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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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On Philosophy

by

G. R. MALKANI

1. *Philosophy the most ennobling influence in the life of man.*

Philosophy has fallen on evil days in the present set-up of things and because of the present-day educational tendencies. There is interest in scientific studies and social studies, for their content and their utility are easily intelligible to the common man, but no love for real and pure philosophy, which is the most ennobling influence in the life of a man. The common man looks upon philosophy with a sense of puzzlement and curiosity. He does not know what sort of knowledge it imparts, and what use one can make of this knowledge for the realization of the good things of life. All he knows is that philosophy bakes no bread. He little suspects that philosophy is nearer to his heart than any other kind of knowledge. It gives a new sense of values, and points to the highest value; and every man unconsciously seeks the highest. Man does not live by bread alone.

2. *The Philosopher is practical in a special sense.*

I can think of no better epithet for a man than that he should be called a *philosopher*, unless of-course the term is used jocularly to stand for a person who is thoroughly unpractical and who finds some difficulty in managing the ordinary affairs of his life. Common people, lacking understanding, know a philosopher by his idiosyncracies and poke fun at him. They do not know the ferment in a philosopher's mind, the inner secret of his life and thought, the sacredness of his problems, and the glory of his profession. He is not easily satisfied. No simple social theory for the betterment of society and no cheap solution of the problems of human life can

find favour with him. Where other people are satisfied, he remains dissatisfied. He is filled with divine discontent. He aims at the highest, the very ideal of perfection. He does that in full awareness of the world and its attractions, and without losing his grip on men and affairs. He is in that sense the most practical of all men. He is not practical in the wrong way. He does not succumb to the attractions of the world and to the values that the worldly people cherish most. He is not selfish. He is not worldly-wise. He is practical in the best sense of the term. He loves the Ideal and seeks to live in the light of it. He has a sense of proportion and balance which few people can have; for he sees all things in their right perspective,—the place which they *ought* to occupy in an ideal scheme of life. He has a correct appraisal of means and ends. The body and its needs are not the whole of the man. That is only the surface-man. There is another man, a deeper man, that has other needs and other demands. The philosopher is the person that administers to those needs.

3. *How philosophy can regain something of its lost prestige.*

It is my plea that no-one should be ashamed of his high calling as philosopher, whatever others, more learned in the sciences, may think of him, and however they may evaluate his work in terms of monetary rewards and other worldly goods. The philosopher should have no value for these except as a means to an end, and he should not measure his own stature in terms of financial well-being or social recognition. Instead, he should teach society a lesson and assume its leadership in thought, action and purity of life. He should worship only the Ideal, and not slave before human idols. That is how philosophy can regain something of its self-respect and respect in society. The term "philosophy" should get back something of its old connotation of *wisdom*, both divine and human. When the philosopher becomes the natural teacher, guide and leader of mankind, society is bound to thrive both materially and spiritually, and realize the highest kind of harmonious existence within itself.

4. *Why do philosophers disagree.*

This naturally raises the question, what is it to philosophise? What does the concept of philosophy signify? Unless the philosopher knows his own proper business, he cannot do philosophy as it ought to be done, and he will ever remain intellectually a frustrated man, and practically ineffective in the spiritual leadership of society. It is necessary therefore to philosophise about

philosophy itself, and to make clear to ourselves reflectively what we mean to do when we want to do philosophy. I cannot say that there is one way only in which we all do our philosophy, as there is one way in which we all do our scientific thinking. Somehow the way we do our philosophy is intimately related to the *kind of philosophy* to which we subscribe. It is not therefore a simple question to answer, "what do we do when we philosophise?" A scientist need not know what conclusions he is going to reach before he undertakes a piece of scientific investigation. He is quite clear about his method and about the nature of his problem. He knows what method to employ in order to solve a particular problem, and he can always be depended upon to adapt his method to the subject-matter in hand. It is not so with the philosopher. There is no universally accepted method of doing philosophy. Different philosophers understand differently how philosophy ought to be done. It is the philosophical stand-point that determines the philosophical method, not vice-versa. A philosopher is supposed to reason things out. He is supposed to be an embodiment of reason, and to make the most thorough and critical use of reason. And yet it is a strange commentary upon the purity of our philosophical intellect that we cannot always agree either about the questions that we should ask or about the methods of solving them. Our reasoning and our conclusions are bound to be varied as we look at things from different points of view. Small wonder, that one philosopher regards another as thoroughly misguided, and even unphilosophical. But who can decide when philosophers disagree? For philosophy accepts no court of appeal higher than itself. Is it not reason incarnate? The common man, perhaps amused by these differences, the high claims and counter-claims and the cock-sureness of different philosophers, can legitimately conclude that personal idiosyncracies and prejudices constitute all the truth behind what a philosopher says, and that philosophy is not to be compared with a scientific discipline or a body of ascertained truths. Philosophical truths, although arrived at through very elaborate and often subtle reasonings, do not merit the dignity of knowledge. The philosophers indulge in nothing less than transcendental illusions, which unfortunately cannot be dispelled through any kind of higher knowledge that is open to us; for any higher knowledge will be just another way of looking at things, and so a different philosophical stand-point. The best thing under the circumstances would be not to give any importance to this inflated conceit of human reason in matters outside common experience, and cease to indulge in these ultimate

illusions of reason. "No philosophy is perhaps the best philosophy," truly a paradoxical conclusion.

5. *It is the philosopher that fails us, not philosophy.*

The common man may be right. But the fact that there are conflicting systems of thought competing for truth does not rule out the possibility that there may be a right way of doing philosophy and a wrong way of doing it. When a philosopher makes an illegitimate extension of a concept and applies it to reality as a whole, or when he treats an aspect of experience as the key to the interpretation of the whole of experience, there is bound to be error. Concepts have their legitimate and illegitimate uses. Different forms of experience have their own special problems, leading to the truth of those different forms. A philosopher is often at the mercy of his own bias. He sees a little, and he thinks that it is the whole. His reason is not guided by a higher revelation of the truth through unimpeachable methods of knowledge. He uses his imagination in an effort to see. But imagination is not the same thing as knowledge, although it is the only method open to us where direct awareness of the truth in the simple sense is ruled out. In the end we must conclude that it is the philosopher that fails us, not philosophy. It may be possible to substitute direct awareness for imagination.

6. *The end-problem of philosophy is the concept of philosophy itself.*

We all do our philosophy more or less unconsciously. The result is that we do it in a haphazard way, and so badly. That is perhaps as it should be. It is because we do philosophy badly that we become reflectively conscious of the problem or the concept of philosophy itself. It is the end-problem of philosophy, and so the most important and the most difficult of philosophical problems. We have to sit in judgment on philosophy itself. No man at the beginning of his philosophical career is faced with this problem. He takes the genuineness of philosophical questions and his capacity to answer them completely for granted. It is only at a later stage when he has become a maturer philosopher that he begins to doubt both, and become reflectively aware of the problem of philosophy itself. Even so, he can resolve this problem only in terms of his final philosophical stand. One cannot absolutely get away from the subjectivity of this stand. Different philosophers will answer differently the question, what is it to philosophise? All I can do, therefore is to give my own answer.

7. *The primacy of the theoretic consciousness.*

We may take it that philosophy is a theoretic activity aiming at some kind of knowledge. It has nothing to do directly at least with practice. And yet it is not unrelated to life. Perhaps the most important thing about life is a clear understanding of the higher values of life or the goal of life. Mere knowledge, without this understanding, is often a dangerous thing. We are almost sure to misuse it in the pursuit of temporary and short-sighted objectives that cannot satisfy the human spirit and only succeed in producing a sense of frustration and defeat. A clear understanding of the ideals that we should pursue in life is a necessary pre-requisite for a good life and for fulfilling the highest aspirations of the human spirit. Philosophy is the way by which we achieve this clear understanding. If our understanding is right, the will too is bound to be right. For the will is subservient to the understanding. We act as we do understand. It is on this account that all systems of Indian philosophy do no more than seek to put our understanding right with things. It is always a new understanding, a vision of the truth, a *darsan*, that is intimately connected with a good life. This vision is bound to influence the will; for the will is naturally obedient to the call of truth, when the truth is clearly seen. Most of our waywardness in life is due to our ignorance and to the lack of an engrossing and convincing vision of the truth. That is why philosophy must always remain a theoretical enlightenment, without which the will can have no direction or purpose. No one can lead a truly good and purposeful life without right knowledge.

8. *What differentiates philosophy from other intellectual pursuits.*

Philosophy, although an activity of the theoretical consciousness, is very different from other intellectual pursuits that have often only a very remote relation to the pattern of life, and have almost a negligible relation to the values that this life ought to realize. A physicist, for instance, may lead an immoral life and still be a great physicist. The sort of knowledge he seeks does not require moral purity as a pre-condition. It only requires intellectual vigour and imagination. He is a worshipper in the temple of learning, but it is a very very secular temple. It would be impossible, in our opinion, to conceive of a philosopher leading an immoral life and still being a great philosopher. He will simply be shut out from those higher intuitions which require a perfect moral instrument for their achievement. There may be no such

connection between life and philosophy in the western tradition; for philosophy in the west is very much an interest of the secular intellect. That is not so in the Indian tradition, where the philosophical quest is associated with the highest spiritual purpose. The philosopher needs to see a transcendent truth; and for that, his whole intellectual make-up must be refined, purified and inwardised. A pure and detached life alone can achieve this refinement of vision. It all depends upon our concept of philosophy. Philosophy can be a secular activity or a spiritual activity. In the former case, its relation to life is accidental and superficial. In the latter case, it is intimate and direct.

9. *Why philosophy must be supposed to go beyond science and to have no connection with science.*

We said that philosophy is a theoretical activity. But what sort of theoretical activity is it? It is not formal like mathematics or empirical like science. It is not concerned with the knowledge of facts, which is the province of science, history and other empirical studies. It accepts facts as everybody accepts them, without question, and with complete reliance upon the methods of science. There need never be any opposition between science and philosophy, unless one or the other transgresses into a field which does not properly belong to it. Scientific truth has to be accepted for what it is, and it has its proper use in society. But it has no tendency to determine philosophic truth. Science studies the object as such, without reference to the subject to which it is given. The object thus taken is only an abstraction. It does not constitute the whole of reality or concrete reality. Experience itself is the concrete reality. The object forms only a part of it, and it plays a varying role in it. Philosophy studies this concrete reality of experience. Its questions are purely reflective questions. These have reference to the meaning of experience and the levels which experience can attain in order to realize the meaning that is immanent in it from the very beginning. It is a churning of experience in order to get at the truth. This truth therefore is not distant. It is not without us, but within us. It is within experience, and the process of seeking it is wholly introvert and personal. Reflection upon experience is a purely spiritual activity. It removes misunderstanding, resolves the conflict in our beliefs, and raises experience to a higher level free from misunderstanding and free from conflict. We then see a new meaning in experience and a new truth. Here is a perfect test of our finding the truth, —the question with which we started has ceased to exist, and the

conflict of beliefs which impelled reflection resolved. The question is dissolved from within. It is dissolved through the analysis of experience itself. We have gained a new depth in meaning and a new insight. That is all our gain. Our experience remains just the same. It has not changed. Only it has shed all doubts and questions with which it was loaded and become transfigured through the very process of interpretation dissolving those doubts. That is all the new vision that we have achieved philosophically. We do not *look out* for the truth,—we *look within*. For verily the Truth is within us, the whole Truth. It will not therefore be very wrong for a philosopher to turn the blind eye to the whole field of scientific investigations, and rate it as of no importance for his own special purpose. Briefly put, science is occupied with *bhūt-vidyā* or knowledge of the elements. Philosophy on the other hand is occupied with *adhyātmic-vidyā* or the truth within us.

10. *Science gives us facts, but philosophy alone gives us values.* ⁴¹⁷

Knowledge of facts has no bearing whatsoever upon the solution of questions of reflection. The whole domain of science is just the domain of mere objectivity. But science by itself cannot determine the status of the object or its truth-value. Philosophy alone can do that. Science gives us facts, but philosophy alone gives us their appraisal or truth-value. It would therefore be wrong to argue that philosophy is a camp-follower of science, or that any progress in the knowledge of facts must affect the solution of philosophical problems or the problems of reflection. The instruments of science or the methods of its procedure, however efficient for the investigation of facts, are always open to rational criticism. We are aware of their limitations. We must therefore keep science and philosophy apart. Science is *unreflective*, while philosophy is pure reflection or criticism. We must not confuse the two. It is this confusion that has worked to the detriment of philosophy. We want philosophy in the scientific way or in the tradition of science, which means for us *empirically ascertained truth*, which we take to be the only genuine variety of truth open to us. We forget that we are degrading philosophy thereby. Philosophy must be freed from the tentacles of science, and purified both in its motive and in its method. The motive is not an abstract pursuit of knowledge for its own sake which can only give us a sort of intellectual or aesthetic satisfaction, but knowledge that is intimately related to the meaning and the purpose of life. The method is not abstract and analytical, or inductive and hypothetical. It is the method of reflective analysis of

experience, in order to realize a deeper meaning that is immanent in it. We demand the vision of a truth that is always present, always known, but *misunderstood*. It is only our understanding that stands in the way and needs to be put right.

11. *Philosophy as a study of the first principles.*

It is generally agreed that the questions of philosophy are in some sense ultimate questions. But what is an ultimate question? An ultimate question is not a question about fact, but a question about the ultimate presuppositions of a set of facts; and if there are different orders or varieties of facts, they will have different presuppositions. What is now an ultimate presupposition? It is argued by some that every question about facts is based upon certain assumptions. These are not questioned. They are taken as true. No question ever questions everything, or questions all along the line. This process of questioning can be carried backward. In the end, we must stop somewhere. We simply cannot carry the process of questioning indefinitely. We have to accept something which we cannot question. That will define our ultimate presuppositions. If the questions are the questions of science we must know the presuppositions of those questions. They will be the first principles of science, which all scientific questions must accept as true. Knowledge of these first principles will constitute metaphysical knowledge. This is all the metaphysical knowledge we can have. We can thus have a philosophy of science, a philosophy of morals, etc., but no philosophy in an absolute or unlimited sense.

This view of philosophical knowledge is exemplified by Kant. He tried to make out the nature of the ultimate presuppositions of science, morals, etc. The ultimate presuppositions of science were called by him *a priori* synthetic propositions. They were prior to all experience and constituted its rational content. They were both necessary and universal. Experience was not possible without them. They constituted the philosophy of the scientific consciousness. Similarly, we could have philosophy of the practical or ethical consciousness, and philosophy of the aesthetic consciousness.

12. *Philosophy as a criticism of the false claims of metaphysics as knowledge.*

Of late, there has been another school of thought that also accepts, like Kant, scientific knowledge as the only knowledge of

reality that is possible to us. But it stops there, and rules out the possibility of ever being able to go beyond it to the so-called first principles of science. There are only two varieties of propositions,—analytic and synthetic. The former are the propositions of mathematics and logic, and the latter the propositions of science. The analytic propositions are purely verbal and do not amount to knowledge. Synthetic propositions are thus the only propositions that give knowledge. There is no such thing as metaphysical knowledge. What then is philosophy concerned about? It is concerned only about the false claims of metaphysics as knowledge. True metaphysics may be said to be a criticism of all dogmatic metaphysics. It shows up the non-sensical character of all those propositions which are supposed to give us metaphysical knowledge. They have an appearance of meaning, but really it is only an illusion of meaning. All we need to do is to analyse the propositions in terms of the common use of words and the rules of language governing this use.

