


218

Philosophical Quarterly

Oct-1956

- JL
Qm. 2, N25
NS6.29.3
123914



THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXIX, No. 3]

[October, 1956

77
4-56

AN ORGAN

OF


THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

AND

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

Managing Editor
PROF. G. R. MALKANI


Editorial Board :
PROF. N. A. NIKAM
DR. B. L. ATREYA



Yearly Subscription Rs. 4
For Congress Members Rs. 3
Foreign 8 Shillings or 2 Dollars. Single copy Re. 1/8 or 3 Shillings

CONTENTS

Necessity and Judgment: by Dr. P. S. Sastri	.. 121
The Nature of Laws in Physical and Social Sciences: by Sri Chandra	.. 145
Immortality: by G. R. Malkani	.. 155
The Eternity of the Self: by Chandrodaya Bhattacharya	.. 167
Place of Reasoning in Advaita Philosophy: by Nirod Baran Chakraborty	.. 177
"Conscience" in Freudian Psycho-analysis: by H. L. Debnath	.. 185



JL

Q M 2, 1125

N56-29-3

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXIX, No. 3]

[October, 1956.

Necessity and Judgment

by

DR. P. S. SASTRI, M.A., M.LITT., PH.D.

University of Saugor, Saugor (M. P.)

1. The pragmatist account of the nature of thought is misleading and one-sided. Thinking, says the pragmatist, "is instrumental to a control of the environment, a control effected through acts which would not be undertaken without the prior resolution of a complex situation into assured elements and an accompanying projection of possibilities.... Thought is a name for the events and acts which make up the process of analytical inspection and projected invention and testing".¹ What some of the actual and real existences do, is called thinking. This logical activity is then a continual development of the biological activities.² Thought arises from the whole situation, from the complex relationship between man and his environment. Hence thought does not operate with the 'given'.³ We select and test the data; and the relevant data of any thinking or enquiry is never 'given', but 'taken'.⁴ And all the logical forms of thought are evolved as being instrumental to the control of environment.⁵ In this system thinking is an activity of an organism arising as a response to the interaction with the environment, and functioning as an instrument to control the environment. The occurrence of the sense-data is not the basis of the processes of thinking; but we have to obtain, select and test the observational data which are employed in all inquiry. The

1. Dewey: *Essays in Experimental Logic*, 30-31.

2. Dewey: *Logic, The Theory of Inquiry*, 25.

3. *Ibid.*, 428.

4. See Dewey: *The Quest for Certainty*, Chapter 7.

5. Dewey: *Logic*, 4.

logical forms of thought are evolved in the course of the natural history of thinking.

Can thinking be a mere adaptation or reaction to the environment? It is true that thought has always an objective reference. In referring to the objects, it renders them significant or meaningful. We cannot say that the objects in themselves are meaningless and that thought invests them with meanings. As such thought cannot be a mere function of a subjective mind. Further, our actions are actuated by ideas; and ideas arise from contact with objective reality. According to Dewey, however, the source of ideas cannot be objective reality; and thought has no direct reference to that reality. All that is taken to exist must then be said to be constituted and determined in the processes of thought. But when our ideas have nothing to do with reality, our thought is barren. If objective reality does not give rise to our ideas, wherefrom do they come? How can they arise from the mere mind? Undeterred by these questions, Dewey would like to take the objective world to be a dream projected by the mind of every individual.

Thinking is taken to be a response given to a specific stimulus.⁶ It is an intra-organic event arising from the extra-organic stimuli.⁷ When incompatible factors appear within the empirical situations, thought is said to arise.⁸ Thinking is "an effort to get out of some trouble."⁹ Ignoring the social matrix of thinking, Dewey emphasizes its biological matrix;¹⁰ and he considers thinking to be merely a means of elaborating a pattern of behaviour. This is thought mechanised. This machinised entity obeys the reflex arc or the conditioned reflex; and yet unlike the nervous system, it can think. This is a strange paradox. If all thought is directed to some activity or other, we have to reject that thought which does not lead to any activity in the pragmatic sense. In other words, the pragmatist has to reject the aesthetic, religious and other such experiences as meaningless.

Knowing, says Dewey, "is not the act of an outside spectator but of a participator inside the natural and social scene."¹¹ Starting with this faith, he takes the essential character of knowledge

6. Dewey: *Essays*, 93.

7. *Ibid.*, 221, 227.

8. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

9. *Ibid.*, 23, 73.

10. Dewey: *Logic*, 25.

11. *The Quest for Certainty*, 188.

to be practical reliability, not any agreement of thought with the objects. The object of knowledge then cannot exist apart from the act of knowing; nor can the object be objective reality because it is a "consequence of directed operations."

This is a faulty doctrine. The operations of knowing cannot and do not create the object of knowledge; and the object of knowledge cannot be the "consequence of directed operations". Dewey confuses the object which we know and our account of the object. The account we give reveals an object which is our intellectual construction. The physical object is not the same as this, though the two must agree with one another. In other words, we should not reduce the objectivity of the object into our mental state. We test our ideas in one way. This should not be confused with what we test after this. We test whether our idea agrees with reality. It is after this that the idea may lead to some activity; and at the end of the activity we may reject or strengthen our initial idea. But in no case is the object a consequence of directed operations. This attribute can to a certain extent be given to our idea of the object and never to the object itself. Dewey's confusion between the object and our idea of the object is at the root of his faulty interpretation of the knowledge-situation.

According to Dewey, propositions can be neither true nor false because they are only "means", and because "means as such are neither true nor false".¹² On the other hand, it is the act of assertion that is true or false. It is true, if it is arrived at after a competent inquiry and if it enables us to achieve the goal of our inquiry. But what is meant when we say that a proposition is only a "means"? If it means that it is a "means" to an act, we have to reject many statements such as the descriptive and the narrative. But if it means that it defines a real subject, then in so far as it agrees with reality it is true. Further the truth or the falsehood of a proposition is determined by its meaning which always refers to reality. And Dewey makes the objective world evaporate altogether. He does not doubt the existence of this world, but our customary knowledge of this world. Our knowledge is not an operational consequence.¹³ It is his logical inquiry that transforms the indeterminate situation into a determinate one, and therefore into a unified whole. We have to convert a thing-in-itself into a thing-for-us; and this conversion

12. *Logic*, 287.

13. See *Essays*, 302; *Logic*, 159.

involves a series of changes effected by us. When an object is known, a new object is created. An existentially indeterminate Kantian thing-in-itself acquires certain determinations. The real world then is unknowable. And yet Dewey claims to know it. To say that a thing-in-itself can become a thing-for-us is to say that it is not at all a thing-in-itself. When we understand it as determinate, we are not adding anything to it. We are only understanding it better and interpreting it more accurately in the light of the reality to which it belongs.

2. The pragmatist and the positivist refuse to give an intellectual and intelligible account of reality. Any attempt to understand the objective world intellectually is a red rag to the positivist. He condemns as metaphysical any attempt at a conceptual representation of the nature of the real world. Yet, he has "entities", under which term he includes individuals, properties, relations and propositions.¹⁴ The ultimate components of the world are here taken to be things, properties and relations; these are combined to form 'atomic facts'; and Wittgenstein argued that the world is the totality of atomic facts. Each atomic fact is a compound of 'simple objects' which form the substance of the world. This is pure metaphysics in spite of the positivist's attempt to repudiate all metaphysics.

Carnap's semantical system or language has signs to designate individuals, and other signs to designate the properties and relations of individuals. These signs enable us to form atomic sentences which may be grouped into sets called 'state-descriptions'. Each such state-description "gives a complete description of a possible state of the universe of individuals with respect to all properties and relations expressed by the predicates of the system. Thus the state-description represents Leibnitz's possible worlds or Wittgenstein's possible states of affairs."¹⁵ The state-description which contains all true atomic sentences is the only one state-description which describes the actual state of the universe. And "a sentence of any form is true if and only if it holds in the true state-description." Further, "a sentence is logically true if it holds in all state-descriptions". This is similar to Leibnitz's conception that a necessary truth must hold in all possible worlds". Rejecting necessity, the positivist admits it at last.

14. See *Introduction to Semantics*, 6.

15. See *Meaning and Necessity*, 9-10.

3. Starting with a complete rejection of metaphysics, the positivist has come to a metaphysical account of the world and of the relation of thought to things. Material things are taken to be logical constructions out of sense-contents. What is a logical construction? Ayer writes: "We may explain the nature of logical constructions by saying that the introduction of symbols which denote logical constructions is a device which enables us to state complicated propositions about the elements of these constructions in a relatively simple form."¹⁶ A logical construction is denoted by a symbol; and once it is denoted, it ceases to be a construction. Further, a proposition about an object is taken to be complicated, while its analysis into elementary sensations is said to be simple and intelligible. But we cannot, on the positivist analysis, bring intelligence or thought into the consideration of a sensation. And yet the physical object is said to become intelligible after this analysis.

Ayer emphasises the value of the definitions in use. It is this process of defining that makes us say that a table, for example, is a logical construction. Such definitions do not add to our knowledge; but they clarify our understanding by unravelling the logical complexities. The revealing of such complexities is the only way of solving the philosophical problems. For example, take the problem of perception. Ayer's 'solution' is that we should find out the nature of the physical thing by giving a definition in use and by "giving an actual rule for translating sentences about a material thing" in the light of this definition. We thus get a series of linguistic statements expressing that some symbols are definable in use in a particular manner. This specific way arises because every factual statement has to fall within the sphere of some special science or other; and philosophy cannot therefore say anything about the way a symbol is used or is to be used. Philosophy cannot do this because the propositions of philosophy are not factual. Hence "in specifying the language to which he intends his definitions to apply, the philosopher is simply describing the conventions from which his definitions are deduced; and the validity of the definitions depends solely on their compatibility with these conventions."¹⁷

Here we have the clearest statement of the role played by convention in Ayer's logic. There are words in every language,

16. *Language, Truth and Logic*, 73.

17. *Ibid.*, 87.

and each word has a conventional application to a specific object. There is nothing to relate a word to an object except this convention. And the word is strictly controlled by a certain science which specialises in conventionalising certain words or symbols. If these conventions are to be explained, we have to go to the respective sciences; for, without defining the terms to be employed, no scientific argument can proceed further. In such a case it is not philosophy that can explain these symbols. As a result there can be no philosophy and no problems which a non-existent philosophy can discuss. And when the propositions of philosophy have no factual content, its solutions, if at all they exist, will have no value or significance.

Let us examine the positivist's contention. Physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. Sense-data, said Russell, are objects of acquaintance. They are the objects of 'sensing', of 'direct apprehension', of 'direct awareness'. We have here a series of vague terms and the meanings of these terms are highly obscure. They all suggest that sense-data are objects of knowledge, if positivism admits that they are objects of knowledge. Otherwise it is very difficult to account for the terms the positivist employs. Since positivism cannot speak of the existence of the objects of knowledge, we have to conclude that these terms are meaningless. They have no objective or factual reference. They cannot have any status. Sense-data involve knowing. The positivist attempts to know that something or other is the case in a given situation; and he conveniently forgets that the verb 'to know' is transitive. He forgets its transitive reference to an object and emphasizes the subjective sensations and the like. I am aware of something; I am conscious of something. This something is the object.

But 'being aware of' is not a name of any object. When I perform an empirical analysis of my sensations, it is true that I do not get any referent for this name. But I do know that 'being aware of' stands for my act of experiencing. Since it is my act of experience, it is meaningless to say that "I do not know what it would be like to come upon an act of awareness." "Being aware of" refers to the unity of the experiencing self with the experienced object. Awareness is a state of the experiencing self. It is not an object which I can clutch with my fingers. It always refers to the object; and the sense-data constitute at least a part of the object in so far as I am aware of my sensations and the object that gives rise to these sensations. The sense-data are ob-

jects of an act like awareness. Ayer therefore errs when he observes: "If sense-data were defined as the objects of such acts, then there can be no sense-data."¹⁸

This contention of Ayer is faulty. For example, I look at an object, say, a tomato. Here I can doubt a good deal. But I cannot doubt the objective existence of some irreducible thing. As Prof. Price observes, I cannot doubt that "there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly present to my consciousness". This entity is called a sense-datum by Prof. Price; and whatever name we may give to it, its objective existence is beyond doubt.

But Ayer thinks that there is room for doubt. When he doubts the existence of the bulgy patch, he assures us that he should not be taken to mean that he doubts "if this patch exists". Either the words 'existence' and 'exists' are used in two contradictory senses, or Prof. Ayer is speaking a language which we cannot understand. He restricts the word 'exist' to the sense-data, and he rejects all reference of this predicate to physical objects. How can the existing sense-data abstain from any reference to the existence of the object from which they are presumed to emanate? We have to say that either there can be sense-data without any object, or there must be both. Ayer seems to hold to the former. Yet he considers the sense-datum to be a constituent of a sense-field. The visual sense-field is that which every-one sees at any given moment; and the visual sense-datum is said to be a constituent of a visual sense-field. How can we reduce what every one sees directly with his own eyes to a series of sensations? Ayer has no right to say that there is something which every one sees. He can only refer to what every one feels as sensation in his physiological frame. His language betrays the hollowness and inconsistency of his doctrine.

We 'sense' an object. This sensing means that the object is sensibly present, that the object appears. If the object does not exist objectively, how can it be sensed, and how can it appear? The sense-datum always refers to appearances, and the appearances must be those of an entity which must exist. A non-existent entity cannot have any appearances. In the very act of sensing we are directly aware of the objective existence of the real physical object. And with the help of our sensations and feelings we only come to

18. On 'Phenomenalism' (Arist. Soc. 1946-47).

understand it and interpret it correctly. Take the example given by Ayer. "When I say that I am now perceiving a match-box, part of what I am saying is that I am sensing sense-data of a certain kind." There is an objective existent which is more than that grasped by my act of sensing. "This something more", says Ayer, "is that further sense-data of the appropriate sort would, in the appropriate conditions, be obtainable." However much we may sense in this manner, there would remain something that cannot be sensed; and this irreducible element is, on the positivist's premises, unknown also. When an element or an aspect is unknown, we cannot determine the conditions that would be appropriate to this unknown element. As such we have no right to say that sense-data of the appropriate sort would be obtained. We do not even know whether that unknown element really involves any sense-data.

A. J. Ayer observes that philosophy cannot "afford us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common-sense".¹⁹ A proposition is said to have meaning when it is analytic, that is, when "its validity depends solely on the definition of the symbols it contains." It has also a meaning if it expresses a fact or a hypothesis that can be verified in experience. This verifiability is in terms of the sense-contents. Hence empirical statements are those that can "be translated into propositions about sense-contents,"²⁰ and these are analytic statements about symbols used in empirical statements. Thus philosophy deals with words and consists of "definitions or the formal consequences of definitions,"²¹ and it clarifies our empirical knowledge by analysing or translating it "into propositions about sense-contents." The words we employ can have a meaning only when they can be translated into the language of the sense-contents. But sense-contents do not "exist"; they only "occur". They are "a part of sense-experience".²² All that exists is merely a logical construction out of sense-contents.

But why should we reduce the existent object to a sense-content? No sense-content can exhaust the meaning of a thing that exists. The alleged sense-content can at best fathom one aspect of the thing. To reduce a thing to a sense-content is to

19. *Language, Truth and Logic*, 33.

20. *Ibid.*, 59.

21. *Ibid.*, 57.

