JL
m73,N55
N55
69626

VOLUME 297 JANUARY 1955

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political
and Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*



ETHICAL STANDARDS AND PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Edited by
BENSON Y. LANDIS, Ph.D., LL.D., L.H.D.
Associate Executive Director
Central Department of Research and Survey
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America
New York City

Copyright 1955, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1955

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

ASHMORE, HARRY. *The Negro and the Schools.* Morris R. Mitchell 152

BAKKE, E. WIGHT, *et al. Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity.* Melvin J. Segal 138

BARCLAY, GEORGE W. *A Report on Taiwan's Population to the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction.* Dudley Kirk 179

BENNETT, JOHN C., *et al. Christian Values and Economic Life.* Benson Y. Landis 161

BERGSON, ABRAM, and HANS HEYMANN, JR. *Soviet National Income and Product, 1940–48.* P. J. D. Wiles 169

BLUMBERG, NATHAN B. *One-Party Press? Coverage of the 1952 Presidential Campaign in 35 Daily Newspapers.* Dayton D. McKean 135

BOND, FLOYD A., *et al. Our Needy Aged.* Robert J. Havighurst 149

BOWLE, JOHN. *Politics and Opinion in the Nineteenth Century: An Historical Introduction.* Harry V. Jaffa 155

BOXER, CHARLES R. *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602–1686.* Harry Bernstein 181

BROWN, HARRISON. *The Challenge of Man's Future.* William Vogt 139

BUTOW, ROBERT J. C. *Japan's Decision to Surrender.* Albert E. Kane 180

CHASE, STUART, in collaboration with MARIAN TYLER CHASE. *Power of Words.* Ithiel de Sola Pool 156

CHESSMAN, CARYL. *Cell 2455-Death Row.* Austin MacCormick 144

COBBAN, ALFRED. *Ambassador and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague.* Pieter Geyl 173

COLE, G. D. H. *Socialist Thought: Marxism and Anarchism, 1850–1890.* James Edward Gillespie 157

COLE, STEWART G., and MILDRED WIESE COLE. *Minorities and the American Promise: The Conflict of Principle and Practice.* Milton M. Gordon 147

CONNALLY, TOM. *My Name Is Tom Connally.* Robert Roth 130

CURRAN, FRANCIS X., S.J. *The Churches and the Schools.* Alvin W. Johnson 160

EELLS, WALTER CROSBY. *Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far East.* Paul J. Braisted 152

FITZGIBBON, RUSSELL H. *Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy.* John Gillin 181

FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (Ed.). *Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Conference held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 1953.* Carl G. Anthon 156

GATES, PAUL WALLACE. *Fifty Million Acres: Conflicts over Kansas Land Policy, 1854–1890.* A. T. Volwiler 142

Groupe d'Études de la Comptabilité Nationale, Le. *Premiers Éléments d'une Compatibilité Nationale de la Belgique, 1948–1951.* Arthur Leon Horniker .. 174

GRYGIER, TADEUSZ. *Oppression: A Study in Social and Criminal Psychology.* Georg K. Stürup 144

PAGE

GURIAN, WALDEMAR, and M. A. FITZSIMONS (Eds.). *The Catholic Church in World Affairs.* D. W. Brogan 158

HAFEN, LEROY, and ANN W. HAFEN. *Old Spanish Trail, Santa Fe to Los Angeles.* A. R. Mortensen 137

HANDLIN, OSCAR. *The American People in the Twentieth Century.* Frank H. Hankins 146

HANRAHAN, GENE Z. *The Communist Struggle in Malaya.* George McT. Kahin 167

HARDY, EDWARD ROCHIE, in collaboration with CYRIL C. RICHARDSON (Eds.). *Christology of the Later Fathers.* Morton S. Enslin 162

HARRIS, LOUIS. *Is There a Republican Majority?* Angus Campbell 129

HARRISON, BRIAN. *Southeast Asia: A Short History.* John F. Cady 176

HARTER, D. LINCOLN, and JOHN SULLIVAN. *Propaganda Handbook.* Malcolm M. Willey 145

HOEFFDING, OLEG. *Soviet National Income and Product in 1928.* Naum Jasny 168

HSU, FRANCIS L. K. (Ed.). *Aspects of Culture and Personality: A Symposium.* John J. Honigmann 143

HUMPHREYS, R. A. *Liberation in South America, 1806–1827.* J. Fred Rippy .. 182

JACOBS, WILBUR R. (Ed.). *Indians of the Southern Colonial Frontier.* M. L. Wardell 136

JEFFERSON, THOMAS. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson.* Vol. IX: *November 1785 to 22 June 1786.* Leslie Lipson 135

JEFFERYS, JAMES B. *Retail Trading in Britain, 1850–1950.* Witt Bowden 163

KASIUS, CORA (Ed.). *New Directions in Social Work.* Arthur E. Fink 151

KENNAN, GEORGE F. *Realities of American Foreign Policy.* Samuel Flagg Bemis 125

KIGER, JOSEPH C. *Operating Principles of the Larger Foundations.* Wilmer Shields Rich 148

KLIMOV, GREGORY. *The Terror Machine: The Inside Story of the Soviet Administration in Germany.* Translated by H. C. Stevens. Ralph F. Bischoff .. 170

KRUTCH, JOSEPH W. (Ed.). *Is the Common Man Too Common?* Rudolf Allers 150

LANDAU, JACOB M. *Parliament and Parties in Egypt.* Harry N. Howard 176

LINDBERG, JOHN. *Foundations of Social Survival.* Heinrich A. Rommen 154

LYON, JEAN. *Just Half a World Away: My Search for the New India.* M. S. Sundaram 165

MCNAIR, ARNOLD DUNCAN. *The Development of International Justice.* Josef L. Kunz 128

MANDER, LINDEN A. *Some Dependent Peoples of the South Pacific.* Stephen W. Reed 166

MARVICK, DWAINE. *Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Setting.* A. E. Buck. 133

MENDELSOHN, RONALD. *Social Security in the British Commonwealth: Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.* Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 163

MILLET, JOHN D. *Management in the Public Service.* Lloyd M. Short 132

PAGE

MORTON, T. RALPH. *Community of Faith: The Changing Pattern of the Church's Life.* Conrad H. Moehlman ... 162

NEEDHAM, JOSEPH, with the research assistance of LING WANG. *Science and Civilisation in China.* Derk Bodde ... 178

NEWMAN, BARNARD. *Report on Indo-China.* William Leon Smyser ... 177

NORTHROP, F. S. C. *European Union and United States Foreign Policy.* Robert Strausz-Hupé ... 126

PINKHAM, LUCILE. *William III and the Respectable Revolution.* Alfred F. Havighurst ... 164

PINSON, KOPPEL S. *Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization.* Louis L. Snyder ... 170

PRICE, DON K. *Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy.* H. R. Crane ... 132

PRIMM, JAMES NEAL. *Economic Policy in the Development of a Western State, Missouri, 1820–1860.* Harold F. Williamson ... 141

PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN. *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court.* Arthur Garfield Hays ... 130

SALVEMINI, GAETANO. *Prelude to World War II.* William E. Rappard ... 171

SANGER, RICHARD H. *The Arabian Peninsula.* Emil Lengyel ... 175

SCHIFFER, WALTER. *The Legal Community of Mankind: A Critical Analysis of the Modern Concept of World Organization.* John B. Whitton ... 127

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation.* Oliver L. Reiser ... 153

SPENCER, PHILIP. *Politics of Belief in Nineteenth-Century France: Lacordaire, Michon, Veuillot.* Paul Farmer ... 172

STOCKING, GEORGE W. *Basing Point Pricing and Regional Development.* Gardner Ackley ... 140

TAX INSTITUTE. *Federal-State-Local Tax Correlation.* Marvel Stockwell ... 134

THIRUMALAI, S. *Post-War Agricultural Problems and Policies in India.* George Kuriyan ... 166

VLAVIANOS, BASIL J., and FELIKS GROSS (Eds.). *Struggle for Tomorrow: Modern Political Ideologies of the Jewish People.* Melville Jacobs ... 159

WALRAS, LÉON. *Elements of Pure Economics or the Theory of Social Wealth.* Translated by William Jaffé. Arthur Smithies ... 138

WELCH, FRANCIS S. (Ed.). *Preparing for the Public Utility Rate Case.* G. Lloyd Wilson ... 140

WORCESTER, DAISY LEE WORTHINGTON. *Grim the Battles.* A. David Bouterse 148

WYNNER, EDITH. *World Federal Government. Why? What? How? In Maximum Terms.* Richard H. Heindel ... 129

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR ... 183

OTHER BOOKS ... 184

INDEX ... 190

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index.*

FOREWORD

This issue contains a symposium on the formulation of ethical standards of practice within specific professional groups. The volume is in large part a revision of some of the subject matter appearing in THE ANNALS of May 1922.

The materials are presented in two parts. The first contains articles on developments within particular professions. The second contains three comprehensive or generalizing articles that sum up the problem of defining a profession and the evidence that business management is becoming a profession. As the third article, it has been thought appropriate to reprint from the 1922 volume Professor R. M. MacIver's article, "The Social Significance of Professional Ethics."

The authors writing in the various groups have been invited to present not mere descriptions but appraisals or evaluations of:

1. The ethical standards that have been recognized or adopted. If there is a code this is quoted. Brief codes are given in full; the lengthier ones are generously quoted.
2. The processes by which the ethical standards were formulated.
3. Activities by way of encouraging observance or by way of enforcement of the code or other standards.
4. Emerging problems or unresolved issues or difficult matters with which the professional group is dealing.
5. Other aspects deemed important by the author.

These specifications have been applied by the authors selected in accordance with their own judgment.

The symposium is published in the expectation that it meets a need for interpretations of recent experience. Here is at least a portion of the record of a process going on in society. It may be restated that the emphasis here has been to record experience, and thus not to consider in any technical sense the social theories involved. Probably, however, the student of social theory will find here materials which are grist for his mill.

BENSON Y. LANDIS

The Ethics of Public Accounting

By John L. Carey

VANNEVAR Bush has noted as one of the important characteristics of a profession the fact that the typical client who buys professional services is not in a position to judge their quality for himself. He must rely on the reputation of the individual professional practitioner and the standards of conduct maintained by the profession as a whole. *Caveat emptor* does not apply.

For each particular profession, therefore, ethical concepts grow as the public interest in its services becomes more clearly discernible. The development of formal ethical standards in the accounting profession is an especially interesting example of such growth because it has come about in so short a time.

From the earliest days of accounting—double-entry bookkeeping was invented in Italy in the fifteenth century—the honesty and integrity of the individual accountant were paramount, because his work was worthless unless people trusted him. But it is a long step from individual reputation to general professional responsibility, and the accounting profession has taken that step in comparatively recent years, as the number of accountants in public practice and the number of people relying on their work have grown at a spectacular rate.

There were approximately 250 certified public accountants in the United States in 1900 and less than 5,000 in 1920; today there are more than 50,000. On January 23, 1954, Mr. Arthur B. Foye, president of the American Institute of Accountants, predicted that the number of certified public accountants in the United States will double in the next ten to fifteen years. Many things have contributed to this growth: the diffusion of corporate stock ownership, with public demand for an independent examination of corporation financial statements; the establishment, and ever heavier burden of, business and individual income taxes; the interest of management, creditors, labor, government, and the general public in the reliability of financial reporting. Not least important is the fact that there may be honest differences of opinion in accounting, so that objective standards are needed to provide understandability and reasonable comparability.

The ethics of public accounting therefore has two aspects: (1) a code of professional conduct and (2) development of generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards.

Accounting Standards

Since the emphasis in this paper is on professional ethics rather than standards, it need only be said about the latter that the American Institute of Accountants (since 1937 the only national organization of certified public accountants) has committees on accounting and auditing procedure which regularly issue authoritative statements aimed toward minimizing areas of difference and controversy in accounting practice.

Rules of Professional Conduct

The American Institute has also had since 1917 an official code of professional conduct, binding on all members, which formalizes the generally accepted ethical standards of the accounting pro-

fession.[1] As in other professions, this code is in continual process of modification and expansion in the public interest. At present there are sixteen rules, which may be summarized as follows:

Professional attitude

1. Firm name, style, and description must be appropriate.
2. Practice as a corporation is forbidden.
3. Occupations incompatible with public accounting are prohibited.
4. Members in practice also engaged in other related occupations must observe the same rules of conduct in such other occupations.
5. Advertising is prohibited.
6. Solicitation is prohibited.
7. Institute members must observe the rules of state societies, where they exist, on competitive bidding.
8. Offers of employment to employees of other accountants are prohibited.

Confidence of clients

1. The confidential relationship with the client must not be violated.
2. Splitting fees with, or paying commissions to, the laity is prohibited.
3. Members may not permit another, except a partner or employee, to use his name in connection with financial statements.
4. A member may not sign work prepared by others, except his own associates or other accredited accountants.

Confidence of third parties

1. In certifying statements, members must conform with generally accepted accounting and auditing standards.
2. Contingent fees (fees based on the accountant's findings or the results thereof) in conjunction with audit work are prohibited.

[1] The Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Accountants appear in full in the Appendix to this article.

3. A member must not vouch for the accuracy of forecasts of earnings.
4. A member may not express an opinion on financial statements of an enterprise financed by public distribution of securities if he or one of his immediate family has a substantial financial interest in the enterprise. If the enterprise is not publicly financed but the statements are used as basis of credit he may not express an opinion unless in his report he discloses any substantial financial interest which he or his family may have in that enterprise.

CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENCE

The concept of independence, implied throughout these rules, is the most important of all, and is in some respects peculiar to the accounting profession. The accountant in public practice recognizes at all times a moral responsibility not only to his client but also to any third party who may place reliance on financial statements with which the accountant's name is associated. This concept of independence, accepted in the profession since early days, is now recognized in law and specifically in the rules and regulations and decisions of the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, which requires that all corporations whose securities are listed on the principal stock exchanges be audited by independent public accountants.[2]

Securities and Exchange Commission

Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission provide that an accountant will not be considered independent with respect to any client in which he has a substantial financial interest, or with whom he is related as promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee. In addition, the Commission has held in specific cases that the following factual situations tended to impair the independence of certifying accountants:

1. The balance sheet was prepared by an employee of the certifying accountants who was also serving as the unsalaried but principal financial and accounting officer of the registrant and who was a shareholder of the registrant.[3]
2. The accountant was an employee or partner of another accountant who held stock of the registrant issued for services rendered in connection with its organization.[4]
3. The certifying accountant consciously falsified facts.[5]
4. The accountants subordinated their judgment to the desires of their client.[6]
5. The agreement between accountant and client indemnified the accountant against liability.[7]

AIA rules on independence

Although the word "independence" is not used in the Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Accountants, it is clear that a number of the rules are designed to buttress independence. Most important is Rule 5, which reads in full as follows:

> In expressing an opinion on representations in financial statements which he has examined, a member may be guilty of an act discreditable to the profession if
>
> (a) he fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not disclosed in the financial statements but disclosure of which is necessary to make the financial statements not misleading; or
>
> (b) he fails to report any material misstatement known to him to appear in the financial statement; or
>
> (c) he is materially negligent in the conduct of his examination or in making his report thereon; or
>
> (d) he fails to acquire sufficient information to warrant expression of an opinion, or his exceptions are sufficiently material to negative the expression of an opinion; or
>
> (e) he fails to direct attention to any material departure from generally accepted accounting principles or to disclose any material omission of generally accepted auditing procedure applicable in the circumstances.

Subjective attitudes

It will be noted that the concept of independence exemplified in Rule 5 is subjective, emphasizing attitude of mind and purpose rather than adherence to standards defining prohibited acts and relationships. As stated by the Executive Committee of the American Institute of Accountants:

> Rules of conduct can only deal with objective standards and cannot assure independence. Independence is an attitude of mind, much deeper than the surface display of visible standards. These standards may change or become more exacting but the quality itself remains unchanged. Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the foundation of the public accounting profession, and upon its maintenance depends the profession's strength and its stature.[8]

Under the subjective test of independence, therefore, it may be argued that an accountant might be independent in spite of close relationships with his client, or that he might lack independence in spite of the most correct appearances. His behavior, whether it meets

[2] Rule 2.01, Regulation S–X, Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.

[3] *In the Matter of Cornucopia Gold Mines*, 1 S.E.C. 364 (1936).

[4] *In the Matter of Richard Ramore Gold Mines, Ltd.*, 2 S.E.C. 377 (1937).

[5] *In the Matter of American Terminals and Transit Company*, 1 S.E.C. 701 (1936).

[6] *In the Matter of Metropolitan Personal Loan Company*, 2 S.E.C. 803 (1937).

[7] *In the Matter of A. Hollander & Son, Inc.*, 8 S.E.C. 586 (1941).

[8] "Independence of the Certified Public Accountant," *The Journal of Accountancy*, July 1947, pp. 51–53.

the test of an objective definition or not, might be the best criterion of independence.

Objective standards

This is not to say, however, that the profession is content either to leave the whole matter to subjective determination or to relegate the task of maintaining the objective concept of independence to enforcement by the courts or governmental administrative agencies. Rules 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, and 15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Accountants fortify the concept of independence in objective terms. For example, Rule 13 limits the financial interest which an accountant may have in a client's affairs, as follows:

> A member shall not express his opinion on financial statements of any enterprise financed in whole or in part by public distribution of securities, if he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest in the enterprise which is substantial either in relation to its capital or to his own personal fortune, or if a member of his immediate family owns or is committed to acquire a substantial interest in the enterprise. A member shall not express his opinion on financial statements which are used as a basis of credit if he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest in the enterprise which is substantial either in relation to its capital or to his own personal fortune or if a member of his immediate family owns or is committed to acquire a substantial interest in the enterprise, unless in his report he discloses such interest.

Rule 3 prohibits fee-splitting, and acceptance of brokerage or commission from laymen. Rule 4 prohibits members from engaging in occupations incompatible with public accounting. Rule 6 prohibits a member from signing a report purporting to express his opinion as a result of an examination of financial statements unless prepared by him or other accredited accountants as defined in the rule. Rule 9 prohibits a member from accepting fees contingent upon the results of his findings.

ENFORCEMENT

Professional standards of conduct are of merely academic value, however, unless backed by adequate power of enforcement. Disciplinary authority over certified public accountants is exercised by state boards of accountancy, by state societies of certified public accountants, and by the American Institute of Accountants. State boards administer the laws concerning certified public accountants, which exist in all the states. They have power to suspend or revoke the certificate of a certified public accountant for misconduct, specified in the governing statute, or for violations of rules which the boards may have adopted under authority of the statute. State societies may admonish, suspend, or expel members found guilty of violations of the bylaws of such state societies or of their rules of professional conduct. The American Institute of Accountants may admonish, suspend, or expel a member who is found guilty of violation of its bylaws or Rules of Professional Conduct, and may publish the name of the offending member if the trial board so orders.

A complaint may be submitted to the Institute by a state society, or a complaint may be submitted by the Institute to a state society or to a state board.

The Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Institute of Accountants may receive complaints from members of the Institute, from the general public, and from Institute staff members who have been instructed to refer to the committee public documents such as court decisions or press clippings which include any allegation or intimation that a member of the Institute has conducted himself in a manner discreditable to the profession. The committee also receives as complaints releases of the Securities and Exchange Commission in which there is reference to members of the Institute, transmitted by the chief accountant of the Commission.

NEW PROBLEMS UNDER STUDY

It will be readily understood that in a rapidly growing profession new problems of professional conduct constantly occur. To devise a code of ethics good for all time is neither practical nor desirable. However, alert recognition of new problems as they arise plus effective organization can be instrumental in devising rules which will maintain an ever higher level of professional conduct. Suggestions for improvement in the standards of professional conduct are continually under study.

For example, it has been suggested that Rule 5 should provide for enforcement of the Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 23 of the American Institute of Accountants, which the profession has adopted.

Statement No. 23 recommends that an independent auditor, in any report to which his name is attached in conjunction with financial statements, either express an opinion on the fairness of the financial statements, with or without exceptions as might be permitted, or, if his examination has been insufficient to justify the expression of an opinion or for other reasons he must withhold an opinion, state clearly that he is unable to express such opinion and the reasons why.

Another area which is being studied deals with the problem of competitive bidding, particularly with regard to municipal audits.

Competitive bidding for professional engagements is one of the things that tends to lower professional standards. Several state societies have adopted rules forbidding members to submit competitive bids, and Institute members must observe those rules where they exist. One of the difficulties in stopping this practice is encountered in defining a competitive bid in such a way as to be acceptable to all concerned. One effective approach to the problem lies in education of the public to an understanding of the fact that they can hope only to get what they pay for, and that a request for bids often automatically eliminates reputable certified public accountants from consideration.

GENERAL PUBLIC INTEREST

In all professions, of course, rules of conduct are adopted in the general public interest as well as in the interest of clients. The doctor has a responsibility for public health, the lawyer for the fair administration of justice, the architect for the safety of all who use buildings. The accountant in public practice is likewise responsible for reliable and comprehensive financial reporting as essential to the general health of the economy.

But the public accountant also has a special responsibility to many individuals who are not his clients and yet have an immediate stake in his work: the banker who lends money on an audited financial statement, the investor who judges the value of his stock on the basis of a corporation's annual report, government agents who accept it in measuring tax liability.

When a famous fraud case revealed the fact that auditing practices previously considered adequate might fail to reveal a falsification of inventories and receivables, the accounting profession promptly adopted new standards for audit of these assets.

Accounting is not an exact science, and never can be. Currently, for ex-

ample, there is a major difference of opinion among economists, business executives, and accountants themselves with respect to the proper depreciation figure for facilities which would cost more to replace than they cost originally. That is a question of accounting principles rather than ethics.

But even in this difficult question, the public is protected by the *ethical* accounting concept of full disclosure; any departure from presently accepted accounting principles must be clearly indicated in the accountant's formal opinion on the financial statements, and if the departure has a significant bearing on the reported figures, he must qualify his opinion or refuse to express any opinion at all.

Accounting, like other professions, will continue to grow and change as far into the future as we can see. The ethics of the accounting profession are designed to give the public the greatest possible protection throughout this process of growth and development.

John L. Carey, New York City, has been since 1948 executive director of the American Institute of Accountants, of which he was previously assistant secretary (1925–30) and secretary (1930–48). He is editor of the Journal of Accountancy and author of Professional Ethics of Public Accounting (1946).

APPENDIX

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT *

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS

(These rules of conduct supplement the disciplinary clauses of the by-laws.)

(1) A firm or partnership, all the individual members of which are members of the Institute, may describe itself as "Members of the American Institute of Accountants," but a firm or partnership, not all the individual members of which are members of the Institute, or an individual practicing under a style denoting a partnership when in fact there be no partner or partners, or a corporation, or an individual or individuals practicing under a style denoting a corporate organization shall not use the designation "Members of the American Institute of Accountants."

(2) A member shall not allow any person to practice in his name who is not in partnership with him or in his employ.

(3) Commissions, brokerage, or other participation in the fees or profits of professional work shall not be allowed directly or indirectly to the laity by a member.

Commissions, brokerage, or other participation in the fees, charges, or profits of work recommended or turned over to the laity as incident to services for clients shall not be accepted directly or indirectly by a member.

(4) A member shall not engage in any business or occupation conjointly with that of a public accountant, which is incompatible or inconsistent therewith.

(5) In expressing an opinion on representations in financial statements which he has examined, a member may be held guilty of an act discreditable to the profession if

(a) he fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not disclosed in the financial statements but disclosure of which is necessary to make the financial statements not misleading; or

(b) he fails to report any material misstatement known to him to appear in the financial statement; or

(c) he is materially negligent in the conduct of his examination or in making his report thereon; or

(d) he fails to acquire sufficient information to warrant expression of an opinion, or his exceptions are sufficiently material to negative the expression of an opinion; or

(e) he fails to direct attention to any material departure from generally accepted accounting principles or to disclose any material omission of generally accepted auditing procedure applicable in the circumstances.

(6) A member shall not sign a report purporting to express his opinion as the result of examination of financial statements unless they have been examined by him, a member or an employee of his firm, a member of the Institute, a member of a similar association in a foreign country, or a certified public accountant of a state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia.

(7) A member shall not directly or indirectly solicit clients by circulars or advertisements, nor by personal communication or interview, not warranted by existing personal relations, and he shall not encroach upon the practice of another public accountant. A member may furnish service to those who request it.

(8) Direct or indirect offer of employment shall not be made by a member to an employee of another public accountant without first informing such accountant. This rule shall not be construed so as to inhibit negotiations with anyone who of his own initiative or in response to public advertisement shall apply to a member for employment.

(9) Professional service shall not be rendered or offered for a fee which shall be contingent upon the findings or results of such service. This rule does not apply to cases involving federal, state, or other taxes, in which the findings are those of the tax authorities and not those of the accountant. Fees to be fixed by courts or other public authorities, which are therefore of an indeterminate amount at the time when an engagement is undertaken, are not regarded as contingent fees within the meaning of this rule.

(10) A member shall not advertise his professional attainments or services:

(a) The publication of what is technically known as a card is restricted to an announcement of the name, title (member of American Institute of Accountants, CPA, or other professional affiliation or designation), class of service, and address of the person or firm, issued in connection with the announcement of change of address or personnel of firm, and shall not exceed two columns in width and three inches in depth if appearing in a newspaper, and not exceed one-quarter of a page if appearing in a magazine or similar publication.

(b) A paid listing in a directory is restricted to the name, title, class of service, address and telephone number of the person or firm, and it shall not appear in bold type, box, or other form of display, or in a style which differentiates it from other listings in the same directory.

(11) A member shall not be an officer, director, stockholder, representative, or agent of any corporation engaged in the practice of public accounting in any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia.

(12) A member shall not permit his name to be used in conjunction with an estimate of earnings contingent upon future transactions in a manner which may lead to the belief that the member vouches for the accuracy of the forecast.

(13) A member shall not express his opinion on financial statements of any enterprise financed in whole or in part by public distribution of securities, if he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest in the enterprise which is substantial either in relation to its capital or to his own personal fortune, or if a member of his immediate family owns or is committed to acquire a substantial interest in the enterprise. A member shall not express his opinion on financial statements which are used as a basis of credit if he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest in the enterprise which is substantial either in relation to its capital or to his own personal fortune or if a member of his immediate family owns or is committed to acquire a substantial interest

* As revised December 19, 1950.

in the enterprise, unless in his report he discloses such interest.

(14) A member shall not make a competitive bid for professional engagements in any state, territory, or the District of Columbia, if such a bid would constitute a violation of any rule of the recognized society of certified public accountants or the official board of accountancy in that state, territory, or District.

(15) A member of the American Institute of Accountants engaged in an occupation in which he renders services of a type commonly rendered by public accountants, must observe the by-laws and rules of professional conduct of the Institute in the conduct of that occupation.

(16) A member shall not violate the confidential relationship between himself and his client.

Standards of Professional Practice in Architecture

By GEORGE BAIN CUMMINGS

AT the Eighty-sixth Convention of The American Institute of Architects held in Boston, June 15–19, 1954, AIA Document 330, entitled "The Standards of Professional Practice," was revised, adopted as revised, and enacted as the official and governing ethical statement of The Institute. The statement, in two sections, reads as follows:

I—Obligations of Good Practice

The profession of architecture calls for men of the highest integrity, judgment, business capacity, and artistic and technical ability. An Architect's honesty of purpose must be above suspicion; he acts as professional adviser to his client and his advice must be unprejudiced; he is charged with the exercise of judicial functions as between client and contractors and must act with entire impartiality; he has moral responsibilities to his professional associates and subordinates; he is engaged in a profession which carries with it grave responsibility to the public. These duties and responsibilities cannot be properly discharged unless his motives, conduct and ability are such as to command respect and confidence.

Planning, technical guidance, advice and counsel constitute the service of the profession. Given in verbal, written or graphic form, they are rendered in order that buildings with their equipment and the areas about them, in addition to being well suited to their purposes, well planned for health, safety, efficient operation and economical maintenance, and soundly constructed of materials and by methods most appropriate and economical for their particular uses, shall also have beauty and distinction.

In order to promote the highest standards of conduct in the practice of architecture, The American Institute of Architects has formulated the following basic principles for the guidance of the profession:

A. An Architect's relation to his client depends upon good faith. Before undertaking any commission he should explain the exact nature and extent of his services, and of his compensation therefor. Where a fixed limit of cost is established in advance of design, the Architect must be given freedom in determining the character of design and construction needed to meet as nearly as feasible the cost limit established but should not be understood to guarantee the final cost which will be determined not only by the Architect's solution of the owner's fixed requirements but by the fluctuating conditions of the competitive construction market.

It is an important duty of the Architect to keep the owner informed, during the progress of the work, as to the probable cost of construction involved.

B. An Architect should consider the needs and stipulations of his client and the effect of his work upon the life and well-being of the public.

C. An Architect may offer his services to anyone on the generally accepted basis of commission, fee, salary or royalty, as Architect, consultant, adviser, or assistant, provided that he rigidly maintains his professional integrity.

D. An Architect should not make use of services offered by manufacturers, suppliers of building materials, appliances and equipment, or contractors, which may be accompanied by an obligation detrimental to the best interest of the client.

E. An Architect's drawings, specifications and other documents should be complete, definite and clear concerning his intentions, the scope of the contractor's work, the materials and methods of construction to be used therefor, and the conditions under which the construction work is to be completed and paid for.

F. An Architect should guard equally the interests of the contractor as well as those of the client. The Architect will condemn workmanship and materials which are not in conformity with the contract documents, but it is also his duty to give every reasonable aid toward a complete understanding of those documents so that mistakes may be avoided. He will not call upon a contractor to make good omissions and errors in the contract documents.

G. An Architect in his investments and in his business relations outside of his profession must be free from financial or personal interests which tend to weaken or discredit his standing as an unprejudiced and honest adviser, free to act in his client's best interests.

H. An Architect should promote the interests of his professional organizations and do his full part of the work of those organizations. He should share in the interchange of technical information and experience with the design professions and the building industry.

I. An Architect should inspire the loyal interest of his employees, providing suitable working conditions for them, requiring them to render competent and efficient services, and paying them adequate and just compensation therefor.

J. An Architect should endeavor to provide opportunity for the professional development of those who enter the profession, by assisting them to acquire a full understanding of the functions, duties and responsibilities of Architects.

K. An Architect should seek opportunities to be of constructive service in civic affairs, and to the best of his ability advance the safety, health and well-being of the community in which he resides.

Finally, every Architect should do his part to forward justice, courtesy and sincerity in his profession. It is incumbent on him in the conduct of his practice to maintain a wholly professional attitude toward those he serves, toward those who assist him in his practice, toward his fellow Architects, and toward the members of other professions, and the practitioners of other arts. He should respect the distinction between professional practice and non-professional enterprise.

II—Mandatory Standards

1. An Architect shall not accept any compensation for his services other than from his client or employer.

2. An Architect shall not render professional services without compensation.

> He shall neither offer nor provide preliminary services on a conditional basis prior to definite agreement with the client that if the contemplated project proceeds, he will be employed as its Architect.

3. An Architect shall not knowingly compete with another Architect on a basis of professional charges, nor use donation as a device for obtaining competitive advantage.

4. An Architect shall not offer his services in a competition except as provided in The Institute's Competition Code.

5. An Architect who has been retained as a professional adviser in a competition shall not accept employment as an Architect for that project.

6. An Architect shall not render architectural services to non-professional enterprises connected with the building industry, except when

> (a) He does not either directly or indirectly solicit orders for the said enterprises.
> (b) He is paid by salary, fee or royalty for his architectural services and does not participate in any profits of the aforesaid enterprises which would influence his professional integrity.

7. An Architect shall not engage in building contracting.

8. An Architect shall not knowingly injure falsely or maliciously, the professional reputation, prospects or practice of another Architect.

9. An Architect shall not attempt to supplant another Architect after definite steps have been taken by a client toward the latter's employment.

10. An Architect shall not undertake a commission for which he knows another Architect has been employed until he has notified such other Architect of the fact in writing and has conclusively determined that the original employment has been terminated.

11. An Architect in soliciting work shall not divide fees except with professionals related to building design, and those regularly employed or known to be associated with his office.

12. An Architect shall not use paid advertising, nor use self-laudatory, exaggerated, or misleading publicity.

> Factual materials, verbal or visual, which dignify the profession or advance public knowledge of the Architect's function in society may be presented through public communication media.

13. An Architect shall not solicit, nor permit others to solicit in his name, advertisements or other support toward the cost of any publication presenting his work.

14. An Architect shall conform to the registration laws governing the practice of architecture in any state in which he practices and he shall observe the standards of practice established by the local Architects' professional body.

15. An Architect shall at no time act in a manner detrimental to the best interests of the profession.

Conclusion

Since adherence to the principles herein enumerated is the obligation of every member of The American Institute of Architects, any deviation therefrom or from the broad principles of good practice as set forth in Section I, shall be subject to discipline in proportion to its seriousness.

The Board of Directors of The American Institute of Architects shall have sole power of interpreting these Standards of Professional Practice and its decisions shall be final subject to the provisions of the by-laws.

NATURE OF THE AIA

Before examining this statement in critical appraisal, the nature of The Institute should be understood. The recent Report of the Commission for the Survey of Education and Registration of The American Institute of Architects indicates the purpose and practice of The AIA as follows:

In 1857 the Articles of Incorporation of The American Institute of Architects stated:

"The object of this Society is to elevate the architectural profession as such, and to perfect its members practically and scientifically."

Today The Institute's By-Laws give fuller definition:

"The objects of The American Institute of Architects shall be to organize and unite in fellowship the architects of the United States of America; to combine their efforts so as to promote the aesthetic, scientific, and practical efficiency of the profession; to advance the science and art of planning and building by advancing the standards of architectural education, training, and practice; to coordinate the building industry and the profession of architecture to insure the advancement of the living standards of our people through their improved environment; and to make the profession of ever increasing service to society."

During the past century, The Institute has become in fact the medium through which American architects accomplish their professional purposes. From its birthplace on the Atlantic seaboard, it now extends across a continent. Its original roster of a few struggling chapters has multiplied to more than a hundred. The unification movement of the early 40's integrated within its structure numerous state associations. From an initial roll of 13, its membership is now approaching 10,000, a majority of all U. S. registered architects. Thus, as a democratic organization within a democratic society, The Institute stands as the sole national agency, geographically comprehensive and professionally representative, uniting all whose concern is the science and art of architecture.

. . . . . .

In 1946 the structural reorganization of The AIA was predicated on the following goal:

"The AIA should so organize as to furnish adequate, inspiring leadership and service to the public, to the profession, and to professional education through the development of long-range objectives so that the architect may occupy himself with every phase of life in the civilization of which he is a part and thus may improve the physical framework of our living." [1]

The nature and intent of The Institute are thus clearly stated to be in the public interest, and the social purpose of the practice of architecture the end to be served.

A CIRCULAR OF ADVICE—1918

The Standards of Professional Practice recently enacted follow closely in form and substance "A Circular of Advice—Relative to Principles of Professional Practice and Canons of Ethics," adopted in 1909, revised in 1912 and in 1918. The present document was first adopted in 1947.

The 1918 Circular, after a preliminary paragraph almost identical with that of the present Standards, treats of the principles under the following headings: On the Architect's status; On preliminary drawings and estimates; On superintendence and expert services; On the Architect's charges; On payment for expert service; On selection of bidders or contractors; On duties to the contractor; On engaging in the building trades; On accepting commissions or favors; On encouraging good workmanship; On offering services gratuitously; On advertising; On signing buildings and use of titles; On competitions; On injuring others; On undertaking the work of others; On duties to students and draftsmen; On duties to the public and to building authorities; On professional qualifications.

The Canons of Ethics which follow are eleven in number. The entire document is not essentially different from the Standards now in effect.

PRINCIPLES AND SOCIAL CHANGE

And that is to be expected. Rules of conduct based upon moral principles would be expected to change but slowly, and only as the conditions under which people live together in society change. In fifty years we have seen this country change from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society. We have become a mobile people. We have become a minutely differentiated people, as each new technological change has altered vocational demands. And by those tokens we have become a much more mutually interdependent people. As we have veered toward interdependence, we have become morally more responsible toward our neighbors. So our codes of ethics are being stated or restated ever more in the public interest.

The principles enunciated by The Institute in 1909, when there were less than 2,000 members, doubtless were stated in an endeavor to uplift the level of professional performance, to assure the public of our profession of integrity as well as of competence, and to raise a standard of ethical professional conduct to which all architects of good will might repair.

Those worthy purposes have been served. There is informed opinion to the effect that the level of professional performance has been raised, and at an accelerating rate. The public increasingly acknowledges the profession's integrity and utilizes its competence. The Institute's membership now includes more than a majority of all practicing architects and is increasing steadily.

Revisions of the Standards (always by action of the annual convention, as set forth in the by-laws) have been few and minor. The language in which they are couched has become familiar and venerated. Even nonmembers of The Institute respect them and generally observe them. Other professional bodies and vocational groups understand them and expect architects to adhere to them.

[1] *The Architect at Mid-Century,* Vol. I: *Evolution and Achievement,* edited by Turpin C. Bannister (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1954), pp. 451–52. Quotation from this work is by permission of the owner of the copyright, The American Institute of Architects.

ENFORCEMENT

The Institute enforces these Standards of Professional Practice through a judiciary procedure, which is set forth in the by-laws as follows:

Architectural Practice

Article 1. Unprofessional Conduct.
Section 1. Definition.

(a) The Standards of Professional Practice are those ethics of conduct and practice which are adopted by the Convention of The Institute or by The Board of Directors, and published and distributed to corporate members and applicants for corporate membership, governing the actions of corporate members.

(b) The "Procedure" noted in this chapter refers to the rules adopted by The Board of Directors under which charges of alleged violations of the Standards of Professional Practice are processed.

(c) Any deviation by a corporate member from any of the Standards of Professional Practice of The Institute or from any of the rules of The Board supplemental thereto, or any action by him that is detrimental to the best interests of the profession and The Institute shall be deemed to be unprofessional conduct on his part, and ipso facto he shall be subject to discipline by The Institute.

Article 2. Responsibility of The Board for Discipline.
Section 1. Disciplinary Action by The Board.

(a) Possible actions. The Board shall be the judge of what constitutes unprofessional conduct by a corporate member, and of whether or not he is guilty thereof. When The Board finds a member guilty of unprofessional conduct it shall:

—censure him, or

—suspend his membership for such time as it deems fitting, or

—terminate his membership, provided that in all instances the member complained of has been offered in writing an opportunity to be heard by The Board in his own defense, subject to the Procedure hereinafter set forth, at a hearing fixed by The Board as to time and place.

(b) The Board is final authority in disciplinary action matters. The decision of The Board in every matter concerning the conduct of a corporate member and every penalty imposed by it on a corporate member on account of unprofessional conduct shall be final and conclusive and without recourse as to the member and any person acting for him or in his behalf.

Many judiciary cases—perhaps thirty—arise in the course of a year, some of which do not run "full term." Many complaints or instances of apparent dereliction are submitted to the Board of Directors. In order both to free itself of a too time-consuming matter (the Board meets only four times a year) and to secure the greatest measure of consistency in the interpretation and application of the Standards, the Board in 1951 enacted the following rule: "There shall be referred to The Secretary of The Institute for reply all inquiries on the matter of ethics."

The carrying out of this policy has resulted as intended, and the opinions and admonitions of the Secretary (an elected officer) are rendered promptly, which greatly advantages the membership. Occasionally digests of such opinions and admonitions are published for the information of members and chapter officers. Since the recent convention, a chart of permitted and of prohibited activities in the nature of advertising has been published to the membership (see the accompanying "Guide to Permissive Publicity and Advertising Practice for Members of The American Institute of

GUIDE TO PERMISSIVE PUBLICITY AND ADVERTISING PRACTICE FOR MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS

	Newspaper and Magazine Publicity	Radio and Television Publicity	Newspaper, Magazine, Radio and Television Advertising	Brochures, Pamphlets, Reprints, etc.	Speeches and Panel Discussions
By the individual architect	May furnish material concerning participation in building projects but may not stimulate self-laudatory, exaggerated or misleading publicity.	May participate in radio or TV programs as part of chapter, region or national AIA activity. May participate as individual Architect if the program is in the best interest of the profession.	May participate where an endorsement of the product by the individual Architect is not required . . . where the participation is not to the detriment of fellow Architects . . . where advertisements (or commercials) pay tribute to the profession. May not purchase space (or time) in own interest or interest of the architectural firm. May not advertise by person or architectural firm in special editions or programs.	May produce a brochure or pamphlet covering facts about the firm and can use this medium in discussions with potential clients, provided it is produced at his own expense and that it contains no advertisements.	May speak to public service, community and educational groups to better explain the profession but not to advertise his own professional availability.
By Chapter and Region	May initiate newspaper and magazine publicity in the public interest and for the good of the profession. May encourage the use of Architect credits in newspapers by diplomatic press relations.	May participate in radio and TV programs to better explain the profession.	May participate in interest of public and profession. May purchase space or time in any of above mediums if the advertisement is in the interest of chapter, region or entire profession. May purchase space in special editions of newspapers and magazines if there is no identification of individual Architects or firms.	May produce brochures, pamphlets, etc., for purpose of enlightening public about the services of an Architect and the value of the profession. May mail interesting articles, brochures, pamphlets, reprints, to selected list of community leaders for purpose of explaining the profession to the public.	May through a Speakers' Bureau participate for the express purpose of better explaining the profession to the public.

At its June 1954 meeting the AIA Board of Directors approved chart reproduced above and directed that it be distributed to the membership

Architects"). There is an eagerness on the part of the profession to accept and follow the Standards. It asks only to be advised competently regarding them.

STATE BOARDS OF EXAMINERS

Much is being done to encourage observance of the Standards, beyond that required of Institute members. Every state in the country requires that the user of the title "Architect" shall pass a qualifying examination and become registered as an architect in that state. Each official State Board of Examiners has the opportunity in personal interviews with candidates to stress responsibility for ethical conduct in every architect's practice, and the Standards of The American Institute of Architects are cited as appropriate for study and observance. The Board of Examiners may (and frequently Boards do) ask in the written examination for licensure questions concerning the ethical understanding and attitude of the candidate.

The state refuses to entertain an application from a person judged not to be "of good moral character." Its Board of Examiners therefore stands upon firm ground in assuming that the ethics of the profession, its rules of conduct based upon moral principles, will be comprehended and accepted by the person of admitted "good moral character."

The state reserves the power to revoke, suspend, or annul a license or to reprimand, censure, or otherwise discipline an architect for certain causes, including among others the following:

> . . . upon proof that the holder of such license is guilty of fraud or deceit or of gross negligence, incompetency or misconduct in the practice of architecture.[2]

[2] The University of the State of New York, *Handbook 35: Higher Education, Architecture, Laws, Rules and Information* (Albany, 1953), p. 28. Although the quotation is from the New York State law, other states follow the general pattern and language.

Violation of the accepted ethical standards of the profession may be considered as at least contributory to the proof of misconduct. Thus, to a certain extent, the force of law encourages the observance of ethical standards.

SCHOOLS OF ARCHITECTURE

Collegiate Schools of Architecture, either in specific courses of study or in the counseling of students, encourage observance of the ethical standards of the profession, and again, the published Standards of The American Institute of Architects is used as the basic text. It is assumed that every candidate for an architectural degree will become a practitioner. It is also assumed that he will become a member of The AIA. In many of the schools there are student chapters where he early begins his connection with The Institute. And of course in such assumptions and activities, consideration of the ethics of the profession is predominant.

UNDERLYING ETHICAL CODES

But, actually, "the quality of mercy is not strained" and no amount of duress, threat, or legal constraint will make an unethical person ethical, or an immoral or unmoral person moral. There must be the underlying social good will in order to develop good social conduct. For the code of ethics of the architect expresses the code of the gentleman, of the Ten Commandments, of the Sermon on the Mount, of the Golden Rule. From the well of good will spring justice, fair play, and regard for the rights of others and for the responsibilities of oneself toward others. Given such philosophy and motivation, there is no ethical problem. The reaction to any set of conditions will instinctively be the just, the kindly, the considerate reaction.

It is on this note that the work previously quoted (*The Architect at Mid-*

Century: Evolution and Achievement) ends. The theme is being constantly expressed and stressed with ever widening effect. With it we conclude this review of the status of the ethics of this profession.

The discipline of Architecture demands all of a man's mind, to comprehend and assimilate; all of a man's skill and ability, to practice; all of a man's spirit, honorably to account for its stewardship. It demands integrity, industry, intelligence, imagination, initiative, and likewise courage, perseverance, sacrifice, and constant striving.

We are free men—by the grace of God and our heritage. Conjoined with our freedom, and not to be dissociated from it, is our responsibility. Socially responsible practice of our profession demands that the architect be a "whole man"—gentleman, scholar, citizen, philosopher. Out of his productive time and income he should give a tithe to the betterment of his community and the society to which he owes his life and his living. Nothing less than a lifetime dedication to the ideals of his profession will suffice for his ultimate satisfaction and happiness.

There is one aspect of our responsibility that no one else can discharge for us. Where we as individuals live and practice our profession, we are the profession. The profession and all architects are judged by us. No program of national publicity or public relations will avail if in our own community we fail to do a good job. Here is a responsibility we cannot transfer or shirk. Upon us personally and individually rests the yoke of the discipline of our profession. Of each of us is demanded the most meticulous care in the handling of each commission entrusted to us.

It is fitting, therefore, that in the enjoyment of these opportunities and in the discharge of these responsibilities, the Oath of the Architect should be:

> Humbly and proudly I profess my competence under the discipline of architecture.
>
> Upon my honor I promise unending devotion to the task of continually studying, learning, seeking, experimenting, that I may become ever better educated and trained for my work.
>
> Upon my honor I promise to my community undeviating adherence to the ideal of service to my fellow men, as the goal of my effort, that I may honestly and fully earn my living—my right to live among them.
>
> Upon my honor I promise to maintain that integrity in practice which will insure to each client the finest possible stewardship of his interest.
>
> Upon my honor I promise in the execution of every commission to strive to create beauty as well as order, character as well as safety, spiritual value as well as convenience.
>
> Upon my honor I promise to join with my fellow architects to make our profession of the greatest possible usefulness and benefit to our society, to share and disseminate all valuable professional knowledge, and to pass on to the succeeding generation the full and fine discipline of our profession, enriched because of my dedication.[3]

[3] *Op. cit. supra* (note 1), p. 461.

George Bain Cummings, B.Arch., Binghamton, New York, is a practicing architect in the firm of Conrad and Cummings, Associated Architects. He is a past president of the Central New York Chapter of The American Institute of Architects, a past regional director of the AIA, and its present secretary. He was made a Fellow of the AIA in 1948. He is vice-chairman of the New York State Building Code Commission, and was a member of the New York State Board of Examiners of Architects (1938–50) and its president from 1948 to 1950. He has contributed frequently to architectural publications.

Ethical Standards of the Medical Profession

By WILLIAM T. FITTS, JR., and BARBARA FITTS

THE ethical standards that have developed around the doctor-patient relationship are probably the oldest standards of any of the professions, either in tacit or written form. Dr. Willard L. Sperry, a theologian, former Dean of the Harvard Divinity School, remarks that "the pre-eminence of medical ethics in the field of the several professions may well be due to its long history, a matter of twenty-five hundred years, and to its initial and still classic statement in the Hippocratic Oath." [1] It may also be due to the constant preoccupation of physicians with problems of life and death, which has made doctors somewhat more conscious of ethical and moral values than many other men. Whatever the reason, the ethics of physicians have been regarded as among the highest of the professions.

In 1922 when THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE published its first issue on the ethics of business and the professions,[2] the articles contained little adverse comment on the medical profession. The article by Morris Llewellyn Cooke on "Ethics and the Engineering Profession" included the following statement:

> Think of the limitless freedom which the medical profession enjoys in the homes of the world . . . the members of the medical profession have carried themselves so faultlessly in these intimate relationships that we never pause to wonder at it.[3]

[1] Willard Sperry, *The Ethical Basis of Medical Practice* (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1950), p. 84. See Appendix to this article for text of the Hippocratic Oath.

[2] Vol. 101 (May 1922).

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

Only Robert MacIver in this same issue, in discussing "The Social Significance of Professional Ethics," ventured to suggest that

> the medical profession has incurred to many minds a serious liability, in spite of the devotion of its service to actual patients, by its failure for so long to apply the preventive side of medicine. . . .[4]

The rash of controversy that has broken out recently, both within the medical profession and outside of it, over fundamental problems of medical practice—prepayment insurance plans, advertising, the hiring of physicians by institutions, and fee-splitting—would seem to indicate that something fairly serious is happening to the oldest and most pre-eminent of the professions. The present controversy contrasts strongly with the complacent picture of 1922, and at first sight it would seem that the physicians of the country had suddenly abandoned their high standards and disinterested motives in favor of a mercenary concern over fees. The underlying problems go far deeper, however, to a group of factors that have been disturbing the economic and ethical patterns of the profession for some years.

It is our opinion that chief among these factors is the great "splintering of medical knowledge" [5] into specialties, which has made some type of group practice inevitable and thus altered the nature of the doctor-patient relationship. A second factor is the spread of

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[5] George Packer Berry, "Medical Education in Transition," *Journal of Medical Education*, March 1953, p. 17.

the insurance principle to medicine, which has intruded a third party between the doctor and his patient and has imposed uniform fee scales in a notoriously nonuniform field. A third factor is the radical treatment of serious disease, which appears, when first applied, to verge dangerously upon human experimentation.

The resulting disturbance to the ethical relationships within the profession—of physician to patient, and of physician to physician—has brought about vigorous attempts to revise the written code of medical ethics established by the American Medical Association and to enforce the code more effectively throughout the country.

AMA and Its Principles of Medical Ethics

The ethical principles of the medical profession of this country were first codified in written form by the American Medical Association in 1848 and were based on Sir Thomas Percival's *Medical Ethics*, written in 1803.[6] The AMA code of ethics has been revised at intervals since that time—1903, 1912, 1940, and 1949—and is still undergoing restudy and revision. The code reflects the consensus of the medical profession in this country because the AMA, by its influence and its organization, is the one all-embracing association for the profession. And much of the current controversy over medical ethics concerns the provisions of the AMA code.

The AMA's influence in medical affairs probably derives from the fact that it has never been a purely political organization, as a trade association in industry might be, but has been an outstanding scientific organization as well. The *Journal of the American Medical Association*, published weekly, is the most widely read of the scientific medical journals. Through its Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry, the AMA has standardized drugs and protected the public from harmful medicines. Three-fourths of the income of the AMA is spent on scientific endeavors.[7] "The objects of the Association," states the AMA constitution, "are to promote the science and art of medicine and the betterment of public health."

Organization

The AMA's influence has been both secular and scientific. Its organizational setup has been distinctive in that, with minor exceptions, a physician cannot join the Association directly but must first become a member of his county (or district) medical society and then of his state (or territorial) medical society. The county societies preceded the national association in point of history and have remained strong units of organization and discipline.

Of the approximately 200,000 physicians in this country, 138,000 are members of the AMA. All physicians who are legally qualified to practice medicine and who agree to conform to the Principles of Ethics are eligible for membership. This means that they must have graduated from an approved medical school, served a hospital internship of at least one year, and passed an examination allowing them to practice medicine in their respective state or territory. Membership in the AMA is required by some hospitals and clinics as prerequisite for staff appointment.

The control of the policy of the Association rests with its House of Delegates, which consists of one delegate for every thousand members of each permanently organized state or territorial medical society; one delegate from each of the specialty sections of the AMA; and one delegate each from the United States Navy, United States Army, United States Air Force, United States Public Health Service, and the Veterans Administration.

The body within the AMA which decides questions of an ethical or judicial nature is the Judicial Council. The Council was first organized in 1858 as a Committee on Ethics, appointed yearly by the president of the AMA, to be concerned with the enforcement of the code of ethics and various problems concerning methods of practice. In 1873 the Committee was reorganized as a Judicial Council with twenty-one members appointed for three-year periods by the Nominating Committee; all questions of a personal character and all questions over credentials were to be referred to the Council *without discussion* and its decisions on all matters referred to it were final. Succeeding revisions reduced the membership to a workable size and spelled out its duties (including its right to decide controversies arising under the constitution), and gradually the Judicial Council has become a very influential body within the AMA. Morris Fishbein writes:

> Since that time [1901] many of the great leaders of the American Medical Association have held the position of chairman of the Judicial Council and under their leadership decisions of conduct have been made which have been vital to the maintenance of the highest standards in medical practice.[8]

The Council is charged with interpreting both the Principles of Ethics and the constitution and may make recommendations to the House of Delegates concerning proposed changes in these documents.

As an illustration of the machinery set up to handle controversial ethical problems, we quote from an article entitled "Fight Over Ethics Averted by A.M.A." in the *New York Times* of June 24, 1954:

> A showdown battle in the field of medical ethics was averted today in the legislative assembly of the American Medical Association. The House of Delegates of the association without debate sent to its Judicial Council a New York resolution that would label "unethical" any doctor practicing with a closed panel physicians' group that solicited patients. . . . The Judicial Council was instructed to report not later than next June at the Atlantic City convention. It was considered possible a report might be ready for the House of Delegates' meeting next winter in Miami, Fla.

AMA Principles of Ethics

The AMA Principles of Ethics—with the interpretation of which the Judicial Council is charged—is a mixture of general moral principles and specific rules of conduct. The subject matter falls roughly into three categories: the relation of the doctor to society, to the patient, and to other doctors. The specific rules of conduct, especially those concerning the relation of doctor to doctor, are subject to frequent alterations and revisions as customs change, but the general principles embodied in the codes, like the Hippocratic Oath, do not vary greatly except in the wording. "The prime object of the medical profession is to render service to humanity; reward or financial gain is a subordinate consideration."[9]

The principal revisions or additions to the codes since 1922 have concerned groups and clinics, advertising and the

[6] Morris Fishbein, *A History of the American Medical Association* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1947), pp. 35–37.

[7] Out of a total income of 8.5 million dollars in 1953, 4.3 million was used for printing and publication costs and an estimated 2 million for scientific activities of the Councils. AMA, *Handbook for the House of Delegates*, June 21, 1954, p. 44.

[8] *Op. cit. supra* (note 4), pp. 951 f.

[9] Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association, December 1953. See Appendix.

giving out of information to the public, rebates (fee-splitting), and contract practice. Many of these changes reflect the intrusion of a third party or parties into the traditional doctor-patient relationship. For an explanation of their meaning we must look to the larger panorama of changing knowledge and a changing economy.

SPECIALIZATION

The unrest and controversy concerning medical care may result from a number of causes, but specialization is of primary importance. The accumulation of new medical knowledge pouring out of the physical and biological sciences has reached a point where the individual physician cannot encompass it, let alone master the laboratory technics that go with it. He is more and more joined by other physicians in an informal or formal (as the case may be) medical team. Although the general practitioner remains the backbone of medical practice, the types of medical specialists and their total number are increasing with enormous speed. The number of physicians certified as specialists by the Specialty Boards increased from 16,000 in 1940 to 52,000 in 1953—one-third of all practicing physicians.[10] Many other physicians limit their practice in whole or in part to a specialty, although they are not certified by the Boards. In 1932 the AMA Committee on Costs of Medical Care estimated that not more than 18 per cent of the physicians of the country need be specialists,[11] a statement which leads one to wonder whether the trend toward specialization has gone too far or whether new medical knowledge since 1932 does require more and more specialists.

Obviously the number of doctors seen by each patient is increasing, whether seen by separate referrals or in a single group clinic containing an organized team of specialists. The "single practice" system may be said to be evolving toward a "multiple practice" system. This process of specialization has been going on for years in industry but the professions, as MacIver pointed out in the 1922 issue of THE ANNALS, seemed at first sight to have been bypassed by the sweep of economic evolution and to retain the spirit and method of the old crafts:

> The doctor, the lawyer, the architect, the minister of religion, remain individual practitioners, or at most enter into partnerships of two or three members. Specialization takes place, but in a different way, for the specialist in the professions does not yield his autonomy. He offers his specialism directly to the public, and only indirectly to his profession.[12]

Or so it seemed in 1922.

Since that time, however, the splintering of medical knowledge has led to the development of nineteen separately organized specialties and the formation of many subspecialties, each with its trained experts and special tools.[13] The Specialty Boards have had tremendous influence on the practice of medicine because many hospitals and other institutions have made appointments to their staffs contingent on board certification. The requirements for certification are usually three or four years of specialty training following an approved internship, plus an oral and written examination to determine the candidate's proficiency in his specialty. The peculiar problems of each specialty have tended to unite the physicians of that group so that the American medical profession, which was formerly a collection of individual physicians joined by one powerful association (the AMA), now shows a tendency to separate into specialty points of view.

[10] *J.A.M.A.*, Vol. 153 (September 26, 1953), p. 391.

[11] *Medical Care for the American People: Final Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 5.

[12] Vol. 101 (May 1922), p. 10.

[13] The first specialty board (in ophthalmology) was established in 1917; by 1933 four more boards were organized, and by 1953 the total was nineteen. *J.A.M.A.*, Vol. 153 (September 26, 1953), p. 391.

Group practice

The struggles of the profession to tie its specialties back together are apparent in the number of surgical teams, group practice clinics, diagnostic clinics, and special disease clinics that have appeared in the United States in the past quarter century. The shift from a "single practice" system of medical care to a "multiple practice" arrangement is now reaping its harvest of major readjustments in the relations of physicians to each other and to the patient. It is a process of readjustment which is being felt all along the line—in medical ethics, medical economics, and medical administration. And the two major areas of controversy (which are really two sides of the same coin) are: how to divide responsibility *for* the patient and how to divide fees *from* the patient. Much of the debate over division of fees which has rocked the medical world and the public in recent months arises from problems of multiple practice, and not from any sudden outburst of mercenary motives on the part of the medical profession.

The division of responsibility for the patient varies rather widely, but the referring physician is usually considered "in charge" of the patient, and the specialist takes responsibility for those periods of specialty care that pertain to him. A surgeon, for example, will take responsibility for the operation and for pre- and postoperative care while the patient is in the hospital, but will probably refer the patient back to the original doctor for all but a few checkups.

Fee-splitting

The division of fees should relate to the division of patient responsibility, but fees depend not only on responsibility but on the amount of training of the physician and on the patient's estimate of value received. Each new specialty as it develops has had to establish an approximate scale of fees. Many critics believe that specialists' fees are too high, and the determination to correct an "unfair" distribution of income has led physicians in certain parts of the country to use secret rebates—a practice widely known as fee-splitting. Although the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics forbids fee-splitting, the practice is widespread. Dr. I. S. Ravdin, in his chairman's address before the section on surgery of the AMA in 1951, stated:

> We hear much about fee-splitting in this country. That it exists to a greater or lesser extent in many communities cannot be denied. When fee-splitting is practiced, patients may be referred *not* to the surgeon best able to effect a cure, but to those who provide the referring physician with the largest share of the patient's fee. We shudder when we read in our papers about the "kickbacks" in industry, and the "5 percenters," yet I wonder if all of us are at times lacking in social consciousness when we turn our backs on this iniquitous practice in surgery. Young men out of the best of our surgical residencies often find it difficult to make a living if they resist the fee-splitting practice.[14]

Fee-splitting usually arises in the division of fees between a surgeon and the referring physician who first sees the patient. For example, the surgeon may charge $150 for the removal of an acutely inflamed appendix in the middle of the night and be paid willingly by

[14] I. S. Ravdin, "Responsibility of the Surgeon to Modern Society," *J.A.M.A.*, Vol. 147 (1951), p. 535.

the patient, who will balk at the $15 charge of the general practitioner who first examined him and made the diagnosis—the general practitioner often spending more time with the patient than the surgeon. The problem then is twofold: how much more should the specialist be paid in a given instance for his more specialized knowledge and (at times) greater responsibility, and should the patient know where his money goes?

At the June 1954 meeting of the American Medical Association the House of Delegates reaffirmed its disapproval of fee-splitting.

Organized medicine today reaffirmed its opposition to "fee splitting," but voted it ethical for two or more doctors in a case to submit a joint itemized bill if the patient requests it.

. . . . . .

The Iowa delegation had sought in a resolution offered last year to draw the whole medical association around to the viewpoint of the Iowa State Medical Society where, for example, a physician, a surgeon and an anesthetist are involved in the same case, the Iowa plan permits them to send a single itemized bill and enables the patient to pay one doctor for the entire bill.

The A.M.A. Judicial Council, headed by Dr. Edward R. Cunniffe of New York, refused to go all the way on this, and the Reference Committee on Miscellaneous Business, of which Dr. R. J. Azzari, also of New York, is chairman, backed up the council.

. . . . . .

. . . and added the following, which was adopted along with the original report:

"In addition, the committee wishes to recommend that the House of Delegates resolve that it firmly opposes 'fee splitting,' rebating or payment of commissions in any guise whatsoever; and that it further opposes any mechanism that encourages this practice." [15]

[15] *New York Times,* June 25, 1954, p. 23.

Ghost surgery

"Ghost surgery" is fee-splitting in reverse, and is not as prevalent as fee-splitting. In ghost surgery, the nonsurgical physician makes the diagnosis and receives the entire fee, which he secretly splits with a "ghost surgeon." The patient either does not know of the existence of the "ghost" or believes him to be a minor assistant at the operation. He credits the operation to his own doctor, who usually supervises all pre- and postoperative care. The danger of ghost surgery lies in the fact that the physician who does the operating usually does not make the diagnosis and may not even examine the patient before he operates.

The American College of Surgeons has conducted a forthright campaign against fee-splitting and ghost surgery,[16] so forthright in fact that the College has been severely criticized for "washing dirty linen in public." [17] In 1951 it removed from its list of hospitals approved for surgical residencies two hospitals in Bloomington, Illinois, whose staffs were engaged in unethical practices. It has encouraged the use of the Columbus Plan,[18] or variations of it, in which groups of surgeons or entire medical societies agree to submit their account books, patient lists, and income tax returns to a certified public accountant at regular intervals for inspection. Variations of this plan have been successfully adopted at the Bloomington hospitals and are now being tried by a group of American College of Surgeons' Fellows in Iowa.

[16] Paul R. Hawley, "The Director's Report," *Bulletin of The American College of Surgeons,* Vol. 38 (January–February 1953), p. 36.

[17] Greer Williams, "Columbus Plan Begins to Roll," *ibid.,* Vol. 39 (July–August 1954), p. 153.

[18] *Loc. cit.*

Standard fees

The problem of fees is further complicated by recent tendencies towards a more uniform fee scale for medical services, a trend strengthened by the growth of medical insurance plans. Most companies have standard fees for every service. The Blue Shield plan, for example, pays $150 for removal of a gall bladder whether the operation is done by the most highly skilled surgical specialist or by a general practitioner, or whether the patient is rich or poor. Many in the profession have urged a standard fee scale and many county medical societies publish a list of acceptable fees. Yet it is difficult to standardize such an unstandard service as medical care. For example, the removal of a diseased gall bladder containing stones may vary from a routine and easy operation to a most difficult one, if the gall bladder is acutely inflamed. The patient who demands a "flat fee" for an operation may get "flat" care.

Lack of agreement on the division of fees has been one of the chief reasons for the high mortality of group practice clinics. If each physician is paid in proportion to what he contributes in individual fees, then certain specialties—for example, surgery—are often highly paid while others such as general practitioners are paid much less. Frequently the general practitioner does just as much work as the surgeon, and attracts more patients to the clinic than the surgeon, who depends on referrals from his nonsurgical colleagues. What percentage should the laboratory physician receive for his services, which are of vital importance in the proper functioning of the group as a whole, although not always directly supplying income? Clearly, a fair division of fees is not easily determined under the present conditions of rapidly varying relationships between physicians.

APPLICATION OF INSURANCE PRINCIPLE TO MEDICAL CARE

Specialization, with its long training and special laboratory technics, has been accompanied by a substantial increase in medical costs to the patient. Although higher costs are frequently offset by shorter hospital visits and lower mortality, patients do not compare their medical costs with the morbidity and mortality rates of twenty years ago, but with the cost of other goods and services that they buy. In recent years nearly all large items of expense that must come out of the consumer's pocketbook have been put on a prepayment insurance or a credit basis, and medical costs have remained as a large and unexpected drain on the patient's budget. The spread of the prepayment insurance principle to medicine was almost inevitable under the circumstances. Therefore the growth of prepayment plans for medical care has been phenomenal. The Blue Cross, a nonprofit hospitalization plan, now covers nearly one third of the population of the United States, and the coverage rises to 60 and 75 per cent in well-organized areas. Blue Shield, which pays the services of physicians, now covers one fifth of the total population, but may run one third or higher in organized areas. Both plans pay a set fee for service directly to the hospital or physician and allow free choice of a physician.

Where plans do not allow free choice of a physician, controversy has been sharp. The New York State Medical Society, prompted by its Kings County component, recently voted to ask the AMA to change its code of ethics on four counts:

Advertising should be understood to be unethical if it was aimed at getting patients for a panel of physicians of a medical care plan, company or other organization.

The practice of medicine by physicians on a salary should be restricted to institutions where patients are "public charges."

Free choice of physician, one of the requirements of the present code of ethics, should be understood to be vitiated if the patient was required to choose a physician from a panel or group of practitioners.

Proration of fees is not unethical if both physicians or surgeons actively participate in providing medical care and if the fee is paid by an insurance company.[19]

The effect of these revisions would be far-reaching, as was pointed out by the *New York Times* in a subsequent editorial:

> A provision in the proposed code which would forbid the payment of a salary to any physician who is not connected with an institution where patients are "public charges" would seem likely to close the offices of group practitioners of medicine and the medical departments of industrial corporations, farm cooperatives and labor unions, even though their medical standards may be high.[20]

The primary target of the resolutions appeared to be the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York. Dr. George Baehr, president of HIP, replied as follows:

> Interpretation of the code of ethics as prohibiting advertising by a health insurance plan like H.I.P. is designed to prevent it from informing the public of its existence and of its premium rates, benefits and methods of operation. In this manner, it would prevent the public from knowing about and joining a nonprofit voluntary insurance plan which is authorized by law.[21]

It is obvious that these emerging problems are serious ones, and ones that will have to be resolved. It seems that one of the difficult issues is just what constitutes "advertising." If it is improper for an individual physician to advertise, then it would seem that it is improper for an insurance group to advertise for a group of physicians. The crucial question is whether one should label as "advertising" the informing of the public of the existence of a nonprofit prepayment insurance plan, along with its premium rates, benefits, and methods of operation.

It is not likely that the New York State Medical Society's proposals will be adopted as they stand by the AMA, for a blow to voluntary insurance plans would be a blow to medicine's own campaign against socialized medicine.

[19] *New York Times*, May 12, 1954, p. 33.
[20] May 15, 1954.
[21] *New York Times*, May 14, 1954.

Problems of Radical Therapy

The remarkable advances of scientific knowledge in medicine have made it possible to carry out many radical measures for the relief of chronic or terminal diseases. For example, procedures have been developed (prefrontal lobotomy) for the treatment of intractable pain, which relieve the pain by destroying that part of the brain responsible for pain perception. Such an operation also changes the patient's personality to some degree. Is this ethical? Surgical technics have been developed to such a point that extensive and deforming operations can be performed with a low mortality rate. These ultraradical operations, performed usually for the treatment of cancer, frequently offer little hope of cure. They prolong life, but often leave the patient wretched and miserable and unable to lead a useful or happy existence. In addition, the surgery is extremely expensive to the patient and his family.

The physician often finds himself hard pressed to know the "ethical" answers to a specific problem. Should "everything possible" be done to effect a cure in an individual patient? One hundred ultraradical operations may yield 5 per cent of cures and many miserable months of life for the remaining patients, whereas a hundred palliative operations may yield no cures but many months of comfort. In Chapter II, Section 2, of the Principles of Medical Ethics is found the statement, "In such instances the physician should act as he would desire another to act toward one of his own family in like circumstances." But does this really answer the ethical problem?

The greatest ethical question arising from radical therapy—euthanasia—has been temporarily put in abeyance by the terrible example of the Nazis during World War II. The pros and cons of "mercy killing" are no longer very seriously argued in medical circles.

One important ethical problem that is currently debated is the question of the controlled "clinical trial" [22] which was recently used on a large scale in this country in the field tests of gamma globulin for poliomyelitis. Is it ethical to withhold medicine from a group of control patients while giving it to a second group of patients for testing? Unquestionably this takes us into the field of human experimentation via the route of statistics. However, any new medicine or treatment is, basically, an experiment on human beings; and the clinical trial is unquestionably a more intelligent evaluation of new medicines than simple trial and error.

Education of Laymen in Medical Affairs

The outpouring of new medical knowledge and new "wonder drugs" could not fail to arouse the interest of laymen. At the same time the medical profession has deliberately fostered public interest in medicine for reasons of its own. It has gradually turned to the public for research funds to help replace the large private contributions that are slowly drying up. It has also promoted informational campaigns about cancer and other diseases to teach laymen to diagnose the early symptoms of these diseases. The reading public has therefore swallowed a steady stream of articles dealing with medical subjects.

The danger of a little knowledge has been only too apparent. Self-diagnosis has become a national hobby. Laymen too often demand treatment with drugs that are new and incompletely tested or entirely inappropriate, simply because they have read preliminary notices by the press. All too frequently patients go wandering from doctor to doctor seeking new ideas to cure incurable diseases, squandering time and money on useless or even dishonest remedies. Is it the duty of the physician to his patient to try to prevent this, or should he not dissuade the patient on the theory that the mental satisfaction of having "tried everything" overbalances the expense?

And how does the code of ethics cover the question of what to tell the patient with an incurable disease, such as certain forms of cancer? A survey of Philadelphia physicians in 1953 showed that the majority of physicians do not tell a patient that he has cancer, although they always tell some member of his family.[23] They may tell the patient himself under special circumstances —if the lesion is usually curable, as, for example, skin cancer; if the patient needs to make special provision for dependents; or if the patient would otherwise refuse treatment.

The problem of truthfulness in medicine is not new, because the best therapy and absolute honesty do not always go hand in hand. But the present glare of publicity has subjected medical matters

[22] A. Bradford Hill, "The Clinical Trial," *New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 247 (July 24, 1952), p. 113.

[23] W. T. Fitts, Jr., and I. S. Ravdin, "What Philadelphia Physicians Tell Patients with Cancer," *J.A.M.A.*, Vol. 153 (November 7, 1953), p. 901.

to a close scrutiny and has shown very clearly the difficulties of early diagnosis of cancer. The solution for this ethical problem is, of course, a cure for the disease.

THE IRREDUCIBLE MINIMUM

Human nature being what it is (and it has not improved noticeably since 1922), the medical profession will probably always include a certain irreducible minimum of physicians who are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the patient or the profession. For a number of reasons it is getting easier to cover up mediocre medical care or outright racketeering. Improvements in anesthesia and pre- and postoperative care have reduced the risks of operation so much that an unscrupulous surgeon no longer fears to perform unnecessary ones. In large cities a physician may know very few of his patients personally, and the loss of this relationship removes an important check on professional ethics. Unnecessary operations and illegal abortions are not new problems, but they may become more prevalent if their safety increases and if the personal element in medicine is gradually reduced.

The medical profession has taken steps to safeguard the public against the unscrupulous physician. For example, hospitals throughout the country have set up tissue audit committees to examine carefully all tissue removed at operation.[24] If such tissue is found to be normal, the surgeon is called to account. If he continues to remove more normal tissue than is justified, his operating privileges are suspended.

The American Medical Association has aimed to protect the public against unethical medical practices by instigating the establishment of grievance committees in the constituent and component medical societies. By January 1953 all of the forty-eight state associations, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii had provided committees for hearing and acting on complaints from the public. In many states grievance committees of the component county medical societies handle the problems locally. The spread of such committees has been a recent development following a resolution of the House of Delegates in 1949 urging their adoption. These committees usually hear complaints from any source—patients, physicians, or lay organizations—and they arbitrate cases or refer them to the society's disciplinary body.

A LOOK TO THE FUTURE

The medical profession in the United States has always been distinguished by a strong streak of individuality and independence, the counterpart probably of the same pioneer spirit which originally marked the commerce and industry of the New World. Nowhere is this individualism more apparent than in the profession's emphasis on the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship. Both the constitution and the Principles of Ethics of the AMA reflect the high regard in which that relationship is held and show the determined efforts of the profession to preserve it intact.

Yet the character of that relation is now undergoing amazing changes under the guise of what are apparently minor economic adjustments. Many medical groups are conscious of this evolution and are attempting to understand and counterbalance the less desirable corollaries that accompany it.

The essence of the doctor-patient relationship is the promise of the doctor to take complete responsibility for a patient once he has accepted his care, and the freedom of the patient in the choice of his physician. Once the physician's responsibility is divided between consultants, other specialists, and laboratory physicians, the strength of the doctor-patient relationship is weakened. Multiple practice is effecting a virtual revolution in medicine because of the fragmentation in responsibility that goes with it. This has been offset to some extent by common consent to leave the primary responsibility with one man, usually the general practitioner or the internist. There is danger, however, that a patient may "slip between the specialists," and to offset this the medical schools are now laying great stress on the "patient as a person," to be viewed as a whole man. Otherwise each specialty sees only its own organ or body part and its own diseases, and a patient's real problems may be missed.

There is another sense in which a patient may "slip between the specialists." When a physician limits his practice to a specialty, he does not normally take emergency calls unrelated to his field, usually because he is incompetent to do so. This means, however, that a patient may be unable to locate the type of doctor he needs or may be refused medical care by several doctors and feel justifiably neglected. The profession has finally recognized its responsibility in this regard by setting up night and emergency services organized by the county medical societies throughout the country.

The division of patient responsibility may ultimately lead to a "nine to five" attitude in medicine as each specialty restricts its area more and more. The intrusion of third parties (insurance companies) into the doctor-patient relationship also weakens the sense of personal responsibility. The flat fees paid by insurance plans for medical care are likewise conducive to a "businesslike attitude" which may not be desirable in a profession.

To replace this loss of an intense individual responsibility, it will probably be necessary to develop a greater sense of the collective responsibility of the profession to society. The absorption of the average physician in his own demanding practice has made him peculiarly blind to the inadvertant gaps in medical care that have arisen through social and economic forces outside his immediate acquaintance. This passive attitude toward the public in general, as opposed to his patient in particular, may be deeply rooted in the nature and history of medical care. In a world where it was impossible to cure more than a few of the sick and dying, the physician unconsciously and in self-protection closed his ears to all but the few he could help.

Insurance plans

The negative attitude of organized medicine and its failure to experiment with insurance plans and related projects have been most unfortunate. The control of medical care is likely to slip out of the hands of the medical profession—as it nearly did during the thirties and forties in the campaign for socialized medicine—if it fails to keep abreast of the health needs and desires of society.

Social medicine

The positive philosophy of "social medicine" (not socialized medicine) as developed in England has been slow to penetrate in this country. The importance of social medicine as a separate discipline is still highly debatable, but its emphasis on the preventive aspects of medical care supplies a real need and brings a much larger horizon to medicine. According to social medicine, the duty of the physician is not just to the individual patient but to the community at large—the body social, as it were; and the physician should study not only individual pathology but the social pa-

[24] George W. Tipton, "The Tissue Audit Committee in an Open Staff Hospital," *Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons*, Vol. 39 (July–Aug. 1954), p. 159.

thology which is recorded in the statistical annals of many disciplines. His scope will then reach out into the fields of statistics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology. This is not a new concept, but the attitude of promoting health as well as curing disease has not been sufficiently emphasized in American medicine, nor the responsibility of the physician for the health of the community as a whole.

Etiquette and ethics

Whatever changes the future may bring to American medicine, the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics will probably continue to undergo periodic revisions. From time to time it has been suggested that some fundamental defect in the Principles accounts for the frequency of these revisions. A most serious criticism was leveled at the code by Chauncey Leake in his *Percival's Medical Ethics* (1927):

> The term "medical ethics," introduced by Percival, is really a misnomer. . . . it refers chiefly to the rules of etiquette developed in the profession to regulate the professional contacts of its members *with each other*. . . . For the average physician, medical ethics (of which there is no satisfactory exposition) means only medical etiquette, and actually there is usually as great a penalty attached to a transgression of one as to the other.[25]

We do not share the view that a code of ethics should be inviolate and unchanging. Moral truths may be unchanging but their application varies as social and economic factors change. The relatively new problem of scientific research on humans (the controlled "clinical trial") is an example of a new ethical problem not specifically covered by the older codes.

Professional codes are concerned, by their nature and their historical development, not only with moral principles but with rules governing the relations of members to each other. Only by eliminating unfair competition between members can a profession establish a high standard of ethics. The early history of codes and rules of ethics indicates that they have been primarily a method of asserting internal professional discipline. When the conditions of competition change, the codes necessarily change with them.

The current problems now facing the medical profession would seem to make it imperative that the problems and history of medical ethics be well understood by physicians everywhere. There is at present relatively little information about ethical problems imparted in the medical curriculum. Many ideals and attitudes are passed along unconsciously from teacher to student, but this may not be enough in an era when ethical attitudes are no longer forced upon doctors by close and intimate contact with patients. Possibly the answer lies in a greater stress on moral character in the selection of medical students and in a greater stress on the teaching of ethical principles in medical schools.

[25] P. 1.

William T. Fitts, Jr., M.D., F.A.C.S., is associate professor of surgery at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, and a diplomate of the American Board of Surgery. He is engaged in teaching, research, and the practice of surgery, and has written a number of articles for medical journals.

Barbara Fitts, M.A., his wife, was formerly a research assistant with the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Philadelphia and now edits the U. of P. Medical Bulletin.

APPENDIX

THE SO-CALLED PAGAN OATH OF HIPPOCRATES *

I swear by Apollo Physician, by Asclepius, by Health, by Heal-all, and by all the gods and goddesses, making them witnesses, that I will carry out, according to my ability and judgment, this oath and this indenture:

To regard my teacher in this art as equal to my parents; to make him partner in my livelihood, and when he is in need of money to share mine with him; to consider his offspring equal to my brothers; to teach them this art, if they require to learn it, without fee or indenture; and to impart precept, oral instruction, and all the other learning, to my sons, to the sons of my teacher, and to pupils who have signed the indenture and sworn obedience to the physicians' law, but to none other.

I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them.

I will not give poison to anyone though asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a plan. Similarly I will not give a pessary to a woman to cause abortion. But in purity and in holiness I will guard my life and my art.

I will not use the knife either on sufferers from stone, but I will give place to such as are craftsmen therein.

Into whatsoever house I enter, I will do so to help the sick, keeping myself free from all intentional wrongdoing and harm, especially from fornication with woman or man, bond or free.

Whatsoever in the course of practice I see or hear (or even outside my practice in social intercourse) that ought never to be published abroad, I will not divulge, but consider such things to be holy secrets.

Now if I keep this oath and break it not, may I enjoy honor, in my life and art, among all men for all time; but if I transgress and forswear myself, may the opposite befall me.

PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION †

PREAMBLE

These principles are intended to serve the physician as a guide to ethical conduct as he strives to accomplish his prime purpose of serving the common good and improving the health of mankind. They provide a sound basis for solution of many of the problems which arise in his relationship with patients, with other physicians, and with the public. They are not immutable laws to govern the physician. The ethical practitioner needs no such laws; rather they are standards by which he may determine the propriety of his own conduct. Undoubtedly, interpretation of these principles by an appropriate authority will be required at times. As a rule, however, the physician who is capable, honest, decent, courteous, vigilant, and an observer of the Golden Rule, and who conducts his affairs in the light of his own conscientious interpretation of these principles, will find no difficulty in the discharge of his professional obligations.

CHAPTER I

General Principles

Character of the Physician

Section 1. The prime object of the medical profession is to render service to humanity; reward or financial gain is a subordinate consideration. Whoever chooses this profession assumes the obligation to conduct himself in accord with its ideals. A physician should be "an upright man, instructed in the art of healing." He must keep himself pure in character and be

* Translated by W. H. S. Jones.

† As revised December 1953. Copyright 1953 by the American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago 10, Illinois, and reprinted here with its permission.

diligent and conscientious in caring for the sick. As was said by Hippocrates, "He should also be modest, sober, patient, prompt to do his whole duty without anxiety; pious without going so far as superstition, conducting himself with propriety in his profession and in all the actions of his life."

The Physician's Responsibility

Sec. 2. "The profession of medicine, having for its end the common good of mankind, knows nothing of national enmities, of political strife, of sectarian dissensions. Disease and pain the sole conditions of its ministry, it is disquieted by no misgivings concerning the justice and honesty of its client's cause; but dispenses its peculiar benefits, without stint or scruple, to men of every country, and party and rank, and religion, and to men of no religion at all." ‡

Groups and Clinics

Sec. 3. The ethical principles actuating and governing a group or clinic are exactly the same as those applicable to the individual. As a group or clinic is composed of individual physicians, each of whom, whether employer, employee or partner, is subject to the principles of ethics herein elaborated, the uniting into a business or professional organization does not relieve them either individually or as a group from the obligation they assume when entering the profession.

Advertising

Sec. 4. Solicitation of patients, directly or indirectly, by a physician, by groups of physicians or by institutions or organizations is unethical. This principle protects the public from the advertiser and salesman of medical care by establishing an easily discernible and generally recognized distinction between him and the ethical physician. Among unethical practices are included the not always obvious devices of furnishing or inspiring newspaper or magazine comments concerning cases in which the physician or group or institution has been, or is, concerned. Self laudations defy the traditions and lower the moral standard of the medical profession; they are an infraction of good taste and are disapproved.

The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young physician, especially among his brother physicians, is the establishment of a well merited reputation for professional ability and fidelity. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of simple professional cards is approved in some localities but is disapproved in others. Disregard of local customs and offenses against recognized ideals are unethical.

The Relationship of the Physician to Media of Public Information

Sec. 5. Many people, literate and well educated, do not possess a special knowledge of medicine. Medical books and journals are not always easily accessible or readily understandable.

The medical profession considers it ethical for a physician to meet the request of a component or constituent medical society to write, act or speak for general readers or audiences. On the other hand, it may often happen that the representatives of popular news media are the first to perceive the adaptability of medical material for presentation to the public. In such a situation the physician may be asked to release to the public some information, exhibit, drawing or photograph. Refusal to release this material may be considered a refusal to perform a public service, yet compliance may bring the charge of self-seeking or solicitation.

An ethical physician may provide appropriate information regarding important medical and public health matters which have been discussed during open medical meetings or in technical papers which have been published, and he may reveal information regarding a patient's physical condition if the patient gives his permission, but he should seek the guidance of appropriate officials and designated spokesmen of component or constituent medical societies. Spokesmen should be empowered to give prompt and authoritative replies and a list should be issued which identifies them and discloses the manner in which they may be reached. These provisions are made with full knowledge that the primary responsibility of the physician is the welfare of his patient but proper observation of these ethical provisions by the physician concerned should protect him from any charge of self-aggrandizement.

Scientific articles written concerning hospitals, clinics or laboratories which portray clinical facts and technics and which display appropriate illustrations may well have the commendable effect of inspiring public confidence in the procedure described. Articles should be prepared authoritatively and should utilize information supplied by the physician or physicians in charge with the sanction of appropriate associates.

When any sort of medical information is released to the public, the promise of radical cures or boasting of cures or of extraordinary skill or success is unethical.

An institution may use means, approved by the medical profession in its own locality, to inform the public of its address and the special class, if any, of patients accommodated.

Patents, Commissions, Rebates, and Secret Remedies

Sec. 6. An ethical physician will not receive remuneration from patents on or the sale of surgical instruments, appliances and medicines, nor profit from a copyright on methods or procedures. The receipt of remuneration from patents or copyrights tempts the owners thereof to retard or inhibit research or to restrict the benefits derivable therefrom to patients, the public or the medical profession. The acceptance of rebates on prescriptions or appliances, or of commissions from attendants who aid in the care of patients is unethical. An ethical physician does not engage in barter or trade in the appliances, devices or remedies prescribed for patients, but limits the sources of his professional income to professional services rendered the patient. He should receive his remuneration for professional services rendered only in the amount of his fee specifically announced to his patient at the time the service is rendered or in the form of a subsequent statement, and he should not accept additional compensation secretly or openly, directly or indirectly, from any other source.

The prescription or dispensing by a physician of secret medicines or other secret remedial agents, of which he does not know the composition, or the manufacture or promotion of their use is unethical.

Evasion of Legal Restrictions

Sec. 7. An ethical physician will observe the laws regulating the practice of medicine and will not assist others to evade such laws.

CHAPTER II

Duties of Physicians to Their Patients

Standards, Usefulness, Nonsectarianism

Section 1. In order that a physician may best serve his patients, he is expected to exalt the standards of his profession and to extend its sphere of usefulness. To the same end, he should not base his practice on an exclusive dogma or a sectarian system, for "sects are implacable despots; to accept their thralldom is to take away all liberty from one's action and thought." § A sectarian or cultist as applied to medicine is one who alleges to follow or in his practice follows a dogma, tenet or principle based on the authority of its promulgator to the exclusion of demonstration and scientific experience. All voluntarily associated activities with cultists are unethical. A consultation with a cultist is a futile gesture if the cultist is assumed to have the same high grade of knowledge, training, and experience as is possessed by the doctor of medicine. Such consultation lowers the honor and dignity of the profession in the same degree in which it elevates the honor and dignity of those who are irregular in training and practice.

Patience, Delicacy, and Secrecy

Sec. 2. Patience and delicacy should characterize the physician. Confidences concerning individual or domestic life entrusted by patients to a physician and defects in the disposition or character of pa-

‡ Sir Thomas Watson.

§ Nicon, father of Galen.

tients observed during medical attendance should never be revealed unless their revelation is required by the laws of the state. Sometimes, however, a physician must determine whether his duty to society requires him to employ knowledge, obtained through confidences entrusted to him as a physician, to protect a healthy person against a communicable disease to which he is about to be exposed. In such instance, the physician should act as he would desire another to act toward one of his own family in like circumstances. Before he determines his course, the physician should know the civil law of his commonwealth concerning privileged communications.

Prognosis

Sec. 3. The physician should neither exaggerate nor minimize the gravity of a patient's condition. He should assure himself that the patient, his relatives or his responsible friends have such knowledge of the patient's condition as will serve the best interests of the patient and the family.

The Patient Must Not Be Neglected

Sec. 4. A physician is free to choose whom he will serve. He should, however, respond to any request for his assistance in an emergency or whenever temperate public opinion expects the service. Once having undertaken a case, the physician should not neglect the patient, nor should he withdraw from the case without giving notice to the patient, his relatives or his responsible friends sufficiently long in advance of his withdrawal to allow them to secure another medical attendant.

CHAPTER III

Duties of Physicians to the Profession at Large

Upholding the Honor of the Profession

Section 1. A physician is expected to uphold the dignity and honor of his vocation.

Membership in Medical Societies

Sec. 2. For the advancement of his profession, a physician should affiliate with medical societies and contribute of his time, energy and means so that these societies may represent the ideals of the profession.

Safeguarding the Profession

Sec. 3. Every physician should aid in safeguarding the profession against admission to it of those who are deficient in moral character or education.

Exposure of Unethical Conduct

Sec. 4. A physician should expose, without fear or favor, incompetent or corrupt, dishonest or unethical conduct on the part of members of the profession. Questions of such conduct should be considered, first, before proper medical tribunals in executive sessions or by special or duly appointed committees on ethical relations, provided such a course is possible and provided, also, that the law is not hampered thereby. If doubt should arise as to the legality of the physician's conduct, the situation under investigation may be placed before officers of the law, and the physician-investigators may take the necessary steps to enlist the interest of the proper authority.

CHAPTER IV

Professional Services of Physicians to Each Other

Dependence of Physicians on Each Other

Section 1. As a general rule, a physician should not attempt to treat members of his family or himself. Consequently, a physician should cheerfully and without recompense give his professional services to physicians or their dependents if they are in his vicinity.

Compensation for Expenses

Sec. 2. When a physician from a distance is called to advise another physician about his own illness or about that of one of his family dependents, and the physician to whom the service is rendered is in easy financial circumstances, a compensation that will at least meet the traveling expenses of the visiting physician should be proffered him. When such a service requires an absence from the accustomed field of professional work of the visitor

that might reasonably be expected to entail a pecuniary loss, such loss may, in part at least, be provided for in the compensation offered.

One Physician in Charge

Sec. 3. When a physician or a member of his dependent family is seriously ill, he or his family should select one physician to take charge of the case. The family may ask the physician in charge to call in other physicians to act as consultants.

CHAPTER V

Duties of Physicians in Consultations

Consultations Should Be Encouraged

Section 1. In a case of serious illness, especially in doubtful or difficult conditions, the physician should request consultations.

Consultation for Patient's Benefit

Sec. 2. In every consultation, the benefit to the patient is of first importance. All physicians interested in the case should be candid with the patient, a member of his family or a responsible friend.

Punctuality

Sec. 3. All physicians concerned in consultations should be punctual. When, however, one or more of the consultants are unavoidably delayed, the one who arrives first should wait for the others for a reasonable time, after which the consultation should be considered postponed. When the consultant has come from a distance, or when for any other reason it will be difficult to meet the physician in charge at another time, or if the case is urgent, or it be the desire of the patient, his family or his responsible friends, the consultant may examine the patient and mail his written opinion, or see that it is delivered under seal to the physician in charge. Under these conditions, the consultant's conduct must be especially tactful; he must remember that he is framing an opinion without the aid of the physician who has observed the course of the disease.

Patient Referred to Consultant

Sec. 4. When a patient is sent to a consultant and the physician in charge of the case cannot accompany the patient, the physician in charge should provide the consultant with a history of the case, together with the physician's opinion and outline of the treatment, or so much of this as may be of service to the consultant. As soon as possible after the consultant has seen the patient he should address the physician in charge and advise him of the results of the consultant's investigation. The opinions of both the physician in charge and the consultant are confidential and must be so regarded by each.

Discussions in Consultation

Sec. 5. After the physicians called in consultation have completed their investigations, they and the physician in charge should meet by themselves to discuss the course to be followed. Statements should not be made nor should discussion take place in the presence of the patient, his family or his friends, unless all physicians concerned are present or unless all of them have consented to another arrangement.

Responsibility of Attending Physician

Sec. 6. The physician in charge of the case is responsible for treatment of the patient. Consequently, he may prescribe for the patient at any time and is privileged to vary the treatment outlined and agreed on at a consultation whenever, in his opinion, such a change is warranted. However, after such a change, it is best to call another consultation; then the physician in charge should state his reasons for departing from the course decided at the previous conference. When an emergency occurs during the absence of the physician in charge, a consultant may assume authority until the arrival of the physician in charge, but his authority should not extend further without the consent of the physician in charge.

Conflict of Opinion

Sec. 7. Should the physician in charge and a consultant be unable to agree in their view of a case, another consultant should be called or the differing consultant should withdraw. However, since the patient employed the consultant to obtain his opinion, he should be permitted to state it

to the patient, his relative or his responsible friend, in the presence of the physician in charge.

Consultant and Attendant

Sec. 8. When a physician has acted as consultant in an illness, he should not become the physician in charge in the course of that illness, except with the consent of the physician who was in charge at the time of the consultation.

CHAPTER VI

Duties of Physicians in Cases of Interference

Misunderstandings to Be Avoided

Section 1. A physician, in his relationship with a patient who is under the care of another physician, should not give hints relative to the nature and treatment of the patient's disorder; nor should a physician do anything to diminish the trust reposed by the patient in his own physician. In embarrassing situations, or whenever there seems to be a possibility of misunderstanding with a colleague, a physician should seek a personal interview with his fellow.

Social Calls on Patient of Another Physician

Sec. 2. When a physician makes social calls on another physician's patient he should avoid conversation about the patient's illness.

Services to Patient of Another Physician

Sec. 3. A physician should not take charge of, or prescribe for another physician's patient during any given illness (except in an emergency) until the other physician has relinquished the case or has been formally dismissed.

Criticism to Be Avoided

Sec. 4. When a physician does succeed another physician in charge of a case, he should not disparage, by comment or insinuation, the one who preceded him. Such comment or insinuation tends to lower the confidence of the patient in the medical profession and so reacts against the patient, the profession and the critic.

Emergency Cases

Sec. 5. When a physician is called in an emergency because the personal or family physician is not at hand, he should provide only for the patient's immediate need and should withdraw from the case on the arrival of the personal or family physician. However, he should first report to the personal or family physician the condition found and the treatment administered.

Precedence When Several Physicians Are Summoned

Sec. 6. When several physicians have been summoned in a case of sudden illness or of accident, the first to arrive should be considered the physician in charge. However, as soon as is practicable, or on the arrival of the acknowledged personal or family physician, the first physician should withdraw. Should the patient, his family or his responsible friend wish some one other than he who has been in charge of the case, the patient or his representative should advise the personal or family physician of his desire. When, because of sudden illness or accident, a patient is taken to a hospital without the knowledge of the physician who is known to be the personal or family physician, the patient should be returned to the care of the personal or family physician as soon as is feasible.

A Colleague's Patient

Sec. 7. When a physician is requested by a colleague to care for a patient during the colleague's temporary absence, or when, because of an emergency, a physician is asked to see a patient of a colleague, the physician should treat the patient in the same manner and with the same delicacy that he would wish used in similar circumstances if the patient were his responsibility. The patient should be returned to the care of the attending physician as soon as possible.

Substitution in Obstetric Work

Sec. 8. When a physician attends a woman who is in labor because the one who was engaged to attend her is absent, the physician summoned in the emergency should relinquish the patient to the first engaged, on his arrival. The one in attendance is entitled to compensation for the professional services he may have rendered.

Disputes Between Physicians

Sec. 9. Whenever there arises between physicians a grave difference of opinion, or of interest, which cannot be promptly adjusted, the dispute should be referred for arbitration, preferably to an official body of a component society.

CHAPTER VII

Compensation

Limits of Gratuitous Service

Section 1. Poverty of a patient, and the obligation of physicians to attend one another and the dependent members of the families of one another, should command the gratuitious services of a physician. Institutions and organizations for mutual benefit, or for accident, sickness and life insurance, or for analogous purposes, should meet such costs as are covered by the contract under which the service is rendered.

Conditions of Medical Practice

Sec. 2. A physician should not dispose of his services under conditions that make it impossible to render adequate service to his patients, except under circumstances in which the patients concerned might be deprived of immediately necessary care.

Contract Practice

Sec. 3. Contract practice as applied to medicine means the practice of medicine under an agreement between a physician or a group of physicians, as principals or agents, and a corporation, organization, political subdivision or individual, whereby partial or full medical services are provided for a group or class of individuals on the basis of a fee schedule, or for a salary or for a fixed rate per capita.

Contract practice *per se* is not unethical. Contract practice is unethical if it permits of features or conditions that are declared unethical in these Principles of Medical Ethics or if the contract or any of its provisions causes deterioration of the quality of the medical services rendered.

Free Choice of Physician

Sec. 4. Free choice of physician is defined as that degree of freedom in choosing a physician which can be exercised under usual conditions of employment between patients and physicians. The interjection of a third party who has a valid interest, or who intervenes between the physician and the patient does not *per se* cause a contract to be unethical. A third party has a valid interest when, by law or volition, the third party assumes legal responsibility and provides for the cost of medical care and indemnity for occupational disability.

Commissions

Sec. 5. When a patient is referred by one physician to another for consultation or for treatment, whether the physician in charge accompanies the patient or not, the giving or receiving of a commission by whatever term it may be called or under any guise or pretext whatsoever is unethical.

Purveyal of Medical Service

Sec. 6. A physician should not dispose of his professional attainments or services to any hospital, lay body, organization, group or individual, by whatever name called, or however organized, under terms or conditions which permit exploitation of the services of the physician for the financial profit of the agency concerned. Such a procedure is beneath the dignity of professional practice and is harmful alike to the profession of medicine and the welfare of the people.

CHAPTER VIII

Duties of Physicians to the Public

Physicians as Citizens

Section 1. Physicians, as good citizens, possessed of special training, should advise concerning the health of the community wherein they dwell. They should bear their part in enforcing the laws of the community and in sustaining the institu-

tions that advance the interests of humanity. They should cooperate especially with the proper authorities in the administration of sanitary laws and regulations.

Public Health

Sec. 2. Physicians, especially those engaged in public health work, should enlighten the public concerning quarantine regulations and measures for the prevention of epidemic and communicable diseases. At all times the physician should notify the constituted public health authorities of every case of communicable disease under his care, in accordance with the laws, rules, and regulations of the health authorities. When an epidemic prevails, a physician must continue his labors without regard to the risk to his own health.

Pharmacists

Sec. 3. Physicians should recognize and promote the practice of pharmacy as a profession and should recognize the cooperation of the pharmacist in education of the public concerning the practice of ethical and scientific medicine.

Legal Ethics

By HENRY S. DRINKER

THE origins of the rules of conduct applicable to lawyers in the practice of their profession, known as legal ethics and legal etiquette, are found in the Ten Commandments, in statutes, in common-law decisions, in the canons adopted by the bar associations and the decisions of their ethics committees construing them, and in the usages, customs, and practices of the bar. Some of them, such as the prohibition of embezzlement, are applicable to everyone, although as an incentive to their observance the lawyer has to consider not only his own reputation for probity but also that of his profession. The obligation of fidelity to trust and the duty not to represent conflicting interests are applicable to all agents and fiduciaries, although the lawyer's intimate confidential relations with his clients require of him the observance of the utmost good faith—*uberimma fides*—at least as scrupulous as in the case of any other fiduciary, if not even more so. The proscription of solicitation and advertising and of enticing another's clients is peculiarly applicable to lawyers, although the doctors have recognized it. The duty not to negotiate directly with an adverse party who is represented by a lawyer is peculiar to the legal profession.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS

These principles of legal ethics and etiquette originated in the Inns of Court in London, where the barristers—the legal ancestors of the modern lawyer—established themselves during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They were practically all the sons of well-to-do parents, who did not have to worry about earning their keep and who traditionally looked down on all forms of trade and on the competitive spirit characteristic thereof. They regarded the law in the same way that they did a seat in Parliament—as a form of public service in which the gaining of a livelihood was not an objective. The profession of the law hence acquired a certain dignity which it has been the aim of the bar to preserve ever since.

The conditions under which the barristers practiced their profession materially contributed to this attitude. They were a select fraternity who lived together and met one another every day, both at dinner and in court, on a friendly basis. "Do as adversaries do in law," said Tranio in *The Taming of the Shrew,* "strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends."

Obviously such intimacy as this would have been impossible for men who were continually blowing their professional horns and plotting to steal away one another's clients.

These amenities of the profession were brought back to this country by the many young men who, in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth, went to the Inns of Court for their legal training and on their return home became leaders of the American bar. That they have not given way before to the aggressively competitive spirit which has characterized our industrial development is due to the inherent conditions which differentiate the law, as a profession, from a mere business, and primarily to the influence of the bar associations in their determination that it shall remain so.

Owing to the influence and competi-

ion of the young men who in colonial ays thus received their training in the nns of Court, high standards of educaion, craftsmanship, and conduct were stablished and maintained in America n the period immediately following the Revolution.

During the second third of the nineeenth century, however, there develped a growing hostility against special rivileges granted by the government. 'rofessions, and particularly bar assoiations, were deemed undemocratic and n-American. This manifested itself verywhere in a lowering of the required ualifications of character, education, nd training. In 1860 Pennsylvania vas the only state which required stulents of law to register at the beginning of their period of study. In a umber of states statutes and even contitutional provisions were passed upolding the inherent and "natural" right f every voter of good moral character o practice law. In others the right of dmission was assured after a brief peiod of study. There was also widepread objection to the organized bar s a "secret trade union" or a privieged class not open equally to all citiens. Even bar meetings, which had been primarily social gatherings of the egal fraternity, or for the purpose of onoring a distinguished judge or lawer, usually recently deceased, were for he most part discontinued. In the peiod immediately after the Civil War, he bar reached its lowest ebb.

BAR ASSOCIATIONS

About 1875 the leaders of the bar, ealizing the deplorable condition into which their profession was falling, as well as the imperative necessity of takng a firm stand against the rising tide f commercialism and the growing inluence of those who would turn the profession from a "branch of the administration of justice" into a "mere money-getting trade," began the movement for the re-establishment at the bar of standards of character, education, and training, and also for the organization of bar associations all over the country. This movement has grown and prospered until now it is universally recognized that for the protection of the public no one may practice law whose character has not been subjected to examination and found worthy, and who has not passed a prescribed test as to his education and legal training. Also bar associations have been organized in all the states, in the District of Columbia, and in a great many counties. These are not merely fraternal societies, holding annual dinners and memorial meetings, or trade associations for the material advancement of their members, but organizations devoted to the pursuit of a learned art in the spirit of public service.

In twenty-five states the bar is "integrated," whether by statute or by authorized Rule of Court: every practicing lawyer must be a supporting member of the bar association, subject to its canons and to discipline by it. In all the other states there are voluntary associations.

The oldest bar association in the United States is apparently that in Philadelphia, which was established in 1802. The American Bar Association was established in 1878. The earliest association to adopt a Code of Ethics was Alabama, which in 1887 formulated its original fifty-six Canons, based largely on Judge Sharswood's lectures on Professional Ethics, delivered at the University of Pennsylvania in 1854, and on the fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, published by David Hoffman of the Baltimore bar in 1834. The Alabama Code was adopted, with minor changes, in a number of states, and in 1908 the American

Bar Association, after extensive study and consideration, adopted thirty-two Canons of Ethics, to which, as amended from time to time, fifteen more have since been added. They have been construed by its Committee on Professional Ethics in a very considerable body of published decisions. While these Canons and decisions have not the force of statute or case law, they are generally recognized by the courts as setting forth the view and attitude of the bar on the problems covered and as embodying sound standards of professional conduct, which the courts will enforce by censure, suspension, or disbarment of members of the bar who are found to have violated them.

NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Proceedings to discipline a lawyer for professional misconduct are not in their nature punitive, criminal, or for the redressing of grievances on the part of those wronged by them, but are to protect the public, the bar, and the courts from the presence of persons unfit or unworthy of continued confidence in the performance of professional duties and relations. The pardon of the offense charged or restitution to the injured party, although perhaps relevant to the severity of the discipline administered, is no defense. *Res adjudicata* does not apply to disciplinary proceedings, nor is there nor can there be any statute of limitations applicable thereto.

Proceedings to discipline a member of the bar by censure, suspension, or disbarment differ from proceedings for contempt, the purpose of which is to maintain and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court and to protect the due and orderly administration of justice, whereas that of disciplinary proceedings is to keep the legal profession free from unworthy membership and to protect clients from untrustworthy advisers and advocates. Contempt proceedings may be dealt with summarily by the court against which the contempt is committed, whereas disciplinary proceedings are the function of the court in which the offender has been licensed to practice. He is entitled to notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to refute them, but not (except in three states) to a jury trial.

While the legislatures may prescribe minimum qualifications of character and preparation for admission to the bar and specific causes necessitating disbarment, they may not constitutionally provide that certain specified qualifications will entitle one to practice or to be reinstated after disbarment, since, under the threefold division of powers prescribed by the Constitution, this is the exclusive function of the courts.

GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINE

The cases dealing with the discipline of lawyers involve two distinct characteristics:

1. Those involving conduct demonstrating that the lawyer is one who cannot properly be trusted to advise and represent clients.

2. Those in which his conduct has been such that to permit him to remain a member of the profession and to appear in court would cast a serious reflection on the dignity of the court and the reputation of the profession.

In cases of the first class, although the dereliction is usually in his professional capacity, this is not essential, since it may be demonstrated in other ways that he is basically an unsafe person to manage the legal business of others.

The burden of proving that he is worthy of admittance to the bar is on the applicant, that of proving him deserving of discipline is on his accusers, the latter burden being proportionate to the length and excellence of his record for good conduct.

CENSURE, SUSPENSION, OR DISBARMENT

For minor offenses the lawyer is censured by the court. For more serious ones he may be suspended from practice, either for a specified term or indefinitely with leave to apply and show good cause for reinstatement. For the more serious offenses he is disbarred. In many of the latter cases the court has granted reinstatement on a finding that he has reformed. It is believed, however, that such reinstatements are too often the result of sympathy or pity for the lawyer and his family with too little consideration for the public and the reputation of the profession. Some courts have persuasively said that disbarment should be ordered only where the court is thoroughly satisfied that the lawyer is one who should never be permitted to practice again, and that accordingly he should be reinstated only in case the court finds that its original conclusion was erroneous.

OBLIGATIONS TO THE PUBLIC RESULTING FROM EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES

By admission to the bar, the lawyer is granted the exclusive right[1] (1) to hold himself out as a lawyer; (2) as such, to advise clients and to represent them as an advocate; and (3) to appear for them in court proceedings.

In recognition of these exclusive privileges the lawyer is charged with the duty to the public: (1) to see to it that those admitted to the bar are properly qualified by character, ability, and training, and that those who thereafter prove unworthy of these privileges are deprived of them; (2) to see to it that able and upright judges are chosen and that any who prove manifestly unworthy or unfit are removed; (3) to represent without charge those unable to pay; (4) not to stir up litigation; (5) not to aid in the unauthorized practice of law.

The lawyer's obligation to keep the bar free from those who are unworthy to represent clients or are a discredit to their profession can be performed only by the wholehearted co-operation of the bar. Too often, it is feared, lawyers permit their friendship or sympathy for one of whose dereliction they have full knowledge to obscure their duty to the public, resulting in the serious injury of the prestige of the profession. Canon 29 requires every lawyer to expose without fear or favor all corrupt or dishonest conduct on the part of fellow members of the bar.

It is also their clear duty to see to it that able and upright judges are chosen and that those who prove manifestly unworthy or unfit are removed. This duty they should perform, despite the natural apprehension of reprisals should their efforts prove unsuccessful.

From the earliest times there has been recognized the duty to defend indigent criminals, when asked by the court to do so, and also to represent worthy persons unable to pay adequate compensation. The bar has organized and supported numerous Legal Aid Bureaus for this latter purpose.

At common law the stirring up of litigation constituted the serious crime known as maintenance, which is aggravated when the perpetrator is a lawyer, who by reason of his special professional privileges is precluded (Canon 28) from instigating, promoting, or prolonging litigation for his own benefit.

Canon 47 provides that no lawyer shall permit his professional services to be used to aid or make possible the unauthorized practice of law by any layman or lay agency. What constitutes the practice of law, beyond the holding oneself out as a lawyer and appearing as such in judicial proceedings, is not clearly settled.

[1] There has been some difference of opinion and considerable litigation on the part of the bar associations through their committees on unauthorized practice with regard to the extent of this exclusive privilege and as to what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. This problem is outside the scope of the present article.

OBLIGATIONS TO THE COURTS

In order to preserve public respect for the judicial office it is obviously necessary for lawyers, as officers of the court, at all times to maintain a respectful attitude to the courts and not to attempt improperly to curry favor with them. A lawyer may not use his personal relations with a judge to influence the court's decisions. Nor may he properly discuss with the judge any case in which he is engaged except in the presence of counsel on the other side; or file any memorandum or brief without giving his opponent a copy. Nor may he communicate with a juror or attempt to curry favor with him by flattery or special attention.

His attitude to the courts must be characterized by candor and fairness. His duty to further the interest of his client does not require him to employ any sort of trickery, chicane, deceit, or misrepresentation. He may not call a witness to swear to facts which he knows to be untrue. Agreements or understandings with the court must be scrupulously carried out and inquiries by the court fairly answered.

It is a most serious offense for a lawyer to alter court records or to do anything amounting to an abuse of legal process.

He may properly interview persons known to be witnesses for the other side. He may not, however, under Canon 9, interview the other party though the latter is expected to be a witness. He may never make to any witness the suggestion that in his testimony he suppress the truth or deviate from it.

While a lawyer may properly render professional service before legislative or other bodies, this must be done openly and in his true character and by means addressed to reason and understanding as distinguished from the exertion of personal influence.

OBLIGATIONS TO CLIENTS

In his relations with his client the lawyer is in the strictest sense a fiduciary to whom the client may entrust the most important secrets, confident that they will not be disclosed. He should be able to rest assured that the lawyer's relation to him will never be abused or taken advantage of for the lawyer's personal benefit. As a protection against the strong influence over the client to which their confidential relation necessarily gives rise, all dealings between attorney and client are most strictly scrutinized, and are presumptively invalid to benefit the lawyer or to operate to the prejudice of the client.

The lawyer's fiduciary relation applies to persons who, although not strictly clients, he has or should have reason to believe rely on him as a lawyer to advise them.

He must not mingle his client's funds with his own or use them for his own benefit. Nor may he accept any compensation or commission or other advantage from other parties to the transactions in which he is employed, without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure. To do so would be a breach of his fiduciary relation and would interfere with his wholehearted loyalty to his client.

He may not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting where so to do involves a speculation on his part on the outcome of the matter.

It is his duty to give his client candid and straightforward advice on all questions as to which he is consulted and

without regard to his personal interest to settle the controversy where this is to the client's advantage, as a fair settlement usually is.

His duty of unwavering loyalty to the client precludes him from representing or furthering any conflicting interest, except in very unusual cases where both the client and the other party desire him to do so after full disclosure by him and a full understanding of the facts and situation by all parties involved. This duty applies to law partners and to associates, who may not represent clients having interests which conflict with one another.

Membership by a lawyer in a labor union involves an improperly divided loyalty.

The acceptance of a retainer involves the representation that the lawyer has no relations with others which would interfere in any appreciable degree with his exclusive devotion to the cause confided to him, and that he has no personal interest which might affect his judgment or endanger his fidelity.

When the interests of clients diverge or become antagonistic their lawyer must be absolutely impartial toward them, which, unless they both or all expressly desire him to represent them, usually means that he must represent none of them.

A lawyer is in no way bound, however, to take a position on an abstract point of law consistent with that for which he has contended in other cases.

He may not attack the validity of a specific document which he has drawn or a construction thereof which he has supported.

It is often wise for a lawyer to refuse to represent conflicting interests even with the consent of all parties, since he will always be subject to the disagreeable even though unmerited charge of betraying professional confidence.

A lawyer retiring from judicial or public position may not thereafter accept employment involving the correctness of any factual situation on which he has thus passed. This does not, however, preclude an ex-judge from changing his position on any point of law.

The lawyer's duty to preserve his client's confidences precludes him from disclosing communications made by the client to him in his professional capacity. This privilege outlasts his employment and may be waived only by the client. It does not, however, preclude the lawyer from making disclosures necessary to prevent a fraud or crime or necessary to refute an accusation by the client against him.

Acceptance of professional employment

Except where assigned by a court to defend those who cannot afford to pay counsel, a lawyer in the United States is not under any duty to accept any client but may choose his own cases and may decline any employment for any reason or without a reason.

He should never presume to undertake professional employment for which he is not reasonably competent, but should recommend or associate a specialist. Having undertaken a matter, he may withdraw provided the client's cause will not suffer thereby.

Defense of one known to be guilty

Although a lawyer may refuse to undertake a case which appears to him unsound or incapable of being successfully prosecuted or defended, or to defend a criminal whom he believes to be guilty, he is not bound to do so. Our legal system does not constitute the lawyer the judge as to the justice or soundness of the causes committed to him. Experience has shown that in many cases a lawyer's first impression of a case has turned out on further investigation to be erroneous. We deem it in the ends of justice to have all the facts and arguments on each side of the controversy presented by expert counsel, stimulated to a maximum of industry and ingenuity by the contest, the ultimate decision to be for the court and jury.

How far he may go in support of the client's cause

A lawyer is not bound to believe in the ultimate justice of his client's case and may not state such belief if he in fact entertains it. He is justified in asserting such defenses as usury, infancy, bankruptcy, and statutes of fraud or limitations. He may not, however, have any part in fraud, in trickery, or in actions involving deliberate violation of the law, nor may he employ coercive tactics or abuse of legal process, or countenance payment to secure specific testimony, or use underhanded means to secure evidence or disreputable tactics to further the client's cause.

On the discovery of fraud or imposition on the part of his client, he is bound to make disclosure necessary to preclude the client from having the advantage of it.

A lawyer may not ordinarily be an important witness in a case which he is conducting as an advocate.

Necessity of direct relations with client

The lawyer is precluded from delegating his professional functions. His relations with his client must be individual, personal, and direct, and not controlled or exploited by any intervening lay agency. It has accordingly been held improper for a corporation, a labor union, or an association to employ and pay a lawyer to advise its employees or members, even where the dealings between lawyer and client are direct, where there is no conflict of interest between the client and the corporation or association, and where it is distinctly in the interest of the corporation to keep its employees free from the worry and difficulties of litigation. As applied to cases of the latter type the present writer does not agree with the soundness of these decisions, believing that the public should have the benefit of group legal service as it has of medical.

Compensation

In the United States the lawyer's fee for professional services is not, as in England, regarded as an honorarium, but as legally enforcible whether under special agreement or on a *quantum meruit* basis. A lawyer usually finds it wiser, however, not to accept any fee from an honest client higher than the client thinks he should pay. The basis for compensation is the time, labor, and skill required in the particular case; whether the employment will preclude his employment by or cause antagonism on the part of other valuable clients; the amount involved and the benefit of his services to the client; the contingency or certainty of the compensation; whether the employment is casual or continuous; and the customary charges of the bar for similar services. A lawyer may, however, where no coercion is involved, stipulate for any fee he chooses.

A minimum fee schedule adopted by a bar association is not enforcible, but indicative only of the customary charges.

Contingent fees are not improper where reasonable under the circumstances. In some jurisdictions they are subject to court supervision.

The client must be ultimately responsible for the expenses of the litigation, although the lawyer may advance them subject to reimbursement.

Division of fees

A layman may be employed by a lawyer on any agreed basis to advise and assist the lawyer, and a lawyer

may accept employment by a layman at a stated salary or other agreed basis. The charge for the lawyer's services must, however, be fixed by him and not by the layman, nor may any such arrangement be used to enable the layman to practice law.

Fees of lawyers for professional services may be divided only with another lawyer, and only on the basis of service or responsibility. This precludes the division of fees by a lawyer on a percentage basis with collection agencies, and the division of fees with another lawyer merely as a forwarder of the case. The latter rule, under Canon 34, condemned a long-standing practice at the bar, but is being recognized. It also precludes the division of fees on a percentage basis on future business with retired partners or their estates.

OBLIGATIONS TO OTHER LAWYERS

A lawyer should be candid, fair, and courteous to other lawyers. His duty to further the client's cause to the utmost of his ability does not require him to sacrifice the good will of his colleagues, which is one of his most valuable assets, and one of which, in retaining him, the client gets the advantage. A lawyer is bound to observe every undertaking made in the course of the proceedings as well as the recognized customs of the bar.

The client has the right to be represented at all times by counsel of his own selection. A lawyer has no vested right to represent the estate of his deceased client, even at the latter's direction.

A lawyer retained to replace one discharged must see to it that the latter is specifically so advised, but is not responsible for the fees owing to him. The superseded lawyer must tell the client all he should know about the case. Under certain circumstances he has a lien for fees owing to him.

From early times it has been deemed highly improper for a lawyer to communicate in any way upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel. This is specifically enjoined by Canon 9. This duty is possibly suspended if the other lawyer unreasonably refuses to submit to his client a reasonable offer of compromise.

One of the amenities which, over many years, lawyers have recognized toward one another is the obligation to refrain from deliberately stealing each other's clients. This, as well as the obligation not to advertise and solicit, it is impossible to define precisely. As we approach the borderline between what is generally considered proper and what is improper, the question, as in the case of many other problems of professional ethics and etiquette, becomes one of good taste.

Canon 7 condemns any disparagement of another lawyer in order to supplant him. It also precludes the making of a competitive bid for professional service, as well as every other deliberate attempt to entice away another's clients.

Advertising and solicitation are specifically condemned by Canons 27, 43, and 46, the only exceptions being advertisements by bar associations to acquaint the public with the advantage of employing lawyers, and law lists circulated primarily among businessmen and designed to enable them to choose competent lawyers.

As construed by the ethics committees of the bar associations Canon 27 is tightening rather than relaxing the condemnation of all kinds of advertising and solicitation, direct or indirect.

Partnerships among lawyers are specifically recognized by Canon 33, but may include none but members of the bar entitled to practice at the locus of the partnership. The partnership name may not be fictitious and must not be misleading, but may contain that of a deceased partner where this is sanctioned by local custom. The name of one retiring to become a judge should not, however, be retained.

THE LAWYER'S CARDINAL LOYALTIES

Neither fidelity to the court, apprehension of judicial disfavor, nor friendship and sympathy will relieve the lawyer nor should deter him from his constant obligation to see to it that no unfit person is made or continued a judge or a member of the bar, whose honor and dignity it is always his duty to uphold and maintain.

To the court the lawyer must be thoroughly candid and sincere, both in word and in action, shunning every sort of deceit or misrepresentation, preserving a self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judicial office.

To his client he owes absolute candor, unswerving fidelity, and undivided allegiance, furthering his cause with entire devotion, warm zeal, and his utmost ability and learning, but without using means other than those addressed to reason and understanding; employing and countenancing no form of fraud, trickery, or deceit which, if brought to light, would shame his conscience or bring discredit to his profession.

To his brethren at the bar he should show courtesy and good faith, respecting their opinions and the relation between them and their clients, disdaining to supplant or surpass them by advertising, publicity, artifice, or by any means other than the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity, achievement, and fidelity to trust.

To himself and his profession he owes tireless industry, unbounded enthusiasm, delight in its problems, and joy in its struggles, and—above all—loyalty to his own ideals and to the traditions of a noble profession.

Henry S. Drinker, LL.B., Mus. Doc., Litt.D., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was admitted to the Pennsylvania bar in 1904 and has practiced law in Philadelphia since that date. He has been a senior member of Drinker, Biddle & Reath since 1932. He is the author of The Interstate Commerce Act (1908), The Chamber Music of Johannes Brahms (1933), and Legal Ethics (1953).

Principles of Professional Conduct in Engineering

By H. A. Wagner

WHEN the American Academy of Political and Social Science, in The Annals of May 1922, published a symposium on ethical standards of business and the professions, it showed that engineering had made measurable progress in defining professionalism and recognizing its ethical obligations, and also in reducing these first broad concepts to relatively "specific" principles of professional conduct. The symposium also revealed that scant progress had been made in the establishment of agencies to interpret, apply, and enforce these principles. Thirty-two years have elapsed, and the situation is little changed. Then, as now, engineering was hampered by the lack of an inclusive organization, universally recognized as its authorized spokesman, empowered to pass judgment on unethical conduct and punish offenders as the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association and their constituent state societies deal with unethical practice in their respective fields.[1]

[1] Engineers are represented by more than a hundred admirable national societies; pre-eminent among them are the Founder Societies, each representing one of the four major branches of engineering (civil, electrical, mechanical, mining and metallurgical). Since 1917 they have collaborated in certain types of activities through a series of agencies which they have created. Through some of these agencies, at intervals, other engineering societies have been loosely affiliated with the Founders. None of these agencies has ever been recognized by the public as the equivalent of the American Bar Association or the American Medical Association; consequently, none has ever been able to influence public opinion as do these two organizations, or use this force to discipline offenders against codes of ethics. Engineering's ethical codes, for example, require engineers to discourage the spreading of exaggerated statements regarding engineering, but the societies cannot deal summarily with offenders, as the American Medical Association chastises doctors who publicly endorse or seem to exploit new wonder drugs or therapy not fully tested or not approved by the profession.

Canons of Ethics for Engineers

Despite this fact, engineers have reached a certain accord in regard to ethical principles. Many of the national societies and numbers of state and local organizations have officially adopted the Canons of Ethics formulated by the Engineers' Council for Professional Development, an agency created by the Founder Societies in 1932. In 1947, the Council synthesized the major principles found in the ethical codes formulated by many of the leading societies. Many of the original codes were in operation in 1922, and some of these were published in The Annals, notably those of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers (which seems to have been the leader of the movement, with a code drafted in 1910 and officially adopted in 1912), the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and the American Association of Engineers. Two of these might more properly have been called "creeds" rather than "codes," as they were modeled after the Hippocratic Oath. Others referred to specific practices then too prevalent which were regarded as hurtful to the profession. Through the years the societies extended the coverage of their codes and revised "principles of professional conduct" as changing conditions of practice and new problems required. Nearly all the provisions of these codes could be classified under

the headings found in the Canons of Ethics for Engineers adopted by the Engineers' Council for Professional Development, namely, obligations imposed by membership in a profession, and the engineer's relations with the public, with clients and employers, and with other engineers. A copy of the code is appended.

Not all the engineering societies have adopted the ECPD Canons of Ethics, but none of the adopted codes is at variance with the Canons. Some of the societies have found it advisable to retain codes drafted for and by their own members, because these codes deal in greater detail with problems which, if not peculiar to particular segments of the engineering profession, are at least more acute in these fields of practice. In certain branches of engineering, for instance, the ownership of engineering records and data may pose ethical problems of such complexity that a society may find it necessary to incorporate in its code of principles of professional conduct a section devoted to this aspect of ethics more detailed than is necessary in Canons of Ethics drafted for engineering societies in general. Other organizations, especially those composed of engineers engaged in a particular industry (automotive, refrigerating, illuminating, aeronautical engineering, and others), may adopt the Canons officially, or may consider that they have tacitly accepted these rules because most of their members belong to technical societies which have adopted the ECPD Canons of Ethics. Still other technical and industrial groups subscribe to the principles but believe that "moral responsibilities cannot be legislated" and rely upon constitutional provisions for dealing with members who "fail to be honest or live up to the code of any gentleman." It can be said that the societies are in accord with regard to fundamentals, but that there are practices denounced by the societies in their codes which are still defended by large numbers of engineers.

American Association of Engineers

In the invitation to prepare this discussion of ethics in the engineering profession, the author was instructed to detail the work of at least one national and one local group. He has chosen to trace the movement in the American Association of Engineers, first of all because he is most familiar with the procedure in that organization. In the second place, three of the distinguished engineers who contributed to the 1922 symposium were members of this organization and the American Association of Engineers was the agency through which they worked to improve ethical standards.[2] The third reason for choosing the AAE to exemplify the evolution of ethical standards is that two of its original aims, stated in the preamble to its constitution, are basic elements in professional ethics. The AAE announced that it intended to "stimulate public service in the profession" and "to promote unity in the profession." In the first aim the AAE recognized the most distinctive characteristic of a profession—its obligation to serve society. In the second, it recognized an equally important characteristic, the principle that engineers in all stages of professional development are by the very nature of a profession under obligation to deal fairly with each other for the good of the profession and its members. The fourth and most compelling reason for the author's choice of

[2] These three engineers were: Morris Llewellyn Cooke, tactician of the AAE campaign for higher ethical standards; Frederick Haynes Newell (known as Father of the Reclamation Service), President of AAE in 1919–20; H. W. Clausen, in whose memory the Clausen Medal is awarded for "distinguished service for the welfare of engineers."

the AAE is the fact that the association's campaign was not fortuitous; it was well planned and carried forward in stages by leaders who were fully aware of the importance of timing.

Engineering's first code

Morris Llewellyn Cooke, well known for his work in later years in the Rural Electrification Administration, was tactician of the movement. It was he, in 1918, who called for a "true-blue and inspiring code of ethics for engineers." He specified that it should be the work of one man, not of a committee, because "committee work is accomplished to a greater or less degree by compromise and we do not want compromise in ethics." At the same time he said:

> Until we engineers can place the service of humanity as the significant and dominant plank in our platform, the profession will continue to have the status of the hired servant, and veer here and there as the winds of business and other special interests may dictate. . . .

His suggestion was adopted, and Isham Randolph wrote the code which appeared in the 1922 ANNALS, reprinted in the Appendix of the present article.

Practice Committee codification

At Mr. Cooke's suggestion the Association created a Practice Committee to which were referred real and hypothetical questions concerning the ethics of specific practices. These questions were considered by the Practice Committee, and some of them were assigned to state and local chapters of the Association for study and discussion. The decisions of the Practice Committee and reports from the chapters were published in the Association's journal. By every possible means the Association stimulated the interest of its members in questions of ethics. This was in line with the plan made by Mr. Cooke who, in 1920, in an article in *Professional Engineer* (the Association's official publication) said:

> Ethical conduct is such as has received more or less general sanction. This means that conduct which at one time or place may receive very generous approval at another time or in a different locality may be generally considered reprehensible. . . . Higher standards only become the rules for conduct when through education they have become accepted as proper by a sufficiently large or influential element within the constituency. . . .

Mr. Cooke recommended that:

> the Practice Committee should subdivide the cases submitted to it into at least two classes: (a) Those upon which the best sentiment of the profession is now capable of concrete expression, and (b) those which require special analysis and protracted study and discussion in order to develop what is our best thought.

At this time, too, Mr. Cooke warned against any "effort at rigorous discipline." He said that the educational work of the Practice Committee was its most valuable contribution, and that clarifying an engineer's relationship and responsibilities would count more at that time than trials for unprofessional conduct. The questions submitted to the Practice Committee involved many practices detrimental to engineers, to the profession, and to society, but they were accepted or common practices, and presumably in harmony with existing principles of ethics. By provoking discussion of these practices harmful to the profession, the American Association of Engineers led its members to acceptance of higher standards of ethics.

During this period C. F. Taeusch, associate professor of philosophy at Iowa State University, became the adviser of the Practice Committee. Dr. D. B. Steinman, eminent and internationally known bridge engineer of New York,

directed the work of codifying Practice Committee decisions for publication in *Professional Engineer* in 1923 (with identifying names of persons or places deleted). In 1927 the Association issued a booklet entitled *The Engineer and His Ethics*, which contained this codification of Practice Committee decisions, the Isham Randolph Code of Ethics, and the Vow of Service, written by Dr. D. B. Steinman—all reprinted in full in the Appendix. This booklet was distributed to AAE chapters and to engineering schools. Thus the Association followed the advice of Mr. Cooke in clarifying for engineers and future engineers their relationships and responsibilities.

Booklet for the public

Realizing that the public had an important though unrecognized interest in the ethical standards of engineering and a direct influence upon those standards, the Association in 1929 brought out a booklet prepared by its Committee on Services and Fees of Practicing Engineers, entitled *How To Employ and Use the Services of Practicing Engineers*. This booklet struck directly at the unwise practice of engaging engineering services on the basis of competitive bids. In addition to information on legitimate methods of engaging the services of engineers, the booklet contained a typical form of agreement, a schedule of minimum recommended fees, and the Code of Practice of the American Society of Civil Engineers, adopted by that organization in 1927. The Association used the ASCE Code rather than its own 1924 codification of Practice Committee cases "in the interest of uniformity and to avoid duplication of effort."

OTHER NATIONAL SOCIETIES

Since 1927 many of the national societies have developed and published manuals of practice much more comprehensive and detailed than the AAE's booklet on employment and use of the services of practicing engineers. Each society emphasizes problem areas which are of special concern to its members. Every national organization is using its resources to "clarify relationships and obligations" of engineers and to bring about acceptance of principles which prescribe practices beneficial to engineers, the profession, and the public.

ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES

Unlike the professions of law and medicine engineering cannot enforce its codes by drastic means, for reasons which were stated in the beginning of this article. Each society must handle violations of its code by its own members. Although a Judiciary Committee was created in 1922 by the American Association of Engineers to serve as a court of appeal from decisions of the Practice Committee and given authority to suspend or expel members who violated the code, it has considered few cases. Other societies have similar agencies, but if they have resorted to rigorous discipline of violators of ethical codes, it has been done with such discretion and dignity that few members of the societies have been aware of the action.

Suspension or expulsion from membership in a major engineering society is a terrific rebuke, but it may have little effect on the individual's future practice of engineering, unless the action is widely publicized. The fear of suspension or expulsion may be a strong deterrent against unethical conduct among members who have joined national organizations for prestige and "contacts." For mercenary reasons they cherish the respect of top-ranking consultants and of engineers eminent in private practice or in industry. Such punishment as can be meted out by the

societies is not a strong deterrent against unethical conduct on the part of less sensitive or less ambitious men. The man who is prone to unethical conduct is likely to be callous. He may have a relatively small but satisfactory field of practice in an area where the public generally and most of the businessmen who are potential users of his services know little of the great national engineering organizations. The societies have no disciplinary power over nonmembers.

Unethical engineers are protected in some degree by the ethical obligation of engineers to refrain from "harming" another member of the profession. Engineers who have seen signs of incompetency or dishonesty are reluctant to initiate action unless the evidence amounts to almost incontrovertible proof, or the element of real and present public danger is so apparent as to compel such action, that is, lay a positive ethical obligation upon the engineer who is aware of the situation.

REGISTRATION LAWS

During the years when campaigns for registration laws engrossed the societies, it was expected that such laws, when they were adopted by all the states, would "put teeth" in the ethical codes. Statutory penalties and state agencies for enforcement, it was believed, would make codes of ethics effective. Overlooking the effect of the "grandfather clause" which elevated many mechanics and surveyors to the rank of engineer and ensured the right of many incompetent and unethical engineers to continue practice, proponents of the laws expected registration to screen undesirables and thus exclude potential violators of ethical codes. Soon after the laws went into effect it was apparent that the boards charged with administering registration laws were given staffs inadequate to enable them to police all phases of the practice of engineering. Their resources were hardly adequate for the job of searching out cases of misuse of the title "engineer," unauthorized practice, and evasion of provisions in regard to "responsible charge." They had little opportunity to initiate action against engineers who were dishonest or incompetent.

It was soon apparent that both individual members of the profession and engineering organizations were very reluctant to bring charges, initiate action, or even appear as witnesses against men who were accused of dishonesty or incompetency. The profession looks to the National Society of Professional Engineers through its constituent state societies for dynamic leadership in enforcement of registration laws. Perhaps, in the future, canons of ethics can be written into the registration laws and enforced.

EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES

Despite the fact that the societies are relatively impotent in legalistic enforcement of ethical codes, they have in a very valid way "enforced" them. The real measure of progress in ethics is not the number of cases of unethical conduct detected and punished; the real measure is the evolution of clear principles of conduct accepted by a majority of engineers as right and just and worthy of support. Since 1922, the societies, by formulating principles of ethics and by provoking discussion of ethical codes made up of such principles, either in society meetings or society publications, have built up strong convictions which will govern the actions of all but a small, surreptitious minority. They have organized sentiment within the profession against many practices accepted in 1922 by a majority of engineers as ethical, although they were admittedly harmful to the public and to the profession of its members. Some of these practices, one of which was competitive bidding, were justified as meeting a statutory requirement—an excuse which has been debunked in a series of court decisions.[3] Despite engineering's codes and the courts' interpretation of the statutes, competitive bidding will *be* unethical only when the principle laid down in the engineering code has wide acceptance by the public and practically unanimous indorsement by members of the profession.

CHANGING STANDARDS

Not all the ethical problems facing the profession today are those inherited from the generation which spoke in THE ANNALS of 1922. Conservatives of that day were unable to see any distinction between "unionism" and "collective bargaining." The American Association of Engineers in 1918 represented the unorganized technical employees of the railroads before the United States Railroad Wage Commission.[4] The Association's spokesmen were officials of the very railroads involved. No coercion was used or threatened. The Association relied entirely upon the fairness of the Wage Commission and the public, and based its case upon the fact that despite increased living costs the salaries of technical employees had not been increased and that in comparison with the wages of organized labor the salaries of engineers were not commensurate with the services they rendered or the time and money spent in preparation for engineering careers. The American Association of Engineers contended that it was "professional" and highly ethical for a society composed of employer and employee engineers to work for the social and economic welfare of all members of the profession. It denounced, however, alignments in which employee engineers were pitted against employer engineers and "collective bargaining" which was based on coercion. Since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, a new generation of engineers has found the problem of "collective bargaining" fraught with ethical considerations. Because the Wagner Act gave the National Labor Relations Board arbitrary power to assign engineers, without their consent, to heterogeneous bargaining units represented by labor unions, the American Association of Engineers prepared a manual called *Technologists' Stake in the Wagner Act* to show engineers how to defend their *real* "freedom of association" under the act and to bring about amendment of the statute. Although the Taft-Hartley Act has ensured autonomy to professional employees, a new generation of engineers insists that collective bargaining is the order of the day and hence ethical, and proclaims its right to "organize" along union lines without sacrifice of professional status. The controversies arising from this situation are bitter, and the discord is ominously apparent in the very silence of all codes on the subject.

One concept which has altered with changing conditions is the attitude of the profession toward the practice of engineering by corporations. In 1922, many eminent engineers were fairly dogmatic on this issue. Today many of them are not so sure that the corporate form is per se "unethical," because of

[3] The American Society of Civil Engineers has reprinted for wider distribution an excellent article which appeared originally in the May 1954 issue of *Civil Engineering,* captioned "Competitive Bidding for Professional Services Not in the Public Interest," in which the author digests a series of court decisions which deny the validity of the "statutory" argument.

[4] On March 31 to April 2, 1919, the Association also testified before the Board of Wages and Working Conditions (appointed May 25, 1918) of the United States Railroad Administration, the Engineering Council assisting in presentation of the case.

the mammoth responsibilities assumed by engineering firms and the staggering capitalization needed to staff the firm with specialists and acquire instruments, laboratories, libraries, and other appurtenances.

OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW GUISE

Some of the new problems are really very old, but they are disguised by innovations in the form of tricks and devices to conceal evasions and violations of ethical principles. Many of these have to do with unethical methods of "getting jobs," which John R. Snell bluntly describes in an appeal for "A Fighting Code of Ethics" in the July 1954 issue of *Consulting Engineer*. He lists "kickbacks," "commissions," "finder fees," "payment for influence" to assist in obtaining (or in payment for) engineering work.

> It is interesting to note [says Mr. Snell] that as a general rule these malpractices exist in locales where corrupt political administrations are tolerated. In fact, the misuse of the construction industry and its heavy publicly subsidized appropriations is one of the important means of support of corrupt government.

He notes that engineers are "in one way or another responsible for the annual expenditures of about 35 billions," and adds, "This is a public trust we cannot glibly brush aside as the responsibility of others." Mr. Snell believes that architects and engineering societies "must agree on a modern, aggressive high level code of ethics." To enforce the code he would have all co-operating firms set up a single standard system of bookkeeping and would have the books of each firm audited periodically to detect infringements of the code.

MAJOR ETHICAL ISSUES

Engineering has made giant strides since 1922 and engineers have inherited social problems of staggering importance—responsibilities which their narrow technical training has ill fitted them to assume. The Red Queen in *Through the Looking-Glass* said, "Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to stay in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!" Engineers, despite their long struggle to raise ethical standards, confronted with unsolved problems, old and new, find themselves in just about the same place they were in 1922. Only a race of supermen could sprint as fast as they must to meet the obligations imposed upon them by the kaleidoscopic changes brought about largely by their own handiwork. They are harassed by petty problems which obscure major ethical issues—on one side by those which deplore "raiding" (the practice of offering irresistible inducements to particularly gifted engineers employed by a competitor) and on the other by those who decry "gentlemen's agreements" between firms (not to hire each other's employees). Perhaps it is fortunate that they find such problems complex and absorbing. Their preoccupation with such details may keep them from facing ethical considerations involved in their responsibility (along with physicists and chemists) for devilish instruments they have devised which may either save our nation from destruction by an aggressor or blast civilization to extinction.

Herman Alexander Wagner, M.E., Ph.D., Chicago, Illinois, is a consulting engineer. He is past president of the American Association of Engineers, has contributed numerous articles to professional engineering journals, and has often acted as mediator and arbitrator in disputes involving professional engineers.

APPENDIX

ENGINEER'S VOW OF SERVICE *

We dedicate ourselves to the service of mankind as members of the Engineering Profession.

We consecrate our professional knowledge and skill to the advancement of human welfare, safety and progress.

As we benefit by the technical knowledge and public esteem won for the Profession by the Engineers who labored in the past, we shall ever strive to augment that heritage before passing it on to the Engineers who are to follow.

We therefore affirm our guiding purpose:

So to live and work as to justify the trust and confidence reposed in the Engineering Profession.

To carry out professional engagements with generous measure of performance, and with fidelity toward those whom we undertake to serve.

To foster a spirit of courteous consideration and fraternal co-operation within the Profession.

To extend encouragement and a helping hand to younger Engineers and to those in need.

To place Service before profit, the honor and standing of the Profession before personal advantage, and the Public Welfare above all other consideration.

SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES OF GOOD PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT †

The compilation consists of four parts as follows:

Part I. Relations of the Engineer to the Public.

Part II. Relations of the Engineer to Clients and Employers.

Part III. Relations of the Engineer to Employees.

Part IV. Relations of the Engineer to other Engineers.

Part I

RELATIONS OF THE ENGINEER TO THE PUBLIC

1. The Engineer should regard his duty to the public welfare as paramount to all other obligations.

2. He should not use his professional standing as a means of sponsoring or promoting commercial or other undertakings of a speculative character.

3. He should scrupulously avoid connection, by act or omission, with any illegal or questionable undertaking or participation in any enterprise inimical to the public welfare.

4. He should not advertise in self-laudatory language or in any other manner derogatory to the dignity of his profession.

5. He should avoid any publicity giving the impression that technical service in technical matters can be dispensed with; or that technical proficiency along any line is easy of acquisition; or that exaggerated returns may be expected from any limited course of technical instruction.

6. He should avoid any questionable statements or any statements couched in language that would convey a false impression, in any of his reports, advertisements, or articles.

7. He should avoid contingent fees as tending to prejudice the quality of the service which he renders; when retained to report on a property or project he should be scrupulously careful to make no

* Written by Dr. D. B. Steinman; adopted by the American Association of Engineers on June 17, 1927.

† Specific Principles of Good Professional Conduct was compiled by the Practice Committee of the American Association of Engineers, under the chairmanship of E. E. Carpenter (1923), codified by Dr. D. B. Steinman (Chairman, 1924–25), and adopted by the Board of Directors in 1924.

business arrangement for compensation or otherwise that might tend to bias his report.

8. The Engineer should strive to give a full measure of service for the best interests of his client and of the public, and should charge fair and adequate fees for such service. He should maintain the professional attitude in negotiations for his services; and he should avoid all practices which have a tendency to affect adversely the amount, quality or disinterested nature of professional services, such as charging inadequate fees, competing on a price basis where (as is almost invariably the case) the service to be rendered or the character of its proper performance cannot be precisely defined, spending large amounts of money in securing business, or consenting to furnish monetary guarantees of cost estimates.

9. The Engineer should use every care to make his estimates accurate and reliable, and in particular should guard against allowing self-interest to lead him into making an inadequate estimate.

10. He should refrain from using any improper or questionable methods of soliciting professional work.

11. He should participate in clean politics and should strive to be a force to assist in the cleansing of politics.

12. He should take an active interest in the public welfare in behalf of which he should ever stand ready to volunteer his special knowledge, skill and training for the use and benefit of mankind.

Part II

RELATIONS OF THE ENGINEER TO CLIENTS AND EMPLOYERS

1. The Engineer should pursue his professional work in a spirit of strict fidelity and full loyalty to his clients and employers.

2. He should inform a client or employer of any business connections, interests or affiliations which might tend to influence his judgment or impair the disinterested quality of his services.

3. He should accept compensation for his services in connection with any work from one source only, except with the full knowledge and consent of all the interested parties.

4. He should hold as confidential such information relating to the business or technical affairs of a client or employer as the latter regards or may be presumed to regard as personal or proprietary.

5. He should not engage in any outside work without the full knowledge and consent of his employer.

6. When connected with any work, he should not accept commissions, outside employment, promise of employment or any other consideration from a contractor engaged upon that work.

7. He should have no business dealings or connections with any client of his employer without the full knowledge and approval of his employer.

8. He should entertain no offers of employment or other considerations from a third party, when such may in any way influence his actions or decisions with respect to the relations which may exist between such third party and the Engineer's employer or client.

9. He should not accept commissions or other considerations for specifying or recommending supplies, equipment or service.

10. He should not pay commissions to others for recommending his services to prospective clients.

11. He should have no interest direct or indirect in any materials, supplies or equipment used in the construction work of his client or in any firms receiving contracts for his client's work without informing his client in advance of the nature of such interest and obtaining his sanction.

12. He should not engage in the independent practice of engineering without the knowledge and sanction of his employer, and under no circumstances should he compete with his employer on the basis of lower fees.

Part III

RELATIONS OF THE ENGINEER TO EMPLOYEES

1. The Engineer should treat his employees or subordinates in a spirit of fairness, with due regard and consideration for their personal welfare and professional advancement.

2. There should be a professional bond between employer and employee when both are engineers, which will dictate and impel reciprocal interest and mutual consideration.

3. The Engineer should pay adequate salaries commensurate with the importance and responsibility involved in the service.

4. He should encourage the professional pride of his employees or subordinates in their work and should offer them every means of protecting their reputations and the quality of the work entrusted to them by not interfering with the proper performance of the duties for which they are responsible.

5. He should recognize the freedom of his employees to change employment and should in no way hinder employees or subordinates on bettering their condition.

6. He should not discharge an employee, nor withhold employment from him, nor discriminate against him in any way on account of his affiliations or activities in any professional, political, or religious organization.

7. He should respect his employee's right to freedom of thought, speech, and outside activity as long as the same does not impair the efficiency and value of the employee's service.

8. He should see that his employee is adequately covered by insurance against risk of casualty arising from his work.

9. In advertising or offering employment, he should refrain from any misrepresentation as to the conditions and permanency of such employment.

10. If in public employ, he should assume the responsibility of consistently protecting the interests of his subordinates.

11. He should make every effort to provide steady employment for his employees and when forced to discharge an employee he should give the most generous notice possible and exert every reasonable effort to assist the employee in finding another position.

Part IV

THE ENGINEER'S RELATIONS TO OTHER ENGINEERS

1. The Engineer should not by word, act or omission, injure falsely or maliciously, directly or indirectly, the professional reputation, prospects or business of another Engineer.

2. He should not attempt to supplant another Engineer after definite steps have been taken toward his employment.

3. If employed in conjunction with another Engineer, and by the same client, he should not review and comment conclusively upon the work of the other Engineer except with his full knowledge and consent or unless the connection of such other Engineer to the work has been previously terminated.

4. He should not use unfair means to effect his professional advancement or to injure the chances of another Engineer to secure and hold employment.

5. He should not attempt to inject his services into a project at the expense of another Engineer who has been active in developing it.

6. He should not interpose between other Engineers and their clients when unsolicited. When solicited, he should avoid any possibility of doing a brother Engineer an injustice.

7. He should not seek or solicit a position occupied by another Engineer.

8. He should not attempt to secure work on the basis of lower salaries or fees.

9. He should be courteous, fair, considerate in his dealings with other Engineers.

10. He should conduct any necessary comment on or criticism of the work of other Engineers with careful regard for the good name and dignity of the engineering profession, and he should scrupulously refrain from criticism to personal advantage, as in negotiating for an engagement.

11. He should not commercialize his affiliations with, or official position in, any technical organization.

12. He should not use his professional affiliations to secure the confidence of other Engineers in speculative commercial enterprises.

13. As a member of any professional organization, he should avoid any act tending to promote his own interest at the expense of the dignity and standing of the organization.

14. As an officer of a professional organization, he should sedulously avoid any

appearance of using his position for personal advertising.

15. He should cooperate in upbuilding the engineering profession by exchanging professional information and experience with his fellow engineers and students of engineering, and by contributing to the work of engineering societies, schools of applied science, and the technical press.

16. He should regard himself as a debtor to his profession and should dedicate himself to its advancement.

THE PROFESSION'S FIRST CODE OF ETHICS *

Any code of ethics must be predicated upon the basic principles of truth and honesty. "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest," are the things for which engineers must contend.

An engineer may not "go beyond and defraud his brother" by any underhand act or method. He may not do or say anything which will injure his brother's reputation or his business for the purpose of securing his own advancement or profit. This admonition carries with it no obligation to refrain from telling known and absolute truth about an unworthy brother, as a protection to others; but the truth so told must be such as can be substantiated, and he who tells it must have the courage which will not shrink from the consequence of his telling.

The engineer owes his client allegiance demanding his most conscientious service. But conscientious service to the client must never entail a surrender of personal convictions of truth and right.

An engineer who receives compensation from an employer may not receive gift, commission or remuneration of any kind from a third party with whom he does business for that employer.

An engineer seeking to build up his business may not resort to self-laudation in advertising. He may state briefly the lines of work in which he has had experience, and enumerate responsible positions which he has held and give his references.

An engineer who employs others, either in his own service or in that of the client who employs him, should recognize in his relationship to them an obligation of exemplary conduct, of helpfulness and personal interest in those with whom he is thus brought in contact, and he should discharge such obligation tactfully and kindly.

The honor of the profession should be dear to every engineer, and he should remember that his own character and conduct reflect honor, or the reverse upon the profession.

If, then, he so lives that his own honor shall never be smirched by his own act or omission, he will thus maintain the honor of the organization to which he belongs.

CANONS OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS †

FOREWORD

Honesty, justice, and courtesy form a moral philosophy which, associated with mutual interest among men, constitutes the foundation of ethics. The engineer should recognize such a standard, not in passive observance, but as a set of dynamic principles guiding his conduct and way of life. It is his duty to practice his profession according to these Canons of Ethics.

As the keystone of professional conduct is integrity, the engineer will discharge his duties with fidelity to the public, his employers, and clients, and with fairness and impartiality to all. It is his duty to interest himself in public welfare, and to be ready to apply his special knowledge for the benefit of mankind. He should uphold the honor and dignity of his profession and also avoid association with any enterprise of questionable character. In his dealings with fellow engineers he should be fair and tolerant.

* Written by Isham Randolph; adopted in 1918 by the American Association of Engineers.

† Adopted by the Engineers' Council for Professional Development, October 25, 1947.

PROFESSIONAL LIFE

Sec. 1. The engineer will co-operate in extending the effectiveness of the engineering profession by interchanging information and experience with other engineers and students and by contributing to the work of engineering societies, schools, and the scientific and engineering press.

Sec. 2. He will not advertise his work or merit in a self-laudatory manner, and he will avoid all conduct or practice likely to discredit or do injury to the dignity and honor of his profession.

RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC

Sec. 3. The engineer will endeavor to extend public knowledge of engineering, and will discourage the spreading of untrue, unfair, and exaggerated statements regarding engineering.

Sec. 4. He will have due regard for the safety of life and health of the public and employees who may be affected by the work for which he is responsible.

Sec. 5. He will express an opinion only when it is founded on adequate knowledge and honest conviction while he is serving as a witness before a court, commission, or other tribunal.

Sec. 6. He will not issue ex parte statements, criticisms, or arguments on matters connected with public policy which are inspired or paid for by private interests, unless he indicates on whose behalf he is making the statement.

Sec. 7. He will refrain from expressing publicly an opinion on an engineering subject unless he is informed as to the facts relating thereto.

RELATIONS WITH CLIENTS AND EMPLOYERS

Sec. 8. The engineer will act in professional matters for each client or employer as a faithful agent or trustee.

Sec. 9. He will act with fairness and justice between his client or employer and the contractor when dealing with contracts.

Sec. 10. He will make his status clear to his client or employer before undertaking an engagement if he may be called upon to decide on the use of inventions, apparatus, or any other thing in which he may have a financial interest.

Sec. 11. He will guard against conditions that are dangerous or threatening to life, limb, or property on work for which he is responsible, or if he is not responsible, will promptly call such conditions to the attention of those who are responsible.

Sec. 12. He will present clearly the consequences to be expected from deviations proposed if his engineering judgment is overruled by nontechnical authority in cases where he is responsible for the technical adequacy of engineering work.

Sec. 13. He will engage, or advise his client or employer to engage, and he will co-operate with, other experts and specialists whenever the client's or employer's interests are best served by such service.

Sec. 14. He will disclose no information concerning the business affairs or technical processes of clients or employers without their consent.

Sec. 15. He will not accept compensation, financial or otherwise, from more than one interested party for the same service, or for services pertaining to the same work, without the consent of all interested parties.

Sec. 16. He will not accept commissions or allowances, directly or indirectly, from contractors or other parties dealing with his client or employer in connection with work for which he is responsible.

Sec. 17. He will not be financially interested in the bids as or of a contractor on competitive work for which he is employed as an engineer unless he has the consent of his client or employer.

Sec. 18. He will promptly disclose to his client or employer any interest in a business which may compete with or affect the business of his client or employer. He will not allow an interest in any business to affect his decision regarding engineering work for which he is employed, or which he may be called upon to perform.

RELATIONS WITH ENGINEERS

Sec. 19. The engineer will endeavor to protect the engineering profession collectively and individually from misrepresentation and misunderstanding.

Sec. 20. He will take care that credit for engineering work is given to those to whom credit is properly due.

Sec. 21. He will uphold the principle of appropriate and adequate compensation for those engaged in engineering work, including those in subordinate capacities, as being in the public interest and maintaining the standards of the profession.

Sec. 22. He will endeavor to provide opportunity for the professional development and advancement of engineers in his employ.

Sec. 23. He will not directly or indirectly injure the professional reputation, prospects, or practice of another engineer. However, if he considers that an engineer is guilty of unethical, illegal, or unfair practice, he will present the information to the proper authority for action.

Sec. 24. He will exercise due restraint in criticizing another engineer's work in public, recognizing the fact that the engineering societies and the engineering press provide the proper forum for technical discussions and criticism.

Sec. 25. He will not try to supplant another engineer in a particular employment after becoming aware that definite steps have been taken toward the other's employment.

Sec. 26. He will not compete with another engineer on the basis of charges for work by underbidding, through reducing his normal fees after having been informed of the charges named by the other.

Sec. 27. He will not use the advantages of a salaried position to compete unfairly with another engineer.

Sec. 28. He will not become associated in responsibility for work with engineers who do not conform to ethical practices.

Codes of the American Rabbinate

By BEN ZION BOKSER

THE American rabbinate is organized in a variety of associations corresponding to ideological as well as regional divisions in the Jewish community. These associations have adopted a series of codes which attempt to standardize procedures and enforce sound ethical practices in various phases of a rabbi's work.

The Rabbinical Assembly of America, which represents the Conservative group in Judaism, adopted its code in 1950; some minor revisions were made in it at the Assembly's convention in 1953.[1] This code must be examined in conjunction with the special Code of Procedure in Placement of Rabbis, adopted in 1947, which is printed in its entirety in the Appendix to this article.

The Central Conference of American Rabbis, which represents the Reform rabbinate, adopted a code at its annual convention in the summer of 1940.[2]

The New York Board of Rabbis, which represents the Reform and Conservative as well as the Orthodox rabbinate in New York City and its environs, adopted in 1943 a code of Standards for Religious Functions.[3] In 1948, the Board adopted a code of Principles Governing Congregational-Rabbinical Agreements, printed in the Appendix.

The problems with which the rabbinic codes deal derive, for the most part, from the autonomous character of the synagogue and its total freedom from hierarchical control. The rabbi is not assigned by any central synagogue body to a particular congregation. Every selection of a rabbi is an act of mutual choice and for a mutually agreed period of time.

The individual Jewish family is similarly free to affiliate with a congregation of its own choice, or to remain unaffiliated. The unaffiliated family can always decide to draw upon specific services from a congregation or a rabbi, discharging its obligations by the payment of a stipulated fee or offering.

The contractual nature of the rabbi's relationship to his congregation introduces an element of insecurity into the rabbi's career, for he is subject to the changing whims of the members of his congregation. Furthermore, the presence in each community of a large periphery of unaffiliated families has often created rivalry among congregations whose welfare depends, among other things, on the size and affluence of the affiliated membership.

