left and next to the right, in spite of strong resistance from the left. That it is increasingly inclining to the right is noticeable in the frequently heard expressions such as a "reverse course" or "back to the old regime." What implications will such a tendency have? A consideration of that question logically forms the conclusion to this analysis.

CONCLUSION

In evaluating the force of the ultraright wing in postwar Japan, a distinction between right-wing organizations and rightist elements must be clearly made. Rightist elements include men of strong conservative conviction, members of the conservative party, bureaucrats, ex-soldiers, and capitalists, as well as landowners. Right-wing organizations are merely the gathering of socially unreliable, reckless people, with some stragglers from the intellectual class.

During the ten years since the end of the war, rightist elements, though weakened temporarily, have constantly maintained their position as the major force in Japanese politics and have been supported by a majority of the people in each general election. In spite of the inactivity and ineffectiveness of the right-wing organizations, the force of the rightist elements has been gradually strengthened, and they are steadily carrying out a "back to the old regime" program. As the conservative Liberal Democratic party and the bureaucrats are in legal control of the machinery of government, they feel no need for the help of the right-wing organizations, even though both aim at rearmament by a revision of the Constitution.

At the same time "back to the old regime" has not served the conservative rightist elements to crystallize patriotic national sentiment. This failure appears to stem from the lack of real independence of the conservatives from subservience to the United States, and from their stubborn refusal to push social reform, their ruinous internal feuds, and their corruption.

As long as the conservative rightist elements enjoy the support of the people and wield political power, the opportunity for the extreme right wing to function will be almost nil. But when the left-wing forces threaten to overwhelm the conservatives and seize power, there is a strong possibility that the ultraright wing will be the last resort of the ruling class. At any rate, the effort of the conservative rightist elements then will inevitably bring forth arbitrary oppression because of their lack of rational persuasiveness and may demolish all the fruits of democracy which postwar Japan has obtained at great sacrifice.

Nationalism eventually formed through such a process may have the appearance of the militaristic ultranationalism of prewar days. But in substance it will be quite different, and it is doubtful if it would be a type of nationalism worthy of the name. It will be a miniature version of American militarism; it will depend for its sustenance on the United States and may lead Japan to become an orphan in Asia. As the old nationalism was marked by its extremism, the new seems to be unique in its lack of a will for independence.

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Internal Industrial and Business Trends

By SHIGETO TSURU

WHATEVER the driving forces which lay behind it, Japan's economy by the time of her formal independence in 1952 had made a remarkable recovery from the devastation she had suffered in the last war, and since then it has continued to expand without letup.

In over-all terms, the record of this achievement may be gauged by the two indexes given below, that of manufacturing production and that of per capita real income.[1]

	INDEX OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION	INDEX OF PER CAPITA REAL INCOME
1934–6 average	100	100
1946	29	52
1952	128	96
1953	160	103
1954	174	105
1955	188	—

Taking the fairly prosperous years of 1934–36 as base, we find that by 1952 Japan had more or less regained her prewar position and by 1954 her manufacturing production stood at 174 per cent of the prewar average and the per capita real income at 105 per cent.

Recovery to the prewar position was accompanied by the re-establishment of the industrial structure which typically prevailed in prewar years. During the period from 1934 to 1936, for example, primary industries, such as agriculture and fisheries, accounted for about 20 per cent of net national income produced; secondary industries, such as manufacturing and mining, for 30 per cent; and tertiary industries, such as commerce, finance, and communications, for the remainder. These proportions shifted greatly during the past twenty years, first in favor of secondary industries as a result of the war orientation of the economy in the late thirties and during the war (the maximum being 41.3 per cent in 1943), then in favor of primary industries in the immediate postwar years (the maximum being 38.8 per cent in 1946), and finally, by 1955, in the direction of restoring the 1934–36 composition with the three sectors producing 22.0, 30.1, and 48.3 per cent, respectively.[2] However, the trend in terms of these broad sectors is somewhat misleading. If we take, for example, the internal composition of the manufacturing sector itself, the dominant position which textile industries occupied in 1934–36 (22.2 per cent of the total in terms of value added) has been replaced by machinery and equipment industries by 1952–54 (21.2 per cent) while textiles (14.4 per cent) dropped to the third position behind chemical industries.[3] The indication

[1] The index of manufacturing production is the one compiled by the Economic Planning Board. The index of per capita real income is calculated from the figures given in Economic Planning Board, *Showa 29-nendo no Kokumin Shotoku* ("National Income of the Fiscal Year 1954") (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau, 1955), p. 125.

[2] The total adds up to 100.4, of which 0.4 is accounted for by the net outflow on external account.

[3] The proportions are calculated on the basis of the Census of Manufactures. Since the industrial classification has been changed in the postwar years, regrouping has been made in order to make the figures as nearly comparable as possible. For prewar data, value-added figures were not officially given. Thus an approximation was made on the basis of gross income ratios as given in Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research, *Kaisetsu Keizai Tokei* ("Annotated Economic Statistics") (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1953), p. 88.

seems fairly evident that the Japanese economy will, as it grows, develop more and more in the direction of expanding the relative weight of manufacturing, and within the latter, of enlarging the branches of heavy and chemical industries.

INVESTMENT FUNDS

An economy can grow only if it succeeds in setting aside out of its annual product a certain amount for investment. Though Japan after defeat in the last war was hardly in a condition to do much by way of setting aside for the future, she managed to sustain a rate of investment as high as the prewar record. The rate, as measured by the ratio gross capital formation to gross national product, was already above 20 per cent in the first postwar year—a level generally considered fairly high. The rate gradually increased as recovery progressed and reached the record level of 31.2 per cent in 1951; it has since fluctuated around 25 per cent.[4]

Sources

Investment has to be matched by saving; and an interesting problem is how in postwar Japan that amount of saving has been obtained. In prewar years the main sources of gross saving were saving by individuals and depreciation allowances by corporations. Retained profits by corporations accounted for the rest. But the picture changed radically in the postwar years. The inflation which plagued the country in the immediate postwar years tended to depress depreciation allowances, which could not catch up with the price rise, and at the same time government began to play a major role in supplying funds for investment purposes. The situation became gradually normalized as years went on. But even in 1954, the government funds accounted for 16.7 per cent of the total gross saving of the country as against 40 per cent contributed by individual saving, 30 per cent by depreciation, and 10 per cent by retained profits.[5]

The changing picture in the sources of investment funds becomes clearer if we focus our attention more directly on the manner in which individual firms obtain their funds. Table 1 presents the composition of sources of supply of funds for prewar and postwar years and reveals the radical change which has taken place over the two decades.

[4] The government capital formation is included in this calculation. See Economic Planning Board, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 110, 122.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

TABLE 1—SOURCES OF SUPPLY OF INDUSTRIAL FUNDS, PREWAR AND POSTWAR

(In percentages)

PERIOD	OWN CAPITAL[a]			OUTSIDE CAPITAL			
	Retained profits	Subscription to new shares	Total	Debentures	Loans from banks, etc.	Government funds	Total
1934–36.....	29.0	57.0	86.0	0.3	12.8	0.9	14.0
1951[b].....	18.4	7.5	25.9	3.5	62.8	7.8	74.1

[a] Does not include depreciation allowances.
[b] Relates to fiscal year.

Source: Economic Stabilization Board, *Showa 27-nendo Nenji Keizai Hokoku* ("Annual Economic Survey for Fiscal Year 1952") (Tokyo, 1952), p. 39.

The weight of retained profits in the total supply of funds has clearly declined, and government funds began to play a greater role after the war; but more striking are the changes in relation to "subscription to new shares" and "loans from banks, etc." Apparently, the opportunity of obtaining funds by floating new issues in the security market has greatly declined and borrowing from financial institutions has filled that gap. The situation seems to be gradually improving in very recent years, but the picture revealed in Table 1 has not changed very much. If we take, for example, manufacturing industry as a whole, the ratio of retained profits to total proceeds declined from 3.6 per cent in the first half of 1936 to 1.3 per cent in the first half of 1954, while the ratio of interest cost to total proceeds rose from 1.2 per cent to 3.6 per cent during the same period.[6]

Reduced financial flexibility

Thus, although investment funds were forthcoming in sufficient amount in the postwar years, the financial position of firms became less flexible than before the war, as they were more dependent both on banks and on the government and had to pay more in interest charges than, for example, they set aside as capital consumption allowances.[7] In short, Japan's manufacturing firms are not yet as viable as they were in thirties. Even in prosperous postwar years the margin of net profit is definitely smaller than prewar, as evidenced by the contrasting figures of 3.1 (in the first half of 1954) and 11.0 per cent (in the first half of 1936) in the ratio of net profit after taxes to total proceeds in manufacturing as a whole.[8]

GOVERNMENT-FAVORED INDUSTRIES

The expansion that has taken place in the postwar economy of Japan is, of course, general. Agriculture as well as manufacturing, transportation along with service industries in general, have all shared in the recovery and subsequent expansionary processes. But as a matter of government policy, special emphasis was given to four industries, namely, coal mining, iron and steel, electricity, and marine transportation. Such a bias in policy is patently shown in the allocation of government funds for new-equipment purposes (see Table 2). Whereas retained profits of the four favored industries occupied about one-fourth of the total retained profits in each of the years 1952, 1953, and 1954, 60 to 90 per cent of government funds were allocated to them. The government further directed private financial institutions to favor the four; thus, here again, the proportion advanced to the four was disproportionately high. Within the four favored industries the emphasis has shifted slightly in the course of past ten years. At first, coal mining was considered to be the major bottleneck, and a greater part of government funds was siphoned into it. Then from about 1948 the electricity industry began to receive greater favor, soon to be replaced by marine trans-

[6] Economic Planning Board, *Showa 30-nendo Nenji Keizai Hokoku* ("Annual Economic Survey for Fiscal Year 1955") (Tokyo, 1956), p. 97.

[7] The ratio of capital consumption allowances to total proceeds was 3.5 per cent in the first half of 1954 as against the interest-cost ratio of 3.6 per cent. In some industries, such as fabricated metal products and marine transportation, the ratio of interest cost to total proceeds has been nearly as high (6.8 and 8.5 per cent, respectively, in the first half of 1955) as the ratio of wages and salaries to total proceeds (7.6 and 10.7 per cent respectively in recent years). See The Bank of Japan, *Honpo Shuyo Kigyo Keiei Bunseki Chosa* ("Analysis of Financial Statements of Main Industrial Corporations in Japan"), Tokyo, 1956.

[8] *Showa 30-nendo Nenji Keizai Hokoku* (cited note 6 *supra*), p. 97.

TABLE 2—SOURCES OF INVESTMENT FUNDS FOR NEW EQUIPMENT (NET)

(In billion yen)

FISCAL YEAR	TOTAL		RETAINED PROFITS		GOVERNMENT FUNDS		FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS		NEW STOCK ISSUES AND DEBENTURES	
	All industries	Four major industries	All industries	Four major industries	All industries	Four major industries	All industries	Four major industries	All industries	Four major industries
1952	529.5	233.1	211.5	55.0	99.4	61.6	98.7	69.6	123.8	46.9
1953	674.7	261.3	280.2	63.7	114.4	82.7	151.9	71.7	126.3	43.0
1954	543.5	215.4	283.5	69.4	88.4	70.5	83.5	46.5	88.2	28.8

Source: Economic Council Board, *Showa 29-nendo Nenji Keizai Hokoku* ("Annual Economic Survey for Fiscal Year 1954") (Tokyo, 1955), pp. 58–59 (Appendix) and Economic Planning Board, *Showa 30-nendo Nenji Keizai Hokoku* ("Annual Economic Survey for Fiscal Year 1955") (Tokyo, 1956), p. 48 (Appendix).

portation. And lately, the iron and steel industry has been receiving increasing attention for modernization of its plant and equipment.

GENERAL INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION

In this way, some industries were favored by the government and some were not. But all branches of manufacturing production made notable progress through the Korean War boom and even afterwards. If we take as base the last preindependence year, 1951 (a boom year), the index of manufacturing production stood in 1955 at 65 per cent higher, and a rise in the indexes of individual branches of manufacturing was general though somewhat uneven, for example, 52 per cent in metals, 27 per cent in machinery, 28 per cent in ceramics, 19 per cent in lumber and wood products, 48 per cent in textiles, 126 per cent in chemicals, 37 per cent in rubber and leather products, 98 per cent in food and tobacco, and 126 per cent in printing.[9] Mining, on the other hand, has remained more or less stationary over the past four years, while generation of electric power has risen by 32 per cent.[10]

The rise in output of this order is remarkable enough. But the expansion in capacity of various branches of production has also been of unusual magnitude. The Korean War gave the first impetus, and between March 1950 and March 1951 the combined index of manufacturing capacities rose by 17.7 per cent. And the rise has continued, in the following year, by another 17.0 per cent and thereafter by approximately 10 per cent each year. Thus in September 1955 the index stood at 192.4, which means that manufacturing capacity as a whole almost doubled in five and a half years—an achievement which is rare for a country already well advanced in industry like Japan.[11] Individual industries made varied progress. Some of the new industries, such as chemical fibers and petroleum process-

[9] Based on indexes compiled by Economic Planning Board.

[10] Based on information supplied by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

[11] Capacity indexes made use of here are those compiled by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and published in Bureau of Research and Statistics, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Tokei Bunseki* ("Statistical Analyses"), No. 9 (February 1956), p. 40.

ing, expanded their capacities manyfold. But even in established industries like cotton spinning, chemical fertilizers, and rolled steel and cement, the rate of expansion in capacity—123.3, 67.6, and 95.1 per cent respectively over the five years and a half[12]—bespeaks the vitality with which the economy went ahead.

REVIVAL OF MONOPOLIES

The government measures of promotion of industries were, of course, not confined to investment funds advanced to key industries. Subsidies in one form or another have been provided to different industries. Typical was a law passed by the National Diet in 1953, to subsidize the interest payments by shipowners on loans for shipbuilding from the city banks above a stated minimum rate of interest (5 per cent per annum), with a view to strengthening the shipowners' competitive power. Since the prevailing rate of interest at the time was 11 per cent, the measure implied that the government would cover the equivalent of 6 per cent in interest payments by subsidies. At the same time, the government promised to indemnify 30 per cent of any loss incurred by city banks in the latter's loans for shipbuilding.

Specific measures of this kind have been numerous in the last few years. But probably the most important move by the government vis-à-vis business in the postindependence period was the steps taken to mitigate some of the restrictive aspects of monopoly control which came into effect during the occupation period. Prewar Japan was noted for her peculiar monopoly structures called "zaibatsu," which used to control a wide range of industrial and business activities under a hierarchical system of family ownership. After Japan's defeat, the occupation authorities took the stern measure of dissolving them, under the directive of the President of the United States which favored "a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry."[13] In accordance with this directive, a number of steps were taken by way of severing former zaibatsu ties, such as the dissolution of zaibatsu headquarters and the elimination of control over enterprises by zaibatsu families. But these were not considered enough, and a directive was issued again by the Far Eastern Commission in June 1947 requiring a program of deconcentration. Subsequently, a law was passed by the National Diet called the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power Law (December 18, 1947), which was designed to prevent the revival or creation of monopolies. Thus, for a moment, it appeared that the days of monopolies were over in Japan. But as time has gone on:

> . . . the companies formerly associated with the former *zaibatsu* have succeeded in regaining leading positions in the principal industrial branches despite various restrictions. After April 1952 when the Peace Treaty became effective, these restrictions were removed or moderated, and following the lifting of the ban on the use of former company names, trade marks, etc., the former names were revived again.[14]

Reassembling of zaibatsu firms


The antimonopoly law was soon revised[15] to permit a manufacturing cor-

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.

[13] Quoted from the President's directive, September 6, 1945. Cf. T. A. Bisson, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), p. 239.

[14] Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute, *Mitsui-Mitsubishi-Sumitomo: Present Status of the Former Zaibatsu Enterprises* (Tokyo, 1955), p. 19.

[15] The revision came into effect as of September 1, 1953.



THE RECONSOLIDATION OF MITSUI BUSSAN

poration to hold shares of competitive firms, to raise the upper limit of shareholding by financial institutions from 5 to 10 per cent, again to legalize the system of interlocking directorates, and to widen the scope of cartels that could be formed. The revision was taken advantage of immediately, and cartels of all forms came into vogue. But the most important move which gathered momentum after the Peace Treaty was the consolidation and realignment of firms along the former zaibatsu lines. Typical was the reassembling into one of all the trading firms which had once been splintered from the old Mitsui Trading Company (Mitsui Bussan). A chart, "The Reconsolidation of Mitsui Bussan," depicts the process of this reassembling.

Another wing of major zaibatsu firms in Japan before the war was Mitsubishi; their trading firm took a smoother course in reconsolidation and re-established the old Mitsubishi Shoji Company on July 1, 1954. It is noteworthy

TABLE 3—DEGREES OF CONCENTRATION[a] IN FIFTEEN MAJOR INDUSTRIES

INDUSTRY	1937	1949	1955	1955 COMPARED WITH 1937	1955 COMPARED WITH 1949
Coal mining	44.4	43.7	40.3	−	−
Rolled steel	66.4	68.3	65.5	−	−
Electrolytic copper	98.2	92.8	85.9	−	−
Shipbuilding	86.8	56.5	49.6	−	−
Aluminum	100.0	100.0	100.0	0	0
Caustic soda	72.0	56.1	56.7	−	+
Ammonium sulphate	78.0	57.6	60.9	−	+
Superphosphate	59.5	61.7	59.3	−	−
Plate glass	100.0	100.0	100.0	0	0
Cement	54.3	70.7	66.8	+	−
Cotton yarns	42.8	57.2	31.9	−	−
Rayon yarns	53.4	94.1	91.7	+	−
Staple fiber	53.8	59.0	52.1	−	−
Cotton fabrics	22.8	31.0	12.6	−	−
Flour milling	77.2	44.6	58.9	−	+

[a] Measured in terms of the proportion which the combined output of the five biggest firms occupies in the total output of the industry concerned.

Source: The Fair Trade Commission (Kosei Torihiki Iinkai).

that in so doing they increased their capitalization fourfold and allocated twenty million of the new shares deliberately to the related Mitsubishi firms. The result was the concentration of share ownership in the hands of Mitsubishi-related firms to the extent of 31.1 per cent, compared with the pre-reorganization concentration of 10.4 per cent.[16] At the same time, the new Mitsubishi Shoji Company came to hold significant parts of shares of Mitsubishi-related firms, such as Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Marine Transportation Company, New Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Company, Mitsubishi Chemical Company, Mitsubishi Electric Equipment Manufacturing Company. In this manner, the interlocking in ownership of the former Mitsubishi zaibatsu firms is becoming rapidly as close as it was before the war.

[16] See Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo ("Institute of Political Economy") (Ed.), "How Has the Mitsubishi Shoji Changed after the Merger?" (in Japanese), *Nihon Keizai no Ugoki* ("Trends of the Japanese Economy"), No. 21 (Tokyo, May 1955).

These examples show quite typically the manner in which the old zaibatsu firms are fast becoming reassembled. The process has not yet come to a stop; and it appears that to a greater degree than before the war the banks, each bearing the name of historically established zaibatsu, have come to occupy the central position by taking advantage of the unusually high degree of dependence of manufacturing firms on outside financial capital.[17]

DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION

From the *qualitative* standpoint the revival of zaibatsu monopolies is of major importance in postindependence Japan. But *quantitatively*, the role of big firms and the position of medium-

[17] Cf. Seijiro Usami, *Nihon no Dokusen Shihon* ("Monopoly Capital in Japan") (Tokyo: Shin Hyoron Sha, 1953), p. 166; also, Nihon Tokei Kenkyujo ("Japan Statistics Institute") (Ed.), *Waga Kuni Shuyo Kigyo no Keiretsu Yushi ni Kansuru Chosa* ("A Study on 'Tied Financing' of the Major Firms in Japan"), Tokyo, June 1955.

TABLE 4.—RELATIVE DIFFERENTIALS IN PER-EMPLOYEE PROCEEDS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF FIRMS, 1951–54

(Per-employee proceeds of firms employing 500 or more in each year as 100)

SECTORS WHERE THE GAPS WIDENED BETWEEN 1951 AND 1954

INDUSTRY	FIRMS EMPLOYING 4–29				FIRMS EMPLOYING 30–99			
	1951	1952	1953	1954	1951	1952	1953	1954
Chemical and related industries	82	68	70	67	126	107	119	112
Machinery manufacturing	45	42	44	40	68	62	65	60
Electrical machinery & equipment	48	45	44	42	76	65	61	60
Printing, publishing and allied industries	41	33	31	29	65	51	50	48
Transport equipment manufacturing	46	43	34	40	60	56	50	57

SECTORS WHERE THE GAPS BECAME NARROWED BETWEEN 1951 AND 1954

INDUSTRY	FIRMS EMPLOYING 4–29				FIRMS EMPLOYING 30–99			
	1951	1952	1953	1954	1951	1952	1953	1954
Food and kindred products	29	32	29	33	47	52	48	56
Textile manufacturing	34	43	43	39	53	66	68	61
Primary metal industries	36	40	42	45	59	60	62	78
Paper and allied products	19	20	21	22	42	41	43	45

Source: Calculated from Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Kogyo Tokei Hyo* ("Census of Manufactures"), Tokyo, annual issues.

and small-sized firms could be considered as an independent topic.

The degree of concentration may be measured by taking the proportion of the combined output of the five biggest firms to the total output of the industry concerned. The latest study conducted by the Fair Trade Commission (Kosei Torihiki Iinkai) reveals that in the fifteen major industries selected the degrees of concentration are, with a few exceptions, lower in 1955 than in the prewar year of 1937, and furthermore, again with a few exceptions, generally lower in 1955 than in 1949 (see Table 3). Although the historical trend revealed in Table 3 is downwards as regards the degree of concentration, it must be observed that in most industries the degree of concentration in 1955 is 50 per cent or higher and, in general terms, not very much different from what it was in prewar times. In fact, if we extend our research into a greater number of industries, we find that the trend towards concentration has been intensified in the last few years, especially in those industries where the competitive struggle for survival has been severe, notably in such industries as flour milling and ball-bearing, penicillin, watch, hemp, and television manufacture.[18]

It has been suggested by Michael Kalecki [19] that the degree of monopoly might be approximately measured by a ratio of total proceeds to prime costs (raw materials plus wage payments). If we take such a ratio [20] for the manufacturing industry as a whole in Japan, it has risen from 121.3 per cent in 1950 to 122.5 and 124.5 per cent in 1953 and 1954, respectively.[21] The upward trend has been greatest in printing, publishing, and allied industries and machinery manufacturing industries (other than electrical machinery). These figures may be taken to suggest that the degree of monopoly, in a sense, has been on the rise in Japan's manufacturing industries in the past several years.

[18] See *Nippon Keizai Shinbum* ("Japan Economic News"), April 23, 1956, p. 2.

[19] *Theory of Economic Dynamics* (New York, 1954), Chap. I.

[20] In current Japanese statistics it is not possible to separate out wage payments from the total of cash payments to employees as a whole. Here the latter is used in place of the former as an approximation.

[21] Calculated on the basis of statistics given in Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Kogyo Tokei Hyo* ("Census of Manufactures"), Tokyo, annual issues.

Relative differentials in per-employee proceeds

Another measure of concentration, that of concentration of production in firms employing five hundred or more, does not give us so conclusive an answer as the one above to the question of the trend towards monopoly. Table 4 presents, for each year between 1951 and 1954, relative differentials in per-employee proceeds, taking as 100 those in the firms employing five hundred or more. If they widen in the course of these years, it may be said that the relative advantages of big firms have risen and the situation has been favorable for further concentration. An inspection of the table, however, shows that the widening referred to has occurred in only about half of the industrial sectors enumerated and that the trend has been not at all uniform in this regard. In other words, in several industrial sectors the smaller firms have gained relatively on the biggest firms in gross productivity, although it is quite true that the sectors which narrowed the differentials in this manner have been mainly those where the relative productivity position of smaller firms in 1951 was below the average.

PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT

Since the change in relative differentials in per-employee proceeds between bigger and smaller firms depends a great deal upon the extent to which they differ in the degree of processing they do within their own plants, the evidence shown in Table 4 is not conclusive enough to enable us to judge the real trend in the concentration of manufacturing industries in recent years. What appear to be more conclusive are the facts that, on the one hand, *wage* differentials between bigger and smaller firms have widened in recent years and, on the other, relatively more people are squeezed in smaller firms now than a few years ago.

Taking as 100 for each year the average wage rate in manufacturing firms employing 500 or more, we find that for middle-sized manufacturing firms (each employing 100 to 499) the average wage differential has widened gradually but steadily from 15.8 per cent in 1950 to 22.3 per cent in 1954, and that for smaller manufacturing firms (each employing 30 to 99) the similar differential has widened from 32.7 to 40.1 per cent over the same period.[22]

Such a trend, no doubt, is a reflection of the widening gap in productivity between the bigger firms and the smaller. It is quite natural that over the past six years of general prosperity accompanied by most active renewals and expansions in manufacturing capacity the firms which commanded large financial resources should have had a distinct advantage in improving the productive efficiency of their plants. They have been able to expand their output without adding extra labor force.

[22] Based on the Ministry of Labor, *Maigetsu Kinro Tokei Zenkoku Chosa* ("Monthly Labor Statistics Survey").

Thus, taking manufacturing industries as a whole, we find that the gross output rose by more than 100 per cent over the past six years without adding greatly to the labor force in regular employment. On the face of it, this fact should be cause for rejoicing. But, unfortunately, the Japanese economy is beset with the perennial problem of oversupply of people who seek work; and the energetic introduction of labor-saving machinery, while improving the competitive position abroad of Japan's manufactured products, creates at the same time internal strains on the employment front. Even with the annual rate of growth in manufacturing production of 10 per cent or higher, sustained over the past six years, the additional labor forces that could be absorbed in manufacturing have been in the order of 200,000 per annum against the total natural increase in labor force of almost a million each year. According to the annual labor force survey,[23] a greater and greater part of annual additional labor forces seem to have entered the sector of distribution and finance,[24] which is not directly concerned with the production of material goods. Furthermore, within manufacturing itself, new labor force seems to have been absorbed generally into smaller firms, as can be seen in Table 5, which summarizes the shift in the distribution of employees by size of firms between 1951 and 1954.

TABLE 5.—DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES IN MANUFACTURING BY SIZE OF FIRMS

(In percentages)

ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING	1951	1954
1–29	43.0	43.9
30–499	34.0	34.8
500 or more	23.0	21.3
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Computed from Statistics Bureau, the Prime Minister's Office, *Jigyosho Tokei Chosa Hokoku* ("The Census of Establishments"), 1951 and 1954.

SUMMARY

In reviewing the internal industrial and business trends in Japan during the past several years, it may be said in summary that the expansion of manufacturing production, in particular, sustained by a high rate of investment, has been most notable, that in the process the government took a more active part than in the prewar normal years, and that the trend towards concentration has reappeared with an accompanying revival of zaibatsu structures. Through the record of continuing prosperity, however, it has become all the more patent that the economy faces the difficult task of creating a sufficiently large number of openings in productive employment to absorb an ever increasing labor force without prejudice to the improvement in productive efficiency which is the sine qua non of the Japanese economy as its exports face competition in the world market.

[23] Conducted by the Statistics Bureau, the Prime Minister's Office.

[24] In 1952, 260,000; in 1953, 360,000; and in 1954, 540,000.

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Problems in Foreign Trade and Investment

By JEROME B. COHEN

THE key to future Japanese economic expansion, to industrial growth and higher levels of output, income, and employment, lies in foreign trade. Lasting increases in Japanese economic activity are likely to be achieved only by export expansion. In food, in textile fibers, in metals and minerals, in coking coal, and in petroleum, Japan must look abroad for the satisfaction of her basic minimum requirements.

Japan's dependence on imports of staple foods rose from 9.6 per cent in 1934–36 to 22.5 per cent in 1955. All the bauxite, raw cotton, raw wool, rubber, and phosphate rock she requires must be brought in, as well as the bulk of iron ore, zinc, salt, and a third of the needed coking coal. Domestic production provides less than 10 per cent of her crude oil requirements. Therefore the problem of essential supplies for her economy, and indeed of economic viability itself, becomes essentially a problem of foreign trade. Japan must sell enough abroad to pay for essential imports. She must generate a volume of exports large enough to cover necessary foreign exchange expenditures.

TRADE AND PAYMENTS, 1952–55

In the postwar decade thus far Japan has been unable to maintain such a balance, although the results for 1955 are promising. Her balance of payments and her economy have been sustained by 2 billion dollars of United States aid in the first half of the postwar decade and by more than 3 billion dollars of United States special-procurement and troop expenditures during the latter half. During 1953, for example, while Japan's export trade stagnated, imports expanded under the domestic consumption boom, with a resultant commodity trade deficit of $945 million. This deficit balance was offset in large part by United States special-procurement and troop expenditures of 750 million dollars, leaving a net payments deficit of 194 million dollars.

In 1954 the trade deficit was reduced, by curtailed imports and expanded exports, to 429 million dollars, which was more than offset by special-procurement expenditures of 596 million dollars, producing a payments surplus of 100 million dollars. Results for 1955 were even better. Exports expanded sharply, imports were held in check, and as a consequence a small trade surplus of 106 million dollars was attained. Special-procurement expenditures of 557 million dollars by the United States enabled Japan to achieve a balance of payments surplus of 494 million dollars, the highest in the postwar decade.

Despite this excellent showing in 1955, Japan is still a long way from achieving its prewar trade status. In the mid-thirties, Japan's trade amounted to approximately 5 per cent of total world trade. It was cut to a fraction of 1 per cent in the immediate postwar years but has since been climbing. For 1955, Japan's share of world imports amounted to 2.8 per cent, her share of world exports to 2.4 per cent. Thus Japan is about at the halfway mark in her effort to restore her position in international trade. The fact that the ratio of exports to national income, which before the war was 18 per cent, is now about 9 per cent tends to confirm this estimate. On a volume basis, Japanese

exports in 1955 were but 50 per cent of 1937 levels, while imports reached 76 per cent of prewar volume. When it is remembered that over the same period Japanese population increased from 70 million to 89.2 million, the lag in Japanese exports becomes even more apparent.

OBSTACLES TO TRADE EXPANSION

The Japanese propensity to inflation has, during much of the postwar period, effectively priced large sectors of Japanese exports out of world markets. The postwar inflation, which carried Japanese prices to three-hundred times the prewar level, was not taken in hand until Mr. Joseph Dodge went to Japan in 1949, but his successful efforts were offset to a large degree by the outbreak of the Korean War and its inflationary impact. The increase in industrial activity and employment, resulting from special-procurement expenditures, spread through the economy with multiplier effects, raised incomes and purchasing power, and culminated in the domestic consumption boom of 1953. Producers, finding it easier and more profitable to sell at home, made less effort to sell abroad, precisely at a time when greater foreign exchange earnings were needed to pay for increased imports.

The rise in prices, the unfavorable trade trends, and the resultant loss of foreign exchange alarmed the authorities, and in the fall of 1953 the Yoshida government instituted a tight money policy. Bank of Japan lending rates were raised, the budget was trimmed, government investment expenditures were cut sharply, and as a consequence deflationary pressures began to be felt. The impact on trade was apparent. Between 1953 and the beginning of 1956, exports rose 800 million dollars, or 69 per cent. As a consequence of this export expansion, of prosperous and expanding world trade, and of the record rice crop which made it possible to hold imports in check, Japan in 1955 attained its best postwar trade and payments position.

Production costs

A second factor obstructing Japanese export expansion is the high production cost of metals and metal products. This category of goods is becoming increasingly important in Japan's export pattern. Although total textile exports (722 million dollars in 1955) still exceed exports of metals, metal products, and machinery (657 million dollars), the latter have been rising while the former have been declining as a percentage of total exports. Metals and products rose from 14 per cent of total exports in 1936 to 27 per cent in 1954 to 33 per cent in 1955, while textiles and products fell from 53 per cent of total exports in 1936 to 42 per cent in 1954 to 37 per cent in 1955. Japanese cotton textile exports were one of her few major export commodities to show a decline in 1955, 9 per cent lower than the postwar record exports of 1954. This decline, which occurred despite a sharp increase in shipments to the United States, was due in part to the fact that world trade in textiles was 11 per cent less in 1955 than in 1954, and also, in part, to restrictions on exports to Indonesia, which in the past has taken as much as a third of Japan's total cotton fabric exports.

The changing pattern of Japan's exports reflects, in part, structural changes in Japanese industry. Before World War II, the textile industry was by far the largest sector of manufacturing industry, accounting for about 29 per cent (in 1936) of the value of factory production and for 38 per cent of total factory employment. Today, the textile industry employs fewer workers than it did twenty-five years ago, although factory employment as a whole has more than doubled.[1] The industry is now smaller, absolutely as well as relatively, than before the war.

This changing structural pattern creates a problem for the Japanese in international trade because, in contrast to their lower and advantageous cost position in textiles, in the production of iron and steel, metal products, and machinery they have higher costs than their major competitors. The Japanese Economic Planning Board estimates that Japan still needs twice as many man-hours to turn out a ton of pig iron or a ton of steel as Britain. Thus, despite the relatively lower wage rates in Japan, the labor cost per ton is substantially greater, both for pig iron and for steel, than the British cost. The explanation of the 55 per cent increase in Japanese exports of iron and steel in 1955 seems to lie in the fact that, although their prices continued to be above those of other suppliers, Japanese producers could offer earlier delivery dates or other special trade arrangements. Over the longer run, however, to cope with exports from West Germany and Britain, Japanese prices will have to become competitive, as the advantage of more immediate delivery is lost.

Trade barriers

Japan is not a member of any trading bloc or currency area. The restrictions of such trading blocs and currency areas thus hit Japan with special force. Lack of convertibility of major currencies is a particular obstacle. Hedged in by customs restrictions, tariff barriers, quotas, boycotts, inconvertibility, protectionists' outcries, antidumping laws, exchange controls, and so forth, Japan has been attempting to balance trade bilaterally, in contrast to the multilateral pattern of her prewar trade, a situation which tends to lower the volume of trade. Indonesia is a case in point. Japanese exports to Indonesia fell from 123 million dollars in 1954 to 68 million in 1955. Indonesia's inability to pay, either in goods or in foreign exchange, caused Japan to reduce its exports.

Japan's accession in 1955 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade will help to lower some of the barriers against Japanese exports, but the fact that fourteen countries, including the United Kingdom, India, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Brazil, invoked Article 35 of the GATT agreement, preventing the application of the agreement in trade between Japan and themselves, is a serious limitation.

In the case of the seventeen GATT countries, including the United States, Canada, West Germany, and Pakistan, with which Japan concluded bilateral pacts, GATT membership gives assurance of most-favored-nation treatment and provides a forum to facilitate, on a reciprocal basis, the co-operative resolution of problems which may arise out of the treatment these nations accord Japanese trade. The seventeen GATT agreements negotiated resulted in guarantees of continued favorable or improved tariff treatment for specified Japanese exports to countries which accounted for about 40 per cent of Japan's 1953 export trade.

TRADE RELATIONS

Not only did the United States sponsor Japan in GATT and itself conclude a bilateral trade agreement with her; it also used its bargaining power to aid Japan by granting concessions to six other countries so that they in turn would grant additional concessions to Japan. In its bilateral agreement with the United States Japan granted concessions on 286 products in 143 tariff

[1] See G. C. Allen, "Industrial Production and Productivity in Japan," *Westminster Bank Review* (London), August 1955, pp. 1–5.

classifications—on about 50 per cent of total Japanese imports from the United States, involving 396 million dollars. The concessions which the United States granted to Japan, however, affected only 131 million dollars of Japanese exports to the United States.

With the United States

In commercial trade with the United States, Japan has in the postwar period incurred large deficits, which were financed by abnormal United States dollar outlays for aid, special procurement, troop expenditures, and so forth. Warned that United States special-procurement outlays were to be tapered off gradually, the Japanese have been attempting to narrow the gap in their trade with the United States both by shifting to other import sources and at the same time by increasing and diversifying exports to the United States. This policy met with considerable success in 1955, though in good part the success was due to two nontrade factors: the large increase in rice production in Japan (the rice crop was 30 per cent greater than in 1954) and the sale of United States foodstuffs under surplus-disposal terms for yen rather than for dollars.

The 1954 trade gap of 469 million dollars was narrowed to 103 million dollars in 1955. In 1955 Japanese exports to the United States rose 81 per cent over 1954 and imports from the United States were 21 per cent lower than those of 1954. Although the export expansion seemed large percentagewise, Japanese exports to the United States amounted to only 3.8 per cent of total United States imports, a much smaller share than Japan's prewar proportion (8.7 per cent in 1931–35). Indeed percentagewise Japan is not an important factor, at present, in United States foreign trade, taking but 4.7 per cent of United States exports and providing 3.8 per cent of total United States imports. On the other hand, the United States is a dominant factor in Japanese foreign trade, supplying 31 per cent of Japanese imports and taking 24 per cent of Japan's exports (in 1955).

The sterling area

Before World War II Japan had a balanced trade with the sterling area. Approximately 20 per cent of both Japan's exports and imports was in sterling. In the postwar decade, Japan's sterling-area trade has been more erratic, being subject to stringent sterling-area controls and dependent upon periodic negotiation and renewals of sterling trade and payments agreements. In 1953, for example, because Japanese export prices rose above world prices and because Japan had accumulated a substantial sterling surplus, the sterling bloc imposed severe restrictions on imports from Japan.

As a result, Japanese exports to sterling countries fell from 596.5 million dollars in 1952 to 313.9 million dollars in 1953, while imports rose. Consequently a 303 million dollar deficit was incurred, the sterling surplus soon vanished, and in due course Japan had to buy sterling from the International Monetary Fund with dollars.

In the negotiations which ensued, Britain agreed to relax restrictions against Japanese imports, a new payments agreement was signed in January 1954, and while Japanese exports expanded, imports from sterling area countries were sharply reduced, with the result that Japan ended 1954 showing a surplus of 155.8 million dollars in its sterling-area trade. Further improvement occurred in 1955 when Japanese exports to the sterling area rose 43 per cent and a payments surplus of 196 million dollars was achieved. By the end of 1955 Japan's foreign exchange holdings of sterling had been restored to 292 million dollars (in contrast to dollar holdings of 911 million).

Southeast Asia

In 1938 the countries of South and Southeast Asia took 15.5 per cent of Japan's total exports. In 1954 they absorbed 27 per cent and for the first nine months of 1955, 23.5 per cent. The area provided 16 per cent of Japan's total imports in 1938, while in 1954 it supplied 18.7 per cent and for the first nine months of 1955, 21.9 per cent.

Apparently, although a material gain in trade with the area has been achieved, the frequently voiced hope that the region would prove the main factor in improving Japan's trade position has not been realized. There are a number of explanations. The purchasing power of the area is low; per capita incomes, while rising in recent years, are meager, even by Japanese standards. In due course, development programs presently under way will increase purchasing power, but the process is likely to be slow, with possible inflation and population increases absorbing some of the gains.

Secondly, the Japanese have had to face stiff competition in export sales to the area, especially from West Germany and Great Britain. Particularly in capital goods and equipment they have been undersold by the Germans, in fertilizers by the Italians, and in some categories of textiles by India. The reparations problem is a third factor which has hindered trade development to a degree. The delay in concluding reparations agreements with Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines, has retarded trade development that would have been more rapid had agreements been reached earlier. No settlement has as yet been reached with Indonesia. A fourth, and very important, restrictive factor is the multiplicity of trade and exchange controls, quotas, lack of convertibility, and newly imposed tariffs designed to protect infant industries which faces the Japanese in South and Southeast Asia.

While these limiting factors have operated to check trade over the past decade, they are likely to be eased in the future. With development of the region and expanding world trade, Japan can hope to capitalize more effectively on the complementarity between the resources of the area and Japan's capacity for industrial exports, a relationship which the Japanese perceived even before World War II.

Communist bloc

Large sectors of public opinion in Japan regard increased trade with the Communist bloc as a necessary and desirable objective; some elements even view it as an economic panacea. What are the facts of the situation? How necessary is Communist-bloc trade to Japan and how likely is it to develop?

Before World War II, mainland China (including Manchuria) was a substantial market for Japanese products, partly as a result of Japanese domination and control as well as investment in Manchuria. Today mainland China (including Manchuria) and the entire Soviet bloc, including the USSR itself, take only 1.8 per cent (1955) of total Japanese exports. In the prewar period Japan sold cheap consumer goods and textiles to China and obtained soybeans, edible oil and oilseeds, coking coal, and iron ore in exchange. In 1955, Japan obtained only 3.0 per cent of its total imports from Iron Curtain countries, including Communist China and the USSR. According to the Customs Division of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, Japan exported 28.5 million dollars to Communist China in 1955 but imported 80.7 million, with a deficit of 52.2 million. Japan's exports to

Taiwan in 1955 totaled 58.4 million dollars; imports amounted to 76.3 million.

Naturally, when the Japanese turn to explore avenues of expanding trade with Asia, many of them think nostalgically of the old China trade. It is hardly likely, however, that, with the state in China controlling foreign trade and in the light of the amazing industrialization goals of the first Five Year Plan, China will want, or have very much exchange, to buy any significant quantity of Japanese consumer goods and textiles.

In view of the huge industrialization effort, in contrast to the minimum agricultural outlays contemplated, it may be that over time China will seek to buy substantial amounts of Japanese capital goods and equipment, but it is difficult at present to see what can be tendered in payment. It is possible to quantify this doubt as to China's (or indeed the entire Soviet bloc's) ability to pay for industrial imports. In a study in the *Harvard Business Review*,[2] George Waldstein took the seventeen leading Japanese imports (for 1951 and 1953) and compared them with Soviet bloc (including Communist China) exports of the same products to the free world. These seventeen key commodity imports accounted for almost three-fourths (72 per cent) of total Japanese imports in 1953. Except for four commodities—coal, soybeans, timber, and oilseeds—the total volume of Communist bloc exports to all Western countries of the items urgently needed by Japan were, in both 1951 and 1953, less than the import requirements of Japan alone.

The four commodities—coal, timber, soybeans, and oilseeds—together in 1953 accounted for 215 million dollars of Japan's imports. This would appear to be the maximum amount which Japan could hope to secure from the bloc unless there were a vast rearrangement of internal bloc trade, with present Chinese exports to the USSR directed, instead, to Japan. Actually, because of existing bloc commitments, especially of Polish coal to the West, a more realistic estimate of imports of the four commodities from the bloc would be about 150 million dollars, or less than 10 per cent of Japan's imports. The broad conclusion that suggests itself, therefore, is that in terms of present ability to supply Japan's import needs, the Communist bloc has little to offer Japan.

[2] George Waldstein, "Showdown in the Orient," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 32 (November–December 1954), pp. 113–20.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN JAPAN

Handicapped by a shortage of capital and moved by the need for replacing obsolete and worn-out equipment with more modern, up-to-date production equipment, Japan officially welcomed foreign capital investment by the passage of a new law in 1950.[3] The results, however, have disappointed the Japanese and left foreign, especially United States, businessmen skeptical.

No substantial amount of foreign capital has flowed to Japan. The total invested in Japan from January 1, 1946, through December 31, 1955, was only 158 million dollars. During the calendar year 1955, the Japanese paid out 11.5 million dollars on the 158 million investment and 16.6 million in royalties and contract payments on the 501 technical-assistance contracts concluded between Japanese and foreign firms. The total of 28 million dollars that the Japanese paid out in 1955[4] compares with new investment of 22 million dollars in 1955. Naturally this excess of payments over receipts is disappointing to the Japanese.

[3] For a translation of this law see U. S. Department of Commerce, *Investment in Japan: Basic Information for United States Businessmen* (Washington, D. C., 1956), pp. 119–26.

[4] Data provided by the Bank of Japan.

The skepticism in United States business circles about the sincerity of Japan's desire for foreign capital stems from the facts that (1) the Japanese seem to prefer foreign grants or loans to foreign equity capital; (2) recently they have either refused or delayed granting approval to a number of proposed financial arrangements; and (3) they have not seen fit to revise their foreign investment law to eliminate the provision requiring seven years to withdraw the principal of an equity investment. The Japanese position, on the other hand, is that (1) they do not wish foreign control of Japanese enterprise and (2) they must protect their foreign exchange reserves and therefore cannot allow unrestricted withdrawal of foreign capital. In view of this impasse, the outlook for any extensive foreign capital investment in Japan is bleak.

CONCLUSION

Japan's international economic position has improved remarkably in the recent past, beyond the expectations of most observers. Present policies of fiscal and monetary restraint, price stability, maintenance of foreign exchange reserves, trade expansion, including reentry into world trade relationships via GATT, rehabilitation, and cost reduction in the heavy goods industries, all are soundly conceived, and, at this writing, appear to be succeeding.

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Labor Patterns and Trends*

By Solomon B. Levine

TO a large extent, Japan's modern economic development was based upon human exploitation and suppression of worker protest. Occupation policy therefore called for deliberate efforts to strengthen the economic status and political effectiveness of the wage earner. SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) enormously encouraged autonomous trade unionism as the chief means for expanding labor's share of national income and securing a voice for the worker equal to management's in setting terms and conditions of employment. Also, the reforms required raising of minimum labor standards in industrial undertakings and broadened the scope and coverage of social security and other protective labor laws.

In certain ways, results have been spectacular. Labor unions, when allowed to exist before the war, embraced little more than 400,000 members at their peak (1936). They were virtually nonexistent at the time of the surrender, but within four years membership mushroomed to almost 7 million. Today, Japan boasts the largest organized labor movement among the non-Communist nations of Asia and the fourth or fifth largest of the free world. Japan's wage and salary earners as a group have made significant gains in the pattern of income distribution. Their earnings at present account for almost one half of the total. Twenty years ago this share was hardly more than a third. In other words, a revolution of phenomenal proportions has been in the making in Japan's postwar industrial relations.

Yet, despite these remarkable developments, the Japanese worker remains in a precarious and insecure position within an uncongenial environment. In the four years since the Peace Treaty, the part trade unions play has begun to crystallize along lines somewhat different from those envisioned when the reforms were initiated. Their effectiveness is limited and their role uncertain.

The purpose of this article is to probe into the major determinants of these features in the current Japanese labor situation, for they are likely to endure in the foreseeable future. To do this, we shall look first at the matrix of the laboring population within which Japanese unionism has taken hold. Then we shall examine the movement in terms of its size, extent, structure, and functions. Finally, we shall offer some speculation about the future of organized labor in the light of its experience during these early years of independence.