According to this view, the fundamental problem of philosophy is not the problem of first principles. There are no first principles. It is also not the problem of a higher or a super-sensible intuition of reality. There is no such intuition. This school of thought, known by the name of logical positivism, considers the question of meaning as of fundamental importance. Only propositions that have meaning can be true or false; and "the meaning of a proposition is the method by which it can be verified in experience." Metaphysical propositions, presumably conveying knowledge, have no meaning, because their truth or their falsehood cannot be verified in experience.

What then is philosophy? It is argued that it is the logical analysis of propositions. This analysis reduces propositions to their bare logical form exhibiting the ultimate warrant of truth and falsehood behind them. Philosophy must not presume to give us knowledge of reality; for that is exhausted by science and its methods of investigating the truth about facts. Philosophy investigates facts of a different sort,—they are illusions of meaning, in propositional form, giving rise to fictitious problems. As a matter of fact, all problems of speculative philosophy or of positive metaphysics can be shown to be no real problems at all. We can never satisfactorily resolve them as we can never satisfactorily answer non-sensical questions. All we can do is to show a question to be non-sensical,—and then we shall just not ask it. The same is true about traditional metaphysics. All its questions

are pseudo-questions that should not be asked. We are deceived by the *form* of the questions that have a similarity to certain other questions that do have a meaning. But it is a fictitious similarity, or similarity of form only, not of substance. If we look to the substance, the metaphysical question is seen to have no genuine meaning.

13. *Logical Positivism is a new form of dogmatism in philosophy.*

It appears to us that the principle of meaning as verifiability is neither rational nor self-evident. It is a form of dogmatism to suppose that there can be no meanings other than the meanings verifiable in sense-experience. Our experience has simply no limitations of sense or of anything else. It is everywhere overstepping all arbitrary limitations put upon it. Once we are conscious of a limitation, we have already gone beyond it. And then, can the meaning of certain words in common use be tested by an arbitrary standard derived from a limitation of experience? It is most likely that we require *instruction* before we can get at the true meaning of certain metaphysical statements in common use, which are not understood to be meaningless, but which have a very indefinite meaning. We can go a step still further. There are literal meanings and there are symbolic meanings. The former are directly connected with some specific kind of experience, while the latter point to a higher kind of experience that cannot be literally expressed and is in that sense quite inexpressible. The symbolic meaning is thus not arbitrary. It avails of the literal meaning, but goes beyond it, *just because our experience would not make sense in any other way*. From the statement "his house is on the Ganges," we naturally go from the moving current which is the Ganges to the bank of the river, because that gives meaning to the statement, and because the connection between the current and the bank is quite well-known in experience. In the same way, certain propositions naturally symbolise a reality, which cannot be literally expressed in the language of objectivity, but which is connected in our experience with what can be literally known and expressed. Thus, we can have knowledge which can be communicated symbolically, but which at the same time does not refer to anything that can be literally expressed. It is then, in our opinion, no more than a mere *dogma* to assert that all knowledge must be expressible in propositions, that these propositions must have a literal meaning, and that this meaning must be verifiable in sensible experience. Philosophy is essentially criticism, not *dogma*. Logical positivism, it appears to us, is mere *dogma*, con-

sistently applied to philosophical problems. It is dogmatic philosophy in a rather sterile sense.

14. *True philosophy a pursuit of the Absolute Values immanent in experience.*

Philosophy, we said, is criticism. This criticism is very systematic and thorough. Facts can be criticised in so far as they involve elements of subjectivity or in so far as they are constructs of the mind. First principles or categories can be criticised. As soon as they are analysed and their meaning is made definite, they are seen to involve a self-contradiction. No first principle is self-evidently true. It is accepted provisionally and is true for practical purposes only. It is not ultimately and indubitably true. What cannot be criticised and what all criticism must ultimately lead to are the values and the ideals of truth that are immanent in different forms of our experience. They constitute the Absolutes of our experience. We cannot deny the Ideals. We are always seeking to know the Ideals. For the Ideals alone give meaning to life and make life worth-while. If it is reality that we are seeking to know (and all knowledge does that), then the value of Truth cannot be denied. The common man knows or thinks he knows, but he is unaware of the ideal. The scientist knows, but he too is ignorant of the ideal of truth. Every-one of them is stuck up in false values, and takes appearance for reality and error for truth. Not that he is a complete stranger to the ideal. The ideal is all the time present in his knowledge and constitutes the element of truth in it. Only he fails to recognise it, and fails also to recognise the conflict in his understanding, which is a standing invitation to philosophical reflection. Philosophy is nothing but reflection; and reflection is nothing but analysis and interpretation of experience in order to remove a conflict. We question experience in order to get at the truth of it. It is a process comparable to churning or to midwifery. What we want to get at is there, present before our eyes, only we do not know it consciously. Philosophical reflection is the method of conscious recognition, that is all. Every-one seeks the truth. Only he does not know the way. The philosopher shows the way.

15. *The Ideal of Truth.*

What now is the ideal of truth? It appears to us that all theories of knowledge that appeal to common-sense as the ultimate test of truth are quite valueless philosophically. Common-

sense engenders beliefs which are only unreflectively entertained. They are the raw material of philosophical criticism. They are the starting-point, not the end. The end may very well reverse all the values of common-sense, and truth may well appear stranger than fiction. The common-sense man is used to fiction. He is naturally shocked when philosophical analysis upsets all his values and puts others in their place. But the shock is part of the enlightenment that philosophy must give. Truth can only be contemplated with wonder. It is so simple and so strange!

Nobody can doubt the view that truth is the knowledge of reality as it is in itself. This is the only meaning of truth accepted by all philosophers, no matter to what school of thought they belong. But they disagree as to the kind of knowledge that is likely to satisfy this ideal, or whether any knowledge can do so. Generally speaking, two different attitudes are possible on this subject. It may be held that the mind or the intellect reveals reality to us with the help of the senses. This is true of our knowledge of the world. It is the commoner view. It means that all our knowledge is mediated. It is judgmental. The problem of truth becomes insoluble on this basis. It leads either to agnosticism or to some kind of phenomenalism. Knowledge of reality as it is in itself, which is the only meaning of truth, becomes impossible of realization. Briefly put, knowledge of the world can never realize the ideal of truth.

There is however another way in which the problem of truth can be approached. We may argue that reality should reveal itself to the mind. This is the less common view. Certainly the world does not reveal itself to the mind. If anything does, it will be no part of the world and no object of any kind. It will be truly super-sensible, the sort of reality with which metaphysics is principally concerned. Whether there is anything of the sort is a different question, which can only be decided through a consideration of our experience in all its forms. But those who accept the possibility of metaphysical knowledge must also accept a super-sensible reality that reveals itself to us directly without any kind of mediation. *Metaphysical knowledge is not possible in any other sense.* This knowledge, it is evident, will realize the ideal of truth. For it is not mediated by thought or by sense. Reality reveals itself to thought and determines thought, not vice-versa. There is no room for doubt or for error; for reality cannot reveal itself otherwise than as it is and what it is. Knowledge is direct, immediate and intuitive, which is the very ideal of truth.

This is how the ideal of truth is capable of being realized in our knowledge.

True knowledge, we said, must be direct and intuitive. But is not sensible awareness such a knowledge? We often believe so in the absence of a better or a higher kind of knowledge. But reflection can find fault with it. Apart from the corruptibility and the non-dependableness of the senses, any kind of sensible intuition is loaded with interpretative elements. It will be extremely difficult to get at the purely intuitive element which is not thus loaded. Certainly it will be quite inexpressible in the judgmental form, which is essentially a form of interpretation. For all these reasons, sensible experience is not unconditionally a form of direct or intuitive experience. However that be, we are quite clear about the ideal of truth and in what sort of knowledge this ideal can be realized. The controversy whether philosophy can admit an intuitive form of knowledge as opposed to merely rational knowledge or knowledge through concepts appears to us, from this point of view, to be quite senseless. A system of concepts does not amount to any knowledge of reality. Knowledge of reality is only possible in intuition or in some kind of direct and unmediated awareness. It is possible to reason only in the sense that reality can reveal itself to thought and thus make thought itself an intuitive form of awareness. This is what is called an intellectual intuition. The genuine concept of philosophy demands the realization of the ideal of truth in direct knowledge or intuition.

16. *The Ideal of Goodness.*

The ideal of truth however is only one of the ideals we seek to realize in life, although it is the most important and the most difficult of all ideals and is equated with metaphysics proper. But philosophy in a wider sense also seeks to realize other ideals. There is such a thing as the ideal of conduct or philosophy of the will. Here again, we find in European philosophy many theories of morals, as we find many theories of knowledge, both idealistic and realistic. What is lacking in all those theories is the elucidation of the *ideal of goodness* or the highest goodness. There is hedonism, utilitarianism, rationalism, intuitionism, even absolutism and all that. But all these theories accept the facts of moral life, and merely seek to explain them through some general principle. Since no single principle which seeks to give unity to these facts quite succeeds in explaining them, each of these theories have been

criticised and rejected in turn. What does not strike the ethical philosopher is that the facts themselves may require to be evaluated, and not merely accepted at their face-value. The facts may constitute only a warped and an inadequate expression of the ideal. We must know the ideal in order to have an adequate philosophy of morals. There are thus two ways of explaining moral facts. One way is to keep facts as they are, and to seek a first principle or a general principle which is common to them and presupposed by them. This is the usual way in which most philosophers go about their job, and give us a theory of morals. The other way is to seek the *ideal*, and evaluate facts in terms of it. The ideal alone gives meaning to the facts and explains them.

What applies to knowledge applies to the will. In the sphere of knowledge, philosophers accept facts of sensible experience and build upon them various theories. They do not ask the question, what is the ideal of knowledge, and how far is the ideal fulfilled by the facts in question. They do not evaluate facts in terms of the ideal. The same is the case in the sphere of morals. We are satisfied with the distinction which we do actually make between right and wrong, good and bad, and seek a general theory of goodness or of value. When no theory appears to satisfy us, we pronounce goodness as unanalysable and indefinable. But have we said anything important about the concept of goodness thereby? If anybody said that the concept of knowledge was further unanalysable and indefinable, we should not think that he had answered any reflective question about knowledge or solved any problem about it. The same is true with the concept of goodness. What we want to know is the ideal content of goodness or goodness as such, that is only inadequately expressed in all good acts. Without the ideal we have no philosophy of morals.

The philosophy of morals is the philosophy of the will as distinct from the philosophy of knowledge. The philosophy of the will seeks the knowledge of the ideal of goodness. Will seeks freedom as knowledge seeks truth. All knowledge claims to be true. If this claim cannot be sustained, truth becomes an ideal to be sought and realized. There is a contradiction in knowledge. As knowledge, it claims to be true; and yet it is not knowledge in the simple sense, since the claim cannot be sustained. It is an appearance of knowledge or illusory knowledge. A similar contradiction is found in the will, and that sets the problem to philosophical reflection. All will claims to be free. Freedom is as much the essential character of the will as truth is the essential

character of all knowledge. But reflection shows that the will is not free, as reflection shows that knowledge is not true. This makes freedom an ideal to be achieved by the will. 'The will is free, and yet it is not free and seeks to be free. The will is moved and dominated by the external forces of desire and passion, ranging from the gross desires of the body to the subtlest forms of egoism and self-willed-ness. That gives meaning to the ideal of freedom.

A critical analysis of ethical facts will show that there is no unanalysable quality of the acts themselves that makes them good or bad. What makes an act good is the freedom that is realized by or through it. What makes it bad is the compulsiveness of desire that gives birth to the act, and at the same time suppresses and almost annuls our freedom. We become victims of desire in its various insidious forms, and not masters of our destiny. An act is more or less good if greater or less freedom is realized through it. We gradually break our bonds, which are both gross and subtle. *Goodness lies in freedom, and in nothing else.* We say the act is good. But the goodness of the act is a transferred sort of goodness. It is derived from the will that is good; and the will is good in so far as it is free in willing the act and is not dominated or controlled by desire.

It may be said that goodness is wider than freedom. Freedom has goodness, not that it is goodness. When we so use the term 'goodness', we do not use it in its moral sense, but in its feeling-sense, according to which something is good because it satisfies or gives joy. There is no goodness in any other sense. *It is either moral goodness which can be equated with freedom, or it is aesthetic goodness in its widest sense of feeling which can be equated with joy.*

If our interpretation of the goodness of moral acts is accepted, these assume a new significance for us. We are no longer troubled with the objective goodness of particular acts, which it is so difficult to determine on a universal basis. We have the test of goodness within ourselves,—how far do we realize our freedom in willing the act. Are we dominated by desire in any form? Action without any desire for the fruit thereof becomes the expression of the highest moral excellence. It is the purest moral act. In any case, it is for the philosophy of the will to determine the ideal of moral goodness. What is important to note is that any theory of morals which does not elucidate the *absolute ideal* of moral goodness can have no philosophical value whatsoever. *Philosophy is*

concerned with ideals or with absolute values, and not with speculative theories either about reality or about morals.

17. *The Ideal of Joy.*

A similar argument applies in the sphere of feeling. Feeling is a unity of the subject and the object, and this unity is always pleasurable. But there are levels of this unity and so of joy. Aesthetic joy in its various forms is an important expression of this unity. At higher levels it merges into religion, where the union is more thorough-going and intimate. It is for the philosophy of aesthetics and the philosophy of the religion of love to elucidate the ideal here, which can be nothing less than absolute joy or *ānanda*, sometimes called *ananya-bhakti*. It is this joy that expresses itself inadequately in all forms of joy from the lowest to the highest, and gives value to all things that are emotionally satisfying.

18. *Is there any absolute unity of the Ideals.*

We have so far pointed to different ideals,—the ideals of truth, freedom and joy,—for which any adequate philosophy must strive. But are they different ideals after all? Certainly as we approach them from the different forms and aspects of our experience, they appear different. Each different form of experience poses its own problems. We resolve these problems through reflective analysis of those forms. Thus the logic by which we reach the ideal is different in each case. That is perhaps all that is philosophically possible to us. The ideals are logically, and therefore philosophically, different. They are reached in different ways and through different arguments. That however does not rule out their ultimate unity in a higher, super-logical or mystic awareness. It is quite possible that the awareness of Truth simultaneously realizes all the other values. If reality is by nature free and by nature joyful, if reality is our own true Self, Knowledge of this reality will at the same time realize for us the values that are inherent in this reality and constitute its very essential nature. We shall not then be able, in that higher unity, to distinguish truth from freedom, nor both these from joy. It may be the higher business of philosophy to show the way to the realization of this ideal of all ideals. It is the crowning phase of all philosophical thought. It will answer *all* our questions and resolve *all* our doubts. The questions of philosophy are inter-related. To solve one completely is to solve all of them. It is all or nothing. We contend that the problem of truth is in the end the central problem of philosophy.

To solve that problem is to solve all the rest. Truth is freedom, truth is beauty, truth is joy. There is nothing greater than Truth. Philosophy must be essentially the pursuit of Truth. The realization of the ideal of Truth simultaneously realizes the other two ideals as well, but the reverse is not true.