PLACEMENT PROCEDURES

One of the objectives of the rabbinic codes is to minimize competition among rabbis in placement. The Conservative group has established a central placement procedure which is administered by an official of the Rabbinical Assembly, in consultation with a committee representing, in addition to the Conservative rabbinate, the lay congregational leadership in the United Synagogue of America, and the training school for Conservative rabbis, the Jew-

[1] The code of the Rabbinical Assembly was issued to its members in Hebrew. Copies may be secured at the office of the Rabbinical Assembly, 3080 Broadway, New York City.

[2] The code of the Central Conference of American Rabbis was printed in full in the 1940 issue (Vol. 50) of the Conference *Year Book*.

[3] This code may be obtained at the office of the New York Board of Rabbis, 10 East 73rd Street, New York City.

ish Theological Seminary of America. The Joint Commission on Rabbinic Placement, as it is called, handles the entire process of rabbinic placement; the individual rabbi is forbidden to enter into direct negotiation with any congregation concerning a pulpit vacancy.

The Reform group never created an instrument of placement parallel to the commission which functions in the Conservative group and in which the rabbis have a decisive voice. In the Reform group, placement appears to be centered in the administrative officials of the Hebrew Union College, the Reform seminary for the training of rabbis. The code of the Reform rabbinate accordingly permits the individual rabbi to apply for a vacancy. A provision banning this was voted down by a referendum of the membership of the Central Conference of American Rabbis by 139 votes to 126. A rabbi, however, must not enter into any conversations about a pulpit until the incumbent has definitely severed his relationship with it. The Reform code parallels the Conservative code in forbidding a rabbi to render any ministrations to a colleague's congregation or to a family in a colleague's congregation, except at the invitation or with the permission of his colleague.

ELIMINATION OF COMMERCIALISM

All rabbinic codes endeavor to eliminate commercialism from the rabbinic profession and from the synagogue life generally. The Rabbinical Assembly code forbids the rabbi to advertise his availability as a performer of marriages or to accept an association with hotels or halls where weddings are performed. He is not to charge a stipulated fee for any service rendered to members of his own congregation, but an exception is made in the case of families not affiliated with the rabbi's congregation. The rabbi must not solicit families that are affiliated with another congregation to join his, and he is enjoined to use his influence against such competitive efforts on the part of members of his synagogue.

The code counsels a rabbi not to accept an invitation from families affiliated with another congregation to render a rabbinic service such as officiating at a funeral or a wedding unless it be with the participation of the rabbi of the congregation to which they belong, or at least with his consent. Fee-splitting between rabbis is forbidden. Substantially similar are the provisions in the codes of the Central Conference and the New York Board of Rabbis.

The rabbi's tenure in office is dealt with in the Principles Governing Congregational-Rabbinical Agreements of the New York Board of Rabbis. These Principles stipulate that the initial term for which a rabbi may be engaged is one year. The succeeding terms are to be three and five years each. After a rabbi has ministered to a congregation for approximately fifteen years, the relationship between rabbi and congregation is to be deemed permanent. This statement also includes recommendations that the congregation arrange for some insurance or retirement plan for the rabbi, and a policy of severance pay if the congregation terminates the services of an incumbent in its pulpit.

SANCTIONS

The provisions in the code of the New York Board of Rabbis governing congregational-rabbinical agreements carry, of course, no sanctions with them, but only the moral pressure which the organized rabbinic opinion in the area covered may command. On the other hand, the codes adopted by the rabbinical associations to govern the conduct of the rabbi himself carry with them sanctions. An amendment to the

Rabbinical Assembly's code which was adopted in 1953 stipulates three levels of sanctions which the Executive Council of the Assembly may adopt against an offending member upon the recommendation of the Ethics Committee. We quote this provision in full:

> Degree of sanctions to be taken against members of the Rabbinical Assembly and applied in accordance with the nature of the violation:
>
> 1. For unwitting and unpremeditated violations, a letter of caution shall be sent to the offending member by the Committee.
>
> 2. For more serious violations, there shall be either a letter threatening suspension, or a six month, one year, or two year suspension from membership in the Rabbinical Assembly, to be imposed by the Executive Council.
>
> 3. For grave violations which have been committed consciously and deliberately, the Committee has the right to recommend expulsion from membership in the Rabbinical Assembly.

The code of the Central Conference when originally submitted to the annual meeting of the Conference did not include any sanctions, and the members instructed the committee to include sanctions in the final draft of the code. The Arbitration Committee of the Conference is vested with the authority of recommending to the Executive Board of the Conference suitable disciplinary action in the case of violations.

Rabbi Ben Zion Bokser, Ph.D., Forest Hills, New York, is the spiritual leader of The Forest Hills Jewish Center, where he has served for the past twenty years. He is a lecturer in homiletics at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and editor of its "Eternal Light" radio program. During World War II he served as chaplain in the United States Army. He is the author of Pharisaic Judaism in Transition (1935), The Legacy of Maimonides (1950), and The Wisdom of the Talmud (1951); his latest book, Out of the World of the Caballa, will be published shortly.

APPENDIX

CODE OF PROCEDURE IN PLACEMENT OF RABBIS

JOINT COMMISSION ON RABBINIC PLACEMENT *

Mindful of its obligation to the congregations which it serves and to the members of the Rabbinical Assembly, the Joint Commission on Rabbinical Placement has adopted the following Code of Procedure in order to assure the placement of rabbis in a manner which is equitable, dignified and ethical.

1) Members of the Rabbinical Assembly may negotiate for pulpits only through the offices of the Commission.

2) At no time will a member of the Rabbinical Assembly submit his name, or even indirectly cause his name to be submatted, as a candidate for a pulpit without the prior approval of the Commission.

3) No member of the Rabbinical Assembly will enter into negotiations with a congregation in any matter affecting placement without the prior approval of the Commission.

4) No member of the Rabbinical Assembly will accept an invitation to preach or otherwise address a congregation or any of its subsidiary or affiliated groups, if the pulpit of that congregation is vacant or is in the process of being vacated, without the prior approval of the Commission.

5) A member of the Rabbinical Assembly will at no time accept an invitation to occupy a pulpit of a congregation except

* Under the auspices of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, the Rabbinical Assembly of America, the United Synagogue of America, New York. Adopted in 1947.

by invitation of the incumbent of the pulpit or by invitation of the Commission.

6) Members of the Rabbinical Assembly shall not insert advertisements concerning placement, or reply to such advertisements.

7) Should a congregation of its own accord invite a member of the Rabbinical Assembly to become a candidate for its pulpit, such congregation will be referred to the Commission.

8) In making recommendations for pulpits, the Commission shall be guided by the following considerations:

a. requirements of the congregation,
b. qualifications of the candidates,
c. seniority of candidates,
d. chaplaincy service, and
e. needs of candidates.

9) A rabbi accepting a call to a congregation will normally be expected to remain with the congregation for a minimum of two years.

10) A member of the Rabbinical Assembly will not resign from his pulpit without prior consultation with the Commission.

11) No member of the Rabbinical Assembly will recommend a rabbi to a pulpit unless so directed by the Commission.

12) Should a congregation seek the advice of a member of the Rabbinical Assembly regarding a rabbi for its pulpit, the member will consult the Commission before rendering such advice.

13) All recommendations of the Placement Commission shall be official in character, representing the collective decision of the Commission.

14) The Commission shall not recommend any person to a position until it shall have been definitely established that the present incumbent of that position, whether or not he be a member of the Rabbinical Assembly, has officially been informed by his congregation or has officially informed the congregation, that a vacancy in the pulpit will exist at a definite date in the near future.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CONGREGATIONAL-RABBINICAL AGREEMENTS *

THE NEW YORK BOARD OF RABBIS

PREAMBLE

The agreement entered into between a rabbi and his congregation is between a religious community and its chosen leader. It goes beyond the stipulation of a legal agreement; it also covers a spiritual relationship. A rabbi is not to be considered as an employee of the congregation. He is a consecrated servant of God called by the congregation to serve the religious, educational, spiritual and pastoral needs of the membership. His ministry shall not be limited to his congregational duties, but shall be left free to serve the larger community. The very nature of the congregation in Israel as a holy assembly and the lofty character of the rabbi's office dictate that the agreement between rabbi and congregation be preserved on the highest plane of mutual integrity, mutual respect and mutual devotion to the religious purpose for which the congregation exists.

* New York, adopted May 25, 1948.

1. THE RABBI'S OFFICE

The rabbi shall be the spiritual leader of the congregation, the recognized authority on Jewish law and practice, the preacher and the one in charge of religious services. He shall also direct the religious school and other educational endeavors of the congregation. His pulpit shall be completely free. No one shall appear in the pulpit during religious worship unless it be at the invitation of the rabbi.

2. TERM OF OFFICE

The minimum term for which a rabbi shall be called shall be one year; the succeeding term shall be for a minimum of three years; the following succeeding terms shall be for a minimum of five years each.

It is a desideratum that after a rabbi has ministered to a congregation for approximately fifteen years, it shall be considered that the relationship between rabbi and congregation is permanent. The rabbi's ministry shall then continue for an indeterminable period or until the rabbi attains a mutually agreed upon retirement age.

3. RETIREMENT AND INSURANCE

The congregation and the rabbi shall agree that the rabbi be enrolled in a retirement plan to which he may be eligible, and each shall agree to pay the respective share of the cost based upon the rabbi's salary.

4. NON-RENEWAL OF AGREEMENT

Agreements between rabbi and congregation shall be renewed upon expiration except for the weightiest reasons, which reasons should represent a genuine expression of the will of the congregation.

In the case of non-renewal of agreement, both rabbi and congregation shall give sufficient notice so that the rabbi, on the one hand, might make himself available for calls to other pulpits, and the congregation, on the other hand, might make provision for uninterrupted rabbinical ministration.

Should the congregation fail to renew the rabbi's agreement on or before its expiration, it shall pay the equivalent of ten per cent of the salary provided for in his current agreement, multiplied by the number of years he has served the congregation under his current and previous agreements.

5. ARBITRATION

In the event of any dispute or disagreement arising between rabbi and congregation, the matter in controversy shall be settled by arbitration, by three arbitrators jointly selected by rabbi and congregation from rabbinical or synagogue bodies.

The Code of the Catholic Clergy

By Paul Hanly Furfey

THE priest's code of conduct is quite definite and detailed. Basically, his obligations are defined by canon law, that is, by the legislation of the Roman Catholic Church. Canon law, like ordinary civil law, is a rather complicated and technical subject.[1] The complete discussion of the canonical obligations of priests lies far beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, it is only fair to warn the reader that what follows is necessarily somewhat oversimplified.

Two Categories of Priests—Diocesan and Religious

Priests are divided into two categories, diocesan and religious respectively, whose status and obligations differ in important respects.[2] Diocesan priests are attached to a particular diocese and are subject to the local bishop; religious priests are members of a religious community—the Jesuits, Franciscans, and Benedictines are examples—and they are subject to superiors who are officials of the community. Diocesan priests possess private property like ordinary citizens, whereas religious priests either renounce private property entirely or at least renounce the administration and private use of it, in either case living in community from a common fund. By and large, the chief activity of diocesan priests is staffing parish churches as pastors or assistants; nearly all bishops and diocesan officers are chosen from their ranks. Religious priests are more typically engaged in special works such as college teaching or the home or foreign missions. There are, however, very many exceptions to these generalizations. Of the 45,451 Catholic priests in the United States, about 63 per cent are diocesan and 37 per cent are religious.[3]

Obligations Common to All Priests

Certain obligations are identical, or at least very similar, for both diocesan and religious priests; it is convenient to consider these together. First of all, there are certain obligatory exercises of piety. All priests are obliged to recite the Divine Office daily. This is a collection of psalms, hymns, prayers, Bible readings, and other pious material, varying from day to day, and usually taking somewhat more than an hour to recite. In addition to the Divine Office, certain other exercises of piety are mandatory for all, for example, daily meditation and examination of conscience, frequent confession, and retreats at regular intervals; the specific application of these general rules varies among diocesan priests and the various communities of religious priests.

All priests are bound to show respect and obedience toward their legitimate superiors. All have the obligation of continuing their studies, particularly the study of the sacred sciences, after ordination. Annual examinations are held to test the progress of the younger priests; and for all priests there are frequent "clerical conferences" for the discussion of technical matters. All priests must wear distinctive clerical garb. The exact nature of the prescribed dress varies from country to country. In some countries the ordinary dress of the Catholic clergy is the cassock, a close-fitting, ankle-length garment with sleeves. In the United States the cassock is worn only around the church and rectory; street dress for priests consists of ordinary black clothes plus the Roman collar.

Clerical chastity

The law of clerical chastity imposes a twofold obligation on priests. First, they are forbidden to marry, and the Church rejects as invalid any marriage which a priest might attempt to contract, say, before a justice of the peace. Secondly, the law of chastity imposes on priests the obligation to preserve purity of life. Thus a priest has a double obligation to abstain from sexual sin; for he is bound to purity not only by the natural law, but also by the special obligations of his state of life.

Forbidden occupations

Priests are forbidden to engage in certain occupations and amusements, either because they are unbecoming to the clerical state or because they would be likely to distract a priest from his primary duties. For example, the occupations of actors, clowns, bartenders, or jailers would be considered unbecoming. The holding of certain public offices and the practice of medicine and surgery, though not unbecoming, are forbidden as alien to the clerical state. There are also restrictions on the practice of law in secular courts. Priests are ordinarily forbidden to volunteer for military service, except as chaplains. As a general principle, priests are not allowed to engage in any form of business, including wholesale and retail selling, manufacturing, banking, or stock speculation. The nonspeculative investment of funds in stocks and bonds is not considered a violation of this prinple. There are restrictions on the assumption by priests of the duties of guardian, trustee, or executor; there are restrictions, also, on the giving of bail.

Amusements

The types of amusements that are forbidden to priests are described in rather general language in Church legislation. In these matters a great deal depends on circumstances. After all, a theatrical performance may be anything from a sacred drama to an indecent comedy. Priests are expected to use sound judgment and to avoid plays, motion pictures, prize fights, and other public spectacles if their presence would be unbecoming or a source of scandal. They should avoid saloons and bars and should not attend horse races. Priests must not promote or attend dances, even dances organized to aid some worthy cause.

Diocesan Laws and the Diocesan Clergy

Every bishop of a diocese has broad powers to make laws for his own territory. Naturally, diocesan laws made by a bishop must not be contrary to the general law of the Church, but they may particularize or extend this general law in accordance with local needs. A bishop may make and promulgate laws at any time and in any manner he wishes; but often he chooses to do this through a diocesan synod. A synod is a meeting of the principal priests of the diocese convoked by the bishop. The laws of the diocese may be codified in the form of statutes drawn up by the synod.

[1] To become a thoroughly competent canon lawyer takes three years of graduate work in a special school of canon law.

[2] The present article takes no account of priests belonging to Oriental rites in communion with Rome. There are a few hundred such priests in the United States and in some respects their rights and obligations are very different from those of the ordinary (Latin rite) Catholic priests.

[3] All statistics in the present article are taken from *The Official Catholic Directory, 1954* (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1954).

Diocesan laws, since they apply only to a particular locality, are likely to be more specific than the general legislation of the Church. They add flexibility to canon law. The Church's general legislation, applying as it does to the entire world, cannot take into account the varying conditions of particular dioceses; but diocesan statutes can do just that. For example, the statutes might prescribe that every rectory have a listed telephone. This would obviously not be an appropriate law for the universal Church, but it might be very appropriate for a diocese in the United States. Again, statutes may set up a schedule of fees; obviously this is also something that must vary from locality to locality. There are many such matters which are more efficiently regulated by local legislation than by general canon law.

Religious priests under diocesan law

Diocesan legislation is naturally of more direct significance for diocesan than for religious priests, for the former are directly attached to a diocese whereas the latter belong to religious communities. However, even religious priests are not entirely independent of diocesan laws. The subject is a complex one; but it can be stated as a general principle that the bishop of the diocese can in any case at least legislate for religious priests in matters concerning the public affairs of the diocese itself, although all religious enjoy a certain autonomy in managing the internal affairs of their communities. For example, if a religious priest is pastor of a parish, he must observe the rules that the bishop makes about parish management in the same way that a diocesan priest would observe them.

Diocesan officers

There are a great many rules and regulations defining the rights and obligations of various diocesan officers. The rights and obligations of some of these officers are defined by the general canon law of the Church. In other cases the office itself has no existence in canon law, but is entirely the creation of the local bishop who therefore defines the functions of the priest who holds it by diocesan law. Among the officers whose duties are defined by general canon law are the vicar general who assists the bishop in the administration of the diocese, the chancellor who acts as the executive officer of the diocese, and the *officialis* who is the judge of the diocesan court. Pastors of parishes also have their functions defined in detail by canon law.

In most dioceses in the United States the offices of diocesan superintendent of schools and diocesan director of charities have been established. The importance of these officers seems to be increasing and in the larger dioceses they are likely to be in charge of large professional staffs. Other priests may be assigned to edit the diocesan newspaper, to take charge of various institutions, or to serve as diocesan directors of the different Catholic societies.

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS OF RELIGIOUS PRIESTS

Religious priests have certain obligations over and above those that they share with diocesan priests. These additional obligations arise from two sources: first, from the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience taken by all religious priests, and secondly, from the rules of the particular religious communities to which they belong. It is worth noting here in passing that not all religious are priests. There are in the United States 154,055 sisters, 8,691 brothers, and several thousand ecclesiastical students in religious communities who also share the obligations of the religious state. Religious priests, then, make up only a small fraction of the total number of members of religious communities.

Chastity

Practically speaking, the obligation of chastity is exactly the same for religious and for diocesan priests. The technical difference is that religious priests assume the obligation by pronouncing an explicit vow, whereas diocesan priests assume it implicitly by virtue of their ordination.[4]

Obedience

By the vow of obedience the religious binds himself as a matter of moral obligation to obey his lawful superiors when they issue formal commands in regard to matters belonging within their sphere of authority. Of course, diocesan priests also have a moral obligation to obey those in authority over them. They must obey the bishop and the various officials appointed by the bishop. In practice, the real difference between religious and diocesan priests is that the former are likely to be called on to practice obedience much more frequently. Practice varies a good deal from one religious community to another, but in many cases the religious priest is required to ask explicit permission in regard to minor affairs of everyday life, say, to make an appointment with a dentist or to spend an evening with friends. Diocesan priests usually enjoy a good deal more independence and can make minor decisions on their own authority.

Poverty

Every religious takes a vow of poverty by which he either renounces all ownership of private property or at least renounces the administration and independent use of it. The exact obligations which religious priests assume in virtue of their vows of poverty vary from one religious community to another. The subject is too complex to permit exhaustive treatment here. However, the following statements are true, at least in a general way, of all religious priests. Such priests normally live in community. Like members of a family, they share the same dwelling, the same common table, the same recreational facilities. If there is an automobile, it is not owned by one religious as an individual, but by the community as a whole, and its use is shared by the members of the community as directed by the superior. All acquisition and spending of money is a community matter, not a matter to be settled by the individual member on his own initiative. If a religious priest receives an honorarium for giving a lecture or writing an article, he must turn the money over to his superior. On the other hand, if he wishes to buy a new hat or subscribe to a magazine, he must get permission. Thus neither in earning nor in spending can the religious priest exercise the same right of private property as the ordinary citizen. It is a right which the religious renounces by his vow of poverty. The vow also requires the religious to live with a certain simplicity. Luxurious living would be contrary to the vow. Diocesan priests must also observe certain principles in their management of money matters, but the vow of poverty restricts the freedom of the religious priest to a much greater degree.

Rule of the religious community

In addition to the obligations that they assume by the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, religious priests must observe the rules of the particular religious community to which each be-

[4] The diocesan priest assumes the obligation of chastity when he is ordained subdeacon, usually about a year before his ordination to the priesthood.

longs. The rules of each community are drawn up very carefully. By the nature of its rules each community can express the distinctive spirit by which it differs from other communities. Thus a community devoted primarily to the foreign missions would differ in spirit from one devoted primarily to education, and this difference of spirit would be reflected in their respective rules.

There are some eighty-eight religious communities of priests in the United States, varying in size from those having half a dozen priests or less to those with several thousand. Some of these communities were founded in this country; others are American branches of Old World foundations. Some were founded within the last few years; others have centuries of tradition behind them. Some specialize in one particular type of work; the work undertaken by others covers a wide range. Naturally, the obligations of religious priests vary widely from community to community.

A few examples will illustrate the wide variety existing among religious communities. The Jesuits, founded in 1540, are a very large community in the United States. They undertake almost all forms of priestly work, but are perhaps best known for their work in higher education. Many well-known universities are under Jesuit auspices, including Fordham, Georgetown, and St. Louis. The Salesians, in contrast, are a comparatively small and new community, interested in a specialized work. They concentrate on work with boys and run youth centers, camps, and schools. The Missionary Servants are an American foundation, established as recently as 1921; they are dedicated primarily to the work of the home missions. Some communities put a great deal of emphasis on prayer and penance. The Trappists are an extreme example. They rise at two o'clock in the morning, spend seven hours a day in community prayer in chapel and five hours in manual labor, abstain from meat, fish, and eggs except in case of sickness, and, as far as possible, maintain perpetual silence. The Benedictines also emphasize community prayer and the spirit of contemplation, but they do a great deal of active work as well, particularly in the field of education. These random examples are enough to show how widely religious communities differ among themselves; of course, the duties and obligations of the priest members of these communities differ correspondingly. It is difficult to make any general statement about the obligations imposed by religious rules over and above the obligations of poverty, chastity, and obedience that are common to all religious communities.

LIBERTY AND LAW

It will be clear from what has gone before that the rights and duties of Catholic priests are rather rigidly determined. Even the diocesan priest finds his liberty considerably circumscribed by canon law and diocesan statutes. The religious priest must also observe the rules of his community and these, in some instances, are very detailed indeed. To an outsider it might therefore seem that the life of a priest is hedged around with so many regulations that the spirit of voluntary service might be supplanted by a spirit of legalism.

What guards the priest against this danger is the fact that every obligation to which he is subject is an obligation freely undertaken. No one can be forced to become a priest or to enter a religious community against his will. Before a young man binds himself permanently to the obligations of the priesthood, he must have proved himself during several years of preliminary training which offer him plenty of opportunity to change his mind. No one can enter the priesthood as the result of a sudden whim, or without long deliberation. The obligations of the priesthood and of the religious state are sacrifices freely and deliberately chosen out of a love of God and neighbor. Duties undertaken for love can never become irksome.

Paul Hanly Furfey, Ph.D., LL.D., Washington, D. C., is professor of sociology and head of the Department of Sociology at the Catholic University of America. He is a diocesan priest attached to the Archdiocese of Washington. His major research and writing have been in the fields of social psychology, the history of social thought, and the methodology of sociological research. He has written numerous articles and several books, of which the latest is The Scope and Method of Sociology (1953).

Ethics of the Protestant Ministry

By Nolan B. Harmon

THE Protestant ministry has been a long time in formulating a code of professional ethics. The reason is simple—and conclusive. No code of ethics *can* be formulated that will have any binding effect on Protestant ministers. Dr. William H. Leach says:

> It [the ministry] is the oldest profession in the history of mankind and yet has no carefully worked-out schedule of professional work nor of ministerial ethics. . . . There is no profession in which his relations to his fellow men and co-workers is so loosely defined.[1]

The matter, however, goes deeper than a casual feeling that since the ministry is a profession there ought to be professional laws holding it together. The chief reason for the absence of any professional ministerial codes governing conduct is that the ministry itself is assumed to follow, by the very nature of its calling, the highest principles of religion and ethics. Practicing as well as preaching the tenets of Christianity is the announced goal of the whole profession. Why then, it may be asked, should the ministry be expected to bind itself to minor matters of routine, or follow man-made rules which, at their very best, cannot supplant the tremendous principles of the Christian faith? The whole Christian ministry is a code of conduct in its outward as well as in its inward manifestations. It cannot, therefore, be expected that men who have committed themselves by private vows and by public ordination to the ministry of Christ, who take the Bible as their rule and guide, will find it necessary thereafter to look to some sort of ecclesiastical Emily Post for guidance on minute matters of ethical conduct. Sometimes it may indeed be that these are no more than niceties of mere etiquette.

[1] *Church Administration* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926), p. 24.

No Binding Common Code

There are other deep reasons why there can never be a more binding code of ministerial ethics for the Protestant ministry.

In the first place, it is impossible to get general agreement among ministers regarding points which have to do with ethics and morals. It is quite true, as has just been pointed out, that all do endeavor to follow what they believe to be the highest religious and moral principles. But ministers—in common with all other Christians—differ greatly as to the application of these principles. Sometimes they even differ as to principles themselves! We have many churches and sects today which cannot agree on some of the great moral issues which divide mankind. How then may we expect them to get together upon minor matters having to do with moot points of professional conduct?

There is not and cannot be any interdenominational court or tribunal which may enforce upon any minister a system governing his morals or his conduct. In Protestantism, every man's conscience provides his own law. Each man is esteemed to be the judge, under God, of his own Christian conduct and must be allowed to walk by the light of his own conscience—provided he keeps the unity of the faith. If his ancestors went to war to prevent men from telling them how they should kneel or

stand or sit at Communion, he is not going to let anyone tell him today how to make a pastoral call or what church publicity he may profitably use. The whole system of Protestantism is bound up with the individual's right in this matter.

On many matters having to do with ethical conduct, the various Protestant denominations have their own individual regulations governing their ministers. Other matters they leave to the obligation every minister is under to keep the moral law and live as a Christian. The Protestant Episcopal Church, for instance, has its canon law; the Methodist churches have their Discipline; other churches likewise have guiding articles or perhaps a sort of denominational "common law," and to these the men of the respective churches look for guidance and authority upon many questions of ethical procedure. To accept guidance from these rules does not abrogate the principle which we cited above; namely, that every man shall be the judge of his own conduct. When a man enters into the fellowship of a particular church, he is always asked if he is willing to follow its customs or polity, discipline and doctrines. He is under no compulsion to do so *up to that particular point*. Once, however, he has promised a great denomination that he will abide by its regulations and rules, he is thereafter morally compelled to obey these regulations and rules as they have been publicly announced and are perhaps privately called to his attention.

Even the minor denominational bodies and religious sects have their rules and principles. A man joining any one of these and assuming the obligations of the particular brotherhood to which he promises his allegiance is expected to keep those rules and regulations which he has thereby promised to keep. Being thus bound by rules and requirements which seem to his own fellowship to be the most important, it is not likely that the ordinary minister will look beyond these for extradenominational courses of conduct.

Finally, every minister is himself supposed to be an arbiter in the field of morals and ethics. He is personally regarded as a judge who decides in such matters, and therefore it is assumed that he can be trusted to regulate his own personal conduct properly. We may as soon expect a medical association to draw up "health rules for physicians" or to issue books on what medicine is good for a doctor, as to expect ministers to tell each other what courses of moral and ethical conduct they consider proper for their professional life. The whole ministry is, as we said above, given to the proclamation and promulgation of high moral and ethical principles.

Jots and Tittles

Furthermore, many matters of professional ethics do not involve vast moral principles. They have to do with jots and tittles or with the niceties of ceremony, and scarcely reach up to the inflexible bulwarks and buttresses of the moral law. When a matter *does* go over into a question of morals, then the minister's conscience, not to say his church, may rightly speak up. But many details of ministerial conduct can rightly be classed as matters of small importance. Whether the car carrying the ministers to a wedding should stop first at the residence of the bishop and then go on to pick up the lower clergy, or vice versa (the latter is correct), such procedures are really of small moment, though it must be admitted that the clergy, too, has a protocol which it sometimes likes to observe. However, many ministerial customs and procedures can rightly be classed as in-

consequential as far as morality or religion is concerned.

COLLECTIVE MINISTERIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In spite, however, of all these reasons why there should not be and cannot be a compelling system of professional ministerial ethics among the Protestant clergy, there has gradually evolved through the years a certain collective ministerial consciousness. The clergy of an older generation did not look with favor upon the idea of a collective brotherhood, as they were influenced by the reasons we have already given. Henry Ward Beecher in his day advised that the ministry should not stick together as a unit. But call it by what name we will, a vague, intangible, interdenominational professional consciousness has come alive among the Protestant ministry. It has certain sanctions, and to a degree its findings can be codified. Its sanctions, it must be admitted, cannot be enforced by physical means, but undoubtedly there is a consensus of ministerial approval or disapproval which can be applied and which does have weight with individual clergymen. Like international law, ministerial ethical judgments must get force and power from public opinion, not from "armed might."

CODES

In line with this gradual evolvement of an interdenominational professional consciousness, there have appeared a number of "codes," as they are called, which were adopted (most of them) some years ago for proper ministerial guidance. Curiously enough, these various codes came forth in a sort of ethical spate all at the same time and with some little ecclesiastical publicity. Since that date, there has been no great effort further to codify professional ministerial conduct. At about the same time there came out two books, *Ministerial Ethics and Etiquette* by Nolan B. Harmon, Jr.,[2] and *Morals for Ministers* under the initials R. E. X.[3] *Ministerial Ethics and Etiquette* reproduced in its pages the codes available at the date of its publication, and on the basis of common ministerial practice detailed all manner of procedures considered proper for the minister. This volume, recently revised, continues to carry in toto the following codes: the Congregational Code adopted by the New Haven (Connecticut) Association of Congregational Ministers in 1925 and presumably still in force; the Methodist Ministers' Ethical Code adopted by a group of Methodist ministers meeting in conference at Rockford, Illinois;[4] the Presbyterian Code, reported as adopted by the Presbytery of New York;[5] and the Unitarian Ministers' Code of Ethics, adopted by the Unitarian Ministerial Union.[6]

It will be noted that these various codes, with the possible exception of the Unitarian Ministerial Union's Code, were adopted by minor divisions of their particular denominations.

Necessarily, these codes had for the larger ministerial brotherhoods of the country suggestive value only. The Presbytery of New York might adopt a code for its own practice, but that would not bind other presbyteries of the United States. Neither would a small Methodist Conference meeting in Rockford, Illinois, have a right to adopt something for the Methodist connection which would be binding upon the Methodist Church over the world. These facts will be understood and have already been hinted at in the paragraphs above, in which we described the difficulty of getting any code which might have general acceptance. The separate codes, however, do have a suggestive value, and have been taken as such.

[2] Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury Press, 1928.
[3] New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.
[4] Published in *Christian Century*, December 16, 1926.
[5] Printed in an article by William H. Leach in the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, July 1927.
[6] Printed in *Church Management*, August 1926.

It will be impossible within the scope of this article to reprint—or even to outline in a specific way—the separate ministerial codes just referred to, though they are not long. They confine themselves particularly to relations as they should be between ministers, since it is at this point that the greatest tensions occur within the Protestant brotherhood. To be sure, many other matters are treated in the various codes, such as the minister's duty to keep himself physically fit, to allow time for professional study, to be scrupulously honest and prompt in the payment of debts, and so forth. It has, however, been the experience of this writer, when invited to address ministerial gatherings upon the subject of ministerial ethics, that the principal issues and tensions upon which ministers wish guidance have to do with the relationships between brother ministers.

RELATIONS BETWEEN MINISTERS

For instance, it is not proper for one minister to seek to proselytize members of another minister's flock; it is not proper for a minister to make overtures to, or consider overtures from, a church whose pastor has not yet resigned; it is unethical for a minister to speak ill of the character or work of another minister, especially his predecessor or successor; it is unethical for a minister on leaving a charge to leave the parsonage or manse in other than first-class condition; it is unethical for a minister to render ministerial service to the members of another parish without first consulting and getting permission from the minister of that parish—such matters are greatly to the fore in ministerial thinking. Every code which has been formulated to date has endeavored to outline rather strictly the proper procedures to be followed when tensions arise from situations such as these.

Everyone knows that a minister should not steal a purse accidentally left in the church; but when a member of another congregation comes, and on his own accord asks that he be permitted to join a particular church, states he is not happy, and cannot find Christian fellowship in the church where his membership has been, what shall the "sought" minister do about him? Will it be a "steal" if his membership is received? Even if the pastor who is to be left agrees to the matter after he has been approached by the receiving minister, how will he really feel about the whole situation? Personal equations are hard to put down with exactness, and church members, like women, can be wooed in subtle and not always obvious ways. One thing is certain: the ministry as a whole looks with great disfavor upon "sheepstealing" and has made this evident in every code, written and unwritten, which has appeared to date.

GROWING SOLIDARITY

We have discussed at some length this matter of ministerial relationships because they are at the heart of Protestant codes. The written codes, as has been stated, have not again been featured in the public press as they were some years ago; but it can be said quite accurately that in recent years there has been deepening within the Protestant brotherhood of the nation a sense of solidarity toward the work of its own high calling.

The ecumenical movement, as it is

called—the drive toward the union of all Protestant churches, groups, and forces in the world—is an outstanding feature of modern church life. As this movement grows in force and effectiveness, we may expect a further solidification of ministerial mores and a deeper and more insistent pressure for observance of commonly accepted codes of conduct.

Publicity-seeking ministers

Already the brotherhood of all ministers is enforcing its findings, especially against publicity-seeking ministers, by an outspoken criticism that is usually echoed strongly by laymen. Ministers who perform stunt marriages, or who mark down the dignity of their calling by engaging in practices which, while news from a reporter's point of view, only gain a certain notoriety, are usually pilloried publicly in a devastating way. Any minister who wishes to arrange for a marriage in a balloon or—and this is a new idea!—perhaps en route to the ground in a parachute accompanied by the couple, can certainly make the Monday morning headlines. Or he can marry such-and-such a movie actress for the sixth time if he so chooses, or in the name of pulpit freedom can sound off on some political move so as to get "two sticks" notice in the paper. Whether he realizes it at the time or not, he will find out later that the vast brotherhood of consecrated Christian ministers, whose business it is to live as well as preach the Gospel, will be irresistibly against him. There may not be outward sanctions to be enforced, but there are inward spiritual sanctions which sometimes become tremendously effective. Woe unto a man when the gates of brotherhood are barred against him! The stunt marriage will be remembered against the preacher when he seeks a new pulpit, and his reputation for taking the other minister's members will precede him when he preaches in a new place or when the visiting committee sizes him up as a possibility for their vacant pulpit. It does not matter that he seems to be "sheepstealing" in an open and aboveboard way. Ministers, like mathematicians, have their own system of arriving at the truth, and what a man *does* speaks louder than what he or his friends say.

Brotherhood of the Protestant ministry

The great Protestant denominations have indeed grown closer to each other through the years, and their common ministry has achieved a degree of brotherhood which was not thought possible seventy-five years ago. That brotherhood may be expected to increase, and while its rules and regulations, its codes and practices, may not gain the formal weight of the Hippocratic Oath taken by physicians, nor be as fixed as the regulations of the bar association for the admission of members, the professional consciousness is *there*. A good minister of Jesus Christ marches in step with other ministers and is anxious so to do.

We expect the idea of a professional code to deepen among ministers as the ecumenical movement gathers momentum. It is not likely that there will be one church within the lifetime of our generation. Protestantism itself calls for each to think as he feels it is right to think, and that means in essence that divisions are allowable and expected, granted that all is done within the framework of Christian love and in line with the standards of Christ. But divisions among Christian ministers wherever such divisions break the brotherhood are not allowable. The brotherhood takes precedence over any individual idiosyncrasies. The code of ethics that governs the Christian ministry may never be written in its entirety, but in its essentials it will prove to be more and more effective. The men who give their lives to the service of the Prince of Peace will always be the first to ask for peace among themselves, for brotherliness, and for charity to all. What is this but professional ethics that transcends all ethics, and part of the "peace that passeth all understanding"?

Nolan B. Harmon, L.H.D., D.Litt., New York City, is Book Editor of the Methodist Church, editor of the Abingdon Press, and editor of the quarterly Religion in Life. He is author of Ministerial Ethics and Etiquette (1928) and has made studies in the entire field of professional ethics among ministers.

A Code of Ethics for Public School Teachers

By Cyrus C. Perry

TWO characteristics differentiate the profession of the public school teacher [1] from most other professions: the setting in which he practices and the nature of his clientele. These characteristics have affected the development and application of ethical standards in the teaching profession.

Unlike members of professions who practice largely as individuals and under private auspices, public school teachers practice in an institutional setting, as public employees with a common employer. As such, they are subject to supervision and direction which constitute restraints on unethical conduct not present in the case of a private practitioner. Because they are engaged in a governmental, tax-supported enterprise, the public has a direct interest in their professional standards. Probably no public service generates more interest in a community than its school system; the extent to which a community will adequately support its schools may depend upon its regard for the quality, character, and professional conduct of the teaching personnel. An adverse public judgment against a few teachers can work injury to the majority, and this in turn results in a disservice to the children.

Public school teachers, to a greater degree than private practitioners, have direct and varying ethical obligations to a multiple clientele. These obligations extend not only to the children with whom they deal but to the parents, the employing school board, and the community as a whole. In addition, as part of a common enterprise, their direct day-to-day contacts with colleagues present unique problems in professional relationships.

[1] The term "teacher" is used herein to mean instructional, administrative, and supervisory personnel of all types.

Early Developments

Most teachers today recognize the desirability of codes of ethics applicable to their professional relationships. They are aware that codes serve as a guide in applying their particular body of professional knowledge. Until late in the nineteenth century primary emphasis in relation to ethics was placed upon a teacher's personal conduct, habits, and religious convictions. The proceedings of the early meetings of the National Education Association show concern for such standards primarily as related to the character of the teacher as a person and his ability to instruct pupils in moral and ethical principles.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, there began to develop an awareness of the broader professional aspects of ethics. This came about partly because of the expansion of public education and the development of professional procedures of instruction and school administration. In time this broader view resulted in the formulation and adoption of codes by various teachers associations, the first being the Georgia State Teachers Association in 1896.

Multiple Codes

Currently there is no single code applicable to all public school teachers. The code of the National Education Association technically is binding only on its membership. While many teachers believe there should be one governing

code, the decentralized organization of the profession into state and local education associations throughout the country makes such general application impractical at this time. All of the states and territories have state-wide associations of public school teachers which are affiliated with the NEA. In addition it is estimated that there are at least 9,000 local associations of which about 5,000 are NEA affiliates. These state, local, and territorial associations are independent entities with their own governing bodies; all but a few of the state associations and many local associations have adopted codes. In addition certain state and local groups, for example, superintendents and principals, have codes applicable to their particular problems and interests.

Role of the NEA

There are over a million public school teachers in the United States. The National Education Association with some 560,000 members is their principal membership organization. As such, it should logically take the leadership in the development of ethical standards for the profession. The responsibility of the NEA for such leadership was recognized in the article on ethics for teachers in the May 1922 issue of The Annals, prepared by the chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Pennsylvania State Education Association. At that time the NEA had no code. After commenting on the work of a number of state ethics commissions, the article concluded:

> If similar commissions could be established in other states and if there could be established a national commission to which appeals from the state commissions might be made, a national code of ethics with an accompanying body of decisions and interpretations would gradually be established. The National Education Association would seem to be the proper organization to take the first steps in this direction. Probably no one thing would go farther toward the securing of proper recognition of the teaching profession than the approval by the National Education Association of a national code of ethics and the establishment under the auspices of that association of a national commission on professional ethics.[2]

The original NEA Code, adopted in 1929, grew out of a recommendation of the Committee on Ethics for the Profession which had been appointed in 1924. The Committee consisted of fifty-six members of the Association employed in various types of positions in elementary and secondary schools and colleges. In large part the Code was based on the results of a questionnaire sent to more than three thousand NEA members. It contained twenty-one ethical principles. The Committee recommended that the Code be used by teacher education institutions and that all state teachers associations establish ethics committees to interpret its provisions, investigate violations, and promote its use by teachers. Amendments were effected in 1939 and 1941 which dealt primarily with the power of enforcement.

By 1950 it was believed that the existing Code was obsolete in some respects. At the request of the Ethics Committee, the NEA Research Division sent to a random selection of 4,000 members a questionnaire similar to the one used in 1928. A representative response was obtained which confirmed the belief that a revision of the Code was warranted. A preliminary draft was submitted in 1951 to some 4,000 members of the Association, including the NEA officers, members of the Representative Assembly, members of NEA committees, and officers of state education associations. The final draft of the

[2] George Gailey Chambers, "Codes of Ethics for the Teaching Profession," The Annals, Vol. 101 (May 1922), p. 126.

proposed Code was recommended by the Ethics Committee and adopted by the Representative Assembly in 1952.

NEA CODE

The Code establishes five principles; they deal with the teacher's obligations to students, to parents and homes, to school and community, to employer, and to professional associates. Under each principle certain specific obligations are set forth. The Code is printed in its entirety as the Appendix to this article.

ACTIVITIES OF NEA

The NEA Committee on Professional Ethics is composed of five members and currently includes a superintendent of schools, a principal, two classroom teachers, and a faculty member of a school of education. Its purposes and functions as laid down by the Representative Assembly of the Association are to study the Code and make recommendations for improving it, to publicize and promote its use by members of the profession, and to render opinions interpreting its provisions. The Committee is also authorized to hold hearings in cases of alleged violation and to make recommendations for disciplinary action to the Executive Committee of the Association.

The Committee meets several times a year to formulate and establish policies. It is assisted in its work by a staff representative at NEA headquarters who also serves as legal counsel. Since the adoption of the new code in 1952, the primary activity of the Committee has been to acquaint public school teachers with its provisions and to carry out programs to encourage its observance. To this end, the Committee during the past two years has (1) distributed on request more than 250,000 copies of the Code; (2) responded to hundreds of requests from members and teachers associations for advice and information on ways to develop constructive programs on ethics; (3) advised teachers as to whether certain contemplated steps in connection with their professional employment would be proper; and (4) rendered formal committee opinions, published in the Association's *Journal*, construing the Code on specific type-fact situations submitted by individual members, state and local teachers associations, and schools of education.

PROJECTS WITH LOCAL ASSOCIATIONS

The organization and activities of the approximately 9,000 state and local teachers associations are so varied that no single association program could be presented as typical. No study has been made showing the nature and extent to which such organizations conduct planned and constructive programs in the field of ethics. The thousands of requests to the NEA Committee on Professional Ethics for materials is evidence of great interest among state and local associations as well as individual teachers. It has been apparent for some time, however, that if this widespread interest is to be channeled constructively, some initiative must be taken on the national level to stimulate and coordinate local activity. To this end the NEA Committee is currently inviting local associations to take part in a nationwide study program which seeks to bring home the implications and importance of the national Code.

The Committee has recently published and distributed to thousands of local associations an *Action-Study Guide* which outlines the purposes and objectives of the Code and presents under each principle of the Code a series of questions suitable for workshop discussions and research, with the request that the results be returned to the Committee for study and compilation by the NEA Research Division. Illustrative are two sets of questions dealing with the first principle of the Code:

1. The Code suggests that the ethical teacher deals impartially with students regardless of their personal qualities and their social and economic backgrounds. Just what is "impartial" treatment? Does it mean "equal" or "same" or "as necessary for each individual's best development"? Perhaps it means all of these. What are some of the factors or conditions in your community which teachers must know about if they are to be impartial in the sense of the Code?
2. The teacher who is ethical with his students recognizes their individual differences and tries to adapt his instruction to meet individual needs. Can one do this and be impartial? What individual differences are typical in your classroom; in your school; in your community? What resources does the school system make available for dealing with these differences? What ethical obligation does the classroom teacher have to seek ways for overcoming the impediments (such as large classes) so as to find and deal with the differences among children?

Prior to the publication of the *Action-Study Guide*, a number of local associations were invited to participate in a preliminary project. They were asked to discuss and report the extent to which teachers were fulfilling their ethical obligations and ways in which they could be assisted in fulfilling them. This preliminary exploration indicates that the public school teacher's primary interest in ethics is in terms of professional growth rather than his individual welfare or advancement and is directed to those provisions of the Code which deal with his relationships to children, parents, and the community. The results of this project lent encouragement to the study now under way.

OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

While various programs are under way at the national, state, and local levels to encourage observance of codes of ethics, there has been no concerted effort toward enforcement through disciplinary action. Since the adoption of the NEA Code in 1929, only one member has been removed for violating its provisions. It is not known to what extent the various state and local associations have enforced their codes through disciplinary proceedings, but it is highly unlikely that more than a few have taken such action.

The absence of a record of disciplinary action is not a serious reflection on the status of ethical practices in the profession. Undoubtedly the overwhelming number of public school teachers are fulfilling their professional obligations apart from formal code requirements. The profession is made up largely of people dedicated to their work who, because of their character and training, can be relied upon to adhere without coercion to self-imposed standards compatible with good ethical practices.

There are, of course, some teachers who fail to adhere to accepted standards. However, in connection with its program of rendering interpretative opinions, the NEA Committee on Professional Ethics has found that a substantial number of alleged violations are due to thoughtless action or to lack of knowledge of accepted professional practices. Thus an important function of the NEA Committee is education in these areas through publication of opinions construing the Code.

Leaders in the profession generally agree that national, state, and local associations look forward to the time when disciplinary action will be taken against those members whose conduct reflects adversely on the public schools. The program of the NEA Committee on Professional Ethics is designed in part to this end. It is believed that the current study program and the building

up by the Committee of a body of opinions construing the Code are desirable first steps. However, the primary consideration in developing these programs on ethics is neither disciplinary action nor promotion of the teacher's individual welfare. Rather it is professional growth.

Codes of ethics are points of reference for individual teachers in developing their own standards. They also are guides to the profession in seeking to achieve its ideals of professional service. As a code is studied, analyzed, and discussed by individual teachers and groups, its implications become increasingly understood and its application to the practice of teaching raises standards in the profession generally and, in turn, the level of service to the community.

Cyrus C. Perry, LL.B., Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is legal counsel to the National Education Association. He was formerly assistant corporation counsel in New York City, representing the Board of Education and Board of Higher Education in legal matters, and was subsequently executive assistant to the corporation counsel. He has been a lecturer on education law and administration at New York University.

APPENDIX

CODE OF ETHICS

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION *

We, the members of the National Education Association of the United States, hold these truths to be self-evident—

—that the primary purpose of education in the United States is to develop citizens who will safeguard, strengthen, and improve the democracy obtained through a representative government;
—that the achievement of effective democracy in all aspects of American life and the maintenance of our national ideals depend upon making acceptable educational opportunities available to all;
—that the quality of education reflects the ideals, motives, preparation, and conduct of the members of the teaching profession;
—that whoever chooses teaching as a career assumes the obligation to conduct himself in accordance with the ideals of the profession.

As a guide for the teaching profession, the members of the National Education Association have adopted this code of professional ethics. Since all teachers should be members of a united profession, the basic principles herein enumerated apply to all persons engaged in the professional aspects of education—elementary, secondary, and collegiate.

FIRST PRINCIPLE: *The primary obligation of the teaching profession is to guide children, youth, and adults in the pursuit of knowledge and skills, to prepare them in the ways of democracy, and to help them to become happy, useful, self-supporting citizens. The ultimate strength of the nation lies in the social responsibility, economic competence, and moral strength of the individual American.*

In fulfilling the obligations of this first principle the teacher will—

1. Deal justly and impartially with students regardless of their physical, mental, emotional, political, economic, social, racial, or religious characteristics.
2. Recognize the differences among students and seek to meet their individual needs.
3. Encourage students to formulate and work for high individual goals in the development of their physical, intellectual, creative, and spiritual endowments.
4. Aid students to develop an understanding and appreciation not only of the opportunities and benefits of American democracy but also of their obligations to it.
5. Respect the right of every student to have confidential information about himself withheld except when its release is to authorized agencies or is required by law.
6. Accept no remuneration for tutoring except in accordance with approved policies of the governing board.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: *The members of the teaching profession share with parents the task of shaping each student's purposes and acts toward socially acceptable ends. The effectiveness of many methods of teaching is dependent upon cooperative relationships with the home.*

In fulfilling the obligations of this second principle the teacher will—

1. Respect the basic responsibility of parents for their children.
2. Seek to establish friendly and cooperative relationships with the home.
3. Help to increase the student's confidence in his own home and avoid disparaging remarks which might undermine that confidence.
4. Provide parents with information that will serve the best interests of their children, and be discreet with information received from parents.
5. Keep parents informed about the progress of their children as interpreted in terms of the purposes of the school.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: *The teaching profession occupies a position of public trust involving not only the individual teacher's personal conduct, but also the interaction of the school and the community. Education is most effective when these many relationships operate in a friendly, cooperative, and constructive manner.*

In fulfilling the obligations of this third principle the teacher will—

1. Adhere to any reasonable pattern of behavior accepted by the community for professional persons.
2. Perform the duties of citizenship, and participate in community activities with due consideration for his obligations to his students, his family, and himself.
3. Discuss controversial issues from an objective point of view, thereby keeping his class free from partisan opinions.
4. Recognize that the public schools belong to the people of the community, encourage lay participation in shaping the purposes of the school, and strive to keep the public informed of the educational program which is being provided.
5. Respect the community in which he is employed and be loyal to the school system, community, state, and nation.
6. Work to improve education in the community and to strengthen the community's moral, spiritual, and intellectual life.

FOURTH PRINCIPLE: *The members of the teaching profession have inescapable obligations with respect to employment. These obligations are nearly always shared employer-employee responsibilities based upon mutual respect and good faith.*

In fulfilling the obligations of this fourth principle the teacher will—

1. Conduct professional business through the proper channels.
2. Refrain from discussing confidential and official information with unauthorized persons.
3. Apply for employment on the basis of competence only, and avoid asking for a specific position known to be filled by another teacher.
4. Seek employment in a professional manner, avoiding such practices as the indiscriminate distribution of applications.
5. Refuse to accept a position when the vacancy has been created through unprofessional activity or pending controversy over professional policy or the application of unjust personnel practices and procedures.
6. Adhere to the conditions of a contract until service thereunder has been performed, the contract has been terminated by mutual consent, or the contract has otherwise been legally terminated.
7. Give and expect due notice before a change of position is to be made.

* Adopted by the Representative Assembly of the NEA in 1952.

8. Be fair in all recommendations that are given concerning the work of other teachers.

9. Accept no compensation from producers of instructional supplies when one's recommendations affect the local purchase or use of such teaching aids.

10. Engage in no gainful employment, outside of his contract, where the employment affects adversely his professional status or impairs his standing with students, associates, and the community.

11. Cooperate in the development of school policies and assume one's professional obligations thereby incurred.

12. Accept one's obligation to the employing board for maintaining a professional level of service.

FIFTH PRINCIPLE: *The teaching profession is distinguished from many other occupations by the uniqueness and quality of the professional relationships among all teachers. Community support and respect are influenced by the standards of teachers and their attitudes toward teaching and other teachers.*

In fulfilling the obligations of this fifth principle the teacher will—

1. Deal with other members of the profession in the same manner as he himself wishes to be treated.

2. Stand by other teachers who have acted on his behalf and at his request.

3. Speak constructively of other teachers, but report honestly to responsible persons in matters involving the welfare of students, the school system, and the profession.

4. Maintain active membership in professional organizations and, through participation, strive to attain the objectives that justify such organized groups.

5. Seek to make professional growth continuous by such procedures as study, research, travel, conferences, and attendance at professional meetings.

6. Make the teaching profession so attractive in ideals and practices that sincere and able young people will want to enter it.

Organized Labor and American Ethics

By KERMIT EBY

IN 1951, the Committee on Resolutions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations presented to the convention its resolution on Ethical Practices. The resolution was adopted, apparently by unanimous consent.

In the resolution, the Committee lamented "the flouting of higher ethical standards to which all Americans subscribe, and which have been flouted by individuals or groups of individuals." Emphasis was placed on the too frequent departures from "the higher moral standards by which all Americans should live." It was agreed that the breakdown cut across all sections of society, including labor.

> For every bribe-taker, there is a bribe-giver; for every tax-fixer, there is a tax-evader; for every "five-percenter" in the nation's capitol, there is a special interest group seeking special favors; for every racketeer and gangster, there is an individual or corporation willing to use his service for ignoble ends, or to knuckle under, without moral stamina, to illicit propositions.

These acts and the guilty individuals are deplored in the resolution, the consequences on the moral fiber of our nation bewailed, and emphasis given to the fact that

> each act of dishonesty or lack of ethics in the labor movement deprives workers of their right to decent, honest, democratic trade-unionism which is single-mindedly devoted to the advancement of the social welfare and economic well-being of American workers.

We in the C.I.O. have constantly *been vigilant to purge our ranks of subversives and corruption, wherever they appear.* Our organization, in expelling eleven Communist-dominated unions with a membership of almost a million, demonstrated its devotion to decency and democracy. We are ready to act with similar firmness against any evidence of corruption that may arise in our ranks. There is no place in C.I.O. for racketeers, for agents of racketeering interests, or for any immoral elements.

Every effort, the resolution continued, will be made to rid the movement of such influences, so that "our organization will remain clean, decent, and honest." The resolution concluded:

> If every element in our society will maintain constant vigilance against dishonest and unethical practices, the people of this country will have scored a major victory in behalf of democracy and against the weakening of moral standards, that can serve as an ally to the sinister forces of subversion and aggression.

Speaking for the resolution, delegates Berne (Communications Workers) and Stettin (Textile Workers) again lamented the breakdown in American morals, assured the nation of labor's vigilance, and concluded:

> . . . with this organization having passed this resolution, we are going to have a clean face in the American public, and I think it is an excellent resolution . . . because I (we) believe that what should motivate people in public life when they hold office is a sense of responsibility, of service, and not of profit.

Thus, troubled by charges of subversion and corruption, the convention of the CIO resolved these things. To this day, an observer is unclear as to the effects thereof. Following a similar emphasis, and moving beyond the "abhorring" stage, the United Automobile

Workers, meeting in Atlantic City in 1952, gave its International Executive Board authority to "curb Communists and racketeers in local unions." This was to be accomplished by amending the constitution so as to vest "the international executive board with powers to review the findings of local trial boards and order new trials." Justification for this step was the contention that it is the duty of the international officers to step in and protect the interests of the local union when it is powerless to oust officers who place personal or political gain above their responsibilities to the rank and file.

This, in a union known for its democratic practices, is a usurpation of power which leaves unanswered the old, old question, "Who will watch the watchers?" It could be, and sometimes is, argued that men who are properly rewarded with honors, salary, and expense accounts are beyond ambition. Frankly, I doubt it!

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

There have also been actions by the American Federation of Labor. Prodded by overt corruption in the International Longshoremen's Association of New York, the Executive Board of the AFL addressed its attention to the problem of racketeering. (The details would fill many volumes.) Writing to the officers and members of the Longshoremen's Association, it declared:

> We have concluded that these disclosures are of such a serious nature as to call for immediate action by us. We wish to make clear the position of the American Federation of Labor on crime and racketeering within your international and its local unions.
>
> Your relationship with the American Federation of Labor demands that the democratic ideals, clean and wholesome free trade unionism must be immediately restored within your organization, and all semblance of crime, dishonesty, and racketeering be forthwith eliminated.

The language is very similar to that of the CIO, except that the AFL does not equate corruption and subversion. Corruption, not Communism, caused the AFL to lose face.

DUBINSKY AND LEWIS

Something new, however, was recently added when David Dubinsky of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union suggested:

> Many rank and file trade unionists, with a long and passionate devotion to the freedom and independence of free trade unionism, know that any form of governmental intervention in union affairs is an evil. But when these same unionists see some of the welfare funds squandered and misused by racketeering elements, some of whom are muscling their way into the trade unions precisely in order to get their hands on these welfare funds, many rank and filers and leaders will come to look upon governmental intervention—to protect welfare funds—as a lesser evil.[1]

Needless to say, Mr. Dubinsky's article has evoked considerable editorial response, mostly favorable, praising him for his "labor statesmanship," a term which not too many years ago was scarcely considered complimentary.

No recapitulation of labor's position on corruption and subversion would be complete without a word from John L. Lewis. At a hearing before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the United States Senate, April 24, 1953, to a question from Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts on his refusal to sign a non-Communist affidavit Lewis replied:

> the CIO took in the personnel employed by the corporation before they became members. The original fault, if any, does not lie with the union. . . . We have special circumstances in various types of organization, including government subdivisions. You have a man who does not act according to Hoyle or according to ethical and moral standards. I do not think any national legislation is needed by the legitimate unions of this country.

[1] *American Federationist*, Vol. 61 (July 1954), pp. 12–13.

MATERIALISM AND CONFORMITY

Probably more professions from the leaders of American labor might be added to the record. More of the same is, however, unnecessary to establish the fact that leaders of American labor, like all other upright Americans, deplore corruption and are against sin, in government, in business, and in their own organizations. And if eighteen years of work in both the AFL and the CIO taught me anything, it was that labor spokesmen are as honest and sincere as, if not more so than, their counterparts in government and business. This is their strength and—unfortunately—it is also their weakness. For our times demand that being as good as our counterparts is not really good enough, either for our unions or our country!

The tragedy of the labor movement is simply that its leaders, its members, and its institutions are increasingly corrupted by the dominant values of the society of which they are a part and which they once desired to reform. The primary ideals of our current civilization are based upon materialism, secularism, and conformity. Many are the times when I moved from a meeting of union executives to one of similar composition in business, to find that the conversations in the two places were strongly similar. Both were concerned with problems of budgets and of money. It is impossible to understand many unions today separately from the corporations with which they do business. Hart, Schaffner, and Marx is big business, but the Amalgamated Clothing Workers is even bigger. Ernest Bevan, when once asked what produces a labor leader, replied, "The man who sits across the table from him." He might very well have replied, "The union takes on the structure of the corporation with which it negotiates."

There is a story, now folklore in the steel union, which goes like this: Once there was a brash young idealist who dared run against an old-time regional director. Now this director was out of the miners' union, and he had grown fat and sleek in the service of his fellows. More seriously, the idealistic challenger charged, the incumbent had got fat by being free and easy with union money. To this the director, in a speech to his fellow workers, replied, "See this suit. Feel its quality. It cost me $150, and this shirt, all silk, cost me $10; shoes, $18.50, Florsheim; watch chain, 21-carat gold." He then patted his stomach and said, "Do you know what I had for breakfast? $2.50 steaks." He then concluded dramatically, "Do you know what I want for you? Suits at $150, $10 shirts, $18.50 shoes, 21 carat chains, and steaks for breakfast." The regional director won the election, so the story goes.

The story is perfectly consistent with the American dream of upward mobility, and the idea that if your boy can make it so can you. Seeing the union boss "on top" gives the worker vicarious satisfaction. The real test of the leader faced with these drives is determined by his ability to keep them in check. Many of them do not, unfortunately. At the 1953 UAW–CIO convention, the Resolutions Committee recommended that Walter Reuther's salary be raised from $11,500 to $18,000 a year. In the course of the debate, delegate after delegate argued that Reuther's salary should be as high as Philip Murray's, when he was president both of the United Steel Workers and of the CIO ($40,000 per year). Delegate Lloyd Jones. Local 2,

expressed the "match 'em" sentiment when he said:

> When I go into negotiations with the Murray Corporation, I have little men who are called co-ordinators, and I find their salaries are $20,000 a year. When I talk with my industrial relations manager, the sixth in line, his salary is $25,000 a year; when I move on above him . . . I find they go up to the vice-president at $45,000 a year. . . . I join with the previous speaker . . . I say, "Let's tell our International President that we are going to give him Phil Murray's salary, as president of CIO, and president of its biggest union, UAW.

Delegate Andy Rapchak, of Local 228, was even more emphatic:

> Now if we are going to be a bunch of cheapskates on this floor here, *how in hell do we expect the companies to give us concessions when we meet with them?* The first thing that they will throw back at us is, "You won't pay your leaders, but you want us to pay your men!" . . . If we are going to have leadership the same as the industrialists do, we should be men enough *to pay as they do!* . . . I, too, say $50,000 and right on down the line.

WALTER REUTHER SPEAKS

To which Walter Reuther replied:

> We have a lot of work to do; we have great battles to fight; we have crusades to lead; and if you try to evaluate what we will work for only in terms of monetary reward, you miss the real point. . . .
>
> I am not interested in being rich. Because if I was interested in being rich, I would be sitting on the other side of the bargaining table, not this side. I sat across from G.M. officials, and the lowest paid guy got $90,000 and the highest one got $100,000.
>
> We never felt envious, because we have something they can't buy, with all their millions, and that is the loyalty and support of a lot of honest workers in this country. . . . I think we have the most wonderful union in the world. We want to keep it that way, and that kind of union has got to have dedicated leadership. . . .
>
> It believes in the movement, and you can't buy that kind of leadership with money. You can only get it, if the people you pick as leaders believe in it.

Walter Reuther's position prevailed in the UAW. I wish it were the prevailing position throughout the entire labor movement, in government, and in the churches. For in each the assumption is that there is a positive correlation between performance and pay. I doubt it!

As an illustration, we might point out the almost positive correlation between a pragmatic concept of the union as a business proposition and union leadership as a means of getting and keeping a sinecure. It is in such unions, led by cynics, that corruption flourishes; the apathy of the rank and file is a direct result. Bread is important but, ironically, men are more inclined to die for the vision of the Kingdom than for the more prosaic realities of the daily "fix."

This is a factor that perhaps needs to be understood by those who lead labor. Exhortations against corruption in a world where the chief emphasis is on success as measured by income and conspicious consumption are not enough. Men will steal or be apathetic to stealing when all around them the rewards go to the thieves. They will steal less, much less, when theirs is a dedication to a cause. This is the reason for the truism in organized labor: the dedicated are corrupted by power, the cynical by money and comfort. In all my years in CIO I never encountered any significant corruption. To the men around me, money was a means to an end, not an end in itself.

LABOR'S MORAL DILEMMA

The beginnings of labor's moral dilemma are deep within itself, and even more thoroughly, deep within the society of which it is a part. The first realization necessary to an understanding of labor's role in America is that it was born out of Gomperism and pragmatism, rather than Marxism and Fabianism. Idealistic critics of the labor movement often take this fact as an indication of labor's lack of an underlying political or economic philosophy which might serve to guide its decisions. This is not quite true. Labor on the whole has a philosophy, a typically American philosophy which might be described as pragmatic dynamism. "A nickel an hour is worth more than a theory any day," a prominent leader once informed me. It is this argument for "more" which makes it imperative that even the most idealistic of labor leaders deliver at the bargaining table. Reuther is one of the most successful, as the record of the UAW attests.

So is John L. Lewis. The difference is not one of success, but of emphasis. Walter Reuther understands that there is not real prosperity for his autoworkers in an America of unemployment and in a world of hunger. But let him speak for himself:

> I have tried before and I will say again, it is true that if we can get America to give more attention to helping people help themselves in the positive fight against hunger and poverty in the world . . . we would have to send fewer of our boys with guns and flame throwers to fight on the battlefronts of the world!

Mr. Lewis, on the other hand, appears to put the security of his miners first.

In a world such as ours a union and the society of which it is a part are well served only if it is understood that there is no security for the parts separate from the whole. Further, the ethic grows out of this understanding and thrives on its implementation. Conversely, the monopolistic leads to the collusive, the collusive to the corrupt, and the corrupt to apathy and decay. It is trite but true: "Where there is no vision, the people perish."

Here again an illustration may be more effective than argument. When I was executive secretary of the Chicago Teachers Union, I was severely censured by one old-timer for presenting the whole garment of intellectual and community interests as the union's responsibility. "We hired you," the old-timer said, "to protect our pensions and get us raises. Never mind the curriculum and John Dewey." We are, he said in essence, no more and no less than the plumbers and the electricians, that is, a monopolistic self-seeking craft. For my disagreement, I was later fired, but to this day, I am convinced that in a Chicago dependent upon state and federal income, the narrower viewpoint is self-defeating even in the economic sense.

LEAVENING INFLUENCES

We begin our concluding section of this discussion of ethics in the labor movement with a question: Are there leavening influences in the movement which will keep it from being corrupted by the values of the world in which it exists? My answer is Yes. However, having so answered, I must admit that there will be occasional manifestations of the ills by which an acquisitive society is beset.

The resolutions, on the surface though they may be, are significant in that they mark a willingness on the part of organized labor to respond to a critical public opinion. For years, suffering from an inferiority complex, the labor movement refused to recognize criticism as such. This attitude could be understood when the movement was young and on the defensive; but a movement which claims the strength of 16,000,000 members has no need of a complex. No man or organization is mature until willing both to tolerate and to encourage analysis and criticism.

While the resolutions, as I said, are a beginning, there is yet a long road to travel. Some fifty labor papers cross my desk monthly. I read several and scan the rest. I do not read them all, for once the line is understood, there is no particular intellectual stimulus in its repetition. These labor papers are the voice, the apologists of the union-power hierarchies. They repeat the speeches, the activities, of these leaders, some significant and some not so. Frankly, they are puff sheets. But they are becoming less so. For the workers are becoming too sophisticated to fall for an unabashed line; too many of them (although not enough) are attending institutes; too many are reading other than union material. And workers have an advantage which other Americans often do not: they are at least exposed to arguments on economics and politics which clash pretty sharply with the prevailing opinions of the capitalistic press.

Again, while there is entirely too much of a one-party approach to national politics in unions, there are many sharp and bitter struggles for power and position on local levels. These give experience in political give and take.

Probably ten to twelve thousand CIO members attend some kind of an institute yearly. At these institutes, discussions are held on all kinds of economic and political subjects. Between 2,500 and 3,000 autoworkers met in Chicago in the spring of '54; included in their discussions were the annual wage, McCarthyism, taxation, and so on. I noticed vitality in those discussions, vitality growing out of necessity. It is such developments which may encourage growth of ethical thought.

Since I have often been seriously critical of the fear of criticism shown on the part of union leaders, I am encouraged when such an established organization as the AFL finally admits that it is not beyond criticism and that those who dare to criticize are not disloyal.

The labor movement today becomes increasingly a service organization. And like all organizations which provide service for their members, it must do so as effectively as it can. There really is not much difference between working as an expert in a union pension office and working for a Social Security government office. Yet there is a difference, and it is significant, for unions are also agitational, sometimes almost revolutionary organizations. The economic gains they administer are often won by struggle on the picket line and through the political rally. Docile members do not make good activists. In fact, here is a real dilemma for union leaders: how to sensitize their members to action but not to such a degree that the members focus their drives on the leaders. It is because of this need for an alert rank and file that only the most corrupt and dictatorial unions can ignore the desires of their membership. This is what so few outsiders understand. Union leaders stay in power not too long after they fail to serve their members' interests.

Thus what appears to be antidemocratic in the larger configuration may be democratic and serve the greater interest. As long as this continues to be true, unions are a bit better than organizations which rest at the peak of the pyramid instead of at the base. At least so I rationalized when I made decisions which set inflationary wage patterns. I was not going to ask the $64-a-week man to be more moral than the $750-per-week executive.

HUMAN RELATIONS AND POLITICS

Long ago, some white workers learned that if the Negro were not lifted to their economic level, they would be reduced to his. Granted that this is a bread-and-butter approach which smacks of the pragmatic, it at least got results. Today the CIO is uncompromising in its fight for racial equality, and the AFL increasingly so. In both cases, the upward thrust grows out of the people. This I assert is good, even though I know that there is still plenty of prejudice among some workers and union leaders who do not believe in the policies they are called upon to implement.

Today, organized labor is in politics to stay. The reason is again obvious. Government increasingly plays a decisive role in its drive for economic security. Facts secured from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, among many other things, influence the decisions affecting labor's security. The leaders of labor understand this and are determined to have their say in this our compensatory state.

And if our trend toward urbanization and industrialization means anything, the influence of organized labor is destined to increase. At regular intervals, drums are sounded, warning of the influences of such a trend. As if workers were not Americans, too, and privileged to their own political place in the sun!

Often I have counted the resolutions at labor conventions. No other resolutions are broader in scope, more generous in outlook. Education, health, conservation of resources, industrial and international peace, are at the center of labor's concerns. More than two-thirds of the resolutions encompass the welfare of all Americans.

This, I again assert, is true because the workers are still inspired by the American dream. Having less, they aspire to more. But more significantly, workers know depression and unemployment, inadequate housing and poverty, and because they know these things, they can more readily sympathize with other people who lack to an even greater extent the good things of this earth.

Consequently, the leaders of labor—authoritarian as they often are, human as they always are—are still, united with their fellows, a force for good in the world. In a relative world, a world of compromise, I prefer to cast my lot with the forces which bring the greatest good for the greatest number. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, there is not such a thing as a worker isolated from his community. Like all other Americans, he is a composite of the total influences which play upon him. Therefore neither he nor his organization is outside of the corrupting or spiritualizing forces of the whole.

We have seen how these forces and the values they stimulate lead to corruption and reaction; how workers want their leaders paid by corporation standards, how some succumb, and also how in a union of 1,300,000 (the UAW) these corrupting forces were resisted. We have also pointed out that the nickel-an-hour approach to problems is often prevalent, but we are not oblivious to the fact that that nickel, more often than not, buys milk. We have looked briefly at the attitudes taken by unions on race and politics, and have found them generally good.

Kermit Eby has been professor of the social sciences in the Division of the Social Sciences of the University of Chicago since 1952, having previously been an associate professor (1948–52). Prior to that he was director of education and research of the CIO in Washington. He also served for a time as executive secretary of the Chicago Teachers Union. Before entering the labor movement he was a teacher in the public schools and also a minister of the Church of the Brethren. He is the author of articles in national religious and labor publications and of several pamphlets, Political Primer, Labor and Education, Labor and Religion (all 1944).

Democracy and Public Employee Morality

By O. Glenn Stahl *

"THOSE holding public office, as servants of the public, are not owners of authority but agents of public purpose." This basic framework for the moral standards that apply to government employment has rarely been so well stated. This particular statement appeared in a proposed Code of Ethics for officials and employees of Arlington County, Virginia, that was prepared by a citizens' commission but never adopted by County authorities.[1]

The phrase "agents of public purpose" pitted against "owners of authority" puts succinctly the eternal conflict between good and evil that besets the public worker. As "agents," they are bound to loyal and efficient performance. "Public purpose" denotes the will of the people, democratically expressed through the ballot box or otherwise. In contrast, those who look upon public employment as an opportunity for self-aggrandizement and for exercise of authority to favor themselves or their friends seem to conceive their role as "owners of authority."

In comparing the ethical problems of government employees with those in private enterprise, writers commonly refer to the public service as if it were an occupation—on a par for example with law, medicine, business management, engineering, or teaching. As a matter of fact, of course, it is a composite of *all* occupations, not one for which a separate discipline, a distinctive technical preparation, and a special code of conduct exist. It is a composite of occupations many of which themselves embrace definite ethical standards, in whatever context they may operate. Practically every occupation discussed in this issue of THE ANNALS, and literally thousands of others, are represented in the public service.

The only group approximating a distinct occupational caste is that of the political heads—elective or appointive—who commonly make up the top echelon in state, local, and federal governments. Neither these political heads nor the legislators and workers in Congress, the state legislatures, and local lawmaking boards and councils constitute the focus of attention for this paper. Here we shall be primarily concerned with the full-time year-in and year-out civil servants—where properly so designated, the *career* civil servants. Therefore we are thinking of men and women from many different walks of life and a variety of educational backgrounds, not necessarily a cohesive professional body.

To refine our subject further, it may be well to rule out of the discussion those routine occupations in government employment that have an ethical environment no different from that of their counterparts in private employment. Generally the same obligations of honesty and integrity prevail for clerical, skilled and unskilled, and even many technical workers in government as

* The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the United States Civil Service Commission, with which he is connected.

[1] From Section 13 of the Code as published in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 1953), p. 120. Through technicalities in a court action ousting the County Board members who had set up the citizens' commission, an antireform group came into power which refused to recognize the importance of one of the best written codes of ethics in the country.

prevail for these groups in the business world.

The publicly employed group on which discussion of moral behavior can profitably center is that comprising the professions, business specialities, and other occupations in government in which some degree of judgment or discretion is exercised—however trivial—in the execution of public policy. This does not automatically *exclude* all employees doing menial tasks or *include* all doing vital work. It may well include, for example, the meter reader for a publicly owned utility service. It may, however, have no special application to a laboratory technician in a public hospital whose careful processing of blood samples must be viewed in the same ethical light regardless of the ownership of the institution.

It may be the bureau chief or the sanitary engineer, the tax assessor or the park ranger, the police officer or the personnel examiner—we are dealing for purposes of this discussion with many occupational categories, usually under circumstances where discretion must be exercised and where publicly adopted laws or rules govern the conduct of either the worker, the citizen affected, or both.

PLACE OF PUBLIC SERVICE IN COMMUNITY ETHICS

Any fair-minded student of the subject will concede that, by and large, the public expects higher standards of conduct from its public servants than it does from its members engaged in private enterprise. The very surprise and indignation occasioned by the internal revenue scandals is recent evidence in point. "We are shocked," says Herbert Emmerich, "not because we have a low regard for public officials, but because we expect them to have so high a standard of integrity." [2] The same point is stressed by Senator Paul H. Douglas in his book *Ethics in Government*,[3] as well as by many other observers.

We must learn to see the actual behavior of government employees in perspective. The Senate subcommittee which reported in 1951 on ethical standards pointed out: "The moral standards of the country, indeed, provide the ethical environment which in turn conditions the standards of behavior of public officials." [4]

This subcommittee went on to observe:

> We also believe that the ethical standards of public officials are probably higher than those prevailing in business and other walks of life. On this point, also, there was persuasive testimony from men of experience in both Government and business and from observers of both. Public officials apparently are more conscious of the problem of moral standards. The resentment which public officials sometimes show when subjected to public criticism may be explained in part by their awareness of the fact that some of their critics would be even more vulnerable to criticism if the same standards were applied.[5]

Public schizophrenia

There is a kind of public schizophrenia that pervades this subject. On the one hand articulate citizens demand extraordinarily high moral standards of public servants, and on the other they seek special action from officials favoring themselves against the larger pub-

[2] "A Scandal in Utopia," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1952), p. 3.

[3] Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952; especially pp. 22–26.

[4] U. S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Ethical Standards, *Ethical Standards in Government* (Report, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, 1951), p. 1.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.

lic interest.[6] George A. Graham, currently serving as staff director of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Personnel, pointed up in a recent book the necessity for all branches of society to bear the responsibility for ethical conduct in public affairs:

> The business executive who thinks only in terms of his corporation, the labor leader who thinks only in terms of his union, the leader of organized agriculture who thinks only in terms of his farm organization are all a menace to the basic integrity of the nation. . . . In a free society the responsibilities of the statesman fall on everyone, and upon each person in accordance with his power and ability.[7]

The public interest

The ultimate standard of conduct for the public servant, therefore, is the public interest as opposed to group or private interests. And so must be the standard for our own society as a whole.

Whenever doctors look upon their own prosperity as synonymous with the status of the public health, whenever associations of manufacturers oppose legislation for the general welfare, whenever labor leaders mistake the interests of their union structures for the interests of all citizens, whenever veterans' organizations exploit patriotism for class legislation, whenever voters view their Congressmen merely as tools to get favors and special consideration, we shall fall short of our goal of the highest possible public ethics. What we need are more and more people dedicated to the public interest itself—rather than to special economic or social or sectional interests.

We already have the largest representation of this kind of dedication *in the public service.* Except for the "stepping stone" artists and the clerical and laboring levels where public employment may represent just a job, most people are attracted to the public service because of their zeal for identification with a larger good than some narrow group interest. It is for this reason, as well as the demands of office itself, that we find the highest moral standards in public employment. Corruption or "shady deals" are actually relatively rare among career civil servants. Even in a major scandal like that in the Bureau of Internal Revenue of 1950–51, only 0.13 per cent of the career people were involved. A supporting example is also found in the disclosures of unsavory influence on key officials of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation—where the agency was initially organized with almost wholly political appointments and, although later covered under civil service, retained much of its political flavor.

This is not to condemn inferentially those who spend a transitory period in the public service. But I believe that the proportion among them—regardless of party—who are really imbued with the public interest is often less than among career public servants.

Such is the perspective in which I believe we must examine the essential characteristics of the moral attitudes and behavior of public employees.

DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE IDEALS

If the ultimate standard, the basic ethic, for the government employee is pursuance of the *public interest,* then the meaning of democracy—authority derived from consent of the governed—is implicit in our consideration of the subject. For the sake of convenience, this democratic base for the moral standards of civil servants may be analyzed first in its external aspects, vis-a-vis the public, and then in its internal, administrative aspects.

External relationships

Public administration in a democracy must serve the public in a manner that strengthens the processes and integrity of democratic society. One of the tests of a public servant is his earnestness in recognizing, as Gordon R. Clapp has phrased it, "the utmost importance" of letting "the people decide for themselves what policies and objectives the public service shall have."[8]

The responsibilities of employees to the public, to the law, and to their current executive leaders are tied together by the common bond of democratic consent. Paul H. Appleby has observed:

> In nearly all administrative decisions the sense of virtuous performance is to be pursued by attempting to inject some increased allowance for the more public interest and some increased concern for those citizens not immediately present or heard.[9]

It is at this point that potential conflict looms between the credo of the professional specialist and the democratic exigencies surrounding the servant of the public. As Appleby admonishes: "In this pursuit there must be care not to confuse one's professional viewpoint, functional preoccupation, or personal prejudices with the public interest."[10] Indeed, the reconciliation of our continuing dependence upon experts in government with the realities of democratic needs and behavior is a central problem of statesmanship and, therefore, at the heart of the civil servant's moral climate.

No one has warned against the limitations of the specialist more eloquently than Harold J. Laski over two decades ago. A political system which fails to keep the expert under control, he says,

> will lack insight into the movement and temper of the public mind. It will push its private nostrums in disregard of public wants. . . . It will mistake its technical results for social wisdom, and it will fail to see the limits within which its measures are capable of effective application. For the expert, by definition, lacks contact with the plain man.[11]

In further definition, Laski states:

> The expert, in fact, simply by reason of his immersion in a routine, tends to lack flexibility of mind once he approaches the margins of his special subject.[12]

Expertise, it may be argued, sacrifices the insight of common sense to intensity of experience. It breeds an inability to accept new views from the very depth of its preoccupation with its own conclusions. It too often fails to see round its subject.[13]

The public servant who does not see round his subject may, however unwittingly, violate the moral law of sensitivity to the public will. Specialization, in the operating programs of government and in pressure groups on the outside, is probably more often the source of unethical behavior in relation to the maintenance of the integrity of democratic institutions than is outright corruption.

Government must be thoroughly grounded on a healthy respect for and intelligent understanding of the democratic environment.

[6] Former Governor of Nebraska, Val Peterson, now Federal Civil Defense Administrator, stressed this point in a recent address in Washington. See "The Public's Split Personality," *Personnel Administration,* Vol. 17, No. 3 (May 1954), pp. 1–5, 11.

[7] *Morality in American Politics* (New York: Random House, 1952), p. 305.

[8] "A Credo for the Public Servant," *Public Personnel Review,* Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1951), p. 14.

[9] *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1952), p. 176.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] "The Limitations of the Expert," *Harpers' Magazine,* December 1930, p. 7.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

We are forced to the conclusion that in the last analysis much of our success in the quest for a responsible bureaucracy will depend upon our ability to foster among the citizenry as a whole, and therefore among the bureaucracy, a respect and devotion to representative institutions.[14]

Herein lies the basic democratic character of the ethical standards found or sought in the external relations of the public employee.

Internal relationships

A cardinal tenet of our democratic faith is respect for human personality, for individual dignity and worth. Not only does this foundation undergird our political system and our civil liberties as a whole; it is also a basic assumption upon which administration must rest.

The success—and therefore the moral behavior—of an administrative undertaking depends ultimately upon the capacity, the integrity, and the motivation of people. Social science research is rapidly confirming our instinctive belief that favorable human relations in an organization are promoted by a democratic environment with high employee participation. Furthermore, we find that the existence of good human relations is not an isolated feature of management but is a quality and attitude woven throughout the entire fabric of administration.

Here we approach common ethical ground with the management of private enterprise. But there is a peculiar necessity for the democratic spirit of administration in the public service, because it is difficult to motivate employees to achieve the high consciousness of their democratic role vis-a-vis the public if there is little democratic practice and recognition of the dignity of man in internal administration.

Hurst R. Anderson has put the ethical necessities in their broadest sense by stating that administrators must commit themselves to "a philosophy of personal and group living which allows everyone to live, work, and contribute to the general good." [15] This permissive philosophy, tempered by necessary co-ordination and control of the specialist, is essentially the democratic spirit in administration—the spirit of respect for subordinates, colleagues, and chiefs that makes for mutual dependence and trust, maximum productivity, and minimum friction. No code of ethics can be effective unless it is exemplified in the acts of top management. It can set no higher standard than that followed by "those who by their action are able to affect in significant ways the careers of their associates and subordinates." [16]

The positive nature of a democratic administrative environment is well stated by Gordon R. Clapp:

> . . . we will get the most out of the talents we have in the service if we build on the strengths of individuals instead of emphasizing their weaknesses. The systems of administration we organize in our agencies, the methods of selection, the techniques of placement, the ideas of appraisal, the delegations of authority, the teamwork arrangements, all these must rest on the assumption that public employees will do their job well. Watchdog systems that assume weaknesses and try to forestall them will never get top-notch performance from employees.[17]

[14] David M. Levitan, "Administrative Responsibility," *Political Science Quarterly* (Academy of Political Science, Columbia University), Vol. 61 (1946), p. 598.

[15] "Ethical Values in Administration," *Personnel Administration*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1954), p. 8. This article, based on an address by President Anderson, of The American University, is a brilliant statement of special value to the public administrator.

[16] Phillip Monypenny, "A Code of Ethics as a Means of Controlling Administrative Conduct," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1953), p. 187.

Thus, again, we see that the framework for moral standards of the public employee has a democratic base and that the maintenance of this basis for internal management is more critical in the public service than in any other environment.

THE FUTURE

If the desirable moral standards of public workers require a high regard for our democratic processes and institutions, then all citizens must be concerned with the conditions that contribute to or detract from that regard. A vital condition is the attitude of the general public itself. The issue has been so well stated by David M. Levitan as not to permit paraphrasing:

> If administrative officials are to appreciate the high role of the citizen and to accord him the dignity becoming free men, they must themselves experience the blessings of free men. Harassed employees—themselves deprived of the privileges and immunities of citizenship—will be ill prepared to accord to others that which is denied to them. A dual interpretation—one applicable to government employees and another to others—of the due process and other liberty guaranteeing clauses of the Constitution is repugnant to the philosophy of the Constitution. Nor is there room in America for two classes of citizens—those who work for the government, and those who do not.[18]

Heroes of the public service

The government employee's democratic impulses can hardly be strengthened if undemocratic practices govern his life—whether through internal administrative restrictions or through abuse and arbitrariness heaped upon him by the general public, legislative bodies, or demagogues. Senator Douglas would undoubtedly be supported by thoughtful leaders in both political parties in the following statement:

> It is fortunate that there are in government large numbers of men and women who lead devoted lives of public service. They work extremely hard for far less pay than they could get in private industry. They never sell out the public interest but instead defend it under great difficulties. They do all this, moreover, without receiving appreciable praise. They are generally either little known or actually ignored by the public. Sometimes they are bitterly attacked by interests which are seeking to obtain unfair privileges or which are swayed by unfounded prejudices. These men and women are indeed unsung heroes, who deserve far more recognition than they receive.[19]

If this caliber of public servant is to be maintained and increased in number, action must be taken for development of the kind of *esprit de corps*, employee selection and training, working conditions, and incentives that will make this condition possible, and for avoiding "open season" on bureaucrats. Many constructive proposals have been made, largely in the nature of institutional arrangements or personnel reforms making the government working atmosphere more conducive to the highest ethical conduct. Of particular interest are those recommended by the Senate Subcommittee on Ethical Standards previously referred to.[20]

[17] *Op. cit. supra* (note 8), p. 15.

[18] *Op. cit. supra* (note 14), p. 587.

[19] *Op. cit. supra* (note 3), p. 27.

[20] "Other proposals in the field of personnel policy are: (1) better salaries in the higher brackets; (2) the protection of judicial procedures for Federal employees accused on loyalty charges; (3) simplified dismissal procedures for all employees (protection is needed against the stigma of disloyalty which is a severe extra-legal penalty, not against dismissal); (4) continued delegation to the departments of large responsibilities for recruiting, training, and developing civil serv-

Unfortunately there is too little opportunity outside of government for practice in the rigorous objectivity and impartiality demanded of public servants. In practically all but a few businesses and professions, the principals can buy and sell where they wish, they can play favorites without fear of punishment, they can disclose or conceal information on their operations largely as they please, they can accept gifts without question of propriety, and they need seldom worry about conflict of interest.

Outline for progress

A continuing strengthening of the moral base for public administration is not likely to come through reliance solely on fringe actions such as periodic entry into the service of persons from private activity, the adoption of codes of conduct, or the inquiries of legislative committees—however essential all these may be. More fundamental and durable progress will be found, in this writer's opinion, in such long-range emphases and actions as the following:

1. More conscious attention in our secondary and higher educational systems to the public service, to the role of the citizen as well as of the public employee in governmental action, and to the ethical implications of public employment. Such education should reflect part of our cultural heritage, worthy of passing on to *all* students, not just those specializing in the social sciences.

2. Continuous emphasis within state, local, and federal government service on moral standards, primarily by the long shadow of behavior of our leading officials and by such special devices as an administrative staff college [21] in the federal service that would afford greater opportunity for mutual respect, understanding, and example among higher ranking personnel.

3. More communication to the people by public agencies on their achievements, their plans, their organization, and their employees—not so much in the form of news releases as by a continuous policy of reporting and a trained attitude that recognizes the public servant's role as a broker and interpreter for the commonweal.

4. More positive recognition by the public—through citizen organizations, universities, and foundations—in the form of honors and privileges given to public workers who perform distinguished service or who exemplify the best in exercise of public responsibility.

This is not the place to spell out the details and the subplans that might contribute to these general lines of approach.

FEDERAL CREED OF SERVICE

We can take heart that as recently as 1951 the career personnel directors in the federal government evolved a creed of service which in tightly packed phrases sets forth all that American citizens should aspire for in public employment:

We as members of the civil service accept our obligation and our opportunity to serve the American people well and in full measure, doing our best to further the free and democratic institutions of our country.

We believe it is our duty to

Carry out loyally the will of the people as expressed in our laws

Serve the public with fairness, courtesy, integrity, and understanding

Help improve the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of our work

. . . and thus do our part in performing the great services of the Government.

ants according to standards fixed by the Civil Service Commission and subject to its supervision and audit; (5) greater diligence in discovering and rewarding outstanding performance and dedicated service among civil servants; (6) more systematic and intensive professional training particularly for officials and employees who will serve in posts abroad. The nature and number of these suggestions emphasize the widely held view that high standards of conduct for the Federal Government are dependent upon maintaining a high quality of personnel in the service." —*Op. cit. supra* (note 4), p. 60.

[21] See *Proposal for a Federal Administrative Staff College* (General Series, Pamphlet No. 5; Washington, D. C.: Society for Personnel Administration, 1953).

O. Glenn Stahl, Ph.D., Arlington, Virginia, is executive vice-chairman of the Interagency Advisory Group (formerly the Federal Personnel Council), United States Civil Service Commission; member of the Executive Council of the Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada; adjunct professor at The American University; and editor of Personnel Administration. For ten years he was associated with the Federal Security Agency, from 1948 to 1951 as director of personnel. He is the author of Training Career Public Servants for the City of New York (1936), coauthor of Public Personnel Administration (third ed., 1950), and contributor to various journals in the fields of political science, education, and personnel administration.

The Control of Ethical Standards in the Public Service

By Phillip Monypenny

THE need of improving the standards of ethics of governmental officers and employees was much discussed after a series of legislative investigations during the last administration, and the discussion has taken a somewhat different turn after even more exciting legislative inquiries under this one. The previous series of discussions resulted in the recommendation that a code of ethics be drawn for governmental employees, at least in the national government. Such codes already exist for some groups of public servants, probably the best known being that of the International City Managers' Association. The codes so far adopted or proposed are directed to rather simple if somewhat intangible standards of conduct, but accompanying discussions have suggested more far-reaching goals of conduct. If the simpler standards are all that are to be included it would seem that a code of ethics is unnecessary. There are laws against larceny and bribetaking. We all disapprove the granting of exceptional favors unless we happen to be the recipient. But the report of the Douglas subcommittee was concerned that officers and employees represent the public, not smaller groups, that they refuse to yield to the pressure of special interest as they go about their work of executing legislative directives, something which is a far more complicated matter.[1]

[1] U. S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Ethical Standards, *Ethical Standards in Government* (Eighty-second Congress, First Session, 1951); Paul H. Douglas, *Ethics in Government* (The Godkin Lectures at Harvard University, 1951; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952).

Certainly ethics, or something akin to it, is an important matter in government. Reliance on the integrity of the appointed personnel of government, especially in circumstances in which supervision by elected officials is very remote, is an inescapable element of large-scale government. The building of a chain of connection between the political impulses of the population and the action of government rests on the responsiveness of the employee group to political impulses directed through elected officials. Although there are plenty of formal controls to enforce this responsiveness, it probably rests, like so many other important social controls, on factors internal to the individual rather than on immediately external factors like threats or promises. It is to controls of this kind, the internal ones, that the term "ethics" may be applied. In this paper we shall examine what may be expected of ethics as a control, and what may not.

Stated Rules and Political Arrangements

The formal controls that enforce subordination to stated rules, whether legislative or administrative in origin, are scarcely a matter of ethics. If they cover the situation, they leave no leeway to the individual; he is not called upon to consult his inner sources as a guide to action. It is not the business of the individual to change such rules, even though he may disapprove of them. Conscience only requires that the stated

rule be followed. But what of the standards of action when the legal rule is unclear? Is this a matter of employee ethics, or are there other determinants, not set up by employee discretion? In most governmental action there are such determinants, not cast in a legal form. The custom of not enforcing parking meter limits as long as the meter is kept filled with coins may be well understood, minor violations of the building code may be deliberately overlooked, obsolete traffic ordinances may be allowed to rest unenforced, as matters of deliberate administrative policy having well understood political sanctions. In such situations the rule and its nonenforcement, or its counterpart, administrative action despite the absence of a clear legal directive, may be deliberate acts of policy, approved by politically effective elements of the population, even though in both cases the ordinary vehicle of adjustment, formal legal action, is not used.

Political pressures

So we may move from the legal rule as a guide to action to politically effective arrangements embodied either in nullification of existing rules or in the use of administrative action not based upon any obvious authority. The absence of a formal rule does not mean however that action rests upon the unguided conscience of the individual employee. The simple view that the whole duty of officers and employees is to act in accordance with the literal letter of the law runs counter to a large body of governmental practice, especially in our state and local governments. If this be wrong much of popular control which operates by pressures as well as by election is also wrong. The political controls which give to elected officers their primacy in the governmental scheme also ensure that pressures which may affect their election will affect the action of their subordinates. Our view of the obligations of an employee is therefore expanded to include both the observation of the existing law and the practical necessity of respecting the pressures by which his office is surrounded. If these exhausted the possible guides to action there would be no place for ethics as a separate system of control. The obligation to obey would be the sum and substance of the ethical code for the public service.

Beyond Obedience

Many people, however, are unwilling to accept subordination to statute or to political authority as the sole obligation of public employees. They expect a welfare official to do more than simply allocate the money he has and make no comment on the suffering that will ensue from inadequate legislative provision for welfare needs. They expect the police captain to take some action against gambling in his district even if some of the local party leaders are privy to such gambling. They expect the purchasing official to refrain from accepting gifts from suppliers even if no law is broken and there is little chance of embarrassing publicity. Some even hold it the duty of generals and admirals to make frank comments on the adequacy of the military program of the administration under which they temporarily serve. In other words, they expect those who are to be the transmission belt for the popular determination of governmental policy to have their own view of their mission and of appropriate policy.

Is this an appropriate or even a safe expectation? There are two ways of justifying it, though they are certainly not conclusive of the question. No matter how much one fears in theory the independent action of the bureaucrat or how much he prizes the sub-

ordination of the elected to the appointed official, there are circumstances in which it is hard to accept the individual human being as purely the instrument of others, indifferent to the purposes for which he is being used, or schizoid, completely ignoring his own opinions as he acts. Of course any subordinate who chooses to act in opposition to his superiors acts at his peril. From another standpoint the legal and informal determinants of governmental action do not necessarily form a seamless web which precisely determines all governmental events. The individual office holder, even the individual employee, has apparent freedom of action in many situations, and his action may be an element in developing an opinion in favor of the values which his action embodies. The level of devotion which he brings to the carrying out of his clear obligations may certainly vary. His perception of the situation in which he seeks to carry out given policies certainly cannot be controlled by formal or informal rule.

If this qualification of the transmission-belt view is correct, then the question of what the officer or employee will do when he has some freedom of decision is an important element in the total determination of governmental policy. Without accepting the view that bureaucracy is an uncontrollable leviathan we may still anticipate that the actions of elected officials, whether legislative or executive, do not completely determine the conditions of all governmental action. It is in this area of apparent indeterminacy that the responsibility of the employee to do other than just follow orders comes into being. It is here that his effective ethics, the choices he makes, the values that his work embodies, are in evidence. Is there anything that can be done deliberately to influence this working ethic?

Ethics as a Means of Social Control

Ethics as an agency of social control, which is our concern here, is a different matter from ethics as a standard by which the individual as an individual may lead a good life. The two conceptions of ethics are not unrelated but they do serve different purposes. To live a good life as an individual is an end in itself. Whether the destruction of an institution of which the individual is a part results from his assumption of the good life is irrelevant. But ethics as a means of social control does not have its end in the life of any single individual. It is a means to secure certain general results in society which affect many individuals. An unswerving adherence to the individual standards of the good life does not necessarily answer all of the ethical questions which arise under the second conception of ethics.

Group standards

Ethics as a system of control also deals with groups, not with isolated individuals. Particular individuals may be capable of very high standards of performance, but it is large groups which must be moved in all social endeavor. Groups impose their own standards on the individuals who join them; they develop their own standards out of their own experience. A man in isolation may change his own conduct radically. It is difficult for a group to develop new standards in relation to the activity which makes it a group.

The standards for groups are therefore likely to be more modest than those which a dedicated individual may embrace. They will also be partial in relation to the whole life of man, covering the aspect of affairs which are common to the group. They must grow

out of present practices and standards. They must be capable of relatively easy application to the events of the day: they must not be so general that a long and sophisticated chain of reasoning is necessary to relate the standards and the action required at the moment; in this respect they are the opposite of constitutional law. The standards developed for governmental employment will probably be various, developed separately for the many different kinds of work which is done by governmental employees. A United States assistant district attorney working up a criminal case must rely on quite different standards of judgment as to what is practical and what is right from those of an auditor in the General Accounting Office verifying a long chain of fiscal documents or a federal public health officer passing on a state grant-in-aid request.

69626

Conflicts and contradictions

Even the simple requirements may not be simple when they contradict prevailing standards and prevailing organization in the society of which government is only part. It is easy to say that employees should not steal, that they should be impartial, that they should not seek private profit in the course of their work, that they should not betray or profit from confidential information. But these standards will not be easy to meet unless the job pays enough to live on, unless employees are protected against hostile action by disappointed persons, unless both the general community and superior officers will reward and protect the impartial performance of office. One can easily think of countries in which these requirements are not present, as they are not in parts of the United States. In such a situation, whatever the formal code, the total system of obligations in which the employee lives does not lay these simple moralities upon him; its imperatives are of a contrary order.

Value and Basis of Written Codes

Assume for the moment, however, that these conditions have been met and that a code of conduct has been drafted which goes beyond the obvious requirement of obeying the law to some of the more subtle and difficult standards, such as that governmental power will be used not only to accommodate those with the loudest voices but also to investigate the situation of the relatively quiet ones and that agency personnel will not become indebted in subtle ways to those on whose conduct they are expected to pass judgment. Why is such a code likely to be any more effective than more formal imperatives which, we are told, are all too widely disregarded?

The action of various professional groups in adopting ethical codes suggests that there is some value in a formal statement of obligations which goes beyond those defined in the law. What such a code rests on is the identification of the individual with the group, an identification which includes his acceptance of group standards and his susceptibility to group action, whether of disapproval or approbation. Every working group determines to some extent the professional future of its members as the group evaluates their conduct and reacts to that conduct. The situation in government is not essentially different. In a given agency there may be no professional group as such, but the working group which includes people at various hierarchic levels has a life of its own which its members cannot easily ignore. The future of the individual and his immediate satisfaction in his work depend in part on judgments within the group. Inevitably there is a working ethic in such a group, and the problem is not

so much to supply one as to modify the existing one to the desired standard.

Any attempt to raise ethical standards must rest on this basis of the group and the group standard. If the new standard is related in some manner to values and beliefs currently held, if it sets out a standard of conduct which is practicable, if it is developed by those who exercise leadership, and if the subsequent actions of those in authority support it, then it is likely to be an effective influence on conduct. Fully considered these are rather formidable limitations. But they do not exhaust the difficulty of evaluating and raising the ethical standards of government.

It will not be easy in any period to develop a generally agreed-on standard for the public service. The values which are to be promoted can scarcely be abstracted from the situation in which decisions that embody them are to be made, and the result of a decision as well as its moral defensibility colors our judgment of its rightness. The Light Brigade acted by the highest standards of military loyalty, yet a little more cowardice, a little more tendency to question legitimate authority, might have resulted in some evaluation of the order given and a more successful outcome to the battle. Soldiers live not to die nobly but to protect their country. The public service demands not alone nobility of purpose but also understanding of the situation within which noble purposes must be pursued. The ethical significance of any governmental act lies not merely in the immediate act but likewise in its consequences as far as these are understood. We do not pay men to be saints but to serve our needs.

Many of the familiar phenomena of government that take place in shabby courthouses and dingy city halls, in the musty rooms of battered political clubs, in the shabby splendor of hotel suites, seem to those used to more prepossessing surroundings to have also a moral dinginess, even though in our imperfect state no other processes have been developed for popular government. If Senator X must have his judgeship, if his candidate is selected to meet an obligation to Boss Y, and if the President by these appointments assures a favorable vote on a measure he has promised to the people who voted for him, is the President's ethics faulty, or the Senator's, or even the Boss's, since each of them has his place in our political world? In any kind of political action people must be united, and if they will not be united by grand ideas then they must be united by favors, with some grand ideas getting some support in the process.

Although these examples are not taken from the strictly administrative sphere they indicate considerations that are not always absent in administrative action, particularly on the part of the responsible political officers of any undertaking. People at lower levels should not hold to administrative standards so sanctified and remote from the larger world in which their particular activity takes place that they cannot appreciate the imperatives of people at higher levels and co-operate when necessary.

The right questions

Codes will be drafted most easily when there is settled policy, when the ends to be achieved are clear, when there is a considerable accumulation of experience. It is then, however, that they are least likely to be needed to raise the standard of performance. Codes will be hardest to draw just when temptation is at its peak and criticism most strong, in the developing area of governmental policy where there are unresolved conflicts between competing groups and competing policies. For such areas Dean Leys has probably made the most useful recent contribution to the discussion of ethical standards.[2] He views ethics not as a matter of rules, but of questions as to the sources to be consulted for applicable rules and as to the ends which are to be promoted. The right questions he thinks will permit the possible choices and their implicit values and consequences to be most clearly stated. If the choices are set out with the clearest possible statement of conditions, the unexamined presumptions which are probably responsible for more deplorable governmental action than any willful wrongdoing will be reduced. Catastrophes in tenements left without periodic inspection, shareholders forced from farms by agricultural assistance programs which ignored their peculiar status, unsophisticated investors led into disastrous enterprises—miscarriages of policy and administration such as these result as much from unwarranted assumptions about the lack of danger as from deliberate intent. In Leys's book the ethical questions posed by various schools are accompanied by contemporary situations in government and business in which choices have been made with or without a due consideration of ethical elements in the decision. If governmental personnel ask the right questions the standards of action will in the long run be higher, even if preliminary answers are later rejected.

[2] Wayne A. R. Leys, *Ethics for Policy Decisions: The Art of Asking Deliberative Questions* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952).

CONFLICTING CHOICES

The development and evaluation of ethical standards in government are harder because the conflicting values among which choices must be made are not always posed as opposite pairs, good or evil, free enterprise or monopoly. Usually there will be a range of desirable things, not in themselves opposed, among which choice must be made, either because of the limits of fiscal resources or because of the limits of the social apparatus through which action must be taken. Anyone who wants to get a view of the poignant incompatibility of apparently desirable things may read the cases Harold Stein has edited illustrating types of administrative decisions.[3] In the "Natural Cement Issue," one finds state support for home industry posed against the lowest possible costs of highway construction. In the "TVA Ammonia Plant," the postwar plans of the chemical fertilizer industry are pitted against the postwar plans of TVA for experimentation with nitrogen to complement its successful work with phosphates. In the "Reconversion Controversy" the maintenance of a martial spirit and full industrial potential is pitted against the minimizing of unemployment and the protection of small plants as war orders slackened in the closing months of the war.

If appointive governmental personnel, either those in political offices or those in the lower ranks, must participate in these hard choices it seems necessary for those outside government to respect the difficulties they face and to suspend judgment until there is time for an adequate evaluation of what was done and of the situation in which it was done. Unrestrained and irresponsible criticism does not provide a good setting for the development of a responsible public service. It is not enough to say, "I disagree with your assumptions, which I freely impute to you, therefore I disagree with your action." Even if the assumptions were known accurately, the action taken could not be judged by that alone. Value premises are only a part of the action, sometimes

[3] Harold Stein (Ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952).

a small part, and the complexity of political life is such that it is altogether possible that different value premises, given the objective situation, would result in similar conclusions.

DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL AWARENESS

We may conclude therefore not that a concern about ethics is unnecessary in the public service in view of controls already present, nor that a simple set of rules can be set up which will solve the problem for all time, but that all persons with official responsibility need to have their attention drawn to the implications of their actions—and of inaction also—and to the presence of ethical problems in all decisions, thus to sharpen their awareness of the choices they are making. In particular administrative agencies codes of ethical conduct covering practices and problems peculiar to those agencies might have considerable value in providing express guides to action which might otherwise be left to individual or group convenience or immediate pressures.

Phillip Monypenny, Ph.D., Urbana, Illinois, is associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois. His particular interest is public administration in the United States. He taught previously at the City College of New York and at the University of Puerto Rico, and has served as consultant to state and local governments on a variety of problems. He is the author of several articles on personnel administration and on ethics for the public service.

The Problem of Defining a Profession

By MORRIS L. COGAN

TO define "profession" is to invite controversy. C. L. Stevenson has said, "To choose a definition is to plead a cause, so long as the word defined is strongly emotive."[1] It is quite apparent that "profession" is just such a word. When definitions of it are proposed they are rarely subjected to rational consideration. Reactions tend to be polarized toward an enthusiastic and uncritical acceptance or toward a rancorous and defensive rejection. So many advantages have accrued to profession, so many claims to it are made by so many people, that the cutting edge of a definition—be it ever so blunt—is almost sure to draw cries of protest from many aspirants to the title. If the definer is prepared to accept these risks, then he must in addition be prepared to see his work result in failure or at best seemingly insignificant accomplishment, for the concept with which he is dealing is extremely difficult to identify and describe. The man who addresses himself to the problem of defining a profession should be able to say with equanimity: "It is better to light a little lantern than to curse the darkness."

THE LITERATURE OF PROFESSION

There is a rather extensive literature of definitions of profession. Research into these writings reveals no general agreement on any "authoritative" statement.[2] The meanings found in most dictionaries are similar, and although these are often cited, they appear to offer to most writers only a convenient point of departure or, perhaps more precisely, a primary theme upon which radical variations are composed. The legal definitions of profession are almost always so closely related to the conditions of a specific case that they are rarely susceptible of wider application, and the arbitrary definitions commonly adopted for purposes of research or descriptive statistics are of almost equally restricted utility.

Some of the writers most notable for their interest in the analysis of profession simply refuse to venture a definition. Outstanding representatives of these are Alexander M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, who, after an extensive treatment of the characteristics of profession, are forced to conclude that certain vocations, possessing these characteristics in a greater or lesser degree, approach more or less closely to the condition of profession.[3] Oliver Garceau writes: "There is no accepted definition of a 'profession.' Interpretation of such a concept is a matter of personal temperament."[4] More recently Roy Lewis and Angus Maude have written that "a moral code is the basis of professionalism. . . ."[5] Beyond this common thread of a special morality,

[1] Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 210.

[2] For a summary and analysis of definitions, see Morris L. Cogan, "Toward a Definition of Profession," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 23 (Winter 1953), pp. 33–50.

[3] Alexander M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The Professions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 4.

[4] Oliver Garceau, *Some Aspects of Medical Politics* (Ph.D. thesis in the Department of Government, Harvard University, 1939), p. 4.

[5] *Professional People in England* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 64.

their efforts at analysis collide head on with the difficulty of identifying and clearly delineating such elusive concepts as the associational standards of admission and conduct, the general and special education, the unified body of knowledge, that are requisite to profession.

Flexner's criteria

In brief, a survey of some of the literature on this topic reveals that the promulgation of a satisfactory definition has progressed but little beyond the six criteria proposed by Abraham Flexner in 1915: (1) intellectual operations coupled with large individual responsibilities, (2) raw materials drawn from science and learning, (3) practical application, (4) an educationally communicable technique, (5) tendency toward self-organization, and (6) increasingly altruistic motivation.[6]

THREE LEVELS OF DEFINITION

Some confusion of terms is evident in many recent discussions of profession. This perplexity appears to derive in large part from the difficulty of communicating ideas and resolving differences when a single term (profession) is used to designate disparate referents. This disparity appears to arise from the use of "profession" at three different levels of definition. If productive consideration of the problem of defining a profession is a desideratum, then an initial clarification of some of the denotations of the word may be useful.

Historical and lexicological definitions

The first type of definition is historical and lexicological. If a specific profession is to be defined, and if such a definition is not to be purely arbitrary, that is, not to be divorced from the rich historical and traditional associations clustering about the term, then the definition must be related to the general concept of profession. This concordance with the "principal features or structure of [the] concept [is necessary], partly in order to make it definite, to delimit it from other concepts, and partly in order to make possible a systematic exploration of the subject matter with which it deals."[7] Once a lexicological and historical examination has been made as the initial step in the process, then it is possible to begin to isolate the essential features of profession in general, and thus to describe—even if only tentatively—the boundaries that set it off from other allied terms: vocation, trade, craft, art, semiprofession, and so on. Research of this kind may provide the framework within which the process of defining a specific vocation can proceed with some assurance that the vocation will tend to remain, in spite of its differentiae, essentially a species of the genus profession. The task is certainly difficult. It involves a recognition of the complexity of the concept and a sustained effort to cut through the nuances and the multiple secondary meanings clustered about the core meaning.

The standard etymological works constitute valuable sources of definitions at the first level. The research in such treatises must however be supplemented by examination of other writings. Among the most illuminating of these are the statements made by Abraham Flexner,[8] Alexander M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson,[9] Robert Ulich,[10] and Alfred North Whitehead.[11]

An objective and rigorous analysis of such writings may provide the basis for a defensible statement of the essentials of profession. The results of one such attempt are reproduced below for purposes of illustration.

> A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of some department of learning or science, and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding. This understanding and these abilities are applied to the vital practical affairs of man. The practices of the profession are modified by knowledge of a generalized nature and by the accumulated wisdom and experience of mankind, which serve to correct the errors of specialism. The profession, serving the vital needs of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the client.[12]

After such a first-level statement has been formulated, the problem of defining a *specific* profession then becomes the concern of the practitioners, who may at this point address themselves to the unique conditions of their area of specialization.

Persuasive definitions

The second level of definition is called "persuasive." Professor Charles L. Stevenson has noted that such statements are used "consciously or unconsciously, in an effort to secure, by [the] interplay between emotive and descriptive meaning, a redirection of people's attitudes."[13] Why is it desirable to encourage definitions of this second type, definitions designed to redirect people's attitudes? The answer lies in the nature of profession and in the behavior of man: profession demands arduous training and the practitioner's personal commitment to an exacting ethical code; men have commonly needed to be persuaded to undertake such training and to follow the dictates of such a code. Both attributes are required, and a failure in either is a failure of profession. It is interesting to note in this connection that the most persistent criticisms of professional groups are in essence allegations of such failure. The public school teachers, for example, are accused of inefficiency due to inadequate preservice education; doctors and lawyers are often criticized for violation of their ethical code.

If profession is to remain desired and desirable, then powerful persuasive definitions are a sine qua non. In recent history it has been all too easy to dismiss such statements as hortatory or messianic. The derogatory force of these adjectives derives from the idea that such appeals do not really influence behavior. It is part of the pessimist myth of our times that the seer and the visionary are without followers, that the appeal to ideals must fail, whereas the appeal to self-interest is universally invincible. Yet it is clear that in human affairs, yesterday's idealistic commandments often become today's laws and are tomorrow translated into action. One has only to observe the series of persuasive definitions in the history of antislavery, recently culminating in the desegregation ruling of the Supreme Court. That there are daily regressions in the course of man's behavior is not to the point; the force of the decision is toward the ideal behaviors, and the persuasive powers of the Supreme Court's decision will probably be of greater influence than the immediate legislative and administra-

[6] Abraham Flexner, "Is Social Work a Profession?" *School and Society*, Vol. 1 (June 26, 1915), p. 904.

[7] Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934), pp. 231–32.

[8] *Op. cit. supra* (note 6), pp. 901–11.

[9] *Op. cit. supra* (note 3).

[10] *Crisis and Hope in American Education* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), pp. 133–35, 158–59.

[11] *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), pp. 72–79.

[12] Morris L. Cogan, *op. cit. supra* (note 2), pp. 48–49.

[13] *Loc. cit. supra* (note 1).

tive actions deriving from it. Where, as in profession, it becomes necessary to redirect men's attitudes, the power of the persuasive definition should not be underestimated. Morris R. Cohen has written:

> It would be a mistake to conclude that the issue [of definitions] is merely verbal and of no real significance . . . no question of this sort can be *merely* verbal, because words are most potent influences in determining thought as well as action.[14]

Two striking examples of the force of the persuasive definition are to be found in the degree to which the Hippocratic Oath and the persuasive definitions offered by Abraham Flexner have both been translated into the program and behavior of contemporary medical societies. To be deflected, then, from formulating persuasive definitions of profession is to be deflected from the extremely important functions of definition at the second level. A few essays of this kind deserve special mention: Morris L. Cooke's "Professional Ethics and Social Change," [15] Robert D. Kohn's "The Significance of the Professional Ideal," [16] and Roscoe Pound's "The Professions in the Society of Today." [17]

The insights provided by the first- and second-level definitions are especially valuable for the construction of theoretical models within which profession may be examined and from which important hypotheses may arise. Such definitions have, however, uniformly collapsed when they have been inappropriately applied as the operational criteria for decisions as to whether *specific* phenomena are to be called professional, nonprofessional, or unprofessional. The failures following upon such misapplication have tended to be generalized, and the positive values of such statements have therefore often been discounted or overlooked entirely.

Operational definitions

The third level of definition is termed operational, and is designed to furnish the basis upon which individuals and associations may make specific decisions as to the behavioral concomitants of profession. The demand for operational definitions stems from the scientific temper of the times. It is a demand for the observable and the measurable; it will not be satisfied by lexicological and persuasive statements.

Operational definitions are the guidelines for the practitioner as he faces the day-to-day decisions of his work. They are, for example, the rules for professional conduct; they mediate the practitioner's relations to his client, to his colleagues, to the public, to his association. They set forth the specific criteria of general and special education for the professional, the requirements for admission to practice, the standards for competent service.

An example of operational definitions in action may be seen in the requirements for preservice medical education. At present this prerequisite to actual practice may be stated as "graduation from an accredited medical school." But behind this apparently simple statement lies a long history of operational definitions promulgated and applied. It has been necessary to set up standards (definitions) for the accredited schools: their admission requirements, curriculum, qualifications of the instructional staff, facilities for instruction, and the like.

[14] Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931), p. 389.

[15] *American Scholar,* Vol. 15 (1946), pp. 487–97.

[16] THE ANNALS, Vol. 101 (May 1922), pp. 1–5.

[17] *New England Journal of Medicine,* Vol. 241 (September 1949), pp. 351–57.

The complex problems of professional ethics have been rather effectively attacked by associations of architects. They have studied and publicized certain "cases"; they have prepared, illustrated, and circularized "ethical documents" specifically designed to offer guidance to the architect in the complicated situations he daily faces, in which he must have operational definitions that will clarify his often conflicting responsibilities to client, public, inspectors, subcontractors, and colleagues.

To build up the body of decisions, illustrative cases, and precedents is a task that makes severe demands upon the time and energy of the practitioners. That this time and energy are well spent is evidenced by the findings of Benson Y. Landis. Dr. Landis has made a sociological analysis of professional codes and has concluded that the optimal control of ethical behavior is generally achieved by those professions that have set up the machinery for control based on "a code containing clear definitions of situations." [18]

The major advantage of the operational definitions is that they restrict the area of idiosyncratic professional behavior and tend to stabilize the boundaries between genuine professionalism, unprofessionalism, and nonprofessionalism. It should not be assumed, however, that the operational definitions are at present an aqua regia in which all the obdurate problems of the professions can be dissolved. Such definitions are relatively rare, since most professions have contented themselves with the generalities of the first- and second-level statements. Where they do exist, they are often rather primitive, lacking precision. What is needed is research, examination of behaviors, trial and inevitable error in developing the theory of profession and in investigating its behavioral accompaniments.

[18] Benson Y. Landis, *Professional Codes* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1927), p. 96.

PROBLEM AREAS AND RESEARCH

Most of the important studies of profession have been done, almost fortuitously, by sociologists, educators, and students of government. It would seem to be up to the organized professions themselves now to encourage research and self-examination. For their own welfare the professions need to support extensive investigations of their own history, their behavior, and their problems. Otherwise they may have to resign themselves to vagueness about their own rights, privileges, and responsibilities; they may expect creeping encroachment by pseudo professions; they may witness the gradual dissolution of the very attributes that have contributed to their survival and growth.

Professionalism under the state

Some of the areas in which research may be valuable deserve mention here. Both the state and the large corporations are absorbing more and more professionals. It is a moot question whether it is possible to maintain professionalism under such conditions. For example, the fact that most teachers are employees of a municipality may have inhibited their professional growth, since the conditions of teaching tend to obscure the locus of responsibility to the client (Is it to each child? to the class? to the local community? to the whole society?) and also tend to limit associational solidarity and self-regulation. At the very least the professions should be examining the enormous readjustments taking place in the relations between practitioners and the state under the socialist regime in Britain. These

are of major importance to professions in the United States. Such processes need to be subjected to close scrutiny. The insight gained from this research may contribute to the survival of professions.

American Medical Association

A closely related problem is at present plaguing the medical associations of the United States. It is clear, for example, that the American Medical Association has failed to define its proper role to the satisfaction of its members and the public. The pressures building up around the question of socialized medicine owe a portion of their intensity to ideological differences, it is true; but some of this intensity is also due to the unwillingness of the AMA to define its role in relation to government. Indeed, it is safe to say that most professional associations have failed to examine the assumptions underlying the maintenance of political lobbies, the functions of the association in the certification of practitioners, the delegation of regulatory powers to nongovernmental groups, and the association's part in the regulation of practice.

Other trouble spots

Very little attention has been given to problems of individual and associational professionalism. Is profession inevitably a group phenomenon or may it be achieved individually? Are there two kinds of profession—personal and associational? If there are, can these two roles come into conflict, that is, is it possible that the dictates of personal professional ethics may force a practitioner to resign from an association whose activities appear unethical to him?

Another trouble spot in organized profession is the frequent conflict between the associational functions of internal protection of members and protection of the client. At the verbal level there appears to be no conflict at all: practically every code gives priority to the welfare of the client. In actual practice, however, the issue is confused, and a great deal of research will probably be necessary before it is clarified. For example, is highly selective recruitment of practitioners a guarantee of competent service to the client, or is it rather a guarantee of economic protection to the successful candidate and at the same time an artificial restriction of vital public services?

Among schoolteachers this issue is even more clearly drawn. Is a teachers' strike a deprivation of services vital to the children or is it rather an ethical imperative for the protection of these very children? Easy answers to such questions are not possible, yet answers must be sought. Otherwise the professions will have to be content with decisions which are no more than vagaries and with actions whose justifications are no more than a defensive posture.

Perhaps it would be appropriate to add a word of caution as to the power of definition to solve the problem of the arrogation of the title "profession" by certain vocations. This process is viewed with a great deal of alarm by many persons, who therefore seek a sharp definition that will serve to cut these claimants off from the title. It should be obvious that definition alone will not accomplish this purpose. Perhaps the best way to make such distinctions clear is to ensure that the genuine professions demonstrate such a consistently high order of professional behavior that ultimately every inappropriate assumption of the title will appear inept, ludicrous; thus the unqualified claimants will either labor to achieve genuine profession or retire from the field.

SUMMARY

In summary, it appears that some of the problems of defining a profession can be resolved if the practitioners (1) seek to establish a general framework within a lexicological and historical context, (2) provide ideal incentives through the persuasive definitions, and (3) develop the behavioral and operational definitions that give direction within the unique conditions of a specific profession.

Morris L. Cogan, Ed.D., is lecturer on education and director of secondary apprentice teaching at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. He is the author of "Preparation for College in the United States" (Universities Quarterly, May 1954) and other articles.

Business Management: A Profession?

By Howard R. Bowen

WALTER Rauschenbusch, the great architect of the "social gospel," once wrote:

> Business life is the unregenerate section of our social order. If by some magic it could be plucked out of our total social life in all its raw selfishness, and isolated on an island, unmitigated by any other factors of our life, that island would immediately become the object of a great foreign mission crusade for all Christendom.[1]

That such words could be written by a responsible religious leader only forty years ago attests to the great progress in the mores and conduct of American business since the era of the "muckrakers." Whatever may be the faults and inadequacies of business today, words so extreme as these no longer fit. Business has unquestionably become more humane and more responsible than it was a generation ago.

At the very time Rauschenbusch was writing, the eminent jurist, Louis D. Brandeis, saw the possibilities of professionalism in business:

> . . . success in business must mean something very different from mere money-making. In business the able man ordinarily earns a larger income than one less able. So does the able man in the recognized professions—in law, medicine or engineering; and even in those professions more remote from money-making, like the ministry, teaching or social work. The world's demand for efficiency is so great and the supply so small, that the price of efficiency is high in every field of human activity.
>
> The recognized professions, however, definitely reject the size of the financial return as the measure of success. They select as their test, excellence of performance in the broadest sense—and include, among other things, advance in the particular occupation and service to the community. These are the basis of all worthy reputations in the recognized professions. In them a large income is the ordinary incident of success; but he who exaggerates the value of the incident is apt to fail of real success.
>
> To the business of to-day a similar test must be applied. True, in business the earning of profit is something more than an incident of success. It is an essential condition of success; because the continued absence of profit itself spells failure. But while loss spells failure, large profits do not connote success. Success must be sought in business also in excellence of performance; and in business, excellence of performance manifests itself, among other things, in the advancing of methods and processes; in the improvement of products; in more perfect organization, eliminating friction as well as waste; in bettering the condition of the workingmen, developing their faculties and promoting their happiness; and in the establishment of right relations with customers and with the community.[2]

This paper deals with two questions, both suggested by Brandeis' eloquent words: (1) Is business management in fact becoming a profession? and (2) Should business management take on the attributes of a profession? There are many who answer one or both of these questions in the negative. My conclusion is that both questions can be answered affirmatively—that business management is gradually assuming some of the marks of a profession and that this tendency *is on the whole* desirable.[3] But before taking up these questions directly, it is well to consider just what is meant by the word "profession."

[1] *Christianizing the Social Order* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914), p. 156.

[2] *Business—A Profession* (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, cop. 1914 and 1925), pp. 3–5.

A full-fledged profession is a vocation in which the following conditions exist: (1) pursuit of the vocation demands that practitioners acquire an intellectually based technique; (2) practitioners assume a relationship of responsibility toward clients; (3) practitioners are organized into responsible associations which set standards for admission to practice and exert control over the actions of their members through codes of ethics.[4] In most professions, the social control exerted by the association is reinforced by public licensing and supervision. Among the traditional professions in which these conditions are most fully realized are theology, law, and medicine. Later additions are, among others, dentistry, veterinary medicine, engineering, architecture, teaching, and accounting.

With these criteria in mind, let us now consider the extent to which the conditions of professionalism are fulfilled in present business management.

Intellectually Based Technique

The art of management has increasingly become a subject for study and research by disciplined and disinterested investigators and scholars. The early work in this field is associated with the name of Frederick W. Taylor, who made pathbreaking studies of efficiency, especially in the art of cutting metals. Taylor's most important contribution, however, was not the particular results of his studies but his approach. He showed that the problems of business might be studied with the same objectivity, the same rigor, and many of the same methods as are common in the laboratories of physical sciences.

In time, many more investigators applied themselves to the problems of business, and their interests were eventually broadened to include not only productive techniques in the factory and offices but also problems of sales, advertising, finance, records, accounting, inventory control, quality control, employee selection and training, job analysis, worker morale, incentives, collective bargaining, public relations, and administrative organization. The effect of these studies, as they have accumulated from the modest beginnings of a half-century ago, is to persuade businessmen (1) that there are efficient and inefficient ways not only of cutting metals but also of meeting problems of business relations; (2) that efficient methods are less costly and therefore more profitable than bad methods; and (3) that the efficient ways may be more easily and surely discovered through the proven methods of painstaking experiment and disinterested observation than through following rules of thumb or uninformed prejudice.

As a result of the development of an intellectually based technique, the practice of management is becoming an art for which one must prepare himself through education and experience. The education need not be formal education; yet increasing numbers of younger men are preparing themselves for managerial roles by study in schools of business, and more and more junior executives are studying for positions of

[3] This paper is based in part on my book *Social Responsibilities of the Businessman* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953).

[4] Cf. Paul Meadows, "Professional Behavior and Industrial Society," *Journal of Business*, July 1946, p. 150. See also A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The Professions* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933); R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1920), pp. 91–122; Talcott Parsons, "The Professions and the Social Structure," *Social Forces*, May 1939, pp. 457–67.

greater responsibility by attendance at the many institutes, night classes, and company training programs now being provided. In short, there is a more or less systematic body of knowledge which one must acquire before one is qualified to fill a managerial position in a large corporation. This is not to say that one may learn to become a successful manager by reading books any more than one can become a great physician by reading books. In both cases, certain personal qualities and long years of experience are required. Nevertheless, formal knowledge is a practical necessity.

RESPONSIBILITY TO CLIENTS

Business is sharply distinguished from the traditional professions in the nature of its clientele and in the character of its relationships to that clientele.

In the traditional professions, the clients are primarily the persons or groups who are served by the practitioners—they are the "customers." And professional ethics are concerned primarily with the relationships between the practitioners and the customers. But the clients of business, that is, the persons who are affected by business operations and for whom business is therefore responsible, include not only customers but also stockholders, workers, suppliers, citizens of the communities in which business is conducted, and, in our interdependent world, the public at large. Responsibility toward clients, then, means responsibility toward all those persons whose lives are touched by business operations.[5] In this sense, the concept of professionalism as applied to business is even broader and more inclusive than as applied to medicine or law or theology.

In most of the traditional professions, the human relationships involved are distinctively *personal* relationships. They are primarily the relationships of individual practitioners to clients who are known face to face. But in business—particularly in the large corporation—the "practitioner" is a *group* of persons who jointly constitute "management" and who are collectively responsible for the conduct of the enterprise. And the clients, often, are known only vaguely and impersonally as "stockholders," the "market," "organized labor," the "public," and so forth.[6]

Because the clientele of business is so diffuse and ramified and distant, and because business relationships are so impersonal, it is much more difficult for businessmen, as compared with members of the traditional professions, to perceive their responsibilities and to respond to them. It is one thing for a physician to realize and accept his responsibilities toward a patient whom he knows as a fellow human being; and it is quite another thing for a business management to understand that its decisions may affect the lives of flesh-and-blood human beings and to act accordingly. Our whole ethical tradition is more immediately serviceable for direct interpersonal relationships than for the kind of impersonal and distant human relationships which are common to business. This means, on the one hand, that it is unusually difficult for businessmen to acquire professional attitudes and practices, and on the other hand that businessmen deserve great credit for the substantial progress already achieved.

[5] This is, of course, not an absolute distinction. Practitioners of the traditional professions have responsibilities to the community—the physician for public health, the lawyer for justice, and so forth. Yet the emphasis in professional ethics is upon the relationship of the practitioner to the person served.

[6] Again this distinction is not absolute in a day of giant law firms and great medical clinics.

Management as a balance wheel

There is no doubt of an increasing acceptance among businessmen of important obligations toward their diverse clients. The concept of "stewardship" is, of course, an old one, and many businessmen have been thinking in this direction. Especially within the past few years, large numbers of business leaders have publicly acknowledged and actively preached the doctrine that they are servants of society and that management merely in the interests (narrowly defined) of stockholders is not the sole end of their duties.[7]

The following are two examples (many more might be supplied) of statements by leading businessmen in which they acknowledge their role as trustees:

> Today, most managements, in fact, operate as trustees in recognition of the claims of employees, investors, consumers, and government. The task is to keep these forces in balance and to see that each gets a fair share of industry's rewards.[8]

> It is becoming clear that in our modern society top management has the opportunity—in fact, I should say the duty—to act as a balance wheel in relation to three groups of interests—the interests of owners, of employees, and of the public, all of whom have a stake in the output of industry. Management can best represent the interests of ownership by acting fairly and wisely with respect to the claims of employees and the public as well. It is a difficult but vital role. It seems to me only too obvious that the very survival of private enterprise requires that private enterprise act to maintain a productive and equitable relation among these three elements: the individual's right to, and the social necessity for, profits; the economic and human aspirations of all workers; and the public's demand for an abundance of goods at low cost. The alternative is plainly intensified industrial conflict followed by increased government regulation forced by an impatient public.[9]

One must not, of course, exaggerate the extent to which businessmen and their corporations have disavowed their selfish impulses and turned their thoughts to the social welfare. And the progress that has occurred has been achieved primarily as a result of changes in the social climate of opinion, attitudes, and values within which business functions. Nevertheless, businessmen have made great progress in their responsiveness to their obligations to society.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

The luxuriant growth of trade associations, better business bureaus, chambers of commerce, and service clubs suggests that business is in the process of developing professional associations analogous to those in the traditional professions. These businessmen's associations do not presume to enforce standards of competence for entry into the practice of business management or to regulate the conduct of their members. But they are at least marginally concerned with formulating codes of ethics and with promoting consultation among businessmen on problems of mutual concern. In the past the orientation of these associations has often been toward the narrow interests of members, and the attitudes of association officials have frequently surpassed those of member businessmen in their

[7] In an earlier issue of THE ANNALS, I tried to show in some detail the growing sense of social responsibility on the part of businessmen: "How Public Spirited Is American Business?" THE ANNALS, Vol. 280 (March 1952), pp. 82–89.

[8] Clarence Francis, Chairman of General Foods Corporation, address at the annual conference of the Harvard Business School Alumni Association, June 12, 1948.

[9] F. W. Pierce, Director of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, address before the Cincinnati Chapter of the Society for the Advancement of Management, December 6, 1945.

reactionariness. Nevertheless, such associations have on the whole broadened the vision of members by focusing attention on the problems of the industry, business at large, or the community, as well as of the single enterprise.

Businessmen's associations have also been useful in providing the sense of group consciousness which is so essential as a basis for ethical behavior.

How Control Business?

We have now considered professionalism in business in terms of three criteria: (1) intellectually based technique, (2) responsibility toward clients, and (3) professional organization. With reference to each of these criteria, it can be said quite definitely that business has been moving in the direction of professionalism. Business management is clearly becoming a learned art for which the practitioner must prepare himself through education and experience. Businessmen are steadily becoming more conscious of the manifold consequences of their actions and more concerned about their social responsibilities. And business organizations are becoming increasingly interested in the ethical aspects of business operations. But it can be said with equal definiteness that business has by no means reached the advanced state of professionalism attained by, for example, the medical profession. And it seems most unlikely that it will (or should) ever attain that degree of professionalism.

The concept of "profession" implies, essentially, a particular form of *control* over the conduct of the practitioner. This control is through voluntary codes which have been formulated by his peers with primary concern for the public interest and which are enforced by these same peers. Professionalism means peer-group responsibility for the conduct of the individual practitioner of the learned arts. When we speak of professional conduct, we refer to actions of a practitioner which are consistent with the accepted code of his peer group. Professionalism is, in other words, a form of social control over the behavior of individuals. When we speak of professionalism with reference to business, we are in fact concerned about the questions, How should business be controlled? and, Is professionalism a feasible or desirable method of control over business?

There is no doubt that business must be subjected to some form of social control. Men cannot safely be turned loose in pursuit of self-interest without some method of ensuring that their behavior will be conformable to the general welfare. In general, there are three types of control available for the purpose: (1) competition, (2) governmental regulation, and (3) professionalism.

The advocates of laissez faire proposed that detailed governmental control over business decisions should be minimized, and that the control, instead, should take the form of widespread and relentless competition. (The early proponents of laissez faire lived too early to consider professionalism as a form of control.) Later, when it became apparent that extreme laissez faire afforded insufficient control over business to prevent certain abuses or undesirable conditions, other forms of social control were advocated. One of these was governmental regulation. Extreme socialists proposed that this should be virtually the sole form of control. Another alternative was professionalism, or voluntary control under the aegis of a peer group to define social responsibilities and enforce "ethical" behavior.

There are few responsible persons in the United States today who believe that any one of the three forms of social control can be relied upon exclusively. There are few remaining advocates of extreme laissez faire, even fewer socialists, and almost no proponents of complete self-regulation by business.

Americans have strong faith in competition as a regulator of business conduct, yet they doubt its usefulness as a sole form of control. They feel that government—in the form of policemen, judges, and regulatory commissions—is useful in curbing the selfishness of men and directing their activities into socially desirable channels. At the same time, they are skeptical of the socialist model of all-pervasive governmental regulation. Americans feel that there is a place for professionalism or self-regulation, yet they do not have confidence in the wisdom and restraint of private businessmen to regulate themselves without external control.

The kind of economy we are evolving is a mixed economy in which control by competition, by governmental regulation, and by self-regulation are combined. Honest men differ as to the most desirable proportions of these three types of control, and when specific problems arise they differ as to which type of remedy is preferable. But they are generally agreed that some combination of the three is essential.

Significance of professionalism

The importance of professionalism (or voluntary regulation) for business is that it offers a type of control that is intermediate between competition and governmental regulation. In so far as businessmen can learn to perceive the social consequences of their actions and voluntarily act in terms of the social interest, the abuses of laissez faire and the dangers of excessive governmental regulation may both be avoided. In this respect, tendencies toward professionalism in business may be regarded as wholesome.

At the same time, it would be naïve and dangerous to assume that voluntary regulation could or should largely supplant competition and governmental regulation in the control of our economic life. Business is different from the traditional professions in the degree to which control through competition is possible or desirable. In the case of medicine, for example, control is achieved primarily through professional self-regulation supplemented by governmental regulation, and competition is obviously unsuitable as a major form of control. For business, on the other hand, competition is a workable form of control which, though it cannot be relied upon exclusively, is more efficient than either professionalism or government. Under these circumstances, business is unlikely ever to become a full-fledged profession, nor is such a development desirable. For professionalism in business is not without danger. The apparatus of organizations and codes that is characteristic of professionalism could easily become a mask for monopoly. The tendency toward professionalism in business may be regarded as socially desirable only if it becomes a means of lessening the need for governmental control—not if it becomes a device for stifling competition.

Howard R. Bowen, Ph.D., Williamstown, Massachusetts, is professor of economics at Williams College. He has served as chief economist of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, economist with the Irving Trust Company, New York, economic consultant to the National Council of Churches in connection with their studies of Ethics and Economic Life, and chairman of the Committee on Business Enterprise Research, Social Science Research Council. He is author of Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (1953), Christian Values and Economic Life (1954), and other publications.

The Social Significance of Professional Ethics*

By R. M. MacIver

THE spirit and method of the craft, banished from industry, finds a more permanent home in the professions. Here still prevail the long apprenticeship, the distinctive training, the small-scale unit of employment and the intrinsic—as distinct from the economic—interest alike in the process and the product of the work. The sweep of economic evolution seems at first sight to have passed the professions by. The doctor, the lawyer, the architect, the minister of religion, remain individual practitioners, or at most enter into partnerships of two or three members. Specialization takes place, but in a different way, for the specialist in the professions does not yield his autonomy. He offers his specialism directly to the public, and only indirectly to his profession. But this very autonomy is the condition under which the social process brings about another and no less significant integration. The limited "corporations" of the business world being thus ruled out, the whole profession assumes something of the aspect of a corporation. It supplements the advantage or the necessity of the small-scale, often the one-man, unit by concerted action to remove its "natural" disadvantage, that free play of uncontrolled individualism which undermines all essential standards. It achieves an integration not of form but of spirit. Of this spirit nothing is more significant than the ethical code which it creates.

There is in this respect a marked contrast between the world of business and that of the professions. It cannot be said that business has yet attained a specific code of ethics, resting on considerations broader than the sense of self-interest and supplementing the minimal requirements of the law. Such a code may be in the making, but it has not yet established itself, and there are formidable difficulties to be overcome. When we speak of business ethics, we generally mean the principles of fair play and honorable dealing which men *should* observe in business. Sharp dealing, "unfair" competition, the exaction of the pound of flesh, may be reprobated and by the decent majority condemned, but behind such an attitude there is no definite code which businessmen reinforce by their collective sense of its necessity and by their deliberate adoption of it as expressly binding upon themselves. There is no general brotherhood of businessmen from which the offender against these sentiments, who does not at the same time overtly offend against the law of the land, is extruded as unworthy of an honorable calling. There is no effective criticism which sets up a broader standard of judgment than mere success.

If we inquire why this distinction should hold between business and professional standards the social significance of the latter is set in a clearer light. It is not that business, unlike medicine or law for example, lacks those special conditions which call for a code of its own. Take, on the one hand, the matter of competitive methods. It is a vital concern of business, leading to numerous agreements of all sorts, but these are mere *ad hoc* agreements of a particular nature, not as yet deductions from a fully established principle which business, as a self-conscious

* Reprinted with some changes from THE ANNALS, Vol. 101 (May 1922), pp. 5–11.

whole, deliberately and universally accepts. Take, on the other hand, such a problem as that of the duty of the employer to his workpeople. Is not this a subject most apt for the introduction of a special code defining the sense of responsibility involved in that relationship? But where is such a code to be found?

THE IDEAL OF SERVICE

Something more than a common technique and a common occupation is evidently needed in order that an ethical code shall result. We might apply here the significant and much misunderstood comparison which Rousseau drew between the "will of all" and the "general will." In business we have as yet only the "will of all," the activity of businessmen, each in pursuit of his own success, not overridden though doubtless tempered by the "general will," the activity which seeks first the common interest. The latter can be realized only when the ideal of service controls the ideal of profits. We do not mean that businessmen are in fact selfish while professional men are altruistic. We mean simply that the *ideal of the unity of service* which business renders is not yet explicitly recognized and proclaimed by itself. It is otherwise with the professions. They assume an obligation and an oath of service. "A profession," says the ethical code of the American Medical Association, "has for its prime object the service it can render to humanity; reward or financial gain should be a subordinate consideration," and again it proclaims that the principles laid down for the guidance of the profession "are primarily for the good of the public." Similar statements are contained in the codes of the other distinctively organized professions. "The profession," says the proposed code of the Canadian legal profession, "is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting occupation." Such professions as teaching, the ministry, the civil service, and social work by their very nature imply like conceptions of responsibility. They imply that while the profession is of necessity a means of livelihood or of financial reward, the devoted service which it inspires is motivated by other considerations.

In business there is one particular difficulty retarding any like development of unity and responsibility. It may safely be said that so long as within the industrial world the cleavage of interest between capital and labor, employer and employee, retains its present character, business cannot assume the aspect of a profession. This internal strife reveals a fundamental conflict of acquisitive interests within the business world and not only stresses that interest in both parties to the struggle but makes it impossible for the intrinsic "professional" interest to prevail. The professions are in general saved from that confusion. Within the profession there is not, as a rule, the situation where one group habitually employs for gain another group whose function, economic interest, and social position are entirely distinct from its own. The professions have thus been better able to adjust the particular interests of their members to their common interest and so to attain a clearer sense of their relationship to the whole community.

Once that position is attained the problem of occupational conduct takes a new form. It was stated clearly long enough ago by Plato in the *Republic*. Each "art," he pointed out, has a special good or service. "Medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on. . . . Medicine is not the art—or profession—of receiving pay because a man takes fees while he is engaged in healing. . . .

The pay is not derived by the several 'artists' from their respective 'arts.' But the truth is, that while the 'art' of medicine gives health, and the 'art' of the builder builds a house, another 'art' attends them which is the 'art' of pay." The ethical problem of the profession, then, is to reconcile the two "arts," or, more generally, to fulfill as completely as possible the primary service for which it stands while securing the legitimate economic interest of its members. It is the attempt to effect this reconciliation, to find the due place of the intrinsic and of the extrinsic interest, which gives a profound social significance to professional codes of ethics.

STANDARDS COMMON, CODES DISTINCTIVE

The demarcation and integration of the profession is a necessary preliminary to the establishment of the code. Each profession becomes a functional group in a society whose tendency is to organize itself less and less in terms of territory or race or hereditary status, and more and more in terms of function. Each profession thus acquires its distinctive code. It is important to observe that what is distinctive is the code rather than the standard. The different codes of racial or national groups reveal variant ethical standards, but the different codes of professional groups represent rather the deliberate application of a generally accepted social standard to particular spheres of conduct. Medical ethics do not necessarily differ in quality or level from engineering ethics, nor the ethics of law or of statesmanship from those of architecture. The false old notion that there was for that most ancient and still most imperfectly defined profession of statesmanship a peculiar code which liberated it from the ordinary ethical standards has died very hard. In truth there could be no conflict of ethics and politics, for politics could justify itself only by applying to its own peculiar situations and needs the principles which belong equally to every sphere of life.

Ethics cannot be summed up in a series of inviolate rules or commandments which can be applied everywhere and always without regard to circumstances, thought of consequences, or comprehension of the ends to be attained. What is universal is the good in view, and ethical rules are but the generally approved ways of preserving it. The rules may clash with one another, and then the only way out is to look for guidance to the ideal. The physician may have to deceive his patient in order to save his life. The lawyer, the priest, and the physician may have to observe secrecy and keep confidences under conditions where it might be the layman's duty to divulge them, for the conception of the social welfare which should induce the one to speak out may equally in the peculiar professional relationship compel the other to silence. Every profession has its own problems of conduct, in the interpretation within its own province of the common principles of ethical conduct. The medical man to whom is entrusted, under conditions which usually admit of no appeal save to his own conscience, the safeguarding of the health of his patient, with due consideration for the health of the whole community, has to depend upon a special code applicable to that situation. So with the legal profession which, for example, has to provide professional service for all litigants, irrespective of the popularity or unpopularity of the cause. So with the architect, who has to determine his responsibility alike to the client, to the contractor, to the workmen, to the "quantity surveyor," and to the community. So with the university professor, who has to uphold the necessity of academic freedom against the pressure of prejudice and the domination of controlling interests which care less for truth than for their own success. So with the journalist, in his peculiarly difficult situation as the servant of a propagandist press. So with the engineer, the surveyor, the accountant, or the technician generally, who has to maintain standards of service and of efficiency against the bias of profit making. So with the manager, the secretary, or the officer of a corporation—for here business assumes most nearly the aspect of a profession—who has to reconcile the trust imposed on him by his employers with the duty he owes to himself and to those whose services he in turn controls. Out of such situations develop the written and the unwritten codes of professional ethics.

RESPONSIBILITY TO THE WIDER COMMUNITY

We need not assume that these codes originate from altruistic motives, nor yet condemn them because they protect the interest of the profession itself as well as the various interests which it serves. To do so would be to misunderstand the nature of any code. An ethical code is something more than the prescription of the duty of an individual towards others; in that very act it prescribes their duty towards him and makes his welfare too its aim, refuting the false disassociation of the individual and the social. But the general ethical code prescribes simply the duties of the members of a community towards one another. What gives the professional code its peculiar significance is that it prescribes also the duties of the members of a whole group towards those outside the group. It is just here that in the past ethical theory and practice alike have shown the greatest weakness. The group code has narrowed the sense of responsibility by refusing to admit the application of its principles beyond the group. Thereby it has weakened its own logic and its sanction, most notably in the case of national groups, which have refused to apply or even to relate their internal codes to the international world. The attempt of professional groups to co-ordinate their responsibilities, relating at once the individual to the group and the group itself to the wider community, marks thus an important advance.

We must, however, admit that it is in this matter, in the relation of the profession *as a whole* to the community, that professional codes are still weakest and professional ethics least effectively developed. The service to the community they clearly envisage is the service rendered by individual members of the profession to members of the public. The possibility that there may still be an inclusive professional interest—generally but not always an economic one—that at significant points is not harmonized with the community interest is nowhere adequately recognized.

The problem of professional ethics, viewed as the task of co-ordinating responsibilities, of finding, as it were, a common center for the various circles of interest, wider and narrower, is full of difficulty and far from being completely solved. The magnitude and the social significance of this task appear if we analyze on the one hand the character of the professional interest and on the other the relation of that interest to the general welfare.

CHARACTER OF THE PROFESSIONAL INTEREST

The professional interest combines a number of elements. It includes what we may term the extrinsic interest, that devoted to the economic and social status, the reputation, authority, success, and emoluments attaching to the profession as a body. It includes also the technical interest directed to the

art and craft of the profession, to the maintenance and improvement of its standards of efficiency, to the quest for new and better methods and processes, and to the definition and promotion of the training considered requisite for the practice of the profession. It may also include a third interest which can be classed as cultural. To illustrate, in the profession of teaching the technical interest in the system of imparting knowledge is one thing, and the cultural interest in the knowledge imparted quite another. Even more obvious is the case of the minister of religion, whose technique of ministration is as a rule very simple and whose main interest lies in the significance of the doctrine. The distinction is clear also in the spheres of the sciences and of the fine arts where the interest in truth or beauty may be discerned from the interest in the modes of investigation or of expression. In other professions it may be harder to identify the cultural as distinct from the technical interest, but if we interpret the term "culture" widely enough to include, for example, such objects as health and the beauty of workmanship, it may be maintained that the cultural interest belongs to every profession and is in fact one of the criteria by which to determine whether or not a given occupation is to be classed as a profession.

Now these three strands of interest are usually interwoven in the general professional interest, but sometimes they are separated and subject to the pull of opposite forces. Thus while the technical and economic interests usually go together and while, for example, the maintenance of standards usually works towards the economic advantage of the profession, these may be unfortunately disjoined. Better technique may at points be antagonistic to professional gain. The lawyer may, to take one instance, lose a source of profits by the introduction of a simpler and more efficient system of conveyancing. The architect, working on a percentage basis, may find his pecuniary advantage at variance with his professional duty to secure the best service for the least cost. Likewise, opposition may arise between the economic and the cultural interest. The teacher and the preacher may suffer loss from a wholehearted devotion to the spirit of truth as they conceive it. The artist, the playwright, the author, may have to choose between the ideals of their art and the more lucrative devices of popularity. Finally, the technical and the cultural interest may work apart. Routine methods and processes may dominate the professional mind to the obscuration of the ends which they should serve. A notable statement of this opposition is given in the valuable investigation into professional organization in England which was published in two supplements of the *New Statesman*.[1] The investigation points to "the undisguised contempt in which both solicitors and barristers, notably those who have attained success in their profession and control its organization, hold, and have always held, not only all scholarship or academic learning of a professional kind, but also any theoretic or philosophical or scientific treatment of law."

Here, therefore, in the structure of the general professional interest we find a rich mine of ethical problems, still for the most part unworked but into which the growing ethical codes of the professions are commencing to delve. A still greater wealth of the material for ethical reflection is revealed when we turn next to analyze the relation of the professional interest as a whole to that of the community.

[1] April 21 and 28, 1917.

PROFESSIONAL INTEREST AND GENERAL WELFARE

Every organized profession avows itself to be an association existing primarily to fulfill a definite service within the community. Some codes distinguish elaborately between the various types of obligation incumbent on the members of the profession. The lawyer, for example, is declared to have specific duties to his client, to the public, to the court or to the law, to his professional brethren, and to himself. It would occupy too much space to consider the interactions, harmonies, and potential conflicts of such various duties. Perhaps the least satisfactory reconciliation is that relating the interest of the client to the interest of the public, not merely in the consideration of the particular cases as they arise but still more in the adaptation of the service to the needs of the public as a whole as distinct from those of the individual clients. Thus the medical profession has incurred to many minds a serious liability, in spite of the devotion of its service to actual patients, by its failure for so long to apply the preventive side of medicine, in particular to suggest ways and means for the prevention of the needless loss of life and health and happiness caused by the general medical ignorance and helplessness of the poor.

In addition it must suffice to show that the conception of communal service is apt to be obscured alike by the general and by the specific bias of the profession. It is to the general bias that we should attribute such attempts to maintain a vested interest as may be found in the undue restriction of entrants to the profession—undue when determined by such professionally irrelevant considerations as high fees and expensive licenses; in the resistance to specialization, whether of tasks or of men, the former corresponding to the resistance to "dilution" in the trade union field; in the insistence on a too narrow orthodoxy, which would debar from professional practice men trained in a different school; in the unnecessary multiplication of tasks, of which a flagrant example is the English severance of barrister and solicitor. Another aspect of the general bias is found in the shuffling of responsibility under the cloak of the code. This is most marked in the public services, particularly the civil service and the army and navy—and incidentally it may be noted that the problem of professional ethics is aggravated when the profession as a whole is in the employ of the state. "An official," says Émile Faguet in one of his ruthless criticisms of officialdom,[2] "is a man whose first and almost only duty is to have no will of his own."

DANGER OF SPECIFIC GROUP BIAS

This last case brings us near to what we have called the specific bias of the profession. Each profession has a limited field, a special environment, a group psychology. Each profession tends to leave its distinctive stamp upon a man, so that it is easier in general to distinguish, say, the doctor and the priest, the teacher and the judge, the writer and the man of science, than it is to discern, outside their work, the electrician from the railwayman or the plumber from the machinist. The group environment creates a group bias. The man of law develops his respect for property at the risk of his respect for personal rights. The teacher is apt to make his teaching an overnarrow discipline. The priest is apt to underestimate the costs of the maintenance of sanctity. The diplomat may overvalue good form and neglect the

[2] *The Dread of Responsibility* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914).

penalty of exclusiveness. The civil servant may make a fetish of the principle of seniority, and the soldier may interpret morality as mere *esprit de corps*.

All this, however, is merely to say that group ethics will not by themselves suffice for the guidance of the group unless they are always related to the ethical standards of the whole community. This fact has a bearing on the question of the limits of professional self-government, though we cannot discuss that here. Professional group codes are, as a matter of fact, never isolated, and thus they are saved from the narrowness and egotism characteristic of racial group ethics. Their dangers are far more easily controlled, and their services to society, the motive underlying all codes, vastly outweigh what risks they bring. They provide a support for ethical conduct less diffused than that inspired by nationality, less exclusive than that derived from the sense of class, and less instinctive than that begotten of the family. As they grow they witness to the differentiation of community. Their growth is part of the movement by which the fulfillment of function is substituted as a social force for the tradition of birth or race, by which the activity of service supersedes the passivity of station. For all their present imperfections these codes breathe the inspiration of service instead of the inspiration of mere myth or memory. As traditional and authoritative ethics weaken in the social process, the ethics formulated in the light of function bring to the general standard of the community a continuous and creative reinforcement.

Robert M. MacIver, D.Ph., LL.D., Litt.D., D.Sc., L.H.D., Palisades, New York, former Lieber professor of political philosophy and sociology at Columbia University (1929–50), professor of political science, Barnard College (1927–36), professor of political science at the University of Toronto (1915–27), has written extensively in the field of sociology. Among his many publications are Society—Its Structure and Changes (1931), Society—A Textbook of Sociology (1937), Leviathan and the People (1939), Social Causation (1942), and Democracy and the Economic Challenge (1952).

Book Department

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT 125
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY 129
ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY 138
SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION 143
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 153
SPECIAL TOPICS ABROAD
- COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 163
- SLAVIC COUNTRIES 168
- WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 170
- OTHER COUNTRIES 175

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 183
OTHER BOOKS 184

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

KENNAN, GEORGE F. *Realities of American Foreign Policy.* (The Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton University, 1954.) Pp. ix, 120. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. $2.75.

This is a notable little book with a big moral lesson for us all in these days: let the American example rather than reliance on international constructs of the law or preachment to others be the rule of our foreign policy.

"Let us face it," says George Kennan in these Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton: "in most international differences elements of right and wrong, comparable to those which prevail in personal relationships, are —if they exist at all—simply not discernible to the outsider." What then are the realities of international life as contrasted with the political moralities of the so-called American mission? They are, as Mr. Kennan sees them: (1) an utter lack of uniformity in the degree to which the various component parts of the free world have advanced along the path of civilization, (2) the population revolution of our times, (3) the technological revolution, (4) the fact that in international affairs we deal with governments not peoples, and cannot deal with governments, particularly in democratic countries, without affecting the opposition factors that may someday constitute a successful government.

These realities defy moral formulas and political devices. We cannot cope with them merely by measures of multilateral mesmerism (like the "fantastic" Kellogg-Briand Pact) for the arrangement of peace. Nor can we make other people like us by a one-sided largess. What we need to do is not to make them like us but cause them to respect us. The best way to do that is to practice on ourselves what we preach to others, or better still not to preach at all but "to conduct ourselves in our capacity as a member of the world community so as to enhance the chances for the preservation of the values we cherish here at home."

Mr. Kennan lays down some specific suggestion for measures of self-control—reflecting the philosophy of the New Deal —that will help win respect throughout the world, such as: (1) a change in psychology and practice from an exclusive to a receptive nation: this means lowering tariff and immigration bars, a thousand times more it means removal of barriers to the mind and spirit; (2) conservation and development of our natural resources and beauty; (3) municipal and regional plan-

ning to do away with "blighted areas, filthy streets, community demoralization, chaotic traffic conditions, and utter disregard for esthetic and recreational values in urban development."

As to the overbearing problem of Soviet power, Mr. Kennan abjures any thought of preventive war. He still believes in a policy of containment, not denying the possibility of massive retaliation in case Russia starts a major war.

SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS
Yale University

NORTHROP, F. S. C. *European Union and United States Foreign Policy.* Pp. 230. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $4.75.

The celebrated Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law of Yale University has given us another book on international politics. The first chapter is entitled fittingly: "A Remarkable Phenomenon." The entire book is a remarkable phenomenon: The continuum of philosophical contemplation and sociological jurisprudence is enlivened—frequently at the most unexpected places—by copious quotations from the *New York Times,* the London *Economist,* and political campaign literature, statistical tables such as the one captioned suggestively "Comparative Quantitative Living Law of the Continental European Community in Percentage of Popular Vote and of Seats in the Lower House of Parliament," and slashing attacks on the Republican Party.

Professor Northrop's analysis centers upon the indisputable division of Europe's population into Protestants and Catholics. His thesis may be construed as follows: Protestants are less ready than Catholics to yield up national sovereignty to a supranational authority; the Council of Europe is not by a long shot close to being a supranational government because its Protestant member states, Britain and the Scandinavian states, cannot follow the Catholic ones, West Germany and Italy, into taking the final plunge which the latter have suggested; France is poised in animated suspension between her Catholic and her Cartesian–Rationalist tradition; and European Defense Community could have made a go of it because its member states would have been predominantly Catholic. Hardly anyone will quarrel with these views. They are sensible; they are limited, however, to the cultural element—"religious and secular living law" in the author's terminology—in European relations. They do not account for economic and strategic developments and their psychological consequences that have worked against European unification and have contributed more decisively to the wrecking of EDC than the Catholic-Protestant bias.