22. *Ibid.*, 122-3.

deny it its legitimate objectivity. Further, the object is never a logical construction out of sense-contents. At the most, our knowledge of the object may be such a logical construction. And any such knowledge reveals that reality is a whole and that it can be apprehended through the principle of non-contradiction. Sense-contents, however, occur as part of the sense-experience; and this experience must be the experience of some sentient organism. In such a case we have pure subjective idealism. Moreover, some mind or other must, on an ultimate analysis, refuse to be a logical construction. That which makes out things to be logical constructions is the mind; and the mind cannot make out that it itself is a logical construction. The positivist's theory of construction must break at some point or other. He cannot speak of material things at all since nothing can be said about them. 418

Ayer says: "To speak about material things is, for each of us, a way of speaking about sense-contents, . . . each of us 'constructs' material things out of sense-contents."²³ All such expressions are misleading. We do not construct material things any more than we do our sense-contents. We become aware of them, of the one through the other. We cannot even equate a material thing with the sense-contents that would occur when it is experienced.²⁴ The sense-contents are our reactions to a given thing; and the knowledge of the thing is our construction. Even then our construction has to agree with reality; and in so far as it agrees, thought and things must be taken to be intimately bound up.

But Ayer proceeds in a peculiar way in his analysis of the perception of the match-box. This perception is said to be the same as a set of statements about sense-data; and the statement that this match-box exists is taken to be the same as a set of statements about sense-data. Thus "the statements about physical objects are somehow reducible to statements about sense-data." It is in this sense that the physical objects are taken to be logical constructions. The meaning of a very simple statement is covered by a series of statements which record our sense-experiences; and each such statement can be understood only by understanding another series of statements to which it has to be reduced. In this way, till we know an infinite number of statements, we cannot know the meaning or truth of the statement that this match-box exists.

23. *Ibid.*, 63.

24. *Ibid.*, 140-1.

Instead of gaining anything we lose the relevant sentence in this positivist maze.

4. The sense-data relevant to the existence of the match-box may be absent; and even then the match-box can exist. This leads Ayer to hold that some of the statements about physical objects are hypothetical. This means that if certain specific conditions are fulfilled, certain sense-data would occur. But it is pretty difficult to determine the conditions, since the conditions can be given only if they are known to have an invariable relation to the sense-data and to the object as well. And any such invariable relation is taboo to the logical positivist. Moreover conditions always refer to the known; and the empiricist's doctrine of the sense-data takes the object to be unknown. And yet this unknown object can be analysed! Does the scientist analyse any unknown substance?

A statement about a physical object can be true and meaningful, if it can be translated into a series of statements about sense-data. But do we really have complete and true translations? We can never get a statement about a physical object verified completely. Every statement about a physical object is capable of being translated into an infinite number of statements about sense-data; and we can never give an infinite number of statements. Each statement describes a single piece of evidence; and to make the evidence adequate we have to give an infinite number of statements about the physical object. And to prove the existence of the object too, we need an infinite number of sense-experiences. Even then our statement that the object exists will itself have to refer to the sense-experience. No statement can refer to the object in positivism. Then any statement is intransitive; and reduced to grammatical terms we have to reject all transitive verbs and accusative cases. This is the tragedy of the empiricist reduction.

Previous experience cannot help the present experience as long as we argue within the folds of positivism. It is difficult to discover or to determine which experience, or which condition, is necessary. Even if we succeed in determining them, it is not possible to give a complete list of the necessary conditions. From this Ayer would argue that "a statement about a physical object is not necessarily indefinite at its own level, but it is necessarily indefinite at the level of sense-data."²⁵ Every statement has thus

25. See *Arist. Soc.*, 1946-47.

two levels of existence. One refers to its own level; and what this means we do not know. We cannot know it since it cannot directly refer to the object. When its direct reference is only to the sense-data, there is no meaning in saying that it has two levels of existence. It is always indefinite. From such an indefinite statement we can gather nothing. Nor can we reduce it into a series of intelligible propositions.

5. Can we ever know anything about the physical object, if we accept the positivist's analysis? It is only the sensory evidence which is direct that can prove the existence of a physical object. This evidence is obtained by "sensing sense-data". The proposition that is taken to tell us something significant about the object must be translated into the sense-datum vocabulary. This vocabulary, says Ayer, is logically prior to the physical object language. We have to translate the latter into the former; and yet we are not better off. As Ayer himself observes: "The phenomenalist claims that categorical propositions about physical objects are reducible to hypothetical propositions about sense-data."²⁶ The positivist reduction interprets all categorical propositions as hypothetical. Here we have the surest abuse of grammar and of commonsense as well. While we always find a hypothetical proposition attempting to become categorical in the scientific procedure, the positivist pleads for the reverse; and at the same time he claims a scientific status to his theories. When we equate the categorical with the hypothetical, we are *ipso facto* equating quality with quantity. This in itself is a return to the dialectic which is at the very outset rejected by positivism, since all dialectic is based on the principle of necessity.

Recognising the principle of necessity, we construct the world. We arrange and adjust the world of experience in obedience to the principle of non-contradiction. Mere supposition is no construction; nor can it construct a world. In asserting its laws, thought transcends supposition by functioning freely and constructively. In this construction we find necessity operating in and through the law of non-contradiction which alone is the principle of logical stability. In constructing the world we find thought functioning as organic and concrete. Starting with the given, thought develops itself in and through the principle of non-contradiction and becomes as consciousness one with reality. And

26. *Ibid.*

as such it reveals the necessity governing the members within reality. Things, therefore, do not lie outside of thought. Thought cannot grasp anything which exists outside of itself; and since we do understand the universe, we have to recognise that thought includes in itself the whole universe.

6. "All philosophy", says Wittgenstein, "is critique of language."²⁷ This philosophy is the same as a linguistic enquiry, a logic of science, the syntax of the language of science.²⁸ Wittgenstein's analysis of language "is concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language."²⁹ Yet Wittgenstein observes that "all propositions of our colloquial language, are actually, just as they are, logically completely in order,"³⁰ and that "every possible proposition is legitimately constructed."³¹ In spite of Russell's opposition to Wittgenstein, there is for both no knowledge outside of the sciences. To know anything about anything, we have to depend on some science or other; otherwise we are sure to be cheated. Sense-observation alone gives positive science yet the positivist holds that sight as such can give us no purely empirical science.

Logical positivism is a union of the old empiricism with the modern logic. It classifies all propositions into the necessary and the factual. The necessary proposition says nothing about the world of fact.³² Most empirical propositions, on analysis, come to have no 'factual content' and therefore no meaning. A proposition has meaning if it can conceivably be verified in terms of sense-experience. It may not be verified in practice; but it should be verifiable in principle, if it were to be significant.³³ If we can conceive no sense experience which can refute it or support it, then it is meaningless; and if it appears to be meaningful, it is not certain. Since meaning and verification are denied to a necessary proposition, and since verification involves sense-experience, it is held that the sense-contents are never connected necessarily. Statements about the sense-contents are taken to be either expressions of the meanings of words, or reports of mere empirical conjunctions. A proposition like 'man is mortal' is an imperfect

27. *Tractus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.0031.

28. See Carnap: *Logical Syntax of Language*, 279-281.

29. Russell's Introduction to *Tractus*, 7.

30. *Tractus*, 5.553.

31. *Ibid.*, 5.5733.

32. See Ayer: *Language, Truth and Logic*, 104.

33. *Ibid.*, 21.

induction which has a mere probability and no necessity. The empiricist would therefore argue that the truths of logic and mathematics have no factual content; and he begins to "explain how a proposition which is empty of all factual content can be true and useful and surprising".³⁴ To put it differently, a necessary proposition is either a tautology or a mere convention of language. It does not state a fact, but that which we already know.³⁵ Thus 'P implies Q' is a mere reminder; and in analysing or explaining it, we only put it in a different form. That which is contained in the meaning of our terms is explicitly stated as a necessary proposition. As such it is not an assertion about the world of fact, but it is an illustration of the way we use language. "The sole ground of their necessity" is a linguistic convention; and yet "any denial of them would be self-stultifying."³⁶

7. This theory is based on the analysis of necessity given by the symbolic logic of Russell and Wittgenstein; and as a consequence it rejects intensional meaning without any convincing argument. This theory makes out that a statement of material implication is a disjunctive statement of fact, and that a statement of formal implication is the same statement generalised. But in implication we do not think in terms of extension. When we say that man is mortal, we mean that the character or nature of being human is intimately and uniquely connected with mortality. The conjunction between man and mortality is due to a special connection of content; and this connection is illegitimately rejected by extensional logic. And when a denial of the necessary proposition is self-stultifying, the necessity here cannot be a mere linguistic convention. A proposition becomes self-contradictory not because of any grammatical principle, but because of its inconsistency with fact. This always has a reference to fact; and to speak of a necessity which does not take facts or things into consideration is no necessity at all.

8. The task of Philosophy, says Russell, is to subject the propositions to a 'logical analysis'. This analysis is supposed to reveal their exact meaning which refers to the sense-data about which a proposition is made. The basis of all knowledge is the individual percept; and "no method exists by which we can begin with data which are public to many observers."³⁷ But if the

34. *Ibid.*, 91-2.

35. *Ibid.*, 105.

36. *Ibid.*, 114.

37. *Human Knowledge*, 22.

meaning of a proposition is based only on my individual percept, and if it has nothing to do with the public data, how can we have the social knowledge of the world which is not private to myself? If the words used by me are true of my sense-data alone, I cannot construct the material world out of my sense-data.

In Russell's view, sense-data are 'mental events' and we only infer 'physical events'.³⁸ But he forgets that even inference works through a strict logical necessity which in this context would render the relation of words, their meanings and their referents internal. Russell's insistence on the private sense-data points out that our knowledge of the physical world is based on certain 'postulates' which themselves are not based on experience.^{39 & 40} Then even the propositions which express this knowledge are not based on experience, and so become meaningless. The sense-data no longer become the 'elements' of the world; and the objects or events of the world acquire an unknowable status which defeats the very function of language and logic. This position makes out that reason is the faculty that uses language for making contingent propositions, which are verifiable in future sense-perception.

This logic of private sense-data holds to the solipsistic sensationalism and rejects reason from its domain. Once the function of reason is put at a minimum, we can never speak about the truth of even a verified proposition. The formal logician cannot arrive at correspondence in the absence of reason. And yet he considers that reason introduces order and simplicity into our language. What is the basis of this operation of reason? If reason too is nothing but a formal linguistic principle, even our analysis would lack all factual reference. If sense-data are admitted to be strictly private, there is no method whereby we can arrive at the meaning or truth of our own statements.

Logical positivism is a theory of sense-contents. It is essentially subjectivistic and solipsistic. There can be no reality outside the 'given experience'; and the world of persons and things cannot be other than the world of perceptions and sense-data. All this is contrary to experience and to common-sense.

9. The modern analysis of language attempts to discover what can be 'said' and what cannot be 'said'; and it endeavours

38. *Ibid.*, 265.

39 & 40. *Ibid.*, 527.

to regulate our thoughts after a consideration of the 'logical syntax' of the language in which we express our thoughts. In a way this methodology was initiated by Kant who wanted to examine critically the way we think. While Kant limited all possible knowledge to the realm of 'phenomena', the positivist's examination of the logic of language is a substitute for the Kantian transcendental deduction of the categories. The limitations of knowledge, the powerlessness of reason, and the Protagorean relativity of truth are some of the outstanding results of positivism. These results make a rational understanding of objective reality very difficult.

Our knowledge is confined to the special sciences. Beyond them we cannot go. We cannot even correlate the findings of the various sciences since this correlation too needs the sense-datum language which cannot be strictly carried out. We have to say, on the basis of this formalism, that nothing can be known for certain. Positivism is committed to the relativity of truth. This doctrine may have an element of value only when it is recognised that the relativity presupposes and is grounded in an absolute truth. But the formalist cannot accept any such thing.

10. The synthetic proposition owes its validity and meaning to a unity. Can we conceive the subject of the synthetic proposition without any reference to the predicate? Can we ever do this in any valid proposition? Consider, for example, the predicate 'animality'. This animality that characterises an animal cannot be the same as the animality of man. Moreover, the animality of one man cannot be the same as that of any other. The predicate, in other words, is necessarily related to the subject which is a given whole of content. The predicate is not the class to which the subject belongs. The property of a subject is specific to that subject; and the thought of the subject necessarily implies the predicate concerned. We cannot think of the subject without referring to the predicate, because when we have the subject, we have also the predicate. What remains for us to do is to make it explicit, to bring it to consciousness, and to relate it to the whole. When we deny the predicate, we also deny the subject, since the predicate is necessarily related to the subject. This is so, not because we have an analytic proposition, but because every proposition is grounded in a whole or a universal. Every proposition is a statement about a given datum which is a whole; and it is bound to lead us to reality. The predicate which qualifies the real can be denied only when the real itself is rejected. Positivism rejects necessity because instead of recognising the subject

to be the universal, it takes the predicate to be the universal. The predicate can be a universal in formal logic where it is always abstract and therefore unreal.

11. The mathematical logician considers that the field of logic is confined to extensions rather than to intensions.⁴¹ In an extensional logic prime importance is given to property or quality, and not to essence. As such this logic takes the theory of classes to be of vital importance. But it is a theory of the abstract universal. A class is held to be "a symbolic or linguistic convenience",⁴² though it is also "an incomplete symbol".⁴³ It is a manifold or aggregate, not a qualitative unit. It is "all the objects satisfying some propositional function."⁴⁴ As regards qualities, the class consists of the instances of that quality. But, though we have classes of relations, the class here consists of the couples, triads and the like because a relation has no instances. Relation unites couples, triads and the like.⁴⁵ Then the relation of 'husband of' would, in a purely monogamous country, "have as its extension all the pairs of husbands and wives".⁴⁶

We have the class 'man', and its defining function 'x is human'. The two cannot be equated.⁴⁷ The class 'man' is the same as " $x (\phi x)$ "; that is, it is the same as x's for which the function ϕ is true.⁴⁸ In the absence of the x's, there can be no such class. But this conclusion is not accepted. On the other hand, these logicians talk of the class of the present inhabitants of the moon,⁴⁹ the class of the Chinese Popes,⁵⁰ the class of knighted scavengers, and the class of squared circles.⁵¹ These classes may not have any existing members. The Principia Mathematica's disavowal of any assumption that classes exist⁵² is plain; and all these logicians do recognise that without intension there can be no class. Yet extension is necessary to a class. Particulars or instances are essential

41. See *Principia Mathematica*, I. 22.

42. *Ibid.*, I. 72.

43. *Ibid.*, I. 81.

44. *Ibid.*, I. 23.

45. *Ibid.*, I. 200.

46. Eaton: *General Logic*, 256 note.

47. *Ibid.*, 414.

48. *Ibid.*, 411.

49. *Ibid.*, 421.

50. Stebbing: *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, 148.

51. *Ibid.*, 184.

52. *Principia Mathematica*, I. 72.

for a universal, though they cannot be reduced to a universal. This is the pure abstract universal which needs multiple particulars and which cannot satisfactorily be related to particulars.

The theory of the abstract universal has strange corollaries. In mathematical logic we hear that the same class is determined by different propositional functions: "The range of possible determinations of two variables may be the same."⁵³ Thus a self-identical thing may be a member of many different universals.⁵⁴ And Stebbing observes: "the class *men* is determined both by the defining property *rational animal*, and by the defining property, *being two-legged and featherless*. 'It is', as Mr. Russell points out, 'this fact that a defining characteristic is never unique which makes classes useful'."⁵⁵

But in all such cases do we have two universals? And are their particulars the same? We have two universals in a way; but their particulars accompany each other. Further, a universal like 'the present inhabitants on the moon' is non-existent. Even if it is conceivable, this concept is a mere day-dream. A universal that can be arrived at without needing any particular can never be called a universal. Mere extension too cannot be the criterion for a class. Otherwise we cannot have a universal like 'moon'. Moreover, how can different propositional functions determine the same class? According to the theory of the abstract universal, one class can have only one propositional function. The idea of a rational animal necessarily involves the fact of being two-legged and featherless. If the universal, for example animality, is not unique, how can it claim to be a universal?