We conclude that the only legitimate business of philosophy is to seek the highest ideal. This is the ideal of Truth. It sums up the truth of all other ideals. Without the knowledge of the Truth, philosophy has missed its mission. It is in the wilderness. It has no use for life. All the jibes of its critics will be more or less justified. Truth makes us free,—and philosophy is the way to it.

A Comparative Study of the Concept of Faith of Stace, Dewey, Kierkegaard and St. Thomas Aquinas

by

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Stace starts his philosophy of religion with Whitehead's definition of it which is full of paradoxes. He quite agrees with the latter with regard to the different points of emphasis that should be noted while stating the nature of religion. What is religion? Stace answers, it is the hankering of the human mind for the impossible, the unattainable, the unknown. Because it aims at the unattainable it is to be regarded as a hopeless task from beginning to end. The goal is only glimpsed, sensed and then lost. Religion seeks the infinite which is by definition impossible of attainment. If such is the goal or object of religion, how are we to reach it? Is it absolutely a hopeless task? Yes, in this finite world of existence. For, existence is relative, and this disease of relativity is everywhere in this finite world, and relativity cannot bring that ultimate bliss which religion seeks. In Indian Philosophy it is said: "In the Infinite only is bliss. In the finite there is no bliss." This bliss is different from all earthly pleasures or happiness not only in degree but in kind. In the finite world it is glimpsed only, everything here is clouded with some darkness and nowhere is the absolute eternal light. But when at the rare moments of mystic illuminations we become God Himself, the Infinite, the Absolute and the Incomprehensible, we at once realize the goal of religion. We realize that this goal is beyond everything finite and relative. It is the incomprehensibility itself and therefore in our attempt to understand it through logic or reason we are involved in contradictions.

To human intellect God or the ultimate object of religion appears to be full of paradoxes or contradictions. God becomes both being and non-being. The root of all these paradoxes lies in the incomprehensible nature of God. This incomprehensibility is the root of the Divine mystery. So when we attempt to reduce the Divine mystery into some concepts (which are essentially finite

and relational) we are bound to produce shallow and false religion. Religion is not a matter of reason but of intuition. It is a matter of the mystic intuition. The two distinct orders, viz., the Divine and the natural orders, intersect in the mystic experience, and at this point of intersection, at this moment, the complete realization of God is achieved, and in this complete realization there can be no division of subject and object, there is nothing beyond God. In fact this moment is God.

Stace says that faith and intuition are one and the same thing. God is known by intuition or faith. To him, intuition through which God is known is the mystic experience, and is the true religious experience. This mystic experience is absolute, infinite and eternal; in other words, this mystic experience is God Himself. Divine nature is such that it cannot be comprehended by any concept whatsoever, for concept means limitation and relation, whereas God is Infinite and Absolute. Hence the mystic experience which is God Himself, has no division of subject-object in it. In it the incomprehensible God is revealed in His entirety. Or, it is the incomprehensible God Himself. So either God is revealed in intuition of the mystic experience or not at all. This revelation, according to Stace, is not a matter of the past alone, but an event taking place always and everywhere. But it is most complete in the mystic illumination which is otherwise understood as faith. God is known through intuition or faith, but this faith should not be blind, as in that case, religion would degrade into superstition or pig-headedness. In other words, we should depend on genuine mystic experience and not on authorities, books or institutions. Faith or mystic intuition discovers God, but reason has also its place in the sphere of religion. It interprets the discoveries of faith to the intellect by means of symbolic propositions and makes clear that these symbolic propositions are mutually consistent and form an ordered system. But reason can never go beyond faith or revelation or mystic experience or intuition.

Dewey, on the other hand, looked at the problem of religion from social and evolutionary points of view. There is no other-worldly-ness in the object or goal of religion. If God is the object of religion, He is to be regarded as the sum-total of ideals that emerge out of our natural and actual experiences. It is the search for the better—and the object is continually and gradually changed with the advance of time, in all its scientific, moral and intellectual progress. This union of ideals does not represent something static existing eternally, infinite and absolute—thus

excluding the existence of this world altogether. It is rather the ever-changing and the ever-increasing possibilities and growth. Dewey's opinion is that in this present state of distraction and depression, a religion of such dynamic nature is most necessary and useful. This scientifically developed age does not believe in the pursuit of the Supernatural. The religion which will hold man in every aspect of his life will be the best for the present and coming generation. He denounces mysticism because in his opinion the mystic experiences very rarely reveal what is truly *religious*. Mystic experiences have been explained from different and special points of view by different mystics in different ages in conformity with the special trend of culture and ideas current in those ages. No doubt there are experiences—the so-called mystical experiences—but the interpretation given of them is always to be doubted. Dewey thus emphasises the *religious quality* itself in his philosophy of religion rather than any particular religion bound by the ties of particular creeds and institutions. For, with the association of particular creeds, dogmas, doctrines and institutions, a religion is bound to lose the religious quality—its most important thing. The traditional supernatural element of religion should be strictly avoided. There can be no true religion with the belief in the supernatural. Thus to Dewey, the nature of religion should be something social, moral and related to human experiences.

To Dewey, religion is, of course, based on faith, but his object of faith is different from that of Stace. According to the latter God is Infinite, Absolute and eternally existing, or rather He alone is really existing without having any reference to time, and is known to the mystic all at once through his mystic experience. To Dewey, He is not something actually existing. He is the sum-total of ideals (and never something actually existing in a definite and particular way) that emerges out of the actuality and possibility of our experience. Hence He is being gradually and continually known through the accumulated experiences of ages. The ideals imply something better, and all our desires and actions are influenced by our faith in this union of ideals. That is religious experience in which one can adjust one's whole self to such union of ideals, whatever may be the field of this adjustment. Hence he distinguishes a *religion* from what is *religious*. He holds that any existing or past religion, because of its concentration on certain dogmas or doctrines or institutions, with a God of a fixed nature, is bound to lose the religious quality (being absolutely static in nature)—an element which is the all-important thing. So a religion without the religious quality is useless, especially in this

age of distraction and depression. We should not stick to the past revelation, nor to the present illuminations alone. We should also look forward. The religious ideals should increase in number and heighten in quality through the increasing scientific knowledge that man will acquire with the advance of time. This tendency of growth not only in connection with the concept of God but with all possible aspects of life should be regarded as the religious quality. This view is obviously different from Stace's, which is absolutely dependent on mystic experience or faith as the source of divine knowledge. Stace's religious attitude is mystic and, therefore, he depends on faith in the supernatural and the incomprehensible. Dewey's attitude is social, natural and scientific, and hence he depends for its development on experience or the scientific method. Faith is no doubt the common element in the two philosophers, but they differ in their concepts of the objects of faith and in the concept of its nature. Hence there is a difference also in their concepts as regards the possibility of religious knowledge.

To Kierkegaard, being or becoming a Christian is full of significance. It is not "doing the natural thing" in a Christian Society. Today everyone becomes a Christian because of the glory of the long history of Christianity. But to embrace Christianity because of its glory or attractiveness is not to be a Christian according to Kierkegaard. There is another reason—i.e. the reasonability of Christianity—which may appeal to one. But both these attitudes are wrong and treasonable to Christianity. One who thinks that reason can explain the self-revelation of the Infinite God is absolutely wrong, for the finite can never explain the Infinite. The Christian faith because of its paradoxical nature cannot be acceptable to reason. For it is the faith that God existed in Christ and thereby *in time, who is by definition eternal*. To become a Christian in the true sense of the term is thus to have a faith. The object of this faith is the reality of the teacher—that the teacher really exists. The answer of this faith is, therefore, unconditionally yes or no. Christianity is not a doctrine but a faith—a faith in the existence of Christ, i.e., in God-Man. The teacher is not a mere human being but God Himself, and hence faith in His existence should be made with infinite passion. The decision to plunge into this faith is full of significance and risk—full of risk, because, as it is said above, it goes against reason.

Thus the fundamental idea of the concept of Christianity of this existential thinker is the faith in the fact that God existed in

Christ. Kierkegaard gives his own interpretations of the meanings of the following words used in Christianity: (1) *The disciple* or the learner who is to be saved by Christ or the teacher, from his *sin*, is *in error* which consists in his being constantly away from the Truth. He thus is in error out of his own choice which implies that he has a *freedom of will*. But he himself cannot make the choice of being free from this error. God because of His infinite love or passion for His creatures comes on earth in the life of Christ, gives us the Truth and the conditions of apprehending the Truth (in other words, faith in the Truth, i.e., "the absolute paradox", the paradox of God in time) and thus to save us. (2) *Conversion*—In consequence of thus receiving the Truth and the conditions of its apprehension, we are given a new direction in our life, i.e., we are now turned towards the Truth. This new turn or new life itself is conversion. (3) *Saviour* or the teacher or the Redeemer Himself is God, and we cannot forget such a Saviour because in forgetting Him we should again be plunged into Error. But the Redeemer in order to save us gives us the condition of apprehending the Truth, the faith which through repentance draws us gradually near Him. God cannot make any distinction as to whom He should save. So He comes down on the earth in the most humble way, to suffer most for the redemption of mankind.

This being the case, the moment when we have the above-mentioned faith we become true Christians and the moment is, therefore, full of significance. By the appropriation of this faith we take a step of uncertainty, because constantly this faith is in conflict with reason. Thus conversion does not mean that the tension between faith and reason disappears. The absurd does not become probable to reason with undertaking of the risk of believing in "God in time". Hence with the deepening recognition of the risk and with the repeated renewal of the decision, the suffering is intensified. True Christianity means to be contemporaneous with Christ in his suffering and humiliation just in the same way in which the apostles suffered and followed Christ as the Holy One in spite of the world's rejection of him.

St. Thomas, on the other hand, is a great believer in the Scripture. He, possessing essentially a philosopher-like bent of mind, offers reasons to support his faith in the Scripture. His merit is thus to introduce 'the Philosopher' (Aristotle) in the Scriptural world. But in this task he never goes beyond what is said in the Scripture. Accordingly, he distinguishes what is with-

in the scope of reason from what is outside it in the Scripture. Some religious truths are absolutely beyond the scope of reason and so are matters of faith, such as, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Last Judgment. But he is sure that God's existence and the immortality of the soul can be proved by reason. This being his attitude towards reason and faith, the mystical element of Stace is not to be found in him and, therefore, his faith does not rest on any mystic experience but purely on the Scriptural doctrines. Stace being essentially a mystic philosopher would reply to him that religious knowledge being basically a matter of mystic intuition is not to be sought in any doctrine. It is to be discovered in the mystic experience in which the experience, the mystic and God become identical. But St. Thomas would never identify God either with the religious experience or with the mystic. According to him, man can never know God's essence in this life. God's essence may be seen by man not with his natural reason, but with the help of the divine light, and by this seeing he (being created by God) is made only a partaker of eternal life.

Thus to St. Thomas, absolute faith in the Scripture is necessary for religious knowledge, reasons can be offered for the proof of only some of the doctrinal truths, and with this Stace would agree on the whole, with one principal and important objection that we should not depend on the Scripture but on the mystic experience for any religious knowledge.

St. Thomas, being a staunch believer in the Supernatural God of the Christian doctrines, differs fundamentally in his religious attitude from Dewey who dismisses the Supernatural element in religion altogether. As a matter of fact he rejects any doctrinal religion, tries to establish and develop a religion on purely natural basis, which must have the religious quality and not the doctrinal flavour in it, and which should help to elevate man in all the spheres of his life. St. Thomas also differs from Kierkegaard on the same point of faith in the Christian doctrine, the latter having attached no importance to Christianity as a religious doctrine. Kierkegaard believes that Christianity is not a doctrine, but it is the faith in the Truth that God existed in the life of Christ; and as such the possession of this faith (which is given by God or Christ Himself to a man) is the only necessary condition of religious knowledge.

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

BY

R. P. SINGH

Bhāskara was either Śaṅkara's contemporary or flourished soon after his death. He seems to have many ideas in common with Śaṅkara. Even then his attitude towards Śaṅkara is not merely one of honest difference. The polemic verges on hostility, and occasionally the attitude becomes condemnatory. Much of this is due to a misunderstanding of Śaṅkara's position by Bhāskara. The fundamental issue between the two, as formulated by Bhāskara, is the nature of reality. According to Śaṅkara, the ultimate reality, i.e. Brahman, is *advaita*, non-dual, devoid of all differences, whether internal or external, specific or generic. According to Bhāskara, the principle of identity-in-difference, of *bhedābheda*, is the basic metaphysical principle. The real is an identity-in-difference. We shall undertake a comparative study of their views mainly with a view to understanding Bhāskara's attitude towards Śaṅkara. The study will reveal to us that on many points Bhāskara is at one with Śaṅkara but he does not see this.

According to Bhāskara, the principle of identity-in-difference embodies the character of the real, not only of the absolutely real but also of the phenomenally real. "Every thing is both one and many. It is neither wholly different nor absolutely identical". (B. B. II, 1. 18). Bhāskara gives an account of the categories of Substance and Quality, Universal and Particular and Causality; and this is meant to be a justification of the principle through an illustration of its operation in human experience. We shall discuss in this article the principle of identity-in-difference as applied by Bhāskara to the relation of Brahman and Jīva.

According to Bhāskara, Brahman not only exists in the form of the universe which is an effect, but also in the form of the "individuated self". The same metaphysical principle of identity-in-difference is utilised to comprehend the relation between Brahman and the individual self. The Jīva is said to be both identical with, and different from, Brahman. The non-difference between the two is natural and so original; the difference is adventitious, *aupā-dika*, caused by something else and so removable with the removal

of the Upādhis. The original nature of the jīva is the same as that of Brahman, and the liberated self becomes Brahman. It is the realization of oneness with Brahman that is insisted on by Bhāskara with a view to attaining liberation. Śaṅkara is at one with Bhāskara in-so-far as the latter holds that the unity of Brahman is primordial and the multiplicity incidental. Both of them also agree that the multiplicity is the differentiation of Brahman caused by the upādhis, the limiting adjuncts. But if in spite of this agreement, Bhāskara does not accept Śaṅkara's philosophic creed *in toto*, it is because for Śaṅkara what is *aupādhika* is *apārmārthika*, unreal, while Bhāskara distinguishes between *aupādhika* and *apārmārthika*, and holds that what is *aupādhika* is not for that reason *apārmārthika*. In order to discover the fundamental point at issue between the advaita of Śaṅkara and the *bhedābheda* of Bhāskara, we must enquire into their conceptions of *upādhi* and *reality*. The conception of *upādhi* plays an indispensable role in the philosophies of both the thinkers; it is the concept in terms of which both of them determine the order of meaning and value of things. Both of them distinguish between an absolute order of reality and value and a relative order. Śaṅkara speaks of the two as the '*pārmārthika*' and the '*Vyavahārika*' orders. The *Vyavahārika* order for him is *aupādhika* and so *apārmārthika*. Bhāskara speaks of the '*svābhāvika*' reality of Brahman and distinguishes it from the '*aupādhika*' reality of the jīva and the world. Both these orders are real, *pārmārthika*, according to Bhāskara. Much of the misunderstanding on the part of Bhāskara about Śaṅkara's true position is due to a want of realization that they are speaking two different languages in their discussion of the nature of Upādhi and of how it is that through upādhis the one Brahman sets itself up as many.