Professor Northrop makes a good case for the contention that Europeans are too particularistic and too conscious of their historical divisions to unite politically. He then proceeds to disregard his case and to place the blame for the failure of European unity not upon the Europeans, but upon an alien villain. That villain is the Republican conspiracy. It is what President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and Senators Knowland, Wiley, and McCarthy have done as well as what they failed to do and especially what they said that: (a) wrecked Mr. Truman's and Mr. Acheson's noble schemes for Europe, and (b) angered and estranged our European allies. This is a remarkable discovery, albeit one not sustained by Professor Northrop's own sources. Reading through the back issues of the London *Economist* of 1951 and 1952, this reviewer came to the conclusion that it was European fear of involvement in the Korean War, Soviet nuclear weapons, and a shift in the emphasis of U. S. economic aid from butter to guns, proclaimed by Mr. Acheson, that caused American-European tensions. If to these fears are added the hopes engendered by the post-Stalinist "New Look," then any conceivable subsequent errors on the part of United States policy can only have had a minor share in American-European misunderstandings. The Republican Administration inherited from its predecessor vast commitments and ticklish problems and had to make choices none of which probably were to its liking. It came up with not a few happy solutions, despite a drastic reduction in budgetary appropriations. The Korean Armistice, South-East Asia Treaty Organization, the Iranian, Suez, and Trieste settlements, and the admission of Germany to North Atlantic Treaty Organization are no mere trifles, the fact notwithstanding that none of these achievements were foreseen by Professor Northrop. This does not mean that, by reversing Professor Northrop's polemic, Messrs. Truman and Acheson should now be denounced as dolts. It does mean that Professor Northrop's ominous forebodings were just a shade hasty and off the mark.

There is a crying need for the philosopher's counsel in making foreign policy decisions. But the connection between Dr. Northrop's partisan complaints and Neo-Platonism—which I understand Professor Northrop's philosophical position to be, although his terminology does stump me—appears contrived and tenuous. In any case, it is always a good idea to wait until the returns are in before sitting in judgment over those poor fellows who have to *make* foreign policy. Incidentally, the Stoics, to whom the author refers frequently, taught the virtue of restraint and prudence. The pools of learning, just like ordinary pools, manage sometimes to be agitated and opaque without being very deep.

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ
University of Pennsylvania

SCHIFFER, WALTER. *The Legal Community of Mankind: A Critical Analysis of the Modern Concept of World Organization.* Pp. x, 367. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $5.50.

This is a new look at old, much plowed ground, and an outstanding contribution to the fund of knowledge essential for the projected revision of the United Nations Charter. In a brilliant synthesis, drawing together the pertinent teachings of political theory, international law, and that new discipline, international organization, the author analyzes the basic ideas which were written into the Covenant of the League of Nations. He then proceeds to show how these ideas not only conflicted with each other, but likewise disregarded the realities of international politics. These realities the founders, in common with many workers for world peace, conveniently ignored. In the last chapter, the author points to similar defects in the United Nations Charter. He remarks that in contrast with the League's founders many authorities today, their hopes for the success of a loose international organization frustrated, now advocate the establishment of a veritable world government.

In the Covenant can be discerned a conceptual framework which is something of a *potpourri* of the teachings of Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff, Locke, Kant and the progressivist and positivist schools of thought of the nineteenth century. In the forefront of the ideas of 1919 was a belief that an effective international organization could be established without disturbing the existing system of sovereign independent states. Even bolder was the assumption that this organization could work even without substantial changes in the existing political conditions with which it would inevitably have to deal. There was likewise a naive expectancy that political interests would somehow disappear from the international scene; that common, unpolitical interests would ultimately unite the peoples into a peaceful, legally organized community. But, as Dr. Schiffer points out again and again, even with some redundancy, this really meant that the success of the League depended upon conditions which, had they existed, would have made the creation of that body unnecessary. In fact, the League was expected to bring about a state of harmony and goodwill which had to exist in the first place before the League could begin to function successfully. No way has yet been found out of this dilemma; in fact, the basic assumption upon which the United Nations was constructed at San Francisco, as submitted frankly by the representatives of the Great Powers, was that their wartime unity and harmony could continue indefinitely. We have all witnessed the tragic deterioration of the United Nations, especially since 1950, which has followed the breakdown of the ephemeral co-operation between East and West.

In 1919 the optimistic progressives, notably Wilson and Smuts, had great faith in the general reasonableness of statesmen, or at least in the peoples behind them. They anticipated that the relations between states

would evolve inevitably toward an era of peace because of the overpowering effect of reason inspired by goodwill. If, however, some state was tempted to act in an unsociable manner, even indulging in aggression, it was hoped that it could be brought back to reason by the force of world public opinion. Public opinion, however, could find effective expression only in states enjoying the blessings of self-government and democracy. Thus Wilson was quite logical in his view that only "self-governing" states should be permitted to join the League. True, not all the states were as yet democratic, but, encouraged no doubt by the creation after the war of so many new states with constitutions superficially free and democratic, the President confidently hoped that soon the democratic way of life would become universal. Russia being weak, and Germany and Italy still far from the time of Hitler and Mussolini, such hopes were not at the time completely fantastic. It should be added that the founders anticipated that reason and goodwill would not always triumph, for they provided for sanctions—obligatory economic and optional military sanctions. But, as Dr. Schiffer points out, and as was to be borne out by experience, the application of sanctions in a crisis itself depended upon the willingness of the members to meet their obligations, and there was no one there to police the policeman. *Quis custodiet custodes?*

At a period characterized by so much sophomoric thinking on problems of international organization—notably by extremists who would expel Soviet Russia from the United Nations, or, on the other hand, immediately establish a world federal state—this sober, mature, and realistic facing up to the basic unsolved difficulties standing in the way of organized peace is a most welcome and in fact an invaluable contribution.

JOHN B. WHITTON
Princeton University

MCNAIR, ARNOLD DUNCAN. *The Development of International Justice.* Pp. 34. New York: New York University Press, 1954. (Distributed by Oceania Publications.) $2.50.

This small volume contains the two lectures which the President of the International Court of Justice delivered in December 1953, at the Law Center of New York University. The first lecture deals with the development of international tribunals since the end of the eighteenth century. Like Judge Hudson, the speaker points to four landmarks in this development: the Jay Treaty of 1794, the Alabama Arbitration of 1872, the Hague Peace Conferences, and the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1922, followed now by the present International Court of Justice. He discusses the rule that only states can litigate before this Court; speaking of the frequent demand that individuals should get the right to bring a claim against a foreign government, the speaker stands against the right of an individual uncontrolled by this government to do so. Further remarks deal with the problem of *ad hoc* and national judges. The very frequent citation by the Court of its own previous decisions and of those of its predecessor is strongly underlined.

The second lecture deals with the development of international law. A strong believer in case law, the speaker sees in the accumulation of case law by this Court and other international tribunals as well as by national courts a most important contribution. He is rather skeptical toward the procedure of codification of international law by conventions, a procedure which has been disappointing and may be positively harmful; there is also little chance for the success of this method in this period of crisis and tensions. But he stands strongly for codification by "restatements" through scholars, not delegates of governments, and urges that the task, so excellently done for 1927–39 by the Harvard Law School Research in International Law, be continued.

Concluding, the speaker states that the development of international justice is not a panacea for all the troubles of the world, that it alone cannot guarantee peace. For a court of law has to give effect to *existing rights,* whereas the most serious conflicts between states involve the problem of *change* of the law. But lawyers have a special duty to perfect the rules of international law and the machinery for its administration.

JOSEF L. KUNZ
University of Toledo

WYNNER, EDITH. *World Federal Government. Why? What? How? In Maximum Terms.* Pp. 84. Afton, New York: Fedonat Press, 1954. $2.00.

"A dangerous affliction of the Western world is its addiction to minimum proposals" (p. 31). This is an overpriced tract—and tracts should never be overpriced—for world government "in maximum terms." It is well written, but always one must ask, is it designed to be effective beyond the converted? This reviewer wonders just how relevant is the subtitle: "Proposals for United Nations Charter Revision."

After stating that "success requires a far greater tactical flexibility then the bulk of the federalist movement has yet shown" (p. 71), the author proposes that the world constitutional convention provides the tactical flexibility in the struggle for world government. It is therefore no surprise that she states, "currently there is a dangerous tendency to put all the world government eggs into the basket of United Nations revisions, a tactic providing little in the way of public education on world government."

Pages 42–46 carry a summary maximum proposal—enough to scare off the lukewarm. But is it good strategy for the author to introduce this by saying it "contains sufficient excess baggage to permit some of it to be abandoned during the bargaining process" (with whom?) without specifying what she considers "excess baggage"?

RICHARD H. HEINDEL
University of Buffalo

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

HARRIS, LOUIS. *Is There a Republican Majority?* Pp. xvii, 231. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. $3.50.

The public opinion polls first became widely known in this country at the time of the 1936 presidential election. In that year, and in each election year since, the private polling organizations have published pre-election forecasts of the electoral decisions, based on samples of voters interviewed during the campaign period. For the most part, the reports of these polls have been confined to newspaper releases with the inevitable strictures regarding brevity and simplicity which such publication entails. The contribution to social science from these polls has not been great.

Now, however, one of the major polling organizations (Elmo Roper) has prepared a detailed statement of its data regarding the 1952 election. This volume, written by Mr. Louis Harris of the Roper staff, is concerned with an explanation of the factors which led to the Eisenhower victory. It is a book which students of political behavior will welcome and we may hope that additional monographs of this kind will be forthcoming from the polling agencies.

Mr. Harris has based the greater part of his analysis on the major demographic divisions which make up the electorate. He shows the candidate preferences of men and women, urban and suburban, white collar and union labor, Irish and German, Catholic and Jew, and a number of the other social aggregates which are customarily thought to have political significance. He identifies, partly on the basis of his polling data and partly on supposition, the issues which he believes moved these different groups. He describes certain changes which the Roper polls found in the attitudes of these groups as the campaign progressed.

These data are obviously of great interest. They bear on questions of great importance to scholars and practitioners alike. The answers they give puzzle this reviewer a great deal, however, since in many cases they flatly contradict comparable data gathered by him and his Survey Research Center associates at the time of the 1952 election. Consider these three findings in the Harris study: (1) Women swung more sharply to Eisenhower than did men. (2) Negroes voted in greater numbers in 1952 than in 1948. (3) Young voters gave

Stevenson a majority of their votes. None of these conclusions is supported by the Survey Research Center data and numerous other discrepancies appear which go far beyond sampling error.

The explanation of these differences is not altogether obvious. The two surveys used different methods of sampling; they also defined voters differently. It would require a very detailed analysis to determine why the discrepancies in the findings of the two surveys occurred. In the absence of such an analysis this reviewer advises all readers of survey reports to examine with a sharp eye the methodologies on which the data are based.

ANGUS CAMPBELL
University of Michigan

CONNALLY, TOM. *My Name Is Tom Connally.* As told to Alfred Steinberg. Pp. viii, 376. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. $5.00.

Tom Connally of Texas cut his eyeteeth on politics. He grew up in a household where it was served, as table talk, at every meal. He first ran for office, and was elected, at 25. He quit running, and being elected, at 75. He served in Congress for thirty-six years, twenty-four of them in the Senate. He was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee while this country fought its greatest war, while the United Nations was born, and while the cold war with Russia culminated in the hot war in Korea.

Now Tom Connally, at 77, has written an autobiography in the "as told to so-and-so" style made popular by the mass circulation magazines. It is a detailed account of Connally's life and of the great events in which he was a participant. It is replete with anecdotes that tend principally to emphasize the prowess of Connally as a political protagonist, but it adds little to what has already been published about those with whom he came in contact and the destinies they shaped.

There is a compelling charm in Connally's recollections of his Texas boyhood, of his strong-willed mother and his kindly, well-to-do farmer father who loved the old South and who doted on politics for its own sake.

There is much of self-revelation in Connally's estimates of the men with whom he worked and fought, estimates composed almost always more of derogation than of praise, even in the case of the two presidents, Roosevelt and Truman, to whose support he devoted the most important part of his political life.

His sharpest attack was directed against the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, whom he regarded as a Johnny-come-lately convert from the ranks of isolationism and whose popular acclaim he frankly resented.

His highest praise was reserved for Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov whom he found "an attractive man" and "one of the ablest diplomats I have ever known." This admiration betokened no softness toward Communism on Connally's part. It was just that he recognized in Molotov a man whose toughness of fibre matched his own.

It is regrettable that, despite the plenitude of anecdotes, the book does not convey adequately the essential flavor of Connally as a Senator, the dignity with which he wore the overlong white hair, black coat, and string tie that would have made most men look like caricatures of Senators; the mercilessness of his invective in debate; the terror he struck in those with less facile and embittered tongues. Perhaps there is no way to convey in print the contempt he could manifest when he referred to an antagonist as "the VERY distinguished Senator" and at the same time gestured with his hand, palm down, to indicate a man who stood only knee high.

Even so, none who reads the book will doubt that Connally is a man who rejoices in giving as good as he gets, and then some.

It is, on the whole, an enjoyable though not particularly informative book.

ROBERT ROTH
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin

PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN. *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court.* Pp. xi, 297. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. $5.00.

The book surveys the seven years of the Vinson Court, particularly from the point of view of civil liberties. Not only that, but the opinions of the judges are analyzed, as are the judges personally. An endeavor is made to classify them as liberal or conservative (restrained)—or liberal on some issues and restrained in others. Thus knowing the predilections of the individual judges from their past opinions and associations, one should have some guide as to how the individual judge or group of judges will decide a future case. The chances are you will guess wrong. The whole business is confusing. As a judge once remarked after hearing the plaintiff: "This Court has no desire to hear the defendant. To hear both sides has a tendency to confuse the Court."

For instance, several cases before the Vinson Court involved the question of whether "confessions" were voluntary. How much police pressure makes a confession involuntary? Ordinarily a man arrested is not inclined to open his heart to his prosecutor. He rarely does so if he has legal advice. Mr. Justice Jackson has said: "Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to the police under any circumstances." Why then should not the court hold that no "confession" is admissible unless the defendant first has had legal advice. Then we would be sure a confession was voluntary. Look at the instances where the young, poor, and helpless, particularly among the Negroes, "confess" in order to avoid police pressure, physical or otherwise. In the Trenton Six case, one of the defendants, implicating not himself but the others, turned to the police and said: "Now can I go home?" But the court tries to determine just how much pressure in the particular case renders the confession involuntary. The present method condemns the lawyerless, the ignorant, and the poor.

Unreasonable search and seizures? A Chinaman whose ostensible business is that of running a laundry, but who on the side handles narcotics, talks indiscreetly to a friend. The friend is "wired for sound" so that the defendant's words reach the ears of the police. Is this wiretapping? Or merely eavesdropping? A narcotics peddler, seized by the police, swallows the evidence. The police use a stomach pump. Is this an unreasonable search and seizure?

The Bill of Rights prohibits legislation abridging free speech. Does this apply to Communists engaged in "conspiracy," whatever that might mean? What is clear and present danger? Is the right to free speech an absolute? That depends on how you define free speech. Have you a right to yell "fire" in a theatre? Does that not depend on whether you think there is a fire?

Justices Black and Douglas have one point of view. Other judges differ. It all reminds me of Mr. Justice Holmes's dissent in a case of many years ago, where Mollie Abrams and others were sentenced to twenty years in jail for publishing a pamphlet which she "had as much right to publish as the Government has to publish the Constitution of the United States now vainly invoked by them." You cannot help feeling that Mollie Abrams was incarcerated because she was not a better lawyer than Mr. Justice Holmes. And so with all these divided decisions which make men free citizens or criminals. Time was when any indefinite law was held unconstitutional on the theory that no citizen should be in a position where he might "guess" himself into jail.

Mr. Pritchett's analysis of the decisions of the Court during the period when Mr. Vinson was Chief Justice, and particularly his charts indicating the groupings within the Court, highlight the uncertainty which prevailed in the field of civil liberties. Perhaps never before in our history has it been so important that there should be a reasonable measure of agreement on what actions by both state and federal authorities constitute violations of the guaranties of the Bill of Rights. We hope, therefore, that the Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren, will be able to develop a greater measure of unanimity in defining of what our liberties consist.

Certainly anyone who is engaged in dealing with these problems will find Mr. Pritchett's book invaluable as a guide.

ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS
New York City

PRICE, DON K. *Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy.* Pp. x, 203. New York: New York University Press, 1954. $3.75.

Since the end of World War II the U. S. Government has come into the position of assuming the responsibility, in large measure, for the support of nonmilitary science as well as military science. The justification for such a position is based, of course, upon the fact that in the world struggle for survival, we must see to it that we remain at all times as strong as possible in all departments, civilian science being near the top of the list. On this argument the government has taken over much of the responsibility for all science and has poured billions into it. There is no question but that, in terms of quantity at least, scientific output has greatly expanded under the forced-draft treatment. But as inevitably happens when any phase of human activity gets drawn into the orbit of big government, the benefits are accompanied by the loss of certain freedoms that have long been held to be essential to a healthy science.

Mr. Price addresses himself, in the broad sense, to the problem of arranging our affairs so that we can enjoy the benefits of governmental support in science and still not suffer too many attendant evils. In at least two ways, however, his book contains much more than a search for a solution to the immediate problem. First, because of his extensive personal experience in government-science administration, Mr. Price is able to throw a great deal of light upon the chain of events, the false starts and the pulling and hauling that have resulted, over the past decade or more, in the presently existing policies. Second, Mr. Price takes a novel approach in building up the background material in that he is as much interested in the effect of science upon government as in the reverse process. His point of view is that the near-infinite complexity of government has, to a large extent, been forced into being by the discoveries of science. There was a time when the services rendered by government were simple and largely nontechnical. The inspection of lighthouses, supervision of weights and measures, and other technical services formed but a short list. In recent decades, scientific developments have forced the government to establish huge organizations to give the required service and supervision in such areas as aeronautics, atomic energy, agriculture, highways, and power. Every new scientific advance forces further responsibilities upon the government and makes it grow bigger. The analysis of the interplay between science and government, equally in both directions, seemed, to the reviewer, to be one of the unique and interesting features of the book. As a source of much inside information and as a stimulating presentation, but with, understandably, no solution, the book is highly recommended.

Mr. Price, while with the Federal Bureau of the Budget, worked on the legislative plans for the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Science Foundation; he served as Deputy Chairman of the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense; he was with the Public Administration Clearing House, and is now Associate Director of the Ford Foundation.

H. R. CRANE
University of Michigan

MILLETT, JOHN D. *Management in the Public Service.* Pp. xi, 417. New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1954. $5.50.

The well-known and versatile author of this first of a two-volume work on the managerial and the political problems of public administration makes no apology for his concern with the mechanics of getting work done as contrasted with the substantive aspects of government policy and program. He regards the elected chief executive in our governmental system as much more than a chief administrator sharing, as he does, with the legislature and the judiciary the supervision and oversight of administrative agencies. Thus he chooses to deal with the problems of public management primarily at the department head or operating level.

In an introductory chapter, management is defined as "the process of directing and facilitating the work of people organized in formal groups to achieve a desired goal." Again, management is conceived as "a system of authority and responsibility in administrative effort." Attempting a somewhat more adequate formulation of the technical, as differentiated from the substantive, phases of management than Gulick's familiar POSDCORB, Millett proceeds to a consideration of the common problems of work direction, work operation, and internal services. The three major parts of the volume which follow are built around these tasks of management. The problems of work direction dealt with in Part I include leadership, planning, communication, supervision, and public relations. The problems of work operation, to which the author devotes approximately one half of the volume, include the traditional technical or auxiliary staff services, such as organization, budgeting, and personnel with the addition of a less common, though useful, treatment of legal service. The internal services of capital plant, supply, printing, transportation, communication, and records management are treated much more briefly in Part III.

A concluding chapter discusses the important and always provocative subject of the values or ends of management. The author, who uses "the quest for effective performance" as the subtitle of this volume, accepts efficiency as a relative or intermediate value, though he affirms it as "an absolute necessity for our national survival." Public administrators, he submits, must be charged with achieving effective performance while possessing an abiding faith in the higher and more fundamental values of satisfactory service, responsible performance, and good government.

Though there is nothing strikingly new in this book, Millett deals with familiar concepts and problems in a stimulating fashion, and adds substantially from his rich experience as teacher, researcher, and administrator to the reader's appreciation and grasp of the common tasks of public management as he defines them.

LLOYD M. SHORT
University of Minnesota

MARVICK, DWAINE. *Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Setting.* (Michigan Governmental Studies, No. 27.) Pp. viii, 150. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1954. $2.25 paper.

The author has undertaken in this study to find out to what degree agency goals are compatible with the interests of the persons engaged in conducting the administrative work of governmental bureaus. The study is based upon a survey, made in 1950, of the attitudes of some 200 professional and administrative persons engaged by a single federal agency (name not specified) in carrying on a research-evaluation program for the national defense establishment.

The persons in this agency were found to belong to three career types: "institutionalists"—civil or military service career persons; "specialists"—scientists, lawyers, engineers, accountants; and "hybrids"—both government service and specialty-group persons. These three types were further distinguished as "bureaucrats committed to a place, committed to a skill, or uncommitted to either."

Analyses were made of the career types (approximately seventy persons in each) which indicated that they did not differ markedly as to age, sex, or organizational distribution. But in other personal characteristics the types were significantly different. The institutionalists were predominantly military persons, few of whom had ever been employed by nongovernmental organizations, and only a small number of whom sought to improve their educational qualifications after coming to work for the government. The specialists and hybrids, on the other hand, were overwhelmingly civilian, with higher educational qualifications, heavier family responsibilities, wider experience with nongovernmental employers, and given to improving their educational status by going to night schools in Washington. Hybrids differed from specialists only in that they often had more experience in public employment and heavier family responsibilities.

The career plans of the three types were found to be markedly different. The institutionalists expected to work out their careers in government jobs, advancing for the most part to executive activities. The specialists looked forward to careers without executive activities, and cared little

whether they were employed by government or by private concerns. But the hybrids were more like the institutionalists in their career plans, despite the fact that in educational qualifications and job experience they resembled the specialists: they looked forward to careers in government service, and they expected to perform executive duties at some time.

From the standpoint of management, the institutionalists were regarded as being "place-bound and rule-oriented,"—the ideal type of bureaucrat, though they were thought to react diversely to official directives depending upon job conditions. The specialists were inclined to be indifferent to the material benefits and social life of the place where they worked, but they exhibited a degree of inflexibility respecting policy changes. The hybrids concentrated mainly on considerations of influence, advancement, and salary; they were given to calculating the personal advantages which could accrue to them through changes in agency goals and procedures.

In conclusion, the author emphasized that his study was quite limited inasmuch as the findings were based upon only a single federal agency and he indicated that further research was needed to determine career perspectives. The reverse side of the coin—the major administrative problem of the degree to which bureaucrats substitute their own ideas for announced government policies or fail to implement new executive directives—was not considered.

A. E. BUCK
Institute of Public Administration
New York

TAX INSTITUTE. *Federal-State-Local Tax Correlation:* Symposium conducted by the Tax Institute, December 3–4, 1953, Princeton. Pp. viii, 248. Princeton, N. J.: Tax Institute, 1954. $5.00.

The twenty-two participants in this Tax Institute symposium represent the academic, legal and accounting professions, private tax research organizations, and tax administration. The individual contributions are segregated into five parts dealing with background considerations, intergovernmental relations, federal and state aid, conflicts of jurisdiction and potentialities of co-operation. The result of the varied background of the contributors and the selection of topics considered is a singularly comprehensive and yet compact presentation of the historical, comparative, theoretical, practical, administrative, and political aspects of the problem of intergovernmental tax co-ordination. A bibliography and an index are included.

The book gives a forthright picture of the many and difficult problems involved in any program looking toward better fiscal co-ordination. No undue optimism pervades the work. Rather the road to reform, in the light of experience with the task, is viewed as long and arduous. There is no wide and smooth freeway such as separation of sources of revenue, or shared taxes, or tax credits, or tax deductibility, or tax supplements or grants-in-aid that leads easily and quickly to the promised land. Indeed the abiding conclusion of the symposium seems to be that only gradually and in modest degree are we likely to make progress toward the goal. Any overall solution, of whatever nature, is remote and therefore the immediate emphasis should be upon the reduction of administrative conflicts, although acceptance of this position in no way should discourage us from looking forward hopefully to the potentialities for good of special study agencies such as the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Nor should we discount the progress already made as in, for instance, exchange of audit information and the use of common allocation formulas.

The question may arise as to whether this volume is merely another plowing of well tilled ground. In part the answer would be yes in that there appears here a review of the nature of the problem, a portrayal of certain differing viewpoints upon it, and a consideration of familiar proposed approaches to a solution. But, on the other hand this work breathes with the vitality born of the long and close experience of its authors in the field. They have toiled therein. Their contributions are in perspective, are concise and realistic. They have come down to earth and have here done the kind of painstaking cultivation so essential to progress toward a better product.

MARVEL STOCKWELL
University of California
Los Angeles

JEFFERSON, THOMAS. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson.* Vol. IX: *November 1785 to 22 June 1786.* Edited by Julian P. Boyd and Mina R. Bryan. Pp. xxix, 669. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. $10.00.

The ninth volume of this historic edition covers the eight months from November 1785 to June 1786. For Jefferson this period had the nature of an interlude, following and preceding a number of great events. The troublesome problems that remained after the treaty with Britain cast their shadow repeatedly across the letters and diplomatic papers. Britain had not yet completed its transfer of military posts. The United States had not paid, and was not yet in a position to pay, the debts that were due to British creditors. On a short visit to London, Jefferson and Adams together explored these matters. But, while they met with some understanding among the merchants interested in Anglo-American trade, they found little encouragement and few well-wishers at the Court or in the Cabinet. Jefferson himself wrote a lengthy explanation of the debt problem to one of his own creditors, Alexander McCaul, and the letter (pp. 388–90) deserves study as a model of statesmanship, clarity, and tact.

Jefferson in Paris, like Adams in London, was making a determined effort to find new markets for American commerce. Much of the correspondence covers the negotiation of a trade treaty with Portugal and the attempt to expand the volume of trade with France. Entry into the Mediterranean was barred by the piracy of the Muslim powers along the Barbary Coast. In preliminary negotiations with these states, the United States discovered how much must be paid in order to buy them off. Jefferson and Adams exchanged letters which go into the relative expense of paying annual ransom, or equipping a small fleet to launch a punitive expedition "to the shores of Tripoli."

Many of these difficulties which beset this first generation of overseas American diplomats stemmed from the same source: to wit, the weakness and domestic discord of the thirteen States. Jefferson goes to great pains in reports to John Jay and in letters to such men as Madison and Monroe, to point out the embarrassments incurred abroad by the United States because of the lack of agreement on the home front. The varying practices of the States in regard to their debts, and the competitive commercial policies which certain States were pursuing *inter se,* made it wellnigh impossible to speak overseas with strength or conviction. The premonitory signs are already clear to the reader that the Articles of Confederation must be drastically overhauled because the authority which they permitted to the center was insufficient to the needs of the new nation.

LESLIE LIPSON
University of California
Berkeley

BLUMBERG, NATHAN B. *One-Party Press? Coverage of the 1952 Presidential Campaign in 35 Daily Newspapers.* Pp. viii, 91. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954. $2.50.

It is a commonplace that the United States has close to a one-party (Republican) press in editorial policy and that this Republican advantage has increased over the years until by 1952, support by circulation was only 10.88 per cent for Stevenson, who had no newspaper support in nine states, negligible support in eight big industrial states, and an editorial advantage over Eisenhower in only three states, all southern. Mr. Blumberg reviews the evidence on this situation, but his primary interest is not to measure editorial, but news support in terms of the column-inches of space given to the two chief candidates. He says that he wishes to leave "content analysis . . . to those whose interests lie in that direction." He selected a sample of thirty-five dailies, whose circulation is about 14 per cent of the daily total; and he studied them for the thirty days preceding the election. In general, less partiality was apparent in terms of space given the two candidates than many critics of the

behavior of the press had asserted. Mr. Blumberg's largely quantitative analysis is only occasionally supplemented in his sections on individual papers by qualitative judgments, such as "The Chicago *Tribune's* editorial preference ran through its news columns clearly and unmistakably." But the evidence for such judgments is not presented.

No disparagement of Mr. Blumberg's study is intended by this generalization: the definitive study of the partiality of the press remains to be made. His sample was very small. The thirty-day period in some instances distorted his results, for a visit by Eisenhower and Nixon to a state where neither Stevenson nor Sparkman appeared in the thirty-day interval naturally produced more space for the Republican candidates. Whether the author answers the question posed in his title will rest upon an answer to the question whether relative assignment of space is an adequate criterion of newspaper partiality—for any reasonably diligent reader of the papers knows that, given two news stories of the same length, equally illustrated with photographs, and both placed on the same page, one may be warm, personal, even affectionate, while the other can be condescending, cold, or even caustic in style and treatment. A study such as this, furthermore, will not reveal instances of the suppression of news items thought to be favorable to the candidate opposed by the publisher. Within these limitations, Mr. Blumberg's little book is a contribution to our knowledge of the press and American politics.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN
University of Colorado

JACOBS, WILBUR R. (Ed.). *Indians of the Southern Colonial Frontier: The Edmond Atkin Report and Plan of 1755.* Pp. vii–xxxviii, 108. Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1954. $5.00.

The development of an Indian policy in America has always been more or less a trial and error procedure. The Spanish, the French, and the English pursued different policies. Then came the United States policy which, east of the Mississippi River, was an adaptation of the English. West of the Mississippi, especially in the Southwest, the Spanish policy so firmly fixed afforded the basis for a superimposed English-United States policy. In the upper Mississippi valley, the French policy, the result of a century's activity, was a factor in determining the English policy after 1763. Here then is a reason for the publication of Dr. Jacob's interesting volume on Edmond Atkin, the first Southern superintendent, and his *Report and Plan of 1755.*

The well written and amply documented sketch of the life of Atkin (twenty-one pages) affords an excellent background for the *Report and Plan.* Atkin was born in England in 1707 and came to America with John Atkin "probably his brother" where they established a profitable trading concern. It was largely through this enterprise that Edmond Atkin came to local political prominence and finally the office of superintendent for the southern Indians.

While in England Atkin wrote the comprehensive document dealing with Indian affairs. *The Report* "to the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations" is a detailed account of the Indians of southeastern United States, as well as some consideration of Indians north of the Ohio River as they are concerned with the whole "western" Indian problem. This permitted the presentation of the French policy in dealing with Indians; it had to be understood, at least should have been understood, by the English in order to carry on the "French and Indian War." Atkin proposed plans to check the French after showing that they were not so successful through the establishment of forts as they were through their policies. His *Plan and Report* analyzed and proposed a revised Indian policy.

Military activities, trade, taxes, political relations, intoxicating liquor (always an Indian problem), trader jealousies, lack of integrity—and understanding—on the part of certain colonial governors, character of the Indians themselves, are but a few of the many subjects presented by Atkin who had a mind for minute details. His evaluation of the Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and lesser tribes is fair and generally accurate.

Dr. Jacobs who had access to a copy of the original *Report,* which is lost, has done a remarkable piece of research work. This volume should be read by every person who pretends to know the frontier and its Indian problems.

M. L. WARDELL
University of Oklahoma

HAFEN, LEROY, and ANN W. HAFEN. *Old Spanish Trail, Santa Fe to Los Angeles.* (Far West and the Rockies Historical Series, 1820–1875, Vol. I.) Pp. 377. Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1954. $9.50.

At long last the story of an important and historic Western trail, too long hidden in near oblivion, legend, and rumor, is now told.

We moderns, often preoccupied with the problems arising from the intricate character of our modern mass media of transportation, only occasionally are aware of the thin threads of communication and transportation which held provinces, colonies, and empires together in bygone days. The modern motorist speeds down U. S. 91 from south central Utah, through a corner of Arizona, and a slice of Nevada, into southern California and Los Angeles, little conscious that for miles he is following an important sector of an old trail laboriously worked out by plodding feet, both biped and quadruped, in the long ago.

For most of the Spanish-Mexican period of California, isolation was the word. Surrounded by deserts to the east and southeast, and by limitless stretches of ocean to the west and south, California's future was never full of promise until the coming of the Anglo-American and the opening of the Overland Trail in mid-nineteenth century.

The Old Spanish Trail was a tenuous link between two far-flung provinces of the Republic of Mexico (California and New Mexico), only lately independent of Spain. In existence less than two decades, it came to an abrupt end with the flood of overland travel coincidental to and following the Mexican War. Trail breaking by Kearny's Army of the West, and road building by the Mormon Battalion opened up the hitherto impossible southern route from Santa Fe to Los Angeles. Mormon settlement in the Great Basin and the following rush of humanity westward resulting from the Gold Rush in California opened up the central overland route, and the Old Spanish Trail was dead.

LeRoy and Ann Hafen, born and raised on the southwestern leg of the Trail (the only sector still paralleled by an important modern highway), are pre-eminently qualified to write this book both through training and long experience in the study and writing of Far Western history.

The story of the Trail, a narrow footpath extending in a great arc northwest from Santa Fe and then southwest to Los Angeles, is told against the background of half a continent and several centuries of time. It does seem that more than occasionally the book drifts far afield from the Old Spanish Trail, when it chronicles in some detail the subsequent lives and careers of those who passed over the Trail to California and later became prominent Anglo-Saxon citizens of that province and state. There are several other areas where the subject matter is of only casual interest to the Trail. On the other hand, there are many interesting features of the book —the descriptions of the terminal towns, Santa Fe and Los Angeles, interspersed with accounts of contemporary observers of more than a century ago, are particularly interesting, especially for those familiar with the modern counterparts of those cities. The chapters dealing with the Mountain Men and explorers constitutes almost a capsule history of the presettlement period of the Rockies and Spanish Southwest.

This book is advertised as the first in a fifteen-volume series under the general title, "The Far West and the Rockies." The Hafens are to be congratulated for such an excellent start for their series, and the Arthur H. Clark Company for its usual excellence in the bookmaking art.

A. R. MORTENSEN
Utah State Historical Society

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

BAKKE, E. WIGHT, et al. *Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity.* Preface by Paul Webbink. Pp. vii, 118. Published jointly by the Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1954. $3.50.

One of the outstanding features of our society is the free movement of labor among jobs, industries, employers, and geographic areas. The voluntary movement of workers has had a profound impact upon the progress and stability of the American economy. It also has affected other institutions including the family, church, government, and education. Until recently most of the literature on labor mobility has been either of a polemical or speculative nature. Only a few miscellaneous facts were known.

With the establishment of university industrial relation centers, a start was made on empirical research in several local labor markets. The work is being co-ordinated and stimulated by the Committee on Labor Market Research of the Social Science Research Council which has sponsored this collection of essays. The contributors to this volume are members of the Committee and all have been engaged in basic research on the behavior of labor markets.

Based largely on census data and the literature pertaining to labor markets, Philip M. Hauser provides a conceptual and statistical background for the interpretation of the other essays. His chapter is followed by reports by Gladys L. Palmer, Charles A. Myers, and Dale Yoder on the methods of analysis and principal findings of the field studies on local labor markets undertaken at the University of Pennsylvania, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of Minnesota. Impediments to labor mobility are discussed by Clark Kerr in his chapter on "The Balkanization of Labor Markets." In the essay introducing the book, E. Wight Bakke indicates the significance of labor mobility and its relationship to our present economic, political, and social institutions. While recognizing the possibilities of uneconomic labor turnover, Miss Palmer, in the concluding essay, shows that labor mobility is essential to economic opportunity and the effective utilization of manpower in prosperity and depression as well as in war and peace.

The findings of these authorities indicate that the traditional hypotheses of economists are misleading in assuming that net differences in economic advantages, chiefly wages, are the main causes of labor mobility. While certain of the individual conclusions in the essays are in conflict, such as the importance of economic considerations in job changes, and there remain large gaps in our knowledge, these objective studies, which take into consideration social, psychological, and institutional as well as economic aspects, will result in a better understanding of the labor market. This small volume is an example of heuristic research of an interdisciplinary nature making use of empirical and deductive techniques. Both the layman and specialist will profit from reading it.

MELVIN J. SEGAL
Michigan State College

WALRAS, LÉON. *Elements of Pure Economics or the Theory of Social Wealth.* Translated by William Jaffé. Pp. 620. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin for the American Economic Association, and the Royal Economic Society, c. 1954. $7.50 List.

All economists will welcome Professor Jaffé's admirable translation of Walras, and political scientists will value the opportunity of examining the work and the point of view of perhaps the greatest architect of modern scientific economics.

Walras uncompromisingly maintains that the pure science of economics is concerned with the explanation of economic conduct and should have no policy implications. He therefore roundly rebukes Adam Smith for his assertion that political economy "proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign" (p. 52), but concedes that Ricardo and Malthus have more claim to scientific standing (p. 53). He is equally critical of the naturalistic viewpoint, such as that of J. B. Say, which attempted to show that a certain economic order was natural and therefore good (p. 54).

Despite his scientific self-consciousness, Walras was unable to construct a science that had no policy implications—for himself at least. For his construction of the general equilibrium system leads him directly to the conclusion: "Freedom procures, within certain limits, the maximum of utility; and since the factors which interfere with freedom are obstacles to the attainment of his maximum, they should, without exception, be eliminated as completely as possible" (p. 256).

The usefulness of a pure science of economics, in Walras' view, depends largely on those who use it:

> In any case the establishment sooner or later of economics as an exact science is no longer in our hands and need not concern us . . . less than a century has elapsed between the publication of Adam Smith's work and the contributions of Cournot, Gossen, Jevons, and myself. We were, therefore, at our post, and have performed our duty. If nineteenth-century France, which was the cradle of the new science, has completely ignored it, the fault lies in the idea, so bourgeois in its narrowness, of dividing education into two separate compartments: one turning out calculators with no knowledge whatsoever of sociology, philosophy, history, or economics; and the other cultivating men of letters devoid of any notion of mathematics. The twentieth century, which is not far off, will feel the need, even in France, of entrusting the social sciences to men of general culture who are accustomed to thinking both inductively and deductively and who are familiar with reason as well as experience. Then mathematical economics will rank with the mathematical sciences of astronomy and mechanics; and on that day justice will be done to our work (pp. 47–48).

One cannot but wonder whether Walras would feel that the twentieth century has fulfilled his hopes.

These matters are peripheral—but a brief review cannot begin to do justice to the general equilibrium system, of which most of us have previously read only brief desiccated versions. Bumbling classical errors such as those involved in the wages fund doctrine or the theory of rent are ruthlessly exposed by the Walrasian logic. Yet, somehow or other, one retains the opinion that Smith, Ricardo, and Mill, though innocent of mathematics, were very great men.

ARTHUR SMITHIES
Harvard University

BROWN, HARRISON. *The Challenge of Man's Future: An Inquiry Concerning the Condition of Man During the Years that Lie Ahead.* Pp. xii, 290. New York: Viking Press, 1954. $3.75.

Much of this book was written on an island, a fact that undoubtedly helped the author understand the earth's limits in a manner that seems to have been beyond many of the writers cited in his bibliography. He cites thirty-odd titles on resources and/or population published during the past ten years. Among these Dr. Brown's book is outstanding, and despite a certain smell of the lamp, in many ways the best.

He has entered a controversial field, winnowed out facts and probabilities from prejudices, hopes and dogmas, and put together a presentation that, at least to this reader, seems so reasonable that its general soundness can scarcely be questioned. Unlike earlier writers, who (though their readers have strangely missed the point) have been primarily concerned with technology, *or* population-resource ratios, *or* certain resources, Brown concerns himself with the totality of factors that are generally accepted as important: energy, natural resources, population dynamics, and socio-economic influences.

His extrapolations from these, made with impressive erudition and a plausibility that would probably be acceptable to most specialists, are an intellectual adventure couched in brilliant writing. He does not build a one-track road to Avernus. Neither does he provide a technological escalator to the Elysian Fields. He leaves this reader with the impression that the bets, if any, are on the black.

There are a few lapses. Dr. Brown has, for example, been somewhat misled on the degree of progress toward an oral contraceptive; and, while he points out that we still do not know how to cope with tropical soils, he reprints the fantastic estimate of

a billion untapped acres for tropical agriculture.

Most books on this subject have suffered from an elementalistic approach and lack of adequate field experience. Dr. Brown's structure is nonadditive and conceived in terms of dependent variables; while it gives little evidence of firsthand acquaintance with geographic and sociological factors, as a map of man-earth relationships the book has an unusually high degree of reliability. Strongly recommended from every point of view!

WILLIAM VOGT
Planned Parenthood Federation
of America

WELCH, FRANCIS X. (Ed.). *Preparing for the Public Utility Rate Case.* Pp. 323. Washington, D. C.: Public Utility Reports, 1954. No Price.

The avowed purpose of this volume by the research staff of Public Utility Reports, Inc. under the editorship of Francis X. Welch, Editor of *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, is to serve as a handbook and guide for the guidance of those concerned with public utility rate cases. It is addressed to public utility managerial officers, staff technicians and attorneys, public utility consultants, expert witnesses, protestants in rate cases and their counsel, and members and staff of public utility regulatory commissions. It is a "how to do it" volume based upon the experience of the editor and his staff in preparing, trying, and reporting cases before regulatory commissions.

Public utility rate cases are important matters—important to the managements, owners and employees of public utilities, to the users of their services, and to the public which must assume the responsibility of regulating utilities through legislators, regulatory commissions, and courts.

The thesis of the editor and his associates is that a rate case should be thoroughly prepared technically and with the proper information to the public and employees of why the rates should be adjusted as requested in the case. It should be competently tried with counsel, witnesses and testimony designed and correlated so as to present the utility company's case thoroughly and forcefully. It must be decided objectively by the commissions in the public interest. The record in the case should be adequate to serve as the basis of appeal to the courts if the case is decided by the regulatory commission contrary to what the parties in the cases believe to be the sound expression of the law. They express the view that, "good and sound practice thus comes to the aid of good and sound regulation."

The handbook takes the reader of its specialized chapters through the mechanics of preparing every aspect of the rate case from the time a decision is reached to embark upon this complex, expensive, and time-consuming venture until the decision and order of the regulatory bodies have been made.

The material in the volume is readily located through use of chapter headings and index. It is a useful addition to the literature of public utility management, law, and regulation.

G. LLOYD WILSON
University of Pennsylvania

STOCKING, GEORGE W. *Basing Point Pricing and Regional Development: A Case Study of the Iron and Steel Industry.* Pp. vii, 274. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954. $6.50.

This work began as a study of the effects on the economy of the South of the basing point pricing system in steel. As the author soon properly recognized, however, this problem could hardly be considered apart from the effects of the basing point system on the total United States economy, or without reference to important aspects of the steel industry other than its pricing system. In short, the book really deals with industrial organization and market structure in the steel industry with special reference to (1) pricing practices and (2) the South.

The author's conclusions are critical of the steel industry and of the basing point system. In this respect, he resembles a long line of distinguished economists, from Frank A. Fetter (*The Masquerade of Monopoly*, 1931) to Fritz Machlup (*The Basing-Point System*, 1949), who have attacked the basing point system as an instrument of collusive pricing and wasteful of resources. Stocking's book, like those of Machlup and Fetter, is addressed to the lay reader as well as the professional economist. Like his predecessors, Stocking tends to smack his lips over the evidences he finds of dark conspiracy and exploitation. But there are significant differences.

Those economists who have disagreed with the attack on the basing point system have not, generally speaking, been satisfied with the steel industry's performance; rather, they have argued that the trouble is more basic, and that the particular form of pricing used is of little importance. Stocking is more sympathetic with this position than was Fetter or Machlup. This is illustrated by the fact that Stocking does not agree with his predecessors' advocacy of *compulsory* f.o.b. mill pricing. Rather, Stocking favors the permission of freight absorption, so long as it is "nonconspiratorial," and so long as it does not tend to eliminate competition. Further, Stocking is much less sanguine in the view that a mere change in pricing rules will produce competitive prices, better resource allocation, and a fair deal for the South. But it should help.

The reviewer believes this to be the most effective, withal the most moderate, of the critical treatments of the steel industry's basing point system. The professional economist will find that the study embodies some new factual findings, based on Temporary National Economic Committee materials, as well as a careful sifting of the old voluminous evidence. Likewise, it contains a penetrating analysis of the complicated recent legal developments with respect to basing point pricing.

The layman with an intelligent interest in public economic policy and the professional economist will each find this a useful and stimulating work. Professor Stocking writes clearly and persuasively, but generally avoids the tendentiousness which has plagued so much work in this area.

GARDNER ACKLEY
University of Michigan

PRIMM, JAMES NEAL. *Economic Policy in the Development of a Western State, Missouri 1820–1860.* Pp. viii, 174. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $3.75.

Few studies have had a greater impact on generally accepted ideas than the publications of Oscar and Mary Handlin, *Commonwealth: Massachusetts, 1774–1861*, and Louis Hartz, *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860.* No one can any longer seriously suggest that the role of government in the United States prior to the Civil War followed Adam Smith's recommended policy of laissez-faire. The carefully documented experience in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania indicates that, at least in those two areas, the state played an active part in economic affairs. There was no adherence to any principle that made it improper *per se* for the state to engage directly in supplying economic goods and services needed by the people, while government aids to economic activities were so numerous as to be commonplace. Decision on the role the state should take in particular areas was largely determined by pragmatic considerations.

With the Handlins and Hartz studies as models, James Neal Primm has undertaken a similar analysis of Missouri. This was a happy choice. Located in the heart of the Mississippi Valley, Missouri drew its settlers from both the northern and southern areas farther east. Admitted as a state in 1820, Missouri thus provides a test of the extent to which the Pennsylvania-Massachusetts pattern may have been modified by a difference in the timing of settlement or the influence of the "frontier."

In general the results of the study confirm the fact that Missourians shared the same pragmatic attitude toward the role of government in economic life as their countrymen in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. The author notes, however, ". . . the development state policy in Missouri often diverged in concept and in detail from the experience of eastern states" (p. 124). These differences he ascribes, ". . . to Missouri's relative youth as a state, her remoteness from eastern centers of population and wealth, her smaller financial resources, and the comparatively wide dispersion of her population."

State action on economic questions did not begin in Missouri, for example, until a half century or more after both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had achieved their political independence. But the ink was hardly dry on the new state constitution in July 19, 1820, when agitation became strong for aid to the large debtor class which had been hit hard by the panic that had affected the whole country in 1819. Laws affording relief to debtors were passed which reflected popular opinion even though they were largely nullified later by court action.

There was strong sentiment for the establishment of a state bank—to the exclusion of private banks—which would be state owned and operated for the benefit of the people. A compromise was reached which provided half state and half public ownership of the bank stock, with management in the hands of elected officials. Missouri's active participation in "internal improvements" was delayed largely because of limited financial resources. Even so, there was some criticism of these activities, not on principle, but because Missouri had been too precipitate in following the lead of "old and wealthy states."

Primm's excellent monograph is a welcome addition to the literature on this general subject. It is hoped that it will inspire similar studies of other areas. It may be further hoped that scholars will be attracted to carry the analysis of the role of the state into the post-Civil War period, when national consideration appears to have shifted the emphasis from the state to the federal level.

HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON
Northwestern University

GATES, PAUL WALLACE. *Fifty Million Acres: Conflicts over Kansas Land Policy, 1854–1890.* Pp. xiii, 311. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. $4.50.

This scholarly monograph makes an important contribution to the history of the trans-Mississippi frontier and to the pioneer history of Kansas in particular. It suggests that similar studies of other states would be profitable in rounding out the story of how most of the great public domain of the United States was transferred to individual land holders, and in describing the tremendous social, economic, and political effects that followed from this step. In the rich iron ore region of northern Minnesota, for example, homesteaders, both bona fide and sometimes only hired squatters, were bought out by eastern iron and steel interests to the mutual profit of each.

In spite of the legend of homespun equality and democracy on the frontier, there were always to be found big men, privileged characters, little men, and paupers, living together just as they always have been everywhere in every age. Land speculators, both large and small, cattle kings, lumber monopolies, and mining corporations have sometimes jostled pioneer settlers, preempted vast natural resources, and at times run the frontier in their own way. This is well illustrated by Gates's volume.

During the last half of the nineteenth century, federal land policies in Kansas made life difficult for the common man who yearned to establish a farm home on the expanding frontier for himself and his family. The normal land laws dealing with the public domain did not apply to approximately half of all the land in Kansas because this was reserved for Indians. In these reservations the government tried to settle the Indians on farms to which it gave them title in fee simple, and then it sold the surplus privately.

The endeavor of man to secure riches without much labor, with the resultant corruption and political pressures, makes the story of land sales in Kansas a sordid one. Land speculators, both large and small, and railroad promoters, fairly or foully, secured grants to be sold to settlers. One of the worst examples was the attempt of the Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston Railroad to secure the 8,841,927 acre Osage Indian Reservation at a bonanza price, with most of the land to be exempt from taxes for years, and the usual provision for lands for schools omitted. A long, bitter struggle ensued, but resulted in the end of the policy of the Indian Office circumventing the Land Office, nullifying statutory laws governing the sale of lands in the public domain, and assisting speculators to get lands by making "treaties" with Indian tribes.

Railroad companies which tried to be just and reasonable did not escape the ire of squatters on their lands. The latter were often ignorant of the fact that federal land laws applied in Kansas to only half its area; in other cases, they knowingly occupied land only as speculators on a small scale. When the law clamped down, however, thousands of innocent home-seeking pioneers either left or tried to save their farms by borrowing at extortionate interest rates, in many cases only to be foreclosed after years of stark poverty.

Professor Gates has thrown new light on the entire agrarian story of the granger and populist movements of the period covered. Perhaps it is too much to expect in addition a paragraph or sentence here and there, dovetailing land history into the political, social, educational, and economic history of the period, and also to indicate how Kansas conditions compared with conditions elsewhere on the far-flung settlers' frontier. Such integration and broad interpretation, however, are seldom expected or found in monographs. The author's thorough and wide research, his lucid style, his ability "to resist the usurpation of particulars and penetrate to the catholicity of things" produced a book which yields both pleasure and profit to the reader.

A. T. VOLWILER
Ohio University

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

HSU, FRANCIS L. K. (Ed.). *Aspects of Culture and Personality: A Symposium.* Pp. xiii, 305. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954. $4.00.

Symposia based on interdisciplinary conferences of social scientists represent a current vogue in publishing. As usual in such cases, the papers in the present volume are presented along with a candid version of what transpired in discussion. The conference, called to deal with "Anthropology and Psychiatry," was sponsored in 1951 by the Wenner-Gren Foundation. As is also common in ventures of this sort, the contributions focus unevenly on the central topic.

Two themes in the conference record struck this reviewer as noteworthy. First is the very frank realization by the participants of difficulties inherent in interdisciplinary co-operation. In contrast to the ambitions of ten years ago, the present times seem to be marked by a much less sanguine attitude toward the possibilities of effective communication and continuity of theory between, say, anthropology and psychiatry. Perhaps enough of us now have tried what we preached to feel bewildered by the problems encountered. There is emerging a realization that it may not be worthwhile to press the struggle for collaboration beyond what comes naturally or grows out of an investigator's quite specific problem. Second, one notes in the conference (as well as in the meetings of learned societies) the implicit expectation that a discussant should look for weaknesses or shortcomings in the paper on which he has been asked to comment. Very shortly we may expect to have "discussion" acquire the same skewed negative meaning that "criticism" already enjoys. An especially shocking instance of the tendency is revealed by Jules Masserman. It is disturbing to witness this notable psychiatrist, who apparently also possesses competence in symbolic logic, destructively attack a paper in which anthropologist Jules Henry uses algebraic formulae to express the acquisition of certain emotional attitudes in socialization. "This sort of thing just isn't done," Masserman says in effect, quite oblivious to the value of adventuresome creativity in scientific endeavor.

National character, learning theory, Rorschachs of Chinese in Hawaii, the dynamics of culture in relation to the individual, next steps in culture and personality research, a cross-cultural definition of psychopathology, and Amish child rearing are some of the topics examined by such people as Ralph Linton, Thomas French, T. W. Richards, John Gillin, Clara Thompson, Manford H. Kuhn, O. H. Mowrer, and Louis Schneider.

JOHN J. HONIGMANN
University of North Carolina

CHESSMAN, CARYL. *Cell 2455-Death Row.* Pp. 361. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. $3.95.

Cell 2455-Death Row is not all that Chessman has written during the more than six years since he entered San Quentin's Condemned Row. Acting as his own attorney, though without legal training, he has written over a million words in connection with the appeals which have carried his case seven times through the California and federal appellate courts to the doors of the Supreme Court of the United States, but never inside those doors. He has won reprieve after reprieve while about fifty less resourceful men have walked by his cell to the gas chamber.

One can understand why a book written under these conditions would be spotty in quality. Some of it is strongly phrased and reads well. The first eleven pages, a description of the reactions of two men to their impending execution, have a tense and gripping power. There is plenty of lively material in the remainder of the book, but the author's account of the long series of burglaries, armed robberies, shooting matches with the police, and high-speed getaways in which he was involved makes the reader feel that he is watching a third-rate movie in which Chessman is producer, director, and leading man, and vastly admires himself in all three roles.

The professional reader would like to know what makes Chessman tick, but he will not find the answer in this book, unless by indirect inference. His life story would throw valuable light on those whose cause he says he is pleading, "the criminally damned and doomed," if one could be sure it is a truthful account. It is only natural that he denies the two particular crimes for which he was sentenced to death, for they are particularly repulsive and atrocious crimes. But that denial and the conceited and insincere tone of much of the book make one unsure of every word he writes about his crimes and their motivation.

Chessman is officially classified as a psychopath, a diagnosis he has characterized as "patently ridiculous" but which he appears in his book to accept. Certainly his involved plan, at age 19, to go to Germany and shoot Hitler was close to psychopathic, but it may easily be pure fiction. Indications that he is what we call a psychopath are found throughout the book: his early and sustained rebellion against authority, his egocentricity, his inability to profit by experience or to have genuine love for any other person, his overweening admiration of himself as having "diabolic cunning," "ruthless self-discipline," "inspired and deadly accuracy" with a gun, as a "character much too improbable for fiction," and so on. Most of all, he admires himself as one whom the "malignant gods" are determined to destroy.

Whether the State of California destroys this man in the gas chamber or not, the malignant gods of his own making have already done so. If he lives, it will be under two sentences of "life without possibility of parole," plus thirteen other long consecutive sentences, none of which will begin to run until the year 2009, when sentences previously imposed would be completed. There are eloquent and thoughtful passages in the closing chapter of *Cell 2455,* particularly those on page 353 in which he seems to me to come close to the secret of his tragic criminal career, that indicate a capacity, not yet developed, for writing of depth and distinction.

AUSTIN MACCORMICK
University of California
Berkeley

GRYGIER, TADEUSZ. *Oppression: A Study in Social and Criminal Psychology.* Foreword by Hermann Mannheim. Pp. xiv, 362. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954. $6.00.

The author of this monograph is not a professional criminologist: he is a very unusual clinical psychologist with experience as a governmental official in the Polish Embassy to the Komi Republic, a former inmate of a labor camp in Russia, and now a displaced person himself. Because of the author's wide background and learning, the book adds substantially to our criminological knowledge.

Oppression is a study of social psychology of the greatest interest in a field which probably in the future will be called clinical criminology, namely, the study and treatment of individual offenders. A study of oppression is basic for the practical worker in this field. All information obtained by clinical criminologists is met with the objection that the criminals *are* so, not becoming so. As an out-group they are met with emotional disapproval, and that which the clinical worker may see as the result of oppression (in the family, in approved schools, in prisons) is in the community mostly seen as constitutional wickedness. That long imprisonment has an influence on prisoners of war affecting their future behavior is a recognized fact, but no complete study is available. Even better material for the study of the influence of oppression could be found in the surviving inmates of the concentration camps. When Germany was just defeated, Grygier succeeded in crossing the German border. Through the United States Military Government of Bavaria, he got access to prisons and camps for a scientific study of Polish prisoners in Bavarian prisons and of Polish displaced persons (1) from concentration camps, (2) from former forced labor in industry, and (3) from forced labor in agriculture. As a result of the German policy in Poland the concentration camps contained Polish citizens who were not temperamentally different from other Poles. If when he saw them they were different they had been made so in the camps.

Personal data were examined for 181 prisoners and 4,100 individuals in DP camps. One hundred and two prisoners and 650 from the camps took an intelligence test. The more intelligent from the three "levels of oppression" mentioned and from the prisons, altogether 280 persons, took two personality tests. Thirty prisoners and 122 from the camps were included in equated samples.

The delinquents differed from the controls in the general direction of aggression and showed more concentrated forms of aggression. At the level of fantasy, a predominance of pessimism and feelings of inadequacy are found. The more oppressed subjects gave more extra-punitive responses. The concentration camp group showed a delinquency rate forty-five times higher than the less oppressed control group.

In the last chapter Mr. Grygier relates his results to the problems of war and international co-operation. The same personality structure is found in prejudiced and in oppressed people. His data are not sufficient to prove these last points, but we now "know that the similarities are striking enough to increase intolerance in both groups: if the oppressed could themselves remain tolerant, the oppressors would probably feel less need to persecute them" (p. 286).

The hypotheses that oppression tends to produce in the oppressed an extra-punitive attitude (i.e., greater readiness to put the blame on other people), that this is due to a defensive process, and that it leads to more aggression and what is called psychopathy and crime are strongly supported. From the reviewer's point of view these hypotheses are also supported by his own practical experience: lessening the oppression in an institution for psychopathics makes it easier to keep good order in the daily life, cuts down disciplinary problems, and is a better way to resocialization of the inmates than the ordinary prison atmosphere.

This book deserves to be widely read and used. The problems are so important that they ought to be taken up again in other cultural settings.

GEORG K. STÜRUP
Institution for Psychopathic Criminals
Herstedvester, Denmark

HARTER, D. LINCOLN and JOHN SULLIVAN. *Propaganda Handbook.* Pp. 440. Philadelphia: 20th Century Publishing Company, 1953. $5.00.

This book raises interesting questions, not so much about propaganda analysis as such, but rather, questions about the usefulness of superficially descriptive presentations of a subject that would seem to call for the most precise and exact formulations. A careful reading leads this reviewer to the inevitable conclusion that, on balance, more is obscured or confused by the author's presentation than is clarified.

The purpose of the book is "to analyze

propaganda movements through applying standard tests and asking penetrating questions." Admittedly some good questions are raised, and some interesting insights presented. It is in the inadequacies of the "standard tests" that the shortcomings become evident, and these shortcomings persist even when it is remembered that the volume is designed "for the student and the public, not for the expert in 'stimuli and response.'"

Basic to the volume is a battery of seventy-seven propaganda techniques, presented, it appears, as fundamentals in terms of which the art of propaganda may be analyzed. These include such categories as cloak of virtue, red herrings, purr words, history proves, window dressing, black and white contrast, ignoring, picturizing, theatrics—to name a few. The difficulty is that while four chapters are given to describing and illustrating the categories, definition is lacking that makes possible their systematic use. Criteria are not included that allow satisfactory differentiation of one man's "window dressing" from another's "glittering generality."

The authors do state that the basic list is "neither rigid nor all-inclusive." But if it is neither of these, and if, as they say, the techniques are different from each other but do overlap, it is hard to know just what in reality they represent, or what valid results are obtained from trying to apply them in the analysis of any assumed instance of propaganda.

The same descriptive approach in the subsequent chapters results in other confusions. Propaganda is defined as "any attempt to persuade persons to accept a point of view or to take a certain line of action." Education *is* propaganda by this definition, as the authors would agree. Yet on other pages there is reference to the "line between educational and propaganda material."

One is troubled, too, by such generalizations as "Propagandists are prone to follow the lead of the social sciences in making broad pronouncements about history and humanity which cannot be supported by inductive reasoning." And where is the evidence that "psychologists and sociologists themselves become psychopathic cases trying to make 'scientific analyses'" of human responses? It is disturbing when a book is larded with loose generalizations such as these. One is likewise disturbed by a book for the general reader that basically seems to rest on an assumption that one explains by naming. It is for these reasons that at the outset of this review the question was raised concerning the utility of a book that has such an approach, even admitting that its chapters individually do contain some interesting materials, and that it does call attention to the fact that there are problems of propaganda that call for analysis.

MALCOLM M. WILLEY
University of Minnesota

HANDLIN, OSCAR. *The American People in the Twentieth Century.* (Library of Congress Series in American Civilization.) Pp. x, 244. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $3.75.

This is a sequel to Mr. Handlin's *The Uprooted* for which he received a 1952 Pulitzer Prize. It is one of a series sponsored by the Library of Congress and because it is intended for popular consumption, academic impedimenta are largely dispensed with. Migrating peoples carry with them the cultures of their homelands, form associations for mutual aid, intermarry, and thus continue, even beyond the third and fourth generations, cultural values of their ancestors. The author thus finds in "ethnic antecedents" a key to group formations and struggles within American society. He knows his material thoroughly and has the imagination and literary skill to present an entertaining and instructive picture.

After sketching the groupings according to color, nationality, and religion, he follows them through the frustrations and conflicts of World War I, the restrictionist and Americanization movements, the prolonged depression, the New Deal ("offered a platform on which all 'minorities' could stand together," p. 203), fascist and Communist propaganda, new labor organization, and a decade of global war. He touches on many situations with a deft hand.

A critic, especially if he be a sociologist and an Old American, finds some points of criticism. The author covers so wide a subject in so small a space that his material is selective, his history impressionistic. His presentation is often onesided. Writing from the standpoint of his ethnic groups, he fails to give adequate representation to the views and activities of the average native American, too often selecting colorful examples and brash utterances of native extremists. The "Boston Brahmins" were not representative. He says: "immigration made American society fluid" (p. 7). Or was it already the most fluid in the world? Did the huge tide of 1900–14 render it more fluid during the 1930's? Was it a mere "assumption" in 1917 that "the United States was still joined by genealogy and culture" to Great Britain? The author should be the first to answer "Yes." Over three-fourths of the colonial population derived from Great Britain and northern Ireland; from them we derived our "ethnic antecedents." It was these principles of civil, political, and religious liberty plus our rich natural endowment that gave our society unusual social mobility, made America the promised land of the world's oppressed, and enabled it to turn millions of Europe's proletarians with socialistic and Communistic ideologies into property owners devoted to many of those same antecedents.

Were the aliens "completely loyal" during World War I (p. 148)? Was there no plain common sense back of restrictionism, and is continued restriction based solely on "prejudices" (pp. 208–9)? Recall those studies showing no increase in the purchasing power of an hour of labor from 1882 to 1914. The immigrant was undercutting his own market. Did restriction become "an expensive luxury" during World War II? Or was it a godsent opportunity to raise the standards of living of the previous immigrant hosts and their children?

Finally, the title is far broader than the content. This is really a work on American minority groups. Written on a chronological base, it does not replace the sociological studies of these same ethnic elements. However, Professor Handlin's approach is valuable, and one may hope he will persist in further studies along this line. The America of today is far different from that of 1900. It is quite possibly even more dynamic; it certainly has made great advances in science, technology, the fine arts, and democratic equality. Much of the whys and wherefores of these changes still need unraveling.

FRANK H. HANKINS
Smith College

COLE, STEWART G. and MILDRED WIESE COLE. *Minorities and the American Promise: The Conflict of Principle and Practice.* Pp. xiv, 319. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. $4.50.

Stewart G. Cole is an experienced practitioner in the fields of intergroup relations and adult education. In this volume, he and his wife have provided a compact summary of majority-minority relations in the United States today, placed these relations in the moral framework of the American creed, and offered suggestions for bringing creed and deed together.

There are several aspects of the study which are particularly commendable, though these aspects are not exploited to full advantage. The Coles wisely devote a chapter to the local community setting of intergroup relations and show a healthy awareness of the role of social class factors in this setting. Nevertheless, the use of social class materials from the research literature is far from sophisticated, and several opportunities for delineating the subtle *interplay* of class and ethnic factors are missed.

The authors are on sound ground in inserting a section on the "philosophy" of intergroup relations in which the social-structural goals of Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and cultural pluralism are evaluated. This is an area of analysis which is crucial both to strategy in the battle against discrimination and prejudice and to fruitful research, and its comparative neglect by both practitioners and social scientists is costly. The Coles reject all three of these "philosophies" and go on to support a fourth called "dynamic democracy" which, in their words, "conserves the best elements of the melting pot and cultural pluralism." This reviewer approached the chapter (VII) which was to describe this synthesis with considerable interest, since he has been concerned in a

recent publication with the same problem. Regrettably, most of what he could glean from the Coles's discussion was a set of indisputable moral homilies on the need for a balance between "human freedom" and "social responsibility." The central problem-area of social structure (intermarriage, cliques, community organization, institutional affiliation) was bypassed.

While in its most ambitious areas the volume under review may not have wholly succeeded, at least it has raised some of the right questions. Moreover, as a summary for the layman of the setting of intergroup relations and of recent pertinent developments in such areas as employment, housing, religion, and education, the general worth of the study is considerable. The book would be particularly valuable in the hands of interested nonspecialists and members of adult study groups who want recent information about intergroup relations in a volume of modest size written in nontechnical language.

MILTON M. GORDON
Haverford College

KIGER, JOSEPH C. *Operating Principles of the Larger Foundations*. Pp. 151. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1954. $2.50.

Dr. Kiger's idea of examining material revealing the intellectual processes of foundation trustees and officers to determine whether he could identify certain principles which had guided and were guiding foundation operation was a good one. There is need for studies which take a comprehensive view of foundations. The student of foundations and their impact on our society is too often confronted with the absence of adequate source material.

This book has given the public access to many significant portions of the voluminous and enlightening records of the Select (Cox) Committee to Investigate Foundations appointed by the 82nd Congress. The availability of this material is especially significant in view of the fact that these records have been, for over a year, consigned to the Select (Reece) Committee to Investigate Foundations appointed by the 83rd Congress. In fact, the records were only fully accessible to the public during the early part of 1953 when they were housed in the Library of Congress.

The wealth of foundation material which it was Dr. Kiger's privilege to examine as Research Director for the Cox Committee prompted his interest. Under a commission from the Russell Sage Foundation, he delved into earlier foundation studies and into the published reports of the major foundations. The result is that he has pulled together for the first time materials from a wide range of the best sources bearing upon the characteristics of America's major foundations.

His findings contain explanations for the motivation of foundations. It is a picture of diversity in both structure and function—including all types of legal structure, various methods of selecting officials and exercising administrative control, differing patterns of grant making; a functional emphasis on using foundation resources as the venture capital of philanthropy; determination to safeguard freedom of action, both for themselves and the recipients of their grants; and, finally, recognition of responsibility to make an accounting to the public.

The work is fully documented throughout and will, therefore, lead the reader to other sources from which he might obtain greater detail on a segment of especial interest to him.

WILMER SHIELDS RICH
American Foundations Information
Service of Raymond Rich Associates

WORCESTER, DAISY LEE WORTHINGTON. *Grim the Battles*. Pp. 410. New York: Exposition Press, 1954. $4.00.

American social workers in 1955 do not usually identify their professional responsibilities by using the words "grim" and "battle," but at the time Vassar graduate Daisy Lee Worthington began her career in 1907 these terms were eminently descriptive. As a young and inexperienced social worker, teamed with her future husband, Wood F. Worcester, she was thrown into the grim battle of child labor in the southern cotton mills as an investigator for the Commissioner of Labor. From then until she paused to publish the semi-autobiographical account of her life's war against poverty in America, she seems to have fought with vigor and tenacity to "mitigate some of [the economic system's] harsher effects" on human beings.

Her emotion-charged book presents a readable and often thrilling description of her efforts to aid the victims of "industry's ruthless course," of private charity's "blind move to [the] disaster" of depression collapse, and the wreckage left by the self-interest of "antisocial doctors." Mrs. Worcester's literary theme and her life's focus is summed up in her final paragraph when she says, "I believe that this is the only effective challenge to Communism—the unequivocal promise of a great nation to work for the abolition of hunger within its own boundaries, thereby giving to the world an example of a people that can have freedom from want in conjunction with all other freedoms."

Her account exudes an aura of crusade and reform which should have a salutary influence on 1955's corps of sophisticated, highly-trained social work technicians. It probably will not convince all of them that Mrs. Worthington's emphasis on the "abolition of hunger" really mirrors the vitality of social work. Some may question the justice of her condemnation of private charity for its depression failure and her open cynicism of mental hygiene. Many certainly will not accept her conception of the "conflicting ancestral strains" of governmental welfare services and voluntary social work. Nor will all agree that the effect of the Community Chest movement has been to "retard rather than hasten progress."

Most readers probably will join in saying, however, that this book contributes a much needed touch of old-fashioned zeal to the literature of social work, and that Mrs. Worcester's story should be required reading for any who have forgotten that hunger does indeed destroy what democracy strives to preserve. If the war against poverty ever does wane in America, this account of former days and old battles may well serve to spark a new attack on a new front by a new generation of crusaders.

A. DAVID BOUTERSE
Pennsylvania Citizens Association
for Health and Welfare

BOND, FLOYD A., et al. *Our Needy Aged*. Pp. xxx, 401. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954. $4.50.

This is one of a growing number of solid, factual books about older people in America. It reports a co-operative study made by six members of the faculty of Pomona College, of the departments of economics, sociology, and government. There are four major sections: a survey by interviews with a sample of the older people of California, a description and analysis of the development and present status of Old Age Assistance in California, a comparison of the California plan of OAA with other state plans, and a chapter of recommendations with respect to the future of Old Age Assistance.

The authors trace the rise of Old Age Assistance in California. From 1928, when 2 per cent of people aged 65 and over received relief payments until 1941, when 24 per cent of the people aged 65 and over received assistance, was the period during which the American people came to accept the idea of cash payments to the needy aged. The State of California led the way.

California does not call this program Old Age Assistance, as do the other states, but Old Age Security (OAS) which confuses it in the minds of many people with the federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance program (OASI). This is regarded by the authors as a misfortune, for it blurs what is to them a basic and valuable distinction between an *assistance* program based on the *needs* of older people and an *annuity or insurance* program, based on the *earnings* of those who have in this way provided for their own old age.

To this reader, Chapter III, on "Pensions, Politics, and Pressure Groups," was especially interesting. This is a history of old age pension politics from the Townsend Plan of 1934 down to the present. The principal villain of the piece is George H. McClain, a leader in the "Ham n' Eggs" campaign of the 1930's, and since 1941 the leader of the principal organization for expanding the Old Age Pension program, now known as the California Institute of Social Welfare. The professional economists and students of government generally have

little use for the political leaders of old age pension movements, and these authors are no exception.

Part of the study was made by interviewing a carefully designed sample of 890 out of the 880,000 people aged 65 and over in California in 1952. Ninety per cent of the people in the sample were interviewed. This is the most extensive sampling study yet made of the old age groups. Topics covered by the interview were: living arrangements, marital status, nationality and race, geographical mobility, occupational experiences, employment status, retirement experience, attitudes toward retirement, educational level, religious attendance, membership in associations, leisure time activities, income, property, and attitudes toward Old Age Assistance.

ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST
University of Chicago

KRUTCH, JOSEPH W. (Ed.). *Is the Common Man Too Common?* Pp. xii, 146. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. $2.75.

This "informal survey of our cultural resources and what we are doing about them" assembles twelve essays which appeared originally in the *Saturday Review*. They discuss in a provocative, sometimes amusing, always interesting manner questions every thoughtful observer of recent cultural developments cannot help asking. The writers, however, are not content with raising these questions; they also try to answer them and to lay bare the reasons why modern culture has become a problem. The situation of modern man, especially in the United States but elsewhere too, has no parallel in the past. For the first time in history large masses have not only access to cultural values, because every individual may receive much more education than ever before, and because mass media make such values available to almost everyone, but also because modern man finds sufficient leisure time for enjoying culture, if he wants it. But this is precisely the problem: does the common man want it? And if he does not, what means are at hand to create in the mind of the common man an attitude appreciative of the great cultural values? The dilemma arises because the same "instruments and techniques which have made mass wealth and mass culture possible make it also possible to manipulate, and to vulgarize, and stultify the masses." The mass media which make accessible to the masses whatever matter they chose to publicize are largely dominated by the necessity of profit. They furnish what is bought and, consequently, adjust their presentation to the taste of the average. Thus, the masses receive what they want, but not what they need if the general cultural level is to be raised above its actual low level. However, there are indications that a true interest in higher things is growing up in increasingly widening circles. How this fact may be utilized for raising the cultural level is one of the main topics of these essays. The greatest obstacle is, as Krutch puts it, "the confusions that arise when the common denominator is consciously or unconsciously allowed to function as a standard of excellence." Besides the business aspect there is the disregard for humanities which have been pushed in the background by the prevailing concern with science. Krutch contributes the introductory essay, which gives the title to the book. Lindemann writes on books, A. Cooke on the press, G. Seldes on radio and TV, A. Mayer on motion pictures, and N. Cousins on the creative artist within modern civilization. Business and culture are discussed by H. K. Guinzburg. President Griswold of Yale has important things to say on higher education, a topic with which deal also J. W. Dodds (On Humanistic Values) and President de Kiewiet of Rochester, on educational awareness. G. F. Kennan, once United States ambassador to Russia, deals with cultural intolerance. The concluding study by D. W. Brogan of Cambridge returns to the general question by analyzing the taste of the common man. Brief though these studies be, they are informative and worthy not only of being read, but of serious consideration. Without being unduly optimistic, the authors believe in the possibility of a future in which the common man may cease to be "too common" and will be able to participate in and to appreciate the great cultural values modern civilization has put at his disposal.

RUDOLF ALLERS
Georgetown University

KASIUS, CORA (Ed.). *New Directions in Social Work.* Pp. xxi, 258. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. $3.50.

This symposium, honoring Philip Klein of the New York School of Social Work, and containing thirteen chapters by eminent contributors aimed "to be a useful, honest, and courageous one." In large measure it has achieved these objectives, but with considerable variability between the high quality of the chapter on "The Financing of Social Welfare" and the inexplicable and inexcusable finale entitled, "The Folklore of Social Work." In any symposium there are inevitable risks of unevenness of quality, but in the opinion of this reviewer a note of apology for the latter chapter must be introduced which this volume, otherwise, should not deserve.

The strongest chapter is Eveline Burns's on "The Financing of Social Welfare," in which social workers are squarely confronted with the obligation to face the economic facts of life. Next in substance is Michael Davis's "Needs and Problems of Medical Care," which does the same for the area of medical care about which social workers have been too pusillanimous. One develops considerable respect for Alfred J. Kahn's "The Nature of Social Work Knowledge," not so much for the conclusions to which he comes as for the solid, though tortuous, thinking that interpenetrates his exposition. Much the same may be said for the chapter by Maas and Wolins, "Concepts and Methods in Social Work Research," for although the "conclusions" are anything but conclusive, the reader cannot escape the implications for social work research of the reasoned analysis of concepts and methods in contiguous areas.

Not too many years ago the Hollis-Taylor study of social work education appeared. It may not be inappropriate to ask of the profession to what use, if any, that report has been put by either social work practitioners or educators. There appears reasonable evidence that it has had limited usefulness, and it may be important to know why. The "shock" method employed by the senior author of that study seemed hardly conducive to an enthusiastic response from the profession. These observations are related to the instant volume *New Directions in Social Work,* which certainly packs in far more sound educational philosophy in a few pages than is to be found in the entire Hollis volume. For example, the chapters by Harry Lurie, "The Responsibilities of a Socially Oriented Profession"; by Arthur Altmeyer, "The People and Their Government"; by Lester Granger, "The Changing Functions of Voluntary Agencies," and by Donald Howard, "Social Work and Social Reform," have real significance for practice and education. These chapters stir social workers to examine not only their experience of conforming to the communities around them—and the price with which that conformity has been bought—but also those instances in which they have dared to express their difference and to gain stature thereby. In this respect the volume written for Philip Klein is written for the entire profession and has real significance for it. It certainly contains more substantial thinking, justifies its conclusions more convincingly, and faces social work with more usable tasks than the volume to which reference has been previously made.

ARTHUR E. FINK
University of North Carolina

EELLS, WALTER CROSBY. *Communism in Education in Asia, Africa, and the Far East.* Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1954. $3.00.

This book is based on six articles which originally appeared in *The Educational Record* during 1952 and 1953. To these have been added chapters on the causes of Communist influence in education, the fate of schools and colleges under the present government in China, and suggestions for combating such influences. The author was advisor on higher education to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from 1947 to 1951. The main chapters reflect his encounter with Communist influences in educational circles in Japan and con-

versations and reading during visits to thirty countries of the Pacific, Southern Asia, and the Near East.

There is a wealth of information here varying considerably in weight of evidence from country to country, but all illustrating familiar techniques of exploitation of local situations. An appraisal of the significance and impact of these activities depends upon historical and cultural perspectives for which one must look elsewhere. For example, unfriendly attitudes to the West, so easily exploited, reflect a long and humiliating colonial experience; pride of country and a love of independence have been nourished by contact with Western literature and institutions; fear of present power in the West is often closely associated with admiration for the West's achievements. Educational systems and institutions developed with varying emphasis in other times and upon various Western models are under great pressure in many places to meet the new needs of independence and the post-war world. The tasks of educators in developing vital and relevant programs are colossal and resources often meager. The concluding chapter of this volume lists a number of suggestions for strengthening the hands of those who are developing democratic educational and other institutions.

PAUL J. BRAISTED
Edward W. Hazen Foundation

ASHMORE, HARRY S. *The Negro and the Schools.* Foreword by Owen J. Roberts. Pp. xv, 228. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954. $2.75.

In making possible publication of *The Negro and the Schools* The Fund for the Advancement of Education (Ford) has struck the highest note in helpfulness. Wisdom lay in:

1. Reliance on research; confidence in the telling effect of truth accurately found, clearly, simply stated. A foremost threat to the demagoguery of Talmadge, Byrns and White is the quiet effort of a research organization, The Southern Regional Council, which is receiving aid from The Fund for the Republic (also Ford).

2. Reliance on Southern scholarship. Reminiscent of that powerful little pamphlet of the depression decade, *The South, The Nation's Economic Problem Number One; The Negro and the Schools* has been ably done chiefly by Southerners. The Fund has set itself up as no advocate of desegregation. It has simply financed illumination on the problem from the most acceptable source.

3. Timeliness. Here is a prime example of what Theodore Brameld has called *reconstructionism* in education. Education must work for the advancement of basic human values and must be *future centered.* This volume, begun in early 1953, appeared just prior to the Supreme Court's most moving decision of May 17, 1954. With ten of the forty-five authors centered at George Peabody College for Teachers (where Ford funds have now placed a clearing house for publicity touching the consequences of the Court's decision and a center for information), that college promises leadership in education's most advanced form.

4. Breadth of setting. From Charles Sumner's defense of racial integration in 1849 to almost the moment of the May 17 decision, the problem is given historic setting. From a sociological aspect, such revolutionary trends, as industrialization of the South, migration of Negroes to the North, and migration of Negroes and whites to Southern (as well as Northern) cities, are clearly shown. One senses that the decision of the court was inevitable and was dictated by rapidly changing conditions within the South as well as by world forces which made continuation of this caste system inflammatory.

From reading this volume one understands better why the South is taking its fate philosophically. I have been through the South studying the reaction. There are mixed feelings, but, on the whole, there is resignation, and among many a sense of relief. Democracy as a concept has been a seething spirit, an expanding one. This volume will help further one of its most recent advances. For an American dilemma is being resolved.

The Negro and the Schools treats the slow steps by which the courts have recognized the constantly expanding meaning of democracy as reflected in racial attitudes against the background of social change itself. Charles Sumner had put the issue squarely in the case of *Roberts v. City of Boston* when he argued (1849) that the operation of segregated public schools "tends to deepen and to perpetuate the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in public opinion." But the court then took the irresponsible view that any caste distinction involved "if it exists, is not created by law and probably cannot be changed by law." A more responsible attitude was revealed in the "separate but equal" doctrine of *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896. This doctrine held against a growing storm of opposition. In 1938 the first Negro crossed the color line in higher education under court order. This movement spread rapidly and with significant ease among the state universities of the South. But it moved still under the Plessy dictum of "separate but equal," the contention being that available facilities were not *equal.*

Behind those changes which led to the momentous decision of May 17, 1954, vindicating Sumner's contention completely, lay a vast fabric of social and economic change. The volume sketches those changes in instances such as the attitudinal impact of Negroes participating on foreign soil in wars for this nation. It gives in considerable statistical array other changes, as in population shifts and in the gradual motion toward actually equalizing facilities between the races.

The volume is helpful in its case studies of desegregation, from which it becomes clear that sociometric study is needed as to the readiness of the various areas of the nation to accept integration of the schools.

MORRIS R. MITCHELL
Putney School of Teacher Education

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation.* Pp. xiv, 552. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $6.00.

In this encyclopedic work the founder of the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism presents his analysis of the factors and techniques of moral transformation through the power of love. Professor Sorokin's thesis is simply stated: there is no solution to any of humanity's problems —war, crimes, materialism, revolutions, suicide, psychoneurosis—except by way of a creative altruism. Without love, armament, diplomatic machinations, police force, or schools of education cannot avert the catastrophe. Only an all-transcending love can accomplish the miracle.

The social scientists have little to say about the nature of love, the efficient ways of its production, accumulation, and use. And so we know less about "love energy" than about heat, light, and electricity. Professor Sorokin intends to correct this situation. In twenty-three chapters, divided into three parts, he exfoliates his program of moral transformation. Part I deals with "Love: Its Aspects, Dimensions, Production, Transformation, and Power"; Part II with the "Structure of Creative Personality"; Part III with "The Ways of Altruistic Growth"; and Part IV with the "Techniques of Altruistic Transformation of Persons and Groups." In following through on this project, Professor Sorokin surveys many cultures, makes liberal use of the collateral findings of others, indulges in many caustic criticisms, and presents numerous original ideas of his own.

In his own lifetime Sorokin has witnessed the fruits of human brutality and hatred: hunted by the Bolsheviks in 1918, captured and condemned to be shot, he saw his friends executed, and observed human bestiality in its most degrading forms. Thirty-five years later he is more convinced than ever that "cruelty, hatred, violence, and injustice never will be able to cerate a mental, moral, or material millenium."

This is an impressive work. My own dissatisfaction with it stems from the difficulty of determining the proper place for fumbling, fallible, but self-corrective human intelligence in Sorokin's scheme. In two chapters (six and twenty-three), Sorokin deals with the role of the "superconscious" in man's mental life. Here the creative-intuitive features of natural science, technology, fine arts, philosophy, religion, and extrasensory perception find their origin and drive. But the whole

problem of "intuitionism" in mathematics is smudged by Sorokin's treatment. Certainly it is inaccurate to classify Bertrand Russell (at least the Russell of the post-Wittgenstein influence) as an intuitionist. Moreover, the entire development of logical Positivism is passed over (including Charles S. Peirce's "evolutionary love"—though the Positivists have also conveniently ignored Peirce's more "metaphysical" ideas). Aside from this defect, the book impresses one as a masterpiece of systematic synthesis.

OLIVER L. REISER
University of Pittsburgh

LINDBERG, JOHN. *Foundations of Social Survival.* Pp. 260. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. $3.50.

This is an extremely interesting treatise in social theory and thus perhaps no easy reading. Not that the author writes obscurely, or in an esoteric jargon not unusual among social scientists. On the contrary, the author writes well and once the reader has grasped the conceptual framework he is captivated by the profound and yet clear development of the problem; what from the standpoint of pure social theory are the foundations of social survival for the *civitas humana,* for the political community, for the more universal overreaching civilizations, and lastly, for the West. Spengler and Toynbee discussed this problem in their formidable volumes with a tremendous array of inductive material. Dr. Lindberg, economist by profession but steeped in classical learning and familiar with philosophy and theology, approaches his problem theoretically. He inquires how the great thinkers of antiquity, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, who were after all as much political-social theorists as they were philosophers, tried to solve the problem of social growth, of balancing the static and the dynamic elements in the social order so that social change in the form of social growth is possible and thus the survival of the city. Dr. Lindberg contends that the foundations of social survival for the great thinkers were to find a social balance among the basic functions of the body politic: the economic production, the biological reproduction, the function of the family, the internal order function, and the external defense functions. At the same time the inevitable conflict between private and public reason, individual and common good, must be resolved by a balance between outer kingdom and inner kingdom, so that the basic social functions are performed at a tolerable social "cost," that is, when obedience to the ruler through established habit minimizes the use of force, for force is expensive; it uses up in progressive ratio the "social transfer," the amount of goods and services set apart for the establishment and the preservation of order and defense, for the ruler, the administrators, soldiers, priests, educators. If obedience to the order be a habit, an internal free assent and not enforced, fear-inspired external conformity, then the myth or reason must produce and nourish in the inner kingdom this virtuous habit. Yet myth, the belief in the gods of the city, is essentially static and also endangered by questioning reason; and reason instead of conserving civil virtue may fall to the temptation of skepticism. They were not able to "lay the Monsters" always threatening the city with their wild order, destroying irrational emotions; furthermore, myth and reason, even if ruling the inner kingdom, produce an essentially static society unable to solve the problem of social survival, even if a *civitas maxima* is formed as it was in Rome and under the inspiration of Stoic philosophy.

In Part II, Dr. Lindberg shows that Christianity with its gospel of love, with its idea of the universal City of God always in the state of becoming, presents a valid theoretical model of social survival, because it tames the lusts, lays the monsters, and produces an elite of those serving love which makes obedience to the order and the inner norm effective. This elite is the saints—not the geniuses nor the wise men of the ancient city—in their exemplary, yet different life-forms of the *Imitation of Christ.* They create a potential of social growth without endangering the City by establishing an inner harmony among the basic social functions, the outer kingdom and the inner kingdom ruled by love and divine truth-producing free obedience to the norm.

This thought-provoking, profound treatise proves again that the social sciences and philosophy need each other, for it is obvious that H. Bergson, especially his last book, *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality,* has been a most productive influence.

HEINRICH A. ROMMEN
Georgetown University

BOWLE, JOHN. *Politics and Opinion in the Nineteenth Century: An Historical Introduction.* Pp. 512. London: Jonathan Cape, 1954. 25 *s.*

In his latest book, the successor to *Western Political Thought,* John Bowle presents, as a many-colored, storied tapestry, the political thought of the nineteenth century. It is lively reading and will undoubtedly command a large audience. Although he makes a determined attempt to relate political thought to its larger historical context, the author is a little misleading in his title. The emphasis is entirely on the ideas of the thinkers; the relation between political thought and political action is dealt with, for the most part, only inferentially. The work has two main parts: Book I, "The Political Thought of the Romantic Age," including chapters on Hegel, Bentham, Comte, Mazzini, De Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill; and Book II, "The Political Thought of the Age of Darwin," with chapters on Herbert Spencer, T. H. Green, Marx and Engels, Nietzsche, *inter alia.*

Mr. Bowle, despite the fact that he has devoted himself primarily to chronicling ideas, is not content to be a mere historian. His larger purpose is that of the true political scientist, the aim of guiding us to our proper destination in a world bedeviled by the mushroom cloud of thermonuclear destruction. That destination is membership in "the parliament of man, the federation of the world." The history of political thought, to Mr. Bowle, is the history of how some ideas "enhance life," while others promote death. He holds, quite rightly I think, that obsolete ideas, such as "metaphysical myths of inevitable national and class conflict," are more than we can afford, particularly if they tend to bring on these very conflicts. Yet a reviewer may be pardoned if he points out that Mr. Bowle has not established, by an independent argument of his own, that the true criterion of timeliness or obsolescence in political ideas is their tendency to promote or hinder what Mr. Bowle calls world commonwealth. After all, how many serious thinkers have argued that war is better than peace, death than life? Mr. Bowle's death-promoting ideologists, or most of them, seem to have believed that they were promoting life as assuredly as Mr. Bowle thinks that he is. A mere classification of ideas on the hypothesis that world government is the solution to our problems does not contribute much to the support of that hypothesis.

In a review as brief as this, it is impossible to discuss individual interpretations. We may, however, venture a few words concerning the author's method in treating the history of political ideas. This is revealed in such a phrase as "Both Thomism and the enlightenment had assumed a transcendental sanction. . . ." The statement, taken literally, is untrue: both Thomists and men of the enlightenment had offered what they regarded as proof of the existence of transcendental sanctions. Mr. Bowle, I believe, regards these proofs as inadequate. But an inadequate proof is not necessarily the same as an assumption of what is to be proved. Mr. Bowle, however, has throughout sketched for us the positions argued by the nineteenth-century thinkers, rather than the arguments for their positions. I doubt that Mr. Bowle is troubled by this, since he considers "political philosophy . . . [to be] part of the age it mirrors . . ." (p. 13). That it is part of its age is, of course, a truism. That it is a mirror means, however, that it is a derivative phenomenon, that the claim to base ideas upon arguments is only part of the illusion produced by the mirror, and that what determines the ideas is not the arguments which support them, but the historical "age." Perhaps Mr. Bowle is right, and his method the true one. But what are we to think when Mr. Bowle goes on to tell us that "modern political philosophers are a luxury

or a menace unless they recognize this need [the need for world commonwealth]." For if political philosophy is nothing ultimately but the mirror of environment, it would seem to depend upon the environment, not upon the political philosopher, whether or not he recognizes this need. I do not see how Mr. Bowle can have it both ways.

HARRY V. JAFFA
Ohio State University

CHASE, STUART, in collaboration with MARIAN TYLER CHASE. *Power of Words.* Pp. xii, 308. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1954. $3.95.

This book is a popularization. To some academicians, that may damn it, but popularizations are useful in a democratic society and Stuart Chase is a master of the genre. Ponderous studies come to life in his simple and apt illustrations and easily flowing language.

Chase surveys a wide range of research areas impinging on communication. These include: information theory, computing machines, the psychology of perception, animal communication, linguistic development of children, structural linguistics, psycho-linguistics, intercultural communication, semantics, group dynamics, and memory and comprehension. In each of these areas he takes the reader over two or three important and suggestive pieces of research which convey the flavor of the field. The specialist might protest the incompleteness of these samples which but skim the cream. For a popular book, however, it is enough that the illustrations be accurate and appropriate. They cannot be complete. Mr. Chase states correctly what students of communication have actually said and often states it better than they, themselves.

A more subtle difficulty for the popularizer is to separate the wheat from the chaff: which studies are good and significant, which incompetent or misleading; which are real contributions and which are not. Another subtle difficulty for the popularizer is the temptation to present the discoveries he summarizes as the golden key to all man's hopes.

Stuart Chase is a devotee of semantics. His earlier book, *The Tyranny of Words* (1938), maintained the semanticist's thesis that many of mankind's ills spring from confusion about language. His present book is more sophisticated. He sees the field of communications research as a broader thing than a crusade against terminological confusion. He still oversells, however, the legitimate points of which the semanticists have made us more aware. While he gives to each scientific discipline concerned with communications a single short but clear chapter, he gives semantics (which is also treated as a science rather than as a philosophical school) about half the book, and of all the versions of semantics, he pays the greatest respect to the tracts of Korzybski. We receive the impression that semantics not only corrects some widespread misconceptions, but that it also can solve political problems, cure neuroses, and perhaps even bring peace to the world.

It is laudable that the communications research of recent years should become accessible to a wider public through the able pen and intelligent exposition of Stuart Chase. It is unfortunate that this should be accompanied in part by some overtones of a doctrinal crusade. The merits of the book, however, balance this defect.

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (Ed.). *Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Conference held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 1953.* Pp. x, 386. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $6.50.

Totalitarianism has been variously subjected to study and analysis by historians, political scientists, and experts from other fields. The three-day conference of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston (of which the present volume is a report) represented one of the first major attempts at an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenon of totalitarianism. The authors of the twenty-one papers read at the conference represent all the major fields within the political and social sciences in addition to philosophy, theology, law, psychology, and practical diplomacy and journalism. They include such well-known experts as George Kennan, William Henry Chamberlin, Frank W. Rounds, Harold D. Lasswell, the late Waldemar Gurian, Bertram D. Wolfe, and the brilliant editor of this volume, Carl J. Friedrich. Among the discussants were outstanding scholars like Hannah Arendt, Merle Fainsod, Sigmund Neumann, Michael Karpovich, Geroid T. Robinson, and David Riesman. Most of the conference participants have had extensive opportunity to observe and experience totalitarianism at close range. Some of them, indeed, have had to flee from totalitarian countries; one of them, Jerzy Gliksman, whose paper dealt with "Social Prophylaxis as a Form of Soviet Terror," had suffered two years as a slave laborer in the USSR.

The conference was divided into seven main parts dealing with various aspects of totalitarianism: political, ideological, psychological, social, economic, and intellectual. The final session was devoted to "Totalitarianism and the Future." The conference did not, of course, attempt to reach final conclusions or to draw up practical resolutions. On the contrary, it revealed the complexity of the problem and brought out in sharper focus the divergent views of the experts. There was above all a struggle for definitions of totalitarianism and authoritarianism, their counterparts, and antecedents. The controversy around the term "totalitarian mystique" (as used by Alex Inkeles), as distinct from "ideology," and such *ad hoc* inventions as "ideocracy" (Gurian) and "logocracy" (Arendt) as possible alternatives for the term "totalitarianism" serve to highlight the semantic difficulties involved. Much light was shed on the nature and practical effects of totalitarianism, particularly as manifested in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Less illuminating and possibly dangerous, in the opinion of the reviewer, were the efforts to identify "authoritarian" traits in people living in totalitarian or free societies. The evidence purporting to demonstrate ideological compliance presented by the psychologists (Maria Jahoda and Stuart W. Cook), based on socio-psychological experiments by Solomon E. Asch, was challenged by several participants. Some of the statements regarding totalitarian propensities seemed to take for granted a genuine "ideological compliance" and "docility" on the part of the people living under totalitarian rule. The June revolts in Eastern Germany (which, of course, occurred after the time of this conference) should guard us against facile generalizations on this point. Moreover, it is important to make a sharper distinction between individuals who actively supported a totalitarian regime (as the majority of Germans during the 30's) and those on whom it was imposed by force (in Communist countries).

We are indebted to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for publishing these proceedings and thus giving us an opportunity to participate, as it were, in this significant conference. The papers and discussions, although inevitably somewhat uneven, were on a high level. Bibliographical footnotes and a competent introduction by Professor Friedrich increase the usefulness of this volume. One closes the book with the wish that other interdisciplinary approaches to totalitarianism will soon follow.

CARL G. ANTHON
State University of Iowa

COLE, G. D. H. *Socialist Thought: Marxism and Anarchism 1850–1890.* (A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. II.) Pp. xi, 482. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. $6.00.

In this second volume of a History of Socialist Thought the well-known British scholar G. D. H. Cole continues his theme to the 1890's. Major attention is given to the origin and development of the First International Workingman's Association in the 60's and its decline and fall in the 70's. The author vividly recounts the struggle between rival aims and tendencies within this organization which he terms "the birth pangs" of socialism as an international force, which for the first time became "decisively a working-class movement." Socialist leaders had now to take into consideration the desires of the trade unions as well as the interest of political parties in social reform.

The present volume is more immediately concerned with rivalry in Germany between Lassallians and Eisenachers and still more with the contest between Marxists and anarchists. Socialist hope of a general European revolution was dashed by the defeat of the Paris Commune, ably discussed by the author. Paris, the center of revolutionary action in the past, no longer could be turned to. In Britain, the condition of the working class had been improving so much that the workers turned to trade union bargaining and extension of the franchise in preference to conflict with the governing classes. Italy and Spain, where the greatest possibilities for revolutionary action existed, turned to anarchism rather than to socialism. Marx himself came to accept the fact that "the chances of the International as an agency of European revolution had disappeared" (p. 192), and he preferred to terminate its affairs lest it resort to impractical and costly revolts. The anarchist leader Bakunin and his followers on the contrary were undeterred by happenings in the West and wished to take advantage of every opportunity for revolutionary action however local and unpropitious it might be, instead of waiting for opportunities for a general European rising. Thus, it was argued, the revolutionary spirit might be kept alive.

Things finally reached such a pass at the Hague Congress of 1872 that Marx and Engels thought of abandoning London as seat of the General Council and transferring it to New York as a haven where it might exist until the "time was ripe for its re-emergence in Europe" (p. 201).

However meticulously and successfully the author has unfolded the tangled web of socialist and anarchist affairs, he is, it seems to the reviewer, even more successful when he devotes a chapter to the adventurous life and character of Bakunin and to the ideas for which he stood. The same may be said of the chapter devoted to Lassalle. Not only have socialism and socialist leaders in the various countries throughout Europe been well covered, but there is also a chapter devoted to American socialism. The reader will find the chapter entitled "Anarchists and Anarchist Communists-Kropotkin" of special interest and value.

JAMES EDWARD GILLESPIE
Arizona State College
Tempe

GURIAN, WALDEMAR, and M. A. FITZSIMONS (Eds.). *The Catholic Church in World Affairs.* Pp. xi, 420. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954. $4.25.

Dr. Gurian begins this most useful and timely book by noting that Ranke thought that the history of the Popes was a suitable subject since the "Papacy belonged to the past." As Macaulay's famous "review" of Ranke showed, there were observers who thought that the Papacy had a great deal of life in it, but even Macaulay (or his New Zealander) might be astonished not only by the importance of the modern Papacy, but by its strength in countries like the United States, Germany, and Holland, and by its ambiguous position in countries like Spain and Latin America. But whether with approval or resentment or merely from curiosity, the world has come to realize that the Papacy, and the Church of which it is the central and ruling organ, is one of the great forces of the contemporary scene.

This book is a symposium and it suffers from some of the inevitable faults of symposiums, but only from the necessary minimum, for the editorial control has been admirably exercised. And, although there are variations in the excellence of the contributions, the general level is high and only one contribution, that on Spain, seems to come from a different world and to be addressed to a different audience (assuming that it is addressed to any audience outside Spain).

There are many merits in this book, but one of the most striking is candor, admirably exemplified in Father Dunne's "Church in Latin America" and in Father McAvoy's "Catholic Church in the United States." Indeed, the latter essay, of first-rate importance for American non-Catholics, leans over backwards in some ways; it does not, in my opinion, allow enough for the recent rapid rise in the general academic status of some Catholic universities. But its candid insistence on the atomistic character of Catholic organization in America is a point well worth making, and one too often ignored.

The essays fall into two classes: discussions of the general relation of the Church to modern society and discussions of the place of the Church (or of religion) in various countries and regions. Thus, there is an excellent discussion of the present tendencies in European Protestantism as well as admirable studies of the Catholic situation in Germany and France. One novel essay is that by Professor Fitzsimons on "The Catholic Church in England" which is of especial interest for America where the situation is in some ways so like, in others so unlike. On two minor points, I am inclined to quarrel a little with Professor Fitzsimons. I think that the editor of *The* (London) *Tablet* was making a perfectly valid point when he described his position as "High Whiggery" not "High Toryism." In its general political and social outlook, *The Tablet* is closest to *The Economist*. It does not lack social zeal, but it believes that free enterprise increases wealth. And in the discussion of the education question, Professor Fitzsimons does not make it quite plain that under the Forster Act of 1870, Catholic schools got aid from the central government, though not from local authorities. More important in this connection is the exclusion of Scotland from the picture. Not only are there more Catholics, proportionately, in Scotland than in England, but there has been no "school question" there since 1918. It was for a version of the Scottish system that the English bishops asked in 1947.

As I have said, the article on Spain stands out by itself. Other articles make it plain that the attitude of the Spanish church is a stumbling block and a stone of offence to non-Spanish Catholics. But for Señor Serer, the things the outside world dislikes (the things that, for example, Father Dunne thinks account in part for the deplorable state of the Church in parts of Latin America) are proofs of Spanish rightness. The proposition Hispanidad = Catholicism is asserted but not proved, and the whole article is written in a rhetorical style that reminds us that Señor Serer is a countryman of Gongorá. And, alone among the contributors on special regions, Señor Serer does not discuss the basic question of the recruitment of the clergy. But its very "Spanishness" makes this a valuable document, which is perhaps *not* out of place in an admirable book animated by a very different spirit.

D. W. BROGAN
Cambridge University

VLAVIANOS, BASIL J., and FELIKS GROSS (Eds.). *Struggle For Tomorrow: Modern Political Ideologies of the Jewish People.* Pp. 303. New York: Arts, Inc., 1954. $6.50.

During the past sixty to seventy years many profound cultural changes, some of which were expressed in new ideologies and movements that were more or less political, occurred among the Jews in response to changes in their relationships to the people among whom they lived. Political scientists, historians, and the public cannot easily obtain good survey treatments of all these origins and alterations. Source materials are often in languages other than English, and in newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets that are available in few libraries. The editors therefore assembled papers which attempt to account for the beliefs and vicissitudes of Jewish organizations since the 1880's. All but two such papers are written by leaders or experts who are protagonists of one or another action group. The volume is an important, clear, and extremely useful handbook for scholars, students, and laymen. Much of it is exciting reading. It is obviously an indispensable purchase for college and municipal libraries. It should serve for some time as a reference that is especially valuable for political scientists and historians, as well as for assigned readings in college courses.

One wonders what might have been the additional value of a larger volume which included as accompaniments of the stirring chapters which it now contains, short discussions by scholarly nonparticipants, if they could be found, who weigh, evaluate, and interrelate all the varied social currents in recent and contemporary Jewry,

not merely those which took organizational form and possessed political meanings. We might have a more balanced picture if the work included sociological and psychological analyses of people of Jewish ancestry in process of thoroughgoing acculturation, people who have remained uncertain, inarticulate, and uninvolved in action groups. We might know more about that deep current composed of persons who have voted, so to speak, with their feet, and voted in favor of choices different from those which were articulated by the advocates of the ideologies and movements which are discussed in this book.

Specifically it includes treatments, most of which are themselves primary source documents, of six Zionist associations: General Zionism, Labor Zionism, Religious Zionism, Mapam—a short article written by the editors themselves, Revisionism, and Ihud; one each on Jewish Territorialism, the Bund, Agudism, Assimilationism, Volkism, Communism—not by a Communist, and Anarchism. The longest chapter is on the Bund. Each chapter has an introduction by the editors and contains a short bibliography by its author. A useful index completes an excellent symposium.

MELVILLE JACOBS
University of Washington

CURRAN, FRANCIS X., S.J. *The Churches and the Schools: American Protestantism and Popular Elementary Education.* (Jesuit Studies.) Pp. vii, 152. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1954. $3.00.

As set forth in the Preface of this study, one in a series of Jesuit Studies published by members of the Society of Jesus, the author's objective is to explore the causes that led Protestants in the United States to relinquish the traditional claim of the Christian Church "to exercise control over the formal education of its children in the elementary schools" to the state.

The author points out that only in the United States has Protestantism during the past century relinquished that claim, whereas the Protestant churches in Europe and the Catholic Church universally have continued to maintain control of the education of the young.

The abandonment of elementary education by American Protestantism, the author asserts, has resulted in the disappearance of numerous Protestant academies and high schools during the past century. Similarly, though a large number of colleges established by Protestant denominations still exist, many have passed completely out of denominational control, while many of those that remain maintain an extremely tenuous connection with the founding denominations. The type of education imparted by these denominationally controlled colleges differs slightly from that of the secular colleges.

The author sets forth as his thesis the contention that it was the "anti-Catholic animus" of American Protestantism that constituted the greatest factor in relinquishing the traditional claim of church-controlled popular education, placing it under the sole control of the state. This "anti-Catholic animus," he observes, resulted in a concerted action on the part of Protestantism, particularly evangelical Protestantism, to control the public school and formal education; to make the public schools Protestant through the teaching of religion and requiring the reading of the Bible—the King James version. The author, further, contends anti-Catholicism inspired the early demands for secularization of the state schools, for it was believed that such secularization would serve to destroy the faith of the Catholic children. Finally, that anti-Catholicism was unquestionably "the most important single factor in the evolution of the educational thought of the Methodist, Baptist, and Congregationalist churches in nineteenth-century America."

No one will question the element of bigotry and anti-Catholicism as factors in influencing the attitudes of churches and even legislative assemblies in American history. But the reader will question whether the author has placed undue emphasis on this religious-hatred animus to the exclusion of a proper evaluation of the forces of democracy that were at work during the past century. Did not the lack of trained teachers, the costly operation of church

schools, the "double tax," in many instances the superiority of state equipped schools, a lack of pupils, a dearth of strong leadership, and frequently a lack of interest and strong faith (all factors which the author recognizes), more than the "anti-Catholic animus" constitute the motivating factors in causing the majority of the Protestant churches to relinquish their rights and privileges, perhaps even their responsibility in elementary education?

Couple with these facts the further impelling forces, both public and private, that were at work in favor of public education under the leadership of such men as Horace Mann and others. American industrialism changed the economic and social life of millions. An ever increasing number of immigrants flocked to our hospitable shores, for America had become a beacon light to the oppressed from every land. May it not be that these and other facts of history constituted the greater force in bringing about a secular public school system rather than fear or hatred engendered by the animus of anti-Catholicism?

The author has produced a thought-provoking study. He points out the shifting attitudes toward elementary education by churches, their idiosyncrasies as well as their inconsistencies which are demonstrated in so many instances. Many extreme positions and statements are quoted on almost every aspect of the subject. Readable, well documented, and with a good index.

ALVIN W. JOHNSON
Washington, D. C.

BENNETT, JOHN C., HOWARD R. BOWEN, WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, JR., and G. BROMLEY OXNAM. *Christian Values and Economic Life.* Pp. xv, 272. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. $3.50.

This symposium is Volume VI of a series of books comprising a study of Christian ethics and economic life, begun in 1949 by the Department of the Church and Economic Life of the Federal Council of Churches, which in 1950 was merged with other agencies to form the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. The National Council "points out that the volume is not a statement or pronouncement of the National Council. Each author is solely responsible for what appears under his name." Thus the book consists of the personal interpretations of competent scholars. There are references to statements of church conferences and bodies on the issues considered, but these are not prominent in the volume.

Professor Bennett, of Union Theological Seminary, states that it is the hope of those responsible for the study that it may provide "the most useful materials now available for the formation of a Protestant economic ethic that is relevant to our situation." His own contributions are among the more precise statements in the vloume. "There should be no place in the Christian life for 'conspicuous consumption'—though few of us are without guilt in this respect."

Considering Christian ethics and economic power, Mr. Bennett states that "Christian love does not mean a sentimental dispensing of charity. . . . It does involve a willingness . . . to give to causes and institutions that depend on private support; to welcome the justice that is often embodied in public taxation; to support economic changes that may be costly to us if they are in the public interest; to share and share again wisely and generously."

In a review, with perspective, of ethics and economics, Professor Bowen, of Williams College, advocates "a narrowing of the distance between ethics and economics, so that the contributions of each can be joined for the purpose of achieving more coherent social policy." His discussion appears to imply that those interested in Christian values have customarily proceeded without much knowledge of what goes on in the market place, while the analysts of the market place have often ignored considerations of social welfare.

Dr. Brown, of the Brookings Institution, summarizes much of his long study of the economics of international relations under the title: "Some International Implications of Christian Economic Ethics." Bishop Oxnam, of the Washington Area, the Methodist Church, gives a Churchman's interpretation of the changing economic order and

its challenge to the conscience of the Christian citizen.

Chapters summarizing the findings of the entire study in terms of "goals of economic life" and "major economic problems" are contributed by Professor Bowen who served for a time as economic consultant to the project.

BENSON Y. LANDIS
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America

HARDY, EDWARD ROCHIE, In Collaboration with CYRIL C. RICHARDSON (Eds.). *Christology of the Later Fathers.* (Library of Christian Classics, Vol. III.) Pp. 400. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954. $5.00.

This is the first volume to appear in the proposed twenty-six-volume series, Library of Christian Classics, as edited by John Baillie, John T. McNeill, and Henry P. Van Dusen. The series is designed to make available to the general reader a section of what the distinguished general editors believe, and rightly, to be "the most indispensable Christian treatises written before the end of the sixteenth century." Subsequent volumes will include such titles as *Early Christian Fathers, Alexandrian Christianity, Early Latin Theology,* and the principal writings of such figures as Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, and the English Reformers. If the present volume is a reliable indication, the series will be a most useful contribution to a field of learning in which contemporary Protestantism—clerical and lay alike—is woefully ignorant. Editors and publishers are to be congratulated upon undertaking so important and demanding a task.

The present volume is largely concerned with the contributions of Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa. In the case of each of these three writers, particularly significant treatises are presented in English translation and with brief, but illuminating introductions. In addition there is an admirable general introduction, "Faith in Christ, Theology, and Creeds," by Dr. Hardy, which in thirty-six pages leads the nonprofessional reader through what could easily seem a most unrewarding and fantastic maze: the affirmation of Nicaea against Arianism, the development of the so-called Trinitarian Formula—what it was and what it was not—and, in particular, the problem which those of the yesteryears were so concerned about, the relation of God and man in Christ. Dr. Hardy is especially to be congratulated upon his lucid treatment and understanding presentation of what might well seem to the average reader simply dated logomachy. His insistence that the modern problem of Christology is diametrically the reverse of the ancient is an important contribution: for us the problem lies in how in the human life of the historic Jesus the presence of God is to be explained; for the fathers, early and later, it was rather how the divine Word of God, which they easily saw appearing on earth, could have had a complete human nature. That is, not how the human could have been uniquely divine, but how the divine could have been genuinely human.

In addition to the major treatises of these three fathers is a series of twelve documents illustrating the Christology of the Ecumenical Councils. These very important documents include such writings as the letter of Arius to Eusebius, the letter of Arius to Alexander (the clearest statement of early Arianism), Eusebius's letter describing the Council of Nicaea, the Chalcedonian Decree, and the Statement of Faith of the Third Council of Constantinople.

All in all this volume is a distinguished contribution in understanding. To understand the past is important; to attempt to live it is something quite different. Once again the biblical word is apt: their ways are definitely not our ways and their thoughts (despite a few anachronistic echoes) not our thoughts.

MORTON S. ENSLIN
Dennis Port, Mass.

MORTON, T. RALPH. *Community of Faith: The Changing Pattern of the Church's Life.* Pp. 153. New York: Association Press, 1954. $2.50.

This study was first published in Great Britain as an Iona Community volume under the name of *The Household of Faith.* The name was changed to *Community of Faith,* the American Preface was written by Alexander Miller, lecturer in religion at Stanford University in California, and John Oliver Nelson, professor of Christian Vocation, Yale University Divinity School, added some queries for Americans.

In the original book, the various types of living in community from earliest to modern times were presented.

Professor Nelson's discussion is skeptical in regard to the need for these in contemporary American life. The economic witness is less important here than in a country with "less to go around." The status of American women is more favorable. Americans can find renewal of life in existing organizations and fellowship to which they belong or might. Above all, would not the Morton plan be accused of collectivism and socialism in a capitalistic framework?

CONRAD H. MOEHLMAN
University of Southern California

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

MENDELSOHN, RONALD. *Social Security in the British Commonwealth: Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.* Pp. xv, 391. New York: John de Graff, 1954. $7.00.

In spite of the bitter opposition it frequently encounters from some quarters in the United States, the welfare state is likely to remain as a legitimate goal of social policy. The present system of social security is an accepted institution which, in all probability, will expand as new problems of need—for example, medical care—prove to be inadequately treated within the private economy. It is therefore appropriate for Americans to be conversant with the experiences of those countries that have more highly developed systems of social security.

For this reason, *Social Security in the British Commonwealth* is of special interest. Dr. Mendelsohn has analyzed the social security systems of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. For each country he has examined the impact of its historical tradition, its governmental structure, and the interwar depression on the genesis of its social security program. He has then compared the various systems with respect to the adequacy of the individual benefits, the universality of the benefits, and the efficiency of administration.

Dr. Mendelsohn might well have stopped here, in which case the book would have been a useful reference for the facts of social security in the British Commonwealth. Fortunately, he continued and related social security to the problem of maintaining a high level of income and employment. To a very large extent social security is remedial; the need for it arises from a social and economic structure which permits interruptions of the flow of income. The effect of these remedial measures on economic activity is complex. On the one hand, they introduce a stability element into the level of aggregate consumption. On the other hand, they may, under certain conditions, inhibit the willingness to work. Dr. Mendelsohn has cast social security in the proper perspective by considering these problems.

The picture that emerges in the British Commonwealth is that of a gradual development from a system of private, individual, unregulated charity to a system of universal social security covering all of the economic contingencies which can arise between birth and death. The rates of development are by no means the same in each country—the British system, for example, is far more comprehensive then the Canadian system—but the trend is unmistakable. This book will be of interest to anyone who is concerned with the growth of British social institutions. It will be doubly interesting to those who believe that the British methods of solving the problem of economic insecurity foreshadow things to come in the United States.

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR.
Northwestern University

JEFFERYS, JAMES B. *Retail Trading in Britain, 1850–1950.* Pp. xvii, 497. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. $9.50.

Domestic trade, Mr. Jefferys tells us, still bore the marks, as late as 1850, of the

old system prevailing before the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century. Broadly, the limited and crude demands of the workers of town and countryside were met mainly by the traditional markets and market halls, fairs, and by peddlers and traveling hucksters. These retailers commonly resorted to "open display and vociferous advertisement." Caterers to the well-to-do included most but not all of "the craftsmen producer-retailers and the fixed-shop retailers of the towns," and they relied mainly on reputation and skill to attract custom. The clear and open marking of prices was exceptional; "common to practically all methods of retailing was the method of haggling, higgling or chaffering as to price."

Mr. Jefferys has undertaken an historical and analytical description of the transformation of the industry since 1850, with emphasis on recent periods of relatively good statistical data. He explains the changes in the channels of trade (for example, the decline of the small-scale producer-retailer) and in the structure and organization of retailing (as the growth of co-operatives, department stores, and "multiple-shop" retailers). There are detailed accounts of the rise of large-scale retailing in fifteen branches of trade, beginning with groceries and provisions.

The persistence of traditional modes of carrying on retail trade is explained in part by the view that Britain, as late as 1850, "was not yet an 'industry state' "; agriculture, the author says, was still the largest occupation. The point seems overemphasized; as early as 1841, the first census that gave fairly good occupational data indicated that hardly one out of five of the occupied population was even then engaged in agriculture. In another section, however, the author associates the late transformation of trade with such lagging economic and social changes as the expansion and consolidation of working-class demand and the growth of the middle classes. The first waves of output by the new techniques flooded the channels of foreign trade; one is reminded of Franklin's remark that the spinners and weavers of England in his time wore rags but "make cloths and stuffs for all parts of the world." By the middle of the nineteenth century, the increase and widespread diffusion of real income called for a transformation of domestic trade consistent with the earlier and continuing changes in modes of production.

Mr. Jefferys' volume maintains the high traditions of scrupulous research in a great variety of fields of modern business history —traditions fostered notably a few decades ago by Professor George Unwin and his associates in their emphasis on the study of intrinsic business records.

WITT BOWDEN

Washington, D. C.

PINKHAM, LUCILE. *William III and the Respectable Revolution: The Part Played by William of Orange in the Revolution of 1688.* Pp. viii, 272. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $4.50.

This is a highly controversial book. The author, who is professor of history at Carleton College, reexamines the English Revolution of 1688 and concludes that: (1) the decisive factor was not the policy of James II but the role of William III, Prince of Orange, and William intervened not so much to strengthen the coalition against Louis XIV as to fulfill deeply rooted personal ambitions to become king of England; (2) James II himself sought neither royal absolutism nor Catholic hegemony in England; rather he desired religious toleration for all and had it not been for William's intervention, would likely have settled his difficulties with Whigs and Tories; (3) the Revolution of 1688 has become "a political myth"; it was in no sense "glorious," but was merely "a respectable revolution" in which "the right people" staged a "palace revolt" in their own interests, reducing royal power and establishing aristocratic control in its place.

The "Whig interpretation" of the Revolution has in recent years undergone more modification than is apparent in this book, but Professor Pinkham does challenge a version still widely accepted. Her own position, well grounded in detailed research, is stated vigorously and in a lively manner, considering the intricate nature of her material—parallel development of policy in England, of policy in the United Provinces, and of diplomacy on the continent in the years 1685–1688.

Some of her conclusions will win less ready acceptance than others. Much of the time she moves in the shadowland of motivation. For William this is particularly difficult, for he was extraordinarily reticent. Probably no one will ever fix with any exactitude just when he determined to seek the English throne. For her own view that this design reached back even into the reign of Charles II, Professor Pinkham depends of necessity on circumstances and actions, and upon statements of others than William. But her analysis is intelligent and her conclusion tenable.

In ascribing to William a far more active role than that suggested by Macaulay or by Trevelyan, one can stop well short of eliminating James II entirely. Though certainly historical judgment of his reign has been affected by the outcome, there is abundant evidence of a Catholic policy which alienated elements much wider than the circle of party leaders. This and other important factors Professor Pinkham rather brushes aside. In refusing to accept the Revolution as regenerative, she is on more solid ground. It is exceedingly difficult, as she points out, to reconcile a view of altruistic and disinterested conduct in 1688 with the palpable opportunism and cynicism which followed.

Professor Pinkham's provocative study will take its place among those against which older views are being tested and in the process of which the story of seventeenth-century England is being rewritten.

ALFRED F. HAVIGHURST

Amherst College

LYON, JEAN. *Just Half a World Away: My Search for the New India.* Pp. x, 373. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. $5.00.

The India of today offers inexhaustible material for journalists, reporters, and writers of all kinds. There has been a steady succession of travel books on India in the last several years, particularly since India's independence. Miss Jean Lyon's book on India is somewhat unusual in that it is a factual record of her experiences and not of her personal reflections and impressions. Miss Lyon reveals in her narrative a genuine friendliness and affection for the peoples of India and their ways. The author, an accomplished journalist, may have gone to India in her role as a reporter, but soon after her arrival in India, she found herself making India her "home." For nearly three years Miss Lyon crisscrossed the length and breadth of the country, lived with Indians of all categories and classes and seems to have been perfectly at home with Maharajahs and beggars, with orthodoxy and untouchability, with the market place and the *ashram*. This is not to say that she accepted India in toto or that she was uncritical of what she saw. In fact the narrative betrays much scepticism and even a subtle cynicism, but all the same, Miss Lyon has an abundant sympathy for the people and a deep faith in the values of life as perceived by the common man in India.

The India of today is going through a peculiar revolution. The Indian is unwilling to throw away centuries of tradition and the weight of an immemorial past and at the same time he is bent on modernization. Village self-sufficiency and atomic energy, the good life based on simplicity and contentment and the abundant life based on mass production and mass distribution, the bullock-cart and the aeroplane —here is a picture of old layers refusing to be submerged and new layers being added on to the old. Most foreigners are left with a sense of bewilderment in their search of the new India, but not Miss Lyon. She has acquired a genuine understanding of the peoples and their problems. She offers no solutions to India's problems, but she analyzes them with great lucidity.

At the end of her travels Miss Lyon reflects in the seclusion of her Himalayan cottage on East-West, Indo-American relations. She accepts the fact that India is not an empty vessel that is waiting to be materially and idealogically filled by foreign powers. India may need a great deal of help from other nations but she also has a few basic values of her own to give to other nations. This book will serve as an

excellent introduction to foreigners wishing to search for the new India. The Indians should benefit equally by seeing themselves through friendly foreign eyes.

M. S. SUNDARAM
Embassy of India to the United States

THIRUMALAI, S. *Post-War Agricultural Problems and Policies in India.* Foreword by Manital B. Nanavati. Pp. xvi, 280. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. $3.50.

This book is the result of a research study into postwar agricultural problems and policies in India conducted by the Indian Society of Agricultural economics at the invitation of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is divided into three parts, the first gives an historical background of Indian agriculture from the pre-British periods up to World War II, the wartime policies and the consequences of partition of India, the technical problems of agriculture like irrigation, soil conservation, land tenures, and methods of cultivation all of which provide an explanation, in part at least, for the basic defects of agricultural production.

The second part deals with the geography of Indian agriculture—the physical and human factors, the interaction of which through the ages has been responsible for evolving the present type of land use. Chapter IV, however, seems to be rather misplaced; the main problems of agriculture are dealt with in this chapter before there is a description of land use (Chapter V) and agricultural production (Chapter VI), and it might have avoided some repetition if Chapters IV and VIII were combined.

The third part which forms nearly half the book gives not merely a very detailed and clear analysis of the basic problems of agriculture, but also suggests the manner in which orderly development is to take place. Thus, in dealing with minimum wages for agricultural labor, the conclusion that "the introduction of scientific management in farming should necessarily precede the enforcement of any measure like the fixation of minimum agricultural wages" is unassailable; because it shows how that would affect favorably only one constituent element in the economy, but would have adverse repercussions on the other elements.

When analyzing economic factors and data, the book maintains an exceptionally high standard; the physical aspects of agriculture, however, are not adequately treated. The cultural aspects receive appropriate consideration and the conclusions are fully warranted. For example, it shows how in the determination of crop production pattern, the human factors have played a more important part as reflected by the consumer's taste or demand mostly for subsistence, and to a small extent for commerce. Consequently, the country is characterized by subsistence farming, and, in the whole evolution of agricultural organization, there has been such an integration with other aspects of cultural life that agriculture is not just an occupation, but is a way of life.

There are some printer's errors here and there, as for example, on page 125 line 9, page 195 line 18; but there is a serious error on page 48 where it is said that "the total area of undivided India was 1,581 square miles. The partition assigned an area of 1,220 square miles to the Indian Union and 361 square miles to Pakistan. Of this the area covered by the Provinces alone was 632 square miles in the Indian Union and 233 square miles in Pakistan." Actually, these figures are all in thousands; three zeros have been omitted in each case. It is hoped that these errors will be corrected in the next edition.

GEORGE KURIYAN
American Geographical Society

MANDER, LINDEN A. *Some Dependent Peoples of the South Pacific.* Pp. xix, 535. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $6.75.

The "dependent peoples" of Professor Mander's title consist of most of the native inhabitants of British Oceania: the Maori of New Zealand, Australian aborigines, Western Samoans, Papuans and Melanesians of Australian New Guinea, Solomon Islanders, Tongans, Fijians, and the unhappy residents of the New Hebridean condominium. This economically poor, culturally diverse, and polyglot population is

perched on many lower rungs of the ladder of advancement toward self-government or full citizenship in modern states; and the degree and kind of its dependency vary considerably from country to country. The painful record of their grudging absorption into a Western society reluctant to admit them, except on its own terms, has raised problems of cultural co-operation and government for which there are still no clear answers. The real subject of this long book, however, is not the people themselves nor their reactions to the impact of European enterprise, but rather the development of apparatus and institutions, programs and policies, through which the colonial governments aid, educate, and rule their native charges.

An Australian by birth and political scientist by training, the author has traveled extensively in the area covered, has maintained close personal touch with officials and scholars, and has ranged extensively through its voluminous but uneven literature of travel, ethnography, history, and *Hansards*. Using the major political divisions as a framework, he presents eight case histories as listed above. For each of these he draws upon anthropological sources to sketch some characteristics of pre-European cultures and culls the historical record for highlights of European penetration and impact. But the bulk of the descriptive material in each of the chapters consists of a chronicle of the major innovations, adaptations, policies and programs of the respective colonial administrations. Problems of land ownership and usage, "indirect rule," education and health, missionary enterprise, and native political movements are traced in each area from their earliest appearance to the postwar period. A final chapter on "South Pacific Regionalism" provides an interesting survey of recent intergovernmental approaches to some problems common to the entire area.

Students interested in the progress of non-self-governing territories, but who have no familiarity with recent conditions and events in the South Pacific, may find this a useful series of accounts. They should appreciate the author's industry and scope, and they will be heartened by his cautious optimism over apparent trends toward a better future for the subject peoples. The volume appears under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. Primary sources are indicated in brief footnote references, but there is no bibliography. The index is inadequate and there are no maps.

STEPHEN W. REED
Yale University

HANRAHAN, GENE Z. *The Communist Struggle in Malaya.* With an introduction by Victor Purcell. Pp. xii, 133. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. $2.00.

This is a valuable, documented account of Communist organization and methods in Malaya from their beginnings in 1924 through 1953. The author's focus is primarily political, with comparatively little attention being given to the socio-economic context.

In the first two chapters, covering the period 1924–40, Mr. Hanrahan shows the close relationship between the Malayan Communist Party and the Comintern, but sees the Chinese Communist Party beginning to exert a paramount influence on the Malayan Party even before World War II, with the latter's membership already primarily recruited from Chinese Malayans. In this part one misses some estimate as to what part of prewar labor unrest was really Communist-led and inspired and what part was merely so labelled by some colonial officials.

Chapter III, "The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army," contains an account of the growth of the Communist-dominated anti-Japanese resistance movement with an assessment of the actual degree of strength and efficiency which it attained. Chapter IV, "The Period of Indecision and the Policy of Moderation," describes the divided counsel within the Malayan Communist Party and its wavering policies during the period September 1945—June 1948. Initially the party's leaders assumed that Malaya would be occupied by a Chinese army. Thereafter they attempted to develop political strength by building up their control over labor organizations, but

in the process appeared to lose peasant support.

Chapter V, "The Guerrilla Revolt" and Chapter VI, "The New Revolutionary Line" contain the most new material. With the launching of the mid-1948 insurrection, the Malayan Communist Party pursued an over-all strategy dominated by the experience of the Chinese Communist Party, with modified Peking rather than Moscow policies being followed. In the final chapter Mr. Hanrahan describes the important switch in party tactics commencing in October 1951 where the endeavor to win mass support took precedence over military and terrorist actions, a change which he notes was coincident with a global shift of Communist policy. He concludes that at present neither the government nor the Communists is strong enough to destroy the other, but that "this is a stalemate only in respect to Malaya itself, for any radical change in the situation outside Malaya would probably destroy the existing balance of power."

Though this study is generally well documented, it would be helpful for the reader to be told something concerning the credentials of Wu-tien-wang whose unpublished manuscript is frequently cited. While, for the most part, the author provides a substantial foundation of facts for his inferences and deductions, occasionally this is not the case.

GEORGE MCT. KAHIN
Cornell University

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

HOEFFDING, OLEG. *Soviet National Income and Product in 1928.* (A Research Study by the Rand Corporation.) Pp. x, 156. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $3.75.

This is an adequate addition to similar calculations of Abram Bergson for 1937 and Abram Bergson and Hans Heymann, Jr., for 1940–1948.

The author makes it clear that contrary to Bergson and Heymann, he had to deal with correct and reasonably complete statistics, and all that was needed was to adapt them to the procedure used by Bergson and Heymann for the later years. Soviet statisticians of the twenties deserve the greatest credit for building up such complicated accounting as that of the national income from almost nothing in only a few years. This reviewer has the greatest regard for this monumental statistical work and prefers to use the official estimates until and inclusive of 1928 as they are and chain the calculations for the subsequent years to them.

The disadvantage that the Soviet estimates of national income were based on their own concept of national income, ascribed to Marx, seems to be overemphasized by Dr. Hoeffding. It would be wonderful to have a series of reliable estimates for national income, Soviet concept, in the USSR for all the years after 1928.

Hoeffding's estimates for 1928 necessarily share in the advantages and disadvantages of the estimates for later years made by his colleagues. As are the latter, his estimates are made at established prices of the year involved and in "adjusted rubles," accepted by the authors as being at factor cost. To reach the estimates in "adjusted rubles," adjustments are made for indirect taxes, subsidies and (a welcome innovation) for differential profits (Tables 6 and 7). An important shortcoming is that no adequate provision is made for interest.

Under Soviet conditions (very intensive utilization of plan capacities; great inadequacy of investment funds in branches and sectors with low priorities), the cost of use of *effective* investments is extremley high. The investments in agriculture must be written down as ineffective (farm output increased negligibly). Immense amounts of effective capital were poured into heavy industry and transportation which resulted in very large increases in output and performance, and *in substantial reductions in relative factor cost.* Rates of interest appropriate for the United States are much too low for Soviet conditions. The small profits of the Soviet enterprises, suggested by the authors as a substitute for an interest charge, are greatly insufficient for this purpose.

In the Bergson-Heymann computations adjustment is also made for farm prices but under an unjustified assumption that farm incomes remain constant.

The principal use for the estimates of national income at prices prevailing in each year, whether these be factor or market cost, seems to be measurement of the changes in the relationships of the factor or market cost itself as among various economic branches. To widen the usability of the accounts, statisticians the world over are striving to make these estimates at comparable prices or costs. This is not done either in the book under review or its companions. Yet, attempts are made on a broad scale to utilize the findings for 1928 and 1937 for measuring the changes in economic structure in the intervening period (pp. 79–96).

Hoeffding writes (p. 81); "comparison of the two estimates [his for 1928 and Bergson's for 1927 in "adjusted rubles"] does not support what might seem to be a plausible inference from general information of Soviet economic experience in 1928–37, namely, that the first two Plans achieved and maintained a significant increase in the share of gross national product devoted to investment." Not only "inferences from general information," but estimates made in the only permissible yardstick—comparable prices show almost a doubling of the share of gross investment in gross national product (such an increase is implied also in the calculations for the share of net investment by Colin Clark and Julius Wyler).

All other changes in economic structure in that vital period of the Soviet economic history are likewise greatly minimized in Hoeffding's comparisons. It is, for example, easy to demonstrate that the share of the consumption of households had declined much more from 1928 to 1937 than by 16 per cent shown on p. 80, if it were computed in comparable prices, for example, in Bergson's "adjusted rubles" of either 1928 or 1937.

Much work would be needed to expand the usefulness of the computations in "adjusted rubles" beyond the narrow limits they have today.

NAUM JASNY
Soviet Economics Study Group

BERGSON, ABRAM, and HANS HEYMANN, JR. *Soviet National Income and Product, 1940–48.* (A Research Study by the Rand Corporation.) Pp. xii, 249. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $5.00.

"We assume . . ." "We guess . . ." "We shall not go far wrong if . . ." Yet it is all immensely worth while. Not for the detailed numerical answers, in which I have even less confidence than the authors, who are modest enough. But very much for the immense wealth of incidental learning and useful calculation, the book is a great quarry for lesser men to build out of. Also, the main orders of magnitude can perhaps be relied on. They never differ by as much as 50 per cent from those, yet unpublished, of Mr. A. Nove (Glasgow University); which is very reassuring.

The book under review is an extension of Prof. Bergson's previous *Soviet National and Product in 1937* to 1940, 1944 and 1948, and it is to the latter that we must go for the very special "philosophy" that underlies both. This is that Soviet relative prices in the plan era are sufficiently rational to be used, after various adjustments, for all the ordinary intertemporal and international comparisons which we base on other price systems. This seems to go both too far and not far enough. Too far in that when we get down to details Soviet relative prices are hopelessly irrational, and for this there is abundant and incontrovertible evidence. There might be, nevertheless, a rational proportionality between the average prices of the major categories of goods and services in which the authors deal.

On the other hand, such rationality is not needed for valid comparisons. Soviet planners would of course *plan* better with rational rubles, but bourgeois slanderers can *calculate* all right with irrational ones. Such rubles give a very different proportion of, say, investment to national income than would a revaluation of all Soviet outputs in dollars or pre-plan rubles. But the solution is not several closely printed pages of arbitrary finagling with the ruble: it is the ordinary procedure of valuing both national incomes in both sets of prices, as

is always done between non-Communist monetary systems.

If neither dollars nor pre-plan rubles nor current rubles give us the ideal scarcity relationships that ought to obtain in USSR, the adjusted ruble is no better. For we simply do not know what these relations are—that is, we do not know what would happen if Lerner's Rule were enforced instead of Khozraschot, and the turnover tax and the agricultural procurements abolished. Yet, in many passages the authors imply that their adjusted factor cost ruble answers precisely that question. All this is a wild goose chase. What we need is for each sector of the economy to have its own ruble-dollar purchasing power parity (for international comparisons) and its own price index (for intertemporal comparisons).

But if the "philosophy" is misguided the statistics are very good indeed.

P. J. D. WILES

Oxford University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

KLIMOV, GREGORY. *The Terror Machine: The Inside Story of the Soviet Administration in Germany.* Translated from the German by H. C. Stevens. Pp. 400. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. $4.00.

At first glance this book appears to be the story of Major Klimov, a young ambitious Russian engineer, as he participated in the day by day activity of Soviet Army headquarters in Berlin. As an account of the relations between the Soviets and the defeated Germans or between the Russians and the other members of the Control Commission, the book is interesting and revealing but not unique. Others have concentrated more on the story of the difficulties among the victors or on the merciless treatment accorded the losers by soldiers and bureaucrats.

The real contribution of *The Terror Machine* is not as an inside story of Soviet rule over the Germans but as a revealing analysis of the Russian people and especially of the young Russian mind. We become aware of the spiritual strength of the Russian people, partially a result of the victory of 1945. Joy came not because the peaceful existence of prewar years was once more possible but because "we stood at a frontier, a frontier that marked the end of the darkest period of our life, and the beginning of a new, still unknown period." A major task had been well done and the people faced forward with their leaders, forgetting that they had lived in a land of decrees and repression and fear.

As the story unfolds after V-E Day at Russian headquarters in Berlin or back home on leave in Moscow, the Russian people are slowly made aware that the regime has not changed and that the individual is still part of a mass bent to the will of the dictatorship. The paralysing fear of authority once more reigns. One of the most revealing passages—and there are many—is Major Klimov's description of a Control Commission luncheon at the residence of the head of the British delegation. Since the members of the Russian delegation had no orders on how to act, they were at a loss and suspicious of each other. "As I chanced to look up from my plate, I met General Shabalin's eyes gazing at me keenly . . . of course I knew the general was in duty bound to keep an eye on me. But I noticed that he was not so much watching me as attempting to decide whether I was watching him."

This book is almost a must for those who realize we must know the Russian people if we are to live at peace with them.

RALPH F. BISCHOFF

New York University

PINSON, KOPPEL S. *Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization.* Pp. xv, 637. College ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $7.50.

American scholars have long waited for the appearance of a complete, definitive one-volume treatment in English of modern German history. Previous publications in German history have suffered from one drawback or another: among them Veit Valentin's *The German People* (weak in organization and indifferently written); the "Short Histories" by S. H. Steinberg and Shuster and Bergstraesser (more than fulfilling their titles by being too short); J. Ellis Barker's *Modern Germany* (now outdated), and A. J. P. Taylor's *The Course of German History* (a scintillating *tour de force* but rigidly condensed).

Koppel S. Pinson's admirable *Modern Germany* seems to be the answer to this pressing need in American academic life. Superbly planned, organized, and executed, this book is a model of clarity. The narrative flows smoothly, with many passages of high literary quality. The author's knowledge of both source and secondary material on German history is encyclopedic in nature; his incisively critical documentation is among the most notable features of the work. He strikes a careful balance among intellectual, political, economic, social, religious, and psychological factors, interweaving them skillfully and with good judgment. This is first-rate historical writing.

Pinson has avoided an extensive, detailed account of Bismarck's diplomacy, the wars of national unification, and the two world wars, and, instead, has directed his attention to such significant forces as liberalism, nationalism, and industrialism. The chapters on the Catholic and socialist traditions in Germany are significant contributions in a book distinguished in general by its originality, a laudable characteristic in any textbook. Especially noteworthy is the author's penetrating analysis of the Revolution of 1848, whose failure in the Germanies he attributes to "the enormous disparity between the political aspirations of the German liberals and the mass support, and [the] actual power and influence they commanded" (pp. 106–7). His account of the origins of World War I, based on study at the Hoover War Library, and his descriptions of the Weimar Republic, the emergence of Nazism, and the Hitler regime are among the best and most convincing treatments of these subjects yet published.

Naturally, there is room for difference of opinion in the interpretation of German history, one of the most controversial fields of modern history; opposing views of the same sets of facts need not be regarded necessarily as lacking in historical objectivity. Other specialists will advocate different views on the role of Prussia in German history (on the ground that Pinson underestimates this central theme), the relationship of Junkerdom and militarism, the extent of the difference between German and Western liberalism, whether or not Nazism can be understood only as a specifically twentieth-century phenomenon, and whether or not the historian Friedrich Meinecke, as an apostle of German liberalism, should be regarded with reverential awe. Others will take issue on such minor points as Pinson's attack on the current revisionist approach to Metternich's conservatism (pp. 55–56), or his denial that Richard Wagner was a herald of Hitlerism —after demonstrating in a brilliant section the tremendous influence of Wagner beyond "clusters of sound" both inside and outside Germany (pp. 264–67).

Such disagreements and differences of opinion are to be expected, as Pinson recognizes (". . . There never is one side that is all black while another is all white" . . . [p. 294]). All in all, this book appears to the reviewer as the finest and most useful history of modern Germany yet to appear in English. A genuinely welcome contribution; it is within the best tradition of American scholarship.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

City College of New York

SALVEMINI, GAETANO. *Prelude to World War II.* Pp. 519. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1954. $7.50.

To review in a few brief sentences a book of over 500 long pages is always a bold undertaking. When the book to be considered has flown from the pen of the respected dean of Italian historians and when it deals with twenty years of international history, such an enterprise is almost bound to seem impertinent and furthermore to be pointless. Fully conscious of its difficulties, I assume the task willingly, however, but with the utmost diffidence. My only aim is to call attention to this remarkable work and to indicate the purposes and methods of its distinguished author.

As is well known, Professor Salvemini was, during the very years of which he tells the story, the witness in exile of his

country's destiny. H ewas by American hospitality spared the humiliation of residing in his native land, then rendered uninhabitable for all upright scholars. Written in Cambridge, dedicated to "My colleagues and students at Harvard," finished in July 1949, printed in Great Britain and published in New York in 1954, the *Prelude to World War II* very naturally bears the traces of these circumstances.

This is the case, as I see it, in two principal respects.

First, as concerns the documentation on which the work is based. Professor Salvemini's main sources seem to be British and American newspapers, particularly the London *Morning Post*, *Observer*, and *Daily Mail*, and the *New York Times*. He writes, in his very frank and revealing Preface:

"If documents were available in greater number, newspapers would have received less attention. Since most documents are still buried in archives, or are being destroyed, one must resort to indirect evidence, and that furnished by the Press is precious."

As the author, however, is a very experienced historian and endowed furthermore with exceptional intellectual integrity, he is naturally led to prefer to mere newspaper reports direct quotations of speeches and diplomatic notes as could be found in the press.

This brings me to the second characteristic of the book which strikes me as an inevitable result of the circumstances under which it was prepared. Gaetano Salvemini is a great Italian patriot. His love of liberty led him to leave his fatherland for a country in which Mussolini's Fascist policies were in deep disfavor long before America entered World War II as one of Italy's foes. What position could he assume? To defend these policies would have meant to become untrue to his innermost convictions. To denounce them undiscriminately would expose him, in his own eyes still more than in those of his American hosts, to the reproach of siding with the latter, whose protection he was enjoying against his fellow countrymen whose lot he was not sharing. As he is anything but a renegade, his double fidelity to his principles and to his nationality drove him to the conclusion that, as he writes, "one is entitled to respect a people while not condoning the crimes of its politicians, and to denounce the dishonesty of its politicians without being charged with hostility against their people."

This conviction of the compatibility of the guilt of the rulers and of the innocence of their people underlies Professor Salvemini's whole story. It allows him to denounce not only Mussolini and Hitler, but also the French and especially the British politicians. In his view their weaknesses made them the unwilling but still the real accomplices of the Italian and German archcriminals. After a very clear and particularly careful analysis of European international politics from the birth of Fascism to the outbreak of World War II, Salvemini sums up his conclusions in condemning most of the leading European statesmen of his time.

His very personal, preponderantly diplomatic and ethical conception of history makes Professor Salvemini's work eminently readable. There is something refreshingly juvenile about his constant censoriousness and his frequent outbursts of indignation.

Is history however only the story of diplomatic maneuvers, somber intrigues, and bloody adventures? Why did the country of Dante, after World War I, fall a prey to Fascism? Why, ten years later, did the grandchildren of Goethe and Beethoven succumb to Nazism? What is the true significance of the Bolshevist threat to present civilization? Such are questions to which the readers of Professor Salvemini will find no adequate reply in his remarkable work, but which they will ask more avidly and more intelligently after being enlightened by his careful scholarship and his great expository talent.

WILLIAM E. RAPPARD
Graduate Institute of International Studies
Geneva

SPENCER, PHILIP. *Politics of Belief in Nineteenth-Century France: Lacordaire, Michon, Veuillot.* Pp. 285. New York: Grove Press, 1954. $6.00.

There has been need for this book, and the author has measured up to the task he chose.

Politics of Belief examines the work of three Frenchmen of the nineteenth century who strove as Catholics to grapple with the problem of how the Church should meet the challenge of the modern world. Lacordaire is presented as the "penitent Christian and impenitent liberal," Veuillot as the leading representative of those whose answer was an exaltation of the Papacy and a condemnation of the modernists, and Michon as symbolizing those torn by the tension between faith and reason.

Lacordaire, in the author's view, ultimately proved a victor; Veuillot outlived his seeming triumph; while the issue which vexed Michon will never be resolved, but must be debated anew in each generation.

Too seldom have scholars outside France —and seldom, too, the French themselves —given serious attention to the debate which provides the matter of this book. Yet in this realm of discussion, as also in other realms involving secular problems of social politics, French thinkers of the early and mid-nineteenth century explored issues which still mark the basic problems of both secular and religious thought in our own times.

This book therefore deserves the attention of both specialists, concerned with the history of French thought in the period between 1830 and 1870, and the serious general reader, seeking a better understanding of his own conscience-wracked age.

The author is to be commended for his gracious and colorful style, as well as his diligent scholarship and temperate judgment.

PAUL FARMER
Portland, Maine

COBBAN, ALFRED. *Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague.* Pp. 255. London: Jonathan Cape, 1954. 21 *s* net.

Sir James Harris, who later was created Earl of Malmesbury, was British Ambassador with the States-General of the Dutch Republic during the years when, in the aftermath of the disastrous Fourth English War (as the participation in the war over the American revolt is traditionally called in Holland), the country was torn by a vehement conflict between the so-called "Patriots" and the Stadtholder, William V of Orange and his adherents. This conflict, which in 1785–87 came to verge on civil war, could not leave the surrounding powers indifferent. The Orangist party had always advocated an English alliance, the Patriots, for that reason, could not count on the support of France.

Professor Cobban describes the struggle between the British and the French Embassies at The Hague, each, but particularly the latter, making use of agents of various grades of reliability and usefulness. Harris's task was to put heart into the Orangist party in the various provinces, whose titular head, Prince William V, was totally unfitted for the stress of the times. The Prussians also come into the picture, largely on account of the Princess of Orange, who was a sister of the new king of Prussia and a woman of a strong and active character. In the end it was a Prussian army that restored Stadtholderly power in The Hague. It was England, however, working hand in hand with the Prussians, that reaped the benefit by establishing her influence in the republic. Not for long, though, for in 1795 the French Revolutionary army overran the country, and the Patriots, in exile or at least out of power since 1787, set up the Batavian Republic on more or less revolutionary principles and closely bound to France.

Professor Cobban has drawn on a mass of unpublished material, and his book throws a good deal of light on a diplomatic episode of which very little is known outside Holland. His pen pictures of Harris and a crowd of his associates and antagonists make good reading. One cannot help feeling, however, that he has missed the most important aspect. He states that he will not deal with the Dutch domestic side of these complications more than is necessary to make the diplomatic struggle intelligible. To pass a valid judgment on Harris's activities, the historian must, none the less, have a clear conception of the crisis in which the diplomat interfered.

In itself, moreover, this crisis would have repaid more sustained attention. With its enlightened and democratic tendencies the Dutch Patriots Movement presents a striking rehearsal for the French Revolution. But, the conflict within its ranks between democrats and aristocrats, and the social standing of each, have never become clear to the author. Inevitably he has to make numerous references to Dutch institutions, personalities, and incidents, but as he does not give more than perfunctory, and in essential points, erroneous indications of the general background, the effect on the reader must often be bewildering.

The explanation of the book's defectiveness in this respect is probably the author's obvious ignorance of the Dutch language which has prevented him from making any effective use of the Dutch historical literature to which he nevertheless occasionally refers.

PIETER GEYL
University of Utrecht
Netherlands

Le Groupe d'Études de la Comptabilité Nationale. *Premiers Éléments d'une Comptabilité Nationale de la Belgique, 1948–1951.* Pp. xii, 209. Bruxelles: Les Éditions de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1953. 250 f. b.

Belgium is one of the few countries in Western Europe without an official system of national accounts. Until now students of the Belgian economy have had available only the invaluable measures of the national income by Professor Fernand Baudhuin, of the Catholic University of Lauvain.

It is therefore extremely gratifying to have this pioneering and authoritative (although unofficial) work on the national accounts of Belgium for the years 1948–1951, prepared by the special "Groupe d'Études de la Comptabilité Nationale" of the Institut de Sociologie Solvay, at the Free University of Brussels. The research of the group was carried on "under the authority" of Professor Henri Janne, the director of the institute, and under the chairmanship of Professor Etienne-Sadi Kirschen. The study not only marks an important event in the evolution of Belgian national income statistics but probably it also is the first macroeconomic investigation in Belgium.

The Belgian national accounts presented in this work are based on the system developed by the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (*A Standardised System of National Accounts,* Paris, 1952), which is currently utilized by a number of countries in Western Europe and by some international organizations. This makes possible for the first time international comparisons of the Belgian national income and product with those of other countries. However, the work is not a mere compilation of statistical information: it combines with the purely technical descriptions of the national accounts a significant analysis of the nature and operation of the Belgian economy in the years 1948–1951. The text comprises an historical chapter, nine other chapters, and a conclusion. It is enriched by one hundred analytical tables and thirteen illuminating graphs.

The introductory chapter discusses the evolution of the study of national accounts, and their various uses and limitations. It then describes the development of the study of national accounts in Belgium. Here—as well as at other appropriate points throughout the text—the authors make clear the serious statistical obstacles that had to be surmounted in building up a Belgian system of national accounts. They point out that for many areas of the Belgian economy the necessary statistical information is simply not available, while the published statistics vary in preciseness, and the necessary basic co-ordination of the existing statistical data has not yet been achieved. Moreover, the authors continue, "the economic statistics actually published in Belgium concentrate attention on some aspects only of the economic life, such as the evolution of basic industries, the movement of prices, or the monetary situation, to the prejudice of aggregates (*grandeurs*) which only the national accounts make conspicuous, such as the total production, the total consumption, or the formation of capital." Consequently, they warn that "the preciseness of the published figures in this work is variable. It is relatively satisfactory as regards the principal receipts and expenditures of the state, as well as for the balance of payments. It is somewhat less good for most of the other aggregates (for example, the construction of housing or consumption of food). In some cases, the margin of error may attain 10 to 20 per cent. For the global figures, and more particularly the gross national product, it appears that the probable difference must not exceed 5 per cent."

These statistical gaps and problems have necessitated a number of methodological changes from the OEEC's "standardized system" (for example, regrouping and reduction in the number of accounts), which are discussed in Chapter II on "The Mechanism of the National Accounts." This chapter defines systematically the sectors of the economy, the national accounts, and the principal economic aggregates—gross national product, national income, and utilized resources (*ressources utilisées*), that is, total expenditures. These economic aggregates are analyzed in detail in the subsequent three chapters (III–V): "The Analysis of Production"; "The Analysis of Expenditures of the Economy" and "The Analysis of Income." And Chapters VI to X are devoted to "a description of the principal tables" which introduce and illuminate "the salient facts of the economy," namely, "Private Consumption"; "Receipts and Expenditures of the State Sector"; "Internal Formation of Capital"; "The Balance of Payments," and "Financing of the Formation of Capital."

Although primarily of inestimable value to researchers on the Belgian economy, this important work also should be of interest to students and specialists in the field of national income accounting.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER
Washington, D. C.

OTHER COUNTRIES

SANGER, RICHARD H. *The Arabian Peninsula.* Pp. xiv, 295. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. $5.00.

The literature dealing with the Arabian desert has been greatly enriched by this book of Richard H. Sanger. He was formerly officer in charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs in the Department of State of the United States and, more recently, Public Affairs Adviser of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

The book covers the great Arab Quadrangle, which is mostly desert, and thus leaves apart the Fertile Crescent. Saudi Arabia occupies the bulk of this arid tableland, but Mr. Sanger also devotes interesting chapters to Kuwait, fortunate owner of the world's deepest oil well known today; to pearl- and petroleum-rich Bahrein; besides the Sheikhdoms of Muscat and the Trucial coast. Aden and its parched hinterland also engage his attention, as does the Imamate of Yemen, which the Romans called Arabia Felix.

Mr. Sanger knows much of this vast region from first hand. He represented the State Department on a mission to Yemen not long ago, and he seems to have visited several of the exotic sheikhdoms, apart from the more obvious places of Saudi Arabia. He knew the late King Ibn Saud, knows his son and heir, on the throne today, and several important sheikhs.

The desert has an ineffable fascination for some people. Mr. Sanger seems to be one of them, and that is, probably, why he writes so superbly about it. His enthusiasm, never inartistically obvious, carries away the reader, too. He writes feelingly about the people of the tent, engaged in an uphill fight against the forces of a sedentary civilization. He deals understandingly with the people of the palm, in line with historic progress. Arabia and petroleum are synonymous today and so the author treats us to a well-informed description of Aramco, which is America's largest Middle East investment. It is also the entering wedge of a civilization which surpasses Arabian Night wonders in native eyes.

The emptiest thing in the world, as some explorers call it, Arabia's Empty Quarter, is poetically described here on the basis of the explorers' own accounts. Soon this Quarter will be filled with the tattoo of riveters as oil exploration pierces its cosmic silence.

The Arabian peninsula has shown to the author that the history of our globe has

become one for the first time in man's recorded life. The West has completely overwhelmed the East, which has fallen under the spell of the machine. Will it be its salvation, will it be our doom? Time was when the East gave us our imperishable values. But what is the use of those values, corroded as they were by disease, ignorance, and poverty? The synthesis of the best produced by East and West may yet provide the escape, but how and through what agency?

It is perhaps because of Mr. Sanger's official position that he had to gloss over the disease, ignorance, and poverty of the Arabian peninsula. It is a pity, because we need that information, too, and it would have further enhanced the value of an otherwise brilliant book.

EMIL LENGYEL

New York University

LANDAU, JACOB M. *Parliaments and Parties in Egypt.* Foreword by Bernard Lewis. Pp. vii, 212. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $3.50.

The first of the Arabic-speaking nations to become emancipated from the Ottoman rule, Egypt was also the first to develop parliamentary institutions and political parties in the Western sense. While the new political order came to prevail in many areas of the Middle East, disappointments and frustrations with respect to parliaments and political parties ultimately led to a reaction against these Western institutions.

Dr. Landau's monograph, originally a doctoral dissertation at the University of London, deals with the development of parliaments and political parties in Egypt in a detailed and factual manner based on research into the available original sources. Part I treats of the development of parliamentary institutions from the establishment of the first Consultative Assembly of Notables in 1866 under Ismail Pasha to the advent of Major-General Mohammed Naguib and the abolition of the monarchy in 1952, through the various constitutional changes in Egypt. Part II traces the evolution of Egyptian political parties, beginning with the old Egyptian secret societies in the mid-nineteenth century. While this aspect of the development of Egyptian political institutions centers primarily on such major parties as the National Party, *Al-hizb al-watani,* and the *Wafd,* the picture is completed with a delineation of the minor political groupings or parties, both in the early twentieth century and in the interwar era. Dr. Landau points out that, to all intents and purposes, Egyptian political parties have all stemmed from the national movement in Egypt, that they have been poorly organized, however wide their seeming appeal or clientele, and that they have tended to center around dominant personalities and leaders, rather than party programs or principles. The author also points out that differences in party programs or principles have developed in the past, not so much on the basis of social and economic textures, but on attitudes toward (1) Great Britain and (2) Islam.