Even when we arrive at the concept of the abstract universal, do we take merely numbers into consideration? And can a particular member be related to another without being mediated by a meaning which is alleged to be common to both? Without considering the meaning or the intension we cannot arrive at the idea of a class. Once we recognise the value and significance of meaning, we are committed to the rejection of the abstract universal and of all that it implies. This in its turn leads us to the acceptance of the principle of necessity which alone can offer the clue to an understanding of reality.

53. *Ibid.*, I. 5.

54. Eaton, 418.

55. Stebbing, 148. cf. Russell: *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*,

12. Proceeding from the theory of the abstract universal, empiricism makes out all logical laws to be the expressions of fixed associations. Positivism takes them to be tautologies; and modern positivism parades under the name of logical empiricism, restricting the scope of philosophy to the interpretation and clarification of the results of science. This scientific knowledge is further restricted to sense data, their orders, correlations, and structures. Human knowledge thus gets limited to the correlation of the observational data. But we are not told why one method of scientific observation is to be preferred as against any other. There is no justification offered for the scientific methods. Consequently, positivism introduces all kinds of postulates, and trades on elements, sense-data or atoms of experience, structures and inferred entities whose nature is unknown. And science itself becomes nothing but a mere correlation of sense-data, since science cannot enable us to understand the objective world as long as its procedure is confined to quantities and measurements. Modern science deviates from quality into quantity, and from there it finds no way out. It is only when the relation of quality to quantity is clearly grasped that we can understand the development and evolution of quantity into the real universal. A failure to understand this evolution makes one stop with the abstract identity as revealed in the concept of the abstract universal. This in its turn makes formal logic accept pure external relations in the framework of associationism.

The empiricist refuses to recognise logical necessity. All necessity is taken to be either individual or racial habit. But necessity, as has been shown by Idealist Logic, is inherent in the very nature of things. There can be no correlation between the frequency of experience and the apparent necessity. Moreover, our conception of necessity presupposes the uniformity of nature.⁵⁶ The rejection of necessity would render the widest generalization to be the least certain. The formal logician obtains the quantitative universal which cannot enable us to deduce any particular from it. If mortality is not necessarily related to man, and if the mortality of man is the widest generalization, we can never say that Socrates is mortal.⁵⁷

56. See Joseph, 421 ff.

57. Statement and Inference, 417, 619-620. cf. Bosanquet: *Implication*, 55 ff.

The empiricist argues that laws or principles are derivable from experience. But in speaking thus, he refers "only to veridical experience, forgetting that without the criterion of legislative principle, experience cannot first be sorted into veridical and illusory."⁵⁸ Our knowledge, however, does not come *from* experience; it arises *through* experience. Experience is not the source, but the vehicle of our insight and knowledge. In an act of experience we bring to the level of consciousness that which is implicit in objective reality. This reality comes alive in our consciousness. As such we do not derive the principles from experience; we only come to know about them through experience.

We cannot argue that the principles are derivable from experience, since experience means to the positivist only a life of pure and abstract sensations. Prof. Cohen speaks of "the fundamental paralogism of empiricistic systems." According to this, there can be no rational structure of things because we cannot discover any such through sensation.⁵⁹ But we cannot forget that a mere sensation which is devoid of any significance or meaning is non-existent. The meaning is implicit in the sensation. When we make a statement about an object, this statement exhibits necessity; and this necessity is grounded in the nature of a unity. Our judgments deal with the given object which is suggestive of a concrete whole. In the absence of this reference, the judgment is incomplete. The necessity implicit in the judgment is a direct consequence of this reference. This is the same as saying that every proposition is relative to a system or a unity. The system exhibits the necessity of connection between the whole and its elements. That is why the proposition can never be limited to the given in perception. We have to go wherever it carries us; and it carries us to reality. As such every judgment affirms a necessity based on reality. If it is to hold of reality, the judgment must be based on actuality. Wherever we have a reference to actuality we no doubt take the sense-experience as the starting point of our judgment. But the sense-experience carries with it a meaning which is vitally united to the object under reference. The meaning of the object or the factual content is integral to any judgment; and whenever we have that meaning, our judgment expresses a necessity which must agree with the necessity recorded by the object in the scheme of things.

58. Lewis: *Mind and the World Order*, 28.

59. Cohen: *Reason and Nature*, 197.

13. Analytic propositions are declared to be tautologous. It is highly doubtful whether we can speak of propositions being analytic and synthetic. However, let us consider the status of the a priori propositions. They are said to be axiomatic and necessary. If a priori propositions are analytic and therefore tautologous, they cannot tell us anything about matters of fact. They are said to remind us of the 'rules' 'governing' our usage of words like 'all', 'or' and 'not'. These rules in their turn must be purely conventional. When these 'rules' are said to govern our usage, we do not know what this 'governing' actually means. Ayer refers elsewhere to the 'rules' that "govern our expectation of future experience"⁶⁰ and to the 'convention' that "governs our usage of the words 'if' and 'all'".⁶¹

The axioms of geometry do tell us something about certain possible facts. Otherwise they will be devoid of any content and therefore of any value. Since we cannot condemn geometry as a fiction, we cannot take its axioms to be mere linguistic conventions. Moreover, the a priori proposition is in reality grounded in fact. Its necessity arises from the fact; and this in its turn gives it a uniform application in a set of cases. An a priori that can arise before any possible experience is at best a hypothesis; and even a hypothesis can thrive only when it is grounded on a specific set of facts.

A general vagueness haunts Ayer's use of the word 'records'. Analytic propositions, we are told, 'record' our determination to use words in a particular manner; and an experiential proposition is said to 'record a possible or actual observation'.⁶² These two uses carry two different senses. One records a determination, and another a possible observation. But the observation in its turn presupposes a determination to observe. A mere observation that does not come from any determination is an impossibility. The moment we recognise that there is a determination, we are admitting the need for an assertion of a fact in and through our consciousness. It is this assertion of consciousness that is described as judgment. In other words, the difference between an analytic proposition and an experiential one cannot lie in the act of assertion which is common to both. Both have their basis in a necessity that is felt in the act of experience. It is only with

60. *Language, Truth and Logic*, 139.

61. *Ibid.*, 105.

62. *Ibid.*, 26.

reference to the speaker that a commonly accepted a priori has a relative priority. But in essence they are identical.

Both these propositions record the assertion of consciousness. In fact the word "records" cannot be divorced from the act of experience. No statement can record anything that is not borne out by experience. When Ayer uses this word, he seems to think that the analytic proposition bears no reference to the experience that must be prior to the statement. Any such proposition is in reality a supposition. Even a supposition must be relevant to the given data. It must have its contact with experience at some point or other. And when this contact does not warrant a convincing assertion, it results in a supposition which can become an assertion. Hence Ayer's distinction between the analytic and the experiential propositions is based on a faulty analysis.

We are told that an a priori proposition is a tautology. A metaphysical proposition is neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis,⁶³ and it owes its origin to "a failure to understand the workings of language" or to an endeavour "to express the inexpressible". But the function of philosophy is said to be critical analysis of "the way in which we speak about things."⁶⁴ We have "to elicit the consequences of our linguistic usages."⁶⁵ This is the work of philosophic or linguistic analysis which gives rise to definitions. Definitions may be explicit or dictionary definitions, and definitions in use. The former employ symbols which simply substitute one symbol for another.⁶⁶ The latter show how a sentence in which a symbol is significantly used "can be translated into equivalent sentences, which contain neither the definiendum itself, nor any of its synonyms."

An a priori proposition can be a tautology only when it expresses a bare identity. "A is A" as a mere proposition is tautologous, since the predicate does not tell us anything about the subject. But as an affirmation of a reality by a consciousness, it is not tautologous. An a priori proposition, however, is more than an expression of bare identity. It expresses a specific characteristic operating within a given identity. It is a priori in the sense that it is presupposed in our apprehension. Its validity or

63. *Ibid.*, 31.

64. *Ibid.*, 61.

65. *Ibid.*, 209.

66. *Ibid.*, 66.

meaning does not depend upon our present experience. Yet our present experience is not intelligible in the absence of such a proposition. In other words, an a priori proposition has a necessity which embraces many propositions and apprehensions; and wherever we have the operation of necessity, we cannot speak of it as tautologous.

Moreover, every necessity is grounded in reality. A proposition which embodies necessity is relative to, is conditional upon, reality. As such it has a hypothetical status and yet it has an existential import. Being conditional upon reality, it refers to reality. A necessary proposition then cannot be a mere linguistic statement. It is an affirmation of consciousness and it defines reality. It is this which makes it factual. And when the positivists speak of analytic propositions being tautologous and non-factual, it is evident that they are not speaking of any proposition whatsoever.

Philosophical analysis is thus factual. It has a necessary reference to the fact which a proposition affirms. This affirmation may be in a verbal language; but the language must agree with the state of consciousness which the affirmation is. If we confine the proposition to mere language, we are ignoring that which the proposition states. Any analysis must refer to that which it states; and this reference is always to the affirmation which is the state of consciousness. And any definition that may be recorded can be correct only when it defines an object or a term with reference to a property which is necessarily related to it. A definition therefore is not a simple linguistic or symbolic one. It is as much grounded in necessity as any definition can be. And no amount of writing or persuasion can put an end to the operation of necessity which is the central feature of all assertion.

14. In positivism, however, necessary propositions are not factual statements. They are only linguistic conventions, and therefore are neither true nor false. Take an object A. We cannot call it B because there is something in A that does not allow me to call it B. The convention here is the way in which our speech conforms to the apprehended character of the object. By refusing to call the object B, we assert its character in terms of A. We mean that the nature of the object cannot admit the character B; and this is due to the operation of the law of non-contradiction. We are, in other words, asserting a necessity imposed on us by the real world. And every assertion is an asser-

tion about the real world. The laws of logic are valid of the world with which thought is intimately bound up; and this world is independent of the present assertion.⁶⁷ In other words, the ground of every judgment is reality; and it can be true only when its subject is completely accepted by reality. When our judgment is said to claim to be true, we mean that there is nothing in the factual world that can interfere with its truth. The objective reality is implicitly recognised as accepting and supporting our judgment. The denial of such a judgment would be self-stultifying, because it would amount to a denial of the factual objective world. It is in this sense that we are forced to employ the law of non-contradiction as ultimate when we have to judge of reality. A necessary proposition cannot therefore be a mere linguistic convention.

Every judgment presupposes a number of conditions which only the objective reality can satisfy. It is true when it agrees with these conditions. When these conditions are rendered explicit, it is absolute and universal. Yet it is to a certain extent conditional. Before these conditions are made explicit, it is conditional on the reality which is not yet known to us. As conditional it is relative to reality. It might assert itself to be unconditional; but it clearly depends on a reality which is yet to be known. This dependence indicates the nature of necessity. Since it is relative to reality it is a necessary consequence of reality. Its necessity is rich with factual content.

The principle of necessity leads us to the contention that every judgment is based on a systematic connection which is a necessary principle underlying the whole as it is apprehended by us. The given in perception necessarily involves the self-transcendence of the given. It is in experiencing this transcendence that thought functions as an analytic and as a synthetic power. In this activity, thought undertakes many experiments at various points of our experience. The so-called laws of logic and other principles are only the expressions of these experiments; and they form the initial conditions of the connexions recognised and effected by thought. When thought does not experiment, it means that thought abstains from thinking. Since this is an impossibility, and since necessity is always implicit in the orderly connections of thought, we have to conclude that thought always displays its necessity.

67. See Joseph, 13; Bradley: *Appearance*, 152-3.

The Nature of Laws in Physical and Social Sciences

by

SRI CHANDRA

Lucknow University, Lucknow

The purpose of this paper is to describe that part of the theory of scientific method which concerns the laws in physical and social sciences. The concept of law falls under three categories:

(1) Law in natural sciences implies a general formula expressing a de facto uniformity of nature—'the formulation of uniform correlation of certain natural phenomena or events'. The law here is not outside the events but is exemplified in and through them. In natural science the term "law" has no import of command or imperative.

(2) In social sciences (including Sociology, Economics and Psychology) the term law 'denotes the formulation of a certain general *tendency* rather than a rigid uniformity'. Because of the highly complex nature of social phenomena and the impossibility of studying them under rigidly controlled and varied conditions, the uniformities that are formulated here are, at best, certain 'general tendencies' which are subject to alteration with changing conditions. It would be erroneous to speak of "iron laws of economics" or of psychology.

(3) Both necessary and empirical laws differ vitally from those of normative sciences like logic, ethics and aesthetics. In these sciences the term "law" stands for descriptions of things as they ought to be—in the sense of a regulative ideal or norm.

Of late there is a strong tendency to demarcate between the status of laws in the sphere of natural and social sciences. It is almost universally claimed that natural sciences have made remarkable contribution towards the promotion of human welfare, while social sciences lag behind in this respect. The laws formulated by the latter are too vague and dubious to afford a sound basis for the solution of practical problems. The question, therefore, is raised: is it not possible for the Social Scientist to apply the method

of physics, and thus arrive at conclusions which would be more tenable. But what method or methods we are going to employ depends upon the nature of facts to be explored. For example, measurement would not be applicable in the same way and sense in the social sphere as in the case of physical sciences.

There is a group of social scientists, who may be called 'naturalistic', who strongly feel that the methods of natural science alone can do full justice to the rigid demands of scientific research. Precise and simple laws allowing prediction over wide range of space and time can be arrived at on the basis of these methods. But social sciences are comparatively at a disadvantage because of the nature of facts with which they have to deal and consequently the less rigorous methods that they have to employ. The subject-matter (human individual, free will, etc.) of the social scientist is more complicated. The methods employed are largely less advanced in-so-far as the social scientist has been prone to mistrust abstractions, does not easily replace qualities by quantities, and consequently his data are not controllable. He is, therefore, at a phenotypical stage—i.e., describing social experience and behaviour in the ordinary language of phenomena. The terms like 'society', 'state', 'economy', etc., remain ambiguous. In recent years there has been a tendency among social scientists (Lewin, Brown, etc.) to overcome these limitations by adopting field-theoretical approach and thus reconstruct social science on the pattern of natural science. Statistical techniques and measurements are now being largely employed. Functional concepts replace substantial concepts, functional analysis is substituted for structural analysis and hypothetico-deductive method for primarily empirical method. Genotypic descriptions replace phenotypic descriptions.

But all the criteria of field-theory are not fulfilled by any sociological theory to-day. Certain writers have succeeded in using single criteria, others are still thinking in terms of class-theory.

There are social scientists (anti-naturalists) who maintain that the Galilean mode of thought is not appropriate in social science. Some of these maintain that social science employing the specific methods of introspection and understanding comes to formulate specific social laws which are sometimes superior to physical laws because "they flow from sources that lie in ourselves". (Kaufmann, *Methodology of Social Science*, p. 143). It all depends upon what criteria we are going to employ for laws being genuine and superior. I believe that as long as social sciences are at a phenotypical stage

and are not in a position to employ the methods of physical science, no strict laws can be formulated. The reasons are as follows:

1. Experimentation has a very limited scope.
2. Social laws are historical, i.e., they are not valid for all places and times.
3. Social laws lack objectivity because of the 'perspective', 'social setting' and 'personal equation' of the social scientist.
4. Because of the lack of measurable magnitudes here, social laws lack mathematical precision.
5. The social scientist is unable to overcome the factor of indeterminacy introduced by human 'freedom of will'. It is felt that decisions of men are largely influenced by irrational factors that defy calculations.