By upādhi Śaṅkara means the 'conditioning factor' or the 'limiting factor'. It is the principle of relativity. As a thing can be conditioned or limited only by another which is different from the nature of the thing itself, upādhi is a foreign or extraneous element. Upādhi, in the words of Śaṅkara, is *anyat Vastvantaram*. It turns the unconditioned into the conditioned, the non-relative into the relative, the unlimited into the limited, an entity having its own nature (*svadharma*) into an entity having a different nature (*paradharma*). Śaṅkara illustrates upādhi in the following way. Ākāśa is said to be all-pervading (*sarvagata*). This conception of ākāśa as all-pervading is rendered possible only due to the limiting adjuncts which are extraneous to it. The ākāśa has no attribute of its own which can be called all-pervasiveness; it

is through its association with "all" that it is designated as all-pervading (*sarvagata*). The question of going or not-going does not arise with regard to ākāśa in itself, for going is an action that connects something existing at a particular place with some other place, and this action is impossible in a thing that admits of no differentiation. The light of the sun or the moon has no shape of its own, but in association with the object on which it falls or through which it is allowed to pass the light assumes the form of the object and appears as crooked or straight or round or square. The object in this case constitutes the upādhi or the limiting adjunct of the light of the sun and the moon. Similarly water placed in a pot assumes the shape of the pot, though in itself it cannot be said to possess any shape. The pot is the upādhi of the water as it conditions the shape of the water.

The upādi is the principle of individuation, and its essence, according to Śaṅkara, lies in "incompleteness" (*asarvatva*). It creates finiteness or limitedness everywhere, and in the ātman it creates the consciousness of individuality *viśeṣaśanjñā* or *viśeṣātmabhāva*. The upādhis of the ātman are the body, sense-organs, manas, etc., as they are the conditions which determine its individuality, differentiating it from other individuals. As the jīva is a conscious entity, its individuality will not be an accomplished fact unless its limited nature is felt and experienced in its operations. The upādhi must be operative at the conscious level also. Śaṅkara therefore speaks of *avidyā* as the upādhi of the individual self. One form in which *avidyā* operates as the upādhi is known as *adhyāsa*, identification of the self with the limiting adjuncts. This *avidyā* is the main upādhi of the jīva.

Brahman becomes many only through the instrumentality of upādhis which in this case are "name and form". *Māyā* and *avidyā* are other synonyms of *nāmarūpa* in Śaṅkara. From the point of view of the finite individual, they are treated as the limiting adjuncts of Brahman, because they turn the one Brahman into a manifoldness. The 'name and form' are not a rival reality; they are *ananya* from Brahman, non-different, because in abstraction from Brahman they have no being. The upādhis serve to bring out a manifoldness out of Brahman without destroying the unity of Brahman. The upādhis are not as real as Brahman, because they have their being in and through Brahman. From the point of view of the jīva, the upādhis are said to be *avidyā* because they serve to veil the jīva's true nature. In relation to Brahman, the *nāmarūpa* in their unmanifested state are said to be the power,

the *śakti*, of Brahman which can be described as neither different from Brahman nor as identical with it. The upādhis are many and have diverse forms according to Śaṅkara (Bṛhad. S.B.V. 6.1).

Though Brahman admits of differentiation only through upādhis, in its own being it is a pure consciousness. "When it has the limiting adjuncts of the body and sense-organs which are characterized by ignorance, it is called the transmigrating individual self; when it has the limiting adjunct of the power of Māyā manifesting through eternal and unlimited knowledge, it is called the Internal ruler and Īśvara Similarly having the limiting adjuncts of the bodies and organs of Hiraṇyagarbha, the undifferentiated, the gods, the species, the individual men, animals, spirits etc., the Self assumes those particular names and forms." (Bṛhad S.B. III. 8.12; S.B. II. 1.14). But the important point to note in this connection is that according to Śaṅkara what is due to the limiting adjuncts cannot be said to constitute the own-being or own-nature of a thing (S.B. III. 2.15). Liberation is the result of the realization of the unconditioned nature of Brahman, its nirupādhika svarūpa.

Bhāskara in his discussion of the concept of upādhi and the function it performs in his metaphysical system agrees with Śaṅkara on many vital points. He accepts Śaṅkara's view that the differentiation of Brahman is due to the upādhis (B.B. III. 2.19) and is at one with him in distinguishing between the own nature of a thing (Svābhāvikam) and the nature which belongs to it or comes to characterize it due to its association with upādhis. The manifold is the Absolute conditioned by the upādhis. The individual self is Brahman limited by the adjuncts (upādhis) of ignorance and desire, of the body, the vital forces, Manas, buddhi and ahankāra. The relation between the jīva and Brahman is one of identity and difference. But the identity is essential, it is natural, svābhāvikam. The difference is non-essential, because it is caused by the upādhis. The important thing to note in this context is that according to Bhāskara, the nature of the jīva which it comes to possess due to the upādhis is in the end eliminated. Individuality which is a creation of the upādhis disappears ultimately. The jīva in its real nature is neither a doer nor an enjoyer. If the latter constituted its own nature, the jīva could never be free from it and the possibility of final release would have to be ruled out. All this is common ground between Bhāskara and Śaṅkara; and Bhāskara's insistence that there is disappearance of the nature of the jīva as doer and as enjoyer in

the state of liberation is but an illustration or application of the general principle laid down by Śaṅkara that "what is due to the upādhis cannot be said to be the own being or true nature of an entity" (S.B. III. 2.15).

In spite of Bhāskara's religious insistence that Brahman is both one and many, unconditioned and conditioned, nirupādhika and sopādhika, and that the aupādhika form of Brahman is not unreal (apārmārthika), he does not assign the same place to both these forms in the scale of values, which he offers to the reader. The real nature of Brahman which can be said to be its own nature is existence, consciousness and bliss, and it is not of the form determined by name and form. It is the realization of the unconditioned Brahman which is conducive to the attainment of mokṣa, and only the unconditioned Brahman is recommended for purposes of worship.

Bhāskara's reason for preference for this valuational bias, is that Brahman, in its own nature, *svataḥ*, irrespective of any other conditioning factor, is of the causal form, above all change, eternal, one and non-dual, niṣprapañca. Though Brahman is both acosmic and cosmic, and though the cosmic form of Brahman is not unreal according to Bhāskara, he assigns a privileged position to the acosmic form in the scale of reality and value. The higher the reality the greater the value it owns. To the opponent's contention that as according to Bhāskara himself Brahman exists in two forms, it is to be worshipped in both these forms, Bhāskara's unflinching rejoinder is that Brahman is not to be worshipped in both these forms; it is the unconditioned form, Nirākāram, niṣprapañcam, which is the object of realization. His only anxiety seems to be that the conditioned form of Brahman may be treated as unreal, and he takes care to sound the note of caution that "the expanded name and form are not non-existent". Even when Bhāskara speaks of creation as an expression of the nature of Brahman, as its conditioned form, and insists that the universe be viewed as a fact and not as a fiction, he tells us that the entire description of the creative aspect of reality has for its main object the establishment of the unconditioned nature of Brahman. (B.B. III. 2.15).

In all this Bhāskara is closely following Śaṅkara. The principle of the inseparability of reality and value, the scale of values, the idea of the material world having an instrumental or mediating function, the unconditioned Brahman as the supreme reality and the supreme value—all this is derived from Śaṅkara. At what

point then does Bhāskara come in clash with Śaṅkara? Bhāskara does not see his way to accepting Śaṅkara's view about the 'reality or the nature of reality' belonging to the manifested universe. It will be futile to attempt to answer the question whether the world is real or unreal unless we decide what we are to mean by calling any thing "real" or "unreal", and if "reality" means two different things to two different thinkers the conflict will be interminable. One may well say with Bosanquet that "every thing is real so long as we do not take it for what it is not" (Logic I p. 258). If we accept this use of the word 'real', the resolution of the issue between Bhāskara and Śaṅkara becomes easy. We have only to ask what is the status assigned by Bhāskara to the world of name and form. Bhāskara's repeated complaint against Śaṅkara is that he condemns the universe of manifestation as false (*mithyā*), as non-existing (*abhāva*), and as an illusion (*māyā*). We have pointed out elsewhere that Śaṅkara by calling any thing unreal (*asat*) does not mean that it has no factual existence, and the predicates of reality and unreality have a value character in his philosophy. The distinction between appearance and reality, between reality and unreality is a value distinction. When Śaṅkara distinguishes Brahman from the universe of manifestation and calls the former *sat* and the latter *asat*, by *asat* he simply means that it is *anirvacanīya*, indescribable either as absolutely real or as absolutely unreal. In other words, Śaṅkara's meaning is that the world does not possess the reality which belongs to Brahman.

Bhāskara holds the same view about the status of the world's reality. Its reality is *aupādhika*. It has existence in and through Brahman. Its reality is the reality of the effect which is derived from the reality of the cause. It has no reality on its own account, and in this view Bhāskara is at one with Śaṅkara (Taitt S.B. II. 6). Though Bhāskara holds that what is due to limiting adjuncts cannot be said to constitute the own nature of a thing, he says that it cannot be said to be "unreal" either. For him *apārmāthika* and *aupādhika* cannot be used synonymously. He illustrates the distinction in the following way. We experience heat in our body due to our coming in close association with fire which possesses the property of fire. The heat we experience is not a property which is inherent in us; it is experienced as being in us due to the *upādhis*. But it is not unreal, though it is not intrinsic or native to the experiencer. (B.B. II. 3.40). In the same way activity (*kartṛtva*) is not a natural characteristic of the *jīva*. It is adventitious, due to the *upādhis* and is therefore removable. But it cannot be said to be "unreal", *apārmāthika*. Both Bhāskara

and Śaṅkara agree that what is adventitious cannot constitute the own nature of a thing and is ultimately removable. If even then Bhāskara insists that the *aupādhika* cannot be said to be unreal or *apārmāthika*, and Śaṅkara argues that the *aupādhika* is necessarily unreal, i.e., *apārmāthika*, the controversy between the two is a merely verbal one. It is a controversy about the proper use of the word "*pārmāthika*." What is *aupādhika* is also called by Śaṅkara *vyāvahārika*, and according to Bhāskara the reality of the manifested world (*prapañca*) is not of the same kind as that of the unconditioned Brahman (*nisprapañca*). Bhāskara expresses the value distinction between the transcendental order and the empirical order of reality by making use of the words '*svābhāvika*' and '*aupādhika*'. It is only prejudice which can prevent one from seeing that the distinction in question has its parallel in the distinction drawn by Śaṅkara between "*pārmāthika* and *vyāvahārika*."

The upshot of the whole discussion is that though Bhāskara repeatedly speaks of Brahman as *bhinnābhinnam*, as one-and-many, he does not hold that multiplicity is as real as unity. The former is adventitious, the latter is original; and it is only the latter which is connected with the attainment of *mokṣa* and with worship leading to that attainment. It is but a superficial way of comparing the metaphysical position of Bhāskara and Śaṅkara to say that one believes in pure unity and the other in identity-in-difference. It is the result of not keeping in mind the fundamental metaphysical issue between the two. Bhāskara himself has not been able to formulate correctly this issue and is content to speak with the vulgar though he thinks with the learned.

The Phenomenological Approach to a Metaphysic of Personality *

by

DEVABRATA SINHA

The philosophy of personality must start from the basis of psycho-physical complex which is the empirical basis of personality. On the other hand, it would concern itself with the question of 'essence' as behind the empirically evident fact of psycho-physical complex. Whether the empirical unity of personality is a seeming unity or a unity that stands on its own ground, whether it is merely a contingent complex or there is a factor of necessity implied in it—all such questions may be put forward. In this regard, two radically different views would come to us. On the one hand, the Realistic School, with which is associated Behaviourism in Psychology, takes in earnest the empirical starting point of psycho-physical complex and would not go farther towards the search for 'essence'. Thus, either the essence would altogether be denied, or, if recognized at all, it is taken as nothing apart from the modalized functional factors. On the other hand, the Idealists and Rationalists would ignore the status of the empirical manifold altogether and seek to posit *a priori* a trans-empirical principle without any reference to the body. The latter, unlike the former, seeks for the metaphysical essence, but it was too easily posited without taking into account the actuality of the empirical complex. A phenomenological enquiry would, on the contrary, depart from both these approaches so far as it seeks to derive essence through pure reflection, without positing, as in the naturalistic standpoint, self-existent, real objects. Nevertheless, in phenomenological reflection, all psycho-physical questions are suspended and there is a transition from psychological description to the enquiry after 'essence', after what Husserl points out as 'the invariant, essentially characteristic structures' of our conscious life.

Man as the psycho-physical natural unit thus provides the point of departure for phenomenological investigation. The embodied

* We attempt here to treat the concept of personality on phenomenological lines in the light of Advaita philosophy.

ego, the individual human person living among other individuals, in the real world, is there to be taken as real; '.....it is from the Ego, the consciousness, the experience as given to us from the natural standpoint that we take our start.'¹ The real, individually existent, human being is a real object like others in the natural world; and the acts of consciousness as belonging to the human subject are events of the same natural world. On the plane of appearance, the psycho-physical natural unity is found to be grounded in the bodily unity. I am aware of myself as a person primarily as constituted in the body. It is through the body that I am aware of subjectivity as differentiated from the outer presented objects. At the bodily level prevails a body-self identity which cannot be superseded on that level. An analysis of I-notion points in the first instance to the body or the self used as body. At such a level, there is but an unreflective I-feeling which is not distinguished from the bodily associations. There is only a functional feeling of unreflective I-hood but we have no explicit awareness of the 'I'. And it is the body which provides the basis for the person's communication with the outer world of other persons and objects. Thus, the bodily unreflective I-hood is at the basis of what is meant by a person as the unique but complex unity of consciousness, communicating with the outer inter-subjective world.

Further reflection on the body-self identity itself would bring out a reflective 'I', claiming to be distinct from the bodily complex. Of course, for the naturalist, the level of bodily self would mark the final stage beyond which we need not proceed. But, that we cannot philosophically confine ourselves to such a level would be evident as we come to the phenomenological implications behind it. Taking 'I' at the reflective level, we recognise it to be the inner principle distinct from the bodily complex. Such a principle, though having reference to the body, is still apprehended as a distinct principle. The self that we ordinarily feel in our activity is implicit and as such bodily, and never to be realized apart from its connection with the bodily complex. In our recognition of the very intimate association between the body and the self, we depart from the idealists on the one hand and the realists on the other. For the former, the bodily basis of the self is sought to be denied altogether, while for the latter, the conscious essence behind the bodily presence is sought to be ignored. For those who propose to proceed phenomenologically, the empirical ego from which to start is not to be taken as

1. Husserl, *Ideas; General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, p. 112.

completely distinct from subjectivity. On the contrary, there is to be found an amalgamation from the very beginning of the factors of subjectivity and non-subjectivity.