While the volume is not strikingly written, and has some of the faults and many of the virtues of a doctoral dissertation, it is a succinct and concise treatment of a very important subject. It closes with a bibliography of the more important sources, including manuscript and archival material, which have gone into the study.

HARRY N. HOWARD

Arlington, Va.

HARRISON, BRIAN. *Southeast Asia: A Short History.* Pp. xi, 268. New York: St. Martins Press, 1954. $3.50.

The author of this book, currently the professor of history at the University of Hongkong and formerly lecturer in history at the University of Malaya, has undertaken the ambitious task of summarizing for the general reader the entire sweep of the history of the half dozen or more countries of Southeast Asia in less than 260 pages of text. The story starts with the Java Ape Man and runs through to the postwar recession of the tide of European imperialism. It is a welcome first-attempt effort to integrate a vast body of political history hitherto available only in scattered works in various languages often difficult of access. The author summarizes admirably the account by Coedès of the history of the ancient Hindu and Buddhist empires of Indonesia in particular. He has done some original research in the history of British policy in Malaya and the Straits and also gives a fairly detailed account of the history of Java and Sumatra. He may be commended for correlating the events of modern European history with contemporaneous developments in Southeast Asia, especially in the half century following 1780.

Unfortunately, the comprehensive grasp of knowledge of the area so indispensable for anyone attempting to generalize in brief compass concerning so vast a span of history is simply not available to the author outside the areas of his specialization. His account of the histories of Burma, Siam, Indochina and the Philippines reflects, at best, only a superficial reading of available secondary materials. Even with respect to Java, the author gives evidence of no appreciation of the tenacity of indigenous Javanese culture in resisting alien intrusions, Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, or Christian.

Minor misstatements of fact are numerous. The Salween River Valley, for example, was never used extensively as a trade route from China to the Bay of Bengal (as stated on p. 19), nor is there a river valley connection between the Arakan and India. The Chettyars and other Indians never acquired ownership of one-third (p. 224) to one-half (p. 212) of the cultivated land of Burma, but only some 2¼ million acres in a total of 18 million. The University of Rangoon was founded in 1921, not in 1923, and separation from India occurred in 1937 not 1939 (pp. 228 and 247). With respect to Indochina, the Pigneau de Behaine treaty of 1787 was never executed by France as implied on page 150, and the character and motivation of French imperialist policy in the nineteenth century is very meagerly appreciated. Professor Harrison's contention (p. 236) that Southeast Asian nationalism was limited to the Western-educated elite needs to be qualified. The feeling of resistance to foreign rule was deeply rooted and included an instinctive defense of cultural values regarded by the people as being outraged and betrayed not only by the foreigners, but also by many of the Western-educated elite themselves.

Such defects and criticisms underscore the fact that historical scholarship within this new field has apparently not yet reached the point where a really adequate short history of Southeast Asia can be written. Professor Harrison's pioneering effort has contributed to that goal partly because it has demonstrated that much more work needs to be done.

JOHN F. CADY

Ohio University

NEWMAN, BARNARD. *Report on Indo-China.* Pp. 245. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $4.00.

One can enjoy this book without being impressed by its scholarship or by its bid for lasting value. It conveys impressions of a trip through a zone torn by battle. Bernard Newman is adept at such reporting, having written two score books on travel, war, and politics in less than that many years. His work bears the nervous imprint of swift writing, but it is competent writing, journalism of a high order, and valuable today when not enough is obtainable about Indo-China.

His own photographs and those from the French and Vietnamese Press and Information Services, with which he supplements them, are admirable. They reflect the author's trip from Saigon through Vietnam's principal show places. He meets the Emperor; describes Dalat, the Northern Capital, and the Baei d'Along; visits the Mois tribesmen; inspects numerous battle fronts; and arrives in the hinterland to see Laos, marvel at Angkor, and salute Cambodia. For those who have once felt the spell of Angkor, few others can describe it, yet Bernard Newman does find words to express his appreciation at first viewing the Temple of Angkor Vat, and all must agree with him when he concludes: "This is a sight to draw a man half way round the world and make him feel glad that he came."

The author has illuminating pages about Vietnam and his visit to the center of the Cao Dai Catholic cult, with its discursive and attractive nuns and its private army.

But if one were to seek enlightenment from his pages on the Binh Xuyen religious sect, which has remained aloof from the Diem cabinet, the largest of the three sects that struggle for power and which controls the police of Saigon, one would find not even an entry in his index.

I am sorry, too, that he lists only Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia as the centers of little Vehicle Buddhism, omitting Thailand, where the religion found refuge for a thousand years, and whence priests were invited centuries ago to spark the revival of Buddhism in Ceylon.

Being chaperoned by the French, Mr. Newman writes a history of Cambodia as seen from Paris. He mentions Battambang only of the three provinces "ceded" by the Japanese to Thailand during the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia. He makes only fleeting reference to Son Ngoc Thanh, temporary premier of Cambodia after the abortive declaration of independence of 1945. While Mr. Newman was in Cambodia this former premier was a leader of underground nationalist troups in division strength, but our author omits reference to Son Ngoc Thanh's letter to King Norodom Sihanouk promising to surrender himself and his men whenever governmental powers were restored to the elected representatives of the people. It speaks well for the improved status of this land of Cambodia which Mr. Newman saw in turmoil, but where Communists have never won a foothold that Son Ngoc Thanh has now come in to make terms, apparently contented.

Some of Mr. Newman's chapters smack of special pleading, and his omissions hurt his case. In describing how war comes to Indo-China, he omits all reference to General Valluy's telegram to Colonel Debes, Commander of the French troops at Haiphong, and to the latter's action of November 23, 1946, which is like telling of the American Revolution without mention of the Boston Massacre.

I think that the French who are leaving and the free Asians who are taking over in Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos may also be glad that Bernard Newman came to visit them. His is not the definitive book on this troubled epoch, but he holds a mirror to the rush of events. He is an optimist in his final word:

"The French have done excellent work in laying the foundations of progress, and can be just as beneficent when they lay down the role of tutor and adopt that of friend."

WILLIAM LEON SMYSER
University of Pennsylvania

NEEDHAM, JOSEPH, with the research assistance of LING WANG. *Science and Civilisation in China.* Vol. I: *Introductory Orientations.* Pp. xxxviii, 318. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. $10.00.

This book—the first of seven volumes which, when complete, will provide for the first time in any language a history of Chinese science—deserves much more space than can be allotted to it here. Its author brings unique qualifications to his formidable undertaking: a distinguished career at Cambridge University both as a biochemist and as an historian of science, coupled with almost two decades' study of the Chinese language and history, and supplemented by some four years of residence in China itself.

This introductory volume treats of such matters as the nature of the Chinese language, sources for the study of Chinese science and technology, and China's geography and political history. Of particular interest is its lengthy concluding section on the history of China's intellectual contacts with the outside world (the ancient Near East, India, Iran, the Islamic and Western civilizations), at the end of which comes a stimulating discussion of diffusion, independent invention, and other problems involved in the study of cultural interconnections. On page 242 there is a fascinating table listing twenty-six examples of Chinese technology (many of them wholly new, even to specialists), with indications of the time lag (anywhere from one to seventeen centuries) between their first occurrence in China and later appearance in the West.

The encyclopedic body of material covered by this volume is carefully and judiciously handled, lucidly presented, and enlivened by a warm literary style. Careful documentation is provided by a bibliography listing almost a thousand items in Western languages, together with several hundreds in Chinese. Both in it and in the main text, Chinese characters are supplied for all Chinese names and terms. Aside from occasional minor errors, inevitable in a widely ranging work such as this, the book's main weakness, if it has one, is an overabundance of detail on certain topics (for example, geography or political history) which, at times, seems somewhat unnecessary. In its typography, format and numerous illustrations (including maps and a Taoist painting reproduced on the cover), the book is an exceptionally beautiful example of the art of the printer.

Not only China specialists, but all persons interested in the history of cultural exchanges between different civilizations, will look forward to the publication of the remaining six volumes, to deal successively with the philosophical background of Chinese science; mathematics, astronomy and the earth sciences; physics, engineering and technology; chemistry and industrial chemistry; biology, agriculture and medicine; and the Chinese social background from which all these things sprang.

DERK BODDE
University of Pennsylvania

BARCLAY, GEORGE W. *A Report on Taiwan's Population to The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction.* Pp. xii, 120. Princeton, N. J.: Office of Population Research, Princeton University, 1954. $2.50.

This little book is more important than its informal publication might suggest. It was prepared by Mr. Barclay as a report on nearly a year's study in Taiwan as demographic consultant to the Joint (United States-Chinese) Commission on Rural Reconstruction. At the same time it is a supplement to Mr. Barclay's recently published study of *Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan* (1954).

Together these form a remarkably lucid case study of the demographic history and prospects of the island of Formosa. The first covers the period of Japanese colonialism, the second the postwar period of Chinese Nationalist control. The purposes of the two volumes, however, are quite different: the first was designed for a scholarly audience, while the present one is directed at the practical administrative and policy problems of Taiwan itself.

In the present volume, Barclay displays a clarity and simplicity of presentation rarely achieved by social scientists. His description of the system for maintaining population data in Taiwan, and of the nature and significance of the available data, is a model for the treatment of so technical a subject.

The broader significance of the study of Formosan demography lies in the fact that it provides an especially well-documented example of a peasant population undergoing selective modernization. In its demographic aspects this has meant a reduction in the death rate as a result of cheap public health measures without a change in the values and practices that maintain very high fertility. The unique statistical record maintained by the Japanese between 1905–43 is probably the most accurate available for such a population over a long period of time.

The rate of natural increase in Formosa has now approximated 2½ per cent annually for a generation. Such a rate of growth cannot continue in the long run and this is the dilemma posed by the author. At such a rate, he points out, "it would take the people of Taiwan only a century and a half to produce the reputed 450 million of the whole of China, and less than 250 years to surpass the present population of the entire world" (pp. 45–46).

Either the birth rate must ultimately go down or the death rate must go up. The reduction of fertility is made difficult according to the author: (a) by official opposition, (b) by the absence of knowledge and means for restricting fertility, and, most important, (c) by the family system and the attitudes and values of which it is composed. These give little hope of early change. *"In the absence of alternative ways* of getting things done, ties of family and friendship are relied upon by nearly everyone for accomplishing many indispensable transactions and services. . . . Thus, the large-family pattern will tend to

persist until, as in all countries that have had success in modernization, new standards of behavior are developed for nonfamilial activities" (p. 103).

Mr. Barclay hopes that education will create new aspirations, especially for such personal benefits as maternal health, that may be increasingly satisfied by concrete progress in economic and social achievement. Intelligent planning in the latter sphere is hampered by lack of knowledge. Barclay closes with some realistic warning and advice on the need for an early census in order to salvage the excellent statistical system left by the Japanese.

DUDLEY KIRK
The Population Council

BUTOW, ROBERT J. C. *Japan's Decision to Surrender.* (Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, Publication. No. 24.) Pp. xi, 259. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954. $4.00.

A novel could not be more exciting than this exceptionally well documented, indexed, and scholarly account of Japan's decision to surrender. Reading other men's minds is at best a difficult if not impossible task, as the author readily acknowledges; but because it is based upon numerous original sources, both in English and Japanese, the story is convincing.

Although vividly portraying the power of so few (the "Big Six") to control the destiny of so many, the book discloses the conflicting views of those in authority and the indecision which remained until the final moment. The evidence is clear that it is not only in the Western democracies that important decisions are sometimes hard and slow in the making. War Minister, General Anami; Army Chief, General Umezu; and Navy Chief, Admiral Toyoda expressed the desire to fight on. They were almost always opposed by Foreign Minister Togo and Navy Minister, retired Admiral Yonai, who wanted an early termination of the war and were usually supported by elderly and vacillating Premier, retired Admiral Suzuki. This conflict made quick decisions by either the Cabinet or the Supreme Council on vital issues almost impossible. The former group, consciously or unconsciously influenced by the samurai tradition inoculated into their younger and fanatical subordinate officers, wanted to negotiate a peace only after a final operational success on the field of battle, if need be on the very shores of Japan itself, in the belief that this would procure better surrender terms, but they never adequately indicated how this success could be achieved. The latter group, instigated and supported by Lord Keeper of Privy Seal, Kido, wanted immediate peace with honor on the sole condition that the imperial institution be preserved. The Emperor, himself, eventually cut the Gordian knot and caused the final decision for peace by exercising his influence through his unprecedented pronouncements and actions.

How the Japanese leaders used the art of "haragei"—saying one thing while meaning another—to achieve their ends in a sort of play acting is well described. There is a fine account of the launching of peace feelers in Sweden and Switzerland, especially those initiated unofficially by subordinate officers at great risk to themselves. These officers were informed through the Office of Strategic Services channels that their venture would end in failure unless official negotiations were commenced in advance of a possible Soviet entry into the war. The quest for Soviet aid (in spite of the Yalta Agreement the contents of which the Japanese were apparently not fully cognizant) and later Soviet mediation make absorbing reading. The part played by the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the intense struggle within the United States Government in reaching the decision to consent to a continuance of the Imperial House, are also indicated, if not sufficiently stressed. The importance of the time element, the commission of hara-kiri by Anami and Kido, and Suzuki's fear of and escape from assassination by the younger officers make the ordinary cloak and dagger story seem pale by comparison. From the Japanese decision of September 6, 1941 to prepare for war while continuing negotiations for peace to that of June 22, 1945 when they elected to prepare for peace while continuing the war, the reader's interest and intellect are stirred. This is a "must" book.

ALBERT E. KANE
Washington, D. C.

FITZGIBBON, RUSSELL H. *Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy.* Pp. xiv, 301. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954. $5.75.

Among books about single Latin American countries by political scientists (or, in fact, anyone else, including "travel writers"), Fitzgibbon's *Uruguay* is at once one of the easiest to read and one of the most informative. He has succeeded in describing and analyzing with a vivid, human style not only the political forms and behavior of the smallest and most democratic nation of South America, but has also provided at least the outlines of the total culture and social organization of the country. Were it not for the relatively slight United States reader interest in Latin American affairs, the book would doubtless have been featured on the list of a commercial publisher. As it is, Rutgers University Press has presented a fine edition that deserves to be widely circulated.

It is important for those interested in democracy to understand Uruguay, the least extensive and yet the most progressive nation in South America. This Dr. Fitzgibbon helps one to do in terms of history, geography, political analysis, economics, an interpretation of the arts, patterns of communications, the role of the religion, and a shrewd appraisal of the country's international position—terms, however, that practically always have direct empirical reference to the human situation.

Although the treatment of Uruguay's accomplishment is sympathetic, it is not one of unqualified optimism. The life of any nation except Utopia consists in a continual attempt to solve problems. Although Uruguay is not presented with some of the difficulties that beset other Latin American countries, it has its share. For example, it has relatively less ethnic, geographic, and social diversity than many of its neighbors of the Hemisphere. But, on the other hand, it is faced with the task of bridging the enormous gap between the life of the disproportionately enormous capital city and that of the rest of the country, and it is permanently placed as a buffer state between "two jaws of the pincers: Argentina and Brazil," to mention no other continuing problems. Uruguay has its challenges and also its opportunity to set an example for the rest of Latin America and the free world. On Fitzgibbon's showing, the chances appear good that both will be met successfully by the peaceful participation of the people as a whole and for their benefit. If one South American country can do this, perhaps others eventually will do likewise. Uruguay as of now, at least, is a living negation of the proposition that "democracy and social progress are impossible in Latin America."

JOHN GILLIN
University of North Carolina

BOXER, CHARLES R. *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602–1686.* Pp. xvi, 451. London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1952. $7.50.

Imperial Portugal once looked out from Lisbon upon an empire stretched on both shores of the Atlantic, and into Asia. Trade in sugar and slaves linked two of these frontiers in a triangular commerce which connected Angola (slaves) with Brazil (sugar) and Portugal. Many officials of the empire had seen service and made profit in Brazil, Africa, and the East. Occasionally an official of the Crown, such as Salvador de Sá, combined extensive private wealth, made by his family in Rio de Janeiro, with useful service to the Crown. Many Brazilian colonials were permitted to serve the Portuguese Crown directly than Spain allowed in her American administration.

The Luso-Brazilian world of the seventeenth century had few families as rooted in the New World, yet valued in the European councils of Portugal, as were the Sás of Rio. Through the life, ambitions, and adventures of Salvador de Sá, almost all the interests of the day came to life: the drives of the *paulistas* into the West

and South, the overland trade with Spanish Tucuman and Potosí, the Portuguese *drang nach süden* to the River Plate, the naval and land wars with the Dutch, slave trade in Africa, mining, shipbuilding, and sugar wealth in Brazil; the potent role of the Jesuit order in Brazil; the diplomatic relations of Portugal with the France of Mazarin and the England of the Restoration. Salvador de Sá was part of most of these and witness of all of them.

The personal material for Sá's biography is very limited and incomplete. The author, however, has skilfully expanded the history of Brazil and Portugal to cover up the absence of private and diaristic data. What little of these exist, he has read and used, but less than a handful of items can be found. Consequently the material in the volume is a vast dragnet of relevant data found in Dutch, British, Brazilian, Portuguese, and French letters, travel, secondary works, and archival documents. These have passed through the author's remarkable historical knowledge about Portugal and settled into a clear, organized pattern of description and narrative history. We may not know as much as we like about the life of Salvador de Sá, but we receive an excellent grasp of Luso-Brazilian affairs, and Angola, Lisbon, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires come from background to foreground as Salvador de Sá conquered, administered, or visited in all these places.

The scarcity of memoirs or diaries of Iberian historical figures is well known. Researchers cannot do anything about it. Contemporaries mention that "notable old stickler," Salvador de Sá, but Professor Boxer has set him back upon his stage of action. His history is very pleasant in style, quite fair yet frank in interpretation, and a real contribution to historical literature. Appendices, bibliography, index, and maps complete the usefulness of the work.

HARRY BERNSTEIN
Brooklyn College

HUMPHREYS, R. A. *Liberation in South America, 1806–1827: The Career of James Paroissien.* Pp. xii, 177. London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1952. (Distributed in the U. S. by John de Graff.) $5.00.

This is the story of the independence movement in southern South America, and of the contribution of a British soldier of fortune to its success. The author does not claim that this contribution was of great significance. The discovery of the Paroissien papers, however, afforded an opportunity to narrate the story afresh, gaining the reader's attention by means of the personal adventures of a man who was in touch with the outstanding leaders and who presented his own views of their traits and achievements. Moreover, the well-informed and imaginative reader can easily envisage Paroissien as typical of hundreds of other foreigners who, with similar motives, took part in one of the great "liberation" efforts of recent history.

The narrative is superb. Details abound, but they are neatly subordinated and fitted into the broad setting of the times in Europe and America. The author's careful disclosure of his sources immediately captures the reader's confidence and he is soon fascinated by the personal element. Perhaps Paroissien was not a great man, but he was full of adventure, enthusiasm, and courage. Like the hero in a Greek tragedy, he moves inevitably to his doom. He went to South America to accumulate a fortune and fate was kind to him for two decades, until he engaged in the investment "boom" of 1822–1825. Although he was in prison for a time, accused of conspiracy, he was fairly prosperous for more than a decade in terms of both money and honors. His ruin was brought about by an attempt to work the silver mines of Potosí. Financial panic in England and disorders in Peru and Boliva wrecked his mining company. Setting sail for the British Isles in 1827, he died at sea and his corpse was cast into the Pacific Ocean. He was only forty-three at the time of his death. "Trader, doctor, soldier, diplomat, company promoter, and mining entrepreneur," he had spent most of his life in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru.

J. FRED RIPPY
University of Chicago

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

We write this letter to express both our appreciation of, and certain objections to, Professor Bronfenbrenner's review of our book *The Hard Money Crusade.*

In criticizing our emphasis on full employment and economic growth as central objectives of economic policy, Professor Bronfenbrenner says that under such a policy "the threat of unemployment and underproduction will no longer be effective in restraining the wage and price demands of organized labor and the farm bloc." We appreciate such a frank statement of views. It helps document our observation that "hard money" policies are often advocated by people who sincerely object to full employment and believe in the value of corrective recessions.

Professor Bronfenbrenner also states categorically that without the threat of unemployment and underproduction "the economy will require something like permanent price controls to prevent a runaway inflation." "Gross and Lumer either fail to see the full implications of their system or fail to be candid in presenting it." But the relation between full employment and inflation is much more complex than the reviewer indicates. Although we have not attempted to analyze this relationship in full, many economists believe it possible for farmers, unions, and industrialists—under nonwar conditions—to engage in the kind of bargaining that will produce wage price policies compatible with a sustainable rate of economic growth and without runaway inflation or permanent price controls.

According to the review, we advocate that "tight money should never, *never,* NEVER be imposed on an economy regardless of price movements." This is a misstatement. In Chapter VIII we show how certain tightening measures—particularly control of consumer credit and speculative credit, bank reserve requirements, supplemental reserve plans, and direct controls on the volume of loans—are desirable under certain conditions. Moreover, the book deals only with the American economy. It does not discuss the role of money policy in "an economy" in general. The role of money policy in underdeveloped countries, for example, is a horse of a somewhat different color.

Professor Bronfenbrenner is also worried that "major institutional changes" are implied by Fair Deal monetary policies. We believe that in a dynamic democracy institutional change is always taking place. One of the purposes of the book, of course, is to indicate some of the institutional changes needed to establish more popular control over the Federal Reserve System.

BERTRAM M. GROSS AND
WILFRED LUMER
Public Affairs Institute

Dear Sir:

Certain of Messrs. Gross and Lumer's objections to my review of their book are based upon misunderstanding. Others reflect genuine differences of opinion.

1. The *fact* of underemployment and underproduction serves no useful economic purpose. Thus far I agree with Gross and Lumer. But the *threat* of underemployment and underproduction serves a useful economic purpose in restraining organized business, labor, and agriculture from inflationary price demands. We hope that the threat need seldom or never be exercised to be effective, but it must be held constantly in reserve. What I oppose, and what Gross and Lumer favor, is therefore not full employment as such, but *guaranteed* full employment.

2. The "qualitative" credit controls on which Gross and Lumer rely in checking inflation have been until now so insignificant quantitatively as to add up to no controls at all. The trouble is that when credit is refused for speculative purposes, the borrower speculates with his own funds and borrows ostensibly for his ordinary business. When I accused Gross and Lumer of forsaking the monetary weapon entirely, I was discounting their listing of qualitative controls as lip service, since housing credit is not among the types they propose to choke off when inflation threatens. As to the "quantitative" controls, which they list most succinctly: these may keep credit cheap for the Treasury, but not for private

borrowers, and are indeed "hard money" under another form.

3. So Gross and Lumer's "popular control over the Federal Reserve System" is hardly a sufficient institutional change to check an inflation without hard money for private borrowers. Barring some sort of psychological revolution in the attitudes of organized business, labor, and agriculture—which I will believe in when I see it—extensive and prolonged price controls on the wartime model will also be necessary. They may cumulate in a major redistribution of income, as they did in Great Britain and as some Fair Dealers would not mind their doing here. I do not attack either controls or income redistribution, but suggest merely that Gross and Lumer let their readers realize the full extent of the institutional changes which their proposals may require.

M. BRONFENBRENNER
University of Wisconsin

OTHER BOOKS

ADAMS, HENRY CARTER. *Relation of the State to Industrial Action; and, Economics and Jurisprudence;* Two Essays. Edited and with an introductory essay and notes by Joseph Dorfman. Pp. viii, 182. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $3.00.

Adolescent in Your Family, The. (Children's Bureau Publication, No. 347.) Pp. ii, 110. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1954. No price.

ANGLE, PAUL M. *By These Words: Great Documents of American Liberty.* Pp. 560. New York, Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1954. $5.95.

BANKS, J. A. *Prosperity and Parenthood: A Study of Family Planning Among the Victorian Middle Class.* Pp. v, 240. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954. (Distributed in U. S. by Grove Press.) $4.50.

BARCLAY, C. N. *The New Warfare.* Pp. x, 65. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $2.75.

BECKHARDT, ISRAEL, and WENZELL BROWN. *The Violators.* Pp. 253. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1954. $3.75.

BEHRENDT, RICHARD F. *Die wirtschaftliche und soziale Revolution in den unentwickelten Ländern.* Pp. 36. Bern, Switzerland: Verlag Herbert Lang and Cie., 1954. 2.60 Sw. Fr.

BROCK, RAY. *Ghost on Horseback: The Incredible Atatürk.* Pp. viii, 408. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1954. $4.75.

BURLAND, C. A., and J. T. HOOPER. *The Art of Primitive Peoples.* Pp. 168. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $7.50.

CAPLOW, THEODORE. *The Sociology of Work.* Pp. ix, 330. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954. $5.00.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.* Translated and edited, with an introduction and additional notes by Peter Gay. Pp. 129. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $2.75.

CHIANG, SIANG-TSEH. *The Nien Rebellion.* Pp. xvi, 159. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1954. $3.50.

Civil Rights in the United States, 1953: A Balance Sheet of Group Relations. Pp. 189. New York: American Jewish Congress, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1954. 60 cents.

COURT, W. H. B. *A Concise Economic History of Britain from 1750 to Recent Times.* Pp. viii, 368. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. $4.00.

CRAWFORD, J. G., and others. *Wartime Agriculture in Australia and New Zealand, 1939–50.* Pp. xiii, 354. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, c. 1954. $7.50.

CUBER, JOHN F., and WILLIAM F. KENKEL. *Social Stratification in the United States.* Pp. x, 359. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954. $4.00.

DAVISSON, CHARLES N. *The Marketing of Automotive Parts.* Pp. xii, 958. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Bureau of Business Research, School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, 1954. No price.

DOWLING, NOEL T., and RICHARD A. EDWARDS. *American Constitutional Law.* Pp. xxx, 899. Brooklyn, N. Y.: Foundation Press, 1954. $7.50.

EAGLETON, CLYDE, and RICHARD N. SWIFT. *1953 Annual Review of United Nations Affairs.* Pp. viii, 213. New York: New York University Press, 1954. $4.50.

EBENSTEIN, WILLIAM. *Modern Political Thought: The Great Issues.* Pp. xvii, 806. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1954. $7.00.

FEDERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (Ed.). *Statistical Pocket-Book on Expellees in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin.* Wiesbaden, Germany, 1953. No price.

FOLLIOT, DENISE (Ed.). *Documents on International Affairs, 1951.* Pp. xxvi, 698. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. 60 *s.*

GABRIEL, RALPH H. (Ed.). *Hamilton, Madison, and Jay on the Constitution: Selections from the Federalist Papers.* (American Heritage Series No. 7.) Pp. xviii, 231. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. $2.25 cloth; 90 cents paper.

GAGNIER, EDMUND WOOD. *Adventure in Analysis: A Searching Biblical Commentary.* Pp. 696. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $7.50.

GIFFORD, WILLIAM ALVA. *The Seekers: Why Christian Orthodoxy is Obsolete.* Pp. xiv, 306. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $4.50.

GOLDSCHMIDT, WALTER (Ed.). *Ways of Mankind: Thirteen Dramas of Peoples of the World and How They Live.* Pp. vi, 212. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $3.75.

GORTER, WYTZE, and GEORGE H. HILDEBRAND. *The Pacific Coast Maritime Shipping Industry, 1930–1948.* Vol. II: *An Analysis of Performance.* Pp. xx, 371. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954. $5.00.

GROSSMANN, KURT R. *Germany's Moral Debt: The German Israel Agreement.* Preface by Earl G. Harrison. Pp. viii, 71. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954. No price.

HAYES, JOHN H. *Factors Affecting the Costs of Hospital Care.* (Financing Hospital Care in the United States, Vol. I.) Pp. xvii, 300. New York: Blakiston Company, 1954. $4.00.

HILL, REUBEN J., and others. *Eddyville's Families: A Study of Personal and Family Adjustments Subsequent to the Rapid Urbanization of a Southern Town.* Pp. xx, 442. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, Institute for Research in Social Science, 1953. No price.

HUDDLESTON, SISLEY. *Popular Diplomacy and War.* Pp. 285. Rindge, N. H.: Richard R. Smith, Publisher, 1954. $3.50.

HUTT, W. H. *The Theory of Collective Bargaining.* Preface by Ludwig von Mises. Pp. 150. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. $3.00.

JAFFE, A. J. and R. O. CARLETON. *Occupational Mobility in the United States, 1930–1960.* Pp. xiv, 105. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1954. $2.75.

JAGAN, CHEDDI. *Forbidden Freedom: The Story of British Guiana.* Foreword by Tom Driberg. Pp. 96. New York: International Publishers, 1954. $1.50 cloth; 75 cents paper.

JEFFERYS, MARGOT, with the assistance of WINIFRED MOSS. *Mobility in the Labour Market: Employment Changes in Barrersea and Dagenham.* Pp. ix, 159. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954. (Distributed in U. S. by Grove Press.) $3.50.

KENDALL, PATRICIA. *Conflict and Mood: Factors Affecting Stability of Response.* Pp. ix, 182. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. $3.50.

KILMAN, ED, and THEON WRIGHT. *Hugh Roy Cullen: A Story of American Opportunity.* Pp. viii, 376. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. $4.00.

KOESTLER, ARTHUR. *The Invisible Writing.* Being the second volume of *Arrow in Blue.* Pp. 431. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $5.00.

KRAINES, OSCAR. *Israel: The Emergence of a New Nation.* Pp. 46. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954. $1.00.

KUMBALL, SOLON T., and MARION PEARSALL. *The Talladega Story: A Study in Community Process.* Pp. xxxii, 259. University: University of Alabama Press, 1954. $3.50.

LANGSAM, WALTER CONSUELO. *The World Since 1919.* Pp. xviii, 797. 7th ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $6.00.

LEMERT, EDWIN M. *Alcohol and the Northwest Coast Indians.* (University of California Publications in Culture and Society, Vol. II, No. 6.) Pp. 303–406. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954. $1.25.

LESTER, RICHARD A. *Hiring Practices and Labor Competition.* Pp. 108. Princeton, N. J.: Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics and Sociology, Princeton University, 1954. $2.50.

Lives of Saints: With Excerpts from Their Writings. Introduction by Father Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M. Editorial Supervision by Father Joseph Vann, O.F.M. Pp. xv, 527. New York: John J. Crawley and Company, 1954. $5.95.

MCAULEY, W. F. *The Concept of Schizophrenia.* Foreword by John H. Ewen. Pp. 145. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $3.75.

MANNING, C. A. W. *The University Teaching of Social Sciences.* Pp. 100. Paris: UNESCO, 1954. 75 cents.

MARKHAM, JAMES W. *Bovard of the Post-Dispatch.* Pp. xxii, 226. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954. $4.00.

MAUSS, MARCEL. *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies.* Translated by Ian Cunnison. Introduction by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Pp. 130. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. $2.50.

MORLAN, ROBERT L. *Capitol, Courthouse, and*

City Hall: Readings in American State and Local Government. Pp. x, 346. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954. $3.00.

MURAD, ANATOL. *Private Credit and Public Debt.* Pp. vi, 195. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954. $3.75.

MURPHY, THOMAS D. *Ambassadors in Arms.* Pp. vii, 315. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1954. $6.00.

O'CONNOR, LILLIAN. *Pioneer Women Orators: Rhetoric in the Ante-Bellum Reform Movement.* Pp. xvii, 264. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $3.75.

ORLANS, HAROLD. *Opinion Polls on National Leaders.* (Final Technical Report, Series 1953, Institute Report, No. 6, 15 November 1953.) Philadelphia: Institute for Research in Human Relations, 1953. No price.

ORR, JOHN BOYD. Wtih the co-operation of David Lubbock. *The White Man's Dilemma: Food and the Future.* Pp. 122. New York: British Book Centre. No date. $2.25.

PADELFORD, NORMAN J., and GEORGE A. LINCOLN. *International Politics: Foundations of International Relations.* Pp. xii, 719. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $6.50.

PALYI, MELCHIOR. *The Dollar Dilemma: Perpetual Aid to Europe?* Introduction by Frank C. Rathje. Pp. vii, 208. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954. $2.75.

PEEK, GEORGE A., JR. (Ed.). *The Political Writings of John Adams: Representative Selections.* (American Heritage Series, No. 8.) Pp. xxxii, 223. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. $2.25 cloth; 90 cents paper.

PERRY, JOHN. *Human Relations in Small Industry.* Pp. xi, 313. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954. $5.50.

PIKE, ROYSTON. *Jehovah's Witnesses: Who They Are, What They Teach, What They Do.* Pp. 140. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $2.75.

RORENSTEIN, ISRAEL. *Capital and Output Trends in Mining Industries, 1870–1948.* (Studies in Capital Formation and Financing, Occasional Paper, No. 45.) Pp. xi, 81. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1954. $1.00.

RUBISSOW, HELEN. *Art of Asia.* Pp. xiii, 237. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $6.00.

SARIOLA, SAKARI. *Social Class and Social Mobility in a Costa Rican Town.* Pp. vi, 136. Turrialba, Costa Rica: Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science, 1954. No price.

SCHMANDT, HENRY J., and PAUL G. STEINBICKER. *Fundamentals of Government.* Pp. xii, 507. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Bruce Publishing Company, 1954. $4.50.

Security and the Middle East: The Problem and Its Solution. Pp. vi, 169. New York: Ballantine Books, 1954. 35 cents.

SHAH, K. T. *Ancient Foundations of Economics in India.* (The Maharaja Sayajirao Gaekwad Honorarium Lectures, 1950–1951.) Bombay, India: Vora and Company, 1954. Pp. 176. No price.

SLAVSON, S. R. *Re-Educating the Delinquent: Through Group and Community Participation.* Pp. xvi, 251. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. $4.00.

SMITH, C. A. (Ed.). *Escape from Paradise by Seven Who Escaped and One Who Did Not.* Pp. xii, 243. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $3.50.

SNYDER, RICHARD C., and EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR. *American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Principles, and Programs.* Pp. xviii, 846. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1954. $7.00.

STALLKNECHT, NEWTON P., and ROBERT S. BRUMBAUGH. *The Compass of Philosophy: An Essay in Intellectual Orientation.* Pp. ix, 258. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1954. $3.25.

STRAIGHT, MICHAEL. *Trial by Television.* Pp. 282. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1954. $3.50.

STRAUSS, E. *Sir William Petty: Portrait of a Genius.* Pp. 260. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954. $5.00.

TOSTLEBE, ALVIN S. *The Growth of Physical Capital in Agriculture, 1870–1950.* (Studies in Capital Formation and Financing. Occasional Paper, No. 44.) Pp. xii, 92. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research in co-operation with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture, 1954. $1.25.

TRAEGER, FRANK N. *Toward a Welfare State in Burma: Economic Reconstruction and Development, 1948–1954.* (Secretariat Paper, No. 6.) Pp. 60. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. $1.00.

WADE, WILLIAM W. (Ed.). *The UN Today.* (The Reference Shelf, Vol. XXVI, No. 4.) Pp. 211. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1954. $1.75.

WESSMANN, LUCILLE TOMLINSON (Ed.). *"Those Having Torches . . .": Economic Essays in Honor of Alzada Comstock . . .* Pp. ix, 134. South Hadley, Mass.: Mount Holyoke College, 1954. $3.00.

WIESE, LEOPOLD VON. *Soziologie: Geschichte und Hauptprobleme.* Pp. 160. 5th ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Company, 1954. D. M. 2.40.

WILSON, G. LLOYD. *Transportation and Communications: Economics, Management, and Regulation.* Pp. xi, 757. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954. $6.00.

WOLFENSTEIN, MARTHA. *Children's Humor: A Psychological Analysis.* Pp. 224. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. $3.75.

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953. Pp. ix, 906. New York: Columbia University Press in co-operation with the United Nations, 1954. $12.50.

ZANZI, A. W. *Economic Reconstruction Problems in South Korea.* (Secretariat Paper, No. 2.) Pp. 75. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. $1.00.

INDEX

INDEX

Accounting, *see* American Institute of Accountants; Public accounting
Administration, *see* Business management; Government employees and employment—administration and administrators
Advertising
  by architects, 11, 13–15
  by engineers, 53, 56, 57
  by public accountants, 2, 7
  by rabbis, 60, 62
  in the legal profession, 37, 44, 45
  in the medical profession, 17, 19, 23–24, 30, 37
  See also Publicity
Alabama Bar Association, Code of Ethics, 38
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 85
American Academy of Political and Social Science, THE ANNALS, May 1922 (*The Ethics of the Professions and of Business*), vii, 17, 20, 46, 47, 48, 51, 77, 108, 118
American Association of Engineers
  and collective bargaining, 51
  Code of Ethics by Isham Randolph, 46, 48, 49
    adoption of, 56
    text of, 56
  Committee on Services and Fees of Practicing Engineers, 49
  constitution, 47
  Engineer's Vow of Service by D. B. Steinman, 49
    adoption of, 53
    text of, 53
  Judiciary Committee, 49
  Practice Committee, study and codification of engineering ethics ("Specific Principles of Good Professional Conduct"), 48–49, 53
    adoption of, 53
    text of, 53–56
  Professional Engineer, 48, 49
  publications by, on ethics and practice, 49, 51
  Specific Principles of Good Professional Conduct, *see above* Practice Committee
American Bar Association
  Canons of Ethics
    adoption of, 38–39
    enforcement of, 39–40, 46
    summarized, 40–45
  Committee on Professional Ethics, 39
  founding of, 38
  influence of, 46
American College of Surgeons, 22
American Federation of Labor, 84, 85, 89
American Institute of Accountants
  and accounting and auditing procedure, 1, 5
  Committee on Professional Ethics, 4–5
  Executive Committee, quoted, 3
  Rules of Professional Conduct
    adoption of, 1–2, 6
    analysis of, 2–4
    enforcement of, 4–5
    text of, 6–8
  use of name by members, 6, 7
American Institute of Architects, The
  Board of Directors, 11, 13, 14
  "Circular of Advice . . ." (1918), 12
  Commission for the Survey of Education and Registration, Report of, quoted, 11–12, 16
  Guide to Permissive Publicity and Advertising Practice for Members, 13–15
  Incorporation, Articles of, quoted, 11
  membership, 11, 12, 15
  purpose and practice, 11–12
  Standards of Professional Practice
    adoption of, 9, 12, 13
    attitude of membership toward, 15
    enforcement of, 13, 15
    interpretation of, 11, 13
    revisions, 9, 12–13
    study and observance of, encouraged by State Boards of Examiners, 15
    text of, 9–11
    used in Schools of Architecture, 15
  student chapters, 15
American Institute of Electrical Engineers, code, 46–47
American Medical Association
  Committee on Costs of Medical Care, 20
  constitution
    emphasis on doctor-patient relationship, 26
    interpretation of, by Judicial Council, 19
    quoted, 18
  Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry, 18
  criticism of, 110
  House of Delegates, 18–19, 22, 26
  influence of, 18, 46
  Journal . . ., 18
  Judicial Council, 19, 22
  membership, 18
  organization of, 18–19
  Principles of Medical Ethics
    adoption of, 18, 29
    enforcement of, 19, 46
    first codification, 18
    interpretation of, 19, 29

    nature of, 19, 26
    quoted, 25, 119
    revision of, 18, 19–20, 24, 28
    text of, 29–36
  protection of public by, 18, 26, 46
American Society of Civil Engineers, 51
  Code of Practice, 46–47, 49
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, code, 46–47
Amusements, and Catholic priests, 65
Anderson, Hurst R., quoted, 94
Antislavery movement, 107
Appleby, Paul H., quoted, 93
Architecture
  and engineering, ethical code for, 52
  Collegiate Schools of, 15
  Oath of the Architect, 16
  State Boards of Examiners, 15
  study of ethical problems, 109
    See also American Institute of Architects—Standards of Professional Practice
  See also Advertising; American Institute of Architects; Clients; Commissions; Competition; Contractors and contracting; Employees; Fees; Financial interest; Professional associates, relations with; Professional competence and efficiency; Professional development; Professional organizations; Public interest—and professional ethics; Publicity
Azzari, R. J., 22

Baehr, George, quoted, 24
Bannister, Turpin C., editor, 12
Bar associations
  advertising by, 44
  codes and canons of ethics, 37, 38–39, 107
  ethics committees, 27, 39, 44
  history of, 38
  influence of, 37, 38
  membership, 38, 74
  minimum fee schedules set by, 43
  See also American Bar Association
Beecher, Henry Ward, 72
Benedictines, 64, 68
Berry, George Packer, quoted, 17
Bevan, Ernest, quoted, 85
Bishops
  Protestant, 71
  Roman Catholic, 64, 65–66, 67
BOKSER, BEN ZION, Codes of the American Rabbinate, 59–63
Bookkeeping, double-entry, invention of, 1
BOWEN, HOWARD R., Business Management: A Profession?, 112–117
Bowen, Howard R., cited, 113, 115
Brandeis, Louis D., quoted, 112
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 91, 92
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 89
Bush, Vannevar, 1
Business
  and Catholic priests, 65
  codes of ethics, 115, 117, 118–119
  competition in, 37, 116, 117, 118–119
  control of, 116–117
  ethical standards of, 91, 92, 112, 115, 116, 118
  multiple clientele of, 114
  professional organizations, 115–116, 117
  See also Business management; Clients; Employees—of business; Professional competence and efficiency; Public interest—and business
Business management, as a profession, vii, 112–117, 121

Cancer, 24, 25–26
Canon law
  Protestant Episcopal, 71
  Roman Catholic, 64, 66, 68
CAREY, JOHN L., The Ethics of Public Accounting, 1–8
Carpenter, E. E., 53
Carr-Saunders, Alexander M., cited, 105, 106, 113
Carroll, Lewis, quoted, 52
Central Conference of American Rabbis
  and rabbinic placement procedures, 60
  Arbitration Committee, 61
  code, 59, 60, 61
Certified public accountants, *see* American Institute of Accountants; Public accounting
Chambers, George Gailey, quoted, 77
Change, social and professional ethics, 5–6, 12, 17, 28, 46, 51–52
Chastity, clerical, 65, 66, 67, 68
Chicago Teachers Union, 87
Children, in public schools, *see* Pupils
Civil liberties, 94, 95
Civil service, *see* Government employees and employment
Clapp, Gordon R., quoted, 93, 94
Clausen, H. W., 47
Clergy, *see* Ministers; Priests
Clients
  multiple clientele
    of business, 114
    of public school teachers, 76, 109
  relations with, in professional practice, 107, 108, 110, 113, 114, 123
    of architects, 9–10, 16, 109, 120
    of business, 112, 114–115, 116
    of certified public accountants, 2–3, 4, 7, 8
    of engineers, 47, 53, 54, 56, 57
    of lawyers, 37, 41–44, 45, 120, 123
    of physicians, *see* Medicine and the medical profession—doctor-patient relationship
    of public school teachers, *see* Parents; Pupils

Clients (*cont.*)
solicitation of, *see* Advertising; Competition; Professional associates, relations with; Publicity
Codes, professional, vii, 28, 101, 105, 107–109, 110, 113, 116, 118, 119, 118–124 (*passim*)
for architects, *see* American Institute of Architects, The—Standards of Professional Practice
for business, *see* Business—codes of ethics
for Catholic priests, 64–69
for engineers, *see* Engineering—codes of ethics and practice
for government employees, *see* Government employees and employment—codes and creeds
for legal profession, *see* Alabama Bar Association; American Bar Association—Canons of Ethics
for medical profession, *see* American Medical Association—Principles of Medical Ethics; Hippocratic Oath
for ministers, *see* Ministers (Protestant)—published denominational codes
for public accountants, *see* American Institute of Accountants—Rules of Professional Conduct
for public school teachers, *see* National Education Association—Code of Ethics; State and local teachers associations—codes
for rabbis, *see* Central Conference of American Rabbis; Joint Commission on Rabbinic Placement; New York Board of Rabbis; Rabbinical Assembly of America
COGAN, MORRIS L., The Problem of Defining a Profession, 105–111
Cogan, Morris L.
cited, 105
quoted, 107
Cohen, Morris R., quoted, 106, 108
Colleagues, *see* Professional associates
Collective bargaining, and engineering, 51
Columbus Plan (medical), 22
Commissions (payments)
architects', 9
engineering, 52, 54, 56, 57
legal, 41
medical, 31, 35
public accounting, 2, 4, 6
Communism, and labor unions, 83–85
Community, the, *see* Public, the; Public interest; Public opinion; Society
Competition
business, 37, 116, 117, 118–119
professional, 28
in architecture, 10–11
in engineering, 52, 54, 55, 58
in legal profession, 37, 44, 45
in Protestant ministry ("sheepstealing"), 73, 74
in public accounting, 7
in rabbinate, 59, 60
See also Advertising; Competitive bidding; Employment practices; Professional associates, relations with; Publicity
Competitive bidding
in engineering, 49, 51, 54
in legal profession, 44
in public accounting, 2, 5, 8
Congress of Industrial Organizations, 85
and corruption, 83–84, 86
and racial equality, 89
institutes, 88
resolution on Ethical Practices (1951), 83
See also United Automobile Workers of America
Constitution (U. S.), civil liberties clauses, 95
Contingent fees, 2, 7, 43, 53
Contractors and contracting
architects' relations with, 9, 10, 109, 120
engineers' relations with, 54, 57
Cooke, Morris Llewellyn, 47, 48
cited, 108
quoted, 17, 48
Corporations
and the professions, 109, 118
employment of doctors and lawyers for employees, 24, 35, 43
engineering practice by, 51–52
influence on labor unions, 85, 89
management positions in, 114, 121
practice as, forbidden in public accounting, 2, 6, 7
Corruption
in government, 52, 92, 93, 101
in labor unions, 83–85, 86, 87, 88, 89
County bar associations, 38
County medical societies, 18, 23, 26, 27
Courts
decisions on competitive bidding in engineering, 51
enforcement of legal ethics by, 39–40
relations of lawyers with, 39, 41, 42, 45, 123
supervision of contingent fees, 43
witnesses, legal ethics concerning, 41, 43
CUMMINGS, GEORGE BAIN, Standards of Professional Practice in Architecture, 9–16
Cunniffe, Edward R., 22

Democracy
and labor unions, 83, 84, 88
and public employee morality, 90–97
development of, goal of public school teaching, 80, 81
Dewey, John, 87
Diocesan law, 65–66, 68

Douglas, Paul H.
cited, 91, 98
quoted, 95
DRINKER, HENRY S., Legal Ethics, 37–45
Dubinsky, David, quoted, 84

EBY, KERMIT, Organized Labor and American Ethics, 83–89
Ecumenical movement, 73–74
Education
work of Jesuits and Benedictines in, 68
See also Professional development; Schools; Teaching; Training and education
Efficiency, *see* Professional competence and efficiency
Emmerich, Herbert, quoted, 91
Employees
of architects, 9, 10, 120
of business
responsibility of management for, 112, 114, 115, 119, 121
See also Labor unions
of engineers, 53, 54–55, 56, 57, 58
Employers, relations with
in engineering, 47, 53, 54, 56, 57
in public school teaching, 76, 78, 81, 82, 109
in state employment, 95, 98–100, 109–110
of labor unions, 85–86, 89
See also Clients
Employment practices
in engineering, 52, 54, 55, 58
in public accounting, 2, 7
in public school teaching, 81–82
in rabbinate, 59–60, 61–63
See also Competition; Competitive bidding; Fees
Enforcement, of ethical standards in the professions, vii, 101, 107, 116, 118
in architecture, 13, 15
in engineering, 46, 48, 49–51
in government employment, 94–95, 98, 100–102
in legal profession, 39–40, 46, 49
in medicine, 19, 46, 49
in Protestant ministry, 72, 74
in public accounting, 4–5
in public school teaching, 76, 77, 78, 79–80
in rabbinate, 60–61
Engineering
branches of, 46
codes of ethics and practice, 46–51
enforcement of, 46, 48, 49–51
texts of, 53–58
corporation practice, 51–52
schools of, teaching of ethical principles in, 49
state registration laws and boards, 50
unauthorized practice of, 50
See also Advertising; Clients; Commissions; Competition; Competitive bidding; Contractors and contracting; Employees; Employers; Employment practices; Fees; Financial interest; Labor unions; Press; Professional associates; Professional competence and efficiency; Professional development; Professional organizations; Public interest—and professional ethics; Publicity; Specialization—in the professions
Engineers' Council for Professional Development, Canons of Ethics for Engineers, 46–47
adoption of, 56
text of, 56–58
Etiquette
in Protestant ministry, 70, 71–72
legal, 37
medical, 28
Euthanasia, 25

Fabianism, 87
Faguet, Émile, quoted, 123
Fee-splitting, 2, 4, 6, 11, 17, 20, 21–22, 35, 60
Fees
architects', 9, 10, 11, 122
Catholic priests', 66
engineering, 49, 52, 53–54, 55, 57, 58
legal, 41, 43, 122
division of, 43–44
remission of, 40, 42
medical, 17, 119–120
AMA Principles of Ethics on, 29, 31, 35
division of 21–22, 23
fee-splitting, 17, 20, 21–22, 35
for service to fellow physicians, 32–33
increase in, 23
proration of, 24
specialists', 21–22, 23
standardization of 18, 23
public accountants', 2, 4, 6, 7
public school teachers', 81, 82
rabbis', 59, 60
See also Salaries
Fiduciaries
obligations of, 37, 41, 45
restrictions on Catholic priests as, 65
Financial interest, regulations concerning
in architecture, 10
in engineering, 54, 57
in public accounting, 2, 4, 7
Fishbein, Morris
cited, 18
quoted, 19
FITTS, BARBARA, *see* Fitts, William T., jt. author
Fitts, William T., Jr. cited, 25
FITTS, WILLIAM T., JR., and BARBARA FITTS, Ethical Standards of the Medical Profession, 17–36
Flexner, Abraham, cited, 106, 108
Founder Societies (engineering), 46

Foye, Arthur B., 1
Francis, Clarence, quoted, 115
Franciscans, 64
FURFEY, PAUL HANLY, The Code of the Catholic Clergy, 64–69

Galen, 31
Garceau, Oliver, quoted, 105
Georgia State Teachers Association, code, 76
Gomperism, 87
Government
  and medical profession, 110, 117
  and professional organizations, 110
  intervention in labor unions, 84–85
  regulation of business by, 115, 116, 117
  See also Government employees and employment
Government employees and employment
  administration and administrators, 93, 94–95, 96, 98, 99, 101, 102
  as "agents of public purpose," 90
  codes and creeds, 90, 96–97, 98, 101, 102, 104
  dedicated public servants, 92, 95
  democratic base of ethics of, 92–95
  discretion and judgment, exercise of, and ethical standards, 91, 100–104
  ethical development, suggestions for, 95–96, 103–104
  legislative investigations, 96, 98
  loyalty investigations and charges, 95
  obedience as standard for, 99–100, 102, 123
  occupations embraced in, 90–91
  political pressures on, 92, 98, 99, 102, 104
  pressure of special interests on, 91–92, 93, 95, 98, 101
  principle of seniority, 124
  responsibility to law, 91, 93, 97, 98–99, 101
  See also Public, the—and ethics of government employees; Public, the—will of; Public interest—and professional ethics
Graham, George A., quoted, 92
Great Britain, professions under socialist regime in, 109–110
Group and multiple practice, *see* Corporations; Medicine and medical practice—group and multiple practice; Partnerships

HARMON, NOLAN B., Ethics of the Protestant Ministry, 70–75
Harmon, Nolan B., Jr., cited, 72
Hawley, Paul R., cited, 22
Hebrew Union College, 60
Hill, A. Bradford, cited, 25
Hippocrates
  quoted, 30
  See also Hippocratic Oath
Hippocratic Oath, 17, 19, 46, 74, 108
  text of, 29
Hoffman, David, 38
Hospitalization, 23

Income, and professional ethics, 29, 86, 110, 112, 115, 119–120, 121, 122, 123
  See also Commissions; Fees; Salaries
Individualism
  in medical profession, 26
  in Protestantism, 70–71, 74
Individuals
  ethics of, and group standards, 100–102, 110, 116, 118, 121
  faith in, as basis of democratic government, 94–95, 98
Industry
  conflict of capital and labor in, 119
  craft spirit banished from, 118
  specialization in, 20
  See also Business; Business management; Labor unions
Inns of Court, London, 37–38
Insurance
  for engineering employees, 55
  hospitalization, 23
  medical, 17, 18, 23–24, 27
  retirement, for rabbis, 60, 63
Internal revenue scandals, 91, 92
International City Managers' Association, code, 98
International law, and public opinion, 72
International Longshoremen's Association, New York, 84
Investment and investors, 65, 114, 115, 119
Iowa State Medical Society, 22

Jesuits, 64, 68
Jewish law, 62
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 59–60, 61
Joint Commission on Rabbinic Placement
  Code of Procedure in Placement of Rabbis
    administration of, 59–60
    adoption of, 59, 61
    text of, 61–62
  composition of, 59–60, 61
Jones, Lloyd, quoted, 85–86
Jones, W. H. S., translator, 29
Judaism
  Conservative, 59–60
    See also New York Board of Rabbis; Rabbinical Assembly of America
  Orthodox, 59
    See also New York Board of Rabbis
  Reform, 59, 60
    See also Central Conference of American Rabbis; New York Board of Rabbis
Judges, 123
  name of, not to be retained in law firm, 45

  responsibility of legal profession for choice of, 40, 45
  See also Courts

Kennedy, John F., 84
Kings County (N. Y.) Medical Society, 23
Kohn, Robert D., cited, 108

Labor, *see* Labor unions
Labor unions
  and engineers, 51
  corruption in, 83–85, 86, 87, 88, 89
  employment of doctors and lawyers for their membership, 24, 43
  lawyers forbidden membership in, 42
  materialistic self-interest in, 85–87, 88, 89, 92
  membership, 87, 89
  political and economic interests, 87, 88–89
  race relations, 88–89
  response to criticism, 87–88
  revolutionary nature of, 88
  subversion in, 83–85
Laissez faire, 116, 117
LANDIS, BENSON Y., Foreword, vii
Landis, Benson Y., quoted, 109
Laski, Harold J., quoted, 93
Law
  and the physician, 31, 32
  attitude toward, of legal profession in England, 122
  practice of
    and Catholic priests, 65
    as a natural right, 38
    standards of admission to, 38, 39, 45
    suspension and disbarment from, 40, 45
    unauthorized, 40–41
  responsibility of government employees to, 91, 93, 97, 98–99, 101
  See also Canon law; Diocesan law; International law; Jewish law; Litigation
Lawyers, *see* Legal profession
Leach, William H.
  cited, 72
  quoted, 70
Leake, Chauncey, quoted, 28
Legal Aid Bureaus, 40
Legal profession, 123
  canon lawyers, 64
  conflicting interests, representation of, 37, 42
  criticism of, 107
  defense of the guilty, 42–43, 120
  direct communication with adverse party, 37, 44
  employment by corporations, etc., as counsel for individuals, 43
  financial gain not main objective, 37, 119
  labor union membership, 42
  partnerships, 42, 44–45, 114, 118
  See also American Bar Association; Bar associations; Clients; Commissions; Competition; Competitive bidding; Courts; Fees; Judges; Law; Litigation; Professional associates, relations with; Professional organizations; Public interest—and professional ethics
Levitan, David M., quoted, 94, 95
Lewis, John L., 87
  quoted, 84–85
Lewis, Roy, quoted, 105
Leys, Wayne A. R., cited, 102–103
Light Brigade, 102
Litigation
  expenses of, 43
  stirring up of, 40
Loyalty investigations, 95

McCarthyism, 88
MACIVER, ROBERT M., The Social Significance of Professional Ethics, vii, 118–124
MacIver, Robert M., quoted, 17, 20
Marxism, 87
Materialism, 85–87, 88, 89
Maude, Angus, quoted, 105
Meadows, Paul, cited, 113
Medicine and the medical profession
  and Catholic priests, 65
  and government, 110, 117
  clinical trial of medicines, 25, 28
  consultations, 27, 33–34
  doctor-patient relationship, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25–27, 29, 31–32, 35, 114, 120
  emergency services, 27, 32
  financial gain not main objective, 29, 119
  free choice of physician, 23, 24, 26, 35
  general practitioners, 23, 27
  group and multiple practice, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26–27, 30, 114, 118
  institutional and contract practice, 17, 20, 24, 35
  laboratory physicians, 23, 27
  medical schools, 28, 108
  prepayment insurance plans, 17, 18, 23–24, 27
  preventive medicine, 17, 27–28, 123
  public opinion of ethics of, 17, 107
  radical treatments, 18, 24–25
  social medicine, 27–28
  socialized medicine, 27, 110
  See also Advertising; American Medical Association; Commissions; Fees; Hippocratic Oath; Professional associates, relations with; Professional organizations; Public health; Public interest—and professional ethics; Publicity; Specialization; Surgery and surgeons
Methodist Church
  Discipline, 71
  Methodist Ministers' Ethical Code, 72–73
Military service, and Catholic priests, 65

Ministers (Protestant), 122
common code for, difficulties of, 70–72
interdenominational professional consciousness, 72, 73–75
published denominational codes, 72–73
See also Professional associates, relations with; Professional development; Public interest—and professional ethics; Publicity
Missionary Servants, 68
Missions, work of Catholic priests in, 64, 68
Monastic orders, *see* Religious communities
MONYPENNY, PHILLIP, The Control of Ethical Standards in the Public Service, 98–104
Monypenny, Phillip, quoted, 94
Murray, Philip, 85, 86

Nagel, Ernest, quoted, 106
National Education Association
affiliated organizations, 77
Code of Ethics
adoption of, 78, 80
amendment and revision of, 77, 78
enforcement of, 77, 78, 79–80
history of, 77–78
interpretation and study of, 77, 78–80
limited application of, 76–77
text of, 80–82
Committee on Ethics for the Profession, 77
Committee on Professional Ethics, 78–80
early concern for ethics, 76
Executive Committee, 78
Journal . . ., 78
membership, 77
Representative Assembly, 77, 78, 80
Research Division, 77, 78
National Labor Relations Act (1935), *see* Wagner Act
National Labor Relations Board, 51, 89
National Society of Professional Engineers, 50
Nazis, 25
New Haven Association of Congregational Ministers, Congregational Code, 72
New York Board of Rabbis
Principles Governing Congregational-Rabbinical Agreements
adoption of, 59, 62
discussed, 60
enforcement of, 60–61
text of, 62–63
Standards for Religious Functions, 59, 60
New York State Medical Society, 23–24
Newell, Frederick Haynes, 47
Nicon, quoted, 31

Obedience
and government employees, 99–100, 102, 123
obligation of Catholic priests, 64, 66, 67, 68
Occupations, professionally incompatible for Catholic priests, 65
public accountants, 2, 4, 6
public school teachers, 82
Orders, religious, *see* Religious communities

Parents, relations of public school teachers with, 76, 78, 79, 81
Parsons, Talcott, cited, 113
Partnerships, 20, 118
legal, 42, 44–45, 114, 118
public accounting, 6
Pensions and retirement plans, 60, 63, 87
Percival, Thomas, cited, 18, 28
PERRY, CYRUS, A Code of Ethics for Public School Teachers, 76–82
Peterson, Val, cited, 92
Pharmacy and drugs, 18, 25, 36, 46
Philadelphia Bar Association, 38
Pierce, F. W., quoted, 115
Plato, quoted, 119–120
Poliomyelitis, gamma globulin, 25
Politics
and engineering ethics, 52, 54
and ethics of statesmanship, 120
and government employees, 92, 98, 99, 102, 104
and organized labor, 87, 88–89
and professional organizations, 110
Pound, Roscoe, cited, 108
Poverty, religious vow of, 66, 67, 68
Pragmatism, 87
Presbytery of New York, Presbyterian Code, 72
President, the, appointments by, 102
Press, the
and architectural profession, 14
and engineering, 56, 57, 58
and medical profession, 30–31
diocesan, 66
labor, 88
See also Publicity
Priests (Roman Catholic), 123
attitude toward obligations, 68–69
common obligations of, 64–65
diocesan
definition of, 64
percentage of, 64
special obligations of, 65–66, 67
diocesan officers, 64, 66
dress of, 65
number of, in U. S., 64
religious
and diocesan law, 66
definition of, 64
percentage of, 64
special obligations of, 66–68
Professional associates, relations with, 28, 47, 108
in architecture, 9, 10–11, 109
in engineering, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55–56, 57–58

in legal profession, 37, 40, 44–45, 123
in medical profession, 18, 19, 21, 23, 28, 29, 32–35
in Protestant ministry, 70, 72, 73, 74–75
in public school teaching, 76, 78, 82
in rabbinate, 60, 61–62
See also Competition
Professional competence and efficiency, 107, 108, 110, 112, 121–122
in architecture, 11, 12, 15
in business, 112, 113
in engineering, 50, 53
in government employment, 90, 94, 96, 97
in public school teaching, 82, 107
See also Professional development; Training and education, professional
Professional development
in architecture, 10, 12, 16
in Catholic priesthood, 64–65
in engineering, 56, 57, 58
in Protestant ministry, 73
in public school teaching, 79, 80, 82, 109
Professional organizations, 108, 110, 113, 115, 116
in architecture, 10
See also American Institute of Architects
in business, 115–116
in engineering, 46–47, 49, 50, 55–56, 57, 58
See also American Association of Engineers
in law, *see* American Bar Association; Bar associations
in medicine, 30, 32, 108
See also American Medical Association; County medical societies; State medical societies
in public accounting, *see* American Institute of Accountants
in public school teaching, 82
See also National Education Association; State and local teachers associations
in rabbinate, 59
See also Central Conference of American Rabbis; New York Board of Rabbis; Rabbinical Assembly of America
Professional training and education, *see* Training and education, professional
Professions
admission standards and restrictions, purpose of, 110, 123
associations of, *see* Professional organizations
characteristics of, 1, 47, 106, 113, 116, 118–120
See also below definition of
clients in, *see* Clients
codes of, *see* Codes, professional
competence in, *see* Professional competence and efficiency
definition of, vii
difficulties of, 105, 106
literature of, 105–106
types of, 106–108
utility of, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110
See also above characteristics of
development and growth in, *see* Professional development
group bias in, 123–124
problems and needed research, 109–110
regulation of competition in, *see* Advertising; Competition; Professional associates, relations with; Publicity
relations of fellow members, *see* Professional associates, relations with
service as goal of, *see* Clients—relations with, in professional practice; Public interest—and professional ethics
specialization in, *see* Specialization
training and education for, *see* Training and education, professional
under the state, 109–110, 123
See also Government employees and employment; Employers, relations with—in public school teaching; Medicine and the medical profession—socialized medicine
Property, private, and Catholic priests, 64, 66, 67, 68
Protestant Episcopal Church, 71
Protestantism
individual conscience as basis of, 70–71, 74
See also Ecumenical movement; Ministers
Public, the
and ethics of government employees, 91–92, 94, 95, 96, 101, 103
support of medical research, 25
will of, responsibility of government employees to, 93, 97, 98, 99–100
See also Public interest; Public opinion; Society
Public accounting
certified public accountants
number of, 1
public responsibility of, 5
state societies of, 2, 4, 5, 8
independence as ethical concept in, 2–4
partnerships, 6
standards of accounting and auditing, 1, 5–6
state boards of accountancy, 4, 8
See also Advertising; American Institute of Accountants; Clients; Commissions; Competition; Competitive bidding; Employment practices; Fees; Financial interest; Professional organizations; Public interest—and professional ethics; Publicity
Public health
responsibility of medical profession for, 5, 18, 30, 36, 92, 114, 123
See also Medicine—preventive
Public Health Service (U. S.), representation in AMA, 19

Public interest (general welfare; service to the public)
and business, 112, 114, 115, 117, 119
and professional ethics, 1, 5, 12, 47, 108, 110, 112, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122–124
in architecture, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 109, 120
in Catholic priesthood, 68–69
in engineering, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57
in government employment, 91–93, 95, 96–97, 98, 101, 119, 123
in legal profession, 5, 37, 38, 39, 40–41, 114, 123
in medicine, 5, 18, 19, 26, 27–28, 29, 35–36, 114, 120, 123
in Protestant ministry, 70, 75, 119
in public accounting, 2, 5
in public school teaching, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 87, 109, 119
Public office
and Catholic priests, 65
See also Government employees and employment
Public opinion
and business ethics, 115
and ministerial ethics, 72
and schools, 76, 82
Public service, *see* Government employees and employment; Public interest
Publicity
and Protestant ministers, 71, 74
on architecture, AIA rulings, 11, 13–15
on engineering, 53
on government agencies and employees, need of, 96
on medicine and surgery, 20, 25–26, 30–31
on public accounting, 2, 7
See also Advertising
Pupils, public school, relations of teachers with, 76, 78, 79, 80–81, 82, 109, 110

Rabbinate
placement procedures, 59–60, 61–63
relations of rabbi with his congregation, 59, 60, 62–63
retirement insurance and severance pay, 60, 63
See also Advertising; Employment practices; Fees; Professional associates, relations with; Professional organizations
Rabbinical Assembly of America
code (for conduct of rabbis), 59, 60
enforcement of, 60–61
code of placement procedure, *see* Joint Commission on Rabbinic Placement
Ethics Committee, 61
Executive Council, 61
Race relations and discrimination
and labor unions, 88–89
Supreme Court ruling on desegregation, 107–108
Racketeering, 26, 83, 84
Radio, and architectural profession, 14
Railroad Wage Commission (U. S.), 51
Randolph, Isham, Code of Ethics by, 48, 49, 56
Rapchak, Andy, quoted, 86
Rauschenbusch, Walter, quoted, 112
Ravdin, I. S.
cited, 25
quoted, 21
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 92
Religious communities (Roman Catholic), 64, 66–68
Research
concerning professions, need of, 109
in business management, 113
medical, public support of, 25
Retirement plans, for rabbis, 60, 63
Reuther, Walter, 85–86, 87
quoted, 86, 87
Roman Catholic Church
Latin rite, 64
Oriental rites, 64
See also Bishops—Roman Catholic; Canon law—Roman Catholic; Diocesan law; Priests; Religious communities
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, cited, 119

Salaries
of government employees, 95, 101
of teachers, 87
Salesians, 68
School boards, 76, 82
Schools
administrative staff college, 96
Catholic, 66, 68
engineering, 49
of architecture, 15
of business, 113
medical, 28, 108
public, 76–82, 87, 107, 109, 110, 119
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2–3, 5
Segregation, *see* Race relations and discrimination
Senate (U. S.), Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 84
Subcommittee on Ethical Standards
cited, 98
quoted, 91, 95–96
Service, as professional goal, *see* Public interest
Shakespeare, William, quoted, 37
Sharswood, George, 38
Snell, John R., quoted, 52
Socialists and socialism, 109–110, 116, 117
Society
ethics of
and government employees, 91–92, 101
and labor unions, 83, 85–87, 89
and professional ethics, 124
See also Change, social; Public, the; Public interest; Public opinion
Special interests, and ethics of government employees, 91–92, 93, 95, 98, 101
Specialization
in industry, 20
in the professions, 20, 107, 118, 123
in engineering, 52
in government employment, 93, 94
in legal profession, 42
in medicine
effect of, 17, 20–23, 27
increase in, 20
representation in AMA House of Delegates, 19
Specialty Boards, 20–21
in work of religious orders, 68
Sperry, Willard L., quoted, 17
STAHL, O. GLENN, Democracy and Public Employee Morality, 90–97
State, the
professionalism under, 109–110, 123
See also Government; Government employees and employment
State and local teachers associations
and NEA Code of Ethics, 77, 78, 79
codes, 76–77
status and number of, 77
State bar associations, 38, 46
State boards of accountancy, 4, 8
State Boards of Examiners (architecture), 15
State (or territorial) medical societies, 18, 19, 26, 46
See also Iowa State Medical Society; New York State Medical Society
State registration laws and boards (engineering), 50
State Societies of Professional Engineers, 50
State societies of public accountants, 2, 4, 5, 8
Statesmanship, 93, 120
Stein, Harold, editor, 103
Steinman, David B., 48–49, 53
Engineer's Vow of Service by, 49, 53
Stevenson, Charles L., quoted, 105, 107
Strikes, of schoolteachers, 110
Subversion, in labor unions, 83–85
Supreme Court, desegregation ruling, 107–108
Surgery and surgeons
fees and fee-splitting, 21–22, 23
ghost surgery, 22
radical operations, 24–25
tissue audit committees, 26
unnecessary and illegal operations, 26
Synagogues (congregations), relations with rabbis, 59, 60, 61–63

Taeusch, Carl F., 48
Taft-Hartley Act, 51
Tawney, R. H., cited, 113
Taylor, Frederick W., 113
Teacher education institutions, 77, 78
Teaching, 122, 123
Catholic priests in, 64, 66, 68
public school
difference from other professions, 76
number of teachers, 77
training of teachers, 107
See also Chicago Teachers Union; Clients; Employers; Employment practices; National Education Association; Parents; Professional associates, relations with; Professional competence and efficiency; Professional development; Professional organizations; Public interest—and professional ethics; Pupils
Television, 14
Tenure, of rabbis, 59, 60, 62–63
Tipton, George W., cited, 26
Training and education, professional, 106, 107, 108, 118, 122
in architecture, 12, 15
in business management, 113–114, 116
in law, 38
medical, 108
of government employees, 95, 96
of public school teachers, 107
See also Professional development
Trappists, 68

Ulich, Robert, cited, 107
Unitarian Ministerial Union, Unitarian Ministers' Code of Ethics, 72
United Automobile Workers of America
attempts to curb Communists and racketeers, 83–84
membership, 89
Reuther's leadership of, 85–86, 87
United States Civil Service Commission, 90, 96
United States Railroad Administration, 51
United Steel Workers, 85
United Synagogue of America, 59, 61

WAGNER, H. A., Principles of Professional Conduct in Engineering, 46–58
Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act, 1935), 51
Watson, Thomas, quoted, 30
Whitehead, Alfred North, cited, 107
Williams, Greer, cited, 22
Wilson, P. A., cited, 105, 106–107, 113
Witnesses (legal), 41, 43
World War II, 25

X, R. E., cited, 72

Prentice-Hall
COLLEGE TEXTS

Coming in February!

PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by ANDREW GYORGY and HUBERT S. GIBBS,
both of Boston University

This new text is the first systematic application of the problem method to the field of International Relations. It presents twenty-five carefully selected cases which offer the student an unusual opportunity to analyze concrete situations and apply certain general principles of International Politics. Two-thirds of the problems were written specifically for this book and present new materials; the remaining cases were carefully selected and edited from leading publications. Ten well known authorities in the field of International Relations contributed new cases which are published here for the first time. All cases were carefully selected to provide geographic balance throughout the book. Among the twenty-five problems there is adequate coverage for Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Far East, and Latin America.

Teaching aids include 20 new maps and detailed bibliographies.

352 pages . 6" x 9" . To be Published February 1955

For approval copies write

PRENTICE-HALL, INC. 70 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

Kindly mention THE ANNALS *when writing to advertisers*

VOLUME 298 MARCH 1955

STATE LEGISLATURE

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*

CONTEMPORARY AFRICA
TRENDS AND ISSUES

Edited by
WILLIAM O. BROWN, Ph.D.
Director, African Research and Studies Program
Professor of Sociology
Boston University
Boston, Massachusetts

Copyright 1955, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1955

Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.

CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD vii

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

AFRICA: THE ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING . . . . . *Robert W. Steel* 1
PEOPLES AND CULTURES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA . . . . . *Melville J. Herskovits* 11
PEOPLES AND CULTURES OF NORTH AFRICA . . . . . *Philippe W. Marçais* 21
PAST AND PRESENT ROLE OF AFRICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS . . . . . *Harry R. Rudin* 30

ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK AND DYNAMICS

AFRICAN ECONOMIES: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS AND PROSPECTS *Frank R. La Macchia* 39
THE CHANGING ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA . . . *Jo W. Saxe* 52
ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE BELGIAN CONGO . . . . *J. Huge* 62
THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN A MULTIRACIAL SITUATION *Sheila T. Van der Horst* 71

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK AND DYNAMICS

COLONIAL ISSUES AND POLICIES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TROPICAL AFRICA *Kenneth Robinson* 84
CURRENT POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA . . . . . *James S. Coleman* 95
CONTEXT AND SOURCES OF POLITICAL TENSIONS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA *Benjamin Rivlin* 109
BRITISH WEST AFRICA: PATTERNS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT . . . . *David E. Apter* 117
BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA: POLITICS UNDER FEDERATION . . . *Kenneth Kirkwood* 130
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY . *Gwendolen M. Carter* 142

SOCIAL DYNAMICS AND TRENDS

DYNAMICS OF URBANIZATION IN AFRICA . . . . . *Daniel F. McCall* 151
IMPACT OF CHRISTIANITY IN AFRICA . . . . . *Emory Ross* 161
EDUCATION IN AFRICA: ITS PATTERN AND ROLE IN SOCIAL CHANGE *Margaret H. Read* 170

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

AITKEN, HUGH G. J. *The Welland Canal Company.* John L. McDougall 221

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION. *University Education for Administration in Hospitals.* James A. Norton 207

BENTLEY, ARTHUR F. *Inquiry into Inquiries: Essay in Social Theory.* Edited by Sidney Ratner. J. R. Kantor 213

BODO, JOHN R. *The Protestant Clergy and Public Issues, 1812–1848.* Don E. Smucker 217

BOLGAR, R. R. *The Classical Heritage and Its Beneficiaries.* Sidney Painter 212

BOWIE, ROBERT R., and CARL J. FRIEDRICH (Eds.). *Studies in Federalism.* J. Eugene Harley 184

BRIGHT, ARTHUR A., JR., and GEORGE H. ELLIS (Eds.). *The Economic State of New England.* Edward C. Kirkland 198

BROWN, STUART GERRY. *The First Republicans.* Claude G. Bowers 188

BURNS, ALAN. *History of the British West Indies.* Harry Bernstein 224

BURTON, HAL (Ed.). *The City Fights Back.* Francis J. Brown 196

DAY, DONALD, and HARRY HERBERT ULLOM (Eds.). *The Autobiography of Sam Houston.* George D. Harmon 192

DE GRAZIA, ALFRED. *The Western Public 1952 and Beyond.* Thomas C. Donnelly 190

DRESSEL, PAUL L., and LEWIS B. MAYHEW. *General Education Explorations in Evaluation.* I. B. Berkson 207

DUVALL, EVELYN MILLIS. *In-Laws Pro & Con: An Original Study of Inter-Personal Relations.* Eleanor S. Boll 205

EPSTEIN, LEON D. *Britain—Uneasy Ally.* G. Kitson Clark 218

ERHARD, LUDWIG. *Germany Comeback in the World Market.* Edited by Herbert Gross. Translated by W. H. Johnston. Kenyon E. Poole 229

Europe: Nine Panel Studies by Experts from Central and Eastern Europe. Murray Edelman 225

EUROPEAN MOVEMENT. *The Economic Future of Europe.* Norman S. Buchanan 186

GILMOUR, G. P. (Ed.). *Canada's Tomorrow: Papers and Discussion, Canada's Tomorrow Conference, Quebec City, November 1953.* W. T. Easterbrook 220

GROSS, FELIKS. *Foreign Policy Analysis.* Norman L. Hill 185

HARKNESS, GEORGIA. *The Sources of Western Morality.* Irl G. Whitchurch 216

HART, B. H. LIDDELL. *Strategy: The Indirect Approach.* Eustace M. Peixotto 185

HAZARD, PAUL. *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century.* John Bowle 211

HOBBS, EDWARD H. *Behind the President: A Study of Executive Office Agencies.* John H. Ferguson 193

HODGSON, KENNETH W. *The Deaf and Their Problems.* Maxine Tull Boatner 208

HOETTL, WILHELM. *The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Political Espionage.* L. K. Truscott, Jr. 229

HOSKINS, HALFORD L. *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics.* Harry N. Howard 234

PAGE

HUXLEY, JULIAN. *From an Antique Land: Ancient and Modern in the Middle East.* A. O. Sarkissian 232

JONES, F. C. *Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–45.* Herbert Passin 235

KEVE, PAUL W. *Prison, Probation, or Parole?* Ralph W. England, Jr. 205

KIRK, GEORGE. *The Middle East, 1945–1950.* Halford L. Hoskins 233

KIRK, RUSSELL. *A Program for Conservatives.* James Burnham 216

KONVITZ, MILTON R. *Bill of Rights Reader.* Leo Pfeffer 189

KORBEL, JOSEF. *Danger in Kashmir.* Norman D. Palmer 223

LA PIERE, RICHARD T. *A Theory of Social Control.* W. Rex Crawford 202

LEITES, NATHAN, and ELSA BERNAUT. *Ritual of Liquidation: The Case of the Moscow Trials.* John S. Reshetar, Jr. 224

LIE, TRYGVE. *In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations.* Henry R. Winkler 183

LOWIE, ROBERT H. *Indians of the Plains.* Edward H. Spicer 201

LUNDBERG, FERDINAND. *The Treason of the People.* Henry Wells 197

LUTHIN, REINHARD H. *American Demagogues: The 20th Century.* Peter H. Odegard 196

MARLOWE, JOHN. *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800–1953.* Emil Lengyel 232

MATTHEWS, RONALD. *The Death of the Fourth Republic.* Philip M. Williams 226

MEYER, ALFRED G. *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice.* J. Plamenatz 210

MILES, ARTHUR P. *American Social Work Theory: A Critique and a Proposal.* W. I. Newstetter 203

MONTGOMERY, JOHN D. (Ed.). *The State Versus Socrates.* Ronald B. Levinson 212

MUMFORD, LEWIS. *In the Name of Sanity.* Mason W. Gross 214

NOTESTEIN, WALLACE. *The English People on the Eve of Colonization, 1603–1630.* John J. Murray 219

OPPENHEIMER, J. ROBERT. *Science and the Common Understanding.* Henry A. Finch 215

OSBORN, RICHARD C. *Corporate Profits: War and Postwar.* Adolf A. Berle, Jr. 199

PALMER, GLADYS L. with the assistance of CAROL P. BRAINERD. *Labor Mobility in Six Cities.* Witt Bowden 201

PARK, JULIAN (Ed.). *The Culture of France in Our Time.* Rhoda Métraux 226

PATEL, GOVINDLAL D. *The Indian Land Problem and Legislation.* M. B. Desai 221

PEARSON, GERALD H. J. *Psychoanalysis and the Education of the Child.* John E. Anderson 209

POTTER, DAVID M. *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character.* Alice Felt Tyler 194

PROUDFOOT, MARY. *Britain and the United States in the Caribbean.* Robert E. Scott 188

PAGE

SAUNDERS, LYLE. *Cultural Differences and Medical Care.* Francis J. Brown .. 204

SEABURY, PAUL. *The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime.* Ralph Haswell Lutz 228

SILVERMAN, HIRSCH LAZAAR. *Education Through Psychology.* John E. Anderson 210

SIMMONS, LEO W., and HAROLD G. WOLFF. *Social Science in Medicine.* Francis J. Brown 204

STURM, ALBERT M. *Methods of State Constitutional Reform.* Roy V. Peel .. 195

TAYLOR, A. J. P. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1884–1918.* Hans Kohn 230

THOMPSON, J. ERIC S. *The Rise and Fall of Maya Civilization.* George W. Brainerd 231

TODD, RICHARD CECIL. *Confederate Finance.* James A. Durham 193

TREVOR-ROPER, H. R. (Ed.). *The Bormann Letters.* Oron James Hale 227

TROMBLEY, KENNETH E. *The Life and Times of a Happy Liberal.* Ott[illegible] Mallery ..... [illegible]

WARBURG, JAMES P. *The United States in a Changing World.* Louis Marti[illegible] Sears ..... 18[illegible]

WILLCOX, WILLIAM B. (Ed.). *The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of his Campaigns, 1775–1782.* Ralph Adams Brown 191

WOLFLE, DAEL. *American Resources of Specialized Talent.* Claude E. Hawley 206

WOLSELEY, ROLAND E. (Ed.). *Journalism in Modern India.* W. C. Clark 222

OTHER BOOKS 235

INDEX 241

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index.*

FOREWORD

Africa plays an increasingly important role in world affairs. The continent is involved, to an ever widening extent, in a complex network of world communications, global strategy, and world politics. Changes are in process which are modifying, and in some areas transforming, the economies, social structures, cultures, ideologies, and aspirations of the divergent peoples of Africa. In the course of these changes, the political relations between African territories or countries and the great centers of organized political power in the Western world are being reshaped and realigned, in some regions radically so.

In effect, we are now witnessing in Africa the early stages in the development of a revolutionary situation which is barely perceptible in some areas but is clearly manifest in other parts of the continent such, for example, as the Union of South Africa or the Gold Coast. The symptoms of this emerging revolutionary situation [illegible]ored in the weakening of traditional systems and the erosion of ancient [illegible]rms and sanctions; the development of new types of economic, social, and [illegible] structures within which peoples who were relatively isolated from one another in times past are now brought into a complex web of contacts, with resulting insecurities, tensions, and conflicts; and the emergence of new relationships, social types, and movements which are not easily contained, if at all, within the framework of traditional social orders and established political and power systems.

The purpose of this issue of THE ANNALS is to illuminate some of the basic realities and situations prevailing and to analyze selected developments and issues in contemporary Africa. The first four articles focus on the environmental realities, the fundamental characteristics of the peoples and cultures of Africa, and the continent's role historically in world affairs. The four articles that follow outline some of the characteristic economic features of Africa, with emphasis on conditions and problems associated with economic change. The last three articles in this section diagnose specific developments in selected areas, while the first article, by Mr. La Macchia, gives a more generalized exposition of African economic situations and issues.

The six articles in the section on "Political Framework and Dynamics" explore some of the continent's important political problems and analyze specific political situations in selected regions and countries. As originally planned, this section was to include an article on the important and dramatic political developments in Kenya and Uganda, but because of the contributor's illness he was unable to finish the article. It should be stressed, however, that it was not the aim in any of these sections to cover all areas but merely to provide a generalized account of the fundamentals, with some "case studies" of particular situations which seemed to have wider implications.

The three articles in the final section provide brief accounts of the impact of urbanization, Christianity, and education in Africa, with special reference to the role of these factors in social change. Actually, of course, there is no sharp separation between economic, political, and social situations in Africa—or elsewhere. The breakdown used here merely suggests a scheme and points of emphasis for the analysis of the varied aspects of the complex reality represented by contemporary Africa.

The editors recognize that certain of the significant situations and dynamic thrusts in the continent are either ignored or given only incidental consideration. No attention is given to the rise of a new state in the Sudan or the important problems inherent in this development, and there is no discussion of Egypt or its increasing preoccupation with African affairs, particularly in relation to the Sudan. Developments and issues in the independent states of Libya, Liberia, and Ethiopia are largely ignored. The absence of a discussion on political developments in British East Africa has been noted. The operational and ideological role of the United Nations is only occasionally cited, and there is no treatment specifically of the seven trust territories in the continent. The role of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa is not considered, and the question of Asian influence is barely mentioned. The impact of the East-West conflict on Africa and the extent of and potentialities for Communist subversion receive only incidental consideration. Finally, there is no specific exposition of United States interests, programs, and policies in Africa, or of the dilemmas posed for us by the revolutionary situations emerging in the continent.

Such omissions are regrettable; but given the limitations of space, and considering the extraordinary diversity and complexity of the African scene, some gaps in coverage and analysis are unavoidable. Despite the incomplete coverage, however, it is hoped that this issue of THE ANNALS will contribute to our understanding and, at the same time, stimulate further study of the conditions of life prevailing and the new men emerging in contemporary Africa.

WILLIAM O. BROWN

Africa: The Environmental Setting

By ROBERT W. STEEL

AFRICA is a vast and still only partially known continent. It stretches for 5,000 miles from near Bizerte, Tunisia, to the Cape of Good Hope and for 4,600 miles from Dakar, French West Africa, to Cape Guardafui in Somaliland. It covers nearly 11¾ million square miles, 9 million of which lie within the tropics. It remains, in large part, scientifically unknown and economically undeveloped. Though no longer the "Dark Continent" of the nineteenth century, it is still far less understood than any other of the great land masses, except Antarctica. We are as ignorant of its physical nature as we are of many of its economic, social, and political problems. There is still much to discover in Africa, many tribes to study, a diversity of languages and cultures to understand, a great range of plants, animals, and diseases to investigate, and vast tracts to be surveyed and mapped.

BARRIERS TO EARLY PENETRATION

The nature of the geographical environment in this widest sense must be appreciated if either the past history, the present conditions, or the future possibilities of Africa are to be properly understood. It was no mere accident of history that left Africa so little explored only a century and a half ago. Europeans had merely touched the fringe of the continent because Africa had appeared primarily an enormous obstacle to seamen as they voyaged to the riches of the East. Apart from the tales of fantastically wealthy kingdoms such as Monomotapa and that of Prester John, there seemed no intrinsic resources within the continent to encourage its opening up. But it was the physical conditions that really discouraged, if they did not wholly prevent, penetration beyond the coastlands. Natural harbors were few; the rivers were generally navigable only for short distances inland and frequently reached the sea through intricate channels in densely vegetated, fever-ridden deltas. Moreover the nature of the climate of the coastlands was sufficient to discourage all but the most fearless of missionaries and traders. Inland the plateau rose steeply and uninvitingly, with its rim broken but infrequently by watercourses, the falls and rapids of which made navigation impossible. In the northern part of the continent stretched the vast forbidding deserts which separated so effectively and for so long the Mediterranean world from tropical Africa.

Some of these obstacles were overcome, in part at least, by the journeys of explorers like Mungo Park, David Livingstone, H. M. Stanley, and J. H. Speke during the nineteenth century. In the process the traffic in slaves was suppressed and, whenever possible, replaced by new forms of trade, such as that in the oil-palm products of West Africa. The rapid political occupation of Africa came later and culminated in the "scramble for Africa" in the 1880's. Economic development was slow and depended largely upon the discovery of minerals, such as diamonds at Kimberley in 1867 and gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886, or upon the construction of railways, several of which in West and East Africa were opened about the turn of the century. Yet despite such activity it could still be said of Africa

by A. H. Keane, writing as late as 1907, that whereas the political conquest of Africa had already progressed so far that it was almost a European dependency, the geographical conquest had advanced much less rapidly and was still unfinished.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AS A LIMITING FACTOR

The last half-century in Africa has seen many striking changes. There has been a steadily growing European interest in Africa, an ever increasing demand in both Europe and North America for the raw materials of the tropics, and a new conception of imperial responsibilities which has particularly affected Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal (the European countries most directly concerned). Social consciences have gradually been awakened, and the strategic potentialities of Africa have been recognized in a new way. There has been a fresh assessment of the possibilities of Africa and of the African peoples, and the whole process of readjustment between Africa and the rest of the world has been greatly stimulated—and profoundly modified—by World War II and its aftermath with all their consequences in terms of political and social relationships and of economic development. The Africa of the middle of the twentieth century presents us with a wholly different picture from that which fifty, thirty, or even fifteen years ago gave us.

Yet in this rapidly changing Africa of today many, indeed most, of the geographical realities remain, some of them seeming almost to have an increased significance. The trends and issues of today must always be viewed against this background, complex and varied though it usually is. The very size of Africa makes generalization difficult and sometimes dangerous, but the meaning and the limitations of this geographical environment must be constantly recognized on every scale—continental, regional, and local—since, in the words of Professor L. Dudley Stamp, "throughout much of Africa, especially tropical Africa, the course of man's life is still dictated in large measure by the physical environment."

GEOLOGY AND TOPOGRAPHY

Geologically and topographically Africa is often described as a continent of uniformity and monotony. This is, however, an overstatement, the inadequacy of which is readily shown by the variety of conditions existing in many individual political units. Over extensive areas it is a great high plateau where the ancient hard crystalline basal complex is exposed, sometimes with granite or granitic rocks dominant and elsewhere with highly metamorphosed schists and gneisses. Many of these rocks have hardly been altered during millions of years; and there has been little folding by later earth movements, apart from the Atlas Mountains and the Cape Ranges at the northern and southern extremities of the continent respectively. There has, however, been considerable elevation and depression of the plateau, resulting in great strains which have given rise to some of Africa's most conspicuous physical features—the Great Rift Valley of East Africa and its associated volcanoes (the highest, Kilimanjaro, reaching 19,565 feet above sea level) and the volcanic peak of Mount Cameroon (13,353 feet) in West Africa. Elevation has also been responsible for the isolation of several large inland seas or lakes which have since wholly or very largely disappeared; remnants survive in the upper Niger Valley, the Lake Chad region, and the central parts of the Congo Basin.

The plateau has a considerable range in altitude, and its continuity is much more conspicuous in southern and eastern Africa than over much of the west and north. Only limited areas exceed 6,000 feet in altitude, though these have special significance because of the diverse ecological conditions that they offer and because of their effect upon white settlement. At the other extreme, there are but few real lowland areas, 600 feet or less above sea level; such areas are especially difficult to develop in tropical regions because of their excessive heat, their inadequate drainage, or the dense and impenetrable nature of their vegetation. Much of the continent lies at between two and six thousand feet above sea level and consists of the hard resistant rocks already noted. Their soil cover is usually thin and unproductive, and the inaccessibility of many of these areas from the ocean is intensified by the forbidding character of the plateau rim and by the unnavigable nature of the rivers, which cascade down the plateau edge to reach the sea across the narrow, usually undeveloped coastlands.

CLIMATE AND NATURAL VEGETATION

But important though topography may be, the essential features of the African landscape are generally provided by climate and natural vegetation. Again there is much uniformity of conditions over wide tracts of the continent. The whole of tropical Africa may be said to be hot throughout the year, with relatively small changes of temperature between the seasons. The coldest areas (apart from small, very elevated parts) experience the "Mediterranean" climate typical of central California, with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers: such districts occur in North Africa and in the extreme southwestern portion of the Cape Province of the Union of South Africa. Altitude does, however, matter greatly, and the generally high elevation of much of the continent causes considerable modifications in temperature. These account for the snow-capped peaks on the equator and call for fires and blankets at night in many places that are very hot indeed by day, and they are primarily responsible for attempts to establish permanent white settlement in many widely scattered parts of tropical Africa.

Of greater significance than temperature is rainfall. Large areas in Africa have average totals of more than one hundred inches in the year, and a very high proportion of the belt included between the two tropics receives forty or more inches a year. One of the wettest places on earth, certainly at sea level, is Debundja at the foot of Mount Cameroon overlooking the Gulf of Guinea, with 412 inches per annum. At the other extreme are the Sahara and the desert and semiarid regions of southern Africa, where whole years may pass without any rain and where average rainfall figures are very low and of little meaning in terms of settlement or agriculture. Seasonal distribution must, however, be considered as well as annual totals. Areas with between twenty and forty inches of rainfall a year, amounts which are, by the standards of temperate regions, more than adequate for cultivation, may suffer severely from drought, at least in some years, owing to the markedly seasonal distribution of the rainfall or the great year-to-year fluctuations in the total fall or the intensity of either the evaporation or the runoff. A high proportion of the annual total may, for example, come in a few torrential downpours that occur perhaps at the end of a prolonged dry season, when the surface is sun-baked and very hard. Thus little rain will penetrate and water the soil. Worse still, the rain may wash away such soil as there is and thereby aggravate what is already one of Africa's most serious problems, that of soil erosion.

The many variable factors affecting climate present us with a far from simple picture about which generalization is both difficult and dangerous. The empirical methods of the indigenous agriculturist may indeed be a more reliable guide to the complex of all the physical elements of the environment than the most carefully prepared distribution maps of the scientist. A study of vegetation belts does, however, indicate something of the physical nature of the environments in which men live in Africa. Equatorial rain forest covers much of the coastlands of West Africa and all the central parts of the Congo Basin. Towards the two tropics and, in East Africa, across the equator as well, the characteristic vegetation is loosely described as "savanna" and may range from deciduous and fairly open forest through impoverished woodland to poor, arid, and treeless grassland merging into the thorn scrub of the desert margins. Extensive areas both north and south of the equator consist of desert and semidesert, and in the extratropical areas of North and South Africa are the limited occurrences of the Mediterranean vegetation of forest and brush. In the more elevated parts of the East African plateau and in Ethiopia the vegetation is greatly modified by altitude and consists of varying zones of forest and grassland.


DIVERSITIES IN MODES OF LIFE

These generalized subdivisions of the continent serve to emphasize the nature of the underlying geographical realities, but they conceal much of the diversity of conditions and may fail to indicate the many ways of life of the peoples of Africa. To divide them into cultivators and pastoralists is an obvious oversimplification for, although it is true that agriculture is everywhere the chief occupation and means of livelihood, there is seldom any clear-cut distinction. Many farmers, European and African, combine the growing of crops and the rearing of livestock. There is, however, value in the broad distinction because it is a reminder of the limiting factors of the environment. The nomad or seminomad seeks water and fodder for his stock where they may be found. The cultivator, in contrast, must depend upon the nature of the soil or the humidity of the atmosphere in the place where he is, even though he may be able to modify these conditions to some extent by fertilization, by the rotation of crops, by the adoption of irrigation or dry farming, or by numerous other devices that enable him to adapt himself to the potentialities or the difficulties of his environment.

Cultivation ranges from the European-owned vineyards of French North Africa and the horticulture of the Cape Town region to the primitive "shifting cultivation" of the forest tribes of the Congo Basin, from the prosperous cotton-growing of the Baganda of Uganda or the coffee cultivation of the Chaga on the fertile, well-watered slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro to the subsistence farming of the Tallensi of the dry Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. So far as African farming is concerned it may be said, with some important and significant exceptions, that methods are usually primitive, though this is due at least as much to the harshness of the environment as to the backward nature of the cultivators. Shifting cultivation, for example, remains the common method of farming in most of the forest areas and over large parts of the wetter savanna zones. Scientific research has not yet produced any practicable and effective alternative to this prevailing system. Today this type of farming is dignified by such terms as "bush fallowing" or "rotational farming," and it has been described as an admirable adaptation to environment provided that

the amount of land available is large and the number of people concerned is small. Yet it remains a most unsatisfactory, because extravagant, way of using the land. The facts that population appears to be increasing quite rapidly in many parts of Africa and that shifting cultivation has, under present conditions, to be practiced over such extensive areas serve to underline the seriousness of the challenge which African farming presents to the skill of the agriculturists and scientists of the more advanced communities of the world.

The keeping of livestock, principally cattle, sheep, and goats, is prevented or made very difficult over vast tracts by the incidence of numerous diseases, such as rinderpest, East Coast fever, and, above all, trypanosomiasis. The latter is caused by the tsetse fly, one of the most widespread and persistent of all the many pests of Africa, particularly in the intertropical regions. On the other hand, stock can often be kept in areas that are much too dry for crops, since the animals can, if necessary, move with their owners in search of new sup-



plies of food or water. These migrations are sometimes extensive and permanent, as with the Bedouins of the Sahara with their camels or the Masai of Kenya and Tanganyika with their cattle. Others are only seasonal and take place over limited areas, as in the drier parts of West Africa or in the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

Science has already done much to check the ravages of disease, including trypanosomiasis, and to produce breeds that are better able to survive the rigors of some African climates. But its operations have been greatly hampered by the presence of wild game, which makes the complete eradication of, for example, the tsetse fly almost impossible, and by the social habits and traditions of many pastoral tribes. The stockbreeder and the veterinary officer can have but limited scope in a society that measures its wealth solely in livestock, in terms of quantity not quality, and whose marriage and other customs are closely bound up with the possession of large flocks and herds.

Too much stock upon too restricted an area has given rise directly to the exhaustion or erosion of the soil and to the lowering of the water table to an alarming extent in many districts. Furthermore these particular problems are not confined to tropical regions or to native farmers. They are, for example, among the most serious of all the problems faced by the Union of South Africa, and are by no means restricted in their occurrence to the crowded Native Reserves of Cape Province. As a result of soil erosion, in European and African areas, the Union is said to lose annually to the Indian Ocean 187 million tons from its land surface.

Despite many modern economic developments, most Africans still make their living from the land, whether as cultivators or pastoralists, or as more advanced "mixed farmers" who grow crops and also keep livestock (whose manure helps to maintain soil fertility) or as mere gatherers of what they can find in the forest or fish from the streams. While the number of non-native farmers is relatively small in relation to the total agricultural production, their contribution to total production and to the improvement of agricultural techniques bears no relation to the smallness of their number, whether it be in Algeria and Morocco, the Union of South Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Nyasaland, or Kenya.

In fact a very high proportion of the 5 million Europeans and 700,000 Asians in Africa—out of a total population of perhaps 175 million—are not directly concerned with agriculture but with mining, commerce, education, administration, and many other pursuits. The Union of South Africa, for example, is the world's chief producer of gold. One-fifth of the world's total output of copper comes from the Katanga Province of the Belgian Congo and the Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia, adjoining districts in the heart of Central Africa. French North Africa is an important supplier of iron ore to European manufacturers, and the manganese mine at Nsuta in the Gold Coast claims to be the largest in the world. Africa maintains its monopoly of diamonds and produces significant quantities of chrome, cobalt, uranium, and many other minerals.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

A single mine has great economic and social repercussions over very extensive areas, through its effect upon the demand for labor and upon the admixture of tribes. Nevertheless it is essential to keep a sense of proportion in assessing the importance of the commercial opening up that has taken place in Africa during the past half century. Significant though African production of numerous tropical and subtropical foodstuffs and raw materials may be, it must be recognized that the continent's participation in international trade remains small. Some years ago it was estimated that the share of the whole continent of Africa was about 4.5 per cent of the world's export trade and 4.8 per cent of the world's import trade, and that the comparable figures for Africa south of the Sahara were 2.8 and 2.6 per cent respectively. Though these figures may have been altered to some extent as a result of the numerous economic changes of recent years, they must remain substantially true, and they underline the fact that Africa, however important may be its contribution in certain commodities, cannot be regarded as a continent of outstanding productivity. Not only is its share in world trade small, but its progress and absorption into the world economy has so far been almost exclusively bound up with the discovery and exploitation of minerals.

POPULATION

Just as vegetation epitomizes to an extent the general nature of the physical environment, so the distribution and density of population are often useful guides to an assessment of the human geography of a region. Africa is unfortunately one of the least known of all the continents from a demographic point of view. We do not know with any certainty what is the total population of the continent: the figure of 175 million already quoted may be as much as 25 per cent above or below the true figure. Only recently the total population of Nigeria has been established by a series of censuses in the Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions to be at least thirty-three million, compared with the twenty-six million which has, till now, been regarded as the "official estimate." But while there may be innumerable doubts and uncertainties for the demographer and the statistician about totals, age, composition, trends, and many other facts of population that we expect, and need, to know today, certain features are sufficiently firmly established to justify governmental and indeed international concern and to give rise to administrative action.

Density

The population map of Africa shows every variation from the remarkable densities of the irrigated Nile Valley in Egypt to the uninhabited tracts of the Sahara, with such extremes often occurring in the closest possible proximity to one another, as in the examples quoted. The average for the whole continent, perhaps only fifteen persons to the square mile, suggests a state of underpopulation. Of all the continents only Australia is less densely peopled. Vast areas have such a small and widely scattered population that they cannot possibly be properly developed under present conditions. The Belgian Congo (900,000 square miles), for example, has about twelve million, whereas nearly four million live on the 20,500 square miles of the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi. French West Africa is approximately four times as large as its neighboring British West African territories, yet its total population is less than twenty million, compared with the figure of about thirty-eight million for the British territories. In the British Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland there are only six million people, one third of them concentrated in the 38,000 square miles of Nyasaland (52 per square mile), with another third in Southern Rhodesia, and the other third scattered over the huge area of Northern Rhodesia, whose density of population averages only 6 to the square mile.

It must not be assumed, however, that all these lands could support a much greater density of population. There is, for example, a steady flow of labor from many French areas in West Africa to better endowed districts in the British colonies, and while Southern Rhodesia is a large-scale importer of labor, especially from densely peopled Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, with its generally infertile soils and poor natural vegetation and its variable rainfall and (apart from the restricted Copper Belt) its poor endowment of resources, supports with difficulty its present population in many districts. Barren and inhospitable British Somaliland hardly provides a living for its 700,000 people in an area larger than England and Wales or the state of Missouri.

Problems of overpopulation

Within the ocean of sparse population there are important and significant islands of overpopulation, and small though they often are they nevertheless constitute focal points of attention, since they represent those areas where there is the greatest maladjustment between man and the land. While it would be an overstatement to claim that pressure of population upon resources is always a main cause of much of the unrest so common in Africa today, to ignore its significance, whether locally or on a larger scale, is equally wrong. Sir Philip Mitchell's suggestion that the basic problem in many parts of East Africa is "the need to adapt agricultural practice and economic policy to the requirements of an increasing population" is applicable to areas throughout the continent.

Lack of population frequently shows itself when economic developments take place, either in the form of mineral exploitation or commercial agriculture, in both cases associated with the immigration, and possibly permanent settlement, of Europeans. Such developments give rise to labor migrations, such as the flow of people from the interior of West Africa to the mining areas of the Gold Coast, or of the population of Ruanda-Urundi to the European estates of Kenya or to the African cotton farms of Uganda. In southern Africa Nyasalanders go in large numbers to seek employment at the mines or on the European farms and increasingly in the manufacturing industries of Southern Rhodesia; the people of Mozambique and Basutoland travel to the gold mines and the other industries of the Witwatersrand. It should be noted that in some cases these migrations indicate the extreme difficulties of making a living in a harsh and unpromising environment, as in the dry areas of French West Africa; in other cases they reveal the existence of these islands of overpopulation, such as Ruanda-Urundi and the southern parts of Nyasaland, which, under existing economic conditions, are incapable of supporting their relatively high densities of population.

The effects of local overpopulation are seen not only in migration but also in land use. Many areas are overcropped or overstocked; soils become exhausted, excessively steep slopes are brought under cultivation, soil erosion readily occurs, and the water table may be progressively lowered. Environmental conditions are often in themselves an adequate explanation of such consequences. In the forested areas of the British protectorate of Sierra Leone, for example, the high rainfall is responsible for the leaching of the soils, and shifting cultivation has taken a heavy toll of the natural vegetation and the soils of the area. Fortunately the introduction of new farming techniques and the reclamation of swamps for rice cultivation may alleviate the situation and restore an equilibrium between population and land before irreparable damage results. Elsewhere, however, administrative action by governments can be largely blamed for the existing position. Thus in the widely different circumstances of Kenya and of the Union of South Africa the establishment of Native Reserves which are too small for the population that they are called upon to support has resulted in the large-scale exhaustion and destruction of the soil. Professor W. M. Macmillan showed years ago that many parts of Cape Province were quite incapable of supporting their population, even allowing for extensive migration to employment on the Rand and elsewhere. More recently it has been recognized that too many parts of Kenya are having to carry more than three hundred persons to the square mile, a figure that is low by European or American standards but is, for agricultural or pastoral peoples under present conditions in Africa, much too great, however low may be the standard of living.

Attempted alleviations

Pressure of population may be alleviated, at least temporarily, by the migration of peoples to other areas where economic opportunities are greater. Indeed this has sometimes been the basis of policy in many parts of Africa, and the possibilities of greater internal development, of the better and more intensive use of the land, or of the more intensive exploitation of resources, have been ignored as long as immediate pressure of population could be relieved in other, and simpler, ways. Today the shortcomings and shortsightedness of such policies and the difficulties that arise from both permanent and temporary migrations are being increasingly recognized. Attention is being given—as in the Sierra Leone swamp-rice projects—to the remedies available on the spot. Development plans have given prime consideration to the local rather than to the distant employment of labor, wherever internal resources permit, though many of these plans remain to be translated into practice and will have to face the opposition of powerful vested interests, such as the employers of migratory mine and estate labor. In any case the damage is already done in many districts. Detribalization has resulted, the land has suffered through the prolonged absence of a high proportion of the young adult males, villages have been abandoned through the wastage of the soil or through the advance of the tsetse fly. The economic and the political bases of society have been so disturbed that no amount of social planning can now make good this damage.

Towns

One final feature of population distribution should be mentioned—the increasing tendency of Africans to live in towns. In some areas towns have long been typical of the pattern of settlement, as with the capitals of the Muslim emirates of Northern Nigeria or of the Yoruban peoples of the Western Region of Nigeria. Such towns have invariably increased in both the size of their population and the scope of their functions with the administrative and commercial development of Africa during the twentieth century. Elsewhere towns have generally been few and far between, though their number has greatly increased as a result of the European and (in East Africa) Arab penetration of the continent. Coastal stations in West Africa have grown until Lagos and Accra have populations of more than 230,000 and 140,000 respectively. In Kenya, Nairobi has a mixed population of 110,000, with Europeans, Asians, and Africans roughly in the ratio of 1, 3, and 6, on a site that was uninhabited little more than fifty years ago. Mushroom towns have been created in the Copper Belt of Northern

Rhodesia and in the neighboring Katanga Province of the Belgian Congo. The growth of towns, like Nairobi of highly mixed composition, has been a striking feature of the economic development of both the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia: the Rand conurbation centered on Johannesburg numbers 1¼ million, including 550,000 Europeans. In addition to these large towns there has been a tremendous growth in the number of smaller towns: in the Gold Coast alone, for example, there are now some sixty towns with more than four thousand inhabitants, principally in those districts that have undergone a complete economic transformation in recent years through the cultivation of cocoa and the development of mining. The creation and growth of these towns and urban communities, large and small, naturally result in new and special types of problems of which comparatively little is as yet known. They constitute an important part of the geographical background that has emerged in the present century.

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

There are, too, many other features that are new and that have altered or may in the future modify this background. Permanent and static though the physiography, soils, and even the climate and vegetation of Africa may seem, the other aspects of the total environment—such as land use, economic development, population patterns, and communication networks—are essentially dynamic and constantly changing. They are directly and immediately affected by political reorganization, by new concepts of economic development such as the British Colonial Development Corporation or the French FIDES (*Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer*), or by ambitious and comprehensive economic planning such as the Volta River scheme and the Kariba and Owen Falls projects in West, Central, and East Africa respectively. New things are coming out of Africa, as they always have, and many of these—in economics, in politics, and in society—will be considered in the articles that follow. These new developments will be better understood, their possibilities more correctly assessed and the obstacles more properly recognized, if the realities of the complex and varied geographical background of Africa are constantly remembered.

Robert W. Steel, M.A., is a fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and senior lecturer in colonial geography in the University of Oxford. He has carried out geographical research in Sierra Leone, West Africa, and was a member of the Ashanti Social Survey team in the Gold Coast in 1945 and 1946. He is the author of a number of geographical papers on colonial and other topics, and editor (with A. F. Martin) of The Oxford Region: A Scientific and Historical Survey (1954). He has edited the Transactions and Papers of the Institute of British Geographers since 1950.

Peoples and Cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa

By MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

CHANGE is nothing new to sub-Saharan Africa. It is as unrealistic to attribute excessive stability to African cultures during the centuries before European occupation as it is to overemphasize change in present-day African life. Where writing is absent, the historical picture is two dimensional, and ethnographic portrayal must therefore lack movement. It does not follow, however, that this unrecorded past must of equal necessity have been stagnant. The dynamic nature of contemporary Africa represents an extension into the present of a continuing characteristic of African life made apparent by the study of African prehistory, and reinforced by the logic of the differences discernible in the distribution of physical types, languages, and cultures over this great land mass.

The population of Africa south of the Sahara cannot be given with any degree of accuracy, but an approximation of 150 million seems acceptable to most authorities. This, for native Africans, is to be contrasted to some 3 million Europeans, 750,000 Indians, and a sprinkling of Syrians, Lebanese, and others. The numerical difference is emphasized when we find that some two-thirds of the Europeans and about half of the Indians live in South Africa. Elsewhere, as in French West Africa, we find ratios of 17 million Africans to 63,000 non-indigenous residents, or in the Belgian Congo 11 million Congolese to 60,000 from outside, or even in Kenya, with what is for Africa a large non-African population, over 5 million Africans in contrast to some 30,000 Europeans and about 120,000 Indians, Arabs, and Goanese.[1] This disparity gives a special character to the impact of the outside world on Africa, and renders it imperative that any evaluation of the present situation in the continent and particularly any planning for the future regard the indigenous African and his traditional ways of life and thought as a major factor in determining the facts and assessing the probable results of change.

Our equation, however, must also take into account the heterogeneities of Africa —the more than seven hundred languages, the innumerable tribal groupings, even the differences in physical type. The resulting complexities of the problem force a balancing of similarities against differences as the only valid methodological procedure; and this, in turn, depends on the particular situation under study and the fineness of focus with which it is regarded. In some regions relatively minor differences between fairly small tribal units can be important, as in the Cameroons highlands; elsewhere, unities over large areas can override conditions imposed by the drawing of colonial boundaries, as in Central Africa, along the line of division between the Congo and Northern Rhodesia.

PHYSICAL TYPES

It is not likely that, as between Africans, differences in physical type have been of any great significance in

[1] United Nations, *Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summaries and Analyses . . . Transmitted . . . During 1952*, Vol. II (New York, 1953).

influencing relations between the indigenous peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. In the technical sense of the term "race" as a major division of mankind, the racial factor over all this region is a constant, for all the Africans belong to the Negro race, despite variations in stature, in body build, in hair form and facial characteristics, even in pigmentation. The Africans of the Guinea Coast are classical Negroids, dark in color, longheaded, broad nosed, with everted lips, small, finely formed ears, and in the main short of stature, having slender legs and powerfully developed torso. North of them lives the Sudanese type, marginal to the "true Negro" and the Caucasoids who inhabit the Mediterranean littoral of the continent. In East Africa the so-called "Hamitic" form finds its most extreme expression in the peoples of the Upper Nile, Kenya, and Ruanda-Urundi, a type with bodily proportions that accentuate the vertical axis, slender in build, with long, narrow face and nose, smaller lips, and numbering among them the tallest peoples of the world. They are very heavily pigmented, however, and their hair is of the wiry, curled Negroid type, standing off the head instead of matting close to it as in the western part of the continent.

Inhabiting most of the vast region of the central and southern parts of Africa are the forms that, for want of a better term, are called "Bantu-speaking peoples." Migrations in Africa have been generally west across the northerly half of the continent, southwest from the region of the lakes toward the Atlantic, and south along the eastern portion. This has resulted in continuous mixture in central and eastern Africa, and has produced the many Negroid groupings, from the Cameroons and French Equatorial Africa south to Angola and southeastward to Mozambique and the Union, that exhibit the heterogeneity resulting from continuing ancestral crossing. In the Congo, too, are enclaves of Negroid Pygmies, while at the extreme south of the continent, the pygmoid Bushman and the larger Hottentot, both highly specialized, lighter-colored forms, have survived a harsh environment only to face extinction under contact with European peoples.

The reason why these differences in physical type have not significantly influenced contacts between African peoples is not far to seek. For one thing, the principal subdivisions encompass great areas, so that contacts between them in significant number have, on balance, been slight. Though instances are to be found, some striking—as in Ruanda-Urundi, where conquest by the Watutsi of the indigenous peoples, the Bahutu and Batwa, of markedly different physical characteristics, resulted in the imposition of a hierarchical social system correlated with these differences —such instances are not numerous. It was only with outside contacts and, indeed, only in relatively recent times that the racial problem, as such, became important in Africa. Its most exacerbated form is manifest in the color bar of the Union of South Africa, where it has been elevated to the status of the dominant political doctrine called *apartheid*. Its importance is also documented in the affirmations as to the absence of color prejudice in official and unofficial French and Portuguese writings, while its significance is apparent on the social level in the Belgian Congo, and on the social and political level in British East Africa, in the continuous flow of discussion in these territories concerning the need to develop multiracial entities so as to ensure future stability.

The importance of the racial problem obviously derives from the fact that Africans and Europeans differ sharply in skin color, that human physical trait which marks off groups of men most readily and is the first to be noted on initial contact. This trait provides a ready frame for drawing racial lines, and for distinguishing groupings to which all kinds of differences of a nonbiological order, actual or assumed, can be assigned. To it are attributed positive as well as negative influences, as where African preference for Mohammedanism as against Christianity is held to result from the fact that no element of color difference enters, with Negro Mohammedans converting Negroes, and no color line drawn in any mosque. That propositions of this sort overlook the existing tensions in the relations between Africans and Indians in eastern Africa, in which color differences are not important, does not lessen the significance of the overriding fact that, in contemporary Africa, the presence of physical differences between Africans and non-Africans is critical in shaping present-day alignments in all aspects of African life.

LANGUAGES

The linguistic picture reflects more clearly the process of contact, change, and consolidation that has characterized the African past. Where isolation with resulting fragmentation is stressed, the fact that sub-Saharan Africa has so large a number of distinguishable languages makes impressive documentation. Yet it must not be forgotten that from the early days of linguistic study in Africa, scholars have been able to discern a series of basic similarities behind the screen of differences which have enabled them to classify this linguistic welter into a restricted number of language families. For many years, these were reduced to three: the Sudanic on an east-west axis from Cape Verde along the Guinea Coast to the Ethiopian highlands; the Bantu, covering most of the continent south of the Equator and reaching to the north of it; and the Hamitic, roughly in the north with respect to the other two families, including Hausa in the west and Galla and Masai in the east. Under this system, Hottentot and, with somewhat less conviction, Bushman, were by some classified as Hamitic.[2]

More recently, however, a revision of this earlier grouping has been proposed and in broad outline has met with the general approval of students of African linguistics.[3] In these terms, the linguistic picture is dominated by the great sweep of a language family called Niger-Congo, which encompasses the whole of the Guinea Coast deep into the interior, including languages previously termed Sudanic and the Bantu forms of speech as well. The Hamitic family disappears. One part, termed Afro-Asiatic, encompasses Ethiopia, moving northeastward into Asia Minor and north and west through Egypt and the northern part of Africa. The remainder is differentiated into a number of smaller units, while Bushman and Hottentot are grouped as an independent "Click" family, taking its name from the phonetic device that, among the languages of mankind, almost uniquely distinguishes them.

Yet the Africans, despite the wide variety of their languages, have not been linguistically provincial. There is ample evidence in the early literature of travel that tribesmen with the ability to speak a number of tongues besides their own were regularly encountered, and this is a reflection of the intertribal contacts that, as we shall see when we consider the nonlinguistic aspects of

[2] For the best short expression of the conventional classification of African languages see Alice Werner, *Structure and Relationship of African Languages* (London, 1930).

[3] Joseph H. Greenberg, "Studies in African Linguistic Classification," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 5 (1949), pp. 79–100, 190–98, 309–17; Vol. 6 (1950), pp. 47–63, 143–60, 223–37, 388–98.

aboriginal African cultures, resulted in the unities that mark large areas of the continent and, in some measure, sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

One important aspect of the linguistic picture is the existence, in various parts of the continent, of auxiliary languages. Kiswahili in the east-central part, and Lingala and Kikongo in the western Congo, come most immediately to mind as outstanding examples. On the Guinea Coast, pidgin versions of European languages served a similar purpose. The best established of these, the Creole of the Colony of Sierra Leone, has because of historical circumstances attained the status of what linguists call a creolized language. As the primary mode of speech of a considerable group of people, it will probably persist in the future as much as any African language. Elsewhere, however, the major historic function of the pidginized modes of speech has been to pave the way for learning the "proper" European languages, which today in much of Africa, with the rapid spread of schooling, have replaced them. Whether in central and eastern Africa these world languages will take the place of the auxiliary forms of speech that have been long established, only time will tell, but at the present this does not seem probable.

The fact that African languages were unwritten poses many questions. In what languages, for example, should Africans be taught to read and write? There seems general agreement that secondary and higher education should employ languages of world-wide distribution, so that students may have direct access to the world's knowledge. Yet what of primary education? Or one may consider the fundamental query as to the relation between language and thought, which has been posed by Africans who reason that to rely for the acquisition of knowledge on a foreign tongue imposes an unreasonable handicap to comprehension, to expression, and particularly to creativity.


An essential further point to be resolved concerns printing. Authorities believe that it is economically not feasible to print books for a language community numbering less than a hundred thousand persons. Though there are a considerable number of African languages whose speakers attain or exceed this figure, there are many more where this condition is not fulfilled. Here, however, another factor enters, one that, wanting a better term, may be characterized as analagous to national pride. Where, as in the Niger Delta, there are many tongues, each with but a relatively small number of speakers, which ones will give way? Attempts of mission boards, commissions of professional linguists, and governmental bodies to suggest, persuade, or impose the use of a single African tongue in such situations have met with little success.

It is becoming clear that in most of sub-Saharan Africa the language of the European power that now governs a given territory will in the future be spoken there, especially to facilitate intertribal communication within it, and for its contacts with the outside world. Conversely, however, the use of different European languages in different African territories, when considered from the point of view of Africa as a whole, seems to function as a divisive force, as is apparent from certain African reactions to propositions to establish a union of all West African territories. This will therefore have to be taken into account in forecasting political developments. The symbolic values of speech being what they are, however, it is difficult to envisage a time in the predictable future when any African language will be replaced by a European one, or where given African languages will completely give way to more widely distributed African tongues.

BASIC CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS

As with languages, so the similarities and differences among African cultures are to be balanced against each other, to give perspective against which current happenings are to be projected. On the broadest level, the similarities include those elements in African cultures which are continental in their distribution and mark off these ways of life from those of other major world regions. Next come the conventions that, while spread less widely, are none the less found in areas of broad compass and distinguish the major culture types of the continent. As we move to the tribal or local group level, the special characteristics that mark each off from its neighbors come to the fore. These characteristics, described in intensive studies of specific societies, are from the comparative point of view to be regarded as variations on the broader cultural themes of wider areal or continental distribution.

The accompanying map, which delimits the culture areas of Africa projected against present political boundaries, indicates an important potential source of tension arising out of the disregard of ethnic lines in partitioning the continent. Such tension is already apparent in the demands of the Ewe of Togoland and of the peoples living in the Cameroons, whose territories were so divided, to be reunited; and it is logical to suppose that these demands will stimulate similar movements among other peoples similarly situated. The areas are given according to their spread at a time which may roughly be designated as the beginning of intensive European expansion in Africa. That



CULTURE AREAS & POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF AFRICA

changes in these cultures have occurred since that time is obvious, though with a few exceptions the basic patterns that dictate the differentiation of these areas are still operative despite the way in which colonial boundaries are at variance with them.

The most dramatic of the changes that have resulted from contact is found in the Khoisan area, where the fate of Bushman and Hottentot cultures has paralleled that of the peoples themselves. The Bushmen, whose ways of life are among the simplest known to man, have been reduced to a few surviving bands in Southwest Africa and Angola. Never having developed herding or agriculture and possessing a sparse technology, they were always hard put to it to survive the rigors of their desert environment. Contact first with cattle-owning Bantu and later with the migrating Boer settlers, whose herds they raided as they would any herd of wild animals, made them fair game. The Hottentots, themselves a herding people who, unlike other cattle-keeping Africans to the east and north, regarded their herds as consumption rather than prestige goods, became servants and farm workers of the incoming whites, and later wage laborers. They were gradually absorbed into the Colored population of the Union of South Africa, whence their culture has, except among a few small groupings, almost disappeared.[4]

Elsewhere, basic cultural orientations have persisted with far less change than a reading of current reports would indicate. Fifty years of linguistic and cultural contact with persons of differing ways from their own, holding positions of power and hence of prestige, did not fail to affect the general African cultural picture. But outside the new centers of population—and within them, more than is commonly held—pre-existing patterns continue. In the back country, all over Africa, life in its basic configurations moves largely as in pre-European days, and where contact has been close and pressures of a social, political, economic, and religious nature have been strong, the mechanism of cultural reinterpretation has come into play. As a result, pre-existing values are retained, but given expression in new outer form.

It is unnecessary to repeat here the features of each of the culture areas that reach from the Sahara south and east to the region inhabited in earlier days by the Bushmen and Hottentots.[5] Let us rather group these six sub-Saharan units in terms of a basic criterion that has been of major importance in shaping responses to recent contact. For this purpose a contrast may be drawn between, on the one hand, the East African Cattle Area, the Eastern Sudan, and those southern and western portions of the East Horn that lie outside the cultural dominance of the literate Amharic groups and, on the other hand, the Congo, Guinea Coast, and Western Sudan areas. The peoples of the former grouping are in the main pastoral, while the latter contains societies that are basically agricultural, where herding is either entirely absent or, if present, has a different place in the culture.

The differences between the cultures of these two principal regions flow from the nature of their basic economies, and follow well-recognized and long-established principles that have been demonstrated to have world-wide applicability. That is, population density is not so great in the pastoral as in the agricultural regions, so that the political units are smaller and the economic systems simpler in structure and more direct in their functioning. From the point of view of assessing the reactions of Africans to contact, these, and other elements in the cultures of these regions that are related to them, are critical.

[4] Sarah Gertrude Millin, *God's Stepchildren* (2d ed.; London: Constable & Company, 1951), gives a vivid account in fictional form of this process.

[5] See M. J. Herskovits, "The Culture Areas of Africa," *Africa*, Vol. 3 (1930), pp. 59–77, and, for a revision of this earlier mapping, *idem, Backgrounds of African Art* (Denver, 1945).

THE PASTORAL SOCIETIES

Outstanding in the pastoral societies of eastern Africa is the special position of the principal animal herded. It is on the basis of this complex of cultural elements clustering about cattle keeping that the largest culture area of this grouping was designated, which, since it has been the most richly documented, may serve as typical of the basic pattern of the pastoral areas as a whole. In terms of this pattern, the most important animal—cattle in East Africa, camels or horses to the north—is the essential element in the prestige system, holding a place that transcends its economic role, ramifying into the social and political aspects of these cultures and into the artistic and religious life as well. Herding is not confined to this principal animal—sheep, goats, and donkeys are variously found, while in parts of the cattle area where the tsetse makes it impossible for this animal to survive, the smaller beasts substitute for it in its socioceremonial role.

A subsistence economy, clearly distinguished from the prestige system and marked by family self-sufficiency, is based on agriculture. There is accordingly little or no exchange of produce, since each group grows what it needs and consumes what it grows. This is in striking contrast to the prestige system, which provides some of the strongest supports for the total tribal social structure through the exchange of beasts on the occasion of marriage—the famous bride wealth, so long termed "bride price," and misinterpreted as wife purchase.

Wealth, as defined in these societies, is restricted to the principal animal herded, and its acquisition is a man's primary ambition. Because wealth, and the prestige associated with it, is in these societies counted in terms of the number of beasts a man possesses, it is to his advantage to have the largest number of head possible. Considerations of quality, opportunities to exchange his animals for other goods, and the idea of consuming them as food have only recently begun to enter. On the other hand, the self-contained character of the subsistence economy has made for a scattering of population and an absence of those features which mark off systems utilizing goods from outside. In eastern Africa, that is, the institution of the market was not found, nor was there any form of least common denominator in exchange. Moreover, except for workers of iron, no craft specialization existed or indeed, in so far as indigenous institutions have been maintained, exists. Among these pastoralists, also, the village, which is the largest type of settlement, in much of the area continues to be the family habitation, where a small group, of the order of the extended family, lives. These people are not nomads, for the beasts are driven to pasturage daily and returned to the habitation at night for protection against wild beasts that roam the plains and inhabit the bush. Gardens are close by, and to these the women repair to weed and reap the harvest after the ground has been made ready by the men.

Other aspects of the culture are attuned to this key. All reports agree on the importance of the ancestral cult—which is the core of the religions of the eastern Africans—wherein the priest in

charge of ritual is the family head.[6] Political structures, as might be expected over so vast a region, show great variation, apparent in the discussion of the five East African political systems considered in the volume edited by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard.[7] Yet the importance of segmentary kinship sections, the role of groupings based on age, technically termed age grades, and the emphasis on local autonomy all tend to distinguish this part of the continent.[8] Art forms are, in the main, those of the household—basketry, which is of high order, beadwork, and designs incised on calabashes. This again brings us to the slight degree of specialization here, in contrast to that which is present where the better-known African art products in wood, metal, and cloth are executed.

AGRICULTURALLY BASED SOCIETIES

The contrasts between the cultures of eastern Africa and those of the western part of the continent are most striking in the elements that have been noted in the preceding paragraphs. In explaining these differences, the ecological factor cannot be neglected. The high, dry plains invite herding, just as they pose many difficulties for the agriculturalist, as those who would introduce new farming techniques are discovering. On the other hand, the lower-lying forested area that comprises so much of the Congo Basin and western Africa inhibits pastoralism and makes the emphasis on agriculture that marks the cultures contained in it a logical adaptation to environmental demands. With agriculture as the sole economic base, the division between subsistence and prestige systems is absent; with a more productive ecological setting and concentration on agriculture, denser populations can be supported, an appreciable economic surplus is produced, and the cultures manifest a degree of specialization of labor that ranks high in the nonindustrialized world.

This specialization of labor takes on two forms. In west-central Africa, especially in the basin of the Congo, it is tribal; along the Guinea Coast and to the north, it is by craft. The tradition of specialization explains why this area has developed the great variety of textiles and the many kinds of pottery found there. This tradition, too, has been responsible for the development of metal working, which not only provides implements of all kinds for daily use, but has produced such recognized art forms as the Ife and Benin bronzes, the Agni-Ashanti gold weights, the Dahomean and Cameroons brass figures, and the intricately designed Congo throwing knives. It has made possible the embellishment of houses and temples with carvings and paintings of a high order, and the development of sculpture that from Guinea and Sierra Leone to the Congo has given the world the masks, statuettes, and other carved figures that today have world-wide renown.

Specialization has made for trade, and trade for markets and the development of pecuniary units of value. These, in turn, have encouraged commercial and, concomitantly, cultural contacts which, though restricted in the case of any given people, have resulted in an interlocking series of relationships that have facilitated the diffusion of the basic patterns which mark off the region. As concerns other aspects of the social structure, the phenomenon of specialization has caused the development of

[6] A sampling of African religious systems from the whole sub-Saharan area will be found in Daryll Forde (Ed.), *African Worlds* (London, 1954).

[7] M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (Eds.), *African Political Systems* (London, 1940).

[8] For a series of descriptions of the social structures of a number of societies of British Africa, see A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde (Eds.), *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage* (London, 1950).

stratification and a class structure. This is the region of stable kingdoms, of established priesthoods and explicit theological systems maintained by those specialists in government and in the manipulation of the supernatural that only economies capable of producing substantial surpluses over subsistence needs can carry in the highly developed forms found in this region.

The empires of the Western Sudan—Melle, Fulah, Ghana, Bornu, Songhai, and Hausa—the kingdoms of Ashanti-Dahomey, Yoruba, Benin along the Guinea Coast, and those of Kongo, Lunda, Bushongo in the Congo are among the best known; but there are many others, down to the smaller principalities that, with simpler but comparable political forms, were interspersed among these more powerful, more numerous, and more widely spread entities. And with the ability to support a larger population has come urban living, especially in the Guinea Coast and the Western Sudan, where the writings of the earliest explorers attest to the existence of populous centers since before the time of initial contact with the literate world.

BASIC PATTERNS AND CULTURAL ADJUSTMENTS

It is evident that the differences between these two great cultural provinces —the pastoral east and the agricultural west—have been significant in the adjustments of their peoples to European contact and control. One need but consider the differential adaptations that had to be made in the policy of indirect rule in British East and West Africa to see one manifestation of this. The relative ease with which Africans in the western part of the continent and the Congo took over the growing of cash crops may, again, be contrasted with the difficulty experienced in inducing the cattle-keeping peoples of the eastern portion to accede to the commercial utilization of their herds, or to adopt methods of improving the quality of their beasts. The very fact that the world economic order has a pecuniary base made adjustment in this sphere less of a break with earlier tradition for the agriculturalists than for the pastoralists. This factor is also operative in some of the concomitant features of modern commercial enterprise, such as selling for profit or the institution of credit. One need but contrast the degree of business success of the Indians in the eastern part of Africa, for example, with the experience of Near Eastern traders in such a Nigerian city as Onitsha, where the Ibo marketwomen and shopkeepers hold a virtual monopoly of trade because of their skill in trading.

Underlying regional and areal differences are broader unities. Such elements of culture as unilateral descent systems, the religious importance of the ancestor—which is great even where ancestral worship does not predominate —and the consequent respect for age as evidenced in the role of senior members of any given grouping are found everywhere. This stress on age differences underlies the institution of age grades and the educational device of the puberty school, which has set a tradition that predisposes the African to formal training in literacy. Everywhere, also, we find an aboriginal tradition of land tenure that has as constants the concept that ownership of land vests in the community, that control over it by an individual persists only during its occupancy and use, and that the sanctions of tenure, in the final analysis, are supernatural. A pluralistic world view, with controlling but manipulatable forces near at hand, has made for a receptivity to Christianity and Islam, and goes far to explain the relation between separatist cults and nationalist movements.

The actual, as against the institutional, position of women is everywhere similar, whereby women play a decisive role, often unrecognized by outsiders, in determining attitudes and reactions and in shaping tribal policy. Nor can the African technique of social control through satire in song and narrative sequence, or the role of magic which as elsewhere in the Old World continues with functional significance, even where industrialization is most advanced, be overlooked when the major unities of sub-Saharan Africa are considered.

The retention of old ways under new conditions can be richly documented by comparing the accounts of early travelers with those of contemporary observers of present-day modes of behavior. On the other hand, we must also recognize the receptivity of the African to innovations, as is apparent from the instance of this noted during the early days of penetration of the Congo by Torday and Joyce among the Bushongo, whose traditions tell how one of their rulers, Shamba Bolongongo, had many years before traveled widely, bringing to them from the Bapende the techniques of weaving raffia fiber, the embroidery of raffia cloth from the Bakalai, and the planting of tobacco and the game of *mancala;* how he reformed the hierarchy of the court by naming representatives of the various trades to office; how he instituted military reforms by abolishing arrows and throwing knives as weapons and restricting arms to the sword; and how he added the police function to the duty of his soldiers.

If to traditions of this sort we add the historical implications of the migrations, conquests, and consequent mingling of peoples throughout sub-Saharan Africa down the years, we come to understand how the present situation, as regards cultural change, is nothing essentially new to the African, and that his techniques of adapting to innovation go deep into his past. Yet at the same time we cannot forget the local and regional differences in aboriginal culture, with the evidence they yield that despite contact and the resulting borrowing, African peoples have known how to maintain old ways as well as to accept new ones. Granting the primacy of the African in the African scene, the considered treatment of any given situation in the light of these two mechanisms is thus seen to be essential to adequate comprehension and skillful resolution.

Melville J. Herskovits, Ph.D., Evanston, Illinois, is professor of anthropology and director of the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University. He has long been interested in Africa, his doctoral thesis, published in 1926, having been concerned with the role of cattle in the life of the native peoples of East Africa. His first field research was in Dahomey in 1931; in 1953 he spent nine months in Africa, visiting all parts of the continent south of the Sahara, where he studied the problem of reaction to European contact, with special reference to the differentials under different degrees of mechanization and industrialization and in terms of the differing colonial policies of the governing powers.

Peoples and Cultures of North Africa

By PHILIPPE W. MARÇAIS *

OBLONG-SHAPED North Africa is bounded on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, on the north by the Mediterranean, and on the east by the desert which stretches into Egypt and the Sudan. In the south the vast emptiness of the Sahara separates it from Negro Africa. The ancient Greeks called this land Libya; the Romans called it Africa. Later, the Arabs referred to it as *Djeziret-el-Maghreb* ("Island of the West"). In the days of Turkish rule it was commonly known as Barbary or Barbary States. Since the beginning of the twentieth century it has been more usual to call it Africa Minor or North Africa.

The very vagueness of these names, as they have been used over the centuries, suggests that the area has never been precisely defined. Since a good definition, if needed, ought to be based upon some characteristic which is common to the entire geographic area, it might be best to call this area *Berbérie* (French term meaning "Land of the Berbers"), inasmuch as *Berbérie* denotes a certain amount of ethnic and cultural unity which the area does, in fact, possess. Politically, however, we distinguish today various sections of this Berber strip which borders the sea for 2,500 miles: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, which together form French North Africa, and Libya, which includes Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. The Sahara not only claims the largest part of Algeria but forms the continental base of all these countries, each of which offers many contrasts, lacks natural frontiers, and is being shaped by sentiments of nationality that are rising, though unequally, in all of them.

North Africa has an insular character, which the Arab conquerors of the seventh century had not failed to discern: it is "a block of highlands hemmed in by the seas and the sands." Its relief offers many contrasts. The Atlas Mountains—which form two parallel ranges, one on the coast and the other inland—cut the land into longitudinal zones; other ridges and ranges, running transversely, divide the zones into plains, plateaus, and depressions. Altitude is fairly high in the center of this mountainous system, but becomes quite low at its two ends, particularly at its eastern end (Tunisia and Libya). The climate presents a diversity even more striking than the relief. Temperate and humid on the coast, it is severe and dry in the interior, where contrasts are often extreme, with snow in the winter and more than 90 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer. Rainfall is extremely variable. Rains abound on the coast, particularly during the cold months, but are infrequent in the interior, where a harsh and enervating dry heat usually prevails. The vegetation shows the influence of this physical and climatic environment: scrubland and some forest in the mountains, fruit trees on the coast, grainfields in the valley and plains of medium altitude. The rest of the area consists of steppes and vast stretches of pasture land, often scanty in vegetation, until one reaches the palm-rimmed oases that dot the desert.

THE PEOPLES

To find any cohesion in a land of so many physical differences and con-

* Translated by George Horner and Mark Karp.

trasts, one must look for it in the human element. North Africa is essentially a Berber country.[1] The Berbers are the oldest ethnic group yet found in this area, although their origin is obscure. The few clues so far obtained from prehistory lead one to believe that the Berbers do not constitute a homogeneous race. By interpreting these clues, two basic types, both white, have been generally distinguished: *Mechta el-Arbi,* which strongly resembles Cro-Magnon man, and a pre-Mediterranean type. Anthropologists, on the basis of what they have learned about them thus far, classify Berbers into several types: (1) short, dolichocephalic, brown haired (perhaps related to the Mediterranean stock); (2) short, brachycephalic, brown haired (suggesting a Kurd type); (3) tall, dolichocephalic, blond haired, blue eyed (easily resembling a European Nordic); (4) the hybrid, who often resembles the second and third types, and in other cases shows a strong proportion of Negroid blood. One should not, therefore, speak of Berbers as if they formed a single race. One should, instead, speak of different Berber types, since it is possible to define different types in fairly precise terms. Moreover, it is certain that several types existed in North Africa in ancient times. From an anthropological point of view, therefore, North Africa shows great diversity, which has been further accentuated by numerous interminglings between different types of Berbers as well as of Berbers with many other racial elements.

The native population includes, in addition to Berbers, Arabs and Jews. Since the eighth century Arabs and Berbers have intermarried so often that it is not always possible to distinguish clearly between them. It is generally estimated that the two major Arab invasions brought about 400,000 men to North Africa, 150,000 in the seventh century and another 250,000 in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In the interval between the two invasions, as well as later on, many smaller groups of Arabs probably immigrated into North Africa, but it is not possible to evaluate their numerical importance. The principal difference between Arabs and Berbers is language. Even language, however, cannot always be used as a distinguishing criterion, since there are many Berbers who now speak the language of their conquerors, while a few Arabs have adopted Berber speech. Nevertheless, it seems more reasonable to distinguish between Arabic-speaking and Berber-speaking groups than between Arabs and Berbers.

[1] The word "Berber" comes from the Latin *Barbari* ("Those who do not speak Latin").

Languages

As a natural consequence of the fact that the Arab conquerors came from the east, Arabic is, on the whole, used more widely in the eastern than in the western part of North Africa. Nevertheless, the distribution of Arabic- and Berber-speaking groups in the Maghreb is very uneven. Coming from Egypt, one meets the first Berber-speaking people in the oasis of Siwa, near the Cyrenaican border. Except for a few scattered villages in the Libyan desert, one meets no important Berber groups until one reaches Tripolitania, where the Berber-speaking Djebel Nefousa represent about 23 per cent of the population. Tunisia, on the other hand, has been thoroughly Arabicized. Berber is still spoken on the island of Djerba and in a few southern villages, but the number of Berber-speaking Tunisians represents only 1 per cent of the total population. In Algeria the percentage is considerably higher: 27 in the department of Constantine (including the Aurès Mountains and Little Kabylia), 34 in the department of Algiers (including Great Kabylia and the Atlas Mountains around Blida, Miliana, and Ouarsenis), but only 1 per cent in the department of Oran, where the use of Berber is limited to the mountains surrounding Tlemcen. In Morocco the percentage may be as high as 40. The Rif, the Middle and High Atlas, the Sous Valley, and the Anti-Atlas are Morocco's principal Berber-speaking areas. Berber is also widely used in the thinly populated Sahara. It is spoken at Touat, Tidikelt, and in most *ksours* of southern Oran; in Mzab and at Ouargla, south of Algiers; along Oued Ghir, south of Constantine; at Gadâmes, in southern Tripolitania; and throughout the area inhabited by the Tuareg—the eastern and southern portion of the Sahara, as far as Zinder.

Looking at North Africa's linguistic map, one may see how the ancient Berber language, which is of Hamitic origin and indigenous to the area, has lost much ground to Arabic. Unwritten Berber dialects, sometimes quite different from one another, have been preserved in such relatively inaccessible places as mountains (e.g. Kabylia), valleys (Sous), islands (Djerba), isolated communities (the *ksours* of southern Oran), or desert regions (the Sahara of the Tuareg). Everywhere else Arabic has replaced Berber. Several varieties of it are spoken in North Africa, although they all have roots in classical Arabic. The degree of similarity to classical Arabic varies greatly, however, depending on whether the language was introduced by nomad invaders (and there were several nomad invasions about which we have little knowledge) or whether it spread to the countryside from cities, as, for example, from Kairouan; depending also on whether the language remained relatively sheltered from neighboring influences or whether it was progressively modified, over the centuries, by contacts with Bedouins.

Arabic is also the language of North Africa's Jews, although a few Moroccan Jews speak Berber. Some Jews have ancient roots in this land; others are relatively recent arrivals. The largest group consists of Sephardic Jews who fled Spain during the Christian *Reconquista* of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It is estimated that there are approximately 500,000 Jews in North Africa—250,000 in Morocco, 140,000 in Algeria, and about 100,000 in Tunisia. An additional 35,000 once resided in Libya, but nearly all were recently expelled. At one time North Africa's Jews lived in closely knit, mostly urban communities, which, except for language and some customs, borrowed little and kept apart from the rest of the population. The impact of European civilization on the Maghreb made itself felt with extraordinary rapidity among the Jews: it accelerated their exodus from the country to the cities, particularly in Tunisia, helped to end their segregation, as for example in Constantine, and divorced them from native customs and Arabic speech.

THE ECONOMY

Even though North Africa has a long seacoast, maritime activity never flourished in this area. In part this may be due to the dearth of good natural harbors; but more important in this respect seems to be the absence in the native population of that urge to go to sea that successively brought Phoenicians, Greeks, Normans, Spaniards, Turks, and in the last century Westerners, to North Africa's shores. Today only the activities of some fishermen on the Moroccan coast and in the Gulf of Gabès may be said to represent a native maritime tradition. Everywhere else in North Africa such navigation as is carried on bears the imprint of Spanish, Italian, Turkish, or other foreign influence.

The native economy is predominantly pastoral and rural. The repetitious succession of plains, mountains, fertile regions, steppes, and deserts creates a fairly uniform pattern, so that, owing to geographic factors, the pattern of native economic activities is roughly the same throughout the Maghreb.

Hunting and herding are undoubtedly the most ancient native pursuits. Today, however, hunting is no longer an essential activity. Even herding has been declining since the last hundred years, but much land is still devoted to it. Nomadic activities dominate the entire Sahara—from the Atlantic Ocean to the borders of Egypt, and from the Saharian Atlas to the bend of the Niger. In the winter the Bedouin, who subsists essentially on camel and sheep, stays near his water sources and palm groves; in the spring he moves toward more fertile lands, often walking hundreds of miles in search of pasture land for his herd; and in the fall he journeys back to his winter quarters. As instances of this seasonal rhythm one may cite the Larbaa tribe, who inhabit the Tell in the southern portion of the department of Algiers, and constantly engage in quarrels with other nomads and sedentary groups over questions of commonage; or the Ouled Sliman, who hibernate in northern Chad and move their flocks as far as the shores of Tripolitania.

"Commercial" nomadism is practically inseparable from pastoral nomadism. Once the caravans of "commercial" nomads provided a kind of liaison between white and black Africa. They imported slaves and facilitated the exchange of grain, dates, wool, butter, cattle, and salt between sedentary and nomadic populations. Today the caravans are only a memory. Their disappearance has impoverished Bedouin life. It has reduced the bold and warlike nomad to the status of a meek herder, whose sphere of activity is steadily shrinking.

The seminomads—such as the Beni Guil of Morocco, the Hamyan of Algeria, and the Hemamma of Tunisia—are found in the high plains that skirt the Atlas Mountains of the Sahara and of the Tell. They spend the winter in the steppes and the summer in the high plains. When going northward, they usually travel in small caravans. In some regions their movements form a fairly regular pattern, in others less so. They raise livestock, primarily sheep, but the continental climate is so hard on the herds that seminomads enjoy few prosperous years. The increase of acreage under cultivation by sedentary farmers reduces the amount of land available for grazing and thereby affects these small herders even more adversely than the nomads.

Mountain areas

The way of life in the mountains is very different. Although activities vary with the region and natural resources, rearing of livestock, agriculture, and arboriculture are the principal occupations. Irrigation has made possible the cultivation of cereals in the Atlas Mountains of Morocco, but farming is still secondary to the raising of sheep and goats, which is carried on despite the limited area available for grazing. Rearing of goats and cultivation of olive and fig trees are the principal means of livelihood in the Rif and Kabylia. In other mountain regions the same meager resources are relied on for a livelihood, supplemented only by the exploitation of forests. Unlike the inhabitants of the plains and steppes, who do not move into the mountains, many mountaineers migrate into the valleys and plains. They form the majority of the new population in the cities and provide the largest contingent of North African labor abroad. Overpopulation in certain mountain regions makes emigration necessary. Population density in one *arrondissement* of Kabylia, for example, is 200 persons per square kilometer (about 518 per square mile). Consequently the men must go elsewhere to find the means of supporting their families.

Coastal areas

The fellahs occupy the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, the long valleys watered by the *oueds*, the hills, the low-altitude plateaus, the plains of Constantine and eastern Tunisia, and the lowlands of the interior. They are either peasants who long ago became attached to the soil or former nomads forced by the precariousness of pastoralist existence to settle on the land. They grow cereals, more or less successfully, depending on the quality of the soil and the abundance of rainfall. Some of them, in addition, raise early vegetables and grapes; others raise sheep and goats. In eastern Tunisia they also cultivate olive trees, which the Phoenicians introduced in North Africa three thousand years ago. The peasants usually live scattered in small groups and hamlets; sometimes they form a village. Today, however, they are strongly attracted toward the modern cities. In the movement toward the cities, rural life is often but a transitional stage—lasting sometimes a few years, sometimes a generation—between nomadism and urbanism. The European colon plays an important role in the process of attracting and adapting the peasants to modern urban life. He is in contact with peasants when he employs them as *khammès* (farm hands), and even when there is no close association, the contrast between his way of life and that of the peasants has an influence far from negligible.

URBAN LIFE

Urbanism is no novelty in the Maghreb. It dates back to the founding of Carthage, the first important city in that area. Tunisia has had a large urban population since the Middle Ages. Almost one-fifth of Tunisia's 3,200,000 inhabitants live in cities, which include the capital city of Tunis, Bizerte, the holy city of Kairouan, Sousse, Sfax, and some large market towns in the Sahel. This may, incidentally, help to explain why an ancient, cultured, and refined bourgeoisie has been able to acquire a dominant influence in Tunisia. In the cities, traders and artisans are intensely active. Tunis, a very large city for a country of Tunisia's size, exerts a magnetic influence on the people. They stream in from all parts of the country in quest of education or of government jobs, or to attend public debates and trials.

Like Libya, which has only one large city (Tripoli), Algeria is a vast rural and pastoral country, without an urban tradition. Excluding Tlemcen, which culturally belongs to Morocco rather than to Algeria, the old cities—such as Algiers, Miliana, or Médéa—or at least the oldest parts of them, scarcely date back to the period of Ottoman domination. Other cities, such as Constantine, show the characteristics of Berber villages. Ports like Algiers, Oran, and Bône have greatly expanded; other centers on the coast and in the interior have hardly expanded at all. Those established since European occupation, such as Blida, Sidi-bel-Abbès, Sétif, and Batna, have grown considerably, though not sufficiently to be regarded as cities. Out of a total population of 8½ million, about 1½ million, as compared with about 200,000 a hundred years ago, live in cities. Urban life is therefore recent in Algeria. Its two major characteristics are the sizable proportion of Europeans and the rural origin of the native population. The native section of Algiers, for example, is largely inhabited by Kabyles. The newcomers

have submerged the old urban elements, the Arab *hadri* and the Turkish *kouloughli*. Lacking an ancient tradition, urban life in Algeria is becoming increasingly Europeanized.

The situation is different in Morocco, where the cities stand out in sharp contrast to the independent mass of Berbers in the mountains. Out of a total population of about 9 million over 1½ million, mostly natives, live in cities. There are some new cities, such as Agadir, Port Lyautey, and Casablanca. Casablanca has expanded enormously; its population is currently estimated at about half a million. But, in addition, Morocco has several ancient cities: Rabat, which functions as administrative capital; Salé, which is located directly opposite Rabat; Fès, a commercial city which has retained a medieval atmosphere; Marrakech, which once was an enormous Saharan village; and many others. All of them are constantly expanding. The lively activities of traders and artisans, bourgeois tastes, and polite manners help to preserve an urban tradition which is a blend of past glory, Andalusian heritage, and Berber contributions. By exerting a conservative influence through its traditional element and a revolutionary one through its new and sizable proletariat, the Moroccan city plays a vital role in the current development of the country.

Social Organization

Despite the large number of cities, some of which have served as local capitals, North Africa has never had a single capital because of the lack of political unity. This lack of unity is usually attributed to geographic factors, such as the elongated shape of the area, the character of its relief, its position between the sea and the desert, the absence of a natural center, and the lack of converging valleys. What should also be mentioned, perhaps with greater justification, are the clannishness of the natives and the fundamental antagonism between plainsmen and mountaineers, as well as that between sedentary and nomadic populations.

Arabs and Berbers have always shared a particular conception of social life. Their society is a web of numerous cell-like units in which the basic element is not the individual, but the patriarchal family, that is, a group of men united by blood ties and living together with their wives and offspring under the absolute authority of the oldest male, the *pater familias*. Each of the men, moreover, may have more than one wife. All members bear the family's name and share its food and shelter—which may be a tent, a *gourbi* (a Berber type of hut), or a house. Among rural and pastoral populations the family usually owns all property, including herds, fields, trees, and farm and domestic equipment. Most activities are organized on a group basis, each family category—men, women, and children—having a different task to perform. The woman's position is clearly inferior to that of the man. She may be married against her will, repudiated by her husband, or see herself joined by another wife. Among Berbers she is also excluded from inheritance. In daily life there is a strict separation of the sexes: the women must eat and attend to their tasks unseen by the men, who meanwhile attend to the external affairs of the community. The *kharrouba* of the Kabyles is the most typical example of this kind of extended family.

Kinship ties or spatial contiguity leads to the formation of larger groups, the douar (a group of tents) of nomads and the village or village quarter of sedentary populations. Douars and villages own land, grain reserves, silos, and granaries, some of which, as in the Atlas Mountains of Morocco and in the Aurès of Contantine department, are fortified. They are autonomous and intensely active social units, formed by the need for joint enterprise which arises from certain events in familial life and from such tasks of common interest as construction or management of rural works.

Several douars or villages often combine to form a still larger unit, the tribe. The tribe—which is called *qbila* in Arabic and *taqbilt* in Berber—is an ill-defined social unit. Not so long ago, when insecurity was rampant, it was based on military solidarity. Today it is generally based on common interests, which may include rights of pasture, wellsprings, and irrigation canals, and on an ancestral tradition of solidarity and *esprit de corps*. Once a week the men of the tribe get together and trade in the *souk*, or market. In Morocco there are also special markets for women. Among Arabs authority over the tribe is exercised by a sheik, *kebir*, or *caid*, who is chosen by the chiefs of the douars and villages. His position is no greater than that of a *primus inter pares*. He makes decisions and is advised by a council of notables, the *djemaa*. Among Berbers a male assembly manages tribal and village interests. Among Berber-speaking and highly conservative mountaineers administration and justice are based on custom, which in Kabylia is called *kanoun*—an ancient Mediterranean name meaning "canon," or "rule." Each tribe has its own body of customary rules and precedents, which are cited orally to decide each case of violation of tribal law and to fix the sanction—which may be moral, social, pecuniary, or penal. Custom varies with the region and easily adapts itself to local needs, but remains highly impervious to outside influences. The influence of custom is the most significant feature of Berber society. It divides the people into politically independent, xenophobic, and warlike blocs, always ready to enter into alliances, the *soffs*, for the purpose of fighting each other. This highly pronounced particularism is the principal factor that keeps North Africans divided into small groups, unable to rise above the notion of a confederation. Intense preoccupation with local interests prevents the formation of an Arab-Berber nation united by religious faith.

Religion

North Africa achieved religious unity following the introduction of Islam into this land by the Arab conquerors of the seventh century. The simplicity of Mohammedan dogma makes it directly accessible even to a population with a way of life as archaic as the one we have described. All that this dogma implies is complete surrender to the will of one God who has decided in advance the fate of every individual and promised eternal happiness to those who will believe in Him and heed the teachings of the prophet Mohammed. The requirements of Mohammedan religion are also quite simple. Every believer must fulfill five obligations: profession of faith, prayer, almsgiving, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Mecca. In addition, there is the fundamental concept of the rite, that is, prescribed speech and behavior, as well as the equally important concept of the difference between purity and impurity, from which prohibition of consumption of pork and alcoholic beverages is derived. Like Judaism, from which it originated, Islam is a highly formalistic religion. It is a complete system, the religious character of which permeates every aspect of life, whether individual or collective, familial or social. It guides thought, gives rise to institutions, inspires cultural activities, and forms the foundation of private and public law. Islam molds individuals and groups, and in this sense it may be said

that the civilizations which it has inspired consist of believers and communities which have no civic or national sentiment.

The Islamization and Arabization of North Africa occurred simultaneously. The Arab conquest gave rise to a succession of empires during which several cities, such as Kairouan and Fès, were founded. These cities became the principal centers of Islamic fervor, thought, and culture in North Africa. Through worship, education, and administrative measures the Arab conquerors' religion spread from the cities to the countryside, reaching at first the large villages, then the regions which could be penetrated with relative ease, and finally, though less effectively, the more inaccessible areas. The Arab Bedouin who invaded the steppes, plateaus, and valleys also played an important part in the process of Islamization of the country. Excepting the Jews, all North African natives are Muslims today, in the sense that they all claim to be Muslims and regard themselves as members of the same mystic community. In the cities, however, people are more strict, more orthodox, and have a better knowledge of Islam than in the countryside. Animism, beliefs in magic, and certain pre-Islamic ritual practices have survived, especially in the countryside. More precisely, it is the Berber-speaking groups which have retained, for the same reason that they have retained their ancient language and customs, most of the pre-Islamic cults of nature, beliefs in family genii, and women's superstitions. Thus a deep gulf separates the cities—where most people are pious largely as a result of education, worship in the mosques, and social pressure—from the countryside, where many pagan superstitions still obtain. An important movement of puritan reform led by the *Oulémas* (Muslim scholars and doctors of the law) has been active for several years in an effort to persuade North Africans to give up the popular brand of Mohammedanism, which includes religious brotherhoods and Marabouts (saints), in favor of orthodox belief and practice.