Because of the above limitations of social science, is it necessary that we should employ the same tools in the social sphere that have proved successful in natural science? Felix Kaufmann (*Methodology of Social Science*, pp. 145-46) is of the opinion that by doing so "social inquiry was led astray by false analogies. 'The organic' theory of society is a case in point; . . . the methods must rather be defined in terms of its specific traits." The fact that a particular method has been successful in one science is no guarantee that it will be successful in another science. It will always depend upon the nature of the facts to be explored.

The Nature of Natural Laws

Weinberg, in his book 'An Examination of logical Positivism' summarizes in the following way the view of the Viennese Positivists in regard to the nature of natural law:

"Laws in science are not general empirical propositions capable of verification. They are schemata or models from which singular propositions can be constructed. We can verify the singular propositions derived from laws, but it is meaningless to speak of the verification of laws themselves because they are not propositions."

Here we have a rejection of the usual view that natural laws are general propositions. But Weinberg gives certain reasons for rejecting the usual view:

1. On the usual view there is no solution for the logical problem of induction,

2. This view requires us to assert propositions which cannot be given a definite meaning in terms of singular propositions.
3. If it is accepted that there are general facts as well as individual facts it would then be difficult to understand how there could ever be any relation between them.
4. The expression of a general proposition is always an incomplete expression because general propositions are logical sums and products with an indefinite number of summands or factors. For the purposes of clarity let us dilate upon this point.

A law thus turns out to be a 'propositional function' from which singular propositions are created for the purpose of subsequent verification. When, for example, we say 'matter gravitates', it does not mean that all matter gravitates, nor does it mean that some individual matter gravitates. It is not an assertion at all. The correct verbal expression of 'Matter gravitates' would be "Being matter implies being marked by gravitation" or "If x is matter, x gravitates." This propositional function presents to us a schema from which assertions can be made and subsequently verified. What we shall verify will be the singular proposition and not the law. As far as the law is concerned we may say that it is "confirmed" in so far as it presents the "correct formula", and not because it is verified.

Thus the only feasible meaning that we can assign to general propositions is that they are finite and explicit truth functions of specified set of elementary propositions. When, for example, we assert that 'All ravens are black', what the proposition really implies is, 'If x is a raven, x is black' for all values of x . If we make an attempt to complete this expression we have to specify the values which the variable x can assume. Thus the view that laws are general propositions in the sense of having a predicative value turns out to be erroneous. According to this analysis, laws must be *propositional functions*.

Similar position is adopted by Blumberg (article in the *Monist*, Oct. 1932) when he says, "Laws in descriptive sciences are not propositions but *models*—usually quantitative in form—for building propositions. A law or hypothesis, therefore, is confirmed, "turns out to be the correct formula", not verified. A law is said to be useful in so far as it enables us to predict, i.e., in

so far as the propositions constructed upon it as a model turn out to be true."

Schlick says practically the same thing but in a different way. According to him, "Natural laws do not have the character of propositions which are true or false but rather set forth instructions for the formation of such propositions. Natural laws are not 'general implications' because they cannot be verified for all cases; they are rather directions, rules of behaviour, for the investigator to find his way about in reality, to anticipate certain events."

There is thus no difference in the viewpoints of Blumberg and Schlick in regard to the nature of 'law'. For Blumberg the term law denotes "model", while for Schlick it means "instruction." On the basis of this kind of analysis of law it turns out to be a 'structure' or 'Schema' on the basis of which we create propositions and, therefore, it has an 'instrumental' worth. (According to positivism laws are useful only in so far as they give rise to true propositions).

Weinberg's criticism of the doctrine of law as propositional function may be stated as follows:

1. Positivists introduced the doctrine of law as propositional function in order to eliminate the problem of induction. But in reality they fail to do so because the induction problem reappears in a new guise.

2. According to Wittgenstein's logic, laws cannot be regarded as general assertions and, therefore, they treated them as propositional functions. By doing so they have not succeeded in making precise and clear the nature of law; for the nature of law even in the guise of propositional function remains ambiguous.

3. The term 'law' has been put in science to two radically distinct uses. "One is the use of law as a structural model from which singular propositions are constructed for the purpose of subsequent experimental testing" (p. 167). There is yet another use of law when, for example, we use a law as the premise to an argument. Thus we often say, "If such and such laws obtain and if such and such data are at hand, then event E is probable to such and such a degree." In this case laws are in the form of general hypothetical propositions or categorical propositions. It must be regarded as a completed proposition, not as functions (preliminaries).

of propositions. Thus when a law is used as a premise to an argument it cannot be treated as a propositional function.

There is yet another line of argument on the basis of which we might reject the traditional view that laws are general assertions. Science is not only descriptive but also predictive. General (enumerative) empirical propositions are, at best, descriptive. In so far as they are true they only report what is known. If laws possess a purely descriptive function they cannot constitute the structure of a science. Laws must be of a nature that on their basis description as well as prediction is possible. This dual function cannot be performed by general propositions.

Thus "laws are regular invariant formulae applied to variant connections and derived from variant data." (Weinberg, p. 157) If we accept this view then we cannot treat them as general assertions capable of truth or falsehood.

When we are confronted with a set of data there are three possibilities:

(1) There may obtain an invariant relation among the data, e.g., very accurate determinations of the direction and acceleration of falling bodies. This kind of relationship may obtain in very rare cases.

(2) There may obtain an almost invariant relation among the data, e.g., the relation of time and displacement of bodies rolling down an inclined plane. Let us clarify what we mean by "almost invariant". In this case the invariant relation does not fit the data exactly. There exists a discrepancy between the values of empirical magnitudes as calculated and the values as observed. Adjustments must, therefore, be made in a law so that the calculated values and the observed values differ by as little as possible. This means that by a process of abstraction we can ascertain what precise relation would hold if the observational data were slightly adjusted.

(3) There may obtain no determinate relationship among the data but only a statistical correlation, e.g., the relation between height and colour of grain in corn.

Let us now examine the question as to which of these possibilities holds in the sphere of social science. As already indicated the first possibility is completely eliminated. As far as the second possibility is concerned, I think that 'functional analysis' is gra-


dually finding a place in social investigations, e.g., the work of Kurt Lewin in terms of field-theoretical approach. But in this connection we have to examine an important question: What is the justification for effecting a conceptual alteration of the data so as to formulate an exact law? The justification is sought to be provided on the basis of simplicity, and descriptive and predictive facility of an invariant function or formula. "The necessity of a simple uniform method of description and prediction as well as the heuristic value of simplicity constitute the justification of abstraction in the case of natural law." (Weinberg, p. 138) That the same advantages accrue in the case of social science is very doubtful. Let it be understood clearly that conceptional alteration of the data or abstraction does not mean that we are falsifying or fictionalizing the data. The law that is thus formulated is not intended to maintain fidelity to the factual but is an instrument for making representation of facts approximate as close to the facts as possible. The simple invariant formula has yet another good point about it. It makes deduction possible.

The third possibility is very common in social science. Consequently, we cannot probably speak of laws in the social sphere in the same sense in which we employ the term "law" in physical sciences but only in the sense of statistical generalizations.

Physical laws and Social Laws

Why is it that social science is not so successful as natural science in making predictions? The objectivistic interpretation is that there obtains strict determinateness in the physical sphere where every minute detail is governed by laws. But, as already indicated, in the social sphere the factor of 'free will' vitiates rigid determination. From the subjectivistic viewpoint laws dealing with human behaviour have not yet been made so precise and rigid because of their complexity.

One word more about the problem of 'freedom of will' in this context may clarify the issues. The thesis of 'freedom of will' is accepted on the basis of the following argument: If we define 'will' as a psychological act that is the cause of an action of the person willing (cause of an action being understood as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of this action), it follows from this definition that the will is free in the sense of 'being efficient'. Here we do not have synthetic proposition about the will but only an analysis of the meaning of the 'will'. Thus our faith in the free-



dom of the will is partly due to our confounding synthetic with analytic propositions.

At this stage a reference to the distinction between empirical and theoretical laws is necessary. In natural science we have both types of laws, but in social science there is no marked tendency to establish empirical laws (i.e., synthetic universal propositions falsifiable by one negative instance). We often fail to distinguish between strict empirical laws and rigid theoretical laws which are also sometimes called as conventions. Our failure to do so results in our belief that there are strict empirical laws in social science. A theoretical law (i.e., a rule of correlation) is treated as rigid "when there is no rule of higher order stating conditions under which it has to be eliminated." (Kaufmann, p. 175). But events are unpredictable even in the physical realm. Modern physics does not attempt to predict or explain everything. There is no attempt in physics for example today to determine precisely the movement of every single molecule within a volume of gas.

The laws of social science are not regarded as strict and genuine because the very nature of its subject-matter precludes the possibility of their having a mathematical form. It is said that social phenomena are not measurable because they contain psychical elements which are in the form of intensive qualities and not extensive quantities (Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology* 77-78). In this connection it may be useful to refer to the question of measurability of economic values (marginal utilities).

The problem is: How can prices be derived from economic values (or marginal utilities?) That marginal utilities are measurable has been asserted by C. Menger, Jevons, Walras, Edgeworth Marshall, J. B. Clark, Wicksall, Frisch and others. They maintain that the prices of goods, according to the subjective theory of value, are derivable from the marginal utilities, and as such they must be contained in them. The order of marginal utilities must be treated as an order of measurable magnitudes. The opponents of this view-point e.g., Cuhel, Bilimowitsch, Pareto and others point out that marginal utilities are intensive magnitudes and, therefore, by their very nature they are not susceptible to measurement. It is not justified to transform marginal utilities which are intensive in character into extensive magnitudes.

This controversy requires closer examination. In order to prove that marginal utilities are susceptible of measurement it is

wrong to assume that numerical values to be arrived at are contained in the phenomena to be measured. Marginal utilities cannot be measured directly. But they may be said to be measured indirectly in the same way as we measure temperature with the help of the thermometer. In this latter case *extensive* magnitudes (e.g., lengths of mercury column) are correlated with temperature sensations, and inferences are drawn from the state of the thermometer to our sensations of warmth.

Another point of difference between natural and social laws that is sometimes emphasized is with reference to the role of experiment. Experiment plays a very negligible part in arriving at social laws, while natural laws are verified by experiment. But if we examine the matter closely, we do not find any clear-cut demarcation in this respect. In so many cases it is also possible for the social scientist to conduct experiments with social phenomena (single persons or groups). Further, systematic observation under the guidance of a theory is possible without the necessity of artificially reproducing the phenomena in a laboratory setting. We also find that the natural scientist frequently dispenses with experiment, as in astronomy. However, these remarks should not be taken to mean that we are running down the importance of experimental technique in natural sciences.

There is another point which needs clarification in this connection. It is maintained that the principle of causality, presupposed in all experiments, does not hold valid in the sphere of psychological and social events. Social phenomena being historical deal with substantive particulars, and being unique are not repeatable occurrences. On the other hand, experiment presupposes repetition. In this connection, we feel, that Kaufmann is right when he says that "physical facts too are unique in the sense that they have a particular location in space and time; . . . in looking upon a particular fact as a historical fact, we stress its uniqueness" (pp. 177-78). Ricker, accordingly, grouped geology with history, and economics with physics, for physical facts can be treated in an individualizing science, and social facts in a generalizing science. The fact is that in the historical sciences the emphasis is on single facts, i.e., datable occurrences, while in experimental sciences facts are not viewed as 'individual' but rather as 'typical'. What we may, however, concede is that the generalizing approach is more successful in natural science than in social science.

Do we thereby mean to suggest that historical science is purely descriptive and that there are no historical laws? No. The

correct position appears to be that there are no strict historical laws to be negated by a single instance to the contrary. But historical science does have rules of inference (theoretical laws), on the basis of which other facts are inferred. Predictions are possible in the social sphere. The rejection of the view that there are laws in history is due to an extreme reaction to the philosophies of history by Hegel, Comte, Marx, Spencer and Spengler.

In conclusion we may point out that the comparison of physical laws and social laws may be vitiated by erroneous preconceptions concerning the nature of the former. Physical laws are treated as necessary or strict laws and contrasted with mere rules or tendencies prevailing in the social field. But if we were to realize that no synthetic proposition is necessarily valid and that many physical laws are not strict (empirical) laws either, this contrast may be seen to be of no fundamental methodological significance.

Immortality

by

G. R. MALKANI

The problem of immortality is generally not considered an important philosophical problem. Death and what happens after death do not form part of our present experience. There is no empirical evidence that there is life after death. Besides, why should we be concerned about it? An indefinite extension of our present life has no special worth and may be a positive disvalue. Why should we not, as a matter of fact, like to be free from the relentless mill of rebirths, if there is any such thing? The only important thing is our present life; and a great or immortal experience here and now will have real worth. We now contend that the aspiration after immortality contains both these elements, namely, continued existence in some form after death and also a great experience here and now if possible. Neither element has value without the other.

A question may be asked here, continued existence of what? Shall we say, the continued existence of the individual? But the individual, argue the Hegelians, is only a psychical centre of experience. He is not the Ultimate Reality. He cannot be immortal. The Whole alone is immortal. The Whole, let us say, is the sum-total of the contributions of the individuals. The individual is immortal only in this secondary sense. He helps to build up certain institutions. These survive him. So there is institutional immortality. But then what is this institutional immortality? The institutions by themselves are lifeless. They have meaning and worth only in the lives of individuals. What then is more important? The individuals or the institutions? Evidently, the former. And then the institutions are at the mercy of fire, flood and war. They cannot be immortal. The individual possibly might be. Let us suppose however that the individual as such is not immortal, but a kind of *absolute experience* is immortal. But no experience can be impersonal. If the person is not immortal, how can the experience be immortal? And then what is the relation of the individual to this kind of impersonal immortality? The individual cannot possibly be interested in it. He has no problem about the immortality of anything that transcends him.

We have a question about the continued existence of the individual, and not a question about the Whole or the Absolute. A Christian philosopher might here say that mere continued existence has no value in itself. Existence has value when it is nobly lived; similarly, immortality has value if it is achieved through our noble and virtuous conduct. It is not our birth-right or a gift,—it is an achievement. It is achieved, let us say, through a Christ-like life. But how many men can live such a life? Man is by nature imperfect, and will remain so more or less to the end. In any case, we cannot draw a line where imperfection ends and perfection begins. It is possible that no man may qualify for immortality; and if some do, there might be a very thin line between those who do and those who do not. Lastly, it is irrational to suppose that immortality can be *achieved* or *produced*. What is won can also be lost. What is produced can be destroyed. No product of any act can be timeless or eternal. Immortality must be part of our nature or it is not worth-while.

A philosopher like Prof. Stout might here argue that the individual cannot be immortal. The idea that the individual is by nature immortal entails a materialistic view of the individual soul. It is as though a thing is hidden in a box or encased in certain covers, and it escapes at the time of death. The analogy of the ghost and the corpse is also sometimes given; and it is asked, what life can the ghost have after it is separated from the corpse? What then is the alternative to this materialistic view of the soul? Let us say, it is the organic view of the individual. The body grows a soul. The soul is the entelechy, the intelligent and living principle, of the body. When the body is dead, the principle is dead with it. It simply cannot survive the body or function without it. But is this not a more materialistic view than the first? If the soul is a product of natural forces, so must be all his experiences, moral, religious, etc. The soul may be a sort of a ghost on the first view, but then it is at least capable of vivifying the body and making it live and function intelligently. It is certainly the more important partner from the human point of view. Something of me goes out of the body and lives. It is less materialistic than the so-called organic view.