In our awareness of the body there are individualized varying modes of consciousness, having the body as its object. Nevertheless, such modalized conscious states have as their substratum the constant revelation of the body in general, and the modalized conscious states partake of the manifestation of this substratum-consciousness (*kuṭastha caitanya*).² And it is on the basis of this general awareness in the background that the explicit awareness of the body from time to time in determinate forms is possible. As the empirical individual appears, he is an amalgamation of the bodily and mental factors, though pervaded by consciousness which makes the whole complex manifest to us. Thus, the essence of consciousness is recognized to be already there in the appearing complex of the individual, though fused with physico-mental complex. So, in an estimate of personality (*jīva*), we are to take into account the substratum-consciousness on the one hand and the physico-mental organism on the other, together with the functional fusion of the former in the latter.³

The subjectivity that is presented in the natural standpoint of the empirical individual is the psychological subjectivity wherein the ego is inwardly felt, but as an existent real involved in the objective world. In the typical attitude of psychological description, the contents of introspection would seldom lose reference, explicit or functional, definite or indefinite, to the body-centre of the individual, and to that extent, to the objective, spatio-temporal world, so far as the body persists in the latter. The empirical 'I' or the ego (*ahamkāra*) is co-eval with the objective world even as belonging to it. Also, such an ego is necessarily opposed to the outer world, it seeks to posit itself in opposition to the very direct outer (*parāk*). It is as thus empirically differentiating itself from the outer world of objects that the self comes to us in psychological introspection. The identity of the self as subjective is grasped only in differentiation from the outer reality.⁴

Through transcendental transformation of such a psychological standpoint, the psychological subjectivity would lose its existential

2. *Pancadaśī*, ch. viii, 3, 20, 21, 24, 25.

3. *Pancadaśī*, IV, 11.

4. *Pancapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, Section I.

import and the 'I', through a process of phenomenological disconnection, would no longer remain a mere ego as belonging to the objective world. As a result, the 'I' stands exclusively as a subject for which the world has being. Instead of the self being referred to the world as on the psychological level, the world is referred to the self which proves to be the transcendental subject (*Sāksin*) as witnessing the experience-continuum.

As we start from the ego, the empirical self is felt to possess an existentiality which demands a higher fulfilment through insight into 'essence'. That is, on the unreflective bodily level we are just aware of the self as existent. The subsequent reflection would bring out the essences in stages of more and more subjectivization. Nevertheless, subjectivity is felt as existent from the very beginning, that is, on the bodily level; and subsequently also, its claim to existence is recognized at every stage of phenomenological 'intuition.' As on each level the essence of subjectivity stands out in a clearer degree, its existential demand to be grasped as actuality is felt correspondingly. And, phenomenologically a point would be reached where the reflecting ego would posit itself absolutely as the self-contained individual essence.

The question, however, remains: how to account phenomenologically for the character of uniqueness that is recognized to be essential to personality? How are we to reconcile the elements of uniqueness with the recognition of pure consciousness (*cit*) as its ultimate essence? Here it is to be admitted that such uniqueness of human personality is to be understood in terms of pure subjectivity which is phenomenologically reflected as a possibility and existentially posited as the ultimate reality. Now, such subjectivity functions freely through various references. Here, in the context of personality, such reference should stand for modes of association of the essence of subjectivity with the empirical manifold of physico-mental processes. The physico-mental complex is understood from the point of view of transcendental subjectivity as but 'intentionally posited' by a consciousness. Such a complex owes its validity to its being all 'that consciousness in its own experiences posits.'⁵ Now, as the mode of referential function varies from one complex to another, the centres of personality also vary. The so-called uniqueness thus is to be understood in terms of the mode of reference as implied in the varying physico-mental complexes.

5. Husserl, p. 153.

Hegel and Aurobindo on the State and Related Matters

by

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Aurobindo is hailed as the foremost idealist philosopher of his time and the hardest to understand. By many he is regarded as the most brilliant exponent of absolute idealism, and by others he is supposed to be a mystic soaring high in the world of yogic meditation leaving aside the world of reason and logic. In his metaphysical outlook he stands very near to Hegel, and on observing the striking resemblance between the two, one may tend to classify these two philosophers under the same group. His conception of Reality is the same as that of Hegel. He agrees with Hegel on the ultimate nature of reality as Spirit and the world as the working of Thought in life. Aurobindo further accepts the Hegelian dialectical law of strife between opposite elements in Nature, but with certain limitations. Dialectics is true so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. For strife leads to compromise and not to fusion which is Nature's ultimate plan. But the alliance at the metaphysical level has not been retained in their political philosophy, and Aurobindo's ideal of human unity has stood as the antipode of Hegel's state.

STATE

W. F. Hegel was confronted with the same age-old problem of liberty and authority which still bewilders the political philosophers of the modern time, and he solved the riddle by idealizing the state as the protector and the liberator of the individual self.

For Hegel, reality is abstract Reason whose essence is freedom, and in order to realize its essence it objectifies itself into the external world. The state comes into existence in the process of the historical development of the Spirit or the Idea, and it works as the divine instrument for attaining freedom; because freedom which is the essence of the Spirit originates in Will, and Will contains two elements, the element of pure indeterminacy, i.e., universality, and the element of determination and differentiation i.e., particularity. Freedom consists in the unity of these two moments,

and Hegel thinks that this unity is sought by art, morality, religion and philosophy; but the final attainment of this unity is possible only in the state. "Truth is the unity of universal and subjective will and the universal is to be found in the state, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements" (Philosophy of History, p. 48). The individual has conflicting impulses. "The satisfaction of one is unavoidably subordinated or sacrificed to the satisfaction of another" (Philosophy of Right, p. 28). To preserve the interest of the individual and at the same time to establish the social interest over private interest is the goal of Spirit. This desire of the individual is described by Hegel as morality. The morality of man demands that man will realise his own potentiality and at the same time give opportunity to others to develop their personality. This claim of morality is fulfilled by the laws of the state. The state, in his view, curbs and constrains the irrational impulse of the individual but emancipates and fulfils the genuine will. Against the arbitrary subjective will, the state upholds the real or rational will which is the universal immanent in the individual. In the state the individual is universalized; his purpose obtains content and significance from the social world, and the ends which he seeks are social. Consequently, he achieves these ends in their fullness, only if he takes account of the nature of society and the principle by which it is constituted. An anti-social act attacks its own substance and is opposed to itself; obviously, to realize the ideal of progress, Law and Government are essential.

The state is the realization of Reason, embodiment of man's rational will, and all progress centers round the state. Sovereignty does not reside in the people but in the king and the aristocrat. So, the people who are guided by their irrational impulses should obey the dictates of the state.

In its internal nature the state is the outward manifestation of inward morality, but in its external relations each state is independent and is free from all moral obligation. Agreements made among states are by nature provisional. The object of a treaty would be to secure the exclusive interest of the state in question. A treaty is violated and ignored if the interests of a state so require. If the states disagree, the matter can only be settled by war. Hegel even thinks that perpetual peace leads to internal corruption. Through war "the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also cor-

ruption in nations would be the production of prolonged, let alone, 'perpetual' peace." (Philosophy of Right, p. 210). Since the state is the basis of all progress and since the state grows through war, war is a necessary condition of social progress.

Hegel is honest in his endeavour to identify state authority with rationality. Were it possible in practice, all the conflicts between authority and individual liberty would be resolved. But his expectation is rather too high to be actualized, and whenever his philosophy has tried to descend on the world of reality it has been degraded into fascism and totalitarianism and finally courted defeat. This is the irony of Hegel's Divine Will.

Aurobindo concurs with Hegel that the state is the product of intellect, a perfection of reason, but he says, with a note of dissent, that it cannot enter into the domain of Spirit. For we must surpass the world of reason to enter into the world of truth which is Spirit. The world is the working out of Spirit into reality, but the Spirit manifests itself not in the state but in a people as a communal soul. This communal soul is the vehicle of the greater eternal Spirit which is seeking its fulness in time and on earth. The soul of the nation is sometimes on the surface of humanity and sometimes it sinks below. When the state is at the height of its glory and accumulates strength and power far outgrowing the other states, the society under the impact of mechanical intellect loses its vital power and its soul.

Theoretically, the state is the collective wisdom and force of the community organized for the general good. Practically, it does not secure the largest good, and it produces a good deal of organized blundering and evil. The ruling class in a state never represents the soul of a people or its aspirations, and there is no guarantee that it would represent even the best mind of the nation. At best the state machinery brings to the surface a certain amount of intellect and power available in the community, which is again caught in the machinery and hampered by it as well as by the largest amount of folly and selfish weakness that come up in the emergence. It is a collective egoism much inferior to the best of which the community is capable. Unlike individual egoism it is not hampered by internal scruples or external checks. It has no soul and an ill-developed ethics.

The progress of history reveals that humanity is gradually marching towards the goal of human unity. And the call of the state to the individual to immolate himself on its altar and to give

his free activities into an organized collectivity is, therefore, not the way for the fulfilment of the ideal of human unity. The subordination of the individual to the state machine is something quite different from the ideal of expanding the ego beyond its limitations and losing it in mankind.

The state is not the best means of human progress. Its utility lies only in providing necessary facilities for, and in removing disabilities and obstacles from, the co-operative action of individuals in the community. The state is not an organism. For it is not capable of that free, harmonious and varied action which is proper to organic growth. It is and works like a machine without tact, taste, delicacy or intuition. "It tries to manufacture, but what humanity is here to do is to grow and create" (The Ideal of Human Unity, p. 27). When the state tries to control education and culture it brings only a dead uniformity. The state brings only a mechanical unity of man which is not the aim of human life. Man will transcend the barrier of this artificial self-imposed limitation and sink in the ocean of humanity. This is not merely the idle dream of the philosopher but the historical necessity of the Idea itself which demands such unity. The tendency of the human race towards larger and larger aggregation is obvious from the process of history itself. Thus through family, tribe, clan and city state man has come upon the nation, which again will be superseded by some other higher and supranational unity. Thus, while Hegel starting with the metaphysics of Spirit as absolute Reason ended in the glorification of state and became unconsciously the spiritual father of fascism and totalitarianism, Aurobindo beginning with the same philosophy of Spirit ended in human unity—brought about without and above the state where man will obey no other law except the law of his own spiritual being.

NATION

Hegel views the nation as the ethical substance of state. The state is not merely a geographical unit artificially made up by the consent of man. It has its historic necessity and growth. The state owes its existence to the moral consciousness of man, and such consciousness can develop only in a people having the same customs, traditions, culture and belief. So one state comprises of one nation only, as national consciousness is the moral thread which binds the people together. The national state is the realization of Reason, the embodiment of Absolute Will and hence the root of all progress. In every phase of historical development, only one nation embodies the Absolute Will more truly than others.

This is the world-historical nation which carries the banner of progress. The world-historical nation has the right to thrive at the cost of weaker nations and can oust, subjugate, and if necessary even absorb, the little nations. Hegel finds the logical support of his theory everywhere in nature. Plants grow by sucking the juice of earth. Animals live on plants or on lower animals. Animals again are the food of human beings. Thus, devouring of lower beings by the higher, i.e., the more rational, is the law of Nature. The same law operates in the life of nations also, and with its superior civilization the world-historical nation is ordained to lead and to rule and to thrive upon the backward nations. To guide this nation along the path set for it in history appear world-historical individuals such as Caesar, Alexander and Napoleon. These political leaders and heroes are the vehicles of world history and bring forth the will of God into actuality.

Hegel's theory of world-historical nation, that in every stage a leading nation appears with "its absolute right of being the vehicle of this present stage in the world mind's development," has a leaning towards racial imperialism. The nation as the ethical substance has the right to acquire the form of the state even by force and wrong. The same consideration justifies civilized nations in treating as barbarians and bringing under subjugation those who lack the essential moments of state. This is an ominous hint towards imperialist aggression and war. The "supreme nation" theory offends against peace. It also militates against the patent fact of growing international cultural fellowship.

Aurobindo and other Indian thinkers admit the nation as the bearer of the vitality of the race. But this nation is not the military-economic-political entity as Hegel conceives. On the contrary, it is the psychological unit, the soul which unites a people. It can enrich itself not by domination over, but by absorption of, the good of others. The organized nation which is the state is not a living organism but a soulless machine or a 'huge beast of prey' whose *dharma* is self-protection and self-expansion. The Indian ideal itself rejects the Hegelian theory that the banner of progress is always carried forward by a so-called world-historical nation. Although the domination of the world by one nation is not yet an impossibility, such a unification will be neither permanent nor healthy.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

A spiritual interpretation of history is given by both Hegel and Aurobindo. Hegel views the Absolute as abstract Reason.

But as Reason is self-conscious like mind, it objectifies itself into the external world. By an act of self-determination, the Absolute evolves itself into the finite, the concrete and the particular. The particular again, in its turn, seeks to identify itself with the Absolute. Separation means bondage for the particular; by identity it attains freedom. Thus pure being or the bare abstract universality, by an internal urge, passes into the particularity or abstract difference. The particular again progressively realizes the Idea or Spirit. As the essence of Idea or Spirit is freedom, this progress made by the particular is the progress of Idea itself towards freedom. This march of Spirit towards freedom or the passage from the particular to the universal is revealed by History.

This Reason, Hegel asserts, is both the Infinite Material as well as the Infinite Form, i.e., the substance and the power which sets the substance in motion. So long as Reason or Providence does not actualize itself in history, it is a mere abstract principle. Hegel claims that Providence, which is Reason, manifests and applies itself in History. History is nothing but the fulfilment of Divine Will, i.e., Theodicia; and the task of philosophy is to realize and prove the conviction that whatever is intended by eternal wisdom is actually accomplished in the domain of active Spirit and that of Nature.

So, the Spirit and the course of its development are the objects of the Philosophy of History. The development of Spirit is towards freedom; in other words, history is the march of Spirit towards freedom. This progress is in the nature of Spirit itself. It is Spirit itself which is working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially. So, in the historical phase of events, freedom of Spirit is being actualized step by step.

Now what is the means by which freedom realizes itself? Though freedom is latent in a hidden undeveloped idea, the means it uses for its realization is external and phenomenal, and is perceptible to our sensations. So long as the Spirit does not actualize itself in history, it remains a mere idea existing in our subjective being only. That which exists for itself only is a possibility, a potentiality; but it has not yet emerged into Existence. Hence the second essential element which is necessary in order to produce actuality is the Will; in other words, the activity of man in the widest possible sense. It is by this activity of man that the Idea actualizes itself. The motive power that impels him to activity is his passion and private interest. The concrete meaning and union of the two, the Idea and human passion, is

Liberty under the conditions of morality in a state. The state, therefore, is the best embodiment of freedom. Of course, freedom is not actualized in all states in the same measure. It is being progressively actualized through the process of political history. The Orientals did not yet attain to the conception that the nature of Spirit is freedom. They were not free. The only knew that one (the king) is free. But the freedom of that man also had resulted in tyranny. The consciousness of freedom first arose among the Greeks. But they, and with them the Romans, knew that only some are free. It is only the Germans who knew that man as such is free. Thus Reason and History march from East to West. "The Eastern nations knew that only one is free; the Greek and Roman world that only some are free, whilst we know that all men absolutely (man as man) are free." (Philosophy of History, p. 20). Though Hegel extols the Prussian state of Hohenzollerns as the highest manifestation of freedom, he does not say that it is the final embodiment of the Absolute. In fact, no world-historical nation is sacred or permanent. The law of dialectics itself demands that every state will have to give way to some other state which embodies Reason more fully. Hegel expects America to be the land where the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself in future.

Hegel saw in Oriental history the embryo of Reason in its rudimentary form. Politically, oriental countries were not very strong indeed, and did not produce his world-historical heroes like Alexander, Napoleon and Caesar. So, the cultural achievements of countries like India and China were not progress according to Hegel's yardstick, nor did he believe that rational progress was possible in those countries. Aurobindo, on the other hand, saw in Europe the play of the intellect, stifling the vital and the spiritual under the deadweight of its mechanical method which has arrested her progress and aspirations. And he was sure that India with her long *sādhana* for realizing the spiritual unity of races will recover her position and show the path towards the unity of mankind.