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Economic Structure and the Labor Force

Even though considered one of the advanced industrialized nations, Japan is still predominantly agrarian, with nearly half of her 90 million population supported by small-scale farming. Of approximately 41 million persons in the Japanese labor force, more than 41 per cent are found in agricultural employment.

A sharp duality, moreover, characterizes the nonagricultural sector. Alongside modern large-scale industrial and technological operations exist more than 3 million small, almost primitive, enterprises. Both the large and the small are vitally important for employment. Probably one third of the labor force is attached to minuscule business units, none of which employ more than 300 persons. In contrast, a relatively few huge enterprises account for the remaining one fourth. For example, less than 400 factories employ more than 1,000 each, while over 400,000 have fewer than 30.[1] The growth and existence of small operations side by side with the extremely large have long been distinguishing features of Japan's industrialization. The postwar period has seen little change in this tenacious economic structure.

Japan's startling population growth during the past decade has accentuated her basic economic pattern. As home island population leaped from 72 million in 1945 to close to 90 million at present, the labor force necessarily grew apace, expanding more than six million in the same period. Annual increments have been increasing to almost one million per year, as the proportion of older age groups in the population has become greater and labor force participation rates, especially for women, remain relatively high.[2] Obviously, a heavy onus faces Japan to provide expanding employment opportunities. In view of the probability of continued population growth for several decades at least, the situation is not apt to be relieved rapidly or smoothly.

On the other hand, the Japanese economic structure affords amazing resiliency for meeting the employment problem. The huge network of small operations has served to absorb, really to "hide," additions to the economically active population. Official figures place unemployment at a remarkably low level, hardly more than 2 per cent of the labor force at most. Once postwar rehabilitation began in earnest, the number completely out of work dwindled to a bare minimum, with absorption occurring mainly in medium and small enterprises and on farms. Except during the Korean War boom, employment in large enterprises has expanded relatively little and in fact suffered contractions as the result of retrenchment under the occupation-sponsored Dodge Plan in 1949–50 and later the Japanese government's "austerity" program following the Korean truce.

The absorbing power of medium and small enterprises, however, has its economic limits. A large portion of workers in these units is considerably underemployed, if not actually unproductively employed; for the inefficiency of small enterprise is marked and contributions of additional workers are apt to be small indeed, if not negative. Estimates place the number of these workers—the potential unemployed—at six million or higher,[3] that is, at least ten times the number reported unemployed. At the same time, Japan's foreign trade dilemmas call for further reduction of per unit labor requirements, especially among larger enterprises, in order to enhance productivity and cut costs.[4]

[1] *The Oriental Economist*, Vol. 24, No. 545 (March 1956), p. 121.

[2] "The World's Working Population: Some Demographic Aspects," *International Labor Review*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (February 1956), pp. 152–76.

[3] *Oriental Economist* (cited note 1 *supra*), p. 137.

[4] Editor's note. The larger enterprises have been able to expand their output without adding to their labor force. Cf. the article in this issue of The Annals by Shigeto Tsuru, "Internal Industrial and Business Trends," under the subhead "Productivity and Employment." —G. O. T.

THE LABOR MARKET

For employment relations this industrial setting produced two notable implications. First, broad and open labor markets have developed only very slowly. Second, relationships between manager and managed in industry have tended to follow traditional, premodern concepts. Although the effects of the Industrial Revolution have markedly penetrated Japanese life, particularly its material aspects, basic social organization remains tethered to a system which from the beginning provided the means for and purpose of Japan's entire industrializing effort. Thus, labor problems arise in large measure from attempts to reconcile the seemingly ineluctable requirements of this culture with notions of liberal capitalism that accompanied Western industrialization.

The race between productivity and population growth in Japan has been mediated by unusual labor market operations. Unlike the economic development of the United States or Great Britain, in Japan's industrialization labor usually moved within fairly restricted channels. Open labor markets failed to emerge because basic patterns of social organization and the traditional agrarian system were preserved in the process. As a result, workers tended to move only between their "home" base and a specified industrial operation. "Horizontal" mobility—across industries and from one enterprise to another—was infrequent. Also, industrial work was often viewed as temporary, even though lasting long periods of time, and was readily accepted only when assurances were given that relationships in the large factory or commercial undertaking would duplicate security found in the traditional family system. While occupation reforms outlawed flagrant abuses in these arrangements (particularly "labor boss" recruitment), labor market "balkanization" continues to be characteristic.

Methods that grew up to allocate labor within the Japanese economy have been difficult to slough because they are integral to the economy itself. Thus, today, worker mobility in Japan remains relatively restricted despite a growing labor supply. With the great mass of small employing units, workers are readily fitted in and tend to remain permanently fixed in their jobs. Prevalence of family-run enterprises fortifies these strong attachments.

At the same time, particularly in large modern organizations, permanent workers and substantial groups of temporary employees are found side by side. In some instances the latter comprise as many as a third or a half of a given enterprise's work force. Employment of both types allows management flexibility in labor deployment (to achieve increases in efficiency as well as to meet fluctuations in production) without doing violence, on the one hand, to the concept of permanent attachment embedded so deeply in Japanese social organization and, on the other, to the traditional view of temporary entry into industry by those primarily concerned with the family farm or small business.

Although public employment exchanges, extended and improved under the occupation, have gained in importance, little fundamental change in these basic labor market arrangements has been effected during the postwar years. Since the Peace Treaty, moreover, especially as the Japanese economy has been thrown more and more on its own devices to find a way out of the dilemma of too many people and too few resources, notable steps have not been taken which might drastically alter the situation. The alternatives are risky. To subsidize small enterprise runs the risk of impeding capital development of large operations and of fastening workers to occupations even more unproductive than they now engage in. To concentrate capital formation in large units is likely, at least until broader markets are developed, to throw an even greater burden on the small enterprises to absorb the growing labor force and thereby to invite unemployment on a greater scale than now exists. Some balanced approach aiming at enhancing productivity in both sectors simultaneously has been required, but it has tended to preserve long-existing labor market operations.

Composition of the labor force

The composition of the labor force reflects the nature of the Japanese labor market. In contrast to the United States where three out of four work in the paid employ of others, Japan is still far from being a nation of wage earners. Wage and salary employees number about 15 million, but there are also over 10 million self-employed and more than 14 million unpaid family workers. In other words, income derived from nonwage employment remains highly important. This, of course, is to be expected in agriculture, where family work predominates; but nonagricultural industries also have substantial proportions of self-employed and family workers. The allocation of the labor force by type of industry—agricultural, manufacturing, and services (or what is called, in the jargon of economics, primary, secondary, and tertiary)—evidences a similar phenomenon. Japanese industrialization has not been marked solely by emergence of manufacturing. Of even greater importance has been the rise of service trades, in which all sorts of petty enterprise and small operations abound, many operated in conjunction with farming.

Wage and benefit differentials

The remarkable thing about all this is that, despite the handicaps faced by small units, their productive contribution in the aggregate has been highly significant, reflecting the admirable energy and imagination possessed by the Japanese. On the other hand, they offer sharp contrasts to the employment conditions of those who become permanent wage earners in large enterprise. To achieve the latter status means a far greater measure of income security—steadier employment, higher wages, and greater social insurance protection. Wide income and benefit differentials exist. For example, firms employing 200 or more pay wages double those with fewer than 50 employees.[5] But, given the structure of the Japanese economy, the chances of reaching this status for the time being are limited.

A different setting for labor organization

Such a milieu provides a wholly different setting for labor organization from that in most other industrialized nations. The area in which trade unionism can take hold is impeded by the narrow and slow channels of labor markets and the peculiar prevalence of temporary workers. In view of these environmental factors, it is surprising that unionism has been established to the extent it has, but because of this fact, its structure and function are likely to be different from those in other countries.

TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP

Japan's labor movement has yet to recover from reversals suffered during the occupation. SCAP's initial encouragement for unionism was blunted as early as 1947 with the prohibition of

[5] *Oriental Economist* (cited note 1 *supra*), p. 121.

the February 1 general strike. A cautious attitude toward labor led eventually to further GHQ-approved restraints: denial of union rights to government workers (1948), revision of the postwar Trade Union Law (1949), and removal of trade union leaders from positions of influence under the Dodge Plan retrenchment (1949) and the "Red purge" (1950). These measures were thought by many the end of labor's opportunity to assume an important role in the new Japan. They took their toll. From the high point of seven million reached early in 1949, total membership dropped to about 5.5 million during the next two years. Of the 35,000 union organizations that had sprung up, almost one fourth had disappeared by 1951.

Yet, since that time, an element of stability, even some slight growth, has featured the size and extent of the movement. Today membership has climbed back to six million and the number of unions again exceeds 30,000—despite the conservative government's continuation of the restrictive labor policies inherited from SCAP as well as their acquisition of even more power to control labor activities than they were permitted under the occupation (through enactments such as the "emergency strike" law and antisubversive legislation of 1952 and the Coal and Electric Strike Control Act of 1953).

EXTENT OF UNIONISM: THE PROBLEM OF GROWTH

By 1949 the new unions embraced over half the workers considered organizable in Japan's labor force. Six years later the organized proportion had fallen to barely 40 per cent. In part the decline is accounted for by the drop in union membership between 1949 and 1951, but in part also it has been due to expansion of employment in those industrial sectors least amenable to trade unionism. Even then, the extent of Japanese unionism has been highly respectable when compared to the United States organization ratio of 35 per cent and Britain's 45 per cent. In other words, in certain portions of Japanese industry, unionism has been highly tenacious; in others, it has been fleeting; and in still others, it has hardly made a dent.

Early postwar period

The reasons for the initial growth of unions in Japan go far to explain the present incidence of labor organization and also the difficulty of extending unionism beyond present boundaries. After the surrender, workers rushed into unions for a combination of political, social, and economic reasons. Reform was the order of the day. Hundreds of political prisoners, experienced in the prewar radical movements, were ordered released by SCAP, enabling them to become leaders in the new political parties of the left, which the occupation at the time saw as a desirable counter to a resurgence of militarism, ultranationalism, and totalitarianism. Unions became building blocks for these political organizations. At the same time, ingrained habits of conformity to authority were at work. SCAP wanted unions; it was the thing to do. Workers blindly followed without clear conception of their purposes. Finally, the economic chaos of the immediate postwar period produced a rampaging inflation, which drove wage earners to look to unions in hopes of protecting their livelihood. Of primary importance was a widespread paralysis of management, which, threatened by purge and demoralized by the defeat, took little initiative in directing and rehabilitating enterprise. Unions virtually took over managerial functions with little resistence from management itself.

In this phase, then, Japanese trade unionism represented neither the protest of workers against management abuse nor the clear-cut struggle between employer and employee classes that have usually characterized labor movement origins in other countries. Rather, it was a response to exigencies produced by disastrous military defeat and uncertainties of military occupation. Later, when emphasis on reform lessened, when a modicum of economic stability was achieved, and when management's prestige had been restored, the impetus for union growth weakened. As a result, since about 1949 the union movement has been searching for new stimuli.

The original growth of the postwar movement took place mainly among industrial operations where wage earners were concentrated. Although the average local union numbers only two hundred members, the great bulk of the unionists are found in the large enterprises—principally ex-zaibatsu and government-operated units. Unions did not arise from the modest beginnings of a grass-roots movement which gradually gained adherents as the merits of unionism, economic or political, were recognized in day-to-day experience. Organization proceeded on a wholesale, rapid-fire basis.

Differing attitudes in large and small enterprises

As yet trade unionism has not established itself firmly beyond the larger enterprises, where, nevertheless, it has become well entrenched. The reason seems to be that workers in large enterprises, wholly dependent upon the modern industrial apparatus, are conscious of their permanent stake in Japan's industrialization. As a result, they are motivated to make the most of their permanent status in these entities and have discovered that unions can serve as powerful instruments for this purpose. Prior to the end of the war, most workers depended upon employer paternalism and government measures to guarantee their well-being in permanent positions. However, such assurances may not be expected today because of internal developments within management and the changed character of the Japanese state. Trade unionism thus has become a significant line of defense for the workers in the major industrial operations.

These attitudes do not appear to extend to smaller operations, where security may still be sought in family patterns of organization. A high degree of organization has obtained in industries identified with modern economic development: rail, sea, and truck transport; communications, electric power, and other public utilities; the manufacture of iron and steel, electrical products, chemicals; coal and metal mining; banking, public school teaching, and various other government undertakings. But only low rates have been achieved in such traditional sectors as agriculture, fishing, textiles, ceramics, retail and wholesale trade, and construction. Where large and small enterprises exist side by side in an industry—as in textiles and machinery manufacture—the large units are likely to be completely organized, the small almost entirely unorganized.

Considerable lip service and some effort have been given, especially at the national levels of union leadership, to organizing the unorganized in Japan. Aside from obstacles such as a lack of interest among small-enterprise workers, the expense of organizing drives, and the resistance of employer groups, the organized rank and file has given only lukewarm support to the proposition. By and large unionists appear primarily interested in their permanent attachment to enterprises rather than development of a solidified labor movement. Japanese unions are notable for their "sectionalism." Even temporary work-

ers in unionized enterprises do not as a rule gain admission to permanent workers' unions, for their inclusion is likely to weaken the bargaining strength of the permanent groups. Accordingly, organized labor in Japan bears aristocratic earmarks.

STRUCTURE: THE PROBLEM OF UNITY

The rapid growth of the Japanese labor movement after the war masked for some time what has become its principal, if not unique, structural feature —that is, "enterprise-wide," or simply "enterprise," unionism. The term should not be confused with "company" unionism in the pejorative sense, for it merely denotes a form that differs from national, industrial, regional, craft, and other common types of unionism. Lack of unity in the Japanese labor movement may be attributed in great part to this structural phenomenon and may be more clearly understood after reviewing the major developments at the national level.

Sanbetsu and Sodomei

As unions sprang up in shops and factories during the months following surrender, two rival national federations, the Communist-led Sanbetsu [6] and the Social Democratic Sodomei,[7] set forth to provide the principal leadership for a unified movement based upon industrial organization. At their height, Sanbetsu's membership was close to a million and a half and Sodomei's reached one million. Both emphasized political action, but in 1949 Sanbetsu fell to pieces under anti-Communist attacks from both without and within the labor movement. However, although Sodomei received occupation favor because of its moderateness and willing acceptance of American policy, it was able to control but a minor portion of the unions. Political appeal failed. A majority of the unionists refused to affiliate with these supra-bodies.

Sohyo and Zenro

Accordingly, a new attempt at unification came in 1950 with the formation of Sohyo,[8] made up of the Sodomei group, national industrial unions that had defected from Sanbetsu, and a number of "neutral" unions. Its purpose was to shun ideological and political emphases, to concentrate upon developing effectiveness in collective bargaining, and to ally with the then forming International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Although Sohyo succeeded in becoming the leading federation by bringing together about half the union membership, its growth has been slow and its control over constituents notably weak. Because of disagreements over organizational policy, several right-wing units with over 200,000 members pulled out almost immediately and reconstituted Sodomei in 1951. A year later, unions which espoused pure industrial unionism withdrew some 40,000 members to re-establish the so-called Shin Sanbetsu,[9] a body that had originally quit Sanbetsu. By this time, with the issue of the Peace Treaty in the offing, Sohyo leadership, under the direction of Secretary-General Minoru Takano, veered sharply to political issues in support of the Left-Wing Socialists and shunned affiliation with the non-Communist ICFTU. In 1953, important constituents, such as the seamen and textile workers, who supported the Right Socialists, walked out and in the spring of 1954 combined with the Sodomei bloc to establish Zenro Kaigi [10] in rivalry with Sohyo. Today, despite Socialist reunification, these two federations—Sohyo with about three million members and Zenro with approximately 700,000—remain far apart over issues of organizational structure, economic strategy, and political ideology.

These national centers are at best loose confederations. Each strives to be built upon national industrial organizations strongly centralized, but these organizations are in fact also loosely constructed. Sohyo gains its principal adherents from government workers, whose unions have developed their own central co-ordinating council. On the other hand, certain private-industry unions such as the synthetic chemical workers and the coal miners have been strategic within Sohyo. Co-ordinating the interests of these two groups has been difficult. The displacement in 1955 of the anti-Western, pro-Soviet Takano faction from Sohyo's helm and the election of Nehru-type "third-force" neutralists to the principal offices of the labor center were in part the result of this internal conflict. Also, one of the reasons for the defection of the Zenro group from Sohyo was the fear of domination by the government unions. Zenro, in contrast to Sohyo, is composed almost entirely of private-industry workers and, with its autonomous subcenter Sodomei still in existence, has retreated somewhat from industrial unionism.

The national unions

The problem stems from a division of functions between national organizations and enterprise unions, the former absorbed almost wholly in political activity, the latter in economic. An attempt to bridge the two lies in the device of national industrial unions, of which at present there are about eighty-five. In addition, numerous prefectural, regional, district, and interindustry councils have been established to achieve co-ordination among the local units, but compared to the industrial unions, these have been of lesser importance. By and large, the national unions are creations of the trade union centers to serve political purposes rather than the result of attempts by local and enterprise unions to strengthen themselves economically. Where they are the product of the latter, they are likely to be very loose co-ordinating bodies. In either case, their power over affiliates has been extremely weak.

Only about half the national unions are now constituents of national federations, although many of the unaffiliated national unions—which altogether embrace as many as one million members in total—are considered "friendly" to one national center or the other. Moreover, some 12,000 local union units, with about 1.5 million members, belong to no nationwide parent body. While these are small unions for the most part, they include several large organizations which prefer to avoid entanglement in political campaigns sponsored by the national federations or national industrial unions. The existence of large numbers of unaffiliated local unions is symptomatic of the weakness of the national unions.

Enterprise unions

Even though connecting links have been formed among the Japanese unions, the crucial unit of organization is centered in the enterprise. As many as 90 per cent of all Japanese unions are organized on an enterprise basis; the re-

[6] Sanbetsu is the abbreviation for Zen Nihon Sangyobetsu Rodo Kumiai Kaigi (All-Japan Congress of Industrial Unions).

[7] Sodomei is the abbreviation for Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sodomei (Japan General Federation of Labor Unions).

[8] Sohyo is the abbreviation for Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan).

[9] Shin Sanbetsu or "new" Sanbetsu refers to Zenkoku Sangyobetsu Rodo Kumiai Renmei (National Federation of Industrial Organizations).

[10] Zenro Kaigi, or simply Zenro, is the abbreviation for Zen Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi (All-Japan Trade Union Congress).

mainder are divided about equally between craft and industrial organization. Operationally, this means that, for economic purposes, the unions have attempted to match their span of control against that of the managerial entity. In Japan, each modern industrial enterprise, whether privately or publicly owned, has played a distinct and specific role within the economy. Such a development evolved logically in the deliberate industrialization of Japan. While competition existed among the zaibatsu combines, each of their respective operations was articulated in the larger scheme of things as a fairly autonomous unit with its own special traditions, technology, and identity. This legacy of discreteness carried over into the postwar years despite the zaibatsu "dissolution" and attempts to prevent reemergence of cartels. Even among the government operations, where there is a single employer unmotivated by profit, sharp distinctions between agencies are readily apparent. As a result, unionists have displayed an "enterprise" consciousness, as opposed to a craft, industrial, or even working-class ideology. This instrument of enterprise organization has provided unions with effective means to match the power of management; for factors in the labor and product markets have not readily afforded alternative bases of meaningful economic organization among workers.

In itself the enterprise organization is apt to be a cumbersome unit. Although it tends to be highly centralized in contrast to national and regional bodies, it embraces a diversity of interests. Where an enterprise has branch operations, even geographically dispersed, each local is likely to be included. In addition, typically every permanent employee becomes a member whether white collar or blue collar, skilled or unskilled. In many cases it has been difficult to draw the line among those eligible and those not eligible to join because, with permanent attachment the primary objective of the union, little consideration is given to clear distinctions between managerial and nonmanagerial personnel. The usual exclusion of temporary workers, despite the unions' insistence upon the "union shop," also emphasizes this outlook. Moreover, leadership is often provided by the articulate and intellectual white-collar employees, many of whom aspire toward management careers. All of these internal organizational features tend to fortify the preoccupation of the enterprise union with its status in the enterprise rather than with the development of a unified, horizontal trade union movement. This inward orientation, paradoxically, has served to give durability to widespread unionism while remaining a major obstacle to labor unity. In a sense, it represents an adaptation of traditional industrial relationships to a new stage in Japan's economic development.

POLITICAL VS. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The functional division reflected in the structure of the Japanese labor movement helps to explain why one hears so much about its political tendencies. However, its political effectiveness does not seem to match its vociferousness. Relations between various union groupings and political parties are treated elsewhere in this issue; [11] here, it may simply be noted that exclusion of the supra-bodies from the hard core of economic activity carried on by enterprise unions has probably tended to increase their attention to political issues. Such a functional division implies not that the two parts of the Japanese labor movement are incompatible but that their links are weak. Enterprise unions, affiliated or not, do give a modicum of support to the national organizations

[11] In Cecil H. Uyehara, "The Social Democratic Movement."

simply out of recognition that political achievements favorable to labor serve to fortify their own effectiveness.

This support, however, has been sporadic and largely cathartic, but seldom self-sustaining. Large-scale, politically and ideologically inspired "struggles," such as the campaigns of 1952 and 1953 for revision of antilabor legislation, the great coal and electric strikes of 1952, and the numerous, and seemingly inevitable, seasonal wage drives each year, have been examples of the failure of the national federations and industrial unions to capture the unswerving adherence of the enterprise unions. Instead the latter seem to utilize these occasions for their own particular purposes and then to drop out as individual settlements are reached.

The heavy stake in protecting the workers' permanent attachment to the enterprise provides a core of issues which, depending upon business conditions, internal methods of management, and inroads of ideological appeal, shunt enterprise unions back and forth between high and low pitches of activity. Thus, attempts to reduce the regular work force or the refusal of management to grant wage increases or benefits on an across-the-board basis to permanent workers are likely to arouse an enterprise union to considerable militancy. Otherwise, long periods of quiescence may ensue. The nature of this type of union-management relationship is reflected in the records on labor agreements and disputes.

Collective bargaining

Collective bargaining as the central theme of Japanese industrial relations has made only gradual progress. Agreements are usually concluded, as would be expected, on an enterprise basis, and multiple-employer bargaining, with the notable exception of the maritime industry, has failed to persist where begun. Although use of written agreements has gradually increased—so that at present they cover 60 per cent of the unions eligible to conclude them and over 3.5 million workers—as yet they are not the principal focus of negotiations. Many merely reaffirm what is already provided in law; many are not periodically renegotiated; many do not deal with substantive matters of wages, hours, and working conditions. Numerous tacit, or at best verbal, understandings exist—often made on an *ad hoc* basis. In general, the situation reflects inexperience but also a lack of interest on the part of the unions in any but a few broad issues, because of the wide diversity of groups they embrace and the still heavy dependence upon employer paternalism. Within this context, use of well-developed grievance procedures, which in American and British experience have been the heart of union-management relations, has not been prominent. Much is left to informal conciliation and mediation and the use of traditional go-betweens. As a result, no new hard-and-fast body of industrial jurisprudence within the shops has clearly taken shape.

Except for 1952, when the prolonged coal and electric power strikes took place, labor disputes have been moderate in number, scope, and length when compared to other industrialized nations. Usually between 1,000 and 1,500 known disputes occur each year, but only about half involve strikes, lockouts, slowdowns, or "production control" (seizure and operation of the plant by workers). Many have political purposes and do not represent bona fide collective bargaining failures. Even then, conflicts have been highly amenable to conciliation and mediation, as indicated by many successful accomplishments of the tripartite labor relations commissions established by the Trade Union Law in 1946. In the Japa-

nese context this is not to be taken as a sign of vigor and maturity in collective bargaining but rather as a failure of the institution to have become firmly established. Thus, although political activity has not come to dominate Japanese unionism, neither has collective bargaining assumed a truly central position.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The limited role which trade unions have come to play in Japan is likely to persist for some time. Even though the principal problem facing the Japanese labor movement is one of finding a basis for unity and growth, the chances of solution are remote in the foreseeable future because of the magnitude of what is involved. Underlying factors relating to the nature of industrial structure and labor markets are not apt to prove amenable to rapid change, no matter what bold steps are taken to enhance productivity, short of some technological revolution at present unknown. Until such basic conditions are ameliorated, unionism is likely to retain its present dual nature of political vociferousness at national levels and economic inwardness at enterprise levels, with only tenuous links between the two.

On the other hand, there is some reason to suppose that in the long run Japan will be able to escape from its present economic dilemmas and that industrialization will proceed to stages which would benefit the working population as a whole and permit the growth of a solidified labor movement. It should not be concluded that enterprise unionism in Japan is not, or does not contain the seeds of, an independent labor movement. Although relatively constricted in interests and activity, the enterprise union does appear to represent a step toward worker self-determination, at least for an important segment of wage earners. While fraught with possibilities of management domination on the one hand and ideological subversion on the other, it has its own staying power, to be enhanced as favorable environmental factors emerge.

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Post-Occupation Conditions in Rural Japan

By JOHN D. EYRE

SINCE the restoration of national sovereignty in 1952, the general organization, orientation, and tenor of Japanese agrarian life have been a continuation, with only minor modifications, of the pattern inherited from the occupation. The post-occupation years have been marked by good harvests, except for a mild decline in 1953, free from political agitation, and not subject to the adverse economic conditions that produced agrarian unrest and misery on a national scale in prewar days. Under the prevailing static and tranquil rural conditions, tendencies for change are difficult to isolate.

Farmers are still poorly organized and economically weak as a group, but they remain numerically one of the most powerful segments of Japanese society. To illustrate, in 1954 the farm population was 38,000,000, or 46 per cent of the total population; the 6,100,000 farm households were 40 per cent of the total 16,500,000 households; and the 18,900,000 men and women farm workers were 43 per cent of the national labor force.[1] Therefore, from the standpoint of these numbers alone, any evaluation of the forces that shape contemporary Japan must include an examination of the present organization of rural village life and of continuing farmer problems and aspirations.

Rural Japan is now an amalgam of older native values, practices, and problems and new elements injected by social and economic reforms instituted during the occupation. Many basic preoccupation social practices have been modified little, and such long-standing dilemmas as the intense human crowding on the land with its unfortunate consequences and the relative insecurity of farm life continue unresolved. Innovations introduced since World War II include the far-reaching land reform, reorganized agricultural co-operatives free of central controls, better farm insurance coverage, more agricultural research and better dissemination of findings through a system of county agents, intensified land improvement and development works, and the encouragement of agricultural improvement associations.[2] Many observers feel that while these innovations will have a lasting impact, they are likely to undergo eventual modification by changing economic conditions and the serious challenge of groups interested in the restoration of more traditional arrangements.

A major difficulty in analyzing current Japanese agrarian conditions and identifying trends for change is that rural Japan cannot be viewed as a single national unit. It is, in reality, a mosaic of farm villages in which each village is a unique compound of social organization, land types, crop complexes, and production techniques. Lowland farming villages, mountain forestry villages, and coastal fishing villages, and the agricultural lands associated with each, form distinctive geographical-occupational groupings having special characteristics and problems. In addition, there are often as many differences be-

[1] Seiichi Tobata, "New Aspects of Agrarian Communities," *Contemporary Japan,* Vol. 23, Nos. 7–9 (1955), p. 573.

[2] These are spelled out in detail in Mark B. Williamson, *Agricultural Programs in Japan, 1945–51,* General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Natural Resources Section Report 148, Tokyo, 1951.

tween villages in any one of these three main types as there are between the types themselves. The Japanese farmer, like the village of which he is a component, cannot be stereotyped. He cultivates varying amounts of land and different crops, and he has corresponding variations in income, social prestige, and influence. Some farmers are prone to follow traditional paths, while others grasp eagerly at new developments that promise greater economic reward. Seen in this light, remarks presented here concerning present rural conditions are not intended as hard and fast generalizations applying equally to all parts of Japan, but as guides to understanding selected features of rural Japan that have local and regional variations.

LAND TENURE SYSTEM

The present land tenure system is the offspring of the occupation's land reform program, which was perhaps the most dramatic and widely acclaimed reform of the postwar era. Land reform can involve different measures of varying scope and intent. The Japanese program aimed at a more equitable distribution of farmland among existing farm households; it was also specifically designed to strengthen the size and importance of the independent owner-farmer group and to enable remaining tenants to secure more of the fruits of their labor through liberalized tenancy conditions. Land for redistribution was purchased from landlords by the Japanese government and was sold to cultivating tenants at low cost. Further, ceilings were imposed on land holdings to prevent subsequent concentration of land in the hands of landlords.

The land reform achieved its land redistribution objectives rapidly and without serious hitch, thanks to the laudable efforts of participating American and Japanese administrative personnel and excellent farmer co-operation. Within two years after the inception of the program late in 1946, the land tenure picture was altered from one dominated by landlords and hard tenantry conditions to one dominated by owner-operators working in an improved economic order. Tenant-operated properties shrank from 46 to 12 per cent of the cultivated land, while the owner class rose to 70 per cent of all farmers in contrast to a prereform 36 per cent. Landless tenants dropped to only 4 per cent of the total farmer group. Absentee landlordism was abolished, and the payment of rentals in kind was replaced by cash payments at stipulated low rates for the 12 per cent of the farmers still in tenant status. Some idea of the immensity of the undertaking and the remarkable speed in achieving purchase and resale targets is shown by the total of 30,000,000 land transfers handled by the agricultural commissions charged with the local administration of the program.[3]

Current indications

The Japanese government has not taken any steps to modify the tenure arrangements established by the land reform. Yet, at the same time, neither has it displayed any enthusiasm for additional agrarian reform measures beyond those already in effect. With the strong comeback made by conservative forces in politics and the accelerated modification of occupation reforms in sectors other than agriculture, the future of the present land tenure system

[3] A detailed and somewhat emotional account of the land reform by one of its American administrators is Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., *Japan—Land and Men* (Ames, Iowa, 1955). This study complements his earlier *Japanese Land Reform Program,* General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Natural Resources Section Report 127 (Tokyo, 1950). See also John D. Eyre, "Elements of Instability in the Current Japanese Land Tenure System," *Land Economics,* Vol. 28, No. 3 (August 1952), pp. 193–202.

is far from certain. Expressing a view held by many Japanese specialists, one qualified observer has remarked that with continued conservative political control in rural Japan, "it is undeniable that there will be a retreat from the general principles of the land reform program as it is actually operating."[4]

At the village level, locally elected agricultural commissions handle land transfers sanctioned by law, see that land regulations are obeyed, and arbitrate land disputes. Their operations to date have been effective despite the fact that their membership is heavy with former landlords and other farmers unsympathetic to continued controls over land transactions and tenure conditions. Few illegal land transfers have been reported. Apparently, agricultural land is too unattractive as an investment under existing rental, tax, and rice-delivery controls to risk involvement. Some local threats to land controls have developed because of the inability of agricultural commissions to cope with land issues in urban fringe areas. There are either administrative or legal provisions for the transfer of farmland to urban uses, but commissions sanction the transfer without further check to see if the lands are used for the purpose stipulated or remain in farming. Such a situation may encourage a more widespread laxness in land administration in other areas.

There is a small-scale but continuing shift of agricultural land from the possession of a small, poor farmers to that of medium and large farmers. Transfers are carried out through legal channels, and the total holdings of the purchasers are kept within land ceilings. However, this minor trend does show that some individuals who gained land under the land reform are unable to retain it because of economic pressures and that the larger owner-farmers are in a favored position to expand their holdings to a better management size. The latter group also owns the 1,200,000 acres of land still cultivated by tenants. It can be argued that the landholding strength of the owner-farmer group that is the high light of the present system could enable a rapid return to landlordism if land controls are slackened in the future. The land reform apparently did not change farmer attitudes concerning the desirability of land accumulation under conditions favoring its profitable manipulation.

[4] Sakae Wagatsuma, "Post-War Agricultural Land Reform in Japan," *Primo convegno internazionale di diritto agrario,* Vol. I (Milan, 1955), p. 756.

CHANGES IN RURAL HIERARCHY

Beyond its primary land redistribution aim, the land reform was conceived by its American architects as a major means to an eventual "democratization" of village life. Explained in an official occupation publication, the reform was "a hard-headed attempt to relieve farmers of the burden of an oppressive landlord system, which fostered antidemocratic social relations and counteracted efforts to increase agricultural production."[5] Considered as a move to revolutionize rural social and political, as well as economic, relationships, the land reform was not a complete success, yet the fact that it did bring change to the existing social structure is important in itself. Traditional relationships between tenant and landlord were broken down, the status and privileges of the landlord were reduced, and the owner-farmer group was established in a position of rural leadership. However, while effecting such changes, the land reform did not disrupt entirely the power structure that dominated rural Japan and it failed to provide solutions to some critical rural problems.

[5] Hewes, *Japanese Land Reform Program* (cited note 3 *supra*), p. 93.

Perhaps the most far-reaching social change made was the reduction of the landlord class, the prereform power elite of the rural areas. Prior to the land reform, landlords extracted both economic and social services from their tenants in exchange for patronage and protection. They were also the political masters of the rural village. It is estimated that there were about 1,700,000 landlords, of whom 1,000,000 were nonfarming and 700,000 were owner-farmers.[6] Acreage leased was small, usually less than ten acres, but with the shortage of farmland it enabled the landlord to maintain his exalted status. Landlords owning more than a hundred acres were relatively few, perhaps only 2,000 in number, and were concentrated in northern Japan. Among the small landlords, the nonfarming group suffered most from the reform, while owner-farmers who retained large acreage lost some of their economic footing but have been able to continue as village leaders.

The fate of the former large landlords has been somewhat different, for although this class suffered the largest land losses it had other economic mainstays to reduce the shock and to help regain lost fortunes. Most of this class were residents of cities and towns instead of the rural villages and approached land as an investment. With the loss of their agricultural properties, members of this class now derive income from the sale of timber and charcoal from forest holdings, which were not included in the land reform, and from accelerated activity in banking, stock manipulation, and commercial and industrial interests. There are many degrees and variations in their economic resurgence, but the trend is toward their regaining the social, economic, and political power lost with the land reform.[7] Many exercise strong influence on political activities in prefectural assemblies and the National Diet, so that their potential role is one of agitator in the higher echelons of government for restoration of agrarian conditions resembling those that were so profitable to them a decade ago.

[6] Nobuo Danno, "Japanese Agriculture After the Postwar Land Reform," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January–March, 1955), p. 112.

Forest Holdings

The failure to carry out a forest reform of the same comprehensive nature as the land reform has created what many consider the main weakness of the present land tenure system. Slightly more than one-half of Japan's forests are owned by private individuals, many of whom were formerly large agricultural landlords. Thus, even after the loss of its agricultural property, the former landlord class continues to control an important economic area in rural Japan. This is a critical matter in mountain villages, where farmland and forest are inseparable in the farm economy. Forest land is needed by the farmer for firewood, charcoal, compost materials, and forage for farm animals. Accordingly, undisturbed forest ownership enables present forest owners to exercise an unchallenged domination over mountain village life. Economic and social conditions in the mountain villages are reputedly the most depressed in Japan; and dearth of economic opportunity and isolation from urban centers reinforce the strangle hold held on village affairs by the large forest owners. Under such conditions, traditional social arrangements and land tenure practices are least disturbed and the impact of postwar agricultural legislation least felt.

[7] For a case study of the economic revival of the powerful Homma family of northern Honshu, see John D. Eyre, "The Changing Role of the Former Japanese Landlord," *Land Economics*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 1955), pp. 35–46.

There is little prospect that a forest redistribution program will be attempted, despite the obvious benefits it would bring to mountain village farmers. The political influence of private owner interests in prefectural assemblies and in the Diet is strong enough to block forest reform proposals. In this opposition, private interests have a powerful ally in forestry circles within the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. There, officials administer the national forests, which occupy 32 per cent of the total forested area, mostly in central and northern Honshu and Hokkaido. The national forest interests are loath to see any of the forests under their jurisdiction released to the poorer management practices of private owners or transferred from under their control for conversion to agricultural land. In contrast to the immediate postwar years, well-organized private and government forestry interests have increased in strength at the expense of agricultural interests. From a technical standpoint, forest reform would be expensive, involve many difficulties, and be time consuming to execute. Incomplete records and maps make a complete national survey of forest land necessary before any detailed reallocation of holdings could be undertaken. Also, a postwar boom in lumber and charcoal prices has sent forest land values spiraling.

Private and national forest interests are also hostile to further agricultural land development using scrub or forest land. Only after overcoming strong opposition in 1946 was a section added to the land reform law empowering the government to purchase tracts of nonagricultural land capable of conversion to food production. Land so obtained was intended for expansion of existing farms and for the establishment of new farm households on their own land. Strong forest interests in agricultural commissions blocked some proposed forest purchases, and many other purchase plans have been forestalled by court cases contesting the legality of the move. The national forest managers have been equally reluctant to release forested areas for agricultural use, even in the period of desperate food shortages immediately after the war. Once the nonagricultural acreage remaining from the land reform purchase program is exhausted, there is little possibility that additional land can be transferred from forest use. As regards the wisdom of further conversion of forest land to agricultural use there is much to be said on both sides, but the issue does point up a current problem in Japanese agriculture.

Fragmentation of Farm Holdings

The shortage of agricultural land continues as the chief underlying cause of landholding inequities and related social conditions in rural Japan. There simply is not enough farmland to supply all farm households with satisfactorily large holdings from the 15,000,000 acres under cultivation. While the land reform tried to allocate this inelastic resource more equitably among farm families, the reapportionment was only achieved by creating many fragmented properties of uneconomic size.

About one-half the Japanese farm households till less than one acre, or a total of one-fifth the cultivated land, and are unable to produce enough food for family needs. Such households live under the threat of perpetual debt and the loss of their small properties to larger and more prosperous landowners in times of economic distress. Lands of this farmer group are also generally of lower quality and are less efficiently managed than those of the larger farmer. Surveys made by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry show that

the only salvation of many small farmers is to seek employment outside agriculture. Out of the total farm households, slightly more than 3,000,000, or about one-half, spend more time and labor working off the farm than in agriculture. About 70 per cent of farm households operating less than one acre are classified in this category of part-time farmers. Thus, about one-half the farm populace has gained little social or economic benefit from the land reform and, by operating in a depressed economic state without hope of obtaining more land, creates serious village social and economic problems.[8] The remainder of the farm households have enough acreage to meet family food requirements and, in some cases, to accumulate a profit from farm operations. Members of the larger owner-farmer group are in the best position to increase their agricultural production and to boost their incomes.

Japanese rural areas were already overcrowded before World War II, and since then they have had to accommodate repatriates returning from the lost empire overseas, urban dwellers bombed from their homes, and new branch families established by younger farm sons. The resultant saturation of farm population has given rise to conflicts between legal and traditional inheritance practices. Under revisions made in the Civil Code during the occupation, equality in inheritance for all offspring is stipulated. However, in actual practice, the eldest son still generally inherits the family property, since further fragmentation of farmland would spell economic disaster.

Younger sons

The alternative facing younger farm sons is to stay on the farm as underemployed workers in a subordinate social position with no hope of eventually securing property or to migrate to the city in search of employment. There are some family pressures to stay at home because of the need for extra labor at planting and harvest, despite enforced idleness during the rest of the year. The younger sons who seek employment elsewhere leave permanently or get outside jobs on a seasonal basis. During the winter agricultural slack season, many younger sons work as fruit pickers, construction gang workers, forest hands, or unskilled labor in other areas. Such labor does not pay enough to permit savings, but it does free the younger sons from total dependence on the family and gives them some freedom from family controls.

A stream of other younger sons moving to the city in search of employment has been responsible, in part, for the accelerated urban growth of the past decade. To illustrate, in 1950–55, Tokyo grew at an average annual net rate of 350,000 people, of whom three-fourths were migrants from the rural villages and towns of other prefectures.[9] With the Japanese economy expanding too slowly to absorb all of the rural overflow, the population and employment problems in both rural and urban areas can be expected to grow in seriousness.

Land improvement works

Land development and improvement works have been pushed during the past decade as a means of increasing food production and providing land for the surplus rural population. However, results have not been encouraging. New agricultural lands have been expensive to create, are generally of lower productivity than existing farmlands, and are too small in total acreage to provide relief from land hunger. Land improvement works improve irrigation and drainage facilities and raise land productivity but do little to increase farm acreage. Finally, a discouraging trend is that cities are now expanding more rapidly on former farmland than new farmland is being added. Lands lost to the city are generally high quality paddy, while lands reclaimed are of inferior quality and unirrigable.

[8] Statistics quoted in Japan FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] Association, *Agriculture in Japan* (Tokyo, 1953), p. 31.

[9] Unpublished statistics obtained from the Statistics Section of the Tokyo Municipal Government in 1955.

RURAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The Japanese farmer has enjoyed greater prosperity during the past decade than during any period of similar length in modern Japanese history.[10] Just after World War II, severe food shortages and the interruption of normal food distribution caused by the bombing of Japanese cities enabled the farmer to sell or barter his foodstuffs at inflated black market rates. It was while the farmer had this unusually large income that the land reform was carried out, so that many farmers were able to rid themselves of debt, purchase farmland under the land reform, make house repairs, and better their living standards in general. Between 1947 and 1950, relatively favorable food prices and benefits derived from the new economic order were offset in part by rising production costs. The Korean War brought another mild farm boom, only to be followed by a gradual downswing in the agricultural economy.

Rural economic conditions are now relatively stable, with the farmer neither uncommonly poor nor uncommonly prosperous. However, the small- and medium-farmer groups are caught in an increasingly tight financial squeeze created by rising production and living costs and an unchanged farm income. Members of these two groups, or about two-thirds of the total farm households, will be the first to experience hardship if rural economic conditions worsen. They have little chance to save money, cannot obtain more land with which to bolster their income, and must pay increasing prices for farm equipment and materials while government-controlled rice prices keep a main part of their income constant. Heavy postwar taxes are a financial burden. In the case of former tenants who are now small landowners, taxes and increased production costs have left them not much better off than they were before the land reform. Government loans and crop insurance provide some short-term relief, but government appropriations for farmer supports are still too small to provide the sort of assistance required.

The agricultural co-operatives, reorganized under occupation auspices on a voluntary-membership nonprofit basis, are important additions to the financial organs serving rural Japan. The main function of the general-duty agricultural co-operatives is as a clearinghouse for transactions involving the farmer and the national government. Here the farmer delivers his requisitioned rice, collects his rice receipts, applies for and receives government loans and aids, purchases fertilizer and farm supplies, and may deposit his savings. More specialized co-operatives handle the processing, shipment, and marketing of specialty products. The present co-operatives are a big improvement over the prewar government-controlled organs, which were organized to further national, not farmer, ends. However, the operating capital and loan funds of most co-operatives are still inadequate, and spirited merchant competition has attracted some business from among the co-op-

[10] For source materials concerning past and present agrarian conditions, consult Norinsho Norin Keizaikyoku Keizai Kenkyushitsu ("Economic Studies Office, Agricultural Economic Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry"), *Nogyo Keizai Kankei Bunken Shu* ("Bibliography of Materials Relating to Agricultural Economics"), Tokyo, published annually since 1949.

eratives' membership. There is a current trend toward reduction of the number of co-operatives through consolidation, in order to reduce overlapping services and overhead.

A brief taste of what rural Japan may expect on a vastly expanded scale in the event of serious crop reduction or rural depression was experienced in the fall of 1953. A relatively light crop decline in northern Honshu brought considerable farmer distress and showed the narrowness of the economic base on which so many farmers operate. Even the small income losses caused by the crop decline brought a sharp increase in applications for government aid, and government offices were bombarded with demands for special disaster grants for northern farmers. Some repercussions of the crop decline were felt in the cities in the form of temporary increases in the price of black market rice.

RICE CONTROLS AND THE FUTURE

The Japanese government continues to control the purchase and distribution of rice through crop delivery and rationing systems. Farmers are required by law to sell stipulated amounts of their rice production to the government at a fixed price, with higher incentive prices paid for amounts delivered in excess of the quota. The rice is then rationed to consumers at the rate of fifteen days' supply each month. Continuation of the government controls over rice is favored in some farmer circles because of the steady income they provide in place of the violently fluctuating prewar rice prices. Other farmers, however, feel that marketing and price controls have prevented farmers from profiting fully from the bumper crops and good market conditions of the past decade and have deprived them of the opportunity to make adequate provision for possible future adversity.

There is continuing, partially organized, farmer pressure on the national government to increase rice delivery prices. However, such demands have been countered thus far by the opposing pressures of urban groups, who are anxious to preserve the present rationed rice price. In many instances, the farmer turns to selling his extra rice on the black market as a solution. Farmers in villages within easy reach of large cities count on profits from black market rice sales as a regular part of their agricultural income. While there has been much talk of decontrolling rice, there appears little prospect of such a drastic move at present.

Farmer protests concerning low rice prices suggest that if rural interests are challenged sufficiently in the future an aggressive farm movement could develop. The limited interest shown currently in such an organized agrarian protest probably stems from farmer satisfaction with the general conditions of rural life developed during the occupation period. Properly organized under enlightened leadership, a farm movement could strive for greater governmental recognition of rural problems and possible solutions, and it could influence legislation dealing with the organization of agriculture.

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Social Stratification and Mobility: Some Political Implications*

By ALLAN B. COLE

COLD war and the shifted balance of power in Eastern Asia since 1947–49 have caused anxiety concerning the degree of Japan's vulnerability to revolutionary pressures. All Japanese governmental agencies of control continue to be in conservative hands but more than this is required of a viable socio-polity. Proposals for revising Japan's democratic Constitution have been advocated from the right especially, but also from the left. Any such trend would surely influence the tensions which almost inevitably exist in such a complex, industrialized society. Since Japan has more protection against foreign Communist pressure than did the landlocked Republic of Czechoslovakia, it is probable in the long run that the national orientation will be more determined by such problems as the development of international trade and the opportunities for mobility upward and downward between social strata. The latter factor tends to mitigate social stresses and to encourage a more politically stable and energized society.

INTENSIFIED POSTWAR MOBILITY

In order to encourage the development of a nonaggressive, democratic Japan, planners of occupation policies emphasized the importance of redistributing economic and political power among various social classes. Thus, the imperial institution was pruned to legitimizing symbolism. The nobility of heredity and of imperially recognized wealth and talent was disestablished. The military services ceased to exist, and so there temporarily disappeared not only their officer groups as such, but also those formerly important ladders of mobility for second and third sons of peasant, petty middle class, and military families.