It is possible that there is a soul, and that it survives the body. But is there any evidence for it? Kant advanced a certain argument on moral grounds. Virtue ought to be rewarded with happiness. It is not so in this life. More often the virtuous man suffers in various ways for his virtue. This argument has been

attacked on the ground that it implies an external view of virtue. It is like asking a boy to behave well and he will be given sweets. Virtue ought to be its own reward. Now the whole moral theory of Kant was very emphatic upon the universality of the moral law and its extreme opposition to all considerations of self-interest. But Kant did not think that this purity of the moral law was incompatible with the expectation of eventual happiness by the virtuous man. All sane moralists would support him in this. The view that virtue has no necessary relation to well-being is too narrow and illogical. Why should any-one practise virtue, if it is conjoined with suffering here and now, and that is really the end of it all? Unless virtue is a way to blessedness, no-one can feel the least obligation to practise it. Even if the moral course is recommended by our practical reason, this reason can have no claim upon us, if it does not at the same time serve our true self-interest. The noblest acts of service and sacrifice are essentially motivated by a belief in immortality. Had Christ, for instance, died completely and for ever, what would his example have proved to us? Nothing except that what he was preaching to other human beings was an invitation to unnecessary suffering. For the end of such a great life was painful death. It was resurrection or conquest over death that gave *meaning* to virtuous suffering. If the end is death, complete and entire, *all the values of life become changed completely*. If there is no hereafter, why not make merry while there is time by all means open to us? For there are no invisible effects of our actions, no *dharma* and *adharma*, but only visible effects. These we can calculate, and decide upon a policy which will be most efficacious for our happiness here and now. Morality and religion will be banned from human calculation. What takes their place is unrestricted search for happiness. This happiness itself becomes a matter of *taste*—you take pleasure in one way, say, in composing poetry, and I take pleasure in another way, say, in indulging my passions. A pig satisfied and Socrates dissatisfied both take their pleasures in their own way, that is all. The end of both is the same,—complete death and no scope to pursue real values. Death levels all things, and turns quality into quantity. There is nothing truly *spiritual* about values. There is no such thing as *eternal values*. Immortality alone gives meaning to the higher values of morality and religion. The moral law is not,—do this or do that, and you will be saved or become immortal. The moral law rather is,—as you sow, so shall you reap. This is the only law of justice that explains the differences of our present existence, gives meaning to duty and responsibility, and makes future exist-

ence ethically necessary. *Without this law, morality makes no sense.*

Some will here argue that the purely moral argument for immortality is incomplete. There might be continued existence of the soul after death on moral grounds. But what is the value of such continued existence which is not accompanied by memory? It is as good as saying,—some-one is dead here, and another man is born there. Each life becomes a rounded whole without any relation to the past. That is no doubt true. But the loss of memory is not a mere and pure loss. It is also a gain. The individual begins with a clean slate, unhampered by the unpleasant memories of the past. He begins his life anew. Death is thus seen to be not a calamity or an unmixed evil. It becomes a saving grace that releases us from life, when life has lost its zest and become burdensome. But although the memory is lost, *belief in continued existence makes all the difference to the meaning of life and the way it is lived.* Take away the belief and life is governed by the naturalistic principle,—enjoy the passing moment and don't worry about the future. But if the belief is there, the individual knows himself to be a pilgrim of eternity. Nothing that is done is ever lost. We are building for the future.

So far we have considered the ethical proof. But it is not proof in the literal sense. For what after all is the guarantee that justice is the governing principle of our lives? The only valid proof will be a theoretical one based upon our present experience. The hypothetical entity called a soul has no value for such a proof. We must substitute for it some entity that is directly experienced. This is the "I". Some have argued that the self is not a continuous or permanent entity. It is only the subjective function of "I", quite momentary in its character. But who knows that I-function and its momentariness? Only an awareness that is not momentary and that is not itself a subjective function can know it. It must be a pure intelligence. This intelligence is permanent or *kuṭastha*. It is the real self. The soul can only be understood in this way in our conscious waking life.

The next question is, is this soul immortal? We cannot answer this question without broadening the base of our experience. European philosophers do not accept any experience outside conscious waking life. Here we find that there is no evidence of a pure intelligence. The only intelligence we know is the active intelligence that is indistinguishable from the acts and the states of the mind. It cannot function intelligently without the body.

European philosophers therefore naturally identify the self with the mind, and make no distinction between the two. The question of survival or of immortality of the self thus becomes a philosophically unimportant question. For how can mind, even if it could survive in some sense, live and function intelligently when the body has dropped away? If it continues to exist, this existence will have no value in terms of experience.

Prof. C. D. Broad, in his lecture on "Human Personality and the Possibility of its Survival", published by University of California Press, says, "...We can conceive a form of dualism, not inconsistent with the known facts of physics, physiology, and psychology, which would make it factually possible for the dispositional basis of a human personality to persist after the death of the individual who had possessed that personality." (22-23). But what sort of persistence would it be? The possibility which he favours more than any other on the hypothesis of this dualism is "mere dispositional persistence unassociated with any kind of experience." (23) But he is of-course sceptical of *any* persistence whatsoever. He says, "...So it is not clear what could be meant by assigning to an individual, considered as a *psychical subject*, a persistent *purely mental* structure and recurrent nonintrospectable *mental* processes.....But, on this assumption, it seems obvious that it is factually impossible for the dispositional basis of a human personality to exist in the absence of a living human body, and therefore factually impossible that it should continue to exist after the death and disintegration of that particular human body which was its bearer." (20-21).

Once we accept the view that the soul is a conscious active mind, we can never prove its survival. We are reduced to certain guesses only; and one guess is quite as good as any other. There might be survival, there might not be survival. For Prof. Broad, there is fear, not hope. All this is changed when we consider the self not only in waking life, but also in other states. We can then *prove* the existence of the self after life and also the value of such existence.

We have awareness not only of the world in wakefulness, but also awareness of certain states of the self. These states belong to *one and the same self*. The self that is awake goes to sleep. He *dreams* and also goes into *sound slumber*. He wakes up, and claims that he dreamt and also slept soundly. In other words, the same self continues through all these changing states and also knows

them. How can the same Self continue in these different states? Only when it is understood as having a nature of its own which is different from the conscious waking self and also different from conscious dreaming self, and shall we not say,—different also from unconscious sleeping self that knows nothing?

This self-identical Self that persists through the states and also knows them must be an essentially intelligent Self. Its intelligence or its power to know or to reveal is never annulled in any of these states, including the state of deep sleep. It cannot be an intelligent mind; for mind cannot be said to function in deep sleep. It can only be a pure intelligence or a pure awareness, not functioning as a mind. It is an awareness that is unaffected by the changing states. It may be called the *sākṣi* or the pure witness.

The intelligent self, so understood, may well be there in life or as long as the states in question continue. But death ends the states. How can we prove that the self survives bodily death? Now we shall have to admit that the death of the body is one thing, and the death of the intelligent self which is of the nature of pure awareness is another. We can easily conceive the death of the body, even if we do not know it actually in ourselves. We see how others die. We have no idea of the death of the intelligent self. If the intelligent self passes away, who can know its passing away? If any-one does know it, that is the real intelligent self that survives the so-called death and contemplates it. No-one can therefore assert the death of the real self. It is *inconceivable*. More than that, *It has no meaning*. Only something that is objective can be said to be born; and being born, can also pass away. The self is no kind of object. Its birth and its death have therefore no meaning. It is by its very nature unborn and deathless. Still it is a negative proof only. We do not know positively the self as *immortal*. We only know that it cannot die, consistently with its own nature as pure intelligence and as the ultimate knower.

We must have positive proof that the self survives death. In order to have this proof, we must give some intelligible meaning to death in our present experience. If the self can possibly die, what do we mean by such death? We can only mean that the self is involved in a kind of deep and dreamless sleep, with this difference that sleep, as we know it, is of finite duration, while the sleep called death is endless. But this accident of duration makes all the difference to the content and the character of the states in

question. A sleep from which there is no waking would not have the character of sleep at all. It would not be any kind of object which could be contemplated. It would not be a *state* which had supervened upon the self. It would be indistinguishable from pure and stateless intelligence, which is the very nature of the self. If the self is in a kind of sleep from which there is no waking, the self is not in *any* sleep of death, but in its own true nature. There is nothing of death here, if by death we mean *some kind of supervening state*. Endless sleep is not sleep, but the true nature of the self. Where others see non-being and nihilism, we see fullness of being and plenitude.

Let us now stick to our original meaning that death is analogous to deep and dreamless sleep and that it has the same internal structure. We thus study death when we study sleep. What is fundamental to the objectivity and nature of sleep must be fundamental to death as well. We now find that sleep must necessarily lead to wakefulness. It is *only* as we wake up that we know sleep as a state of unconsciousness or of ignorance. No wakefulness, no objectivity of sleep as a state supervening upon the self. Further, we know sleep always as past, never as present. We do not know it as something in itself and directly. We only know it as an *interval* between the last wakefulness and the present one. It is a conscious gap between two wakefulnesses. We can therefore legitimately say,—if sleep, then prior wakefulness and also post-wakefulness. In other words, there can be no sleep which is not preceded by wakefulness and which does not in its turn lead to wakefulness. This analogy ought to be literally applied to death, if the resemblance in their internal nature is to be kept in tact. If death, then there must be life before death and also life after death. Death and life are just alternating states like sleep and wakefulness. This proves the survival of the self after death as a necessity of its being. If it dies, then it must live again.

A question might be asked here: Granted that the Self is of the nature of pure intelligence and that it exists as a self-identical reality in all the states. But then how can it know any object? How can it know any of the states? It is free from any mental act or modification. How can any intelligence know an object without a mental act? Pure intelligence cannot therefore know. It cannot also *create* any illusory appearance. So even if the pure intelligence can be said to know a state in some sense, that state would be quite real and not illusory. The conclusion

would be that the states at least constitute some real objects which cannot be annulled. The outer world is so to say replaced by an inner world.

We now contend that the self by itself and as pure intelligence knows no state. This is clearly so in deep sleep. In that state, we never *can know* that we are asleep. If the state were there and the self were there, the two would coalesce, and the state would never be known as a state at all or as object of any kind, and so distinct from the self. The same can be said about dreaming. If we knew the dream for what it is at the time that we were dreaming, we would cease to be deluded and so cease to dream. We know both sleep and dreaming, *when we wake up from them*. What about wakefulness? Here we have the illusion that we know that we are awake when we are actually awake. As a matter of fact, if we were always awake and never had any experience of any other state, we should not know that we were in the state of wakefulness. Wakefulness would not be a state and would not become knowable. No state is a state to pure awareness. It has no kind of objectivity. This objectivity only emerges when pure awareness takes on the activity of the mind as a means of knowing, and when therefore it is in what is called wakefulness. *The states are thus reducible to mental constructs or conceptual entities*. They are not real entities that are known non-conceptually and for what they are.

The question of states can be conceived in two different ways in Vedānta as the question of the sensible world is also conceived in two different ways. The first way is to accept the common-sense view of the matter and then devise a conceptual machinery to make it harmonious with the Ultimate Truth. In the case of the reality of the sensible world, the machinery takes the form of *sriṣṭi-driṣṭi-vāda*. The other way would be to accept the common-sense view provisionally, and then analyse and interpret it in such a way as to bring out the higher level of truth in it and the illusory character of our starting point. This will be what is called the *drṣṭi-sriṣṭi-vāda*.

A similar alternative is open to us in the case of the states. We can accept the states at the common-sense level. To account for our knowledge of them, we suppose that the pure intelligence or *sākṣi* is present in all of them and knows them directly. Having known them, it can also remember them. The memory-knowledge of the past states of deep sleep and dreaming is uncontradicted at

the practical and common-sense level. If this knowledge is illusory in the end, it is illusory on the basis of the abstract principle that all objectivity implies illusoriness. Since all the states are objective to *sākṣi*, they are illusory.

This whole stand-point is open to serious objections. (1) The pure intelligence or *sākṣi* can only know the state presented to it non-conceptually or what is called *nirvikalpajñāna*, if there is any such thing. In such knowledge, the subject and the object cannot fall apart. They must coalesce. In other words, there is no sense in saying that the subject is *aware of the object*. The object has become indistinguishable from the subject and is the subject. But if that is so, where is the objectivity of the state, and how is the state illusory? (2) This original experience, not being the experience of *anything in particular*, will leave no trace which can be revived into the memory of a particular thing or state. An object has not been known, how can an object be remembered? (3) Let us suppose that memory is somehow possible. But the form of memory, in connection with deep sleep, is clearly negative. It is the negative object,—“I did not know anything in sleep.” This is the negation of all experiences of wakefulness relating to definite objects A, B, C, D, etc. This negation is clearly an object. There is nothing analogous to it in the original experience in deep sleep, where there is awareness of no object of any kind, much less awareness of a negative content. Will it not in that case be a case of knowing one thing and remembering a different thing? Shall we call it memory? The same is the case with the so-called memory “I slept soundly and happily in sleep.” This happiness of sleep which I represent to myself on waking up is quite objective to me. There is no analogous object in sleep itself. Of course, it can be argued here that dreamless slumber is not so dreamless as to preclude *all experience at all levels*. There might be experiences at a sub-conscious level; only these experiences are incapable of being dragged into explicit memory. But then who vouches for these experiences? They are nobody’s experiences; for nobody claims them as his own either directly or in memory. The undeniable experience is that of a gap filled by nothing,—and it is this image that confronts us when we think of death. (4) It is argued that what I know in deep sleep is positive ignorance. But positive ignorance *implies* the negation of knowledge of particular entities, such as A, B, C, D, etc. Our memory is thus *related to the original experience*. But our question is, should there not be an

identity of form between what is originally experienced and what is remembered? The original experience relates to no kind of object, while memory-experience does. Besides, we have no awareness of positive ignorance which is not ignorance of positive entities like A, B, C, D, etc. There are no such positive entities present in sleep of which we can be said to be ignorant. Pure ignorance, without reference to any object, can be no object to us, and cannot be said to be known. Pure ignorance is pure self. (5) Lastly, memory can always be carried back *in principle* to the time and the place of the original experience. But in sleep, there is just no experience determined temporally or spatially. We carry back our memory to the point of waking, and then there is a blank of all experience. Memory has no scope here.

Our knowledge of the states of deep sleep and dreaming is not a case of genuine memory. Our *only* experience of the states is the experience of a *transition* from one state to another (*avas-thāntar*). It is the experience of *waking up*. This experience is first and original, it is direct, it is not memory. It is in this experience that the pastness of sleep and the presentness of wakefulness emerge *simultaneously, not successively*. But if that is so, our experience of sleep has the form of memory, but not the substance of it. It is not real memory, but only an *appearance of memory*. In other words, the pastness of sleep is made when sleep itself is made; and sleep itself is made where wakefulness is made, i.e., in the experience of waking up. This experience arises not in the waking ego which knows only sensible objects, or in the dreaming ego which knows only dream objects, or in any other ego,—it can only arise in a pure intelligence which is not any kind of ego, but which is the ground of the different egos as they appear to arise, function and disappear.

The Self, as pure intelligence, is the only ground of the states and reveals them. It does not reveal them successively or as things-in-themselves. *It reveals them simultaneously, and only with the aid of the intellect*. In this sense, waking consciousness has primacy. No intellect, no objectivity of any kind and at any level. But waking consciousness has no primacy in the sense that it is more real than sleep or that it is the real ground of the latter. It is not as though we are always really awake, and only wrongly believe ourselves to have been in sleep or to have slept. Wakefulness itself has meaning only in the transition from sleep. It is as relative as any other state. It is therefore no more and no less real than sleep itself. Both states belong to *sākṣi* that neither

sleeps nor wakes, but that nevertheless *appears* to do both. The appearance with its succession in time is accordingly an illusion. What does not sleep and does not wake appears to do so.