The Spirit which works out the evolution manifests itself in a people as a communal soul. A people, like a man, is an organic living being subject to the cycle of birth, growth, youth, ripeness and decline. In each people there is a soul-idea or life-idea at work less mortal than its body. "If this idea is itself sufficiently powerful, large and force-giving, and the people sufficiently strong, vital, and plastic in mind and temperament to combine stability with a constant enlargement or new application of the power of

the soul-idea or life-idea in its being, it may pass through many such cycles before it comes to a final exhaustion." (Spirit and Form of Indian Polity, pp. 19-20).

A people which learns to live not solely in its physical and outward life but in the soul and spirit behind may not exhaust itself and end by dissolution under the impact of new races and peoples. Having itself fused into its life many original smaller societies it may absorb the new impacts by the force of the spirit and live through a more glorious cycle.

Human society has to pass through three stages of evolution before it can arrive at the completeness of its possibilities. In the first stage, the society organically develops by the power and principles of its life, by a blind internal impulse only. In the second stage, it becomes more and more intellectually self-conscious. It learns to review its ideas, needs and institutions with the power of critical and constructive reason. It also becomes aware of social and political ideals which promise to raise the community above the level of vital existence and inspire bold experiments which open the possibilities for the realization of a more ideal society.

But the second stage is also attended with a serious danger. Working with the materials of life, reason turns away from the principles of a people's vitality, forgets that society is a living growth and treats it as a machine. A powerful but mechanical and artificial organization is created at the cost of an organically self-developing communal soul in the body of a free and living people.

This error is overcome only when society reaches the third stage of its evolution, when collective life is governed neither by the instincts of the vital self, nor by the constructions of a reasoning mind, but "by the power of unity, sympathy, spontaneous liberty, supple and living order of his discovered greater self and spirit in which the individual and communal existence have their law of freedom, perfection and oneness" (Spirit and Form of Indian Polity, p. 26). At this stage reason acts as an intermediary and regulating factor. It is used to test and assure the steps towards the higher spiritual life. This is possible only when man's attempt to abide by the law of spiritual existence is no longer an exceptional aim for individuals but is recognized as the imperative of his being.

Europe has become a captive of its mechanical intellect, but India has not been crushed by the early invasions, by the robust vigour of Islam and the steam-roller of the British system. She is

still surviving and is forging ahead, because India did not live merely by the outward organization but by the power of her soul.

Hegel's prediction regarding America has come true. America with her vast economic resources and atomic weapons is really playing the role of the world-historical nation. Of course, the inexorable law of dialectics demands its replacement by another more glorious nation, and the futility of wars and of armaments is gradually being felt by the powerful nations. Now they are thinking along the line of world peace and prosperity through toleration and co-existence. This is an idea and a cry of the soul which has characterised the history of India in the remote past. Then will the burden of History be revealed in India. Will she guide the nations along the path set for them with a new power—the power of liberty and fraternity?

Craze for expanding empires and imperialism with the desire of establishing national superiority filled the political air when Hegel wrote his Philosophy of History. This stimulated him to generalize that the nation is the best medium of human progress. One hundred years have elapsed since Hegel's time—a period filled with bitter national jealousies and wars. A new age is in the offing, an age of international amity and friendship, and the prospects of national states are on the wane. Attempts are being made to advance and perpetuate the cause of world peace through the mediation of an international organization like U.N.O. In this setting Indian seers like Aurobindo are expecting that the next phase of History will evolve a system where man will dive deep into the ocean of humanity and enjoy the fruits of eternal love and friendship.

Causal Argument in Hume's Dialogues

by

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Hume has so artfully written the dialogues that it becomes very difficult for a casual reader to make out the exact sense or real intentions of Hume. Among this collection of ambiguities there is at least one thing certain, viz. that Hume at places says what he does not mean to say, and very often, does not say what he really wants to.

To humour the public he puts forward certain arguments in favour of the religious hypothesis. To satisfy his own sceptic mind he wants to refute them. The result is that neither the arguments nor their refutation is frank and clear.

Take for example the causal argument in the Dialogues. To put it in a nut-shell, the argument goes as follows:—

Nothing exists without a cause.

Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence. It is absolutely impossible for a thing to produce itself or to be the cause of its own existence.

Now if we proceed to trace effects to their causes, we must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause or some necessarily existent being. To suppose an infinite regress would be absurd. The question naturally arises, why this particular succession existed from eternity and not any other succession or no succession at all. To search for the bases of this argument in Hume's general philosophy would be a thankless task.

Hume's epistemological position can be summarised in these words:—All real knowledge is derived through senses. It can be traced to impressions or ideas, the ideas being only the copies of the impressions.

So his way of testing the truth and the validity of an idea or a piece of knowledge is, "point out the impression from which it is derived." If no such impression is to be found, he rejects the idea as fictitious. With this test of knowledge he proceeds to

examine the idea of causality or necessary connection and finds that it has no impression corresponding to this connection. So there is no logical ground for believing that there is any necessary causal relation between two events, or that there must be a cause for every event. It does not require any penetrating insight to see that an upholder of this thorough empiricism cannot be a believer in the apriori argument for causality, which starts with the assumption that nothing can exist without a cause.

It is curious to note that Philo, with whom many of Hume's learned critics have identified him, comes forward with the remark that nothing exists without a cause, and the original cause of this universe is what we call God. To add to the bewilderment of the reader Hume allows this remark to pass unchallenged. It is reinforced by the repeated assertions of some-one or other character of the dialogues to the effect, that the existence of God is unquestionable. It cannot be doubted by any man of common sense. The difference is only about the nature of God.

From these assertions if we turn to other sections of the Dialogues we find that every thing that was previously agreed upon is doubted. It creates a confusion, which does not seem to be unintended. The reader finds it difficult to judge the real position of Hume. It appears that Hume does not consider himself responsible either for proofs or for refutation and leaves every thing to the reader to make out for himself.

He formulates the argument in an evidently contradictory manner. In proving a necessarily existent being, he cuts at the root of the very conception by asserting that it is absolutely impossible for a thing to be the cause of its own existence.

The same inconclusiveness we find in most of his objections against the causal argument. Let us in brief examine his objections. In the first place he denies the very possibility of an apriori argument in order to demonstrate any matter of fact. Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. There is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction. So there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.

(ii) Further, even if it be necessary, why not suppose the material universe itself to be the necessarily existent Being, or suppose it to be an eternal succession of objects. Thus we do away with the necessity of a First Author, because a thing that exists from eternity cannot have a cause (which implies a priority in time).

In this chain or succession of objects, each part is caused by the preceding part. When we are satisfied about the cause of each part it is absurd to ask for the cause of the whole, just as in case we know the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty, it is very unreasonable to ask for the cause of the whole twenty.

(iii) The sum of the digits of the products of 9 is 9. Take for example 18,27,36. $1 + 8 = 9$, $2 + 7 = 9$, $3 + 6 = 9$. This wonderful regularity is not the work of any cause. It is a necessary result of the nature of numbers. Is it not possible in the same manner, that the whole universe and the order of nature be the necessary outcome of the nature of bodies or matter?

A close consideration of these objections of Hume against the causal argument leads a reader to the same conclusion which Hume has put in the mouth of Philo at the close of the argument. Philo, giving his comment on the argument and its refutation, goes on to say:—"That the argument apriori has seldom been found very convincing except to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning Other people, even of good sense, and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies."

In the first argument what Hume wants to say in so many words is that it is in no way necessary that there should be a necessarily existent being or a first cause. But he does not put it in these simple terms, in order to elude the easy grasp of the public. He does not acquaint the reader with the background of his argument, his starting point and the general position on which he relies. The result is that the reader fails to get a coherent view of his position. No doubt, if we are absolutely cut off from all experience and all reality, mere abstract reason, in that case, will find the existence or non-existence of any being equally possible. Nothing may be necessarily existent then. But having the experience of the world as we do, Hume ought to have shown that the world requires no first cause, or that it is not necessary that every event should have a cause. Hume does not expressly say this anywhere in the dialogues. This can be attributed to the following reasons. Hume's sceptic assertions in his earlier works had aroused so much adverse criticism from all quarters that he had not the courage of openly asserting that a cause is not necessary for an event. This is why we find an apologetic attitude in Hume's letter to Gilbert Stuart, in which he says, "Allow me to

tell you that I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause. I only maintained (in the Treatise) that our certainty of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded neither from intuition, nor demonstration, but from another source." Here Hume invents a new form of certainty, (which he had previously excluded from the species of knowledge), to escape public censure.

The 2nd objection against the causal argument is all the more confusing and misleading. In justifying eternal succession he gives the analogy of a collection of 20 individuals, and asserts that if we know the cause of each individual it would be unreasonable to demand the cause of the whole twenty. If it is not a deliberate effort to confuse the point, one would find it difficult to reconcile it with Hume's unfailing logical mind. Evidently we do not know and cannot know the cause of every object in an infinite succession. Moreover an event is not explained merely by referring it to the preceding event. The law of sufficient reason requires that there must be a complete set of conditions to determine an event. Unless we presuppose a first cause we cannot explain satisfactorily any part or the whole.

As to the last objection, it is not a refutation but only opposing one hypothesis to another. Simply by supposing the universe to be the necessary outcome of the nature of matter, the question of the first cause is only postponed, not dismissed. One may still ask about the cause of matter and its nature.

Embryology and the Theory of Organicism in Psychology

by


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Embryological studies have been mostly studies of physical structural growth and of behavioural development. Two representative studies will be enumerated here in favour of Organicism, namely the experimental studies of Driesch and the studies of Coghill.

The growth studies of Driesch are famous as bearing directly upon the problem of regulation, though his findings as indicative of the fact of internal regulation of a 'Vital Force', operating from within and thus regulating growth in general have not, in general, found support from the experimental and naturalistic biology. Naturalistic Biology finds the reasons for the phenomena, noted by this well-known Embryologist, in the organisation of the Embryo itself. In one of his experiments with the larvae of a sea-urchin, he destroyed one cell among four double cells. If the machine theory of the rigidly fixed cell-net were true, then the creature, if it develops at all, would certainly be a cripple, because the corresponding part is lacking. It was surprising that what actually grew out of the egg was a complete organism though the total size was one fourth less than the normal. To Driesch this was evidence for the inner operation of the 'Entelechy' and he believed that this definitely shows how the 'trans-empirical' principle operates. Coming as the finding does from an eminent biologist, who spent most of his time on an experimental analysis of the material on which he bases his theory, it is certainly a representative view, and the lesson drawn from his experiments is fundamentally organicistic, apart from his conclusions regarding the trans-empirical view, and is in conformity with the findings of K. S. Lashley with regard to the functional aspects of the brain. This particular study with regard to the development of the sea-urchin conclusively shows the operational advantage of the whole over the parts in that it demonstrates that what is lost by the exclusion of a part, is made good by the whole, constituted by the

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remaining parts. Evolution or development of the organism is development of the whole and not individually of the parts taken separately. The organism grows as a whole, and that is why it is possible that the loss sustained by the exclusion of a part can be made good by the rest. It shows the essential unity of the organism, and if growth, change or development, be an inherent function of the living, it certainly takes place not piecemeal, but as one whole function corresponding to one whole structure of the materials, whether, in the ultimate analysis, they be atoms, electrons or any hypothetical or real elements. The functional unity of the cerebrum, as indicated in the studies of Lashley, pointed out the same organised and integrated nature of behaviour. For various reasons these studies cannot be accepted as proofs of Vitalism, because Vitalism is itself an out-worn doctrine. Instead of supposing some 'Entelechy', that operates in making good the loss, Driesch should have taken the integrated nature of the organism as the explanatory fact behind the phenomenon. The same phenomenon that led him to conclude the existence and operation of the 'Entelechy' has led others to the naturalistic and organicistic point of view that the whole is sufficient unto itself, that such organisations in nature are self-explanatory, and finally that the parts are not merely put together in a heterogeneous combination but are organised into a homogeneous whole.

Studies, from which Driesch derived his three proofs of Vitalism, all lend support to the organismic point of view. It is only a difference in the theoretical interpretation that separates Driesch from other Biologists. He followed the rigorous experimental method, and his studies indicate that in collecting facts he was guided by an absolutely objective attitude. But as is well-known, a theoretical bias predisposes the scientist to seek for facts in support of his pet view. Thus the same objective studies are interpreted by a Biologist with a naturalistic bias in a different light. The important fact for Driesch, to be accounted for in each case, is the aspect of adaptive regulation involved in typical processes as illustrated in what he regarded as 'crucial instances in favour of Vitalism'. The general procedure was all along to present such instances as would be utterly inconceivable in terms of a Physico-Chemical theory, which was regarded by him as identical with the narrow mechanistic theory. He offered his own solution by the postulation of an 'Entelechy', a postulate, which he supported by experimental evidence in three fields of investigation. The logic throughout is the same in all the more or less independent lines of investigation, and the logic, peculiarly enough, favours his

Vitalistic as well as the Organicistic points of view. The logic and the facts disprove, without doubt, the physico-chemical and the narrow mechanistic principles, but the rejection of narrow mechanism does not necessarily mean turning to Vitalism or any form of supernaturalistic explanation of phenomena in the vital world.

The first proof against mechanism and in support of the non-mechanistic hypothesis, which we can take as a proof of Organicism also, is the typical experiment, almost crucial in nature, cited above. He showed that a mechanistic principle is not necessary, and this assumption depends upon the fact that the fragmentation of the eggs of certain organisms within wide limits and along any plane at early stages does not affect the development of a normal organism from any one of the parts. The fact that the developing ovum appears to be homogeneous in all its parts leads him to regard it as a 'harmonious equipotential system'. The presence of polarity and bilaterality, as admittedly present in the initial structure of the egg, still leaves it such a system; and since in these crucial experiments extra-organic conditions were judiciously kept constant, the eventual growth by differentiation and complete growth of the organism cannot be due merely to physico-chemical factors, either internal or external. There must be, therefore, some other intervening variable, which cannot be affected by fragmentation. This logic, it is obvious, led him to postulate the 'entelechy' as a 'non-spatial agency', since it is difficult to conceive of such a system as a machine, which in the ordinary sense is not a harmonious equipotential system; and it goes without saying that fragmentation of a machine would disturb its normal activity. Therefore, the conclusion that the developing ovum is not a machine is inevitable from the premises. This principle can be extended to the adult stages of a living process, and this extension can very well be supported by the well-known facts of normal regeneration of lost parts as found in many lower forms.

Apart from Driesch's theoretical interpretation, the facts on which he bases his theory certainly prove the non-mechanistic and the equipotential nature of the living, and are beyond doubt in line with the current emphasis upon 'epigenesis' as contrasted with the traditional 'pre-formation hypothesis' of development. We are, however, not here concerned with the criticism of his vitalistic conclusions or the conclusions of other Biologists, headed by Jenkins, pointing out the limitations of the application of the notion of 'equipotentiality' in the strict sense of the term, because it is

probably applicable to certain types of eggs only; and a restriction of potentiality must, sooner or later, occur as segmentation proceeds. A thorough-going doctrine of 'Epigenesis' will imply the view that the manifoldness of a natural system can increase from within itself and, therefore, a consistent theory of development of the normal organism out of the distorted being does not require to be supported by the postulation of an intangible and unknown something. Equipotentiality and homogeneity of the growing organism contain within themselves the explanation for the normal growth in spite of the distortion. The facts collected are, therefore, proofs of Organicism rather than of Vitalism.