Purges of conservative and chauvinist leadership made way for thousands of "new faces" in politics. Many officials from the Diet and central bureaucracy down to village headmen were at least temporarily barred from authority. Zaibatsu families were removed from decisive economic power, and a widespread shift of managerial personnel was required.

In the countryside, the landlords were weakened, and small proprietors became numerically predominant. The tenant class was drastically reduced in size and agrarian discontent was alleviated.

Industrial laborers were encouraged to organize, and quickly they linked political with economic demands. Repressive agencies and other institutions which had bulwarked the former oligarchy were abolished. Bureaucrats had to behave somewhat more like civil servants rather than like members of a class ruling on behalf of the Emperor. Financial and legislative power came to be exercised by the people's more freely elected representatives.

* For a fuller, though still concise, treatment of the topics discussed in this article, see the same writer's booklet: *Japanese Society and Politics: The Impact of Social Stratification and Mobility on Politics,* Boston University Studies in Political Science, Boston: Department of Government, Boston University, 1956. The opportunity to study these problems in Japan during 1952–54 was made possible by research fellowships from the Fulbright program of the Division of Exchange of Persons, Department of State, and from the Ford Foundation. However, only the author is responsible for the interpretations here presented.

There was at first marked downward mobility of Japan's elites. Those with more peacetime functional validity have recovered more rapidly and fully, though in an altered situation. The prestige of the former nobility lingers, but its remnants are today more than ever found in the professions, in business, and in the bureaucracy.

Military officers of all services have fallen even more drastically in the social scale. Some were reduced to farming and to menial occupations, while more fortunate ones entered corporations in managerial or advisory capacities. Some have become active in revived veterans' organizations, and since the depurges a few have been elected to public offices. With some difficulty, because of lowered military prestige, others have been recruited for high ranks in the new Defense Forces. Japan's economic weakness and reduced relative power among Asian nations raise doubts as to the scope for revival of military roles domestically as well as in foreign affairs. The days when the military had direct access to the Emperor, could force the resignation or modification of cabinets, and could shape foreign policies seem to be past. Although conservative politicians seldom if ever assert the principle of civilian supremacy, neither they nor the elites of business forget the recent past or would relish the return of military dictation and pressure for national economic planning and controls. Meanwhile a generation is growing up largely without military experience and inclined to be critical of militarism and of its partial revival.

The new elites

To the extent that a vacuum was left by the disestablishment of these once powerful groups, it has been filled by three intimately related elites: the managers and financiers of large economic enterprises, top bracket bureaucrats, and conservative politicians—especially those of national standing. Big business groups are economically and politically the most powerful circles in Japanese society today, but they and their associations cannot manipulate the conservative parties to the degree that some leftists assert. The zaibatsu families proper have markedly dwindled in power. Energetic, shrewd, and usually well-educated managers have assumed economic leadership; many of them are also active in politics. They tend to be less aristocratic than their predecessors, and the popular impression is that rigorous conditions have also encouraged them to be less guided by moral principles. Their own explanations of motivation, however, do not stress profit but rather public service and their quest for distinction.

The most extensive and intensive mobility occurred before the occupation ended in 1952. It is difficult to describe specifically changes since the recovery of national sovereignty, for such social trends are normally more discernible over longer periods. In general, the freeing of former elite groups resulted in their partial resurgence, to a swing back toward—but not fully back to—the former pattern of economic and political power, and to the consolidation of individual statuses by efforts to make their stratal attributes more homogeneous and to defend recent gains.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BUREAUCRACY

Since Professor Tsuji has treated political aspects of the bureaucracy in an earlier article in this issue of THE ANNALS, only a few social high lights need be mentioned here. In the first place, democratization has lessened but not ended the formidable centralization of Japanese government. Japan's topflight bureaucrats are therefore conscious of wielding great powers. Relatively few of them were dislodged by purges, and, because Japanese administrations were not seriously interrupted by the occupation, there was no sudden rise in bureaucratic employment after resumption of sovereignty. It is often pointed out that prevailing Japanese experience has stressed close relations between government and business rather than relatively free enterprise. Scarcity of capital since the war, especially before 1951, has enhanced the financial power of governmental economic administrations. There has been some growth of responsibility on the part of bureaucrats, who are now more dependent on the Diet for appropriations. And there has been some broadening of educational channels for recruitment. The continuous impact of bureaucracy on the universities has also somewhat diminished.

Bureaucracy is a functional class. In terms of complexly defined general statuses it includes a number of subclasses: the highest bureaucrats plus their closest administrative associates; middle-ranking functionaries and professional experts; lower-middle-class clerical workers (the "little soldiers"); and less skilled maintenance staffs. These hierarchies compare in recruitment, rank, rewards, prestige, and power with those of large-scale companies. Section and bureau chiefs often behave like intermediate bosses, while the "army" of clerks in governmental services, corporations, and administrative offices commonly displays the fatalism of people who feel like impotent cogs in somewhat impersonal mechanisms.

Bureaucracy in Japan as elsewhere is by nature instrumentally compliant with the prevailing political forces. In times past, Japanese bureaucrats have actually shaped primary policies, and during World War II the greater degree of central planning and controls played into their hands. But the shift of legislative power to the Diet has caused more of them than ever to forge their way up in party circles. Reformist parties, which have had brief or, since 1948, no share in power, have had little appeal for bureaucrats except that many of the unionized and unorganized clerical workers and officials of low and middle ranks vote for them. There is a tendency, however, for bureaucrats—who may have been somewhat radical in university years—to wear into conservative grooves as they mount the official ladders.[1]

URBAN MIDDLE STRATA

The greater complexity of urban as compared to rural social stratification is readily apparent from the following table of proportional distribution of occupational groups. Strata composing the urban middle class have been grouped and totaled.[2] Because of paternalism and hierarchy in the Japanese family system and its many projections, observers need to modify Western clichés about the support of de-

[1] In fact, in such a swiftly changing society, the attitudes of older age groups repeatedly show correlations with political conservatism and cultural traditionalism. The average age of party leaders mounts as one moves from left to right of the political spectrum. The early manhood of most of Japan's present conservative party leaders occurred before and just after the end of the Meiji reign, when oligarchy had already become consolidated.

[2] These statistics do not clearly distinguish the middle elements in rural communities from those in medium- and large-size cities. However, an indication of their size since the land and associated reforms of 1947–49 is seen in the fact that some 87 per cent of Japanese farmers became owner-operators, or chiefly such, with less leased land. Subsequently their numbers have slightly declined, and it should be remembered that, especially where landholdings are so tiny and traditional social relations so strong, more is required than redistribution of land to encourage rural middle strata.

PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED POPULATION NATIONALLY AND IN THE SIX BIG CITIES, 1950 (1952)

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS	NATIONAL [a]	6 BIG CITIES [a]	SAMPLE SURVEYED IN 6 BIG CITIES (1952) [b]
Professionals and Technicians	4.6%	7.0%	8.1%
Managers and Officials	2.0	4.1	18.4
Clerical and related	8.5	16.9	15.6
Merchandisers	8.4	15.8	8.0
Total Middle Strata	23.5%	43.8%	50.1%
Agrarian	47.9	5.1	2.1
Mine and Quarry	1.1	0	0
Transportation	1.2	2.3	3.7
Craft and Industrial Workers	40.0	71.0	26.9
General Labor	4.0	6.9	3.9
Service	4.0	8.7	4.0

[a] It will be noted that percentages in the first two columns exceed 100 per cent. This is because persons (for example farmers and other seasonal workers) who had more than one occupation were multiply listed.

[b] The percentages in the third column do not reach 100 per cent because some respondents were considered to be nonemployed.

Sources: For data in the first two columns of the table, Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, *Kokusei Chosa Hokoku* ("National Census Reports"), Population Census of 1950, Vol. III, Part 2, Results of a ten per cent sample tabulation; for data in the third column, "Report of a Sample Survey of Social Stratification and Mobility in the Six Large Cities of Japan" (mimeographed; Tokyo, December 1952), p. 12, Table 2 (hereafter abbreviated as "Six City SS-M Study").

mocracy by middle elements. Nevertheless it is from sectors of these groups that significant support is derived. Organized labor and white-collar workers may be more spectacular in prodemocratic demonstrations, but the characteristic attitudes of the urban proletariat include marked acceptance of authority as well as of political radicalism.

In 1952, approximately 32.3 million gainfully employed Japanese were estimated to have been of voting age, the rest of some 46.77 million persons eligible for suffrage being composed of housewives and other types referred to for census purposes as "nonemployed." [3]

However, the latter tend to share the social statuses of their families. In the accompanying table, the right-hand column shows the occupational distribution of a sample composed of 899 males in Japan's six metropolitan areas whose social mobility and class identities were studied by the Research Committee of the Japan Sociological Society in 1952.

According to criteria applied by a board of experts, less than 9 per cent of those in the third column were identified as belonging to the upper class; over 60 per cent were recognized as middle class; [4] and just over 29 per

[3] In 1954, 34.73 million persons of voting age were gainfully employed, and the total number of eligible voters was approximately 48.2 million. The actual number of voters in 1955 was 37.33 million.

The number of persons eligible for suffrage has gone up, according to Tokyo newspapers on election day, July 8, 1956, to 50,298,101—a figure almost too specific to be quite accurate! The total labor force in December 1955 was approximately 41,410,000, while those not in the labor force amounted to 19,840,000.

[4] This middle group was subdivided into slightly more than 18, 23, and 19 per cent in upper, middle, and lower-middle substrata, respectively.

cent were judged to be in the lower class.[5] "Middle class," of course, is in relation to Japanese society.

Occupation and political alignment

Turning now to a carefully conducted survey of social attitudes by various occupational groups, based on a random sample from districts of Tokyo in 1952, the findings will be seen to have significance for political behavior.[6] Well-conceived questions were used to ascertain degrees of political radicalism or conservatism as well as tendencies toward authoritarianism. The managerial group showed the highest combination of conservatism and authoritarianism. Artisans (who are conditioned by the apprentice system, usually work in small paternalistic shops, and are among the foremost "carriers" of traditional attitudes and values) were the highest in authoritarian tendencies. We have mentioned the ambivalence of factory workers, inclined toward political radicalism yet tolerant of authoritarianism. Students showed the most radicalism and the least authoritarianism, in part because they are in youthful revolt against authority. In both respects, professional workers were the most moderate of a medial group, which included slightly more conservative-authoritarian merchandisers and clerical workers.

Occupational identification tends to be associated with the most homogeneous and telling attributes of general social status. In proceeding to discuss other characteristics of Japan's middle strata, be it noted that other determinants, such as prestige, esteem, education, income, style of living, and influence over the behavior of others, are compounded in the identification of class membership. And when a society is in rapid flux, inconsistency of such components on the part of individuals and families is common. With this reservation, it is safe to state certain generalizations.

In the first place, the Japanese middle class, though large relative to society as a whole, is limited in its independent security in a country where population presses heavily on slender resources. Moreover, in a culture noted for feudalistic survivals, statism, and concentration of modern economic power, the middle strata suffer further disadvantages. In terms of economic ownership, the middle-class pyramid is skewed, having a massive base of petty shopowners and an elongated peak composed of large-scale entrepreneurs, whom we have treated among the elites. Middle-size enterprises are relatively few in number. These and smaller interests are often connected with larger firms by subcontracts, but many of them resent the advantages of larger companies and clamor for ampler access to credit and other facilities. This friction helps to explain why a minority of owners of small and middle-size businesses support reformist parties, particularly the right wing of the Social Democrats; but the wage and other labor poli-

[5] According to two systems of self-identification, respondents to interview questionnaires were distributed as follows:

	PER CENT		PER CENT
		Upper &	
Capitalist	9.5	upper middle	4.5
Middle	24.2	Middle middle	25.3
Worker	66.3	Lower	41.3

Not all respondents were willing to identify themselves in the categories in the right-hand column. "Six City SS-M Study" (cited in Sources of table, *supra*), p. 17, Tables 11, 12, and p. 52, Table 59a.

[6] Kotaro Kido and Masataka Sugi, "Shakai Ishiki no Kozo—Tokyoto ni okeru Shakaiteki Seiso to Shakai Ishiki no Chosa Kenkyu" ("A Report of Research on the Structure of Social Consciousness—Social Stratification and Attitudes in Tokyo"), *Shakaigaku Hyoron* ("Sociological Review"), Vol. 4, Nos. 1–2 (January 1954), pp. 74–100, especially p. 80.

cies of these parties repel most entrepreneurs.

Small factory and store owners have been called the "bosses of Japan's social microcosms" and the "non-commissioned officers of civil society," [7] because of their paternalistic relations with employees and the role they played in former Fascist trends. Rarely do they initiate political movements, but a program which enlists their adherence can attain far-reaching influence.

White-collar workers

White-collar workers are strategically placed in governmental and private agencies from the standpoint of group action. Being literate, politically aware, and fairly class conscious, they have become highly organized. This is true of occupations which in the West are often not extensively unionized. For example, the Japan Teachers Union, claiming 547,000 members, has been radical in its political action. Many of its rank and file show high tolerance for authoritarianism and conservatism, however. Teachers in Japan are on the border line between professional and white-collar work.

Intellectuals

Much has been said about the radicalism of Japan's intellectuals, because they are so prominent in the adult communication of ideas; but seldom is it pointed out that many professional types are moderately conservative. Professional workers tend to feel vested interests in special skills, a feeling which militates against egalitarianism. Many Japanese intellectuals, however, are not directly involved in profit-and-loss relationships and problems, and higher education has led them to keen interest in politics, to awareness of modern movements, and hence to bitter criticism of vestigial feudalism. They are more capable than others of theoretical and abstract thinking; and they tend to reflect their cultural heritage in their sense of responsibility, in their identifications of political with moral principles, and in the ingredients of their nationalism. Surveys have found them to be more sanguine than other groups about the application of intelligence to societal problems. Members of the *interi* (intelligentsia) are often motivated by ambition for public distinction, but they commonly feel frustrated by governments which use them as experts but permit them little if any influence on the formulation of national policies. These factors, and the momentums developed under the formerly oppressive state, help to explain intellectual radicalism. Many intellectuals enter the bureaucracy, while others emphasize revolutionary reformism. Having rather high prestige, but often low incomes and poor prospects for employment, they commonly sympathize with labor. In causation, however, middle-class radicalism differs in many ways from workers' socialistic protests against low status and other disadvantages.

[7] Masao Maruyama, "The Ideology and Movement of Japanese Fascism," *Japan Annual of Law and Politics*, No. 1 (1952), pp. 95–128, especially section 5 entitled "Social Exponents of the Fascist Movements."

URBAN WORKING CLASS

As industrialism matures, a gradually increasing proportion of the urban labor force is recruited from the offspring of workers and from petty middle-class families. Population pressure and underemployment in rural areas, however, still cause second and third sons (and many daughters) of farmers to seek temporary, seasonal, or regular urban employment. Those with little or no capital usually become "industrial peasants" or sedentary laborers; those who are able to attain more education and a start in some enterprise commonly enter the urban lower middle class. Unless they are able to graduate from universities or technical colleges, they cannot enter the management of large corporations and can at most climb to the shop position of foreman. Acumen, thrift, and energy can, however, earn them proprietorship of small and middle-sized enterprises. Coming from traditional areas, where the solidary family system and patron-client relationships are still strong, they tend to be rather docile under paternalistic employers.

Classes never operate as such politically, but rather their members seek to promote common interests by instrumental organizations. One of the greatest sociopolitical changes in postwar Japan has been the growth of a freer and rather militant labor movement, which has become a new ladder of mobility, both within unions and federations and in the field of labor politics. Not only have workers become more class conscious and politically active; labor leadership has risen in the movement and has become less dependent on intellectuals. Articles in this issue treating organized labor and the recent Social Democratic movement have indicated how unions and federations are articulated with reformist parties. Here it will suffice to explain that the more leftist and politically active unions are mostly composed of workers in large-scale industries and in governmental services, administrations, and monopolies; moderate or conservative unions tend to be organized in smaller-scale enterprises (where both employer and labor bossism and paternalism are stronger) and in certain industries which employ many women or which involve workers who feel vested interests in their skills and prosperity. Personal leadership, rivalries, and historic momentums also influence affiliation with the major federations on the left and right of the labor movement. Unavoidably the cleavage in the Social Democratic party, which was superficially reunified in October 1955, is structured in the labor movement.

The common linkage of radical political action with economic demands is impelled by the potent role of government in the economy and by the relatively low status and incomes of workers who face concentrated private power in the more modern sectors of production. Dr. Levine and certain Japanese interpreters of labor problems have also stressed a functional explanation.[8] They emphasize that most unions are organized on the basis of enterprises, and that local union officials usually handle economic bargaining, leaving political strategy to the headquarters of the national federations. Aside from widespread Marxist ideology, especially among the leaders of leftist unions, the officers of labor federations tend to justify their positions and try to coordinate their affiliates by mobilizing for economic and political offensives.

STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Occupation is not in itself a reliable indication of rural social status, because from one-half to two-thirds of Japanese farmers engage in gainful auxiliary activities. A surveyed sample of 961 household heads from 101 villages in 14 prefectures along the Inland Sea littoral in 1952 showed that slightly less than three-fourths were engaged at least part time in farming, forestry, or fishing.[9] Family lineage and prestige,

[8] Solomon B. Levine, "The Labor Movement and Economic Development in Japan," *Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association*, 1955; and the same writer's "Prospects of Japanese Labor," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 23, Nos. 5, 7 (May, July 1954), pp. 65–70, 107–10.

[9] This survey was conducted by the University of Michigan's field research station at

long residence in the locality, personal and household property, ownership of arable and forest lands, amount of taxes paid, extent of control over water rights, authority over the labor and loyalty of dependents, education, prosperity of nonagricultural enterprises, public office as well as connections with bureaucrats and politicians on village and higher levels—these are more common criteria of membership in rural strata. The rural survey mentioned above judged the class distribution of respondents as follows: 9 per cent upper class, 34.5 per cent upper-middle, 37.5 per cent lower-middle, and 19 per cent lower.

During democratization, many changes accompanying redistribution of land disturbed the hierarchical stratification of agrarian society and encouraged limited mobility. Today there is a residual landlord stratum, but it has been weakened in agriculture. Absentee landlordism has been virtually eliminated. The emphasis on broader participation in local government and on democratization of the relatively few rural organizations, such as co-operatives, has made it more difficult for such interests to dominate politics. But they still enjoy significant social as well as economic power. Many of them retained water rights and profitable forest lands. Some have shifted activities at least in part to local industries, banking, commerce, warehousing, and transportation. During the current "reverse course" and since the depurges, many such persons have resumed positions as local political bosses and as leaders of other organizations. Among their advantages are self-confidence, superior education, strategic contacts, and access to the cheap labor of those who long have been their loyal subordinates. Where such leaders have retired, they sometimes have been able to sponsor their successors, who, in some cases, are members of the greatly enlarged owner-operator class.

Reduction of the tenant proletariat from more than one-quarter to about 5 per cent of all farm families, and the corresponding tendency of an expanded class of proprietors to emphasize traditionalism, have abated revolutionary ferment. Agrarian reforms in effect have helped to perpetuate the difficulties which farmers' and labor unions encounter in attempts to reconcile interests and to co-ordinate activities. Japanese farmers' unions have declined in membership since the land reforms; many such organizations have been concentrating on defending gains made during the democratization period. The main leftist organization is cleft by disputes between factions which favor the left-wing Social Democrats and those who prefer the more radical Labor-Farmer and Communist parties. The principal conservative federation of farmers' unions (which is said to be influenced mainly by the interests of prosperous owner-operators and former landlords) is allied with the right wing of the Social Democratic party.

POLITICAL TENDENCIES OF VARIOUS STRATA

Conservative parties have been relying chiefly on rural districts for the amassing of electoral numbers, on capitalist circles for financing, and on managerial and bureaucratic leadership, as well as on veteran politicians, for elite personnel. In terms of occupational groups, political conservatism is strongest among administrative elements in commerce, industry, finance, the bureaucracy, transportation, and communications and is supported by most merchandisers and the bulk of the farming population. Polls and special surveys indicate that only about one-fifth to one-fourth of the proprietary-managerial business group usually votes for Social Democratic party candidates. There is evidence that such support comes mostly from small and middle enterprisers and comparable echelons of public administration. Similar surveys and electoral returns from rural constituencies have indicated that, since 1948, support for the two main conservative parties, now imperfectly united, has varied between 60 and 75 per cent, with 11 to 16 per cent of rustic voters favoring the Social Democrats. But since the summer of 1956 polls show a marked increase of support for the latter party.

According to the stratification-mobility study of a sample from Japan's six largest cities, 73.7 per cent of respondents self-identified as capitalists supported conservative parties (in 1952); 60.5 per cent of those conscious of middle-class status and 38.3 per cent who called themselves members of the working class did likewise.[10] Strongest support of reformist parties comes from industrial workers, white-collar employees, and persons in professional and technical occupations. Polls and sample studies indicate that approximately one-fifth to one-fourth of voters among professional workers are conservatively inclined, whereas about one-third to 45 per cent of the entire salariat usually supports reformist parties. It is frequently estimated that between 35 and 40 per cent of craft and industrial workers support conservative parties. Most of them are unorganized and are employed in small and medium-sized enterprises.

Summarizing, we may conclude that interstratal tensions, which seem to be unavoidable, have been significantly reduced in rural Japan. Perhaps more overt evidences of "confrontation" in urban society are in part the results of freer organization and expression and, indirectly, of lost control over overseas markets and raw materials while population continues to swell. At any rate, the integrative aspects of stratification still seem to outweigh disintegrative factors. Social mobility slowed down in the countryside after the marked effects of agrarian reforms became stabilized, but considerable mobility to and in the cities continues. While neither as extensive nor as intensive as in North America, it is nevertheless significant. It is chiefly at the policy-forming levels of economic and political organizations that somewhat revised elites have reconsolidated themselves. Studies of stratification-mobility help to explain the growth of reformist parties since 1945, but they indicate that conservative combinations will probably retain power in the foreseeable future. Of course, stratification and mobility, though fundamental, are only two among the many social factors which determine the course of politics.

Okayama City; its findings are soon to be published.

[10] "Six City SS-M Study" (cited in Sources of table, *supra*), pp. 24, 26.

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Women's Position and the Family System

By Shio Sakanishi

JAPAN fought her way out of the feudal system in 1867 through the Meiji Restoration and adopted a Western system in political, economic, and social fields, in which the improvement of women's position was necessarily a part. In 1871 a system of primary education on the basis of sex equality was put into effect. Yet from the first general election in 1890, prewar electoral laws barred women from the franchise, and later legislation forbade their joining political organizations or attending meetings of a political nature. The Civil Law of 1900, prescribing the inferior position of women, provided that a married woman should forfeit rights enjoyed in spinsterhood and should be subject to the will of her husband as a legal incompetent.

After World War I, as a result of the remarkable emergence of working women due to the development of capitalism, equal rights of the sexes and protection of mothers and children were advocated. In 1922 by an amendment of the fifth article of the Peace Preservation Law that had ruled women out of politics altogether, women received the right to participate in political activities to a limited extent. In 1924, the League for Realizing Women's Suffrage was organized. Meanwhile, the Society for the Study of Politics, composed of leaders of the proletarian parties, was organized, and such progressive women leaders as Akiko Yosano, Natsu Kawasaki, Sumako Fukao, and Kikue Yamakawa joined the group. Abolition of the family-head system, equal opportunity for both sexes, protection of women, equal pay for equal work regardless of sex, abolition of licensed prostitution, were put on the platforms of the proletarian parties. In 1930 the Women's Civil Rights bill passed the lower house of the Diet, but was shelved in the House of Peers. After the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, women's progressive activities were suppressed.

In 1932, a Women's Association for National Defense was organized under the sponsorship of the Army. In addition, the National Council of Women's Organizations was formed under the direction of the Ministry of Education. In this way, both the Army and the bureaucrats strengthened their control over women and prepared the way to war. In 1940 the League for Realizing Women's Suffrage was ordered dissolved, along with the remaining proletarian parties and labor unions, and in 1942 all government-controlled women's organizations were merged into the National Women's Association, which, as a subordinate organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, was to serve the fascistic ends of the Army and the bureaucrats. The government appointed women leaders as commission members or research staff of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and organized neighborhood associations to aid in mobilizing women and integrating them into the wartime administrative structure.

The Confucian Social Order

Such, in brief outline, were the changes in the status and activities of women during the seventy years after Japan became a modern state. Actually, most women remained as they had been in former times, and there was no substantial emancipation. One cause hampering the advancement of women was the fact that the Meiji Restoration aimed essentially at reform of the political structure, and its leaders wanted to leave the traditional social order unchanged. The Confucian social order imposed three types of obedience upon women: obdience when young to parents, obedience when married to husband, and obedience when aged to children. The family system placed a greater burden upon women. They did not enjoy educational opportunities, and they found it impossible to achieve economic independence. Theirs was a child-bearing lot to meet a national policy calculated to enrich and strengthen Japan. Some people blame women themselves for their blindness and passivity, but we should not forget that they were living in the days when the dignity and equality of the individual were not recognized and the traditional treatment of women as inferior to men was prevalent.

Reforms of the Occupation

Following unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945, Japan revived as a democratic nation under the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The late Fumimaro Konoe, the virtual vice prime minister of the Higashikuni Cabinet formed immediately after surrender, opposed women's suffrage because it "would retard the progress of Japanese politics." However, General MacArthur directed the Shidehara Cabinet, formed in October 1945, to emancipate women. On December 15, 1945, the Diet approved a revision of the Election Law to give women voting rights as well as electoral eligibility equal to men. In the general election held on April 10, 1946, thirty-nine women were elected to the Diet. In the session that commenced the following month, women representatives participated in parliamentary work for the first time in Japanese history and gave final approval to the new Constitution, which in Articles 14, 24, and 44 specifically stipulated that women should enjoy the same rights as men, not only politically, but also economically and socially, as well as matrimonially. This Diet session also passed the Local Autonomy Act which entitled women to be elected as heads of local governments and as members of local assemblies.

On January 24, 1946, licensed prostitution was abolished by Imperial Ordinance. Further, the reform of the educational system based on the principle of coeducation from elementary school to university was carried out, and the Labor Standards Law which contains a provision for protection of women, as well as equal pay for equal work regardless of sex, came into existence. Changes in the position of Japanese women thus took place in very rapid succession.

The first session of the Diet to meet after the new Constitution went into effect on May 3, 1947, approved the revision of the Civil and Criminal Codes and passed the bill to establish a Ministry of Labor. The revised Civil Code, which abolished the family-head system and annulled the legal incompetence of women, provided for freedom of marriage and specified the rights and duties of both husband and wife. It also stipulated equality of husband and wife in parental power, property rights, and the right to seek divorce. The new Criminal Code was also thoroughly consistent with the principle of equality of men and women. Except for the Imperial House Law which does not sanction a female head of state, women came to enjoy perfect legal equality with men. In September 1948, the Ministry of Labor established the Women's

and Minors' Bureau, charged with protecting working women and minors and improving women's position in general.

REVISION OF THE CIVIL CODE

Among the many rights given to women in rapid succession, the revision of the Civil Code was the most important and far-reaching in its effects. The old Civil Code defined three types of authority over women. The first was the authority of the family head, who had the right to make decisions regarding marriage, the setting up a separate family, and the place of domicile of all members of the family. The second was the authority of the parent. Without the approval of parents, one could not marry. The third was the husband's authority over his wife. The relation between husband and wife was that of master and servant. A husband could divorce his wife without her approval and was under no obligation to guarantee her living after divorce. Though the law stipulated monogamy, polygamy virtually prevailed. A husband could recognize, as his own, without his wife's approval, children he had from a woman other than his wife and could have their names entered in the family register. It was quite possible for a legitimate wife who had been childless or who had given birth only to daughters to be thrown out of the house penniless by a bastard son who had succeeded his father as head of the family.

The new Civil Code abolished the family-head system, and in its stead provided for freedom of marriage, equality of husband and wife, equal right to property, equal right to divorce, and equal obligations of chastity. In former days the family council exercised absolute power in case a dispute broke out regarding marriage, inheritance, or support, but nowadays the family courts, 228 subcourts, and 60 local consulting agencies throughout the country are giving advisory services to women.

Divorce

According to the statistics of the Ministry of Welfare, the total number of divorces in 1943 was 48,832. A wife's position not being guaranteed by law, a husband or husband's family could arbitrarily present a notice of divorce, while a wife could not divorce her husband however much she wanted to do so. With the revision of the Civil Code, however, the number of divorces suddenly increased to 79,551 in 1947 and to 83,689 in 1950. The number has now begun to decrease gradually, totaling 76,479 in 1954. What is noteworthy is the fact that 20 per cent of these divorces were proposed by husbands and 79 per cent by wives, while those by mutual consent were only 0.4 per cent. These figures indicate that women, by utilizing their newly acquired right, actively began to put an end to their unhappy, submissive married lives. It must not be overlooked that a substantial number of these divorces resulted from the war, which had destroyed normal home life for many years. The war and defeat rendered many men economically incompetent, at least temporarily, while emancipated women won economic independence by finding jobs outside the household. Opportunities in work of a service type particularly expanded rapidly under American influence, and it was cynically said that women obtained what men lost. These conditions explain the sudden increase of divorces in postwar Japan, a trend more noticeable in large cities than in rural areas.

It is dangerous to conclude from these figures that women have become sufficiently conscious of their own interests. In the family affairs which the family court has handled since revision of the Civil Code, abandonment of inheritance occupies a very large number of cases, amounting to as many as 191,000 in 1951 and increasing each year. It must be noted that 67 per cent of these cases are filed by women. Many women in rural areas are persuaded to abandon their rights to inheritance on the ground that dividing the small farmland among brothers and sisters will bring about common ruin. The fact that so many women abandon their inheritance without understanding their legal rights or the full implications of their action indicates how far women still have to go before becoming fully conscious of their enhanced legal position.

"BACK TO THE OLD REGIME" MOVEMENT

The ten years after the end of the war were a transition period, with confusing oppositions of old and new, excesses by some people, and apathy in others still bound by old customs. To reach a satisfactory adjustment might be expected to take many years at best, but instead of gradual development of a system suitable to the Japanese environment, the present tendency seems to be toward revival of the old system, incited by the so-called "back to the old regime" or "reverse course" movement.

This movement came to the fore soon after the Peace Treaty was signed in 1952, when the Japanese government became free to correct the "excesses" of the reforms ordered by the occupation. It gained momentum after the Yoshida Cabinet resigned in December 1954 and the new Hatoyama Cabinet brought in many conservative die-hards among its members. Especially since the House of Representatives election of February 1955 when the conservatives gained a majority, hostile criticism of the new Civil Code has been voiced by a number of old-fashioned politicians and its revision is part of their policy. For instance, they claim that a child's duty of supporting parents having been dispensed with in the law, parents have to live wretched lives in their old age with no family to support them. The new Civil Code, however, obliges children equally, rather than the eldest son alone, to support parents, and parents feel more assured than under the old Civil Code, when they were dependent on the oldest son only. There are, it is true, some young men who claim that under the new system they have no obligations to their parents. For conservatives to criticize the new Civil Code from this standpoint is quite beside the mark, because these young men are guilty of a gross and mistaken interpretation of the law.

Economic difficulties

There is no denying the existence of many miserable aged people in present-day Japan, but this situation is due not to the new Civil Code but to general poverty as a result of the war. Parents after bringing up children do not have enough means to support themselves and without adequate social security provisions are dependent upon their children. But under present social and economic conditions young people find it hard to support a wife and children, to say nothing of parents. Among the 65,648 cases handled by the family courts in 1954, those in which parents presented complaints of neglect by their children were extremely few. It would appear that by and large parents are being taken care of by their children.

Common inheritance system

Another misunderstanding concerns the common inheritance system. In March 1954, Minister of Justice Takeru (Ken) Inukai stated that "there is no denying that effectuation of the new Civil Code which stipulates common inheritance has brought forth the tendency of dividing land into small pieces in rural areas."

Many besides Inukai deplore the shrinkage of farming units, yet a survey conducted by the Japan Legal Scholars Association from 1951 to 1954 shows that the new Civil Code has not been responsible for the division of land into smaller parcels. Among farmers, the eldest son inherits the land, and other children, money and movable property. For example, in Nishino Village in Yamanashi prefecture, which is considered a prosperous village, the eldest son inherits the land, while other children are being given the opportunity of a university education in Tokyo. Property is thus being divided in a way most convenient to all members of the family. Under the former system of primogeniture the law recognized only the privilege of the eldest son, but at present the equality of men and women in the common inheritance system is decreed by law.

Constitutional amendment

The leaders of the Liberal Democratic party desire to amend the Constitution, particularly Article 24, which reads: "Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with equal rights of husband and wife as a basis." They are also interested in reinstating the provisions of the old Civil Code relating to the three types of authority over women. These changes they consider necessary for the revival of the family-head system as the basis for the social order and as a basis for ancestor worship, which in turn is a prerequisite to Emperor worship.

Current attitudes on marriage

As to the actual situation, despite the new Civil Code, several studies show the persistence and continuity of old patterns. In March 1952, the Institute of Public Opinion Research conducted a survey on choosing mates in marriage. The following results were obtained:

	PER CENT
Parents choose son's or daughter's mate	14.1
Son or daughter chooses own mate	26.6
Before decision, parents and son or daughter consult with each other	56.1
No opinion	3.2

Despite the abolition of the family-head system, the established tradition still continues, except in large cities, that a mate is chosen by consultation between parents and children. Usually, in this consultation parents exercise great pressure, especially on women, who do not have economic independence. To a questionnaire sent out in March 1951 by the Women's and Minors' Bureau, women answering that they would obey their parents amounted to 51 per cent, those answering they would do as they wished, totaled 36 per cent, and those with no opinion, 10 per cent. If the last group can be safely included in the first category, a majority of the women queried would thus leave a decision of major importance in their life to another's will.

In rural areas particularly, parents choose the mate of their son or daughter. In Yamato Village in Yamagata prefecture, parents make decisions in 91 per cent of the cases. In many instances, too, the relations between the two families involved play an important role in deciding the matter, for mates are generally chosen from among relatives or relatives' acquaintances. While young people may wish to choose their own mates, most of them acknowledge that "as long as we must live under the same roof with our parents, it is safer to abide by their choice."

In another study conducted by the Women's and Minors' Bureau in 1955, both young men and young women were asked whether a married woman should obey the family of her husband.

Their answers:

	PER CENT MEN	PER CENT WOMEN
Must obey	28	38
Had better obey	37	36
Depends on the case	29	24
No need to obey	5	1

What is interesting in this study is that the traditional attitude prevails among both men and women, though women are *more* conservative than the men.

"Husband leads, wife follows" and "there are three types of obedience for women" have been traditional sayings. In fact, women were forced to marry before their individuality had became fixed so that they could be molded into the patterns desired by their husbands and husbands' families. Another questionnaire sent out by the Women's and Minors' Bureau in 1955 asked, "Do you think it is desirable for women to marry before their attitude toward life is established?" The answers:

	PER CENT MEN	PER CENT WOMEN
Yes	5	6
Depends on the individual woman	15	11
No	76	79
No opinion	4	4

An interesting point in these questionnaires is that once a girl is married, it is considered better policy to obey the commands of her husband's family and follow its customs, although in a high percentage of replies it is thought desirable to postpone marriage till individuality and character have had opportunity to develop. In the first point of view, the realistic attitude of women is expressed, in the second, their ideal; the problem our younger generation is faced with today is how to reconcile the two without sacrificing themselves.

Superstition

Along with the prevalent feudalistic attitude in human relationships, superstition is deeply rooted in the minds of the people. It is almost impossible for outsiders to understand how miserable this makes Japanese women, and how it prevents their advancement. For example, young people are often not allowed to marry if their years of birth are found not to be "congenial." A young bride may be sent home because she is said to have come from the direction "unlucky" to her husband's house. She cannot initiate even a very simple improvement that makes her housework easier, because it may disturb the household gods. Instead of a doctor, a soothsayer may be called to attend her illness, and by the time she is sent home, it may be too late to save her life.

WOMEN'S POLITICAL INTEREST

Looked at from a broader point of view, the situation is more encouraging. That women have become interested in politics and have learned the close relation between politics and daily life is a remarkable advance. They hold a potentially stronger position than men, since according to a report of the election division of the Local Autonomy Board, as of December 20, 1955, there were 26,144,090 eligible women voters, 2,159,902 more than eligible men voters! In the first general election under the new election law (1946), 39 women representatives were elected. Though in the second general election (1947) women representatives decreased to 15, and in the third (1949) to 12, their quality has steadily improved. In the last seven years approximately 1,000 women have been elected to local assemblies; 7 have been elected heads of towns or villages. Though numerically weak, they are playing a noteworthy role in preventing corruption and wasteful expenditures. According to the *Asahi Yearbook* (1956) 4,000 women have been appointed and are serving as mediators in the family courts; 13,682

women have been nominated members of welfare committees and children's welfare committees; 128 women have been elected members of prefectural boards of education; and 10,000 have been elected members of local social education committees.

Mention should also be made of women's rate of balloting. In the first general election, women's rate of voting was 67 per cent, while that of men was 78.5 per cent. In the 1955 House of Representatives election, 72.1 per cent of the women voted compared to 79.9 per cent of the eligible men. Women have shown a keen interest in the elections of local assemblies, which have a more immediate connection with their daily lives: in the first election of those bodies in 1947 their rate of voting was 71.5 per cent as against 82.9 per cent for men, but in 1951, 92.2 per cent of the women voted against 92.3 per cent of the men.

Few feel that life has become better since the achievement of woman suffrage. Yet many women go to the polls, thinking it will help to bring about better days and convinced that merely to do housework diligently is not enough. The political consciousness of Japanese women has begun to awaken. They may talk about politics with no fear of being socially unacceptable, and psychological obstacles to political discussion are notably diminishing. According to a public opinion survey concerning women's voting conducted by the Women's and Minors' Bureau in March 1955, 75 per cent of the women who voted did so dictated by their own judgment without being influenced by anyone else. However, a larger proportion of women in rural areas and of those who voted for the conservative parties apparently did so under the influence of family opinion. It is repeatedly said that since women voters number two million more than men, if they were to unite it would be possible for them to elect desirable representatives and to realize fair politics supported by public opinion. But it will take years before women's political consciousness becomes developed enough to exercise wisely the rights they legally enjoy.

GROWING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

In addition to political participation, women have slowly begun to work toward economic independence. The number of women workers is increasing annually. Besides the natural increase in the population, the number of comparatively older women who must secure income has increased remarkably. Many young women, now with opportunities in education equal to men, are interested in professional careers. The change has come about as a result of changing socioeconomic conditions.

During the six years from 1948 to 1955, the female population over 14 years of age increased from 28,470,000 to 31,130,000, a 9 per cent increase. During the same period, women laborers increased from 13,500,000 to 16,580,000, a 23 per cent increase. Women comprise 41.3 per cent of the total working population and are thus playing an important role in Japanese economic activities. Those in agriculture number 8,640,000 (51.8 per cent); in industry, 2,510,000 (15.4 per cent); in hotel, restaurant, and similar work, 1,820,000 (11.1 per cent); in commerce, 2,780,000 (17 per cent); in transportation and communication, 240,000 (1.5 per cent); and in public service, 200,000 (1.2 per cent). More than half of those in industry are employed by the spinning and weaving industries.

Compared with men, women employees are young. Their average age is 25.5 years as against 33.2 for men. Women's average length of service is 3.6 years, about half that of men; many go to work for short periods before their marriage. They support 0.2 family member on an average, as against the 2.5 members supported by men. One of the most serious social problems today concerns war widows who must work to support their children as well as themselves. These women, without professional training, cannot go out to work and are eking out a scanty existence by work in their homes.

Wages

Though the Labor Standards Law calls for the same payment for the same job performed regardless of sex, women's wages are actually substantially lower than those of men, largely because of differences in age, lengths of service, educational backgrounds, and the number of dependents. The average monthly wage of women in industry is ¥8,012 ($22). Those in a special line, such as the tobacco industry, get as much as ¥15,104 ($40) a month, while women's average wage in the wood-working industry is as low as ¥5,080 ($14). The average monthly wage in the weaving industry is ¥5,864 ($16). In 1954 women's average wages were 44 per cent those of men.

Employment difficulties

While the number of women desiring employment is rapidly increasing, opportunities are decreasing. Though young girls with junior or senior high school education can often find employment, university graduates are facing difficulties, due partially to such old notions as that women do not die of hunger or that because of inefficiency and a tendency to short service they should not be placed in responsible positions. The harsh present-day fact is that women must work to live. Yet not only do they face difficulty in finding employment, but, as their wages increase, they are threatened with discharge by age-limit regulations which make it possible to hire young women at lower wages in their place. Recently Fukuoka prefecture has set the age limit for women teachers at thirty, Chiba and Okayama prefectures at forty-five.

Unemployed women increased from 90,000 in 1948 to 240,000 in 1954, but these figures do not tell the whole story, for unemployed individuals are often cared for by the family and are difficult to check. Because the Labor Standards Law extends special protection to women, employers also tend to give priority to male job seekers. While the Labor Standards Law assures women of the same pay for the same job, limitations on working hours, prohibition of midnight work, and paid leave for maternity and other reasons, these very provisions are obstacles for women seeking employment.

FAMILY PLANNING

One of the most significant postwar social movements affecting women is family planning. The first Eugenic Protection Law was passed in 1948. Its aim is to protect mothers physically and economically and to make possible abortion with the approval of a physician, which has helped to lessen the former practice of "illegal" abortion with resulting harmful effects on the mother. The number of reported abortions in 1949 was 245,104, but it increased suddenly in 1954 to 1,143,059. Many abortions are unreported, and it is estimated that the number of actual abortions is double the figure given above. The charge for an abortion operation is usually ¥3,000 (about $8.00), but some doctors perform it for less than ¥1,000 ($2.75). According to a survey of the Institute of Population Studies in 1955, 37.2 per cent of married couples in the

cities were practicing contraception and 30.4 per cent in rural areas. Compared with the birth rate of 31 per cent per thousand persons between 1933 and 1937, the birth rate declined sharply in 1954 to 20 per cent.

Throughout Japan, there exist some 800 Eugenic Protection Council offices. Public health nurses and midwives also give birth control information, and the government is planning to train 30,000 experts within the next year. The International Family Conference held in Tokyo in the summer of 1955 provided the impetus to nongovernmental groups and organizations having close connections with the people, such as agricultural associations, physicians' and pharmacists' associations, social work agencies, and women's organizations, to diffuse birth control information to the grass-roots level through their channels. They are also trying to rouse public opinion through the radio and press. Furthermore, in January 1956, the Ministry of Welfare announced the establishment of a division in charge of family planning. The movement for family planning which had been advocated by a handful of intellectuals for a long time has finally come to stay.

PROSTITUTION

Another social problem which has come to the fore amidst rapid social changes in postwar Japan is prostitution. According to a survey of the Women's and Minors' Bureau in April 1955, there were 1,921 prostitution areas in the nation with 37,112 operators and 129,008 prostitutes. In addition, the number of clandestine prostitutes was estimated to be between 300,000 and 500,000. In the past it had been the custom in Japan to delineate certain areas where licensed operators were permitted to run houses; thus prostitutes were segregated from the lives of ordinary citizens. After the abolition of licensed prostitution in January 1946, houses of prostitution began to be operated in residential areas. Many operators are former legitimate businessmen who have chosen this "trade" to solve financial difficulties arising from war damage, reparations, unemployment, or depression; many prostitutes, too, are motivated by economic necessity. Enlightenment, encouragement to operators of houses to change their trade, and protection for those women already degraded are strongly called for.

Against human traffic, the government has laid down strict punitive measures, and the police are now actively rounding up suspects. The Civil Liberties Bureau of the Ministry of Justice handled 275 cases in 1955. Taking into consideration the fact that households which sell their daughters are in extreme economic want, the government is planning to extend the coverage of the Livelihood Protection Law and to institute a Welfare Loan Scheme for needy households in agricultural and fishing villages.

Between 1948 and 1955, an anti-prostitution bill was presented to the Diet four times and failed each time, until the untiring effort of the women members of both houses of the Diet finally pushed it through in May 1956. However, the strong opposition from operators forced the conservatives to modify the bill so that it will not go into effect until April 1, 1957, and those bylaws applying heavy penalties to the operators of houses of prostitution not until April 1, 1958. This extension was designed to give operators time enough to change to new businesses. In the meantime, the Ministries of Labor and Welfare have started to work on plans to help the women find respectable occupations, and in co-operation with local governments, they are establishing a special agency to look after them.

THROUGH THE TURBULENT YEARS

Looking back at the steps taken by Japanese women during these ten turbulent years, one cannot help admiring their courage and good sense. Centuries of severe discipline and submissive lives had not crushed their spirit, and in times of crises they managed to show their potential capabilities. To be sure, to a majority of them, the new legal rights and new opportunities at first meant little, but now they are more conscious of their responsibility and are determined to see that nobody shall take these privileges away. They are doing their best to create a better and more peaceful world for their children.

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The Aftermath of Educational Reform

By Daishiro Hidaka

LIKE many aspects of Japan's life, her educational system after 1952 bore the heavy imprint of more than six years of reform, guidance, and direction, if not control, by SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). During the period from the end of World War II to the conclusion of the Peace Treaty in 1952, Japanese education passed through revolutionary changes in its principles, system, quality, method, and administration. Most of these have remained as the foundation of the educational system in 1956. It is necessary, therefore, first to examine in what way and sequence and how these reforms took place.

The Japanese educational world was "cleaned up" as a result of the SCAP directive, "Administration of the Educational System of Japan," issued on October 22, 1945.[1] This policy directive sought to ban the spread of militarist and ultranationalist thought, end all forms of military drills and athletics, and in their place teach and translate into practice the ideas of fundamental human rights, freedom of thought, worship, and assembly, the dignity of the individual, parliamentarism, and world peace. The same policy directive required the investigation of all personnel connected with education and the dismissal of professional soldiers, militarists, active advocates of ultranationalism, and opponents of occupation policy. Further, a thorough revision of schoolbooks, guidance materials for teachers, and similar items was required.

In a subsequent directive issued one week later, "Investigation, Screening, and Certification of Teachers and Educational Officials," SCAP ordered the purge of militarist educators. On December 15 state Shinto was deprived of its time-honored privileges, and on December 31, SCAP ordered the suspension of the teaching of *Shushin* (Japanese ethics), history, and geography.