French Influence

More than a century of French influence in North Africa has brought about substantial changes in all fields. Population has increased enormously. In Algeria it has increased from 2 to 8 million in less than a century, in Tunisia from 1 to 3 million between 1867 and 1946, and in Morocco from 4 to about 9 million since 1912. In Libya the rise in population has been much less significant. The causes of this demographic development are many: among the most significant are the creation of conditions of security, the progressive elimination of famines, a wider distribution of the food supply, the decrease in epidemics, and better medical care of infants. Clearly, a people which believes that man cannot stay unmarried and that he has been created, as the biblical expression goes, to be fruitful and multiply, cannot fail to grow rapidly once it is afforded better protection against death.

The development of economic resources is keeping pace with the increase in population. An effort is being made to meet new needs by applying modern methods to agriculture and stock rearing which, in their traditional form, have for centuries constituted the basic elements of a precarious economic equilibrium. The tractor and the reaper-binder are used to cultivate vast tracts of land, where the soil is conserved and enriched; the old-fashioned plow, however, is still used in many places, where the yield is consequently low. Anyone visiting the countryside when farmers are at work in the fields cannot fail to notice the disparity between European and native techniques, as well as the attachment of the natives to primitive methods of cultivation. Other Western types of activity, such as construction of public works, mining enterprises, shipyards, and various industries, have helped to develop the country's resources, thereby increasing the food supply.

The creation of a new economy has tended to aggravate the disintegration of the traditional social system, although both processes have been taking place at the same time. In Algeria the old structure has been shaken as a result of early territorial and administrative revisions. The tribe has been reorganized and broken up into smaller units. Moreover, collective ownership of land has given way to individual ownership. Within the last few years a rural proletariat has appeared, particularly in former pastoral areas, although it is still disorganized and ill-adjusted to modern labor requirements. At present, however, the most serious social upheavals stem from the mass influx of rural population into the cities. A huge urban proletariat is in process of formation. Cities like Casablanca, Agadir, Algiers, and Oran at first attracted only a few individuals, later some groups, for whom housing facilities had to be improvised. Now entire families are moving in. Intelligent, but unskilled and having little or no technical training, these urban dwellers form an unstable labor force. Divorced from their own social system of communal values, they struggle to develop individuality of conscience and behavior.

As a last item, one may mention the existence of a labor surplus in North Africa. It consists almost entirely of Berber mountaineers. Many of them cross the sea to earn their living in France, where there are now about 300,000 North Africans.

Conclusion

These are, in brief outline, the major demographic, economic, and social problems of an immense country, which in trying to bridge the distance between primitive and modern times within a few decades faces a crisis of greatly accelerated growth. The native masses are only vaguely conscious of this crisis. The Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian elite, however, often show a deep and objective understanding of the problem. To them has fallen the responsibility of guiding, together with France, the necessary evolution of the countries into which North Africa is now divided. Increasing participation in administration and government enables these elite to approach that political maturity which alone can justify national aspirations.

Each of the North African countries currently claims an identity of its own: Libya is a state of mixed population with a Bedouin majority; Tunisia has an ancient oriental civilization; Algeria has been westernized in the course of a century; and Morocco can be distinguished by its Berber particularism. All of them, however, must solve the basic problem of woman's emancipation before they can become modern states.

Philippe W. Marçais is professor at the Faculté des Lettres of the University of Algiers and the author of several books on North African linguistics, ethnology, and sociology. He is currently engaged in an ethnographic and linguistic study of the Fezzan.

Past and Present Role of Africa in World Affairs

By Harry R. Rudin

THAT Africa, the continent nearest Europe, should be the last great area of the globe to attract the exploring and exploiting attentions of the Europeans is a matter requiring explanation. In earlier times Africa had not escaped the attentions of other peoples in the Mediterranean world. Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and Arabs had at various times exercised control over all or parts of North Africa, where the remains of their cultures are still discernible. Arabs, who had dominated the Indian Ocean from the sixth century on, established settlements on Africa's east coast, where they engaged in trade for gold, spices, and slaves. Arab influence was weakened with the coming of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, but in the seventeenth century, under strong rulers of Oman, the Arabs started to drive out the Portuguese and to re-establish Arab power, which persisted into the late nineteenth century.

Unknown Africa

In that period of curiosity called "the Age of Discovery" Europeans knew very little about the great kingdoms and empires that existed in the Chad and Upper Niger regions. Here were great states that filled their history with wars and conquests, states that had very elaborate political systems, even important universities. The Songhai kingdom on the Upper Niger near Timbuktu had an impressive polity and economy long before the first Elizabeth ascended the throne of England. States of great significance existed in this part of Africa near the end of the nineteenth century and had to be dealt with by either war or diplomacy before the colonial powers of Europe could establish any measure of control.

Early in the fifteenth century people in Western Europe knew of rich lands beyond the Sahara Desert from which gold and slaves came into North Africa and Muslim Spain. Getting into these regions was one of the purposes behind the cautious explorations of Portuguese sailors along the west coast of Africa under the sponsorship of Prince Henry the Navigator. A simultaneous desire of Europeans to find a shorter route to the even greater wealth of the Far East was a more powerful incentive to get around the massive continent that barred the way. Those who looked in the west for that shorter route to Cathay found a different obstacle, North and South America; but these lands invited exploration and exploitation and were found to possess such wealth as to make most Europeans forget their original quest for a short cut to the Far East. The harbors, rivers, and climate of the Americas tempted whites into the interior, where they could settle, develop plantations, and in other ways exploit the resources of a rich continent. In Africa the inhospitable climate and hostile natives, the lack of good rivers and harbors giving easy access into the interior tempted no Europeans into penetrating the continent. So far as Africa's promise of wealth went, Europeans had to be satisfied with trading posts along the west coast to obtain gold, ivory, and slaves. In the seventeenth century there were numerous posts of this commercial character, established by "adventurers" from France, Portugal, England, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Prussia, and even the Duchy of Kurland.

Greater Importance of Far East and America

The first actual settlement of European colonists in Africa was that started at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company, which, like similar trading companies from other European states, sought to make itself the successor of the Portuguese in the Far East. This colony served as "the Tavern of the Seas," where sailors could break their long and scorbutic voyages to India and the Spice Islands and put in for fresh food and water. In the course of time the colony grew, its population increasing as a result of religious persecutions in Europe that caused Huguenots and others to seek asylum here. With the increase of population, people moved into the rich farm lands of the hinterland, despite the wishes of the Dutch East India Company. As these colonists moved northward they made their first violent contacts with the Bantu people, who were being forced out of their original home in the lakes region of Central Africa by the pressure of incoming Hamitic peoples. This was the beginning of South Africa's relations with the Bantu, relations that have not lost their violent character in the middle of the twentieth century.

Until the nineteenth century Africa was of secondary interest to Europeans, who were much more concerned about the wealth possible either by trade with the Far East or by plantations in the Americas. For the Far Eastern trade Africa offered its shores for way stations; for the American plantations it offered the labor of its slaves. It has been estimated that during the three centuries or so of the European slave trade in West Africa twelve to fifteen millions of slaves were taken from their homes for work in America. This Christian slave trade had a shorter history than that of the Muslims on the east coast; but it should be pointed out that many of the slaves traded by the Arabs achieved positions of great influence in the Muslim countries, involuntary though their presence there was. The slave trade of Western Europe came to an end after the strange prickings of conscience in the humanitarian eighteenth century led men in the first half of the nineteenth century to the abolition of the trade and of slavery itself.

During the wars of the French Revolution and of Napoleon the British were anxious to maintain and protect their growing trade in the Far East. There was a danger that the French, having conquered the Low Countries, might make themselves masters of the Dutch colony at the Cape and thus be in a strategic position to interfere with British commerce. To anticipate the threat, the British occupied the Cape in 1795. France's countermove was to send Napoleon to Egypt in the hope of recovering the position that France once held in the Levant; the French also hoped to destroy the base of British power by the recapture of India, with Egypt used as the springboard for military operations. Although the British abandoned the Cape in 1803, they retook the place soon thereafter and annexed it to the Empire in the treaties that marked the collapse of France's costliest effort to defeat her traditional rival. Thus the British made sure of their route to India and China at the time they abandoned the slave trade, as if to symbolize the fact that, with the disappearance of the traffic in human beings, Africa had value only as it protected the routes of the Far Eastern trade.

The Suez Canal

This interest in the Far East kept alive the interest of Europeans in Africa.

The defeat of Napoleon in Egypt did not end French activities in that part of Africa. One of Napoleon's schemes was to shorten the route to Asia by reconstructing at Suez the canal that had existed in ancient times. His defeat meant that he was not the one to carry out this plan. But Frenchmen revived the plan in the 1830's, when they threw their support to Mehemet Ali of Egypt and his grandiose schemes of conquest in the Near East. It was not until 1855, however, that the Viceroy of Egypt awarded to Ferdinand de Lesseps the concession for the construction and operation of a canal at Suez. That Frenchmen should have control of a route that cut by almost 50 per cent the distance between Liverpool and Bombay was unthinkable to the British. They marshaled every conceivable argument against the scheme. This verbal attack failed and the British had to accept the accomplished fact of the canal, the opening of which was a gala occasion in November, 1869.

In 1875 the bankruptcy of the Egyptian khedive enabled Disraeli to acquire for Britain the shares that the improvident ruler offered for sale. Contrary to the belief of many Americans, the British did not acquire control of the canal by this purchase, which represented 44 per cent of the total number of shares. Despite their holding so many shares, under the constitution and bylaws of the Suez Canal Company the British have only ten directors on a board of over thirty. Even the occupation of Egypt in 1882 by the British did not give Britain control of the canal, which belongs to the Canal Company, holding a ninety-nine-year lease. According to the convention signed by the powers in 1888, the canal must be neutral and open to trade in times of both war and peace. Under the terms of the original concession of a hundred years ago, the Canal Company must hand the canal back to Egypt in 1968.

EXPLORING AND PARTITIONING AFRICA

The explorations that made inner Africa known to Europeans were the work of the nineteenth century, for the most part of the second half. Except for a small area here and there little was known beyond the coastal rim prior to 1800. Opening up the interior can be said to have its systematic beginning with the founding of the African Association in England in 1788. In 1795 the Association sent out Mungo Park to find out where the waters of the Nile entered the sea, if they did. Some people believed that the Niger had connections with the Nile; others that its waters entered the sea in what was later discovered to be the mouth of the Congo; and still others believed that the river emptied its waters in a lake in the Sahara. Similarly fantastic notions existed as to the course and source of the Nile. Early maps of Africa show the Nile and the Niger running here and there in the interior with little regard for the physiography made known by the explorers of later times. Between 1820 and 1850 the mysteries of the Niger were solved, and an acquaintance had been made with the powerful Muslim kingdoms in the Niger and Chad regions. The snow-covered peaks of Kilimanjaro and Kenya were first seen by Europeans in 1849. The Nile kept the secret of its sources until 1870. The work of David Livingstone and of H. M. Stanley in the 1860's and the 1870's gave the world its first reliable information about the Congo's vast system. It is difficult to believe that much of our knowledge of Africa is less than a hundred years old.

The partitioning of the continent was precipitated by the convocation held in Brussels in 1876 at the invitation of Leopold II of Belgium, who professed a great interest in the humanitarian work of exploring and civilizing the Congo. Later, Leopold employed Stanley, who made hundreds of treaties with the Africans in the Congo. Leopold told the world that it was his purpose to create a federation of native states in Africa and that he would be their European representative. While engaged in this work for Leopold, Stanley found Brazza engaged in similar work for the French. Both the English and the Portuguese were aroused to a recognition of their own interests by these activities of the French and the Belgians; in their fear they signed a treaty that would have blocked the French and would have nullified plans for the international control of navigation on the Congo. So loud and strong were the protests all over the world against this treaty that the British government did not press for its ratification by Parliament. Out of this dispute over the treaty came the conference at Berlin in the winter of 1884–85, when arrangements were made for freedom of trade in the Congo Basin, for navigation on the Congo and Niger Rivers, for the suppression of slavery, for restrictions on the sale of arms and liquor, and for recognition of the principle that, to be valid, occupation of lands in Africa had to be effective. The race for lands in Africa was on; but it was finished soon after it had begun. By 1890 the vast continent had been virtually divided, a process that had occurred with the force of an explosion, so short was the time it had taken.

Importance of commercial and territorial expansion

To account for this unusual historical phenomenon is no simple task, particularly since the relevant archives have yet to be studied before scholars can know why this or that part of Africa attracted the attention it received. This rather sudden revival of imperialism had been preceded by a mood and a policy of anti-imperialism of varying degrees of strength in the several states of Western Europe. Anti-imperialism had been based essentially on the arguments of Adam Smith and his school, who believed it was uneconomic to possess and administer overseas colonies. Industrialism and its concomitants gave such persuasive powers to this point of view that people were convinced toward the middle of the nineteenth century of the need of loosening the bonds that subordinated colonies to the mother country and of letting colonial trade follow its natural course to the greater material advantage of all concerned.

This anti-imperialist sentiment disappeared rather quickly in the 1870's, when a general depression sent Europeans on a quest for new markets outside Europe. To prevent the dumping of surplus goods on domestic markets by their neighbors, they first raised their tariffs. But a tariff offered no protection to the overseas markets scattered here and there along the African seaboard and elsewhere; nor could a tariff alone enable Europeans to dispose of the surplus goods glutting their warehouses at home. By the formal occupation of territories in distant parts of the world, Europeans protected the trade they had there by making doubly sure that other governments could not move in and exclude them. The reader should be warned, however, that the protection of markets was not the sole reason for occupying territories in Africa and elsewhere; on the contrary, there were places where countries proceeded to occupy lands without the prior investment of a single penny, sou, or pfennig.

The seizure of lands in faraway places is so full of the drama of high adventure as to give to colonies a more important role than they actually possessed. As a simple matter of fact, the great commercial expansion that took place in other than colonial areas was of vastly greater economic significance to countries in Europe than the economic activities taking place in places where the exciting seizure of territory placed Eu-

ropeans in positions of mastery over peoples of other races.

The partitioning of Africa gave direction to the vectors of interest followed by European countries. Having acquired possession of South Africa in 1815 and control of Egypt in 1882, Great Britain, particularly Cecil Rhodes in the 1890's, cherished the dream of a rail connection between these two places located a continent apart. The dream was never realized; but the effort to give it substance had a decisive influence on Britain's relations with other European countries in Africa—with Portugal, desirous of linking Angola and Mozambique; with the Congo Free State eager to have access to the Nile and the Sudan; with Germany, where a few high officials sought to create a *Mittelafrika* of ample dimensions out of territories belonging to Germany and to others; with France, seeking a trans-African empire by the union of French Equatorial Africa with French Somaliland in a venture that ended at Fashoda; and with Fascist Italy, believed to be trying in World War II to link Libya with the large Italian Empire created in East Africa by Mussolini with the conquest of Ethiopia in the 1930's.

Diplomatic agreements

While disputes of varying degrees of intensity arose in Africa to disturb the relations of European countries with one another, the fact remains that European powers did not find in these African squabbles reasons for going to war. It can even be said that Africa offered the powers the means of diplomatic accommodation in agreements providing for the exchange of territories. The foundations of the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 were laid in Morocco and Egypt, the French getting from the British a free hand in the former by giving the British a free hand in the latter. That the peoples native to these two areas were not consulted illustrates the fact that innocent victims are often sacrificed on the altars of international friendship. Other parts of Africa had a similar role to perform in the many agreements that Europeans made with one another between 1890 and 1919; actually even later, when one considers the negotiations with which Fascist Italy embarrassed both Great Britain and France in the twenties and thirties to get the fulfillment of promises made in the secret treaty of London in 1915 that Italy would get territorial compensation in Africa if France and Britain took possession of Germany's African colonies. Thus there is a sense in which it can be said that Africa contributed to the peace of Europe.

Economic base for Europe

Beyond that contribution, Africa and those other parts of the world engaging the commercial and colonial attentions of Europe combined to place an international economic base of broad proportions under the rapidly developing life of Europeans. Here is the explanation for the unfulfillment of the dire predictions made by Malthus at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Instead of the wars, famines, and plagues foreseen by this Cassandra in a clerical collar as nature's method for keeping the population of Europe within the limits of Europe's own food supply, this internationalization of the European economy brought in such quantities of food and resources as to enable the population to grow from 187 millions in 1800 to 400 millions in 1900. It also gave Europeans the highest standard of living in their history, ridding them of the famines that had been occurring about every ten years from earliest times.

A later prophet, Karl Marx, predicted that the factory system in Europe would create recurring crises in overproduction, leading inevitably to the need of state

intervention to possess or to control the instruments of production and distribution. The fulfillment of these predictions was postponed for two generations by this overseas extension of Europe's economy. The depression of the late twenties and early thirties could not find a solution in the kind of world-wide economic expansion that brought Europeans into Africa and all over the world in the 1880's. The inability of our times to find an extra-European solution has resulted in the return of the regulatory state of mercantilism and the steady disappearance of laissez faire. As a part of this broad economic expansion of Europe Africa made its contribution to Europe's prosperity and even to her polity.

AFRICA ESSENTIAL TO THE WEST

In recent decades Africa's economic contribution has changed considerably. In the 1880's, apart from the gold and diamonds of South Africa, the commodities sought by Europeans were ivory, palm oil, palm kernels, natural rubber, precious woods, and the like—in general, articles that were part of Europe's luxuries. The private trader was the agent who sought these goods and sold them for a profit. In the twentieth century technology has given us vastly different needs for our prosperity and our security. In addition to the private trader, governments are now interested in the exploitation of Africa, especially where critical minerals are concerned. These changes have given Africa an importance that was not dreamed of seventy years ago. Manganese is now needed in the manufacture of steel; cobalt and columbite are essential for the production of the heat-resistant steels used in jet planes; industrial diamonds have found new uses endlessly in modern industry; chrome, copper, lead, zinc, bauxite, and tin are no longer in adequate supply in the West but have been found in Africa. America is now importing iron ore from Liberia for steel plants lacking adequate domestic sup-

TABLE 1—MINERALS EXPORTED FROM AFRICA, 1938 AND 1950

Colony	Mineral	Quantities Exported	
		1938	1950
Nigeria	Tin ore	23,489,000 lbs.	25,574,000 lbs.
Do.	Columbite	0	2,354,000 lbs.
Gold Coast	Manganese	726,000,000 lbs.	1,593,000,000 lbs.
Do.	Bauxite	0	114,948 long tons
Sierra Leone	Chrome ore	498 long tons	13,909 long tons
Tanganyika	Diamonds	3,590 carats	131,237 carats
Northern Rhodesia	Copper, blister	413,700,000 lbs.	487,158,000 lbs.
Do.	Copper, electrolytic	77,803,000 lbs.	164,166,000 lbs.
Do.	Lead	(?)	27,730,000 lbs.
Do.	Zinc	14,969,000 lbs.	50,792,000 lbs.
French Equatorial Africa	Diamonds	16,003 carats	116,481 carats
Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi	Refined copper	154,870 metric tons	167,007 metric tons
Do.	Tin	1,813 metric tons	4,020 metric tons
Do.	Tin ore	6,657 metric tons	16,353 metric tons
Do.	Diamonds	5,759,000 carats	2,457 kilograms
Do.	Cobalt	5,401 metric tons	9,026 metric tons
Angola	Diamonds	671,000 carats	555,000 carats

TABLE 2—EXPORTS FROM AFRICA TO THE UNITED STATES, 1938 AND 1950

Colony	1938 (Thousands)	1950 (Thousands)
Nigeria	$ 3,290	$36,974
Gold Coast	6,591	64,450
Sierra Leone	215	1,430
Tanganyika	855	6,205
Kenya and Uganda	2,645	13,744
Northern Rhodesia	15,572	30,299
Southern Rhodesia	1,851	6,939
Nyasaland	3	417
French West Africa	1,484	3,756
French Equatorial Africa	11	39
Belgian Congo, Ruanda-Urundi	1,039	25,495
Angola	180	10,316
Mozambique	209	3,831 [1949]
Liberia	1,030	13,921 [1949–50]

plies. The uranium of the Belgian Congo and of South Africa is an absolute need in the manufacture of atomic weapons. Since the craving appetites of Mars and industry are difficult to satisfy, prospecting is being feverishly carried on in all parts of Africa as new sources of supply are sought for our prosperity and our security. The changes that took place in this regard in Africa between 1938 and 1950 are apparent from Table 1.

There is another way of representing the growing economic significance of Africa to the West. In dollar values the exports of Kenya and Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Tunisia increased two and a half times between 1938 and 1950. In the same period Gold Coast exports increased nearly three times; those of Nigeria three and a half times; those of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, French West Africa, and French Morocco four times; those of Angola five times; and those of Liberia eight times.

In the past the United States never manifested much interest in Africa, certainly not enough to make the occupation of territory by Americans at all likely. Americans out of New England appeared on the east coast of Africa in the early nineteenth century as whalers, or as traders interested in slaves, ivory, hides, tortoise shell, gum copal, and so forth. On the west coast American humanitarians were behind the colonization society that founded Liberia as a home for emancipated slaves. Americans were the first to recognize the Independent State of the Congo, for reasons that gave evidence of considerable political naïveté on our part; Americans fought the Barbary pirates; and Americans established in the eighteenth century with Morocco relations of a very friendly character, which have suffered much in recent years. It was during World War II that Americans found Africa of a critical importance. North Africa acquired strategic significance as a base of operations for the reconquest of a Europe overrun by Nazis; and here and there below the Sahara Americans established air bases that had a necessary role in the task of winning the war. It is as a source of strategic minerals, however, that Africa has assumed a major importance for the United States. Table 2 makes clear our country's growing share in African exports.

Just as the Entente victory in 1918 resulted in territorial rearrangements in Africa, particularly with regard to the colonies of Germany, so also World War II resulted in important decisions regarding Italian possessions. There

was no difficulty about Ethiopia, who recovered her lost independence. With regard to the other territories of Italy, the big powers of the West desired arrangements that would exclude Russia from Africa and from the eastern Mediterranean; hence, the long lapse of time between the signing of the peace treaty with Italy in 1947 and the final disposition of the Italian colonies. The French, the Arabs, the Russians, the British, and even the Americans all had particular and conflicting interests in the future of Libya—territorial, political, strategic. After long and at times intemperate debate the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to make Libya independent, a decision that became actuality on December 24, 1952. Eritrea was made autonomous for local affairs and federated with Ethiopia. Italian Somaliland was put under Italian trusteeship for a period of ten years; during this period the people are to be prepared for independence.

Because of the cold war in the middle of the twentieth century Americans cannot limit their interest in Africa to mineral resources alone. As the leader of the West against the threat of aggressive Communism, the United States is making strategic use of North Africa in case it should again become necessary to come to the aid of a Europe overrun by invaders from the east. Stretching from Casablanca in the west across North Africa to the Suez Canal (there is now an American director on the board of the Canal Company) lies the main strategic defense for the West, marked by air fields and naval bases. It is in connection with the methods whereby the United States acquired the right to construct air bases that the formerly friendly relations between Americans and Moroccans have grown cooler. Despite the assistance given by America to win her independence, Libya had long shown herself less than eager to accept the presence of an American air field built years ago; it was finally accepted as accomplished fact by the Libyan government only a few weeks ago. In both Tunisia and Morocco there were loud outbursts of opposition when these French protectorates were brought within the defense perimeter of NATO. From these reactions to the West in North Africa one can deduce only that the strategic line constructed there rests on a foundation of sand in more senses than one, for behind the demand for independence is the understandable desire not to be in the front-line trenches of a third world war.

Europe's needs

Like the Americans, Europeans are becoming aware of their increasing need of Africa. The independence that has come to Asiatic lands has narrowed considerably the international economic base on which Europeans formerly rested their security and prosperity. As the territorial base of European life contracts, so also the commercial base, as tariffs, exchange restrictions, quotas, the lack of foreign exchange, and other factors interfere with the freedom of goods to move across international lines or with the ability of peoples to get the resources their security and prosperity require, despite the Atlantic Charter's promise of equal access to the resouces of the world. There has also come in recent decades a contraction of the areas into which European surplus populations could move and settle down. Now such peoples must remain at home, where governments try to solve their problems by increasing food production in Africa (a continent that cannot feed its own growing population), and by using Africa's resources as a means for paying for the food that has to be imported. Portugal has a plan for settling hundreds of thousands of her people in

African territories despite the fact that Africans are in virtual rebellion where whites have settled in large numbers.

THE COLD WAR

It is ominous that, just when the West needs Africa most, Africans are demanding greater freedom and better economic opportunities for themselves. This conflict of interests has come when the West finds itself involved in the cold war with Russia. In addition to the places already named, troubles of the gravest sort have developed in Kenya and are threatening to break out in the Union of South Africa. In 1954 after much haggling Egypt succeeded in getting the British to withdraw their 80,000 troops from the Canal Zone and to abandon the Empire's greatest military base.

We may well raise the question whether Africans will take their stand on the side of the West in the impending showdown with Russia. It is perfectly clear that they are no longer satisfied with a continuing colonial status, despite the bold and costly colonial development schemes worked out by their colonial masters since the end of World War II. For their struggle against the metropolitan powers the West has given rather effective weapons to the Africans—verbal ones in the promises of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, political ones in the organs of the UN. In their efforts to win greater freedom the Africans can count on the sympathy of countries that have but recently won their independence and on the support of the Russians, who miss no opportunity to make it clear that they are still fighting capitalistic imperialism and that the best way to effect the collapse of capitalism is to undermine its imperial foundations. Quite unintentionally, in their successful wars against Italy and Germany in this century, the powers have convinced many Africans that there is little hope of getting their status improved unless their masters are first defeated in war. Thus, unless colonial powers undertake the kind of revolutionary policies adopted by Great Britain for making the Gold Coast and Nigeria self-governing, the danger exists that Africans may find their interests at this point bound up in a Russian victory over the West. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Africa may prove to be a greater obstacle on the road of the West to a peaceful and prosperous future than she was centuries ago on the route of the West to the riches of Cathay.

Harry R. Rudin, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is Colgate Professor of History and chairman of the History Department at Yale University. He is author of Germans in the Cameroons, 1884–1914 (1938) and Armistice—1918 (1944) and of articles on Africa and European diplomacy.

African Economies: Basic Characteristics and Prospects

By FRANK R. LA MACCHIA

A GENERAL survey of African economies presents formidable difficulties. The problems are complex, and changes are occurring so rapidly as to render generalizations which were valid only a few years ago highly questionable today. Africa cannot be characterized briefly and accurately as either poor or wealthy. It cannot be stated categorically that it is or is not a continent of "vast, untapped resources." The fact is that a great deal has yet to be learned about the potential wealth of Africa. There is a considerable body of knowledge of the resources of Africa, but the greatest part of the work in the fields of mapping, geological and topographic surveys, mineral, soil, and hydrological surveys, and the systematic compilation of meteorological data still remains to be done.

In the following discussion, it is proposed to highlight: (1) the existing resources and potentialities of the African economies; (2) the nature and effects of economic change; (3) the position of Africa in the world economy; and (4) the character of forces favoring or resisting orderly economic development. In doing so, it is hoped that certain misconceptions will be erased and further thought and discussion stimulated.

BASIC ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND POTENTIALITIES

The economies of Africa have in common underdeveloped human and natural resources. Low incomes are universal, ranging widely from perhaps $30 a year per capita in the least advanced areas to $250 in the Union of South Africa. Most countries would probably fall in the $40 to $70 range. The great majority of the people are farmers and pastoralists, producing largely for subsistence but also increasingly for sale. Standards of food consumption are low, diets are deficient in protein, and famine in certain areas is not unusual. Capital formation has been a slow and difficult process, relying principally on the investment of European governments and enterprise. Local savings are generally meager but are increasing as the habit of saving spreads with the growth of the money economy.

In spite of these similarities, the African economies are at different levels of development. Some are more advanced than others in methods of production, income, and standards of living. All combine in varying degrees elements of subsistence and money economies. These differences are due to factors such as climate, soil fertility, availability and accessibility of mineral and water resources, the extent and nature of European settlement, enterprise, and influence, indigenous trading habits, and the use of money.

In the Union of South Africa, extensive mineral resources have combined with a moderate climate to attract the largest population of Europeans in Africa. They have applied the requisite technology and with the aid of foreign capital have developed large primary export industries. They have also provided a sufficiently large and prosperous internal market to generate substantial growth of manufacturing industries. These developments have in turn fostered the growth of a large urban, Afri-

can wage-earning population, as well as the widespread use of money throughout African villages. Similarly the Rhodesias and French North Africa have attracted large numbers of Europeans, thus providing the major stimulus to investment and development. In British West Africa there is no European settlement of any consequence, but European influence in the form of missionary effort, trade, investment, government, and law has been exerted for nearly two centuries.

Abundant rainfall in certain of the coastal areas of West Africa favors the production of tree crops. The bulk of the world's cocoa and palm kernels and oil is produced here by African farmers. British West Africa, besides being the world's largest producer of cocoa, has substantial mineral resources. It is one of the largest producers of manganese and the largest producer of columbite, and substantial quantities of tin, gold, and diamonds are mined there.

The Belgian Congo throughout most of its area has abundant and well-distributed rainfall, which provides the basis for its great variety of crops. The Congo's economy is as dependent on its agricultural exports as on its better-known mineral and metal output. Crops produced for export include tropical tree crops—coffee, palm kernels and oil, tea, rubber, cocoa, and bananas—as well as a variety of field crops such as cotton and groundnuts. The Congo's diversity, magnitude, and quality of mineral resources are almost legendary. Besides being the world's largest source of industrial diamonds and cobalt and a major producer of copper, tin, and uranium, it also produces appreciable quantities of manganese, gold, and zinc. European enterprise not only owns and operates the mining and ancillary industries but contributes the largest proportion of agricultural production. Africans produce virtually all of the cotton, and some of the palm kernels and oil, coffee, and groundnuts.

Soils

The African environment is on the whole an exceedingly difficult one and often presents problems which have only long-term or costly solutions. In a continent essentially agricultural, the conditions of agriculture are generally unfavorable and result in acreage yields which are far below world averages. Soils vary greatly in fertility but are generally mediocre or poor. Many areas are seriously eroded or exhausted as a result of recurring torrential rains and poor farming practice. In many areas soils are so constituted that after a rain they harden and render cultivation exceedingly difficult. It is increasingly open to doubt that plowing in tropical areas is the correct method of working soils, since this may result in rapid oxidation of organic matter on exposure to tropical temperatures.[1]

Water

Water is also a major problem. Rainfall in many areas fluctuates enormously in timing and quantity from year to year. Unfortunately, the indigenous people of Africa have not, generally speaking, acquired the techniques of irrigation and water storage, drainage, and flood control. Relatively little land even in areas of European settlement is actually under irrigation. There are under way large irrigation projects in French North Africa and experimental schemes in Southern Rhodesia, but the problem has hardly been tackled in most areas. There is in addition an urgent need for many more wells and boreholes and storage dams to supply the consumption requirements of human beings and livestock.

[1] See L. D. Stamp, *Africa: A Study in Tropical Development* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1953), pp. 97 ff.

Shortage of capital

The generally low incomes of African farmers limit the supply of capital for investment in equipment. Agricultural credit is sorely needed, but often no credit facilities exist. Where they do, the risks involved in extending credit to indigenous farmers may be considered too great because, without security of tenure, they lack the desire or ability to make real improvements on their farms.

Population pressure

Rapid population growth in such areas as Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, and French North Africa has resulted in fragmentation of the land into units too small to provide an adequate means of subsistence. Without countermeasures, malnutrition and deficiency diseases become more widespread and production of crops for sale tends to decline. By contrast, in certain areas settled by Europeans, there are large landholdings, often underutilized and undercultivated.

The expanding population in much of Africa south of the Sahara has thus limited severely areas on which Africans may carry on their traditional practice of "shifting cultivation." Accordingly, periods of fallow have been reduced to the danger point. There is inadequate knowledge and little understanding of crop rotation, fertilizers, the need for terracing slopes, and other methods of soil conservation and rehabilitation.

There are now under way programs of agricultural development designed to attack some of the problems cited and to help realize the limited potentialities of African agriculture. These include extension services, education in agricultural schools, experimentation, free distribution of fertilizer, and the establishment of agricultural credit institutions. Road programs are helping to expand production by providing readier access to markets. Large areas throughout tropical Africa could be brought under cultivation if it becomes economical or absolutely necessary for survival to clear tsetse-fly areas. The tsetse fly, the vector of trypanosomiasis—sleeping sickness in humans and nagana in cattle—covers vast areas of land throughout tropical Africa, for example, two-thirds of Uganda and half of Northern Rhodesia.

Labor problems

The problems of human resources in Africa are no less formidable than those of the physical environment. Although in certain areas population pressure is acute, the chronic and major problem in Africa is the inadequacy of the labor supply, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The continent is sparsely populated by about 16 to 18 persons per square mile. This average density does not reflect the existence of serious population pressures in North Africa, Nyasaland, Ruanda-Urundi, and parts of West, Central, and South Africa.

In areas of rapid economic growth in the postwar period, labor shortages have been acute. These shortages are due in part to the small labor force but also to the inability of the African subsistence populations to adapt rapidly to the requirements of the Western economic system. In the early history of European penetration, compulsion was frequently resorted to in an effort to obtain sufficient labor. Today forced labor is less prevalent and is limited mainly to certain areas where labor on public works is exacted for failure to pay taxes, or where administrators are authorized to requisition labor in an emergency and for the maintenance of village roads. Private employers have to rely on the usual incentives to attract and keep labor, and on recruiting services such as those in the Union of South Africa and

Southern Rhodesia, which recruit mainly from Mozambique and Nyasaland but also from as far away as Tanganyika. In Southern Rhodesia, a free transportation service is provided for immigrating Africans.

Incentives

Incentives have been inadequate and not of the type which would induce Africans to remain in employment. Labor turnover rates of 200 and 300 per cent are not uncommon. Africans newly arrived in the towns and employed for the first time in a Western-type firm for money wages do not respond to money incentives in the same way as do urbanized Africans, whose responses are by and large not distinguishable from those of Europeans. Rural Africans leave their villages because the land no longer provides the means of subsistence, but perhaps also frequently out of curiosity and a desire for adventure. For them it is a demonstration of manhood and independence and an opportunity to bring back highly prized possessions such as bicycles and treadle sewing machines, which greatly enhance their owners' prestige. Thus the newcomer is often a "target laborer," who is interested in earning only enough money with which to purchase specific articles. The sooner he earns it, the sooner he leaves employment. Although this type of labor still exists, it is being reduced as the towns acquire an increasingly large proportion of married men with their families who consider themselves more or less permanent urban residents.

Productivity

African labor is largely undifferentiated, unskilled, and inefficient by Western standards. Wages are therefore extremely low by the same standards, although it is probable that they are in general even lower than their efficiency justifies. The reasons for low productivity among Africans are quite apparent. Most Africans are subject to a wide variety of diseases and usually are afflicted with several at a time. Malaria appears to be the most widespread and has the most serious economic impact in terms of absenteeism. Add to this bilharziasis, numerous parasitic diseases, tuberculosis, yellow fever, sleeping sickness, venereal diseases, and a host of others, and one wonders that many Africans can walk around, much less work.

Lack of training

Africans are inefficient because they lack training. There is a dearth of basic and technical schools, in-service training, and labor apprenticeship schemes; moreover, opportunities for advancement for Africans are often limited by law or custom. Functions requiring skills, managerial talent, and administrative ability are performed by Europeans and other non-Africans. In areas of heavy European settlement there is a tendency to perpetuate these conditions in order to prevent the "dilution" of European labor and otherwise protect what are considered to be European interests.

The Gold Coast and Nigeria, on the threshold of complete self-government and with the weight of public responsibility largely on African shoulders, feel most acutely their shortages of technically competent engineers, managers, accountants, and other professional persons—those possessing the abilities necessary for the management of a modern society. Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya, still dependent in large measure on foreign advisers, are becoming increasingly aware of these deficiencies. With the help of those advisers, they are developing a steadily expanding corps of their own technically qualified personnel.

Mineral resources

Although the great majority of the population of Africa is engaged in farming, the principal initial investment interest of Western enterprise, and hence the prime mover of economic development, is largely the continents' mineral resources. The bulk of private investment has been in the mines. Public investment has been directed principally toward the provision of railroads, roads, telecommunications, and power systems to serve the mining regions. Even today private investment is going primarily into mining and the metal industries. Current railroad construction and hydroelectric power development are justified largely in terms of a potential expansion in the production of minerals and metals for export.

There are two major railway projects under way in East and Central Africa—one in Uganda and the other in Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. The Uganda project is an extension of the Mombasa-Nairobi-Jinja line of the East African Railways to provide access to the copper and cobalt deposits at Kilembe. The other line, connecting the Mozambique and Rhodesia Railways, will link the asbestos and chrome center of Southern Rhodesia with Lourenço Marques. When completed this line will relieve the strain imposed by the unprecedented volume of traffic on the railway system of the Rhodesias and the port of Beira in Mozambique. This traffic load resulted from the great postwar expansion of mineral and tobacco exports from the Rhodesias and large-scale imports of capital goods for development.

Potentialities in the mining industry are still attracting a considerable amount of attention. New copper and cobalt mines and refineries are being developed in the Northern Rhodesia Copper Belt. Iron-ore mining in French West Africa, begun in 1953, is producing at the rate of a million tons a year, somewhat less than Liberia's iron-ore production, which started a year earlier. The discovery of uranium in association with gold mining has given the industry a great boost in the Union of South Africa. Throughout Africa there is also considerable exploration and prospecting under way. In certain areas, workable mineral deposits have been found, but in order to exploit them it is first necessary to provide new transport facilities or hydroelectric power. For example, there are promising deposits of copper and iron in Mauritania and aluminum in French Guinea. But the copper and iron require railway construction and port development, and hydroelectric power is required for the production of aluminum. Similarly, the planned production of aluminum from the large bauxite deposits in the Gold Coast will require the construction of a large hydropower dam on the Volta River, a new port at Tema, and a new railroad.

Fuel resources

Africa is poor in fuel resources, at present producing a little petroleum in French North Africa and Egypt and coal mainly in the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Nigeria. Oil explorations have been conducted in other areas but have thus far met with no commercial success.

On the other hand, the hydroelectric power potentialities of the continent are the largest in the world. As the African economies expand, gradual realization of this potential will become necessary.

ECONOMIC CHANGE

Before European penetration, the traditional indigenous economy was one of

agricultural production for subsistence and barter, with money playing a relatively insignificant role. Under the impact of European civilization in the form of missionaries, traders, industrialists, agricultural settlers, plantation owners, and government officials along with their Western values, morality, patterns of behavior, and institutions, profound and lasting changes have occurred in the native economic and social systems. Tribal wars have been halted, famines have been averted, infant mortality has been lowered, the general death rate from disease has been reduced, and the use of money both as a medium of exchange and a standard of economic values has been steadily enlarged. All these contributed to increased physical well-being and a rapid increase in the human and livestock populations of many areas. In many areas serious population pressures occurred. In regions of European settlement they were aggravated by the reservation of the better lands for European use. On the other hand, the introduction of the plow and other improved hand implements made it possible to cultivate larger areas, although sometimes with harmful effect to the soil. Under the influence of traders, Africans became increasingly aware of the cash value of cereals and other crops as a means of obtaining cloth, pots and pans, and other simple consumers goods, and later, tools, sewing machines, and bicycles. The requirements of government also made them conscious of the need for cash to pay taxes. Missionaries not only brought Christianity but gave basic and practical education, instilled habits of cleanliness, and provided medical care.

Transition to exchange economy

The Western-type money economy reached into every corner of Africa. The rapid expansion of transport and communications and the development of mining, industry, and European plantation agriculture brought a persistent and heavy demand for African labor. As a result today there is virtually no African community which does not depend in some measure on money earnings. The transition from subsistence native economies to full-scale exchange economies is, however, by no means complete.

In the United Nations' interesting and valuable study recently published, *Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in Tropical Africa,* an attempt is made to determine statistically the extent of the the commercialization of the subsistence economies of nine territories.[2] This report concludes that between 65 and 75 per cent of the total cultivated area and about 60 per cent of the total male population over fifteen years of age are devoted to subsistence production.

Within these average percentages, considerable variations exist. In the Gold Coast, for instance, only 21 per cent of the male labor and 25 per cent of the area are employed in subsistence production, while in French West Africa it is 77 per cent and 81 per cent respectively.

About three million, or 13 per cent of the adult male population, in these nine African territories are employed outside the indigenous agricultural economies, the largest proportions primarily in Southern Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo, and Kenya. Despite the importance of mining, the high ratio of capital to labor in this industry makes it a far smaller employer of labor than agriculture. Only 11 per cent of the wage earners is employed in mining compared with approximately one third

[2] Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa, French West Africa, Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, and Uganda.

in agriculture, and 10 per cent in secondary industries. The largest absolute numbers of African wage earners in agriculture are in the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika, Kenya, and Southern Rhodesia. One would expect this because of the existence of relatively large and numerous European farm holdings in these territories. The greatest number in mining are, in descending order, in the Belgian Congo, Nigeria, Southern Rhodesia, and the Gold Coast; in secondary industry it is the Belgian Congo and Southern Rhodesia.

Effect on native economies

The steady movement of labor into money-earning activities outside of the native economies has had serious effects. The demand in European areas has been largely for male labor without their families. The result has been to reduce the number of employable males in the native economies, completely denuding some villages of economically productive males, leaving only the women and children and a few aged and feeble men to perform the necessary work. Food production has been adversely affected and countries formerly self-sufficient—although at minimal nutritional levels—are now importing considerable quantities of foodstuffs to supplement local production. However, the diversion of resources from subsistence agriculture to export and ancillary industries has enabled Africa to produce more for export; with increased foreign-exchange earnings it can pay not only for the additional food it requires but for capital equipment for development as well.

The disruptive effects of separating families have also been felt in the urban, mining, and European agricultural areas. It has contributed to high turnover rates in industry, which in turn have retarded the growth of a skilled African labor force. Many employers are becoming aware of the importance of developing a settled and contented labor force and are encouraging workers to bring their families with them as fast as housing can be provided. In the Northern Rhodesia Copper Belt today about half of the workers now have their families living with them, a much larger proportion than a decade ago.

The transition from subsistence economies to exchange economies is accompanied by many noneconomic stresses, particularly in areas of relatively large European settlement. As Africans become more integrated into the exchange economy they become more responsive to monetary incentives, but they quickly learn that ability, initiative, and skill are not necessarily rewarded by advancement in status and income. The relegation of Africans to an inferior political, economic, and social status stimulates resentment, bitterness, and frustration. Under these circumstances, the growth of a middle class of Africans having a vested interest in a harmonious, evolutionary process of development in co-operation with the more enlightened members of the European community is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION

Africa's contribution to the world economy has been principally in the form of its exports of raw materials. It has constituted a market of only limited importance, accounting in 1952 for about 7 per cent of the world's total import trade. It has also provided some opportunities for employment and profitable investment. Certain British territories have made net contributions to the dollar and gold holdings of the sterling area or supplied commodities which would otherwise have had to be purchased from the dollar area. The

British territories and the Belgian Congo have had an export surplus in their merchandise trade. In general, however, Africa's trade shows an increasing import surplus in the postwar period. In 1952 it reached 1.2 billion dollars or 27 per cent of total exports. Since both exports and imports have been increasing, this reflects a larger expansion of imports than exports, a situation one might expect to find in an area in the process of development. Most of the import surplus was accounted for by the French territories and the Union of South Africa.

The data reflect a net flow of resources in the form of consumer and capital goods from the rest of the world to Africa, financed by international loans, grants, new private investment, and reinvested profits. In return, the rest of the world—principally the European metropoles and the United States—have received African exports which comprise a very modest proportion of their total imports but nevertheless constitute a large share of their imports of specific commodities. This is because Africa's production of an impressive number of products represents a significant percentage of the world's total output. In 1952, for example, Africa produced 99 per cent of the world's industrial diamonds, 94 per cent of its columbite, 84 per cent of its cobalt, 56 per cent of gold,[3] 41 per cent of beryllium, 35 per cent of phosphate rock,[3] 33 per cent of manganese, 29 per cent of chrome, 21 per cent of copper, 16 per cent of asbestos (but a much larger percentage of a highly desirable grade), 13 per cent of tin, and 10 per cent of graphite (but most of the strategic flake variety). It also produced a major share of the world's uranium supply. In addition Africa produced 80 per cent of the world's output of palm oil and kernels, 66 per cent of its cocoa, 68 per cent of sisal, 26 per cent of groundnuts, and 13 per cent of the coffee.

[3] Gold and phosphate rock percentages exclude Soviet bloc production.

Diversification

The Union of South Africa contributes almost 20 per cent of Africa's total export trade. Its exports are fairly diversified and include a large variety of manufactured goods as well as primary products. By contrast all the other territories of Africa rely largely on the production and export of primary products for their income, some depending heavily on one or only a few commodities. Before Northern Rhodesia federated with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, its income depended almost entirely on exports of copper. With federation Northern Rhodesia is now part of a more diversified economy, which is, nevertheless, still dependent on a relatively small number of products—including copper, its major commodity, and tobacco, asbestos, gold, chrome, clothing, hides, and tea. The Gold Coast is heavily dependent on cocoa, although income from exports of gold, diamonds, manganese, and mahogany has risen in recent years.

Liberia is predominantly dependent on rubber and iron ore for its income. French West Africa relies on a half dozen agricultural exports for most of its income. In all of Africa south of the Sahara, aside from the Union of South Africa, the Belgian Congo has the most highly diversified agricultural and mineral economy, although its secondary industries lag behind Southern Rhodesia's. Five major commodities—copper, tin, coffee, cotton, and palm oil—comprise about 65 per cent of the Congo's total exports; of the rest no other product constitutes more than 4 per cent of the total.

Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, with their relatively large European populations and substantial French investment, produce a variety of products for export—grains, olive oil, fruit and vegetables, canned fish, phosphate rock (of which they are the world's largest exporter), manganese, lead, and iron ore.

Postwar economy

The trade of the dependent territories of Africa is oriented toward their respective metropoles by virtue of close political, investment, monetary, and personal associations. These ties have become firmer as a result of exchange and import controls, so that the metropoles' share of their territories' trade, traditionally predominant, is now larger than prewar. The trade of Liberia and Ethiopia is mainly with the United States, while Libya's trade is with Italy and the United Kingdom.

The postwar period provided a great stimulus to Africa's economies. Demand for Africa's products was strong and steady, and was reflected in continuously rising prices. Sterling devaluation in 1949 and later the rapid increase in world demand for strategic commodities arising out of the Korean conflict resulted in further increases in prices. Entrepreneurial profits were high and provided the basis for an expansion of private investment. Local governments shared in the general prosperity through revenue collections, and some were able to increase their reserves appreciably while devoting relatively small sums to development. This is particularly true of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and to a lesser extent Uganda and Northern Rhodesia. Elsewhere, as in the Belgian Congo and Southern Rhodesia, revenues encouraged a rapid expansion in public expenditure and borrowing for development.

Since the peak in 1951, prices of African exports have generally fallen, with the notable exception of copper, cocoa, tobacco, and until very recently coffee, but not seriously enough to have caused any significant changes in the size of development budgets.

Marketing Boards

The peculiar vulnerability of primary producing countries to the effects of price changes in world markets is universally recognized. In certain of the British territories, namely the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Uganda, the mechanism of marketing boards is being utilized as a means of offsetting the serious disadvantage of excessive dependence on the production for export of a small number of commodities. Originally established to expedite the collection and sale to the United Kingdom of agricultural products during World War II, these boards have since the end of the war become: (1) instruments for mitigating the effects on the local economies of severe fluctuations in the world prices of their products; (2) devices for combating price inflation; and (3) a means of mobilizing savings for economic development.

By paying producers prices lower than world prices, the Marketing Boards accumulate reserves. A part of these reserves are allocated to a stabilization fund to regularize producers' incomes in the event of a serious fall in world prices, while the remainder is normally available for economic development. The Boards have pursued a conservative policy of fixing producers' prices in order to avoid inflation and have generally underestimated the trend of world prices for their products. The result has been a large, rapid rise in the Boards' reserves. Only a very small part of the reserves have so far been made available for development. However, it is anticipated that expanded development programs now planned will require not only the use of Marketing Board funds available for this purpose, but loans from abroad as well.

PROGRAMS AND POLICIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Before World War II centralized planning and execution of public development programs had not yet become accepted as the means by which the metropoles could exercise their responsibilities toward their dependent territories in Africa and elsewhere. This is, of course, not to say that there was therefore no economic development. On the contrary, the rapidity of economic change in the postwar years was made possible by—or in some cases occurred in spite of—basic facilities most of which had been constructed over the preceding half-century and which represented considerable public and private investment. The obsolete and obsolescent transport, communications, and power facilities have been strained to the utmost during and since the war to meet the abnormal and sharply rising demands of Europe and the United States for foods and minerals. Disruption of normal supplies during the war and continued shortages after the war, at least until 1952, denied Africa the physical capital needed to rehabilitate existing facilities.

In the postwar period, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and more recently Portugal have adopted policies and programs designed to further the economic and social development of their territories and have made available for this purpose extensive grant and loan funds. The two major economic policy objectives appeared to be the following: (1) to improve the standard of living and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the dependencies and, in the case of the United Kingdom's territories, to establish a firm basis for self-government in the very near future; and (2) to encourage the dependencies to make increasingly important contributions to the economies of the mother countries as they develop further. During a time when Europe was beset by balance-of-payments problems the metropoles turned to their territories to maximize the production and export of dollar-saving or dollar-earning commodities. The shortage of fats and oils in the United Kingdom prompted that country to undertake the bold and disastrous Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika, in which the British taxpayers lost over 84 million dollars. In the Korean and post-Korean buildup of Western strength Africa is viewed as an important contributor of strategic commodities required by the West.

All plans in British, French, and Belgian territories have certain elements in common. They are generally ten- or four-year plans which have been reviewed and revised frequently to reflect changes in cost estimates and modifications in the scope or character of projects as experience dictated. All plans place greatest emphasis on the development of basic facilities, that is, transport—roads, railways, ports—thermal and hydroelectric power, and telecommunications. A smaller proportion of funds is devoted to such directly productive activities as agriculture, manufacturing, and mining, while development in the fields of education, health, and housing is generally assigned the smallest share.

Government participation

In all cases, the metropoles contribute only a share of the costs of development in the form of grants or loans. Grants of 420 million dollars allocated by the United Kingdom government to its African territories from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund constitute approximately 16 per cent of the estimated cost of the formal development plans.[4] In addition the United Kingdom has made available for direct investment in all of its colonies through the Colonial Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation 280 million dollars and 140 million dollars respectively. A further source of public investment funds is the London market, where the territories have been able to float substantial loans for development.

France finances development of its territories south of the Sahara through FIDES (the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development) and the Caisse Centrale. France's grant contribution to FIDES is 55 per cent of the cost of the development program while the local governments' share is 45 per cent. The Caisse Centrale is authorized to extend loans to the territories to help them meet their contributions to FIDES. In North Africa, France makes grants to Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco through a Fund for Modernization and Equipment, supplemented by loans from the French treasury. Belgium's financial contribution to the Congo's development program is entirely in the form of loans.

The formal plans by no means represent the total developmental effort. They often exclude the investments of certain public corporations and railway programs. They exclude, of course, private investment programs which in the Belgian and British areas approximate or exceed public investment. To cite data on public investment in the formal development plans therefore provides an incomplete picture of total investment. Nevertheless, it does indicate the important role played by government in the development of Africa. Excluding the Union of South Africa and Egypt, total public investment in the formal development plans from 1946 through 1953 was approximately 3.8 billion dollars. The largest expenditures were made by France and the French territories—2 billion dollars in North Africa and 0.7 billion dollars in Africa south of the Sahara; expenditures in the British territories, including Southern Rhodesia, amounted to 0.7 billion dollars, and the Belgian Congo 0.3 billion dollars. Agencies of the United States have contributed substantially to African development. United States grants and loans to all African countries, including the Union of South Africa, through 1953 were approximately 600 million dollars. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has also made important contributions and has shown an interest in doing even more. Its loans have totaled 110 million dollars to the Union of South Africa, 70 million dollars for Belgian Congo development, 42 million dollars to the Rhodesias, 8.5 million dollars to Ethiopia, and 7.5 million dollars to French West Africa.

Criticisms of current plans

The lack of balance in some of the programs has been quite evident. In some territories the Europeans have been under nationalist attack for pursuing economic policies which benefited largely the European populations and only incidentally, if at all, the indigenous populations. They have been further criticized for not adequately providing for health and educational deficiencies. The programs undertaken in a number of territories were often of large scale, spectacular, costly, and resulting in little apparent benefit to the indigenous population. Moreover, in a few territories public investment has not induced nearly as much private investment as the governments had hoped.

Partly because of political pressure and partly because of the validity of the criticism that the programs were, on the whole, not placing sufficient emphasis on rural agricultural development

[4] Excluding Southern Rhodesia, which as a self-governing colony did not qualify for grants.

and on ameliorating the social problems of the cities, a few programs have recently been recast to place slightly greater emphasis on this type of development. There is an increasing awareness of the importance in the long-range development of Africa of basic and technical education and of improvements in the productivity of the small farmer. Countries can no longer afford an illiterate, unskilled, and undernourished population. Nevertheless, social programs do divert scarce resources from directly productive investment and constitute a current charge against the whole economy for future benefit. Expenditures on social programs should not reach the point where capital and recurrent costs become so high as to necessitate the postponement of urgently needed economic development projects.

OUTLOOK

The magnitude and speed of future development in Africa depends on a variety of factors, economic, political, social, and psychological. Among the more important economic factors is the future level of capital investment. Obviously, for many years it will be necessary for Africa to continue to rely on a flow of finance from abroad whether in the form of intergovernmental loans and grants or private investment. Nevertheless, as in the past, the territories will have to bear the major share of the burden of development, including the deferred financial load of external loans, out of income earned by the employment of their own resources.

The basis for future income required to continue and expand development programs in the public and private sector and to service external loans will be the export industries. If the prices of Africa's exports are maintained at about their present levels in relation to import prices Africa's ability to pursue development programs should not be impaired. Incentives to expand production will be operative, incomes will increase, and governmental revenues will be buoyant. If, on the other hand, there is a steady decline in export prices without a proportionate fall in import prices, output of the export industries will tend to fall and incentives to expand productive capacity will diminish with declining incomes. Public development programs would become more costly during a period of contracting governmental revenues. Under the circumstances, without expanded external aid the result would be a reduced rate of development.

The outlook for Africa's export industries is on the whole reasonably good. Prices of a number of African commodities which slumped after the Korean crisis have recently risen again. There should be a sustained and increasing demand over the years for Africa's exports, given the present rate of economic expansion in the United States and Western Europe.

The noneconomic factors affecting development involve fundamental attitudes, customary behavior, and incentives which do not lend themselves to rapid change. Among these are African nationalist attitudes toward foreign private investment; popular attitudes towards continuing and expanding public development programs; the willingness of the people to be taxed for the provision of essential public services; the business initiative and imagination of private individuals and their quickness to take advantage of private opportunities offered by the expansion of public facilities; the rate of growth of a local body of technological, administrative, and executive ability; and the development and spread of a sense of public responsibility and devotion to duty among elected and appointed officials. In areas where problems are complicated by the existence of several races and by laws, regulations, and behavioral patterns of a discriminatory nature directed against the African majority and nonwhite minority, the speed of future development will depend in addition on the course of race relations: the degree to which wage and employment rigidities are relaxed; the extent to which non-Europeans are permitted to participate in the planning and execution of development programs; and the response of non-Europeans to opportunities offered.

Frank R. La Macchia, Washington, D. C., is an international economist with the Department of State's Office of International Financial and Development Affairs. He served as a research economist on Africa for the Department of State from 1948 to 1952. In 1952–53 he was Consul in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.

The Changing Economic Structure of French West Africa*

By Jo W. Saxe

BETWEEN 1854 and 1865 General Faidherbe, an energetic soldier, consolidated French trading establishments on the coast of West Africa and extended French influence to the interior. Marching inland from four Senegalese towns—which had been French since pre-Revolutionary times and the inhabitants of which had enjoyed some of the rights of French citizenship since 1848—Faidherbe's troops set up a series of military and trading centers as far as the Niger River. In 1904 the colonies of Senegal and Sudan, which Faidherbe had established, were federated with the southern territories of Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Dahomey; and in the early twenties the Federation was expanded to include Mauritania in the north and Niger in the east.

The creation and consolidation of the Federation, like Faidherbe's penetration of the interior, were essentially achievements of individual soldiers and administrators; they were never more than an adjunct to French policy elsewhere. To some extent rivalry with the British, who were establishing themselves in Nigeria and the Gold Coast during the same period, spurred penetration of the interior. In the course of negotiations largely about other problems, the French and the British eventually agreed on the boundaries of their respective territories in West Africa. The French West African Federation which emerged from these agreements lacked natural unity both in territory and population.

Nevertheless the eight territories of the Federation were tightly knit together. In 1946, under the terms of the new French Constitution, they became an integral part of the French Republic. French political tradition—as expressed in the 1848 grant of civic rights to inhabitants of four Senegalese towns and in the incorporation of the Federation's diverse territories into the French Republic—was to have important consequences in later stages of West Africa's economic development.

Today French West Africa extends from Lake Chad to Dakar and from the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea. It covers one-sixth of the area of Africa and contains about 18 million people, or less than one-tenth of the continent's total population. Seven foreign enclaves—of which two, Nigeria and the Gold Coast, are of considerable political and economic importance—lie within its land borders.

A substantial part of French West Africa is desert or subdesert savanna, where little more than stock raising is possible. To the south of this region is a broad band of savanna with a longer rainy season, where food grains such as millet and sorghum can be grown. This savanna becomes progressively more humid and somewhat wooded toward the south. On its wetter southern edge and in the drier northern edge of the tropical rain forest which lies between the savanna and the southern coast, tropical tubers, corn, cocoa, and coffee can be grown. The rain forest itself is composed of tropical hardwoods, of which a certain number find a market in Europe. Along the coast are found oil and coconut palms.

The river valleys and deltas, particularly the great valley of the Niger, the valley of the Senegal, and the delta of the Casamance, are sufficiently well watered to make the cultivation of rice possible.

Almost all the soils of the area are poor in organic matter and fragile in structure. Continuous or intensive cultivation causes a rapid decrease in fertility. The more valuable and readily marketable hardwoods are scattered throughout the rain forest, making the felling and transporting of timber more costly as the more accessible areas are logged out.

The known mineral resources of the Federation are few. Small gold and diamond deposits are mined by Africans and Europeans. Recently, large bauxite and iron deposits were found in Guinea, not far from the port of Conakry. Both deposits have a low value per ton, however.

French Influence

Traditionally, the population of French West Africa devoted the largest share of its production to subsistence, leaving only a small margin to be traded abroad for manufactures and foodstuffs. Under French influence, however, West Africa's foreign trade underwent changes so radical as to provoke an agricultural and economic revolution. The flow of trade was increased and regularized, particularly in palm nuts and palm oil. Moreover, new crops were introduced. Of these, peanuts and cocoa, especially the former, rapidly became the most important, both because climatic and soil conditions were suited to them and because native methods of farming could readily be adapted to their cultivation. Introduced into Senegal as early as 1840, peanuts were being exported in substantial amounts at the end of the nineteenth century. Completion of the railroad from Dakar to the Niger River in 1923 and development of roads in southern Senegal made further expansion possible. Exports of peanuts rose to 400,000 tons in 1929 and to over 600,000 in 1939. Cocoa was introduced into the Ivory Coast shortly after the turn of the century. Exports reached 16,000 tons in 1929 and 55,000 tons in 1939. Together, peanuts and cocoa formed about 60 per cent of total exports by value in 1939. The introduction of peanuts and cocoa was followed by that of coffee and bananas. At first these were grown only on European plantations in the Ivory Coast and Guinea. Coffee was rapidly adopted by native farmers, but bananas continued even after World War II to be principally a plantation crop. In 1939 coffee and bananas made up about 10 per cent of the value of exports. Gold, palm nuts, and palm oil made up an additional 15 per cent.

In 1914 the French extended their administration to every part of the Federation and were building the ports, warehouses, railroads, and roads which were necessary for collection and shipment of exports and for distribution of imported consumer goods to African farmers. By 1934 the railroad system reached a total length of more than 2,300 miles and was virtually complete. Ports and port facilities were improved, good gravel roads were extended throughout the peanut-raising regions of the Senegal, and many schools, hospitals, dispensaries, and administrative buildings were built.

The growing trade and construction brought a considerable French population to the new political and economic centers of the Federation—the ports and railroad towns.

All these innovations profoundly changed the activities of a part of the African population. Within the export crop zone, that is, the coastal areas in which the new crops could be grown

* Where necessary, the author has used his own estimates to fill gaps in the published statistics on which this account of the French West African economy is based.

economically, production of food crops declined as that of peanuts and cocoa increased. Rice began to appear among the imports of the Federation. But changes were not limited to this zone. Temporary and permanent immigrants came from the interior to work for wages in the coastal areas, in response to the demand for seasonal labor on peanut farms, on cocoa farms, on banana plantations, and in the logging camps, as well as for the construction and operation of ports, warehouses, and railroads. Taxes, consumer goods, and various administrative measures played a large part in bringing about this migration. The demand for seasonal labor for the cocoa farms of the Gold Coast led to a similar migration from the interior of French West Africa.

ECONOMIC "SECTORS" OF THE FEDERATION

Thus, as a result of French public and private enterprise, a new economic structure had been firmly established by the end of the 1930's. This structure can best be described by dividing it into six relatively well-defined, if somewhat unconventional, economic sectors. Accounts of the transactions between these sectors would be, in effect, the social accounts of the Federation. The receipts side of these accounts can be arranged to show the gross "national" income or product of the Federation, and the expenditures side to show its gross "national" expenditure.[1]

The first three sectors are similar to three which are defined in the simplified system of national accounts of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC):[2] Government, Enterprises, and Households. The first of these is identical with the Government sector as defined by OEEC. The second differs from the corresponding OEEC sector in that it includes European-owned farms but excludes African farms and handicrafts. The third excludes traditional African households. The remaining three sectors have been devised to fit French West African conditions. These are: Farmers (African farmers producing for export), Migrant Wage Earners, and the Traditional Economy.

African farms excluded from Enterprises are included in the Farmer or Traditional Economy sector. Migrant Wage Earners are set apart because of their relatively large number and their ambiguous position between the Traditional Economy and the five sectors which comprise the newer "European" economy. In respect to transactions with the rest of the world, it will be sufficient for descriptive purposes to assume that they are made only by the Enterprise or the Government sector.

The division of French West Africa's economy into these six sectors is based on similarities in economic behavior of units which are included in each sector and on differences in the way of life between units of different sectors. The nature and import content of consumption by units in the Household sector, for example, is radically different from that of units in the Traditional Economy; that of Farmers differs from both, having an import content smaller than that of Households and larger than that of the Traditional Economy.

[1] The statistical data required for a detailed presentation of these accounts are not available. The French government is preparing similar accounts for some postwar years, but these accounts have not yet been completed or made public. Data for prewar years probably do not exist. There are, however, some statistical series which go back to the 1930's, as well as a number of estimates and qualitative appraisals of the flow of goods and money. On the basis of this information it is possible to set forth in very general terms the relative importance of the sectors before the war and the nature of the relations between them. When this is followed by a description of the changes in the structure of French West Africa during the war and postwar years, it is also possible to estimate changes in the size and distribution of the "national" product of the 1950's.

[2] For details see OEEC National Council Research Unit, *A Simplified System of National Accounts* (Paris: OEEC, 1954).

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD

In the late 1930's the Traditional Economy had relatively few transactions with the rest of the economy. It received a small cash income from sale of food or handicrafts to Farmers and Migrant Wage Earners, made a few purchases from Enterprises, and paid taxes to Government. Migrant Wage Earners were in a similar position, but were increasing in number and were beginning to provide a sort of bridge between the Traditional Economy and the "European" sectors.

Farmers were the next largest sector, and their activities accounted for a large part of the "national" product. They received a substantial cash income for their production of peanuts, cocoa, coffee, and so forth, and spent a large part on purchases of imported goods from Enterprises. It was characteristic of the Farmers' accounts that they showed a substantial credit balance with Enterprises (that is, that they received more for their crops than they spent in purchasing consumer goods) and a small deficit with Government (that is, that they paid taxes but received no cash payments from Government). But payments to Enterprises and Government did not require all of their cash income. The balance was used to hire migrant labor or to make purchases from the Traditional Economy, or it was hoarded. There is some evidence that a minimum amount of the currency in circulation was held more or less permanently by Farmers.

The Household sector included French residents of the Federation, largely composed of civil servants and employees of Enterprises, and Africans holding similar positions. It was a relatively small sector, in balance with Government, since Households paid relatively large amounts in taxes. It was probably also in balance with Enterprises, since receipts of Households from wages and salaries were balanced by expenditures on imported consumer goods purchased from Enterprises. Consumption by Households differed substantially from consumption by the Traditional Economy, Migrant Wage Earners, and even Farmers. It was, for example, somewhat smaller in the aggregate than consumption by Farmers, larger per capita, and included a wider range of goods. There were more Africans than Frenchmen in the Household sector, but consumption by Africans was smaller per capita than that by the French. To the extent that Africans were newcomers to the sector, they consumed fewer imported goods, since they were still under the influence of the way of life of the sectors from which they had come. However, there was a tendency for Africans in this sector more and more to align their way of life with the standard set by the French. This tendency was very probably reinforced by the political rights enjoyed by African inhabitants of the four Senegalese towns previously mentioned. Nevertheless, the Household sector was probably somewhat smaller than the Farmer sector in the interwar period. The relatively small numbers involved (perhaps 150,000 to 200,000 including Frenchmen, as compared with 500,000 to 1,000,000 Farmers) and the relative newness to the sector of many Africans, limited the share of Households in the "national" income and the pressure of their consumption on the import side of the balance of payments.

The Government sector seems to have been about the same size as the other two. It was probably in surplus with almost all of the other groups, judging

by a consistently small budgetary surplus on current account and its limited capital expenditures. It had grown in size over a period of decades, but seemed to be relatively stable during the 1930's.

The Enterprise sector was the largest, partly because it did a very large share of all the foreign business of the Federation. In respect to internal transactions with Farmers and Households, Enterprises spent more than they received: purchases of export crops exceeded sales of consumer goods despite gradually increasing purchases by Households. Abroad, on the other hand, Enterprises sold the export crops of the Federation and bought a somewhat smaller amount of consumer goods. Enterprises also bought a small amount of capital goods abroad, largely on Government account. These purchases were responsible for a small trade deficit. On the basis of exports of crops produced by Farmers, imports of consumer goods, and amounts of prewar budgets, it appeared that the Household and Government sectors were of about the same size and that the Enterprise sector was about three times the size of either—that is, either receipts or expenditures of Enterprises within the Federation were three times as large as receipts or expenditures of either of the two other sectors.

WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS

The prewar economic structure of French West Africa did not survive World War II. From 1940 to 1943 the Federation was in the hands of the Vichy government. The authority of the administration in political and economic affairs was increased in an effort to produce supplies for France, particularly edible oils, and to maintain the integrity of French control against both the Germans and the Free French. Neither effort was successful. Production and exports slowly declined, and the Germans began to take an active part in the disposal of the diminished output.

The Free French government at Algiers replaced Vichy shortly after the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942. With the interruption of trade with France, production and exports declined more rapidly.

The increasing inability of both governments to provide shipping either to bring imports to the Federation or to evacuate its exports reduced the level of trade in 1944–45 to little more than one-third of the average over the previous decade. Neither regime had been able to maintain export production, which had been progressively abandoned in favor of production of food crops, particularly in Senegal. There was a considerable migration of Africans to the cities in search of employment, as money income was no longer forthcoming from the sale of export crops. Moreover, what consumer goods were available could be found only in the cities. There was also a large increase in the French population. Nine or ten thousand persons came to West Africa during 1939–42 and were unable to leave until the end of the war. In addition, there were Allied military units which were being moved through the area. As a result, demand for consumer goods and for African labor increased.

Open inflation was avoided by tight price and wage controls, Lend-Lease, and British assistance. In 1944 the situation was aggravated by a campaign to produce goods required by France and the French forces. Production quotas and requisitioning of crops and of labor were briefly and unsuccessfully applied. The result was a further disruption of the prewar economic structure of the Federation.

There were two other specific results of the war. One was that all the equipment of the Federation—ports, railroads, roads, buildings, motor vehicles, and so forth—gradually deteriorated through continued use without adequate maintenance and replacement. The other was that a considerable effort was made to produce certain manufactured goods in French West Africa. In this respect the most important and successful innovation was the creation of an oil pressing and refining industry in Senegal.

POSTWAR CHANGES AND REFORMS

Postwar political and economic changes combined to reinforce the disruptive effects of the war and to introduce new elements into the economy of the Federation. The political structure was completely reformed. An Assembly was established in each of the territories, the number of which was increased from seven to eight in 1948, and a federal council was established at Dakar. In all of these bodies Africans had a majority of the seats. Moreover, French West Africa was allotted sixteen seats (later increased to twenty) in the new National Assembly, twenty in the Council of the Republic, and twenty-two (later twenty-seven) in the newly created Assembly of the French Union. Almost a million West Africans were eligible to vote in the 1946 elections and 600,000 of them did. By 1951 three million were eligible, and half of them voted. The powers of the administration were curtailed in favor of the new Assemblies, particularly in matters of finance. The authority to tax, borrow, and spend public funds was almost completely in the hands of the Assemblies. Representatives of the Overseas Territories in the French Parliament were largely responsible for the enactment of a law in 1950 which accorded substantial equality of pay and allowances to African employees of the French government and its subdivisions, including the Federation of French West Africa and its component territories. In 1953, the same representatives were influential in the enactment of a comprehensive labor code for the Overseas Territories. The code brought wage standards and working conditions of Africans substantially closer to those obtaining in France. These and other measures indicated a strong tendency of Africans to change their way of life to one approximating French standards more closely.

French government expenditures

Acting under the same influences which had brought about political reform, the French government enacted several measures and voted large sums of money to provide for the social and economic development of the Overseas Territories. French West Africa had benefited from a program of public investment during the thirties, but the postwar program was on an unprecedented scale. The earlier programs were financed largely by borrowing, were for the most part limited to construction of ports and railroads, and were relatively small in amount. The postwar program was financed by French government grants and loans on very favorable terms, and it included almost every aspect of the economic and social life of the Federation. The relative importance of public investment expenditures in French West Africa rose from less than 10 per cent of total public expenditures in 1938 to 40 per cent in 1952. This proportional increase was accompanied by a sizable absolute increase in public expenditure in real terms over the same period. The public investment programs required a large increase in current government expenditures as well, particularly for maintenance of new schools, hospitals, and so forth.

The French government also extended

its activities in French West Africa in other ways. It assumed the costs of defense and a considerable part of the costs of the executive arm of the Federation's government. It bore a large part of the cost of an expanded judicial system and undertook to pay for certain navigation, air transport, and communication facilities. As a result large amounts of money, equipment, and personnel were made available.

All of these measures encouraged an increase in the French population of the Federation. The newcomers, however, were somewhat different from the prewar French inhabitants. There was a greater variety of occupations among them; the ratio of women and children to the total was higher; and settlement in the Sudan, Ivory Coast, and Guinea tended to reduce the concentration of the French population in Dakar and other Senegalese towns. This increase and diversification of the French population induced a similar trend among Africans in the cities and encouraged the growth of various urban institutions: banks, shops, service trades, schools, motion picture theaters, and so forth.

Production and exports

Important changes occurred in the production and exports of the Federation. The total value of the peanut crop as an export was increased by local processing of a substantial part of the crop into oil and oil cake. However, the relative importance of peanuts as an export declined while that of coffee and cocoa rose. This increase reflected not only an increase in production but also high world-market prices. The absolute and relative importance of exports of wood, palm nuts, palm oil, and bananas remained more or less stable.

Mineral production increased, notably iron ore and bauxite from Guinea and phosphates from Senegal. Exports of all three, however, barely replaced gold exports in value, the latter having fallen sharply from prewar levels as a result of low prices and rising costs of production. There was hope that a newly discovered copper deposit in Mauritania could be profitably exploited, but this had to be preceded by a long period of exploration and research. The future of the mining industry thus appeared to be prejudiced to some extent by uncertain markets and the need for heavy capital investments before production could begin.

In sum, the resources of French West Africa had not changed, except for an increase in coffee and cocoa production and the discovery and exploitation of certain minerals. The economic structure, however, had changed radically. The change can be appreciated from a brief description of the six sectors of the economy as they appeared in 1952–53.

Changes in the economy

With the migration of some of its inhabitants to the coffee and cocoa farms and to the cities, the Traditional Economy diminished in size. Its transactions with the rest of the economy appeared to be slightly larger than in the interwar period.

Migrant Wage Earners continued to occupy an ambiguous position. They appeared, however, to be moving away from the Traditional Economy and toward the "European" economy.

Farmers were barely holding their own absolutely and failed to improve their relative position. The prewar surplus in their accounts with Enterprise was probably reduced somewhat by a deterioration in their terms of trade and by an increasing tendency to consume imported goods, although evidence on these points is scant and difficult to interpret. It is clear, however, that the situation of Households changed radically, while that of Farmers did not.

Households became very important. Their numbers increased substantially, as a result of the immigration of Frenchmen and of the influx of Africans from other sectors. The new African members tended more and more toward higher levels of consumption, including consumption of imported goods. The relatively large numbers of Africans in this sector and the more rapid change in their way of life, compared with Farmers, as well as the stronger political and social bargaining power which they had obtained as a result of postwar reforms, made it possible for them to obtain a substantially larger share of the "national" income.[3] The prewar limits on the claims of this sector on the "national" income and its pressure on the import side of the balance of payments were considerably relaxed.

Government also expanded greatly, not only in real terms but also proportionally to Enterprises. Capital expenditures increased from six to eight times over the prewar level and current expenditures about three times. It is estimated that the number of Government employees doubled between 1939 and 1952. An increased proportion of Government payments went to Households, but Government bought more imported goods from Enterprises as well. Government expenditures increased more than receipts from taxation. The resulting deficit was met largely by French government contributions to the public investment program. The economic and social reforms of the postwar period were, in effect, a floor under Government expenditures on salaries and social services. There was every indication that the Government sector would continue to expand and that it would of necessity continue to rely on external assistance. Although taxes were raised, there was certainly a political limit on tax increases. This situation will leave Government heavily dependent on external assistance, unless there is a considerable increase in productivity within the economy. Both mining and production of export crops seem to be close to ceilings on output—and perhaps productivity—set by physical factors. If this is the case, Government will be faced with the problem of developing the Traditional Economy to a point where output will not only be able to meet all the new claims on the "national" income but will also be sufficient to meet new claims from members of the Traditional Economy whose consumption is certain to be affected by such a development.

The Enterprise sector, while it increased in importance, increased proportionally less than Government and Households. On the same basis as that used to estimate the relative importance of these sectors in the interwar period, Enterprises were only twice the size of Government and Households, both of which were still at about the same level. Farmers fell far behind in importance to Government and Households. Enterprises had a deficit in their operations abroad, since Households were consuming more imports and Government was buying more imported capital goods.

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

In conclusion, it may be said that the growth of "national" revenue in most sectors of the economy appears to be either limited by physical factors or dependent on assistance from abroad. Foreign assistance provides capital and a continuing subsidy to consumption, which has been increasing as a result of political and social reforms. The French government and the government

[3] There were about 300,000 to 400,000 Frenchmen and Africans in this sector in the 1950's, while the number of Farmers did not seem to have changed since the 1930's.

of French West Africa are aware of this problem and are attempting to solve it by initiating a revised public investment program. Whereas the first postwar public investment program was directed toward improving transportation, communications, and social services, the second is to be directed toward developing the agricultural productivity of the Traditional Economy and Farmers. This will be a long process, and a part of the investment will of necessity be siphoned off to conserve natural resources and to provide for rising standards of consumption in those two sectors. At the same time the Household sector is likely to continue to grow, and its standards of consumption will probably continue to increase more than proportionally to its increase in numbers. Postwar reforms have given to Africans, particularly to those in the Household sector, the power to enforce their claims to a new way of life. Under the pressure of these claims, Government will be obliged to expand many of its activities in such fields as public health, housing, and education.

The resources which Government can obtain from the economy do not appear to be sufficient to meet all these claims and to supply the capital for development of the sectors in which an increase in productivity may be possible. No doubt some rearranging of the economy in the form of changes in the fiscal and marketing systems is possible and may provide some of the needed resources. But a considerable deficit will be met in the future, as it has been in the recent past, by the French government. Wartime disturbance and postwar reform have laid the burden of change in French West Africa on France.

SOURCES CONSULTED

Assemblée Nationale, Commission des Finances. *Rapport sur l'emploi des fonds d'investissements dans les territoires de l'Afrique Occidentale Française.* Paris, Journal Officiel, Documents Parlementaires. Session de 1953, No. 6830.

Boissier-Palun, L., and B. Cornut-Gentille. *Allocutions à la séance d'ouverture de la deuxième session 1952 du Grand Conseil de l'Afrique Occidentale Française.* Dakar, 1952.

Conseil Économique. *La Conjoncture économique dans les territoires d'Outre-Mer: Conjoncture de l'Afrique Noire.* Paris, Journal Officiel, Avis et Rapport du Conseil Économique, No. 18, 1954.

Gouvernement Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, Direction Générale des Finances. *Circulaire relative à la Politique financière de l'A.O.F. et à la préparation des Budgets de 1950.* Dakar, 1949.

———. *Circulaire relative à la politique financière de l'A.O.F. et à la préparation des Budgets de 1951.* Dakar, 1950.

Gouverneur Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française. *Discours à l'ouverture de la session du Conseil de Gouvernement.* Dakar, 1938.

Haut Commissariat de l'Afrique Occidentale Française. *Annuaire Statistique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française,* Édition 1949, Vol. I, Édition 1951, Vol. II. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950, 1951.

Haut Commissariat de l'Afrique Occidentale Française. *Bulletin de la Statistique Générale de l'A.O.F.* Dakar (Quarterly), 1946–.

Lacaillon, J. "Les Budgets de l'A.O.F.: Contribution à l'étude des finances des territoires d'Outre-Mer." *Revue de Science et de Législation Financières,* January–March 1954, pp. 181–87.

———. "Les Incidences du Code du Travail des territoires d'Outre-Mer." *Revue de Science et de Législation Financières,* July–September 1954, pp. 688–717.

Leduc, G. (Ed.). *L'Économie de l'Union française d'Outre-Mer.* Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1954.

Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer. *Annuaire Statistique de l'Union française d'Outre-Mer 1939–1949.* Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1951.

Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Service des Statistiques. *Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique d'Outre-Mer* (Bimonthly), 1945–.

———. *Documents et Statistiques* (Irregular), 1949–.

Organization for European Economic Cooperation, National Accounts Research Unit. *A Simplified System of National Accounts.* Paris: OEEC, 1954.

Richard-Molard, J. *Afrique Occidentale Française.* Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949.

Jo W. Saxe, Oxford, England, Ford Foundation fellow, has traveled extensively in French West Africa. He currently holds a studentship at Nuffield College, Oxford University, where he is preparing a study of the economic structure of the French Union. Previously he served as assistant economic commissioner in the Mission to France of the Foreign Operations Administration (and, from 1948, in the agencies which preceded it), where he was concerned with the Overseas Territories of the French Union.

Economic Planning and Development in the Belgian Congo

By J. Huge

GEOGRAPHIC factors play a basic role in determining the pattern of economic development in the Belgian Congo. The Congo is a large land area (900,000 square miles, or almost a third the size of the United States), situated in the center of the African continent and connected with the Atlantic Coast only by a narrow corridor along the lower stretches of the Congo River. It has a system of navigable waterways 11,300 miles long, made up of the Congo River and its tributaries, but the principal mineral deposits of the area are concentrated in the eastern part of the country—in the area furthest from the sea. Its hot and humid equatorial climate is not particularly favorable to European settlement except in the higher altitudes.

In 1953 the native population of the Belgian Congo was 12,026,000, the population density being 13.3 inhabitants per square mile. Most of the natives live in their tribal environment and devote themselves to agriculture, but an important fraction (over 20 per cent) now live in the population centers created by the Europeans. These are the "detribalized" natives, most of whom are employed in European enterprises.

The economy of the Congo is still largely based on foreign trade. Mineral products and raw or semiprocessed agricultural products are exported from the Congo in return for imports of capital goods, materials for industry, and consumer goods—though most consumer goods in the Congo are produced locally.

As Table 1 shows, the total value of exports in 1953 was over 400 million dollars. Minerals (mainly copper, tin, cobalt, diamonds, and gold) account for over 60 per cent of the total value of exports. Copper is by far the most important of the minerals; in 1953 the export of this commodity amounted to over 137 million dollars. Most (80 per cent) of the nonmineral exports consist of palm-oil products, cotton products, and coffee.

Imports to the Congo in 1953 amounted to 360 million dollars. As seen in Table 1, industrial equipment and materials make up the largest part of imported goods.

The economy of the Congo has been developing rapidly in recent years. One indication of its growth is the increase in the volume of foreign trade, as shown in Table 2.

The rise in imports from 1945 to 1950 reflects the efforts made to re-equip the country industrially after World War II, as well as the beginnings of the Ten Year Plan. The new investments did not appreciably influence the volume of exports until somewhat later.

When studying the development of exports from the Congo it should be emphasized that these exports are becoming increasingly diversified. This diversification has taken two forms: the trend toward substitution of semiprocessed materials for raw material exports, as for example the export of zinc metal instead of zinc ores, palm kernel and peanut oil instead of unprocessed palm kernels and peanuts; and the introduction of new export products, such as cobalt alloys and manganese ore.

TABLE 1—Principal Exports and Imports of the Belgian Congo, 1953
(millions of dollars) [a]

Exports	
Minerals [b]	262.1
Industrial Products [c]	39.2
Agricultural Products [d]	105.3
Animal Products	3.2
Total value of exports	409.8

Imports	
Industrial and Agricultural Machines and Tools	84.0
Heavy Metal Equipment (girders, plates, rails, tubing, etc.)	34.9
Food and Beverages	32.1
Automotive Vehicles and Parts	31.5
Cloth and Clothing	25.9
Petroleum Products	14.4
Others	138.0
Total value of imports	360.8

[a] Belgian Congo francs are converted to dollars at the official rate of exchange, approximately 50 Belgian Congo francs to one U. S. dollar.

[b] Principal minerals are copper, tin, cobalt, diamonds, gold, zinc, manganese, tungsten, and zinc ores. Some 93 per cent of the value of mineral exports is represented by the following items: copper ($137.5 million); tin and tin ore ($39.6 million); cobalt and cobalt products ($37.8 million); diamonds ($1.7 million); gold ($1.3 million).

[c] "Industrial Products" refers principally to agricultural products which have been processed to some extent; vegetable oils account for 75 per cent of the value of these industrial products.

[d] About 80 per cent of the combined items "Agricultural Products" and "Industrial Products" is made up of palm-oil products ($39.5 million), cotton products ($40.0 million), and coffee ($33.5 million).

Another index of the increasing pace of development of the Congo's economy is found in the expansion of native expenditure for consumer goods. In 1951 natives spent roughly 340 million dollars on consumer goods, 228 million dollars of which were for food and 68 million dollars for clothing; this is almost twice as much (in real terms) as natives were spending on similar goods in 1938.[1] Most of these increased consumer expenditures were for nonfood items. Thus food consumption has increased by only 50 per cent in the years since 1938, while consumption of clothing, decorative items, and household equipment tripled and in some cases quintupled during the same period, indicating a substantial improvement in living standards. This improvement resulted from a rise in native purchasing power; wages have gone up appreciably in connection with the increasing productivity of labor.

Along with the increased diversification of exports is a marked tendency toward an increase in the number of variety of local industries producing for the internal market. For example, the new industries installed during the past few years include manufacturers of bags, blankets, canvas, bottles, fibro-

[1] The growth of native consumer spending is evident in the following index of physical volume of consumption (1948–49 equals 100): *1938*, 67.1; *1948*, 94.6; *1949*, 105.4; *1950*, 108.2; *1951*, 129.1.

TABLE 2—The Volume of Foreign Trade, Selected Years, 1920–1953[a]
(1951 equals 100)

Year	Imports	Exports
1920	9.6	8.8
1930	29.2	34.9
1938	29.5	65.0
1945	20.7	74.9
1950	72.4	97.3
1951	100.0	100.0
1952	142.0	106.8
1953	141.7	111.8

[a] The index used here is a Laspeyre type of index of the quantity of imports and exports.

cement, plywood, and construction materials.

The index of industrial production naturally reflects these new developments. As shown in Table 3, industrial production increased about fourfold from 1945 to 1953. The process of industrial growth in the Congo is typical of a developing economy; imported goods are being brought in at less and less finished stages, while locally produced raw materials are being processed domestically to an ever increasing extent. Analysis of the kinds of goods imported confirms these trends; the largest part of imports consists of capital goods.

The gross national product, first calculated in 1950, stood at 712 million dollars in that year. In 1951 it was 928 million dollars, and in 1952 it rose to slightly over one billion dollars. By comparison, the fiscal burden is very light. Government expenditure was 98 million dollars in 1950, 128 million in 1951, 140 million in 1952, and 152 million dollars in 1953. This relatively low level of public expenditure, coupled with the continuing growth of the national income, indicates that the Belgian Congo is capable of supporting the public investment effort of the Ten Year Plan.

TABLE 3—INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, SELECTED YEARS, 1930–53 [a]

(1947–49 equals 100)

1930	21.4
1938	28.5
1945	64.0
1950	147.4
1951	179.4
1952	206.9
1953	250.0 [b]

[a] The index used here is a Laspeyre type of index of the volume of industrial production.
[b] Provisional figure.

TEN YEAR PLAN

The objectives of the Plan are both economic and social. In drawing up the Plan, the Belgian government had as a main target the raising of the standards of living of the populations for which it is responsible. A quickened pace of social progress was essential if this was to be achieved. But if this progress is to be possible and permanent it must be based upon a stable and prosperous economy. The economic and social aspects of the Plan are therefore intimately related.

The Ten Year Plan is not based on the concept of a government-regulated economy. It is designed to stimulate the economic development of the country, and thereby raise living standards, by planned public investment. The essence of the Plan is the development of transportation and power; this will lay the foundation for the expansion of industry necessary for the growth and stabilization of the economy. Hence, since its inception, the Plan has provided for the investment of approximately half of its funds in transportation and power production; the readjustments made in the Plan as it has been put into effect have not changed the relative importance assigned to these two sectors.

Economic development depends upon increases in the productivity of labor. Since the native population in the Congo is rather limited in numbers, increases in total production can come only from increasing the per capita output in the economy. It was thus necessary to provide for the gradual mechanization and rationalization of methods of production.

Two basic difficulties stood in the way of transforming methods of production—the lack of technical proficiency characteristic of the native industrial worker and the lack of organization in native agricultural production. To meet the first of these problems an extended program of vocational training was incorporated into the Ten Year Plan.

With regard to native agriculture, the Plan provided for a gradual conversion of the inadequate farming methods to a system of rational cultivation—from a purely extensive system of agriculture to an intensive one.

Finally, it was decided under the Plan to attack and quickly resolve a number of social problems, such as public health and hygiene, basic education of the native masses, and housing for the natives living in the large urban centers. Also, provision of public funds for investment in the fields of water supply and construction of silos, warehouses, and public buildings was incorporated in the general program.

Execution of the Plan

This sketch of the broad outlines of the Plan shows that it involves the adaptation of public investment to the need of the country for economic development. The Plan has no coercive aspect of any kind; it has been placed at the service of the economy and will not subject the latter to any rigid goals; it consists primarily of a coordination of existing projects, the number and importance of which made coordination necessary.

The period of ten years which is assigned to the Plan does not mean that when this time has elapsed the equipment of the Congo will be considered finished. It means simply that the programs which have been presented have been projected as far as possible into the future. Even now we know that the effort will have to be continued beyond the end of the ten-year period, partly because of the enlargement of original projects, partly because new projects will be added.

In drawing up and implementing the Plan, it has been essential to consider carefully its effects on the economy as a whole. Given the limited reserves of native and European manpower in the territory and the shortage of transportation equipment and power, an unnecessarily large volume of public works could burden the economy and push it toward inflation. On the other hand, if the Plan is carried out with due consideration for current economic conditions it can play the role of a stabilizer in the economy. It is clear, after several years of the Plan's operation, that it is already filling this latter role.

Technological as well as financial factors have had to be considered. Although the Belgian Congo has rich potentialities, there are technical as well as financial limitations on the development of these resources. Thus, in putting the Plan into operation it has been necessary to weigh the technological practicability of projects, the possibility of financing the original expenditures, and the capacity of the Congo's economy to bear the future amortization and maintenance costs necessarily involved.

For the financing of the original investments, loans have been and are available—mainly from Belgium, the Belgian Congo, Switzerland, the United States of America, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. To a certain extent the Plan may also be financed by the operating budget surpluses, after the setting aside of a substantial anticyclical stabilization fund. These available funds are sufficient to permit investments at a rate approximately equal to what the Congo's economy can absorb.

As for the question of meeting the additional costs involved in the Ten Year Plan's investment program (such as the expenses of operating and maintaining the economic and social installations to be created by the Plan and the payment of interest and repayment of capital borrowed), it is not likely that there will be any problem. Under the original limits set by the Plan, these increased

costs appeared to be compatible with the expected increases in national income and public revenues. The years which have passed since the drafting of the Plan have confirmed this forecast, and earlier expectations have even been surpassed insofar as the increase in national income and public revenues is concerned.

It should be noted that no special administrative organization has been created for the carrying out of the Plan. Its execution has been entrusted to the existing government departments and the important semiofficial organizations charged with transportation, water supply, agricultural research, and so forth. New organizations had to be created, however, for the study and construction of electric power projects and housing in the native cities.

Programs of the Plan

The total amount of investment of the Ten Year Plan (1950–59) was originally estimated at 500 million dollars, but soon after it was put into operation the Plan had to be re-examined in the light of changing circumstances and the rising costs of the projects. It became apparent that the original program (and later additions to it) would have to be spread over a period of more than ten years. Despite the longer period required for the realization of the Plan, the amount allocated for the original ten year period has been increased to approximately 960 million dollars.

Of the credits allotted through 1959, 43.9 per cent is devoted to transportation, of which 16.8 per cent is for river transport, 13 per cent for roads, 10.1 per cent for railroads, and 4 per cent for improvement of air transportation facilities. Electric power developments receive 6.4 per cent and the improvement of agriculture 5.5 per cent of the Plan's investments. Of the remaining funds, 25.8 per cent is devoted to social improvements and 18.4 per cent to improving the equipment of governmental services.

Transportation

Up to now, transportation organization in the Belgian Congo has been largely based upon its river system. This vast system (11,300 miles of navigable rivers) offers the advantage of draining the biggest part of its territory. This system has gradually been connected by rail to the outlying industrial regions. Although cheap, the present transportation system suffers from all the disadvantages inherent in slow river transport, with the additional disadvantage that numerous transshipments are necessary for most voyages of any length.

Under the Ten Year Plan the situation will be ameliorated in the following ways: (1) The river system will be improved by increasing its navigability, developing the harbor installations, and adding to its fleet capacity. (2) The speed of transport will be accelerated by connecting the two principal existing railway systems, Port Francqui–Katanga and Kindu-Albertville. A second connection, the railway Port Francqui–Léopoldville, is being studied. This line should put the most distant eastern part of the colony in direct communication with the seaport of Matadi. (3) A modern road system will be developed. The complete project provides for the establishment of the main north-south and east-west axes as well as a series of feeder lines connecting to the railways and rivers places which are poorly served by the existing system. (4) The ground installations of the airports will be adapted to meet the requirements of modern aircraft.

The road program consists mainly of the creation of asphalt-covered highways. The first phase will be started

with the east-west highway across the colony, the connection of the Kivu to the Congo River, and the construction of the most important feeder lines. The Plan provides for a thousand miles of these roads to be finished by 1959. The program will be continued after this date. Studies now under way cover 3,100 miles of roads.

At the same time that this program is being realized the Ten Year Plan is continuing the improvement of the secondary road system (more than 70,000 miles) by the important program of mechanical maintenance and the replacement of the old temporary works and ferryboats by metal bridges. The program for river transport includes the extension and modernization of harbors, the improvement of the river system, and the increase of the fleet capacity.

The seaports of Matadi and Boma are provided with 1,300 yards and 235 yards of quays respectively. In Matadi 610 yards of new quays will be constructed and in Boma 260 yards. The latter will, in addition, be provided with 375 yards of lighterage quays. Finally, a new port, provided with 90 yards of quays, will be developed at Banana.

To cope with the increase in traffic which must be handled by the river system, equipment of the river ports will be improved by the building of jetties and loading quays. These harbors are to be provided with adequate handling equipment. The harbor of Léopoldville is the object of special attention; 950 yards of new quays will be added to the 925 yards already existing.

To improve navigability, channels will be deepened and a system of luminous buoys installed. By dredging the mouth of the Congo, channels thirty feet deep have been created and maintained. Luminous buoys have been installed recently between the port of Matadi and the ocean, a distance of 90 miles, as well as on the middle stretch of the Congo between Léopoldville and Stanleyville, a distance of 1,080 miles. The program is being continued on the main tributaries of the river.

The fleet of the *Office des Transports coloniaux,* serving the interior river system, is constantly being increased. Thus its capacity has been enlarged from 100,000 tons in 1948 to 210,000 tons at present. The rail transport program provides for the creation of a new rail connection of 275 miles between the localities of Kamina and Kabalo, connecting the east to the southeast. These works are in progress.

As for the existing railway systems, the Ten Year Plan pays particular attention to increasing their capacity by improving the rails and the rolling stock. The track has been doubled on certain sections of the Léopoldville-Matadi line and the capacity of the terminal stations has been developed accordingly. The rolling stock has been modernized as a result of the replacement of steam power by electric diesel power. The electrification of a section of the line Léopoldville-Matadi is provided for in the Plan.

The program for air transport is in progress, with the construction and development of fifty-four main airports as the goal. Among these should be noted the Léopoldville airport, the three-mile-long runway of which has just been finished. Stanleyville and Elisabethville, which with Léopoldville are the principal economic centers of the country, will be equipped with airports capable of receiving aircraft of the DC-6 type. Five airports are planned to handle aircraft of the DC-4 type, twenty-one those of the DC-3 type, and twenty-five others lighter weight aircraft. In addition, local airfields and emergency landing fields are being planned at numerous points in the territory.

Electricity

Up to the present, the production of electric power has been supplied both by the public authorities through a system of thermal generating stations (diesel) of weak power and by private companies (mainly in the mining industry) which have established hydroelectric centrals of varying capacity. The hydroelectric power available in the Congo has increased from 96,500 kilowatts in 1949 to 275,000 kilowatts at the end of 1953. The installed capacity of the thermal stations can be estimated at about 35,000 kilowatts. Since the Belgian Congo is poor in fuels but especially rich in water power, it is from this latter source that larger quantities of power will be obtained. According to very approximate estimates the unharnessed power available in the territory of the Congo is 130 million kilowatts, of which 24 million kilowatts are economically utilizable. The Ten Year Plan provides for the establishment of hydroelectric power stations in the principal cities—notably in Léopoldville, Stanleyville, Bukavu (Costermansville), and Albertville. In the first stages, the power of each of these stations would be from 20,000 to 50,000 kilowatts. Work is already in progress in Léopoldville and Stanleyville.

Private enterprise is constantly developing its means of power production. Taking into account the projects now under study, an installed capacity of 800,000 kilowatts in hydroelectric stations will be reached in the near future.

Agricultural development

Agriculture is important in the economic life of the Congo; one-half of the total exports of the colony, in terms of volume, consists of agricultural products. Actually the importance of Congo agriculture is only partially revealed by export data, since a large proportion of the total commodities produced are consumed locally. In terms both of domestic consumption and exports, therefore, agriculture is crucial in the Congo economy.

Help given the European settlers should be mentioned here. European settlers have profited from the establishment of processing factories for agricultural products (notably tea), the creation of farming schools, and various measures designed to aid these farmers in adapting to tropical conditions. It is, however, in the native sector of agricultural production that the greatest effort has been made under the Plan.

The development of native agriculture has both economic and social aspects, since it demands a complete change of old-fashioned methods of cultivation, methods which are bound up with tribal organization. The natives are concentrated in little villages of a few families each. They are ignorant of the principles of rotation. They cultivate the soil to exhaustion and then move on in search of new lands to cultivate. This procedure results in an extremely poor utilization of the soil with all its consequences—small yields, erosion, and laterization of bare lands.

The Plan's accepted program seeks to remedy this situation by regrouping and stabilizing these farmers on lands where soil surveys have been made and by organizing crop rotations according to studied cycles. Gradual mechanization and the use of fertilizers will lead to increasing yields.

Communities created on this new basis are called *paysannats indigènes* ("native land settlements"). They will receive the economic and social equipment required for their development, such as co-operative stores for buying and selling, distribution of potable water, schools, dispensaries, and public buildings. The settlement of 450,000 native families in these communities, out of a total of 2,500,000, is foreseen by 1965. Thus far 120,000 families have been settled.

Other forms of aid to agriculture include antierosion and deforestation projects, agricultural surveys, the selection and breeding of basic plant stock for the planters, and, in order to remedy the lack of animal proteins in the native diet, the development of stock raising and pisciculture.

Social measures

The first objective of the Ten Year Plan in the social field is the improvement of public health. The Plan as a whole includes campaigns for research on and treatment of diseases, the elimination of insects, the development of health education, and the construction of hospitals, laboratories, and schools. A great effort is under way for the distribution of drinking water in tribal and detribalized native centers.

Education in all its phases is being actively developed. There are already 11,500 primary and kindergarten schools, 93 teacher training schools, and 12 schools for future native employees of local administration throughout the colony. For secondary education there is a total of 187 institutions; and for technical and vocational training there are about a hundred. Finally, the interracial University Center of Lovanium has begun its first courses.

Industrialization has made heavy demands on native manpower and has brought large numbers of natives to the main economic centers. An acute housing shortage has thus developed, with a consequent danger of social disturbances. To remedy this situation it was decided to create an Office of African Cities for the construction, within the framework of the Ten Year Plan, of houses for natives in the larger towns. The Office at the present time operates branches in Léopoldville, Bukavu, and Stanleyville; its action will be extended elsewhere. It plans the construction of 40,000 houses by the end of 1959. At the moment 6,149 houses are completed and 2,470 others are under construction.

Equipment of public services

The development of public services has been included in the Ten Year Plan. These programs cover a wide field, including telecommunications, meteorology, geology, cartography, and the construction of new administrative buildings. For example, under the aerial photocartography program 215,000 square miles have been surveyed since 1950. Adding the surface surveyed by private organizations to that figure, the total surface photographed amounts to 275,000 square miles, almost a third of the territory of the Belgian Congo.

THE PLAN IN THE CONGO'S ECONOMY

While the Plan is being carried out a rapid evolution of the economy is taking place. The period of superficial exploitation of the raw materials of the territory is now over; an intensive development of the resources of the Congolese economy is in process. In mining, simple surface mining is giving way to the extraction of ores from deeper lying deposits; agricultural yields are increasing; and industry is adding more and more value to raw resources.

The reserves of the Congolese subsoil are important. In addition to the ores which have up to now constituted the basis of mining production, new minerals will be exploitable in the near future, on condition that the equipment and above all the power are available. These include particularly the many special metals which modern technology uses in growing quantities.

The Congo's reserves of hydroelectric power are among the richest in the world, and the harnessing of these reserves will permit the satisfaction of all foreseeable needs. In agriculture, the period of intense development has only started. An immense increase in production is possible for food crops as well as for cash crops.

The aim of the Plan is to stimulate the development of these resources by improving the basic economic structure of the country and by adapting it to meet new needs.[2]

[2] Sources for the material presented in this article are: *Plan décennal pour le développement économique et social du Congo Belge* (Ministère des Colonies) (Brussels: Les Éditeurs De Visscher, 1949); *La Situation économique du Congo Belge en 1953* (Ministère des Colonies) (La Louvière: Imprimerie Louviéroise, 1954); *Bulletins mensuels de la Banque Centrale du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*, especially No. II, 2ème année (1953), p. 361: Le Revenu national du Congo Belge en 1952.

J. Huge is a geologist and a mining engineer. Prior to 1950 he was in the Department of Economy of the Belgian Congo. In 1950 he was assigned to the Administration of the Ten Year Plan, and since 1953 he has been director of the Commissariat of the Plan.

The Union of South Africa: Economic Problems in a Multiracial Situation

By SHEILA T. VAN DER HORST

CONTACT between black and white has been more far-reaching and sustained in the Union of South Africa than in any other part of southern Africa. Today the livelihood of all the Union's inhabitants is dependent in some degree upon the world economy, upon industrial specialization and trade. One would go far to find one of its inhabitants, black or white, who does not want, and in some measure obtain, the products of modern industrial processes.

AN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION

The transformation from a predominantly rural economy, largely organized on a subsistence basis, has taken place during the last century. A hundred years ago many of the white pastoral farmers scattered through the interior produced little for sale, while among the African tribes the family was the unit of production and consumption, and there was little specialization and trade beyond the family group.

The development of mining and the consequent growth of markets in the mining towns and the ports which supplied them began an agrarian as well as an industrial revolution. Adjustment to the new circumstances has been made unusually difficult by the heterogeneous composition of the population, varying so greatly in culture, race, and language. To the struggle for survival in a poorly endowed environment has been added strife between conflicting claimants to land. Conflict and competition sharpened by cultural, color, and linguistic differences have, as yet, prevented the development of a socially and economically coherent society. South Africa is in a state of economic and social transition, but there is no agreement, even among the politically dominant whites, as to the desired goal, let alone as to the path to be followed.

Economic development has been limited both by the response of the indigenous peoples to the stimuli introduced by white traders, missionaries, settlers, and governments and by the social and political structure established by these newer groups. Economic forces have led to the growth of a common system of production, and the great majority of adult men in all racial groups have been drawn into a Western-market economy and are, temporarily or permanently, in paid employment in mines and factories, on commercial farms producing specialized crops, in transport, commerce, the professions, public services, and domestic employment. But although the whites have welcomed the Africans as laborers they have feared the indigenous tribes, in early times as a military threat to the struggling white outpost, and today as a potentially hostile black proletariat. Moreover, as the Africans have become accustomed to mining and industrial work, groups of white workers, fearing competition, have combined to protect their vested interests. Limits have thus been set to the incorporation of nonwhites, and particularly Africans, into the industrial structure. In all industries and undertakings the labor force is racially mixed, but members of the different racial groups are not employed indiscriminately. Throughout the economy, employment continues to conform to a general pattern originating in the fact that from the outset the

whites have provided the initiative, skill, and capital, and the nonwhites most of the manual labor.

As a result of the initial reluctance of the Africans quickly to change their way of life and become full-time wage laborers on the mines and in the towns and the subsequent reluctance of the whites to accept Africans as fellow citizens, the system of labor migration continues to permeate the economy. Failure to appreciate the full significance of the developments taking place and official attempts to maintain the status quo have prolonged the transition and aggravated the difficulties of social adjustment. It has been too little realized that methods of production cannot be isolated from other aspects of culture and that the introduction of new techniques is not compatible with the preservation of old ways of life. Change has been at once too fast and too slow. Consequently, the economy presents a curiously mixed and patchwork picture with sharp contrasts, inconsistencies, and contradictions.

POPULATION

With an area of some 473,000 square miles, the Union of South Africa is equal in size to the four states of California, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada. Its population numbers 12½ millions, including migrant workers from neighboring territories.[1] The population is usually classified into four different "racial"[2] groups. The whites, or Europeans as they are called throughout southern Africa, number 2½ million. They comprise descendants of the original Dutch East India Company servants and settlers and later immigrants of European, and predominantly British, origin. The Africans, locally known as Natives or Bantu, number 8½ million. They first came into permanent contact, and recurrent conflict, with the white settlers some hundred and fifty years ago when the eastward dispersal of white settlement met the southwestward expansion of the African tribes in the hinterland of the present town of Port Elizabeth, over four hundred miles to the east of the colony's headquarters at Cape Town.[3] The Colored people, who number a little over a million, form a separate population group. They are of mixed blood, for the most part the product of intermarriage and concubinage. Their forefathers were the slaves imported from the Dutch East Indies and other parts of Africa during the regime of the Dutch East India Company, the Hottentots who grazed their cattle at the Cape at the time of early settlement, and the white officials, settlers, and sojourners at the Cape, once known as the "Tavern of the Seas."[4] The Colored people are concentrated in the southwest around the area of early white settlement, although there are small groups throughout the Union and most towns have a few Colored families; 90 per cent live in the Cape Province.

The fourth population group is the Indian or Asian, numbering some 366,000. Descendants of indentured laborers imported from India during the latter part of the nineteenth century to work on the sugar plantations on the Natal coast and of traders who followed, they are concentrated in Natal and have since been debarred from entering the other provinces of the Union except by special permission, nowadays rarely given. A small number of Indians, largely traders and market gardeners, are scattered through the Transvaal and Cape Province. Of the Indian population, 82 per cent is in Natal, 13 per cent in the Transvaal, and 5 per cent in the Cape Province. The Orange Free State has not permitted Indians to settle there.

In 1951 the Africans formed 67 per cent of the population, the whites 21, the Colored 9, and the Indians 3. These proportions have remained almost constant over the last fifty years, the high birth rate in the nonwhite groups having been counteracted by a high death rate.

[1] The Union draws some hundreds of thousands of migrant laborers from neighboring territories. The High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland, in particular, which are under the political control of Great Britain, are economically interdependent with the Union. Labor is drawn from them in the same way that it is from the Native Reserves within the Union.

[2] I use the term as it is customarily used in South Africa without any implication of scientific correctness.

[3] See H. M. Robertson, "150 Years of Economic Contact between Black and White," *South African Journal of Economics*, Vol. II, No. 4 (December 1934), p. 409.

[4] J. S. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People*, (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1939), pp. 9–13; Sheila Patterson, *Colour and Culture in South Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), Chap. II.

TABLE 1—PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS

Population	1904	1911	1921	1936	1946	1951
White	53	52	56	65	73	75
Indian	15	46	31	66	71	76
Colored			46	54	59	61
African		13	13	17	23	24
TOTAL	23	25	25	31	37	39

Townward movement

The most marked development in regard to the structure of the population has been the townward movement of population during the last forty years. Table 1 indicates the proportion of the population enumerated in towns and villages at successive censuses.

It will be noticed that the townward movement began first among the whites. For the African population these figures are not a true indication of permanent urbanization because large numbers of the Africans in urban areas are more or less temporary residents there, who come to the mining and industrial towns from the rural areas within the Union and from other African territories and return to rural homes after spells of work on the mines and in the factories, commercial firms, and private houses of the whites. The majority of these migrant laborers are men, but an increasing number of African women are finding their way from the rural areas to the towns to supplement the meager agricultural production or simply to join their menfolk. The number of African women in urban areas has increased more than sevenfold in forty years, from less than 100,000 in 1911 to 762,000 in 1951. Despite the increased migration of women and the increase in the number of African urban families, in 1946 there were 185 male Africans in urban areas for every 100 females, as compared with a masculinity rate of 97 for the European, 92 for the Colored, and 111 for the Indian population. The unbalanced composition of the urban African population in the major towns and the accompanying excess of women, children, and old people in the rural areas have far-reaching social and economic consequences.

NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS DISTRIBUTION

The economic development of the Union has not proceeded at an even pace nor have modern techniques and methods of production spread through the whole economy. Alongside highly capitalized mines, modern factories, and commercial farms producing specialized crops, there are large districts, amounting to some 12 per cent of the whole country, where methods of production have advanced little beyond the substitution of the plow for the primitive hoe. But life in these areas has not remained untouched by the impact of white settle-

ment and mining and industrial developments, for they form the reservoir from which much of the labor to man the mines and factories is drawn. Drained of their manpower, yet increasingly overcrowded, these areas have stagnated and even deteriorated, and they present a marked contrast to the increased specialization elsewhere.

The general level of productivity in the Union is not high. Whether from the point of view of current classifications into developed and undeveloped areas or into rich and poor, South Africa falls into an intermediate position. In terms of national income it is in the same group as Cuba, Puerto Rico, Austria, Hungary, and Italy.[5] In 1952–53 the average national income was £100 per head. But averages of this kind are misleading where, as in Africa, the distribution of incomes is very unequal. Comparisons are also misleading because of the difficulty of evaluating income in money where ways of life and climatic conditions vary greatly.[6]

Racial differences

One of the most characteristic features of the Union is the great general disparity in the incomes of the different racial groups. Little detailed study has been made of income distribution but calculations based on the data available gave average annual incomes in 1936 as £130 per head for whites, £28 for Indians, £19 for Colored persons and £10 for Africans.[7] There has almost certainly been some improvement in the relative position of the nonwhites in addition to the increase in the national income since that date. Nevertheless, the gap between the incomes of most whites and most nonwhites remains very large. In manufacturing industry, where the gap is least, the average African man's earnings are approximately a quarter of the average white wage. The wages of Colored persons and Indians are as a rule higher than Africans'. In 1950 in manufacturing industry they averaged 40 and 37 per cent respectively of white wage earnings. In the mining industry the gap is much greater, African earnings, including the cost of food and housing provided, averaging one-eighth to one-tenth of white earnings.

The reason for the large difference in incomes is twofold. In the first place mining, which set the pace and pattern for economic development in South Africa, was dependent at the outset upon the importation of skilled labor from abroad, and high wages had to be paid to attract experienced miners to the remote, rough, and expensive mining camps. At the same time local African labor could be obtained for much lower rates. Africans, however, were at first prepared to work only for short periods of a few months, were genuinely unskilled, and could only be used for rough manual work. For the last fifty years trade union action, backed by social and legislative sanction, has successfully maintained the more highly paid work as the preserve of the white. This pattern of employment and wages has outlived the circumstances which gave rise to it and has spread beyond the mining industry and become typical of the older trades and industries, particularly in the inland provinces. In the coastal cities the racial stratification of employment is not so clear cut, as the Colored people in the Cape and, to a less extent, the Indians in Natal have occupied an intermediate position.

There is little doubt, however, that even if the more highly paid jobs were not reserved for them, the incomes of the whites would on the whole be higher than those of the nonwhites, for white immigrants have brought skill, technical knowledge, and capital to South Africa. Little is known regarding any possible innate differences in industrial capacity between the different racial groups. Whether or not such innate differences exist, differences in upbringing and environment, and in opportunities for employment, education, and the acquisition of property, are sufficient to account for a large measure of the disparity in productivity and income which is characteristic of the different racial groups.

Lack of mobility

The social and industrial structure being organized on a color basis, there is little mobility between the unskilled and semiskilled manual worker on the one hand and the skilled, supervisory, and executive occupational groups on the other. The type and grade of work done by individuals and hence their incomes are determined by their racial group as much as by individual aptitudes and preferences.

To this rigid stratification are added the low productivity of much of the land and the system of labor migration which retards the growth of an efficient labor force and perpetuates the circle of low productivity, and consequent poverty, in both industrial and agricultural areas.

Productivity in Rural Areas

Notwithstanding increased urbanization, some 60 per cent of the total population, but only 25 per cent of the white, still lives on the land. The share of the national income accruing to agriculture is, however, only 15 per cent of the total, giving an average yield from agriculture of just less than £30 per head for those in rural areas, less than one-third of the average income per head. These low returns go far to explain the townward movement of population. The reasons for the low average returns from agriculture are, in the first place, that a great part of the country is handicapped by having a low and variable rainfall. Only one-third of the Union receives more than twenty-five inches of rain a year and only half more than twenty. The soils, moreover, lack phosphates, and good soils are patchy. Large areas are arid and suitable only for extensive grazing. The irrigable and potentially irrigable area is very small. Only about 6 per cent of the area of the Union is cultivated, and it is estimated that at the most 15 per cent is ever likely to be cultivated.[8] In most parts agricultural yields are low and variable, owing partly to lack of capital and poor methods of cultivation, particularly where land is occupied by Africans; nevertheless agriculture is also severely handicapped by natural features.

Methods of agricultural production vary from specialized production, on highly capitalized fruit, grain, and wool farms and commercial estates, to scratching a few acres of soil and planting traditional crops and grazing a few head

[5] United Nations: *National Income and Its Distribution in Underdeveloped Countries*, Statistical Papers, Series E, No. 3 (New York, 1951).

[6] See Simon Kuznets, "National Income and Industrial Structure" and "International Differences in Income Levels," in his *Economic Change* (London: William Heinemann, 1954), Essays 6 and 8; and S. H. Frankel, "Concepts of Income and Welfare and the Intercomparability of National Income Aggregates," in his *The Economic Impact on Underdeveloped Societies* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, 1953), Essay III.

[7] Industrial Legislation Commission of Enquiry, U.G. 62, 1951, p. 24; "National Income and the Non-European," in *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), Chap. XIV.

[8] Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, *Third Interim Report*, U.G. No. 40, 1941, pp. 7–9. See also *The Future of Farming in South Africa*, Social and Economic Planning Council Report No. 4, U.G. No. 10, 1945 (Pretoria, South Africa: Government Printer, 1945), pp. 2–3.

of scrub cattle, sheep, and goats on communal pasture lands in the Native areas. In the area set aside for white ownership, comprising some 87 per cent of the total area used for farming, 55 per cent has a rainfall under twenty inches and is only suitable for extensive grazing. The average size of a farm is large, more than half being over 600 acres in extent and more than a quarter over 1,000 acres. Since the war farming has prospered, and there are a considerable number of wealthy sheep, maize, and fruit farmers. Mechanization on farms owned and controlled by whites is increasing; the number of tractors has risen from 6,000 in 1937 to 48,000 in 1950; and the output of agricultural products which remained stagnant in the thirties and war years is growing.[9]

Hired labor on farms is predominantly African, although in the western Cape farm laborers have usually been Colored and the employment of Africans in this area is a comparatively recent development. Some two million Africans live, largely with their families, on farms owned and occupied by whites and another half million on farms owned, but not occupied, by whites. The terms and conditions on which these Africans live on farms vary from full-time employment at a cash wage to labor tenancy. Labor tenants are required to work for certain periods in return for the right to cultivate small plots of ground and graze a limited number of stock.[10] It has now become usual to pay a small cash wage during the periods of work for the land owner.

Problem of Native Reserves

In 1951 there were 3½ million Africans in the Native Reserves excluding perhaps half a million migrant laborers, more or less temporarily absent at work in the mining and industrial centers. Instituted a century ago in the British colonies as a protective measure to prevent the African tribes from being entirely dispossessed of their land, the Reserves have become economic backwaters, the Union's backward areas. Moreover, the right of Africans to acquire land outside these areas has been whittled away to vanishing point while within them, with some modifications, tribal systems of land tenure have been retained and have been a potent factor retarding improved methods of farming. Stagnation and poverty are the hallmarks of the Reserves. In them agricultural methods remain primitive and unproductive.[11]

[9] Calculated at prewar prices, the value of crop production was virtually the same in the mid-forties as the mid-thirties but increased 27 per cent between the years 1944–47 and 1949–52.—"The Revolution in Our Agriculture," *Farming in South Africa* (Department of Agriculture, Pretoria, South Africa), Vol. 29, No. 336 (March 1954), p. 163.

[10] According to the Agricultural Census returns in 1952, the average value in cash and kind of the monthly wages of farm labor was £27 for white men, £6 for Colored and Indian, and £3 for African.—Agricultural Census No. 26, Census Year 1951–52, *Labour on Farms and Wages of Farm Labourers* (Union of South Africa, Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1954), p. 1.

[11] A sample survey of one district showed the average value of the income from farming of a family of six as only £7 2s. 3d. a year, including the value of produce raised and consumed. The produce raised was estimated to fluctuate between 15 and 30 per cent of basic requirements of foodstuffs and clothing. —D. H. Houghton and E. M. Walton, "The Economy of a Native Reserve," *Keiskammahoek Survey*, Vol. II (Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: Shuter & Shooter, 1952), pp. 106, 184.

See also "The Reserves," Native Economic Commission 1930–32, U.G. 22, 1932 (Pretoria: Government Printer), Part I; "The Native Reserves and Their Place in the Economy of the Union of South Africa," Social & Economic Planning Council, *Report No. 9*, U.G. No. 32, 1946, pp. 12–13; M. Elton Mills, "Land Tenure," *Keiskammahoek Rural Survey*, Vol. IV.

There is no doubt that the output of these areas, which comprise some thirty million acres, could be increased very greatly by improved agricultural techniques. Experimental work has shown that in some areas twice the usual yield could be obtained by better methods. But the problem is not a simple one. Administrative attempts to improve agriculture have come up against the conservatism of the people, their ritual attitude towards cattle, traditional or only slightly modified systems of land tenure, and the system of labor migration which drains these areas of their manpower and yet is necessary to prevent starvation. At any one time more than 40 per cent of the men between fifteen and sixty are away at work on the mines and in industries situated for the most part hundreds of miles away. Moreover, those who are at home are there only temporarily "resting" between spells of work in the towns, and they do little productive agricultural work.

The introduction of modern farming methods and the creation of a skilled, self-supporting peasantry would require far-reaching changes. Experience in South Africa confirms Professor Kuznets' warning:

> Above all, policy action must be made in full cognizance of the social and cultural corollaries of higher levels of economic performance, and of the implicit destruction of longstanding and entrenched interests and attitudes which the adoption of these corollaries threatens.[12]

Yet new methods and the adjustment of old ways of life are essential if the increasing population is even to maintain, let alone improve, its low standard of living. In the Reserves, in the first place, a redistribution of land would be necessary and a reduction in the number of families who now occupy land but are largely dependent on the earnings of emigrant breadwinners. According to tribal usage every married woman cultivated a small field, usually three to five acres in extent, while grazing land was held in common. This widespread distribution of small patches of land and communal grazing lands has been retained. Consequently, the potentially more enterprising cannot acquire additional land and establish themselves as whole-time farmers on economical holdings. Secondly, traditional attitudes towards cattle will have to be modified, and commercial values will have to take the place of tribal religious and social values. Thirdly, effective reconstruction requires the growth of a class of full-time African farmers and agricultural workers and a reduction and eventually an end to the constant flow of nonspecialized workers between the industrial and the rural areas. The increased productivity of the Reserves is accordingly closely linked with the stabilization of the labor force and the permanent settlement of workers in the mining and industrial areas. While the right of Africans to enter, acquire property, and remain in the towns is insecure, they cling to a rural foothold and retain small plots which they are not able to use effectively.

[12] Simon Kuznets, *op. cit. supra* (note 6), p. 250.

Importance of Gold Mining

It was mining, and particularly gold mining, which stimulated South Africa's economic development and brought her into the world economy. Mining drew men, capital, and railway lines first to Kimberley and then to the bleak and sparsely settled Witwatersrand, whose towns now contain an eighth of the Union's total population and between a quarter and a fifth of its white population.

Although today manufacturing indus-

try as well as farming exceed gold mining in the numbers employed and in the share of the national income accruing to them, gold mining continues to be of key importance, for much of the prosperity of both farming and manufacturing is still directly or indirectly dependent upon gold production. Gold also remains South Africa's principal export.

Up to 1936 two-thirds of the private capital invested in the Union from abroad was invested in mining[13] and since World War II it is estimated that a quarter of foreign investment has been in gold mining.[14] In addition foreign capital has helped to finance the large amount of auxiliary investment required to develop new mining areas.[15]

The expansion of manufacturing and constructional industries which has been such a marked development of the last twenty years was, in the first place, largely a result of the increased prosperity of the gold-mining industry, resulting from the increased price of gold in the thirties. Net investment in the Union in the years 1933–39, estimated at 345 million pounds, was almost double the investment for 1923–29, and one fifth was directly in gold mining.[16] At the same time gold constituted 70 per cent of the exports which enabled manufacturing industry to pay for imports of materials and equipment. In the interwar period manufacturing industries imported 50 per cent of the materials used and all the machinery and specialized equipment, while they contributed approximately 3 per cent of exports. Although exports of manufactured goods have increased greatly, notably to the Union's northern neighbors, manufacturing industries still require foreign exchange far in excess of what they earn,[17] and so are indirectly dependent upon exports.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

World War II further stimulated manufacturing and constructional industries. The engineering and metal industries in particular expanded, and new branches were established for war production and to meet the needs of the home market.[18] Since the war this expansion has continued, encouraged in the immediate postwar years by difficulties in obtaining goods from overseas and by the continued rise in both money and real incomes and protected, since 1949, by import and exchange controls. Investment has taken place at an unprecedented rate. Between 1946 and 1952 net investment is estimated to have averaged 205 million pounds a year, of which just under 40 per cent was financed by funds from abroad. Even allowing for the 200 to 300 per cent increase in construction costs, this represents a considerable increase over the estimated average investment of 50 million pounds a year in the prewar period which was also a time of expansion.

[13] S. H. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 156.

[14] Bank for International Settlements, *22nd Annual Report* (Basel, 1952), p. 156.

[15] It has been estimated that an investment of 150 million pounds in mining will have to be accompanied by an equal investment of 150 million pounds in providing water, light and power, railway connections, roads, and housing on the new Orange Free State gold fields.—W. P. de Kock, "The Influence of the Free State Gold Fields on the Union's Economy," *South African Journal of Economics,* Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1951), p. 144.

[16] S. H. Frankel and H. Herzfeld, "An Analysis of the Growth of National Income in the Union in the Period of Prosperity Before the War," *South African Journal of Economics,* Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 1944), pp. 124, 128–29; P. G. Franzsen, "National Accounts and National Income in the Union of South Africa Since 1933," *South African Journal of Economics,* Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1954), p. 124.

[17] See T. H. Kelly, "South Africa's Foreign Trade, 1933–1953," *South African Journal of Economics,* Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1954), pp. 80, 81; and also H. M. Robertson, "South Africa's Means to Pay for Imports," *Optima* (quarterly review published by Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa), Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1953).

[18] H. M. Robertson, "The War and the South African Economy," *South African Journal of Economics,* Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1954), p. 102.

TABLE 2—RACIAL COMPOSITION OF WORKING POPULATION IN 1946
(Percentage of total working population)

Industry	European	Indian	Colored	African
Farming, Forestry, Fishing	4.8	0.4	2.8	92.1
Mining and Quarrying	10.7	0.1	0.5	88.6
Manufacturing Industry	35.0	3.6	14.1	47.2
Transport and Communication	59.1	1.1	6.7	33.2
Commerce and Finance	56.1	7.6	7.4	28.9
Public Administration, Defense, and Professions	52.7	1.7	7.4	38.2
Entertainment and Sport	46.9	3.3	6.2	43.7
Personal Services	3.5	1.0	10.5	84.9

Source: Industrial Legislation Commission of Enquiry, U.G. 62, 1951, p. 16.

The number employed in manufacturing and constructional work has increased fourfold in the last thirty years and more than doubled since 1939, having been 176,000 in 1920, 353,000 in 1939, and 713,000 in 1950. In 1946, 21 per cent of the white working population, 22 per cent of the Colored, 25 per cent of the Indian, and 14 per cent of the African male adult population were engaged in these types of work.

Concurrently with the continued expansion of manufacturing industry, new gold fields are being developed with a potential output comparable to that of the Witwatersrand. At the same time, other mineral production, notably coal, diamonds, copper, asbestos, manganese, chrome, and iron ore, has continued to increase and has more than doubled since prewar days. Uranium has also been added to the mineral products. The value of mineral production, other than gold and uranium, has risen from 12 million pounds in 1939 to 63 million pounds in 1951.[19]

The simultaneous expansion of mining and manufacturing industry has been made possible by the import of capital, by immigration, by the redistribution of labor within the Union, and by the increased absorption of the indigenous African population into industry and trade. (The racial composition of the working population in the principal industrial groups in 1946 is shown in Table 2.)

The economic integration which has taken place poses social and political problems which could be ignored while agriculture, mining, and domestic service were the chief avenues of employment for Africans. Agriculture, for the most part, relied upon workers resident on the land, and mining from the outset was organized on the basis of migrant laborers who returned to their rural homes after a term of work on the mines. The mines, with minor exceptions, provide accommodation for their African laborers in barracks, known as compounds, and there has been little opportunity for wives and families to

[19] Official Year Book, No. 21, 1940 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1940), p. 812; Government Mining Engineer, *Annual Report 1951,* U.G. No. 50, 1952 (Pretoria: Government Printer), p. 59.

accompany mineworkers and live with them at their place of employment.

The growth of manufacturing industry and commerce has occurred at a time when increasing familiarity with Western ways and the pressure of new wants have combined with the exhaustion of the soil to bring about more permanent migration. Women have followed the breadwinners, and families are increasingly being established in the towns despite the theoretical division of the country into black and white spheres.

Urban conditions

This movement has presented a formidable physical and fiscal problem of providing housing, transport, and public and social services; it has also challenged the traditional social structure. White and black have been brought together in the more crowded circumstances of town life in relations other than the customary one, of master and servant or administrator and tribesman, in which Africans first entered the colonial economy. The difficulties of adjustment have been increased by the reluctance of the whites to face up to the social and political implications of the new conditions created by industrialization, and by their refusal to concede permanent rights, including rights to acquire property in the growing towns. Moreover, their attempts to enforce partial segregation, by requiring that Africans employed in industry shall live in separate areas outside the towns, have added to the cost of providing roads, transport, power, sanitation, and other services.

The whole responsibility for accommodating African workers in industry has been thrown upon the urban authorities. Municipalities have been confronted with the problem of providing public housing for the great majority of the two million Africans in urban areas, who exceed in numbers the white urban population but whose low wages do not enable them to pay rents sufficient to meet the high cost of building. As a consequence, thousands of urban workers and their families are still living in one-room shacks and hovels, in conditions which defy description, with no security or opportunity for maintaining decent family life.

Attempted regulation

The cost of providing accommodation, fear that the towns may attract more work seekers than will be absorbed, and reluctance to countenance the growth of a black urban proletariat have led to attempts to stem and regulate the townward movement. The right of Africans to enter urban areas to look for work has been severely restricted. The restrictions on movement are difficult to enforce and lead to evasion and frequently to great hardship. At the same time, attempts to control the urban settlements and townships, to enforce the general prohibition on the sale of European liquor, and to limit and regulate the brewing and sale of traditional African beers, lead to vexatious police raids. Consequently the law is brought into disrepute and the jails are filled with petty criminals convicted for statutory offenses which carry no moral stigma. Serious crime is increased by the breakdown of traditional and community sanctions and the failure to develop new ones. Traders, missions, schools, and administrators together with industrial developments have brought about the dissolution of the old tribal culture, but a new synthesis has yet to be evolved.

INFLUENCE OF RACIAL POLICIES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Attempts to protect the whites from the potential competition of nonwhites have been an important factor restricting productivity and delaying adjustment to changing conditions. Systematized regulation of apprenticeship has excluded Africans, and in the northern provinces other nonwhites, from the skilled trades and has limited the number of white artisans. This has increased the shortage of skilled labor which has retarded development when other conditions were propitious. At the same time lack of opportunity for nonwhite youths to acquire skill, training, and employment has led to considerable unemployment among those not strong enough to do heavy manual work and unwilling to go into domestic service.

Labor unions

The phenomenon of organized labor adopting restrictive devices is not confined to South Africa, but in the Union such action has been reinforced by color prejudice. Trade union organization has been largely confined to white and mixed (Colored and white) trade unions.[20] Collective bargaining has been fostered by the state and given statutory sanction, but African trade unions, although not illegal, are not recognized by the state nor included in the state-sponsored system of collective bargaining. Moreover, unions registered for collective bargaining are not permitted to admit African members. In South Africa, breach of contract has been a criminal offense for the majority of African workers. Consequently strikes of Africans have generally been illegal. In 1953 the prohibition on strike action by Africans was extended and all strikes of African employees are now illegal. The denial of the strike weapon, together with the fluctuating composition of the labor force resulting from the prevalence of migrant labor, has retarded the growth of African trade unions and, in contrast to white unions, they have not been a potent force in the labor market.

[20] Legislation is pending prohibiting the formation of new mixed unions and encouraging the separation, on a racial basis, of existing mixed unions.

Recruiting of labor

The reservation of skilled work for white men and the maintenance of high wage rates in these occupations has placed a heavy burden on industry. In the gold-mining industry, which cannot pass on the cost by raising the price of its product, the rigid demarcation of spheres of employment has been an important influence determining labor policy. Precluded from reorganizing their labor force to make the most effective use of the labor now available, the Transvaal gold and coal mines maintain an elaborate recruiting organization. Wage rates are standardized and individual mines are not permitted to raise wages to attract labor, but recruited labor is distributed among them on the basis of agreed quotas. On the terms and conditions offered, most Union Africans prefer other types of work, and the mines draw more than 60 per cent of their African labor force from outside the Union where wages are lower and opportunities for paid employment are fewer. The High Commission Territories supply some 17 per cent of the total.

Restrictions

The newer manufacturing industries have been less hampered in their use of labor and have drawn on all sections of the population, although few African women are, as yet, employed in industry. Employers do not, however, have a free hand in organizing their labor force. Government regulations require separate work places and wash places, as well as separate canteens, where these are provided, for members of different racial groups. The employment of a fully integrated labor force is thus precluded by law as well as custom. Nonwhites are not employed in positions of

authority over whites; consequently, opportunities to mount the industrial ladder are limited. Nevertheless, the expansion of industry has widened the range of employment open to members of all racial groups, particularly as machine operatives. The employment of nonwhite supervisors and clerical workers is also increasing in the growing number of concerns in which the labor force is predominantly nonwhite.

In the government service and state-controlled undertakings such as the railways, whites are given protected employment in unskilled occupations, at wages above those prevailing for the type of work, as well as in skilled and administrative work. Only in the police force and as teachers and nurses are nonwhites employed in any number by the state on other than manual work. In these branches nonwhites are employed to serve members of their own racial groups.

The general restriction of opportunities for nonwhites has serious social and economic repercussions. It breeds a sense of frustration and grievance among the nonwhites and reduces their incentive to work. It has also meant that the small white population of 2½ million has to provide the professional, executive, administrative, technical, and most of the clerical workers for all the Union's private industries and public services. The consequence is that scarcity of labor for skilled, technical, supervisory, and administrative posts has retarded economic development.

Apartheid

The manifest instability, injustice, and wastefulness of the existing situation have led to the enunciation of the policy of *apartheid*. This policy means different things to different people. To some it represents an attempt to revive the old defensive frontier policy of nonintercourse. To implement it fully would reverse the developments of three centuries, disrupt the economy, and partition the country. Proponents of *apartheid* maintain that it is essential for the preservation of Western civilization in the Union, that the white group should retain its separate identity and political supremacy, and that it is only by separating the different racial groups that unrestricted development can be permitted without threat to the whites. This argument has great political appeal, but it ignores the economic integration which has already taken place and the interdependence of white and black in every branch of production. As the policy is economically impracticable it tends to become simply a theoretical justification to make racial discrimination morally acceptable.

Outlook for Economic Development

The recent expansion in manufacturing industry has led some to look to further industrialization as a solution for South Africa's low productivity and relative poverty. The Union is the most industrialized country in southern Africa, and it has sometimes been suggested that she might become the workshop of Africa. In this respect she has certain advantages over her northern neighbors in that her population has had longer contact with a market economy and is more accustomed to the idea of full-time employment for wages. Her transport services and public utilities are more developed. In competition with the rest of the world, however, her chief advantage lies in proximity to African markets.

In addition to the featherbedding of white employment, a general policy of protecting agriculture and manufacturing industry has been followed. As a result South Africa is practically self-sufficient in food production, but large sections of the community are not adequately nourished, the consumption of dairy produce, meat, and green vegetables being very low. The methods of assisting agriculture and manufacture have raised costs and handicapped the export industries, increasing their dependence on the supply of low-paid African labor. Yet the present economy is largely dependent upon international trade. Even within the curb of exchange controls, expenditure upon imports has been between one-quarter and one-third of gross domestic expenditure.

The population is increasing at the rate of 2 per cent per annum, and it is essential that productivity should increase in order to maintain even the present low average level of income. Since the war the national income, crudely adjusted by the retail price index, has increased at an average rate of between 4 and 5 per cent per annum, although there have been fluctuations from year to year and the rate of increase has fallen since 1951. This increase has accompanied the inflow of capital, and a continued inflow appears to be necessary to support anything like past rates of increase.

South Africa's future economic development is closely linked to her economic relations with the rest of the world, including other parts of Africa. These relations in turn will be influenced by the manner in which the internal conflict between economic requirements and political theories is resolved. There are formidable problems of adjustment and mutual accommodation ahead, if the diverse racial groups are to be knit into a stable society in the new conditions which have emerged as the result of rapid economic change. The economic outlook cannot be divorced from the political.

Sheila T. Van der Horst, Ph.D., Cape Town, Union of South Africa, is senior lecturer in economics at the University of Cape Town. She is on the Council of the Economic Society of South Africa, is a member of the Executive Committee and chairman of the Cape Western Regional Committee of the South African Institute of Race Relations. She is author of Native Labour in South Africa (1942), of the chapter on Labour in the Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa (1949), and of various articles on South African labor and monetary problems published in the South African Journal of Economics and other periodicals.

Colonial Issues and Policies with Special Reference to Tropical Africa*

By Kenneth Robinson

AFRICA ceased to be the Dark Continent only by becoming the colonial continent, and it is because Africa is still, in so many ways, the colonial continent that its problems have come to occupy an increasing share of the time and energies of the Western world, in an age when colonial government has come to be widely considered a dangerous anomaly whose only justification must be sought in the effectiveness with which it prepares for its own disappearance. As late as the beginning of World War II, however, the continuance of non-African control of virtually the whole of Africa was equally widely taken for granted as the only practical possibility, at least until a future so remote that it need not be considered. The European masters of the African continent were, it was supposed, free, within very wide limits, to decide what were the appropriate objectives of policy and how they were most likely to be realized.

Changed Attitudes to Colonialism

Since the end of the war, however, Africa has ceased to be a world apart and become part of the world. Colonial rule is not merely on the defensive but in many parts of Africa on the way out, and everywhere it is regarded as, at best, an inevitable expedient to be replaced as soon as possible. Some of the factors that have produced these changes were indeed inherent in the activities of the previous period, while others are the outcome of increases in the speed and extent of social and economic change resulting from the war. But perhaps the most important are the result of changes external to Africa itself, changes in the attitude of the rest of the world to Africa, exemplified not only by the colonial powers but more strikingly by international opinion, as expressed in the chapters of the United Nations Charter relating to trust territories and non-self-governing territories.[1] This changed attitude is often accompanied by a lack of historical perspective which easily leads to the assumption that a mere half-century of European rule has obliterated some of the characteristics that made it inevitable, and thus to the ignoring of features of the political realities in Africa which, significant before the period of European control, may well re-emerge when that control finally disappears.

European control, in this context, means essentially the influence and ultimate control of relatively remote West European rulers and the day-to-day rule in the African territories of agents appointed by and responsible to them. Once substantial European settlement has taken place, European "settlers"—in the broadest sense of permanent residents—present characteristics and attitudes increasingly differentiated from those of such "external" agents of control. The transfer of control to settlers, in fact, means not a straightforward continuance of West European rule but its transfer to an African-based elite (albeit of European origin) which may well seek to make permanent a new and different form of colonial rule over the subject masses. This is, indeed, what has happened in the Union of South Africa, and it is still uncertain whether it can be prevented from happening in North Africa. It is not as self-evident as doctrinaires currently assert that if recourse were had to *l'épreuve de force*, the European residents of North Africa must lose out entirely to "nationalist" forces, any more than the Jewish immigrants in Palestine succumbed before similar forces. The history of British intervention in the Sudan, to take another instance, suggests that British withdrawal from those territories might well result in the resumption of the Muslim thrust south, interrupted only three-quarters of a century ago, unless those to whom power is transferred seek to prevent this and are able to find effective means of doing so. To recognize these possibilities is not, of course, to make any judgment about their desirability: it is merely to emphasize that the real basis of imperialism is to be sought in disparities of power between one political unit and another.

Africa was the colonial continent par excellence because it was politically fragmented, technologically retarded, and economically poor: a little more than half a century of European control has not so decisively changed these characteristics that the mere withdrawal of the European colonial powers can be counted upon to ensure "independence."

Desire for Independence

The great motive power in African politics today is, however, the desire for independence. For the important, though in most parts of tropical Africa still numerically small, minority who have acquired some of the values of the more technologically advanced "Western" way of life, probably the most profound aspiration of political life is the desire if possible to attain, but at any rate to assert, an equality with the rest of mankind, and more particularly their European rulers.[2] So long as the world is organized politically on the basis of a number of theoretically equal and independent units, this desire to assert equality will almost inevitably assume the form of a demand for the creation of territorially based sovereignties, formally at least independent of any external control. However uncertain may be the criteria by which the possibility of such statehood is, in any given case, to be assessed, it is abundantly clear that few, if any, of the indigenous social units of tropical Africa could provide even the minimal base for such an evolution.

"Independence," even of the most tenuous and formal kind, can only be attained in considerably larger units, with more numerous people and larger real resources. These larger units, it has been commonly assumed, must be the territorial units created by the colonial powers, although their boundaries were drawn up with little regard to existing ethnic divisions and no thought of affording the basis for the evolution of new sovereign states. It is often argued that the setting up in such a composite territory of the formal structure of a political democracy will provide an effective focus for the unification of the peoples round the new political institutions with which they may come to identify themselves. Several recent instances suggest, on the con-

*I have incorporated in this article parts of a convocation address entitled "Africa in Mid-Century" which I was privileged to deliver at the University of Ohio on July 19, 1954.

[1] Cf. Kenneth Robinson, "World Opinion and Colonial Status," *International Organization*, Vol. 8 (November 1954), pp. 468–483.

[2] Cf. Léopold Senghor, *Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale*, November 22, 1952, p. 5503: "Vous les savez, les Africains ont actuellement le mystique de l'égalité . . . ils veulent que les mêmes principes soient dès l'abord posés pour la Métropole et les territoires d'outre-mer. Ces principes d'égalité posés, les Africains sont disposés à tenir compte des réalités."

trary, that the imminent withdrawal of the colonial power may well result in the re-emergence or emphasis of cleavages between different ethnic groups within the originally artificial colonial unit.[3]

Quite apart from this issue of "tribal separatism" it is idle to ignore the existence in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, of groups which, for one reason or another, cannot immediately or easily find their place in a large-scale exchange economy with a modern secular political system but which for a considerable time to come will need special administrative and other arrangements for their protection. Experience elsewhere—in the United States, in New Zealand, in Australia—strongly suggests that attempts at a brutal and compulsory "integration" or "assimilation" of such groups to the pattern of a large and different society are seldom successful. Special provision for their administration may well be necessary in many parts of Africa, if separate independent states replace existing colonial administrations.[4]

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The political issues confronting Africa today thus stem largely from the very conditions which made it the colonial continent, although also from some new factors which have made their appearance during the period of colonial rule, notably the permanent settlement in certain parts of the continent of European and Asian immigrants. The major problem is whether forms of political organization can be devised which will make it possible to replace colonial rule without a reversion to the political fragmentation and absence of any large-scale framework of law and order which were such important factors in making colonial rule possible, but also without the mere substitution, in some areas, of other imperialisms for the colonial rule of Western Europe; and, finally, without merely transferring power to a charismatic dictatorship, whether "indigenous" or of one of the immigrant races. The assumption that there can be only one solution of this problem, namely the successful creation of a fully democratic Western type of representative government in a number of new territorial sovereignties, though widely held, does not seem a very hopeful one, if only for the reason that this form of political structure was evolved in circumstances quite different from those of Africa and requires, for even moderately successful functioning, conditions which seldom obtain there. Against this necessarily summary assessment of present political problems in Africa, it is now proposed to consider the objectives and methods of the major governments which have been concerned with its affairs during the period of colonial rule.

COLONIAL POLICIES BEFORE WORLD WAR II

It has already been emphasized that during the half century between the partition of Africa and the beginning of World War II, it was taken for granted that most of Africa should be, and would for long remain, under external control.[5] The dominant characteristic of British policy was that described by the word "trusteeship." While no doubt some kind of self-government would have been asserted as the ultimate objective of trusteeship, it was assumed that, at any rate in the African territories, this was a very remote possibility, though there should of course be a gradually increasing degree of participation by the inhabitants in the political decision-making process.[6] There was, however, a fundamental ambiguity in British policy. On the one hand, there were in all the African territories Legislative Councils. In all of these councils in 1939 there was, it is true, an official majority, but the historical evolution of the Commonwealth elsewhere made it inevitable that they should nevertheless be regarded by the small English-educated intelligentsia as "Parliaments in embryo." It was inevitable, too, that this intelligentsia should look to an increase in the number of the elected members of the Legislative Council, and their eventual assumption of ministerial responsibility, as the predestined end of political development, an attitude fully shared by European settlers in East and Central Africa, though they assumed that such developments must, at least for an indefinite future, be restricted to members of their own community.

These Legislative Councils were, in fact, relics of an older British approach to the problems of colonial rule. In Africa, as British penetration had increased and vast areas been added to the Empire—these areas inhabited by peoples whose social, economic, and political organization, though little known and less understood, was clearly totally unlike that of Western Europe—a different philosophy of colonial government had been evolved, that generally known as "indirect rule" but more precisely described as the "native authority system." According to this philosophy, the customary authorities in African tribal society, chiefs and elders, were to be recognized and supported by the administration, their rule was to be purged of gross excesses, and they were then to be assisted gradually to adapt themselves to the new needs and the changing world resulting from British rule and contact with Western society. Great emphasis was placed by most of the exponents of this system on the evil consequences of too rapid social change: the ideal forms of economic development were those which least disturbed the rural life of the African, especially those under which, without disturbance to that way of life, he might learn to grow for himself cash crops, like cocoa in the Gold Coast, cotton in Uganda, or groundnuts in Northern Nigeria.

Native administrations

"Indirect rule" was not concerned to answer the question, Where is all this leading? It was the duty of the trustee to hold the ring, to keep the scales even, so that, in the phraseology then current, "the African could develop on his own lines."[7] These innumerable "native administrations," as they were called,

[3] See, for example, "Grievances in Ashanti," *The Times* (London), November 30, 1954, for Ashanti agitation for a federal constitution in the Gold Coast; U. K. Colonial Office, *Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda* (Cmd 9028) and *Buganda* (Cmd 9320) for Buganda separatism; and *Special Report on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem* (UN Document T/1101) for the analogous issue of Ewe unification.

[4] A good popular account of experience in America, Australia, and New Zealand will be found in Walter Kolarz, "The Rebirth of Native Peoples," *The Listener*, Vol. 52, No. 1342, November 18, 1954, pp. 838–40. For a more extended discussion, see A. Grenfell Price, *White Settlers and Native Peoples* (Melbourne, 1950). Such special provision exists, for example, in India (Article 244 and the fifth schedule of the Constitution of India).

[5] This view was, of course, challenged by settlers, especially those in Kenya, and by radical opinion in Britain and France, though this was usually more concerned to purify, supervise, or even internationalize such external control than to advocate a substitute for it.

[6] Cf. the statement of the British Colonial Secretary (Malcolm MacDonald) in the House of Commons, December 1938, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 342 (Fifth Series), p. 1246.

[7] The best account of the philosophy of "indirect rule" is by Margery Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria* (Oxford, 1937). The most complete account of its actual accomplishments is by William Malcolm Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, 4 vols. (London, 1950).

varied in size and capacity from the great, well-organized emirates of Northern Nigeria with budgets running even in those days into hundreds of thousands of dollars, occasionally employing European technical officers, to small groups of a few thousands, hardly recognizing the existence of a single political authority at all and with an annual revenue of no more than a few hundred dollars; from native administrations which really could manage for themselves the collection of revenue and the provision of some local services, to those which were merely the outward forms behind which a British administrative officer actually did the work. The problem of how this heterogeneous collection of "native administrations" could ever take over all the increasingly complex activities of government, and, if they could not, what form of indigenous organization might eventually replace the British administration was too remote a contingency to be worth much consideration.[8]

French policy

The permanence of the association between metropolitan France and the overseas dependencies and the necessity for that association to be expressed in the clear-cut legal forms appropriate to a single political entity have been not so much objectives of French policy as its obvious and unquestioned basis. This juridical and administrative integration of the dependencies with the metropolitan country has not, however, invariably been accompanied by the assumption of the practicability, at all events in the present or the immediate future, of that social and cultural assimilation which it is so commonly taken to imply, and the significance of which was perhaps most succinctly expressed in the phrase of Schoelcher, "the French Republic does not intend to make distinctions in the human family." So far as the tropical African territories were concerned this was a possibility which seemed quite as remote as the objective of self-government in British territories, and French policy between the wars did not advance any nearer to its realization than to make it possible for a tiny minority of selected individuals among the millions of inhabitants in these territories to enjoy the rights of French citizenship. Only Senegal was represented by a deputy in the French Parliament, and both the single Senegalese deputy and the special citizenship accorded *en bloc* to the natives of the four Senegalese coastal towns without the individual application, or the acceptance of French private law, required elsewhere, were, in fact, like the Legislative Councils in British territories, legacies of a much earlier period of French policy.

The current policy, called "association," aimed at the deliberate creation of an African elite, accepting the standards of Western civilization and "associated" with their French rulers in the work of colonial development. French policy was accordingly more ready in principle to welcome social and economic change in Africa, and even to seek to accelerate it, since the objective was not that Africans should develop on their own lines, whatever those might be, but that they should be assisted to take their place, eventually, as French citizens, alongside other French citizens in a modern world. It had, however, come to be accepted among most of those at all directly concerned with actual administration in the tropical African territories that such a policy was either undesirable or only to be achieved in a remote future.

[8] See Donald Charles Cameron, *My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria* (London, 1939), p. 115, for some discussion of these issues.

Belgian colonial administration

The Belgians had no national philosophy of colonial rule, in the sense in which the development of self-governing institutions was such a philosophy to the British, or social, economic, and eventually political integration with metropolitan French life was such a philosophy to the French. The Belgian philosophy was indeed a far clearer example of a purely empirical approach than was that of the British who so vaunted themselves on their practical outlook. The Belgians, however, had their own particular preoccupation. It was to avoid the repetition of scandals such as had disgraced the administration of the Congo Free State before the Belgian government had itself assumed responsibility for the Congo. Some characteristic features of the Belgian system had their origin in this preoccupation, notably the complete subordination of the administration to authorities in Belgium responsible to the Belgian Parliament. The Belgians extended no rights of participation in any political bodies in the Congo to Africans or to resident Belgians. Their administration was wholly official and paternalistic, and if in some respects it resembled the British in adopting the forms of "indirect rule," most of the period up to the end of World War II was in fact marked by a continuing increase in the direct control of Belgian officials. Belgian policy, however, was far more ready than was British policy to try to face up to the problems inevitably involved in the provision of labor for mining and other large-scale enterprises under European management and the consequent emergence of increasingly large numbers of Africans living outside their tribal societies in new urban areas. One result of the Belgian preoccupation with economic development was an absence of the industrial color bars developed further south, a willingness to train Africans to do the work of more expensive Europeans; another was a marked tendency to emphasize the more immediately practical aspects of education—the extension of primary and technical education—to the exclusion of secondary or higher education apart from that provided by the Catholic missions for the training of priests.

Portuguese colonies

Portuguese policy, though redefined in the Colonial Charter of 1933, has long remained unchanged in essentials. Africans who achieved the necessary standards of education and European culture might be given the same legal status as the Portuguese themselves. Their numbers were, inevitably, very small, and subordination in a colonial regime was the lot of the vast majority of the African population.

Common assumptions and practices

Underneath the obvious divergences of policy there were, before World War II, certain similarities. Earlier versions of the policy of "identity," assuming identical social institutions and political rights for Africans and Europeans, were everywhere represented by mere historic survivals, even where they were not actually being reversed. The dominant policies emphasized the pragmatic necessities of "differentiation" even when they did not proclaim the desirability of avoiding the destruction of African social institutions and the complacent imposition of a Western pattern of life. They were, moreover, invariably associated in practice with a subordinate role for Africans in relation to Europeans. The colonial powers, on the whole, emphasized their negative duties —the prevention of extortion and injustice, the maintenance of law and or-

der, rather than the promotion of large-scale social change.

TRENDS IN POLICIES SINCE WORLD WAR II

This pattern was drastically changed by the events of World War II and its aftermath. Some accounts of different parts of Africa today suggest that a complete transformation has occurred and imply that the westernizing influence of economic and social change has entirely destroyed any specifically African, let alone customary tribal, society. Other people go to the opposite extreme and appear to deny the reality of any substantial change, or indeed, in some cases, its very possibility. In fact the nature and extent of these changes induced by Western contact vary greatly as between one area and another, and this great variation presents not only colonial powers but such emerging African governments as those of the Gold Coast and Nigeria with a major problem and challenge. How have the policies and activities of the colonial powers responded to these changes?

British policy

British policy has changed least inasmuch as the development of self-governing nations, if possible within the Commonwealth, if not, in friendly association outside, remains its objective; and in so far as it always provided much of the essential legal and administrative foundations for such a development by its treatment of each territory as a separate unit, with distinct laws, budget, public service, and Legislative Council.

But British policy has changed most in two ways: first, its acceptance, though with some misgiving and uncertainty in regard to those territories in East and Central Africa with a substantial settled European population, of Western parliamentary government of the British type as the kind of self-government to be built on these foundations; and, secondly, its acceptance of an immense change in the speed at which such developments may be expected to be brought about, especially in the West African territories, where there is no settled European population. These changes have had four main consequences since the war: (1) There has been greatly increased representation of the people of the territory in their respective Legislative Councils. (2) Cabinets, or executives composed largely of elected members of the legislature, have been developed, each responsible for some department of government, although still including also some British officials, usually in charge of finance, law and order, and defense and external affairs. (3) The system of native administrations has been replaced by systems of African local government more representative of the ordinary people, largely, if not wholly, elected—perhaps the most exciting, though sometimes dispiriting, attempt now being made in the world to develop a grass-roots democracy, to teach by practical experience the nature of elections, the meaning of representation, and the problems of the financing and operation of local public services.[9] (4) The final consequence of the changed outlook in British policy has been the much greater readiness to speed up economic development, using not only public moneys but also (not entirely successfully) newly created public instrumentalities to supplement private enterprise in this field.

French tropical Africa

French tropical Africa, too, has seen substantial changes since the war.[10]

[9] For these developments see the *Journal of African Administration*, published quarterly by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London.

[10] See Kenneth Robinson, *The Public Law of Overseas France Since the War* (Oxford: Institute of Colonial Studies, 1954), and "French Africa and the French Union" in C. Grove Haines (Ed.), *Africa Today* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 311–31.

Everywhere the rights of citizenship have been greatly extended. The special legal system which up till 1946 was applied to all who were not citizens, which in practice meant practically all Africans, has been totally abolished, as has the system of forced labor. French criminal law and trial on criminal charges by ordinary French courts have been extended to all the inhabitants instead of being restricted, as they were before the war, to the few thousand Africans who had become French citizens.

All the tropical African territories now send deputies to the French National Assembly, senators to the Council of the Republic, and councilors to the new Assembly of the French Union. They send, for example, thirty-seven deputies to the National Assembly, instead of the solitary one returned by Senegal before the war. In the eight West African territories and in Togoland, all electors vote together on the same electoral roll; elsewhere the new African citizens vote on one roll for their deputies, while French citizens of metropolitan status vote on another for theirs. Although it is possible for Africans to acquire metropolitan status, the vast majority of this latter electorate are Frenchmen of France. Since the number of Frenchmen in all the French tropical African territories with a combined population of thirty million probably does not exceed 150,000, and they return six of the thirty-seven deputies, this involves a substantial measure of preference.