The problem of immortality can now be easily tackled. If the question is whether the self survives death, the answer is that it *cannot but do so*. Life and death can only be understood to have any *meaning* on the analogy of sleep and wakefulness. Life and death must alternate as sleep and wakefulness do. The self that survives is a pure intelligence; but this pure intelligence is joined to, or falsely identified with, a subtler non-physical body which somehow retains the desires, the traces (*samskāra*s), the attitudes and the aptitudes of the living and the growing individual personality, that goes from one life to another. This individual is a pilgrim of eternity, learning and gathering more and more experience. The common-sense question about immortality ends here.

There are, however, others who are not satisfied with this kind of immortality. The endless cycle of life and death appears to them to have no value. For them the question is,—is there no end to the cycle, no liberation from it, no great experience which may be called the experience of immortality? Immortality is justified only in such experience. It gains value then. What value is there if I am condemned to live and die without end, even if it be in what are called higher spheres of spiritual activity? We all want conquest over death. It is the source of our greatest sorrow and misfortune. The only release from death appears to be *life eternal*.

What is this life eternal? Evidently, it cannot be anything like our present life. All life, as we know it, must age and end in death. It must alternate with death, as wakefulness does with sleep. Again, life eternal cannot simply be a great experience. Any experience, however great, will be a mental affair or an affair of conscious waking life. How can this be eternal? A mental affair must lapse and be followed by a kind of sleep of the mind. A mental affair is born, and it also goes out. The true immortal life cannot be born and cannot go out. It must be literally timeless and deathless. It can have no fluctuations of states. We shall have to say of it,—it always was, is and shall be. But if that is so, in what sense can we be said to possess this eternal life or to achieve it ourselves?

This brings us to the transient character of our achievement and the immortal character of life itself which is our true Self.

The conscious mental affair is the only way of *experiencing* immortality. It becomes a great experience or an immortal experience only in a transferred sense, i.e., its object is great, free from birth and death, free from the alternation of states and immortal. This experience we can have here and now; and when we have it, we are said to become immortal. As a matter of fact, we never *become* immortal, we always *are* immortal. Only we do not *know* this real immortality of our true Self. We do not know that the Self is by its very nature unborn and deathless. It is also the great or the ultimate reality,—the reality behind the states of the individual and also the reality behind the phenomenal world. To know this reality in its true and complete form is to have immortal experience. We call it the experience of the identity of *jīva* and *Brahman*.

To have this immortal experience, which alone may be said to bestow immortality upon us, we must realize the true nature of our Self. The Self is not a mind. A mind can have no immortality,—it can be put in a swoon, it can cease to function, it can lapse. Our daily sleep is a clear example of this. The Self is a pure awareness beyond the mind. No-one has ever seen *its* death; but it is the *witness* of the death of the mind, at least in sleep. The apparent states of the Self are variations in mental functioning. When the mind functions through the sense-organs, it is wakefulness. When it functions independently of sense-organs and through its own accumulated desires and tendencies, it is dream. When the mind does not function at all and returns to its causal or seed form, it is sleep. But these variations in mental functioning do not in the least touch the real intelligent Self, that remains the pure witness of these changes. It is the immortal reality that is untouched by birth and death and rebirth. To know it as that is to have immortal experience. Immortality is our birth-right. *We are* immortal, here, now and for ever. Only we are ignorant of the fact. When we know the truth, we are said to *achieve* immortality. It is an illusory achievement. For nothing that we can do can add to or detract from our immortal nature. We can *prove* immortality conclusively because our true Self reveals itself for what it is in our present experience. Only we need to attend to it and get rid of false notions derived from what is called common-sense and all science that is ultimately based upon common-sense.

The Eternity of the Self

by

CHANDRODAYA BHATTACHARYA
Indian Academy of Philosophy, Calcutta

A positivist would consider the self to be a function of, or something which is indissolubly connected with, a living individual organism, so that in the absence of the organism the self must also be absent—nothing of the self can be said to exist either before the birth, or after the death, of the organism. Without some religious prepossession, it would appear quite absurd to believe in the eternity of the self, in the face of the objectively observable close connection between the mortal body, especially the cerebral part of it, and those activities which specifically belong to, or constitute, self-hood, such as acts of cognition, volition and feeling, in short, acts of consciousness. In any case, if my self is to be immortal, it should be capable of existing without any present body. But is there any ground for believing that the self as a matter of fact exists, or may even possibly exist, apart from the body? Moreover, even if it could somehow be established that the self actually or possibly exists apart from the body, this would not be sufficient to prove its eternity.

Evidently, here, there are two questions: (1) Can the self at all exist without the present body? (2) Supposing it could, can we show that it is eternal? Now some of the extra-ordinary phenomena such as those which are recorded and studied by the British Psychical Research Society may be relevant to an affirmative answer to the first question, but not to the second. Even among these extraordinary phenomena, very few pertain to the observation of a live subtle body. Further, the likelihood that these visions of live subtle bodies are nothing but subjective fancies cannot perhaps be ruled out at the present stage of scientific investigation into these extraordinary phenomena. The phenomena of clairvoyance, clairaudience, premonition, telepathy, etc., would seem to exist undeniably. But parapsychology which studies these phenomena scientifically is perhaps still in its infancy. Whatever be the right explanation of these phenomena, they are not likely to show that the mind can function without being connected with the present body, although in these instances the mind,

apparently at least, would seem to know things without sensory stimulation of an ordinary type. In India where the soul's transmigration is a common religious tenet, certain specially gifted persons are believed to remember their experience in some of their embodied states immediately preceding the present one. If these instances of extraordinary memory could be historically verified, that would have been some evidence in favour of the contention that the self can continue to exist without being connected with the present body. But the historical verification in question would seem never to have been attempted in any sense that could be considered scientific. The initial improbability of there being any activity which could be said to belong specifically to a soul apart from its connection with its present body clearly sets at nought all such traditional or hearsay reports about this type of memory in regard to previous existences of the soul.

But against this positivistic view there are certain indirect considerations which lead us to think that the soul must have existed previous to the birth of the present body and will also exist even after its death. Of course, it cannot be denied that consciousness is *found* only in connection with a living body possessed of a brain. Still, this would not justify the hypothesis that consciousness is just a function of the physical organism. Granting that a particular thought and a particular cerebral process occur simultaneously, we are nevertheless unable to pass, in any intelligible sense, from the one to the other either by observation or by reasoning. So far as intelligibility is concerned, physical and mental processes would seem to lie altogether in two disparate regions, although their concomitance would seem to be a fact of experience. This means that this factual concomitance may not be a necessary connection. So their disconnection should not be considered impossible. That is, the end of the physical organism does not demonstrate the extinction of consciousness. It, perhaps, merely removes from our view the signs by which we usually know the presence of consciousness.

The modern theory of behaviourism, no doubt, reduces all conscious process into no more than a special type of physico-chemical process occurring within the physiological organism. But this attempt to give an account of human life and experience wholly in materialistic terms would seem to be altogether unsatisfactory. Spirit or consciousness may be inseparable from body or matter. But to say that it is altogether non-existent, or that except as a mode of matter in a certain type of organization it

is non-existent, would seem to be an extravagant claim on behalf of materialism. Granting that consciousness apart from some physiological process is never a fact, it will still have to be conceded that when we are conscious of something, we are not conscious of that physiological process; and yet at the same time, we are, or at any rate can be, conscious of consciousness without being conscious of the concomitant physiological process. This shows that consciousness cannot be identified with the physiological process in question. Allowing that matter exists, the minimum that must be granted is that spirit, too, exists (may be involved in matter), at least as a general tendency towards life and consciousness, so that, whenever there is available an appropriate instrument, it manifests itself as a self of experiences.

However, the above consideration does not avail for the eternity of the self. This only provides for the possibility that consciousness or spirit may persist (just as physical process or matter persists) in some form or other even after the death of the organism. It may even be considered to provide for the possibility that the principle of spirit may be eternal. Nevertheless, this eternity would belong to the principle of spirit, as such. It need not imply that the self which manifests itself in my body here and now would be identical with the self which will manifest itself in another body there and then. As Dr. R. Das says, "Universal spirit (if any) which knows no birth may suffer no death. But its immortality cannot mean the immortality of the individual self with which alone we are concerned when we discuss the problem of immortality" (Vide his paper entitled 'The Immortality of the Self' in the Proceedings of the 29th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Part III, p. 16). The word 'I' as employed by a grown up human being in regard to himself undeniably means something, whatever be its precise interpretation; and the question of immortality is raised about this individual self or 'I'. Can it be said that the individual self which is what I mean by the word 'I' has been existing from beginningless time even before the birth of the present body and will continue to exist upto endless time even after the death of the present body?

Schelling's argument for pre-existence is relevant here.¹ Kant, as is well-known, thought that he could provide for moral freedom

1. For this brief account of Schelling's interesting view on pre-existence, we are wholly indebted to Dr. Martineau's account of it as given in his *Study of Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 285-87.

without detriment to natural necessity by distinguishing between the world of appearance where causality reigns supreme and that of the thing-in-itself which is free from causal necessity. Now Schelling accepts, like Kant, the position that the empirical character as well as every particular act of an agent is subjected to causal laws and so constitutes a sphere in regard to which scientific prediction is possible—from the agent, constituted as he is, no action other than he actually does can be expected. But Schelling raises the further question, "From where does that constitution of his come? Is that also wholly due to natural causality?" To this, Schelling's answer is that every man brings his own peculiar constitution and nature along with him into his empirical existence when he is born a man, a constitution and nature which is already fashioned by a free act of his at his pre-natal state of noumenal existence. If that constitution were given him either by God or by nature, all his actions would take place by sheer necessity; and then he could not be held responsible for them. Man's essence is not a thing, but an activity. Unborn man is an original timeless Will which freely causes itself to be "some-what". The act which determines a man's life in time does not belong to time, but to eternity. It is an eternal act, immanent in him throughout, going back to the beginning of creation and itself an eternal beginning. This determining act beyond time which settles the individual nature persists through birth, and shapes the type and constitution of the bodily organism. Though man is not conscious of this timeless self-causation, yet his moral experience conforms to it; for, in spite of the determinism of action, the good man has peace of conscience which is possible only to free righteousness; and even a bad man cannot, on the plea of the evil constitution of his nature, either escape remorse or claim immunity for guilt which he knows to be his own.

This view of Schelling seems to us to contain a kernel of truth so far as pre-existence is concerned. But it is mixed up with certain ideas that cannot be accepted. Schelling saves freedom by carrying it into a pre-natal and noumenal state of the self where nevertheless the noumenal ego is supposed to perform an act of self-determination by which it makes itself what it essentially is in its empirical life. It would appear, however, that an act which certainly has a beginning is a phenomenon and therefore cannot be supposed to belong to the noumenal world of freedom from causal necessity. Nor do we gain anything by calling an act eternal. For the phrase 'eternal act' would seem to be self-

contradictory.² This free act has been postulated in order to explain our sense of responsibility for our moral acts. This means that the said free act could be different from what it was. In other words, it must have happened. If so, in what sense can it be called eternal?

In order to provide for both moral responsibility' and 'causal determination in the spatio-temporal world', it is indeed necessary to make an advance on Kant's position in the way in which Schelling does by maintaining that the present moral character of an agent is mostly due to his own pre-natal acts. However, that Schelling considers these pre-natal acts to proceed from the noumenal self is due to his inability to transcend Kant's general notion of freedom as what necessarily belongs to the noumenal world. Noumenal freedom is, no doubt, compatible with phenomenal determinism. Still it fails, as Schelling partially realizes, to provide for moral responsibility. Here we can only very briefly indicate how this difficulty in Kant's notion of freedom can be removed within the general framework of his transcendental philosophy. Responsibility implies, as we have already said, that the agent could have acted in a manner different from that in which he actually acted on a certain occasion. That is, even as falling within the spatio-temporal universe, a moral act must be supposed to be free from the laws governing that universe, in the sense that in spite of natural inclinations for or against it, it cannot be executed except at the free approval given to it by the agent. This implies that something like Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy obtains in the domain of voluntary acts, and yet an act is, in general, determined by the formed character of the agent. If so, we should perhaps partially modify Kant's position in the matter thus. (1) That there is a general tendency of an act's being determined by the present character of the agent and a motive presented to him is due to the fact that an act is a phenomenon; (2) that still the act cannot take place except with the approval of the agent, and that therefore it may not take place at all in spite of the general tendency just mentioned and an actually existing motive toward it. This is due to the fact that the agent has a noumenal aspect, on account of which he is free from the sphere of causality; (3) there would still be the possibility of predicting the act; (4) but, then, this prediction will have to be understood as only having a high degree of probability and not

2. Cf. *Ibid.*

absolute certainty.³ Moreover, the formed character must be supposed to be ultimately due to the free acts of the agent himself, if the agent is to be held responsible for his action at the present moment. And if it be a fact, which indeed would seem to be the case, that a person is born with at least a general tendency towards the formation of a certain type of character and propensity, then, we must attribute them to his pre-natal acts. Schelling seems to be quite right upto this extent. But that this pre-natal act is an eternal act in the noumenal world is open to the objections which we have urged against it.

This leads to the conclusion that the pre-natal act or acts must belong to a sphere of existence which is within time and causality. And this conclusion would be a partial justification of the Indian belief that a present agent must have had innumerable births and deaths in the past, from beginningless time. The Nyāya school of philosophy has thought it necessary to postulate the prior existence of some empirical life similar to the present one in order to explain the innate conative tendencies which even a new born child possesses, such as the tendency to suck the mother's breast. But even more similar to Schelling's argument for pre-existence based on the notion of an agent's responsibility for his action is another argument employed by most schools of Indian philosophy, namely that of *kṛtāhāna* and *akṛtābhyaṅama*, which also provides for post-mortem existence which we propose to consider next. We shall state the gist of the argument thus. Reason demands that I should not enjoy any pleasure nor suffer any pain which I do not deserve by actions for which I am responsible, nor should any action of mine go unrequited. Hence a person who is now undergoing a certain suffering or enjoying a certain happiness must have already acted in a way so as to deserve that suffering or happiness; and if he has not done any such action in his present life, he must have performed it before his present life began. The rational principle behind this thought is that the doer and the enjoyer should be identical. Similarly if I have done some action which deserves to be followed by some pleasurable or painful experience and it has not as yet been so followed, I must persist till it actually happens so. For reason demands that what should take place actually does so.

This argument need not be interpreted (as in Indian philosophy it generally is) so as to imply that the motive of a moral agent is

3. That all prediction of natural phenomena is of this type, at least considered theoretically, is a commonplace of modern science.

invariably that of seeking pleasure or avoiding pain. Kant is perhaps right in holding that the purity of the moral act demands that it should be motivated by reason alone and not by the idea of pleasure or avoidance of pain. Nevertheless, the argument we are considering now is valid. However, in order to appreciate its validity, it may be necessary to observe a certain distinction. The standpoint of a moral being as an agent who considers only the goodness or the badness of an action, irrespective of whether the action is pleasurable or painful, is different from the stand-point of a moral being who judges what consequence, pleasurable or painful, should follow a good or a bad action. And the validity of the argument in question can be well appreciated from the latter stand-point. From this point of view, a moral being cannot remain indifferent to whether virtue and vice are requited or not. The claim for adequate retribution would seem to have its rational basis here.

It is sometimes thought that the claim for retribution is meaningless in the context of morality and that, properly understood, virtue is its own reward and vice its own punishment. But this line of thinking would seem to be misleading. This is caused by the failure to distinguish between the two standpoints which we have just referred to, namely the standpoint of the moral agent and that of a moral being who is a judge as to what consequence pleasurable or painful should follow a right or a bad action. Virtue is indeed its own reward and vice its own punishment. But this is so only in the eye of the moral agent and not also in that of the moral being as a judge.