United States Education Mission

In rebuilding Japanese education, SCAP apparently decided to respect the responsibility and initiative of the Japanese people as far as possible, while giving fairly strong directions based upon opinions of American educational experts. The United States Education Mission arrived in March 1946. During its one month stay it solicited the views of Japanese educators, studied educational problems, and submitted a final report to General MacArthur, advocating a program to democratize education in Japan, confident that "there is an unmeasured potential for freedom and for individual and social growth in every human being."[2] Fair and reasonable in its recommendations, the report had a great influence, direct and indirect, upon later educational reform.

[1] The major directives issued by SCAP affecting the educational system may be found in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), Vol. II, pp. 205–6, 224–45; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Documents Relating to the Allied Occupation of Japan* (Foreign Office, Section of Special Records, 1951), Vol. 2, pp. 175–78, 205–26, and Supplement, pp. 77–78.

[2] United States Education Mission to Japan, *Report, Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (mimeographed; Tokyo, March 30, 1946), p. 1.

Japanese Educational Reform Committee

SCAP did not immediately press for all the changes recommended. In August 1946, SCAP requested the Japanese Educational Reform Committee to deliberate independently on educational problems and to submit a reform plan. The committee consisted of fifty members from the educational world, some of whom had co-operated with the United States Education Mission, and other individuals of learning and experience. They devoted themselves to the task until June 1951, establishing nineteen special subcommittees to study thoroughly separate aspects of the problem. Acting on their suggestions, the Ministry of Education drafted and presented a series of bills to the Diet after revision and sanction by SCAP. In effect, this committee was practically responsible for the basic plan for Japan's postwar educational reform. The Ministry of Education bore the formal responsibility, under the control of SCAP's Civil Information and Education Section, of translating into law the committee's recommendations.[3]

Fundamental Law on Education

Some fifteen or sixteen key measures were enacted into law through the process just described, including the Fundamental Law on Education, adopted on March 31, 1947.[4] The latter, the "educational charter for a new Japan," declared in its preamble that Japan's contribution to peace and the welfare of humanity through a democratic and cultural state depends "fundamentally on the power of education." The law set forth the aim of education, the course of education, equal opportunity in education, compulsory education, coeducation, school education, social education, political and religious education, and educational administration, on the basis of liberal and democratic goals of truth, freedom, and peace.

This fundamental law replaced the Imperial Rescript on Education which had since its promulgation in 1890 by Emperor Meiji possessed status as the only authority for national education in Japan. Though the Rescript did much historically to lead the Japanese to unity and national development and in its contents even defined human relations in universal terms, it was based upon semifeudalistic relationships between master and servant under then existing conditions. It was thoroughly nationalistic, centering about the Emperor, and it undoubtedly was used for militaristic purposes after the Manchurian Incident of 1931. In June 1948 the Diet by resolution affirmed it to be invalid and inconsistent with the new Constitution, which provides that sovereignty resides in the people.[5]

The great conversion in the principles of education was naturally followed by a drastic reform in the prewar system.

The New Educational System

Under the prewar system, six years of elementary education were compulsory. Thereafter, three distinct lines of education were available. The first, or orthodox line, provided for a five-year middle school, a three-year high school for liberal arts and basic subjects, and a three-year university course (four for medicine). A collateral system provided for middle schools and vocational schools in agriculture and technical and

[3] See Monbusho ("Ministry of Education"), *Nihon ni okeru Kyoiku Kaikaku no Shinten* ("The Progress of Educational Reform in Japan") (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1950), and Yomiuri Shimbunsha ("Yomiuri Press") (Ed.), *Nihon no Shingakki* ("The New Term in Japan") (Tokyo: Yomiuri Press, 1955).

[4] *Political Reorientation of Japan* (cited note 1 *supra*), Vol. II, p. 865.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 585.

commercial fields of a middle school standard, followed by colleges offering higher vocational education. A third variant established a two-year higher elementary school for those who could not proceed to middle school. Among the three systems there was a great difference in the quality of teachers and facilities and in the standard of education offered. Consequently, an individual's future and social standing were often determined by which of the three courses he followed. There was such marked discrimination between men and women in available educational facilities that women by and large had little opportunity for higher education.

In accord with the purpose of the Fundamental Law on Education, the School Education Law, enacted March 27, 1947, drastically simplified the pluralistic and discriminatory system; it marked a step toward the realization of equal opportunity in education. At this time the so-called "6–3–3–4" system was provided for. Besides the six years of elementary school, a three-year middle school education was made compulsory. Then came a three-year high school and a four-year university course (six years for medical and dental schools). A kindergarten for children from three to five years of age was also incorporated in the regular school system.[6]

The present elementary school is not so different from the former so far as the system itself is concerned, but its curriculum and quality have been greatly changed. The three-year middle school is totally new. Its curriculum has two main divisions, required subjects and optional ones, as well as some special educational activities. The new high school gives ordinary courses and vocational courses. Besides the regular three-year high school, there are newly established part-time four-year high schools and correspondence courses for young men who are already earning their living. The new university system aims at extending and deepening the knowledge of as many people as possible, giving them expert knowledge and technical training and bringing up all as citizens with a strong sense of responsibility. Availability of university lectures to the public and correspondence course education on a university level are new for Japan, designed to spread knowledge of a university standard as widely as possible. Inevitably, of course, there have been practical difficulties in carrying out such a program. In addition to the regular four-year program, Japanese universities offer graduate work for the master's degree and the doctorate. The first normally requires two years' study, and the second, three years', each requiring a thesis in addition to prescribed courses.

Another new feature of postwar Japanese education is the junior college, born as a result of a revision in the School Education Law in 1949. As a branch of the main trunk of the 6–3–3–4 system, this college is a semivocational, semitechnical form of higher education, spread over two or three years. In most cases, its standards of curriculum are in accord with those of the four-year college. If a student wishes, after graduation from junior college he may proceed to a four-year college.

Curriculum

Since the purposes for which education is offered determine the curriculum and its quality, fundamental reforms in the course of study offered in Japanese schools were also made.

Compulsory education in the past centered about state textbooks. Generally speaking, these textbooks aimed at molding an individual into a component of the state and a loyal subject of the Emperor. A well-arranged collection of teaching materials, these state-issued textbooks produced uniformity in education. Teachers seemed to believe that the textbooks as the standard of their teaching should be faithfully followed, even in order of presentation of materials, and that their meaning should be fully and uniformally understood by all pupils, regardless of personal capacity or mental tendency. Teachers had little freedom to prepare their own curricula.

In contrast to this, the new educational system respects the value of the individual and his personality and seeks by applying a deeper concept of humanism to develop his individuality and individual capacities. Most teachers brought up under the old-fashioned system had neither the necessary training nor the experience to apply the new concepts. To meet the need, the Ministry of Education published "Courses of Study" to suggest how to prepare and develop a curriculum and to assist teachers in their educational activities.[7] The "Courses of Study" contained elements of the American-style, liberal study guidance, a change from the old-fashioned attitude that a teacher gives students something conventional to guide voluntary study. Emphasizing the importance of group discussion problems and projects, the guide asked that in addition to textbooks, class and school libraries and audio-visual aid materials be used in stimulating a pupil's will to study. The new education leaves both the quality of the curriculum and the teaching method to the independent judgment of the educators themselves.

Textbooks

Because of this principle, the status and use of textbooks also had to be altered. Under the new system, the textbook is no longer the only authority of education as it was in the past, but a core around which a broader and more flexible system of instruction can be offered. Since many prewar texts were banned or unsuitable for this type of education, the Ministry of Education in 1947 compiled a series of provisional new textbooks for elementary, middle, and high schools. A year later it began a fundamental reform to replace all textbooks compiled by the Ministry of Education with a list of private publishers' "authorized textbooks." Under this system, which came into force for the first time in 1949, the Ministry of Education fixed an examining standard and appointed an examining committee under its direct control.

DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS

Although the intent of reforming the educational system and teaching was generally reasonable and desirable, the results were not necessarily satisfactory. Many difficulties were unavoidable because of the political, social, and economic circumstances of the postwar period. In three or four years a reform was carried out which would normally have required as many as ten to accomplish. The greatest difficulties in the execution of the new system were the results of failure to establish a careful, detailed, and concrete yearly plan, lack of sound financial support, and the attempt to put into practice new methods before the values of the whole plan were fully understood and supported by the public.

[6] See Monbusho ("Ministry of Education"), *Kyoiku Kakushin Shingikai Yoran* ("Handbook of the Council on Educational Reform"), Tokyo: Monbusho, 1952.

[7] This *"Gakushi Shido Yoryo"* was originally distributed in parts, the first in the fall of 1947. In 1951 it was put out in a revised version. See Monbusho ("Ministry of Education"), *Gakusei Hachijunen Shi* ("An Eighty Year History of the School System") (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 524 ff.

Elementary and middle schools

The chief problems of the elementary system centered in the delayed rehabilitation or reconstruction of worn-out or war-damaged buildings, with the resulting shortage of classrooms and the inevitable double session and temporary classrooms. These problems existed because of inadequate fund raising for, and construction of, new-system middle schools, most of which were established in conjunction with elementary schools. Even in the figures for 1954 the problem is evident—22,036 schools and 11,750,000 students, both boys and girls; excluding nearly 90,000 foreigners, elementary students represented 13 per cent of the total school population.

Special problems attended the new-system middle schools started in late May 1947. Since the system was adopted only about eight weeks after the enactment of the School Education Law, there was insufficient time to prepare for its execution. Owing to the confusions of the postwar period, including scarcity of qualified teachers and difficulties in accurately determining the number and state of existing school buildings and the precise distribution of students, many of whom were still scattered as a result of the wartime evacuation program, the program began under inauspicious circumstances. The confusion and mismanagement attending the hurried adoption of the program became an important political issue in the National Diet and within the government and SCAP as well.

Despite these difficulties of space, teachers, and funds, as well as an inadequate supply of textbooks, school attendance in the compulsory schools has been excellent, over 98 per cent in both the elementary and middle schools, even if long-time absentees are included.

High schools

Most of the new-system high schools were former middle schools, and like the new-system middle schools, they too started all at once in 1948, each with its own school district. The chief problem encountered was the desire to create an all-round school offering, with many courses added to give pupils more option in choosing vocational studies. This idea was pushed with special emphasis, if not coercion, by some SCAP educational relations officers. The adoption of many optional courses for students did not always develop their personalities as intended; oftentimes, it is charged, it encouraged a sluggard's inclination to the opposite path. Another consequence of SCAP pressure was an unreasonable merger of high schools, frequently in disregard of the history, traditions, character, and even the locality of each school and the will of its founder. Various knotty problems remain in the operation of the new high school system that stem from this period. As of 1954 the number of high schools in the nation numbered 3,256, serving 2,545,254 pupils with a regular teaching staff of 108,825. Approximately the same figures held for 1956.

New daigaku system

A major characteristic of the new *daigaku*[8] (college or university) system has been the diffusion of a standard university education throughout the country. Since the Meiji era, higher educational institutions had been concentrated in a few large cities. In 1947, before the new daigaku system was put into practice, 28 of the 59 national, public, and private universities were located in Tokyo, serving about 49,000 students. If the higher technical and normal schools are added, 257 such institutions out of 635, or 54 per cent, were located in Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka.

To correct such maldistribution, the Ministry of Education, under SCAP's direction, planned the establishment of at least one national university in each of the 46 prefectures. In May 1949, 267 old-system national universities and colleges were reorganized into 69 new-system national institutions. Before this, by March 1948, 12 private and public daigaku had already switched over to the new system. Each year since 1950 has witnessed a gradual increase in the number of daigaku. By 1954 there were 72 national daigaku, 34 public universities, and 121 private universities—a total of 227, with a teaching staff of 36,489, serving a student body of 417,952 men and 57,180 women. The total number of university students was approximately the same as before the war.

Since the new daigaku system stresses general education without neglecting training in expert knowledge, postgraduate courses were instituted to promote scientific research of a higher caliber. Four public universities inaugurated such a program in 1950 and 11 private universities in that and the following year. By 1954, 64 universities offered graduate training, of which 30 were private institutions, 4 were public, and 12 were national. Over 8,300 students were then enrolled, of whom 404 were women.

According to the School Education Law, no new university may be authorized until the Ministry of Education consults the University Chartering Committee. Organized in late 1947, the committee consists of forty-five members, thirty-three connected with higher education, seven government officials, and five "men of learning and experience." The committee judges an application according to fourteen fixed, standard requirements and submits its recommendations to the Ministry of Education for final authorization or rejection.[9]

The establishment of the new-system college or university created its own special problems. The quality of almost every faculty was lower than under the prewar system, a consequence of the necessity of sudden heavy additions to the teaching staff. Many daigaku were so lacking in housing, equipment, and teaching staffs that they scraped through the qualifying examination on the premise that these faults were due to financial difficulties which in time could be remedied. In national universities, there have been problems due to forced mergers of different types of institutions, producing in some instances widely scattered physical plants which may be even fifty or sixty miles apart from each other. University management has inevitably suffered. And not least, the new-system daigaku were launched two years before the junior colleges, and this inverse order had a serious and unfortunate effect upon their quality.

Both the Ministry of Education and many Japanese had repeatedly requested SCAP to give practical attention to the problem of establishing a junior college system first. SCAP did not readily agree. Not until after the examination and certification of daigaku in 1949 did SCAP consent to inauguration of the

[8] Traditionally, before 1948, the term *"daigaku"* had been applied only to universities and the term *"senmongakko"* had been used to describe other specialized schools of higher learning. Since the reform the word "daigaku" has been used to describe both the universities and what, more strictly, would be colleges under the new system.

[9] See Monbusho, Daigaku Gakujitsukyoku, Shomuka ("Ministry of Education, General Affairs Section, University Science Office"), *Daigaku Setchi Kijun, Daigaku Setchi: Ninka Shinseisho Kisai Yoshiki* ("University Establishment Standards, University Establishment: Approved Written Application Forms"), Tokyo, July 1953.

junior college system in 1950. Had the process been reversed, many an old-system higher school or technical college could have smoothly switched to being a junior college instead of attempting, very ineffectively, to offer quality education at the university level.

This situation was predictable, for institutions which might have become junior colleges were faced with a crisis: either they had to achieve daigaku status or their future was ruined. A number were certified as universities only by the most lenient application of the required standards. In short, it is generally agreed in 1956 that the new-system universities by and large are still inferior in quality to the old ones. They represent a raised standard, however, when compared to the former higher schools and technical colleges, for education is extended by one year and the teaching staff and equipment more or less improved.

Junior college system

The junior college system was established to fill the gap between the high school and the four-year college, and especially to improve education for women, which had been considerably retarded. Because of the complicated problems previously referred to, the system was agreed upon, though with difficulty, in June 1949 and launched in 1950, with 17 state, 41 public, and 193 private junior colleges. Of these 115 were coeducational, 11 for women, and 25 for men only. In 1955, there were 266 junior colleges; students numbered 77,960, and the regular teachers totaled 5,525. Junior colleges, like the universities, require certification by the University Charter Committee. Qualifications are almost the same as for a four-year college, even as to teaching and entrance requirements. The curricula are arranged to permit its graduates to proceed to the four-year course, if desired. Although the junior college seems to contribute toward democratizing education by extending opportunities, there has been much argument since 1952 for and against its retention in the new system.

Reform of Educational Administration

Efforts to bring educational administration in line with the reforms of the system were made in the Board of Education Law (1948), the Ministry of Education Establishment Law (1949), and the Private School Law (1949). The major changes followed the three basic principles of democratization, decentralization, and independence of educational administration. To implement these, and departing from the old system, elective boards of education at village, town, city, and prefectural levels were established, freeing education from direct control of the Ministry of Education and placing responsibility upon the citizens. The Ministry simply became an advisory body, giving technical guidance rather than directly supervising education. Beginning on November 1, 1948, boards of education were established in the forty-six prefectures, the five largest cities, and forty-six other cities, towns, and villages. To avert confusion that might arise from immediately establishing the system in nearly 10,000 local self-government bodies, the organization of boards for all other cities, towns, and villages was not made compulsory until 1950. This period was later extended to November 1, 1952, partly because of a lingering doubt as to the soundness of applying the system to such small local bodies. In a general election on October 1, 1952, 9,950 new boards were established, and the system went into full operation.

Each board, operating through a council system, had the right to adopt and execute powers of administration in

education, science, and culture. The prefectural boards had seven members, while the city, town, and village boards had five. One member was elected from among members of each local assembly, the rest by direct vote of the inhabitants. Tenure was for four years, with half the board elected every two years. The functions of the boards were to supervise the superintendents of education, appoint and dismiss educational personnel of all schools below high school level in its jurisdiction, draw up educational estimates for the year and present them to the local assembly, and handle the licensing of teachers.

Paralleling changes in the public school system, the private educational system was also changed, by the basic Private School Law of December 1949. The law set up certain academic standards and also tried to stipulate that private schools should be operated in the public interest and to foster their independence from the supervision of government authorities. At the same time, for major changes in practice or programs private school officials were required to consult either the Council for Private Universities, in matters relating to that level, or the Council for Private Schools, at the high school and lower levels. To ensure a degree of democratization, the law also declared that a private school must have more officials than the legally fixed minimum for the election of officers, must have restrictions against overweighting the board with members of a particular family, and finally must have an advisory council or consultative body. The law of March 1950 also makes it possible for a private school to receive financial aid from the state or local public bodies. A Private School Promotion Law in 1952 paved the way for private schools to obtain loans and subsidies more easily. In January 1954, the Private School Teachers' Mutual Relief Association Law established associations to develop private education by promoting the welfare of teachers, supported by subsidies or grants from the central government, prefectures, and the Private School Promoting Society.

In connection with a general governmental reorganization and streamlining program, the Ministry of Education was reorganized in May 1949, and in June 1952 underwent further reorganization to adjust to changes required by the Board of Education and other laws. As a result of these measures, the Ministry shifted its emphasis from compulsory supervision to guidance and advice, based upon learning, technique, and experience. The reorganization also reflected the shifting of control from the central government to local autonomy, while at the same time establishing clearly the minimum standards necessary for the distribution of research, statistics, and studies in education, science, and culture.

Under the Ministry of Education were organized eighteen councils on a variety of subjects. The most important was the Central Educational Council, which in 1952, after the Education Reform Committee had completed its work, was to act as a consultative body to the Ministry. With a membership of fifteen men of learning and experience, it seeks to secure political neutrality in educational administration, and to it almost all important basic educational policies are referred for study and advice.

Revision of Reform

Any review of postwar educational developments must recognize that they owed much to the direction and well-meant guidance of SCAP. At the same time, it must be conceded that often occupation authorities were ignorant of Japan's historical background, society, and psychology. As a result some re-

forms went to extreme in their high-handed instructions and directives, though one must take into account also the effect of interpretation and assistance by Japanese whose only qualification was a command of English. It is also apparent that a number of reforms produced results contrary to expectations. One such example was SCAP's attitude toward the Japan Teachers Union. SCAP encouraged the union's formation and activities, gave it the right to strike, and was so indulgent that the union soon began to play a leading role in major strikes, including the general strike scheduled for February 1, 1947. Such a policy left a deep-rooted problem that still remains to plague Japanese education, a result largely produced by the disinclination of occupation authorities to give thoughtful ear to responsible Japanese who had sincere, considered advice to offer.

In this general situation, revision of the reforms themselves and political issues related to the administration of education came actively in question.

Soon after General MacArthur was replaced by General Matthew Ridgway as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in April 1951, the Japanese government and other bodies were given freedom to examine and reconsider postwar legislation and administrative reforms with the intent of making them conform more closely to the real conditions of Japan. This re-examination took place in the midst of a rapidly changing scene. The Peace Treaty brought national independence in April 1952, when the Korean War had not yet reached its final compromise settlement. The repeal of the major purge restrictions returned former ruling conservative forces to public activity, many regaining a voice in politics and government. The educational world also witnessed a whirl of varying opinions concerning revision.

Educational philosophy challenged

In January 1956, Minister of Education Ichiro Kiyose, a depurgee, questioned for the first time the philosophy of education underlying the Fundamental Law on Education. He stressed the necessity for amendment, pointing out the lack of national consciousness in the new idea of education, for example, its complete disregard of the idea of *ko* (obedience to parents, or filial piety) as a traditional Japanese virtue. This point is certain to be hotly argued in connection with revision of the Constitution, which other Liberal Democratic members desire.

The 6–3–3–4 system

Other reforms had been challenged earlier, for even in the fall of 1951, some individuals, partly out of an emotional reaction, insisted on an over-all re-examination of the 6–3–3–4 system because of the financial problems involved in its support. They were overruled by a majority opinion which opposed change, though accepting a possible need to revise details of operation. As of 1956 it seems clear that the principle of the 6–3–3–4 system will be retained for some time to come.

Social science courses

Some critics also urge the necessity of revising the formula of basing teaching in elementary and middle schools on the experiences of daily life in the direction of more emphasis on courses of study with scientific, specific, logical topics, but again general opinion seems to support the current practice. The social science courses, however, have become the most controversial among the subjects of study. The question is whether teachers can offer a properly balanced general education in combined subjects of history, geography, civics, and morals, all of which used to be taught in separate courses before the war. It is asked, should not the history of Japan be made a compulsory subject, from the standpoint of national consciousness? In a country where church and church schools have little influence upon the citizens, is it not necessary to give students a personal, humanitarian education in order to appreciate the practical values of democracy? And too, there have been complaints about a politically slanted education in the social science courses.

In such an atmosphere of criticism, the Course of Study Council, one of the eighteen established in the Ministry of Education, adopted in August 1952 a revised course of instruction in the social science courses which went into operation in April 1954. The main aims of the revision were to give continuity and correlation to social science subjects in elementary and middle schools; to readjust concrete objectives and areas of study according to grades and to systematize subjects in the three fields of history, geography, and civics; and to conduct moral education through general teaching, without setting up any special course for it, and especially to direct the attention of pupils to moral sense and custom whenever human relationships are referred to in their studies.

Other issues

Since 1952, also, teaching methods have been revised, as educators have discovered that guidance through appropriate motivation is desirable to overcome self-indulgence from a too great emphasis upon individual choice and selection of study.

There have also been demands for revision of the high school system, for the alteration or abolition of school districts, and for correction of the excesses of the optional course system in the high schools.

Revision of courses

Against such a background, the Ministry of Education carried through an over-all revision of courses of study, based upon recommendations reached by its Course of Study Council, which canvassed the problems from December 1952 to August 1954. The most important principles determined upon for forming a curriculum of study are as follows: to prepare common subjects and units of study as much as possible for the first-year classes; to provide a variety of courses of study in line with the goals and abilities of pupils as they enter upper classes; to increase the quality of students' preparation for specialized study by restricting the number of optional courses permitted; and to allow recombinations of compulsory courses as occasion demands.

New-system daigaku

Criticisms were also directed against the new-system daigaku, on the grounds that it is reckless for impoverished postwar Japan to have more than 220 daigaku. There is, however, widespread misunderstanding on this subject. Some people do not seem to know that the term *shinsei daigaku* ("new-system university or college") includes both universities and colleges, though since the Meiji era the term "daigaku" has generally meant "university." If both can be called "daigaku," the number of daigaku students in 1954 is almost the same as in the year before the reform of the educational system, 475,000 as compared to 470,000. At the same time, it is an incontestable fact that there are differences in scale, structure, and quality among the new-system universities or colleges. The Ministry of Education has classified national universities into three types: universities with graduate schools, which attach importance to a high degree of scientific

research; universities stressing the training of professional experts; and those engaged in teacher training.

The standards of a daigaku have undergone revision. Readjustment took place after studies of American practice and that of other countries. To help private institutions financially, medical and dental colleges were authorized to separate premedical or predental training from the four-year faculty. Although the juxtaposition of a four-year and a two-year course in colleges primarily engaged in teacher training was also criticized, it was adjudged a necessary evil for the time being.

STUDENT GUIDANCE

One of the most urgent postwar problems was guidance for students, who were drifting about in the midst of political, economic, social, and intellectual chaos. Unfortunately students, not responsible for the war, defeat, and its aftermath, have had to suffer from the postwar ravage, humiliation, and poverty. They lacked confidence in adults and their superiors, while they sought a firm new principle of life amidst the collapse of traditional values. Lacking the experience necessary to recognize the reasons for their difficulties, they were liable in their pent-up dissatisfaction and indignation to fall prey to Communist propaganda. Under the sponsorship of left-wing students, the National Federation of Students' Self-Government Associations (Zengakuren [10]) was organized early in 1948. With branches throughout the country, it organized a Communist cell in practically every institution, which brought about a rapid succession of disturbances inside and outside schools. Because of this activity, many people supposed that the masses of Japanese students were drifting towards the extreme left. But the genuine leftists, even at the peak of their strength, were perhaps only some 4 or 5 per cent of the total number of students. To insulate students from radicalism, there was no other means than to teach them a democratic way of thinking, to build up their social, scientific faculty to recognize reality, and to train them to express courageously their own independent opinions.

In Japan, however, there are very few universities with an adequate system of guidance. To correct this shortcoming, Dr. Wesley Parkinson Lloyd and three other experts were invited from the United States in June 1951 and stayed for almost a year. In April 1955, Dr. Lloyd paid a second visit to Japan and assumed leadership in a study of student guidance programs.

SCHOLARSHIPS

Another urgent problem connected with student guidance was how to strengthen the Japan Scholarship Society, a government auxiliary organ established in 1944 to encourage study. Its primary function was to extend monetary grants to talented boys and girls on very generous terms, in order to help the large number of able students who because of financial difficulties were in danger of losing "equal opportunities" for education. In 1952, students who had to work their way amounted to 60 per cent of the total number. About 7.3 per cent of these received Japan Scholarship Society scholarships. In the past fiscal year, the Society contributed to the financial support of 220,000 students.

Japan Scholarship Society grants have been supported by every political party and cabinet in the postwar period. From a budget of 13 million yen in 1946, the sum was increased to 4,400 million in 1956, a 350 per cent increase. In the meantime, its collections from loans amounted to 10,000 million yen. It is estimated that 2,000 million yen a year more is required to meet the demands of all students who qualify for Society scholarships.

[10] An abbreviation for Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sorengo.

JAPAN TEACHERS UNION [11]

To disregard the existence of the teachers' unions, which have a peculiar influence in educational circles in postwar Japan, would be to ignore a vital problem in the present educational system and the political issues it has created.

On December 1, 1945, Zenkyo [12] (All-Japan Schoolteachers' Union), which included a number of ultraleftist leaders affiliated with the Communist party, was organized in Tokyo. On the following day, the Nikkyo [13] (Japan Educators' Union) was also established in Tokyo. Although both desired to organize a single national union, they flatly opposed each other because of political and ideological differences. Through a strenuous campaign with the help of other radical labor unions, Zenkyo developed into the Zenkyokyo [14] (National Conference of Schoolteachers) in 1946, with a membership of 340,000, and joined the projected general strike scheduled for February 1, 1947, which was banned at the last minute by General MacArthur. In the meantime, the moderate Nikkyo had been reorganized into the Kyozenren [15] (National League of Schoolteachers' Unions), with a membership of only 10,000. With occupation encouragement, the two unions were finally merged in June 1947 into one body, the Nikkyoso [16] (Japan Teachers Union) of the present day. The leadership of the new union inevitably fell into the hands of the former leftist Zenkyo faction, which conducted fruitful campaigns for the establishment of a minimum wage system, security in the right to a living, and betterment of working conditions.

Political tendencies

The revision of the National Public Service Law in November 1948, based upon General MacArthur's letter to the Prime Minister of July 22, 1948, took from nonoperative public officials the right to strike and the right of collective bargaining. This drove the Japan Teachers Union into an intense struggle to protect their vested rights and organization. In this struggle, the leadership increasingly leaned to the left. At the time of the general elections of January 1949, nearly 3,000 of its members, it is said, joined the Communist party. In September of that year, nearly half of its central executive committee, however, joined the Social Democratic party, and in May of the following year, under the slogan of a united democratic labor front, the union associated itself with the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo [17]). At its national convention in 1951, just prior to the San Francisco Peace Conference, the Japan Teachers Union adopted the so-called "four peace principles" advocated by the Social

[11] See Daishiro Hidaka, *Kyoiku Kaikaku e no Michi* ("The Way Toward Education Reform") (Tokyo: Yoyosha, 1954); Kazuasa Ishii, *Ushinawareta Kyoiku* ("Lost Education") (Hobunsha, 1954); Shigeo Odachi, *Watashi no Mita Nikkyoso* ("The Japan Teachers Union I have Seen") (Tokyo: Shinseikisha, 1955). Ishii is a former member of the central committee of the Japan Teachers Union, and Mr. Odachi, a former Minister of Education.

[12] Abbreviation for Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai.

[13] Abbreviation for Nihon Kyoikusha Kumiai.

[14] Abbreviation for Zenkoku Kyoin Kyogikai.

[15] Abbreviation for Kyoin Kumiai Zenkoku Renmei.

[16] Abbreviation for Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai.

[17] Abbreviation for Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai.

Democratic party: an all-inclusive peace treaty, neutrality, no rearmament, and no military bases for foreign troops after a treaty. Ever since, the union has conducted its activities with almost the same strategy and objectives as a political party, closely allied with the Left-Wing Social Democrats.

With a membership of over 500,000 in 1956, and with forty-six prefectural federations organized under eight district councils under the control of its Tokyo central headquarters, the Japan Teachers Union is the largest union in Japan. It has a working budget of almost 130 million yen, excluding nearly 220 million in its special account. Discontinued as a legal labor union in 1948, it is not even an employees union as authorized under the National Public Service Law, but merely a private association. Yet it has the entity of a labor union, the power of a political body, and the character of an educational research organ. It uses these functions skillfully, sometimes separately and sometimes in combination.

Since its formation in 1947, the Japan Teachers Union had adopted the definition of a teacher as an educational worker who is a part of the class struggle. It has subsequently developed its welfare division into the School Life Co-operative Association, with a branch in every prefecture. Handling daily necessities, including school supplies, it has even launched a book-supply business, taking advantage of its influence on both selection and sales. On at least two occasions, the Fair Trade Commission has had to send it warnings.

In its early political activity, the Japan Teachers Union organized a national movement to press for completion of the 6–3–3–4 system and to oppose reductions in educational budgets, and called for educational rehabilitation conferences. After joining Sohyo in 1950, the Japan Teachers Union took up political issues and assumed a leading role in urging a collective peace treaty. Its political strength is shown in the fact that in the 1950 elections for the House of Councillors it elected 8 union members, and in the local elections the following year helped elect 10 governors and 150 members of local assemblies. Among 140 members of prefectural boards of education were 49 teachers, 42 of them union members. With the intent of legalizing its political activities, Japan Teachers Union organized in August 1952 a twin body, the Japan Teachers Political League, renamed in November the Japan Democratic Education Political League (Nisseiren [18]). All Diet members affiliated with this league were members of the Left Socialist party and swayed by the Japan Teachers Union policy in their party activities.

Conventions

The Japan Teachers Union also has the character of an educational research body. In 1951 its national convention adopted resolutions to affiliate with the World Confederation of the Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) and to hold an annual convention for the study of teaching based on the principle that "the right course and method of teaching can be discovered by teaching experience." The fifth of these annual meetings was held in February 1956, attended by several thousand teachers, with lecturers chosen from among so-called "progressive" scholars. Communists are reported to be the behind-the-scenes directors of the conventions. By the "right course and method of teaching" the union seeks to make the teacher and the union weapons in the class struggle. Behind their slogans, such as "education for peace and humanity," "world peace," "national independence," "democracy," and "defense of living," one finds anti-American, antiliberal, pro-Soviet, and pro–Communist China leanings and the Marxist interpretation of the class struggle.

[18] Abbreviation for Nihon Minshu Kyoiku Seiji Renmei.

Despite its size, publicity, and frequent attempts to indoctrinate pupils in the classroom, there may not be so much danger in the activities of the Japan Teachers Union as the Ministry of Education, the police, and other agencies have reported. None the less, it is indisputable that there have been many infringements of "political neutrality in education," as provided for in Article 10 of the Fundamental Law on Education.

An example of the Japan Teachers Union members' attempts to influence education in a most decidedly unneutral way is the *Diaries of Elementary School Children,* compiled by the Japan Teachers Union in southern Yamaguchi prefecture. The compilation became the objective of much controversy in June 1953 because its contents were excessively anti-American and pro-Soviet. A second example is the strike of pupils in a Kyoto City middle school, which resulted from demonstrated prejudice in classroom education.

POLITICS AND EDUCATIONAL REVISION

As the evidence of the political unneutrality of union members in their teaching piled up, the Ministry of Education determined to take steps to prevent such one-sided education.

The result was the introduction early in 1954 of a bill to secure and enforce political neutrality in compulsory schools. The purpose of the bill was not only to secure political neutrality but to protect the independence of the teacher by making it illegal to incite teachers to teach contrary to Article 10 of the Fundamental Law on Education. No offender could be indicted unless requested by his local board of education. At the same time the government presented a companion bill to limit the political activities of public school teachers. Although vigorously opposed by the union, the Left Socialist party, and many newspapers and commentators, the bills were passed after only slight amendment.

Decentralization issue

Generally speaking, the educational administration system is open to the charge of confusing democratization with decentralization. Because of the deep-rooted tradition that survives in the semifeudal customs of the provinces, decentralization of the administrative system at random has served only to slacken the speed of democratization. When the boards of education were first organized in 1948, occupation authorities insisted on decentralization, and the Ministry of Education had no alternative but to seek a compromise by postponing its enforcement. After the summer of 1951, the question of the boards of education system was referred to the Council for Government Ordinance, the Council for the Board of Education System, and the Local Administration Investigating Committee. No one supported the system, and opinion was evenly divided as to its propriety. As the time approached to institute a board of education in every city, town, and village in 1952, violent debates occurred. Not only were the Japan Teachers Union, the Left and Right Social Democratic parties and the press opposed, but some responsible government officials were also reluctant to institute the system. The Yoshida Cabinet, however, did not postpone its adoption, but instituted it on schedule, presumably as a countermove against the Japan Teachers Union, believing that conservatives would dominate the new local boards and thus help check

the influence of the Japan Teachers Union in the prefectural boards of education.

The compulsory establishment of the new system in every city, town, and village in 1952 imposed a heavy financial burden on each locality, though it appears not to have had any effect upon the quality or character of education offered. On the other hand, most local communities are suffering from difficulties in obtaining qualified superintendents, administrative confusion, and problems in exchange of personnel.

Although the adoption of the complete system was designed to curb the Japan Teachers Union in 1952, the tables have turned in 1956. The Liberal Democratic party came to insist upon the abolition of these local boards to help simplify administration, while the Japan Teachers Union and the Social Democrats fought to preserve its original form. In June 1956 the government forced through the Diet important amendments to the Board of Education Law which go into effect in October 1956. The number of members on prefectural boards is reduced from seven to five, and on lower levels from five to three. In place of direct popular election, the new law provides that members at each level shall be appointed by the chief executive official, subject to the approval of the local assembly of that level. Superintendents of education on the prefectural level are to be appointed by the governor subject to the approval of the Minister of Education, while superintendents on the city-village-town level require the approval of the prefectural board of education. The important right to hire and fire teachers on the city-village-town level is given to the prefectural boards of education, though the local principal and the local boards of eductaion have the right to submit information or opinions to the higher board. To the chief executive of each local unit of government is transferred the power to draw up the annual educational budget, in consultation with his respective board of education. And finally, the Minister of Education is given the express authority to issue "advice," "instructions," and "guidance" to all local educational bodies.[19]

The subject of heated controversy, the bill passed the Diet in the closing days of the session in June 1956, provoking stormy debates and finally riots in the upper chamber which required the President of that body to call in uniformed policemen to maintain decorum. This bill and the attendant riots became a major issue in the July 8, 1956, elections of the House of Councillors. For whatever significance it may have, all opponents of the bill up for re-election won easily.

The proposal indicated that the government is trying to correct the excessive decentralization of the educational system and to adapt it to more traditional Japanese practice. At the same time, the government is attempting to bring national unity out of the diversity of local education, somewhat after the pattern of British educational practice.

Textbooks

A companion bill introduced at the same time and clearly aimed at the influence of the Japan Teachers Union over the distribution, supply, and choice of textbooks, was the school textbook bill. The proposal provided that the examination—and approval—of school textbooks be under the direct control of the Minister of Education, after consultation with the School Textbooks Examination Council. The standards and procedures for examination and approval were likewise to be revised. The measure also provided that members of the School Textbooks Examination Council be appointed by the Minister of Education. In addition, a registration system for publishers and suppliers of textbooks was prepared, in order to exclude those unqualified. Like the board of education bill, this became a subject of political controversy. The government was charged by its opponents, both within and outside political parties, of seeking to revive state control of education. On March 2, the President of Tokyo University and nine other presidents of leading educational institutions and prominent leaders in the educational field issued a joint attack on the two bills and proclaimed that they threatened the autonomy and neutrality of education. The school textbook bill did not pass.

[19] "Chiho Kyoiku Gyosei no Soshiki oyobi Unei ni Kansuru Horitsuan Sonota" ("Bill Concerning the Administrative System of Local Education and Its Operations and Other Matters") passed the National Diet June 2, 1956; see also *Kokkai Junpo* ("Ten-Day Reports, National Diet"), June 15, 1956, pp. 47–48.

The dilemma

That scholars, educators, and the press should entertain deep misgivings over any revival of state control over education is understandable. But the problem still remains of how to remedy the evils of the Japan Teachers Union. It would not be proper to pass political judgment on the educational system of Japan without considering adequate countermeasures against the excesses and the infringements of the spirit of the new educational system which the Japan Teachers Union represents.

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Japan's Foreign Relations

By Katsuo Okazaki

FROM the time of surrender in 1945 until the Peace Treaty went into effect in 1952, all matters pertaining to Japan's foreign relations were under the jurisdiction of SCAP—the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. During these six and one-half years, Japan had no external diplomacy worthy of the name. Her major "foreign relations" were domestic ones, dealing with the occupation forces and the headquarters of SCAP.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs During the Occupation

Because of the absence of any genuine foreign relations, whenever the question of retrenchment in government offices or personnel arose, the abolition of the Foreign Ministry was certain to be suggested. The argument was simple: since there was no diplomacy, there was no need for a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The naïveté of such a suggestion and the importance of foreign relations under the occupation are amply demonstrated by the fact that three of the five prime ministers who held office between 1945 and 1952 were former career diplomats: Kijuro Shidehara, Shigeru Yoshida, and Hitoshi Ashida.[1] Fully understanding the need for a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they rejected the nearsighted proposals for its abolition that came from some government quarters and even from SCAP, and succeeded in preserving it.

Since most foreign service officers were engaged in liaison duties with SCAP headquarters as members of the Central Liaison Office, or attached to other ministries for the same purpose, only a small staff remained in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself, engaged in research and study. The abolition of the Central Liaison Office in 1949 and the absorption of its successor organ, the Central Liaison and Co-ordination Office, as a part of the ministry was largely an organization-chart change, though it bolstered the institutional structure of the ministry. The revival of the normal functioning and duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began in February 1950 with the establishment of seven Japanese Overseas Agencies in the major cities of the world and the dispatch of a small number of diplomatic officials to staff them.[2] By April 1954 their number had increased to thirty-one. The duties of these diplomatic offices were first to promote trade and commerce, and second to perform normal consular functions. They were not, of course, accredited to the governments of the countries where they were established. Each office established required the formal approval of SCAP, and through SCAP of the government concerned. Until the signing of a peace treaty, this was as far as Japan could go toward achieving normal diplomatic relations.

[1] Shidehara served from October 9, 1945 to April 22, 1946; Yoshida headed five cabinets in all from May 22, 1946, to May 20, 1947, from October 15, 1948 to December 7, 1954; Ashida held office from February 23 to October 7, 1948.

[2] The first Japanese Overseas Agencies (later renamed Japanese Government Overseas Agencies) were established in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, Taipeh, Paris, and London. See Japanese Government, *Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan* (Tokyo: Section of Special Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1951), Vol. 2, Supplement, pp. 14–17.

The successful resumption of full-scale diplomatic relations after 1952, however, was not merely a simple matter of reopening offices and appointing men. The training of Japanese Foreign Service Officers requires much effort and time, for besides having a knowledge and judgment of international affairs and being fully conversant with international law and international conventions, a Japanese diplomat needs extensive training in such foreign languages as English, French, and Spanish. They cannot, like their American and British counterparts, go everywhere and still converse in their own tongue. If at the end of the war the foreign ministry had been abolished, even temporarily, and its officials dispersed, Japan would have faced great difficulties in executing her foreign policy after independence. Even after regaining her full sovereignty, Japan faced and still faces a lack of trained officers. High recognition and credit are due the former officials of the ministry who as prime ministers enabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue during the occupation.

The initial opposition at the end of the war to the existence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gradually disappeared. Important issues such as economic rehabilitation and the conclusion of the Peace Treaty itself obviously emphasized the significance of relations with foreign countries even beyond that of prewar days. As the end of the occupation approached, the Foreign Office came to take upon itself the duty of co-ordinating the policies of various ministries and guiding their course toward expansion of trade and the conclusion of peace treaties.

Yoshida and the Peace Treaty

The major task was the Peace Treaty itself. It is no exaggeration to say that Japan's policies during the occupation were focused upon regaining independence at the earliest possible date. This work fell primarily upon the shoulders of Shigeru Yoshida, who after his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Higashikuni Cabinet in September 1945 served nine months in that office until his appointment as prime minister in May 1946. In the next eight and one-half years Yoshida held the post of prime minister for more than six years and during that period, prior to April 1952, was concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was the central figure in Japan's postwar politics during the period preceding and following the Peace Treaty. Ardently desiring the restoration of Japan's independence, he seemed to have given all the passion of his more than seventy years to attaining it, even to renouncing his cherished cigars. When it was decided that he was to be Japan's chief plenipotentiary delegate to the San Francisco Conference, Yoshida gave up smoking cigars, though his liking for them is probably no less than Sir Winston Churchill's. Although partly attributable to reasons of health, his abstention may well have been prompted also by the Oriental belief that when praying to the gods for help, one should express sincerity by abstaining from the things most liked. After the Peace Treaty had been signed without mishap, guests at the luncheon party given by United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson saw Mr. Yoshida savoring a cigar with great satisfaction, the first in several months.

Although it took six years before a peace treaty could be signed, the treaty itself did not solve every problem. There were many things that had to be done before Japan could re-establish her position in the international field, and a co-ordination of domestic and foreign policies was essential to accom-

plish them. What, then, were these problems?

THREEFOLD TASK OF DIPLOMACY AFTER 1952

Clearly the conclusion of a peace treaty was not an end in itself. The goal was independence, and the Peace Treaty was but a means to that end. When the Peace Treaty finally came into force, it could not be said that Japan had attained complete independence, a fact which had, of course, been foreseen.

In the first place, many countries in the world had not signed the treaty, particularly the countries immediately important to Japan in East Asia, such as China, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, and India. Nor had Japan concluded peace with any of the Communist countries, including Communist China and the Soviet Union. In addition there were nations with whom Japan had not been at war but with whom diplomatic relations had been severed as a result of defeat and the occupation. At the time of the San Francisco Conference, Japan's aim was to restore peace with as many countries and as soon as possible.

With a number of these nations, and particularly with those in Southeast Asia, a resumption of diplomatic ties was linked with the knotty problem of reparations. It was not a simple question of a mere formal exchange of diplomatic representatives and the opening of former offices.

Secondly, although Japan had gained her political independence in 1952, it would be only a nominal independence unless she had a viable economy to sustain it. In April 1952 Japan had a population of 87 million. Since she lacked natural resources, she had to import annually 2.1 or 2.2 billion dollars worth of goods. Exports amounted to a little over 1.2 billion dollars. Unless the gap of 800 million dollars could be filled, imports of critical goods needed for her people and industry would be reduced, with attendant hardships on all. Since income sources other than ordinary trade were in the red, the only way left, aside from expending all her scanty holdings of foreign currencies, was for Japan to rely upon income from the United States special procurements. These included the purchase of munitions and food supplies needed in the Korean War, materials for Korean rehabilitation, dollars spent in Japan by American military personnel, purchases of supplies for the American Security Forces stationed in Japan, and offshore procurement.

But Japan could not rely indefinitely upon such an unstable source of income, for there was no telling how long it would continue. It was urgent, therefore, to balance imports and exports. Former Prime Minister Yoshida laid stress upon an "economic foreign policy," stating that "there is no true independence without economic independence."

Thirdly, even if a nation attains political and economic independence it will not last long if its people lack patriotism and determination to preserve it. Defense power is necessary for national independence, but what is more necessary is a people's determination to sacrifice—even life itself if necessary—to uphold it. For whatever reasons, it seems that in postwar Japan there are some individuals, particularly among the youth, who act and speak in such a way as to make one wonder whether they are really Japanese or not. Japan had to face the problem of seriously seeking means of fostering the awareness of independence in the minds of the people, as well as of finding concrete measures of self-defense to protect her from the threat of aggression, without losing the faith and confidence of other nations.

These were the problems confronting Japan in 1952, problems not dissimilar to those facing other countries. Since April 1952, when the Peace Treaty went into effect, the government's policies, both domestic and diplomatic, have been directed towards attaining these three major objectives.

RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

In restoring peaceful relations with those nations which had not signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan first approached those with whom the opening of negotiations would not be too difficult. In 1952 peace treaties with the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan and with India were concluded. Neither of these nations insisted upon reparations.

Negotiations with the government of the Republic of Korea were started at about the same time but reached a deadlock over the "Rhee Line" issue, a unilateral extension of Korean territorial waters some sixty miles offshore, and property claims over the assets [3] in Japan owned by the Japanese firms registered in Korea at the end of the war. Complicated by shadows from the historical past, these negotiations have been resumed on numerous occasions since but have not been successfully concluded to date.

Next Japan entered into negotiations with Southeast Asian countries claiming reparations—the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, and the three countries in Indochina—as a necessary prelude to a restoration of diplomatic relations. At first, they demanded such huge reparations, the Philippines asking 8 billion dollars and Burma 10 billion dollars, that there was no possibility of an early understanding. Although the restoration of diplomatic relations seemed almost hopeless at one time, these nations gradually adopted a more realistic view. In 1954, a 200 million dollar reparations agreement was concluded with Burma and diplomatic relations established. Then in May 1956, a 550 million dollar reparations agreement was reached with the Philippines, and with the exchange of ratifications on July 23, 1956, of this and the companion peace treaty, diplomatic relations with that nation were once more restored. As the reparations accounts with the three countries of Indochina are expected to be small, they do not constitute much of a problem. Already there has been an exchange of ambassadors with these countries. The one major diplomatic reparations–peace treaty problem remaining unsettled in Southeast Asia is with the Indonesian Republic. Japan and Indonesia have already exchanged consuls, so that virtual diplomatic relations already exist.