The local Assemblies established in all the territories are wholly elected, but except in Senegal and Togoland, the same system of two electoral rolls, one for French citizens and one for the African citizens, is used, though the majority of the members is, in every case, elected by the latter. Although the franchise, which is rather complicated, falls short of universal suffrage, it is fairly wide, and the electorate has increased from about one million in 1946 to about five million in 1952. These territorial Assemblies are not, like the Legislative Councils in British territories, intended to be "Parliaments in embryo" but are modeled closely on the General Councils which exist in each of the ninety departments of Metropolitan France. They have some executive powers, must be consulted by the administration on a wide range of subjects, and most important of all vote the territorial budget, though they must include in it provision for certain "compulsory" expenditures.

The French have not devoted so much attention as have the British to the development of local government bodies in the rural areas, though there has, in the last five years, been a steady increase in the number of municipalities set up in the towns. In the Cameroons and Togoland, however, elected rural local authorities with their own budgets and sources of revenue have recently been established and plans have been tabled for similar developments in French West Africa. French policy, like British, has not so much changed its objective as its speed. It does not aim at the creation of new self-governing units, but at the incorporation, eventually on a basis of equality, of these areas in a larger unit, Greater France or the French Union.

Changes in Belgian practice

In Belgian Africa, there have been, perhaps, less dramatic changes of tempo. It was only very recently, in 1952, that in the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi the basic law which would permit the development of a system of representative local government councils was passed, and although similar develop-

ments have been officially stated to be the aim in the Congo proper, this has not yet been given legal form. Perhaps the most radical change in Belgian practice, in the long run, will turn out to have been the development of more secondary education and the establishment of a university in the Congo, which opened in 1954. It may be that Belgian concentration on economic and social development, to the exclusion of any provision for participation in political activity, will prove to have been sound. But experience elsewhere suggests that such development must eventually give rise to the emergence of new classes demanding some share in political power and that there are dangers in too long a delay in establishing a basis for some form of political participation, since too long a delay means that when at last the pressure cannot be withstood, a big jump has to be made overnight.[11]

PRESENT PROBLEMS AND OUTLOOK

All these policies are reverting to the older policies of "identity," though with widely varying degrees of wholeheartedness. The demand for "identity" in the sense of acceptance as equals is indeed the basis of much African "nationalism." This involves the attempt to transfer to Africa social, and especially political, institutions not designed to suit African conditions and certain to be extensively modified by the African environment if they succeed in surviving there. These Western democratic forms of government which Africans demand and which attempts are being made to establish in Africa are, even in most favorable conditions, exceedingly difficult to maintain and work successfully. They call for a degree of political consensus which has been achieved in comparatively few parts of the world and in still fewer where there exist, within one political unit, communities with as vastly different social and cultural habits as, for example, Europeans, Asians, and Africans in East and Central Africa. But even where there are no non-African communities to reckon with, it is, of course, most misleading to think of Africans as presenting any substantial homogeneity of social and cultural patterns. As the cementing force of opposition to colonial rule is removed by advances towards self-government these divisive factors may present even greater difficulty than they do now. Moreover, any country in which very rapid social change is in progress is almost bound to generate serious tensions dangerous to the stability even of a well-established indigenous political system enjoying deep-rooted loyalties, let alone to a recently imported exotic system like Western parliamentary democracy. If such threats to the stability of the political systems of the new African states which British policy seeks to establish in West Africa should develop, they should not be ascribed to allegedly inherent deficiencies in the African peoples but to the other aspects here indicated.

The French Union

In the French territories of West and Central Africa, there has not, as yet, been an overt development of nationalist movements, in the sense of African political parties campaigning for separate self-government or independence. The actual demands of the postwar political movements have been expressed in terms of an extension of social, political, and economic privileges to Africans within the French system, for equality with the metropolitan French. But there are signs that this phase is passing and that African political leaders, particularly in French West Africa, are beginning to demand greater autonomy, greater real powers for the Territorial Assemblies, and the development of some kind of federal relationship between the African territories and France.[12] If the French Union structure proves sufficiently flexible to accommodate these pressures, it may well provide a viable basis for the continued association of a Western European country and her one-time African colonies, but the adjustments required to accommodate these pressures have no real precedent in the history of French colonial policy.

East and Central Africa

But the difficulties of combining political stability and forms of democratic government, considerable though they are in territories like those of West Africa, in which there are no settled non-African immigrant communities, are relatively small in comparison with the problems of those territories in East and Central Africa with settled European and Asian populations. In contrast both to the Union of South Africa and the French North African territories, the European settled populations in East Africa, and even in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, are small, both absolutely and in relation to the numbers of Africans, less than 60,000 in the three East African territories, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, as compared with 18 million Africans, and less than 200,000 in the new Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as compared with 6 million Africans. Under the general label of "Partnership" different approaches to the political problems of political race relations are being tried out in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in Tanganyika, and in Kenya. All involve acceptance of the principle of African participation in government, but although this is accepted by some of the European settlers, it is opposed, in each case, by a considerable minority. In none of these territories of East and Central Africa, therefore, can success be predicted with any confidence, and in all of them the course of events is being influenced by factors outside the territories themselves. Neither in North nor in South Africa, where the same problem exists, though the proportion of European settlers to the African populations is enormously greater, has a solution been found; moreover, it is precisely that area which appears furthest from a solution, the Union of South Africa, which exercises the most direct influence, alike on Europeans, Asians, and Africans in East and Central Africa. Its history and example enormously increase the suspicions of Africans and Asians of any attempt to devise methods of dealing with such issues in these other territories, while encouraging some of the more intransigent demands by European settlers for domination over the other communities.

Gold Coast

It is difficult to assess at all precisely the influence which the emergence of an almost completely self-governing and wholly African government in the Gold Coast is having on African expectations and aspirations in these areas, but African demands for a real share of political power are certain to be encouraged. The next five years will be of critical importance in the resolution of these problems of political race relations in these areas. Europeans, Asians, and Africans are being presented with what is probably their last chance to find a basis of mutual accommodation in the political field.

[11] These misgivings are shared by many Belgian authorities. See, e.g., *L'évolution politique du Congo Belge (Compte Rendu des Journées Inter Universitaires d'études coloniales)* (Brussels, 1953).

[12] See Léopold Senghor, "L'Avenir de la France dans l'Outre-Mer," *Politique Étrangère*, 1954, pp. 419–26.

Democratic government

Recognition of the explosive force of the deep-seated demand for the acceptance of the African, and the emerging African countries, as of equal status with other parts of the world, and of the vital importance to the Western world of the earliest practicable resolution of the surviving tensions of colonialism, must be matched by readiness to examine the specific social and political problems of individual territories and to attempt to appreciate coolly their significance for political stability. The immense effects of the rapid increase in communications in creating new demands, social, economic, and political, are still too little realized. But, on the other hand, many stubborn facts, and in particular the consequences both internally and externally of disparities in power, are not thereby obliterated. We need a much greater willingness to accept the empirical approach in politics and not to attempt the universal application of one particular model of political organization. "It is easier and quicker to install the *forms* of democratic government than to achieve the *substance* of a broad diffusion of economic, political and social competence without which the forms may be a snare and a delusion." [13]

[13] Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1954), p. 225.

Kenneth Robinson, Oxford, England, is fellow and librarian of Nuffield College and reader in colonial government at Oxford University. Formerly an assistant secretary in the Colonial Office, he served in the Gold Coast during World War II and has traveled widely in British and French territories in Africa. He was visiting lecturer in African studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in 1954, and has written many papers and articles on African subjects.

Current Political Movements in Africa

By JAMES S. COLEMAN

ONE of the most striking features of the African political awakening has been the mushroom appearance of an unexpectedly large number and wide variety of sociopolitical movements and associations. Although these movements differ markedly in their degree of organization, solidarity, and objectives, there has been a tendency to lump them together indiscriminately into one of two categories. In the eyes of most African nationalists they are considered as simply different aspects—but emphatically integral parts—of a rational and single-minded "struggle for freedom"; whereas to many resident Europeans or colonial administrators they are regarded simply as either irrational and atavistic reversions to barbarism or as manifestations of manipulated discontent on the part of self-seeking and exploitative minorities of *déracinés*. It is the purpose of this essay to discuss and analyze briefly the origin, development, and differing characteristics of these movements and to note the impact they have had upon colonial policies.

BACKGROUND TO AFRICAN AWAKENING

Most forms of politically relevant group activity in contemporary Africa are in one way or another the product of the stimulation or provocation of (*a*) the dynamism of the Idea of Progress, the processes of commercialization and industrialism, and other distinguishing attributes (that is, individualism, rationalism, and secularism) of that historical cluster of phenomena known as "Westernism"; and (*b*) the confusions, frustrations, and bitterness produced by the carriers of the "Western impact"—a paternalistic colonial system, an intensive and at times intolerant Christian evangelization, and comparatively unenlightened agents of Western economic enterprise. These two sets of factors—one stemming from the provocative challenge of a technologically advanced intrusive culture and the other from a variety of superimposed alien institutions—have combined to create social situations which lay the basis for the birth and development of political movements.

These "ripe" situations are distinguished by at least three special elements. One has been the staggering blow modernity has dealt the structure of authority, systems of belief, and the cohesiveness of traditional African societies. Indiscriminate missionary education, the relatively uncontrolled operation of Western economic forces, and the adaptability and impatient drive for self-transformation on the part of many African peoples have produced situations of profound disorganization, instability, tension, and insecurity. Another element has been the accumulation of both material and psychic grievances that have been and are bitter and pervasive. Some of these are the inevitable "transition pains" of societies undergoing rapid change. Others are natural human reactions to avoidable situations of hopelessness and denial arising from unimaginative colonial policies. Still others simply reflect an agonizing awareness by Africans of the painful facts of life—that a deep gulf exists between African socioeconomic realities on the one hand and the new wants and aspirations generated by culture contact on the other. This despair is matched in in-

tensity only by their passionate conviction that with African self-government and forced industrialization they can rapidly bridge the gap. Finally, there has been an upward thrust of new leadership cadres from the more westernized groups acutely distressed by their own insecurity and bitterly aggrieved over the disabilities and inequities of alien rule.

Play of external influences

These situational factors of social disorganization, accumulated grievances, and the emergence of a new and claimant leadership are only part of the background; a variety of external influences have intruded or operated either to further ripen the situation or more particularly to inspire, assist, provide direction, or activate the emergent leadership cadres. The most important carriers of these influences have been (*a*) Africans who have traveled or resided abroad, especially as students at universities in Europe and the United States; (*b*) the printed word, particularly in the form of literature directed to target groups in Africa by interested organizations abroad as well as through the medium of the African-owned nationalist press; and (*c*) those non-African individuals and groups within and without Africa who for various reasons have undertaken to champion what they have claimed to be the cause or interests of the Africans.

Among the many sources from which these influences have originated, four deserve special mention: the metropolitan country, the United States, Soviet Russia, and India. The role played by unofficial organizations and political parties of the metropolitan country in the African political awakening has been vastly underestimated. The activities of such groups as the Fabian Colonial Bureau, and later the Africa Bureau, have won for its leaders the affection of most African nationalists and the hostility of not a few administrators as well as of most of the white settlers of East and Central Africa. The current activities of the more militant Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism and the recently launched Movement for Colonial Freedom are representative of the continuing stimulus provided by unofficial organizations in the United Kingdom to Africans temporarily resident there as well as in the African territories. A similar function has been performed by political parties and the labor federations in metropolitan France.

Unofficial organizations and influences operative in and from the United States have also played an important historical role. Nationalist leaders such as Premier Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah (Gold Coast), Dr. Hastings Banda (Nyasaland), Mr. Peter Mbiyu Koinange (Kenya), and Dr. E. B. Kalibala (Uganda) and scores of other political leaders and activists throughout British Africa are graduates of American universities. Many American religious sects (Negro and white), as well as militant Negro movements such as Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (which still survives) and the pro-Communist Council on African Affairs, have also had their effect.

The Soviet Union has supported nationalist development in Africa as part of its global strategy to create situations of instability and weakness within the Western world, to train and indoctrinate Communist leadership cadres with the expectation that by manipulating mass discontent and nationalist symbols they could seize power in African Soviet Republics, and, in general, to carry out Lenin's dictum to attack the West through its dependent territories. The instruments in this program have been many and varied. The seducement of African students in England and France by British and French Communists has been the most direct. Other approaches have included the irresponsible use of United Nations organs to harass colonial powers and build up the image of the Soviet Union as savior of the colonial peoples, university scholarships or summer "Vodka" tours to African students for study or travel behind the Iron Curtain, the establishment of liaison between pro-Communist international front organizations (for example, the World Federation of Trade Unions and the International Students Union) and African student groups and labor organizations, and the effort to feed propaganda through pro-Communist African newspapers or other literature outlets in Africa.

As the vanguard in the struggle against British colonialism, India has exerted a remarkable influence. It has been and remains a symbol of the successful achievement of independence, and success stories in situations of intense aspiration can serve as powerful stimuli. The Indian National Congress has been both an inspiration and the model for organization founders in Africa. Moreover, Indian minorities in South and East Africa, who continue to look to India for guidance, have had a very direct and important influence upon African political developments, including in some instances active organizational collaboration.

Here then were two sets of circumstances conducive to the appearance of political movements: (1) the prevalence among most African societies of what might be called "transitional crisis"—an exploitable and highly inflammatory condition marked by a sort of generalized malaise and sense of frustration, an instability of expectations, and a predisposition towards almost any form of action or radical change that promised tension release, direction and focus, and a set of apparently realizable goals; and (2) the play of a variety of special external influences which served to aggravate those situations and to inspire and agitate the minds of the new politically claimant elite.

Precipitating factors

In addition to these predisposing and external influential factors, there have been certain special circumstances or unique events that have precipitated the birth of political movements. At least three of these deserve mention.

One refers to situations of uncertainty and doubt regarding the legitimacy, effective power, or stability of political authority. Developments during and since World War II—such as imperial self-criticism and pledges of constitutional reform, the shortage of administrative staff, victorious independence movements elsewhere, and the emphatically anticolonial character of postwar world opinion—all tended to raise doubts, to reveal weaknesses, and either to set in motion a process of political change or to create the assumption and expectation of change.[1] In short, the mere existence of political uncertainty, whether from a collapse or weakening of government power or from the assumption or fact of political change,

[1] These situations of political doubt and confusion have been primarily a phenomena of British Africa—in part because of the self-liquidating theory of self-government and in part because of the more intensive open self-criticism generated by British democracy. The paternalism that has prevailed in Portuguese and Belgian territories, and to a qualified extent in French areas, has tended to forestall or to extinguish any serious questioning of the political order. The remarkable number and type of political movements which have appeared in Togoland and the Cameroons under French trusteeship is explained in part by the fact that they are the only areas of French tropical Africa where both the legitimacy and the ultimacy of French authority are seriously in doubt.

has provoked political ferment and organizational development aimed at radical change.[2]

A second type of precipitant has been the actual or threatened intrusion or imposition of some new disability or set of coercions—real or imaginary—involving deeply felt needs such as land, security, or status. Indeed, any change considered detrimental—even the abolition of clitoridectomy—might become a symbol for arousing and focusing generalized discontent. Colonial legislation and other official action prejudicial or believed to be prejudicial to African land rights, as well as measures involving, or believed to involve, new taxes, have been among the most common provocations to mass action and organizational formation. Again, constitutional changes, whether projected or in progress, which have been and are disadvantageous (or appear to be so) to the interests, integrity, or aspirations of one group (class, tribe, or race) vis-à-vis another group have also been crucial stimuli to formal political activity. For example, the Uganda National Congress became more active as a result of the apprehensions created over the project to integrate the Buganda kingdom into a Uganda state and by the crisis resulting from the deposition of the Kabaka (King). Similarly, both the Nyasaland and the Northern Rhodesian African Congresses were energized by their vision of the potential disabilities Africans would acquire in a Central African Federation infected by the native policy of Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, there are few politically relevant movements in Africa today that have not been "triggered" by some variant of one of these factors.

A third and perhaps most decisive precipitant has been the appearance of an unusual African leader—a messiah, hero, or national leader, possessed of something akin to Weber's charisma. It has been this uncommon type of leader—himself frequently the product of the most tortured cultural ambivalences—who has been able not only to mobilize, channel, and focus aspirations and mass discontent upon a fixed set of objectives such as self-government or "Africa for the Africans," but also to incite surprisingly large numbers of Africans to "political" action by articulating their aspirations through the manipulation of modern or traditional symbols or through the exploitation of situations of acute political uncertainty or threatened disabilities.

VARYING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

Although most African political movements have common roots in the conditions created by modernity and the colonial experience, and tend to acquire shape, focus, and *élan* under certain similar circumstances, there have been and are wide differences. These differences can be found in their goals, the symbols they employ, the social background of leadership cadres, the instruments and techniques for securing and maintaining discipline among followers as well as support or acceptance among the masses, and the degree and nature of formal organization. Moreover, most movements can be further distinguished by determining where they fall—according to the above criteria—between such sets of polar extremes as *traditionalist*-modernist, rational-irrational, programmatic-opportunistic, constitutional-terroristic, and materialistic-idealistic. Yet the complex blending of old and new

[2] As Gaetano Mosca would argue, a period of renovation and revolution has commenced which permits "all to aspire to the most exalted positions and some to attain them . . . (and) . . . once such a movement has set in, it cannot be stopped immediately." See his *The Ruling Class* (New York, 1939), pp. 67–68.

that one finds in these movements places positive limits upon even the most rigorous and systematic efforts designed to establish clear-cut categories.

In each political movement one finds a different mixture of interacting factors drawn from the following:

1. *The precolonial situation,* including the nature of authority patterns of indigenous African societies, the fluidity of intergroup and intragroup relationships at the beginning of colonial rule, and the historical circumstances under which that rule was imposed.

2. *The colonial experience,* including especially the differential play of forces of acculturation, the survival of traditional structures of authority and forms of association, the degree of exposure to unsettling external influences, and the size and political orientation of those groups most affected and aggrieved by alien rule.

3. *The contemporary limits to political activity,* with special reference to the rigidity of colonial policy and institutions, the freedom of the milieu in terms of political expression, and the realizability of political aspirations of the new claimant elites.

These several variables have been and are the important determinants of the form, structure, and orientation of African political movements. Each movement, however, is highly relative to the historical situation in which it is rooted as well as the milieu into which it is born.[3] Once these necessary reservations are made, stressing both the complexity and relativeness of these phenomena, a more detailed treatment of three selected types can be made, namely: messianic, tribal, and territorial movements.

Messianic politico-religious movements

Among the several responses that have been made to situations of tension, deprivation, and frustration produced by culture contact, the so-called messianic movement is perhaps the most inscrutable and difficult to categorize. The history of sub-Saharan Africa during the past fifty years is filled with accounts of such movements, and several are currently either openly or covertly active, or they are simmering beneath the surface, or perhaps even some are in gestation. Although there are many variations among these movements, they share certain common attributes. One is that although basically religious in their origin and symbolism, most of them have tended to acquire a strong political significance in that the extinction of the European presence is considered to be a prerequisite for the realization of their vision of the good life. Another is that a "prophet" or "messiah," or a millenary dogma, serves to provide a sense of purpose, direction, and certitude. A third common element is the promise and expectation of a radical "transformation" in the form of either a return to an old or the realization of a new "golden age." These attributes account for that type of xenophobic, fanatical, and nonprogrammatic anti-Europeanism which messianic movements represent and which distinguishes them rather sharply from the more organized and westernized "nationalist" movements.

Certain special situations tend to be linked with the occurrence of these movements in sub-Saharan Africa. The peoples involved very frequently have been subjected to intensive Protestant evangelization marked by considerable sectarian competition and rivalry. Cir-

[3] The decisive causal variable in some movements may be the social structure of the indigenous culture; in others it may be the degree and character of missionary enterprise; while in others it may be simply the absence of competition from other politically claimant races.

cumstances of acute despair and confusion, political denial and hopelessness, or economic insecurity have frequently prevailed. In particular, outlets for meaningful political expression have tended to be absent. These movements are far more common in British East and Central Africa, the Belgian Congo, and in French Equatorial Africa before the postwar political reforms—areas where the presence of white settlers or the prevalence of a rigid paternalism precluded any significant sense of political self-realization or hope on the part of Africans. Finally, the movements have tended to be phenomena of *particular* African tribes or cultural groups rather than Africans in general. Thus, the *Dini ya Msambwa* of western Kenya has been confined almost exclusively to the Bukusu and Suk tribes; the Mau Mau is an affair of the Kikuyu, *Kimbangisme* in the Belgian Congo and *Amicalisme* and *Kakisme* in French Equatorial Africa are expressions of the Bakongo; and so forth.[4]

Despite these coincidences there are significant variations in the character and orientation of the differing politico-religious movements subsumed under the general rubric "messianic." At least three might be broadly distinguished:

1. *Puritanical movements* such as, on the one hand, the episodic, highly localized, and thus far inconsequential Mahdist movements among the Islamized groups of the western Sudan and, on the other hand, Christian revivalist and prophet-led movements which attack witchcraft, idols and shrines, and many traditional African customs.[5]

2. *Chiliastic movements* of the "Watchtower" variety which preach that "the Kingdom is at hand in this generation" in which there will be "a complete absence of all the ills of this world." Their political significance is strikingly revealed by the fact that they are banned in most African territories.

3. *Nativistic movements*, whether of the "rational" (self-transforming) or of the "magical" (divine intervention) types, which aim to recapture certain aspects of traditional tribal culture.[6]

Tribal political movements

The concept of the "detribalized African," useful though it may be in referring to social change at the most general level, is a very inadequate tool for the description and critical analysis of specific African political phenomena. The concept tends to evoke the distorted image of polar extremes—of "tribalized" witch doctors and secret societies on the one hand and of "detribalized" barristers and their "national congresses" on the other, with very little connection between the two. This is indeed a gross distortion of African realities: with few exceptions most Africans—including diviners and barristers—stand somewhere between the two extremes. Moreover, few reflective Africans today would argue on behalf of either the inevitability or the desirability of complete westernization. Eclecticism is the dominant strand in current African political thought. Old Africa is slow to die, and one of the reasons is the respect New Africa has for it.

Thus, the proportion of "traditionalism" to "modernism" in any given movement is not fixed or stable, and in any case both ingredients are normally present. While the messiahs, leaders, and activists tend to be "modernists"—in the sense of coming from the ranks of those groups most exposed to Westernism—their own personalities, as well as the movements they lead, are complex mixtures of both the old and the new. This relativeness of the content of non-messianic movements makes classification both difficult and arbitrary. For analytical purposes the most useful criterion for distinguishing between the varying forms is the unit of focus of politically relevant activity: (1) the *tribe* (used in a generic sense to refer to the largest of any indigenous African political grouping) or (2) the *territory* (the artificial political unit created by the imperial powers, such as Uganda and Nigeria).[7]

In the case of tribal movements, differences in scale and size of the traditional unit provide the most useful criterion for broadly distinguishing two levels of organization, namely, *kinship associations* and *pan-tribal movements*. Kinship associations are found in large numbers in nearly every urban, mining, or industrial center of sub-Saharan Africa. Functionally, they are not unlike the cultural associations formed by first-generation American immigrants in the large impersonal eastern cities of the United States. They have sprung into being as a consequence of the persistence of the strong feelings of loyalty and obligation to the kinship group (family, lineage, or clan) or to the village where the lineage is localized.

Most kinship associations commence as simple mutual aid, protection, or self-help societies; but many tend to take on highly important political functions. In the case of the local politics of the village or town of origin, the branches organized by the "sons abroad," as well as the "parent" branch organized by home-town activists, become centers for local political action on the part of the educated elements. In the case of politics above the local level these associations perform a variety of highly significant political functions: they have been and are fountainheads for the dissemination of political—particularly "nationalist"—ideas in the interior, training grounds for cadres of political activists, vehicles for the emergence of new "tribal" or "national" leadership, as well as the primary organizational cells for pan-tribal unions and territorial political movements.

Pan-tribal movements have been organized attempts to foster a feeling of loyalty and unity towards, and to advance the prosperity and welfare of, the tribe. The latter refers to the widest sense of conceivable community above that of the kinship group but below

[4] This tribal focus of messianic movements does not invalidate the distinction made in this essay between such forms of expression and "tribal movements" discussed subsequently. Moreover, the tribal bias is not an invariable characteristic, as evidenced by the infectious spread of Mau Mau and the multitribal nature of the Maji-Maji Rebellion in Tanganyika. See R. M. Bell, "The Maji-Maji Rebellion in the Liwale District," *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, Vol. 28 (January 1950), p. 38.

[5] For example, the Kyoka Movement in north Angola (1872), the Harris Movement of Liberia and the Ivory Coast, the Second Elijah Movement in Nigeria (1914), and more recently *Kimbangisme-Amicalisme-Kakisme* in the Belgian Congo and French Africa.

[6] As in the case of all analytical types, there are no pure nativist movements. The classification signifies rather a conscious traditionalist *orientation* and is sufficiently broad to include such contemporary expressions as the *Dini ya Msambwa* and the Mau Mau of Kenya, with certain qualifications. Indeed, the spirit of nativism is reflected in the oft-quoted dedication in Jomo Kenyatta's book, *Facing Mount Kenya* (London, 1953): "To Moigoi and Wamboi and all the dispossessed youth of Africa: for perpetuation of communion with ancestral spirits through the fight for African freedom, and in the firm belief that the dead, the living, and the unborn will unite to rebuild the destroyed shrines."

[7] Except for Basutoland and Swaziland there are no African territories that are conterminous with tribe; hence by our criterion, except in cases of tribal pretentiousness or imperialism, there are no tribal movements that have a territorial focus; and by definition there are no territorial movements with a tribal focus. This is true despite the fact that the Ibo have predominated in the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the Yoruba in the Action Group of the Western Region of Nigeria, the Baganda in the Uganda National Congress, and the Kikuyu in the proscribed Kenya African Union.

the level of the territory. These movements have been launched initially for several very different purposes, few of which were strictly "political" in origin.[8] Many sprang into being simply as a result of the stimulus of competition, the power of suggestion, or the urge for imitation. There was a phase in Nigerian political development, for example, when it was considered fashionable for all "progressive" Africans to found their own "national" or "state" (that is, tribal) union. Finally, there have been some cases where a pan-tribal institution emerged as the logical capstone to autonomous kinship associations which had been founded independently and over a period of time in several widely dispersed cities and towns.

These pan-tribal unions have been a phenomena mainly of British Africa, a fact for which at least three explanations may be given: (1) the prevalence of greater freedom of association; (2) the policy of deliberate tribal preservation (indirect rule), as well as strong official encouragement of movements for pan-tribal (as distinguished from "territorial") integration and consciousness; and (3) the official attitude towards the Western-educated elements as manifested both in the earlier exclusion of those elements from the central apparatus of colonial government and in the more recent effort to channel their energies into local government.

Once formed and in being, pan-tribal unions have tended to become politicized. This is in part the result of the official policies just enumerated. It is also the result of the gravitation of the politically conscious educated elements to their tribe of origin not only because of the persistence of tribal loyalties and obligations or their new appreciation of African culture, but also because the tribe could provide them with a relatively secure political base, a fairly reliable personal following, and masses whose aspirations, belief systems, grievances, and tensions they knew intimately and therefore could most easily and legitimately appeal to or manipulate. Moreover, in many cases tribal unions have taken on the political functions of organized pressure or bargaining groups on behalf of tribes placed in a minority or disadvantageous position as a consequence of constitutional developments at the territorial level. Finally, tribal unions were "organizations in being" which territorial politicians found highly useful not only as a structure in which they could climb to positions of leadership in territorial politics but also as an immediately available, developed organizational apparatus and a cadre of political activists.

Although divisive in terms of the development of a territorial consciousness and loyalty, most pan-tribal unions have been incomparable instruments for wide-scale integration of peoples never before united. Two remarkable examples of this have been the Ibo State Union and the Kikuyu Central Association. Both of the large tribes which these unions represent (Ibo, 5 million; Kikuyu, 1 million) are distinguished by a high degree of decentralization of indigenous authority; in neither case was there a tradition or a memory of a pre-existing unity or statehood. Yet in each instance the pan-tribal union, by focusing upon certain genuine cultural similarities such as language or common ceremonies or upon certain shared disabilities or grievances, or simply by being led by a "national" hero, has been able to create an Ibo or a Kikuyu "tribal" consciousness transcending former localisms, at least among certain strata of the population.

[8] For example, the Ibo Federal Union of Nigeria was originally founded by Western-educated Ibo leaders to mobilize the resources of the Ibo peoples in a heroic drive towards self-transformation through Western education. The Pan-Yoruba *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* was launched initially as a cultural organization ". . . to foster the study of the Yoruba language, culture and history." The All-Ewe Conference was organized to unite the Ewe peoples through the elimination of restrictive colonial frontiers. The Pan-Chagga Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union had a purely economic origin, as suggested by its title. The Kavirondo Welfare Association was conceived by a missionary as a means to develop communal life in the reserves of Kenya. The Kikuyu Central Association came into being for the specific purpose of presenting the African land case before a British Commission of Enquiry. The Descendants of Kintu in Uganda, however, was founded as an oppositional movement of the Baganda against the Mengo ruling classes in the Buganda kingdom —an obvious political purpose.

Territorial political movements [9]

The line between tribal and territorial movements is not sharp. Indeed, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Premier of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, was for long simultaneously president of the Ibo State Union and of the pan-territorial National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. Yet there is one crucial difference between the two movements —the fact that the target of the territorial movement is the capture of, control over, or participation in, the central institutions of power and government of the territory. In the pursuit of these objectives, two types of territorial organizations have emerged: (1) the *nationalist movement* which among other things agitates for a constitutional order that will make such control and participation possible; and (2) the *political party* which seeks to achieve and hold power, via the electoral process, in the constitutional order thus established.

[9] See list in Table 1.

TABLE 1—PRINCIPAL POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA [a]

Group A: Territories of British West Africa

Area or Region	Political Association	Area or Region	Political Association
Gambia	Democratic Party Gambia Moslem Congress	Nigeria Western Region	*Action Group National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons[b]
Sierra Leone	*Sierra Leone People's Party National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone	Northern Region & Northern Cameroons	*Northern People's Congress Northern Elements Progressive Union Middle Belt People's Party Middle Zone League National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
Gold Coast	*Convention People's Party Ghana Congress Party Moslem Association Party Northern People's Party National Liberation Movement	Eastern Region	*National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons National Independence Party United National Party
Togoland (British)	*Togoland Congress Convention People's Party All-Ewe Conference	Southern Cameroons (British)	*Kamerun National Congress Kamerun People's Party

* Identifies the political party which received the highest vote in the most recent election to the representative assembly of the territory or state concerned.

[a] This list is not exhaustive. It includes only those territorial movements that are constitutional and have some sort of formal organization. It therefore excludes tribal, messianic, and subversive political movements. The Belgian and Portuguese territories are omitted because of the absence therein of the conditions necessary for formal political associations to have a meaningful existence. The closest approximation would be such pressure-group associations as the *Fédération des Associations de Colons du Congo et du Ruanda-Urundi* (Fédacol) or the *Union des Colons du Ruanda-Urundi* (Ucorudi).

[b] The NCNC controls a majority of the seats from the Western Region in the Central Nigerian House of Representatives.

TABLE 1—*Continued*

Group B: Territories of French Tropical Africa

Territory	Metropolitan Parties	African Parties[c]
French West Africa		
Mauritania	Rassemblement du Peuple Français[d]	*Union Progressiste Mauritanienne (IOM) Entente Mauritanienne
Senegal	Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière[e]	*Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (IOM)
Sudan	Rassemblement du Peuple Français	*Parti Progressiste Soudanaise (SFIO) Union Soudanaise (RDA)
Guinea	*Rassemblement du Peuple Français Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière	Indépendants d'Outre-Mer (IOM) Union Forestière Union du Maude Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
Upper Volta	Rassemblement du Peuple Français	*Indépendants d'Outre-Mer (IOM) Union Voltaïque Amicale Voltaïque Union du Lobi
Ivory Coast	Rassemblement du Peuple Français Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière	*Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
Niger	Rassemblement du Peuple Français	*Union du Niger Indépendant (IOM) Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
Dahomey	Rassemblement du Peuple Français	*Parti Républicain Dahoméenne (IOM) Groupement Ethnique du Nord Union Progressiste Dahoméenne
Togoland (French)		*Union des Chefs du Nord Togo Parti Togolais du Progrès (IOM) Comité de l'Unité Togolaise Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise
French Equatorial Africa		
Chad	Rassemblement du Peuple Français	*Union Démocratique Tchadienne (RPF) Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
Middle Congo	Rassemblement du Peuple Français Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière	*Parti Progressiste Congolais (RDA)
Ubangi-Chari	Rassemblement du Peuple Français	*Mouvement d'Évolution Sociale de l'Afrique Noire
Gabon	Rassemblement du Peuple Français	*Indépendants d'Outre-Mer (IOM) Défense des Interêts Locaux Union Gabonaise
Cameroons (French)	Rassemblement du Peuple Français Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière	Évolution Sociale Camerounaise Union des Populations du Cameroun (RDA-PC) Renaissance Camerounaise Bloc Démocratique Camerounaise

[c] The abbreviations indicate the parliamentary group or broader association to which the party is attached (*apparanté*) or allied, i.e.: IOM: *Indépendants d'Outre-Mer*, an organization of overseas *parlementaires;* SFIO: *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière;* RDA: *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, a Pan-French African political movement having its greatest strength in the Ivory Coast; RDA-PC: signifies that the U.P.C. identifies itself with the pro-Communist wing of the RDA.

[d] Formal name of the Gaullist movement.

[e] Formal name of the French Socialist Party.

TABLE 1—*Continued*

Group C: Territories of British East and Central Africa and the Union of South Africa

Territory or State	European Associations	Arab/Asian Associations	African/Colored Associations
British East Africa			
Kenya	Elected Members' Organization United Country Party Federal Independence Party	Kenya Indian Congress Kenya Muslim League Central Arab Association	African Members' Association
Zanzibar	—	Arab Association	—
Uganda	Uganda Chamber of Commerce	Asian Association Uganda Muslim Union	Uganda National Congress Uganda National Congress Youth Association Uganda People's Party All-Uganda Party
Tanganyika	Tanganyika European Council	Asian Association Muslim Association	Tanganyika African Association
British Central Africa			
Nyasaland	Convention of Associations Nyasaland Association	Nyasaland Asian Convention	Nyasaland African Congress Nyasaland Chief's Union Nyasaland African Progressive Association
Northern Rhodesia	*Federal Party[f]		N. R. African National Congress N. R. All-African Convention Euro-African Society
Southern Rhodesia	*United Rhodesia Party Confederate Party[f] Independent Labour Party Independent Rhodesia Party		Southern Rhodesia African Association
Union of South Africa	*Nationalist Party United Party Labour Party Liberal Party Union Federal Party	South African Indian Congress	African National Congress Bantu National Congress Non-European Unity Movement Coloured People's National Union Coloured People's Congress All-African Convention African People's Organization

[f] The Federal Party and the Confederate Party are also the majority and minority parties, respectively, in the Legislative Assembly of the new Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Accordingly, in so far as it wins political concessions from the colonial power, a territorial nationalist movement progressively takes on the attributes of a territorial political party. This is precisely what has occurred in the ideal conditions of British West Africa where nationalist movements have been long in gestation and favored with a situation which made a transformation to a political party possible.

In French tropical Africa a rather different, if not a reverse, development has occurred. Although prewar French

policy effectively prevented the emergence of nationalist movements, the dramatic extension of citizenship and suffrage to Africa under the 1946 Constitution called political parties suddenly into being for the purpose of electing candidates for office in the new institutions. With the passage of time these territorial "electoral" parties have tended to take on certain attributes of a nationalist movement, although none —except for certain parties in the trust territories—have seriously advocated secession.

In the plural societies of British East and Central Africa a very different situation has developed. There the racial composition of the population, the social forces at work, and the political climate have been such as to rob Africans of the usual objective of a nationalist movement (independence or political equality) as well as a constitutional order in which political parties could meaningfully participate. As a consequence of this absence of function and hope, not only are political movements far less developed but also there is a strong predisposition towards conspiratorial and messianic movements.

Several factors have operated to focus African political energies and passions upon territorial, as distinguished from tribal, movements. In the modern world mere "bigness" has a seductive attraction. It is not only a symbol of power, equality, and respectability but also a means by which to "make one's voice heard." Largeness in scale is also considered essential for rapid industrialization and economic development. Also, except for such large cultural groups as the Yoruba, Ibo, Ewe, Hausa, Baganda, Kikuyu, few African tribes are so constituted or situated in the eyes of educated Africans themselves as to become independent national states. Again, in some instances simple imitation and emulation, or the irrepressible expansiveness of thought and aspirations characteristic of a "liberation" mood, are not negligible factors. Moreover, the social groups most actively working for change have frequently been those whom circumstances have placed closest to the territorial superstructure (students and teachers, clerks, and artisans employed by colonial government and foreign firms, and so forth) or those elements, such as traders and merchants, who have benefited most from a broad area of economic interchange. All of these groups find it comparatively easy, if not attractive, to think and act in "territorial" terms. Furthermore, there is the obvious fact that only a territorial movement can seriously challenge the power and legitimacy of a colonial government. Perhaps the most decisive factor, however, has been the coercive influence of territorial representative institutions—Legislative Councils, Regional Assemblies, *Assemblées Territoriales*, or *Grands Conseils*—which have compelled African political leaders to organize and act with a territorial frame of reference if they want to act meaningfully.[10]

In many situations there exists an uneasy alliance between tribal and territorial movements. All of the knotty problems—and potential instability—implicit in the existence of incipient national separatism in a multinational state are in evidence. While in the early stages tribal movements were useful, if not indispensable, organizational props to leaders of territorial movements, many of these leaders have become irritated by, if not fearful of, the "pressure group" fickleness of tribal unions representing minority groups. Moreover, some of these tribal leaders fear that they will be challenged by the leadership that might rise through the structure of the larger pan-tribal unions. The more centrally minded Jacobins among these leaders detest these *corps intermédiaires* because they represent a constant threat to "national" territorial unity and a potential obstruction to rapid social and economic change. These centrifugal and centripetal pressures are among the most critical political forces at work in many parts of Africa today.

[10] French Africans find it easier to think and act politically in "territorial" terms not only because of the *étatisme* of the French system but also because of the French policy of direct rule. The effect of this policy is strikingly revealed in the different political orientation of African modernists in Dahomey, where the French extinguished the kingdom of Dahomey, and in Uganda, where the British preserved the kingdom of Buganda.

EFFECT OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS ON COLONIAL POLICIES

Just as there tends to be a polarization of attitudes concerning the cause and nature of African political movements so are there extreme views regarding the actual effect they have had and are having on colonial policies. African nationalists tend to the view that little or no change would have occurred had it not been for the intense pressure they generated from below. Imperial spokesmen argue, however, that most postwar reforms in colonial policy were self-produced or that in any event the changes are but current applications of traditional principles. Both are partially correct. Certainly, apart from the revolutionary sociopolitical forces asserting themselves within Africa, World War II produced profound changes in the world "climate of opinion" regarding colonialism as well as in imperial attitudes and policies.

There can be little doubt, however, that the unexpected appearance of highly organized and disciplined mass movements under a new militant leadership, such as the Convention People's Party of the Gold Coast or the Action Group of the Western Region of Nigeria, has forced a drastic revision in imperial calculations far beyond West Africa. These movements revealed in startling fashion that, given determined and skillful leadership and "ripe" situations, tremendous social forces could be tapped and channeled into political activity. This revelation dealt a devastating blow to the major assumption underlying all previous policy regarding the African peoples, namely, that they constituted an inert mass that could be manipulated and molded at will—and indefinitely—by the alien intruder.

The impact of these movements upon policy has varied greatly. On the British West Coast since 1945 there has been a continuous interaction between African nationalist movements insatiably pressing for new increments of power and a prudent and responsive British administration conducting a delaying action—a process which has now reached the stage where self-governing African states will soon be entering the main stream of world affairs. In French tropical Africa a separatist nationalism —except in Togoland and the Cameroons —has not developed; but political parties operating as pressure groups within and without the National Assembly are compelling a greater devolution of power to the African territorial governments and Assemblies than either the Napoleonic tradition or the policy of assimilation would normally envisage. In British East and Central Africa, African movements, whether in the form of the terroristic Mau Mau or the National Congresses of Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, have compelled a far more liberal interpretation of the concept of "partnership" than European settlers would have thought conceivable five years ago. Moreover, for the time being the gravitation of total power into the hands of resident white settlers has been arrested, at least in Kenya,

Uganda, and Tanganyika. Finally, in the Belgian Congo, the extraordinary attention paid during the last few years to the problem of the status and future of the *élite noire* is a reflection not only of the existence of pressures from burgeoning social forces within the Congo, but also of the strong impact that political movements in neighboring French and British areas have had upon official Belgian calculations.

In sum, while there is little doubt that the rise and maturation of African political movements has undermined smug prewar assumptions, the variation in the impact of such movements nevertheless does, as noted above, point up the crucial importance of colonial policies during the initial stages in determining the form and direction taken by these movements striving for new relationships beyond colonialism. In Africa, as elsewhere in the non-European world, policies of avoidance and repression are not only sterile, but, in the long run, quite futile. Once unleashed and in motion, social energy is irrepressible and uncompromising in its quest for direction and expression. Policies of responsiveness and constructive guidance offer the possibility that such expression will be responsible, purposive, and creative. Meanwhile, the ubiquitous and cynical agents of a new imperialism are abroad armed with special skills and seductive formulas for the manipulation of unsatisfied social energy and incipient political movements.

James S. Coleman, Ph.D., Los Angeles, California, is instructor in political science at the University of California at Los Angeles. During World War II he was a member of the General Staff Corps and of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Mission to the French government. In 1951–52 he was engaged in field research in British and French West Africa under a Fulbright scholarship. In 1952–53 he was a teaching fellow in the Department of Government of Harvard University. He is author of several articles on political developments in tropical Africa.

Context and Sources of Political Tensions in French North Africa*

By BENJAMIN RIVLIN

THE crisis in French North Africa, although possessing many distinguishing features of its own, is not unique in our times; it comes under that familiar genus of contemporary political problems called "colonial." Actually, the crisis in French North Africa belongs to one of the more complex varieties of the colonial problem, for besides conflict between a native nationalism and a colonial power it involves conflict between an indigenous population and strong European settler groups. Recent official French statistics reveal the following division in the population of French North Africa: [1]

	MUSLIMS	EUROPEANS
Algeria ...	7,500,000	1,000,000
Tunisia ...	3,250,000	250,000
Morocco ..	7,900,000	400,000

In each of the territories, political and economic power rests in the hands of the French minority, but an ever growing spirit of nationalism has risen among the indigenous population to challenge the dominant position of the French. Since the end of World War II, French North Africa has been in the throes of a struggle, becoming increasingly acute, between these two determined forces.

HOSTILITY TO FRENCH DOMINATION

Native hostility to French domination goes back to the outset of French penetration into the region. When the Maghreb was subjected to French control in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a vital culture, albeit technologically backward and politically weak by Western standards, was already established there. The native culture was a Muslim culture that went back for more than twelve centuries. For half of this period, this culture experienced a steady decline from the great heights it had attained as a center of civilization during the Middle Ages. But there remained a living heritage among the Muslim population in the form of their Islamic religion and their history. Despite cleavages within it, Islam played an important role as a cohesive force in the Maghreb; for Islam was not only a religion but a total way of life. Thus it was not surprising that the native population at first resisted the alien invaders by arms, and later, when defeat became inevitable because of superior force and power, resisted assimilationist pressures which implied inferiority of the native culture. Much of this resistance was inspired by traditional religious leaders, who strove with determined stubborness to withstand the pressures of assimilation and the threat of religious deterioration. To this day, religious elements have played an important role in the movement of native self-assertion in French North Africa.

* The author wishes to express his indebtedness to the Social Science Research Council for the grants that made possible much of the research for this article.

[1] Office of Technical Publications of the French Prime Minister, *Facts and Figures About French North Africa* (Paris, 1952), p. 8. These figures must be considered as rough estimates. Figures for Morocco refer to the French zone only. In Morocco there are some 220,000 Jews and in Tunisia some 70,000. The number of Jews in Algeria is difficult to determine, since in Algeria the Jews are French citizens.

More significant, perhaps, from the point of view of the current crisis was the establishment of French control and the pursuance of an official developmental policy which set in motion a process of social change that broadened the basis of hostility between the natives and the French. The introduction of modern techniques of production transformed the area from a static pastoral system into a relatively modern one, which was closely integrated into the industrial economy of France. Accompanying demographic changes saw the emergence of a European minority, which was particularly large in Algeria, and a shifting trend among the native population from rural to urban life. The effect of these long-run economic and demographic changes was felt in the development of two opposing phalanxes. On the native side, the new economy produced an *haute bourgeoisie* and merchant class, generally resentful of French rule, and the restive, poverty-ridden, and detribalized masses of the urban slums. On the other side, it produced an entrenched privileged French community of colons, entrepreneurs, and *petits fonctionnaires*, all with a great stake in the area.

Simultaneously with these developments, another long-run change—this one in the intellectual sphere—took place in North Africa. The impact of the Western liberal-democratic tradition on the indigenous population gave rise to a native intellectual elite. It was inevitable that the French tradition of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* should take root, for the glaring contrasts in the living standards that were emerging in French North Africa betwen the natives and the French provided rich soil for their growth. Thus the French, perhaps unwittingly, created a new dimension to the ideological framework as well as a new source of leadership for the native nationalist movements.

From the very beginnings, French policy proceeded with little awareness of, or concern for, the possibility of a conflict between France and the indigenous population, a possibility which eventually materialized with the rise of nationalist movements. French policy was concerned with a twofold task: to bolster France in the great European competition for empire by keeping the reins of government in North Africa securely in French hands; and to establish a permanent and secure home for French settlers and preserve their privileged position in the region. Native nationalism represented a force inimical to the desired stability; to meet its challenge, France adopted a policy of forceful repression of any manifestation of native dissidence, since she either did not or was unwilling to recognize the problems emerging from the long-run process of change at work in the Maghreb. The policy of force inevitably served to aggravate the situation rather than to alleviate it. A chain of challenges and responses was touched off: repression led to more dissidence, dissidence to repression, and so on to this day.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THREE TERRITORIES

Having presented some general observations as to the nature of the conflict, a closer look at specific developments within the three territories is now in order. It should be kept in mind that Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco came under French control at different times under differing circumstances. French penetration into Algeria began in 1830, and full control over the country was not attained for some five decades. The protectorate over Tunisia was established in 1881–83, while that over Morocco came into being in 1912, although it took some twenty-two years to "pacify" the country.

Algeria

In Algeria, the first North African territory to come under French control, the watchwords of the French administration were *réfoulement* (driving or forcing back) and "We shall forget their [the natives'] existence." [2] A policy of colonization was embarked upon shortly after the French occupation began. Native lands were sequestered and land grants were given to French settlers. Algeria was viewed as a prolongation of France. Eventually, three departments (Algiers, Oran, and Constantine) were organized in Northern Algeria, representation for the French settlers was secured in the French National Assembly, and even local administration of French-settled communities followed as much as possible the model of the metropole. The French population of Algeria increased steadily; land was brought under modern cultivation; roads were built; modern European cities sprang up; and the economy of Algeria was integrated into that of France. All in all Algeria was being transformed from what Napoleon III had called in 1860 "an Arab kingdom" to a French province across the sea.

But this transformation hardly resolved the issue of the smoldering conflict between the French and native societies. Although the policy of integrating Algeria into France is often referred to as "assimilation," that is, making the territory and its inhabitants French, it is an error to think that a successful assimilation was achieved. The territory of Algeria may be juridically called "part of France," but the people did not become French by fiat. The case of the Algerian Jews, who were all made French citizens by the Crémieux Decree (1870), does not detract from the validity of this observation. To the Jews, who had lived for centuries as an oppressed minority, French citizenship meant increased security, a chance to breathe freely.[3] To the Muslims, however, French citizenship offered no attraction of new security; on the contrary it threatened to undermine their world by introducing a new civil code that superseded Koranic law. Consequently no Crémieux Decree was conceivable for the Muslims, as the latter were psychologically unreceptive to French citizenship. It is quite true that French law opened the door of citizenship to a limited number of Algerian Muslims. To qualify for citizenship a knowledge of French was required, as well as renunciation of one's personal status under Koranic law by the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the French civil code. Those who followed this course were assimilated, but the vast majority of Algerian Muslims remained outside the pale of the French community. In the meantime, resentment and disaffection spread among unassimilated Muslims, as the impact of the French presence began to take effect. When the French tried to meet the mounting pressure of the nationalists in Algeria by the Statute of 1947, which made all Algerian inhabitants French citizens, they only confirmed the social dichotomy of the Algerian population. Since the Algerian Muslims in 1947 were no more prepared than their ancestors were in 1870 to give up their adherence to Koranic law in order to become French citizens, the 1947 statute permitted them to acquire French citizenship without having to surrender their personal Koranic status. However, those Muslims who were not subject to the French civil code were placed under a separate electoral status.

[2] S. H. Roberts, *History of French Colonial Policy* (London, 1929), Vol. I, p. 161.

[3] See André Chouraqui, *Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord: Marche vers l'Occident* (Paris, 1952), pp. 82–85.

The statute created two electoral colleges: the first college consisted of Frenchmen and a relatively small number of assimilated Muslims; the second was made up of the vast majority of the Algerian population. Each college elected an equal number of deputies to the French National Assembly and to the newly created Algerian Assembly.[4]

The Statute of 1947 was not designed merely to placate mounting Algerian nationalism. It was, perhaps, more basically a plan for preserving French domination over the country. By segregating unassimilated Muslims from Frenchmen in the election process, the statute served to placate the French population, which feared that it would be overwhelmed by the sheer number of Muslims if the franchise and representation were based on absolute equality. Thus the Statute of 1947 confirmed the unassimilated status of Algerian Muslims. Today, notwithstanding the legal fiction that Algeria is a part of France and that French citizenship is universal in Algeria, there are two distinct communities in the country: a minority which controls the country's economy and government and a majority of about 85 to 90 per cent of the population which has inferior status and manifests an unwillingness to be permanently subordinated to the minority and its way of life.

Rivalry for Tunisia and Morocco

At first glance it would seem that the difficulties arising in Algeria would be avoided in Tunisia and Morocco because the two latter were not annexed by France but were brought under French control as protectorates. After the conquest of Algeria, French imperialist interests eyed the two Muslim kingdoms that enclosed Algeria on the east and west. But France was not alone in having designs on Morocco and Tunisia. The race for colonies was in full force towards the end of the nineteenth century, and France faced competition from Italy in the case of Tunisia, and from Germany, Great Britain, and Spain in the case of Morocco. One effect of this rivalry was to prevent outright annexation of the two countries, which were ruled by native sovereigns. To overcome these difficulties and at the same time achieve political and economic control over the countries, French diplomats utilized the technique of the protectorate. This technique permitted the achievement of the desired goal in a relatively simple fashion. Instead of removing the ruling sovereign and destroying existing native institutions, all that was necessary was to obtain the reigning potentate's assent to measures empowering the French to reform the existing regime. Thus the Convention of La Marsa of June 8, 1883, extracted the pledge of the Bey of Tunisia to "undertake the administrative, judicial and financial reforms which the French Government shall consider useful" in order "to facilitate for the French Government the accomplishment of its protectorate." Similarly, the Treaty of Fez of March 30, 1912, stated in its first article that "the government of the French Republic and His Majesty the Sultan have agreed to institute in Morocco, a new regime which will bring about the administrative, judicial, educational, financial and military reforms which the French Government shall consider necessary to introduce in the Moroccan territory." Since the French had a variety of persuasive weapons, including the acquiescence of the European powers in their action and armed forces at their disposal, the reigning monarchs had no alternative but to accede to the establishment of the protectorates.

[4] For an analysis of the Statute see L. Gray Cowan, "The New Face of Algeria," Part I, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 66 (September 1951), pp. 340–65.

The protectorate technique

For the French the protectorate technique was an admirable arrangement. Empowered to introduce reforms, they established a new regime headed by a Resident General who exercised full governmental powers, even though nominally he was acting for the sovereign Bey or Sultan. The net result was the formulation of a policy largely in the interests of the French settler element. The innovations introduced by the reforms established favorable conditions for French settlement and economic expansion. Land was expropriated for European settlement, roads were paved, ports were developed, railroads were built, and modern administrative methods were introduced. Financially and economically, the countries were linked to France. Together with Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco became markets for French industrial products and sources of raw materials.

The protectorate regime, however, did not prevent the development of conflict between the European and indigenous communities. In fact it institutionalized the dichotomy between Europeans and Muslims. As in the case of Algeria, the native population's resentment of the favorable treatment and superior status accorded to Europeans gave rise to indigenous nationalist movements. The fact that Tunisia and Morocco retained a semblance of sovereignty and that their legal personalities remained separate and distinct from that of France—in contrast to Muslim Algeria which, following its annexation and under the impact of the policy of *réfoulement*, lost whatever legal personality it had prior to the French conquest—undoubtedly served to stimulate nationalist sentiment in those two countries. For, the partial retention of native sovereignty served as a symbol of independence and cultural autonomy. The nationalists attacked the protectorate arrangements, arguing that these arrangements were archaic vestiges of nineteenth-century imperialism. Claiming that the protectorates were never designed to be permanent, they called for the restoration of their rights to self-government and independence.

Since it was never pretended that under the protectorate regime French nationality replaced Tunisian or Moroccan nationality, French settlers in these two countries remained aliens. For a long time their alien status did not bother the French in Morocco or Tunisia, since the French administrations were exercising the real powers of government in their favor. With the rise of native nationalism, however, French settlers became alarmed over the implications of possible restoration of native political power in countries which were their adopted homelands, but in which they were legally aliens. Consequently, they opposed any concession to nationalist aspirations and built up strong counterpressures to preserve and perpetuate their rights and privileges. No longer wishing to rely for the protection of their interests on the Resident General, they demanded a direct and substantial voice in the government of the protectorates. In this way they would achieve the dual objectives of assuring their political power and of undermining their legal status as aliens.

Demands such as these have served as a red flag to the nationalists. In recent years the French government has proposed changes favoring settlers in the protectorates. Such proposals, however, have been sternly rejected by the nationalists and have touched off a reaction that has included appeals to the United Nations, campaigns of civil disobedience in the form of boycotts and strikes, and even violence in some in-

stances. Clearly, the most crucial element in the crisis in Tunisia and Morocco is the difficult problem posed by the conflict between native and French communities.

COMMON FACTORS IN TENSIONS

The conflict in French North Africa must also be considered within the context of the colonial crisis that began to develop after the end of World War I and reached its climax in the aftermath of World War II. A combination of factors after World War I—the Wilsonian doctrine of national self-determination, the Soviet revolution and its wide appeal to colonial peoples, and the depression of 1929—shook the foundations of the old colonial system. Restiveness grew among colonial peoples and a tide of self-assertion, taking the form of militant nationalist movements, rose to challenge the status quo. The nationalist movements of the Maghreb were part of this rising challenge, which was heightened after World War II. The promises of a new and better world as expressed in the Atlantic and United Nations Charters fanned the hopes and expectations of the colonial peoples.

World War II had a particularly great impact on French North Africa. The presence of Allied forces in the area, a major theater of military operations, had important consequences. It affected the thoughts and behavior of all strata of the population, from the Sultan of Morocco, who had a famous conversation with President Roosevelt, to the average native, who saw his European ruler defeated in battle. Furthermore, the Muslim world outside of the Maghreb was in the midst of a great change. The Arab League had come into existence. Independence had been attained by one Muslim state after another—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Libya. Other former colonies such as India and Burma had also become free. Further evidence of Muslim self-assertion was being manifested by Egypt and Iran, which were standing up to their former European overlords on such matters as the Sudan, the Suez, and oil. Witnessing these developments and inspired by anti-imperialist sentiment, the nationalists of North Africa intensified their efforts to end colonialism in their countries.

Political movements

Intensification of nationalist efforts took the form of a stepped-up program for political action. The nationalist leadership realized that without the application of political pressure and the demonstration of their political strength they could get nowhere. The past decade witnessed the emergence of a stronger nationalist organization in each of the territories, and their acquisition of a broader popular base. Whereas in their early stages the nationalist movements drew their strength mainly from intellectuals, religious leaders, and the *haute bourgeoisie*, they now reached into the masses. In Algeria, of particular significance in the postwar years has been the emergence of the *Mouvement du Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD) as the most important nationalist group in the country. Although this group is now experiencing some internal difficulties, it is still the most important nationalist force in Algeria, and it owes this position to its great strength among the urban proletariat and the poor agricultural worker. In Tunisia, a strong labor movement, the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (UGTT), and an agricultural organization, *Union Générale de l'Agriculture Tunisienne* (UGAT), were developed as important arms of the leading nationalist party, the Neo-Destour. In Morocco, although denied the right to form their own unions, Moroccan workers with leadership provided by the Istiqlal (Independence) party were organized in large numbers, either clandestinely or within the officially recognized French labor organization, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT). It should be noted that the Moroccan nationalist movement, generally considered the least developed and having the weakest popular base among nationalist movements in French North Africa, demonstrated great popular support during the past two years by its ability to lead successfully a program of civil disobedience. Moroccan nationalism probably received its greatest boost from the crude policy of repression employed by the French in Morocco. Nothing perhaps did more to unite the Moroccan people and to make them aware of nationalism than the deposition in August 1953 of Sultan Mohammed V, following the latter's refusal to agree to prosettler reforms.

Economic development

The French aided the nationalist cause during this postwar period in still another way. The tempo of economic activity was stepped up and its direction turned away from its prewar orientation.[5] The war experience had demonstrated the great weakness of the existing economic relationship between France and North Africa. Having been entirely dependent upon France for manufactured goods, North Africa suffered greatly when it was cut off from the metropole during the war. It is said, for example, that throughout French North Africa not even a soap factory existed in 1940. French elements in North Africa were determined that such a situation should not be permitted to continue, and as a result many new industries began to crop up in North Africa. The threat of another war in Europe reinforced this development through a steady flow of flight capital from France and other parts of Europe. Increased industrialization and economic activity meant the creation of conditions—as, for example, the acceleration of the rate of native urbanization—favorable to greater nationalist activity.

Postwar economic development also greatly enhanced the stake of the European population in French North Africa. That the European population should therefore harden its attitude toward nationalists followed almost naturally. In the past decade many fruitless efforts were made to arrest the growing tension in Franco-native relations. At various times during this period it seemed that some headway towards amelioration of the situation was in the offing, but at no time was the impending settlement achieved. It is not easy to work out a solution that would harmonize the interests of settlers and natives. Because of the conflict, which is still growing, between these two groups, French Premier Mendès-France, who has proposed certain concessions to the nationalists, is experiencing considerable difficulty in his attempt to stabilize the situation in French North Africa.

Crucial population division

Clearly, were it not for the presence of a settler element, the problem of adjustment between France and the native nationalists would be much simpler. This is not to say that France, in trying to preserve its control over North Africa, has no concern other than protecting the interests of the European minority. Considerations of national prestige, the French Union, and the French national economy are also involved. Every French government since the war has hesitated to make concessions to the

[5] See *L'Économie de l'Union Française d'Outre-Mer* (Second series; Paris, 1954), pp. 32–34.

nationalists lest this be interpreted as a sign of France's weakness as a world power. However, were it not for the presence of European settlers in North Africa, France would have greater freedom in working out a settlement with the nationalists. The crucial problem in French North Africa, therefore, continues to be the division of the population into two distinct cultural elements, the native and the French, each possessing a driving determination to survive as an entity, each pressing for political control to achieve this end.

Benjamin Rivlin, Ph.D., Brooklyn, New York, is assistant professor of political science at Brooklyn College. In 1951 and 1953 he conducted research in France and North Africa under the terms of grants from the Social Science Research Council. During World War II he served with the Office of Strategic Services in Washington and North Africa and more recently has worked on African affairs in the research branches of the State Department and the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations. He is the author of numerous articles on North African affairs and of the Carnegie Endowment's case study, The United Nations and the Italian Colonies (1950).

British West Africa: Patterns of Self-Government*

By DAVID E. APTER

WITH considerable applause from the West, new nations are taking shape in the Gulf of Guinea, infamous slaving ground, historic trade area, and that part of the continent of Africa once known as the "white man's graveyard." Africans in British West Africa are, with great skill and good humor, divesting the European of his colonial burden. They are doing so within the structural framework of secular democratic government. That great problems occur in such a process almost goes without saying. That Africans are capable of handling their difficulties can be easily demonstrated. In British West Africa where no permanent European settler population lives off plantations, estates, or farms,[1] Africans are attempting more than even a benevolent colonialism could hope to offer. Such efforts enhance the significance and meaning of parliamentary government in the larger process of social change.

We shall attempt a quick look at the problems of developing a central system of authority which are attendant upon political developments now occurring in British West Africa. Ignoring the developments in Sierra Leone and Gambia, the efforts in the Gold Coast and Nigeria throw into sharp relief the complicating effects which size, tradition, wealth, and constitutions, among other factors, have brought to bear in these differing colonial territories on the West Coast of Africa. In formal terms, the Gold Coast has developed a unitary system of authority as its basis of secular political rule. Nigeria has, on the contrary, been forced to accept a federal system. Meanwhile the Gold Coast has achieved the greatest constitutional advance along the lines of self-government, while self-government by 1956 is the slogan of many Nigerian nationalists. How can we compare the simultaneous development of political freedom in these two areas? What significance can be drawn from the parallel? To answer our question we will look first at the common colonial framework under which both were ruled by imperial Britain. We can then view the political developments in the Gold Coast where the Convention People's Party under its Life Chairman, Kwame Nkrumah, the Prime Minister, has brought the country to the very verge of independence. Finally, a more impressionistic commentary on Nigeria will, perhaps, serve to illustrate some of the factors of the indigenous environment, both social and economic, which help or hinder the development of a central secular system of authority.

BACKGROUND OF BRITISH COLONIAL AUTHORITY

Both the Gold Coast and Nigeria were administered as Colony and Protectorate[2] under the system of indirect rule. While the actual term is a vague one, it developed in practical fashion in Northern Nigeria and was adopted in one fashion or another for most of British Africa.[3] In Northern Nigeria

* Research in *British West Africa* was undertaken in 1952–53 under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council.

[1] By law Europeans are barred from land ownership and there is no permanent European settler population.

[2] The distinction between Colony and Protectorate has largely disappeared.

[3] See F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922).

the Fulani and other Islamic kingdoms were conquered by a small British force, which was then faced with the problem of having to administer a large territorial area, having a large population, with only a limited European complement to do so.[4] In an area where intertribal warfare was common, the effort to provide a framework of stability and peace under the British flag, partly as a device to stimulate trade and partly because stability and peace were regarded as essentials of British rule, would have required a large police and administrative staff. This was impossible, and the defeated chiefs and emirs were called upon to give their allegiance to Britain and, in return, were allowed to rule according to their own laws and customs, backed up by the prestige and force of British arms. The ideal was a dual system of authority in which the chiefs and the district officials co-operated closely. The traditional pattern of life was maintained as much as possible, excepting where that pattern was repugnant to British law.

This system worked reasonably well. Chiefs served as agents of British rule. Modifications in social organization such as those brought about by the introduction of commercialism, a money economy, and new types of occupations and consumer products were made without sudden catastrophic consequences, as the old systems of authority subtly shifted in their nature and functions. The commonly accepted official view was that so long as the structure of tribal government was maintained, no violation of tradition would take place —hence there would occur no fundamental breakdown in social life. It was presumed therefore that there would result few disruptions which might require a large administrative staff, a costly item for a reluctant Colonial Office.

While the system of indirect rule was applied generally throughout West Africa and other parts of British Africa, the results were varied. In places like the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, where much the same cultural tradition as in Northern Nigeria prevailed, indirect rule worked out as envisioned, that is, as a partnership in authority. Ultimately it was believed that by developing local agencies of rule under the chiefs, self-government would come about. In the Colony[5] and Ashanti areas of the Gold Coast, and in the Eastern[6] and Western[7] Regions of Nigeria, the very opposite of what was intended occurred. In these areas putting chiefs into the administrative hierarchy of the colonial service, no matter how "indirectly," violated the traditional prescriptions of office of these authorities. The result was to foster the growth of a nationalist movement which, in the Gold Coast, came ultimately to regard the chiefs in the same way as the British, that is, as imperialists. Much the same thing occurred in the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria, aggravated in the former instance by the fact that no traditional system of formalized chieftaincy existed, and the British had appointed paramount chiefs who had no indigenous source of support.

EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

In both Nigeria and the Gold Coast the traditional patterns of social life and organization have had thrust in their midst very modern Western types of organization. There has been the clear emergence of new status groupings based

[4] See A. C. Burns, *History of Nigeria* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951).

[5] The Colony is the coastal area of the Gold Coast.

[6] Predominantly Ibo.

[7] Predominantly Yoruba.

on money incomes, on occupational positions, and on awards of political authority. Further, there were sharp pressures toward upward mobility, heightened by the possibilities of success via well-known routes, for example, education, politics, or commerce. The situation was permissive. In other words, no racial barriers to the opportunities of Africans existed, in contradistinction to British East and Central Africa, where certain kinds of activity and roles are absolutely barred to Africans. With such an environment it was possible for expectations to develop far in advance of actualities. The situation was exaggerated by the penetration of commerce into all corners of Africa. In the Gold Coast today, for example, even the most "bush" cocoa farmer is dependent upon the decisions of the government as it fixes the prices he will receive for his cocoa from the Cocoa Marketing Board.[8] The amenities of Western culture have forced their way into tribal society, sometimes with drastic effects.[9] Large numbers of youth, for example, who have had some schooling or job training are no longer content with the normal agricultural system of the past, the authority of the chiefs and elders, or even the responsibilities and demands put upon them by traditional family life. An atomization of traditional social structure often occurred in which the family, the village, the territorial division were no longer the exclusive social organizations to which individuals belonged.

For those who found such organizations restrictive, political parties served to refocus their lives, providing acceptable opportunities to whatever gratifications people sought. Much of the more flaming radical nationalism came from the slums of Usshertown in Accra, or from Lagos or Ibadan, where traditional society had loosened its hold while new ways of life and standards served as a major attraction. Some of the prerequisites for nationalism and mass organization came about when education did not automatically result in acceptable jobs, when demand for commercial products was not matched by purchasing power, and hostility against the British as rulers found no acceptable medium of expression. The early nationalists, mainly chiefs and the "British Africans" (that is, those who were trained under British auspices and became "black Englishmen" divorced from the general public), were gradually displaced as important political figures by members of the mass radical "movement-party" devoted to rapid change and self-government. In the Gold Coast the intellectuals, lawyers, and other professional men in the United Gold Coast Convention themselves received little of the support given to Kwame Nkrumah in the movement which provided psychological sustenance to thousands, whether Fanti, Ashanti, Ewe, or Krobo. The Convention People's Party superseded traditional tribal boundaries, recruiting individuals from a broad base in which many differing peoples, for many diverse motives, shouldered the common burden.

[8] A Statutory Board.

[9] A Gold Coast Liberation Movement has been initiated in Ashanti as part of a protest against the price of cocoa fixed by the government. This organization has set as its object a federal system and is supported by the Asanteman Council.

Nigeria

A similar development in Nigeria, particularly under Dr. Azikiwe, was unable to unite diverse groupings in a common organ devoted to independence. The degree of public disenchantment with colonial officialdom proved less intense in Nigeria, particularly in the rural areas. With a huge territory in

which the penetration of Western patterns of subsistence moved more slowly than in the Gold Coast, and where traditions of tribal warfare and local particularism remained strong, regional-tribal boundaries proved too strong for the emergence of a popular mass party coalescing large groups from all parts of Nigeria, devoted to independence under a single leadership. Rather the contrary occurred, in some instances where the "movement-party" might count on more traditional bonds as a stimulus for recruitment than was true of the Convention People's Party in the Gold Coast. In this regard, party rivalry is exacerbated by tribal nationalism. Such a system would seem self-perpetuating so long as the Action Group in the west of Nigeria and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons continue to appeal to regional ties and to tribal membership.

It is in the Gold Coast rather than in Nigeria that there has occurred the most rapid advance toward self-government via a newly developed central conciliar system based on the British parliamentary model. Compared to the Gold Coast, Nigeria is in far more difficult straits, with a population of over 31 millions, and three regional divisions having widely differing cultural attributes as well as competing and conflicting political aims. The Muslim emirates of Northern Nigeria remain more or less autocratic. They tend to stand against independence, fearing the domination of the Ibo and Yoruba to the south. In the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, where much the same conditions exist, the situation is less telling for several reasons. One perhaps that is difficult to evaluate today is the fact that the Northern groups were in part subject to the Ashanti in the central part of the Gold Coast. Perhaps more important today is the fact that they are the most poverty-stricken, the most poorly educated, and the generally least influential of the three major groupings of the Gold Coast. By contrast, the Northern Region of Nigeria is about three times as large as the Western and Eastern Regions combined, and has a population over twice as large as either one of them.

THE GOLD COAST

In spite of all the ills that plague her, the Gold Coast remains the most hopeful spot on the map of Africa, if one is concerned with African freedom and self-government. As the people of the Gold Coast are themselves aware, the world is watching this small territorial artificiality as it takes over the reins of government and, under an African Prime Minister, Cabinet, and Legislative Assembly, creates a nation state.[10]

The Gold Coast has already come a long way since the British formally established their rule in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Gold Coasters have left behind and perhaps lost forever some of their traditional heritage, in their haste for the symbols and artifacts of Europe. But much of their traditional environment remains, holding both promise and problems for those who seek to make Ghana [11] a free nation of free Africans in what remains a predominantly colonial continent.

Traditional Gold Coast society was not limited to the Gold Coast as we know it today. With borders drawn arbitrarily, this small nation of some

[10] For a short discussion of the political problems attendant upon such development see "Political Democracy in the Gold Coast" in the forthcoming volume *Africa in the Modern World*, Norman Wait Harris Foundation Lectures (University of Chicago Press).

[11] The nationalist name for the Gold Coast taken from the historic Ghana kingdom of the Sudan, which reached its glory in the eleventh century and from which some Gold Coasters claim the modern Akan derive.

92,000 square miles, containing a population of some 4½ millions, has been cut off from people in the Ivory Coast, a French possession to the west. Its historic affiliations in the north are towards the French Sudan and the Mossi peoples, while its eastern border cuts through the much disputed Ewe country towards the coast, where approximately one-third of the Ewe people live in the Gold Coast proper, one-third in Togoland under British Administration,[12] and one-third in French Togoland and Dahomey. Further, a great cultural and and historic bifurcation can be seen, dividing the Gold Coast into the predominantly Islamic peoples of the Northern Territories and the Akan and other peoples of the coastal and forest regions to the south. The latter treated the Northerners with contempt, formerly found slaves among them, and kept them in acknowledged obeisance. Today the southerners are finding new reasons for their traditional prejudices. Their lands produce cocoa, they have money to educate their youth, they dominate the Convention People's Party, the nationalist organization which has brought the country to the threshold of independence, while the Northerner ekes out his existence under the dry desert heat which rolls in from the Sahara.

In spite of divisions and continual cleavages this area, with historical tribal disputes often extenuated by new conditions, has developed under colonial aegis and nationalist prompting into a parliamentary state. The leadership is confident that all they need is political power in order to move mountains, build roads, equip schools, and turn the country into a modern nation. They have been given political power, and both the British and the Africans are impressed with the skill and efficiency with which these objectives have been tackled. Almost everyone is in favor of the present government, the British no less, perhaps, than some of the Convention People's Party zealots. From 1946 when the Burns Constitution, which gave Africans a majority of the Legislative Council, came into effect, providing representation for chiefs, municipal leaders, and appointees of the Governor, until today when the Legislative Assembly (elected from 104 electoral districts on a popular electoral basis) determines what is law, power has been given to Africans to do with it what they will.

[12] *Togoland* is a United Nations Trust Territory.

Problems

Many hardships still face the people of the Gold Coast. They have, to a great extent, many of the problems common to what are generally called "underdeveloped" areas, where extractive industries and agricultural produce predominate and where no institutionalized pattern of savings and investment or wage labor exists.[13] There are severe shortages of trained personnel. Recently an accelerated plan for education came into effect to promote universal education, but the prospects for its success are not yet clear.[14] Illiteracy is high, particularly in the north.[15] The new University College of the Gold Coast which gives a London University External Degree has been one attempt to meet the needs for an educated population (along the lines of the Cambridge model), while the Kumasi College of Technology has been established to turn

[13] For a discussion of Gold Coast economic conditions and their relevance to politics see "Some Economic Factors in the Political Development of the Gold Coast" in *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 14 (1954), No. 4.

[14] See Ministry of Education, *The Accelerated Development Plan for Education* (Accra: Government Printer, 1952).

[15] The present Minister of Education is from the Northern Territories.

out the technicians which a modern development program would require.

The nationalists seek to develop the country as the first fruit of political freedom. Yet they inherit certain basic deficiencies such, for example, as limited port facilities and shortages of crucial building supplies. Even cement, the major building material, must be imported from Great Britain at large cost, although a cement plant will soon be constructed under a government plan.[16] Meanwhile development projects increase employment and wages, but no corresponding increase in consumer products is available to supply the enlarged buying community, which wants the pots, pans, clothes, automobiles, and radios made in other parts of the world. The danger of inflation is therefore acute.[17] On the other hand cocoa, the primary product of the Gold Coast, from which most of her income is derived, is tied in value to the world market. The prosperity and income of the Gold Coast depends upon how much cocoa and chocolate America and Great Britain consume. Partly for this reason and partly as a move to develop the internal resources of the country, the Volta River Development Scheme, which will produce electricity, irrigate the Accra plains that are arable only part of the year, and produce processed aluminum from the large bauxite reserves of the Gold Coast, has been initiated in an effort to reduce the Gold Coast dependence upon one commodity, cocoa.

In spite of the great programs of development upon which the government has engaged, it is important to note that government remains the great entrepreneur. The most alert, active elements in the nationalist movement have, in co-operation with their British administrative staff, pushed for economic change as part of the political program of nationalism. By their use of authority, they have given central government extremely utilitarian functions by which they maintain their own support. Yet it must be remembered that the Gold Coast is still a place where more people have their hands outstretched waiting to be helped than will help themselves. It is a place where people do not quite know where to turn, particularly in the rural areas, to enjoy the fruits of political freedom in economic terms. Under these conditions, government becomes the great focal point of economic and social change, translating the vague wants and dissatisfactions of the public into "positive action." [18]

The pressures upon the government are all the more critical since it must maintain its popularity at the polls. For many whose expectations were too great, or who find themselves threatened by those who no longer keep to traditional ways of life, nationalism is bitter. For the Elders, who occupied positions of great prestige in traditional society, as for the chiefs, being spurned by aggressively minded youth is a bitter pill to swallow. For others, who expected miracles once Kwame Nkrumah came to office, less change is evident than they desired. Streets were not suddenly paved, wells did not appear overnight, and the problems that plagued them before plague them still. The government of Kwame Nkrumah must handle demands of all kinds in an atmosphere of shortage, of badly trained personnel, and of great hopes and expectations. It must be aware of the problems facing rural schools in a little bush village, and hear the complaints of the chiefs who come with their staffs of office, clad in their brilliant "togas," with their retinues, their umbrellas, their petitions, and their dignity, to protest to the government that they are being undermined.

[16] See W. R. Lewis, *Report on Industrialization* (Accra: Government Printer, 1953).

[17] See Dudley Sears and C. R. Ross, *Report on Financial and Physical Problems of Development in the Gold Coast,* Office of the Government Statistician (Accra: Government Printer, 1953).

[18] "Positive action" was the original slogan of the CPP, referring to a policy of nonviolent but active opposition to the British authorities prior to the Constitution of 1950. It was during the positive-action campaign that Nkrumah and others were put in jail in 1948.

Kwame Nkrumah

Kwame Nkrumah, the first African prime minister in a British dependency, is a most unusual person. A compound of idealism, political shrewdness, organizing genius, and good common sense, he has created a mass political party and a social movement which claims thousands of members throughout the Gold Coast, yet which is committed to no dogma, no fixed set of principles, and no binding objectives save one, self-government. In almost every village there is a "swish" [19] house with the red, white, and green pennant of the Convention People's Party fluttering from a stick. Each unit will have its district or local secretary, its propaganda secretary, and, invariably, several local ward boys who do "favors" for the population, usually for a small fee. A picture of Nkrumah in business suit or toga may adorn the wall. Outside, the town looks much as it must have appeared to the District Commissioners who on "shanks' mare" made their tours of the districts and villages thirty years ago (or to the chief who now sits increasingly deserted in his house, while the retainers, now ward boys, are increasingly disrespectful and strive to replace him in the central positions of authority). Kwame Nkrumah has indeed led a mass radical movement to political responsibility. He has displaced the well-dressed lawyers and professional men who once laid claim to the title "nationalist." He has taken the young away from the Elders and chiefs and alerted them to potentialities which only a few years ago they would have never envisioned. The District Commissioner of yesterday might see little change in the landscape, but he could scarcely walk through the seemingly undisturbed villages without being acutely aware that something big had happened.

[19] "Swish" is red laterite soil which is used for building materials in the Gold Coast.

Convention People's Party

What kind of movement and party organization has Kwame Nkrumah created? He has created a weapon, crude, strong, and solid, which brought him and his followers out of jail into positions of authority. It is a cross between a Tammany machine and an evangelical movement. Instead of preaching tribal membership and tradition, it promises salvation to all who join, and to join is to believe in and fight for independence. It is open to all those who will direct themselves to the well-defined goal, freedom, but the terms of freedom are being worked out on a more pragmatic basis. To date these terms have increasingly been those of parliamentary democracy. The movement collects the culturally displaced persons who see in the political party a means to gain personal advantage. It collects opportunists who want political power and know that there is no power other than that granted by Nkrumah. It supports those partly educated dissatisfied youth who have seen an image of a different world, and who believe that Nkrumah will lead them to greater prosperity, dignity, and achievement than possible under colonial rule.

It is often a rags-and-tatters political party, given to great enthusiasm,

united in devotion to Nkrumah, undisciplined, organized in some respects like a Communist party, with a central committee and Nkrumah as "Life Chairman." Yet it is radical, empirical, and popular, rather than elitist, dogmatic, and parochial. It is by no means an organization where all decisions flow from the top down, but rather one where good communications, local freedom of expression, and "rebellions" against party directives help to keep the "Life Chairman" in touch with popular attitudes and give him some idea of public sentiment in villages and towns.[20] The Convention People's Party is not separated from the general public by self-importance and prestige positions, or by strings of degrees, or by occupations other than politics. The leadership devotes its full time to the business of creating a public interest, and catering to it in regular ward-heeler fashion. The opposition, a conglomeration of intellectuals, lawyers, discredited nationalists and ex-CPP members, and Northern Territories and Muslim groups, is neither a cohesive group nor an alternate government. The most serious effort to create a national opposition, under the guidance of Dr. K. A. Busia, professor of sociology at the University College of the Gold Coast, met with failure at the polls.[21] Such an opposition has neither the issues, the personnel, the time, nor the money to actively oppose the government. Theirs is a perennially negative position, attempting to criticize a man and a program which, at present, have never been more popular. It has often been stated that no true opposition will appear in the Gold Coast parliament until final self-government is achieved. Others, less hopeful, feel that after the British leave it is most unlikely that Nkrumah will tolerate any real opposition which might threaten his supremacy. In any case, for the moment it is difficult to see how an opposition based on more than purely transitory matters [22] might develop, excepting, perhaps, the rebirth of regional nationalism, which is possibly latent in Gold Coast politics.

Responsible representative government

We have tried to give some indication of how and why nationalism has emerged in the Gold Coast, and how the challenge of public responsibility and office has been met. Nationalism has become legitimate. Yesterday's radicals are the responsible public figures of today. Nkrumah has risen from "dangerous agitator" to Africa's greatest statesman in only a few short years, both in the esteem of his own people and the estimate of the British from whom he wrested power. Using a unitary parliamentary system, he is proceeding to wield a national democratic society out of the hitherto fragmented segments of the population. The earlier impact of commercialism and the decay of tribal organization is being minimized, while the stimulation of new ideas and objectives is more and more represented in an integrated national policy.

In spite of certain dangers in this process of developing a parliamentary system in the Gold Coast via the Convention People's Party, as matters stand now it is likely that the Gold Coast will have a far easier time developing an accepted unified pattern of parliamentary authority in the near future than Nigeria. If anything, Nkrumah is holding back on the final dissolution of colonial status in order to maximize later success. Having a firm majority in the Legislative Assembly and faced by a timid regional opposition representing the North, the development of the internal economy and local development are matters which preoccupy the regime. The government is less concerned with decisions regarding what should be done than it is with questions of what is the best way to achieve objectives. For this purpose the parliamentary system with its administrative adjunct serves admirably. The Nkrumah government which was advocating immediate self-government in 1949 is now itself reluctant to make the final step. In other words, the point has been reached where constitutional matters are not the primary questions of the day, nor are issues over the participation and degree of control to be exerted by Africans. There is responsible representative government—the routine of government business continuing under the Nkrumah government in the fashion of cabinet government.

[20] Recently there has been an attempt to tighten up control over locals which do not stay in line. During the recent elections when several locals chose candidates who did not have official CPP blessing, the candidates were expelled from the party if they failed to drop out of the race. Sixty-four members of the party were expelled for this reason.

[21] Busia, himself, was the only member of his party, the Ghana Congress Party, elected in the 1954 election.

[22] Such as the present Ashanti "separatist" movement due in part to local objections to the price of cocoa fixed by the government and which has as its object a federal constitution.

NIGERIA

Several miles to the east of the Gold Coast across the French dominated areas of French Togoland and Dahomey, the largest colony in the British dependent empire, Nigeria, follows hard on the heels of the Gold Coast in constitutional change and self-government. The Ibo of the Eastern Region, supporting the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) under its dynamic leader Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Yoruba of the Western Region united in the Action Group led by Obafemi Awolowo, and the Muslims of the North under their emirs in the Northern People's Congress and the Northern Elements Progressive Union indicate tribal separatism and divisions which make rapid political progress difficult. A federal constitution, regarded as the only workable scheme for uniting Nigeria into a single entity for political purposes, has been regarded by many as a device by the Colonial Office to slow down the pace of nationalism. In spite of such criticisms, it is difficult to see any alternative to federalism at this time. Recent constitutional discussions in London and Lagos held under the auspices of the Secretary of State for Colonies have indicated the extent to which regional differences and local prejudices have made co-operation difficult.[23] At present the possibilities for co-operation between the Action Group and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons look hopeful. Upon that co-operation much of Nigeria's national future rests.

If the Gold Coast faces difficulties caused by disease, ignorance, shortages in trained workers, lack of port facilities, poor transport, and a population geared more to new demands than to new efforts, Nigeria faces all these on a more grandiose scale. By contrast, the Gold Coast is in a superior position to take the structures of parliamentary government and use them for operational purposes, that is, solving just these kinds of problems. In Nigeria, with a large population, the amount of resources, both human and physical, required to pursue programs of political and economic construction looms much larger. At the same time, the federal system based upon regional integrity

[23] How the federal constitution was established and the issues raised is a revealing chapter in Nigerian political history. See *Proceedings of the General Conference on Review of the Constitution*, January 1950 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1950).

has resulted in partially separate budgets, tax schedules and requirements, and separate governmental organs with their own council of ministers, prime minister, house of assembly, administrative service. The various regional governments are therefore left to advance as they can towards political development, while the over-all role of the central government remains unclear. This poses a unique difficulty in the way of creating a consciousness of national membership and promoting a viable central system of authority for a united Nigeria.

Regional separatism

Considering that the Gold Coast and Nigeria were ruled by a common colonial system, and both originally showed marked tribal differences and demarcations, particularly as between north and south, the question is often raised regarding the relative insignificance of regional separatism in the Gold Coast and its persistence in Nigeria. In spite of the growth of new social groupings whose interests, both intellectual and economic, would seem more unifying than any possible tribal affiliations, why has tribal separatism been maintained? One answer, perhaps, lies with the character of indigenous institutions in Nigeria, the response of which to the stimuli of Western culture was in some ways very different from that among the Akan groups in the Gold Coast. In the Gold Coast those chiefs and lawyers who had performed conspicuous service for the British administration were ultimately regarded as traitors and viewed as absolute barriers to real freedom. They, no less than the British, were objects of public odium and in the final sweep of radical nationalism chiefs, their retinues, their followers, and the lawyers and politicians of indirect rule were all classified together, and scarcely any have survived in public office today. By abolishing their former leaders and chiefs, Nkrumah was able to direct attention to himself as the central leader. Such a situation did not occur in anything like the same degree in Nigeria. In the Eastern Region, among the Ibo, the lack of a centralized system of traditional authority and indigenous patterns of marketing and commerce allowed a superficial adaptation to British ways of economic life, while scarcely impeding social organization. A somewhat atomistic form of traditional life helped to absorb the immediate impact of European culture. When, however, the British began to install paramount chiefs among the Ibo, who have little formal system of chieftaincy, the basis for later nationalism was laid. Today the NCNC, which recruits largely from the Ibo groups, is the strongest potential for a national political party in Nigeria.

Western Region

In the Western Region a complex system of "cult" groups or semireligious organizations, such as the old Ogboni societies, exercised subsidiary authority. These groups allowed traditional activities to continue in spite of increasing contacts with Western authorities and culture. They deflected the full impact of colonial rule from the agencies of chieftaincy, and the latter were not "undermined" as in the Gold Coast. Moreover, the British "saved" the Yoruba from continuing the long and costly series of wars which had reduced the strength of the Egba, and almost destroyed the authority of the Alafin of Oyo. Depredations from the Emir of Ilorin among the Yoruba were halted. Not only did the British help re-establish peace among the Yoruba, but they enhanced the power of some of the local chiefs, and by considerable segments of the population were regarded more as saviors than as colonial adventurers.[24] One result has been a less wholehearted disaffiliation from chieftaincy. The various traditional societies like the Ogboni served to deflect some of the more drastic effects of British rule, while newly strengthened chiefs aided the re-establishment of trade and normal social life so sorely taxed from years of intertribal warfare and raiding. Even today the Oni of Ife is regarded as one of the powers behind the Action Group, and the chiefs still figure in political life in a way which they have been unable to do in the Gold Coast for perhaps twenty years.

The North

Meanwhile in the North where a more patriarchal social pattern under an accommodated system of Islamic law persists, orientation to radical political change is decidedly negative. Efforts to enhance the nationalist position in the North[25] have often resulted in riots and deaths. The emirs recognize the threat to their supremacy of the southern inspired nationalist movements.

Weakened nationalist potential

With such sharply differentiated cultural differences within the area demarcated by the present boundary of Nigeria, the establishment of sanctioned symbols of centralized authority is difficult. In the Gold Coast, the political party has served up a unifying theme around self-government while denigrating traditional social organization. In Nigeria traditional social organization has combined with secular politics, and it has been difficult for a mass movement cutting across tribal boundaries to develop. The local organs fulfill some of the same functions which the Convention People's Party performs in the Gold Coast, thereby weakening the nationalist potential and reducing mass solidarity and recruitment. Among the Ibo, for example, tribal unions keep alive tribal bonds and separatism, particularly among migrants to Yoruba country to the west. Such tribal unions promoted protection, security, and cohesiveness based on ethnic and cultural affiliations. But although they facilitate local activity in community life, they reduce the sharp awareness of an all-embracing national polity in which all Nigeria should participate.[26]

PARLIAMENTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

One of the great questions which plague political scientists is how to calculate the effects of a given measure in the context of social change. The West African experience does give some indication of how secular conciliar institutions can affect the massive reorganization of social life by peaceful means. In both Nigeria and the Gold Coast, government is one of the means of promoting a new way of life.

Because of the crucial role it can play in these processes, central government assumes an importance in underdeveloped areas which has not been habitual in the West. It is of crucial significance where large territorial areas having a multitude of demands need to be developed on an integrated basis. Central government is then in the position of balancing developmental priorities against local requirements, short run objectives against long run objectives, receiving a total revenue out of which capital investment can proceed.[27]

[24] A good example of this position is found in Samuel Johnson's *History of the Yoruba* (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1921).

[25] Particularly by the Northern Elements Progressive Union.

[26] See Aloba Abiodun, "Tribal Unions in Party Politics," *West Africa*, July 10, 1954.

[27] Implicit here is the key role of government as investor. Contrary to popular assumptions, private capital is scarce and un-

Further, administrative organization and conciliar organs are integrated from local to central levels under British administrative practice. The Gold Coast "revolution" has involved replacing expatriates with Africans, while establishing a parliament, with cabinet government, as the central decision-making body. This type of organization has facilitated the rapid development of the Gold Coast towards self-government.

Regionalism versus nationalism

In Nigeria, however, central government is in a sense residual to regional government. Close administrative and political ties are found at the regional level and matters of public business are conceived of in regional terms. The region has become the functioning group to be represented in the central legislature. Administrative officers receive their instructions from a public divided into relative power blocs with differing degrees of effective demand. In other words, the responsiveness of authorities in Nigeria is more to pure power than in the Gold Coast. Such a pattern inhibits the growth of national consensus and obfuscates and distorts basic needs in society. Priorities are scheduled more on the basis of local demands than according to a projected state of affairs. That such a condition is highly desirable under some circumstances will be conceded, but special conditions in underdeveloped areas tend to minimize the advantages of federalism. If parliamentary institutions are to have genuine meaning in a nonindigenous environment, then they must become part of the meaningful pattern of daily life. In the long run, the advantages accruing from an efficiently operating central authority seem great. The successful integration of nationalism with parliamentary organs in the Gold Coast has made the transition to self-government almost an administrative shift. Having gathered a large mass following, the party machinery has sought to maximize the benefits it can bring, both to the country and to party members and officials, by using the full paraphernalia of parliamentary government. Nkrumah can capitalize on the administrative hierarchy of ministries and departments to service public needs, meanwhile retaining the *expertise* of British administrators as needed. At the same time an expansion of the offices available to party members built into a system of parliamentary and bureaucratic interrelationships makes the parliamentary system useful to the nationalist cause. Those agencies which provide the Convention People's Party with an efficient means of capitalizing on its initial political successes reduce the danger of a distortion and perversion of authority, while democratic processes can become more and more entrenched.

In Nigeria the recognition of regional needs and imperatives has tended to harden local and regional parochialism. The perpetuation of such conditions in a federal system means that general consensus expressed through parliamentary means can only be tentative, and on minor issues. Equally, a sense of national solidarity and membership in a united Nigeria is postponed. In the Gold Coast the "revolution" against local particularism, tradition, and regionalism has occurred. The "movement" became the party. The radicals assumed the propriety of the parliamentarian. This has not yet occurred in Nigeria. The regions have remained affiliational and orientational boundaries, and the advantages of independence under such circumstances seem gravely reduced.

Both the Gold Coast and Nigeria are examples, however, of different approaches toward the development of self-governing democracies in West Africa. The value of parliamentary institutions as vehicles of social change is being tested in this process. Equally, the cause of African freedom hangs in the balance.

available in anything like necessary amounts, and government assumes the entrepreneurial function.

David E. Apter, Ph.D., Evanston, Illinois, is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University. He was engaged in field research in West Africa in 1952–53 under a Social Science Research Council Area Research Training fellowship, and is author of the forthcoming volume, The Gold Coast in Transition: A Case Study of Political Institutional Transfer.

British Central Africa: Politics Under Federation

By Kenneth Kirkwood

THE fact that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland [1] is barely a year old raises a number of difficulties for the analyst of politics under federation. If, however, we view recent events against the political background of Central Africa and the related territories of British Africa we can more safely comment on current developments and the outlook for the future.

World, Commonwealth, and African Background

In the Federation of Central Africa where less than a quarter-million whites live among more than six million indigenous Africans, racial problems dominate the political scene. The estimated population in 1951 is shown in the accompanying table.

Estimated Population in British Central Africa, 1951

	Whites	Africans	(Asian and Other Colored)	Total
Southern Rhodesia	138,000	2,010,000	10,500	2,158,500
Northern Rhodesia	37,000	1,890,000	3,500	1,930,500
Nyasaland	4,000	2,390,000	5,000	2,399,000
Total	179,000	6,290,000	19,000	6,488,000

The following words used by a former Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, in a House of Commons debate on federation, provide a concise and convenient comment on the world setting:

> Behind the matter we are to discuss to-day lies one of the central problems of our generation, which will certainly be with us throughout this generation, namely, the question of colour and of racial relations. In many parts of the world colour conflict has transcended class division as the motive force of politics and history. I think that the claim of the Soviet Union to be able to solve problems of colour is now much more potent than her claim to solve social and economic problems of the world.[2]

Within the Commonwealth of Nations today a major choice facing all her peoples is whether they are to seek to create a strong, united, multiracial international association or to consolidate bonds based on differences in ethnic and social origin. During the discussions on Central African federation there were marked differences in outlook, on questions such as the weight to be attached to African opposition, between Britain and the older, or "Anglo-Saxon," dominions on the one hand and India, Pakistan, and the new, or "non-European," member nations of the Commonwealth on the other. Where many Britons, Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders continued to think in terms of the prewar policy of trusteeship towards the nonwhite peoples, Indians, West Africans, and West Indians were highly critical of any actions which appeared to be out of harmony with the postwar "partnership" policy of the Commonwealth.

[1] "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland" is the official name. A motion to adopt "Rhodesia" as the name for the whole Federation was introduced, but rejected, in the first session of the Federal Assembly.

[2] Patrick Gordon Walker, *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), *House of Commons*, Vol. 504, No. 137, col. 777, July 24, 1952.

In Africa the new Federation may best be examined within the context of the "plural" or "multiracial" societies of British Africa. Situated between the Union of South Africa, committed to an official policy of *apartheid*, and the territories of British East Africa, profoundly disturbed by the Mau Mau outbreak in Kenya, Central Africa may be seen as the last area or zone where Britain might hope to avert the dangers of extreme nationalism and racism.

Major Political Forces

The political aspirations of the Africans must be taken fully into account in any realistic appraisal of current policies and probable future trends in Central Africa but it is only recently, notably since 1945, that African political movements in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland have strengthened, in leadership and organization, to the point where they demand close and continuous attention. Before 1945, and even today, the struggles between rival groups of whites have preoccupied political leaders in Central Africa and the United Kingdom. The whites have tended to divide on two fundamental issues: the acceptance or otherwise of the Crown and the "British connection," and the control and regulation of relations between whites and Africans in Africa. If the nature and course of developments in Central Africa are to be understood we should keep in mind these two distinct, yet related and constantly interacting, planes of division.

Broadly stated, a small but vocal minority of whites in Central Africa, composed mainly of Afrikaans-speaking adherents of the Dutch Reformed Church from South Africa, are either republican in outlook or indifferent to the British Crown.[3] Most members of this group are also strongly opposed to any external intervention on behalf of the indigenous native peoples, or Africans, and the great majority are traditionally segregationist in their outlook on racial questions. (There is a small but important minority of Afrikaans-speaking liberals or nonracialists.)

The majority of the whites are English-speaking and most belong, albeit nominally, to one or other of the liberal Christian denominations. The English-speaking whites may be divided, almost equally, into those of British South African origin (from the Cape Province, Natal, and the Witwatersrand) and those who came directly from the United Kingdom. But although English-speaking settlers are conscious of differences in their place of origin and whether or not they are "new" or "old" settlers, it is difficult to determine any significant correlation between place of origin and length of residence in Africa with race attitudes and attitudes to the Crown. In general, the great majority of English-speaking whites have a conscious loyalty to the Crown and a desire to preserve the British connection, but a majority strongly oppose any United Kingdom control over native policy.[4]

[3] For historical reasons, notably the rivalry between Kruger and Rhodes in the late nineteenth century, many Afrikaans-speaking Central Africans view the political boundary between South Africa and the Rhodesias as purely arbitrary. They maintain close links with their fellows in South Africa and are very conscious of the powerful political position of Afrikaner-nationalists in the more populous and developed Union.

[4] Sir Godfrey Huggins drew considerable applause when, during a Southern Rhodesian debate on federation, he referred to the possibility of Central Africa's following the revolutionary path of the former British North

They also favor a policy of differentiation between Africans and Europeans, and a significant minority support a policy of *apartheid,* or thoroughgoing segregation. If it is helpful to label these main groups we might describe them as British-Dominionist, African-nationalist, and Afrikaner-nationalist.

If space permitted we should describe several other significant groups and subgroups among the whites and Africans, but a mere list of groups or "factors" must suffice. The general Imperial factor [5] is still important, as are the British-Liberal and British-Conservative subfactors. Historically, the Chartered Company factor was very significant, and the Missionary factor [5] must still be taken into account. The emergent Native-Liberal factor promises to become more potent in the future, drawing as it does upon nonracial Christians, African and white, and upon individuals of other religions and of nonracial secular outlook. The White Trade Unionist factor also justifies separate consideration. The main purpose in listing these further groups or "factors" is to emphasize the complex nature of the forces which operate in the highly dynamic political process of emergent Central African nationhood.

CLOSER ASSOCIATION MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AFRICA

Under this head it is convenient to consider separately the early attempts to unite the three territories, and the successful postwar endeavor. As in the case of South Africa, much is to be learned from the conclusions and efforts of the pioneer thinkers and actors who examined or sought to achieve closer political association. It is also possibly of more than incidental interest that whereas Union came about in South Africa after several unsuccessful attempts at federation, federation was effected in Central Africa after several unsuccessful attempts at union or amalgamation. In both cases the eventual form of the political association was strongly influenced by considerations of native policy or race relations.

A white movement

The British South Africa Company administration [6] sought to amalgamate Northern and Southern Rhodesia during World War I, but this move was nullified by the strong resistance of the settlers in Southern Rhodesia. It was not until after Southern Rhodesia achieved Responsible Government in 1923, and until the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia had attracted a substantial number of whites in the late 1920's, that the modern movement for closer association was initiated. It is difficult to overemphasize the fact that "closer association" has been an almost exclusively white movement since its inception; just as it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the fact that one of the principal motives of the local whites in seeking closer association was to remove or reduce the control of the United Kingdom government over native policy and administration.[7] If these facts are kept in mind, the events and reactions of whites and Africans become readily intelligible.

American Colonies, if the United Kingdom were to obstruct the aims of the local whites.

[5] As examples of the traditional British usage of "factor" see C. W. de Kiewiet, *The Imperial Factor in South Africa* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937) and R. Oliver, *The Missionary Factor in East Africa* (London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1952).

[6] The British South Africa Company administered the Rhodesias under a twenty-five year Royal Charter from 1889 to 1914. A Ten Year Supplemental Charter prolonged their administration until, in 1923, Southern Rhodesia was granted a Responsible Government constitution. The Colonial Office assumed responsibility for the government of Northern Rhodesia in 1924.

[7] Under the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Letters Patent of 1923 the right was reserved to the United Kingdom government to approve or disapprove legislation affecting African interests. There is no case on record to show that any law passed by the self-governing whites has been disallowed, although certain changes of detail have resulted from United Kingdom requests. In Northern Rhodesia white settlers have influenced native policy, but power and responsibility has rested directly with the Colonial Office and Colonial Service. In Nyasaland the white settlers have had little influence.

Hilton Young and Bledisloe Commissions

In the decade before the outbreak of World War II the aspirations of the supporters of closer association were frustrated by the determination of the British government to preserve intact what one English scholar has described as the southern frontier of the Trust, that is, the boundary between Northern and Southern Rhodesia. To British investigators, notably the majority of members of the Hilton Young Commission of 1927–29 [8] and the Bledisloe Commission of 1938–39,[9] the unproved native policy of parallel development in Southern Rhodesia supplied a major obstacle to the closer political association of that territory with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In the latter territories, administered by the Colonial Office, no theoretical barriers, horizontal or vertical, restricted or governed African advancement. Individual members of both commissions saw a strong case for the rearrangement of administrative organization and control in Central Africa, and the Bledisloe Commission, in particular, recognized a need for interterritorial co-operation between the three territories. But neither commission was prepared to ignore the different aims of native policy north and south of the Zambezi, recently described as a "Mason-Dixon line," nor were they willing to ignore the opposition of the Africans in the northern territories to closer political association with Southern Rhodesia.

In view of the subsequent adoption of the federal principle it is also pertinent to recall that the Hilton Young and Bledisloe Commissions rejected federation as well as amalgamation as being undesirable. The illiberal nature of the draft constitution drawn up by a conference of local white political leaders at the Victoria Falls in 1936,[10] and other indications of the aims of the settlers in seeking union, led the Bledisloe Commission to dismiss amalgamation, even though the economic and formal administrative advantages of this form of union were perceived. The alternative proposal of federation was rejected out of hand by both commissions because they saw little or no hope of a stable federal arrangement between a Colony enjoying Responsible Government and two Protectorates directly under the Crown. From their analysis they concluded that any such association would occasion friction between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom government which would lead to the disruption of the federation or complete amalgamation.

Efforts in Central Africa

The acceptance by the United Kingdom government of the recommendations of these commissions disappointed the white political leaders in Central Africa, but Sir Godfrey Huggins, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, and Mr. Roy Welensky, leader of the white unofficial members in the North-

[8] See *Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa.* Cmd. 3234/1929.

[9] *Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report.* Cmd. 5949/1939.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 113–15.

ern Rhodesian Legislative Council, persisted in their efforts to induce the United Kingdom government to re-examine the whole question of closer political association. For some years Huggins and Welensky supported the Central African Council,[11] which was instituted in 1945, but this consultative, co-ordinating body, with no legislative powers, proved unsatisfactory to the two leading political figures of the Rhodesias, and in 1949 a further meeting of white political leaders was held at the Victoria Falls to consider closer association.[12] The normal work of the Central African Council was interrupted when committees of officials were appointed to reconsider the desirability and the form of closer association.

Under Labour government

It was in 1950 that the British Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Attlee Labour government announced that there would be a fresh examination of closer association. In 1951 a Conference of Officials was held in London. These officials, drawn from the Public Service of Southern Rhodesia, the Colonial Service in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices in London, duly recommended, as a matter of urgency, that the three territories of Central Africa be brought together under a federal form of government.[13] The political dominance of the Malan Afrikaner-Nationalist government, returned to office in South Africa in 1948, and the rapid deterioration in race relations consequent upon the enforcement of *apartheid* occasioned the officials' sense of urgency.

In September 1951 the proposals of the officials were discussed by a conference of political leaders from the United Kingdom, the Rhodesias, and Nyasaland. The conference, held at the Victoria Falls, was attended by African representatives from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but Southern Rhodesia did not deem it necessary to include an African in its delegation, primarily because it considered its government to be representative of all races in the Colony. The Victoria Falls Conference reached agreement on a few important general matters, but little headway was made towards federation.[14] The British Cabinet Ministers, especially the Secretary of State for the Colonies, were subsequently criticized by local whites for being too concerned with African welfare and for the weight which they attached to African opposition to the federation proposals. However, barely a month after the conference the British general election saw the return of the present Churchill Conservative government, and new Secretaries of State for the Colonies and Commonwealth Relations assumed office.

Under Conservative government

There is no doubt that the new Conservative ministry was far less mindful of "partnership" than its predecessor. Certainly the responsible Ministers thought and acted within a framework of Trusteeship, and, as Trustees, they considered it legitimate for the United Kingdom government to make decisions for their African wards, and, if necessary, to impose these decisions. If this fundamental difference in outlook between the postwar Labour and Conservative governments is grasped it is easy to understand the course of events in 1952 and 1953. In January 1952 a private meeting took place in London between the British Ministers, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This paved the way for a further conference on federation in London in April 1952.[15] Two Africans from Southern Rhodesia attended, but they later declared their opposition to federation and refused to participate in subsequent proceedings. The African representatives invited from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland boycotted this conference and subsequent meetings.

Despite strong protests from the parliamentary opposition, the Labour and Liberal parties, who were alarmed by the manner in which the government ignored African demands and requests and by the amendments to safeguards for African interests in the draft constitution,[16] the Conservative Ministry continued on its path. Preparatory Judicial, Fiscal, and Public Service Commissions were appointed,[17] and in January 1953 a further conference was held to approve the final federal scheme.[18] African representatives from all three Central African territories were sent to London at this time to make evident the strength of African feeling against federation. They were sympathetically received by the British press and public, but little official attention was paid to their views. From a formal legal standpoint the decisions of the United Kingdom government and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on federation were sufficient to bind these territories, but under Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia, where a referendum had been promised, it was necessary to consult the electorate. The referendum was held in April 1953, and a substantial majority approved the federal scheme.[19] In July 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council was finally approved by a majority of the House of Commons, and the Order was

[11] The Central African Council, with an able secretariat, promoted a number of important parallel laws and interterritorial services during the years when it was active.

[12] The failure of the whites to invite African representatives to this unofficial conference did much to undermine the confidence of the African political leaders in the good faith of the local white politicians and influenced their subsequent outlook on federation.

[13] *Central African Territories: Report of Conference on Closer Association* (London, March 1951). Cmd. 8233/1951. With this report should be read Cmd. 8234/1951 (*Central African Territories: Geographical, Historical and Economic Survey*) and Cmd. 8235/1951 (*Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy*).

[14] Cmd. 8411/1951 contains both the communiqué issued after the Victoria Falls Conference, September 1951, and the statement of the Conservative government, issued in November 1951. The conference communiqué declared that economic and political partnership was the only policy under which federation could be brought about, that it was important for Central Africa to preserve the British connection and to strengthen British traditions and principles, and that a common handling of certain general problems was desirable, provided that "an acceptable scheme with adequate safeguards for all could be agreed upon." The communiqué makes plain, however, that the Africans were reluctant to consider federation and that they first wanted "partnership" defined and put into progressive operation.

[15] Cmd. 8573/1952 explains the background and certain details of the April–May conference, and it sets out the "Draft Federal Scheme" which was adopted by the conference and discussed in Parliament in the middle of 1952.

[16] In the original proposals of the officials a specially protected Minister for African Interests was included in the Federal executive.

[17] See *Reports of the Judicial Commission, July 1952* (Cmd. 8671/1952), the *Fiscal Commission, August 1952* (Cmd. 8672/1952), and the *Civil Service Preparatory Commission, August 1952* (Cmd. 8673/1952).

[18] See *Report by the Conference on Federation,* London, January 1953 (Cmd. 8753/1953) and *The Federal Scheme* prepared by the conference (Cmd. 8754/1953).

[19] The result of the 1953 Southern Rhodesian referendum was 25,570 votes to 14,729 in favor of federation. Although no direct comparison is possible, it is of interest that in the 1922 Southern Rhodesian referendum, 8,774 voted in favor of Responsible Government, and 5,989 for entry into the Union of South Africa. This was shortly before the return of the first predominantly Afrikaner-Nationalist government in the Union in 1924.

made on August 1, 1953. It is significant that the Labour and Liberal parties maintained their strong opposition to the end.[20]

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The full machinery of the Federation has yet to be brought into operation, but the main constituent elements are in being. A Governor-General is at the head of the structure of government. The substance of power, however, lies in the hands of a Ministry of six, drawn from the Federal Assembly and under Prime Minister Sir Godfrey Huggins. All Ministers of the Federal Executive are white elected members. The Federal Assembly comprises thirty-five members, of whom twenty-six are elected by exclusively or predominantly white constituencies; fourteen from Southern Rhodesia, eight from Northern Rhodesia, and four from Nyasaland. Of the other nine members, who specially represent African interests, six are Africans. The two African members from Northern Rhodesia and the two from Nyasaland are returned by African electors, but the two Africans from Southern Rhodesia are elected by the voters registered on the Common Roll of the Colony, that is, by an overwhelmingly white electorate.[21] The remaining three representatives of African interests are whites: the Southern Rhodesian member is elected by all the voters on the Common Roll, but the Northern Rhodesian member and the Nyasaland member are appointed by the Governors of their respective territories.

As a special safeguard for Africans there is an African Affairs Board, composed of representatives of African interests, which is a standing committee of the Federal Assembly.[22] Its main functions are to screen federal measures which may prove harmful to Africans and to recommend constructive measures. A special procedure is laid down in the Constitution to enable the Board to communicate its views to the Prime Minister, the Governor-General, and the United Kingdom government. The United Kingdom government has the ultimate power to approve or disapprove measures which appear to be detrimental to African interests.[23] A Federal Supreme Court and Federal Public Service complete the structure. The latter is still in process of formation under an Interim Federal Public Service Commission: the probable relative numbers, positions, and prospects of Africans and whites in the Service have yet to become apparent.

[20] The Opposition's main argument was based on the fact that the Africans had not consented to federation. The Opposition called divisions in the House of Commons when they voted against the second and third readings of the enabling bill, and also when on July 27, 1953 they voted against the motion for an address to the Crown requesting the making of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council.

[21] In November 1953 there were 48,870 white, 481 African, 586 Colored, and 606 Asiatic voters registered on the Common Voters' Roll of the Colony.

[22] There were several important changes to the composition and procedure of the African Affairs Board, as originally proposed by the officials, before it was finally agreed that the six members of the Board, three African and three white, should be drawn from the nine representatives of African interests in the Assembly. The officials had proposed *inter alia* that a Federal Minister for African Interests should be the chairman of the Board, and that the civil servants at the head of African affairs in the three territories should be members.

[23] The Constitution provides that any law to which the African Affairs Board objects shall be reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure. The United Kingdom government also has power to disallow a Federal law at any time within twelve months after it has been assented to by the Governor-General.

PRESENT TRENDS AND ISSUES: FEDERAL

All six Ministers of the Federal Executive and nineteen of the other ordinary elected white members of the Assembly represent the Federal party. The only other political party which is represented is the Confederate party, which has a solitary member who was returned by a Southern Rhodesian constituency. In the absence of any normal party political alignments the chief interest of the first session has lain in the behavior of members on racial issues.

From the evidence available thus far three broad groups may be distinguished. The largest, or central, group, led by Sir Godfrey Huggins, accepts the goal of eventual interracial partnership but, for an unspecified future, favors the continuance of differential treatment for Africans, especially in the social sphere. The liberal or nonracial group comprises about six members made up of the four Africans from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the white representative of African interests from Nyasaland, and the Federal party member for Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia. The segregationist group also comprises about six members: it is led by the Confederate party member[24] from Southern Rhodesia who, from time to time, has received the support of right-wing members of the Federal party. The white representatives of African interests from Northern and Southern Rhodesia, who are, respectively, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the African Affairs Board, and the two African representatives from Southern Rhodesia are included in the central group because they have tended to side with the Prime Minister and his supporters. They are, however, in the left wing of the center group, and the Africans from Southern Rhodesia have sometimes formed a bridge with the nonracial group.

The above crude classification is based partly on knowledge of the past behavior of members, but mainly on their reaction to specific racial issues which have arisen in the course of the first session. There have been several issues of this kind during debates on draft laws such as the Income Tax and Immigration Bills, while certain motions have dealt specifically with race relations. The most controversial and revealing debate was on a motion introduced by an African member from Northern Rhodesia and seconded by an African from Nyasaland. The original motion called for equality of treatment of all races in all public places within the Federation, and for the enforcement of equal treatment by Federal legislation. The debate, however, was largely confined to racial discrimination in post offices and on the Rhodesia Railways. The white missionary representative of African interests from Nyasaland therefore moved an amendment calling for the admission of all first- and second-class passengers, irrespective of race, to the restaurant coaches on the Rhodesia Railways, and for the removal of racial divisions in the post offices. This motion was defeated by a 24 to 6 vote. Although they participated in the debate, none of the representatives of African interests from Southern Rhodesia voted in the divisions. A Federal party amendment was then carried and the original motion fell away. This amendment called for an endeavor to provide improved facilities for all races.[25]

[24] The native policy of the Confederate party is essentially the same as the *apartheid* policy of the Union government. The party advocates "the principle of separate development and land apportionment as between European and Native" and "the principle of special Native representation." See *The Confederate Party: Statement of Principles* (Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, 1953).

[25] *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Federal*

PRESENT TRENDS AND ISSUES: TERRITORIAL

The Nyasaland African Congress has recently demanded the advancement of Nyasaland to self-government status,[26] and African leaders, including representatives in the Federal Assembly, have reaffirmed their opposition to federation. They also expressed a strong desire to be linked politically with Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika and to cut adrift from Southern Rhodesia. These demands, especially the demand for self-government, have been ill-received by whites, most of whom perceive a serious threat to the whole structure of the Federation if Nyasaland Africans are accorded a form of government comparable to that which exists in Southern Rhodesia. The African National Congress also warned of a possible cessation of the flow of African migrant workers from Nyasaland. It is doubtful if this could be achieved, but the threat has perturbed many white employers in the Rhodesias who are dependent on Nyasa labor. As an indication of the general reactions to this situation in Nyasaland we may quote the white editor of a right-wing Southern Rhodesian journal who has chosen to draw on the authority of Abraham Lincoln to support his view that the "preservation of the Union" is a higher duty than the recognition of "state rights."

Northern Rhodesia

African National Congress leaders in Northern Rhodesia have made demands similar to those of their fellows in Nyasaland, but two recent developments of particular interest have commanded public attention in that territory. They are the introduction and acceptance of the "Moffat Resolutions" in the Northern Rhodesian Territorial Legislature,[27] and the breakdown in negotiations to end the industrial color bar on the copper mines. John Smith Moffat, a white member nominated to represent African interests in the Legislative Council, won the overwhelming support of African and white members of the House for his resolutions which declared that the objective of policy in Northern Rhodesia must be to remove from each race the fear that the other might dominate for its own racial benefit, and that every lawful inhabitant has the right to progress according to his character, qualifications, training, ability, and industry, without distinction of race, color, or creed. While the declared goal was a franchise with no separate representation for the races, the special interim arrangements for communal representation would have to continue, to prevent domination of one race by the other. Meanwhile the United Kingdom should continue to hold the balance on contentious issues.

In the practical field of race relations the failure of the mining companies and the white trade unionists to reach agreement on means of allowing the advancement of African workers on the copper mines is very significant. These particular negotiations, which have been in progress for fifteen months, have been followed with keen interest by Africans throughout the territory. As the copper mines are the mainspring of the territorial and the Federal economy, the issue is of crucial importance. The Northern Rhodesian government, in an effort to break the deadlock, has now appointed a Board of Inquiry to make recommendations. In view of the past failure of similar investigations it is difficult to forecast the outcome of this inquiry, but there can be little doubt that the white mineworkers will strongly resist recommendations which appear to threaten their interests.

Southern Rhodesia

In Southern Rhodesia the territorial Prime Minister, Mr. Garfield Todd, the ex-missionary successor of Sir Godfrey Huggins, is in a strong position in the territorial Assembly where his party, the United Rhodesia party, committed to the support of federation, holds twenty-six of the thirty seats.[28] Two strikes, one by African mineworkers and one by white railway workers, have threatened the colonial economy during the life of this government, elected in January 1954, but both were settled by decisive government action. Apart from these industrial disturbances the principal preoccupation of the government appears to have been its effort to devise means of retaining white immigrants in the territory, in competition with the opportunities afforded by the Union of South Africa and Northern Rhodesia. A good deal of attention has also been given to the defense training of whites, and the citizen forces have received special instruction in methods designed to ensure internal security.

The Colony has continued to apply its traditional policy of "parallel development" towards the Africans, and there have been no major amendments to the Land Apportionment Act and Natives (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act, which effect territorial segregation, or to the Industrial Conciliation Act, which helps to enforce a policy of occupational segregation. The only significant amendments to the Land Apportionment Act are those which are designed to permit the new university to cater to both African and white students, and to permit the first African barrister to occupy chambers in the center of Salisbury, the Federal capital. In the political sphere the Prime Minister has announced his intention of reviewing the franchise qualifications, but the precise nature of the proposed amendments remains uncertain.[29]

Assembly, July 20, 1954, No. 29, cols. 1483–1532; July 29, 1954, No. 35, cols. 1938–84. The debate on a motion proposing the admission of African students to the Gwebi Agricultural College, Southern Rhodesia, also contains much of interest; see *Ibid.*, August 3, 1954, No. 37, cols. 2098–2138.

[26] Nyasaland is a Protectorate under the control of the United Kingdom government. It is administered by a Governor and Commander-in-Chief who is assisted by an Executive Council composed of a majority of senior officials, *ex officio*, including the Secretary for African Affairs, and nominated unofficial members. The Legislative Council is composed of official and unofficial members nominated by the Governor. It has been usual to have a majority of whites among the nominated unofficials. Africans have recently demanded at least parity of representation with whites.

[27] Northern Rhodesia is also under the control of the Crown but it has a substantially greater measure of "self-government" than Nyasaland. The "member" system is in operation and a minority of elected unofficials hold portfolios in the Executive Council. Again, the white unofficial members of the Legislative Council are elected, not nominated. They are, however, counterbalanced by *ex officio* and nominated officials, and by members, including Africans, appointed to represent African interests.

[28] Southern Rhodesia is the only territory with a reasonably well-developed political party system. In the years immediately after the war Sir Godfrey Huggins' United party had a bare majority and was in danger of defeat by a party resembling the Confederate party, which advocated thoroughgoing racial segregation. From 1948, however, the United party has continued to hold at least 24 of the 30 seats, even though the majorities gained by it in about seven of the constituencies have been of less than 100 votes. The present Opposition comprises two Independents, one member of the Independent Rhodesia party and one member of the Independent Labour party.

[29] The Southern Rhodesian practice of having a nonracial electoral register, or Common Voters' Roll, was taken over from the Cape Colony. Throughout the history of the territory there have been attempts to prevent or minimize further African enrollment, and in

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Prognostications about the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland range from predictions of imminent, disastrous interracial warfare, to forecasts of a new era of unbounded economic prosperity, when all races will co-operate with great mutual cordiality. While I feel a sense of cautious optimism, I believe that the achievement of partnership will be a long and painful process.[30]

The first general problem to consider arises from the fact that it is a small, permanently settled white minority which has been given the major responsibility for the good ordering and management of affairs in Central Africa. The tasks of a governing minority in any society, culturally homogeneous or heterogeneous, large or small, are difficult, but they are greatly magnified when a small, racially identifiable immigrant population is given charge of far greater numbers of people possessing markedly different cultural characteristics. As a helpful comparison we may note that the total white electorate of Central Africa is roughly equivalent in number to the electors in one constituency in the United Kingdom.

Unless the United Kingdom is prepared to participate actively in the government of Central Africa it is very doubtful if partnership will come about by peaceful means, or in a form which will ensure the preservation of values and standards of government comparable to those found in the Western world today. Space does not permit me to describe in detail the type of institution (an African Affairs Council) which I believe is urgently required in the United Kingdom if Britain is to participate effectively in the achievement of partnership, but the proposal aims at the effective mobilization and utilization by the United Kingdom government of the expert knowledge of Africa which is available in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales.[31] I think it important that satisfactory means be employed to make real and stable self-government possible in the multiracial societies of Africa.

The above proposals presuppose at least some degree of willingness on the part of whites and Africans in Central Africa to engage in fruitful co-operation with the United Kingdom. I believe that this willingness still exists among all peoples in Central Africa, despite the recurrent fears which are evoked among Africans and whites by changes of government in Britain, and despite the anger felt by Africans at the imposition of federation. If some method is devised to remove or minimize the unfortunate effects of British party political disputes on human relations in Africa, it could, in course of time, supply a stimulus to white and African leaders to co-operate with Britain in the interests of their own groups and of future generations.[32]

the 1948 elections both major parties committed themselves to an abandonment of the common franchise. But the principle and practice has survived thus far, mainly through a raising of the qualifications in 1951.

[30] I should make clear that I personally regret (*a*) the failure to decide upon a satisfactory representative system before federation, (*b*) the minority representation accorded Africans, and (*c*) the imposition of federation upon an unwilling majority.

[31] Institutions which are broadly comparable to the African Affairs Council I have in mind are the Belgian Colonial Council and the former British Council of India, which operated from 1858 to 1935. Frederick D. Lugard, in his *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London, 1922), Chap. IX, pp. 174–78, suggested the formation of an African Council, and William Malcolm Hailey, in *An African Survey* (London, 1938), pp. xxv–xxviii, discusses the general problem of such institutions.

[32] Although its importance should not be exaggerated, I think it significant that during the prefederation discussions on safeguards for African interests a number of whites pointed out that such safeguards might be needed for the whites, especially in future years.

Leadership

In the small white population, leadership is at a premium even though the whites enjoy educational services which are substantially better than those provided for Africans. Sir Godfrey Huggins has an outstanding intellect and is endowed with a forceful and pleasing personality, but there are very few individuals of his caliber, and with his knowledge and experience, who are in a position to succeed him. There are younger men who could continue Huggins' work, but everything depends on the success of their endeavors to command the support of a significant number of the white electors and, at the same time, to establish effective bridges with leaders of the emergent African "middle class." At present, time appears to be against them, and the real danger exists that the large number of uneasy and uncertain voters who have supported Sir Godfrey Huggins in the past may, when he retires, choose to follow a racist leader who exploits their doubts and fears. As I see it only courageous and rapid action, designed to satisfy the legitimate desires of Africans for more political and economic opportunities and governmental responsibilities, and a decisive lead to remove social pinpricks, can ease the prevailing tensions and avert the dangers of extreme white or African racism.

Nothing is more important in Central Africa than assisting the emergence of an adequate number of statesmanlike African leaders with an appreciation of Western political and legal traditions, and an understanding of the functions and procedures of Western democratic institutions. If whites in Central Africa find it impossible to recognize the need to encourage the emergence of such African leaders it is to be hoped that the United Kingdom will not hesitate to intervene, in the interests of the white minority as well as of the Africans.

My cautious optimism for the future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is founded largely on an appreciation of the human qualities of Africans, especially the moderation and patience of many educated men and women. In concert with the nonracial whites they can create a union based on partnership.

Kenneth Kirkwood, Oxford, England, is Rhodes Professor of Race Relations at Oxford University. He was the organizer of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Natal, and is chairman of the Natal Regional Committee and member of the National Executive Committee of the South African Institute of Race Relations. He formerly lectured at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and he has engaged in travel and research in Africa for many years, mainly in South, Central, and East Africa. In 1952–53 he was attached to the Universities of London and Oxford and in 1953 he visited the United States on a Carnegie traveling fellowship. His published articles and booklets include The Proposed Federation of the Central African Territories (1951) and The Group Areas Act (1951).

Union of South Africa: Politics of White Supremacy

By Gwendolen M. Carter

THE election of May 1948 brought to political control in South Africa Dr. Daniel F. Malan's Nationalist party, which represented both a more extreme Afrikaner nationalism than had held such power before and a more clear-cut, legalistic approach to the relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. Though they governed at first with the support of the more moderate Afrikaner party, the Nationalists achieved independent political power in 1950 through the elections in South-West Africa, and an over-all majority of 29 seats in the House of Assembly[1] in the general election of April 1953. Moreover, although the Opposition parties—the United party and the Labour party—which were united in an election pact, polled some hundred thousand more votes in 1953 than did the Nationalists,[2] the latter increased their percentage of the popular vote over that received in 1948 more than did their opponents. Thus, the Nationalists seem likely to stay in power in South Africa in the foreseeable future. What are the reasons for their political success? What does it mean for the Union of South Africa, in the handling of its complex racial situation and in relation to its international position?

Basis of Afrikaner Nationalism

It must be remembered that Afrikaner nationalism is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. In 1912, within two years of the Act of Union (which created a unitary state out of the two British colonies, the Cape and Natal, and the two former Boer states, the Transvaal and Orange Free State), General Hertzog broke away from the Union Cabinet of Generals Botha and Smuts to form the first Nationalist party. Hertzog, whose Nationalists governed the Union from 1924 to 1932,[3] was dedicated to the so-called "two streams" policy, that is, to developing the Afrikaners (the modern descendants of the original Dutch, German, and French settlers), who were still predominantly farmers or urban workers, to the place where they could be on equal terms with English-speaking South Africans, whose lesser numbers were more than counterbalanced by their more prosperous economic status. When Hertzog fused his party with that of General Smuts in 1934 to form the United party, it was under the view that both the European peoples of the Union had reached the stage of development where their co-operation could be on terms of equality.

It was at that moment that Dr. Malan, in turn, broke away from Hertzog to forge the political arm of a widespread movement which preached Afrikaner separatism in every aspect of life. Though challenged for supremacy among Afrikaners by other groups, in particular the Ossewa Brandwag, a cultural organization which roused the widest, most fervent Afrikaans nationalist sentiment in generations, the Nationalists ultimately made themselves the undisputed political leaders of nationalistic Afrikanerdom. At the same time, they helped to weld that community into a new cohesiveness which forms a major element in their political success.

In part, the Nationalists have appealed to the past to secure the widespread support they now command in the Afrikaner community: to the way in which the British imperial factor pursued the trekkers who sought to escape into the isolation of the interior in the nineteenth century; the Anglo-Boer war; the discrimination against their language, Afrikaans, until the 1920's. More particularly, however, the Nationalists emphasize the separate identity of the Afrikaner people and the imperative need to preserve it against those Europeans both inside and outside the Union who hold other values. Their sharpest attacks are directed against the Communists, whose materialist philosophy conflicts with the deep religious sentiment of the Afrikaner, but they also oppose what they call "liberalistic" sentiments, in particular those which support racial equality.

Closely allied to these views is the characteristic Afrikaner attitude to the Bantu, who comprise 8½ of the 10 million nonwhites of the Union. More than a century of close contact with a primitive and pagan people ingrained in the Afrikaner a sense of his own cultural superiority to, and basic racial differences from, the non-European. Always he has been fearful of being overwhelmed physically and/or culturally by the vastly greater numbers of the Bantu. To this is now added a new sense of strain, particularly for the growing body of Afrikaner urban workers, as the Bantu come increasingly to the cities to take jobs created by South Africa's industrial revolution.

Apartheid

Nationalists under both Hertzog and Malan have encouraged South African industrialization in order to free the country from economic dependence on other countries, in particular Great Britain. But, as Mrs. Van der Horst has pointed out, economic development of this type, particularly in a country with a relatively small white population and a shortage of skilled labor, tends to intermingle the different population elements and make for social mobility. Both processes run counter to traditional South African mores. It is largely because the Nationalists with their policy of *apartheid*, that is, rigid racial separation defined in law, promise more chance of maintaining these traditional mores in the face of economic development that its program has been so appealing to the average Afrikaner. In other words, *apartheid*, as the Nationalist sees it, is the means for preserving and even intensifying racial and social divisions in a dynamic economic situation.

Some Nationalists, particularly in SABRA (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs) and the Dutch Reformed Church, have enunciated the conception of "ideal *apartheid*," that is, complete territorial separation between Europeans and Bantu. But this would involve such a revolution in South African life, which is built in every sphere on the basis of cheap native labor, that realistic political leaders reject it as not currently feasible. Most proponents of ideal *apartheid* now hold it out as an ultimate goal, to be achieved perhaps in two or three hundred years. In this form, ideal *apartheid* provides a justification for the Nationalist policies of denying the Bantu rights in the European areas in which they are employed,

[1] Of the 159 seats in the Assembly, three are held by native representatives, who are Europeans elected by Africans in Cape Province who can meet certain qualifications. Africans throughout the Union also elect, through an indirect system, four Europeans to the Senate. Otherwise they have no franchise. There is universal suffrage for Europeans.

[2] In 1953, there were 20 unopposed seats, 18 conceded to the United party and 2 to the Nationalists; in 1948, there were 11 uncontested seats, 10 going to the United party and 1 to the Nationalists. Calculations for these seats vary. A common one, used here, is to reckon 7,500 votes for the winning party and 1,500 for the other.

[3] From 1924 to 1929 with the support of the predominantly English-speaking Labour party.

as well as an encouragement for any move to build the Native Reserves into a Bantu national home.

Apartheid legislation, as formulated by the Nationalists, has both goals: to keep the European areas of the Union under the exclusive control of white South Africans, and to promote a distinctive life for the Bantu. Both build on traditional South African practices, a major reason why the main opposition group, the United party, finds it easier to criticize Nationalist *apartheid* legislation in details than in principle.

The key to South African life, in fact, is that the great mass of European South Africans think of their country in the same terms as Americans, Canadians, and Australians think of theirs, that is, as a white society dedicated to the values of Western civilization (except racial equality). For these South Africans, the fact that a large majority of the people resident in the Union do not belong to this Western, white society provides problems with which the Europeans must cope rather than reasons for a fundamental reconsideration either of customary standards or basic principles.

Opposition Parties

At the same time, there are some Europeans in South Africa who, either on grounds of expediency or of principle, oppose some or all aspects of the Nationalists' *apartheid* policy. The United party itself has a wing which declares that the economic intermingling of South Africa's peoples should be allowed to follow its own logic both in industry and in domicile. This group points out the handicap for economic development of putting impediments in the way of encouraging a larger, permanently domiciled, and better-trained Bantu population in the European areas. In so doing, it is supported by, or (perhaps more accurately) reflects the views of, secondary industry, which draws more than half its labor supply, including the semiskilled, from Bantu.

Those who press the logic of the current situation still more rigorously, like the small, intellectual-based Liberal and Labour parties, maintain that political rights must also be extended to the Bantu as they acquire Western education and ways of life. For them, the obvious overcrowding in the Reserves coupled with the findings of the authoritative Fagan Report of 1948 that more than half the Bantu are outside the reserves at any given time, indicates the fundamental fallacy of the Nationalists' assumption that the Reserves, even with the addition of the British Protectorates—Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland—can ultimately support the Bantu. Having thus attacked the rationalization of an ultimate ideal *apartheid,* not on the ground of desirability but of feasibility, they maintain that there remains no justification for excluding the Bantu from the political rights which should be the concomitant of his economic contribution within the European areas.

The Liberal party even went so far at its autumn 1954 Congress, under the urging of its Transvaal members, as to approve ultimate universal suffrage, thus going well beyond its original platform of "equal rights for all educated men." Though it affirmed the view that universal suffrage could be achieved only by a series of stages, its acceptance of universal suffrage as an ultimate objective, with all this would involve because of the numerical predominance of the non-European, is a radical innovation in political programs other than those of the non-Europeans themselves.

This new stand of the Liberal party, however, is chiefly a reflection of its political impotence. Though there may well be a growing liberalization of sentiment towards the non-European, especially among English-speaking South Africans, it is still far too weak and scattered to provide a base from which to win elections. This was proved decisively by the Provincial elections of 1954, the first in which the Liberal party (which was formed after the United party defeat in 1953) had a chance to participate. Despite some able candidates and a great deal of hard campaigning, the Liberals proved unable to win a seat, and in several cases lost their deposits.

More surprisingly, the same fate was suffered by the Union Federal party, which had similarly broken away from the United party after the 1953 election. The Federalists are based chiefly in Natal, the predominantly English-speaking province, and are dedicated to retaining the link with the Crown, upholding the English language and culture, and, more vaguely, liberalizing the franchise provisions for non-Europeans. Though Nationalist statements on the imminence of a republic in South Africa, particularly noticeable at their 1954 Transvaal Provincial Congress, make the Federalist emphasis on the Crown the more important to many English-speaking South Africans, the party seems to have little future, and may well rejoin the United party in due course.

Though the 1954 Provincial elections thus serve to confirm the position of the United party as the official Opposition, in what is still in effect a two-party system, they have not eased the strains existing within that party. Its small but articulate liberal wing still feels that it can best serve its purposes from within rather than outside the party. Nonetheless, their effectiveness seems to have receded from the high-water mark of February 1954 when the United party leader, Mr. Strauss, took pains to endorse the growing economic integration of races in South Africa. The United Party Transvaal Congress in the autumn of 1954 spent some nine hours debating the problem of freehold for non-Europeans in urban areas, and another four on the issue of African trade unions, both endorsed in part on earlier occasions but still resisted by many members of what still remains essentially a conservative party. The issue of a franchise for Africans was not even raised. In November 1954 the United party formally adopted at its Union biennial conference a statement on the non-Europeans which accepted their permanent place within South African society. It is questionable, however, whether this offers a dynamic native policy which could provide an alternative to that of the Nationalists.

Apartheid Programs

As far as effective policy is concerned, therefore, the initiative remains with the Nationalists. They have incorporated in legislation the main outlines of their *apartheid* policy and are now trying to carry it through in detail. The Group Areas Act, the cornerstone of residential *apartheid,* under which any area may be designated for the exclusive occupancy of any one race—Europeans, Bantu, Colored (mixed blood), Indians, or even Chinese, of whom there are a very small number—has not yet been put into effect anywhere because of the complexities involved. Under special legislation (the Natives Resettlement Act and the Natives Urban Areas Amendment Act), however, the government is removing the "black spots" in urban centers, particularly Johannesburg. In the Western Areas Removal Scheme, Bantu in townships adjoining European sections of Johannesburg are being forcibly moved to new sites further from the city, losing in the process some of the few freehold rights possessed by Bantu in European areas. Only as the result of insistence

by the Johannesburg municipality are they being allowed in some compensation to buy land in the Reserves. Similar plans to remove "black spots" elsewhere and limit African residence in urban centers are causing concern to the municipalities (whose jurisdiction is being overridden), affecting land values because of uncertainties, and creating widespread ill feeling among non-Europeans.

The Nationalists are also enforcing the legislation against Bantu influx into the cities: refusing them permits to enter some areas where living facilities seem inadequate though jobs are available; making it more difficult for "foreign" natives, that is those from outside the Union, to hold positions in the cities; deporting unemployed natives from urban centers to the farms where there is great shortage of labor; and, constructively, insisting that municipalities provide jobs for the Bantu born and brought up in their own locations. In some advanced towns like Boksburg on the Rand, Bantu are given a wide range of aptitude tests to determine where best they can be used.

Bantu education and labor

Less encouraging from the Bantu point of view is the legislation affecting their education, work, and organization. The Bantu Education Act, 1953, transferred native education (except higher and special education but including teacher training) from the provinces to the central government, placing it under the Department of Native Affairs, which is strongly imbued with *apartheid* philosophy, and seeks to enforce a more uniform pattern of instruction by replacing mission with so-called Bantu-controlled schools. The new arrangements avowedly seek to broaden the effect of education by bringing it to many more than the 40 per cent of Bantu children who now receive some formal education; in March 1954 the Minister of Finance declared, however, that the government contributions to Bantu education would be pegged, and any increase in funds for schools must come from the Africans themselves. Moreover, the ultimate objective of the Act is said by the Minister to be to prepare the Bantu for "their opportunities in life . . . in accord with the policy of the State." Not surprisingly, many Africans fear that the end result of the legislation may be to reduce the quality of Bantu education and thus limit their professional opportunities still further.

In economic life, recent *apartheid* legislation gives the Minister of Labor power to limit labor in certain industries to a particular race, thus making a vertical as well as the normal horizontal color bar. Though Bantu are not ordinarily allowed to take positions designated as skilled, there has been considerable downgrading of certain jobs, in practice, to allow Bantu to hold them—evidence of how difficult it is to resist the pressures caused by shortage of skilled labor. That this can or will be prevented by legislation seems unlikely. As far as industrial organization is concerned, however, the African is in a very weak position. African trade unions have never been recognized under the Industrial Conciliation Act, but in practice they have existed, and have had considerable effect from time to time. In presenting the Native Labor (Settlement of Disputes) Act, 1953, the Minister of Labor expressed the hope that it would lead to the natural death of African trade unions. The measure sets up an elaborate hierarchy of boards to deal with industrial disputes in which Africans are involved. These boards have the power to make binding settlements, and Africans are represented only on the regional level. Since the Bantu have no right to strike, their present possibilities of effective industrial influence are slight.

Native Reserves

In the areas where Bantu organization is welcomed, that is, in the Native Reserves, the Nationalists have consciously attempted to restore tribal divisions and traditional lines of authority. Partly, this is to provide a reinforcement of Bantu culture and, to this extent, may be seen as one of the major manifestations of positive *apartheid,* that is, creative rather than restrictive. Many Bantu believe, however, that tribalism is outworn and that the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, now put into force at the tribal level in several small areas, seeks to thwart African nationalism rather than to give more self-government to rural Africans.

Political organizations

So far, the Nationalists have not directly attacked the organizations through which the non-Europeans attempt to mobilize their nationalist sentiment and make it effective. The African National Congress, by far the most important organization among the Bantu, worked in close conjunction with the South African Indian Congress in the defiance campaign of 1952. This campaign sought to arouse European sentiment against the so-called "unjust laws," notably the pass laws under which every male African must possess a pass if he is outside the Reserves, but also the culling of cattle, the Bantu Authorities Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Suppression of Communism Act. Though little sympathy was roused among Europeans by the program of passive disobedience under which some eight thousand Africans voluntarily courted arrest and imprisonment, the defiance campaign made a considerable impact on the thinking of the authorities, who were surprised, and disturbed, by the degree of organization and discipline displayed.

Rather than launch a frontal attack on the organizations themselves, however, the authorities have preferred to act against their leaders, who have been systematically prosecuted, condemned, immobilized, and forbidden to attend meetings. The instruments used for the most part have been the Riotous Assemblies Act and the Suppression of Communism Act, 1951; the latter makes it an offense to try to change the existing social, industrial, economic, or political structure of society by promoting disturbances or encouraging interracial hostility. This act was reinforced in the spring of 1953 by the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Public Safety Act, which imposed heavy penalties, such as flogging, for many offenses, including advocacy of passive disobedience. These techniques have been extremely effective in curbing non-European action and, quite possibly, the extension of organization. Throughout 1954, the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress have been trying to organize a Congress of the People to draw up a Charter of Human Rights for Non-Europeans to dramatize their present position. It has yet to be seen, however, that they will be able to hold the mass meetings which they plan.

DILEMMAS POSED BY APARTHEID

While these restrictions may be effective in preventing mass demonstrations by the non-Europeans or even an extension of their growing solidarity, they intensify rather than limit the bitterness felt by every educated and articulate Bantu. In fact, the key feature of the present situation in South Africa is the increasing polarization of sentiment. To a degree, the adoption by the Liberal party of universal suffrage as an ultimate objective is a rather desperate

attempt to build a bridge between the non-Europeans and at least a small group of Europeans. The latter are well aware that the Suppression of Communism Act has also been used against a very considerable number of white trade union leaders, with a consequent limitation of the effectiveness of the non-Nationalist trade unions which is not unlike that experienced by non-European organizations. By adopting the political objective which the more radical non-European organizations have been demanding for some time, the Liberal party is trying to indicate that it not only recognizes the similarities of the problems faced by liberal-minded Europeans to those of non-Europeans, but also that it believes all adults in South Africa, regardless of race, should share ultimately in the determination of its policies. But even so far-reaching (for European South Africans) a declaration seems to have done little to attract non-European leadership. What might have been taken with open hands only a short time ago is now regarded only with suspicion.

This steady tendency for non-European opinion to become more extreme, and estranged from all Europeans, is not only a result of European actions and attitudes; it helps in turn to create them. Short of large-scale violence, it is difficult to envisage any general acceptance by European South Africans of ideal *apartheid* as an immediate necessity. But the Nationalists and the main body of the United party seem each to have been supported in their own views by the sense of growing intransigence among non-European leaders. Where the Liberal party is led to make more and more concessions to non-European sentiment—and thereby seems completely to have eliminated itself from any chance of winning a seat in a parliamentary or provincial election—the bulk of United party members become increasingly cautious about endorsing policies which might lead to greater concentrations of non-Europeans near the cities or put more power in their hands. Convinced though they are that Bantu labor is essential to the economic development on which depends their own individual prosperity, as that of the country at large, they are hesitant about concessions like freeholds which do not offer any sure return.

The approach of Nationalist leaders is still more clear cut. They endorse economic development but not at the expense of what they see to be the primary objective—the security of Afrikanerdom. Narrowly racial though this may seem at first glance, the Nationalist believes implicitly that it is bound up with the future of white civilization in South Africa. Thus they are prepared to welcome into the Nationalist party any European who accepts their view of life and their political leadership. Confident that their approach to the non-European offers the best and perhaps only hope of developing a modus vivendi in the world's most complicated racial situation, they feel that ultimately all other Europeans must recognize this also.

Moreover, the Nationalists believe that persistent political defeat, coupled with its obvious inner dissensions, will lead the United party to split even more than it did following the 1953 elections, with the hiving off of the Liberal and Union Federal party, and the rebellion against Strauss's leadership which led to the expulsion of six United party members who have now formed the Conservative party. In the long run, then, the Nationalists believe that the desire to share in political power, plus the growing intransigence of the non-Europeans, will lead to a common white front under their direction.

What stands in the way of this development? Perhaps the hope of the United party that it can regain political power, though this is very slim. More particularly, a fundamental—though perhaps not unbridgeable—difference in political attitudes and objectives. The Nationalist party accepts the parliamentary system because it has not been curbed by it in its progress towards political power. No other system, in fact, offers the Nationalists so good a chance to win decisive political power with a minority of the votes. But the Nationalist attitude both to the Citizenship Act and the Representation of Voters Bill shows a lack of feeling for the normal conventional restraints of the parliamentary system which is disconcerting to many of their opponents. In the Citizenship Act, passed by a very small majority shortly after they came into office, the Nationalists removed the special privileges customarily granted to British immigrants in gaining citizenship, despite the widespread protests of most of the English-speaking minority in the country, the group most particularly affected.

The Representation of Voters Bill has had a more checkered career. Intended to make political *apartheid* complete by removing the Colored from the Common Roll in Cape Province, the Nationalists have tried one expedient after another: action by a simple majority, which was declared unconstitutional by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court; making Parliament itself a High Court with ultimate jurisdiction over the Constitution, which was similarly declared unconstitutional; and several more recent attempts to secure the necessary two-thirds majority within Parliament itself. On the one hand, it may be said that the recent consistency with which the constitutional approach has been used undercuts criticism of earlier methods. At the same time, the rank and file, as well as some more prominent figures in the party, have frequently demanded packing the Supreme Court or the Senate to bypass constitutional forms. It is this tendency in the Nationalist party to seek objectives by whatever means are feasible which constitutes its greatest difference from the traditionally minded, conservative, and highly constitutional United party.

Other differences between the parties might be more easily overcome. The United party includes not only all the English-speaking not in one or other of the minor parties but also a substantial number of Afrikaners. It still receives some 20 to 30 per cent of Afrikaans votes. But these are being whittled away as the pressures of militant Afrikanerdom increase. Even the English-speaking may gradually be attracted to the Nationalists if the constitutional issue is once settled. Big business and industry in the Union get along well with the Nationalists, who have had a good record of prosperity, likely to continue. But this accretion will be slow, and over a long period of time.

Future Role of Non-Europeans

Decisive to the situation, in the long run, are the non-Europeans. Not much action can be expected from the million Colored, most of them in Cape Province, despite their resentment at being displaced from the coveted role of "appendage to the whites," as Hertzog called them, and made to feel the sting of *apartheid*. In fact, of all the groups in the Union, the Colored have been most affected by *apartheid* legislation, though this is, in some measure, because they had fewer restrictions previously than either Indians or Africans. But despite their resentments the Colored have been singularly lacking in ability to weld themselves into a cohesive group or to work with other non-Europeans. Even their Marxism tends to be Trotskyite.

The Indians are a relatively small but

potent group. Their third of a million are mostly in Natal; a small but influential group is on the Rand in the Transvaal. Their strength is in the intelligence, training, and sense of purpose of the leaders of the more radical group; it lies also in the support they secure, implicitly or explicitly, from India. Discrimination against Indians in South Africa is spread before the United Nations annually by the Indian government, evidence of its continuing concern.

In the end, however, it is the Africans, or Bantu, who by sheer weight of numbers will be the decisive factor. Many of them are still satisfied by the opportunities they receive; others scarcely know about anything beyond their kraal or village limits. But the most significant fact about the Bantu is the rapidity with which the ideas and sentiments of so many of them have changed. Six years ago, economic concessions would have been enough to consolidate the moderates in their positions of leadership in Bantu organizations; perhaps two years ago, political overtures would have been enough. By now, it is doubtful whether any concessions would satisfy the younger, more radical leaders, many of whom are Communist trained or influenced. Yet it is difficult to evaluate either what they think or how they are going to act. The barriers built by the Nationalists with great skill, the constant police espionage, the immobilization of the relatively few leaders, dam up resentment; there are few clues to how this bitterness can or will express itself. If it is in violence, then the retaliation will be so terrible that it may take years to rebuild a nationalist movement among the Africans. Passive resistance of any obvious sort brings individual retaliation which is a powerful deterrent. Perhaps only a complete economic boycott could be totally effective, yet the difficulties in the way of organizing it, particularly in the face of current restrictions, are enormous.

Some people believe that economic advance may siphon off pressures by giving non-Europeans the chance for individual advancement. Yet it seems more likely that the consequences of economic advance will be a greater awareness of how much is still being withheld in the way of social, residential, and political privileges.

Within this broader setting, white South Africa continues its parliamentary and party activity. If never consulted, the non-European is at least never ignored. Increasingly the focus of attention is upon him in party programs, speeches, and legislation. This is something relatively new in South African affairs, which used to be dominated by the old struggle between Boer and Briton, or, in the newer terminology, Afrikaner and English-speaking South African. That division remains and is temporarily acute because of the militancy of Afrikanerdom. But its future depends on how dangerous non-European tension becomes. This rests, in turn, on the degree to which the aspirations of the non-Europeans are satisfied, either within the program of *apartheid* or despite it.

Gwendolen M. Carter, Ph.D., Northampton, Massachusetts, is professor and chairman of the Department of Government at Smith College. She is the author of The British Commonwealth and International Security (1947) and numerous articles and pamphlets on the Commonwealth and African affairs, and coauthor of Major Foreign Powers (1949, 1952). She was in South Africa in 1952–53 on a Rockefeller Foundation grant studying the political parties and the election; she had made an earlier study tour in 1948–49.

Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa

By DANIEL F. MCCALL

TOWN life, and a constantly increasing movement of people to the expanding towns, is one of the most striking characteristics of present-day Africa. Town life, in itself, is not new to the continent. An early Dutch merchant was surprised at the size and orderliness of Benin City and compared it favorably with the Amsterdam of his time; Diogo Cam was impressed by the efficient organization of the capital of the Bakongo kingdom; Arabic writers testify to an extensive development of urban centers in the medieval Sudanic Empires; and there are the immense ruins of stone towers and walls of Zimbabwe in Central Africa. The Yoruba people are particularly noted for their propensity to build large towns; Ibadan, the third largest town in Africa, has often elicited surprise that it could survive on an essentially indigenous basis.

These old towns, however, were different from modern African towns in several ways: they were different in structure in that they were organized on the basis of kinship, and power and commerce were channeled through that form of organization; they were different in scale[1] in two ways, in actual size and in extent of outside contact; and they were parochial in culture.

Many of these older towns have disappeared and those which remain, like Kano, have been modified and are being further transformed. The new cities and towns are the result of contact with the West; one writer says that the cities are a colonial creation,[2] and another, that the city is the creation of the whites and peopled by blacks.[3] The old towns grew out of, and maintained, their distinctive cultures; in the new towns, Africans who are being urbanized are also, to some extent, being westernized. The old towns had trade with some other areas, but the new towns are an integral part of the network of world trade. This paper is concerned only with the new type of town.

The proportion of people living under urban conditions is already significant, but it is not possible to give exact figures for the whole area because of the inadequacy of available statistics. However, in the Union of South Africa, where the process of town growth has gone farthest, approximately 25 per cent of Africans are living in towns,[4] but in some territories, particularly in East Africa, the number may fall below 5 per cent. North and West Africa come next after the Union in the matter of urban growth, and Central Africa has shown a considerable recent growth.

FACTORS IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The towns are administrative and commercial centers; they are therefore the nexus between Africa and Europe. As investments increase, urban growth accelerates. Towns are a symbol and an index of economic development. The rate of growth of African towns in this century has been rapid but this pace has accelerated astonishingly during World War II, owing largely to the need of the West for strategic materials and bases.

[1] Godfrey and Monica Wilson, *The Analysis of Social Change* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1945), Chap. XI.

[2] Georges Balandier, "Document du travail," presented at the UNESCO Conference in Abidjan, 1954.

[3] J. Dresch, "Ville Congolaise," *Revue de Géographie Humaine et d'Ethnologie,* Vol. 3 (1949); quoted by Balandier.

[4] Sheila T. Van der Horst, "The Union of South Africa: Economic Problems in a Multiracial Situation," in this issue of THE ANNALS.

In the postwar period a number of factors, such as the desire of the European powers to meet the threat of anti-colonialism, the acceptance of the doctrine that rich countries should help poor countries, increased knowledge of African economic problems, the generally increased scope of governmental activity in business, and a feeling that the African people should be rewarded for their loyalty during the war, combined to encourage the public sector of investments which it is hoped will stimulate private investment.[5] All of the territories have development plans envisaging extention of transportation and communication systems, education and medical programs, and electrification and industrialization which, if successful, will undoubtedly contribute to urban growth.[6]

The harnessing of hydroelectric power, of which Africa has an enormous potential, is now in varying stages of planning or realization in various parts of the continent. The utilization of this power will necessitate new industries which will require labor, and since the only reservoir of labor is the subsistence sector, more and more people will be drawn out of the tribal villages to build new towns and to enlarge the old ones.[7]

This period has already witnessed the development of some secondary industry which, outside the Union of South Africa, is relatively insignificant in the total economy but is important in regard to urban growth. Some production for the local market has begun. Furniture, cement, bread, beer, and cigarettes are now being made, and textiles are being machine woven from local cotton.

A favorable world market has furthered the increase of cash crops; and finally, in certain areas, there has been a transfer of some capital from Asia. Such developments help to explain the fact that several towns have doubled their populations in the last decade.

It should be recognized that the economy of an African territory is a fragile one. It is an adjunct of the economy of the metropolitan power and would be the first to be affected in the event of a slump. The emphasis on mining, and the tendency toward monoculture with the consequent dependence on a single export, or at best on a small number of exports, make an African economy extremely vulnerable.

A fragile economy

The modern African town did not grow out of the needs of, and in service to, its own hinterland; its primary relationship is to Europe. In many cases it has grown beyond the capacity of its hinterland to support it without radical agricultural reform, which has not been achieved anywhere as yet, so that some of the food for townsmen has to be imported from overseas. Even so, some of the towns are a burden upon the land; wood and charcoal are brought to the town, where people can afford higher prices, and fuel becomes scarce in villages at considerable distances from the urban market.[8]

[5] Cf. Raymond Bertieaux, *Aspects de l'Industrialisation en Afrique Centrale* (Brussels: Institut des Relations Internationales, 1953), p. 24.

[6] Organization for European Economic Cooperation, *Investments in Overseas Territories, in Africa South of the Sahara* (Paris, 1951).

[7] Industrialization based on electricity and automotive transport, unlike that based on steam and railways, need not result in excessive concentration, but it can be assumed that, even with planning for a dispersed development of industry (of which there has been no indication as yet), any increase in industrialization in Africa will contribute somewhat to urban growth. Cf. William F. Ogburn, "Inventions of Local Transportation and the Patterns of Cities," in Paul Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (Eds.), *Reader in Urban Sociology* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), p. 262.

[8] Similar effects in the competition for water supplies and other goods were pointed out by Lewis Mumford, "The Costs of Costiveness," in his *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), pp. 240 ff.

In any economy there is an exodus from the towns when commerce declines, but in Africa a slump not only would mean an abrupt halt in town growth and a dispersal of urbanites but the villages probably could not absorb them. The land under the present methods of farming could not tolerate a return of the urban population to agriculture.