Similar to this Indian argument for the eternity of the individual self is Kant's ethical argument for immortality. The argument is as follows. Our moral consciousness tells us not only to act rightly always but also to realize in ourselves perfected virtue or holiness. That is, we must not only follow the good, turning a deaf ear to the seductive call of evil tendencies in us, but also cease altogether to feel any such natural inclination towards immoral acts. However, no sensuous being can expect to have this sort of holiness. So man who is a sensuous being (although he is partly reason) cannot attain perfected virtue. He can only come nearer and nearer to holiness or moral perfection, but never reach it completely. But because he is under a moral obligation to reach it, it must be possible for him to do so in an infinite process in infinite time. This implies that he must be immortal in order to be able to make this infinite progress towards the attainment of

moral perfection—an infinite progress is only possible in an infinite duration of personal existence. If holiness is to be realized by man progressively, his immortality must be presupposed.

It will be useful for our purpose to examine two points of criticism which Dr. Broad has urged against the above argument.⁴ First, the command to make ourselves morally perfect, he says, is not to be taken literally; it merely means that we must not be contented with our present level of moral achievement; but it does not imply that we shall ever be able to make our character perfect. Secondly, Kant's premises are incompatible with each other; for while the one asserts that moral perfection is attainable, because it is our duty to attain it, the other says that it is not completely attainable now or ever within a limited time however long, because we are partly sensuous in nature.

It would appear, however, that the first objection can easily be met. According to Broad, the injunction "Thou shalt be holy" is equivalent to "Thou must not be contented with thy present level of moral achievement." But it may reasonably be asked, "Why must I not be contented with the present level?" The answer, "Because there is a level higher than this" cannot be ultimate and is, therefore, inadmissible; for we must not be contented even with that level which is higher than the present one but falls short of perfection. Therefore, the only ultimately satisfactory answer would be "Because the present level of moral achievement is not moral perfection, and because moral perfection is what thou must attain". Thus even Dr. Broad's interpretation of the command to make ourselves perfect is unable to avoid making the attainment of perfection itself as our duty and hence unable to avoid its further implication that we can be morally perfect.

But Broad's second objection stands on surer ground. If we ought to attain holiness, it is certainly possible for us to attain it completely even now or at any future date. To hold that we can only approach it more and more but not actually attain it except in an endless process in infinite time is really to deny that it is at all capable of being attained in any strict sense. If we are to stick to the proposition that an 'ought' implies a 'can', we must reject such a contrary position. But if we reject this, Kant's argument for immortality of the soul loses some of its force.

4. *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, 1st Edition, p. 140.

Nevertheless, we contend that the argument, when partially modified, can be made to support a more moderate conclusion which, however, is sufficient to meet the demand of our ethical consciousness and is, really speaking, more desirable than the conclusion of Kant himself. To elaborate our contention. The categorical imperative declares to me "Thou shalt attain perfected virtue or holiness". This implies that I can become perfectly virtuous. But since it is impossible for a sensuous being to attain holiness, and since I find myself to be composed of both reason and sense, I discover that I cannot, constituted as I am, become holy. If now we do not intend to reject the proposition that an 'ought' implies a 'can', nor to whittle down the categorical character of the commandment "Thou shalt be holy", we must grant that it is possible for me to eschew the sensuous aspect of my nature, now or in the future, so that I can be perfectly virtuous. Since, however, I on whom the ethical command "Thou shalt be holy" is binding, have not yet carried it into practice, I must continue to exist at least upto the time of that consummation, if not for infinite time. For what ought to be achieved must be capable of being achieved; so the conditions that are necessary for bringing it about must be actual; my persistence is one such condition for bringing about my moral perfection; and, therefore, my persistence must be a fact.

This conclusion is more moderate than Kant's, since it guarantees the persistence of the individual moral agent only upto the time of his attaining perfected virtue, and not for infinite time. But the conclusion is also more desirable than Kant's. For the attainment of holiness and the consequent cessation of the struggling moral agent is a higher ideal than that of a mere continuation, in infinite time, of an agent that is doomed for ever to struggle with his sensuous nature without being able to subjugate it completely.

It may be asked, "Does not everything of the individual self perish, after it attains moral perfection? If so, can the consummation of the moral ideal be a desirable state of affairs?" But this mode of thinking forgets that the moral agent is, as Kant says, both reason and sense. With the elimination of the sensuous nature, there is no reason to think that his rational nature would also cease to exist. Indeed the moral injunction "Thou shalt be holy" implies "Thou shalt be pure reason"; and this latter must not involve "Thou must die even as pure reason". Nay, if the argument *kṛtahāna* employed in Indian philosophy holds any water,

the self which attains holiness must not be supposed to become extinct after it has attained this state of the highest moral value we can conceive of. For the essence of this argument lies in the rational idea that nothing of moral value, whether positive or negative, which a person has achieved by his moral acts, can ever be lost, unless, of course, the moral value achieved has some limitation in it; and holiness is a thing of the highest moral value with no such limitation. Of course, to attain holiness is to die as a sensuous being, to shake off our sensuous, selfish, egoistic, individual and personal nature. But this is no real loss. To be afraid of losing our individuality is to hug the very thing which we are commanded to eschew by the imperative to attain holiness, i.e., to stick to our sensuous and irrational nature.

This brings us to the Indian notion of immortality, which, as Deussen points out, is different from and more valuable than the usual western notion of it as a mere prolongation of one's individual existence through endless time. In fact, individual and sensuous existence is, in a sense, a partial death of the true essence of spirit in us; and true immortality should consist in freedom, achieved once for all, from this death.

Place of Reasoning in Advaita Philosophy,

by

NIROD BARAN CHAKRABORTY

Lecturer in Philosophy, Darjeeling Govt. College

The philosophy of Śaṅkara is Advaita on the positive side and Māyāvāda on its negative side. It is a metaphysic of absolute, non-dualism based on the admission of the sole reality of consciousness and the falsity of all things that are other than consciousness.

Śaṅkara bases his philosophy mainly on śāstric statements. Three different sets of upanishadic texts constitute the basis of his philosophy. These are: (1) Texts teaching non-dualism such as, ekamevādviṭīyam (Reality is One without a second), (2) Texts teaching the unreality of pluralism such as neha nānā asti kincana (there is no real plurality here) and (3) Texts teaching the non-dual Absolute to be the material cause of this universe (yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyente, from which all the beings etc., have sprung forth).

The conclusions of Advaita Vedānta may also be arrived at by logical criticism and independent reflection. Śaṅkara himself, of course, does not attach much value to independent reasoning. He thinks that reasoning is a free activity and a man can reason in any way he likes. Finality can never be attained by unaided reasoning.¹ A man can easily refute the arguments of any other man. And in this way conflicts and differences of opinion originate without any final solution. If the argumentation be based on any revelation or if it is determined by certain infallible principles, truth can be easily ascertained. Arguments are effective only when they follow revelation or intuition. Bertrand Russell in the West thinks almost on the same line. He observes:² "Instinct, intuition or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reasoning confirms or confutes; Reasoning is a harmonising, controlling force rather than a creative one." This

1. Śārirakabhāṣya, p. 2, 1, 11.

2. Mysticism and Logic, p. 13.

shows the futility of unaided reasoning. Reasoning should be based on intuition or insight which alone can give us a glimpse of truth.

Truth cannot be obtained by one and all. Only a man who is pure in heart and clear in conscience can realise it. In Advaita philosophy, Truth is regarded as objective (*Vastutantra*) and not subjective (*Puruṣatantra*). Truth as objective is also eternal and universal. It is eternal in the sense that it is valid for all times and universal in the sense that it demands universal acceptance. Now Truth which is objective can be revealed only to the seers who are pure in heart and clear in conscience. It can never be constructed, created or manipulated by any man. The Vedas represent the truths which were revealed to the great seers of the past. Therefore these are regarded as the embodiments of truth. As truth is not subjective, so the Vedas representing truth cannot also be the same. The Vedas are objective, universal and eternal. Now reasoning which is in conformity with the revealed truths of the Vedas can alone be relied upon. Actually speaking the value of reasoning lies in the clarification and explication of the revealed truths.³ Here one is reminded of Mill's view with regard to the value and function of syllogism. He thinks 'that a syllogism is one of the special ways of dealing with the conclusion of an Induction.' Induction establishes general real propositions like "All men are mortal." Syllogism interprets these propositions by applying them to particular cases like Ram, Shyam and Jadu. Induction establishes a conclusion on the basis of observation and causal relation, while syllogism interprets it. In this interpretation lie the value and the function of syllogism. In the same way the Advaitin holds that truth is realised in intuition and reasoning interprets it. The significance of reasoning lies in the interpretation of the revealed truths and in nothing else.

Here a question may arise: If revealed truths are unquestionable why are contradictory statements found in the upaniṣads which are admittedly the revealed texts? Brahman is said to be characterless and indeterminate (*Kaṭha* 3-15) and again Brahman has qualities (*Muṇḍaka*, 1-1-9). The world is said to be non-existent (*Br̥ha* 4-4-19; *Śvetā* 6-8) and again the world originates from Brahman (*Taitti. Bhṛguvalli*, 1). Brahman can never be

3. "Śrutyaiva ca sāhāyatvena tarkasya abhyupetatvat"—*Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, p. 1, 1, 2.

known (*Kaṭha*, 6-12; *Kena*, 1-5, *Br̥ha* 4-5-15) and again Brahman alone is to be known (*Br̥ha* 4-4-19, *Taitti* 2-1-1). Jiva and Brahman are sometimes regarded as one (*Chāndogya*, 6-16-3) and again as different (*Kaṭha* 3-1, *Śvetā* 4-5). How can these contradictory statements be regarded as equally valid?

In answer we may say that the contradictions in the statements are only apparent and not real. The statements represent different grades of experience and they are valid from different standpoints. Indian philosophy accepts the principle of the difference of station and duty (*adhikāra-bheda vāda*). It is admitted in India that all people have not the same capacity and so their station and duty also cannot be the same in the metaphysical and the spiritual sphere. For this, the upaniṣads contain various principles which are meant for people at different stages of spiritual life. Advaita is meant only for the strong-hearted who can follow logic dauntlessly and face conclusions however opposed to the ordinary ideas of reality and value. For them alone Brahman is the only reality, the world is false, and Jiva and Brahman are identical. This Brahman, again, cannot be known in any ordinary way. Generally, whenever we know anything, we make it an object of knowledge. But Brahman being knowledge itself can not be an object to it. So, at the time of knowing Brahman the subject becomes Brahman, and ultimately knowing means becoming. Those, again, who are faint-hearted, turn to God for help and mercy. They understand Brahman as possessing attributes, the world as a real creation of Brahman, and Jiva as somewhat different from the Ultimate. The Advaita position represents the higher order of spiritual experience in relation to the theistic position. The theistic experience is not illusory, but it is valid only from a particular standpoint. A higher order of experience with greater logical force reveals the veracity of the Advaita position, i.e., the non-duality of the ultimate reality.

Foreigners and modern men sometimes misunderstand the meaning and significance of *adhikāra-bheda-vāda*. They think that this principle goes against the modern humanistic conception of the equality of all men. Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya's elucidation of the principle may remove their doubts and misgivings. He observes: "The difference of *adhikāra* or spiritual status is not necessarily a gradation, and so far as it is a gradation it does not suggest any relation of higher and lower that implies contempt or envy. The notion of *adhikāra* in fact means, in the first instance, just an

acceptance of fact or realism in the spiritual sphere. It is a question of duty rather than of rights in this sphere, and a person should be anxious to discover his actual status in order that he may set before himself just such duties as he can efficiently perform in spirit. It is a far greater misfortune here to overestimate one's status than to underestimate it. A higher status does not mean greater opportunity for spiritual work, since work here means not outward achievement, but an inwardizing or deepening of the spirit", (Advaita vāda and its spiritual significance).

The ultimate reality of the Vedas and the futility of unaided reasoning are therefore logically admissible. Here it may be objected that as ordinary perception is determined by objects, it too is to be regarded as equally valid with the revealed truths of the Vedas.

We reply that validity may be of different forms. Śaṅkara himself admits three forms of validity—transcendental (pāramārthika), empirical (vyāvahārika) and apparent (prātibhāsika). The apparent validity of a thing is constituted by its capacity of being presented. The snake that appears on the locus of a rope is apparently valid as it is presented, for however short a period. Of course the presentation of the object is visible only to a few and not to all. The world has empirical validity, as in the experience of us all it goes as objective and extramental. The world is experienced by all and not by some only, and hence it is superior in status to that of the snake which appears only to a few. But all these experiences are cancelled in a higher realisation, where Brahman or Consciousness alone shines in its pure light. The Śāstric realisation is superior to ordinary perception, as it supervenes afterwards. In the case of apparent reality, the experience of snake is cancelled by a later knowledge of the real nature of the rope. The experience of rope has empirical validity, and so is superior to that of the snake. This shows that when earlier and later knowledge come in conflict, the later knowledge negates the earlier.⁴ The report of perception is contradicted by the later knowledge of the Vedas. In our ordinary perception the world appears as real, but in the Vedas it is negated as false. Here the ordinary perception conflicts with the vedic; and as the vedic is a later knowledge, it is superior to the verdict of the ordinary per-

4. "Tadanapavādhane tadapavādhātmanāḥ tasya utpāṭṭeranupapatti"
—Bhāmati, N. S. Ed., p. 10.

ception. Thus the ultimate validity of the Vedas cannot be questioned.

As Śaṅkara holds that scriptural knowledge is superior to any form of independent reasoning, so he relies more upon the vedic texts than upon mere reasoning. The Śāstric basis of Advaita philosophy has already been pointed out at the outset of this paper. But it is not meant that Śaṅkara gives no logical arguments. In Adhyāsa bhāṣya⁵ we get superb logic with regard to the falsity of the world. Śaṅkara analyses our experience there, and shows that objectivity is superimposed on the pure subject, and that without this superimposition no objective element is intelligible in any way.

Experience involves a distinction between the subject and the object, the knower and the known. As light and darkness are fundamentally opposed to one another, so the subject and the object are. The subject is intelligence as such, but the object is non-intelligent and inert. So there can be no intelligible relation between the two. But a relation is to be conceived between them in order to explain the possibility of our experience. As this relation cannot be real, it is only imaginary. It is known as the relation of superimposition. Now the question is: What is superimposition? Superimposition is perceiving something in some other thing (atasmin tadbuddhiḥ). The subject is pure self-revealing Consciousness and devoid of all attributes. But we superimpose the characters of the object on the subject, and say 'I am lame,' 'I am dumb,' 'I am blind,' and the like. Lameness, dumbness, blindness etc., are the characters of the sense organs, and these are imposed on the inmost self (pratyagātman). Again a man considers himself in difficulty when actually his relatives are in trouble. As the sky which is essentially characterless is conceived as blue, so the pure subject is understood as possessing objective attributes. This is due to false identification between the subject and the object, which are fundamentally distinct and opposed in nature. As our experience is based on this false identification, it is definitely false. This proves the falsity of the experienced content or the object. It also proves the falsity of the world which as identified with Consciousness appears as significant and meaningful.