Because Japan was not actually at war with many of the nations of Central and South America, the Middle and the Near East, and some countries in Europe, they posed no problem, and Japan successively restored diplomatic relations with them. As of 1956, Japan has resumed normal diplomatic ties with most of the countries of the world, except the Communist nations. Thus the first postindependence objective has been almost completely attained.

JAPAN AND COMMUNIST CHINA

Among the Communist countries Japan has especially close interest in the Soviet Union and Communist China. Because Japan has already accorded recognition to the National Chinese regime on Taiwan, recognition of the People's Republic of China will entail

[3] Of particular concern were the extensive holdings by Japanese citizens of long-standing investments in the Bank of Korea, Korean Railways, and other financial instruments of the Korean government itself. The Korean Republic sought possession of all these, together with Japanese-owned property in Korea held at the end of the war.

difficulties from the standpoint of international law. At present Japan has only small-scale trade relations with Communist China. Despite an increasing though modest degree of cultural interchange that has recently occurred, the existence of the unsettled repatriation of former Japanese military personnel retained in China and the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1952 remain as further obstacles. In the future, there is every indication that the question of recognition of Communist China may become a live diplomatic political issue. Since such an issue will inevitably raise questions of Communist China's admission to the United Nations and her repeated claims to liberate Taiwan, the issue has decidedly a wide impact upon Japan's foreign relations. The effects of these issues on the political situation in the Far East are inescapable.

Aside from the question of whether one recognizes Communist China or not, the existence of that government, controlling the mainland of China and ruling a population said to number 600 million, cannot be denied. It is unfortunate that the United States and Great Britain, the leaders of the democratic group of nations, differ so basically in their policies towards Communist China. The United States brands Communist China as an aggressor and bans the export of strategic materials to that country, blockading her coasts and preventing her ready communication with the outside world. Great Britain considers such a policy calculated to push Communist China further into the Soviet camp and is trying to encourage Communist China's intercourse with the free nations by opening the doors of each to the other. Apart from the respective merits of these two policies, the disunity in the policies of the democratic nations offers Communist China the opportunity of playing one democratic nation against the other.

As a neighbor to the Chinese mainland and traditionally close to the ancient culture of China, Japan cannot be indifferent to the role of Communist China in the world, nor to the attitude of the members of the free nations toward her. Former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida brought up the question of divergent policies of the democratic nations with the leaders of the United States and Great Britain when abroad in 1954, in the hope of obtaining some fundamental common policy, but his attempt was not successful.

RELATIONS WITH USSR

A major diplomatic problem for Japan in 1956 is her relations with the Soviet Union. Although the USSR failed to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, her diplomatic mission that had existed in Tokyo during the occupation, attached to the Allied Council, continued to remain even without any formal recognition by the Japanese government. Since 1952, and even before, in the first Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, the Soviet Union had suggested the restoration of diplomatic relations on a number of occasions and in various ways. In December 1954, when the first Hatoyama Cabinet was formed, the Soviet Union proposed through its unofficial representative in Tokyo that diplomatic relations be promptly restored. Negotiations opened in London the following year, only to end in a stalemate in March 1956 over Japanese insistence upon the repatriation of her nationals detained by the Soviet Union and the return of the southern Kurile Islands. The Soviet Union countered by a ban on fishing in important northern Pacific waters. Negotiations in Moscow in May of this year produced a modified lifting of the fishing ban and paved the way to a resumption of formal treaty negotiations, with Prime Minister Hatoyama's trip to Moscow in October 1956.

PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Besides restoring diplomatic relations with individual states, Japan wishes, as a member of the world community of nations, to contribute to world peace and prosperity by joining the United Nations and other international organizations. Japan's admission to the United Nations has not yet been realized due to Soviet veto in 1952 and 1956, but she has already joined the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. As a council nation in ECAFE and as the holder of other influential positions, Japan has been contributing to the activities of these organizations.

ATTAINING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

Attaining the second major diplomatic objective has been very difficult. In a miserable state at the close of the war and with her territory reduced to less than one half of what it had been, Japan had to face the added problem of the return of millions of her nationals repatriated from abroad. Over 80 million people were crowded into a country smaller than the state of California. The greater part of the nation's wealth had been spent in military expenditures or lost in air raids. Her overseas assets were confiscated by the Allied powers. The question of how to maintain a minimum standard of living for her people posed a difficult problem. A combined program was begun in 1949, and renewed in 1953 after the Korean War boom, to promote economic stability at home by austerity and to increase exports abroad. By 1954 it had succeeded in greatly narrowing the gap between imports and exports. The upward trend in 1954 continued in 1955 and appears to be still in process. Today, Japan needs to rely less and less on United States special procurements to balance her foreign trade.

This goal was achieved not by domestic policies alone. Application of the so-called "economic foreign policy" naturally differs according to the nation involved, and therefore cannot be summarily discussed. But it is true that Japan's foreign policy since independence has stressed in every possible way the expansion of trade and the increase of exports. To this end Japan has sought to promote friendly relations with various countries in an effort to eliminate the misunderstanding that she is seeking to increase her exports by unfair competition. This has meant the conclusion of many treaties of commerce and trade agreements. To expand markets and to promote mutual understanding, Japan has also dispatched trade missions to the American continents, Southeast Asia, the Middle and the Near East, and other parts of the world. In relations with such countries as Great Britain, particularly sensitive to threats of Japanese competition, Japan invited British experts in cotton textiles and ceramics to Japan to show them that Japanese goods were not imitations of British goods or designs. The recent decrease in British complaints about Japanese competition is believed to be a result of such efforts. Japan joined GATT (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1955, and further endeavored to establish good trade relations. Remaining problems are suggested by the fact that some fourteen member nations of GATT have yet to extend full and equal treatment to Japan.

Toward Southeast Asia, where trade

is especially important to Japan, the government adopted the following three policies:

1. Elimination of trade barriers, easing of import restrictions, import quotas, and tariff barriers, conclusion of treaties of commerce and trade agreements, liberalizing of mutual exchange of products, and promotion of multilateral trade.

2. Lowering of production costs, essential if Japanese goods are to remain competitive once the doors to a freer trade are opened.

3. Increasing the purchasing power of the trading countries. The demand for Japanese goods in Southeast Asian countries is high, but these countries are so extremely impoverished that they cannot buy even if they wish. Japan, therefore, sought to devise means to increase their purchasing power through payment of reparations, development of resources, investments, setting up joint enterprises, and the purchase by Japan of large quantities of raw materials.

These policies were gradually put into full operation. In 1956 Japan's trade with Southeast Asia, which seems destined to become her most important trading area, is about to surpass her trade with the United States.

It appears that Japan's effort to attain economic independence is nearing the point of success. But because of the keen character of international competition, further efforts are, of course, required.

COMPLICATIONS IN FOSTERING THE SPIRIT OF INDEPENDENCE

The diplomatic problems involved in Japan's modest efforts to create a defense establishment were threefold. First was the possibility of misunderstanding by other nations that rearmament for self-defense meant a return to the path that led the nation to the holocaust of the last war. Secondly, the problem patently involved diplomatic relations with the United States, because of the Security Treaty of September 1951, the Administrative Agreement of February 1952, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of March 1954. Thirdly, to eliminate any possibility of a misunderstanding abroad required that the people of Japan be convinced that a defense establishment was exactly that, defense. For unless the people of Japan are fully convinced of this fact, more than convinced, give it their full unstinted support, not only will that defense be futile but other nations would pardonably entertain reservations themselves.

Thus while it may seem an odd aspect of foreign relations or diplomacy, one of the tasks undertaken was to promote a fuller and more accurate understanding of the need, the problem, and the nature of self-defense requirements among the Japanese people. This meant "fostering the spirit of independence."

Though it sounds simple, it was and is a very difficult problem. After the war, Japan's military installations were completely destroyed, her military forces disbanded, and the nation left without any means of defense. Further, Article 9 of the Constitution, written under the direction of the occupation authorities, stipulated that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." Through these and other occupation measures, such as the banning of pensions and aid to the families of several million soldiers who had been called into service and died for their country, the people were led to abhor the military forces without always having particular reasons.

When, after the Korean War broke out, the occupation authorities quickly became concerned with Japan's lack of defense, the Japanese people cannot be blamed for being skeptical. Since that time the United States government has taken every opportunity to press for the strengthening of the self-defense forces and Japan's rearmament, as everyone knows, and Japan also accepted this in principle when she signed the Security Treaty in 1951. But having been taught that it was right not to have any armed forces and that the ideal set forth in the Japanese Constitution will be attained when world peace is achieved, the people had become quite indifferent to the need of defending their own country. Many Japanese, particularly the young people, misunderstood the moves for rearmament as not being for the benefit of Japan but for the benefit of the United States. A tendency grew to regard the early self-defense establishment as the mercenaries of the United States. Thus, despite the government's efforts to explain the situation, many Japanese opposed rearmament even without weighing the issue.

Constitutional revision

After various studies of the causes for the people's reluctance to rearm, the Japanese government concluded that although it seemed a very far-fetched idea, the first thing to be done was to revise the Constitution and other systems identified with the era of occupation reform. After all, the new laws and institutions were of an alien origin, many of which were incomprehensible to the Japanese people. The objective was and is to preserve the merits of the reforms but to make them a part of Japanese life and blood. Otherwise how were the people to work for their country, how were they to be expected to defend it with their lives? Unless the changes instituted under the occupation regime thoroughly reflect the best of the Japanese traditions, culture, and social system, was it not asking too much of the people to be patriotic?

However, unless Japan is careful, such moves at revision may be misunderstood by various foreign countries as an attempt to revert to the old, discredited past, to revert to militarism. Therefore a dispelling of the misunderstandings entertained by some countries, particularly those of Southeast Asia, who still watch Japan's attitudes with skepticism, was and is required. Fortunately, friendly feelings and mutual understanding between Japan and Southeast Asian countries have greatly increased recently through an exchange of culture and technology and co-operation in economic fields. In all of this Japan's foreign policy and her foreign relations are involved. It is believed that Southeast Asian countries may not pose difficult problems. However, Communist China and South Korea may attach very erroneous interpretations to the question of Japan's self-defense as well as to her efforts to make her own the reforms of the period before 1952.

U. S.–Japan Security Treaty

A major factor in the total problem is Japan's relations with the United States over the security issue and particularly the United States Security Forces now stationed in Japan under the terms of the Security Treaty and related agreements. The Security Treaty is but a temporary measure. The United States Security Forces will not remain in Japan indefinitely. The pride of an independent country will not permit the indefinite stationing of foreign troops in its territory.

The friendly feelings of the Japanese people towards the United States greatly deepened after the war, and Japan now views the United States as her ally. However, the demands of the United States Security Forces for expansion of the military bases which eventually lead to requisitioning of land from the people are being opposed and have re-

sulted in cooling the friendly feelings of the Japanese people toward the United States. The situation is such that the Security Treaty of 1951 may end by becoming the source of anti-American movements. For this reason among others, Japan herself desires the early establishment of an adequate self-defense setup which would enable the United States Security Forces to withdraw.

Understanding is needed

Japan's foreign policy must be directed toward deepening foreign nations' understanding of Japan. Domestically, it must aim at making the people fully understand the world situation and what Japan must do to become a powerful nation which, as a member of the international community of nations, will contribute to peace and prosperity of the world.

NEUTRALISM AND UNITED STATES RELATIONS

In outlining the basic policies pursued by Japan since her independence, emphasis has been laid upon the diplomatic aspects of the general policies. Fortunately, these policies are gradually being implemented, though the progress is slow. Japan's course seems to have been finally established.

Intimately related to Japan's diplomacy since 1952 have been two other problems which require a further discussion, the relations between Japan and the United States and the policy of neutrality.

The relationship between Japan and the United States is not merely that of two friendly nations but that of two nations in an alliance under the Security Treaty. Consequently, every cabinet since the end of the war has made friendly relations with the United States the basis of its foreign policy. Despite this fact, anti-American movements have frequently occurred in Japan in opposition to United States military bases and other issues. Even during the occupation people used to say that GHQ was an abbreviation of "Go Home Quickly."

Recently, the issue of land requisition by United States military forces in Okinawa has produced heated arguments not only in Okinawa but also in Japan proper.[4] The primary objective of the United States forces in Okinawa as well as of the Security Forces in Japan is the security of Japan and the maintenance of peace in the Far East. If by any chance a situation should arise under which these United States forces were forced to act in defense of Japan, Japan's self-defense forces and all her people would be in duty bound to act in concert with them for the defense of Japan. In such a case, mutual friendship and confidence between Japan and the United States would be most important. Lacking this, United States military personnel would not readily sacrifice themselves for the defense of Japan. Japanese politicians must point out this fact to the Japanese people and make efforts to win their understanding. The United States government should also view Japanese-American relations from a broad perspective and refrain from taking steps in minor matters which would unnecessarily incite anti-American sentiments. The governments of the two countries and their people are in complete unison in their basic thinking on the question of Japanese-American relations. However, there is cause for great concern, because in the handling of concrete

[4] The question became a political issue during the campaign for the House of Councillors in June–July 1956, through the release on June 13 of the subcommittee report of United States Congressman Melvin Price for the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Japanese newspapers carried the account in issues of June 14. From this date on, the press was full of the subject.

issues far-reaching considerations are apt to be forgotten.

Public opinion in Japan

In Japan, only a very small number of extreme leftists oppose Japan's basic policy of being a member of the democratic group and of promoting Japanese-American friendship and assert that Japan should instead join the Communist orbit. However, there are, among the women, the young people, and the intellectuals, some who, referring to the example of India, advocate the so-called policy of neutrality and assert that Japan must firmly maintain a position of neutrality, leaning neither to the United States nor the Soviet Union. This trend of thought, capitalized on by the left-wing elements who aim to alienate Japan from the free camp, is being given exaggerated publicity.

Policy statement, 1953

Following Japan's recovery of independence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs analyzed the debates on neutralism and expressed the following views in a formal policy statement to the Diet on January 30, 1953:

It is necessary to distinguish between the policy of neutrality in peacetime and in wartime. In peacetime, it is natural for any nation to maintain peaceful intercourse and trade relations with all nations. Therefore, a nation must not extend favorable treatment to one particular nation and treat another with discrimination. Japan intends to maintain friendly relations with various nations on the principle of no favoritism and no partisanship. If this is to be called a policy of neutrality, then it is a fine thing. However, if unfortunately a big war should break out, the situation changes completely. In such a case, it would be a great mistake naïvely to think that since Japan has no armed forces and that since she has maintained friendly relations with all nations on the basis of neutralism, she would not possibly be attacked by any power. It is clear from examples that when the world's major powers are fighting a life or death war, Japan, which is of great strategic importance geographically and in view of her population and industrial power, will not be left untouched. Therefore, if Japan is to maintain her position of neutrality, she needs to have armed forces strong enough to uphold her policy. Yet Japan is barred from possessing war potentials by Article 9 of the Constitution. A policy of neutrality without power to back it up in wartime is unfortunately under the present world situation nothing more than empty words.

Now, let us view the issue from another angle. We know that the enforcement of social justice is possible only when each individual citizen upholds the principle of justice. If the citizens shut their eyes to social evils and are utterly indifferent to such problems, a just society will never be realized. In the same way, international justice can be realized only when the nations of the world exert themselves to uphold that principle. For example, in the world today where the democratic camp and the Communist camp are in conflict, it is possible for nations which do not belong to either of the two camps to judge which is right and which is in the wrong. Furthermore, if a nation refuses to join the group which is just, or to oppose the group which is wrong, because of its policy of neutrality, true international justice cannot be enforced. The Korean War gives a very good example. In the case of the Korean War, the majority of the nations of the world passed judgment on which side was right and which was wrong and acted in support of the party that was in the right. If a nation cannot distinguish between right and wrong and between good and evil, that nation is not qualified to be an independent nation. It is cowardice for a nation to refuse to support the party that is in the right after reaching a decision on the question of right and wrong. Japan believes in the justness of democratic principles and therefore has determined to rise or fall together with the group of demo-

cratic nations. Japan has no intention of compromising, by finding refuge in such a nebulous term as neutralism.[5]

Present attitudes

The preceding statement indicates the basic thinking of the Yoshida Cabinet. The Hatoyama Cabinet is supposed to be upholding the same basic principle. However, recent negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union are leading some foreign powers to think that Japan's basic foreign policy is wavering. It would not be possible, however, for any government to change such a basic principle, because the majority of the people firmly believe in it. It is doubtful that it can be changed as long as the conservative party of Japan enjoys the support of the people.

[5] Shugiin (House of Representatives), *Kanpo Gogai, Dai 15 Kai Kokkai Shugiin Kaigiroku* ("Supplement to the Official Gazette, 15th Session of the National Diet, Record of the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives") (Publication Office of the Ministry of Finance, 1953), January 30, 1953.

Katsuo Okazaki, Tokyo, Japan, is a former career diplomat and an active member of the Liberal Democratic party. Entering the diplomatic service in 1923, he served in Great Britain, China, the United States, India, and other countries before the war. In 1947–48 he served as Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1950 as Chief Cabinet Secretary, and in 1951–52 as Minister of State Without Portfolio. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1952 to 1954. He was elected to the National Diet in 1949 and was twice re-elected.

Problems in Self-Defense

By MASAMICHI ROYAMA

THE Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26, 1945, required Japan to reorient its government and economy to peace. Following the end of the war, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) ordered the dissolution of all forces of militarism and extreme nationalism and by the enactment of a new Constitution prohibited Japan from arming again by its own will. How thoroughgoing occupation policy was in its early stages in pursuing these objectives is clear from its permission of Communist party activities, the Pauley proposals on reparations, the destruction of all army equipment including arsenals, the purge of wartime leaders, enactment of a new police system, land reform, and new labor legislation. These series of occupation policies guided the thoughts and actions of the Japanese people in an atmosphere of negative peace and placed them under the illusion that the self-defense of Japan was an occupation problem with which they had nothing to do.

U. S. POLICY SHIFT

The progress of events, however, made occupation policy change direction. This change became apparent in the United States aid programs for Japan and the occupation handling of strikes during 1947–48. Basically it reflected the change in the international situation, manifested in Soviet possession of atomic bombs, as well as in the Communist seizure of power in China. Even among the Japanese people the problem of self-defense, which had almost been taboo, was gradually discussed and stirred public opinion.

National Police Reserve

In June 1950 the Korean War broke out, and most of the American forces in Japan were dispatched immediately to Korea under the emergency. To fill the vacuum caused by the transfer of these troops, on July 8, two weeks after the war began, General MacArthur authorized the creation of a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men. The objective of this force was to maintain internal peace and order, not to defend Japan against any direct aggression from outside enemies. Its establishment can be regarded as the beginning of Japan's self-defense program.

Responsibility for self-defense

By 1951, that American policy toward Japanese rearmament had shifted was evident in General MacArthur's New Year's message to the Japanese people, in which he recognized that the 1947 "Constitution renounces war as an instrument of national policy." He continued:

> If, however, international lawlessness continues to threaten the peace and to exercise dominion over the lives of men, it is inherent that this ideal must give way to the overweening law of self-preservation, and it will become your duty within the principles of the United Nations in concert with others who cherish freedom to mount force to repel force.

Thus General MacArthur hinted at the necessity of Japanese responsibility for self-defense.

The conclusion of the Peace Treaty and the United States–Japan Security Treaty on September 8, 1951, made this

policy concrete. In the Security Treaty, Japan accepted the expectation that she would bear the responsibility for the gradual increase of her self-defense forces. In the meantime, United States Security Forces would be deployed in Japan. Their withdrawal was made contingent upon there being a "United Nations arrangement or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions" as to assure peace and security in the "Japan Area." Clearly one of the "alternative" conditions was Japan's ability to take over her own defense.

Japanese difficulties

For Japan, the implementation of her responsibility had many difficulties, due to weaknesses in her still war-damaged economy, psychological obstacles to any kind of rearmament among her people, and, basically, because of Article 9 of the Constitution by which Japan renounced war and armaments. While American policy had changed, Japanese internal circumstances could not be easily adjusted to it. Japanese recovery of sovereignty in 1952 led the government to adopt its own way of solving the problem step by step. Under American insistence and despite domestic political conflicts, Japan pursued a policy of progressively increasing her self-defense forces.

BEGINNINGS OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

On October 15, 1952, six months after recovery of independence, the National Police Reserve was changed into the National Safety Force, under the jurisdiction of a National Safety Board, which had been established on August 1. Originally under the prime minister himself, the Board was later headed by a director-general of cabinet rank who was responsible to the prime minister. The Safety Force was to undertake the maintenance of domestic peace and order, while responsibility for defending Japan against direct outside aggression remained with the United States Security Forces. The strength of the Safety Force was increased at the same time to 110,000 men, and with aid supplied by the United States both in organization and equipment, it began to take on the aspects of a modern army.[1] Additional fighting power, this time sea units, was provided when in November 1952 the United States leased seven frigates for the use of an embryo Japanese navy.

Reflected in the budget

The modest beginning and subsequent expansion of Japan's defense establishment was reflected in the national budget. In 1950, when the National Police Reserve was organized, the Japanese budget provided for a defense outlay of only 31 billion yen. In 1952, this allocation was increased to 59 billion yen. The 1952 budget also appropriated 65 billion yen for national defense payments, including what was known as Japan's defense-share contribution, the expense borne by Japan for supplying equipment and services to American troops stationed in Japan under the Administrative Agreement signed on February 28, 1952.[2] Expenses for an item called "security" totaled an additional 56 billion yen.[3]

[1] The National Police Reserve had originally consisted of four divisions. The increase in personnel made possible their enlargement and the formation of a Northern Regional Corps, with headquarters in Hokkaido, which took over the defense of that island after the departure of the United States First Cavalry Division in 1954.

[2] After 1954, the defense-share contribution was the expense Japan had to bear in accordance with Article 25 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, amounting to $155,000,000. This amount was to stand until a new agreement takes effect.

[3] Expenses for security were appropriated only in 1952, to meet the new situation after independence. The purpose was to construct and repair various facilities necessary for moving and relocating United States troops in Japan.

In all, more than 180 billion yen were allocated for defense in 1952.

In 1953, the budget provided for appropriations of 61.2 billion yen for the Safety Board, 62 billion yen for national defense payments, and 12 billion yen for the purchase of light airplanes or ships for the use of the Safety Force. The 1954 allocations showed little change from the previous year, totaling 132 billion yen, out of which 74 billion yen were for the use of the Japanese forces, and 58 billion yen for national defense payments including expenses for American military advisers. The increase in allocations to Japan's own force resulted from a decrease in the defense-share contribution, agreed upon by Japan and the United States, as a consequence of the United States military assistance program.

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT

The next step in the rearmament of Japan, and a major one, came as a result of long discussions and negotiations over the extension of Mutual Security Assistance to Japan that began in June 1953. Prior to this, Japan's Safety Forces had as their assigned mission defense of the nation against internal disorder or aggression. But the condition underlying aid under the mutual security assistance program was that a nation accepting it be prepared also to defend itself against outside, or direct, aggression. The issue brought to a focus the legal, political, and economic questions of rearmament during the long months the proposal was in process of negotiation.

As applied to Japan, Secretary of State Dulles proposed that the aid be spent for the purchase of equipment to be used for the maintenance of internal security and in the defense of Japan. Actual negotiations began early in July 1953 and produced agreement on basic terms by the end of September. But it required many twists and turns, mostly political and economic, before the agreement was finally signed and Diet approval granted in March 1954. The result was a significant extension of support for rearmament in the name of defense from quarters formerly opposed. The second largest political party, the Progressives (Kaishinto), had been generally opposed to the government's rearmament program since 1950. But in September 1953 Prime Minister Yoshida secured the support of Mamoru Shigemitsu, president of the Progressive party, in maintaining that a defense force was not barred by the Constitution. With this assurance of support in the Diet, the Prime Minister dispatched his former Minister of Finance to Washington to negotiate as reasonable a commitment for Japan as possible. His selection indicated the basic economic problem involved in rearmament, how to finance the costs for any enlargement of the existing establishment. The discussions in Washington revealed that, as usual, the United States government desired Japan to proceed faster in building up its military forces than the Japanese government felt was either financially or politically possible. The compromise subsequently reached tentatively provided for a gradual yearly increase in the size of the Safety Forces, with a goal set for 180,000 at the end of three years.

The formal approval of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement by the National Diet in 1954 marked the formal transformation of Japan's original National Police Reserve into a full-fledged defense force. It represented the culmination of thirty months' efforts by the government to fulfill the pledge

given in the Security Treaty that Japan would undertake to increase her ability to defend herself.

NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE

To qualify for aid under the mutual security program Japan proceeded in the spring of 1954 to revise the National Safety Law to permit defensive action against armed aggression, and the National Safety Board submitted to the cabinet its recommendations for increasing land, sea, and air power to a combined strength of 152,000. On July 1, 1954, the National Safety Force was transformed into the National Defense Force, and the National Safety Board into the National Defense Board, and a new air defense force was established. The Defense Board became in fact a ministry of defense, headed by a minister without portfolio, but attached to the Office of the Prime Minister.

In 1955, although there was a plan to increase Japan's defense power, the Hatoyama government had campaigned on and adopted a fundamental policy of placing a ceiling on the total national budget at 1 trillion yen, and the defense expense was set at almost the same amount as the previous year, 132 billion yen. To reconcile these two objectives, Japan requested a reduction in her defense-share contribution. This the United States accepted, and Japan's defense-share contribution was decreased by 15 billion yen, giving to the Defense Board a budget of 86 billion yen and to the national defense payment only 45 billion yen. To re-emphasize American desire for Japan's assumption of responsibility for her own defense, the joint statement issued at the time, on April 19, stated:

> It is recalled that the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States expresses the expectation that Japan will gradually increase its responsibility for self-defense, and it is also a basic policy of the Japanese government to strengthen the defense forces gradually. It has been made clear that it is the Japanese government's policy, in accordance with this expectation, and this policy, to appropriate a larger part of its national resources for defense purposes during 1956 and succeeding years.[4]

NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL

One problem that had been recognized earlier and to which solution was sought concerned the establishment of a supreme organ to recommend defense policies and programs. Even prior to the law setting up the Defense Board of 1954, the establishment of a national defense council had been envisaged, with functions of deliberating and advising the prime minister on basic defense policies, outline of the defense program and its relationship to industry, overseas dispatch of troops for defense, and other matters deemed necessary by the prime minister. Since the Japanese Constitution provides that administrative power belongs to the cabinet, it was planned that administrative matters connected with self-defense, including command and control of the Defense Force, should be under cabinet, hence civilian, jurisdiction.

But not until May 1955 did the Hatoyama government present to the Diet a bill concerning the structure of the national defense council. Two points became controversial and eventually forced shelving of the bill. A proposal to include noncabinet members in the council had to be eliminated because it ran into opposition from Liberal party members who objected to abandoning the principle of cabinet responsibility. The second point at issue, which concerned what matters were to be referred to the council for advice, eventually developed into a no-confidence motion against the director-general of the Defense Board over the presentation of data regarding a Six Year Defense Plan. The arrival of "Honest John" rockets from the United States, amidst Diet deliberations, intensified the controversy and forced abandonment of the bill.

[4] Gaimusho Johokyoku ("Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs"), *Happyo Bunsho* ("Collected Reports"), No. 1 (December 1954–June 1955) (Tokyo, August 1955), p. 63.

With the bill stymied, the Hatoyama Cabinet decided at a meeting on August 2, 1955, to establish as a provisional measure a cabinet ministers' defense council to discuss defense policies. Part of its work was to examine policy, looking toward Foreign Minister Shigemitsu's visit to the United States in 1955 to increase Japan's defense strength and to deliberate upon a Six Year Defense Plan projecting an increase in Japan's defense power into 1960. Although the plan was not publicized on the ground that it was not yet decided, it provided for land, sea, and air defenses of some 260,000 men (Army 180,000 men, Navy 35,000 men and 12,000 tons, and Air Force 35,000 men and 1,200 planes).[5] The Hatoyama government desired the establishment of a defense council with a statutory basis, and in the 1956 session of the Diet, the government again introduced a bill to establish a national defense council. This time, in June, after the position of the conservatives had been strengthened by a merger, the bill passed. It provided for a National Defense Council, composed of the prime minister, the finance minister, the Defense Board director-general, and the Economic Planning Board director. It will advise the prime minister on basic principles of national defense, mobilization of the Defense Force, defense plans, and similar matters.

[5] *Boei Nenkan* ("Self-Defense Yearbook") (Tokyo, 1956), p. 161.

THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IN 1956

Thus in 1956, the structure of the defense establishment included the National Defense Council, advisory to the prime minister; and the Defense Board headed by a minister of state and in charge of the Defense Force, consisting of a Ground Self-Defense Force, a Maritime Self-Defense Force, and an Air Self-Defense Force. More than 180,000 men were in uniform, trained by American military advisers both in Japan and the United States and with American military assistance totaling more than 700 million dollars. The Defense Force, though small in number, was declared to be combat ready, capable of using the latest equipment and facilities. There was also a good chance that the Six Year Defense Plan would be adopted and put into effect.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

Despite Japan's assumption of responsibility for a progressive increase of her self-defense force, the basic drawback to open rearmament has been Article 9 of the Constitution. Socialist objections notwithstanding, the Hatoyama government has proceeded with execution of its policy of increasing self-defense strength by interpreting Article 9 broadly. If such a program as the Six Year Defense Plan, discussed in 1955 by the cabinet ministers' defense council but not announced publicly, should be adopted, it would be impossible to pretend that this does not constitute arms. In this case, the government would have to choose between revising the Constitution, which it cannot do for three years at least as a result of the House of Councillors election on July 8, 1956, and securing public acceptance of the interpretation of Article 9 that possession of arms for self-defense was never prohibited.

The apparent inconsistency of actual practice with constitutional provisions has produced a history of semantic conflict. The Yoshida government during its tenure insisted that the term "safety force" indicated not a military force but only a "police force." In December 1954, when the first Hatoyama Cabinet was formed, the government argued that the Constitution did not deny Japan the right of self-defense and therefore permitted a minimum degree of military forces to counter direct aggression as a means of self-defense. The government contended that there was no obstacle to assuming that the self-defense forces were military forces. However, as there are still differences of interpretation of Paragraph 2, Article 9, of the Constitution, the Hatoyama government has broadly hinted at the necessity for amending the Constitution.

DISPATCH OF TROOPS OVERSEAS?

The controversial issue in the Diet and public opinion is that if rearmament is openly carried out for self-defense, Japan would have to accept the responsibility for dispatching Japanese troops overseas, in case a treaty that might be concluded in place of the present Security Treaty imposed upon Japan new obligations. On September 1, 1955, when Foreign Minister Shigemitsu visited Washington, a joint communiqué was issued which accepted the principle of eventual treaty revision and progressive withdrawal of American forces, contingent upon Japan's becoming strong enough to contribute substantially to her own defense. The communiqué implied the overseas dispatch of Japanese troops. If rearmament should be carried out with such an implication, opposition that will insist upon a narrow interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution is only natural. The present trend of public opinion is that the government should make efforts to eliminate friction caused by enforcement of the Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, rather than concern itself about the far future. A great gap still exists between public opinion and government views as regards the establishment of an autonomous national defense and the withdrawal of American forces. The constitutional issue thus will remain a subject of heated controversy.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES

While interpretation of the Constitution is a juridical problem, the question of its amendment is a political one. But in the background there are psychological or emotional factors, which, although imponderable and constantly changing, are extremely important in deciding national defense policies. They show the ambivalent public attitude toward United States–Japan relations. Perhaps the best example illustrating this ambivalence is the question of American military bases on Japanese soil. The Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement establish Japan's obligation to provide for American military bases, but the sentiment of the Japanese people is opposed to this obligation, for the Japanese people do not like to be associated with war or warmaking potential. The problem of military bases is complicated by the lack of administrative efficiency of the Japanese-American Joint Committee provided under the Administrative Agreement of 1952, a conflict of interests among inhabitants close to the bases, difficulties of compensating for lease of lands, and the influence of the Communist party and other political groups. Very serious conflicts have arisen at Uchinada in Ishikawa Prefecture, at Myogi Asama in Nagano, and over enlargement of the Sunakawa Base at Tachikawa, near Tokyo. Solution of many of these specific issues is a matter of time, if the reasons for the necessity of acquisition of land are reasonably explained and the compensations fairly fixed. The fact that some Socialist party members are now playing the role of mediators in these conflicts, rather than leaders of the opposition movement, proves this trend.

Home Defense Corps

Another factor causing a psychological obstacle to both self-defense and rearmament is the opposition of young people and some women against any system of conscription. It reminds them of the former barbarous military system, and it is natural for young men, and their mothers and sisters, to have an antipathy to rearmament, when the past inhuman system is still vivid in memory. No one even among government circles has yet openly advocated a system of conscription. As a part of the plan to increase defense strength, however, the government has planned a volunteer system called the Home Defense Corps, by which volunteers receive short-term training in their localities by the Defense Force to act only against "indirect" aggression. This idea, organized under the former director-general of the Defense Board, Shigemasa Sunada, has been continued by its present director-general, Naka (Chu) Funada, but is being re-examined by studying examples of similar programs in other countries. In view of the present trend of public opinion, especially among youth, however, a more reasonable and sincere atitude is required by government leaders.

IMPORTANCE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL

The elimination of the possibility of a revival of the former irresponsible military government by the establishment of the principle of civilian supremacy is also essential for the solution of the self-defense problem. In present-day Japan, nostalgia for past militarism has not yet been completely wiped out. Occasionally, some former war criminals make statements lacking in self-examination and find response among some people. Even in the present defense setup, there needs to be a concern that its control remain in civilian hands. A number of former officers of the former Imperial Army and Navy hold ranking positions in the Defense Force. With the political parties nothing but a gathering of factional groups, they lack self-confidence to give responsible leadership to the cabinet and the Diet on the self-defense problem. The opposition Socialist party is in a particularly disadvantageous position, without experience in military administration.

DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS

International diplomatic problems confronting Japan are difficult ones, whether Japanese-Soviet relations, relations with Communist China, reparations problems with Southeast Asian countries, or relations with Korea. Differences of opinion between the conservative Liberal Democratic party and the Socialist party, as well as disunity within the parties, provide another psychological obstacle to developing a united national opinion on the self-defense problem. Fortunately, the foreign trade situation during the past year turned favorable, and this will contribute to the solution of the reparations problem. If the self-defense program goes its own way without a favorable solution of these diplomatic problems, it will inevitably fail by inviting confusion and opposition in public opinion.

WHEN THE TIME IS RIPE

In short, as the self-defense problem is closely connected with both domestic politics and the international situation,

it is believed that the self-defense of Japan will be accomplished by revision of the international treaties and the Japanese Constitution when the time is ripe, after gradually eliminating obstacles step by step. Since the relations with the United States are particularly important, the necessity for both Japan and the United States to make further efforts to understand the other's position and the psychology of the people cannot be overemphasized.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

WILLIAM S. HAAS. *The Destiny of the Mind: East and West.* Pp. 327. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. $6.50.

The author whose main field of research was (d. January 1956) the civilization and political situation of Iran endeavors to show that there exists a profound difference in the Eastern and Western ways of thinking or, as he terms it, of the consciousness here and there. The West thinks in categories of "unity in variety," whereas the East thinks according to the ideas of "juxtaposition and identity." The West is preoccupied by the will to resolve the oppositions found in reality; the East recognizes a thoroughgoing polarity. The former operates by means of concepts and aims at objectivation, the latter is concerned with consciousness itself and not with its contents. This thesis is elaborated in several respects. Eastern thought is closer to the magic world, whose influence the West tends to eliminate more and more. The Western mind wonders at problems, the Eastern is filled by awe in face of the mysteriousness of all that is. To prove his view the author discusses the differences in the approach to and the understanding of knowledge, analyzes art and style, and studies particularly the problems of perception, of freedom, and of immortality as they are presented in these two worlds.

Provocative though this book be, it is also disconcerting. Not because of its main thesis, but because of the manner in which it is supported. There are but very few references, no bibliography, and many of the statements are made in a rather apodictic manner, without any proof forthcoming. It is, therefore, difficult to form an opinion on the tenability of the several propositions. But there are features which render the assertions made rather questionable. Whatever the authority of Mr. Haas may be in regard to Eastern ideas, some of his statements on Western thought are obviously wrong. He attributes, for example, to Parmenides the ideas of matter and form; one looks in vain for them in the extant fragments. The Stoic conception of world cycles is said to refer only to human history; but the Stoa, as Heraclitus before, assumed that in the final conflagration everything would be reabsorbed in the primeval fire. One is not a little amazed to read (p. 262) that "only a simpleton would not be horrified at the idea of continuing indefinitely." Socrates, Thomas, Pascal, Kant, and so many others, were they "simpletons"?

On the other hand, one finds many remarks which are interesting and original. This is especially the case with the author's comments on art. He also has some novel things to say about the relationship of customs and ways of dressing to the generally prevailing mentalities. (Although

here, too, he forgets that loose and floating garments were worn by Greeks and Romans and not only by the peoples of the East.)

On the whole, one senses a preference for the Eastern mind, although there is no devaluation of that of the West. But the author feels, it seems, that the West might have fared better had it not been so much engaged in its peculiar approach to reality and life. All the doubts the book arouses notwithstanding, it is worth while reading. But it will be up to the experts to appraise the solidity of its foundation.

RUDOLF ALLERS
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BORIS GOUREVITCH. *The Road to Peace and to Moral Democracy: An Encyclopedia of Peace.* Vols. I, II. Pp. xiv, 1083; xxvi, 1540. New York: International Universities Press, 1955. $20.00 the set.

These two volumes by the vice-president of the Union for the Protection of the Human Person by International Social and Economic Co-operation, Inc. represent an enormous amount of effort and embody an obviously passionate dedication to the ideals of peace and freedom. The author, whose experience has brought him in touch with the suffering and tragedy of mankind, is anxious to ensure that men shall not have again to suffer the unspeakable horrors endured by so many millions of men, women, and children during the last generation.

The author begins by suggesting that in this hour of destiny the churches, moderate socialists, labor unions, and democratic parties can initiate the necessary fundamental reforms—including a reform of international law and a considerable modification of the United Nations which, however, will fall short of world government. The following chapters deal in succession with the German enemy, Soviet Russia and the Western world, the Japanese enemy and Eastern Asia, the democracies between the two world wars, the aims of the peace, the lessons of war economy, and, finally, the problems of the planned economy of peace. It will be seen that the author begins with the contemporary scene; indeed, the greater part of his work deals with the international politics of the twentieth century with interspersings of historical material throughout the two volumes. Clearly the author has read and meditated a great deal. It is difficult to evaluate the depth of many of his judgments both because of the absence of citation of authorities and the width of the canvas on which he has worked.

In some respects the volumes can be regarded as an exposition of contemporary events and, from this point of view, the question might be raised whether the work would not have gained by separating much of the detailed information from the more philosophical reflections and assertions. It is a moot point, of course, how far in developing a theoretical position a writer should adduce detailed evidence in order to clinch his thesis. It is the feeling of this reviewer that the present work would have been improved by the omission of a good deal of factual material which is available in many other volumes and which tends to obscure the major principles the author has sought to emphasize.

The attempt to include every piece of information has led the writer to include items of news which in many places seem to have little or no relevance to the subject under consideration. For example, in the chapter dealing with Soviet Russia and the Western world, there are references to internal South African politics, Adlai Stevenson's trip around the world, bumper crops in most of the countries of Southwestern Europe, the "bloody Mau Mau movement," the Central African Federation, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Kellogg Pact, Nelson Rockefeller's reference to the Amazon Valley, and so forth. These isolated references distract the reader from the main subject matter. Indeed, the vast amount of information seems to have dominated the form and structure, and to this degree one must regret to report that the admirable purpose and lofty ideals behind the volumes are not served in the most effective manner.

The reviewer should add that *The Road to Peace and Moral Democracy* comes highly recommended by such authorities as Professor Robert M. MacIver; M. Henri Laugier, former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations; and Señor Hernán Santa Cruz, former President of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

LINDEN A. MANDER
University of Washington

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ. *Power and Community.* Pp. 134. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. $3.00.

These essays examine and reject the current vogue of attempting to explain the workings of society in terms of power. The author believes that the attempt to explain everything in this way starts from a woefully incomplete understanding of man and is itself symptomatic of the deep malaise that grips Western society.

He rejects also another current vogue: that the social sciences can be scientific in the same sense that the physical sciences are. This is impossible because the "facts of the social sciences are not the facts of the physical sciences." The latter trie to sort facts from opinions, while the social scientist must deal with peoples' opinions as facts, regardless of whether they are true or false. Also, social science cannot be "scientific" because it usually deals with phenomena which cannot be observed directly, and with the "actions and interactions of innumerable personalities." Therefore, there can be no such thing as political "science" in the scientific sense.

Dr. Strausz-Hupé does find that "scientism," the worship of science, has almost become a world religion. All of the warring ideologies march under its banner. This results in "a remarkable process of interpenetration between them," with the result that what they now hold in common is "perhaps more significant than their divergencies, although this *convergence* merely intensifies their rivalries."

Both democracy and communism now worship production and consumption. Both also aggrandize the central power at the expense of the private sectors. Both rely on bureaucracy, that "teeming rabbit warren of petty power-holders," which produces "the tyranny of a multitude of petty despots ensconced behind piles of paper and the numbered doors of anonymous authority."

Accordingly, democracy is no sure defense against its rivals. "If a man's life is taken as a composite of economic, religious, educational and other cultural activities, then democracy is not a specific 'way of life.'" It is "a method for sharing power on the basis of legal equality" and for holding the rulers accountable. As such it is largely "non-ideological," and a democracy which becomes total "has ceased to be democratic and has given way to totalitarianism."

Internationally, "national interest" is nearly impossible to define and has a shrinking appeal. "Democracy cannot put its heart into power politics, for if it does, it ceases to be." If "power politics holds the answer to the great questions of history, democracy must lose out—or must lose itself." This means that world tensions must be allayed if democracy is to survive. It does not mean loss of power in the world, for historically it is the nations which have grasped for power which have gone down, while those that have been blessed with bountiful accretions of power did not seek it.

Nevertheless, "the dynamics inherent in modern technological development" and other factors argue for world domination, and "the overarching fact of our times is the struggle between freedom and tyranny." To prevent the victory of tyranny, the disaster of war may have to be faced.

The reviewer would be inclined to feel that the author's principle of interpenetration will prevent the disaster, aided by the growth of other systems and nations. The leavening of tyranny already appears to be under way in the Soviet orbit and, given a few decades, this process could go far.

Dr. Strausz-Hupé has written a stimulating series of essays which should induce serious thinking in many readers. His chapters deal with power and personality, history, science, community, and security.

D. F. FLEMING
Vanderbilt University

JAMES FREDERICK GREEN. *The United Nations and Human Rights.* Pp. viii, 194. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1956. $1.50.

This volume is a careful and useful survey of the record of the United Nations

and the specialized agencies in the field of human rights through 1955. It is intended ultimately to be Part III of a larger study to be entitled the "United Nations and the Promotion of General Welfare" to be published by the Brookings Institution in its series on the United Nations.

The author, James Frederick Green, deputy director, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs in the Department of State, is well qualified through experience and knowledge to deal authoritatively with the subject. Within certain limits he has succeeded admirably in writing an informative volume. He has given a sense of the experimental nature of United Nations activity in this field and of the way in which it has moved beyond the experience of the League of Nations in its discussions of the concept of internationally recognizable human rights. He has indicated the way in which United Nations human-rights activities stand at the center of some of the most difficult and controversial issues that face the Organization. Among these are the conflict between domestic and international jurisdiction, between differing concepts of human rights, the anticolonial campaign of the Arab-Asian bloc, as well as a host of others. And he has summarized the major policies of human rights that have developed over the years, in the process summarizing also the long and involved human-rights discussions that have consumed literally hundreds of committee sessions as well as a number of meetings of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. This in itself was no easy task.

At the same time, however, the author seems to have imposed severe limitations on himself: this is a book of summary, of statement of problems, rather than a book of analysis or of probing into the foreign-policy considerations or domestic pressures that go far in shaping specific national policies in the United Nations. One would have wished that Mr. Green had felt free to allow his rich experience and understanding to play analytically on such matters as the complex of issues surrounding the Bricker Amendment, on the attempt to include self-determination of peoples within the concept of human rights, and more generally on the role that an organization such as the United Nations might properly seek to play in the field of human rights. And there are a host of other questions that might also have been fruitfully explored and analyzed.

As it stands, however, *The United Nations and Human Rights* is to be highly recommended as a reference volume. It is a reliable guide to the general course of United Nations debates, decisions, and difficulties in the field of human rights since the inception of the Organization.

MARINA S. FINKELSTEIN
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MAURICE DUVERGER. *The Political Role of Women.* Pp. 221. Paris: UNESCO, 1955. $2.50.

This small volume is a general report describing the results of a survey into the political role of women undertaken by UNESCO's Department of Social Sciences at the invitation of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. The report is based on four national reports relating to France, the German Federal Republic, Norway, and Yugoslavia. The latter were completed by local scholars, and M. Duverger was obliged only to use their information and to draw such conclusions as he felt were justified. That the task of the national reporters was difficult is attested to by a general complaint set out at the beginning of the book. The inquiry was hampered by lingering suspicions on the part of politically minded women themselves that any such inquiry only invites an emphasis on a difference that the active women do not care to acknowledge at all.

In general, despite the most valiant effort by Professor Duverger to make useful the disparate data furnished him, his regard for high scientific standards forces him to write that no conclusions are possible on a variety of the important questions he raises. One of these is the significance of female nonvoting by age group. The few elections on which there is material show that abstentions in the youngest age group tend to be lower than in the oldest group, while it is the reverse with male nonvoters. Again, the size of the female vote by occupational category is a matter of obvious high importance, but the information is too thin for generalizations. The stability of the female vote falls in the same class.

In the second part of his report, Professor Duverger considers the part played by women in political leadership, that is, the exercise of authority, and the making of decisions. He is concerned here with candidacies, success in being elected, and influence in parties and pressure groups. Over-all, it is concluded that although the proportion of women taking part in political life is as large as that of men, the proportion of women who achieve formal positions in parties, in government, or in pressure groups is very small.

The book is frustrating to the reader as it must have been to the writer. Its author wants to answer important questions, and formulates them well; but the investigation simply did not furnish enough evidence with which to do the job.