African territories, like other places, cannot hope to achieve autarchy, but an increase in food production and the production of more industrial goods for local consumption would make the economy healthier and the basis of town growth more secure. For the most part, industry means processing for export. The oil from peanuts and palm nuts is being extracted; logs are being sawed into boards; some ores are smelted into ingots of the metal. This reduces the shipping space needed, thereby lowering transport costs, creates more jobs, which require more training for new skills, and increases the amount of money in local circulation; the result is an increase in urban activity but not in economic stability.

THE TOWN AND ITS HINTERLAND

The towns and the countryside are inseparably interrelated; in truth, they are different aspects of the same reality —like the two faces of a coin. The character of the town is determined, among other things, by the nature of the hinterland from which it draws its labor force and for which it acts as emporium. But rural life has been transmuted by the same forces that have given rise to the towns. Money transactions are replacing traditional exchanges of gifts in kind and service. Crops are grown for export now as well as to fill compound storage bins. Much of the money in circulation in the villages has been remitted to rural families by absent members working in the towns, mines, and plantations.[9]

African society has been affected to such an extent by the impact of the West that the tribe is a sick institution even in the rural areas.[10] The superimposition of outside authority, the intrusion of proseletyzing religions which attack the ideological foundations of tribal authority, the values of the market place superseding the values of the kinship system and allowing commoners to become richer than the chief, all contributed to the decline in effectiveness of tribal organization. The necessity of meeting new situations for which there were no tribal precedents, the temporary or permanent loss of much tribal manpower to outside employment, the corruption of chiefs in their role of custodian of land, and the venality of many of them in spending such profits for personal use have further reduced the capacity of tribal organization to function.

The social disorganization of the countryside further contributes to the growth of the towns, which, to a greater extent, are able to provide the basis for the synthesis of a new society.

[9] United Nations, *Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in Tropical Africa* (New York, 1954), p. 30.

[10] Kofi Abrefa Busia, *The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti* (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1951); Monica Hunter, *Reaction to Conquest: Effects of Contact with Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa* (London: H. Milford, published for the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures by Oxford University Press, 1936); Raymond Leslie Buell, *Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847–1947* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947), p. 13; Louis S. B. Leakey, *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu* (London: Methuen & Co., 1952).

DIVERSITY AND SIMILARITY OF TOWNS

In a continent as large as Africa, one would expect some regional variation, and, of course, these differences are felt in the structure and life of the towns. National differences among Europeans as well as the diversity of tribal cultures, length of contact, religion, availability of education and the type offered, altitude, latitude, and climate contrive to give different towns different characteristics, but all are undergoing more or less identical processes although the outcome may vary from place to place because of different combinations of such factors.

Given this range of variation, it is difficult to make any generalization on the characteristics of urban centers that would be true of the whole continent. The fact that we are dealing mainly with the process of urbanization allows us to consider some details as irrelevant, but even in the realm of process there are variations. Only the central tendencies can be indicated.

All Africans living in, or moving into, towns find their customs affected by the fact that town relationships are predominately universalistic rather than particularistic; [11] all statuses, except racial, are achieved rather than ascribed; and kinsmen make up only a small part of the people with whom they daily interact. Contacts are numerous but casual; relationships involve segmental roles rather than the whole personality; ethnic and cultural heterogeneity, mobility, the impersonal nature of commercial contracts, and the mere numbers of the community combine to give the individual an anonymity which lessens the effectiveness of approval and derision of others in control of behavior,[12] so that law enforcement agencies become indispensable. The division of labor has antisocial forms and crime is a profession.

The conditions of employment entail the necessity of regularity and punctuality, forcing change from habits based on rural seasonal patterns. Training on the job gives new motor habits and skills. Common experience encourages organization for common interests. A greater variety of goods are available, and new standards of living can be aspired to, even if they are not always reached.

The town is a source of social change because it has its own necessities of organization, arising out of its economic functions and the ethnic diversity of its population, but it is also a transmitter of other forces, such as education and commerce, which also make for a social change. The town is both a response to forces of change and a focus for them, a place where they operate more intensively.

SEQUENCES OF URBAN GROWTH

The following outline of urban growth is an abstraction which applies, within limits, to most African towns. Although only a few have yet completed the process, they generally can be placed somewhere along this line of development.

Before the town is founded, there is a tribal population, probably sparsely settled and living by subsistence farming. A few intruding Europeans select a site suitable for mining, or for a port, a trading station, or a headquarters for regional administration.

There might already have been a village at the spot; in fact, that might have been one of the reasons for choosing the site. A certain amount of labor is needed for the activities which Europeans have begun, and this is hired from the village and the surrounding countryside. As the enterprise expands, labor is drawn from greater distances, and as the number of people increases, it becomes necessary for the supply of food and other necessities to be organized, and for the community to be governed. This, in turn, means additional employment and adds to the growth of the town.

At first tribesmen come into the town to earn money for a specific purpose, such as to pay taxes or to buy a bicycle, and consider their stay in town as a temporary sojourn. They may return when other needs arise; in fact, the desires and necessities for which money is required tend to become recurrent and the habit is formed of spending a certain number of months each year in town.

Some skills as well as muscle power are needed: tallying and keeping records requires schooling, and certain manual operations require training. Clerks and experienced workmen may be brought in from older towns, or even from Europe, but eventually a school is indispensable for the continuance of the commercial and governmental functions of the town. When a school is established, it may be under the auspices of a religious mission and dedicated to other purposes, but most of its graduates will generally find employment as clerks. Manual training is often furnished by the employing company on an apprenticeship basis.

The kinds of tasks performed in the town will multiply; agricultural products that in the beginning were merely collected for export may now be processed first. Even services necessary to the town itself contribute to specialization. As the complexity of labor requirement increases, employers encourage workers to stay on the jobs for which they have been trained. For the employees, a rise in income makes it feasible to keep a family in town.

At this point, the town has a few permanent residents who are outnumbered by the temporary residents, and in addition there are always some visitors who come for various reasons. This majority of temporary residents are semiurban, semirural, spending part of their time in town and part on their farms. Of them, one might say that, in general, the child grows up in the village, the young man comes into the town to earn a living and, when aged, returns to the village. This type of town dweller is tied to his rural relatives and they to him; they send him food from time to time and he sends money home, and they cultivate the fields which will support him in his old age.

There is a great deal of movement back and forth between the country and the town at this stage; relatives may come to visit a man and crowd into his quarters while they sample the excitements of the town or look for work; and he fairly regularly goes home to rest and to display his acquisition of goods and to distribute some of them to kin and relatives by marriage. To the degree that this situation obtains, it minimizes the development of distinctive contrasts in urban and rural traits. As long as these ties last, a villager has somewhere to stay in the town and someone to show him around the pitfalls and through the intricacies of the maze of urban relationships; the villager is abashed at the strangeness and the complexity of the town but does not feel completely solitary and lost.

[11] Marion Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 248 ff.

[12] "Informal means of social control—such as gossip . . . could remain powerless were it not for the fact that they are backed up by economic pressures. . . . "—Svend Riemer, "Villagers in Metropolis," in Edgar A. Schuler *et al.* (Eds.), *Outside Readings in Sociology* (New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952), p. 648.

Equally important, the townsman avoids making changes in habits that will alienate his rural kinsmen to whom he will return.

During this period, country patterns tend to persist in the town, but town ideas also get disseminated to the villages, and the difference in the rate of change between the two is thus lessened.

The demographic structure of an African town, during this phase, is different from, and inverse to, that of the rural areas. The town has a preponderance of males and youth. There are comparatively few children in the towns and very few of the aged, but between the ages of seventeen and fifty, that is, the employable years, an individual has a greater chance of survival in the town. The number of females, smaller in total than that of the males, shows the same bell-shaped distribution in ages. The newer the town, the greater the unbalance in the demographic structure; the older the town, other things (such as the government's urban policy) being equal, the greater the approach to demographic stability.

Toward demographic stability

The subsequent developments in town growth are largely measures tending toward demographic stability, that is, to a lessening of the disproportion in the sex and age ratios. One important prerequisite for stabilization of town populations is housing. African townsmen, primarily, are a labor force, and it is cheaper for employers to provide housing for a single man than for a family. If a married man is hired, he is frequently given the same-sized quarters as a single man; when the married man later wants to visit his family, he may quit his job and hope to find another when he returns. This means high turnover of labor, which in turn contributes to keeping low the level of skill, so that the employer is constrained to offer inducements, at least to his more skilled workers, to remain; better housing is often provided for this reason. Skilled workers tend to change jobs less often than the unskilled.

Another prerequisite for demographic stability of the towns is a larger income for the urban family. In the country, the wife supplements the husband's income by her labor on the farm; in the town there are usually few opportunities for her to contribute to the family income. In the Union of South Africa, an increasing number of urban African women are employed in domestic service and other occupations. Many, however, are dependent on earnings from illicit beer brewing; income from this traffic is curtailed by frequent police raids. In West Africa, women are petty traders who sell food, cloth, cigarettes, and many other things; and some earn more—a few, much more—than their husbands. This economic opportunity, as well as the age of the towns, explains the more nearly normal sex ratio found there.

A further prerequisite for stabilization is a system of social services. Kin groups, due to dispersal, can no longer fulfill their mutual obligations to help an individual in distress. Welfare costs have to be born by the governments, and this helps to account for administrative ambivalence towards urban stabilization.

In South Africa, a further factor slows down but does not reverse the tendency toward stabilization. The philosophy of *apartheid* designates the African as essentially a rural being, and the town is considered as belonging to the white man. The African can come to the town on sufferance when the purpose is for the service of the white man, but it is thought proper that the African's wife should stay on the reserve and keep a farm; economic development, however, has made this impossible, and cities are building housing for African families despite the contradiction of this action with the prevailing ideology.

In spite of these obstacles, the growth of commerce and industry with its division of labor and specialization and the fight against high rates of labor turnover, constantly force increased stabilization.

As long as an unbalanced sex ratio continues it has serious implications in regard to family life, birth rate, and mobility. Many of the men in the towns are bachelors, but those who are married may keep their wives in the country to cultivate the farms, although a wife sometimes joins her husband in the town. If a man is a polygynist, he is able to achieve both ends of having a wife with him and one tending the distant farm.

The scarcity of women in towns militates against the fidelity of a town wife, who is unceasingly importuned during her husband's absence at work by numerous womanless men. A husband sometimes sends his wife back to the village, where his relatives can guard her chastity, and then, perhaps, he begins to prey upon some other man's wife, or forms a liaison with an unmarried woman, or consorts with prostitutes. Sexual infidelity is a frequent source of friction and a significant factor in the brittleness of urban marriage.

This separation of many of the men in the towns from the women in the villages has a depressing effect upon the birth rate and population growth. In comparison with the rest of the world, Africa appears sparsely populated, and many development plans hinge upon availability of labor supply. Population has increased owing to suppression of warfare, improvement of sanitation and health facilities, and rising levels of living, but a continuation of the unbalanced sex ratio in both towns and rural areas may slow down the rate of increase.

Beginnings of classes

As the urban population progresses toward stabilization and tends to become distinct from the rural population, further divisions in the urban population take place. An incipient class structure appears. Wealth, education, and occupation set some apart from others less favored or gifted, or perhaps merely newcomers, and doing the less remunerative work.

Differences in fortune, training, and ability in the competitive towns give rise to a number of stations, or statuses, which approximate classes, whose members influence each other in evolving group mores which are a departure from the past.

Several factors hinder the solidification of classes in urban Africa. One such factor is the continuation of kin obligations, which drain the resources of the successful individual to aid his less fortunate relatives. Another is that trade is dominated by European, Asian, and Levantine merchants, and a large, well-to-do African middle class based on commerce is prevented from arising. Discrimination, which varies in degree (and in the rationalization for it) in different territories but is never absent, puts all Africans in one category and all Europeans in another. As long as the European fills the dominant role and is exclusive, the emergent upper group of Africans will feel psychologically bound to the lower group. And frequently housing shortages prevent the rising elite from separating itself residentially from the other elements.[13]

The lesser differentiation of women

[13] M. McCulloch, *Survey of Recent and Current Field Studies on the Social Effects of Economic Development in Inter-Tropical Africa* (UNESCO, in preparation).

also retards class formation. Women receive less education than men and although more urban women than rural women are literate, still the number is small. The occupational opportunities for a woman are limited and in some places absent, so that she is less affected by these modifying influences than the man, and because she is not employed, she is free to visit the country relatives and may keep up the contact with her husband's kin as well as with her own. Therefore, the woman, generally, is more conservative, more apt to preserve the traditional customs, and less likely to take up town ways that are glaringly different. To some extent illiterate wives slow the rate of internalization of urban attitudes by the husband and are not able to identify themselves on his level of the class structure.

Children also are often not able to identify with the father's status because of the common practice of sending children to grow up in the country with relatives; accordingly, adjustments to urban and class attitudes have to be made as adults, after rural patterns have been set. Thus men show the marks of class more than their wives and children, a fact which raises the question whether class exists, since class is usually considered as being composed of families. Among the elite especially, where families tend to be stabilized, this less often applies.

Class formation tolls the knell of tribalism in the urban environment. The marks of class are independent of the marks of tribal membership; classes comprise people of various tribes. A European language is not only a means of communication but a symbol of status (like European clothes) for the elite. For other levels, a vernacular lingua franca usually serves the multitribal population. The lines are still fluid and the word "class" should be used with care, but we are not dealing with a static situation and it is necessary to indicate the trend.

Old and new overlapping

The processes outlined above are operative simultaneously and are interrelated. In the towns we see the old and the new, the contrasts and conflicts of Africa, the past refusing to die and the future struggling to be born. Nowhere has the town completely sloughed off its tribal background; nowhere has the urban synthesis finally jelled; but everywhere change is moving in that direction. It is not implied here that there is a renunciation of all African cultural features but merely of traditional organization.

URBAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The feeling of ethnic solidarity carries over into the town and is especially important for new arrivals. Some sections of towns tend toward a tribal or language homogeneity. Even when this is not possible, some form of organization is usually felt necessary for the protection of the members of a common ethnic group in the strange environment of the town. Each "strangers' community" may elect a headman to represent it, and town authorities sometimes find it convenient to deal with certain matters through the several headmen of the various tribal elements. Or a Tribal Union may be formed for mutual aid.

On the other hand, mutual sharing groups in which each contributing member takes the "kitty" in rotation exclude kinsmen, since custom frowns on exactness in exchanges between kinsmen. Other collectivities which have begun to knit the disparate tribal elements into common units are schools, churches, trade unions, political parties, nationalist movements, and public places of recreation such as beer halls and football fields. The more that Africans identify themselves with these groups, the less important tribal affiliation becomes; these associations perform services, or create outlets for emotion and energy, that formerly were found in the tribal organization.

Classes

The upper stratum of African society, which one could logically term a middle class,[14] keeping in mind that the European forms the upper class, includes the most educated, who in some places may be university graduates trained in Europe or America, and in other places locally educated persons of lower level; the upper ranks of government service, which may mean Senior Civil Service, or merely chief clerks; the most responsible employees of commercial firms, which may be managerial staff or only storekeepers or cashiers; perhaps teachers, headmasters of schools, and ministers of religion; and sometimes privately established professional men, or traders successful enough to survive the non-African competition. The actual composition varies with the occupational opportunities in the territory, which in turn depend upon economic, educational, and administrative conditions.

Between the elite and the laborers are an artisan group—tailors, shoemakers, goldsmiths, masons, carpenters, and other skilled workers. Even where the level of skill is low and the craft could be learned in a few months, the apprenticeship is for a number of years, so that ordinarily anyone out of his teens would be discouraged from beginning, but there is nothing actually to prevent anyone from moving from the category of laborer to that of artisan or even to the elite, if he can acquire the education and the income.

[14] G. D. H. Cole, "The Conception of the Middle Class," in Schuler *et al.* (Eds.), *op. cit. supra* (note 12), pp. 345 ff.

Family

The above positions and institutions in the social structure are innovations, but previously existing institutions, such as the family, are modified in the new milieu. An African who ventures into a town is an offshoot of a kin group, and others may follow to the extent that they can be supported; but those who cluster around the man who has gained a foothold in the town are only a fragment of his primary group. The family in the town exists under difficulties and tends to approximate the nuclear family in form, that is, a husband, wife, and children. Other relatives found in the compound of the extended family in the country are found more rarely in town dwellings.

When a crisis arises and the members of the nuclear family want to discuss it with others, being habituated to the extended family of the villages, they call in whatever kinsman, no matter how distant, who happens to be in the town. Proximity in space takes the place of closeness of relationship in the town.

Marriage

In most areas, there are three kinds of marriage which are recognized as legal: civil, church, and customary. The first two are on the Western model and the latter is supposed to be according to tribal customs. In fact, however, customary law cannot operate effectively to attain traditional goals in the towns[15] because a marriage is a contract between families and not merely between individuals, and it often happens that both of the families are not in the town and may even be unknown to each other. Traditional gifts are usually commuted to money, and labor services, if ob-

[15] A. L. Epstein, *The Administration of Justice and the Urban African: A Study of Urban Native Courts in Northern Rhodesia*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953.

served, are shortened in time. Furthermore, customary law marriage between members of different tribes is an anomaly unless, as sometimes happens, both agree to accept one of the tribal forms. If a man is an immigrant into a town where one tribe is dominant he may do this. In addition to legal marriage, there are casual unions which break up when either party so desires.

OUTLOOK

The towns and cities will play an increasingly vital part in the life of Africa. The town is the door through which Africa is entering the modern world. Civilization in the twentieth century is an urban civilization. "The influences which cities exert upon the social life of man are greater than the ratio of the urban population would indicate, for the city . . . is the initiating and controlling center of economic, political, and cultural life that has drawn the most remote parts of the world into its orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples, and activities into a cosmos." [16] In Africa cultural groups are beginning to appear in the cities; nationalist movements get rural support but have their headquarters in the towns. Nations are in the process of formation in Africa and the towns are the crucible. The towns today give us an insight into the future. "As the city is, so will the nation be." [17]

[16] Louis Wirth, "Urbanism As a Way of Life," in Hatt and Reiss (Eds.), *op. cit. supra* (note 7), p. 32.

[17] William B. Munro, "City," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1937), Vol. 3, p. 481.

Daniel F. McCall, Boston, Massachusetts, research associate, African Research and Studies Program, Boston University, was a Social Science Research Council fellow in 1951–52 and studied an urban community in the Gold Coast. He taught at the University of Liberia in 1953 and attended the UNESCO Conference on urbanization in Africa at Abidjan in 1954.

Impact of Christianity in Africa

By EMORY ROSS

AFRICANS south of the Sahara in our day face a challenge not before put to so large a group of people. This challenge is for an unprecedentedly complex triple change:

1. Horizontal change, across the whole range of concepts and practices of life —in thought, language, religion, political and social organization, land, marriage, inheritance, occupations, economics, housing, disease causation and cure, recreation, communications of all kinds, and in nearly every other aspect of life.

2. Vertical change, from the most primal large society remaining on earth, the animistic communal primitivism of 160 million Africans, to something approaching the West's present society, the most individualistic, specialized, and technological society which the world has yet seen.

3. Speedy change, both horizontally and vertically, at a pace not before attempted by any such mass—change attempted by many thousands of Africans in a two or three generations instead of in the three or four milleniums "normally" taken by Western society.

UNORTHODOX NATURE OF CHANGE

Such triple change cannot be effected in any orthodox or perhaps in any orderly fashion. There is no established order for it in past experience with such mass. It is in essence unorthodox.

Because it is thus unprecedented, this speedy change from animistic communalism to some pattern of an individualistic democracy based in considerable measure on the Hebraic-Christian religion suffers from the ignorance and inexperience both of the West and of Africa.

FORCES IN CHANGE

The West did not intentionally initiate such inclusive and speedy change in Africa. It began with merely incidental touching of Africa four or five hundred years ago as a way station on the journey in the search for the fabulous Indies. It later scratched spots on the fringes of Africa to seize slaves destined to bring change and progress in the West's own New World, not in Africa. Then, a century or so ago, it ventured exploration here and there in Africa, and finally produced a Livingstone.

Livingstone stimulated a Stanley and other venturesome penetrators of Africa. King Leopold II of the Belgians sparked a Western political acquisitiveness aimed at Africa. British, French, and German rivalries began to heat over several fires. Africa was involved and was "partitioned" in a fashion unprecedented in any other like land mass.

Two power crises then took their names from Africa, Fashoda and Agadir, the latter in 1911. Three years later the Western world went to war. Africa had no initiative in the war but was engulfed in it. It suffered greatly, and its whole fabric was rent. Thereafter, its raw materials were dug and taken with ever increasing speed to repair the West's self-ravages and to prepare for further struggle.

World War II

This came in 1939 without Africa's volition, but with even more involvement than in 1914. Rommel hit Egypt, pounded Suez, and a thousand African communities. some of them thousands

of miles away, were shaken. Troops, artillery, bulldozers, airfields, harbors, bridge gangs, pipelines, tank depots, naval stores, munition dumps, roads—in two years Africa was penetrated by the "fall out" of World War II from the Mediterranean to Table Bay, from Monrovia to Mackinnon Road.

Six or seven hundred thousand Africans were drawn into military combat and labor services in distant places. Many hundred thousand others were used nearer home in these strange new works of global war.

Billions of dollars poured through millions of man-hours to spread throughout Africa elements of almost the total product of the scientific, technological, war-waging West. The multiple effects on Africa can never be assessed or measured with certainty. One only knows that they were immense.

In the interest of the West

This whole long onslaught has not been primarily for Africa's sake but for that of the West. It is unlikely that anyone would have had the temerity, or would have put up the money or mobilized the outside manpower, to risk so untried and unpromising an experiment in such swift human change for the sake of Africa itself. It was rather the mounting expansion and crisis of the West in these past two or three generations—its hungry maw reaching for raw materials in greater and greater volume than ever before demanded or even imagined; its need for political, economic, and strategic bases overseas to support its own internal struggle and to arm for its own crises—which originally contributed most heavily to European action in Africa.

Africans were initially prodded, pushed, and in some cases even compelled by forced labor and then military enlistment into a speed and type of change they had not dreamed of, and which many did not want. Pressures built up, speed stepped up. And now a mass is in movement. It probably will not stop, cannot be stopped. The desire is for change. Africa's triple change—across the board, up the scale, unprecedented and unpredictable in speed—is under way.

AFRICAN CONCEPTIONS OF CHRISTIANITY

In considering the impact of Christianity in Africa south of the Sahara, it is essential that we keep clearly in mind that the African animistic communal society links its religion tightly with the whole of its life. There are great variations in belief and practice within the approximately eight hundred tribes in Africa. But long association and friendship with Africans through the years evoke the conviction that Africans, in their tribal societies, generally regard life as the product and within the control of their religion. The whole of their life and society is the expression of their religion.

This being so it is natural that in their new contact with a new type of life and society possessing a religion new to the African, they should regard this new life and society as the expression of that new religion.

What then is more logical to the African than that the West should be regarded as the product of Christianity, its society as a Christian society, its people as Christians—in short, the West and all its products as Christian?

The early tendency of the Africans to so classify the West was perhaps reinforced by the not infrequent past references in the West—less frequent in later years—to the "Christian West," to our "Christian civilization."

When therefore the African point of view is considered in terms of the part played by the Christian religion in Africa in the past century or so, it is not

sufficient to confine attention only to Christian missionaries, missions, and churches, to Christian schools and hospitals. The Africans early tended to regard all Westerners as representatives of Christianity, all these Westerners' political, economic, social, racial, personal patterns and actions as representing Christianity in life. It was in essence doing only what perhaps most Westerners were doing with respect to African people and society: regarding that society and all its works as representative of an animistic religion.

It is probable that today some Africans educated in Western patterns are prepared intellectually to accept the idea that important segments of our Western life and action are not Christian, and even that numbers of professing Western Christians do not expect or work towards the Christianization of all these segments. But that does not mean that these Africans all admire that philosophy. Indeed it probably means in numbers of cases that Africans are disappointed, uncertain, and confused. They see that the Christianity which they thought had undergirded, stimulated, and controlled the great new Western accomplishments which they now desire was in important ways not even as powerful as their old animism in controlling a whole life and society. Christianity probably seems an insecure base on which to build a whole new life.

The slave trade

It is with some such background as this that we should try to evaluate Christianity in Africa. In such an evaluation it is essential to remember that the "Christian" West's first large-scale approach to Africa was for slaves. Slavery had long existed in Africa, as in almost all primitive societies: a domestic slavery, largely, with all the attendant abuses and cruelties. It was the West, however, which, touching the coast in many places and stimulating coastal Africans to raiding the interior for slaves, internationally commercialized the slave trade, established transoceanic transport for it, made it "big business" in its day. Accompanying this was a certain amount of talk of the Christianizing advantages which pagan Africans had in being captured, shipped, sold, and worked in the Christian West.

This doubtless appears now to most Westerners as what it was: pious humbug, a negation of Christianity. But there are here and there in Africa today some of Western descent who appear to Africans to be invoking their Christianity and the value to Africans of their Western science and productivity as reasons for their minority, and almost exclusive and complete, domination of the social, economic, and political scene throughout large African areas and over large numbers of Africans.

The parallel between this and the earlier Christian apologetic for slavery is of course not exact, but it is suggestive enough to Africans who remember the religious sanctions set forth for the "Christian" West's first large-scale relations with Africa—slavery.

Race prejudice

The common racial and cultural prejudices are likewise important factors in parts of Africa in making Africans critical of the Christianity with which those prejudices seem to enter Africa. Of course, it can be and is pointed out that Christ's teachings and constant examples while on earth were all against racial and cultural prejudices and exclusions, and that therefore Christianity cannot be held responsible for the prejudice now found. That attitude doubtless seems unrealistic or even hypocritical to a good many Africans. They believe they can see Western "Christians" put-

ting numerous disabilities on other races and cultures in the West, in the East, and in Africa.

IMPACT OF CHRISTIANITY

It seems clear then that the impact of Christianity in Africa has by no means come only through Christian missions. These impacts have come through many different national cultural, economic, and political channels from the West. Even within the different Christian missions those national forces have not infrequently produced quite different attitudes, methods, and results.

The theme of this paper therefore is that religion, in this case Christianity, is not something in a separate compartment of life called church or missions or worship. It is an integral, inextricable part of life, all life. It is a major element of that holism of which Jan Smuts, Haldane, Whitehead, and others have written. Its impact upon that wholeness of life represented within a tribe by Africa's animistic communal society comes through the whole of the life poured in upon Africa in these later years from the so-called Christian West. The impact is from many sources; it is direct and indirect. Its effect is total in character.

Generally, despite weaknesses and errors already named and later to be named, it seems correct to say that the impact of Christianity from the West upon African life has been thus far the strongest element in change and progress in the past three generations. The following points support this conclusion.

Individual choice

First, Christianity has been the chief influence in introducing and spreading the concept—revolutionary in Africa's communal society—of individual choice, initiative, and power, coupled with sobering individual responsibility for one's fellows and one's society. This has been a power of Christianity in all lands and in all generations since Christ. It has entered Africa not only through teaching and example in Christian missions but also in many political and economic contexts, in social customs, and in the historic bases of the Western peoples entering Africa who had themselves gained it through the influences of Christianity in their own lands.

The whole man

Second, Christianity has been, everywhere in Africa south of the Sahara, the introducer of Western-type education of the whole man: head, hand, and heart. Christian missions still carry the bulk of the load of this broad education, sometimes without, but increasingly with, the aid of public funds.

Medical and health gains

Third, Christian missions have been almost everywhere the introducer of Western medical, surgical, and public health methods, and the pioneer trainer of Africans in these skills.

Self-help

Fourth, Christianity has pioneered in self-help programs, in agricultural improvements, in training for trades and professions, and it was in many cases earliest in giving Africans practice and responsibility in these. It was the pioneer in aiding Africans to travel and study in the outside world.

Displacement of animism

Fifth, through Christian spiritual illuminations and through slowly convincing demonstrations in medicine, surgery, science, agriculture, and general education, all in a Christian atmosphere, it has given many Africans most powerful aid in the essential displacement of animistic superstitions, fears, and oppressions. The continuance of those animistic inhibitions in full strength would render quite impossible African advance in modern science, economics, technology, and political forms, and in new optimum social forms and toward a new spiritual community embracing all.

African Christians

Sixth, although statistics are never wholly revealing in matters of the heart and mind, and most African statistics have special weaknesses, the best available figures indicate that there are 21 million or more professing African Christians. The same source indicates that in all the rest of the so-called non-Christian world, with about fifteen times the population of Africa, there are some 20 million Christians. As of now, Christianity has drawn more Africans together than any other power entering Africa in modern times.

IMPLICATION OF DIVISIONS IN CHRISTIANITY

These elements are of great importance in the building of a new society in Africa. But human weaknesses among Christians in the West and among such Westerners in Africa are so numerous and so great that Christianity cannot yet develop its fullest re-creative power in Africa. As there are splits in human personalities and societies, so are there splits in the Christianity brought in from the West to Africa, sharply reducing its effectiveness.

Let me suggest four splits in the spiritual and cultural forces in the West and in Africa which now exist, which in some places appear to widen, and which, if they continue unrepaired and uncontrolled in the future, may bring crisis mounting to explosion and despair in the spiritual and cultural experiences of Africa and the West and remove or greatly reduce the most powerful of all forces guiding economic, political, and social development.

Split between Protestants and Roman Catholics

The first of these four splits in the Christian world is the split between Protestants and Roman Catholics. We in the West know something of the historical, national, and political reasons behind this split. We are still somewhat emotionally sensitive to it all. But those historic and current conditionings of ours are for the most part quite hidden as yet from the Africans. Probably for most Africans this is one of the incomprehensible and bewildering aspects of the Christian religion as imported from the West. This is a split of the first magnitude in Christianity in Africa.

Its gravity is, of course, also recognized in the West, but oftentimes with a kind of fatalistic sense of inevitability. It does not at first appear as inevitable to the African as he hears both groups preaching from what appears to him as the same book, the Book of Books, and teaching the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the unity with our Maker within the church.

It would seem that whatever may be possible to be done for the healing or the narrowing of this first split I mention, and for the development of better functional understandings and relationships in many parts of Africa between Roman Catholics and Protestants, would make a contribution of the first magnitude in our spiritual and cultural fellowship and co-operation with Africa.

Splits among the Protestants

The second of the four splits is among Protestants themselves. Protestants' Western denominational divisions are nearly all represented in Africa, at least all of those having missionary interests. There are fifteen Christian councils in as many political divisions in Africa south of the Sahara, and most of them

represent some solid co-operative Protestant planning and action. But none of them has within its membership all of the Protestant forces within its area. In public education matters the co-operation among most members within a given Christian council is generally good. This is also true with regard to government relationships and in the production of general Christian literature and other good reading materials. Co-operation in leprosy work and in some places in other medical undertakings is to be found.

But the fact remains that in what is the most important single training task which Christians alone must do in Africa—the training of the Christian ministry and the church's lay leadership—there is only limited interdenominational and international co-operation here and there throughout the continent. There is not, for example, in the whole of Africa a single union Protestant theological seminary of full rank. There are, indeed, very few spots where any solid co-operation exists between denominations for the training of the Protestant ministry.

This example of Protestant divisions is not lost upon African Christians. In some places it operates to divide members of the same or related tribes along theological lines, although it must be said that for the most part the Western denominational loyalties appear to be rather less rigid among large numbers of Africans than they are in the Westerners' homelands. This is hopeful for the future.

But where political, economic, educational, cultural, and other disabilities put upon Africans are most pronounced and severe, as currently for example in the Union of South Africa, there the Western religious denominational pattern is not only followed but widened. There are more than 1,100 separatist African denominations registered in the Union. Using the split pattern of Western Christianity, as between Protestants and Roman Catholics and among Protestants themselves, the underprivileged majority has run denominational riot in the Union. This is in considerable measure an effort to escape white domination in at least one sector of life. But the adoption of the Western Christians' split pattern is demonstrably not the way to gain spiritual solidarity in Africa any more than it has been in Europe and the Americas.

Split between Negro and white

The third of these four splits within the church and our society is that between colors, between black and white. Segregation on grounds of color in our home churches and society, and barriers, tangible and sometimes rather intangible, on color grounds in Africa is for Africans—as it should be for us—a negation of the basic Christian Gospel of God's Fatherhood, of love and brotherhood, and sharing of the "oneness" there is in Christ.

What seems to Africans as color discrimination exists in almost all parts of Africa, brought chiefly by the Christian West. It may not be in reality discrimination based wholly on grounds of color. There has been historically discrimination of various types in Liberia and Ethiopia by members of the ruling group in relation to some or most of the people making up the mass of the population. This is now diminishing and was obviously not color discrimination. But when such discrimination occurs between white and Negro the general tendency of the Negro is to assign it almost wholly to color. Reasoning and argument about such assignment is often of little avail, for emotions and feelings and not the more rational processes of the mind are in control. And, besides, obvious and avowed color discrimination does exist in many parts of the West and in Africa, and Africans know it.

Nowhere in the West is color discrimination more evident than in the United States. And no groups seem slower to root it out than thousands of individual Christian congregations in this country. More interracial progress has been made in political, industrial, labor, academic, sport, theatrical, musical, and other groups, than in tens of thousands of churches. Africans are coming to know this also. For there are more than a thousand African students in America now, and scores of other Africans come each year here on government or private business.

And when, in addition, they see the excesses regarding race in the Union of South Africa, and the place of the dominant church in them, and the segregation within and without the church in many other places in Africa, it is small wonder that this split between black and white assumes major proportions as they think of Christianity and of continuing Western dominance in most of Africa.

The progress toward better racial attitudes in the United States both before and after the Supreme Court decision of May 1954 holds great promise in our international relations. But there is much lost ground to be made up by Christians in Africa, ground indispensable for the foundations of a world Christian society.

Split between spiritual and secular elements

The fourth of these four splits is the one in the West between the elements we call "spiritual" and those we classify as "secular." It is difficult, confusing, and often painful for the African to learn that Christians seem to regard some things as spiritual and some others as "secular," separated fairly sharply from the spiritual. To African traditional thought and action such a division does not make sense. It is a negation of the facts of life as he and his fathers have observed and lived it for generations. Life to him is a unity guided and almost always controlled by the spirit.

To accept a religion with all the power, beauty, and promise of Christianity and then gradually to find that this Gospel as practiced so largely in the West is expected to control only a part of life and not to enter, except rather superficially, into what is called "secular" aspects of life—that is a disillusionment of great dimensions.

One doubts that any other one split in spiritual and cultural concepts in the West is more important in our relations with the Africa of today and tomorrow than is this Western split between religion and great sectors of human life.

This split seems to Africans to manifest itself, for example, in our reluctance, sometimes refusal, to try to deal with political problems where Africans feel their interests are jeopardized. In industrial, labor, economic, and related matters they feel their basic rights are often acutely involved. It is hard for them to understand Western Christians' attitude that these somehow are things with which spiritual forces do not seek directly to deal. We need not be surprised, in these circumstances, if they rather suspect that our reluctance stems from our feeling of group identification, racially and culturally, with the ruling white political and economic powers, and from our hesitancy to do things which might weaken white solidarity and white supremacy. That may seem to them a more likely explanation than that this new and powerful Christian Gospel cannot tackle effectively these urgent problems of life.

This split manifests itself, too, in our not bringing from the West a clear, viable Christian philosophy of man's spiritual relationship to the all-giving and all-powerful Mother Earth. We

from the West can produce more crops from the land, sometimes. We often urge Africans to use "better" methods of agriculture. We on occasion seem to agree when governments or plantation owners (with government sanction) force Africans to adopt new commercial crops or new methods of cultivation.

But where, Africans can naturally ask, in all this Western emphasis on land and the new uses of it is there a clear Christian replacement of the old and tried animistic spiritual attitude and practice regarding land? This right relationship to land is one of the most important things in the African's life. His life and all life depend on it. It is a matter that must be spiritually based, and soundly. It must be spiritually, as well as "physically" (there is little difference to the animistic African), good for the whole "tribe," that is, society. What is the Christian West's spiritual attitude and control regarding land, the African wonders?

The fact is that in the West a spiritual conception of the land has disappeared. Our real approach is technological, not spiritual. Yet we should have been able to gain the former without losing the latter. That combination of the two is what masses of Africans instinctively want. That is what nearly all of the so-called "underdeveloped" peoples of the world want. They have a deep inner reluctance to become as highly developed technologically as we are if at the same time they must become as underdeveloped spiritually as we appear to them to be. They cannot yet believe that is truly necessary. Even primitive Africans instinctively resist such "progress."

The African's spiritual linkage to his tribal land is one of the most powerful forces in his life. It is embittering to be put off his land by foreign whites, as in some places he is. Or to be concentrated on "locations" that are a stench. Or to be assigned "reserves" within his own ancestral lands by foreigners who, when they came, "had the Bible and we had the land. Now we have the Bible and they have the land."

It is hard for him to accept the separation, in a religion as powerful as Christianity, of things spiritual from things physical like land; of things spiritual from things "secular," as in industry, labor, and politics. It is not illogical that he should begin to suspect that Christianity is not as powerful as he had thought it to be, and that some of its practices developed in the West may not be as pure as its pulpit presentations.

These four splits and others growing out of them in the Christian life in the West are great handicaps to the Christian Gospel in Africa. The oneness, the wholeness, of the hoped-for Christian life and community are broken. The fullness of life which Christianity promised in Africa seems to them not yet widely produced. They freely aver that Christianity has helped them do many things in Africa. But they wonder if Western Christianity is really concerned with the whole of life in Africa.

CONCLUSION

If the foregoing be accepted as a generally valid sketch of some of the effects of Western Christianity in Africa, two conclusions may be drawn:

1. Christianity, in direct and indirect ways, has had probably the most fundamental, widespread, and creative effect of any element entering Africa south of the Sahara in modern time.

2. Christianity, handicapped by its Western human distortions from the original teachings Christ gave in a society not so far removed from its own animistic communal origins, has failed to give everything it might to Africa's rapidly changing people.

This failure presents grave dangers. It may so discourage and embitter the African that he will in the end fanatically combat the West on all fronts. It may lead him to develop his own distortions of Christianity on the ground that if the West can warp that powerful religion to its own selfish national and cultural ends, so can Africa. Finally, it may leave him as defenseless prey to other outside philosophies and ideologies which at this stage are not yet established among Africans and thus are not required to produce anything at all in African society. They have now only to promise. And they cleverly promise among their most attractive wares what seem to Africans to be some of the same values offered by Christianity, and partially produced, but then frustratingly refused completion by the "Christian" West.

Such dangers are serious; and they pose a critical challenge to Christianity and the peoples and governments of the West.

Emory Ross, D.D., New York City, was a missionary in Africa from 1912 to 1933, serving four years in Liberia, and about eighteen years in the Belgian Congo as missionary and secretary of the Congo Protestant Council. From 1934 to 1953, he was secretary and secretary of the Africa Committee of the Canadian and North American Mission Boards for Africa South of the Sahara. He is the author of several books, including Out of Africa (1936) and African Heritage (1953). He gave the Lugard Lecture in 1953 and the Hoernle Lecture in 1954. He is president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and president of the American Leprosy Missions.

Education in Africa: Its Pattern and Role in Social Change

By Margaret H. Read

In order to give this section on education some integration and validity, arbitrary limits have been set on the territories covered. They include all territories from the Sahara to the Zambezi River, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Nile Basin. By excluding North Africa, Egypt, the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somaliland, Southern Rhodesia, and the Union of South Africa, the remaining territories, with the exception of Liberia, are all at present non-self-governing or trusteeship territories with a political relationship to some metropolitan country in Europe.

In the general assessment of education within these set limits a historical perspective is essential, and here we find that the existing data are very uneven in respect to coverage and precision and that the needed research has not yet been done except in isolated studies. This historical view is the more important considering the rapidity of modern change, especially in territories, such as the Gold Coast, where political changes herald great expansions of educational facilities.

The relation of descriptive material to analytical studies raises another set of problems in presenting this article. Since 1945 in spite of certain large-scale surveys of education in particular areas, there have been very few "compilation studies" of the extensive amount of material appearing in periodicals and in annual and special reports. There are three major problems for the student in this field. One is the difficulty of relating educational plans as they appear on paper to actual achievement in practice. Another is the lack of "bench marks" for estimating advance in educational facilities and in school enrollment and attendance. The third is the absence of accepted criteria for assessing educational progress, using that term in a wide and comprehensive sense.

Traditional Training

Modern studies of socialization, especially among preliterate peoples, have drawn attention to the provision for training in behavior and in technical skills which has been described sometimes as a traditional educational system. The use of these terms and the attempt to equate tribal training in Africa with a modern school system have led to considerable confusion among Europeans, and to resentment among African peoples on two counts: one the ignoring of the training given by them to their children and the other the reiteration by educational writers that tribal training should have a place in the school system without taking any steps to achieve it or to integrate it. One of the sharpest clashes between Europeans and Africans arises from a misunderstanding by the European of the significance of traditional interpersonal behavior as taught by tribal elders; and one of the major reasons for the increasing fragmentation of African society in urban and industrial centers is the abandonment by African parents and elders of all attempts to train their children on traditional lines.

The patterns of socialization among African peoples have received on the whole very little attention from social anthropologists. Among the studies which have been made two distinct patterns

emerge: those among the small communities, organized on a clan or restricted tribal basis, such as the Tallensi of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, as described by Professor Meyer Fortes; [1] and those among the large tribal units or military states, where there was a centralized political authority and a hierarchical social status system. The age-set systems of the East African peoples are found both in smaller tribal groups and in larger centralized ones, and were sometimes, but not always, related to cattle keeping and to training for warfare.

The life of the small communities, such as the Tallensi, was centered in the struggle for livelihood and in the intricate pattern of kinship relationships. We find therefore an emphasis on the importance of children to the family groups, demonstrated in the indulgence shown during the early years of childhood, followed by the desire of children to grow up as quickly as possible and take part in adult activities, both social and economic. This stress on children being "little adults" was in sharp contrast to the recognized age sets in East Africa, where after the infant and wholly dependent stage was passed, boys and girls, according to their age, had recognized and progressive positions and responsibilities in the life of their community and later of the tribe as a whole. The emphasis in most of the training in the age sets was on obedience, endurance, and co-operation in a recognized unit. Training in both the larger and the smaller communities emphasized correct behavior to equals, superiors, and inferiors, and the acquiring of the necessary technical skills for craft work, cultivation, cattle keeping, or warfare.

When the former training of children and young people in African societies is compared with the modern school systems now operating, certain features of the traditional patterns appear to have been abandoned, notably those which showed the close correlation between the training of personality and character and the integration and cohesion of family, clan, and tribal units. Three of these elements were absent in the early forms of schooling as introduced in Africa, and though their significance has been progressively realized, the attempts to incorporate them into the modern school system have been spasmodic and not altogether successful.

Physical development and social recognition

The first was the close correlation in African tribal society between physical development and social recognition. The so-called age sets were organized not so much by age in years as by recognized physical changes—the appearance of second teeth, prepuberty changes, the actual onset of puberty, the birth of the first child, and so on. The emphasis in the majority of African societies on fertility and on the capacity to beget and bear children was the keynote of the initiation rites where they were on an organized tribal basis. This emphasis included instruction given during these rites, and privately, before and at puberty, in sexual intercourse, sex hygiene, and sexual behavior in general. This instruction, which was associated with general social behavior and the responsibilities of young adults, was given at or about the period of the most important physical change for boys and girls. Their normal activities ceased while they were withdrawn from ordinary life to undergo this training, and they returned to their community as individuals charged with new knowledge and new responsibilities. The age at which children went to school, the

[1] Meyer Fortes, *Social and Psychological Aspects of Education in Taleland* (Oxford, 1938).

prevalence of mission boarding schools, and features of the initiation rites which were dangerous to health and objectionable on Christian moral grounds caused the missionaries to clash with this traditional training. The result was that it was largely abandoned by Christians, and at the same time the essential sex teaching and training in social behavior were omitted.

Enlargement of social and political horizons

The second element in the traditional training which was squeezed out by modern schools was the gradual enlarging of the social and political horizons of the children. The learning of genealogies of the families and clans, as among the Ashanti and the Baganda, the recognition of social groupings in hierarchical tribal settings and of their reciprocal relationships, the hearing of tribal "history" in praise songs and legends told at tribal gatherings—these were forms of direct learning which had no place in schools but had set times and places in a traditional situation. In more specific behavior patterns the organization of age villages, as among the Nyakusa,[2] of boys' dormitories in villages and of competitive dance groups between village and village as among the Ngoni, and of attendance at tribal law courts where codes and norms of behavior were in review—all these gave young Africans a training in citizenship which was related to their own society.

Artistic expression

The third element for which the early schools, and to a great extent the schools of today, made no place was those aesthetic activities which had for African peoples a deep emotional content. Music of all kinds, vocal and instrumental, tribal dancing, the telling of hero stories and folklore, tribal expression in dress, house decoration, carving and painting of ritual and common objects, dramatic recitations and miming—these touched the roots of African emotional life.

ROLE OF TRADERS AND MISSIONARIES

It is generally accepted that in all the African territories south of the Sahara missionary societies were responsible for opening schools wherever they established their stations. It is not always realized that the commercial company, especially in West Africa, played a significant part in what the Portuguese first and the French and Belgians later called "the mission of civilization."[3] European thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw no incompatibility between establishing "forts" to regulate the slave trade and educating a very limited number of Africans to assist them in their enterprises. This education implied as a rule conversion to Christianity, and in this respect the early trading companies anticipated the work of the missions.

Some of the chief gaps in the history of education in Africa are gradually being filled by historians, by missionary writers reviewing their work for centenary celebrations, by research students carrying out investigations in a limited field on material in the Records Office, in local archives, in the archives of mission houses, and in the Vatican library. The results of this research, as illustrated in Dr. Roland Oliver's book, *The Missionary Factor in East Africa*,[4] and in recent unpublished theses on West Africa in the University of London, show how varied were the beginnings of educational work in all the African territories. The common element, in trading posts and in all kinds of mission stations, was the need for intermediaries between the foreign traders and missionaries and the people. The emphasis in the majority of missionary enterprises, apart from their primary task of conversion to Christianity, was on the importance of training teachers, evangelists, clerks, and artisans who would assist them in establishing their mission stations and by taking over the routine duties enable the missionaries to extend their work.

Another result of recent research has been to establish the intention of the early missionaries to emphasize the training of Africans in agriculture and elementary technical skills such as building and carpentry. There has been widespread criticism over the last half century that mission schools gave too literary and academic an education, and unfitted boys for working on the land. Investigations of missionary records have shown that in many cases mission boards and the missionaries themselves intended to emphasize the practical vocational aspects of education. The eventual emphasis on literary skills was largely due to pressure from the Africans themselves because that was what they wanted from the schools; and also, at a later stage, to standards of academic attainment set up by systems of inspection and examination.

Present mission schools

The contemporary picture in the African territories today is that of a widespread network of mission schools at all levels, from the "bush" or village school up to the full secondary school and teacher training college. The widest development of mission schools has occurred in the Belgian Congo and in British territories, with the exception in the latter of Northern Nigeria, where the treaties made with the Muslim emirs at the beginning of the century precluded the opening of Christian schools among the Muslim peoples. A common feature in the Belgian Congo and in British territories has been the use of the vernacular languages in the lowest classes of the primary schools. The study of these languages, and their reduction to writing, was one of the outstanding contributions of the pioneer missionaries. While they attacked and rejected much of the African cultural background in their attempts to abolish "heathen practices," these early missionaries did signal service to the African peoples and to the future of African studies by recording and transcribing the vernacular languages and by giving the African peoples the New and Old Testaments in their own language.

In the British territories the missions depended for their educational, and indeed for all their work at first, on contributions from the home churches, and on the gifts, often in kind, from African peoples and the almost universal payment of fees by the pupils in schools. As the governments in the territories assumed full responsibility for all the administrative services, they established a system of grants-in-aid for mission schools, dependent on the standards attained and the reports of inspectors appointed and paid by the government. The present methods of financing schools, in Liberia as well as in all the non-self-governing territories, have developed from the history of mission schools over the last fifty to sixty years. In addition to the government schools, which now exist in all territories, there are assisted and nonassisted schools, conducted primarily by missions but also by plantations and other industrial undertakings.

In the Belgian Congo a distinction is made between "national" missions based in Belgium and "foreign" missions based in other countries. After 1948 the foreign missions were offered equal sub-

[2] Monica Wilson, *Good Company* (Oxford, 1951).

[3] Margaret Read, *Africans and Their Schools* (London, 1953).

[4] London, 1952.

sidies for their schools if those in charge were equally qualified—that is, if they had taken courses in French language and literature and had studied the Belgian educational system and Belgian history and culture. In British territories there is a supposition that non-British missionaries will be able to use and teach English in their schools. In the past it has not been stringently enforced, but the tightening up of the grants-in-aid system indicates that this requirement will in the future be necessary for continued financial support.

DIVERGENT EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS TODAY

The new edition of Lord Hailey's *African Survey*[5] to appear shortly has a section on education which incorporates the situation as recorded in the most recent surveys and studies. Two recent comprehensive surveys have been made, one on the Belgian Congo by Dr. J. Vanhove[6] and the other on the British territories in East and Central Africa and in West Africa, carried out by two educational missions.[7] No studies of contemporary educational systems comparable in scope and integration have been made in the French or Portuguese areas or in Liberia, though some significant effects of education on social change have been recorded in recent French sociological studies. It is clear from the information available, whether integrated in a survey or scattered throughout reports and articles, that Africans in these territories have educational opportunities which differ widely in type and extent, and that the systems also show divergences in the philosophy and intentions behind the facilities offered. This is true also in the ten British African territories, which have no uniformity in their educational systems. Since it is impracticable to describe the existing system in any detail, a selection has been made of four of the most salient features of the present day found to a greater or lesser degree in all the territories and relevant to the effects of education on social change.

Integration with metropolitan systems

This feature affects the non-self-governing territories only and is directly connected with the general political relationship between the African territory and the metropolitan country. Thus there are variations in the administration and planning of education, as illustrated in the Gold Coast with its almost complete autonomy and in French West Africa with its close integration with metropolitan France. This relationship, however, cannot be summarily dismissed as one of virtual autonomy or integration. It has to be analyzed into several component factors: the responsibility for policy making and implementation; the financing of education; the determining of educational standards and of the equivalence of certificates and degrees; and the varying educational opportunities offered to different racial groups in multiracial states such as the Belgian Congo and Kenya. In the British territories, though there is in London an Advisory Committee on Education in the colonies, which assists in recruiting and training expatriate teachers and in giving specialist help in the territories which ask for its co-operation, the full onus of policy making lies with the ten respective governments, and they are also responsible for the financial implementation of their policies. They have looked, however, since 1940 for additional financial help, especially in capital expenditure, from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, grants being allocated on the basis of long-term and shorter-term planning. In educational standards, local autonomy exists up to the end of the secondary school period, when external examinations are taken, based on the Cambridge School Certificate. A West African Examinations Board has now been set up which will conduct examinations within these territories at the secondary school level. In the French territories the postwar educational system in France has been taken as the model, and the colonial teaching and inspectorate service are unified with that of France.[8] The responsibility for policy making and finance lies with the Director of Education in each of the two French territories, and all diplomas and certificates awarded by him are valid throughout the French Union. Contributions to colonial education are made from the French Development Fund. In the Belgian Congo, though there is recognition of the dual nature of the Congo population and of the essential link with the French language and with Belgian cultural institutions, policy is determined in the Congo and education is financed from Congo sources.

Degree of educational uniformity and methods of control

Two factors have influenced the development of education in all these territories, including Liberia. One is the multiplicity of mission schools which preceded but now exist alongside the state schools. The other is the marked divergence between education in the towns and the coastal areas generally and in the hinterland away from the main routes of communication. Nowhere is there any uniformity in educational facilities between the towns and the up-country areas; nor is there anywhere, in spite of all attempts at control, much effective equivalence in the kind of education given in mission and state schools, especially at the lowest levels. Throughout the African territories the methods of control of educational facilities and standards at different levels follow the same pattern: the inspection of schools through a central inspectorate; an examination system, which varies in its application to primary, secondary, and technical schools; the standards of academic attainment required for entry into postschool training or into direct employment; and the control of the training of teachers and of their conditions of service. Systems of inspection based on a central government department of education are a universal method of control. It has been the experience in most British territories that where mission or government supervisory services to assist teachers were set up, following the recommendations of the Phelps Stokes Commission in the 1920's, the effectiveness of the inspecting staff has been much increased. In addition the appointment of education advisers to the Protestant and Roman Catholic missions in a territory, paid for by state funds, has made for better co-operation in carrying out policies. In the French territories the leaving certificate of the primary schools is equivalent to the French "certificat d'études" and is universally recognized for entry into employment and into vocational training. In British territories where the school nomenclature varies greatly, and especially in those areas where educational standards are rising rapidly, the entry into employment from the schools is being raised continuously.

The situation created by the coexistence of schools under government and

[5] William Malcolm Hailey, *An African Survey* (former edition, Oxford, 1938; new edition forthcoming).

[6] J. Vanhove, *L'Oeuvre de l'Éducation au Congo Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi* (Brussels, 1953).

[7] Nuffield Foundation and Colonial Office, *African Education* (London, 1952).

[8] French North Africa is not considered here. The units in French Africa referred to are the Federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa.

voluntary agencies is nowhere seen more clearly than in the recruitment and training of teachers. The history of mission education and the recent educational surveys have shown that the expansion of school facilities and the maintenance of standards in the teaching profession are very difficult to reconcile. In all the territories "untrained" teachers are found in large numbers and are regarded by the education authorities as their major problem, professionally and administratively. Governments exercise some control through the grants-in-aid system where it is based upon the qualifications of the teaching staff in a school. Professional standards are maintained through the recognition given to teachers trained in normal colleges. Thus the diploma awarded in the nine Écoles Normales in French territories is valid throughout the French Union, but this high standard of teaching when applied to staffing primary schools makes them too expensive to establish universally.

Appearance of educational ladder

In the names of the kinds of schools provided there is no uniform practice, not only between the different regions but between the British territories also. The universal term "primary school," for example, means the first eight years in Liberia; in the Belgian Congo it is a four year course divided after the first two years into an ordinary and a selective course; in French West Africa there is one type of primary school lasting five years for Africans and Europeans; in French Equatorial Africa there is a village junior primary of four years and a regional or urban full primary of six years; in the hinterland of several British territories there is an unrecognized preprimary or "bush school" course, and a full primary one of six years, or a four year junior primary and a further four years called senior primary or middle school. The demand for secondary education, both academic and technical, which far exceeds the facilities available, poses the problem of selection in an acute form, and this in its turn is closely connected with the language medium used in the primary and middle schools. In all territories the medium in the secondary schools is the European language of the metropolitan country, though in the Belgian Congo and in most British territories courses at the secondary level can be offered in African languages. Where the primary schools, as in the state schools of French West Africa, use only French as the medium of instruction, the problems of selection can be solved by competitive examinations. In many other territories the basic instruction is given in the primary schools in a vernacular language, with a European language introduced either early in the curriculum or at a later stage. Here selection for the secondary school poses problems of testing intelligence as well as attainment, in order not to exclude able children who may have been handicapped by language difficulties.

Universal primary schooling

Compulsory education may exist as a policy on paper, but it can only be made effective where there are school facilities provided for every child. Several territories, Belgian, French, and British, have compulsory ordinances which can be put into effect in restricted areas, but it is clear that no considerable area of any territory has all its school-age population enrolled in school. The best documented study of the expansion of educational facilities is found in the Gold Coast publications, beginning with the report dealing mainly with reorganization in the years 1937–41 and following through with the Ten Year Plan of 1947, the Accelerated Development Plan of 1951, and the report

on progress in education in 1954.[9] These documents illustrate clearly the two major problems in educational expansion in Africa: the provision of finance and the provision of teachers. They also illustrate the determination of a territory on the verge of self-government to provide universal schooling facilities in all but the most remote section of its territory.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND AFRICAN ADVANCE

From French and British West Africa before World War II an increasing number of Africans were going to the metropolitan countries to take university degrees and higher professional training in law and medicine. Some of these men went at their own expense, others secured state scholarships. French policy continued and increased after 1945 the system of scholarships. British policy did the same, but also set up university colleges, one in East Africa, two in West Africa, and most recently one in Central Africa. These university colleges had a dual purpose: to give increased facilities for Africans to get degrees and higher professional training; and to equip a number of them to fill administrative and professional posts in their own countries. In 1950 an Institute of Advanced Studies was opened at Dakar, already an important research center, to give diplomas in arts, science, medicine, and law, with the intention that it should become the university of French Africa. In 1954 university courses were begun at Kisantu in the Belgian Congo under the auspices of the University of Louvain. In 1951 a new university college was opened in Liberia, based on the higher college founded in 1862.

In most African territories therefore there now exist institutions for higher education of a university grade. There is a clear intention to integrate the standards of work and the degrees given with university standards in the metropolitan country and thus to ensure that Africans have equivalent qualifications for senior administrative posts and that they are eligible for research grants. The pursuit of research in the human and physical sciences and in fields such as history, law, and language is taken for granted in the university colleges. In addition there are three social science research institutes in British East, West, and Central Africa; in the Belgian Congo research institutes in medicine and agriculture have long been at work, and the Institute for Scientific Research in Central Africa is actively engaged in an extensive program of research in the natural, biological, and social sciences in the Congo. In Dakar l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire has established a world-wide reputation for its published and projected research.

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

There is general agreement, based on abundant evidence of a political and economic character, that the spread of modern education has been one of the most powerful forces in African social change. Yet there have been very few studies, either historical or contemporary, which focus in a limited area on the sociological changes resulting from modern education, such as the one by K. A. Busia on Sekondi.[10] It is clear that the impact of schools, over a historical period, has had very different results in the coastal areas and the hinterland, where in some remote parts

[9] Gold Coast: *Report of the Education Committee* (Accra, 1942); *Ten Year Plan of Development and Welfare* (Accra, 1947); *Accelerated Development Plan for Education, 1951* (Accra, 1951); *Progress in Education in the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1954).

[10] Kofi Abrefa Busia, *Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi* (London, 1950).

it is still possible to study the effects of the first impact of the new schools on a preliterate people. Hence though the generalizations which follow, based on data drawn from material in other fields, can be regarded as valid in respect of the main social changes due to education, they are less illuminating as guides to future planning than they would be if they were supported by detailed sociological studies for given areas.

Occupational mobility

As we saw at the opening of this article, one of the first purposes of the early schools was to train Africans to serve European enterprises, commercial, missionary, administrative. From that time on, the traditional and relatively standardized forms of livelihood and employment underwent progressive changes. Warfare, cultivation, herding stock, fishing, trading, craft work were the main occupations in tribal life. The demands of European enterprise, for which boys were taught and trained, introduced a money economy as well as new skills. This led to two main forms of mobility. One was a change over from following the local traditional and family form of livelihood—a change which implied individual choice, new rewards, new skills. The other was the movement of individuals and groups from remote areas to centers of employment, inaugurating the modern phenomenon of migrant labor. Sociological research has shown clearly that one effect of the spread of schools is to increase emigration from rural areas, and it was pointed out in the British educational survey of East and Central Africa that "the flight from farming" was causing great concern about the maintenance of the basic food supplies.

Urbanization

The growth of towns for administrative, commercial, and industrial purposes caused a demand for increased facilities for schools and also for some educational solutions for the problems of seasonal unemployment, slum conditions, and juvenile delinquency. The contrasts here between the Copper Belt towns in the Belgian Congo and in Northern Rhodesia are illuminating. The Belgian policy of permanent urbanization, as contrasted with that of mainly migrant labor in Northern Rhodesia, led to the use of school facilities and of adult informal education to meet the new situation for the Africans. It provided also a ladder of advancement in technical training which created a new skilled artisan class which was at home in and enjoyed industrial employment and urban amenities.

Rural community life

The combination of migrant labor, cash crops, and a money economy has probably caused more changes in social life in the villages than the village schools themselves. Since many of these schools were part of the missionary enterprise, the religious and ethical teaching given has had significant effects, especially on the outlook and status of women. The postwar work in community development and adult literacy has not only given women the skills of reading and writing but has created amenities such as water supplies, better roads, co-operative stores, maternity homes, dispensaries, giving village women more leisure, more security, and less isolation. In many parts of Africa women's clubs and societies have been started or have received a new impetus where they existed before, and women are emerging from a purely domestic and physically arduous life to take part in community affairs, to express their women's point of view, and to organize themselves for further advance.

This changed outlook among rural women is part of a wider change in the status and authority patterns in village life. Wherever local government on modern lines is being introduced, younger educated men and women are taking responsibility, and the traditional status and authority of the older age group is being challenged. In many rural areas the division between Christian and non-Christian in the community is on the basis of age, since the younger group have been to school and have been baptized, and show signs of challenging traditional authority where it seems to them to oppose social and economic advance.

Part of the change in outlook in rural areas is also due to the gradual penetration of informal education through the media of radio, films, and newspapers. The spread of the small household receiving set known as the "saucepan specials" in Northern Rhodesia, coupled with the publication of *The African Listener*, directly connects literacy with listening in. The popularity of the new vernacular journals is another instance of the desire to use a new-found skill; and the development of African film units in several territories is related to the growing interest in locally made, as distinct from foreign, films.

Intergroup and interpersonal relations

Social change can be measured in concrete terms, such as new types of houses, clothing, and amusements; supplies of water and electricity; and circulation of newspapers and sale of radio sets. Though most of these developments are a result of education, many of them can be enjoyed by the illiterate and are a result of general economic improvements. It is modern education, however, which is mainly responsible for the new middle classes in the towns, and for the vigorous women's groups in towns and rural areas. It is responsible too for the gradual splitting up of the former large joint families and patriarchal households, and for efforts on the part of younger educated women to bring up their children on more modern lines. These new group and personal relations create tensions within the existing society and in some areas, such as the big towns, by undermining the stability of family and household groups create new forms of insecurity.

Margaret H. Read, Ph.D., London, England, is head of the Department of Education in Tropical Areas in the London University Institute of Education and professor of education in the University. She held a research fellowship under the International African Institute for field research in Central Africa and was a lecturer in social anthropology at the London School of Economics until 1940. She was a member of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa and is now a member of the Colonial Social Science Research Council, and of the two Advisory Committees at the Colonial Office on Education and on Social Development. Former and forthcoming publications include The Indian Peasant Uprooted (1932), African Standards of Living and Social Change (1938), Africans and Their Schools (1953), and Education and Social Change in Tropical Areas (1955).

Bylaws of The American Academy of Political and Social Science

Revised as of January 24, 1955

Article I. Name

The corporation shall be known as "The American Academy of Political and Social Science."

Article II. Purpose

The purpose for which the corporation is formed is the promotion of the progress of political and social science, especially through publications and the holding of meetings.

Article III. Members

The corporation shall have the following classes of members and such other classes or forms of membership as the Board of Directors may at their discretion from time to time determine:

A. Annual Members—Any person who shall pay to the corporation the amount of the annual dues prescribed from time to time by the Board of Directors shall be an annual member of the corporation for the twelve months' period for which the payment is made.

B. Life Members—Any person who shall pay to the corporation the sum of $200, shall become a life member of the corporation and as such shall have all the privileges of annual members, but shall not be subject to the payment of any dues.

Article IV. Meetings of Members

Section 1. The annual business meeting of the members shall be held on the fourth Monday of January in each year. The place and the hour of such meeting shall be fixed by the President. The Board of Directors may change the date of the annual business meeting if in their judgment another date may be desirable.

Section 2. Special meetings of the members shall be called at the discretion of the President, or at the written request of any two directors, or of any ten members. Any such request shall state the general nature of the business to be transacted at such meeting. Special meetings shall be held at such place as shall be fixed by the Board of Directors, or, if they fail to do so, then by the President. The time of holding the special meetings shall be fixed by the President and shall be within thirty days of his receipt of the request for the meeting.

Section 3. The Secretary or the President shall give not less than ten days' notice of the time and place of each annual and special meeting of the members. The notice of every special meeting shall state the general nature of the business to be transacted thereat.

Section 4. Twelve members present in person shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at all meetings of the members.

Section 5. In lieu of written notice to members of any annual or special meeting of the Corporation at least ten (10) days' notice of such meeting shall be given by advertising once in one newspaper of general circulation within the City of Philadelphia, and once in the legal journal published in the County of Philadelphia, if any.

Article V. Directors

Section 1. The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by a Board of Directors. The persons presently acting as directors shall continue to serve as such until their respective terms expire. Beginning with the annual meeting of members in 1955, the Board of Directors shall consist of twelve (12) persons and at said annual meeting in 1955 there shall be elected four directors for a term of three years, two directors for a term of two years, and one director for a term of one year. Thereafter four directors shall be elected at the annual meeting of members each year, for a term of three years.

Any unexpired term created by the resignation, death, or total incapacity to act of any director may be filled by a majority of the remaining directors though less than a quorum. If they fail to so elect, the members shall do so at their next annual business meeting or at any special meeting called for that purpose.

Section 2. A meeting of the Board of Directors shall be held immediately following the annual business meeting of the members. If a quorum of directors be then present no notice of such meeting shall be necessary and at such organization meeting the Board of Directors may elect officers for the ensuing year and may also transact any other business coming before the meeting. In addition to such meeting, regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held on the fourth Fridays of May and October in each year at such place and hour as may be determined by the President or by a majority of the directors.

Section 3. At the discretion of the President or at the written request of any two members of the Board of Directors, a special meeting of the Board of Directors shall be called by the President. Any such request shall state the general nature of the business to be transacted at such meeting. The time of holding a special meeting shall be fixed by the President and shall be within ten days of his receipt of the request therefor. Such meeting shall be held at the place at which regular meetings of the Board are held unless the Board shall otherwise designate.

Section 4. The President or the Secretary shall give to each director not less than five days' written notice of each regular and special meeting. The notice shall state the time and place of the meeting and in the case of a special meeting shall state the general nature of the business to be transacted thereat.

Section 5. Five (5) members of the Board of Directors shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at meetings of the Board of Directors.

Section 6. The President shall have the power to appoint such committees as he may deem necessary and to prescribe the duties of such committees.

Section 7. The Board of Directors shall submit each year at the annual business meeting of the members a report of the principal activities of the Board during the preceding calendar year and a statement of the financial condition of the Academy.

Section 8. The Board of Directors shall have the power and authority, by affirmative vote of a majority of those present at any duly convened meeting, to borrow money and to purchase, sell, lease away, or otherwise acquire or dispose of real estate.

Article VI. Officers

Section 1. At the first meeting of directors after the annual business meeting of members in 1955 and each year thereafter, the directors shall elect a President, a First Vice-President, a Secretary, and a Treasurer. They may also elect one or more additional Vice-Presidents and an Assistant Secretary and an Assistant Treasurer and such other officers and assistant officers as they may desire. All officers shall hold office until the organization meeting of the Board of Directors following the next annual meeting of members and until their successors are elected and qualified. Any officer shall be subject to removal by the Board of Directors at any time. A vacancy in any office may be filled by the Board of Directors at any meeting thereof.

Section 2. The President shall be the chief executive officer of the corporation and shall be responsible for conducting its activities, subject to the control of the Board of Directors. He shall preside at all meetings of members and of the Board of Directors at which he is present.

Section 3. The First Vice-President shall in the absence or during the disability of the President have all the powers and perform all the duties of the President provided however that the Board of Directors may grant the President a leave of absence for any period and may delegate the powers and assign the duties of the President for such period or any portion thereof to some officer other than the First Vice-President, including any officer specially elected or appointed for the purpose, and may revoke such delegation of powers and assignment of duties at the pleasure of the Board.

Section 4. The Secretary shall keep the minutes of all meetings of the members and of the Board of Directors. He shall give notice of all such meetings, shall have custody of the corporate seal, and shall affix the same as required by the Board of Directors. In the absence or during the disability of the Secretary, his duties shall be performed by the Assistant Secretary.

Section 5. The Board of Directors may by resolution not inconsistent with these Bylaws add to and define the duties of any officers, and any officer whose duties are not defined in these Bylaws or by the directors shall have the duties ordinarily pertaining to his office.

Article VII. Fiscal Provisions

Section 1. The fiscal year of the corporation shall coincide with the calendar year.

Section 2. Any of the funds of the corporation on deposit with any bank or trust company shall be subject to withdrawal on the signatures of such persons as may be determined from time to time by resolution of the Board of Directors.

Section 3. The books and accounts of the corporation shall be audited annually by independent auditors who shall be elected by the Board of Directors. A copy of each such report of audit shall be delivered to each member of the Board of Directors.

Article VIII. Amendments

These Bylaws may be amended by a majority vote of those present at any meeting of the members of the corporation or of the Board of Directors. Any such change made by the Board of Directors shall continue in effect unless and until altered at a meeting of the members of the corporation.

Book Department

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT 183
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY 188
ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY 198
SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION 201
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 210
SPECIAL TOPICS ABROAD
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 218
SLAVIC COUNTRIES 224
WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 226
OTHER COUNTRIES 231
OTHER BOOKS 235

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

LIE, TRYGVE. *In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations.* Pp. xii, 473. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $6.00.

It is perhaps too early to judge the exact role of Trygve Lie in the shaping of the United Nations, but this description of his seven years as Secretary-General adds to the information upon which such judgment must be based. The Charter gives to the Secretary-General far wider power than the Covenant gave to his predecessors in the League of Nations. The right to present to the Security Council any situation which he judges a threat to international peace and security is the linchpin of these powers. At the same time, the Secretary-General is the administrative head of the large and complicated Secretariat of the United Nations. Many observers had the impression during Mr. Lie's tenure of office that administration was neither his forte nor his major interest. These memoirs appear to confirm that assessment. His concept of the duties of the Secretary-General makes clear that he saw the office as an independent and powerful instrument to be used in the effort to preserve the peace in the face of growing international divisions. It is true that in his Preface he suggests that he may at some future time give us his reflections on the many administrative problems which confronted him, but I suspect that no reader will fail to carry away the feeling that such problems were not the major concern of the first Secretary-General. His account of his stewardship is heavily weighted with descriptions of his individual efforts to conciliate the many critical issues of the cold war—in the questions of Iran, Palestine, the Berlin blockade, the Korean war, Red China's representation in the United Nations. He is most revealing in his discussion of his swing round the major capitals of the world as he attempted to promote his so-called ten-point peace plan in 1950. For while the basic outlines of his program and efforts have been well-known, his account does fill in details which add much to our knowledge of the significant elements of the cold war era. His growing disillusionment with the policies of the leaders of the Soviet Union, despite his earlier efforts at impartiality (which, among other things, won him the criticism of American representatives and public), come out almost as a central theme of the volume. More to the point, his descriptions of meetings with Soviet representatives, from Stalin down, leave little doubt of the fundamental intransigence of the Soviet position, even in the instances when they accepted some measure of compromise.

In contrast to his extended description

of such political matters is Mr. Lie's discussion of his handling of a major administrative question, the problem of the "loyalty" investigations of U.N. employees. Here, despite his long analysis of his position, the account seems to indicate that he lost control of the situation. It may be, as one reviewer has already suggested, that his role here persuaded many of his supporters not to insist upon his postponing his resignation until the end of his second, three-year term of office. In any event, the observer from the outside has the impression from these pages that Mr. Lie took a much less independent position on this issue—and managed it much less skillfully—than in the case of the problems of international peace which occupied most of his attention as Secretary-General.

On the whole this is an important book, particularly for the layman who has some concern for the major problems of our time. It reveals no great international secrets, but it is revealing of the attitude and the work of a man of good will attempting to do an almost impossible job and, it should perhaps be added, finally sacrificed as a result of the deep international tensions which he did his best to ameliorate.

HENRY R. WINKLER
Rutgers University

BOWIE, ROBERT R., and CARL J. FRIEDRICH (Eds.). *Studies in Federalism.* Pp. xlii, 885. Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1954. $15.00.

This volume was inspired by an interest in the movement for some kind of federal union for the countries of Western Europe. Financial assistance was provided by a grant from the Ford Foundation as secured for the Federalism Project by the American Committee on United Europe. Messrs. Bowie and Friedrich were directors of research; they were assisted by a group of associates and research assistants. In a Preface, Professor Friedrich explains that most of the same material has appeared in French and much of it in German. He further notes that these studies "were prepared at the request of the Comité pour la Constitution Européenne of the Mouvement Européen."

In general, the directors and editors followed a plan of assigning to "native" authorities the task of covering aspects of federalism in their own countries. The studies were confined to Australia, Canada, West German Federal Republic, and the United States.

A Summary of Contents will reveal the principal topics and phases of federalism treated and those who wrote about them:

1. The Federal Legislature, by Robert R. Bowie; 2. The Federal Executive, by Carl J. Friedrich and Robert H. Guttman; 3. The Federal Judiciary, by Paul A. Freund; 4. Defense, by Robert R. Bowie and William J. Schrenk; 5. Foreign Affairs, by Louis B. Sohn and Paul Shafer; 6. Commerce, Transportation, and Customs, by Arthur E. Sutherland; 7. Federal Powers Over Currency, Banking, Credit, and Foreign Exchange, by H. van Buren Cleveland and Herbert J. Spiro; 9. Agriculture, by Ayres Brinser; 10. Labor and Social Security, by Carl J. Friedrich and Albert A. Mavrinac; 11. Personal Rights, by Robert G. McCloskey; 12. Citizenship and Immigration, by William J. Schrenk; 13. Defense of the Constitutional Order, by Carl J. Friedrich and Arthur E. Sutherland; 14. Overseas Territories, by Robert R. Bowie, Carl J. Friedrich, and Guy J. Pauker; 15. Admission of New States, Territorial Adjustments, and Secession, by Carl J. Friedrich; 16. Amendment of the Constitution, by Edward McWhinney.

There are useful bibliographies including general works on federalism and books and monographs relating to the federal systems and practices in the five countries studied. Appendices carry the "Draft Resolution of the Study Committee for the European Community" and the "Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community." The Introduction by Professor Friedrich provides a helpful review of efforts towards a constitution for the European community.

This volume is essentially a factual review of aspects of federalism in the five countries chosen for attention. There are some limitations which attend a large cooperative labor of this nature, but a patient pursuit of the storehouse of reliable information found in this volume will reward all those interested in federal government.

The recent events in Europe leading to the sidetracking of the European Defense Community (EDC) in favor of the newer plan for what is officially described as "Western European Union" should certainly not decrease the importance of this work; on the contrary its usefulness is all the more apparent.

J. EUGENE HARLEY
University of Southern California

HART, B. H. LIDDELL. *Strategy: The Indirect Approach.* Pp. 404. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $5.95.

As one of the best known military theorists of our time, B. H. Liddell Hart definitely influenced generalship on both sides in World War II. For this reason the present book is important as it brings up to date the military philosophy previously expounded in his other works.

History proves, he says, that success in war is due generally to the "indirect approach" rather than to the "direct." His "indirect approach" may or may not be such in a geometric sense for he writes, "a decision is produced more by the mental and moral dislocation of the command than by the physical dislocation of its forces and these effects transcend the geographical and statistical calculations which fill nine-tenths of the normal book on military history."

To prove his point, Liddell Hart reviews war from Marathon to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This covers the bulk of the pages. The narrative is too concise for a beginner, but it could hardly be more full in a single volume. In Conclusions he says that "we can crystallize the lessons in two simple maxims—one negative, the other positive. The first is that, in the face of the overwhelming evidence of history, no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position. The second, that instead of seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by one's attack, it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully launched."

The meat of the book, however, is Part IV, "Fundamentals of Strategy and Grand Strategy." Here Liddell Hart analyses not only military strategy, but also such questions as why sometimes the result of victory is an unsatisfactory peace. As to the present, he regards the "H" bomb as a "direct" and, therefore, incorrect approach.

He also points out the difference in war aims of "the acquisitive State" which "inherently unsatisfied, needs to gain victory in order to gain its object, and must therefore court greater risks in the attempt. The conservative State can achieve its object by merely inducing the aggressor to drop his attempt at conquest." This differs with General MacArthur's "There is no substitute for victory."

An outstanding chapter is "Hitler's Strategy" which is compared with that of Clausewitz, Napoleon, Lenin, and Ludendorf. Hitler gets more credit for ability than in most current history. However, the author shows how Hitler, like Napoleon, became intoxicated with success and then, impatient, turned to "direct" actions and downfall.

The book is well worth the time of any serious student of world affairs or politico-military history, particularly as Liddell Hart numbers among his disciples many of today's leaders.

EUSTACE M. PEIXOTTO
Brigadier General, USA Retired
Washington, D. C.

GROSS, FELIKS. *Foreign Policy Analysis.* Pp. xxiv, 179. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $3.75.

The problem to which Professor Gross addresses himself in this small volume—the application of scientific thinking and concepts to foreign policy analysis and formulation—is indeed one that has been "sadly bare of clear ideas," as Mr. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. asserts in a brief foreward. The author approaches the subject with a proper acknowledgment of the "serious limitations of application of a scientific method to a study of social phenomena." He wisely warns the reader not to expect "any startling new theories," and he admits that the processes which he outlines have been basic to the foreign policy analyses of "empirical realists" in the past, although not consciously organized into a scientific system.

Ideology is central to Professor Gross's conception of foreign policy. As he puts it, "there can be no foreign policy without an ideology; more, there are no men without

ideologies." In his opinion the ideology of a nation furnishes the objectives of foreign policy. Designating as "factors" those elements necessary "to enforce such objectives," he identifies them as geographic, economic, demographic, military, social-political, and social-psychological; he labels as factor X the element of chance and accident. Foreign policies, in the author's analysis, are "patterns of behavior" or "courses of action" which, in a long-range view, are in the nature of strategy determined by ideology; short-range policies are like tactics. In substance, Professor Gross's system of science is one of relating ideology, factors, and policies. Nothing exact or mathematical is claimed for the processes described. They offer logical methods of thinking about foreign policies, but they provide no test-tube finality.

No doubt the processes presented by Professor Gross would be useful to analysts of past and present policy. The extent to which they could be used for the determination of future policy is not so clear, because here, since the variables are not yet in view, they cannot be taken into account for events yet to come. The author incorporates into his system the "problem paper" approach of the Brookings Institution, with the formulation and discussion of alternative courses of action as a means of deciding upon future policies.

All in all, Professor Gross has made a good beginning to a scientific approach to foreign policies. His book is commendable —if for no other reason than that it presents a new point of view. In time it may be that foreign policies, like medicine, will be transformed from an art into a science, to use an analogy suggested by the author in his final chapter.

NORMAN L. HILL
University of Nebraska

EUROPEAN MOVEMENT. *The Economic Future of Europe.* Pp. 188. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $3.50.

This slim volume contains the preliminary papers of the European Movement's Second Conference of Westminster held in January, 1954. Unfortunately for American readers, it is nowhere stated just what the European Movement is and what it stands for, or what particular issues on the conference agenda the four "Introductory Reports" and four "Working Papers" that make up the volume were intended to illuminate. Without any prefatory explanation on these points, the book is best regarded as a collection of essays by nine eminent Europeans on the broad theme indicated by its title.

Unless the reviewer is mistaken, however, all the contributors subscribe to a common thesis. One strand of this thesis is that, for political and social reasons, real levels of living in Europe have to be raised appreciably and that, broadly speaking, only two means to this end are available. The first is to integrate the European market into a unified whole so that the labor and capital resources already in hand can be more effectively utilized. The second is to raise efficiency and output within this integrated market by stepping up the rate of productive investment. But both are necessary and must be pursued together. All the contributors are thus concerned to explore the practical means towards their common objective. Baron René Boel, a Belgian banker and industrialist, examines the monetary problems of Europe—dollar shortage, convertibility, and European Payments Union—as they bear on trade and investment. Lord Layton reviews the existing international economic institutions to determine how and how far they serve to promote the desired end. G. M. Nederhorst, a Dutch socialist, gives an interesting analysis of the implications of economic unification for national wage levels, displacement of workers, and migration. Johannes Semler and Muhlis Ete explore the questions of how best to mobilize European capital for new investment, the potentialities of a common investment policy for Europe instead of merely national policies, and investment in the overseas territories. René Piaton writes on other problems in the expansion of production.

The second strand of the common thesis is that the full potential of the European economy cannot be realized without the restoration of vigorous trade and investment within the world as a whole. In other words, the European countries can do a good deal for themselves, but the solution to such problems as instability of raw material prices in world markets, the development of underdeveloped areas, unbalanced exchanges, and dollar shortages must be shouldered by other countries, chiefly the United States. The two papers by André Philip and Julian Amery deal essentially with these non-European aspects of raising real incomes in Europe. Both are excellent though perhaps Amery's paper is fresher and more original in its approach.

One cannot but admire the devotion and sincerity with which these members of the European Movement have approached the economic problems of Europe. The authors see their separate problems realistically yet optimistically. But the real nub of the whole problem is put very nicely in the short paper by Professor I. Svennilson in these words: "we cannot preserve the present economic nationalism of the welfare state and at the same time continue to talk about economic integration. Political co-ordination or even integration is necessary in order to formulate the plans or conclude the agreements which will lead to economic integration. If the various countries are not prepared to proceed in this direction, and to give up at least some part of their political autonomy in sphere of economic policy, there seems to be little sense in continuing to play around with ideas about economic integration." The painful truth of this assertion would appear to be incontestable to any sensible person here or abroad.

NORMAN S. BUCHANAN
University of California
Berkeley

WARBURG, JAMES P. *The United States in a Changing World: An Historical Analysis of American Foreign Policy.* Pp. xv, 496. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954. $5.75.

In thirty chapters and an Epilogue, Mr. Warburg deals with American foreign policy from 1607 when the Colonies were merely pawns to the present when Washington has become the world's chief stage. He assembles a vast body of facts, analysis of which would require a book. Only as they illustrate the author's approach to what may be termed *Tendenzgeschichte* may one note particular points. Familiarity with his previous writings alerts the reader to an early buildup for the New Deal point of view. Thus it is illuminating to discover (p. 19), *in re* the approaching Revolution, that "in the urban centers the ever present resentments of the ill-housed and ill-fed were readily mobilized into a spirit of revolt against the existing order." Here is an astonishing backward projection of modern clichés more appealing to the publicist than the historian.

Again, the Constitution is viewed as surprisingly liberal considering the prosperity of the Founding Fathers—an echo of the earlier Charles A. Beard. More credit is awarded Thomas Jefferson for democratic principles than for diplomacy. Anticipatory is Jefferson's interpretation of revolutionary excesses—French, but Russian may be substituted—as the outcome of previous tyranny than as an indictment of democracy. Jacksonian Democracy attested the conflict between the few beneficiaries of the industrial revolution, finance capitalism and the "American System," and the disinherited majority (p. 106).

There are few factual errors. Shay's Rebellion (p. 32) should be Shays'; two English adventurers were hung (p. 89). One was Scottish and only one was hung: Johnson's drunkenness (p. 158) was not at his inaugural but at his swearing in as Vice-President. Seal fisheries were not settled satisfactorily under Benjamin Harrison (p. 182). To impugn the integrity of F. D. Roosevelt at Pearl Harbor is wholly beyond the author's power (footnote p. 339). Nicholas Biddle, on the other hand, was "selfish, vain, and irresponsible" (p. 107). The wickedness of Senator Joseph McCarthy transcends description.

The normalcy of Warren Gamaliel Harding is the author's *bête noire*. Eisenhower would not consciously pursue this base objective but his "concessions to a demagogue whom he obviously despised" are an uncomfortable reminder of von Hindenburg and Hitler (p. 467).

Wide reading and much thought underlie the present volume. The resulting synthesis is interesting and at times profound and merits close attention. But the reader

whose ancestral roots and whose personal memories lie in pre-New Deal America will be prepared to challenge the author's views at many other points than opportunity was accorded to the present reviewer.

LOUIS MARTIN SEARS
Purdue University

PROUDFOOT, MARY. *Britain and the United States in the Caribbean: A Comparative Study in Methods of Development.* Pp. xii, 434. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $8.50.

Side by side in the Caribbean lie a number of island dependencies belonging to two world powers, Great Britain and the United States. Because of differences in relations with the metropolitan powers they provide an excellent laboratory for the study of comparative colonial administration. As a former lecturer in modern history at Oxford married to a Northwestern University geographer, Mrs. Proudfoot is well suited to make such a study. She has, on the whole, succeeded admirably.

The title of the book is slightly misleading, for it covers selected dependencies—Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands of the United States, and Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad, and St. Lucia in the British Caribbean. The Virgins and St. Lucia are, moreover, but lightly covered. It might have been better to omit them altogether than to slight them, for added complexity in the study is not compensated for by any great mass of information about them.

Mrs. Proudfoot's approach in this study is functionally comparative. That is, she discusses each matter—relation of dependencies to metropolitan country, internal administration and politics, economic and social life, and the like—for each of the colonies in turn before moving on to the next point. This is at the same time enlightening and confusing; enlightening in that it makes integrated comparisons possible, confusing in that the reader finds it difficult to picture any one of the islands as a unit. Nonetheless, the book supplies a comprehensive view of the dependencies covered but, as in most surveys, breadth of coverage is achieved at the expense of depth.

Relatively little new material appears in this study, but it reflects a painstaking compilation of widely scattered official and unofficial material that has not previously been combined, especially in the thirty-four factual tables at the end of the work. It is regrettable that much of the information does not extend beyond 1951, for recent cultural studies in particular would be a valuable addition. See, for example, THE ANNALS, January 1953, dealing with Puerto Rico.

This book is best suited for the "expert" who already is acquainted with the area, for the array of fact might overwhelm the neophyte. Given the mass of data included, inevitably a few factual errors crept in, and I for one cannot accept all of the author's statements and conclusions, but she has provided a worthy contribution to the literature of the Caribbean.

ROBERT E. SCOTT
University of Illinois

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

BROWN, STUART GERRY. *The First Republicans: Political Philosophy and Public Policy in the Party of Jefferson and Madison.* Pp. 250. Syracuse, N. Y.: University of Syracuse Press, 1954. $3.00.

Professor Brown has condensed into less than 200 pages a sound and thoroughly documented history of the Jeffersonian party during the first thirty-four years of the Republic. He sets forth accurately the principles, philosophy and policies of the Jeffersonians. Seldom anywhere has a political party been led by men of the stature of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe. On the few occasions when Jefferson and Madison did not see eye to eye, the differences were minor. True Jefferson insisted on a bill of rights which Madison at first thought unnecessary, but it was Madison who sponsored the first ten amendments that constitute our Bill of Rights. The party was united in opposition to the Federalist's financial, economic, and foreign policies. It was Gallatin who, as Secretary of the Treasurer, made the system designed by Hamilton conform to the American idea. The Jeffersonian hostility to Hamilton's Bank, explained by Federalist propagandists as due to Jefferson's and Madison's "ignorance of banking," is described by the author as due to their understanding of liberty and equal rights. These "first republicans" successfully challenged the Federalist's system of privilege. Thus Gallatin proved Hamilton's imitation of Pitt's funding system to be a fraud. Thus Jefferson defeated the Federalist plan to scrap the treaty with France on the ground that it was made with a monarchist and feudalist society which had been destroyed with the reminder that the treaty was made with France, not just Louis Capet; and he laid it down as the American policy that treaties are points of honor and cannot be scrapped to meet the momentary requirements of domestic politics. Thus in opposition to the Hamiltonian reliance on measures that would discourage foreign trade the Jeffersonians favored a liberal trade policy, and, as the author says, they would have given warm support to Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade plan.

Professor Brown makes clear that the Jeffersonians enunciated the fundamental principles on which the nation has operated for a century and a half. Where the Federalists said that Congress had no right to information from the Executive on treaties negotiated, Jefferson declared that since Congress must determine on ratification or rejection, it is entitled to the inside story. And when the Federalists tried desperately to crush democracy and deny the freedoms with the Alien and Sedition laws, the Jeffersonians fought the battle of civil rights—"the first great fight for civil liberty" on the success of which was "conditioned the whole future of the United States."

The average American knows, as Henry Adams wrote, that no treaty as humiliating as that of Jay would have been accepted any time after 1800, but few are familiar with the scurvy trick played on Monroe by the Federalists in sending him as Minister to France to soften the resentment there over the Jay treaty and then recalling him "in disgrace" for cultivating friendly relations after Robespierre was dead and the Terror was ended. Here we have the sorry story.

An admirable and authoritative book that all Americans would do well to read.

CLAUDE G. BOWERS
New York, N. Y.

KONVITZ, MILTON R. *Bill of Rights Reader.* (Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty.) Pp. xix, 591. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. $6.50.

Even a cautious observer of the contemporary political scene can note a definite, if modest, brightening in the atmosphere that pervades civil liberties and personal freedoms.

A concommitant of this trend is an awakened public interest in the problems of freedom and security. This renewed interest is, of course, a manifestation of approaching sanity. But it is more than that; it is a cause of it as well. In a democracy it is still a safe bet that given light the people will in the end find the way.

It is in this respect that Professor Konvitz's collection of cases on civil rights represents a real contribution. When our Constitution finally emerged from the convention without a bill of rights and the omission raised a storm of objection, Madison, who himself thereafter became the chief draftsman of the Bill of Rights which was later added to the Constitution, expressed his perhaps prophetic skepticism as to the value of such a declaration of rights "because experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is most needed." Nevertheless, he agreed that "a bill of rights would be a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community." The court decisions compiled and edited by Professor Konvitz present indeed good ground for an appeal to the rational and mature sense of the community.

While apparently designed primarily for college and law school use, the book can and should receive a wider circulation. Fortunately, Supreme Court decisions, at least in the field of civil rights, are largely

free of the legalistic jargon that so repels non-lawyers. Indeed some of the decisions (as, for instance, Justice Jackson's opinion in *West Virginia State Board of Education* v. *Barnette*) are stylistic gems and are masterpieces of eloquence that can be appreciated by any intelligent layman.

Professor Konvitz's choice of cases, while more modest than Emerson and Haber's, is sound. This reviewer is particularly pleased with the prominent position accorded to religious liberty, which, historically, is the progenitor of all other liberties. That this position is still maintained is evidenced by the cases in Professor Konvitz's book; these show clearly that none of the freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is as secure today as is freedom of religion. One need only compare *Finer* v. *New York* with *Kunz* v. *New York,* both decided by the Supreme Court on the same day, or *Tucker* v. *Texas* with *Dennis* v. *United States* to see how differently political and religious heterodoxies are treated by the Supreme Court.

It is, of course, not to be expected that a critic will fully agree with all Professor Konvitz's inclusions and exclusions. This reviewer, for example, finds it difficult to justify the omission of *Kedroff* v. *St. Nicholas Cathedral,* a decision of monumental significance. If a choice had to be made between the *Kedroff* case and *Watson* v. *Jones,* this reviewer believes Professor Konvitz erred in choosing the latter. *United States* v. *Ballard,* though a difficult case to grasp, is likewise too important to have been omitted. Nor is this reviewer persuaded by Professor Konvitz's explanation for his omission of any opinions by Holmes or Brandeis. *Schenck* v. *United States,* the concurring opinion in *Whitney* v. *California,* and the dissent in *Abrams* v. *United States,* though temporarily eclipsed by *Dennis* v. *United States,* and *American Communications Association* v. *Douds,* are not dead; this reviewer ventures to suggest that they are likely to outlive *Dennis* and *Douds.* By and large, however, the selection shows genuine understanding of the basic issues, the opinions are edited with care and judgment, and the introductory comments, while they could well have been expanded, are in most cases adequate. All in all this is a useful book and should receive wide circulation.

LEO PFEFFER
American Jewish Congress

DE GRAZIA, ALFRED. *The Western Public, 1952 and Beyond.* Pp. ix, 226. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1954. $3.00.

The analysis from which this book of many insights developed was carried on by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan and was financed by the Carnegie Corporation as a part of a national study of the 1952 presidential election. A sample of 2,021 Americans was chosen, according to principles of statistical probability, to stand for the people of the nation. The West's portion of the sample was 210 cases, later increased to 452 to make it more representative. In the study, the West is the eight mountain states and the three Pacific Coast states. Three-fourths of the votes of the eleven states were cast by California, Oregon, and Washington, a fact which should be kept in mind as one considers Professor De Grazia's conclusions.

In September and October of 1952 interviewers from the Survey Research Center, with a pre-tested questionnaire of approximately 50 questions, interviewed the 452 persons selected. Immediately following the election 210 persons, nearly all of whom were in the original 452, were seen again by the interviewers, who on the return trip had a shorter questionnaire of some 30 questions. All the information gathered was transposed to International Business Machine tabulating cards containing punched codes. Then the crank was turned, and quickly the political secrets of the West were revealed.

The chief finding of the study is that in 1952 the West voted as did the nation, that is for Eisenhower, only more so. The Republican presidential vote in the West increased by 8 per cent more than in the nation as a whole, the mountain states swinging even more vigorously to Eisenhower than did the coastal states.

No overriding issue seemed to explain the swing, although the unpopular Korean War was the most important Republican asset. The 25 per cent of the voters who had not made up their mind by the opening of the campaign, and who composed the group that decided the election, were precisely the ones who were most opposed to continuing the Korean War. Local issues peculiar to the West were not of importance in the election. National and international considerations were uppermost in the minds of Westerners as they went to the polls.

Party organization did not play much part in the vote outcome, De Grazia found. Relatively few people reported being contacted by party workers, and of those reached, few believed they had been influenced. Voters apparently made up their minds from information reaching them via mass media. Only 11 per cent of the voters waited until the last two weeks of the campaign to decide how to vote, and two-thirds of these voted for Eisenhower.

Although De Grazia states the West votes far more like other American regions than previously believed, the study does indicate some differences. The West in 1952 voted significantly fewer straight tickets, and the rural areas of the West voted more liberal than did rural areas in other regions.

The most important truth about Western politics that De Grazia lassos is that the West is oriented toward the positive or welfare state. In the minds of Westerners, the Democrats have become associated with the idea of such a state. Consequently, when the Republican party wins, "it wins as a recess from the Democratic party, or as a change of horses of the same gait or speed."

The only amendment I have to offer to De Grazia's conclusion is that when the presidential candidate of the Republicans wins in the West, he wins because the people want to change to a horse of *slower* speed.

THOMAS C. DONNELLY
New Mexico Highlands University

WILLCOX, WILLIAM B. (Ed.). *The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of his Campaigns, 1775–1782.* Pp. li, 658. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954. $7.50.

There has always been argument and uncertainty regarding the contribution of Sir Henry Clinton to the winning of our War for Independence. Accepting the general ineptness of British command, one may yet ask why Clinton did not do more to aid Burgoyne? Why he remained largely inactive around New York for three years? Why he shut himself up on Manhattan Island while the world was being turned upside down? Recalled shortly after Yorktown, Clinton found that he was receiving full blame for that defeat. He demanded a parliamentary inquiry; it was refused. The remainder of Clinton's life, over a decade, was devoted to the preparation of his personal memoirs of the war in America. Obviously, he aimed to justify his conduct and pin the blame on others. Nearly half the manuscript dealt with the campaign of 1780–81. Clinton died before his manuscript was ready for the printer, and together with all of his papers it eventually became a part of the manuscript collection of the Clements Library at the University of Michigan. Scholars have had access to it, but this is its first publication.

In appraising this massive volume (with its more than 200 pages of documents, letters, and extracts of letters) the reader may well ask certain questions: of what historical significance is this manuscript of Clinton's? Does the editing bear the stamp of careful and intelligent scholarship? Will the reader gain insight into the thinking and character of a man so largely responsible for the American victory?

There are several reasons why this account has great historical significance. The length and importance of Clinton's service is one factor. Another is the dearth of analytical writing by the Revolutionary military leaders, on either side. Yet one may well ask to what extent a manuscript, prepared for publication years after the events described took place, and written for the sole purpose of self-justification, can be trusted? Professor Willcox asserts that "however suspect his [Clinton's] analysis, in the process of making it he composed a study in the problems of command—not only strategy but logistics and finance, politics and personal relations—

that is unique in the literature of the war." Furthermore, after years of careful study in which he compared Clinton's manuscript with the letters, papers and military orders of the war years, the editor concludes that "if the test of reliability is the accurate reporting of events and views, his narrative is as reliable as the most exacting scholar could desire."

This reviewer has already indicated his answer to the second question, concerning the quality of the editing. Professor Willcox demonstrates not only a thorough mastery of the Clinton Papers, but an unusual ability to analyze military situations and to discuss military problems. Furthermore, no one can read the superb Introduction without sharing the editor's understanding of the character of this paradoxical and little-known general. While it may be wished that the author's style were as delightful as the editor's, this is a volume that no student of the eighteenth century can safely ignore.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
State University of New York

DAY, DONALD, and HARRY HERBERT ULLOM (Eds.). *The Autobiography of Sam Houston.* Pp. xviii, 298. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. $5.00.

"From many points of view he [Sam Houston] is the most striking figure of his century, certainly in North America. His is truly an epic figure for his is truly an epic life" (p. xi).

On March 2, 1793, Sam Houston was born. He lost his father when quite young, and his mother moved from Virginia to Tennessee. Sam soon ran away from home and passed several years with the Cherokee Indians.

During the War of 1812 he enlisted in the army and served under Andrew Jackson. In the Battle of Horseshoe Bend, Houston was wounded and Andrew Jackson cited him for heroism. When strong enough Houston journeyed on horseback to Washington. "I reached the seat of Government," said Houston, "soon after the burning of the capital. In common with every true friend of my country, my blood boiled when I saw the ruin, and I experienced one of the keenest pangs of my life" (p. 15).

At the conclusion of the war Jackson resigned his commission and began the study of law. He was elected to Congress in 1823 where he served until he became Governor of Tennessee in 1827. On January 22, 1829, Houston "made a romantic marriage, only to leave his wife a few weeks later to go into disgrace and self-imposed exile, giving up his political career [resigning the governorship] with a statement that he 'would not fight with a woman'" (p. xii).

He made his new home among the Cherokees in Arkansas. During his residence there, he became acquainted with the frauds practiced upon the Indians by the federal officials, so he undertook a mission to Washington for the purpose of exposing them, but the results were futile; meanwhile, there is no doubt that Sam Houston learned of Jackson's interest in Texas. When trouble subsequently appeared in Mexico, Houston moved to Texas. After Santa Anna failed to give the people of Mexico a government based on the Constitution, the Texans revolted. A militia was organized, and Sam Houston soon became Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He finally brought it to a glorious conclusion by the battle of San Jacinto when Santa Anna and his entire army were captured.

Sam Houston became the first president of the Republic of Texas on October 22, 1836. He now told President Jackson that "my great desire is that our country Texas shall be annexed to the United States . . ." (p. 135). As Houston was not eligible to succeed himself, he was followed by Mirabeau B. Lamar, who had visions of grandeur.

In 1841 Houston was again elected President of Texas. He still urged the annexation of Texas to the United States, but he retired from office before he saw the consummation of his dream in December 1845 when Texas became a state in the Union. Sam Houston now became a senator of the United States. Here he served his country well from 1846 to 1859, when he became governor of Texas. As governor he fought valiantly to keep Texas in the Union. He was deposed as governor because he refused to pledge his allegiance to the Confederacy.

The editors are to be congratulated on the excellency of their work. They have accomplished their purpose by letting Sam Houston speak for himself. The illustrations are interesting, the bibliography is adequate, and the index is satisfactory.

GEORGE D. HARMON
Lehigh University

TODD, RICHARD CECIL. *Confederate Finance.* Pp. x, 258. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1954. $5.00.

The great contribution of Bernard Baruch to public finance makes appropriate the award to the author of this book by the United Daughters of the Confederacy of the Mrs. Simon Baruch University Prize. The volume contributes to a neglected area of Southern history; it throws some light on the current attitudes of the South; and perhaps most importantly emphasizes problems of importance to the survival of this nation should it again become a theatre of war.

In terms of Southern history, no facts of major importance have been added. It does strongly suggest a re-evaluation of the public service of Christopher G. Memminger, the Charleston banker who was Secretary of the Treasury until the Confederate Congress made him a scapegoat, a willingness that even continues in the recent *History of the Southern Confederacy* by Professor Eaton. Mr. Todd demonstrates that Memminger was in fact a harried genius and that the twin problems of insufficient revenues and inflation were so vast that the would-be nation could not survive a long struggle.

It is the direct concentration upon the revenue resource problem which gives the book its greatest value. The drama of last charges, turning of flanks, blockade running, and debates about constitutional law are absent. Instead there are faced the hard realities of produce loans, printing press money, counterfeiting, requisitioning, price control, tax collection, and the organization of these activities in a region badly sliced by invading armies. The lesson seems plain that if atomic warfare ever were to isolate parts of this nation, effective resistance and civilian morale would depend upon adequate taxation, and measures for requisitioning and stemming inflation.

There are profound suggestions with respect to the impact of Confederate financial experience upon present Southern attitudes about the function of Government; it is unfortunate that these are not further developed. Why is there usually support for heavy taxes and balanced budgets from the South, a debtor area? Why is it that a great agricultural producing region has been the source of much support for direct anti-inflationary measures? Is the States's rights tradition consistent with the typical Southern attitude favoring centralized direction of foreign and financial policy, and such newer issues as public housing and the maintenance of farm income? Perhaps the biographer of the late (and usually underrated) Senator Burnet Rhett Maybank, descendant of Robert B. Rhett, Charleston's leading secessionist, will make an attempt to answer some of these questions.

JAMES A. DURHAM
Executive Office of the President

HOBBS, EDWARD H. *Behind the President, A Study of Executive Office Agencies.* Pp. vi, 248. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954. $4.50.

In two previous studies, *Executive Reorganization of the National Government* (1953) and *The Executive Office of the President* (1953), the author established himself as a competent student and analyst of the administrative organization of the national government. With this experience as background, the author brings together in the volume under review a series of chapters treating in detail past and present agencies that have made up the Executive Office of the President. The series is tied together at the beginning with an historical treatment of the Executive Office and at the end by a chapter dealing with the machinery under President Eisenhower.

Each of the several agencies dealt with —Bureau of the Budget, National Resources Planning Board, White House Of-

fice, Council of Economic Advisers, National Security Council, National Security Resources Board, and Emergency Mobilization Agencies—is treated in parallel fashion. A brief historical note is followed by a description of the agency, its personnel, functions, and relationships with other parts of the national government. But the treatment is more than descriptive. Included also are criticisms and recommendations made by the Hoover Commission and similar bodies, professional students of public administration, and the author himself. From the detailed studies emerges an overall view of how the President gets his advice and performs the manifold duties required of him.

Readers will appreciate the historical tidbits with which the book abounds. They will also appreciate the scholarly manner in which the author has applied himself. But the greatest rejoicing will occur over the fact that the author and publisher have made available in a single volume a detailed account of relatively new and obscure agencies that play important and crucial roles in the American government. Without detracting from the Presidency itself, the book takes the reader backstage for a glimpse at the men, women, and organization which make it possible for the President to carry out his crushing responsibilities.

The book is too detailed and academic for popular consumption. Specialists in public administration will find few suggestions that are new. Some readers would welcome a more critical approach. Footnotes are at ends of chapters. Visual materials are absent. But for reference and teaching this volume fills an important gap in the literature dealing with the national government.

JOHN H. FERGUSON
The Pennsylvania State University

POTTER, DAVID M. *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character*. Pp. xxvii, 219. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. $3.50.

This important volume is based upon lectures given at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions. Professor Potter is the Chairman of American Studies at Yale University and is well qualified to make an analysis, from an interdisciplinary point of view, of that often mentioned concept, the American character. Even in the wide area of American studies, however, cultural anthropology, social psychology, and psychoanalysis are rather unusual auxiliary fields.

Part I of the book is preceded by a long Introduction which shows the relationships between history and the behavioral sciences and makes a plea for a united effort on the part of these disciplines to co-operate in the study of human culture and the search for a science of man. Part I itself has two sections, one showing the dilemma and frustration of the historians who have written of national character without comprehension of all aspects of the problem; the other discussing the valuable contributions to such an analysis already made by the behavioral sciences and suggesting lines along which the historians and scientists might pursue investigations.

Part II is much longer and has seven chapters discussing different phases of the nature of American abundance and of its part in shaping national character. These are very interesting and provocative chapters showing the effect of plenty upon American social and political institutions, in fact upon all aspects of American culture and upon the inner life of the people, determining how they look upon themselves and the world outside. Professor Potter goes beyond the physical plenty in the resources with which the continent was endowed and analyzes the abundance that has continued to be produced from man's use of those resources. This is the author's main contribution to this line of thought, for Americans have from the beginning been aware of the effect of abundant natural resources. It is in this continuing growth of wealth and resources caused by the inventive and adaptive ability of the people that Professor Potter finds one trait of a national character and reason for his apparent optimistic belief that, with a clearer knowledge of the bases of their culture and a closer examination of their history, the people of plenty may progress to a fulfillment of the American "dream."

The chapter, "Abundance and the Mission of America," offers some interesting conjecture on the reasons why it has been difficult to export American democracy and why the world today is not entirely friendly to the United States. Chapter IX on "Abundance and the Frontier Hypothesis" may be, with the first chapter, the section of the book most interesting to historians, for here Professor Potter makes his contribution to the mid-twentieth century's re-evaluation of, if not attack upon, the so-called Turner thesis. This section and some similar parts of Professor Henry Nash Smith's *Virgin Land* seem to contain valid criticisms of, and supplementary ideas for, the Turner frontier hypothesis as it has been expanded by the numerous Turner disciples in the sixty years since Turner published his work. One must, however, call attention to the fact that Professor Potter and his contemporaries, who criticize the Turner emphasis on the frontier as the edge of settlement or of unused land and resources, forget that from the vantage point of the mid-twentieth century they may be able to define "frontier" not as Turner's generation did but as—in Professor Potter's words—"the edge of the unused," and thus make a frontier hypothesis that fits the need for explaining the continuation of American abundance long after the free land frontier had disappeared.

The chapter on advertising as an institution of abundance is intriguing and amusing and may have a validity that a younger generation will be able to accept without question. The final chapter with its return to a consideration of the author's interest in the behavioral sciences will probably seem to most historians a bit fantastic and a mental exercise of little use to either those sciences or to the historian, despite a willingness to grant Professor Potter's original premise of the necessity to view American culture as a whole.

ALICE FELT TYLER
University of Minnesota

STURM, ALBERT M. *Methods of State Constitutional Reform*. (University of Michigan, Michigan Governmental Studies, No. 28.) Pp. xii, 175. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1954. $2.50.

Many of the publications of state university bureaus of research are not for review; they aren't even for reading. On receipt, they are to be put on shelves with books of the same size. Such studies are chiefly items in the decoration of a professor's office. This sad commentary does not apply to the Michigan studies, which have always been more than merely useful; necessary, really, to the student of state and local government.

Professor Sturm's monograph on methods of state constitutional reform was written by him from published sources. He also consulted experts in every state in the Union, as well as Puerto Rico and Hawaii, a type of research which has become quite popular in recent years, as well it should. The solicitation of advice was by mail; the only other way to make a satisfactory survey would be personal visitation, a method both expensive and time consuming. At any rate, this is an exercise in comparative government, carried out in the currently approved fashion. As a study, it is of immense value to political scientists. It should also be of interest, perhaps, also of inspiration, to leading citizens and public officials.

It is possible, briefly, to summarize Sturm's findings and conclusions. There have been many changes made in state constitutions. Two-thirds of the states have replaced their original documents. The old distinction between fundamental law and statutory matter has broken down: most modern constitutions are cluttered up with trivia. In most states, conventions are used for altering constitutions, but when there is sharp definition of "revision" and "amendment," conventions are employed for the former purpose, and not the latter. In either case, there is widespread reliance on popular referenda. Most minor changes originate in the legislature or with the people, by means of the "initiative." An interesting development is the "constitutional commission," such as that of New Jersey, Georgia, and Minnesota. Sturm notes two problems, each occurring within an area of importance to constitutional

change: (1) legislatures usually resist efforts to reduce the length of documents or their own prerogatives; and, (2) the citizens do not participate fully in decisions on "issues." There is less nonvoting when candidates are pitted against each other.

Most of Sturm's proposals for improvement and reform are eminently practical. However, since we, the citizens, don't want any disturbing reforms, there probably won't be any of consequence in the next few decades. The rural voters of Georgia, for example, are not going to allow any changes depriving them of advantages they now enjoy. Sturm shares the preference which most political scientists have for short, compact constitutions consisting entirely of "fundamental law." But he doesn't seem to be very optimistic about the realization of this ideal.

ROY V. PEEL
University of Utah

BURTON, HAL (Ed.). *The City Fights Back.* Pp. 318. New York: Citadel Press, 1954. $5.00.

The subtitle states prosaically that this is "a nation-wide survey of what cities are doing to keep pace with traffic, zoning, shifting population, smoke, smog, and other problems; narrated and edited from material developed by The Central Business District Council of the Urban Land Institute."

The book is all of this, but it is more; it is a vividly written ecological study which tells how cities—New York, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Allentown, Donora, and a dozen more—are shaking off the slow-creeping paralysis and decay and making "downtown" again the heart of the city. It is a realistic appraisal of the factors which led to the decay—indifference, opposition of some land owners, politics in city transit systems, opposition to zoning, absentee ownership, and the "rugged individualist" who asserts that he can "do with his property as he pleases." Failures are recounted as well as successes, but there are changes in many cities of which they may well be proud.

The author does not believe that there has been a "flight to the suburbs" but only that the city has overreached its former boundaries. As evidence, he cites the fact that few downtown stores have given up their locations in the heart of the city but only have established branches, and that many report increasing sales in the downtown establishment.

Although the pattern of organization varies, most city planning has been initiated by one or a small group of civic leaders *within the city*. Seldom has it been successful when promoted by outsiders. The second step is the organization of a committee or a council which may be independent of the municipal government or be given some official status. The third step is bold and courageous planning, both immediate and long range, followed by funds to translate plans into expressways, parking centers, new or refurbished buildings, parks and civic centers.

There are two omissions in this "Tale of Cities." One is that of housing and family relocation. The other is the important part played by public funds—local, state, and Federal—in slum clearance, in low-cost and apartment housing, and in reconstruction of many types.

The book concludes with a number of appendices that give helpful details not included in the narration.

FRANCIS J. BROWN
American Council on Education

LUTHIN, REINHARD H. *American Demagogues: The 20th Century.* Pp. xv, 368. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954, $5.00.

This is an important handbook for understanding one aspect of American Politics. It is, as the author says, concerned with those politicians "who in their aspiration for political place and power pandered to the passions and prejudices, rather than the reason of the populace, and performed all manner of crowd-captivating tricks, only to betray the people." With a net so wide, the wonder is that Mr. Luthin could confine his study to ten demagogues of recent or contemporary history. Many an American politician—and not a few whom history regards as statesmen—would also fit the definition of demagogue here proposed. But no one can quarrel with the inclusion of those "masters of the masses" who come in for special scrutiny in this volume.

A chapter each is devoted to James Curley, the Boston Brahmin-Baiter; Theodore "The Man" Bilbo of Mississippi; William Hale Thompson of Chicago otherwise known as "Big Bill the Builder;" "Alfalfa Bill" Murray of Oklahoma; "Boss" Hague of Jersey City; "Ma" and "Pa" Ferguson of Texas; Eugene Talmadge, "The Wild Man" of Sugar Creek, Georgia; Vito Marcantonio, the leftist political chameleon from Harlem; Huey Long; and Wisconsin's "Briefcase Demagogue," Joseph McCarthy.

Mr. Luthin, who is a lecturer at Trinity College in Hartford, has been extraordinarily successful in capturing the flavor of the demagogue, the environment in which he thrives, and those perverse charismatic qualities that make him click. All politicians, by definition, have some of these traits, the demagogues being those who have them in unique pattern or degree. One stands in awe at their capacity for vivid invective and vituperation. "A vicious, malicious, pusillanimous, cold-blooded, premeditated, plain ordinary United States Senatorial liar," said Bilbo in describing his opponent in 1934. His enemies were "poor folk beaters, shooters of widows and orphans, international well-poisoners . . . , spitters on our heroic veterans, unemployment makers, munitions manufacturers, and skunks who steal Gideon Bibles."

Even as the demagogue loots the land and its people, they love him for the solace he brings to their own guilt-laden souls. When Talmadge was accused of stealing public funds, he shouted to the crowd, "I stole it all for you," and they cheered him to the echo. William Hale Thompson "socking King George on the snoot"; Jim Curley crying out against the Brahmins of Boston; Alfalfa Bill inveighing against "the interests"; Huey Long denouncing the "Wall Street Money Devil"; Joseph McCarthy reviling "Fifth Amendment Communists and their collaborators"; all play essentially the same role.

In a summary chapter on "The Mark of the Demagogue" the author offers an arresting analysis of some of the major methods and characteristics of American demagogues. Among other tactics he exploits racial, religious, sectional, and class antagonisms; identifies himself as a "common man" and his foes as aristocrats or worse; assumes the role of wise country bumpkin against the city slicker and of the semiliterate yokel against the intellectual. Most demagogues are symbol specialists in a fashion undreamed of by semantic scholars. William Jennings Bryan's alpaca coat, Bill Thompson's sombrero, Talmadge's red galluses, Joe McCarthy's briefcase, are symbols of identification as familiar as "candy mint with a hole" or "His Master's Voice." In a vulgar and primitive fashion the demagogue knows how to put on a good show, to provide the pageantry and entertainment that people in the mass cry for and enjoy. Huey Long's sound trucks, Gene Talmadge's barbecues with "Fiddler John Carson" on the stump, Hague's Jersey City Police Quartet, Curley's vaudeville, and Bill Thompson's animal acts, "packed 'em in" and prepared them for their demagogic innoculation. Demagogue and sloganeer are virtually synonymous, and Curley's tirades against the "goo-goos," Bill Thompson's "America First," Huey Long's "Share Our Wealth," and "Every Man a King" are random samples. And the demagogue himself becomes a slogan; "Our Jim," "Ma" and "Pa," "Old Gene," "Big Bill the Builder," "The Man" Bilbo evoke emotions that defy catalogue or analysis.

There is, of course, more to the demagogue than these traits and tactics. There is the soil of sectionalism, of racial discrimination and religious bigotry, of poverty and ignorance, and fear and hate out of which these monsters grow. But one is bound to admit that in their own way they make their mark on our society and their contribution to our culture. But to assay these aspects of the American demagogue would require another book.

PETER H. ODEGARD
University of California
Berkeley

LUNDBERG, FERDINAND. *The Treason of the People.* Pp. 370. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. $4.50.

"The chief purpose of this book," its author announces in an early passage that both sets the tone and typifies the style of the chapters to follow, "is to focus critical

attention on a neglected branch of our system of government—the citizenry—with a view to demonstrating how the major beneficiaries of the democratic idea fail to measure up to it, and how they are allowing to be established the preconditions to another kind of system (not necessarily a dictatorship, but possibly so) even as so many persons and groups vociferously hail the triumph of democracy in our midst." This undertaking is described on the dust jacket as "a shocking exposure of how we have failed as American citizens."

With an air of having solved single-handed a peculiarly baffling and sordid murder case, Mr. Lundberg proceeds to reveal such "shocking" details as these: usually less than half of those eligible to vote go to the polls in national elections, and many of those who vote do so "mechanically," that is, fail to cast "an intelligent ballot." The jury system often works badly. The American people spend more money on such things as gambling, movies, radios, bowling, liquor, and tobacco—that is, on "the frivolous, the inane, and the trashy"—than on such things as education, medical research, and adequate housing, that is, "the serious, the enlightening, and the spiritually, morally, intellectually or even physically sustaining." This last discovery leads Mr. Lundberg to the interim conclusion that "the public as a whole—and this means the electorate—is infantile, always excepting a minority."

Mr. Lundberg also finds it reprehensible from the democratic point of view that the draft has to be resorted to in time of war, that there is always a lot of "griping" among service men despite the fact that they are "pampered," and that many civilians have been known to engage in war profiteering. Other "shocking" revelations include the following: Negroes and other ethnic groups are often discriminated against; pressure groups are powerful and tend to serve their own interests rather than the general welfare; all organizations, with political parties singled out for special mention, are run by their leaders ("oligarchs") and not by the rank and file. These discoveries lead Mr. Lundberg to the painful conclusion that democracy is a failure.

The basic flaw in all this is Mr. Lundberg's understanding of democracy, a concept which he never bothers explicitly to define. It is clear from the context, however, that he regards it as a system under which an unfailingly rational populace considers all questions solely in the light of their bearing on "the common interest" and, by an unexplained process of "representation," translates its collective wisdom and virtue into law. If one sets off from such a simplistic, not to say simple-minded, notion of what democracy means, it is easy to conclude that democracy does not work —and that the average citizen commits "treason" vis-à-vis the "democratic idea."

HENRY WELLS
University of Puerto Rico

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

BRIGHT, ARTHUR A., JR., and GEORGE H. ELLIS (Eds.). *The Economic State of New England.* Pp. xii, 738. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954. $6.00.

In economic development as in grand opera there seems to be a fascination in what a previous generation would have called "a decline." The New England economy, like that of the South, has therefore received an almost disproportionate attention. The analysis here under examination was undertaken by the Committee of New England, organized by the National Planning Association; the former group contained the usual array of big names from agriculture, business, manufacturing, labor, government agencies, and the like; it appointed as head of its research staff Arthur A. Bright, Jr. and on his death in 1953 George H. Ellis. Under the direction of these two men a staff drafted twenty chapters covering the various phases of the New England economy. Although the book is thus undertaken in the fashionable tradition of co-operative scholarship or division of labor, it has an exceptional unity of treatment and approach. In general it is not hostile to state intervention in the economy; it has a preference, however, for voluntary and regional rather than enforced or national activity, notwithstanding a caveat that "historically New England has placed national interests above regional interests. It must continue to do so." All programs must "be assessed in terms both of benefit for growing areas and of burden on older economic regions. In seeking solutions to regional programs, New England must not resort to recrimination, irresponsible exploitation of federal programs, or special pleading for preferred treatment." The report comes to the conclusion that the destiny of New England continues to lie in manufacturing activity.

Of all the recent post-mortems on New England, the volume here under review is the most full and the least opinionated. There is no doctrinaire war cry for a return to laissez faire; on the other hand there is no doctrinaire adherence to the blessing of state enterprise. On both counts the treatment of electric power is revealing. A comparison of the discussion with that in Seymour E. Harris's *The Economics of New England* demonstrates the superiority in inclusiveness and balance of the work here under review though Harris' book is nowhere near as extreme as some of its popularizers have made it out to be. Perhaps the measure of agreement the present volume achieves is best revealed in the fact that the dissenting opinions of Mr. Victor J. Canzano, Cotton Director of the Textile Workers Union of America, here included, are infrequent and, in the opinion of this reviewer, largely on matters of detail.

EDWARD C. KIRKLAND
Bowdoin College

OSBORN, RICHARDS C. *Corporate Profits: War and Postwar.* (Bureau of Economics and Business Research, Bulletin Series, No. 77.) Pp. 79. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1954. No price.

A solid and important piece of statistical and economic analysis has been done by Dr. Richards C. Osborn of the University of Illinois in the monograph under review. The subject matter is important; the data carefully compiled; the implications are far-reaching. This reviewer knows of no comparable collection of figures showing the course of corporate profits, employee compensation, return on corporate net worth and stock prices set against the background of price-level and national product.

Professor Osborn has compiled the figures on the size of prewar, wartime, and postwar corporate profits from 1939 to 1953; he has noted the adjustments in corporate profits and some aspects of government policy (notably the "full employment" policy with respect thereto), and the relationship between corporate profits and actual employment. He concludes that corporate profits have not been "too high," depending—this is important—on the conception one has of their proper function. Profits, though by 1953 they had climbed (after taxes, p. 65) to double those of 1939, have not, he concludes, "been too large after taxes on the basis of reasonable or valid criteria of measurement." Unless, of course, it is considered that the government already is in a position to assure stability of return so that risk is no longer significant. His concluding essay, "Corporate Profits in the American Economy," opens without attempting to answer a range of huge questions—among them that of the true source of risk capital.

Resisting the temptation to discuss most of the more fascinating facts developed, one or two may be noted. "Manufacturing" corporate profits (before taxes), both during the war and after the war, rose very rapidly: in 1951 they were seven times those of 1939. But (after taxes) the increase was not too far out of line with the increase in price level—that is, they followed the course of prices. In fact, this earning power was really used by the government as a means of collecting taxes. Again, stock prices (the Stock Exchange is once more in the news) from 1939 to the early months of 1954 increased by approximately the same percentage as did the cost of living—though there has plainly been an increase since then. One reason for the increase both in profits and, more sluggishly, in stock values, is that corporations today "turn over" their net assets about twice as fast as they did in 1939: that is, they have vastly increased their capacity

to produce and distribute (per dollar of assets) and have reaped a corresponding profit.

Notably interesting is Osborn's discussion of the relationship between corporate profit and what is now called "full employment" policy. In effect this is a brief review of the policy of the President's Council of Economic Advisers under Mr. Leon Keyserling's leadership, set in the context of business thinking in terms of incentive profits and economists's and governmental thinking that the American system cannot progress unless substantially all groups are potential consumers for a steadily expanding product. Osborn implies criticism of Keyserling's view that some shift of before-tax corporate income should be made from "business" to consumers; and of his apparent fear that the United States was accumulating too much capital rather than too little. The writer wishes Osborn's own views had been added to his concise summary.

Endless other relationships can be observed, and the study consequently opens a vista of thinking to thoughtful students of contemporary American economy. The best this reviewer can do in the allotted space is to urge careful attention to an invaluable collection of important source material.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

Columbia University

TROMBLEY, KENNETH E. *The Life and Times of a Happy Liberal.* A Biography of Morris Llewellyn Cooke. Pp. 262. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. $4.00.

This is a "must" book for those interested in public versus private power. It is especially valuable for university professors and students because it gives a play-by-play account of the long contest for and against the Tennessee Valley Authority and rural electrification. This contest is still undecided as shown by the recent testimony by the ex-governor Sidney McMath of Arkansas. He testified before a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee that the Arkansas Power and Light Company decreed his "political execution" when he refused to block a rural electrification co-operative project. Historical background is given for the contemporary Dixon-Yates contract to build a private power plant to sell power to the government TVA plant.

This book is much more than the story of public versus private power. It is the account of a happy, vigorous engineer in many fields of public service and reflects his successful working philosophy. Morris Llewellyn Cooke, the public-spirited engineer, I first knew as Director of Public Works in a reform administration of the City of Philadelphia. Here he cleaned up a municipal mess and brought a suit at his own expense which reduced electric rates to the consumer.

Throughout a long life, he originated and promoted ideas and programs directed to the relief of social and economic abuses or vacuums. One of these programs was the more constructive use of natural resources. By the appointment of President Franklin Roosevelt, he served as Chairman of the Water Resources Policy Committee.

Cooke's most conspicuous public service was as head of the Rural Electrification Administration where he was much opposed but ultimately successful. This was one of his major achievements—to promote the legislation, set up a new government administration and carry it through to success against the all-out opposition of powerful political and economic interests.

Not less interesting is the account of his services in labor-management relations and scientific management in industry. The principal actors in these fields stride vividly across these well-written pages.

Cooke always tried "to keep enough things going so that some things would be going right to compensate for those going wrong." The philosophy which kept him cheerful under attack and durable to old age include: "regard troubles and difficulties as inevitable." "Watch out if things get quiet." "Peace and progress are in irreconcilable conflict."

The author, Kenneth E. Trombley, has been an army officer, an advertising copywriter, and in recent years an editor of *The American Engineer.* He writes "this book was developed in the glow of an irrepressible personality and soul-stirring inspiration," which he succeeds in conveying to the reader.

OTTO T. MALLERY

Philadelphia, Pa.

PALMER, GLADYS L., with the assistance of CAROL P. BRAINERD. *Labor Mobility in Six Cities: A Report on the Survey of Patterns and Factors in Labor Mobility, 1940–1950.* Pp. xiv, 177. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954. $2.75 cloth; $2.25 paper.

Labor Mobility in Six Cities is a product of exceptional collaboration even in this era of co-operative institutional research. The Social Science Research Council is of course itself an outstanding example of voluntary co-ordination for stimulating research. The work was sponsored financially by the Air Force. The ten-year work histories comprising the source data were collected by the Bureau of the Census. The planning and management of the survey were handled by a technical subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Gladys L. Palmer, for the Council's Committee on Labor Market Research in co-operation with seven university research centers and the Office of Statistical Standards.

The volume lists numerous preliminary reports too bulky for general publication but designed to meet the immediate interests or needs of agencies concerned with manpower problems. The published volume therefore gives only a summary view. Possibly the effort to state the conclusions in concise and generalized form accounts for an occasional appearance of laboring the obvious, as when it is stated (p. 100) that "relatively few workers enter and many leave contracting occupations and industries, and the reverse occurs in expanding segments of the economy," or (p. 127) "a labor force adapts more readily to changes in the industrial demand for labor than to changes in the occupational structure." No doubt, however, a quantitative analysis even of such obvious generalizations has some bearing on certain manpower problems, especially in a period of acute labor shortages.

Although quite technical, the volume contains much of general interest, and the tabulations are detailed enough to make possible a certain amount of independent evaluation and use. Mobility is rather rigorously defined for the purpose of the analysis as a change of employer during the ten-year period; and it was found that about three-fifths of the persons included in the samples were mobile in the sense of having had at least two employers. Among the "mobile" men, 70 per cent made at least one occupational shift that involved a different level of skill. Laborers exhibited a high degree of mobility and moved in large proportions to higher levels of employment; at the same time, the relative demand for laborers declined significantly—evidence tending to support a rather hopeful view of the effects of the more recent technological and managerial changes on levels of skill.

The fully warranted claim is made for the survey material that "it constitutes the most comprehensive body of data yet available on the mobility of the work force in this country."

WITT BOWDEN

Washington, D. C.

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

LOWIE, ROBERT H. *Indians of the Plains.* (Anthropological Handbook Number One.) Pp. xiii, 222. New York: McGraw-Hill Company (for the American Museum of Natural History), 1954. $4.75.

Since the early 1900's the American Museum of Natural History has published in its Anthropological Handbook Series a number of useful volumes on American Indians. These clothbound, well illustrated little books have been familiar not only to visitors to the Museum, but also to many students of the American Indian in all parts of the world. There have been no other regional summaries of Indian life quite so handy or quite so authoritative. The quality was kept high by securing the recognized authority on each important area of the Americas. Thus Herbert J. Spinden, student of the Maya calendar system, wrote the one dealing with civilizations of the Aztecs and Mayas, and Clark Wissler, who

initiated the systematic study of the cultures of the buffalo hunters of western United States, wrote the *Indians of the Plains Handbook*. These were standard equipment for graduate classes in anthropology until the 1930's, when they began to be dated.

As a result of continuing vigorous research in every area of American anthropology, the handbooks have been in need of revision for nearly twenty years. The first one issued was *Indians of the Plains*, by Clark Wissler, for long Curator of Anthropology in the American Museum of Natural History, colleague of Franz Boas, important influence in his own right on American anthropology, and throughout his career indefatigable student of the Plains Indian way of life. Now some years after Wissler's death, the need for a revision of his often-reprinted handbook has been met.

The present volume is a wholly new production, although it follows the original very closely in plan. The American Museum has chosen as author the man who can without any question be accepted as the authority on Plains Indian life and custom—Robert H. Lowie, Professor Emeritus of Anthropology of the University of California, former staff member of the American Museum of Natural History, and life-long student of the Crow Indians.

Dr. Lowie's book is about as usefully arranged a summary of information on the Plains Indians as one could wish for. The first chapter lists the Plains Tribes, classifies them linguistically, maps their locations at about the time of first contact with whites, gives population figures over a century or more for each of the thirty-three tribal groups, and discusses briefly the "diagnostic traits" which distinguished the Plains Indian culture. Chapter II is the longest, dealing with the "Material Culture" and presenting in fascinating array all those characteristic products of the buffalo hunters from the tipi to the bullboat and the parfleche. Chapter III, dealing with Dr. Lowie's speciality of kinship and social organization and well flavored with his salty style, is a comprehensive survey of the complexities of family, warrior society, and tribal organization. Chapters IV, V, and VI are respectively devoted to recreation, art, and supernaturalism, the last two surely two of the most interesting chapters in the book. Chapter VII contains much new material, revising completely Wissler's earlier conclusions on "Prehistory and History." Chapter VIII is an all-too-brief discussion of the "virtually complete assimilation" by the Plains Indians of the white man's ways. The final chapter is an original and extremely interesting consideration of the distinctive features of Plains culture and how and when these traits took form.

The illustrations are superbly chosen; many are the same as those which appeared in Wissler's handbook and which could hardly be improved upon, but there are many more in addition which make vivid and concrete almost every section of the book, including those on social life and religion. The Index is a tremendous improvement over the earlier edition. Every tribe is listed with topical reference to every aspect of culture mentioned in the text for that tribe. It may in fact be said that the Index, as much as any other feature of this well-printed and wisely illustrated volume, justifies calling it a handbook. The concept of it as a brief compendium of the most important facts about one of the most important regional Indian cultures has been kept in mind throughout by author and editor.

EDWARD H. SPICER
University of Arizona
Tucson

LA PIERE, RICHARD T. *A Theory of Social Control*. Pp. xi, 568. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954. $7.50.

In spite of the *de haut en bas* attitude of the sophisticated toward textbooks, when one not only achieves distinction as a course manual but makes contributions to our thinking, it deserves such encomiums as any reviewer can bestow.

Professor LaPiere's is such a textbook. Twenty years of reflection and teaching have given him an excellent mastery of the literature, chiefly in English, upon which he draws. In addition, he has attempted "to devise a conceptual system that would account for conduct that is not wholly explained by socialization and situational interaction," a system that would be much more satisfactory than the mere machinations of the masters of the mass media, a phrase that might please even the alliterative Mr. Toynbee.

The theory, in brief, affirms that between the person and the situation the force exercised by group norms and standards and the rewards and punishments in terms of enhanced or deteriorated status which such (small) groups manipulate are potent motive makers.

This theory is developed with a multitude of down-to-earth illustrations in Part II of *A Theory of Social Control*, which treats of the nature and structure of groups, their norms and values, and goes on to the dynamics of their operation, and the decisive actions that groups under the leadership of authority take against reluctant or recalcitrant members. All of this, although occasionally on to abstract or too naive a level, comes home to men's business and bosoms and is the very stuff of social living.

It is much to the author's credit that he is historically minded (one of the highest awards of the intellectual critic) and that in days when we are told to talk of American ways of life in the plural, he is on his guard against gross oversimplifications.

Readers will have various reactions to the apparent assumption that group survival is a kind of final value not to be questioned and that the function of philosophic thinking is only to provide rationalizations and ideologies that are more or less effective, but about whose ultimate truth we should preserve a becoming scepticism. While Darwin and Darwinism do not appear in the index, one cannot fail to think they are in the background of LaPiere's discussion of the essential social process of achieving dynamic equilibrium.

It would be fun to teach this book, and a wise teacher could make a highly enlightening educational experience out of it.

W. REX CRAWFORD
University of Pennsylvania

MILES, ARTHUR P. *American Social Work Theory: A Critique and a Proposal*. Pp. ix, 246. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. $3.00.

American Social Work Theory represents the author's attempt to deal with what he calls "the" theory of social work, emphasizing what is termed the modern period (from the mid-1930's) rather than the so-called sociological period which preceded it. The author characterizes his effort as "a critique and a proposal."

It does not appear entirely clear to this reviewer to whom the critique part is actually aimed. If it is addressed, as the proposal must be, to professional social workers, the analysis seems somewhat superficial.

Most of the emphasis is an attempt to support the contention that the most important factors in an explanation of personality are found in the culture from which the individual comes, rather than in Freudian psychology. He attacks (and perhaps with some justification) what he calls "rampant Freudianism." He appears really to go to extremes at times in trying to point out the shallowness and limitations of Freud while still trying to keep at least one commendatory foot on the diving board.

He points with documented justification to the religious origin of the modern social work emphasis on the dignity of the individual. And he feels that the Western Christian tradition is the most important factor in explaining American social work.

The discussions regarding social case work, social group work, and community organization for social work, which consume almost two-thirds of the book, add very little to the literature of social work in the opinion of this reviewer. The confusion between method and process is as disappointing as it is common.

The proposal in the final chapter has some points to commend it, particularly the plea for a broader social scientific approach to building a theory of social work.

Some superficial people may characterize this book as an intemperate treatise on "Freud isn't God." This, it would seem, would be unfair. On the other hand, some may feel that it will have some value in that it is intentionally provocative at many points. For example, at one place this appears: "Case Work has the largest and best-developed body of literature in the field, and throughout its history there have

been enough literate practitioners to continue the refining of the process."

An error in editing appears on page 161 in reference to Grace Coyle's Social *Process* (not Progress) in Organized Groups. Many of the references seem dated, that is, not modern.

This reviewer feels this work suffers from partial observation and lack in thoroughness of analysis.

W. I. NEWSTETTER
University of Pittsburgh

SIMMONS, LEO W., and HAROLD G. WOLFF. *Social Science in Medicine.* Pp. iv, 254. $3.50.

SAUNDERS, LYLE. *Cultural Differences and Medical Care.* Pp. 317. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1954. $4.50.

Although these two volumes were undoubtedly written without close collaboration of the authors, they are so distinctly within the same frame of reference that, in effect, they represent Volumes I and II of what might well be a series of books. The first is an analysis of the basic premise that, without minimizing the primary importance of the physical factors involved in illness, "a sound foundation clearly must include whatever the social sciences can contribute to the personal and more comprehensive problems of medical care." The second specifically applies this premise in the case of Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest.

One of the authors of *Social Science in Medicine* is a professor of sociology, the other of medicine, yet the entire volume is so integrated that it is impossible to determine which is responsible for writing the various chapters. The authors frankly admit the difficulty in translating their premise into the treatment of the mentally and physically ill, but they have done a superb job in pointing the way. They have assiduously avoided both the technical vocabulary of either field and the generalities into which they could so easily have fallen.

The entire volume is an analysis of the interrelationship resulting from the following graphic presentation.

The Individual acts in *His Environment*
1. As an *Organism* in its *Physical Habitat*
2. As a *Group Member* in his *Society*
3. As a *Person* in his *Culture*

In their analysis of the impact of environment upon the individual, the authors emphasize the need of knowing not only the total cultural pattern but also that of the subgroups—family, church, and many others—with which the individual identifies himself. "Recognition of identifiable subgroups with corresponding subcultural elements takes on special importance in our present approach to medical care." The perspective given by an understanding of these *subgroup-subcultural* segments of society is made more specific by the authors' emphasis upon the necessity of relating them to the situation of the individual at the time and place of the illness.

The final chapter is an illustration of this sociomedical alliance. It is a candid examination of the hospital and of hospital practice in its treatment of patients and the problems which arise from inadequate recognition of the values to be gained from the contributions of the social sciences. Extensive footnote references are included and the volume concludes with a considerable bibliography.

Cultural Differences and Medical Care shows the need for the sociomedical alliance in a culture group which is often at variance with that of the medical practitioner. "When the practice of medicine involves the application of elements of the institution of medicine in one culture to the people of another, or from one subculture to members of another subculture within the same cultural group, that is done or attempted by those in the healing roles may not be fully understood or correctly evaluated by those in the patient roles. Conversely, the response of those on the patient side of the interaction may not conform to the expectations of those on the healing side. To the extent that this occurs, the relationship may be unsatisfactory to everyone concerned."

The author describes, in considerable detail, the physical surroundings, the family history, and the culture of the occupants of an apartment house. Against this specific background, he describes the cultural chasm that exists between the Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest and those that are not of this culture. This chasm tends to be widest in what Saunders calls "healing ways." Some sixty pages of notes and demographic data provide excellent source material.

Both volumes conclude on an optimistic note. They recognize that it is only recently that medicine has recognized the importance of the individual's environment and culture, and that the social sciences have sought to apply their knowledge to the ill person. Now that a beginning has been made, they believe that the contribution of each discipline to the other holds promise for the welfare of the individual.

FRANCIS J. BROWN
American Council on Education

DUVALL, EVELYN MILLIS. *In-Laws: Pro and Con: An Original Study of Inter-Personal Relations.* Pp. viii, 400. New York: Association Press, 1954, $3.95.

This study was undertaken in order to contribute empirical data for a neglected area of family research. Dr. Duvall points out (and summarizes) the scanty literature on in-law relationships in the American family; describes the individuation that has caused the separation of such kin in the past; and gives an impressive list of factors in modern society that are tending to hold conjugal groups closer together, physically, psychologically and economically. For these reasons, Dr. Duvall feels that factual knowledge about in-law relationships is becoming an increasing need.

The book is divided into three parts. There is, first, an analysis of the comments and observations presented by 5,200 cases (1,337 through group interview; 60 of these by individual interview also; and 3,863 by a letter on "Why I Think Mothers-in-Law Are Wonderful People," solicited for a radio contest). The greater part of the analysis, therefore, concerns the mother-in-law and treats all of her changing roles from the time her children are of courting age until she becomes grandmother-in-law. Other chapters deal with father-, brother-, sister-, daughter-, and son-in-law. A second part of the book is interpretation—an attempt to explain *why* the cases felt as they did. Most of this interpretation is new and enlightening; some is challenging; a part does not seem to be supported by the data given. This last is probably an inevitable result of a study that is truly pioneering in nature, and in which all significant factors cannot be foreseen at the outset. For instance, there is no attempt to measure the intensity or frequency of contacts between the subjects and their in-laws. Yet, in the reading, this factor appears to be crucial in interpreting the feelings involved. The third part of the book suggests what to do about in-law relationships. The author's discussion, in this section, will be valuable to family members, counsellors, and teachers.

Out of long and practical experience in the field of family relationships in general and an intensive concentration upon the present particular aspect of them, Dr. Duvall has undoubtedly made herself the current authority in this area. She has written a book which should be consulted as the best obtainable not only as a guide to, but also as the starting point for further research in, relationships with in-laws.

ELEANOR S. BOLL
University of Pennsylvania

KEVE, PAUL W. *Prison, Probation, or Parole?* Pp. 263. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1954. $3.75.

Mr. Keve's book is a welcome addition to the writings produced in recent years by probation and parole workers designed to give general readers the practitioner's eye view of these correctional procedures. Now Assistant Chief Probation Officer in Hennipin County, Minneapolis, Minnesota, the author describes his experiences as a probation-parole officer in the Arlington, Virginia area from 1943 to 1945.

Within the framework of descriptions of thirty-odd cases he supervised, Mr. Keve discusses the major principles and problems of in-community correctional work, and in addition considers certain less obvious problems confronting the officer and his clients: the conflicting roles of sentencing judge, prosecutor, and correctional worker; postprison sexual adjustment; probation work with white-collar criminals; and the difficulties found in supervising offenders whose crimes (for example, bootlegging) are not regarded locally as wrongdoing. The author's subjects dwelt mainly in small cities and rural areas; the court for which he worked was not overwhelmed by the great numbers of socially disad-

vantaged offenders who are usually, in the busy courts of large cities, handled with impersonal routine. Consequently, the atmosphere of *Prison, Probation, or Parole?* is one of more leisurely, personalized court proceedings and somewhat lighter caseloads than are usually described by writers on this topic. Mr. Keve saw little of the professional criminal, and most of the cases discussed are examples of "occasional" and "emotional" offenders—bigamists, sex deviants, abortionists, and embezzelers—who exemplify what the author calls "the ordinary little man who intends to live right."

Eight of the twenty-one chapters are devoted to cases involving abortionists, rapists, and psychopathic offenders. Without attempting a systematic treatment of these, Mr. Keve does assess the risks they present as probationers or parolees and concludes that the last two, together with *female* abortionists, have personality problems which exceed the resources available to most in-community correctional workers.

This book is refreshingly free from both moralizing and sensationalism; what little drama it contains inheres naturally in the cases themselves. While presenting no theory of causation, the author views crime and the treatment of offenders from a sociological frame of reference, emphasizing primarily the role of situational and attitudinal factors. The general reader will find *Prison, Probation, or Parole?* an absorbing account of work with other than run of the mill criminals; for the student and the novice practitioner, it will serve as an excellent informal introduction to the basic elements of in-community correctional techniques.

RALPH W. ENGLAND, JR.
University of Pennsylvania

WOLFLE, DAEL. *America's Resources of Specialized Talent: A Current Appraisal and a Look Ahead.* Pp. xx, 332. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. $4.00.

The United States wastes much of its intellectual talent. Chronic shortages of scientists, doctors, engineers, teachers, and other professional specialists continue. Yet efforts to improve the guidance, education, and placement of gifted youngsters have been pitifully ineffective, and the services of many a talented adult are frequently misused or not used at all.

These are some of the findings of the report of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training as reported by its director, Dael Wolfle. The Commission was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation. Its members were appointed by a board representing the American Council of Learned Societies, American Council on Education, National Research Council, and Social Science Research Council.

The study is focused on those of the nation's workers who labor chiefly with their heads instead of their hands. It is in no sense a special pleading for an intellectual elite. It is simply an effort to present some facts, heretofore not to be found in one place, about the people who master special portions of the growing body of knowledge upon which our complex industrial, military, scientific, and social machinery is based.

The staff of the Commission has rendered a notable service to manpower specialists by bringing together in an orderly fashion masses of data on college graduation trends since 1900; the occupational distribution of college graduates; supply, demand, and the potential supply in the specialized fields; characteristics of students entering those fields; and utilization of educated specialists.

Many more young people are capable of specialized training than receive it. College graduating classes could be twice as large as they are without loss of quality. Who goes to college and who doesn't are frequently determnied more by fate than by intellectual capacity. Thousands of the nation's brightest high school graduates fail to enter college each year because of lack of opportunity or motivation. Of those who finish, many have difficulty finding suitable employment even though shortages may exist in their particular fields. Talented women have especially serious employment problems. The services of older professional workers are frequently cut short by arbitrary retirement regulations.

The Commission believes that it is sound policy to encourage and help the ablest members of the young population to continue in school. However, each must be permitted to choose for himself the fields in which he wishes to specialize. Any infringement of this right would be inconsistent with democratic ideals. On completion of his training, the young specialist is deserving of much better placement assistance than exists at the professional level today.

Although this report has shed much light on America's resources of specialized talent, the author and his colleagues are impressed with the gaps in knowledge about their subject. They recommend that a public agency assume responsibility on a continuing basis for collecting specialized manpower information and making it publicly available. Their report will provide a splendid start for such a project.

CLAUDE E. HAWLEY
Washington, D. C.

DRESSEL, PAUL L., and LEWIS B. MAYHEW. *General Education, Explorations in Evaluation: The Final Report of the Cooperative Study of Evaluation in General Education of the American Council on Education.* Pp. xxiii, 302. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1954. $3.50.

Nineteen colleges participated through committee meetings, summer workshops, and local campus activities in this co-operative inquiry directed by the authors of the *Final Report.* Exploratory studies were conducted in six areas usually included in programs for general education: Social Science, Communications (oral and written English), Science, Humanities; and two "pervasive objectives": Personal Attitudes and Creative Thinking. As the authors explain, despite agreement in statements of objectives, general education programs differ greatly in practice, a primary cause of diversity being the difference in approach—whether "content-oriented," "intellectually-oriented," or "student-oriented." The exploration in evaluation was motivated by the hope of achieving greater unity through a reconsideration of the learning processes involved in general education.

In the final chapter, the authors state their conclusion that a positive integrating principle is the great need of the general education movement today. However, they reject the several current proposals. To make *Common Knowledge* the basis is considered impracticable in view of the vast and complex nature of contemporary knowledge. *Good Citizenship* is likewise adjudged inadequate because the idea of American democracy "is too frequently a provincial concept resting upon the assumption of the superiority of the cultural heritage of the Western world." *Education for Adult Life* they regard as unacceptable: "it threatens to become mere vocational and avocational education." Finally, *Values,* whether of a religious or of a humanitarian character, the authors think, cannot serve as a unifying basis because college faculties will not agree on a common core of beliefs. On their part, they propose "critical thinking" as a primary principle of curriculum organization. However, there seems to have been considerable skepticism among members of the working committees as to the validity of this proposal in view of the wide differences of opinion on the nature of critical thinking, its relation to specific subject areas, and its applicability to the creative arts and to moral issues.

There are important materials for consideration in the individual chapters recording the work on the various groups of objectives; the analysis of critical thinking is particularly good—better balanced than the usual statements in pedagogical literature. But the bland suggestion to make critical thinking—as equally applicable to all knowledge areas and value conceptions—the unifying factor in general education hardly entitles the *Report* to be considered "a guide to the pursuit of the high aims and ideals of the general education movement," the purpose for which the publishers offer it. Probably this reviewer's prejudice in favor of the principles that the authors reject accounts for his lack of enthusiasm.

I. B. BERKSON
City College of New York

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION. *University Education for Administration in*

Hospitals. Pp. xix, 199. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1954. $3.00.

This is the first report of the Commission on University Education in Hospital Administration and its special study staff headed by Dean Herluf V. Olsen of the Dartmouth School of Business Administration. By questionnaire, interview, and personal investigation they examined the need for a program to train hospital administrators, and here suggest a program to meet that need, discuss the limitations of existing graduate programs, and conclude with thirty-one broad recommendations.

The hospital administrator is described as operating a multitude of diverse services for clients in a peculiar stress situation. Many of the people whose activities he must co-ordinate live in a professional social world with its own ethos of status, duties, and values—a world over which the administrator has little control. The administrator finds himself legally accountable to an amateur board likely to be self perpetuating, but also informally responsible to many segments of the public which show increasing interest in his work. To supply the persons needed for such positions a program of recruitment, undergraduate and preprofessional study, graduate work and residency training, and postgraduate training is prescribed. Problems of pedagogy, university administration, and research are discussed.

On many points there will be general agreement. There certainly will not be unanimity on the report as a whole. For example, the commission recommends that experience not be a requirement for admission to the program. This would demand a change in many present policies which some consider quite reasonable.

More heated discussion will be provoked probably by the idea that hospital administrator training programs should be located in university schools of business. At the present time, seven of the twelve degree-granting graduate programs are in schools of public health; two are in schools of business; and the other three are in medical or graduate schools. The committee recommendation would stimulate controversy even if no forces other than bureaucratic empire building were at work. There is much to be said on different sides: for the business schools is their experience in teaching administration and their contact with commercial activities such as are important in hospitals; for the schools of public health is their ethos of service and medical programs. One can argue convincingly that it is easier to improve the administrative programs in public health schools than to induce the required atmosphere of social service motivation in schools of business. Certainly no single answer is likely to satisfy everywhere.

More educational programs need a report like this one—not for final answers it gives, but for initial questioning it provokes.

JAMES A. NORTON
Harvard School of Public Health

HODGSON, KENNETH W. *The Deaf and Their Problems: A Study in Special Education.* Preface by Sir Richard Paget, Bart. Pp. xx, 364. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $6.00.

This penetrating and timely book, written by an English author and educator was first published in England. It is approached from the point of view of the English schools, yet is relevant to the education of the deaf of all lands. The historical teachings of Luzerne Rae (who began editing the *American Annals of the Deaf* in 1847) used by the English teacher and writer Thomas Arnold in 1884 as a basis of his studies provides a connecting link with America. Mr. Hodgson, in the present volume, has drawn from this vast fund of knowledge and has not only dealt adequately with the deaf, but also with the contributing forces of early educational reformers working with hearing children.

After bringing the scattered data on the teaching of the deaf in Italy, Spain, England, France, and Germany into some kind of pattern, Mr. Hodgson builds his climax with the philosophical and scientific approaches which sponsored and formulated the medium of speech and manual language in the eighteenth century. By 1760 a school was started, and the deaf were no longer mainly instruments of experiment as they had been when Jerome Cardan, John Wallis, William Holder, and John Bulwer were intent upon producing "the miracle of speech" from them. Miracles gave way to facts, and when it was established that speech was acquired and not inherited, and that dumbness was a result of hearing loss, teachers of the deaf were making progress.

Almost simultaneously the Abbé de l'Épée in France (1760), Samuel Henicke in Germany (1772), and Thomas Braidwood in England (1783) founded schools and sponsored methods which "branded" schools of thought from then on out.

Sir Richard Paget, Bart., in his Preface sets the tone by his interpretation of the moral that "the opposition of oral and silent teachers should be allowed to die out and be replaced by a constructive and experimental effort on an international scale." The oralists have assumed a superior attitude toward hand language, much the same as rabid liberal arts advocates have toward their vocational brothers. Taken to extreme this annihilates the democratic approach to all teaching for it disregards individual differences.

Mr. Hodgson explains the ear per se. He also outlines the growth of interest and understanding, which were effects of social action toward the deaf, and the rise of national systems. The transition period came when America's Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet went abroad and brought back the "French System" of teaching the deaf, the sign language. With great wisdom he combined articulation and evolved the "Combined System" for American schools. His son, Edward Miner Gallaudet, used the Columbia Institution in Washington, D. C., to cradle the world's first (and only) college for the deaf, Gallaudet College, in 1864.

The first oral school came in 1867. Despite the controversy of methods, Hodgson points out that medicine and science have stepped into the classroom to clarify matters. Statistics show that more graduates of the combined schools go to college than do oral school graduates. This, alone, reveals on which side liberal education lies. As Hodgson asks: "is the aim to educate the deaf, or make them *appear* normal by speaking"? His whole economic, social, and political approach will be of interest to the layman.

MAXINE TULL BOATNER
Hartford, Connecticut

PEARSON, GERALD H. J. *Psychoanalysis and the Education of the Child.* Pp. x, 357. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1954. $5.00.

Pearson opens his book with a discussion of the relation between education and psychoanalysis in which he points out the failures of the early applications of psychoanalysis to education by describing personality difficulties that came out of permissiveness, open sex education, and progressive education. Through case histories he then presents the various disorders in which learning is and is not involved in the neurotic conflict. There follows an outline of psychoanalytic theory in relation to child development with applications in defense mechanisms, creativity, the reality principle, and the contributions of ego-psychology. A final section on the development of the moral sense treats of the super-ego, the development of the ego ideal, and the relations on the psychoanalyst to the educator.

The book though liberally documented with references to the psychoanalytic literature contains almost no references to the nonpsychoanalytic discussions of the same problems. For example, his theory of language development upon which there is a voluminous scientific literature is stated thus, "psychoanalytic research has proved that the development of language results from the ability of the child to learn to control his excretory organs."

A theoretical bias thus constrains the author from a scholarly approach to his problem. But even within his own system of thought, he fails to recognize that generalizations based on a small sample of emotionally disturbed children may not apply to all children and that principles have a hierarchial order and should not contradict one another. In the early part of the book he emphasizes hedonic principles as the primary forces in education, whereas later he explicitly states that identification is the primary force. In both the cases presented and the generalizations made the

adultomorphic fallacy continually appears, namely the reading into an earlier phase of development the feelings and reactions characteristic of later phases.

A major theoretical difficulty is a lack of recognition of the function of stimulation in the learning process. For example he states "the purpose of the learning process is to supply adequate systems of gratification as substitutes for elementary biological functions and products." And later he says "at best stimuli from the external world are not as pleasurable as those that arise from fantasy and therefore there is a constant tendency to look inward rather than outward." But it is clear from modern research that a complex organism depends for its very existence upon a tremendous input from the external world, and that curiosity and manipulation in the human being and the higher apes which seem to arise from primary and nonsatiable adient drives, gives to the organism a radically different developmental turn than holds for lower animal forms.

However, the author seems to be wiser than his theories in his practical approach to many of the problems presented by children. The book is more readable and more moderate in tone than many of the books written by psychoanalytically oriented persons. Nevertheless, one wonders what specific evidence supports some of the practical generalizations. Consider for example this statement "if the child has a strong exhibitionistic drive, materials (educational) should be presented through the medium of dramatics; if the child's drive is to peep, it should be presented through the medium of scientific research."