In the field of heredity again Driesch believes the situation is further complicated for the Mechanist by the fact that the aggregate of reproductive cells constitute, more or less, an isolated equipotential system. Any one of these cells, however, produces the normal off-spring similar to the parent organism, a fact which poses the problem how differentiation can ever arise in a homogeneous system. There is, however, no new problem here, provided the continuity of the germ-plasm be admitted, as the egg-production process is essentially the same as any other type of cell-division; and therefore, while Driesch has taken the help of the fact to prove his postulation of the 'Entelechy', this really points in the direction of the organismic point of view.

He finds a further proof for his theoretical position in the commonly accepted facts of regulation in behaviour. Jennings and several other experimental Biologists point out that the living organism, typically enough, exhibits variable behaviour to the same external situation. Driesch infers from this a violation of the causal law. The concept of 'Entelechy' is, therefore, brought in to account for the adaptiveness of behaviour in general. At the risk of gratuitous anthropomorphism and the fallacy of reasoning in a circle, he infers the operation of a sort of teleological principle from adaptiveness of any sort. This can be consistently and satisfactorily explained by the uniqueness of the organism itself.

The most significant facts for our purposes here are the embryological and developmental studies of this eminent biologist. Unfortunately, however, he took a different theoretical position; but so far as he denounces the mechanistic and additive point of view and has crucial experimental evidence in support of the non-mechanistic position, he has established the uniqueness of life phenomena and the growth of the organism as something, which cannot be explained in terms of mechanical addition of parts only.

So far as this non-mechanistic position is concerned, there is no difference between the Vitalist and the Organicist, and rejecting Vitalism does not necessarily mean the ignorance of the fundamental uniqueness of the living and its growth. The appearance of the complete organism in spite of the distortion of the original living material is a phenomenon, which has been verified by many subsequent experimentalists. This phenomenon is evidently possible because of the division of another cell, which thus assumes the function of the one removed. It is really the whole, functioning as a whole, that leads to this interesting phenomenon, and if the whole is taken as one and serves as the natural entelechy instead of the super-natural vital force, there is nothing wrong. Even the Naturalist and the Organicist is willing to reduce that position to what he calls the 'organisation', which is its own vital force. It is the very behaviour or property of an organisation of integrated parts. This is exactly the phenomenon, which the Gestalists prefer to think in terms of 'praganz', a principle which is less metaphysical because of its more recent promulgation.

2. Studies of Coghill: Formulation of the most important Law of Developmental Direction from his Embryological Studies.

Coghill is another front-rank experimentalist whose findings have lent a powerful support to the Organicistic position. In his embryological studies of the common salamander, he found that the earliest movements are made by the most anterior part of the muscle system of the trunk; with the development of the external gills, forelimbs and the hind-limbs, their first movements are made with the movement of the trunk. Coghill believes that this kind of expanding behaviour pattern is applicable to all kinds of vertebrates. Results obtained from his experiments on simple animals, the amblystoma, are very illuminating and these can safely be applied to the developmental studies of the human foetus and to those of the infant. He found that till a certain stage of growth the little organism of the animal is non-motile and does not react to tactual stimulations, but the separately developed muscle-segments can be stimulated by electrical stimuli. The first stage of motor reaction is the simple flexure stage. At this stage the head being touched, there will be a reaction by bending the head away from the stimulus. The lower parts of the body are not yet sensitive. With further maturation this typical bending response extends downwards and the entire body reacts by the coiling reaction. Land locomotion of this animal is still more significant. At first the legs move as a part of the whole body reaction. It

appears as if the animal is simply repeating the swimming movement. It is only gradually that specific definite reaction of the legs to suit the definite reaction of walking takes place. Independent movement of the whole leg first and next the restricted specific motion of the parts occur. From these observations Coghill generalises that the earlier movements involve a mass reaction of the entire body. Development by maturation consists in a gradual differentiation of more and more specific movements of the primarily integrated and generalised behaviour pattern. This generalisation is found to be true in the genesis of motor behaviour in the human foetus before birth and is also found to be working in the motor co-ordination in the baby after birth. The developmental direction observed in the amblystoma is also found to be true in the case of children.

These data have led to certain important generalisations regarding the basic principles governing behaviour development. It is evident from these studies that mass activity precedes specific behaviour. The responses of the foetus are in the beginning diffuse and non-specific. The organism not completely differentiated into the normal organisation of the animal or the human infant reacts as a whole and it is only later that specific reactions concerning parts of the organism emerge in the course of maturation by further differentiation. Differentiation and specification of functions can take place only with further differentiation and specification of the structural organisation. The nervous system, it seems, concerns itself first with the maintenance of the integrity of the individual and only later makes provision for local reflexes.

Coghill has, therefore, assembled valuable testimony concerning the origin of reflexes. It is evident from his findings that reflexes as discrete or as simple but rigid S-R bonds are not to be found in the premature organism. What is noted is a definitely generalised whole reaction involving the whole organism and, therefore, the specific S-R bonds are only the later differentiations. Development is from the general to the specific, obviously an approach just opposite the Reflex approach. Coghill's, without doubt, is a very wide generalisation and will be applicable to all kinds of development. For Genetic Psychology this has been an invaluable experimental contribution.

These findings are important in another sense in that they have changed the connotation of the term 'original nature'. These embryological investigations into the pre-natal development of structure and function of the organism show that the behaviour

patterns at birth (which Watson has rather capitalised as S-R bonds out of which the whole behavioural history of the organism comes to exist) have their history behind at the pre-natal stage of development. Studies of pre-natal development reveal rather the primarily integrated nature of behaviour, and that behaviour is not a mechanical combination of unrelated and separate elements of behaviour like the reflex acts. The idea of a rigid system of fixed parts has been replaced by a flexible and variable system. The earliest reaction is, to start with, an integrated reaction, and the reflexes observed at birth are only the fragmentary parts of the whole reaction and are the results of differentiation along with the differentiation of the structure of the organism at the foetal or even at the earlier stages of germinal differentiation. This presupposes the fundamental fact that differentiation is not one of quantity alone, taking place by cell-division and multiplication, but also differentiation of the property of the divided and multiplied cells, as a result of which functional differentiation also takes place. All these differentiated parts serve again the common purpose of the maintenance of the integrity of the organism and any action, therefore, is the total reaction of the whole organism. The nervous system is not merely a connection mechanism like a telephone system, operating between definite stimuli and responses as is typically supposed to be the case in a reflex function; it is a correlator and an organiser of behaviour also. The function of the organism, in fact of the nervous system, is mainly integrative in nature.

This approach lays greater stress on the integrity and continuity of behaviour. From this point of view, birth is not a zero point in life and the individual's behaviour development, as is evident, beyond any dispute, whatsoever, from the embryological studies; it is only an incident in the series of incidents in the continuous process of growth and differentiation. Brooks has aptly observed:

This breaks down the absolute barrier between reflex and habit and between the native and the acquired . . . Modern Psychology regards the child as an integrated and continuously growing organism, developing under the inter-acting influences of his own structural characteristics and of the environment about him.

A Swiss Neurologist, Minkowski, had similarly shown that with human foetuses at the earliest stages of growth, when the foetuses are only a few centimetres in length, occurrences of re-

flexes in the sense of fixed S-R connections are not observed. The reflexes as discrete acts are not found, but simple acts of the type are always found to be allied with other movements. He found, for example, the pattern of the movement of toes, as group differentiates, out of a larger pattern of movements of the leg, foot and toes. Here are again studies, which go to disprove the existence and operation of such an entity as the simple reflex, for the occurrence of which there is no evidence. Sherrington, as early as 1905, had recognised this point, because he described the so-called simple reflex as pure 'abstract conception.'

These embryological studies have in a way revolutionised the traditional belief that complexity of behaviour emerging with the progressive maturity of the organism is derived by the progressive integration of more and more originally discrete units. The story of the organism is being told now just the other way—that out of organisation comes a complexity of organisation through differentiation, and that differentiation comes in between the higher and the lower forms of organisation; specification, it is held, is not the start, nor is it the end. From a cosmos, relatively undifferentiated, comes a cosmos, not from a chaos.

It is, therefore, asserted that the integration of the organism and its behaviour or properties follow from the very nature of the organism. Integration or organised behaviour has not to be explained by super-imposing a super-natural agency operating from without or from within. Organisation is the very nature of the living, and organisation of behaviour as the necessary outcome of the integrative action of the structural system needs no other principle for explanation. Nature is sufficient unto itself, and organic existence is sufficient to account for all that is organic. That is the final naturalistic and organismic point of view, not only held by biology, but extended even to the physical universe. The entire process of evolution is governed and guided by this fundamental law which no science can ignore.

Reviews

GAUḌAPĀDA : A STUDY IN EARLY ADVAITA

REPLY TO A REVIEW

A brief reply is here attempted to Sri Chandrodaya Bhattacharya's review of my work, *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita*, published in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, pp. 145-151. I am using the expression 'attempted' advisedly, because my work on Gauḍapāda itself is an *attempt*, as the reviewer rightly observes; and I can only attempt a reply to the considered and scholarly review of my friend Sri Bhattacharya.

The reviewer has his own notions about what a scholarly work ought to be; and he is quite definite that in a study of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda there is no place for the Upaniṣadic stories. It is well known that the so-called Upaniṣadic stories are not mere stories. Each one of them has a rich philosophic content. And, in a work on Gauḍapāda, whose *Kārikā* (I do not know if an English rendering of this word should be given, as per the directions of the reviewer) is based on the Upaniṣads, and who refers to these stories himself, these stories cannot certainly be 'out of place'. Sri Bhattacharya says, 'The book also contains many of the important Upaniṣadic stories connected with the doctrine of non-duality of the Self'. If the stories are *connected with* the doctrine of non-duality, I ask, can they be 'out of place'? After all, what are the stories that I have related? and how many? In Chapter II I have given the important episodes of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* and shown how Gauḍapāda has drawn upon them. The title of the chapter is 'The Upaniṣadic Basis of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā'. In Chapter V, I have referred to certain episodes of the same Upaniṣads relating to *Prāṇa*, because they are cited by Śaṅkara himself in his commentary, and the citation is warranted by the *Kārikā*. I wonder by what criterion the learned reviewer has decided that these episodes are irrelevant and too many.

Sri Bhattacharya takes exception to my use of Sanskrit words in English sentences. But he ought to know that the use of such words is inevitable in a work of this kind. And, the majority of those who are likely to read it will not be those who would find those words either strange or unintelligible. 'If such words are used at all', advises Sri Bhattacharya, 'they should be immediately accompanied by their English rendering.' It is, however, not in

his interest to mention that my book carries a glossary of Sanskrit terms.

He refers to my admission in the Preface that there are a few errors in print, and objects to my characterization of them as venial. And, in justification of his objection he cites footnote 17 on page 84 where the reference is printed as 'Gk II, 23' instead of 'Gk III, 23'. I am, however, grateful to Sri Bhattacharya for drawing my attention to such a grave error.

But he alleges graver errors in my book, which I must examine. The first of these allegations is regarding my understanding of the relation between Gauḍapāda and Buddhism. My thesis is that Gauḍapāda is not a Bauddha, and that his work is not to be characterized as a treatise on Buddhism. Positively stated he is a continuator of the philosophy of the Upaniṣadic sages like Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka, and not of Bauddha teachers like Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. I can understand Sri Chandrodaya Bhattacharya's elaborate argument, if he disagreed with my thesis. But strangely enough, he seems to agree with it. He concedes that my refutation of the view that Gauḍapāda is a Bauddha, 'would, on the whole, seem to be justified'. Yet he holds that I go 'a bit too far', that I 'overshoot the mark'. How much far do I go? What is the mark? How do I overshoot it? If Gauḍapāda is not a Bauddha, if he is a Vedāntin, an Aupaniṣada teacher, then it is obvious that it is Vedānta that he teaches, and not Buddhist doctrines, and that between Vedānta and Buddhist doctrines there ought to be significant points of difference. Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, against many of whose conclusions regarding Gauḍapāda and his work, I have had to argue in my book, while admitting that Gauḍapāda is to be regarded as an Advaita teacher, still insists that that teacher has accepted and approved of the Bauddha doctrines and advocated them throughout his *Kārikā*. My position is that, although Gauḍapāda makes use of Bauddha terminology and arguments especially in the fourth *prakaraṇa*, he advocates Vedānta, and not Buddhism. I do admit, as Sri Chandrodaya Bhattacharya himself recognizes, that Advaita and Buddhism have influenced each other. But how this admission is equal to granting 'almost all Prof. V. Bhattacharya tries to maintain in this connection', I am not able to understand. Sri Chandrodaya Bhattacharya does not like my suggestion that Gauḍapāda must have adopted Bauddha modes of expression and techniques of argument even as the Hindu monks who preach Vedānta in the countries of

the West to-day feel the necessity of clothing their thoughts in Christian expressions. But he does not say why this suggestion is unpalatable. He merely says that the hypothesis of mutual influence is more probable. But I fail to see why both my suggestion and what Sri Bhattacharya claims as the more probable hypothesis—which I have not denied—cannot be true. What I have attempted to show in the chapter on 'Gauḍapāda and Buddhism' is that Gauḍapāda's main aim is 'to expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that he does not deviate from his purpose even when he adopts the arguments of the Bauddha Idealists and dresses his thought in Buddhist terminology.' As I have understood Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya from what he has written in his *Āgama-śāstra of Gauḍapāda*, I am certain that he would not endorse my view. My reviewer too, obviously, differs from this view. The straight course, then, for either of them should be to say that Gauḍapāda is a Bauddha in disguise, that he is not a Vedāntin at all.

Probably, I will be accused of going too far: and Sri Chandrodaya Bhattacharya will say, 'I am not one of those classical opponents of Advaita who regarded it as non-Vedic, veiled Buddhism, and who were of the view that the teachings of the Upaniṣads and of Buddhism are incompatible. I, on the contrary, hold that there is practically no difference between the Brahman of the Upaniṣads, on the one hand, and the *viññaptimātra* of Vijñānavāda and the *Sūnya* of Nāgārjuna, on the other'.