GILBERT Y. STEINER
University of Illinois

MAURICE DUVERGER (Ed.). *Partis politiques et classes sociales en France.* Pp. 332. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1955. 975 *fr.*

Political parties and social classes in France: such is the subject matter of a book published under the supervision of M. Maurice Duverger, a well-known professor of public law at the University of Bordeaux, by the French Association of Political Science. The book hardly fulfills the expectation raised by the title.

It falls short of the mark for two reasons. Firstly, it came out in the third quarter of 1955, within a few months of the general election which took place on January 2, 1956. Thus, the emergence of the "Ponjadist" party, the most spectacular feature of the election, does not enter the picture. Well, Ponjade's "Union" is probably more closely related to a distinct social group (shopkeepers and handcraftsmen in small towns, and so forth) than any other party now in existence.

Secondly, the book consists of a set of reports submitted to a roundtable conference of the aforesaid association last year. Within the framework of the International Association of Political Science, the whole problem is still being investigated; therefore, we have before us, at best, a provisional summing up, a mere halt on an itinerary which bids fair to be a rather long one. Moreover, the initial chapter, a synthetic exposé from the pen of M. Duverger himself, hardly bears comparison with his own book on *The Political Parties* printed in 1951.

In our judgment, the best survey of the question to date is available in an opuscule, *Political Parties and Social Realities* which M. G. E. Lavau, a professor at the University of Grenoble, wrote three years ago. M. Lavau is among the contributors to the new book—he deals there with the "middle classes." But his general conclusion is not formulated as forcibly as in the opuscule. It is worth borrowing it from the latter source because it fittingly expresses a theme that runs intermittently all through the whole set of reports.

"With the exception of the Communist party, a French party can never be taken as the political projection of a social group, of an economic category of Frenchmen, of a belief, of a political doctrine. It rather stands as a set of abstractions, as a medley of heterogeneous elements. . . . For instance, is the Socialist party (the so-called 'French section of the Workers' International') truly a worker's party? Here is the answer returned in 1953 by the 'French Institute of Public Opinion': Workers, 21 per cent of the membership; clerks, 6 per cent; state officials, 13 per cent; trade people, 5 per cent; industrialists, CADRES (engineers, technicians, salaried intellectuals), 4 per cent; liberal professions, 1 per cent; women not linked to any profession, 26 per cent; people with an income, pensioners, 10 per cent; agriculturists, 14 per cent."

In the case of other political parties (Christian democrats, "peasants," and so forth) the same test would bring forward similar evidence. In M. Lavau's words, the French parties are not rooted in productive and professional activities, in distinctive solitary interests (moral or material) of various sections of people in the

national community. They are rooted in concepts of supposedly universal import. The "Ponjadist" party, although it originated in a well defined economic sector, is proving no exception to the rule; it has plunged, soul and body, into undiluted fascism. It follows that the French political world may look more dedicated to mere verbalism than any other—and, by the way, it cannot but help pressure groups to achieve their purpose. Of course, under the impact of international developments, empty ideologies and pressure groups are quickly brushed aside, at the call of patriotism, but not for ever.

ANDRÉ GÉRAUD

Paris, France

BERTRAM D. WOLFE. *Six Keys to the Soviet System.* Pp. xv, 258. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1956. $3.75.

Bertram Wolfe does not claim that there are only six keys to the Soviet system or that the six he describes are the only useful ones. He believes, however, that his analyses of "The Struggle for Power," "The Coordination of Culture," "The Worker in the Workers' State," "The Two Types of Soviet Election," "The Kremlin as Ally and Neighbor," and "The Nature of Totalitarianism" will provide "some of the elements of a general theory of totalitarianism." Mr. Wolfe was influenced in the choice and number of his keys by the fact that the book was not written as an integrated study of the Soviet system, but is a selection from the author's articles and addresses written between 1940 and 1955. He did not include two other "keys"—Soviet agriculture and the peasant and Soviet planning and the dynamics of its economy—because he was not satisfied with his studies of these matters. These are, of course, exceedingly important aspects of Stalinist totalitarianism, but even without these "keys" this is an excellent book. The articles stand up in spite of the great changes that were proclaimed during and since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which occurred after the book went to press. These analyses stand up because Mr. Wolfe has used the best available information, has based his studies on wide knowledge of Communist strategy and tactics, and has been admirably restrained in respect to polemics and prophecies.

He describes the atrocities against history, science, art, and education. These and other outrages against human freedom and dignity remain in the record of Soviet totalitarianism in spite of the fact that the new collective leadership has blamed them all on Stalin and promised to make amends. The new leaders have announced reforms of the slave labor camps and they have unbound the worker from his machine, but the fact remains that the militarization of life in the USSR is a product of Marxism-Leninism as applied by the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev and Bulganin have asked Tito to forgive and forget; they have abolished the Cominform, but "Titoism" in Yugoslavia and elsewhere proves not only that the Communist monolith will crack under pressure but that that pressure is the result of Soviet imperialism, which, as Mr. Wolfe says, "combines all the imperialisms that have ever been invented in the long history of man." The two articles on China, first published in January 1947 and April 1949, contribute less, it seems to me, to an understanding of the external relations of Stalinism than the papers on Poland and Tito.

Mr. Wolfe does not find much very new about the new men who have taken over since Stalin's death or about the "new look" they claim to have given to Soviet policy. The new men are really some of Stalin's younger henchmen who are bringing fresh vigor and more subtle tactics to an old system that is based on continuing the war against their own people and against all other peoples for the control of the world.

HAROLD H. FISHER

San Francisco State College

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN. *Soviet Russian Nationalism.* Pp. ix, 330. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. $7.00.

From 1942 to 1947, Professor Barghoorn was Press Attaché at the United States Embassy in Moscow, and in that era of good feeling was able to travel relatively

freely in the Soviet Union. The impressions received at that time were supplemented when he spent the years 1949–51 in an official capacity in Germany interviewing refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. He is now associate professor of political science at Yale. Author of *The Soviet Image of the United States* and also numerous articles on Russia, he has long devoted his attention to the subject of Soviet nationalism.

While Soviet leaders have denounced nationalism as a pernicious product of capitalistic society, they have proclaimed the virtues of patriotism. "Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism . . . are progressive, revolutionary, and universal. In contrast nationalism and cosmopolitanism are retrogressive, reactionary, and narrowly limited" (p. 10). Patriotism was, indeed, decried at one time; but with Stalin's pronouncement on the possibility of building socialism in one country, the cult of patriotism developed, beginning to flourish after 1933–34. Soviet patriotism in turn became "a pattern of rationalizations for Kremlin imperialism" (p. 24).

Under a façade of federalism the central government has increased its power and control. Although lesser nationalities have been permitted to retain their own languages and a certain amount of cultural autonomy, the dominance of the great Russians has nevertheless increased. Insistence upon the unitary character of the Communist party as opposed to a federal organization has been one of the most important factors in the Russification of the Soviet Union. After World War II Russification of non-Russian peoples proceeded with great strides, and national discontent among most of these groups has now only "limited political significance." "With the possible exception of anti-Semitism the picture of nationality relations . . . [in Soviet Russia is] not one of bitter conflict or antagonism" (p. 120). The use of the Cyrillic alphabet has been pressed. Today all nationalities use this alphabet except the Baltic peoples (Latin) and the Georgians and Armenians who have an alphabet of their own. The study of the Russian language is constantly being furthered, and the author feels it safe to predict that within perhaps ten years all Soviet citizens will have a good speaking and writing knowledge of Russian (p. 92).

Much interesting evidence is presented to support the author's thesis that the Soviet Union is not only nationalistic but imperialistic as well. He has much to say about characteristics of Russia's past that have survived to the present day. Although it is not easy to be concise and definite in discussing cultural heritages or in discussing something as intangible as nationalism, it appears that the book would be more effective if the valuable material here presented could have been knit together more closely into a sharper pattern. The study is well documented, but unfortunately the publisher has grouped the forty-five pages of notes at the back of the book. Chapter guides at the top of the pages of notes would have aided the reader immensely in spotting the proper reference.

E. C. HELMREICH

Bowdoin College

C. BOBROWSKI. *La Yougoslavie socialiste.* Pp. xvi, 237. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1956. 750 *fr.*

The aim of this book, written by a French economist, was to present the general evolution of Tito's Yugoslavia with an emphasis on its economic development as conditioned by ideological concepts and practical policies of the Yugoslav Communist regime.

In the introductory chapters the author deals with the historical and geographical background and with the political development of Yugoslavia between 1940 and 1950. In the next chapters he examines the various stages of the economic policy of Communist Yugoslavia. The first Five Year Plan (1947–51) was inspired by Soviet precedents, but modified after Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. The "period of transition" of 1949–51 was characterized by the massive and rapid collectivization of agriculture, a decrease of production, and a grave inflationary pressure. To remedy this situation, the Yugoslav rulers started revising their economic policy and introducing the "institutional reform toward democratization."

In the last period examined in the book

(1952–55) these trends are being accentuated, thus making it possible for the Yugoslav Communist leaders to claim a special position in the evolution of political and social forms and paths of our time. That new variant of socialism is characterized in the economic field by a supple federal planification, compatible with market economy and with the decentralization of the nationalized enterprises and their "workers' councils."

In reviewing the most recent concrete problems, the author stresses their grave and still unsolved aspects (foreign trade balance, agricultural production, new industrial investments) but in his opinion one should "believe in the realities of the new promises." Nevertheless, his confidence in a better future of the Yugoslav economy is based on political rather than economic reasons.

The prevalence of political considerations in the author's analysis, or, to be more precise, his distinct political sympathies for the Yugoslav Communist regime, unmitigated by sober political evaluation, deprive the book of its scientific impartiality.

Useful as a survey of economic problems of postwar Yugoslavia, Mr. Bobrowski's book reflects in the French language the basic official political theses of Tito's government. Without being himself a Communist, the author accepts as objective facts the contentions of a totalitarian regime which has introduced some economic and political reforms ("within a theoretical frame strictly corresponding to the principles of the Marxist doctrine," as Mr. Bobrowski himself says), but refuses to make any concession in the decisive problem: the monopoly of political power for the Communist party.

MILORAD M. DRACHKOVITCH
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MEISSNER, BORIS. *Die Sowjetunion, die baltischen Staaten, und das Völkerrecht.* Pp. xi, 377. Koln: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956. No price.

The problem of the Baltic states played a most important role in international relations and world history in the era immediately preceding World War II. Since then it had become a symbol of the European split into two inimical ideological camps.

A secret protocol of the Moscow Pact of 1939 and the subsequent Frontier and Friendship Agreement designated the Baltic States as a Soviet sphere of influence. Ribbentrop and Molotov, Hitler and Stalin were at best paper friends; diplomatic loyalty meant nothing in the face of the Soviet Union's determination to take advantage of Germany's difficulties in the West to strengthen her own strategic frontiers. In late 1939 the Soviet Union made treaties with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which gave the former government the right to establish military, naval, and air bases in these territories. Lithuania, as "compensation," was given the district and city of Vilna. Under a further Soviet-German agreement, German residents of the Baltic States, the landowning "Baltic Barons," were evacuated to Germany, as a means of preventing a "Sudeten" problem in the Baltic. It was clear that these agreements were but preliminaries to outright annexation. In mid-June 1940, in the midst of the Battle of France, the Soviet Union quietly completed her occupation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Finns defended themselves against Soviet expansionism, but the other Baltic States have remained behind the iron curtain.

All these developments are examined carefully by Boris Meissner in a distinguished doctoral dissertation written at the Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht of the University of Hamburg. It is a ponderous volume written with typical Germanic *Gründlichkeit,* with 1,180 footnotes and a thirty-page bibliography. Dr. Meissner presents an extraordinary indictment of the Soviet concept of international law. His book is based in large part on all available Soviet sources.

It is a dreary picture of "agreements" effected by force, threats and ultimatums, interference in constitutional problems, forced Bolshevization, and outright annexation. For the Soviet monolithic diplomatic mind, the principles of sovereignty and national self-determination are merely inconvenient stumbling blocks invented by decadent capitalism. Whatever enhances the Soviet territorial and strategic position becomes unilaterally international law. The principle of compromise becomes beautifully simple: 100 per cent for me, 0 per cent for you.

Dr. Meissner rightly regards the Baltic situation not as a narrow regional problem but as a European-wide and even world-wide question. He does not look upon the independence of the Baltic nations as an unattainable ideal, on the theory that suppression of peoples against their will and the denial of self-determination cannot continue forever. But he does not explain how this can be achieved in the face of Soviet intransigence, the curious Russian concept of compromise, and the peculiar Soviet understanding of the meaning and nature of international law.

LOUIS L. SNYDER
City College of New York

LOUIS DE JONG. *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War.* (Translated by C. M. Geyl.) Pp. xi, 308. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. $5.00.

The art of advertising has often achieved desired results with scare techniques, selling products to people who because of innocence, lack of knowledge or sheer stupidity fall victim to manufactured fear. In many respects, all people share certain defects in perception—particularly when it comes to international politics. This may be proven by the numerous books about Nazi Germany, some of them nostalgically respectful and others clumsy moans about past mistakes. One of the most important, and by no means dated ones, is de Jong's splendidly authenticated dissection of the German Fifth Column, a fascinating but empty ogre, a blueprint of treason and betrayal that was never realized—and perhaps not realizable at all! The only thing in this direction in which Hitler did succeed was to arouse the cataclysmic treadmill of panic, hoping in one way or another "to destroy the enemy from within, to conquer him through himself."

This then is the story within a story: fear and rumor grown to become accepted as fact, and of the facts themselves. Dr. de Jong, director of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, has undertaken this formidable task and has written an unusually precise but nevertheless spine-chilling recital of facts and figures, fears and fancies which were partially fed by a successful German war machine and partially spawned by our own imagination, self-deprecation, unreason and "worrying overtime." As the *Stukas* had been equipped with sirens for psychological reasons, so all the pronunciamentos and released rumors which flirted with schemes of interference and destruction remained basically a phantasmagoria, a glamorate of diversion and dissension, exploiting with devilishly clever strategems and expediency the moment and the occasion. But there was spying and there were leaks; some were caught, others interrupted, but audacious schemes continued to be hatched in the hope of at least partial achievement, such as for example the schemes for bombing America's east coast and occupying the Azores.

But the threat existed, externally bred—internally taken on by many *Reichsdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche,* who marched and swore allegiance to the swastika. And while there were four genuine fifth columns: in Hungary, Rumania, Poland and Yugoslavia, only in Poland—we are told—and in Yugoslavia did they facilitate in any way military conquest. We feared the Trojan horse, which grew because of our own anxieties, which in turn befogged our true perceptions. On the other hand, perhaps our overzealous attention prevented greater realization of Hitler's fantastic plans for destruction from within. The disciplined retrospect tells us how much effort and energy we wasted in dealing with an overrated, exaggerated bogy. And this account holds many lessons for the present and the future.

BORIS ERICH NELSON
Hampton Institute

MOSHE DAVIS (Ed.). *Israel: Its Role in Civilization.* Pp. xviii, 338. New York: Seminary Israel Institute of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1956. (Distributed by Harper & Brothers, New York.) $4.00.

One of the problems faced by Israel concerns the future relationship between Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora. In order to give this problem the thorough and profound treatment which it merits, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America has established an Institute at the annual sessions of which, since 1952, one may hear papers and discussions bearing on the development and influence of Israel. Some of these essays and addresses are presented in this volume. The contributors are Americans and Israelis, Jews and Christians, scholars and men of affairs.

A basic difference in viewpoint emerges from the two addresses grouped as the volume's first section under the title The Role of Israel in the Modern World. Professor Louis Finkelstein, Chancellor of the Seminary, defends the view that the creative energies—expressed in religion, language, art, and the like—of Diaspora Jewry made the State possible long before its actual establishment. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's Prime Minister, asserts that the Diaspora Jew faces the painful choice of flight from himself or flight from the world, and that only in Israel can a Jew attain a universal, cosmopolitan outlook by being totally himself.

Part II is entitled What History Teaches. Professor William F. Albright opens it with a discussion of the Covenant between God and ancient Israel. He sees in the modern restoration the latest development in Sacred History and, therefore, an event from which mankind may expect a great deal. The section closes on a similar note by Professor Carl J. Friedrich who recalls the Bible's contribution to the sense of history as a process with purpose and value. Israel of today, by its very existence, gives further meaning to this sense of history, if only because it is the first state to have been created by international action.

Between these two essays are four others of a more documentary nature. Professor H. L. Ginsberg reviews the findings in the Dead Sea scrolls. Professor Salo W. Baron calls attention to several very interesting parallels between Israel's current situation and that of the Second Commonwealth. Professor Morton Smith points to some influences by the Diaspora on Palestinian Judaism of the first century. Professor Saul Lieberman recalls some values of life exemplified in discussions in the Palestinian Talmud which have not lost their relevance for Israel today.

Part III, The New State, is descriptive in nature. Abba Eban, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, leads off with a view of his nation's place in the milieu of the Middle East. This is followed by essays on Israel's Constitution—formulated but not adopted—on Israeli democracy, religion, music, and art. Martin Buber discusses the problem of the emerging Israeli personality. The *halutz* (pioneer) has built the land, making a desert blossom like a rose. Now, however, a new types of *halutz* is called for, one who will concentrate on building character. Allan Nevins, the Christian historian, echoes this hope.

In the final section, America and Israel, Professor Howard Mumford Jones discusses learnedly, though with a light touch, "The Land of Israel in Anglo-Saxon Tradition." Professor Selig Adler surveys "The Background of American Policy Toward Zion." Professor Robert T. Handy deals with "Zion in American Christian Movements," and Dr. Alexander Bein finds that "American Settlements in Israel" have been disappointingly few. Abba Eban brings the volume to a close with a brief outline of the common elements in the make-up of the United States and Israel.

It is obvious from the few remarks here offered as examples that the volume contains much interesting information and many stimulating ideas. It deserves careful reading and discussion.

SOLOMON GRAYZEL

Philadelphia, Pa.

ISHTIAQ HUSAIN QURESHI. *The Pakistani Way of Life.* Pp. xi, 81. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. $4.00.

To the small number of books on Pakistan now available, this volume comes as a welcome addition. The author was a professor of history at Delhi University before partition and was a prominent member of the Muslim League. He served in the Pakistan Cabinet during the first six years, and apparently wrote the book while still Minister of Education. More recently, Professor Qureshi has been teaching at Columbia University.

The book forms part of a series sponsored by UNESCO aimed to further mutual understanding between the different peoples and countries of the world. In view of the extraordinarily limited information now available about the various peoples and customs of Pakistan, the chances of producing a comprehensive introductory study at this time are restricted. What the author has done is to portray the view of Pakistan as seen by a member of the elite in a highly idealized manner.

The picture which emerges is a valuable document of the romantic vision which provided the foundation for the Muslim League ideology, an ideology which has since foundered on the shoals of harsh realism. The benefits of Mughal rule in India are exaggerated, and the faults of the Hindus unduly stressed. But precisely that reading of history provided much of the emotional fervor for the Pakistan Movement.

What has been neglected is a description of the weakness of the Muslims—their economic, social, and educational degeneration—which led to the demand for Pakistan as a protection against the more advanced and energetic Hindu community. Pakistan today is a land of underprivileged peasants—still harrassed by a small overprivileged elite—striving to better their lot. The intellectual history of Pakistan during its first decade has been characterized by the painful shift from the romantic view portrayed in this book to a more realistic appreciation of the immediate need for solutions to exceedingly complex problems.

As a document, this book is invaluable for helping to explain the attitudes and failures of the Muslim League. As an account of the Pakistani way of life, it represents an ideal toward which many Pakistani aspire.

STANLEY MARON

Human Relations Area Files
New Haven, Conn.

DAVID E. APTER. *The Gold Coast in Transition.* Pp. xiii, 355. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $5.00.

This is a spirited book which is appearing at a time when the political fortunes of the Gold Coast are in the news. Dr. Apter's questions go straight to the heart of the matter in a masterly first chapter in which he discusses whether British parliamentary government is a suitable mechanism for the development of African societies from a traditional, tribal stage to that of a centralized, self-governing state. This query has long troubled administrators in British Africa, but it has seldom been posed by the political scientist.

As a pioneer in method Dr. Apter has many difficulties. As a political scientist he wants to make political generalizations. He describes the stages by which the Gold Coast is attaining self-government, but he wants also to generalize as to political development in all African territories and to test political theories, particularly those of Weber and Marion Levy. Anything less would brand him as a "mere historian." Yet, he is dealing with such an unfamiliar situation that he is obliged to give background information on environment, population, economic development, history, ethnography, and the evolution of the British policy of Indirect Rule.

With this complex story to tell, it is not surprising that Dr. Apter has little room to develop his concepts. Some of them hold up the speed of his narrative; some are so condensed that reviewers have described them as "jargon"; and some are not developed fully. Even his fundamental concept of "institutional transfer" needs working out in greater detail in a particular area if it is to be really fruitful.

Again Dr. Apter's problem is central government and its evolution in a state composed of many different tribal political systems. The analysis of these traditional systems is vital to his purpose, yet the anthropological material available is uneven and little of it geared to answer his particular question. He therefore oversimplifies and often apparently relies on impressions alone. This is particularly true in the pages dealing with ideas and values and the evolution of Kwame Nkrumah as a charismatic leader.

The fact that this book sets too high a target does not, however, detract from its

importance. It merely points to the need for more experiment and it is excellent news that Apter, with his vigor and penetrating insight, is carrying out such experiments in East Africa.

For British administrators and anthropologists the most valuable chapters are those which break the newest ground: those which describe the rise to power of Nkrumah, the process of absorption of British parliamentary ideas by a new ruling class, the work of British civil servants and technicians in the new regime, and the analysis of the current situation in two sample districts. These chapters are something of a *tour de force* based, as they are, on nine-months field work.

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DUN J. LI. *British Malaya: An Economic Analysis.* Pp. xi, 123. New York: American Press, 1955. $3.00.

In this era of revolutionary change occurring in colonial and postcolonial areas, Malaya occupies a strategic economic and political position. Yet, there has been very little written, outside of some penetrating journalistic works, which provides insights into the nature of imperialism in Malaya: internal economic and political problems, ethnic conflicts, and so forth. The need for enlightenment on one of these problems —imperialism—is partially fulfilled in Dun J. Li's work, *British Malaya: An Economic Analysis.*

Tracing the broad outlines of Malayan economic development from 1895 to 1938, Dr. Li analyzes both the economic gains reaped by the imperial power and the social and economic losses sustained by the Malayan people. The author perceptively relates continuing governmental surpluses and the vast private profits arising primarily out of the exploitation of tin and rubber. One suggestion of the profitability of this rich colonial region is the fact that in the entire period the balance of trade was always "favorable." For the British economy, Malaya proved a steady source of profits, dollar exchange, vital raw materials, and government revenue.

Resource development was made possible not only by the application of foreign technology and capital but also by the organization of a foreign labor force. The labor force for tin and rubber exploitation came mostly from immigrating Chinese and Indians since the native Malays resisted job offers. In a framework of free immigration, government intervention, and the absence of an organized labor movement, even in the prosperous nineteen-twenties maximum daily wages of less than a dollar prevailed.

While Malaya's economic growth has been marked, some unfavorable aspects of imperialist economic development on the people and the economy are clear. Government revenues came mostly from taxes on opium, tobacco, and liquor, and railway profits. Official policy was largely responsible for the widespread use of opium, which often provided over 50 per cent of the revenue. Most government spending was for a bureaucracy: roads, railways, and the military, medical services and education having a low priority. The economy's dependence upon rubber and tin has made it vulnerable to sudden market changes, and the chances of more balanced development have been precluded by the large remissions abroad.

Dr. Li's book provides much useful material; his work clarifies the outlines of Malayan economic development, making more meaningful present-day problems and alternative solutions leading to political independence and economic maturity. While many useful facts and detailed figures are presented, their full impact is often softened by the author's failure to put them in clear analytic focus. For example, his analysis of Malaya's "favorable" balance of trade is not related to the balance of payments; thus one aspect of imperialism is left obscured.

CHARLES HOFFMANN
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TIEH-TSENG LI. *The Historical Status of Tibet.* Pp. xi, 312. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1956. $5.00.

The issue of the status of Tibet, long quiescent, again briefly stirred international interest in 1950. In essence, the problem

was whether that country, once strong and independent, had in the course of centuries become legally a part of China. Li Tieh-tseng, in a book born of his Ph.D. thesis, traces the history of Tibet's foreign relations from the T'ang Dynasty (618–907) to date. He concludes that Tibet was a vassal of China from the time of Kublai Khan (1260–95), and that China acquired full soveregnty over the Tibetan nation at the end of the eighteenth century. That authority had faded back to suzerainty again, however, by the beginning of the twentieth century.

The author describes the British efforts from 1885 onwards to break down Tibet's isolation, the concern of Tsarist Russia, and the efforts of the dying Manchu Dynasty to reassert its waning control, with rivalry between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas constituting a complicating factor. Some of the seamier aspects of the period of Manchu ascendency in Lhasa are glossed over. More important, there is a too-quick acceptance of the finality of Mongol and Manchu overlordship, without adequate consideration of the nature of that Oriental "suzerainty."

Further, the argument about an issue of sovereign (or suzerain) rights which was approached by Britain and China from vastly different points of view and only dimly—if at all—perceived by Tibet, has been permitted to obscure political reality. For the question of technical status was patently subordinate to a power struggle along traditional lines. Peking and the British sought to build up their respective positions in Tibet; the Tibetan theocracy, linked by assorted ties of religion and vassalage to the Manchu Throne, fought for an effective independence.

Naked power dictated the denouement. After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, Tibet exercized a de facto autonomy—but in its political naiveté neglected to prepare an international position against the day that a unified China would again descend upon it. When the Communist Peking regime in 1950 demanded that Tibet accept Chinese "liberation," the British *raj* had left India; and Lhasa's appeal to the United Nations for help didn't even get on the agenda.

So Tibet was forced in May 1951 to submit to "peaceful liberation." Dr. Li says that "settled the issue of Tibet." It did indeed, but not on the basis of the intrinsic merits of the case—and that is what the present book was about.

Dr. Werner Levi has remarked (*Far Eastern Survey,* Aug. 1956) the identity between parts of Li's book and a 1949 Ph.D. thesis by Sung Yao-ting, "Chinese-Tibetan Relations 1890–1947."

O. EDMUND CLUBB
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ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS and A. J. THOMAS, JR. *Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas.* Pp. xvi, 476. Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956. $8.00.

Non-Intervention deals with the legal principle of nonintervention and, from the viewpoint of the international lawyer, does it well. Probably it deserves a more descriptive title than it now carries, however, for a large and interesting part of the study concerns aspects of the doctrine of nonintervention which do not lie exclusively within the Western Hemisphere. In a work considering the import of nonintervention in the Americas, one might expect to find some discussion of the principle in terms of general international law and of legal practices under the United Nations for purposes of comparison; but this book carries such discussion far beyond a few statements which might serve to orient the reader. In fact, it includes not only a great deal of substantive material on non-American law and practices, but also a series of value-judgments concerning the correctness and effectiveness of the non-American as opposed to the American doctrine and practices.

Although I do not agree with all of the conclusions presented in these interpretive sections of the book, they do contain much that is valuable and thought-provoking. Consequently, the specialization of the title performs a disservice to the prospective reader who may not care to concern himself with American law alone, but who may not be aware of the wider scope of the present study.

My lack of agreement with some of the

conclusions of the authors has to do, I suspect, more with the nature of the differences between the social sciences and the science of the Law than with substantive content. Lack of space prohibits discussion of those differences, which arise out of what international lawyers on the one hand and social scientists on the other are trying to do and the factors they take into account in their calculations; but I will predict that the international lawyer will find this study more useful than will the political scientist or economist. However all of them can read it with profit.

As to content, after a three-chapter description of the evolution of the doctrine of nonintervention in Europe and America the remainder of the book is divided into two long sections. The first, of seven chapters, is on "The Principle of Non-intervention as It Reflects the Legality or Illegality of Intervention," and the second, of nine chapters, deals with "Certain Grounds and Types of Intervention." The kinds of materials covered can be suggested by listing a few representative chapter headings—"Legality of Individual Intervention under General International Law," "Collective Intervention," "Collective Self-Defense," "Intervention by Recognition and Non-Recognition," "Intervention for Democracy," "Asylum as Intervention."

Three appendices follow the body of the study: the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Pact of Bogota, and the Rio Treaty. Unfortunately the authors did not include a comprehensive bibliography, though the extensive footnote citations serve the purpose to some extent.

ROBERT E. SCOTT
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SAMUEL LUBELL. *Revolt of the Moderates*. Pp. ix, 308. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. $2.75.

MERLO J. PUSEY. *Eisenhower, the President*. Pp. 300. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. $3.75.

Samuel Lubell here applies his method of personal chatty interviews with voters to assess the results of Eisenhower's attempt to remake the Republican party. The dazzle of the Eisenhower personality has concealed the peculiar achievement of his purpose. Of course "the primitive urge for re-election affects every decision" as indeed it must if we are to have representative government instead of dictatorship or anarchy. Lubell says that "for every county in the country the Presidential returns have been analyzed at least as far back as the Civil War."

McCarthy and the outstanding isolationist leaders are viewed as practicing "the politics of revenge." Thus the German counties which, fifty years ago were overwhelmingly Democratic, swung suddenly Republican three times—following World Wars I and II and even the Korean War and politicians simply exploited their opportunities in seeking electoral support. Probably Eisenhower's major problem is living with these Republican isolationists.

Lubell sees us now returning in mid-century to the even balance of the two major parties reminiscent of the 1870's and 1880's. Thus we have had alternating Republican and Democratic Congresses and may continue to have them. A considerable number of voters avow their intention of casting their ballots to prevent either party from becoming too strong. The effect of good incomes in rehabilitating the Republican party is highlighted by one former Democrat who explained his turning Republican by, "I'll tell you the truth: I married a wife with some money." The rising incomes under Democratic Presidents evidently relieved many a prospering Democrat of his underdog complex and induced him to join the ranks of the party of social prestige. Of this there can be little doubt, as Lubell's statistics demonstrate that the Republicans need not expect the Civil Rights issue to recapture the Negro vote; he is too engrossed in "jobs" and the conviction that the Democratic party is more concerned about his welfare than the Republican.

If Pusey's book was designed as a campaign biography, it is rather too devoid of perceptive insights for the party of the college graduate and is too colorless for the rest of the voters. It is often as pedestrian as a government report. It purports to cover Eisenhower's call to the presidency and the first three years of his administration. As a partisan document it employs conventional devices: "The Democratic candidate gibed," and so forth, "Give 'em Hell, Harry . . . ranted and sputtered." How is the following for omnibus *innuendo*: "He (Eisenhower) has never attempted to grab a piece of territory, to seize an industry, to intimidate Congress, to pack a court, or otherwise to abuse the power in his hands." The villains lurk between the lines and need not be named.

If the President himself is almost above criticism his team is not infallible. Brownell's reputation "was somewhat impaired . . . when he accused President Truman of knowingly promoting a Soviet spy." Weeks' boner in ousting Dr. Allen V. Astin is frankly reported. "Mrs. Hobby was not personally responsible but she drew criticism upon herself by saying that 'no one could have foreseen' the extraordinary demand for the [polio] vaccine." Dulles however is almost if not altogether too good to be true. His achievement is certainly not as neat as Chapter VII would seem to have it.

"Ike handles his visitors with the adroitness of a life long politician," which no doubt he was as a general. The President's Cabinet has been resuscitated from an approaching desuetude and Eisenhower has shown a remarkable adaptation to the Presidency. But when Pusey says that "the power of Commander-in-Chief could not reasonably be stretched to meet all the situations that might arise in the Formosa Strait," he is on doubtful constitutional ground.

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LAWRENCE H. FUCHS. *The Political Behavior of American Jews*. Pp. 220. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. $4.00.

Of the Jew it has been said that he is like everyone else, but more so.

This volume by Lawrence H. Fuchs, assistant professor of political science, Brandeis University, substantiates this observation, but more so—it provides the factual material to prove it. From innumerable sources—encyclopedias, learned articles and studies, old newspapers, documents and autobiographies—he has culled an amazing array of facts and has presented them clearly and convincingly as if to answer *one* question.

That *one* question the author poses in his first chapter, "But Is There a Jewish Vote?"

Ten pages are devoted to an analysis of this question—a question, by the way, that might be asked concerning the Catholic citizen, the Irish-American citizen, the member of the American Medical Association, and so forth. And the author's discussion highlights some helpful conclusions true of Jews and others: ". . . group expression in politics is indispensable to democracy." ". . . a strong case can be made that ethno-religious diversity in American society has been a major factor in mitigating class cleavage."

The general inferences that Professor Fuchs draws from the study of his facts are these: Jews, like all other citizens, have participated in all phases—good and bad—of American political life. Jews, having suffered as a persecuted minority in the Old and New Worlds, tended to vote for the party which at the time held out more liberal promises of justice, fair play, and opportunity. As a group the Jews since the 1920's developed a strong zeal for the Democratic party at the very time they were improving their economic status; this in seeming contrast to general class tendencies in American politics.

This final judgment concerning the political behavior of American Jews the author attributes to the ethical and spiritual values of the Jewish cultural tradition which cut across Jewish differences of income, occupation, and education. This, together with his strong individualism, accounts in large measure for his political liberalism, his tendencies to join new political ventures, and his unpredictability as a voter.

One wishes that the author of this illuminating, original, and excellent volume did not use the inaccurate and stuffy word

"Hebrews" for the flesh and blood reality generally known as "Jews."

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NEIL MACNEIL and HAROLD W. METZ. *The Hoover Report, 1953–1955.* Pp. viii, 344. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. $6.00.

The first Hoover Report, *The President's Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 1947–1949,* was an undoubted success. It restricted itself to the investigation of administrative practices and made 273 recommendations, of which 72 per cent were carried out by Congress or by the President. The success of the first really brought the second into existence. There persisted the common feeling in and out of Congress that not only administrative efficiency, but the overall legislative record of Congress should be submitted to nonpartisan evaluation. And the second commission proceeded to scrutinize official public policy from two very salient criteria—strengthening of the system of private property and congressional control of the purse strings.

The authors held important editorial and research jobs with the second Commission. They know intimately the Commission's recommendations as well as the substance of the nineteen task force reports. They have done an excellent job in presenting, in abbreviated form, the work of the 200 men who served on the Commission or on the task forces.

But the second Hoover Commission report is a very controversial political document. On almost every page it quarrels with American political history of the last quarter century. The tone is essentially that of Mr. Hoover's political speeches of 1932. Big government stifles business, and business is the very lifeblood of America. "Big government is becoming a Frankenstein's monster that turns upon its creators" (p. 4). Business methods are more efficient than those of government and much of the work now being done by the government, and especially by the Department of Defense, should be performed by private companies upon a contractual basis.

The fundamental thesis of the Commission's report is best expressed in the chairman's earlier volume, *The Challenge to Liberty* (1934). It is that man's greatest potential tyrant is his government. History may prove that Herbert Clark Hoover is right, but the alacrity with which the American people have accepted, and supported, social security, rural electrification, housing, and other such social welfare measures in the last twenty-five years serves to emphasize the general unpopularity of the laissez-faire doctrine. Even the new conservatives, a potent force in America, have abandoned the Hoover-Hayek position on many fundamental issues.

The Commission's report is quietly being relegated to the shelves of historical documents. This book seeks to prevent that dispensation. It criticizes the critics and castigates them as "spokesmen of selfish pressure groups" (p. 307). This it has a right to do, but the authors should also admit, which they do not, that the personnel of the Commission and of the task forces were recruited generally from business and its professional allies. There are other equally important segments of the population—farmers, workers, and minorities—and they should have been represented on any policy-evaluating commission.

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HARRY L. CASE. *Personnel Policy in a Public Agency: The TVA Experience.* Pp. xiv, 177. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. $3.00.

Anybody with even a smattering of understanding of large-scale personnel operations is almost sure, in reading Mr. Case's *Personnel Policy in a Public Agency,* to find himself annoyed almost beyond measure by two characteristics of the presentation. The first is the bland assumption, explicitly expressed or unmistakably implied at least a hundred times, "Look how good we are; and look how hopelessly incompetent the other fellows are." The second is the abysmal ignorance of the facts of personnel life and the extreme difficulty experienced in drawing sound conclusions from the meager facts only partially known.

A few examples—only a few of scores which could be cited if more space were available—illustrate these two characteristics. Over and over the practical perfection of the Tennessee Valley Authority set-up, with the three members of the Board having administrative responsibilities, appointed by the President of the United States, is iterated and reiterated. At no place in the book is there even a faint indication of any knowledge that, in this country of ours, there are more than a thousand local governments with the council-manager type of government; that the manager is chosen by the legislative body, not the chief executive; and that the supreme administrative authority is vested in him, not in a board. The pious but more or less hypocritical legislative decrees as to political influence in appointments which Mr. Case regards as peculiar to the TVA are all but standard in the recent and many of the older civil service laws. The claim that "there is a much smaller gap in TVA between plans and decisions . . . and contact with the public which uses the service . . . than in most large public agencies" (p. 5) takes no cognizance, to cite two instances, of the close relationships in every large city of the police and the public health officers with the public served. To give two illustrations from the technical personnel field, Mr. Case, in the book, never does get clear the relationship of position classification and recruiting, with the former coming first; in fact he asserts flatly that "recruitment and appointment of personnel is the original and most elementary function of personnel administration" (p. 8). And repeatedly "nepotism" is branded as a cardinal personnel sin, though the most efficient filling and repair station whose operation I have ever observed personnally is manned by a father and his four sons. And so on and on to such an extent that it is difficult to recognize and appraise fairly some of the good points in the book, such as the interesting description of the TVA employee relations, containing many conclusions I am not ready to accept.

The truth seems to be that the TVA authorities, woefully ignorant of the rapidly developing science and art of personnel administration, as exemplified in the cities of Cincinnati and Milwaukee and in the state governments of California and New Jersey, decided to improvise a personnel system all their own. As improvisers they did fairly well, even though they fell considerably short of the early personnel conceptions in this country which were expressed in the civil service rules of the Chicago Civil Service Commission as long ago as 1913. But why proceed as if little or no worth while development work in this field has ever been done? Why pay no attention to the personnel things which correspond to the bathtub, the automobile, the telephone, the airplane, the plastics, and the wonder drugs? In short, the discerning reader, if at all informed of personnel realities, must almost surely reach the conclusion expressed in the adage beginning "He who knows not and knows not that he knows not. . . ."

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ROBERT E. CUSHMAN. *Civil Liberties in the United States: A Guide to Current Problems and Experience.* Pp. xiii, 248. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956. $2.85.

If the directors of the Fund for the Republic had taken a poll among political scientists and civil rights' students to learn who was considered best qualified to describe and assess the present state of civil liberties in the United States, there is little doubt that the name of Robert E. Cushman would have appeared at or near the top of the list. A past president of the American Political Science Association and the guiding spirit of Cornell University's distinguished program of research and publication in the field of civil rights, Professor Cushman adds to his stature by the clear and concise conspectus contained in the present book.

The volume was commissioned by the Fund for the Republic and five thousand paperback copies have been distributed by the Fund to the press, lawyers, civic leaders, and some educators.

This is not a technical study. There are no footnotes or appendices and, while cases are referred to by title and with citations,

there is little use of lawyers' language and an almost total absence of academic jargon. Professor Cushman's Introduction states that the book was "designed to be an outline of the entire area [of civil liberties] with perhaps just a little meat on the bones." Let it be said that the bones are exceedingly well assembled and the little meat discreetly distributed and tenderly done.

To compress as vast an array of facts and problems as present-day civil liberties present into a relatively slender volume involves, of course, the making of choices and the placing of emphasis. Here it is easy to express differences in preference. This reviewer, for instance, was a little puzzled by the contrast of twenty pages allotted to academic freedom as against only three for "Military Power and Civil Liberty" and two for civil liberties problems of aliens. Another surprise was to find only one mention of McCarthy: perhaps McCarthyism is so much of the past that the Wisconsin senator rates no more—but is Huntington Cairns' role in matters of obscene literature cases really twice as important (pp. 18 and 38)?

This reviewer would also have chosen a different illustration of academic freedom problems than the *Tandy* case (referred to, but not identified by that name, on page 82). The gentleman involved was on a one-year appointment at Kansas State College at Emporia; his signature on the petition for pardon of the Communist leadership was written on official college stationery; his relief from teaching duties was voted by the faculty while the College administration continued payment of his salary; the American Association of University Professors declined to consider the case a violation of its principles of academic freedom. There are stronger cases, regrettably, to illustrate the precarious state of academic freedom today.

But if one can differ on such matters of detail it should be repeated that the total impact of this sane, orderly, and detached summary is impressive and instructive. We are indebted to Professor Cushman—not the least for the splendid reading suggestions attached to each section—and to the Fund for the Republic's directors who made this book possible. My only regret is that the Fund's free distribution could not have extended to every public library in the country!

FRANCIS H. HELLER
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ROBERT A. HORN. *Groups and the Constitution.* Pp. ix, 187. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1956. $3.00.

Over the past thirty years the Supreme Court has been restating the concepts of civil liberties. Dr. Horn's book is only one of the many in which scholars have attempted not only to review these cases, but to develop theories and patterns of thinking and to chart the future development of the law. Dr. Horn professes to see a cumulative body of constitutional law of association.

The thesis [as here stated] appears clear and unequivocal. Freedom of association *is* one of the most important civil liberties. Variations on the theme appear, however, as the author pursues his thesis. In places he is concerned primarily with the right of association, that is, the right of individuals to act collectively for the accomplishment of common objectives. In other places Dr. Horn pursues with equal vigor and enthusiasm a parallel but somewhat less clearly defined thesis which contends, generally speaking, that the Court is gradually admitting that the provisions of the Bill of Rights may be extended in protection of groups, such as religious, labor, and political associations. In spite of the assertion concerning "freedom of association," the central theme is that associations have, or should have, guarantees of civil liberties equal to those bestowed on natural persons. Dr. Horn confesses, however, ". . . it is a rare thing to find in the judicial opinions . . . any overt discussion of the nature of groups or the rights of groups." "The Court's rhetoric," continues Dr. Horn, "is still the rhetoric of individualism, but its logic is the logic of the collectivity of our own time. The Justices focus the light of their learning upon the individual before the bar, but if one looks back at the rear wall of the courtroom, one can see, large and distinct, the shadow of the group for whom the individual litigant stands."

Dr. Horn insists that "the rights of associations have been raised upon the rights of individuals to associate." This oblique approach by the Court to the rights of associations obscures the issues and dilutes the evidence supporting the author's hypothesis. He is required to interpret the opinions not in the rhetoric in which they are expressed but rather as they cast shadows on "the rear wall of the courtroom." The chief organizational defect of the study lies in the constant intertwining or even confusing of the two theses: the right to associate and the rights of associations. Yet the value of Dr. Horn's research and his contribution to the literature lie in his pursuit of the vaguer of these two concepts.

There can be little sociological or legal controversy concerning the basic rights of individuals to associate. It does not follow, however, that "the group for whom the individual litigant stands" shares with the individual the broad grant of constitutional freedoms.

Yet such is Dr. Horn's central thesis. Because of the elusive character of the concept, the author in his search for evidence pounds at the periphery of the law, analyzing dissents and concurring opinions—even *obiter dicta*—in an attempt to wring from the Court or the individual justices admissions which support the thesis. It is an exploratory investigation and admittedly one which reveals little positive evidence. Dr. Horn is, nevertheless, to be commended for the intensity of the search and for his integrity in the statement of findings. Throughout the study the author steps nimbly from idea to idea and, when fancy dictates, he launches on erudite excursions, such, for example, as his delightful essay on the nature of American political parties. The book is an expanded and revised version of a series of Walgreen lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in 1953. *Groups and the Constitution* covers familiar ground, but it provides a somewhat novel approach to segments of American Constitutional Law which undoubtedly merit extensive investigation.

HAROLD M. DORR
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EDWARD A. SHILS. *The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies.* Pp. 238. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. $3.50.

The secret police as a characteristic or even dominant agency is a device by means of which authoritarian governments maintain their control over an otherwise unmanageable mass society. In modern history this device was developed in Russia under the Czars and perfected under Lenin and Stalin. In the time previous to the Russian revolution this sinister guardian of insecure authority was continually at grips with his twin brother and mortal enemy, the conspiratorial community of revolutionary intellectuals who vied with their persecutors in ruthlessness no less than in secretiveness. While this underground fight determined the pattern of domestic policy, the operation of law was perverted into a form of irresistable violence, and intelligence appeared as naturally hostile to authority—a horrifying picture, against which as a dark foil there stood out in bright colors the ease and security of life in the Western democracies.

Thus it came as a terrible shock to lovers of liberty all over the world when, in the years following World War II, the leading democracy began to flaunt a security policy which seemed to mimick some of the more odious features of a system associated in the public mind with Hitler's Gestapo or Stalin's Gay-Pay-Uo. It is true, there was much noise and relatively little damage. Neither did McCarthy, McCarran, and their associates really succeed in violating the sanctuary of privacy and personal freedom nor did that group of Communists, Soviet agents, and fellow-traveling intellectuals, the target of the wrath of the new demagogues, ever constitute a serious threat to America's security or its democratic institutions. But the ugly noise was deafening indeed, and the subsequent lowering of domestic moral was as alarming as the loss of international prestige which weakened the cause of the Free World.

However, there is reason to be thankful for the fact that time has become ripe for a book like Mr. Shils's. Instead of retelling in detail the distressing story of the extravagancies of recent American security

and loyalty policies, he dispassionately surveys the phenomenon as a whole, explores its causes, and interprets its significance in the light of the American liberal tradition and the principles of a free society. He shows how extremist tendencies, latent in American life throughout its history, attained a short-lived prominence under the shock of the disillusionment administered to the American people by the failure of the Allies to "win the peace" in 1945, and how this frustrating experience deepened an ingrained public distrust of the intelligentsia. In drawing his conclusions the author arrives at a reaffirmation of the idea of a pluralistic society which combines public-mindedness with attachment to the idea of privacy. Regarding the future he seems moderately optimistic. The feud between politicians and intellectuals, he thinks, has come to an end, and the intellectual has won final recognition as a respected member in the council of political advisers.

HELMUT KUHN

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ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

Automation and Technological Change. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Congress of the United States, Eighty-Fourth Congress, First Session. Pp. vi, 644. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955. $2.00.

During October 1955, a Joint Committee of Congress held nine days of hearings in the field of automation and technological change. Representatives of management, organized labor, engineers, physical scientists and economists were heard. Not a single witness was opposed to automation *per se*. There was general agreement that in the long run it means increasing productivity and progress which are basic values in the American ideology.