5. An interested reader may consult 'Advaita siddhi' for the further arguments of falsity.

Later Śāṅkarites adduced further arguments to prove the falsity of the world. Post-Śāṅkara Advaita philosophy is mainly based on independent reasoning, and Post-Śāṅkara Advaita texts are argumentative treatises. Later Śāṅkarites adopted the technique of argumentation discovered by the logicians of the new school (Navya Naiyāyikas) and used it creditably in their treatises. Various objections were raised against the Advaita contention of the sole reality of Consciousness and falsity of all other things presentable. The Śāṅkarites answered these charges and defended their position against all these attacks. Argumentation, in Indian philosophy, proceeds in three different ways—positively, negatively and positively-negatively.⁶ Vāda is the positive form of argumentation where a philosopher tries to establish his position. The establishment of the thesis of a particular philosophy constitutes the subject-matter of the Vāda form of argumentation. Vitandā, on the other hand, negates all possible objections against a particular system of philosophy. Here the argumentation is purely negative in character, as it negates the charges and the views of the opponents without adducing any positive proofs for the thesis in question. Jalpa is yet another form of argumentation where the positive and the negative characters of the same are balanced. Here the opponents are criticised only to prove the thesis of a particular philosopher. Positive proofs for the thesis are equally important here with the answers to the criticisms against it.⁷

In Post-Śāṅkara Advaita philosophy, thinkers have used different forms of argumentation in different contexts. Sometimes treatises after treatises have been written as polemics against the opponents and the argumentation employed has taken the form of Vitandā. Khandanakhanda Khāḍya of Śrī Harṣa is a case in point. Śrī Harṣa here with the help of a formidable dialectic disproves the case of the opponents, but does not take pains for the positive establishment of any thesis. All the efforts of Citsukhācārya, on the other hand, are mainly directed to the establishing of the position of Advaita. So the argumentation used by him is mainly of the Vāda form. Sometimes, again, he uses Jalpa form of argumentation in his Tattvapradīpikā. There he establishes

6. There are three kinds of Kathās: Vāda, Jalpa and Vitandā (Nyāya-bhāṣya, p. 1, 2, 1).

7. Vide M. M. Jogendranath Tarka Vedanta Tirtha's article on "The art of philosophical disputation", published in the "Cultural Heritage of India."

the Advaita conclusions by refuting the charges of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas.

'Advaita Siddhi' of Madhusudana Saraswati, a famous Post-Śāṅkarite philosopher, represents independent reasoning in Advaita philosophy in its superb form. It embodies all the arguments for Advaita and also the answers to critics. A careful reader of 'Advaita Siddhi' will have to admit that Advaita philosophy is no less argumentative than any other system of philosophy in the world.

"Conscience" in Freudian Psycho-analysis

by

H. L. DEBNATH

Lecturer in Philosophy, S.C.S. College, Puri, Orissa

The capacity to distinguish between right and wrong is supposed to be an integral aspect of human personality. So that in legal terminology a man who cannot distinguish between right and wrong is termed insane. It is then quite natural that philosophers would have tried to come to a correct understanding regarding the origin and nature of this faculty in human beings. Freud himself was not a philosopher, but his observations about human personality, based on his penetrative analysis of human psychic apparatus, have certain philosophical and moral implications. In this paper an attempt will be made to see the Freudian view of 'conscience' and its place amongst moral theories.

The British Empiricist Locke held that 'conscience' or the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong is not innate in human mind, and that man imbibed it from others in course of his experience. The faculty of 'conscience' is a social heritage, born out of social interaction. Being a social product, in the first place, the concept of right and wrong is relative to the culture of a particular society and is not of universal import; and secondly, it is not equally developed in all, and so is liable to error and amenable to education. The fact that many of the fundamental principles of morality are common to every society does not, Locke thinks, disprove his empirical thesis. They are apparently universal not because they are innate, but because they are profitable. Philosopher Kant, on the other hand, held 'conscience' to be something innate and universal. So that what is right for one is equally so for all men irrespective of society or culture. This universal conscience which is latent in every mind, though manifest in different degrees of development, makes no error. For, "an erring conscience is a chimera". Freudian account of conscience, we will see, is definitely empirical and so comes very near to Locke's view, though it differs from the Lockian concept in that it envisages conscience to be intimately related to the more or less common forces that determine the development of human charac-

ter. It also recognises the element of phylogenetic factor in conscience. Conscience, thus, though an empirical product, yet, gets a rather more uniform trait in the Freudian concept than it had in the Locke's view. Before we elaborate further in this line it is worthwhile to see how, according to Freud, conscience develops in an individual.

Kant once remarked that the things which most convincingly proved to him the greatness of God were the starry heavens above and conscience within. To this Freud humorously replies, "The stars are unquestionably superb, but where the conscience is concerned God has been guilty of an uneven and careless piece of work, for a great many men have only a limited share of it or scarcely enough to be worth mentioning."¹ The implication is, conscience is not something innate, for it is not uniformly present in all. To add to this he says, "Conscience is no doubt something within us, but it has not been there from the beginning."² Conscience, according to Freud, develops in course of experience. Small children are at first a-moral. They are guided by their pleasure-seeking impulses against which they have no inner inhibitions. Whatever restrictions are imposed on their untrammelled nature are from external authority. The immediate authority are the parents who, being the first love-object of the children, are looked upon both with veneration and awe. "The influence of the parents dominates the child by granting proofs of affection and by threats of punishment, which, to the child, mean loss of love, and which must also be feared on their own account."³ The function, that is conscience, out of which arises self-criticism, is thus the replica of the parental authority, and in fact arises out of the introjection of the external restrictions. In course of the child's development this introjection, or taking over into one's own self, of the external parental authority is supposed by Freud to be a normal state of affairs. So that in every individual, the conscience, or to be more precise, the Super-Ego, which implies a wider entity having conscience as one of its functions, "takes the place of the parental function, and thenceforward observes, guides and threatens the ego in just the same way as the parents acted to the child before."⁴ In course of

1. Freud: New Introductory Lectures, p. 84.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

the child's growth the super-ego is influenced by other persons who have taken the place of the parents in being concerned with the upbringing of the child, and so are regarded as ideal models. But parents being the first love objects, the identification with the parents is the strongest of all identifications. This incorporation of the parental authority in the ego leads to the formation of the super-ego which retains a great amount of its original nature even though it is more or less amenable to modification by later influences. "Although it is amenable to every later influence, it preserves throughout life the character given to it by its derivation from the father-complex, namely, the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to rule it".⁵

Freudian position is thus a sort of a half-way house between the two extreme views, viz., (1) Conscience is something rigid and subject to no modification; (2) Conscience is the product of experience and so is always amenable to modification. According to Freud, conscience is, no doubt, the product of experience. But the child's early experiences of its parents are supposed to be of singular importance in shaping and determining the moral ideas of the child. So that the conscience that is formed in childhood is more or less permanent and not amenable to any amount of moulding by the educating process. But so far, it may seem, Freud does not advance anything farther than what Locke had said. According to Locke also conscience is the product of experience and the child develops its conscience in course of its early experiences with parents, teachers, playmates and others in the environment. But it is to be noted that the recognition of the decisive role of the parental function so as to establish a sort of causal relation between it and the conscience, and the regularity of the manner in which the super-ego and so the conscience develops in a normal individual is undoubtedly a Freudian contribution. Why the parental authority leaves such a lasting impression over the child's mind so as to determine his future standards of self-criticism can be understood only in the light of the child's early libidinous attachment to its parents.

In course of normal development, every child, according to Freud, passes through certain well-defined phases. During the Oedipus phase the child forms object-cathexis of the parents which is abandoned with the coming of the latency period and the con-

5. Freud: The Ego and the Id., p. 69.

sequent passing away of the oedipus phase. For the normal development of a child it is imperative that the child should not remain fixated at any one of the early phases that mark the history of its development. So the successful overcoming of the Oedipus phase is a necessary condition of normal growth. But "when it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues a modification in his ego which can only be described as a reinstatement of the object within the ego..."⁶ It is this reinstatement of the parental function (introjection) that helps the overcoming of the Oedipus phase and the formation of the super-ego and the conscience. The formation of the function that we call conscience is a regular affair, and its influence is so great and lasting because it is the outcome of the first object-cathexis and is formed at a period when the mind is very plastic and impressionable. If we thus consider the origin of the super-ego and the conscience, "we shall perceive it to be the outcome of two highly important factors, one of them biological and the other historical: namely, the lengthy duration in man of the helplessness and dependence belonging to childhood, and the fact of his Oedipus complex, the repression of which we have shown to be connected with the interruption of libidinal development by the latency period.... We see, then, that the differentiation of the super-ego from the ego is no matter of chance..."⁷

Freud does not stop short at this stage. He goes further to account for the two best known but the least accounted for characteristics of conscience, viz., (1) that it is a hard task-master, that its demands are exacting, and (2) that its commands are expressed in the form of a 'Categorical Imperative'. Locke did not so much emphasise these two characteristics, while Kant, though fully emphasised them, failed to account for them, so much so that Kant has been criticised for making 'conscience' something inexplicable. Perfectionists did no better. For, they attempted to base 'obligation' on man's rational insight giving him a conviction that certain forms of conduct are conducive to his self-perfection. So that the 'command' of conscience becomes 'conditional' to the realisation of a certain end, and thereby brings down 'conscience' from the position of a 'hard task-master' to the position of a 'wise counsellor'. But our inner experience is inclined to give a verdict in favour of the harsher nature of conscience, and our

6. Freud: *The Ego and the Id.*, p. 36.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

attitude is well expressed in the expression 'prick of conscience', with which we feel, we are punished when its command is violated. Kant did not ignore this aspect of conscience though he failed to explain it. Freud not only recognises that conscience is harsh and exacting in its demand but also attempts an explanation of this with the help of his depth Psychology.

We have seen that conscience arises out of the introjection of the parental authority within one's own ego. So that conscience may be expected to be harsh and exacting only in those cases where the child is treated in the same way i.e., harshly by its parents. But Freud, in course of his investigation noticed the curious fact that conscience develops as an exacting and harsh task-master even in those cases where the child is treated with tenderness and so "the severity of the super-ego need not correspond to the severity of its upbringing."⁸ How then are we to account for this harshness of the super-ego and so of conscience if we are to explain the institution of conscience in terms of parental authority? Freud, here, in his own characteristic manner takes recourse to a highly original explanation derived out of a deeper analysis of the psychic apparatus. Careful study of the psychic apparatus both in its normal and abnormal form led Freud to the conviction that we have got two groups of fundamental instincts—"the erotic instincts, which are always trying to collect living substance together into ever larger unities, and the death instincts (or the aggressive instincts) which act against that tendency, and try to bring living matter back into an inorganic condition. The co-operation and opposition of these two forces produce the phenomena of life to which death puts an end."⁹ Usually these two instincts act in co-operation, the best examples of which are found in sadism and masochism. The love towards the parents also is not free from an admixture of aggressiveness. When the super-ego arises as a result of the identification with the parents the aggressive element is turned inward against the ego. For, "Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualisation or even of a sublimation. It now seems as though when a transformation of this kind takes place there occurs at the same time an instinctual defusion. After sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructive elements that were previously combined with it, and these are released in the form

8. Freud: *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, p. 142.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

of inclinations to aggression and destruction. This defusion would be the source of the general character of harshness and cruelty exhibited by the ideal—its dictatorial 'Thou shalt.'"¹⁰ In support of this line of explanation of the severity of the command of 'conscience' in opposition to the Kantian idea that the 'Categorical Imperative' reveals the command of God within us, Freud has at his disposal the pathological cases in which the conscience becomes rather too severe and punishes the ego in a relentless way. In melancholic attacks the 'conscience' of the patient becomes too severe, "abuses, humiliates and ill-treats his unfortunate ego, threatens it with the severest punishments, reproaches it for long forgotten actions."¹¹ But when the attack is over, "the whole moral fuss is at an end, the critical voice of the super-ego is silent, the ego is reinstated, and enjoys once more all the rights of man until the next attack."¹² So Freud remarks, "It is a very remarkable experience to observe morality, which was ostensibly conferred on us by God and planted deep in our hearts, functioning as a periodical phenomenon."¹³ Freudian depth Psychology thus clears much of the mystery that was associated with the 'Categorical Imperative' of Kant.

It should be noted here that the Freudian account of the super-ego and the conscience, though related to the history of the development of the individual, yet, properly interpreted, it turns out to be evolutionary. For, though, the super-ego and the conscience can be traced back to the influence of the parents, teachers and so on, "In general, parents and similar authorities follow the dictates of their own super-egos in the upbringing of their children..... The result is that the super-ego of the child is not really built up on the model of the parents, but on that of the parent's super-ego; it takes over the same content, it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have been handed down in this way from generation to generation."¹⁴ Freud in this connection makes an important criticism of the well-known materialistic interpretation according to which, "the 'ideologies' of mankind are nothing more than resultants of their economic situation at any given moment." To this Freud says, "That is the truth, but very

10. Freud: *The Ego and the Id.*, p. 80.

11. Freud: *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, p. 83.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

probably it is not the whole truth. Mankind never lives completely in the present; the ideologies of the super-ego perpetuate the past, the traditions of the race and the people, which yields but slowly to the influence of the present and to new developments, and so long as it works through the super-ego, plays an important part in man's life, quite independently of economic conditions."¹⁵

From the foregoing exposition it will be clear that the Freudian account of conscience, though empirical, yet goes beyond other empirical accounts advanced so far, and gives a more comprehensive explanation of many of the so long unexplained elements connected with the concept of conscience. Many of the modern Psychologists also have held a view like that of Freud, but none of their views are as comprehensive as that of Freud. McDougall's 'sentiment of self-regard',¹⁶ for example, has a very close relation to the Freudian doctrine of 'super-ego' and conscience. McDougall also recognises "both the existence and great moral influence of the ideal self, together with the fact that it is acquired from models in the environment."¹⁷ But McDougall fails to explain the aggressive elements in the super-ego, lays less stress on the early childhood experiences and the operation of the unconscious tendencies.¹⁸

Freudian account, though more satisfactory than many similar views held on the subject, cannot be regarded the last word on the subject. The most obvious criticism arises out of the fact that although Freud recognises the secondary importance of the later influences upon the formation of conscience, yet he seeks to explain the origin of conscience solely by the influence of the parents, or to be more precise, by the Oedipus Complex. In this connection we cannot ignore the view of the outstanding sociologist B. Malinowski who remarks, "The complex exclusively known to the Freudian school, and assumed by them to be universal, I mean the Oedipus Complex, corresponds essentially to our patrilineal Aryan family with the developed *patria potestas*, buttressed by Roman law and Christian morals, and accentuated by the modern economic conditions of the well-to-do bourgeoisie. Yet this complex is assumed to exist in every savage or barbarous society. This certainly cannot be correct..."¹⁹ If what Malinowski says

15. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

16. J. C. Flugel: *Man, Morals and Society*, p. 40.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

18. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

19. Bronislaw Malinowski: *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*, p. 5.

be true, then the Freudian account loses much of its universal character. Secondly, the Freudian account is not clear about the distinction between 'guide to right action' and 'the standard' of right action. At first it appears from the Freudian account that the parental authority serves only as a guide to right action, for, originally it taught in the form of commands 'do this, don't do that.' If so, the original commands cannot be said to be exhaustive of all the situations which the individual faces and judges throughout life. Later on, Freud seems to think of the parental authority as a standard itself, thereby making actions right only because they are in accordance with the will of this authority. So the child wants to be like the ideal-self (super-ego) and do whatever it dictates. But modern investigations²⁰ have shown that the concept of authority itself cannot serve as a standard of right and wrong. For, it is always a subordinate one and points beyond to some other standard by which the authority itself judges actions to be right or wrong.²¹ Piaget made an investigation on this issue with a large number of children. From that Lamont concludes that "even when very young children use an authoritarian standard of judgment, they are not necessarily accepting the view that authority 'makes' acts right and wrong.... Then it means that there is a vague, hazy reference, even in our most primitive moral attitude, to something beyond the mere command which validates it and makes obedience to it proper."²² This 'something beyond' still remains unexplained; and cannot the apriorists and the absolutists still look with hope to it:

20. Cf. W. D. Lamont: *The Principles of Moral Judgement*, Ch. II.

21. Cf. *Ibid.*, Ch. II.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.



Printed by G. Srinivasachari, B.A., at the G. S. Press, 21, Narasingapuram Street, Mount Road, Madras and Published by Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, E. Khandesh.

Qm 2, N25 N56-29-3