I hold the view, as already indicated, that there are significant points of difference between Advaita-Vedānta and the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrines of Vijñānavāda and Sūnyavāda, in spite of similarities. My reviewer, however, is convinced that I have not understood properly the Mahāyāna texts, and has kindly referred me back to the works of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. One of the texts he wants me to read again is Candrakīrti's commentary on *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, xiii, 8. He himself has given his reading of the text. According to him, Candrakīrti's statement about śūnyatā (characterlessness) is similar to the Vedāntic view that Brahman is devoid of all qualities (*nirguṇa*); to argue that voidness or characterlessness is itself a character is like arguing that 'absence of all qualities' is a quality. I am afraid that Sri Chandrodaya Bhattacharya is oversimplifying the matter. Brahman is not characterless; it is only devoid of characteristics. To say that Brahman is the plenary reality, involving no 'distinction', is not the same as saying that voidness is ultimate. As understood by Advaita teach-

ers, the Sūnyavāda-negation is limitless; it is bare negation. The advocates of Sūnyatā doctrine have not denied this charge. The reviewer cites *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, xviii, 9, as evidence to show that Nāgārjuna admits such a thing as ultimate truth, which 'can be realized only in one's own experience', which is 'quiescent, speechless, and altogether unitary in character'. I do not think that Sri Bhattacharya's rendering of the expressions employed in the *kārikā* brings out the meaning correctly. According to Candrakīrti's explanation, the truth is seen only by those whose vision has been cured by the application of the ointment of voidness (*sūnyatā-darśanāñjanāñjita-buddhinayanāḥ*). The truth is not speechless; it cannot be spoken about (*prapañcair-aprapaṇcitam = vāgbhir-avyāhṛtam*), because it is void; there is not even knowledge of it; how can there be any speech about it? (*yatra jñāna-syāpy apracāraḥ kaḥ punar vādo 'kṣarānām.*) It is of the one essence, which is voidness (*sūnyatayaikarasatvāt*). Thus it is clear that although Nāgārjuna makes use of Upaniṣadic terms, he uses them to mean *sūnya*. That in some of the later schools of Buddhism the doctrine of the void was given up and a positive conception of reality appears instead is a different matter, with which we are not concerned here.

Discussing Vijñānavāda, I have stated that while the distinction between the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* may be explained in Advaita, it becomes difficult of explanation in Vijñānavāda. The reviewer holds the opposite view. The Vijñānavādin, says he, can easily distinguish between the *parikalpita* house (whether seen in dream or in wakefulness) and the *paratantra* idea which is supposed to correspond to the house. Even admitting his definition of this distinction, my objection stands, because for the Vijñānavādin there is nothing external or other than ideas. Is there a *parikalpita* house at all apart from the *paratantra* idea, wherefrom it can be distinguished? As for Advaita, I have explained that there is only one truth, which is the *pāramārthika*; what is called the *vyāvahārika* is an appearance thereof; and the *prātibhāsika* is an appearance within that appearance. In fact, there can be ever so many grades of appearance; *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* are only convenient distinctions.

I now come to two other criticisms urged by my reviewer, which refer to my understanding of Advaita itself. The first concerns the relation between reasoning and Scripture. His verdict is that my discussion of this topic is 'an amalgam of what Vedānta says on the subject and the Bradleyan criticism of thought', that

my account, as it stands, is 'vague, obscure and unconvincing', and that the obscurity is due, at least in part, to the importation of the Bradleyan criticism of thought'. How this is so, he does not explain. Is the employment of the Bradleyan dialectic intrinsically bad? As he has no objection to the use of the Bauddha dialectic, why should he have any to the use of the Bradleyan criticism of thought? Does he not accept the Vedāntic view that the ultimate truth cannot be gained by mere logic (*tarka*)? If this Vedāntic view can be explained by making use of Bradley's arguments, is there anything wrong in that procedure? I suppose, he does not mean to say that I identify the Bradleyan metaphysic with Advaita. I have indicated the nature of the help and the limits of the Veda. I have referred to the procedure of inquiry consisting of study of Scriptures (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), and meditation (*nididhyāsana*). I have devoted one whole chapter to the consideration of 'the way and the goal'. Yet, Sri Bhattacharya complains that I have not discussed the problem of how the mediate knowledge of the Self received at first from Scripture may be made immediate. I am glad that at least he acknowledges the fact that 'this question has been raised and answered by classical writers on Advaitism'.

In connection with the same criticism, Sri Bhattacharya objects to my rendering the term '*upapatti*' as 'intelligibility in the light of reasoning.' As a canon of Scriptural interpretation, he rightly says, *upapatti* means that when Scripture itself offers arguments in support of a particular Scriptural statement, then, we are to know that this particular statement expresses the principal intention of Scripture. But, how is this incompatible with my rendering of *upapatti*, or its interpretation. From the fact of the reasonableness of a particular text, we are to determine that it is purposeful. In other words, Scripture itself offers reasons for what it teaches. It makes out that what it teaches is intelligible in the light of reasoning.

The other criticism is about 'self-knowledge'. Sri Bhattacharya finds fault with my description of the intuitive experience of the Self (*anubhava*, *ātmakṣātkāra*) as the knowledge that is the Self. His reason is that Self-knowledge is something that is to be brought about and is incompatible with ignorance, whereas the Self which is eternal is what reveals ignorance. Sri Bhattacharya is evidently confusing Self-knowledge with the *akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti* (the final modification of the mind that has taken the form of the

impartite reality). It is this *vr̥tti* that reveals the Self, and is incompatible with ignorance. Destroying ignorance, it destroys itself. Self-knowledge that is eternal is only figuratively spoken of as being attained, gained or brought about. The usage 'knowledge of the Self' is analogous to the expression 'the head of Rāhu'. Terms like *mokṣa*, *anubhava*, *prajñāna*, *sākṣātkāra* signify the Self. Let me quote a few statements made by classical Advaita teachers. Padmapāda says in the *Pañcapādikā*, 'There are characteristics such as happiness, objective experience, and eternity; although they are not separate, they appear as if separate from consciousness'. (*ānando viṣayānubhavo nityatvam iti santi dharmāḥ, apr-thaktve 'pi caitanyāt prthag ivā 'vabhāsante.*) Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya observes in the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha*, 'When the Self is conditioned by objects, it is spoken of as experience; and when the adjuncts are not intended, it is called the Self'. (*ātmaiva viṣayopādihiko 'nubhava iti vyapadiśyate, avivakṣitopādhiś ca ātme 'ti.*) In the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, Vimuktātman declares that *anubhūti* (experience) is infinite. Raising an objection, 'There can be no experience without an experiencing self; how, then, can experience be infinite?', he replies; 'The self itself is experience'.

In conclusion, I must thank Sri Chandrodaya Bhattacharya for the time and energy he has devoted to the review of my book. I must thank him also for the opportunity he has given me of thinking again, to some purpose, about Gauḍapāda and Advaita.

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

THE CENTRAL PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM; A study of Mādhyamika System, by T. R. V. Murti, M.A., D.Litt., published by Messrs. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Ruskin House, Museum Street, London. Price 30 shillings net.

In these days of rapidly dwindling standards, aimless education and research, and commercialism in the sphere of scholarship, it is comforting to see the talented author Dr. Murti labouring assiduously for years for the production of this monumental work in which Indian scholarship has reached almost its Himalayan peak. Any remark that can be made in respect of this book must therefore be only in the superlative.

The book is divided into three main parts, and it comprises fourteen chapters of abiding value and of absorbing interest. In

addition, there is a scholarly and authoritative Glossary of technical terms, an appendix containing an illuminating note on the different kinds of *Sūnyatā*, and a flawless and exhaustive Index.

Part I of the book is mainly historical, and traces the origin and development of the Mādhyamika philosophy and its dialectic to resolve the conflict between the *Ātmavāda* (substance view of reality) and *Anātmavāda* (the modal view of reality). The influence of the Mādhyamika philosophy on later philosophical schools such as *Vijñānavāda* and *Vedānta* has also been indicated in full.

The second part forms the principal matter of the book and is devoted to a critical exposition of the Mādhyamika philosophy, of the structure and application of the dialectic to thought categories, and of the conception of the Absolute and its ethics and religion.

The third part compares the Mādhyamika with some of the well-known dialectical systems of the West—of Kant, Hegel and Bradley, and undertakes a short study of the different absolutisms such as Mādhyamika, *Vijñānavāda* and *Vedānta* whose separate standpoints are not generally appreciated.

The author, who is eminently qualified and equipped to undertake an incursion into the mysteries of the complicated and obscure Mādhyamika system which for centuries dominated the thought and culture of Asia, has done wonderfully well in recording the whole system in such fullness as would astonish any scholar who is acquainted with Buddhist philosophy. He has not omitted a single authority which is capable of making a contribution to our understanding of the subject. He has not only consulted early Buddhist works on Mādhyamika, *Yogācāra* and *Tāntric Buddhism*, but also utilized all Hindu philosophical treatises which either criticised the Mādhyamika system or added some information for a fuller understanding of the system. He has not only laid under contribution the Jain religion and philosophy, but has also ransacked the writings of all the eminent thinkers of the East and the West for this monumental work.

The book is complete, exhaustive, deep and penetrating, and is replete with rich information on Buddhist philosophy in particular and Indian philosophy in general. Dr. Murti may easily be considered as the greatest authority on Buddhist philosophy today.

In India, right from the dawn of history, no differentiation has ever been made between science and philosophy, and this fact is rarely taken into account by the so-called friends of San-

skrit. Both of these, *Jñāna* (knowledge) and *Vijñāna* (science) went by the one name of *Darśana* (philosophy), and it is due to this peculiar circumstance that half-educated people usually decry Sanskrit as being indifferent to science. That may be one of the reasons why Sanskrit is being neglected in modern days in India, the birthplace of Sanskrit language and culture.

Because philosophy and science are one and the same and are covered under the one title of *Darśana* (Immediate Knowledge), the subject has become such a life and death question with Indian thinkers. The ultimate cosmic substratum, whether it is *Śūnya*, *Vijñāna*, *Brahma* or *God* (*Yahweh*), must be logically and scientifically established before a Church can be built where millions of people will receive initiation and practise spiritual discipline, and by intense meditation proceed to realise the One Life of all lives, One Thought of all thoughts, and the One Origin of all origins, the *Prajñāpāramitā* or Perfect Intuition, or in the memorable words of Dr. Radhakrishnan—"The One Breathing Breathless". The knowledge of the ultimate cosmic substratum must be inherently right, because otherwise millions are likely to go the wrong way and pass through wrong channels of *Avidyā*, the ultimate result being a complete frustration of their spiritual aspirations.

With the West, philosophy is an individual excursion into the domain of the ultimate origins with no following and no *Sampradāya* (congregation). In the West, philosophy seems to be an acrobatics in logic, reasoning, arguments and dogmas. This philosophy is no guide to spiritual discipline of a huge congregation, undertaken solely for the spiritual uplift with a view to obtaining liberation. Western philosophy at its best is a Point of View, while Indian philosophy is something more, it is a Way of Life.

The author most appropriately recognises the *Mādhyamika* as the Central Philosophy of Buddhism, and there cannot be any dispute on this point. The *Mādhyamika* dialectic concerns itself with *Śūnyavāda* in which *Śūnya* is taken as the ultimate cosmic substratum from which everything else originated. This *Śūnya* transcends the four categories of existence, non-existence, a combination of the two and a negation of the two. *Śūnya* is the Absolute Transcendental Intuition which cannot be described in words, but can be realised by intense meditation and mental concentration. The power of the mind is wonderful. It can adjust itself to any idea or thought, and realise it even without the help

of words. By concentration and meditation, mind can raise itself up to an Absolute *Śūnya* which transcends the four categories above stated. The Buddhists even go so far as to declare that *Samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* are only two different conditions of the mind.

The conception of *Śūnya* is reached through a dialectic process which is a battle of reasons, arguments and counter-arguments. All philosophical dogmas, theories and ideas are ruthlessly examined from the point of view of *Śūnyavāda*, and while the validity of *Śūnya* is established, all other points of view are rejected. It is like protecting the fortress of *Śūnya* against continual bombardment of other systems of thought.

Meticulous care is taken to establish the truth of *Śūnya* as the ultimate cosmic substratum, because the conclusion should not only be philosophically and logically correct, but also must form the basis of a scientific cosmic mechanism. In later systems of philosophy this *Śūnya* is taken as the ultimate cause, although in describing the ultimate there is some difference with regard to nomenclature and the nature of the ultimate. Thus *Vijñānavāda* will not accept *Śūnya* as the ultimate cause, but instead consider *Vijñāna* (cosmic consciousness) as the cause of the universe. In *Vedānta* the ultimate cause is *Brahman* with existence, consciousness and bliss as the attributes of the ultimate cause. In all these schools of thought the nature of the ultimate is almost the same with minor differences.

Scientifically speaking, all tangible things are condensations of the ultimate cause, call it by any name you choose,—*Śūnya*, *Vijñāna*, *Mahāsukha*, *Brahman*, *Śabda-Brahman* (Sound as *Brahman*), or *God* (*Yahweh*). What is philosophically true must also be scientifically true, otherwise these systems of philosophy have very little chance of survival. The *Śūnya* or *Vijñāna* ought to be realised by meditation and mental concentration, or by scientific observation and experiment, or by both. But science which is dependent entirely on *Pratyakṣa* (direct perception) has to labour under a great disadvantage. Science can at best, reach a stage inferior to that to which the power of mind can rise. Science therefore should be satisfied with a knowledge of the stage where *Śūnya* has condensed itself in things tangible. So far science has dealt with the qualities of primordial matter (*Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*) and two of the five *Tanmātras*, namely, the Sound-rudiment and the Form-rudiment, but is yet ignorant of the cosmic rays and radiations which were an open book to the ancients.


They could play with these rays and radiations which were and still are freely floating around.

The Vajrayāna shows the intermediate stage to which science can reach, by maintaining that "wherever there is manifestation it must be Śūnya in essence." The deities are the manifestations of Śūnya and they have a form and colour. They are the residents of the invisible world and can be realised and visualised through meditation. This element of colour which is a condensation of Śūnya is found in every tangible thing, and the presence of Śūnya can be detected in the form of cosmic colour. This cosmic colour is the stage to which science can reach but has not reached so far.

Vajrayāna works and the Sādhana literature are replete with information on rays and radiations which are the condensations of Śūnya or the ultimate cosmic substratum. The five Dhyāni Buddhas are the condensed forms of the five Skandhas or elements, akin to the five *Tanmātras* (rudiments) of the Sāṅkhya system. These elements are at the back of the world of matter. The five Dhyāni Buddhas are the concentrates of cosmic colours which are, to all intents and purposes, omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent, and can be seen everywhere on all tangible manifestations. A simple prism will show the presence of these cosmic colours in all tangible things, proving at once that the world of matter in its ultimate state is nothing but rays and radiations. This stage is much higher than the research on Primordial Matter in which modern science engages itself. In future, when science will deal with rays and radiations, enough scientific information will be found in the philosophical and Tāntric works of India to engage scientists for centuries.

By virtue of its priceless contents Dr. Murti's Central Philosophy of Buddhism will for a long time remain the only standard and authoritative work on the subject, and if I may venture a prediction, it will never be excelled. Dr. Murti's work is one of the last batch of brilliant books produced by an Indian, before oriental scholarship in India sinks into chronic decadence. Signs of this, alas! are too apparent.

B. BHATTACHARYYA



Books Received

1. "The Meeting of the East and the West" in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy, by Prof. S. K. Maitra, published by Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry.
2. "Anekantavada" published by Shree Jaina Atmanand Sabha, Bhavnagar.
3. "Research of Reality (God)" by Vijay Shankar Rai, published by Shraddha Prakashan, Jabalpur, price Rs. 10/-
4. "New Depths in Philosophy" by Swami Madhavtirtha, Vedant Ashram, Valad, price Rs. 2/-.
5. "Introduction to Bhagavad-Gita" by D. S. Sarma, published by International Book House, Bombay.
6. Selections from Pāli Jātakas by N. K. Bhagwat, published by International Book House, Bombay, price Rs. 3/- only.
7. "The Philosophy of the Church Fathers", Vol. I, by Harry Austryn Wolfson, published by Harvard University Press. Price 10 dollars.

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