There was less agreement about the meaning of automation, its effect upon the business structure, the short-run impact upon workers, and the solutions to the possible problems that it might bring about. The term is so recent that at the time of the hearings it had not appeared in standard dictionaries. The Subcommittee adopted a broad definition "to include all various new automatic and electronic processes, along with rapid technological advance and improved know-how generally." The concept, for example, was intended to include the printed circuitry process used in the manufacture of radio and television sets and machines to solve complex mathematical problems. A more limited definition was suggested that would emphasize the feedback principle as the essential element whereby electronic sensing devices automatically pass information back to a processing machine which corrects for wear or other factors calling for adjustment.

Labor union officials believe that automation in the short run will cause serious frictional unemployment. Among other proposals, they made suggestions for increased unemployment compensation, improved social security, guaranteed annual wage plans, a shorter work week, and higher wages. In other words, they have incorporated the underconsumption branch of Keynesian economics into their thinking on automation.

Management representatives, on the other hand, tend to minimize the unemployment problems associated with automation. Their favorite example was the installation of dial telephones which was accompanied by a growth of employment in the Bell System. They assume that during the next decade population will increase faster than the labor supply. It is argued that, under such conditions, there is a need for increased investments in automation in order to raise our standard of living.

While continuing study was suggested, the Joint Committee made no specific recommendations for federal legislation. Chief reliance was placed on the Employment Act of 1946 to maintain a dynamic economy that would ease the impact of automation. These hearings are important to social scientists since they contain the thinking of specialists and representatives of unions, industry, and government on automation as well as proposals for dealing with its potential impact on the economy.

MELVIN J. SEGAL

Michigan State University

FRANCIS X. SUTTON and others. *The American Business Creed.* Pp. xiii, 414. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $6.75.

This is a study of the ideology or creed of American business as revealed in the public statements of business men, institutional advertisements, and the literature of business associations, such as the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Committee for Economic Development, and the National Association of Manufacturers. Chapters I to XII are devoted to a documented exposition of creed content, arranged by principal themes; Chapters XIII to XVIII to a theoretical analysis of the factors which determine the character and motivation of the creed.

Ideology is defined as "any system of beliefs publicly expressed with the manifest purpose of influencing the sentiments and actions of others." The ideology of American business is determined by three factors—cultural, institutional, and motivational. The first two are regarded as of minor significance and given only cursory treatment; the culture provides a body of traditional ideas with which the business creed must be moderately compatible, while the institutional framework constrains ideology to some extent and influences its modes of expression. The really significant determinants are motivational forces.

Businessmen are subject to strains, anxieties, doubts, and conflicts engendered by their economic and social roles. To maintain their psychological stability they require an emotional cathartic—an ideology "to resolve these conflicts, alleviate these anxieties, overcome these doubts." They create such an ideology, the major themes of which are merely "verbal and symbolic resolutions of these conflicts." Thus, businessmen are both producers and consumers of ideology. What they say publicly about themselves and their social role may influence others, but its primary purpose is relief of psychological tension.

This production-for-use theory of business ideology rests on shaky foundations. It is based on irrational, deterministic psychology; it rejects self-interest as a principle of motivation; it denies the inferential value of behavior as a test for belief and intent; it accepts self-serving public statements as real but denies the reality of private convictions; it treats as valid what businessmen say but ignores what they do. Like other people, businessmen have personal complexes and indulge in specious rationalizations; this we know from common observation. But it is absurd to infer from this that the systematic propaganda of Big Business, on which vast sums are lavished, is nothing more than verbal and symbolic resolution of internal conflicts; that it is not inspired by self-interest, not designed specifically to influence public opinion. Such propaganda is a manifestation of corporate power, not of psychic torment, as the authors might have discovered had they examined economic structure and behavior instead of the corporate soul.

HORACE M. GRAY

University of Illnois

HERRYMON MAURER. *Great Enterprise: Growth and Behavior of the Big Corporation.* Pp. ix, 303. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $5.00.

It is the author's judgment that most of the innumerable studies of the corporation have been piecemeal or have lumped characteristics peculiar to a small number of corporations. He chooses to concern himself with an over-all rationale, a general perspective. The declared aim of the book is "to suggest what the large corporation is and where it may be going." In setting that course, he admits in the Preface that "anyone who ventures to speak out loud about the large corporation is greatly indebted" to books reflecting studies of Berle and Means on implications of management control; Aaron Gordon on business leadership; Peter Drucker on management-employee relations; Galbraith on his theory of countervailing power; and Berle on a treatment which looks from particular facets of the corporation to the need for

an over-all rationale. The author says that he is particularly indebted to *Fortune's* publisher, "who conceived the project, initiated it, and edited it." He acknowledges also his debt to four "special researchers" of *Fortune's* staff and to the present and past staff who "have created methods for studying and reporting the current behavior and historical background of United States business." Extensive background materials were "subjected to *Fortune's* standard checking procedure," and the manuscript resulting from examination of extensive data on fifty corporations chosen for special study was "subjected to *Fortune's* regular checking processes." The text, however, carries no bibliographical footnotes and no general bibliographical list.

The very inclusive aim at gaining general perspective on what the large corporation is and where it may be going is surely one of major difficulty. The big corporation, as Maurer says, is vast and sprawling; often is no longer simply a device for doing business; will not sit long enough for a definitive portrait; often appears unique, shaped by particular and complex circumstances. Perhaps such are the reasons why most of the earlier studies are less helpful on the broad questions than one might wish them to be. It seems fairly clear, however, that in the critically creative task which the author announces, no special researchers or standard checking procedure should be supposed to provide assurance beyond assembling and assuring the accuracy of details. Indeed, to this reviewer, one of the more interesting aspects of the report, namely, the effort to view the managerial search for consensus in corporation committees in the light of the traditional practice of the Friends' meeting, seems to be Maurer, without dependence on special researchers and checkers.

In view of the need of reaching a consensus much beyond that of the individual corporation, not only on the legal foundations of the market but also on the place of the corporation in our society, it is disconcerting to find that "government officials are part of a hierarchy not subject to social controls and very imperfectly subject to political ones." This reviewer's judgment is that, aside from internal details, what the corporation is and where it is going remains a basic question of public policy, with major ramifications in corporate personality, proprietary perpetuity, limited liability, and, in general, unlimited size.

J. P. WATSON
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HAROLD BARGER. *Distribution's Place in the American Economy Since 1869.* (National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 58, General Series.) Pp. xviii, 222. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $4.50.

Barger's book deals with the role of wholesale and retail distributive agencies rather than with the role of distribution as a function. Within this framework, the author attempts to measure the volume of goods distributed and the corresponding inputs in both man-hour and margin terms and thus to draw conclusions in terms of trends in productivity in the distribution industry and in its margins.

Part I deals with trends in employment and output. The number of persons engaged in distribution, as defined, grew from 6.1 per cent of the labor force in 1870 to 16.4 per cent in 1950. From 88 persons engaged in distribution for each thousand in commodity production (agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and manufacturing) in 1870, the proportion increased to 407 per thousand in 1950, an annual growth rate of 2.1 per cent. This phenomenon is partially the result of hours of work declining more in retail and wholesale establishments than on farms, and in mines and factories, and partially from the enlarging scope of distribution. Moreover, wholesale and retail functions have tended to become more specialized as markets have become larger and more complex. Finally, it is noted that technology changed less rapidly in trade than in manufacturing so that output per employee rose less rapidly.

Productivity is measured in terms of output per man-hour which is observed to have experienced a growth rate of 1.1 per cent per year in wholesale and retail trade as compared to 1.9 per cent in agriculture, 2.3 per cent in manufacturing, and 2.6 per cent in mining. The author recognizes that his figures for trade probably contain some downward bias because of the increased quantity of services rendered. Unfortunately, but perhaps necessarily, the services rendered are discussed primarily in what may be called the frill services—adjustments, delivery, credit, free trials, and so forth, rather than in the more fundamental service of providing products in such a way as to minimize consumers' procurement tasks. (For the hurried, mobile housewife the modern supermarket, with its breadth and depth of assortment and its rapid turnover operation in perishables, may be in fact rendering a much greater and more meaningful aggregate of distribution service than the low turnover limited-line, limited-assortment so-called "service" store.) If a broader view of the service rendered by the modern marketing mechanism were taken, the downward bias resulting from not introducing an increase-of-service factor in the calculations might well be much greater. In fact, the weakest aspect of the entire work is the failure to come to grips with the concept of the output of distribution and the way in which technological progress is related to it.

Part II is an attempt to measure the history of distribution cost (value added by distribution) on an aggregate basis in terms of the percentage of the final retail price paid by the consumer. Tables of margins by decades are developed for 32 kinds of retail and 19 kinds of wholesale trade. As in all such aggregative studies which must employ fragments of data, the reader may have reservations about the use of specific figures and the propriety of certain allocations, weightings and adjustments. Some of these may arise from the attempt to categorize "wholesalers" and "retailers" which is implied from the way in which the margin studies are used. For example, although the author attempts to meet the multiple wholesale level problem by adjustments, whether these adjustments are adequate to reflect such phenomena as the rise of drop shippers (nonstock carrying wholesalers highly important in coal and lumber) is not clear. This reviewer's reservations are in the line of a caveat to the reader to recognize the limitations of the data (as does the author) rather than a criticism of the significant work which Dr. Barger has undertaken. Over-all, the author has done an excellent job in measuring the history of distribution cost and tracing the growth of the distribution industry as he defines it. In addition, his bibliographies on sources of margin data (pp. 152–97) and trade periodicals prior to 1919 (pp. 198–215) will prove valuable to students of marketing history.

C. S. GOODMAN
University of Pennsylvania

LINCOLN H. CLARK (Ed.). *Consumer Behavior,* Vol. I: *The Dynamics of Consumer Reaction,* Vol. II: *The Life Cycle and Consumer Behavior.* Pp. viii, 128; viii, 125. New York: New York University Press, 1955. $8.00 both volumes.

Consumer Behavior represents a collection of papers sponsored by the Committee for Research on Consumer Attitudes and Behavior, which was founded in 1952 by a group of social scientists, mostly from the areas of economics, psychology, and sociology, to encourage interdisciplinary investigations into the fields suggested by the Committee's title. It is exceedingly difficult to draw broad generalizations concerning the papers because of their heterogeneity of quality, content, and approach. These exploratory studies reveal, however, the broad possibilities of such research and one is left with the feeling that although few definitive answers are given, some "of the deeper questions that arise at the market place" have been touched upon.

The first volume is primarily concerned with problems of consumer decision and choice. William Whyte, Jr. writes on consumer values and attitudes in a new type of suburb for which Park Forest, Illinois serves as an example. Nelson Foote, using the autonomy of the consumer as his theme, poses ten research hypotheses. Ruby T. Norris has a brief paper on the "Processes and Objectives of House Purchasing in the New London Area." The most important empirical work in the volume is "A Study of Purchase Decisions" with George Katona indicating "The Research Design" and Eva Mueller describing methodology of "The Sample Survey."

There are also five short articles which represent a panel on the technical problems of measuring preferences. Since this is a necessarily brief review, detailed discussion of the individual papers is not possible.

The study of purchase decisions by Katona and Mueller is a provocative pioneering venture into the area of psychological economics. The separation of motivational forces into two types, those that are a function of environmental precipitating circumstances and those that depend on individual attitudes, seems to be a useful concept. The traditional idea in economic theory of the consumer as a rational economic man is certainly worthy of empirical investigation. An attempt is made in this direction in "A Study of Purchase Decisions" by measuring the degree of deliberateness exercised by different types of consumers in the purchase of durable goods and sport shirts. There is a disturbing technical point connected with this paper. All of the relationships studied utilize a single independent variable at a time. For example, the relation between income and degree of deliberation is analyzed. What may appear as the effect of a single variable may really, of course, be the confounded effects of more than one variable. This is not clearly indicated to the reader. The basic difficulty is that there were not a sufficient number of cases in the sample to support a multivariate analysis. As a matter of fact, even in the present study, percentages are often computed on distressingly small bases. Although the point concerning multivariate analysis is made in the article, it is the opinion of this reviewer that a misleading impression is given as to the separate influences of the variables studied.

One of the most significant sections of Volume I is a three-page subcommittee report by James Tobin which blocks out areas within which further research may be pursued.

Volume II concerns itself with the relationship between the life cycle and consumer behavior. Several of the articles are quite imaginative and penetrating in their attempts to deal with what are at best vaguely defined fields. The continuous consumer-panel technique used by Robert Ferber may prove to be a highly useful tool for theoreticians in consumption economics. For example, income elasticities computed from such samples are a valuable check on similar measures obtained from cross-section and time-series data. Furthermore, they do not require the questionable assumptions necessary in using other bodies of data.

Volume II seems to contain more outright speculation than the first volume. Several of the articles theorize on the basis of isolated illustrations, introspection, and simple assertions.

These volumes are a first effort of the Committee for Research on Consumer Attitudes and Behavior. If the Committee receives the financing it requires, improvements over this first effort may be expected.

MORRIS HAMBURG
University of Pennsylvania

IRVING BERNSTEIN, HAROLD L. ENARSON, and R. W. FLEMING (Eds.). *Emergency Disputes and National Policy*. Pp. xi, 271. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. $3.50.

The numerous strikes following World War II, in which at times more workers were involved than in any previous year on record and some of which interrupted functions essential to society, resulted, among other things, in the enactment of the "National Emergencies" provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. They established a special procedure for the handling of those labor disputes which imperil the national health and safety. This procedure provides for presidential authority to obtain temporary injunctions enjoining strikes and for the submission of the case to Congress if neither the injunctions nor the efforts of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service nor a secret ballot of the employees on the employer's last offer effects a settlement. These provisions have been widely criticized for various reasons.

The axis upon which the book revolves is the statement that "the critics can agree only upon what they dislike; their affirmative proposals run the gamut from nothing at all to compulsory arbitration." The study, however, neither recommends any of these proposals nor does it make a new one. It deals essentially with three questions, each of which is the subject of one of its three parts: What Is a National Emergency Dispute? What Is the Taft-Hartley Experience? And What Are the Elements of a National Policy? The answers of the fifteen contributors are presented as working material for use by interested legislators and citizens in efforts to shape a national policy for emergency disputes.

The Introduction sets forth several ideas that run through the discussions of the contributors: the great strike is a complicated affair, subject to influences arising out of economics, politics, the government of private organizations, and public opinion. Accordingly, none of these factors must be stressed to the exclusion of others. Nor must the fact be overlooked that there are sharp differences in impact among strikes in the same industry as well as among strikes in different industries. Policy, thus, must be fitted to the particular strike. It must also be geared to changing foreign relations. For all these reasons it must be flexible. As to the procedural aspects of the problem, the main charge against the Taft-Hartley system is that it is ineffective. Congress is incapable of dealing with major disputes except in a broad enabling fashion. Governmental intervention in such disputes must therefore be by executive action.

Within its limited objective to show what interested legislators and citizens need to know about the problem, this is a very good book. Yet there are probably many such interested persons who would have appreciated it if the authors had wound up the careful analysis of the factors involved with a statement setting forth the national policy which they recommend.

KURT BRAUN
Washington, D. C.

CHARLES R. WALKER, ROBERT H. GUEST, and ARTHUR N. TURNER. *The Foreman on the Assembly Line*. Pp. 197. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $4.00.

This book is a sequel to the earlier work by Walker and Guest, *The Man on the Assembly Line*, and like the earlier work is based on a study made in an automobile assembly plant. It is concerned with the role of the foreman in a mass-production unit, but there are implications for all concerned with the management of others in an increasingly mechanized modern world. Many studies have been made in America and Britain of the foreman, his role, his task, and his equivocal status. For the most part the studies have been from the "outside looking in"; this book is an attempt from the "inside looking out."

The techniques used were observation and semi-directive interviews. The material and the judgments made are largely qualitative, but in Chapter VIII there is the beginning of quantification and the authors promise further quantitative analyses, the scheme for which is adumbrated. Much of the material in the first nine chapters, 120 out of the 149 pages of the main text, is given in the form of quotations ". . . in the hope that some of the dynamic atmosphere of the plant might find its way into the printed page." The aim succeeds, but in such a short book the quotations seem excessive and their reading sometimes becomes tedious. The authors are overmodest, and I would have preferred more of their own comments and fewer of the foreman's.

While the methods of study have the effect of making the resulting material exciting, the book suffers from the limitation of the foreman's point of view, the implications of which have not been followed up. The book gives a vivid picture of the foreman's job as a compensating mechanism for the inflexibility of a technological system which has been ruthlessly projected into the work organization. The foremen are said to accept the technological dimension of the production system—more importantly so, according to this book, do the authors. They give a concept of a total system having social and technological dimensions, but they do not fully consider the foreman's role in relation to the totality, only to the parts. Perhaps Plant X, though so willing to be examined, may not be so ready to accept comprehensive change as it appears to be to accept technological convulsions.

The observational material is very rich

and is well displayed. As an overture to a more comprehensive study, it is excellent.

A. K. RICE

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B. C. ROBERTS. *Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain.* Pp. viii, 570. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $6.00.

The British trade unions not only make up a powerful and well-organized pressure group, but they also dominate the Labour Party. During nearly seven postwar years they have shared indirectly in the management of a great industrial society and have had a hand in policies that guide the global British Commonwealth of Nations. Since return of the Conservatives to power, they have continued to participate directly and indirectly on a wide range of official and nonofficial boards and commissions.

Hence the importance of the issue posed by the Webbs over a half century ago vastly transcends the mere question of whether they still remain miniature democracies. Their constitutional growth, the Webbs saw, as "the long and inarticulate struggle of unlettered men to solve the problem of how to combine administrative efficiency with popular control." Roberts concludes his exhaustive mid-century resurvey with the opinion that, while the struggle still goes on, in the main it has been successful so far as the conduct of trade union affairs goes. This holds although the unions have grown enormously in size, power has been centralized in the hands of a few giant unions, amalgamation and federation has spread rapidly, and the practice has become more general of hiring full-time professional organizers, secretaries, research, and expert staff.

To arrive at his conclusion Roberts examines trade union practices from bottom to the top of their rather complicated, but highly varied, administrative hierarchies: looking at membership rules, elections of officials, determination of policies, lines of authority, and trends in development. Union democracy has many flaws. Nearly 50 per cent of labor is still unorganized. At bottom, attendance and membership participation are low. Transfer from one union to another is difficult. The courts have had to step in to protect membership rights. Throughout all levels women are underrepresented. Despite vast growth in duties, overworked union officials are poorly paid and tend to neglect adequate labor education by means of schools, labor papers, and efforts to arouse interests of the rank and file.

But while yielding much ground, the British trade unions have, Roberts believes, successfully maintained "a fair balance between popular support and efficient administration." The historical data cited offers rather thin support for the conclusion. Meanwhile the author has next to nothing to say about trade union reaction within the Labour Party, the seemingly increasing aversion to socialist ideas of any sort whatsoever, the failure of the unions to organize the fifty per cent of the unorganized at home, or to assume effective leadership either in the larger arena of British industrial society or the world at large.

ROBERT A. BRADY

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SIMON KUZNETS, WILBERT E. MOORE, and JOSEPH J. STENGLER (Eds.). *Economic Growth: Brazil, India and Japan.* Pp. xi, 613. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1955. $12.50.

This volume contains about thirty papers dealing mainly with long-term trends in output, demographic changes, and the role of the state in the modern economic history of Brazil, India, and Japan. The papers were given at a research conference in 1952 held under the auspices of the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council. The conference was designed as an experimental attack on the problem of economic growth drawing upon the several disciplines within the social sciences and focussing attention upon countries less familiar to Western scholars than those which have been in the vanguard of economic development.

As the editors recognize, the strength of the volume lies in the value of the individual contributions, each dealing with a particular aspect of growth in one country.

While the volume is organized by subject matter rather than by country, the essays vary so much in content and emphasis that inter-country comparisons cannot be readily made.

Perhaps some conception of the flavor of the materials can be conveyed by singling out some of the many interesting theses advanced by the various authors:

The increase in population has tended to depress economic growth in India by fostering a make-work attitude, diverting land from commercial to food crops, and necessitating the use of foreign exchange for grain imports rather than capital goods. (Kingsley Davis.)

The get-rich-quick psychology which permeates Brazilian economic attitudes (due in part to a long succession of evanescent booms in sugar, gold, diamonds, coffee, rubber, and other products) is a handicap to economic growth. Scientific farming can replace the exploitive system of land rotation in Brazilian agriculture, but it will lead to a further concentration of people in already densely populated areas rather than to the development of the hinterland. (Preston E. James.)

While the authority of the Japanese government was used to stimulate new investment and technological change, particularly in the 1870's and 1880's, "the real drive and momentum [for growth] lay in large measure outside the realm of national political ambition and state activity." Spontaneous forces within Japanese society, fostered by the tradition of leadership, imitation, and cohesion and by favorable external circumstances, built the Japanese industrial state. (William W. Lockwood.)

Many other valuable insights are offered by Daniel Thorner, Edwin P. Reubens, Irene B. Taeuber, Bernard J. Siegel, Henry William Spiegel, Helen B. Lamb, Marion J. Levy, Jr., and other contributors.

The authors occasionally refer to revisions made in the light of the comments of the conference discussants, but the discussion itself is not reported in the volume.

The book is highly recommended to all persons interested in the study of economic growth.

IRVING B. KRAVIS

University of Pennsylvania

KENNETH F. WALKER. *Industrial Relations in Australia.* Pp. xviii, 389. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $7.50.

For the specialist in industrial relations, compulsory arbitration is the core of the Australian system regulating the relations between labor and management. This is indeed a central problem in Professor Walker's first-rate study, but it is not the only issue and significantly he does not regard it as a simple or uniform institution. For the largest part of the book is taken up by an examination of "some patterns in industrial relations." This consists of seven case studies—furniture, the Broken Hill metal mining industry, meat slaughtering, coal mining, pastoral and metal industries, and stevedoring—showing that a considerable diversity of labor-relation systems is compatible with compulsory arbitration. The nature of the different industries itself seems to have influenced their industrial relation systems at least as much as the legal device of compulsory arbitration has done.

This central part is preceeded by a short discussion of the arbitration systems themselves. In this the author puts a good deal of deserved emphasis on the diversity of the systems in the Australian states, upon the changing relationship between state and federal machinery, and the variations in the degree of compulsion. The third major part of the work is devoted to evaluation and generalization. Some of Mr. Walker's main conclusions are, briefly, that compulsory arbitration has not eliminated strikes and other work stoppages; it is doubtful whether it has reduced their frequency, or whether arbitration has developed at the expense of conciliation as is frequently claimed. It has made for wider bargaining units, a tendency which the author believes fosters greater intransigence. While the Australian system tends to bring the "bad" employer up to the level of the "good" employer, the general level of real wages has not been influenced since real wages have simply risen with productivity. Changes of wage rates have spread rather rapidly throughout the economy. Yet the system has shown considerable flexibility since effective wages tend to deviate from

those set in the awards, and cost of living adjustments are frequent. Nevertheless, there is some justification for the statement that in Australia the courts rather than a politically responsible body have made wages policy.

Though I have little to quarrel with in these conclusions, some critical comments on a few points seem indicated. The international comparisons of strike frequency used in the book are rather skimpy, particularly since the source to which Walker refers employs a far greater variety of yardsticks. The relationship between wage changes and productivity is seen apparently as a one-way street, so that possible influences from the money-wage side upon the rate of substitution of capital for labor are neglected. Since what is termed a change of productivity is greatly affected by alterations of the capital–labor ratio, this neglect may be quite serious. Walker's claim that widening the bargaining unit makes for a more intransigent attitude in bargaining seems to contradict the conventional assumptions of economic theory and would deserve more supporting evidence than the author offers. However, it is fitting to conclude this review of an excellent addition to the well-known Wertheim series in industrial relations, on a positive note. I would like, therefore, to refer to the general analytical framework which Walker suggests as a tool for the study of industrial relations. Not only does it offer a challenge to future investigators, but Mr. Walker presents in his own work an example of its successful application.

ADOLF STURMTHAL
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SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

KARL MANNHEIM. *Essays on the Sociology of Culture.* Edited by Ernest Mannheim in cooperation with Paul Kecskemeti. Pp. ix, 253. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. $6.00.

This is the fourth and last volume in the series of the posthumous sociological works by Karl Mannheim. Written in the 30's the three *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* have been ably translated and edited by E. Mannheim and P. Kecskemeti who have done their best to adapt the work to the readers of a different generation; but the material on which they are based are, by necessity, those which were available some twenty-five years ago. The reader should not, however, be discouraged and think that he is offered some "old stuff." One reads many parts of the essays as if they were written yesterday.

The first culminate in an outline of the sociology of culture. This outline is based on two from among the author's predicted ideas: first, that society exists not only in acts of sociation, but also in acts of ideation closely related to the former; second, that sociology should be cultivated on three levels: general sociology, or conceptualization of acts of sociation and ideation independently of their historical setting; comparative sociology where concrete historical processes receive more attention; and structural sociology devoted to the study of historical configurations in terms of the concepts of general sociology. The structural analysis, states the author, emphasizes the whole; a vast portion of the sociological output has no cumulative character because of the reluctance to put together what the specialist has taken apart.

The second and third essays, dealing respectively with the intelligentsia and the democratization of culture, stand midway between the author's general and structural sociology. The problem of the intelligentsia is one of the focal points in the sociology of culture. The intelligentsia is characterized by the multipolarity of viewpoints which is a consequence of the loose aggregation of the group members. According to the general plan of the sociology of culture offered in the first essay, the author studies the social background of the intelligentsia, its particular associations, its varying historical roles, its social habitat, and the natural history of the individuals composing it.

In the essay of the democratization of culture, the author tries to show how the new (democratic) modes of elite selection have affected such aspects of culture as art, philosophy, religion, and the everyday outlook. Somewhat paradoxically, he asserts that dictatorship is not an antithesis of democracy; but at another place he concedes that it is tantamount to the degeneracy of democracy, which is destroyed not so much by external enemies as by self-neutralizing factors developing in its midst.

With the publication of the last portion of Mannheim's scientific heritage his stature as a scholar can be fully measured. In the present reviewer's opinion, he deserves to be placed among the top ranking sociologists of the second quarter of our century.

N. S. TIMASHEFF
Fordham University

J. O. HERTZLER. *The Crisis in World Population: A Sociological Examination with Special Reference to the Underdeveloped Areas.* Pp. xiv, 279. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1956. $5.00.

The wide general interest in population matters has encouraged a number of demographers and others to write popular works on the subject. While Mr. Hertzler's book is far better than most of the other popular presentations I have read, it shares with them two or three basic faults.

Someone writing on population for a lay audience is faced with a continual dilemma: must a technical tool be introduced at this point, or would a less precise circumlocution serve as well? Steering a middle course between specialists' jargon and superficiality is a high art which few have mastered. Mr. Hertzler typically presents his data in large indigestible clumps, literally several pages of sentences like, "Mexico for 1947–49 had a rate of 28.3 and for 1953 a rate of 29.5; Venezuela for 1950. . . ." Since there is little communication in such passages, he must resort to purple prose to make his points: on a single page, we find "breathtaking," "critical," "inescapable," "horrendous." The current growth of the world's population, described with sober clarity, needs no such hyperbolic adjectives.

A more fundamental criticism is that Mr. Hertzler is never certain whether he is writing as an objective scientist or as a polemicist for a particular social program. The theme of the book is a simple one: the population of the world is growing at an accelerating rate, and since neither the improvement of food production nor industrialization nor migration, nor all of these together, can solve the problem of how to feed the increasing number of mouths, the answer is to reduce the birth rate. The analysis is sound, but I find the intermittent moralistic note jarring. We are assured, for example, that the use of contraceptives is not "unnatural, unsocial, or immoral," as though this were a point that could be settled by exhortation. A Roman Catholic would reply by demanding, for example, that the restrictions on international migrations be eased; but the social value on which these are largely based, "the waxing strength of economic and political nationalism," the author accepts as a fact of nature. For each antagonist, one value is dispensable and the other not and discussing the matter in moral terms means that the issue is never joined.

Values are changed not by argument but mainly by the transformation of the social structure in which they are embedded. In prescribing how underdeveloped countries ought to be modernized, however, Mr. Hertzler emphasizes the importance of maintaining as much social continuity as possible. "The protection and improvement of the agricultural base are essential to all else." "Any loss of nonmaterial values that reside in the traditional system and community life . . . should be avoided" whenever possible. "Changes should be effected gradually." It is the author's privilege to ignore the argument of the considerable number of economists, chief among whom perhaps is Ragnar Nurkse, that the industrialization of an underdeveloped country is feasible only if it is rapid enough to break through the institutional barrier. But as a sociologist Mr. Hertzler must be aware that the high valuation of large families is so closely integrated with the joint family system and the peasant village structure as to be another aspect of the same social phenomenon. To demand a radical change in one and the minimum disturbance of the other is to propose the utopian.

WILLIAM PETERSEN
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AMOS H. HAWLEY. *The Changing Shape of Metropolitan America: Deconcentration Since 1920.* Pp. 177. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956. $4.00.

In this small volume, Professor Hawley has put some meat on our skeleton of hunches about the changes which have been taking place in urban areas over the past decades. Using census data, he surveys over-all growth patterns in metropolitan areas (as well as their central city and satellite components) and investigates differences in these patterns by size of central city, growth rate of central city, proximity of central cities to one another, geographic location, amount of manufacturing employment in the area, amount of industrial relocation, and regional location.

Professor Hawley indicates that rates of population growth in metropolitan areas have declined between 1900 and 1950 due to the stability of central cities, but that satellite areas have been growing rapidly since 1920. In an especially interesting analysis he shows that high rates of growth occurred as far as 35 miles from the center of the central city in the past decade. However, the peak rates of satellite growth are still in a 5 to 10 mile radius from city centers, where they have been for the previous two decades.

As might be expected, satellite as well as total area populations have grown most slowly in areas where central cities have also grown slowly. However, the lower the growth rates of central cities, the higher has been the proportion of growth taking place in their satellite areas. Higher growth rates were found in widely spaced metropolitan area, due perhaps to the same factors that produced highest growth rates in the Western regions. At the same time, satellite growth has been greatest in bunched metropolitan areas (those whose central cities were less than 50 miles apart) and in the Northern region, perhaps for similar reasons.

A novel analysis shows that metropolitan areas near rivers have grown the least, and areas away from water locations, the most. However, the greatest satellite growth was found in areas whose central cities bounded on lakes and oceans. The most rapidly growing *kinds* of satellite areas were found to be those located near highways, replacing those located near intra-area railways. These findings could perhaps be correlated with the age of the central city.

This summary has not done justice to a book tightly crammed with generalizations, tables, and charts. Yet, the author's unwavering devotion to data has some drawbacks. For example, there is no explanation as to why he selected the variables that he studied. Nor is there any interpretation of findings, and the reader is left to his own devices. Admittedly, interpretation is risky since Census data are based on categories of city, satellite, and metropolitan area as defined by political boundaries, and these are not relevant to, and may interfere with proper ecological analysis. Nevertheless, the book would have been more valuable if the author had given us the fruits, however preliminary, of his theorizing.

HERBERT J. GANS
University of Pennsylvania

OTTO POLLAK. *Integrating Sociological and Psychoanalytic Concepts: An Exploration in Child Psychotherapy.* Pp. x, 284. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1956. $4.00.

This is the second volume of a study carried on within the Child Guidance Institute of the Jewish Board of Guardians in New York. It reports a two-year project in which eight cases were carried through from the beginning. Three of the cases are given in some detail. The preparation for therapy is reported for the fourth. We learn nothing about the other four. It is clear that this is not a research report: research has been postponed for a third phase of the project, with some suggestions included in a final chapter.

Why this long running start of four years before more formal research is undertaken? The justification is that the time has been spent on a *demonstration of possible practices*. After this time the team of workers has been educated to the significance of what they are doing, and the theorist has learned some of the limits that are necessary in using theory in practice. In his statement of evaluation, Mr. Herschel Alt, director of the agency, points out a few concrete results: more fathers and siblings are now being seen, more home visits are being made, more doctors and teachers interviewed. This suggests the substantive change taking place as people work together within the new orientation.

The social science concepts that survived as most useful were four:

The *family of orientation,* including all the significant people in the immediate environment, becomes the focus, instead of merely the mother-child relationship. The chief consequence is including the father and some siblings in therapy.

Soial interaction means that the behavior of one group member can be viewed as simultaneously cause and effect of the behavior of other members. The multiple interactions are difficult to handle in practice. In the first case (Peter) the staff was unable to bring in the single sister Louise; in the second case (Steven) they brought in his younger sister Marilyn, but left out the younger brother Ralph, a neurotic victim of sibling rivalry.

In using the concept of *social role* they followed Cottrell's suggestion that stress is likely to be correlated with the number of incompatible roles a person feels he has to fulfill. Thus multiple identifications become lifted out of the sphere of intrapsychic conflicts to the more accessible content of social roles.

Finally, the concept of *culture conflict* turned out to be significant, but in a somewhat unexpected direction. The conflict that proved to be of interest was that between the culture of the child therapists and the culture of the clients.

Among the innovations is assigning a single therapist to mother, father, and child. This defies the tradition of separate therapists, and is an admirable return to good sense. The contribution of the book lies mainly in this direction. The criticisms are chiefly of a discrepancy between acceptable theory and practice; there is little trenchant criticism of theory either in psychoanalysis or in social science.

ERNEST R. HILGARD
Stanford University

CLARK E. MOUSTAKAS (Ed.). *The Self: Explorations in Personal Growth.* Pp. xviii, 284. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. $4.50.

These seventeen essays belong in the new era of post-Freudian psychology. The self is no longer a focus of subterranean forces that are occasionally lighted by fits of rationalization. The writers have pondered Hocking's observation about psychology being a science of human fallibility. We are then leaving the telegraphic system of William James and E. B. Titchener, the hydraulic mechanism of the behaviorists, and even the swamplands of psychoanalysis. Irrationalist explanations of motivation, for instance, in terms of a single hidden drive now look like a broken cistern. Geneticists show a similar tendency to postulate an unknown entity akin to the Id, thus compounding mystery upon mystery. Depth psychologies are being exposed to critical examination.

If now the self seems more complex, by reason of its transformations, it is also open to investigation as a trustworthy order of factual material. Desires, interests, values, traits or sentiments at least speak an honest language. The self is characterized by healthy growth and accessibility. Façades, when they appear, may be recognized by the subject. Presuppositions are open to the application of tests concerning their adequacy.

These essays are selected, not written for a symposium. They share common ground of accent upon problems incident to the development of an aggressive, open, confident, and dignified selfhood. They share a fresh confidence that psychology is coming of age, having passed through epochs of piecemeal analysis. The essays are uniformly stimulating, but those by Goldstein, Allport, Angyal, Horney, Radhakrishnan and Maslow deserve special mention.

Critical readers will have difficulties with basic concepts. Contexts do little to clear up ambiguities. Meaning is too often assumed to be singular and unilateral. Terms like "real experience," "facts of existence," "inner personal experience," "real self," "penetration to reality" tend to induce a sense of hopelessness. Sometimes words

seem to be playing their own game with a liberty that leaves the subject doubly obscure. If philosophers are among those queer people who insist upon the mastery of concepts and terms, and upon their consistent use, their company might be sought out by scientists whose prestige far outweighs the common lot. To announce a reform within a science naturally raises hope, but that is not enough. Special claims to knowledge should indicate the caliber of the credentials involved.

Self-actualization psychologists here show signs of progress at many points. Few are more welcome than those dealing with the magic of "adjustment" and the guilt-complex. Pray, to what kind of situation is a person adjusted? Perhaps I should be honest enough to acknowledge a sense of guilt. Complacency in either direction may be a deadly illness. All of which raises a question. Why do psychologists skirt the hypothesis of the self as a center of value? The ubiquitous elemental desire to count in the eyes of others is often refined into the desire to be worthy of respect. This turning toward improvement in quality of living called honesty, self-respect, sense of dignity, curiosity, aesthetic enjoyment, and so forth, suggests a certain need for axiology. Psychologists could further illuminate one aspect, even while recognizing the logician, the artist, and the ethicist.

IRL G. WHITCHURCH
Kingfield, Me.

JOHN J. CORSON and JOHN W. MCCONNELL. *Economic Needs of Older People.* Pp. xvii, 533. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1956. $4.50.

Corson and McConnell have written an outstanding book on the social and economic problems of an aging population. The style is highly readable and the organization of the material logical and clear. Here, for the first time in twenty-five years, the basic facts, trends, and implications of the aging problem have been brought together in a single publication which should serve well the purposes of students and leaders interested in the challenge of our older population problem.

The background chapters defining the problem, describing the characteristics of an aging population, and discussing the role and relative significance of various income sources from employment and savings are packed with facts as well as interesting reading. The chapter on political implications of the aged should be must reading for any person interested in political trends and developments.

The following chapters on the various sources of income maintenance for older people—public assistance, social insurance, public and private retirement systems, and the basic issues involved in these programs —are authoritative and comprehensive.

The chapters appraising the significance of private pension plans, probing other approaches to old-age security, and speculating on our ability as a nation to provide adequate income maintenance for the aged are noteworthy for their imaginativeness and their perspective. It is refreshing to see the whole subject treated in such a balanced and essentially objective fashion. Too frequently, writing in this field has been colored with partisanship for one approach or another. Here, balance is achieved and the essential values of income from employment, assistance, social insurance, retirement plans, and personal savings are all presented and weighed as to their social and economic significance.

The entire book is further enhanced by the report of the Fund's Committee on Economic Needs of Older People. By the use of a basic report text, amplified and qualified by the personal dissents or qualifications of individual committee members, one gets the feeling of being present as the issues are weighed and the conclusions drawn.

While approving generally existing income maintenance programs, the Committee argues for more adequate and earlier measures to deal with those permanently and totally disabled prior to age 64. "The retirement test" now used by the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance should also be reexamined, according to the Committee, to determine the feasibility of a sliding scale of payments so arranged that persons offered a chance to work will find it more profitable to take it than to turn it down. Finally, it recommends a Council to report to Congress before 1960 on potential methods of long-range financing in the light of program needs and the best interests of the economy.

CHARLES E. ODELL
U. S. Department of Labor

MARGARET MEAD. *New Lives for Old: Cultural Transformation—Manus, 1928–1953.* Pp. xxi, 548. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1956. $6.75.

In 1928–29 Margaret Mead and Reo Fortune studied Manus society in the Admiralty Islands. Major publications of their findings are Mead's *Growing Up in New Guinea* (1930) and *Kinship in the Admiralty Islands* (1934), and Fortune's *Manus Religion* (1935). In 1953–54, Dr. Mead returned with Theodore and Lenora Schwartz to study the changes which had occurred in the intervening twenty-five years. They were profound and had taken a turn which Dr. Mead had not expected. In this book, she gives a general account of these changes and discusses some of the questions which they raise for anthropological theory and for the administration of dependent peoples.

Manus society in 1928 was still organized in accordance with pre-European values and sentiments. Twenty-five years saw mass acceptance of Roman Catholicism and increasing dissatisfaction with the old social order as Manus acquired new wants and horizons. Conversion of their island into a major American military and naval base during the war gave concrete evidence of the materialistic utopia which the Manus, along with other Melanesians, had come to believe Europeans enjoyed and in which they were increasingly desirous of participating. Withdrawal of the American forces produced a tremendous letdown and at the same time fed the growth of the utopian ideal. Younger Manus found it difficult to adjust to prewar patterns. Some preached reforms against the old financial system which made young men dependent on elders. Then came word that a miraculous fleet with "cargo" for all was on its way, had already arrived down the coast, and the Manus were swept by religious frenzy in which they destroyed all the symbols of their old life. Out of it emerged a highly integrated and purposeful community of villages, with an independent Church, bent on building a new and better social order, and led by a former native police sergeant of outstanding ability.

At times the account is overly polemical and shows evidence of padding. It is journalistic, and admittedly without benefit of detailed analysis of the extraordinary mass of data collected in the field. These are minor deficiencies compared with its many positive features. It is one of the best documented accounts of a revitalization movement for any non-Western society. Dr. Mead's observations are often cogent and widely applicable. Discussion of method in the Appendices is valuable. The book, moreover, is convincing evidence of the importance of community restudy by the same persons who worked there before. The more detailed analyses yet to appear in technical publications, together with this and the original reports, should lead to a set of documents of lasting value for social science.

WARD H. GOODENOUGH
University of Pennsylvania

PHILIP DRUCKER. *Indians of the Northwest Coast.* Pp. xii, 208. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $5.75.

Indians of the Northwest Coast is the second in the anthropological handbook series being published by the American Museum of Natural History. It describes in careful detail the patterns of culture of the Indians who lived along the coast from southern Alaska to northern California. The account is based substantially on the excellent collections of materials to be found in the American Museum of Natural History.

The reader will share some of the excitement of the field worker as he finds some particularly good and representative specimen or gets the details of a ceremony and is able to fit them into a culture pattern. Scores of excellent plates bring the material to life. The commentary goes far toward fulfilling the aim of the study, which is to make the material objects that one may see in a museum more meaningful by showing how they fit into the whole style of life of the people.

The author has done well in solving the difficult problem of describing the basic shared culture among the numerous tribes in the area, while still being alert to the numerous local variations. The description of the material culture is particularly good. The tools and weapons, the excellent woodwork, both in its utilitarian and artistic aspects, the ceremonial masks, the totems, and so forth are carefully described and beautifully illustrated. These are all related in the discussion to the economic patterns built substantially around fishing, the social organization, and the religion of the area.

In a handbook of this kind, it is probably unwise to go far beyond the level of careful description into questions of anthropological analysis, but a few such excursions might have added to the meaningfulness of the account. In the description of the political patterns, for example, Dr. Drucker notes that in most of the area, political authority is primarily local. There were relatively few tribal or intertribal elements. Yet, there was some development in the direction of tribal political structures and even of confederacies. Under what conditions does this take place? How do the local and the more complex political systems fit into the total social structures? One might get a better picture of the life in process among these peoples if such questions were raised. At one point, such an issue is explored. The author notes that the Potlatch, a ceremony important for status determination and social integration, became much more highly competitive under circumstances that brought several local groups into close interaction. It was much more difficult to determine status in such a situation. The discussion of this shift in function—or perhaps more accurately the change in emphasis—is very helpful in relating the Potlatch to the total social and cultural pattern.

Altogether, this is an authoritative and vivid account of the colorful life of the Indians of the northwest coast, reconstructed as fully as possible in terms of aboriginal patterns.

J. MILTON YINGER
Oberlin College

THEODORE SALOUTOS. *They Remember America: The Story of the Repatriated Greek-Americans.* Pp. xvi, 153. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956. $3.50.

Peopled by immigrants, America has also been a country of emigration. Those who departed one year were for the most part newcomers of previous years returning to the old country to live on their New World fortunes or to confess defeat in the struggle for wealth. Condemned by Americans as "birds of passage" with a perverse and inexplicable preference for Germany or England, Italy or Greece, these individuals have received little attention from historians of immigration.

Mr. Saloutos' study of Greek repatriates, based chiefly on two hundred interviews in Greece with Greek-Americans and others, is thus a pioneer venture. It should indicate whether similar studies of other nationalities are crying out to be written before all the informants disappear.

The answer is equivocal. For Greece, the repatriates' importance was mainly economic. The young Greek emigrant thought of America as "the land of gold," and it was the savings he brought back from there which most keenly interested his relatives and friends; his greatest impact was on the backward economy of Greece. More enterprising than the stay-at-homes, the repatriate might popularize Yankee notions like pasteurized milk or set up a small business. And the government subjected him to confiscatory taxes and forced loans.

Dollars and drachmas apart, however, the returned emigrant seems a rather insignificant figure. He himself had been altered by life in a different culture; the favorite epithet for him was "shaken one." Did he in turn shake Greece? The millions of other immigrants who remained in the United States to live out their similarly shaken lives made their impact on American society. But the thousands who returned to Greece were often the most Greek of the Greek-Americans, so tied to the homeland by folkways, family, economic failure abroad, or even climate that their ability or desire to Americanize Greece was minimal. They might scorn the dowry system and be Americanophile in politics, but, tossed as they were by the winds of Greek affairs and of war, they were apt to revert to old ways. Some, disillusioned with village life, moved to Athens, but the urban movement (like other matters) was not Americanization so much as a modernization touching all countries. "The village I knew wasn't there; it was different," one of Mr. Saloutos' informants complained.

The returned emigrants did remember America, and their very miscellaneous comments on life in the United States and in Greece are fresh and engaging. But neither this nor the book's more conventional evidence quite sustains (except in certain economic particulars) the author's inference of a larger significance for Greek society. Historians who consider following in other countries the example set by Mr. Saloutos can take both caution and encouragement from his book.

ROWLAND T. BERTHOFF
Princeton University

MAX GLUCKMAN. *Custom and Conflict in Africa.* Pp. ix, 173. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. $3.50.

Rarely does one come upon so substantial a contribution, presented in so compact a form and so readable, as the British Broadcasting Corporation's series of Third Program lectures by Professor Gluckman, reproduced in permanent form in his little book. This is the popularization of science at its best, for it is clear that the book is the distillation of many years of thought on the important problem of the relation between social cohesion and social conflict.

The basic theme, stated on the second page, is that "men quarrel in terms of certain of their allegiances, but are restrained from violence through other conflicting allegiances which are also enjoined on them by custom." This gives rise to what is called "the peace in the feud." Authority, moreover, is accepted, so that any rejection takes place within its framework. Hence, there may be rebellion, but not revolution. This explains, too, the common African tradition that a subordinate is expected to take the blame for an unpopular act of a leader.

The focus is now narrowed to family conflict between "parental and filial allegiances, and wider kinship allegiances," a point of great psychological importance where the components of affect in relationships between individuals on the two sides of a family in a unilateral descent system are compared. The functions of "witchcraft," both in making and in resolving conflicts, and of ritual, which permits violation of customary roles to strengthen the very divisions in society whose discontents are disclosed by these socially sanctioned excesses, are next considered. Finally, there is a discussion of how the basic principle works in a "modern" society and for this "the bonds in the colour-bar" of South Africa are utilized.

Technically, the book derives both its strength and weakness from its orientation. The relevance of the social anthropological approach in analyzing phenomena lying within the area of social organization comes out clearly in the first three chapters, where the essential contribution is made. But when Professor Gluckman attempts a sociological explanation of magic and ritual, which lodge primarily in the belief system and only function tangentially in the structuring of society, his argument falters. And so, too, does the application of his dialectic to South Africa; in this case because he must have recourse to the historic dimension which he is unaccustomed to handling. Indeed, the considerable degree of insight these last three chapters show, for they are only less satisfactory when compared to those that precede them, probably arises from the fact that Professor Gluckman is more at home with cultural phenomena than his sociological emphasis would lead one to expect.

One might wish, too, that he had drawn more widely on comparative African data, but this is a minor point. We can only be appreciative of the stimulating formulations he has given us, and hope to have more of them from him.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS
Northwestern University

MELVIN CONANT. *Race Issues on the World Scene.* Pp. xiv, 145. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955. $4.00.

In the summer of 1954 thirty-six scholars met in Hawaii to discuss Race Relations in World Perspective. The conference lasted four weeks. In the light of these talks Mr. Conant has written "a personal summary of many of the discussions and parts of conference papers." And he "reviews a number of race situations in the light of economic, political and ideological factors in our contemporary world." This is a difficult task.

Each of the papers he summarizes is of necessity a highly condensed abridgement based on the writer's prolonged study of a complex subject, and a double condensation can hardly fail to misrepresent at some point. There is no racial situation that is simple, and it is daring to simplify to the extent of publishing a map which purports to show what territories in Africa are areas of tension and which are not. On the broadest lines such a simplification might be of help to an audience who knew nothing of Africa, but what is one to think of a map that shows Tanganyika as an area stippled to indicate tension, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland a virgin white? No one in these territories would agree with the verdict. Southwest Africa, the Cameroons, and all French Equatorial Africa are apparently untroubled by strife, while the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and the Belgian Congo are tense; if forced to distinguish so rigidly, I should put them the other way round. And on what basis is Angola uneasy and Mozambique quiescent? In short, this map is definitely misleading and I am afraid this is true of other statements, and still more omissions, in that part of the book which attempts to summarize local situations. Discussion of *apartheid* in South Africa does not mention the size of the respective areas to be held by white and black, yet this is surely a most vital point; at present less than 13 per cent of the Union's territory (and less than 25 per cent of what is potentially fertile) is reserved for the Bantu. The statement that whites are outnumbered by Bantu by one to thirty-two is no doubt a misprint for one to three point two, but the slip is sufficiently important to attract the notice of a proofreader who knows anything of South Africa. It is not true to say that in Kenya "the better land is monopolized by a few" settlers (p. 11). The area reserved for European settlers is 12,000 out of 265,000 square miles, of which perhaps 80,000 might be classed as "the best" in fertility and rainfall. It would be true to say that in Kenya a complex legal and tribal structure stands in the way of making the best use of land and that a basic problem now being tackled is the overcoming of fears about land, fears which are rooted in economics and accentuated by racial difference. Mr. Conant has nothing to say about the difficulties which lie in the way of getting the African, throughout East and Central Africa, from a communal to an individual tenure of land, nor of the reversal of policy by which Southern Rhodesia has recognized that Africans are coming to towns to stay there. His exposition of the "challenge to the African Elite" (p. 107) seems to me to omit the essence of the dilemma that confronts them.

In short, I find this book unrevealing on the areas I know best and suspect other students will find the same, while a commentary on a conference is not a suitable form for a popular introduction to the subject.

PHILIP MASON
Royal Institute of International Affairs
London, England

EDUCATION AND RELIGION

JAMES B. CONANT. *The Citadel of Learning.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1956. $2.00.

The *Citadel of Learning* is divided into three separate essays. In the first one, Mr. Conant argues with convincing eloquence and logic that the advancement of learning can flourish only in an environment in which scholars are free to dissent, to quarrel, even bitterly, over conflicting premises. In comparing the dogma-controlled universities of Soviet Russia with free citadels of learning, the author makes a distinction between the accumulation of knowledge and the advancement of learning. With this philosophy of education, presumably only the totalitarian would dissent. Yet today some scientists and some officers in the armed services warn us that out of these captured citadels of learning are coming technical developments which threaten our very existence as a nation. If this be true, it does not follow that we should ape the educational methods of Russia, but it does emphasize the need for finding out why we may be lagging in technological advancements.

"An Old Tradition in a New World," the second essay, presents first a description of the differences between European educational systems and our own, and the historical reasons for these differences. The author brands as harsh, unrealistic, and not constructive the criticism of those who would have us copy the European tradition in education. It does not follow, however, that we can be smug about our achievements in education, for Mr. Conant points out that we stand in urgent need of modification to meet the challenges of our times —our emergence as one of the two great rival powers on a globe shrunken in size by the speed of communication.

To educate adequately our young people for this new environment, the author stresses the need for an education which will "develop a higher sophistication about foreign affairs." Toward this end he proposes greater emphasis on the study of history and of foreign policy—ours and that of other nations. Since some of our citizens, a large number, will be needed to work abroad, Mr. Conant believes that instruction in foreign languages must and will find a more important place in the curricula of our schools and colleges. Just what curriculum changes should be devised to meet these new concepts of the educated man, the author does not say.

In his concluding pages of the essay, the author calls attention to the need for identifying the talented students, giving them motivations for continued education and adequately educating these intellectually gifted.

"Basic Problems of Education" is the title of the final essay. Space limitation [placed on this review] dictates the consideration of only one of the problems outlined. In view of the magnitude of the increase in high school graduates which faces us, what shall be the nature of the expansion of post high school education? Mr. Conant, I think unfortunately, disposes of the four-year colleges by indicating that some of them may become two-year colleges and others may give more emphasis to the education of students planning to enter upon graduate studies. The disposition is made without argument or demonstration that the four-year college—I assume he refers to those not a unit of a university—has no role other than preprofessional education. The author sidesteps the place of the four-year college by pointing out that he is considering the problem from the point of view of the taxpayer and not of those individuals and foundations to whom the independent four-year college looks for support. The solution of the problem of expanding educational opportunities beyond high school Mr. Conant finds to be in the founding of publicly supported two-year colleges in our cities. If this is achieved, the universities need not increase in size and hence will accept students more strongly motivated for higher education and with higher aptitudes for scholarly achievement.

In this brief review, it has not been possible to present adequately or appraise with discrimination the theses which Mr. Conant propounds. Certainly before we spend millions for bricks and mortar, perhaps before we urge or tempt our young people to become teachers, we should try to determine where the buildings should rise and what should be the nature of the teaching we shall require. *The Citadel of Learning* provokes the type of thinking the taxpayers and those who influence them must pursue before it is too late.

SAMUEL S. STRATTON
Middlebury College

CORA DU BOIS. *Foreign Students and Higher Education in the United States.* Pp. xviii, 221. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1956. $3.50.

Considering the great interest and investment in international educational exchange, this volume has long been needed. Prop-

erly so, the book is cautious and judicious as is warranted by the present, but steadily improving state of information and concepts in cross-cultural situations. Even so, it may upset devoted campaigners for study abroad.

However, I agree completely with the author, an anthropologist, that in the long run the perspectives afforded by social science and a description and appraisal of ongoing practices are necessary to achieve operational and administrative effectiveness. Her book does place the subject of study abroad in an appropriate perspective so that the subject may "carry fewer unrealistic and disillusioning expectations."

Part I discusses the quantitative increase in student exchanges ("There is no way of predicting with assurance that the numbers of foreign students will increase in the future, but it does seem clear that qualitative improvements in dealing with our foreign guests is the next task before us." p. 10), variations in goals and motives ("If we are providing educational opportunities, we and our guests must expect education to be the primary goal." p. 17), the role of the federal government, and comparative perspective.

Part II, which delineates the elements of adjustments to this country, covers the salient factors in prearrival attitudes, relevant configurations of American life, stages of adjustment and readjustment, factors in sojourn and postreturn adjustment, and typologies and forecasts. It also provides a sound basis for the operational insights for American colleges and universities in Part III.

Several observations may be sampled.

Self-esteem is a key element affecting reactions to the host country (p. 54). One of the greatest practical contributions that orientation work and student counseling can stress—and for Americans going abroad too!—is an understanding of American culture, its valuational and relational situations (p. 65). The most important factor in the constructive adjustment of foreign students is found to be "the opportunity and the capacity of the individual student to establish warm, supportive interpersonal relations" (p. 93).

Although the national diagnostic approach and psychological typologies may still be too tentative and ethnocentric to be immediately useful for individual counseling (pp. 122–23), research surging forward especially since 1950 may offer additional help.

Two of many campus cautions contained in Part III may be cited. ". . . When action outstrips understanding, procedures are likely to be made paramount to substance" (p. 134). There is "the need for continuity of experience, for new and meaningfully collected data, and for constant reappraisal of practices if we in the United States are to offer students from abroad constructive educational opportunities" (p. 197).

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Institute of International Education, and the American Council on Education are to be highly commended both for this quality volume and the series "Studies in Universities and World Affairs" of which it is a part.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL
University of Buffalo

GEORGE F. KNELLER. *Higher Learning in Britain.* Pp. xii, 301. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. $6.00.

Probably no American has spent as much time in Britain studying its universities and university colleges as has the author of this volume. Broadly read in the literature and widely acquainted with its writers and with present-day practises and issues, he beyond doubt knows more about British higher education than any other American. His well-written and perceptive book summarizes his knowledge and briefly and gracefully states his opinions concerning current controversies and trends into the future.

Although not divided into sections, the volume has three parts. Chapter I lightly sketches historical backgrounds; Chapters II through IV describe the present situation; and the remaining six chapters analyze and appraise the points of view of conflicting schools of thought. The bulk of the book, therefore, relates to educational theory; and this weighting of necessity makes the historical section weak and the

section delineating current arrangements less full than this reviewer would have liked. Both of the earlier sections, however, give the reader succinct and useful information not easily found elsewhere.

At the beginning of Chapter V the author lists the "leading protagonists" engaged "in the mêlée of modern argument" concerning the problems of British higher education: the literary humanists, the scientific humanists, the Christian partisans, the agnostics, the social thinkers chiefly concerned with good citizenship and social progress, and the professional educational or pedagogical critics. He then proceeds to detail and dissect the conceptions of the first three of these groups, but unfortunately he never gets around to doing the same for the latter three. Rather, he brings them in by indirection, a plan of action which this reviewer finds most disappointing. He does such an able and profitable job exploring the thinking of such literary humanists as Sir Richard Livingstone, such scientific humanists as John D. Bernal, and such Christian partisans as Sir Walter Moberly that this reader wonders why he failed to continue in the same vein with the agnostics, the social thinkers, and the educationists. Indeed, he never clearly identifies the members of any of these latter groups, and thus the volume flattens out in the last chapters except for a very able and useful summary and critical appraisal of problems and trends in Chapter X.

Nonetheless the volume constitutes the best over-all discussion of British higher education known to this reviewer. It will probably be widely read in the British Isles and should be in the United States.

W. H. COWLEY
Stanford University

WILLIAM S. GRAY and BERNICE ROGERS. *Maturity in Reading: Its Nature and Appraisal.* Pp. xii, 273. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. $5.00.

Professor William S. Gray and Miss Bernice Rogers have not written just another book. Doctor Gray, professor emeritus of education and director of research in reading at the University of Chicago and president of the International Reading Association, is the author of many monographs and books on reading. And Miss Bernice Rogers is a research associate at the University of Chicago. These co-authors have undertaken a monumental enterprise which originated several years ago with an appeal by the National Council of Teachers of English for a report on the nature and development of maturity in reading.

Maturity in Reading: Its Nature and Appraisal proceeds from the premise that since reading is essential to all mass media of communication, and since society depends upon man's ability to receive and to send ideas expressed verbally, reading is essential to each member of society. This social aspect of reading gives origin to the idea that reading habits are a part of the behavior problem, a facet of the total personality.

The authors first review the important studies made on the reading habits of adults, attempting to find: who reads what, why people read, and how well people read. Findings are clear in the individual studies, they report, but it is difficult to unify the studies. The authors describe briefly the findings and then search for unifying factors by which reading behavior may be interpreted, and they present data analyzing reading behavior in terms of social structure. Secondly, they formulate a concept of maturity. This is carefully done by referring to research studies in this area of psychology. And the concept is developed that reading maturity exists in close relationship to general maturity.

The bulk of the book is a description of the preliminary study and the Trader City Study (38 cases). It includes the methods, purposes, techniques, materials, and findings used to develop a scale for measuring reading maturity. This is followed by a special fuller analysis of selected cases in the Trader City Study. A result of these studies is the development of an "Instrument of Appraisal" of reading maturity based on eighteen criteria. This Reading Maturity Scale was applied to various adults and the procedures, general and specific, are fully described. Individual case studies are described in detail.

It is interesting to note that the authors explain that because of the complexity of the scale, the reliability and the validity of

it have not been determined. They admit its limitations, but its advantages are made very clear. It illustrates the possibility of relatively objective studies of maturity in reading, and it provides a wealth of concrete data on which certain timely proposals for increasing the maturity levels of young people and adults can be based.

Here is an interesting, stimulating book —an objective one—which can be of much value to persons, professional or lay, interested in studying reading competence.

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JOHN S. DIEKHOFF. *The Domain of the Faculty in Our Expanding Colleges.* Pp. xiii, 204. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. $3.00.

JOSEPH JUSTMAN and WALTER H. MAIS. *College Teaching: Its Practice and Its Potential.* Pp. viii, 257. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. $3.75.

These two volumes represent two poles in interpreting college (and university) teaching. The second is conscientious, external, and dull by reason of its platitudes; the first, by an informed humanist who has become a professor of education, is crisp, lively, intimate, and informed. The table of contents of the Justman-Mais volume reveals its professional provenience: "goals of college teaching," "responsibilities of the college teacher," "professional growth of the college teacher," and so on, ending with "techniques of instruction" and "evaluating learning and teaching." A fair sample is the section on "curriculum strengths and weaknesses." The "strengths" are solemnly identified as "adaptability to individual needs," "dynamic quality of the program," "intellectual freedom," "elective influence on instruction (!)"; and the weaknesses, five in all, include "lack of clarity in aims of studies" and "dissatisfaction with prescribed studies." This last, however, does not mean what it says, but refers two sources of dissatisfaction with all curricula: patterns become obsolescent; nobody can define general education. All this is followed by "a balanced view" which gravely informs us that much can be done to improve the college curriculum, that "curriculum improvement" will come only when teachers are careful to distinguish the good from the bad, that "there is no certain remedy by which to secure a good curriculum," and that easy formulas are apt to conceal "deep" pitfalls. As Byron remarked of another set of platitudes, all this is extremely true.

Mr. Diekhoff's volume is, unfortunately, a collection of articles, from which I could well spare the first one, "The Mob at the Gate," in which he swallows unreflectively the doctrine that the colleges are about to be overwhelmed by numbers; but once past this, Mr. Diekhoff, who really understands that higher education is a problem of intellect, culture, and moral independence, has given us some of the most stimulating observations on the academic world we have had this year. He writes English, not pedaguese; he knows the college of arts and its faculty instinctively; and he knows that changes are going forward in the colleges that are exciting and momentous in terms of civilization. If he drops into jargon, as he sometimes does, it is into the jargon of the business and the industrial world because he is addressing himself to trustees and regents, among others; but his world is the world of academic reality, not the fuzzy world of pedagogical theorizing and "helpfulness." One comes upon this passage with relief:

"Broadly speaking, all the formal schooling of the teacher—indeed, all his education in and out of school—is vocational training. Even though Ph.D. training is terminal schooling, it does not follow that the graduate school is responsible for teaching the teacher everything that he needs to know. One cannot be an effective teacher without what one learns in the primary schools, but we do not ask the graduate school to give a student remedial teaching in fractions and the alphabet merely because every teacher needs them in his work. To ask for a graduate program in 'general education' is also to ask for remedial teaching."

Legend runs that the late Alfred North Whitehead once said that the great weakness of American universities was good teaching. Light is thrown on this paradox in another passage by Professor Diekhoff, which also cheers me:

"Certainly the graduate school should not so regiment its students as to make it impossible for them to continue their general education. It should encourage, not discourage, the philosophical habit of mind. . . . But the chief more particular objects of the graduate school should be to develop further the love of learning in its students, to give them some mastery of the techniques by which they may pursue knowledge . . . and to provide them with some expert knowledge upon which they may build and which they may communicate to their future students. . . . This is enough for the graduate school to do; and if it does this, it makes its proper contribution both to schoarship and teaching."

HOWARD MUMFORD JONES
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HOLTAN P. ODEGARD. *Sin and Science: Reinhold Niebuhr as Political Theologian.* Pp. 245. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1956. $3.00.

Sin and Science is a comprehensive, concise, critical consideration of the confused cogitation of Reinhold Niebuhr from his earliest efforts to *The Self and the Dramas of History.*

The Notes fill 22 pages; the Selected Bibliography, 14 pages; the Index, 11 pages with Calvanism (sic); a beautiful example of the printer's art.

The four principal chapters are: "The Chains of Dogma," "Experimentalism Between Two Christs," "Political Stalemate," "Democracy and the World"—about the same space is granted to each. These longer chapters are followed by two brief ones: "The Course of a Faith in Sin" and an "Epilogue: The Irony of Sin" and a "Postscript: Notes on Conservative Tendencies."

In "The Chains of Dogma," the absolutes of Niebuhr's thinking are found to be "sin," "faith," "dialectic," and "meaning."

"Niebuhr has obviously relied heavily on Augustine for his doctrines of sin and evil" (p. 16). Precisely, but since Augustine drew heavily on Neoplatonism, Manichaeism, Cicero, Stoicism, Aristotle, this is one of the reasons for Niebuhr's bewilderment. Tertullian is the first to assume original sin but for him it is only "taint." *It becomes guilt with Augustine!*

"The triumph of dualism in Niebuhr's thought is glory to the supernatural and tragedy to the world. The human enterprise is sold short to struggle through history under crippling handicaps" (p. 57). "Knowledge becomes by implication twofold"; Impossible to discriminate between revelation and mere confusion; God becomes wholly—other; "Niebuhr is antihistorical."

In "Political Stalemate" the author points out that Niebuhr does not know his history (pp. 112–16). We agree! If Niebuhr would only read Irving Brant, *William and Mary Quarterly,* January 1951, pp. 19 f., he might be persuaded to make amends for so grievous an error with reference to Madison.

In "Democracy and the World," the five elements of democracy are described as change, relation of freedom and authority, tolerance, faith in human nature, and majority rule (pp. 128–51) and claims that "Niebuhr has come to the decision that oligarchical rule is actually inevitable."

It was in 1952 that Niebuhr in a single lecture at the University of Wisconsin entitled "The Two Dimensions of the World Crisis" summarized his political thought. This chapter VI is an invaluable analysis of it.

CONRAD H. MOEHLMAN
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JOHN DAVID HUGHEY, JR. *Religious Freedom in Spain: Its Ebb and Flow.* Pp. ix, 211. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press, 1955. $3.00.

The Catholic Church in Spain has had an astonishingly ambivalent history. On the one hand, as Gerald Brenan in his authoritative *The Spanish Labyrinth* has observed, it kept alive the sense of individuality and freedom of the Spaniard during an age of absolutism, and it promoted some radical social programs. On the other hand, it was intolerant of religious dissenters, Jew, Moor, or Protestant, joining with the state to preserve the religious unity of the nation.

It is with this latter topic that the pres-

ent work is concerned. A Southern Baptist missionary in Spain for four years, Dr. Hughey is presently a professor of practical theology in Switzerland. His book evidences much scholarship and a high degree of objectivity. It will elicit respect even from those who may nevertheless dispute certain of his conclusions. He treats of a controversial problem on a high plane.

As Dr. Hughey points out, religious intolerance was not peculiar to Spain at the beginning of the modern era. But Spain continued to adhere rigidly to the policy even when it was abandoned or tempered in other countries (Switzerland continues to ban the Jesuits from functioning). In Spain, religion and politics were fused to an almost unparalleled degree.

Spain's weakness has resulted—we are referring to the religious-political question—from the strength of the extreme Right and the extreme Left. The author's summary of developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brings out this fact clearly. The voices of the moderates in both camps usually went unheard. Protestants welcomed the Liberal program of religious freedom, though it soon became evident that the liberals themselves were frequently without affection for any creed.

Complete separation of Church and State was brought about by the Republic of 1931. Religious freedom was proclaimed, but Mr. Hughey notes that certain harsh and discriminatory steps were taken against the Catholic Church. With the triumph of Franco, Church and State were once more united, and restriction upon Protestant activities imposed. The author declares that the handicaps upon Protestants have increased during the past decade.

Protestantism has had little success in Spain. Even during the most favorable periods for non-Catholic proselytizing, little headway was made. The author estimates the number of communicant church members to be about 10,000. He attributes the lack of success in part to unsettled political conditions. It should not be forgotten, however, that a common religious faith was, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the one solid bond of unity in that conglomeration of kingdoms called Spain. Unfortunately, many present-day Catholic Spaniards, both clerical and lay, have yet to awaken to the legitimate demands of the twentieth century.

The author blames the Church chiefly for the absence of religious freedom in Spain. "The Pope, if he wished, could change Spanish policy of religion." Is this not an over-simplification? His discussion of the Catholic theory of religious toleration is insufficiently documented. Omitted is any reference to the pronouncement of Pius XII in 1953 on this subject. This important pronouncement strengthened, on the whole, the cause of those Catholic theologians in Europe and in the United States who have been advocating a more liberal viewpoint in relation to religious minorities.

FRANCIS E. MCMAHON

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VLADIMIR GSOVSKI (Ed.). *Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania.* With an Introduction on the Soviet Union. Pp. xxxi, 311. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1955. $5.00.

The century-old problem of Church-State relations has been moving toward an historical climax in Communist-governed countries because the basic anti-all-religion philosophy of their governments clashes with the strong convictions and culture of their people. The immediate advantage in this struggle lies with the state. On the one hand, it promotes atheism as a matter of official policy, and on the other, it suppresses church activities through executions and long-term imprisonments of church leaders, the nationalization of church schools, dissolution of religious orders, confiscation of church buildings and other property, and the suppression of religious books, periodical publications, and organizations. It also puts severe restrictions on the training of prospective clergymen and the filling of parochial, congregational, and episcopal vacancies. The pace of oppression differs some from country to country, but one is struck by the consistent sameness of aims and methods as the governments endeavor to weaken and control the churches which they cannot destroy and to use them as handmaids for their Communist purposes.

Twelve able authors, all lawyer-refugees from the countries under discussion, present careful surveys of the laws, decrees, regulations, court decisions, government declarations, quotations from the controlled press, as well as official pronouncements of church leaders, where available. In most cases the contributors also provide brief introductions to the history of the churches in these states prior to 1945.

The story of persecution is told graphically, in a way which appeals to the general reader, without losing its value to the specialist. The exhaustive documentation is based largely on official sources; for the inconvenience of the reader, unfortunately, it is located at the end of chapters rather than of pages. Lengthy tables and pertinent statutes and bibliographies are included.

Dr. Vladimir Gsovski, the general editor, shows the ideological source of church oppression in his brief but thoroughly documented introductory chapter on the "Separation of Church from State in the Soviet Union."

The book deserves a special welcome at a time when the American public ponders (we hope) the meaning of the Soviet smile. The reviewer hopes that the forthcoming volume covering church and state in Soviet Russia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia will give full attention to the church problems of non-Christians as well—for instance, Jews and Mohammedans—and, also, show the deteriorating situation of churches in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

JOHN BROWN MASON

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HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY

M. F. ASHLEY MONTAGU (Ed.). *Toynbee and History: Critical Essays and Reviews.* Pp. xiv, 385. Boston, Mass.: Porter Sargent, 1956. $5.00.

This world, human life, or what you will, is an incomprehensible affair. None the less, the human mind is so constituted that it will never cease trying to comprehend it, and putting forth its solutions of the insoluble. Hence all the religions and all the philosophies. One or other of the religions may command our devotion as an act of faith; one or more of the philosophies may secure our respect. But all of them, judged dispassionately, fail to convince. They are too simple, too tidy.

When I was a boy I asked one of my teachers what he thought of X's philosophy, and he made me a memorable reply. He said "X constructed what claimed to be a complete explanation of everything, and all the other philosophers got to work and proceeded to pick it to pieces." That seems to show that X was about as successful as a philosopher can expect to be; for if you or I were to construct a complete explanation of everything, none of the other philosophers would give it a moment's attention.

And so with Arnold Toynbee. His success is to be measured not only by the millions—well, nearly millions—of his appreciative readers but by the eminence and, in some cases, by the savagery of his distinguished critics. The volume under review is an anthology of the outpourings of these distinguished persons. The word anthology means, by derivation, a garland of flowers; but most of these roses have thorns, and the thorns stick deep. The wretched Toynbee has prostituted his unrivaled knowledge of history in the service of a bogus philosophy; and yet, he has achieved a failure of such gigantic proportions that it dwarfs most people's successes. He has written, it seems, the most reprehensible and the most fascinating of books. No one who has read it—even in its abridgement—will ever be the same again.

It need hardly be said that these essays differ in quality, but only a very few are worthless. Most of them make interesting points, in praise or blame; but an attempt to read them all in one go will produce the same effect as the lamprays produced on King John.

D. C. SOMERVELL

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England

RICHARD PARES. *Yankees and Creoles: The Trade Between North America and the West Indies Before the American Revolution.* Pp. vii, 168. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. $4.75.

Mr. Pares, joint editor of the *English Historical Review*, came to this task well prepared by his two volumes, *War and Trade in the West Indies* and *A West-India Fortune*. The latter work required the same kind of detective work that he uses so successfully in the volume under review.

He expresses surprise that some American historian has not undertaken this fascinating job long ago. For historians on this side of the Atlantic have long been fully aware of the need of such a thorough analysis as he has presented, a fact pointed out by Charles M. Andrews in 1914.

He surveys the triangular West Indian trade as carried on by the merchants of Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, and on occasion by some of the more southern continental ports, as well as by merchants in the West Indies and especially in Britain. What makes his research so valuable is that he covers the long period from the founding of the North American and West Indian colonies to the American Revolution.

This span of time enables the reader to watch the rapid growth of West Indian economy, the slower development of the continental settlements, and the gradual replacement of West Indian and British shipping by the mounting strength of the settlements on the Atlantic seaboard.

Mr. Pares is adept in ferreting out the details of this very substantial business. He tells us throughout his time span not only who conducted the trade and supplied the capital for it, but also what kinds of ships were used, who the sailors were, and how they were paid. In addition the collection and disposal of the cargoes both on the continent and in the islands are minutely depicted. Lastly the effect of this trade on the economy of North America is set forth.

Mr. Pares has found answers, often incomplete, to all these questions by his study of ledgers and collections of letters for endless facts and figures. Again and again he has to unravel his evidence, break it into sectors. Briefly stated, no one else has tackled this task successfully because no other person has brought the author's rare combination of abilities and tenacity to bear on the multiple problems.

His conclusion is that the West Indian trade made an important contribution to the formation of capital in the American world and served as a lubricant to keep American commerce moving in all directions. In summary, he states, "We must be satisfied with the knowledge that more North American shipping was employed in this trade than in any other, that every North American port and nearly every North American merchant had something to do with it."

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C. R. FAY. *Adam Smith and the Scotland of His Day.* Pp. 174. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956. $4.75.

The second half of the eighteenth century has been well described as "Scotland's Augustan Age," for during that period there flourished a galaxy of Scots who made significant contributions to virtually all branches of higher learning. These include David Hume, the philosopher; William Robertson, the historian; Robert Burns, the lyric poet; Henry Mackenzie, author of the *Man of Feeling*, named by Sir Walter Scott "our Scottish Addison"; Joseph Black, the discoverer of latent heat; and James Watt, the inventor of the steam engine. Among the most illustrious Scottish writers of that day was Adam Smith (1723–90), the author of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and also of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776); that treatise which is rightly considered to have inaugurated the modern study of economic science. It is with Adam Smith, his life and times, that this book deals.

The author, Dr. C. R. Fay, the well-known economic historian, has arranged his treatment of the subject thus. First, he deals in summary fashion with Smith's life and work. Then he describes Kirkcaldy, that town in Fife where Smith was born and where he wrote his *Wealth of Nations*. Next, he deals with Glasgow whose university Smith attended as a student and at which he later taught as professor of moral philosophy. Then Dr. Fay gives an account of Edinburgh, the Scottish capital, where Smith lived during his later years as Commissioner of Customs. Thereafter, in successive chapters, the author gives an account of Smith's relations with some of his more famous contemporaries—notably Townshend, the statesman, Gibbon, the famous historian, and Benjamin Franklin, the American statesman and diplomat.

Dr. Fay of course draws upon such earlier standard treatises as Rae's *Life of Adam Smith* (1895) and W. R. Scott's *Adam Smith as Student and Professor* (1937), but he has also pursued such independent research as he could into Smith's background and career. He has produced a book which presents a vivid picture of the great Scottish economist, and which is not only interesting but also illuminating.

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D. HARRIS WILLSON. *King James VI and I.* Pp. 480. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956. $6.00.

Mr. Willson, professor of history at the University of Minnesota and an established authority on the early Stuart period, has now given us a biography of King James VI of Scotland who became James I of England in 1603 which should at once become standard. Professor Willson sees written history as a reasonable facsimile of the past, not as an excuse for psychological excursion nor as a prop for a particular interpretation. For he stays close to the evidence, and of this he is a complete master. The result is a narrative with authority, and also one written with grace. Even on difficult questions, such as James' attitude toward his mother (Mary Queen of Scots), the role of Salisbury (secretary and lord treasurer) and Raleigh's last voyage, his analysis is deft as well as convincing. He is equally successful in handling such varied material as James' progress from Edinburgh to London in 1603, James as countryman ("a sylvan Prince"), and James' ideas of royal prerogative.

It is a work from which we learn much. The treatment of James VI before 1603 is perhaps less assured than the story of James I—Scottish history in the sixteenth century is tortuous indeed. Yet James' subordination of the Scottish nobility (Catholic and Protestant) to the monarchy, and his neutralization of the Kirk in political affairs —these help us to understand his peaceful succession in England, his one great achievement which had happy consequences, and an event which now seems normal only because of his success in overcoming obstacles to it.

Likewise, it was in Scotland that James revealed his ideas of kingship as well as his own character and personality, a central theme which gives unity to the book. But the author never involves himself personally in the reputation of his subject and has succeeded in making this strange individual credible to us. Writing with detachment he is able to admire James' active mind, particularly his interest in medicine, science, and theology, and to do justice to his literary talent. But overshadowing all, as Professor Willson makes abundantly clear, was the unrelieved self-love which controlled his judgment, his pettiness in the face of grave issues, his superficial affections, and his physical cowardice. Though he had many ideas which in others might have developed into principles—his vision of reestablishing Christian unity, his design for a permanent union of England and Scotland, his notions of universal peace—with him they were not much more than manifestations of vanity. He seemed to injure nearly everything he touched.

Some readers may be disappointed that Professor Willson makes no attempt to evaluate his subject in terms of the revolutionary episodes ahead. Yet, as history, his book is all the more solid and satisfying for its strict concern with James and his contemporaries, who of course were living quite in ignorance of the future.

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KEITH FEILING. *Warren Hastings.* Pp. xii, 420. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. $6.00.

Warren Hastings, first of the Governor-Generals of India, has been accounted the greatest of that august dynasty. The magnitude of the problems confronting him, the paucity of the resources at his disposal, and the measure of success which he achieved combine to justify this verdict. He molded policies in an era when principles of enlightened administration were making difficult headway against those of stark spoilation. He met a war crisis with a resolution without which the British interest in India would have been overwhelmed. His responsibilities far exceeded his authority. He was shackled by a preposterous arrangement which permitted a majority of his council to overrule him, and his control of the subordinate governments at Madras and Bombay was tenuous. Moreover, he was at times stalemated by the authorities at home. Under these circumstances his immediate success was necessarily limited, but the experience of his successors demonstrated the fundamental soundness of the policies which he sought to establish. The egregious impeachment proceedings which pilloried him for a decade after his return home, and cast a shadow over the rest of his life, have served to heighten the drama of his career.

Professor Feiling has written a biography which is sympathetic without being adulatory. Hastings' foibles, weaknesses, and mistakes are recognized along with the qualities which made him a great man. The book is well-written, perhaps too well-written. There are places where one would gladly exchange a subtle innuendo for a plain statement of fact. It is more successful in creating atmosphere than in giving a coherent narrative. Where the author wishes to tell a straightforward story, of the trial for example, he does it excellently, but readers not familiar with the history of India in Hastings' time may well feel that his treatment aggravates the confusion of a theme already sufficiently complex.

In a subject as well worked as the career of Warren Hastings, it is hardly surprising that the author has not turned up anything particularly new. He rather confirms the facts established and the judgments reached by previous writers. It might have been supposed that now that the Governor-Generals are no more, a new appraisal of Hastings would be attempted. One does not find it here, and perhaps for a very good reason. For Hastings' attitude toward India is surprisingly modern. He wrote to one of his successors, "Among the natives of India there are men of as strong intellect, as sound integrity and honorable feelings, as any of this kingdom. I regret they are not sufficiently noticed, sufficiently employed, nor respected so much as they deserve to be." A wider acceptance of this view would surely have expedited and ameliorated the coming of self-government for India.

LEONIDAS DODSON
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ROSS J. S. HOFFMAN. *Edmund Burke, New York Agent: With His Letters to the New York Assembly and Intimate Correspondence with Charles O'Hara, 1761–1776.* Pp. ix, 632. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1956. $6.50.

Edmund Burke saw to it that much of his life should remain misty and obscure, not only to his political detractors but to his biographers. Even some of his semi-public activities, such as his service as agent for the General Assembly of the Province of New York, and his connection with Dodsley's *Annual Register*, have remained too largely matters of rumor and speculation. Since 1949, however, the Rockingham-Fitzwillian-Burke papers have been available at the City Library in Sheffield, Yorkshire, and the Northampton Archives at Lamport, and even more recently Burke's previously unknown letters to Charles O'Hara of County Sligo have come to light. New possibilities of great importance, therefore, have opened up for the study not of Burke only, but of the whole Rockingham "connexion" and the politics and policies of the early years of George III. Professor Hoffman was one of the first persons to explore the great manuscript resources at Sheffield and Lamport, and he was responsible for the final opening up of the O'Hara collection. Now he has edited the first extensive selections from the new Burke manuscripts, two blocks of material which gain a kind of unity from the emphasis of the editing on American affairs.

At Sheffield he found a manuscript book of the dictated drafts of Burke's letters to the New York Assembly, 1771–75, which had been overlooked by the official editors of Burke's *Correspondence* (1844). Almost none of the letters as sent had ever been found. The letters to O'Hara had been completely unknown to Burke's biographers, as had the close relationship between O'Hara and the Burkes, perhaps the most intimate and uninhibited friendship of Burke's life beyond his own family. O'Hara's letters to Burke, which had lain in the Fitzwillian collection but had been ignored by Burke's editors, provide helpful material for Professor Hoffman's excellent review of Burke's early life and his involvement with American affairs to 1776 and for the bridging narratives and annotations.

As an introduction to the American notebook (80 pages) Hoffman includes a 170-page study of the colonial agent, with special reference, of course, to Burke, to the Province of New York in the British Empire, and to the approach of the American Revolution. Burke as agent for the New York Assembly is distinguished, on the one hand, from such American spokesmen-diplomats as Franklin and, on the other, much to his credit, from the typical placemen or hired lobbyists holding colonial agencies. In spite of contemporary insinuations to the contrary, Burke, like Franklin, appears to have worked honestly and persistently to prevent the break between the colonies and the Mother Country.

Burke left no memoir or journal, but the letters to O'Hara (330 pages) come close to being an intermittent diary for the obscure years shortly before and after Burke entered Parliament. Almost every phase of his activities, his aspirations, his successes and frustrations is poured out to O'Hara as to a favorite uncle: his troubles with Hamilton, his introduction to Rockingham, his first speech in Parliament, his purchase of Gregories, his distress over the collapse of his East India stock.

The letters in this volume provide the greatest addition to the materials of Burke's biography since the *Correspondence* of 1844. They may be supplemented by reference to the *Checklist* of Burke's correspondence recently compiled for the Index Society by Thomas W. Copeland and Milton Smith, and they will fall into their proper relationship to the whole of Burke's career with the publication of the comprehensive edition of Burke's *Correspondence* now being prepared under the editorship of Professor Copeland.

Professor Hoffman provides an adequate index and appends a useful bibliography for Burke and the New York agency.

DONALD C. BRYANT
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A. S. EISENSTADT. *Charles McLean Andrews: A Study in American Historical Writing.* Pp. xx, 273. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. $5.00.

As the subtitle suggests, it is more a discourse on an historical point of view than a biography of an historian. A sketch is given, to be sure, of the family background, the early training, and the long career of the late C. M. Andrews; in addition, the author describes Andrews as a friend, teacher, editor, and guardian of the historical profession. But Mr. Eisenstadt is mainly concerned with defining the new scientific history in which Andrews was trained in the late nineteenth century, with showing abundantly how Andrews exemplified and improved on the work of his mentor, Herbert Baxter Adams, and with fitting the historical writing of Andrews, particularly of his monumental achievements in colonial history, into the intellectual orientations of late nineteenth and early twentieth century America. For that period the book becomes, in fact, a critical analysis of American historical writing with Andrews as the main focus.

As Mr. Eisenstadt admits, the organization of his study makes for some repetitiousness, but he knows how to find fresh terminology for the new context of a previously mentioned aspect of his subject. His book is written with sustained cogency and studded with percipient and epigrammatic observations. It is distinguished throughout for rigorous probing and discriminating judgment.

Mr. Eisenstadt ends his book, however,

as he ends his Introduction, with an unresolved problem. He has proved that Andrews did not, in fact, adhere to the impartiality he professed, and despite his many tributes to the historian's accomplishments, he rests his case, as it were, on the relativist indictment of scientific history presented during Andrews' last years. The author says that the scientific ideal in history "opened no broader avenue to the truth of the past than the ideal which had dominated a prior age or that which was to dominate a subsequent one" (p. 218). We are justified in asking him, even granting the view that historical facts do not speak for themselves, if he is not himself using some relative standard to discover the relativity of Andrews' version of history. What of the author's capacity to detach Andrews' special pleading from his solid historical reconstruction? Is his evaluation of Andrews also destined to be cast out?

I am inclined to think that Mr. Eisenstadt is hoist with his own petard, but that his book is of more permanent value than his theory of history permits.

WILLSON H. COATES
University of Rochester

CHARLES PAGE SMITH. *James Wilson: Founding Father, 1742–1798.* Pp. xii, 426. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1956. $7.50.

Here is a work in the best tradition of historical biography. It presents the interesting development of character and personality of the hero and his public achievements, effectively projected against the historical background. This compact volume satisfies all the canons of good historical writing—meticulous respect for truth, a fine sense of values, and a rare understanding of the great issues involved.

Biographical writing, as old as history, has never been more popular than it is today. The graphic sketches of the *Old Testament*, Plutarch's *Lives*, Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*, and even the ponderous biographies of the Victorians have always enjoyed a certain degree of popularity. In recent years, however, biographies by writers like Maurois, Strachey, Ludwig, Bradford, and others, some of whose psychographs pay only lip service to history, usurped the stage. Close at home, Van Doren's *Benjamin Franklin* reflects a wholesome trend which is currently emphasized by the projects for the publications of "The Papers of Great Men." Although Wilson's papers are not listed for publication in this classic series, Dr. Smith's account of his amazing contribution to our early history readily justifies his hero's claim to a place in the hall of fame of the Founding Fathers. "It was Wilson's vision, more than that of any other single member of the Constitutional Convention, which was fulfilled in the next century and a half of American history." "James Wilson was a conservative with a boundless faith in the potentialities of a free society under law." Even the jurisprudence of today, like our legal education, is greatly indebted to the concepts of this "stiff Scottish lawyer, who gave one of the first series of law lectures in the nation he had helped to create." These are quotations from the Epilogue, which should be required reading for all students of law, especially at the University of Pennsylvania, where the lectures were given. Wilson's papers in general are not treated, as is customary, in a special section on sources or bibliography. On the other hand, the need for the information is supplied by introductory paragraphs to the Notes on the successive chapters. Like the Notes themselves, they reveal an unusually wide and intensive range of research.

While the biography as a whole will interest the average reader, it has an especial appeal to the scholar. Some of the chapters call for a considerable knowledge not only of history but of economic theory and speculations on the nature and origins of law and society, as, for example: "Continental Policies and State Politics"; "Champion of the Bank"; "The Federalists Attack"; "A Scotsman and a Scholar"; "The Nature of Law"; "Law and Society."

The final chapter, "The Morass," is a pathetic story of disintegration and decline. Haunted by creditors and the threat of a debtors' prison, Wilson died a virtual fugitive—a great man who, "always anathema to his enemies, had become a political liability to his friends." He was buried in "quiet obscurity beside the waters of Albemarle Sound, far from the scene of his great triumphs."

Despite the evidence of considerable cutting to meet the demands of publishers, space should have been found for the apotheosis in 1906, when James Wilson's remains were brought to Philadelphia for re-internment near Franklin and others of his friends and colleagues in Christ Church cemetery, with suitable eulogies by Chief Justice Fuller and Andrew Carnegie.

WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH
American Philosophical Society

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

In THE ANNALS of July 1956, there appears the text of an address by myself before the Academy entitled "A View of Africa."

On page 125 under Ethiopia I made the statement that "His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie has recently *accepted* a new constitution."

I find that a somewhat unfortunate interpretation has been given my use of the word "accepted." It has been inferred that this new constitution was not granted by the Emperor *of his own free will*, whereas it was in fact given by him.

I would greatly appreciate it if, in your next issue of THE ANNALS, you would print the correction: "has recently *granted*."

FRANCES P. BOLTON
U. S. House of Representatives

Dear Sir:

Mr. Ralph Brown's review of my biography of Thaddeus Stevens in your valued publication is a mass of unproved assertions. His main thesis appears to be that I misrepresented Lincoln. I have a great deal of respect for the martyred President, but it is not the business of the historian to be a blind worshiper of any man. My attitude towards Lincoln is expressed in the following paragraph in the Foreword of my book:

"That Lincoln was the most sympathetic figure of the war period requires no argument, but a comparison of his and Stevens's political programs with measures adopted during the war leads to the inevitable conclusion that political leadership came from the Capitol rather than from the White House. Lincoln's program was rejected, Stevens's adopted, and Lincoln finished by praising what he had previously opposed."

As for Reconstruction, Lincoln's program and Stevens's were practically alike, for, as I have shown, there is evidence that Lincoln would have been in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment; and on April 30, 1866, Stevens introduced a bill to admit the former rebel States to participation in the National Government if they accepted that Amendment. Encouraged by the unprincipled Andrew Johnson (whom, Mrs. Lincoln told Herndon, Lincoln "greatly disliked" after getting better acquainted with him) they had the foolhardiness to refuse to do so. This led to the imposition of Negro suffrage, without which the Federal Government would have fallen into the hands of former rebels and their Northern allies at the next presidential election.

RALPH KORNGOLD
Chicago, Ill.

Dear Sir:

I regret that I found it necessary to say some rather harsh things about Mr. Korngold's book, and I do not blame him for resenting my criticism.

Mr. Korngold has indicated two points of rebuttal to my review, expressed in his first two sentences. He says that my review "is a mass of unproved assertions," and that my "main thesis appears to be" that he "misrepresented Lincoln." If Mr. Korngold had read my review as carefully as I read his book, he might have hesitated to make either statement.

If any reader wishes to turn to my review of Mr. Korngold's book (March 1956), he will find that I supplied the pages where he committed each of the "sins" which I listed; I do not know how I could be more specific. As for his second charge, I *do* contend that he misrepresented Lincoln—along with nearly every other per-

son in his book, including Thad Stevens himself. That, however, is only a part of my criticism of his book. Any reader of that volume who is at all familiar with the literature of the Reconstruction era will note that Mr. Korngold has relied upon outdated and strongly biased works and has ignored almost every important study published in the last three decades. His biography of Stevens, I repeat, is strongly partisan, inaccurate, ill-tempered, and is obviously based upon inadequate as well as inaccurate research.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
State Teachers College
Cortland, New York

Dear Sir:

In the *Saturday Review,* November 12, 1955, Carlos Baker discussed the functions of a book critic. He stated that his primary task is to report on the contents of the latest books; next, in the case of a non-fiction work, to restate and examine its thesis; and, finally, to judge the skill and effectiveness with which the thesis has been presented.

Rubin Gotesky in his "review" of *Concept of Freedom* (ANNALS, July 1956, p. 167) has violated all of these canons of criticism. The tone is set in the first paragraph: "To those who know Roman Catholic doctrine, this is 'old stuff'." From that point on, the book is condemned! The obvious reply is that to those who know bigoted anti-Catholic propaganda, this "review" is "old stuff." Gotesky does not report on the contents of the book. Rather, by taking a few words and phrases out of context, he attempts to document his charges that the Roman Catholic Church has never achieved satisfactory answers to human problems and that the authors of this book "consistently misrepresent opponent philosophies." The only misrepresentation is on the part of Gotesky. The book is not intended to be and, to an unbiased mind, is not an apologia for the Catholic Church—nor even for Thomistic philosophy. It seeks to explore the basic meaning of human freedom and to apply this meaning to various areas of human life. It should be judged by the validity of the arguments that it advances and not by an appeal to religious or even philosophical prejudice. Professor Gotesky has, of course, the right to reject those arguments provided that he states them fairly and gives his reasons. This he has not done in his "review." In fact, he mentions only one of the fourteen articles and then pays it what, to a Catholic, is a doubtful compliment, saying that "it could have been written by a non-Catholic"!

There is no claim made in this book, either explicitly or by implication, that "The American Bill of Rights was a Catholic invention." If, however, Professor Gotesky were familiar with the work of such outstanding *non-Catholic* scholars as the Carlyles, Passerin D'Entrèves and Charles McIlwain, he would, perhaps, realize that medieval scholastic philosophy did much to lay the groundwork for the principles upon which the Bill of Rights is based.

Gotesky concludes his "review" with an uncalled-for slur upon the competence or integrity of the prominent men and women who composed the Awards Jury of the Freedoms Foundation—presumably because they did not agree with Gotesky!

The authors of the *Concept of Freedom* are prepared for any just criticism based upon the work itself. They feel that THE ANNALS has done a distinct disservice to the members of the American Academy of Political and Social Science by printing this so-called "review" which is more reminiscent of the *Menace* of the nineteen-twenties than THE ANNALS of the nineteen-fifties.

CARL W. GRINDEL, C.M.
St. John's University

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