JOHN E. ANDERSON
University of Minnesota

SILVERMAN, HIRSCH LAZAAR. *Education Through Psychology: A Subjectivist-Idealist Format for Education.* Pp. 58. New York: Exposition Press, 1954. $3.00.

Despite the enthusiasm of a Foreword, a Preface, and an Introduction it is not clear why or for whom this book was written. It consists of platitudes stated in declarative sentences which are neither stimulating nor interesting. The author shows little familiarity with or insight into the modern literature of education, psychology or philosophy and refers mainly to the "grand old men." Samples of generalizations follow: (p. 27) "if teachers wish to develop thinking in students, they must give pupils material to think about"; (p. 43) "every teacher should formulate individual lists of attitudes to be taught, including a scientific attitude, a critical attitude, a problematical attitude, a tolerant attitude, a historical attitude, a patriotic attitude—in fine, a comprehensive philosophic attitude. Students must be made to *think.*"

JOHN E. ANDERSON
University of Minnesota

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

MEYER, ALFRED G. *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice.* Pp. xx, 181. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $3.50.

This, as the author tells us, is a critical essay; it is not a complete study of Marxism, but selects for exposition and criticism certain aspects of the theory that seem important to the author either as contributions to social science or because they express what is deepest and most characteristic in the Marxian attitude to the world. Of the contributions to social science, the one most fully discussed is the Marxian conception of society as a system of events functionally related to one another. Mr. Meyer maintains that, according to the better Marxian view (for he admits that Marx never got rid of his cruder "mechanistic" conceptions), the economic substructure does not create the superstructure, but has a negative influence on it, tending to prevent the emergence of features unsuited to itself. The Marxist attitude to the world is seen as consisting primarily in the conviction that class institutions distort and debase human nature (this Mr. Meyer calls "the theory of alienation"), in the faith that society is nevertheless moving towards a condition that must end this distortion, and in the belief that the proletariat are the only class who, as they become "class-conscious," acquire a true understanding of society and its historical progress, the understanding contained in the Marxian theory. It is in this sense that there exists, for the proletariat and for the Marxist (and for them alone), a "unity of theory and practice." The disintegration of Marxism in the West Mr. Meyer attributes to the spread among Marxists of double about this unity.

Though the author modestly says that none of the opinions and interpretations in his book may be new, the impression it creates is of quite exceptional freshness, vigor and thoughtfulness. It puts many points better than I have ever seen them put before; and some of them are new to me. The first and longer part of the book, the critical exposition of the doctrine, is the better of the two. Mr. Meyer has rightly been at pains to make as much sense as possible of Marxism, and on the whole has contrived to do it without reading more into the theory than is there to be found. He has perhaps exaggerated the extent to which Marx was thinking in terms of functional rather than direct causal relations; and has made too much of this distinction as a partial defence of Marx's economic determinism. Marx's critics have mostly been as unconcerned as he was about the difference between these two types of relations; and the gist of their criticism is valid whichever of the two we suppose Marx to have meant. Marx did not believe that economic determinism is one among several equally valid interpretations of social change; he thought it the only key to the true understanding of it, because he assumed that the economic factor is objectively fundamental in a way in which the "superstructure" is not.

The last chapter—as is the habit of last chapters—is the weakest. Among the "thorny and painful questions" put by Mr. Meyer on page 145 is this one: "Is pure science inevitably conservative or inevitably revolutionary?" There are in Mr. Meyer's own book several good arguments showing that questions like this are logically absurd.

J. PLAMENATZ
Oxford University
England

HAZARD, PAUL. *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century: From Montesquieu to Lessing.* Pp. xx, 477. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954. $6.00.

The most striking contrast between the eighteenth century and its predecessor was the cult of happiness. Lowering theological obsessions gave way to a confident rationalism; the new idea of progress became popular. This change was congenial to the late Dr. Hazard's brilliant, discursive mind. His far-ranging survey is spiced with the wit and urbanity of the French tradition in which he was bred and which still remains strongly derivative from that brilliant age. After the laborious team work to which we have become accustomed, this *aperçu* of a single mind is welcome and occasional reckless generalizations are offset by refreshing readability.

Dr. Hazard was concerned not with the folk-roots of culture, but with its aristocratic flower; not with massive economic and political upheavals, but with the intellectual changes destined to contribute to them. The "literature of social pleasure" was not, in his view, something to be deplored, and where Sorel scarified the limitations of the *salon,* Hazard applauded its verve. His book is divided into three sections, "Christianity on Trial"; "The City of Men"; and "Disaggregation"—a title which might have been better translated. It thus covers the rise, the apex, and the decline of the Enlightenment. Why, we may ask, did the decline take place? Because, Dr. Hazard suggests, the rationalism of Voltaire, Diderot, and D'Holbach satisfied neither the philosophers nor the men of feeling. The thought was too brittle, the emotional appeal too limited, the social ambient too circumscribed. Outside the *salon,* incalculable movements were under way. The sequel, after Rousseau, was something new in European history, the intellectual domination of the Germans.

But the romantic and revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century were to obscure the great achievements of the eighteenth. Dr. Hazard's book reminds us of its lasting influence. In the political sphere alone, Bentham and Saint-Simon were products of the Enlightenment. In

spite of the emotional reaction it provoked, the belief went on that the world could be changed and organized for the benefit of man. When de Maistre maintained that it was inevitably the scene of original sin and its punishment and nothing more, he showed a belated affinity with the theologians denounced by Voltaire. This belief in progress and perfectibility inspired both Mazzini and Marx, the two most representative exponents of liberal and collectivist ideas. The all-pervading triumphs of modern science, moreover, for all their empirical basis, derive from eighteenth century tolerance and common sense. Further, the Enlightenment was cosmopolitan. It crossed the oceans as well as the frontiers. The City of Men, after all, is what all governments—even the Indian—desire to build today. This sometimes mannered, but stimulating book serves as a lively reminder of our debt to the first age of modern European history in which man attempted to make himself.

JOHN BOWLE

Oxford, England

BOLGAR, R. R. *The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries.* Pp. viii, 592. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. $8.50.

The scholars of the Middle Ages and Renaissance lived in the shadow of their classical heritage. Their task was not to add to the sum of man's knowledge, but to comprehend and exploit this heritage. In attempting to do this they were beset by many difficulties. The works embodying the classical heritage were in tongues that were strange to them. Then the mere physical possession of these works in reasonably accurate form required a long, arduous struggle. But far more serious was the basic impediment of different outlooks on man, the world, and his purpose in it. The classical heritage was pagan while the medieval scholars were deeply Christian.

Mr. Bolgar's purpose is to show what part of the classical heritage was available to medieval scholars at various times, how they sought to use it to satisfy their needs, and to explain how these needs came into being. In the first two of these he is eminently successful. Mr. Bolgar depicts clearly and effectively the various types of learning such as grammar, rhetoric, or logic, needed at different periods and how the scholars sought them in the available part of the classical heritage. He is less convincing when he seeks in the general history of the Middle Ages the forces which give rise to these needs. Here he produces intriguing and stimulating suggestions, but a medieval historian can easily provide entirely different explanations which are equally plausible. For example, while there is undoubtedly a connection between the development of legal studies and the decline in feudal violence, few historians would accept the view expressed on page 132 that it was the establishment of order in the tenth and eleventh centuries that led to the enthusiasm for legal studies. Mr. Bolgar makes history far too simple and at times distorts it to suit his needs. Here and there, however, he has furnished shrewd insights into possible connections between political, social, economic, and intellectual history.

This book is not for the amateur. In fact most scholars will find it useful chiefly as a guide to further study. To comprehend it fully one must be a master of both classical and medieval learning. This reviewer found himself continually hampered by the fact that he had only the vaguest idea of the nature and content of many classical works cited by Mr. Bolgar. On the other hand Mr. Bolgar's discussion of the relation of Peter Lombard to the classical heritage will mean little to the classical scholar who has not read the *Sentences.* For Mr. Bolgar writes always in general terms and very rarely gives illustrative examples. But for anyone with enough background to grasp its broad ideas, Mr. Bolgar's book is extremely stimulating. It is likely to inspire the reader to acquire the necessary knowledge to understand fully at least part of his vast panorama of learning.

SIDNEY PAINTER

Johns Hopkins University

MONTGOMERY, JOHN D. (Ed.). *The State versus Socrates.* Pp. vi, 247. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $3.50.

The current resurgence of interest in the life and death of the great Athenian questioner and martyr is a sign of the times, deducible from our concern with loyalty oaths and with the meaning and limits of academic freedom. In these circumstances we may well expect any fresh discussion of Socrates to relate itself centrally to these issues. The present book by its very title, and still more by its subtitle, "A Case Study in Civic Freedom," promises to fulfil that demand.

The promise has been kept. In a spirit of judicial fair play which, however, does not exclude personal conviction and faith, Professor Montgomery has sought to present an historically accurate and sociologically balanced account of what he believes to be a perennially recurrent conflict between the necessities of social stability and the quest for truth. The method pursued is well suited to its end. The body of the book is composed of happily chosen excerpts from some eighteen writers, from Plato to Plato's most violent latter-day opponent, Professor Karl Popper, grouped under the captions, "The Background of the Case," "The Case for the Prosecution," "The Case for the Defense," and "The Appeal to History."

Of special interest is the section devoted to the prosecution, whose charges (with the capital exception of those brought by Winspear and Silverberg from the standpoint of the "class struggle") are not introduced merely *pro forma,* but are seriously considered, and acknowledged to bear some weight. In the Introduction, which sets forth Professor Montgomery's own conception of Socrates and of the degree of his guilt as charged, we hear that "Socrates may not have understood the role of the public in a democratic society," and that "he aroused speculation which might have ended in abrupt changes in the government and life of Athens." Even so, Socrates is acquitted; there was never any real doubt about that. The condemnation is declared to have arisen out of irrational fear and the willingness to sacrifice the long-term values of the search for truth to a transient and ultimately dangerous expediency. But Professor Montgomery's concern is not after all for Socrates, but for us and our cherished way of life. "The survival of that way of life requires that we refrain from a second and even more disastrous verdict against Socrates."

In looking back over this excellent volume I find two points at which I am prompted to raise a question. Professor Montgomery is, I think, a little surer than he has a full right to be that the historical Socrates was wholly secular in his outlook, motivated only by the human ideal of the rational search for truth. This is to set at naught the evidence of the *Apology,* with its reference to the "divine mission" and the conviction that life and death are known in their ultimate values "only to God." In thus secularizing Socrates our author appears to me to have taken one step into that most frequent quagmire of Socratic criticism, exemplified in many of his quoted authorities—the temptation to bring this significant ancient figure into closer conformity with a widely-held modern ideal, or (as does Nietzsche) with its antithesis. Also, in referring to the continued trial of Socrates, I could wish that our author's clear indication of the contemporary opponents of Socrates had been matched by an equally clear identification of those who today play the role of Socrates; in other words, that he had given us greater aid in our difficult task of drawing a clear line between the wholesome dissenter—whom we must at all costs allow to speak—and the outright menace to the state.

RONALD B. LEVINSON

University of Maine

BENTLEY, ARTHUR F. *Inquiry into Inquiries: Essay in Social Theory.* Edited with an Introduction by Sidney Ratner. Pp. xvi, 365. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $6.00.

Inquiry into Inquiries consists of twenty chapters, each comprising an article or note of which about two thirds have previously been published. Of the unpublished papers, several are unfinished, but have been included at the behest of friends. The materials are classifiable as (1) sociology (knowledge and society, new ways and old ways to talk about man, and sociology and mathematics) and (2) evaluations of vari-

ous philosophical and scientific theories (the Jamesian Datum, and the positive and the logical).

The editor explains the range of time (1910–50), topic, and occasion. Bentley applies his own reconstructions of the logic of the social sciences. Freed from private business affairs he turned to the philosophy of history, political science, psychology, mathematics, the natural sciences, and formal logic. Shade of Sir William Petty! But quite unlike the seventeenth century genius who, when the *Principia* was published, merely remarked: "as for Mr. Newton's book I would give 500 pounds to have been the author of it," Bentley sets to work. He heaps up pungent commentaries upon the writings of philosophers and scientists.

Vigorously he attacks weaknesses in language and errors of thinking. As to the latter, mentalism is one of his special targets. Stimulated by recent objective psychology he condemns various forms of psychistic constructions—for example, his criticism of Professor Lewis' article on the *Mental* (Chapter XI) and the piece entitled "Physicists and Fairies" (Chapter VII).

However often he hits the mark in this book, these critical efforts are not of its essence. In the first place, although the author commendably assaults mentalistic ways of thinking he only verbally departs from them, as when he labors mightily to naturalize James's mentalism. In the second place, he wishes mainly to present his philosophy—namely, a sociocosmological dialectic. Underlying every concrete situation he sees the fusion of knowings and the known. "We return to a status of world in the mind, yet mind in the world. We solve it by symbiotaxis. The world is in the mind socially taken as action (symbiotaxis). The symbiotaxium constructs the world—knowledge—i.e., it 'is' that world. The world (knowledge) includes mind (mind as psychological technique)" (p. 25).

Bentley's critics will undoubtedly interpret his dialectic as reducing things and events either to "full temporal and spatial phenomenality" (p. 36) or simply verbal symbols. This philosophy, with preferred terminology ("transaction"), Bentley believes is important for science. Others may find sociocosmic dialectics in sharp contrast with the scientist's analytic investigation of things and events.

J. R. KANTOR

Indiana University

MUMFORD, LEWIS. *In the Name of Sanity.* Pp. vii, 244. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1954. $3.75.

In this collection of essays and lectures Mr. Mumford follows the current fashion of using the threat of the atomic bomb to re-emphasize points which he has been making for a generation or more. He states his theme in the opening chapter: "each of us must accept, as his own, the personal responsibility for safeguarding man's essential humanity. . . . We must uphold love and reason as more precious than life itself." The dangers are obsessive prejudices, fixed ideas, narrowed horizons, automatisms, moral numbness and inertia, psychotic malice, irrational violence, and delusional projections. In Mr. Mumford's familiar manner we are again warned of the dangers of mechanization and overreliance on technology. He portrays vividly various possible consequences of the threat of atomic war, and from an analysis of modern art he deduces new evidence of the dehumanization of man. Finally, he presents us with the necessity of using "the powers of Prospero" to check the "uprising of Caliban."

All this is done with characteristic vigor and deadly effectiveness. While Mr. Mumford yields to no one in his vivid apprehension of the horrors of a Communist triumph, he castigates us for employing the same weapons of fear and violence in an irrational effort to isolate ourselves from the real problems.

It is impossible to disagree with much of what Mr. Mumford says, and we can easily become frightened by the horrors which he reveals to us. On the other hand the book as a whole seems to let us down. The basic exhortation is, of course, not new, and Mr. Mumford's originality lies more along the lines of devastating criticism than of positive suggestion. Furthermore he distracts us by scattering his shots, and, in this single book at least, neglects to provide the theoretical basis for such major theses as the relation of a given style of painting to the particular period of civilization in which it makes its appearance.

It is perhaps one of the gloomiest confirmations of Mr. Mumford's general theme that it is becoming easier and easier to write books of this sort. Unfortunately, however, these books seldom succeed in carrying us beyond the point of demonstrating that new forms of moral and spiritual leadership are needed if our civilization is to survive. It is unfair to expect that, at their chosen level of analysis, they will provide that leadership themselves.

MASON W. GROSS

Rutgers University

OPPENHEIMER, J. ROBERT. *Science and the Common Understanding.* Pp. 120. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954. $2.75.

Oppenheimer's lectures will be very highly valued by all those who are presently restudying the interaction of natural philosophy and human wisdom. There are available, I think, for the serious general reader better reports on the essentials of wave mechanics and on the logical nexus of scientific and value decisions. Nonetheless, a certain mood fuses the elements of Oppenheimer's exposition and it elevates a document which is essentially contemporary into a dramatic encounter with eternal issues. The author's sincere and alert vision brings him to the most splendid moral rediscoveries, re-creations rather than learned reminiscence. Unit after unit of his analysis and judgment is excellent, whether it deals masterfully with the paradoxes of individuality, and appreciation of the Enlightenment, the logical structure of atomic experimentation, the genuine objectivity of micro-physics, the maintenance of determinism in the macrophysical world, the meaning of brotherhood, the arrogance of Marxist pretensions, the compatability of motives of intellectual curiosity and the quest for power over nature, the triumphant continuity of scientific advance, and many other themes. I could only wish that in the recital of the achievements of such men as Rutherford or Chadwick, Oppenheimer had dwelt more on the friendly alliance between concept and practice in the procedures of the successful physical sciences.

Turning now to Oppenheimer's major theses, their integration in terms of complementarity is much less valuable than the treatment of particular problems. Complementarity is a set of limitations. Inherent limitations have a way of dissolving. Did not Diderot remind Europe that the inherent necessity by which light was only white was eliminated by Newton's prism, and has not De Broglie very recently challenged von Neumann's alleged proof that wave mechanics must be statistically indeterministic forever? Analogies from alleged inherent necessities are doubly vulnerable; their necessity may be specious and the analogy, if uncontrolled, is of course closely equivalent to a myth. No myth is more desolating than a myth of limitation. Oppenheimer's argument needs a far more adequate theory of the hierarchy of different forms of analysis, knowledge, and skill and a far more articulate theory of presupposition than it presently possesses.

Our author would be the last to conceive of science as a temple dedicated either to living or slaughtered oxen, or to busy beavers. Despite all his preoccupation with eternity, he does not conceive of science in terms of eternal progressive quests. Here the masters of the Enlightenment such as Condorcet and Kant, and even the much misunderstood Laplace, might be guides in the question so crucial for these lectures; whether natural knowledge in any region must be limited forever by the melancholy morals of complementarity. The general reader will not learn from any mention by Oppenheimer that among the physicists themselves, Bohm, De Broglie, Vigier, and others are at the moment following up the possibility that a recasting of wave-mechanical concepts may restore full causal description in place of the indeterministic wave-particle complementarity! Certainly, it is both sobering and invigorating to encounter antinomies, but the encounter is of itself neither instructive nor edifying. We must still ask whether antinomy as an inherent limtiation is specious and so the generator of myths of

limitation, or is it perhaps the definition of a task of transcendence? Heroism is of one piece, a mutual alliance of heart, head, and hand. Please, a little less Kierkegaard and little more Hegel!

HENRY A. FINCH
The Pennsylvania State University

KIRK, RUSSELL. *A Program for Conservatives.* Pp. ix, 325. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954. $4.00.

Russell Kirk is probably the leading spokesman of the New Conservatives, who are wheeling so formidably into position on our intellectual field. Two years ago, in *The Conservative Mind,* he honored his philosophical ancestors with a series of laudatory, discerning, and polemical essays. To the astonishment of author, publisher, and initial public, this scholarly—though often eloquent—work has rung up four printings. Now, he turns from the flanking maneuver of historical analysis to direct statement.

Mr. Kirk has chosen his enemy: secular, humanitarian progressivism; the current—paradoxical—variety of centralizing "liberalism," as we usually call it. And he attacks mercilessly. Most startly of all for a conservative, member of a philosophical clan that during our century has usually hugged close to the wailing wall, Mr. Kirk is so confident as to be cocky. He not only beats liberalism; he has the effrontery to pity it. "But why break a butterfly on the wheel? These illusions now are consigned to the dear, dead days beyond recall; the terrible events of our time have buried John Dewey and his generation deeper than any Pharaoh."

A Program for Conservatives does not present an itemized political platform. Ranging over the great political, social, moral, and religious issues that confront us, it throws on and around them the light of those conservative principles that Mr. Kirk finds most fully and finely expressed in Edmund Burke.

It is refreshing to come upon a style in which Burke's deep phrases like "unbought grace of life" and "contract of eternal society" are once more natural. Occasionally, there is an agrarian sort of crankiness in Mr. Kirk's animadversions. For the most part he moves in the main line. He is not only reviving the conservative tradition, but he is rescuing it: both from sterile reactionaries who have degraded it, and from verbalists who by paying out a few modish conservative phrases are at present trying to hitch a ride on the shifting Zeitgeist. Mr. Kirk's books are good meat, even for vegetarians.

JAMES BURNHAM
Kent, Conn.

HARKNESS, GEORGIA. *The Sources of Western Morality: From Primitive Society Through the Beginnings of Christianity.* Pp. xi, 257. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. $3.50.

Human experience, by reason of variety and richness, is kind to interpreters. Especially does an appeal to history lend itself to favorite themes—if only the interpreter is allowed to select his evidence with a free hand. For an undertaking of this proportion Dr. Harkness has worked with high courage and a keen sense of responsibility. She has condensed the cultural span of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome, and of the early prophetic and postexilic Hebrews. The ninth chapter marks the beginnings of "Christian ethics" in the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. All this is interestingly compacted within two hundred fifty pages.

At least four ideas set the stage. In eras of undifferentiated thinking, religion and morals are mixed together; the human mind has a penchant for seeking divine sanction for superior moral standards; notably with the Hebrews, literary sources are cast in a theological mold; and the author chooses to study "what has motivated the masses of the people when they were not trying to be ethical theorists at all." Adding these together, we come to the theme that religious faith is the source and sustainer of morally sensitive living. Faith undergirds moral principles—almost any kind of faith in any kind of a god.

Morality in this context appears to be identical with *mores* or morals. Such studies are valuable, but less adequate than they purport to be. Given "the concept of *a good God demanding goodness* [which] prevailed both in Hebrew culture and in Biblical interpretation, and Jehovah's moral qualities have through the centuries evoked morality in men." This hollow form tries to ignore the mass of Old Testament materials which testify to the contrary. Goodness in God came all too tardy, and even in the greatest of the prophets had not shed all of its provincial color. Moreover, Hebrew "morality," as with Amos, was hammered out in an actual situation and registered its achievements in revised ideas on God.

Confusing the issues of temporal and logical priority appears to be the rule with a theological ethics. But the seamy side of moral development cannot be hidden with good grace. Unless one sacrifices depth and quality in ethical thinking, a critique of hedonism does not stop at the level of "paradox" rather than at its repudiation of human dignity. Plato also taught that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it, that a superior kind of *eros* sought moral perfection in the beloved, and that the moral ideal is "to become like unto God so far as it is humanly possible." He repudiated religious sacrifice altogether as an immoral institution. We might learn from him and from others, if we surrendered the cliché about the superiority of moral insight among the Hebrews. At least, that step would prepare us to appreciate the moral integrity of Jesus, rather than push him down into an Hebraic messianic setting. In short, Dr. Harkness is too much impressed by current theological winds.

IRL G. WHITCHURCH
Kingfield, Me.

BODO, JOHN R. *The Protestant Clergy and Public Issues, 1812–1848.* Pp. 291. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. $5.00.

This is a superbly documented study of American political and social history interacting with a debate on church and state relationships which took place between the War of 1812 and the war with Mexico. The title is unfortunate because it obscures the more precise and special definition which Dr. Bodo gives to his work. It is a definition, incidentally (p. vii), which makes this reviewer wonder if the author has read modern Anabaptist historiography. In any case, a more accurate descriptive title would be: The Educated Calvinist Ministers of New England and Public Issues 1812–1848.

Essentially, the book starts where Alice Baldwin left off in her significant study, *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution* (Durham, 1928). Dr. Bodo used the same scholarly methodology, namely: a painstaking study of primary sources through a survey of sermons classified in the bibliography by denominations, reports of voluntary ecclesiastical societies (about which he makes a neat democratic point), contemporary periodicals, biographies, memoirs, and selected secondary writings. There are twenty-three pages in the bibliography of which seventeen are primary sources; hence, this work will shed much light in a field where Sweet, Mead, Gabriel, Perry, and the Niebuhr brothers have been laboring with real helpfulness for the understanding of the origins of American culture in relation to religion.

The story of the New England theocrats is tragic. Theirs was a corporate anti-individualist vision for the Christianization of American culture according to God's will as revealed in the Old Testament; for the affirmation of world outreach via missions against isolationism; and for interdenominational unity against fissiparous denominationalism. In a sense it was the last noble effort to realize the *Corpus Christianum* in the modern world, an effort doomed to failure by the separation of church and state, by religious pluralism, and secularism generally.

Moreover, the theocrats, like all aggressive sects (in the Troletschian sense) and all church-dominated states (in the *Corpus Christianum* sense), were forced to make specific judgments in political action. Here is where the book makes the reader wince: they endorsed the American Revolution, but preferred the pre-revolutionary social order; they looked askance at Irish and German Catholic immigration; they sought to solve the Negro problem by colonization in Liberia, and, on the Indian question, split between assimilation and colonization in the West; they resisted American political expansion with a mixture of moral

arguments and anti-Southern and anti-Western sentiments. The above judgments are documented with a series of brilliant, colorful quotations.

Inside the church the antitheocrats attacked this religio-political synthesis as incompatible with the New Testament, on the one hand, and as dubious politics on the other. For example, William Lloyd Garrison launched what Dr. Bodo calls an "almost unanswerable" attack on the Liberian colonization scheme (pp. 135–137). The antitheocrats were actually of two somewhat different types: the Channing party of Unitarianism and the Alexander Campbell type of separationist Biblicism. These religious forces merged with the Republican and Democratic politicians to create an individualism which choked off the covenantal theocracy of the rival party. This, of course, at the high price of what Dr. Bodo calls, "the sterile, secularized 'Americanism' of the nineteen-fifties."

There is something amazingly permanent about the issues framed by this book. The church is usually poised between a false union of the Gospel and some relative political good; and a church so separate from the state as to be irrelevant. The theocrats were right in seeking a corporate social Gospel. They were wrong in most of the answers they gave in that larger quest.

Dr. Bodo has made a real contribution with this rich thrust into primary materials. As a Presbyterian minister in the Calvinist stronghold of Princeton, he is emotionally involved in the debate but remains judicious throughout save for an anti-Catholic thrust at the end of Chapter III.

DON E. SMUCKER
Bethany Biblical Seminary
Chicago

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

EPSTEIN, LEON D. *Britain—Uneasy Ally.* Pp. 279. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. $4.00.

That any alliance should be uneasy need be a matter neither for surprise nor regret. Two communities with different traditions, different needs, different historical experiences, and different geographical situations may sincerely desire to work together for a common object, but it is unlikely that they will always think alike. In fact unless they are held together by the unhealthy relationship of master and satellite there are likely at times to be open disagreements. Such disagreements might well be of value to either party as affording an insight into another point of view, but unfortunately as far as public opinion is concerned they are more likely to excite a mood of ignorant resentment which can be exploited by those who desire to frustrate the objects of the alliance. Consequently, the work of reinterpretation is continually necessary and to that work this book, which is a sympathetic review of the movements of opinion in Great Britain since the war, makes a notable contribution. There are indeed two difficulties which are probably inherent in such a work. The first is that the views of foreigners presented currently by one who does not share them may be made to appear as psychological peculiarities to be tolerated rather than as rational opinions to be considered on their own merits. The author of this book, so it seems to an Englishman, sometimes falls into this error, as in his discussion of the difficulties presented to the allies of the United States by the division of powers in the American Constitution and consequently by the apparent possession by Congress of power without sufficient responsibility. It is not suggested that the British way of doing things is "right" or the American "wrong": such statements would be meaningless, but the matter is very important, and the British case could be stated more cogently than it is here. The other danger in presenting a chronicle of incidents and opinions is that of underestimating the force of public indifference and oblivion. Much of what is recounted may be significant as a symptom of the way certain people's minds have worked, but it should not be taken as informing the mind of the public at the present time. Probably, if a very little experience of political work in Great Britain is any guide, most people have been always much more absorbed in the pressing problems of the cost of living and the difficulties about housing than in understanding the very complicated series of international agreements which have followed the war, and, what they may have known about these from time to time, they have forgotten. To ask the author to take into account the very important feelings of the inarticulate would be to ask him to write a different book, which he has disclaimed his intention of writing; in reading his book however the point must be kept continually in mind. In general, however, his account is both sympathetic and well balanced, and he can be particularly commended for his careful analysis of the extremely muddled but nonetheless important belief that the United States is a "capitalist" power and the champion of a thing called "capitalism," a belief which is still likely to produce trouble. Three omissions from his account may be suggested. He ought probably to have emphasized the importance of the rape of Czechoslovakia and also of the blockade of Berlin, each of which provided proof of the aggressiveness and lack of scruple of Russian Comunism. He ought certainly to have made clear the quite devastating results of the reports of the activities of Senator McCarthy and others like him. British, and continental, opinion may have been misinformed on these matters, but the Amercian public ought to be frankly told how deep and disastrous is the impression they have made, or how seriously they compromise the anti-Communist cause. But he does emphasize what is the most important point of all: the great danger of the ignorant but natural fear that the United States, which has not suffered from war in the way that others have done, is more ready than other nations to start another. This sometimes only sits as a ghost on the threshold of the European consciousness, but it can always be brought from its lurking place by ill-advised words or actions, or conjured by the malicious for very sinister ends. It is dangerous both to us and to the United States, and it is very important that when Americans speak their minds they should realize what may be in the thoughts of those who are listening to them. For this reason may an English reviewer say that he hopes many of them will read this book.

G. KITSON CLARK
Cambridge University
England

NOTESTEIN, WALLACE. *The English People on the Eve of Colonization 1603–1630.* (The New American Nation Series, edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris.) Pp. 302. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. $5.00.

The full impact of Alice Duer Miller's lines, "were they not English our forefathers," is brought home when reading this second volume of The New American Nation Series. Professor Notestein in this admirably written and information-packed book has given us an insight into just what sort of people these forefathers were. Starting with a background of English history up to 1603, Professor Notestein calls upon his deep and thorough understanding of the source materials and the literature to give a penetrating thumbnail sketch of the English character and the intellectual and cultural influences that shaped it. Of special interest are the formative forces of the Bible and of Greek and Roman authors.

Professor Notestein has culled the dramatists and other literary figures in order to draw his composite portraits of noble, gentry, and yeoman, but offers little that is not already known to the specialist in British history. Nevertheless, what he has to depict is well drawn and will be of utmost value to the American historian. His chapters on the clergy, lawyers, physicians, and businessmen will be read with great profit and pleasure by specialists in all fields. Perhaps even more enlightening, and surely more entertaining, are the chapters on schools and universities for "when Englishmen went to the New World they were too poor at first to erect universities such as they had known, but in time they took over the English conception of how a university should be housed" (p. 130).

There are two quite ordinary chapters on Puritanism, but those treating with public officials ranging from king to churchwarden will be used by most students of the British Constitution, to which Professor

Notestein has devoted so much of his life. In these brief but thoughtful essays, the reader comes into contact not only with sheriff, justice, and constable but also the people with whom they dealt. With them he goes to the assizes, joins the justice and the constable in carrying out the king's justice, and works with the churchwardens on the problem of relief for the poor. With them he visits legal and illegal alehouses, prevents violence before it happens, and carries out a myriad of duties. Of special interest is the connection of the high constable with wages and that of the churchwarden with nonreligious activities. Professor Notestein has presented a panoramic view of the busy, lusty English officialdom about which he writes.

Space limitations necessitated a cutting of the book and undoubtedly such considerations prompted Professor Notestein to relegate to footnotes much relevant material which perhaps would have been better incorporated into the text. The index although not complete is adequate, but many readers would perhaps have preferred a fuller bibliography. Such are, of course, personal observations and are in no way intended to detract from what is a splendid addition to The New American Nation Series. Here indeed is a portrait of the Englishmen who supplied such a "goodly heritage" to the America that was in the making.

JOHN J. MURRAY
Coe College

GILMOUR, G. P. (Ed.). *Canada's Tomorrow: Papers and Discussion, Canada's Tomorrow Conference, Quebec City, November 1953.* Pp. vii, 324. New York; Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $4.00; $3.50.

This collection of oddly matched essays has as its theme "an attempt at sober prophecy as to what Canada may and should become in the next fifty years." The tone throughout is one of extreme caution, and, in the reviewer's opinion, of modesty overdone. This is a world of uncertainty and the risks of prediction are great, but this has always been so, and the times and the opportunities call for more than cautious self-examination and a sobriety verging on dullness. In short, the volume at many points leaves the impression of a lack of color and spontaneity in the Canadian scene, elements certainly not lacking in Canada's past. Hilda Neatby in a thoughtful essay on cultural evolution touches on the most underdeveloped area of Canadian life, yet even here there are indications of advances too strong to be held in check by such restraints as the necessity of "a conscious dedication to the good life." B. K. Sandwell, whose faith in the natural operation of economic laws remains unshaken through depression and boom, foresees a population of approximately thirty millions by the end of the century, a forecast which cannot be said to err on the side of optimism. In a very general survey of Canada's natural resource position, M. W. Mackenzie comes close to taking the life out of a lively and exciting theme. R. K. Stratford in his "Challenge to Science" draws attention to Canada's weakness in fundamental research and looks to sociology and "a vision, clear and bright" to overcome this deficiency. D. W. Ambridge sees the happiness of mankind as the ultimate purpose of industry and argues that we "should press for the establishment of a government department whose duty it would be to assist Canadian industry in a great national effort to lead the world out of the hopeless morass in which we presently wallow."

Maurice Lamontagne presents an analytical account of the role of government in Canada's development in the past and its likely role in the future. Although he leaves himself open to attack by historians and economists at many points, his reflections on the problems raised by bureaucratic expansion in a democratic society merit careful reading. On the educational front, N. A. M. MacKenzie succeeds in providing perspective on the present struggle between traditionalists and progressivists in Canadian education. D. G. Creighton's "Canada and the World" is at once the most provocative and the most scholarly essay in the book. In his illuminating discussion of the objectives of Canadian foreign policy there are few of the qualifications so popular among academics and no concealment of likes and dislikes. Writing as "An Outsider Looking In," D. W. Brogan is not at his best and his comments suggest the need for a closer look. The book closes with a useful digest of the discussions which followed presentation of these papers. This digest, along with A. G. Gilmour's first-rate Introduction, provides the frame for an assortment of writings in which rhetoric and appeals to fine sentiments mingle with genuine insights and scholarly interpretation in an experiment in prophecy, which, with all its shortcomings, might well be repeated at an early date.

W. T. EASTERBROOK
University of Toronto
Canada

AITKEN, HUGH G. J. *The Welland Canal Company: A Study in Canadian Enterprise.* Pp. ix, 168. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $3.50.

This is an almost aggressively modest book. The author has denied himself the luxury of purple passages, he refuses to rhapsodize over the personalities of the men connected with the Canal and has stayed carefully within the bounds set in his Preface—"to set down nothing which further inquiry or more penetrating analysis might prove to be false." Within those limits he has succeeded admirably.

As an economic project, the Welland Canal scheme has parallels in the history of a number of American states. The initial engineering investigation was so poor as hardly to justify the name. The capital costs were so high as to be beyond the means of any local body of capitalists; yet a new level of development for a great territory seemed to wait upon the completion of this one great work.

The differences were that the Welland Canal was only one link in a great through route to Europe for the export products of the interior of North America. A part of that St. Lawrence route lay within the province of Lower Canada (now Quebec). And, in any case, its success depended on the total costs to Europe, including the ocean haul from Montreal, rather than on the costs on any part of it. The full story becomes, then, part of the competition of the North Atlantic ports for the trade of the interior. To this was added the complication that the St. Lawrence route cut across the nearly inevitable nationalism of the United States.

In the working out of the project, the attempt to keep it under the control of British subjects forced it to turn for capital to an ever increasing degree to the Province of Upper Canada (Ontario), and it ended by becoming the public work which it has since remained.

The writer has told its story with care and competence. All the details are here and, in particular, the interplay between the governing aristocracy of the time and the rising entrepreneurs is clearly shown. The book is a valuable addition to the history of Canada in the nineteenth century and to the study of the relations between business and government.

JOHN L. MCDOUGALL
Queen's University
Canada

PATEL, GOVINDLAL D. *The Indian Land Problem and Legislation.* Pp. xvi, 534. Bombay: N. M. Tripathi, 1954. $5.00.

Dr. G. D. Patel studied the historical aspects of land tenures in Gujarat, northern part of Bombay State, at the Gokhale Institute of Economics and Politics, Poona, for his doctoral thesis. Later, as an officer in the Government of Bombay in charge of land tenures, Dr. Patel had to study similar tenures in other parts of the Bombay State. In this book he has examined in detail the features not only of the tenures in the Bombay State but also of the variety and shades of them under the Permanent Settlement in other parts of India, and has given complete information about the legislation and procedure for their abolition.

The reader will find that Dr. Patel has presented the legal and administrative details about the subject in an exhaustive manner. It is unfortunate, however, that, largely arising out of the limitations of his office, the author has avoided the examination of the flaws, legal and procedural, that have come to light in their working. Even more than this, what a discerning student of agricultural economics would welcome is the study of the economics of agrarian

reforms and a peep into their actual working, the degree of their success, which would have given him some inkling into the shape of things that are emerging. The supreme need is to avoid the pitfalls of the present system of land management and taxation and through radical land laws to evolve a healthy and wholesome pattern of ownership and use of agricultural lands leading to higher production per acre, capita, and man-hour. The value of the study would have been considerably enhanced even if Dr. Patel were in a position to pose questions on the problems and handicaps that emerged while implementing land reforms, such as the question of compensation and legal status, the extent of knowledge and awareness about tenancy and allied legislation, the extent of protected tenancy, evictions, the supplementary litigation that arises from these land laws and corrodes the rural social fabric and the grievous delays in the disposal of tenancy suits. If the book similarly had examined the requisite pattern of agricultural organization under existing conditions which could ensure higher productivity and tried to assess the land and tenurial laws accordingly, probably a truer picture of the efficacy of agrarian legislation might have emerged from his labors.

The reader will also fail to understand the relevance of an account of the 'Bhoodan' movement in the study, particularly in view of the fact that the philosophy is likely to controvert the purpose of some of the vital pieces of land legislation such as prevention of subdivision and fragmentation and consolidation of holdings. The significance of the human and psychological approach that is being brought to bear on the problems of land distribution and ownership should be appreciated. The author, however, could well have been fair both to 'Bhoodan' and its critics if along with its profound philosophy and the amount of land donations received, he had, for instance, compared the size and the quality of donations to the magnitude of the task, the implications of the technique on the existing pattern of land ownership, agricultural organization and productivity, the procedure and the factors governing allotment of land received under the silent social revolution, the legal squabbles and technicalities involved, the resource sanction behind the land allottees to ensure proper and systematic exploitation of land, the arrangement and provision to remedy this lacuna, and preventive steps to avoid the achievements of the movement from being nullified through large-scale land transfers after the stipulated time.

M. B. DESAI

University of Bombay
India

WOLSELEY, ROLAND E. (Ed.). *Journalism in Modern India.* Pp. xii, 308. Bombay, India: Asia Publishing House, 1954. Rs. 7/8.

This is a much needed book for all of those who are concerned with the communication of ideas. It is by no means a definitive study of the press of India, but it is a very thoughtful and lucid description of the main contours of the Indian press. As such, it is invaluable to those who would make the pretense of understanding India, its foreign policy, and its people.

The literature of the press in India is scanty, and with the coming of age of this new nation as a great power, there is a need for more books of this kind which will throw light upon its multitude of characteristics. The need for the book is to be found in the fact that the last book of comparable scope was Margarita Barns's book in 1930, although a somewhat more formidable tome about Indian journalism was printed in the Marathi language in 1952.

As Professor Wolseley points out in his Preface, it is somewhat presumptuous for an American to edit a book on the Indian press, but the job needed doing and he has done an excellent one. He has assembled a very impressive list of fourteen experts on various phases of the Indian press and while inevitably there tends to be some repetition, this has been kept to a minimum by sharp editing.

An excellent beginning to this book, and, in fact, to any book on the press, is provided by A. D. Mani's thought provoking Introduction. It is all that an introduction ought to be and could well serve as a model for some time to come.

In addition to the Introduction the book is divided into five parts: "The Journalistic Scene"; "Writing and Editing Techniques"; "Related Fields"; "Educational Aspects"; and a "Forecast." The book also contains a bibliography of Indian journalism and a general bibliography of journalism books.

Professor Wolseley spent eighteen months in India as a Fulbright scholar on leave from Syracuse University School of Journalism where he is Chairman of the Magazine Department. All in all he has done an excellent job. The book is a useful addition to the library of any scholar who is interested in the field of press communications.

W. C. CLARK

Syracuse University

KORBEL, JOSEF. *Danger in Kashmir.* Pp. xvi, 351. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. $5.00.

Since 1947 the newspapers of India and Pakistan and the records of the United Nations have been full of the Kashmir dispute, but until recently clear and dispassionate accounts of the background and course of the dispute, and the basic issues involved in it, have not been generally available. At least four books published within the past two years, however, have presented the essential information in a concise and readable fashion. Two are highly personalized volumes by two Englishmen who had long years of service in India: *Horned Moon,* by Ian Stephens, former editor of *The Statesman,* and *India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides,* by Lord Birdwood, who held high positions with the British Army in India. An able young Canadian scholar, Michael Brecher, has published a painstaking and well documented record of *The Struggle for Kashmir,* with emphasis on the role of the United Nations.

Josef Korbel covers much the same ground as does Mr. Brecher, but his book has certain distinctive features aside from its attractiveness and readability. One is his emphasis on "the real issue," which he describes as one of principle and not of territory, "the uncompromising and perhaps uncompromisable struggle of two ways of life." Another is his inside story of the work of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, especially in the first months of its existence, when he served as its chairman. Obviously, he does not share the view of Lord Birdwood that there is "little profit in following the detailed course of the Commission's inquiries in the first months of their survey."

A third distinctive feature of Mr. Korbel's book is his clear warning of the growing "danger in Kashmir." Already, he asserts, Kashmir has become "a veritable powder keg for the whole of Asia. . . . the internal political development gives reason for real international concern. . . . Kashmir is being subjected to a systematic process of communization," and a continuation of the dispute can only profit "the cause of Communism." He believes that the real situation has been constantly minimized or overlooked by Nehru and the United Nations, but not by the Communist Party of India or the leaders of the Soviet Union. In this grave warning is to be found the main thesis of the book and the justification for its title. In documenting this thesis he designates names and cites evidence. His discussion leads him far afield into a general treatment of Communist strategy and tactics in Asia and of the activities of the Communist parties of India and Pakistan.

Mr. Korbel has no sympathy with those non-Communist leaders, like Nehru, who try to follow a policy of "neutrality" under present world conditions. These leaders, he warns, "ignore the lessons of modern history." As an anti-Communist Czech, painfully aware of the fate of his own country, his attitude is quite understandable; but it leads him to misinterpret, and even largely to ignore, the mainsprings of India's present foreign policy and the limitations upon her policy of "neutrality." It is quite unfair to Nehru to assert that "he sees no danger to India from without" and "is not disturbed by present-day Communist policy."

In a Foreword Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who was designated as plebiscite administrator for Kashmir, points out that

"a dispute that involves one-fifth of the world's population, and that can erupt into a world war, bears watching." Mr. Korbel, who has been watching Kashmir closely for some years, has written a readable account of the course of the dispute and a timely warning of the possible consequences of its prolongation.

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

BURNS, ALAN. *History of the British West Indies*. Pp. 821. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954. (Distributed by the Macmillan Company.) $12.00.

Any book which attempts to make the impossible possible deserves the best wishes of the reviewer. This book steps courageously toward that end. The unbelievably minute factors of West Indian history, climate, wars, settlement, legislatures, and the ambitions of Spain, England, France, Holland in those waters, would long ago have been forgotten had they not been kept alive by the romance of buccaneering, piracy, and privateering, on one hand, and the rival drumbeats of imperialistic European powers on the other. Most of the vast battleground was occupied by these aggressive elements; the native, New World aggressions were contributed to West Indian history by the hurricane and the Carib Indian. These were American, and all the rest were of European origin. The author is far more impressed with the influence of the West Indian hurricane upon history and empire in that theater.

The book gets under way with large spirit and broad pen, only to find that in time, especially by 1900, one must bow before the inevitability of history and book publishing. As a result, the nineteenth century is hurried and nervous, and the twentieth century, although listed in the table of contents, turns out to be treated as a catalogue of dates and events (1901–52), handled in less than five pages. The history of the West Indies proved once again easier to manage for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than for the two modern centuries.

The book is clearly written and very well organized by this nonacademic historian, but the reviewer deserves the right to deliver an academic criticism for the author's failure to use the sources and perspective of Spanish historiography. Not that he is too partial to the English, since his treatment is cool and rational, but rather that this discrimination underplays the prior role of Spain in the Caribbean, the Spanish Main, and the history of the dotted sea which Spain claimed, populated, and patrolled. It is fair to add that for his purposes the English records, laws, statutes, and plantation diaries are ample.

There are twelve appendices, a bibliography, an index of persons, and a general index. For readers interested in the historical background of the area now included in most of the British Federation—from Jamaica to British Guiana—this book offers a unity which is nowhere else to be found. This gives it a unique reference character. There is little or no discussion of the British possessions on the Central American mainland, from Honduras down to the Mosquito Coast. Political, imperial, and legal history includes the concurrent developments in economic (sugar, trade), as well as social (negro and plantation) history.

HARRY BERNSTEIN
Brooklyn College

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

LEITES, NATHAN, and ELSA BERNAUT. *Ritual of Liquidation; The Case of the Moscow Trials*. Pp. xi, 515. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. $6.50.

This is a definitive work on the three trials of the Old Bolsheviks which occurred between August 1936 and March 1938. More than half of the volume is composed of quotations, and the 103 pages of notes stand as an example of what highly financed research can accomplish.

The authors have painstakingly scrutinized the available stenographic reports of the trials and a mass of related (as well as some unrelated) data for the purpose of explaining the psychology of capitulation and confession and the motivation of the defendants. They assume that the charges were false and discount the role of promises, threats, and force. Their explanations are plausible and, for the most part, are well documented. The trials are related to Bolshevik doctrine very effectively and from it the authors have derived certain "rules of translation" to explain the extreme statements made by the defendants. Of special interest is Part III in which the various forms of denial and resistance are analyzed and profusely illustrated with examples. Many revealing quotations from classical Russian literature are employed—especially from Dostoevsky—ostensibly "to clarify some of the unexpressed content of Bolshevism." Yet Leites goes too far in the note to Chapter IV which contains twenty-two hypotheses regarding family relations among the pre-Bolshevik Russian intelligentsia "illustrated" by some rather incongruous passages from Russian classics. In any case, anyone bold enough to list twenty-two hypotheses should devote more than five pages to an explanation of them.

Recent Communist purge trials for which there are data—those of Rajk, Kostov and Slansky—are also treated here, and there is a brief postscript on Beria. However, other Communists who were liquidated without benefit of ritual in the late thirties, such as Zatonsky and the Politburo members Chubar and Kossior, are ignored in this study. One may also legitimately ask whether the ritual of confession and liquidation is less important now than previously and whether the Soviet public trial is not a unique event. The authors have stressed the ritual of liquidation but have not given adequate attention to the substance.

The lay reader who may want to read but one volume on the trials—and that quickly—would find it easier to read Victor Serge's brilliant novel, *The Case of Comrade Tulayev*, or Alexander Orlov's recent book. This is not to disparage the volume under review, but only to point out that its size and character will limit its use. At the same time it is evident that the authors have produced a volume which is both substantial and provocative.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.
Princeton University

Europe: Nine Panel Studies by Experts from Central and Eastern Europe; An Examination of the Post Liberation Problem of the Position of Central and Eastern European Nations in a free European Community. Pp. iv, 146. New York: Free Europe Committee, 1954. $1.00.

Exiles from the satellite countries discuss European economic and military problems in this small volume, contributing reports on the Council of Europe, the Coal and Steel Community, European defense, power and energy, transport and telecommunications, finance and trade, agricultural integration, public welfare, and labor and social security. Each report, though brief, evidently attempts to serve several functions. It presents some empirical data on the subject in question; it urges that the exiles be given a consultative voice in the Council of Europe and other existing organizations to promote European integration; and it makes recommendations as to economic or military policy after liberation.

The information on conditions in the satellite countries and on the possibilities of functional integration with Western Europe, which all the panels favor, is necessarily quite superficial. What there is, however, is intriguing, though often intermixed with statements based upon guesses or hopes. Thus, the Panel on Public Welfare declares that mass Communist indoctrination "will have lasting effects which must be considered, as far as possible, with a view to countering them in the post-liberation period"; but two pages later it announces that "the captive peoples who have experienced Communism at home and have learned to despise it will not be in need of anti-Communistic education." The Panel on the Coal and Steel Community appears to have been the most detailed and careful.

That liberation will entail a sudden and complete shift of allegiance of the satellite countries in a world still embroiled in a cold war, rather than a gradual change in economic or diplomatic policies, is assumed and not discussed. Although the economic policy recommendations for the post-liberation era are usually couched in rather vague language, their highly conservative tenor on some key issues, notably

finance and farm ownership, suggests that the authors have little confidence in economic appeals to secure popular revulsion against Russia and friendliness for the West. This is not true of all the recommendations; but even the Panel on Labor, which urges eventual free unionism and free labor mobility, suggests that the right of free bargaining may have to be restricted during an undefined transition period.

Sponsorship of research on economic conditions is certainly one of the most fruitful things the Free Europe Committee can do; but this book is not a model of what such research should be.

MURRAY EDELMAN
University of Illinois

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

MATTHEWS, RONALD. *The Death of the Fourth Republic.* Pp. 318. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $5.00.

This book has the merits and defects of vigorous popular journalism. The author laments the *république pure et dure* of which the resisters dreamed; not until page 233 does he turn to the Fourth Republic of fact. His themes are the decadence of prewar France, the hopes of regeneration born in the Resistance, and their disappointment through Communist betrayal, socialist pettiness, and conservative inertia and blind selfishness. The depressing case is argued with force and pungency.

The work is chatty in style and slipshod over details. "No one liked it, the new constitution" (p. 227) is a typical sentence. French railwaymen retire at 55, not 50 (p. 295); the prewar parties number thirty-six on page 30, but thirty-two on page 204; Ribbentrop, Hindenburg, Baudouin, Robert Schuman, and Manila are misspelled (pp. 44, 57, 75, 245, 297). No authorities are cited. Controversial statements (for example, that the late Yves Farge was a secret Communist in 1944) are made without qualification or evidence (p. 151).

The judgments are often arguable and always pessimistic. Blum, de Gaulle, and Mendès-France are the only leaders whom Mr. Matthews approves. The Schuman plan is dismissed (p. 265) as a scheme to unload French social insurance costs onto German industry; the steelmasters's hostility to it is ignored. There are naive "might have beens"; even if Jules Moch's brother, by speaking more briefly at the 1944 Socialist Congress, had tricked the party into accepting subsidies to Catholic schools, it is unlikely that clericals and anticlericals would have permanently buried their feud in a united French labor party.

Yet, these faults concern trivialities. Mr. Matthews makes too much of his selected incidents, but they illustrate the right themes. The quarrel between socialists and progressive Catholics has indeed paralyzed the democratic Left. Mendès-France's fiscal plans in 1945 could have averted the later economic troubles. This shrewd account of what went wrong picks out unerringly all the main political conflicts and social problems from alcoholism to housing; the general reader will find no better guide to them. Yet, though acute, succinct, and lucid, it is only the prosecution's case. Writing in December 1953, Mr. Matthews naturally felt pessimistic; six months later the French people, as often before, showed themselves capable in a crisis of unexpected resilience.

PHILIP M. WILLIAMS
Oxford University
England

PARK, JULIAN (Ed.). *The Culture of France in Our Time.* Pp. x, 345. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. $5.00.

In the nine essays which constitute *The Culture of France in Our Time,* Julian Park and his six collaborators—French, American, and English—present the general reader with "an overview" of some aspects of French life and thought since World War II. The first five essays—on poetry, the novel, and the press; on art; the theatre; music; and philosophy—are primarily concerned with contemporary men, their ideas and productions, and the trends apparent in their work. The last four essays—on education, religion, law, and science—reach further into the past, into the Napoleonic era and earlier, in their treatment of the present. Culture, in this volume, is used in the limited sense as the authors are primarily concerned with critical descriptions and appraisals of cultural artifacts—novels, plays, paintings—and of some of the institutional means—education, the church—by which French culture, in the broader sense, is shaped and transmitted, rather than with the use of such materials for an interpretation of French life. Nevertheless, the several essays help to provide the American reader with some basis for thinking about France, and one at least, that on science by Jean Mayer, suggests the struggle through which Frenchmen are going to maintain in their own minds the sense of their intellectual preeminence in the contemporary world. Of particular value are the essay on education by Julian Park and the introductory section in the essay on science which is concerned with educational specialization, as these lead the reader through the unfamiliar maze of the educational system, and help him to grasp both the homogeneity and the diversity of French thinking.

In a volume of this kind, which does not attempt to create a synthesis, there are areas of overlapping and of apparent contradiction which are very provocative. Thus while Park's discussions of education and religion indicate the extent to which France has become not merely secularized but even de-Christianized, Barbara Beyer's analysis of contemporary art emphasizes the renaissance of church art. Discussion of the political system and politics as such is avoided in this volume, and some subjects—for instance, developments in the social sciences—are given extremely summary treatment. Even so, what the American reader can derive from this book, with its diversity of thought and direction, is some understanding of French culture in transition and of continuity in change.

RHODA MÉTRAUX
New York Hospital

TREVOR-ROPER, H. R. (Ed.). *The Bormann Letters: The Private Correspondence Between Martin Bormann and his Wife from January 1943 to April 1945.* Translated by R. H. Stevens. Pp. xxiii, 200. New York: British Book Centre, 1954. $3.75.

Born in 1900, and an early convert to National Socialism, Martin Bormann was fired from his first Party job in the office of the Reich Party Treasurer. Rudolf Hess then picked him up, and he became the indispensable assistant in the Party Chancellery. In 1941, with Hess' dramatic defection, Bormann became the head of the Party apparatus and confidential secretary to Hitler. By 1943, when this series of private letters begins, he was the least known but most powerful of the Nazi satraps in Hitler's entourage. Shunning publicity, he served Hitler with dog-like devotion and was rewarded with the Führer's complete trust and confidence. He remained with his master to the end, witnessed his marriage to Eva Braun as well as his last will and testament, and supervised the cremation of Hitler's and Eva Braun's bodies. He has been "missing" since May, 1945, when he led a small group of survivors from the Führer bunker in an unsuccessful attempt to escape from encircled Berlin.

In 1929, Bormann married the daughter of Walter Buch, chief of the Nazi Party disciplinary court. This volume contains about 250 letters, telegrams, and notes exchanged between Bormann and his wife between January 1943 and April 1945. They are intimate, affectionate, and unbelievably banal. Bormann's letters to his wife afford some interesting details of intrigue among Hitler's lieutenants, and they reflect the state of mind of the hierarchs as the Nazi Reich approached its end. But unless we can assume that they are typical of the correspondence between Nazi leaders and their thoroughly Nazified spouses, these letters possess slight historical significance. An exception is the copies of orders sent from the Party Chancellery to the Gauleiters in connection with the July 20 Putsch against Hitler and the regime.

The originals of these letters form a part of the Bormann papers which passed from Frau Bormann, who died in Merano in March 1946, through intermediaries to a Swiss citizen. François Genoud, the

present owner of the papers and the copyright, has written an Introduction in which he expresses the naive opinion that these letters will correct false impressions of Bormann and place him in a truer and more favorable light. H. R. Trevor-Roper, an English historian, provides a second Introduction, which gives a contrary but more acceptable evaluation of Bormann as the instrument of Hitler's will, who was "a devil for work," and executed his master's orders with ruthlessness and brutality.

ORON JAMES HALE
University of Virginia

SEABURY, PAUL. *The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats Under the Nazi Regime.* Pp. xiv, 217. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954. $3.00.

This book is an excellent and well documented study of the careers and activities of the Wilhelmstrasse diplomats during the Nazi regime, based upon the voluminous documentary material, memoirs, and monographs now available. The author has drawn up criteria of analysis to discover the degree of loyalty of a state bureaucracy to a political regime, and specifically to Nazi Germany. Added interest is given to his analysis by his examination of the progressive disintegration of the old German diplomatic service and of the moral problems encountered by career civil servants of diplomacy when faced by the terrors and rewards of a revolutionary and police state.

The author regards Hitler's declared and undeclared foreign policy before 1933 as indeed explicit but primarily a propaganda weapon for seizing internal power. He estimates correctly the historical significance of Hitler's secret conference of November 1937 with his military and diplomatic chiefs, in which the Führer outlined his program for ruthless German expansion in Eastern Europe, and his assessment of the international situation arising out of the Spanish civil war. It was after this meeting that Hitler took over direct control of the army, the foreign office, and the national economy.

Joachim von Ribbentrop was the new foreign minister of the Third Reich, whose first task was to prepare the way diplomatically for the invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and above all for the involvement of Nazi Germany in a major war. He maintained for a time the independence of the foreign office from party and state agencies trying to control foreign-policy formulation, nazified the Wilhelmstrasse, but in the end could not prevent the triumph of irregular foreign policy advisers including Goebbels, Himmler, Rosenberg and Bormann. Although Ribbentrop symbolized the 1939 diplomatic pact between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, he remained "Hitler's shadow" in the wartime Reich, a harassed foreign minister following the Führer in a wartime caravan. "Statesmen held responsible for the policies they engender and develop," writes Dr. Seabury, "invariably come to symbolize them as well."

In his concluding chapter on the vanishing diplomatist, the author summarizes the role of German professional diplomacy in the Third Reich. He points out that the career diplomats, with important exceptions, failed to perceive the demise of professional diplomacy, failed to act in time, and above all failed in moral courage. He quotes Anthony Eden to prove that "the conditions which the Diplomatic Service originally grew up to meet no longer exist unchanged in modern international affairs."

The idea of some old career officials that the bureaucracy could remain as a state within a state during public ideological struggles and terroristic revolutionary movements, influencing and shaping the policies of the chief of state and his lieutenants, did not prove true in the Nazi regime. In Europe, the historic technique for the autocratic control of bureaucracies was developed by the Empress Maria Theresa and her director of foreign policy, Count Kaunitz, in the diplomatic revolution of 1753. Said Max Weber, often quoted in this book, "politicians must provide the counterpoise to the rule of officialdom."

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ
Twentynine Palms, Cal.

HOETTL, WILHELM. *The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Espionage.* Translated by R. H. Stevens. Pp. 327. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $3.95.

The Secret Front is neither an account of the inner workings of a "secret service" nor a description of a "secret front." However, it is a firsthand tale by one who carved himself a niche of sorts in the Nazi intelligence structure. As such, it doubtless belongs in any contemporary library of the intelligence history of World War II.

Hoettl seeks to impart a personal flavor which the reader will find wanting. He has written a minimum of major events which can be substantiated, plus a smattering of hitherto unknown items which are sometimes interesting, but add little to our knowledge. I found most interesting the character sketches of personalities of the Nazi intelligence scene. The remainder of the book recounts results of political espionage in Eastern and Southern Europe, with some detail on actual intelligence operations in Italy. One feature—interesting though unrelated to intelligence—is the "Musings of a Dictator," presumably thoughts jotted down by Mussolini during the first weeks of his captivity.

Hoettl's book is not an exposé of secret intelligence operations; rather it recounts the struggle between the Secret Service and the Foreign Office as to which should be the proper instrument of political diplomacy and reflects the struggle with the Military Intelligence Services, which it absorbed in 1944. The success of the Secret Service in these struggles testifies to the monstrous capability which this machine contributed to Hitler's acquisition of absolute power.

Total absence of factual documentation is understandable since few records have been left to German military writers. Hoettl is outspoken in describing the arch-villains with whom he associated, but these are all silent in death, as are many others who could substantiate or refute Hoettl's statements, claims, or conclusions. One wishes Hoettl had written personal experiences of intelligence training, secret intelligence activities, actual operational planning, and personal conduct of intelligence operations. These are lacking.

In the Introduction, Ian Colvin and Colonel R. H. Stevens, formerly of the British Foreign Service, who translated the book into English, indicate that Hoettl makes the best of material at his disposal, and presents a factual, honest, and objective account unbiased by past loyalties or prejudices. The American reader will find this pill hard to swallow, for the book indicates how the great German Secret Service—of which the author was a proud member—plotted, schemed, lied, murdered, stole, and betrayed to support Hitler's mad plan of conquest. Americans will hardly believe that Wilhelm Hoettl, an illegal Austrian Nazi, Sicherheit Dienst member, and political intelligence agent, could ever be an impartial historian or commentator upon events involving Hitler's Third Reich. The book contains one gross error, surprising from this expert in Balkan affairs. On page 319 he describes Dr. Durcansky as a former Croat Foreign Minister. Dr. Durcansky is a Slovak, and was Slovak Foreign Minister in the Tiso regime.

Newspaper reports from Austria and elsewhere in recent years indicate that Hoettl still plies his trade. However, he has failed in all postwar attempts known to the West to gain any position of prominence in either political or intelligence spheres. He is still regarded by police authorities of Western governments as an intelligence fabricator and peddler.

GENERAL L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.,
USA, Retired
Office of U. S. High Commissioner for Germany

ERHARD, LUDWIG. *Germany's Comeback in the World Market.* Edited by Herbert Gross. Translated by W. H. Johnston. Pp. 276. New York: Macmillan Company, 1954. $4.50.

In this book Professor Ludwig Erhard, Minister for Economics in the German Federal Republic, provides us with an enthusiatic portrait of Germany's phenomenal comeback in world markets. Germany's economic recovery has been most sharply evidenced abroad by her rapid export advances in European markets, and her replacement of Britain as the largest exporter to Central and South America after the

United States. One might cavil at the space devoted to the chaotic years before the currency reform. But this background does serve the purpose of emphasizing the extent of recovery. At the same time, as Minister Erhard himself points out in his Preface, it also permits the reader, the British reader in particular, to appreciate the inherent limitations on the continuation of the rate of progress experienced during the years 1948 to the present time. A great part of the recovery was simply the inevitable reassumption of its position in world markets by a nation that had long ago forged for itself the role of exporter of industrial goods to great industrial nations.

The book traces German trade relations geographically as well as through time. Chapters are devoted to relations with the sterling area, dollar markets, the Middle and Far East, eastern Europe, and Latin America. Interesting as this progress report undoubtedly is, American readers are likely to find themselves still more interested in the light the book throws on postwar Germany's international economic philosophy. It is Erhard's credo that a liberalized world trade is a prerequisite for mutual trust. But the difficulties are admitted; witness the author's regret that Sweden's desire for greater access to Germany's market for agricultural and industrial products could not be adequately satisfied.

Since Germany's recovery is reported in this book as of 1953, and from a particular point of view, the reader will want to remind himself of some of the underlying domestic factors that are bound to exert an important influence on the future course of German trade. West Germany has benefited greatly from a policy of low wages and long hours that has not been opposed by the unions. Moreover, no serious objection has been raised to the policy of favoring imports of raw materials and equipment over consumption goods. Thus capital formation has been stimulated, and costs have been kept down. But there is evidence that in the future German labor may contend more vigorously for a share in gains in productivity. Moreover, Germany has been spared the necessity of diverting resources to armaments. The present highly favorable export picture might suffer seriously from the inflationary effects of defense outlays amounting to DM 10–15 billion yearly and the withdrawal of half a million men from production to military service.

KENYON E. POOLE
Northwestern University

TAYLOR, A. J. P. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918.* Pp. xxxvi, 638. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954. $7.00.

The volume by Professor Taylor of Oxford University, an impressive achievement above all by the lively way of its narrative, is the first volume of a new series to be called "The Oxford History of Modern Europe." This first volume deals with the history of international relations from the downfall of the system of Metternich to the end of World War I, when Woodrow Wilson on behalf of democracy and Lenin on behalf of totalitarian Communism announced the dawn of a new era in which the old concepts of power policy would no longer apply. Mr. Taylor's volume is to be followed by one by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, dealing with international relations in Europe between the two world wars, while only later another volume will present the international relations in Europe from the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 to its repetition on a smaller scale in 1848. The author of this last volume has not been announced yet. In general the whole plan of the new venture of Oxford books seems tentative and not too clearly defined.

The first volume in the series marks, however, a promising beginning. Mr. Taylor writes with scholarship and wit, a not very frequent combination, which may attract a wider circle of readers to his book. His trend to overstress and overstrain, though it may not always please the critical reader, will certainly not displease the general public. The book has the defect which all diplomatic histories have: it tells us too little about the political ideas, the cultural trends and the social structure of the nations involved, of their inner tensions and parties, and as a result the international relations are left suspended in a vacuum. But with this reservation which concerns more the whole trend than the book itself, Mr. Taylor's work is the best presentation of the tangled web of alliances and alignments of the European powers in the second half of the nineteenth century at present available in any language.

Perhaps the title of the book is misleading. One cannot speak for the period which lasted from 1848 until 1900 of a struggle for mastery in Europe. All the great European powers of that time were much more concerned with preserving the balance of power than to become the masters of Europe. That is true even of Bismarckian Germany. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century Germany consciously though vaguely reached out for the mastery of Europe. In her attempt to unify Europe under her leadership, she destroyed the European balance of power and thereby Europe. In April 1917 the United States entered what had been until then the Great European War; in November 1917 Russia, which in the nineteenth century had been more and more integrated into Europe, turned her back upon Europe. The European balance of power which had preserved peace from 1814 to 1914 could no longer be re-established. In its place a world balance of power is slowly and painfully emerging after the defeat or containment of German, Japanese, and Russian struggles for world mastery.

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

OTHER COUNTRIES

THOMPSON, J. ERIC S. *The Rise and Fall of Maya Civilization.* Pp. xii, 287. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. $5.00.

The history of Maya artistic and learned attainments has long been available to the student. Maya social and political history, philosophical orientation, personality structure, and general way of life are less accessible, but are of greater potential interest to the social scientist. It is this side of the Maya civilization that Thompson has tried to approach. The attempt is courageous; archaeologists feel safer when keeping to less inferential materials. The effort is necessary, since only by making it can the archaeologist provide data for the integration of his findings into the fields of history and social science.

Thompson's knowledge of Maya archaeology is unexcelled; and this background supports the large number of inferences made. The text is not organized for the presentation of a sequential history and description of the material culture of the Maya, but for the exploration of their customs and beliefs, their philosophical orientation, their daily lives. The processes of thought of the Maya are explored in sections on mathematics and astronomy, on engineering, on cosmology. The behavior and activities of the individual are re-created, and a chapter is devoted to short fictional sketches of life among the Classic Maya.

As may be seen, there are more data for the social scientist in *The Rise and Fall of Maya Civilization* than in more conventional archaeological texts. The manner of presentation is, however, closer to that used by writers in the humanities. Anecdotes and atmospheric descriptions are frequently used as devices in bringing the Maya to life. The text is also studded with comparisons between Maya and modern life and with quotations from European sources which suggest the large body of similar emotions and situations which confront men of all cultures. To the reviewer many of these, as for example a comparison of a Maya ceremonial center with the zoned skyscraper section of a modern American city, seem labored. The Maya civilization would seem to be more understandable in its own right.

The political organization of the Classic Maya has been the subject of much speculation among archaeologists. There is every evidence of constant interchange of knowledge among the priestly hierarchy and their dependent craftsmen. There is also little evidence of warfare and conflict among the religious centers. Thompson conceives the Maya to have been organized as city states or in units comprised of several neighboring religious centers with

their adjacent but dispersed agricultural populations. He suggests that any confederation between such states may have rested on blood ties between religious rulers as well as on the body of esoteric ritual, calendric, and literary knowledge shared by the priesthood.

Thompson's book is not easy to pigeonhole but is very much worth reading. Books of this sort by specialists aid in broadening and merging compartamentalized knowledge.

GEORGE W. BRAINERD
Southwest Museum
Los Angeles

HUXLEY, JULIAN. *From an Antique Land: Ancient and Modern in the Middle East.* Pp. 310. New York: Crown Publishers, 1954. $6.00.

This is a remarkably informative book by the learned former Director-General of UNESCO. It is based on travel notes which Mr. Huxley took before and after the general meeting of UNESCO in 1948 in Beirut. The antique land referred to here includes Turkey, Iran, nearly all Arab countries, Crete, and Cyprus. His official duties precluded his making extended journeys to any of these places, and everything he did had to be done in a hurry. For instance, to visit Petra from Amman he had to go "two and one-half hours by plane, two and one-half hours by car, two and one-half hours on horseback, and two and one-half hours roughish walking" (p. 119), and his stay in Jordan was just fifty-two hours. Yet, in his attempt to see all that remains in the cradle of civilization he missed hardly anything of importance. Baalbek, "the show-place of the Lebanon," Byblos, the "window of the dim and distant past," Aleppo, Damascus, and Bagdad, Ctesiphon, Luxor and Karnak, Cairo, Constantinople, and Isfahan, and of course Jerusalem, parade through his pages and are brought to life by his lively pen. The superbly produced plates from his photographs (in color and monochrome, printed in Holland) clearly testify to the artistic beauty of the past. The author's learned observations on such topics as the evolution of the alphabet (pp. 48–56), and the extent of the Mesopotamian flood plain in ancient times, are refreshing; and his remarks on various types of architecture certainly enlightening. Interesting and also intriguing are the sidelights he casts on bee eaters of Petra, wall creepers on the fortress of Aleppo, the hoopoes of Cairo and the golden hamsters of north Syria.

In writing a book such as this the author probably did not intend to add just another book of travel notes on the Middle East to the public. His is meant to be a purposeful work, and the grandson of T. Huxley seems to have shouldered a messianic task of propagating the idea of science and technology to humanity. By studying and illuminating the accomplishments and achievements of the past he means to demonstrate that what has been done in the past can be done again under the "evolutionary humanism" generated by UNESCO. To him the desert is a challenge to humanity. "If the ancients could make the desert blossom . . . as the basis for orderly and civilized life, what can we not hope from the proper application of our greater knowledge and higher technical skill?" (p. 30). He raises many stimulating questions and in at least one case he offers his answer. "Our generation," he says (p. 84), "has had the opportunity of making Jerusalem an international holy place. Yet today there is an Iron Curtain between the two halves of that city." Statements such as these provide the key to our understanding of our most difficult international problems.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
Library of Congress

MARLOWE, JOHN. *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800–1953.* Pp. 440. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $6.00.

A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800–1953 contains a straight chronological narrative of Egyptian history with special emphasis on Anglo-Egyptian relations. The story begins with the first British occupation in Napoleonic times and ends with the recent revolution. The author tells us little more than what is known from other books and contemporary issues of the *New York Times*. His bibliography contains only English sources, with one exception, a book in French. Some obvious publications are absent, while others are not unimpeachable sources. The United Nations, for instance, has published excellent material on this country. A book devoted to Anglo-Egyptian relations may be expected, in part at least, to be based also on Egyptian material. If the author has no mastery of the Arabic, he should have consulted Egyptian sources in French, and there are also enlightening publications on this subject in German and Italian. Also a book of this nature should contain at least one map.

It is not the reviewer's intention to imply that the author leans too much to one side in his appraisal of Anglo-Egyptian relations. Mr. Marlowe is an Englishman and he has enough of his countrymen's political maturity and sense of fairness to be critical, and sometimes highly critical, of England's actions. He is outspoken about what may be called Britain's "age of arrogance," when she assumed that what was good for London was also good for Cairo. Nor does Mr. Marlowe overlook the damage done to the two countries's relations by the highhanded and unimaginative policies and actions of English bureaucrats. He gives proper credit, at the same time, to such great colonial administrators as Lord Cromer, British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, and Lord Kitchener, Sirdar of the Egyptian army and Governor-General of Sudan.

The author thinks little of the Arab League which Britain created in order to satisfy Egypt's *amour-propre* and pan-Arab aspirations. He rightly says that it has never developed beyond the paper-organization stage, and that its almost sole major preoccupation is anti-Zionism. In Mr. Marlowe's view, Palestine assumed a disproportionate importance in holding together the Arab States.

The author is no less critical of the Egyptian ruling class, which he describes as beholden to its own interests, regarding power as a means toward self-enrichment, self-aggrandizement, and a chance to dispense patronage among friend and kin.

The author does not go into the causes of the dethronement of King Faruk and the establishment of the military junta. We are not told much in this book about General Nâguib who at the time of writing of the book appeared to be the leading figure. Mr. Marlowe notes the plans of the military regime but he also notes that they have never blossomed forth into any sort of achievement. He is not sure whether the Egyptian revolution may not harden into a "wooden-faced and jack-booted authoritarianism or dissolve into a morass of fanaticism, xenophobia, and pseudo-Communism." The British government, he says, will have to make up its mind whether the Egyptian revolution was a signal of the rebirth of a nation or just another *coup*. Then, again, the author speculates that Egypt may be another corroboration of the wise French adage: *"Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose."* Recent events that have occurred since the writing of this book leave the reader wondering too that they may be different faces of the same impenetrable Middle Eastern mystery.

EMIL LENGYEL
New York University

KIRK, GEORGE. *The Middle East, 1945–1950.* Pp. vi, 319. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. $7.50.

This volume, essentially a continuation of the author's *The Middle East in the War* in the familiar format of the Royal Institute's Survey Series, deals with the principal developments in the Middle East from the close of World War II to the outbreak of war in Korea. In order to establish liaison with previous Royal Institute of International Affairs Studies and to provide a setting for a particularistic treatment of the events and issues through approximately half a decade of postwar readjustments, the account opens with a review of the interplay of policies in this strategic area which resulted in the "expansion over almost the whole region of that 'power vacuum' which, in the circumstances of the cold war, threatened the Western conception of global security. . . ." The two succeeding parts are devoted to "Turkey, Persia, and the U.S.S.R." and "The Arab Countries and the Western Powers."

This study everywhere bears evidence of

a great deal of painstaking research. Some of the themes treated did not have to be developed wholly from scratch, of course, since basic studies already existed for parts of the period covered by the survey relating, for example, to the conflict of Great-Power interests in Iran and to the struggle for Palestine. Nevertheless, the author has not failed to check these accounts against his own findings from the sources available to him—sources of a great variety from state papers to contemporary press reports—and so has produced a volume indispensable to a full understanding of the forces at work and of the situations resulting from their complementary or conflicting action.

The author's treatment of the British regime in Palestine and its degeneration into an Arab-Zionist struggle is particularly noteworthy in that commendable care has been taken to present with complete objectivity an analysis of events that seldom have been viewed dispassionately and placed in proper perspective. Yet it is only in this connection that the author's judgment may be called in question even lightly. He has devoted only a little less than half of the entire volume to events in Palestine culminating in regional war and the erection of the state of Israel, as contrasted with about one-twelfth of the whole to Anglo-Egyptian relations including Sudanese problems. It is true that, even on a global scale, some of the most striking events of the years 1945–50 occurred in the Palestine area, but that these were so much more significant than developments in other sectors of the Middle East is not immediately apparent. There can be no gainsaying, however, that the treatment of subject matter throughout the volume has been in keeping with the best scholarly traditions.

HALFORD L. HOSKINS
Library of Congress

HOSKINS, HALFORD L. *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics.* Pp. vi, 311. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $4.75.

As Dr. Hoskins, already well-known for his contributions in the field of Middle Eastern history, points out at the inception of his current study, the strategic position of the Middle East at the intercontinental crossroads and the impact of developments in that area on the struggle between the great powers, including the United States, have focused international attention on the region since the end of World War II. Beginning with a survey of the contemporary Middle Eastern scene in its world setting, the volume plunges into a topical treatment of the major problems with which the Middle East has confronted the free world generally and the United States in particular—issues involving not merely questions of international politics, but the development of nationalism and the complex problems of an underdeveloped area.

Dr. Hoskins devotes a very useful chapter to the question of the Turkish Straits, with brief historical backgrounds, and brings the story down to date with the new American interest in the issue well highlighted. The next two chapters are allocated to the problem of another international artery, the Suez Canal, centering about the Anglo-Egyptian controversy recently settled in the agreement of October 19, 1954. A chapter is also devoted to the problem of the Sudan and the agreement of February 12, 1953. The two chapters dealing with Israel in the Middle Eastern complex and the aftermath of the partition of Palestine in 1947 are written with objectivity and understanding of the basic issues involved in the Arab-Israel controversy concerning the questions of the Arab refugees, Jerusalem, boundaries, and compensation. They are followed logically with a treatment of the development of Arab nationalism and the formation of the League of Arab States. The author then turns to the problem of Iran and provides a well-balanced account of that country's complex social and economic problems together with an analysis of the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy which reached a settlement in October 1954. Two full chapters are assigned to the "oil factor" in Middle East relationships and to the very significant "strategic aspects" of Middle East oil. The author's reflections on "the Point Four balance" and on the economic and social problems in this underdeveloped region are much to the point. The volume closes with a consideration of strategic questions in the Middle East and the search for situations of strength, in which alternative policies are discussed, if no special panaceas are offered.

As a whole, the volume is not only well-balanced, but well-organized, and well-written and throws much light on a host of problems. It should be widely read, not only by students of the area, but by all who seek a broad and intelligent understanding of the peoples and the problems of the Middle East. The volume contains six black and white maps and a very useful critical bibliography of major sources for a study of the area.

HARRY N. HOWARD
Arlington, Virginia

JONES, F. C. *Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–45.* Pp. xii, 498. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. $6.10.

From 1937, the Japanese announced it as their fixed policy to establish a "new order" of things in East Asia. In place of the existing system of European domination, the Japanese proposed to end white colonialism and to establish a system of mutual co-operation among Asians under Japanese technical and moral leadership. This plan, which for a time stirred the imagination of many of the nationalist leaders of Asia, collapsed both because of the growing resistance of the nations embraced within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and because of Japan's final defeat by the Allied Powers.

Professor Jones has given us what is without question the most distinguished and comprehensive analysis yet available of this phase of Japanese history. Drawing upon original materials, such as the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal, Professor Jones has painted a fresh and live picture. However monolithic Japan's expansionist policy may have appeared, any given policy adopted was in fact the outcome of the competition of many crosscurrents at war in Japanese society. We are given by Professor Jones a sense of the issues that lay between the war and the peace party, the business world and the military, the diplomatic service and the armed forces, the Army and the Navy, the junior officers with their populist nihilistic fascism and the senior officials with their statism.

Furthermore there was a basic ambiguity at the heart of the "new order" concept itself. For Japan, one of the imperial powers, the Co-Prosperity Sphere was simply a technique of rule; but for the Japan which felt its kinship with "exploited Asia," it was really intended as an association for the mutual benefit and protection of free and independent nations. The conflict between these two conceptions underlay much of the contradiction that was so evident in Japan's overseas policy: the alternate wooing and cracking down on nationalist movements, the brutal exploitation for her military needs, and the genuine support of national cultural revival.

In the end, the Japanese became the victims of what Niebuhr has called the "irony" of history: they reaped not only unexpected results, but results which were the contrary of their intentions. The experiment of the new order, which was to establish Japanese dominion in perpetuity, turned out to be merely an exercise in independence for the former colonial nations; it brought into existence the new forces which were heading for inevitable conflict with Japanese policy. By their very success in liberating Asia from the white man, the Japanese had very nearly turned it over to the Communists.

HERBERT PASSIN
Tokyo, Japan

OTHER BOOKS

American Heritage. (Vol. VI, No. 1.) Pp. 120. New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, 1954. $2.95.

BAILEY, SYDNEY (Ed.). *The House of Lords.* Pp. 180. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $3.25.

BERDYAEV, NICOLAS. *Christianity and Anti-Semitism.* Translated by Alan A. Spears and Victor B. Kanter. Pp. 58. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $2.75.

BERESFORD, MAURICE. *The Lost Villages of England.* Pp. 445. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $12.00.

BILFINGER, CARL. *Völkerrechtliche und staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen.* (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. XXIX.) Pp. viii, 557. Köln; Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1954. No price.

BINGHAM, JONATHAN B. *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 in Action.* Pp. xiv, 303. New York: John Day Company, 1954. $4.00.

BOLSTER, ARTHUR S., JR. *James Freeman Clarke: Disciple to Advancing Truth.* Pp. xii, 373. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $4.50.

BOWERS, CLAUDE G. *My Mission to Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II.* Pp. xvi, 422. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954. $6.00.

BRANDT, RICHARD B. *Hopi Ethics: A Theoretical Analysis.* Pp. x, 398. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1954. $7.50.

BROEHL, WAYNE G., JR. *Trucks . . . Trouble . . . and Triumph: The Norwalk Truck Line Company.* Pp. viii, 226. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. $5.50.

COHEN, MORRIS R. *American Thought: A Critical Sketch.* Pp. 360. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. $5.00.

CURTI, MERLE. *Probing Our Past.* Pp. xii, 294. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. $4.00.

DAVIS, HAROLD T. *Political Statistics.* Pp. xv, 364. Evanston, Ill.: Principia Press of Illinois, 1954. No price.

DAWSON, ROBERT M. *The Government of Canada.* Pp. x, 667. 2nd ed.; Rev. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954. $7.25.

DESAN, WILFRID. *The Tragic Finale: An Essay on the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.* Pp. xiv, 220. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $4.25.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *London and Paris Agreements, September–October 1954.* (Department of State Publication, No. 5659.) Pp. vi, 128. Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 1954. 45 cents.

DOYLE, WILLSON K., and others. *The Government and Administration of Florida.* (American Commonwealth Series.) Pp. xv, 444. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. $4.95.

FERM, VERGILIUS. *A Dictionary of Pastoral Psychology.* Pp. xi, 336. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $6.00.

FRIEDRICH, CARL J., and J. KENNETH GALBRAITH. *Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University.* (Vol. V.) Pp. viii, 420. Cambridge, Mass.: Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1954. $5.00.

FURNISS, EDGAR S., JR. *The Office of the Premier in French Foreign Policy Making: An Application of Decision Making Analysis.* (Foreign Policy Analysis Project, Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 5.) Pp. vii, 67. Princeton, N. J.: Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton University, 1954. No price.

GILLMOR, DAN. *Fear the Accuser.* Pp. xi, 308. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954. $3.00.

GIRARD, ALAIN, and JEAN STOETZEL. *Français et immigrés: l'attitude française, l'adaptation des Italiens et des Polonais.* (Cahier No. 19.) Pp. xvi, 531. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953. 900 *fr.*

GOGUEL, FRANCOIS (Ed.). *Nouvelles études de sociologie électorale.* Pp. xiii, 213. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954. No price.

GOUAULT, JACQUES. *Comment la France est devenue républicaine.* Pp. 239. Paris: Librairie Arman Colin, 1954. 1,200 *fr.*

GOULDNER, ALVIN W. *Wildcat Strike.* Pp. 179. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1954. $3.00.

GRISWOLD, ERWIN. *The 5th Amendment Today.* Pp. vi, 82. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $2.00.

HICKS, JOHN D. *The American Nation.* Pp. xii, 776, ci. 3rd ed. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1955. $6.75.

HIGHSAW, ROBERT B., and CHARLES N. FORTENBERRY. *The Government and Administration of Mississippi.* (American Commonwealth Series.) Pp. xiv, 414. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. $4.95.

HOIJER, HARRY (Ed.). *Language in Culture: Conference on the Interrelations of Language and other Aspects of Culture.* Pp. xi, 286. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. $4.50.

HOLDEN, WILLIAM P. *Anti-Puritan Satire, 1572–1642.* Pp. xii, 165. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954. $3.75.

HUNOLD, ALBERT C. *The Industrial Development of Switzerland.* (National Bank of Egypt Fiftieth Anniversary Commemoration Lectures.) Pp. 45. Cairo, 1954. No price.

IRWIN, HAROLD S. *Evolution of Futures Trading.* Pp. xii, 95. Madison, Wisc.: Mimir Publishers, 1954. $3.00.

JOHNS, RAY. *Executive Responsibility: An Analysis of Executive Responsibilities in the Work of Voluntary Community Social Welfare Organizations.* Pp. xii, 258. New York: Association Press, 1954. $4.00.

KARTUN, DEREK. *Africa, Africa! A Continent Rises to Its Feet.* Foreword by Alphaeus Hunton. Pp. vii, 99. New York: International Publishers, 1954. $1.50 cloth; 75 cents paper.

KIRKPATRICK, CLIFFORD. *The Family: As Process and Institution.* Pp. viii, 651. New York: The Ronald Press, Company, 1955. $6.00.

KUZNETS, SIMON, and ERNEST RUBIN. *Immigration and Foreign Born.* (Occasional Paper 46.) Pp. xii, 107. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1954. $1.50.

LE COMTE, EDWARD. *Dictionary of Last Words.* Pp. xxix, 267. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $5.00.

LEE, RAYMOND L., and others. *Contemporary Social Issues.* Pp. xv, 864. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $3.95.

Looking Forward: Sections of Works in Progress by Authors of International Publishers on the Occasion of its Thirtieth Anniversary. Pp. 223. New York: International Publishers, 1954. $2.00.

MACIVER, R. M. (Ed.). *New Horizons in Creative Thinking: A Survey and Forecast.* Pp. x, 159. New York; London: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1954. (Distributed by Harper and Brothers.) $2.00.

MAJSTRENKO, IWAN. *Borot'bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism.* Translated by George S. N. Luckyj. Edited by Peter Dornan. Pp. xv, 325. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954. $4.50.

MARTIN, KINGSLEY. *The Rise of French Liberal Thought: A Study of Political Ideas from Bayle to Condorcet.* Edited by J. P. Mayer. Pp. xviii, 316. 2nd ed. New York: New York University Press, 1954. $3.75.

MASON, PHILIP. *An Essay on Racial Tension.* Pp. ix, 149. London; New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954. $1.50.

NEWSAM, SIR FRANK. *The Home Office.* Pp. 224. London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. $2.40.

OSTOW, MORTIMER, and BEN-AMI SCHARFSTEIN. *The Need to Believe: The Psychology of Religion.* Pp. 162. New York: International Universities Press, 1954. $3.00.

Rehabilitation and Development of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries in South Korea. Pp. xviii, 428. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $8.75.

REID, J. K. S. (Ed.). *Calvin: Theological Treatises.* (The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. XXII.) Pp. 355. Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster Press, 1954. $5.00.

Research and Information on Africa. (Continuing Sources.) Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress, Reference Department, 1954. 45 cents.

ROETHLISBERGER, F. J., and others. *Training for Human Relations: An Interim Report of a Program for Advanced Training and Research in Human Relations, 1951–1954.* Pp. xvii, 198. Boston: Harvard University, Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1954. $2.00.

RORTY, JAMES, and MOSHE DECTER. *McCarthy and the Communists.* Pp. viii, 163. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $2.00 cloth; $1.00 paper.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE. *The Middle East.* Pp. xviii, 590. 2nd ed. London; New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954. $6.50.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. (Ed.). *Treasury of Philosophy.* Pp. xxiv, 1280. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $15.00.

SBAROUNIS, ATHANASE J. *Studies and Memoirs from the Second World War.* Pp. 423. Athens: Government Printing Office, 1951. No price.

SCHRAMM, WILBUR (Ed.). *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication.* Pp. 586. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1954. $6.00.

SHEPHERD, CHARLES R. *A Nation Betrayed: The Story of Communism in China.* Pp. 179. New York: Exposition Press, 1954. $3.00.

SMITH, SEYMOUR A. *The American College Chaplaincy.* Pp. x, 180. New York: Association Press, 1954. $3.75.

SMITH, WATSON, and JOHN M. ROBERTS. *Zuni Law: A Field of Values.* Pp. ix, 175. Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, 1954. No price.

Soviet Planning. Pp. xvi, 143. Calcutta: The Employers' Association, 1954. 1 R.

STERN, KARL. *The Third Revolution: A Study of Psychiatry and Religion.* Pp. xii, 306. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1954. $4.00.

STEWART, KILTON. *Pygmies and Dream Giants.* Pp. viii, 295. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1954. $3.75.

SUSSMAN, MARVIN B. *Sourcebook in Marriage and the Family.* Pp. xi, 431. Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955. No price.

THRALL, ROBERT M., and others (Eds.). *De-*

cision Processes. Pp. viii, 332. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954. $5.00.

TRACHSEL, HERMAN H., and RALPH M. WADE. *The Government and Administration of Wyoming*. (American Commonwealth Series.) Pp. xiv, 381. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. $4.95.

Tulane Studies in Political Science. (Vol. I.) Pp. 112. New Orleans, La.: Tulane University, 1954. $2.00.

TURNWALD, WILHELM K. *Renascence or Decline of Central Europe: The Sudeten German-Czech Problem*. Translated by Gerda Johannsen. Pp. 89. Munich: University Press, Dr. C. Wolf and Sohn, 1954. No price.

VERGOTTI, JACQUES M. *La Neutralité de la Suisse: Son évolution historique et ses aspects dans les relations internationales de la première moitié du XXe siècle*. Pp. 172. Lausanne: Imprimerie La Concorde, 1954. $1.50.

Vocational Guidance in France. Pp. vi, 134. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1954. $1.00.

VON FRITZ, KURT. *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity*. Pp. xiv, 489. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $7.50.

VOSKUIL, WALTER H. *Minerals in World Industry*. Pp. vii, 234. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $5.75.

WADIA, P. A., and K. T. MERCHANT. *Our Economic Problem*. Pp. xvii, 757. 4th ed. Bombay: New Book Company, 1954. Rs. 8.

WIENS, HEROLD J. *China's March Toward the Tropics*. Pp. xv, 411. Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1954. $7.50.

WOODCOCK, P. G. *Concise Dictionary of Ancient History*. Pp. 465. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $6.00.

WOODS, C. A. *The Indian Communities of Natal: Their Economic Position*. (Natal Regional Survey, Vol. IX.) Pp. x, 102. New York: Oxford University Press for the University of Natal, 1954. $4.00.

INDEX

INDEX

Abiodun, Aloba, cited, 127
Afrikaner nationalism, 131, 135, 142–143, 148, 150
Age grades, 18, 19, 171
Agriculture
  commercial and cash crops, 4, 8, 19, 39, 40–41, 44–45, 46–47, 53–54, 55, 62, 63, 69, 73, 75–76, 77, 79, 83, 87, 121, 122, 152, 153
  in development plans, 40, 48, 49–50, 60, 64–65, 66, 68–69, 70
  native, *see* Tribal society and economy—agriculture
  research institutes, 177
Air transport, development of, 66, 67
Akan, 120, 121, 126
Algeria, 21–29(*passim*), 46–47, 49, 109–116 (*passim*)
Angola, 12, 16, 34, 35, 36, 100
Apartheid, 12, 82, 131, 132, 134, 137, 143–150, 156–157
Apter, David E., British West Africa: Patterns of Self-Government, 117–129
Arab League, 114
Arabs and Arabic, 9, 11, 21, 22–23, 26–28, 30, 31, 37, 151
  See also Bedouins
Areas
  Africa, 1
  Belgian Congo, 62
  French West Africa, 52
  Gold Coast, 121
  Union of South Africa, 72
Ashanti, 18, 19, 86, 118, 119, 120, 124, 172
Asia
  capital from, in Africa, 152
  effects on Africa, viii, 37
  See also Asians; Far East; India
Asians, in Africa, 6, 9, 86, 92, 93, 157
  See also Indians
Atlantic Charter, 37, 38, 114
Atomic weapons, 36
Attlee, Clement, 134
Awolowo, Obafemi, 125
Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 96, 103, 119, 125

Baganda, 4, 101, 102, 106, 172
Balandier, Georges, cited, 151
Bananas, 40, 53, 54, 58
Banda, Hastings, 96
Bantu people and language, 12, 13, 16, 31, 72, 143–150
Basutoland, 8, 72, 101, 144
Bauxite, 35, 43, 53, 58, 122
Bechuanaland, 6, 72, 144
Bedouins, 6, 23, 24, 28, 29
Belgium
  colonial policies and programs, 2, 48, 49, 64–70, 89, 91–92, 97, 103, 108, 172, 173–174, 175, 177
  in exploring and partitioning of Africa, 33–34, 161
Belgian Congo, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 35, 36, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 62–70, 89, 92, 100, 103, 108, 173–179(*passim*)
  See also Congo Free State; Independent State of the Congo
Bell, R. M., cited, 100
Berber people and language, 21, 22–23, 25–29
Berlin Conference (1884–85), 33
Bertieaux, Raymond, cited, 152
Boissier-Palun, L., cited, 60
Botha, Louis, 142
Brazza, Pierre Paul F. C. Savorgnan de, 33
British Central Africa, *see* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Northern Rhodesia; Nyasaland; Southern Rhodesia
British Commonwealth of Nations, 90, 130–131
British East Africa, viii, 12, 19, 90, 100, 105, 106, 107, 119, 131, 170–179(*passim*)
  See also Kenya; Tanganyika; Uganda
British South Africa Company, 132
British West Africa, 7, 8, 19, 40, 90, 92, 103, 105, 117–129, 170–179(*passim*)
  See also Gold Coast; Nigeria; Sierra Leone
Brown, William O., Foreword, vii–viii
Brussels, convocation in (1876), 32
Buell, Raymond Leslie, cited, 153
Buganda kingdom, 86, 98, 102, 106
Burns, A. C., cited, 118
Bushman people, culture, and language, 12, 13, 16
Busia, Kofi Abrefa, 124
  cited, 153, 177

Cam, Diogo, 151
Cameron, Donald Charles, cited, 88

Cameroons, 11, 12, 15, 18, 91, 97, 101, 103, 104, 107
Cape Province, 3, 6, 9, 73, 75, 131, 142, 149
CARTER, GWENDOLEN M., Union of South Africa: Politics of White Supremacy, 142–150
Central Africa, 10, 11, 31, 41, 92, 151
  See also Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Central African Federation, *see* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Chouraqui, André, cited, 111
Christianity, vii
  African, 100, 165, 166, 169
  and indigenous religions, 19, 153, 161–165 (*passim*), 168
  and race relations, 13, 143, 163–164, 166–167, 172
  contributions of, 164–165, 168, 173
  missions, missionaries, and mission schools, 40, 44, 71, 80, 89, 95, 99, 102, 132, 135, 146, 155, 163, 164, 172–174, 175, 176, 178
  sectarianism, 99, 165–166
  secularism, 163, 167–168, 169
  U. S. sects, influence on political movements, 96
Chrome, 6, 35, 46, 79
Churchill, Winston, 135
Class structure, 19, 45, 119, 157–158, 159
Cobalt, 6, 35, 40, 43, 46, 62, 63
Cocoa, 10, 40, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 87, 119, 121, 122, 124
Coffee, 4, 40, 46, 47, 52, 53, 55, 58, 62, 63
Cold war, *see* East-West conflict
Cole, G. D. H., cited, 159
COLEMAN, JAMES S., Current Political Movements in Africa, 95–108
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (British), 48, 175
Colonial Development Corporation (British), 10, 49
Colonial policies, 38, 84–85, 86–87, 89–90, 92, 95–96, 99–100, 107–108, 109
  See also colonial policies and programs *under* Belgium; France; Great Britain; Portugal
Colonialism
  after World War II, 38, 84, 97, 107, 108, 120
  before World War II, 84, 86–87
  withdrawal of colonial powers, possible effects of, 85–86, 92, 94
Colored people, 16, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79, 136, 145, 149
Communism, viii, 38, 104, 143, 150
Congo Free State, 34, 89
  See also Belgian Congo
Congo River and Basin, 2, 4, 18, 32, 33, 62
Convention People's Party (Gold Coast), 103, 107, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122–125, 127, 128
Copper, 6, 35, 40, 43, 46, 47, 58, 62, 63, 79, 132, 138, 139
Cornut-Gentille, B., cited, 60
Cotton, 4, 8, 40, 46, 62, 63, 87
Cowan, L. Gray, cited, 112
Crémieux Decree, 111
Culture areas, 15–20, 121

Dahomey, 18, 19, 52, 104, 106, 121
Diamonds, 1, 6, 35, 40, 46, 53, 62, 63, 79
Disraeli, Benjamin, 32
Dresch, J., cited, 151
Dutch East India Company, 31, 72

East-West conflict (cold war), viii, 37, 38
East Africa, 1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17–18, 19, 92, 93, 151, 171, 172
  See also British East Africa; Mozambique
Education, vii, 159, 166
  by missions, 44, 89, 95, 146, 155, 163, 164, 172–174, 175, 176, 178
  by trading companies, 172, 173
  effect on social change, 102, 177–179
  financing of, 173–175
    See also below, place of, in development plans
  languages used in, 14, 173, 174, 176
  native (tribal), 19, 170–172
  of Bantu, in Union of South Africa, 146
  place of, in development plans, 48, 49, 50, 53, 57, 60, 65, 68, 69, 122, 152
  primary, 69, 89, 173, 176
  secondary, 69, 89, 92, 173, 175, 176
  standards, control of, 174–176
  teacher training, 69, 146, 173, 175, 176, 177
  universal (compulsory), 121, 176–177
  university
    in Africa, 69, 92, 121–122, 139, 177
    of Africans abroad, 96, 97, 159, 167, 177
  See also Vocational training
Egypt, viii, 7, 13, 31–32, 34, 38, 43, 114, 161
Emirates, 9, 88, 118, 120, 125, 126, 127, 173
Employment, occupational distribution, 44–45, 79
Entente Cordiale (Anglo-French, 1904), 34
Epstein, A. L., cited, 159
Eritrea, 37
Ethiopia, viii, 4, 13, 34, 37, 42–43, 47, 166
Evans-Pritchard, E. E., editor, 18
Ewe, 15, 86, 102, 103, 106, 119, 121
Exploration, 1–2, 32, 161

Faidherbe, Louis Léon César, 52
Far East, and African exploration, 30, 31

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Central African Federation; British Central Africa), 7, 46, 90, 93, 98, 105, 106, 107, 119, 130–141
Fez, Treaty of, 112
FIDES (*Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer*), 10, 49, 175
Forde, Daryll, editor, 18
Fortes, Meyer
  cited, 171; editor, 18
France
  colonial policies and programs, 2, 12, 48, 49, 52, 53–54, 56–58, 87, 88, 89, 90–91, 97, 105–114(*passim*), 172, 174, 175, 177
  Constitution of 1946, and Overseas Territories, 52, 106
  Council of the Republic, territorial representation in, 57, 91
  in Egypt, 31–32
  in exploration and partitioning of Africa, 33, 34, 161
  National Assembly, territorial representation in, 57, 91, 111, 112
  North Africans in, 29
  See also French Union
Frankel, S. H., cited, 74, 78
Franzsen, P. G., cited, 78
French Equatorial Africa, 12, 34, 35, 36, 92–93, 100, 104, 175, 176
French Guinea, 18, 43, 52, 53, 58, 104
French North Africa, *see* Algiers; Morocco; North Africa; Tunisia
French Sudan, 52, 58, 104, 121
French Union, 57, 91, 92–93, 115, 175, 176
French West Africa, 7, 8, 11, 16, 18–19, 36, 43, 44, 46, 49, 52–61, 88, 91, 92–93, 104, 106, 121, 174, 175, 176, 177

Garvey, Marcus, 96
Geography (physical features), vii, 1–10, 18, 30, 32, 39, 154
  Belgian Congo, 40, 62–63, 66, 68, 70
  British West Africa, 40
  French West Africa, 40, 52–53
  Gold Coast, 122
  North Africa, 21, 23–25, 26
  Union of South Africa, 75
  See also Areas; Mining and minerals
Germany and Africa, 34, 36, 38, 56, 112, 142, 161
Ghana, 19, 120
Gold, 1, 6, 8, 30, 35, 40, 43, 46, 53, 58, 62, 63, 77–78, 79, 81
Gold Coast, vii, 4, 6, 8, 10, 35, 36, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 54, 86, 87, 90, 96, 103, 107, 117–129, 170, 174, 176–177
Great Britain
  and Suez Canal, 32, 38
  colonial policies and programs, 2, 38, 48–49, 87–88, 89, 90, 93, 97, 102, 107–108, 117–118, 126–127, 132–136, 140, 173, 174–175, 177
  in exploration and partitioning of Africa, 32, 33, 34, 161
  Far Eastern trade, 31
Greenberg, Joseph H., cited, 13
Groundnuts, 40, 46, 48, 87
  See also Peanuts

Hailey, William Malcolm, cited, 87, 140, 174
Haines, C. Grove, editor, 91
Haldane, Richard Burdon, 164
Hamitic peoples and languages, 12, 13, 23, 31
Hatt, Paul, editor, 152, 160
Health and medical care, 1, 28, 41, 42, 44, 48, 49, 53, 57, 60, 65, 69, 125, 152, 157, 164, 166, 172
Henry the Navigator, Prince of Portugal, 30
Herding, *see* Tribal society and economy—stock raising
HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE J., Peoples and Cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa, 11–20
Herskovits, Melville J., cited, 16
Hertzog, James B. M., 142, 143, 149
Herzfeld, H., cited, 78
Horner, George, translator, 21
Hottentot people, culture, and language, 12, 13, 16, 72
Houghton, D. H., cited, 76
Housing, 29, 45, 48, 60, 65, 66, 69, 80, 156, 157, 179
HUGE, J., Economic Planning and Development in the Belgian Congo, 62–70
Huggins, Godfrey, 131–132, 133–134, 136, 137, 139, 141
Hunter, Monica, cited, 153
Hydroelectric power, 10, 43, 48, 64, 66, 68, 69–70, 122, 152

Ibo, 19, 101, 102–103, 106, 118, 120, 125, 126, 127
Income, per capita, 39, 41, 74–75, 83
Independent State of the Congo, 36
India, 31, 86, 96, 97, 114, 130–131, 150
Indians in Africa
  discrimination against, in Union of South Africa, 145, 149–150
  employment and wages, 19, 74, 75, 76, 79
  population figures, 11, 72–73, 150
  relation with Africans, 13, 97
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 49, 65

Investment, 39, 41, 46, 47, 48–49, 50, 121, 127–128, 151, 152
in Belgian Congo Ten Year Plan, 49, 62, 64, 65–66
in British colonies, 40, 48–49, 90, 127
in French North Africa, 49, 115
in French sub-Saharan Africa, 49, 57–58, 59–60
in mining, 43, 44, 78
in Union of South Africa, 78–79
Iron ore, 6, 35–36, 43, 46, 47, 53, 58, 79
Islam, viii, 13, 19, 27–28, 85, 100, 109, 111–112, 113, 118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 127, 173
Italy and Africa, 34, 36–37, 38, 112
Ivory Coast, 52, 53, 58, 100, 104, 121

Jews, in North Africa, 22, 23, 28, 109, 111
Johnson, Samuel, cited, 127
Joyce, Thomas Athol, 20

Kalibala, E. B., 96
Karp, Mark, *translator*, 21
Keane, Augustus Henry, 2
Kelley, T. H., cited, 78
Kenya, vii, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 36, 38, 41, 44, 45, 87, 93, 96, 100, 101, 102, 105, 107, 131, 174
Kenyatta, Jomo, quoted, 100
Kiewiet, C. W. de, cited, 132
Kikuyu, 100, 101, 102–103, 106
KIRKWOOD, KENNETH, British Central Africa: Politics Under Federation, 130–141
Kock, W. P. de, cited, 78
Koinange, Peter Mbiyu, 96
Kolarz, Walter, cited, 86
Korean War, 47, 48, 50
Kruger, Stephanus J. P., 131
Kuznets, Simon
cited, 74; quoted, 77

Labor
and social change, 154–159, 178
code for French Overseas Territories, 57
farm, in South Africa, 76, 79, 83
migrations and migrant labor, 8, 9, 24–25, 29, 41–42, 54, 55, 56, 58, 69, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79–80, 81, 138, 155, 178
problems in Gold Coast and Nigeria, 121, 122, 125
productivity, 41, 42, 63, 64–65, 75, 80–81, 156
racial composition of working population (South Africa), 79
racial discrimination, *see* Race relations—occupational discrimination
turnover, 42, 73, 155, 156
See also Employment; Labor unions; Vocational training; Wages
Labor unions
French, and African political movements, 96
in Africa, 74, 81, 114–115, 132, 139, 145, 146–147, 148, 158
Lacaillon, J., cited, 60–61
LA MACCHIA, FRANK R., African Economies: Basic Characteristics and Prospects, 39–51
La Marsa, Convention of, 112
Land
African and Western attitudes toward, 167–168
ownership of, 19, 26, 29, 76, 77, 98, 153, 168
Languages in Africa
African
Berber, 22–23, 28
groups of, 13–14
number of, 1, 11, 13, 14
use in schools, 13, 176
writing and printing of, 14, 175
Afrikaans, 131, 141
Arabic, 22–23
auxiliary, 14
European, 14, 158, 174, 175, 176
Leakey, Louis S. B., cited, 153
Leduc, G., editor, 61
Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 96
Leopold II, of Belgium, 32–33, 161
Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 32
Levy, Marion, Jr., cited, 154
Lewis, W. R., cited, 122
Liberia, viii, 35–36, 42–43, 46, 47, 100, 166, 170, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177
Libya, viii, 21–29(*passim*), 34, 37, 42–43, 47, 114
Lincoln, Abraham, quoted, 138
Livingstone, David, 1, 32, 161
London, secret treaty of (1915), 34
Lugard, Frederick D., cited, 117, 140

MCCALL, DANIEL F., Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa, 151–160
McCulloch, M., cited, 157
MacDonald, Malcolm, cited, 87
Macmillan, W. M., 9
Malan, Daniel F., 134, 142, 143
Malthus, Thomas Robert, 34
Manganese, 6, 35, 40, 46, 63, 79
Manufacturing, 8, 39, 46, 48, 57, 63–64, 73, 74, 77–83(*passim*), 115, 122, 152, 153
Marais, J. S., cited, 72
MARÇAIS, PHILIPPE W., Peoples and Cultures of North Africa, 21–29
Marx, Karl, 34–35
Mau Mau (Kenya), 100, 107, 131
Mauritania, 43, 52, 58, 104
Medical care, *see* Health and medical care
Mehemet Ali, 32

Mendès-France, Pierre, 115
Millin, Sarah Gertrude, cited, 16
Mills, M. Elton, cited, 76
Minerals and mining
and labor, 8, 44–45, 71–75, 79–80, 81, 89
exports, 1938 and 1950, table, 35
importance of, in African economy, 1, 6–7, 10, 35–36, 43, 46, 48, 77–78, 79, 152
in Belgian Congo, 6, 35, 36, 40, 45, 46, 62, 63, 68, 69
in British West Africa (Gold Coast), 6, 8, 35, 40, 45, 122
in French colonies, 6, 29, 35, 43, 46, 47, 58, 59
in Northern Rhodesia, 6, 35, 43, 132, 138, 139
in Union of South Africa, 1, 6, 8, 35, 36, 39, 53, 71–72, 74–75, 77–78, 79–81
See also names of individual minerals, as Gold
Missions, see Christianity—missions, missionaries, and mission schools
Mitchell, Philip, quoted, 8
Moffat, John Smith, 138
Mohammed (V) ben Youssef, (Sidi), 114, 115
Mohammedanism, *see* Islam
Money economy, in Africa, 18, 19, 39–40, 42, 44–45, 118, 119, 153, 178
Morocco, 21–29(*passim*), 34, 36, 37, 46–47, 49, 109–110, 112–119
Mosca, Gaetano, quoted, 98
Moving pictures, 179
Mozambique, 8, 12, 34, 42, 43
Mumford, Lewis, cited, 152–153
Munro, William B., quoted, 160
Mussolini, Benito, 34

Napoleon I, 31, 32
Napoleon III, quoted, 111
Natal, 73, 75, 131, 142, 145, 150
Nationalism and nationalist movements, 158, 160
and European settlers, 49, 84–85, 86, 93, 99, 109, 111, 112, 113–114, 115–116, 144
and foreign investment, 50
backgrounds, influences, and precipitating factors, 95–98, 119
desire for independence and equality, 85, 92, 94, 95, 106
in British Central Africa, 106, 107
in British East Africa, 106, 107–108, 138
in British West Africa, 105, 107, 117–129
in North Africa, 27, 28, 29, 85, 109, 110, 112, 113–116
in Union of South Africa, 147, 150
influence on colonial policies, 107–108, 121
relation to messianic, tribal, and regional movements, 19, 85–86, 99–103, 106, 120, 124, 126–128
Native Reserves, 6, 9, 72, 76–79, 144, 146, 147, 156, 168
Niger (territory), 52, 104
Niger River, Valley, and Delta, 2, 14, 30, 32, 33, 52, 53
Nigeria, 7, 9, 19, 35, 36, 38, 42, 43, 45, 47, 52, 87, 88, 90, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 117–120, 125–129, 173
Nile River and Valley, 7, 32, 34
Nkrumah, Kwame, 96, 117, 122–125, 128
North Africa, 3, 4, 6, 13, 21–29, 30, 36, 37, 40, 41, 43, 49, 56, 85, 93, 109–116, 151
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 37
Northern Rhodesia, 6, 7, 8, 9–10, 11, 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 98, 105, 107, 131, 132, 133, 138–139, 178, 179
See also Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Northern Territories, 4, 118, 120, 121, 124, 171
Nyasaland, 7, 8, 36, 41, 42, 96, 98, 105, 107, 131, 133, 138
See also Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Ogburn, William F., cited, 152
Oil-palm products, 1, 35, 40, 46, 53, 58, 62, 63, 153
Oliver, Roland, cited, 132, 172
Orange Free State, 73, 78, 142

Park, Mungo, 1, 32
Partitioning of Africa, 15, 32–34, 86, 161
Pastoral societies, *see* Tribal society and economy—stock raising
Patterson, Sheila, cited, 72
Peanuts, 53, 54, 55, 58, 62, 153
Perham, Margery, cited, 87
Phoenicians, 23, 25, 30
Physical types, 11–13, 22
Political parties and groups, 95–108
Belgian Congo, 100, 103
British, effect on Africa, 96, 132, 134–136, 140
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 105, 137–139
French Equatorial Africa, 100, 104
French North Africa, 114–115
Gold Coast, 103, 107, 117, 119, 125, 127, 128
Kenya, 100, 101, 102–103, 105, 107, 131
Nigeria and the Cameroons, 101, 103, 107, 120, 125, 126, 127
Union of South Africa, 105, 134, 135, 142–150
See also Nationalism and nationalist movements

Population
Belgian Congo, 7, 62
British East Africa, 93
density, 7–10, 16–17, 24–26, 41, 62, 73, 151
Europe, inrcease in, and colonial resources, 34
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 7, 93, 130
French West Africa, 7, 8, 52, 58
Gold Coast, 121
increases, 5, 28, 41, 44, 58, 83
Nigeria, 120
North Africa, 24–26, 28, 109
racial composition, 6, 9, 10, 11, 72–73, 79, 91, 93, 109, 130
Union of South Africa, 72–73, 79, 83
Ports, 43, 48, 53, 54, 57, 67, 71, 113, 122, 125
Portugal
colonial policies and programs, 2, 12, 34, 37–38, 48, 89, 97, 103, 172
in exploring and partitioning of Africa, 30, 31, 33
Press, African, 96, 179
Prester John, 1
Price, A. Grenfell, cited, 86

Race relations
and Christianity, 13, 163–164, 166–167, 172
and Mohammedanism, 13
in Belgian Congo, 12, 69, 89
in British Central Africa, 130–141(*passim*)
in British East Africa, 12
in French colonies, 12, 112
in Portuguese colonies, 12
in Union of South Africa, 12, 71–72, 74–75, 80–83, 93, 131, 132, 142–150(*passim*), 156–157
occupational discrimination, 42, 45, 51, 71–72, 74–75, 80–82, 89, 119, 138, 139, 146–147
political, *see* Colonial policies *and its cross references;* Nationalism and nationalist movements
significance of, 12–13, 45, 51, 71–72, 80–83, 93, 130–131, 138–139, 140–141, 143–144, 147–148, 149–150, 157
See also Apartheid; Native Reserves; Slave trade
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., editor, 18
Radio, 179
Railroads, 1, 34, 43, 48, 49, 53, 54, 57, 66, 82, 113, 152
READ, MARGARET H., Education in Africa: Its Pattern and Role in Social Change, 170–179
Read, Margaret H., cited, 172
Reiss, Albert J., Jr., editor, 152, 160
Religion, *see* Christianity; Islam; Tribal society and economy—religion
Rhodes, Cecil John, 34, 131
Rice growing, 8–9, 53, 54
Richard-Molard, J., cited, 61
Riemer, Svend, quoted, 154
RIVLIN, BENJAMIN, Context and Sources of Political Tensions in French North Africa, 109–116
Roads and road programs, 41, 43, 48, 53, 57, 66–67, 80, 111, 113, 121
Roberts, S. H., quoted, 111
Robertson, H. M., cited, 72, 78
ROBINSON, KENNETH, Colonial Issues and Policies with Special Reference to Tropical Africa, 84–94
Robinson, Kenneth, cited, 84, 90–91
Rommel, Erwin, 161
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 114
Ross, C. R., cited, 122
ROSS, EMORY, Impact of Christianity in Africa, 161–169
Ruanda-Urundi, 7, 8, 12, 35, 36, 41, 91, 103
RUDIN, HARRY R., Past and Present Role of Africa in World Affairs, 30–38
Russia, *see* East-West Conflict; Communism; Soviet Union

Sahara, 3, 6, 7, 21, 23, 24, 30, 32, 121
SAXE, JO W., Changing Economic Structure of French West Africa, 52–61
Schoelcher, Victor, quoted, 88
Schuler, Edgar A., editor, 154, 159
Sears, Dudley, cited, 122
Senegal, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 88, 91, 104
Senghor, Léopold
cited, 93; quoted, 85
Shamba Bolongongo, 20
Sierra Leone, 8, 9, 14, 18, 35, 36, 103
Slave trade, 1, 24, 30, 31, 33, 36, 117, 161, 163, 172
Smith, Adam, 33
Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 142, 164
Social Science Research Council, 109, 117
Social science research institutes, in Africa, 177
Somaliland
British, 8
French, 34
Italian, 37
Songhai Empire, 19, 30
South Africa, 4, 11, 31, 34, 35, 36, 41
See also Union of South Africa
Southern Rhodesia, 7, 8, 10, 36, 40, 41–42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 98, 105, 131, 132–133, 139
See also Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Southwest Africa, 16
Soviet Union, and Africa, 37, 38, 96–97, 114, 130
See also Communism
Spain, 23, 30, 112
Speke, John Hanning, 1
Staley, Eugene, quoted, 94
Stamp, L. Dudley
cited, 40; quoted, 2
Stanley, Henry Morton, 1, 32, 161
STEEL, ROBERT W., Africa: The Environmental Setting, 1–10
Strauss, J. G. N., 145, 148
Sudan, viii, 34, 85, 100
Sudanic empires, 19, 30, 151
Sudanic languages, 13
Suez and Suez Canal, 31–32, 37, 38, 114, 161
Supreme Court (U. S.), ruling on educational segregation, 167
Swaziland, 72, 101, 144

Tanganyika, 6, 35, 36, 42, 43, 45, 48, 93, 100, 105, 108, 138
Tin, 35, 40, 46, 62, 63
Todd, Garfield, 139
Togoland, 15, 91, 97, 103, 104, 107, 121
Torday, Emil, 20
Trade
Belgian Congo, 35, 36, 40, 46, 62–64
changing emphasis of, 33–37
early trading companies and posts, 30–31, 52, 172
exports, 1938 and 1950, 35–36
French West Africa, 36, 53–60(*passim*)
Gold Coast, 35, 36, 122
local and caravan, 18, 19, 24, 25, 151
Marketing Boards, 47, 119
place of Africa in world trade, 6–7, 45–47, 50, 151, 152
Union of South Africa, 36, 40, 71, 79, 83
Trade unions, *see* Labor unions
Transportation and communication, 43, 44, 48, 60, 64, 66–67, 80, 125, 152, 161
See also Ports; Railroads; Roads and road programs
Transvaal, 73, 81, 142, 144, 145, 150
Tribal political movements, 99, 100–103, 106, 107
Tribal society and economy
agriculture, 4–5, 6, 16–19, 24, 25, 28–29, 39, 62, 68, 73, 75–77, 153, 171, 178
and indirect rule, 87, 118, 126–127
arts and crafts, 17, 18, 20, 171, 172, 178
change in, 9, 20, 29, 44, 62, 80, 89, 90, 95, 100–101, 110–111, 118, 119, 124, 147, 153–158, 161
government, 27, 118, 124
kinship, 18, 26, 101, 151, 153–159(*passim*), 171
labor specialization, 18–19
marriage, 17, 159–160
religion, 17–18, 19, 20, 28, 153, 161, 162, 163
stock raising, 4, 5–6, 16–18, 24, 28, 39, 44, 52, 75–77, 171, 178
training of young people, 170–172
See also Land
Tsetse fly, 5, 6, 9, 17, 41
Tunisia, 21–29(*passim*), 36, 37, 46–47, 49, 109–110, 112–119

Uganda, vii, 4, 8, 36, 41, 47, 87, 93, 96, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108
Union of South Africa, vii, 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 38, 39–40, 41–42, 43, 46, 71–83, 85, 93, 105, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137, 139, 142–150, 151, 152, 156, 166, 167
United Nations
and Africa, viii, 37, 97, 113, 121, 150
Charter, 38, 84, 114
United States, viii
air bases in Africa, 36, 37
and Libya, 37
early relations with Africa, 36
exports from Africa to, 36, 46, 48, 50
influence on African political movements, 96
investment in Belgian Congo, 65
racial discrimination in, 167
trade with Liberia and Ethiopia, 47
Uranium, 6, 36, 40, 43, 46, 47, 79
Urban communities and life, vii, 58
and Islam, 28
apartheid programs, 145–146, 148
as index of economic development, 115, 152–153
education in, 175, 178
European responsibility for, 25–26, 53, 56, 58, 62, 73, 111, 151, 152, 154–155, 157
in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, differences in, 25–26, 111
Jewish, in North Africa, 23
kinship groups in, 101, 111, 159
nationalist movements in, 110, 114, 115, 160
population figures, 9–10, 25–26, 58, 62, 73, 151
precolonial towns, 9, 19, 25, 26, 151
relation to hinterland, 152–153
sequences in urban growth, 154–158
social and economic problems, 29, 42, 45, 49–50, 66, 69, 72, 73, 77, 80, 89, 110, 154, 156–157, 170, 178, 179
social structures, 158–160
townward movement, 9–10, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 39–40, 56, 73, 75, 110, 115, 143, 146
women in, 73, 80, 156–157, 158, 179

VAN DER HORST, SHEILA T., The Union of South Africa: Economic Problems in a Multiracial Situation, 71–83
Van der Horst, Sheila T., cited, 143, 151
Vanhove, J., cited, 174
Vocational training, 42–43, 64, 69, 89, 154, 155, 164, 170, 173, 175
Volta River Development Scheme, 10, 43, 122

Wages, 42, 56, 57, 63, 74–75, 76, 81
Walker, Patrick Gordon, quoted, 130
Walton, E. M., cited, 76
Weber, Max, 98
Welensky, Roy, 133–134
Werner, Alice, cited, 13
West Africa, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 18, 31, 41, 93, 151, 156–157, 172
See also British West Africa; French West Africa
Whitehead, Alfred North, 164
Wilson, Godfrey, cited, 151
Wilson, Monica, cited, 151, 172
Wirth, Louis, quoted, 160
Witwatersrand, 1, 8, 9, 10, 77, 79, 131
Women
employment, 19, 81, 156–157, 158
in urban areas, 73, 80, 156–157, 158, 179
position of, 20, 26, 27, 29, 178–179
World War I, 36, 132, 161
World War II, 2, 34, 36–37, 38, 47, 56–57, 78, 89, 90, 97, 107, 114, 151, 161–162

Yoruba, 9, 19, 101, 102, 106, 118, 120, 125, 126–127, 151

Zinc, 35, 40, 62, 63

VOLUME 299 MAY 1955

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*



69626

AIR POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Edited by

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, Ph.D.
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute and Professor of Political Science University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

STEFAN T. POSSONY, Ph.D.
Visiting Professor, Foreign Policy Research Institute University of Pennsylvania Professor of International Politics Graduate School, Georgetown University Washington, D. C.

Copyright 1955, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1955

7 - JUL 1955
STATE LEGISLATURE, MAS

CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD vii

THE DEFINITION OF AIR POWER

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE AIR . . . . *Stefan T. Possony* and *Leslie Rosenzweig* 1

SOME FALLACIES CONCERNING AIR POWER . . . . . *Eugene M. Emme* 12

THE SCOPE OF UNITED STATES AIR STRATEGY . . . . . *Thomas D. White* 25

NATIONS AS AIR POWERS

AIR STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES . . . . . *Elton C. Fay* 30

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET AIR POWER: A HISTORICAL AND MANAGERIAL INTERPRETATION . . . . . *Ramsay D. Potts, Jr.* 38

A STEEL RING FOR THE IRON CURTAIN: AN APPRAISAL OF AIR POWER IN OTHER NATIONS . . . . . *Edward W. S. Hull* 49

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF SECURITY

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF AIR POWER . . . . . *Lewis S. Thompson* 58

OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AIR POWER . *W. Barton Leach* 67

AIR POWER AND FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY IN THE FAR EAST *Thomas K. Finletter* 76

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE AIR AGE . . . . . *Robert D. Murphy* 87

EUROPE AND AIR POWER . . . . . *Raymond Aron* 95

THE ROLE OF NATO'S AIR FORCES . . . . . *Alvin J. Cottrell* 102

AIR POWER IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST . . . . . *Paul M. A. Linebarger* 109

FUTURE PROBLEMS AFFECTING SECURITY

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE . . . . . *T. F. Walkowicz* 118

DROPPING THE PILOT . . . . . *Donald T. Perkins* 128

AVIATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION . . . . . *Robert Strausz-Hupé* 134

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ACADEMY FOR 1954 . 141

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

BROWN, DELMAR. *Nationalism in Japan.* Albert E. Kane ... 191

BRYSON, LYMAN. *The Drive Toward Reason.* Dorothy Rudy ... 168

COLE, CHARLES C., JR. *The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangelists, 1826–1860.* Albert Post ... 178

COOK, THOMAS I., and MALCOLM MOOS. *Power Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy.* Richard W. Van Alstyne ... 148

CRAWFORD, KENNETH GRANT. *Canadian Municipal Government.* Maurice W. Armstrong ... 180

CRESAP, DEAN. *Party Politics in the Golden State.* Dean E. McHenry ... 159

DIXON, W. MACNEILE. *The Human Situation.* Henry Nelson Wieman ... 175

Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Carl G. Anthon ... 183

DRAGNICH, ALEX N. *Tito's Promised Land: Yugoslavia.* Joseph S. Roucek ... 184

DUROSELLE, JEAN-BAPTISTE and others. *Les relations Germano-Soviétiques de 1933 à 1939.* Harry R. Rudin ... 150

FRANKEL, S. J., and R. C. PRATT. *Municipal Labour Relations in Canada.* Maurice W. Armstrong ... 180

FREE EUROPE PRESS. The Research Staff. *Satellite Agriculture in Crisis.* Ernest F. Winter ... 184

FREYMOND, JACQUES. *De Roosevelt à Eisenhower.* Oliver Benson ... 147

FULLER, J. F. C. *A Military History of the Western World.* A. E. R. Boak ... 151

GIPSON, LAWRENCE HENRY. *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763–1775.* Clinton Rossiter ... 156

GLOVER, J. D. *The Attack on Big Business.* Robert A. Brady ... 164

GOLDBLOOM, MAURICE J. *American Security and Freedom.* Rubin Gotesky ... 162

GROSSER, ALFRED and others. *Administration et politique en Allemagne occidentale.* Henry L. Bretton ... 187

HABER, WILLIAM and others. *Manpower in the United States.* Selig Perlman 172

HALLE, LOUIS J. *Civilization and Foreign Policy.* Lawrence H. Chamberlain 146

HANSON, EARL PARKER. *Transformation: The Story of Modern Puerto Rico.* Otto Tod Mallery ... 193

HARRIGAN, ANTHONY (Ed.). *The Editor and the Republic, Papers and Addresses of William Watts Ball.* Frederic E. Merwin ... 157

HEATH, MILTON SYDNEY. *Constructive Liberalism.* George B. Tindall ... 159

HENRY, ANDREW F., and JAMES F. SHORT, JR. *Suicide and Homicide.* Austin L. Porterfield ... 169

HORGAN, PAUL. *Great River: The Rio Grande in North American History.* Vols. I–II. George C. Osborn ... 152

PAGE

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946–1953, The. Raymond Vernon ... 167

JACOBS, CLYDE E. *Law Writers and the Courts.* Robert J. Harris ... 161

JONES, GEORGE HILTON. *The Main Stream of Jacobitism.* Norman Victor Hope 179

JONES, THOMAS. *A Diary with Letters, 1931–1950.* R. G. Cowherd ... 178

KAPS, JOHANNES (Ed.). *The Tragedy of Silesia, 1945–1946.* Carl G. Anthon 183

KELLY, ALFRED H. (Ed.). *American Foreign Policy and American Democracy.* Louis J. Halle ... 147

KOCHAN, LIONEL. *Acton on History.* Crane Brinton ... 176

KULSKI, W. W. *The Soviet Regime.* Frederick L. Schuman ... 182

LAUTERBACH, ALBERT. *Man, Motives, and Money.* George Soule ... 166

LEISS, AMELIA C., and RAYMOND DENNETT (Eds.). *European Peace Treaties After World War II.* Gerhart Niemeyer ... 152

LOCKWOOD, WILLIAM W. *The Economic Development of Japan.* Allan B. Cole 190

LORENZ, LINCOLN. *The Admiral and the Empress: John Paul Jones and Catherine the Great.* Sidney Harcave ... 157

LORWIN, VAL R. *The French Labor Movement.* W. Henry Cooke ... 186

MCREYNOLDS, EDWIN C. *Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner State.* Frederick D. Kershner, Jr. ... 160

MARSHALL, MARTIN V. *Automatic Merchandising.* Theodore N. Beckman ... 164

MORGAN, ROBERT J. *A Whig Embattled: The Presidency Under John Tyler.* Charles M. Thomas ... 154

MUELLER, KATE H. *Educating Women for a Changing World.* Althea K. Hottel 174

Nation Looks at Its Resources, The. J. Russell Whitaker ... 165

PARNES, HERBERT. *Research on Labor Mobility.* Carroll R. Daugherty ... 171

PARSONS, E. A. *The Alexandrian Library.* Morton S. Enslin ... 176

PLAMENATZ, JOHN. *German Marxism and Russian Communism.* Thomas I. Cook ... 181

PROTHRO, JAMES W. *Dollar Decade: Business Ideas in the 1920's.* Broadus Mitchell ... 163

RANDALL, CLARENCE B. *A Foreign Economic Policy for the United States.* William C. Hawkins ... 166

ROBINSON, EDGAR EUGENE. *The Roosevelt Leadership, 1933–1945.* Louis B. Wehle ... 153

ROSTOW, W. W., and others. *The Prospects for Communist China.* Paul M. A. Linebarger ... 188

RUSSELL, LORD OF LIVERPOOL. *The Scourge of the Swastika.* Boris Erich Nelson 187

PAGE

SHANAHAN, WILLIAM O. *German Protestants Face the Social Question.* Conrad H. Moehlman 177

SHAW, FREDERICK. *The History of the New York City Legislature.* Wallace S. Sayre 158

SHEPS, CECIL G., and EUGENE E. TAYLOR. *Needed Research in Health and Medical Care.* Charles A. Metzner 170

SOSNOVY, TIMOTHY. *The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union.* Harold C. Hinton 182

SUN, E-TU ZEN. *Chinese Railways and British Interests, 1898–1911.* Charles F. Remer 189

TAFT, PHILIP. *The Structure and Government of Labor Unions.* Herbert J. Lahne 172

TEN BROEK, JACOBUS, EDWARD N. BARNHART, and FLOYD W. MATSON. *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution.* Donald P. Kent 169

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. *A Study of History.* Vols. VII–X. Pitirim A. Sorokin 144

WARD, BARBARA. *Faith and Freedom.* Helmut Kuhn 174

WHITAKER, ARTHUR P. *The Western Hemisphere Idea.* J. Fred Rippy 149

WHITE, LEONARD D. *The Jacksonians: A Study of Administrative History, 1829–1861.* Ralph Adams Brown 155

WILGUS, A. CURTIS (Ed.). *The Caribbean: Its Economy.* Harvey S. Perloff 192

WILLIAMS, PHILIP. *Politics in Post-War France.* Johannes Mattern 185

WRIGHT, QUINCY, and others. *Research for Peace.* Frank M. Russell 150

ZORNOW, WILLIAM FRANK. *Lincoln and the Party Divided.* Frank L. Owsley 153

CORRECTION 194

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 194

OTHER BOOKS 195

INDEX 201

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index.*

FOREWORD

Inevitably, in an atomic age, nuclear air power must be the sword and shield of freedom. By the same token, no aggressor can hope to conquer free society without a well-rounded atomic air capability as his primary strength. Nuclear air power thus has become the most portentous single fact of modern life, pregnant with evil and good. Without American air power, postwar Europe might have fallen an easy prey to Communism. Without this same power it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to forge the system of alliances uniting most of the world's peaceful and democratic nations. Atomic air power has given the free world a true and trusted defense.

But even more significant: Long-range air power has put an end to geographic inaccessibility. The remote bases needed to prepare, secretly, for destructive surprise attacks no longer are inviolate against retaliation. Henceforth the heartland is nearly as exposed as the periphery. With the express purpose of keeping a new military holocaust at bay, the American nuclear force for years has been pointed at the very core of incipient aggression. The free world's plan is to continue to employ American and British nuclear superiority as the chief deterrent to cataclysmic folly.

Whether nuclear air power will succeed in giving the world what it never possessed before, an effective tool for the prevention of war, depends on the presumptive aggressor's rationality. If he thinks reasonably, he will realize that he cannot defeat the United States except through a dislocating and disruptive nuclear attack and that he has little chance of forestalling even more devastating counterblows. However costly an atomic war would be to the free world and the United States, it would also spell disaster for Communism.

Aviation is far broader than air power. Just as military aeronautics could destroy the fruits of a million years of human effort, civil aeronautics might join a fractured world into a more co-operative society. The ability to fly for purposes of commerce, travel, recreation, research, health, and production is one of mankind's greatest current values. Once fully developed—and we are very far from aerotechnical maturity—aviation may modify profoundly our present urban structure and thus reduce our vulnerability to atomic weapons. As a commercial endeavor of many facets it is contributing to the transformation which society is presently undergoing. Air transport is helping in the development of backward areas. It has allowed a dramatic intensification of trade and travel and thus an ever wider distribution of hard currency throughout the world. As a result, it holds promise of making economic protectionism increasingly difficult. Psychologically, aviation is putting an end to national isolation and self-centeredness. Aeronautics, a tool of peace as well as of warfare, is thus one of the most creative forces of modern civilization.

Thus far scholars have given only limited attention to the problems of modern aviation. The failure of political scientists to deal more directly with the changes wrought in political relationships by the development of flying poses grave questions. Could it be that we are paying a penalty for leaving the life and death problems confronting modern statecraft in the hands of men who are not governed by judgment acquired through the scientific method? Could it be that the politi-

cal scientists have been scientific about all problems except defense and war? Could it be that political scientists have been overlooking one of the most promising methods of increasing co-operation among nations? The fact remains that the meaning of aviation has not yet been fully grasped by governments, military commanders, business leaders, scholars, or nations. They are frightened by the military threat, but remain unaware of the peace potential of aeronautics. Never before has a vital problem been so neglected and so blanketed by emotion, misinformation, muddledheadedness, ignorance, and plain apathy.

This issue of THE ANNALS is designed to illuminate the nature of air power and nuclear weapons and to bring out some of their impacts on modern civilization. Of the four sections into which the discussion is divided, the initial two address themselves to the problem of defining air power and assessing the relative strengths of nations in the air, with primary emphasis on the United States and the Soviet Union. The last two sections deal with current and future security problems created by air power. While most of these articles analyze defense within the American frame of reference, one discusses European attitudes toward air power and security.

Some of the important questions considered are: Has United States foreign policy in recent years placed undue reliance on atomic weapons, to the exclusion of other instruments of policy? Does the fear of atomic warfare in overseas countries reduce the effectiveness of the Western alliance system? How is it possible that the Soviet Union, an industrially backward country, should now be in possession of modern aerial weapons systems? Is there such a thing as a nuclear stalemate, and what would be the strategic implications for the United States of such a stalemate, should one occur? Is it really true that nuclear weapons can be used in only one manner, namely through "strategic bombardment," and that they necessarily must put at risk the survival of entire nations and continents?

Fifty years after its birth, aviation is still in a formative stage. Within the next generation enormous changes are likely to occur: nuclear propulsion with its unlimited range; rocket propulsion with its high-altitude and high-speed capabilities; a reduction of transport costs to the present level of cheap surface transportation or below; a lesser dependence on large airfields; aerial suburban communications; and perhaps mankind's first advances into space and, therewith, probably the most disruptive event of human history—the establishment of a link with the universe.

It is impossible to cover in one issue of THE ANNALS the total spectrum of these numerous problems. Our hope is that this issue will induce scholars to devote more attention to a development which should never have been ignored. The study of aeronautics is no less important than the study of diplomacy, politics, international law, or trade; in fact, it is indispensable if we are to get a full understanding of international relations. Let us become familiar with aviation and learn how to impress this extraordinary force into the service of defense, prosperity, and human progress.

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ

The Geography of the Air

By STEFAN T. POSSONY and LESLIE ROSENZWEIG

STRATEGY and international politics are influenced strongly by geography. Since modern strategy, to a large extent, concerns itself with aviation, and since strategy and foreign policies are intimately interwoven, the study of aerial geography becomes a necessary step in the analysis of international relations. Aerial geography is as yet an infant science, and the political implications of its findings are far from clear. Yet the time has come for political scientists to take a look at that invisible sea in which we live, the air.

The term "geography of the air" is a linguistic misnomer for something which might more properly be designated by such words as "atmography," "pneumography" or even "aerography." But since the term "geography" has assumed a clear meaning in the English language irrespective of its etymological origins, it is thought best to retain it. The geography of the air, then, is the study of the physical differences of the air in various locations and altitudes. More specifically, it is the study of those differences which are most significant in regard to flying, and it attempts to bring out the implications which those differences have as regards human activities in the air.

CONVENTIONAL FACTORS

Naturally, many conventional geographical factors have aeronautical significance. Flying is influenced by conditions on the ground which include weather on airfields—fog frequency, wind intensity and direction, and temperatures; elevation of airfields (the higher the elevation, the longer the runway required); hardness of soil or of other surfaces such as snow and ice; topographical characteristics of airfield surroundings; the logistical and transport systems of airfields; topographical factors facilitating or impeding navigation; and electromagnetic anomalies interfering with the functioning of instruments. In terms of human geography, flying is influenced by such factors as population densities, availability of skilled manpower, trade relations, surface transportation systems, purchasing power, the availability or absence of navigational "airways," industrial potentials, and by a host of cultural, political, and military factors. Finally, flying itself can be the subject of a geographic analysis: How much flying is done in a particular country? What types of aircraft are being used? How are the flying activities organized? What are the production and maintenance systems? For what purposes are the planes kept in the air? How does flying influence the structure of a given society and its economy? And so on.

WINDS AND AIR MASS MOVEMENTS

Winds used to be objects of conventional "surface" analysis, but this has ceased to be true. Customarily, statements on wind directions have referred to winds on the ground and in the lower altitudes. Yet wind directions change with changing altitudes. It is important to get a clear understanding of "prevailing" and actual winds at *all* important altitudes and to keep close and constant checks on winds at all currently usable altitudes. For example, at 20,000 feet, there may be a westerly, at 30,000 feet a northerly, and at 40,000 feet an easterly wind, all different winds occurring at the same time—although

admittedly such a radical diversification by height may be rare.

Recently we have gone beyond the study of "winds" and have become interested in the movements of the atmosphere as a whole. The entire mass of the atmosphere carried by the earth weighs approximately 5 x 10^{15} tons, less than one one-millionth of the earth's weight. Each square meter of the earth's surface carries ten tons of atmospheric pressure. Yet this entire mass of air is constantly in flux. Winds and other weather phenomena appear to be governed by these gigantic air movements, which, according to theory, are caused by two primary forces, the rotation of the earth and the sun's radiation. The surrounding atmosphere is heated by the sun and spun around by the earth. As a result, the atmosphere moves from west to east in the Northern Hemisphere and from the southeast to the northwest in the Southern Hemisphere, while the hot air over the equator and the tropics flows partly to the poles and partly to the middle latitudes; at lower altitudes, cold polar air flows toward the temperature zones. These warm and cool masses meet at about 40 degrees latitude and form the vast unstable weather zone which is continually shifting according to the region and the time of the year. Within this zone, there are areas where certain types of weather occur with frequency and regularity. Many air routes have characteristic weather patterns.

An important example of the significance for aviation of air-mass collisions is the so-called jet streams, which reach velocities of up to 300 miles per hour. Jet streams have been discovered, at altitudes from 30,000 to 47,000 feet, in an area between 40 and 50 degrees north latitude; in winter they have been found at 25 to 35 degrees north. These seasonal fluctuations seem to follow a cyclic rhythm. It is not known whether the oscillations of the jet streams create weather patterns on the earth or simply reflect them. Once the nature of the jet streams is understood, it should become possible to use the extraordinary energy which they represent and, at least on some routes and at some times, increase flying speeds considerably.

There is a good possibility that a third basic air movement may be of importance. This movement is the aerial parallel to the ocean tides, and like them is caused by solar-lunar attraction. Existence of this movement has been deduced from the fact that the pressure on the earth's surface changes periodically on a twelve- and twenty-four-hour cycle. This could be the case only if the atmosphere expanded and contracted cyclically—if it were "breathing" in consonance with the changing positions of the sun. The magnitude of the semidiurnal change is so great, however, that it must be influenced by the effects on the atmosphere's temperature by the sun's radiation acting *in addition* to the tidal forces.

Air movements, moreover, are influenced by terrain features. Everywhere in the world, mountain ranges have their aerial replicas in the form of gigantic up and down draft envelopes. On the "prevailing" windward side of the mountains there is an updraft, and on the leeward a downdraft. The rising air cools, and as a result the air cascades down like a torrent, frequently at a speed of approximately 4,000 feet per minute. As the air hits the base of the mountains, it bounces off and rises again, five to ten miles away from the mountain wall, in a tremendous vertical updraft, forming a standing wave, which sometimes reaches altitudes of 60,000 feet or more. Glider pilots use this type of air crest to gain and hold altitude.

The strategic importance of wind patterns is very great. Suffice it to point out a parallel to the days of sailing vessels when windward positions conferred great military advantages: those in this position could sail to the enemy but the enemy found it difficult to attack their base. Similarly in the air age, the belligerent who has to buck prevailing head winds to reach his targets (and pass through highly turbulent areas) is at a disadvantage, especially if his opponent is able to utilize jet streams.

THE ATMOSPHERE

The discovery that there was such a thing as air was made comparatively recently, although the phenomenon of wind, of course, must have been known to the first generation of men. The Greeks talked about air (*pneuma*) as one of the basic elements and attempted to describe its characteristics. Useful knowledge of the air has been accumulated, however, only since the eighteenth century.

The fact that the chemical composition of the air is variable was suspected by Priestley and established in 1846 by Bunsen. We know that in higher latitudes the nitrogen content of the air is greater than at the equator, that oxygen content rises slightly with the latitude, and that water vapor goes down as we move from the equator to the poles. The air contains more "impurities" over land than over water, and considerably more over industrial cities than over rural areas. It is possible that the distribution of chemicals within the atmosphere is influenced by gravitation; for example, it is believed that at higher altitudes the helium content increases considerably while the argon diminishes. We are, however, as yet unsure of the frequency at various altitudes of hydrogen and ozone.

SPHERES

Biologists are interested in the atmosphere because it contains the oxygen which man can use freely without assistance from instruments. The lower half of the troposphere, the narrow zone that sets the stage for life on our planet, has been termed the physiological atmosphere or ecosphere. Depending on physical fitness and habitation, the hypoxic zone of the ecosphere starts at about 13,000 feet. At that point the decrease of oxygen pressure begins to have strong psychophysiological effects upon man. At this point too, aircraft engines begin to require supercharging. The anoxia zone has been established at approximately 52,000 feet, where man loses consciousness almost instantly upon exposure. This is the approximate altitude beyond which, in spite of the occurrence of free molecular oxygen in the atmosphere, oxygen no longer enters the lungs; instead water vapor and carbon dioxide fill the respiratory system. Above 52,000 feet molecular oxygen begins to vanish from the atmosphere. In so far as noninstrumented and unprotected man flying in nonpressurized cabins is concerned, the 52,000-feet line must be considered the rim of space.

With increasing altitude, the characteristics of the air change in practically all respects. Starting from the surface and proceeding upward, the lowest portion of the atmosphere is called the troposphere. This is the "weather zone" of cloud cover, precipitation, and turbulence. In it temperatures fall rapidly till we reach the upper limit of the troposphere, the tropopause, which, in the middle latitudes, is situated at about 33,000 feet, but at the poles is as low as 20,000 feet and over the equator as high as 50,000 feet. Immediately above is the stratosphere, rising to about 66,000 feet. Within the stratosphere temperatures probably remain constant. Above is the ozonosphere, which extends upwards to 115,000 feet.

In terms of temperature, it has been suggested calling the zone above the

stratosphere, which is characterized by sinking temperatures, the mesosphere; in it the low temperature of − 117° F. is reached at about 225,000 feet. The zone above the mesosphere has been named the thermosphere. It begins at about 330,000 feet and reaches to 1,320,000 feet and above, hitting a temperature maximum of 4,118° F. at that point. It has been conjectured that, as at lower altitudes, temperature differences cause turbulence, but whether this will be the case in a near vacuum remains to be seen.

At 400,000 to 450,000 feet, the distance between air molecules becomes as great as the length of the sound wave. This is the acoustical frontier of the atmosphere beyond which there is no sound, no sound barrier, and hence no speed which can be meaningfully expressed in Mach numbers.

The exosphere is the area where the atmosphere reaches interplanetary space. In it air particles which have collided with other particles often bounce outward; sometimes they are recaptured by gravity but sometimes they escape into the universe. The exosphere begins approximately at an altitude of 2,000,000 feet but may reach as high as 10,000,000 feet, roughly 2,000 miles.

High-altitude rockets already have reached the periphery of "space." The next significant border will be crossed where, with given speeds of flying machines, the earth's gravitation can be counterbalanced in an altitude where friction no longer impedes movement. Naturally, beyond this area there must come a zone where a flying machine would leave the gravitational field of the earth and enter "space" in the proper sense of the word, subsequently reaching the gravitational field of another celestial body. In fact, the gravitational influences of the moon may become noticeable relatively soon; after all, they make themselves felt on the earth itself. At the halfway mark between earth and moon, the attraction of the moon would be approximately eighty times less than that of the earth. The next "boundary" would be defined by the so-called "abaric point," where the gravitational pull from the moon equals that of the earth. This point is located at approximately 24,000 miles from the center of the moon and over 200,000 miles from the earth, and it is there that we shall have found the true terminus of our planet.[1]

LAYERS

In the higher altitudes, there occur the phenomena of molecular splitting and ionization. Nitrogen, which is the major constituent of the atmosphere, is split into single atoms and becomes a quite different kind of gas at 400,000 feet. Nitrogen, however, is largely an inert substance and although changing in form, is not expected to have any notable effect on high altitude flights. More important is that fact that oxygen, the two-atom type which man breathes, is being split in half by very short-wave ultraviolet rays. One half joins the two-atom molecule to form the three-atom molecule ozone which is poisonous to man; the other half of the oxygen remains free. These single oxygen atoms are highly corrosive and extremely active, and thus may have some effects on high altitude flights. There are, therefore, two "poison layers": the ozone layer, which occurs between 65,000 and 115,000 feet, and the layer of atomic oxygen, which is most prevalent around 350,000 feet.

The ionosphere, which lies above the stratosphere—like the ozonosphere, the mesosphere, and the thermosphere—is subdivided into the D, E_1, E_2, F_1, F_2, and G layers. The D ionized stratum

[1] The gravitational influences of the sun will make themselves felt during the entire trip to the moon.

reflects long-wave signals at approximately 180,000 feet. The E layer extends from 225,000 feet to 330,000 feet, reflecting medium radio waves below 3 megacycles (wave length of 100 m). The E layer has been subdivided into the E_1 and E_2 zones. The E_1, or lower layer, exists all the time, while the E_2 layer appears only in daytime, at the higher altitude. The F stratum hovers during the day at approximately 980,000 feet and is termed F_2. During the night the F_2 stratum descends to about 825,000 feet and then is called the F_1 layer. The F layers reflect short-wave emissions.[2] Initial observations have been made about a G layer situated above the F_2.

As might have been expected, these ionization phenomena produce difficulties of instrumentation. Long-wave broadcasting is dependent on the D layer, standard wave on the E, and short-wave on the F layer. Radar, television, and frequency modulation broadcasting waves are not reflected by these "walls" of ions but pass through them into space. The various layers, however, often act concurrently and may cause double or triple signal reflections. Signals, moreover, are subject to deflections. In addition to the question of accuracy and dependability, the problem of instrumentation at altitude falls into four distinct parts: communications between two vehicles or tactical employment of instruments from one vehicle against another, both flying within the same electronic "layer"; communications or tactical employment from one vehicle against another which is flying in a different "layer"; utilization of equipment from vehicles at high altitudes against the earth's surface; and employment of electronic equipment from the earth's surface against the high altitude vehicle. It is possible that the functioning of equipment will depend upon four sets of circumstances: on the constant electromagnetic characteristics within the various layers; on variable changes such as electromagnetic "storms"; on the geographic location of electronic equipment on the ground (or aloft in low altitudes); and on the power outputs of the various transmitters, which, particularly in so far as ground equipment is concerned, must be considerable.

In the upper regions electronic communications of all beams and wave lengths will be subjected to electromagnetic diffusion, solar interference, ionization reflections, aurora effects, and cosmic radiation, all of which pose obstacles that must be overcome before man can navigate, communicate, and operate successfully in the upper atmosphere.

At present the power outputs of very high- and ultra high-frequency transmitters are between 8 and 12 watts. Such outputs are satisfactory up to 25,000 to 35,000 feet. At higher altitudes far more power is required to neutralize the various types of interference. To overcome the initial barriers which appear at approximately the 35,000-foot level, power outputs must be squared. To break through the additional obstacles at still higher altitudes and to transmit reliably over growing altitude ranges, ever more substantial power outputs will be needed. Presumably these outputs must continue to rise as flights reach increasingly greater heights. Hence a vehicle at 500,000 feet may need communications equipment with kilowatt instead of watt power. Naturally this will pose considerable weight problems.

LIGHT, RADIATION, AND METEORS

Visibility changes with altitude. Higher above the ground the day lasts longer; at some times of the year and

[2] The E and F layers also are known as the Kennelly-Heaviside layer.

down to given latitudes, the sun does not set at altitude, like the midnight sun of the arctic. In daylight, as we ascend, there is always clear visibility above the tropopause but as we approach the 40,000-foot area, the color of the light changes, turning first into eerie blue and then into violet. Auroras—visible particles in the sun's radiation—make their appearance. Above 100,000 feet, there is "eternal darkness," a very somber pitch-black darkness with no visibility, yet in the daytime the surface of the earth should be plainly visible from that altitude, except for clouds. Needless to add, these light conditions will require adjustments on the part of the flying personnel.

The problems of vision increase with speed. At 300 knots per hour the pilot will have flown from 1,000 to 5,000 feet before he can complete his perception and start muscular action in response to a sight stimulus. Another 1,800 feet would be traversed before his movements are completed. At higher speeds these time delays become more critical. This problem is significant, since high altitudes can be reached only through very great speeds.

As to radiation hazards, it is not believed that in flights of relatively short duration (that is, several hours), ultraviolet and soft X rays would endanger human effectiveness and health. Reasonable wall thickness should provide adequate protection against all likely radiation dangers. However, there may be in the upper atmosphere other forms of radiation which have not yet been ascertained and which may be harmful.

Meteors constitute another threat to flight safety in high altitudes. It was found that below altitudes of 260,000 to 330,000 feet, the blanket effect of the atmosphere reduces the hazard of collisions with meteors to negligible amounts, even for prolonged flights lasting several months. At altitudes between 330,000 and 390,000 feet the probability of collision increases to 1 part per 1,000 per day. The probability may well be in error by a factor of 10 or more in either direction. It is likely that up to these altitudes flights of less than twenty-four hours' duration could be made with little danger from meteors. Engineering could take care of most of these meteoric threats. The danger from meteoritic collision might become serious, however, if prolonged excursions, lasting months or years, at altitudes greater than, say, 400,000 feet, were to be undertaken. Concerning the validity of such estimates based on "averages," it must be remembered that the frequency of meteors is greater on some orbits than on others, and that this frequency varies with the year's season. Moreover, the effective impact of the meteors is dependent upon the direction in which they approach the earth: it is far greater in case of "collision" than in case of "overtaking." It may be, therefore, that there are regions in the air which, at least during certain times, the traveler had better avoid, similar to the inhospitable areas on the earth—the deserts, tundras, icecaps, and the jungles in the rainy season.

LIFE IN THE CABIN

Flight in lower altitudes is possible without protective equipment. At somewhat higher altitudes, oxygen masks and pressurized cabins become necessary, to be followed at even higher altitudes by pressurized suits: at an altitude of about 60,000 feet, blood would be boiling.

At higher altitudes, the atmosphere becomes so thin that for all practical purposes, there is no air left. However, the requirement for air within the cabin remains. At altitudes below approximately 70,000 feet this requirement can be satisfied relatively easily by pressurizing outside air. But pressurization becomes increasingly difficult because,

as the air gets thinner, it would require ever larger power outputs and because the extreme pressure ratios would result in excessively hot temperatures. There also is the potential danger of excess ozone concentration in air compressed at very high altitudes. This triple difficulty probably must be solved by taking the required air along in the vehicle; but, obviously, the vehicle must then be built in such a manner that escape of the air will be prevented—not a mean task for future engineers.

Assuming that a hermetically closed cabin can be constructed, the additional problem will emerge that human exhalations like carbon dioxide, methane, and hydrogen sulphide must be eliminated. In their historical dive in the bathyscaphe—a hermetically closed cabin—Auguste and Jacques Piccard used chemicals to absorb the poisonous gases. In future, however, more effective solutions will be required. According to some German authorities, the "gas exchange" problem might be solved through the utilization of botanical plants (e.g., *Alga Chlorella*). As in open nature, these plants would produce oxygen and at the same time dispose of the dangerous substances.[3] The practical difficulties of carrying along a sufficiently gas-productive "garden" should be obvious.

Lack of outside air will influence the temperature within the cabin. High speeds in a relatively dense atmosphere will heat the vehicle's skin, and normal heat transfer will tend to overheat the inside temperature. To prevent such overheating artificial refrigeration of the conventional type will be needed; it should be usable to about 60,000 feet. At higher altitudes, the vacuum will preclude heat transfer. Thus heat will not flow by itself into the cabin, nor will it be distributed evenly there. Moreover, the vehicle no longer will be heated by friction but by radiation.

With increasing altitudes gravity will be correspondingly reduced. Lack of gravitation may change human metabolism and thus the thermal regime of the human body. It also may modify man's movements, perceptions, activities, psychological balance, and general effectiveness. There is a distinct possibility that machinery will be needed to produce artificial gravitation, for example by substituting rotary for the downward pulls. Thus, composite oxygen production and gas exchange, ventilation, refrigeration and heat, and possibly artificial gravitation systems will become necessary. These requirements will pose extremely difficult technological problems, not the least of which will be the necessity of reducing these various "life systems" in weight, so that they can be carried aloft.

ENGINES

The usability of engines changes with altitude. Piston engines can fly only at relatively low altitudes and give their best performances at a few thousand feet. In order to fly at high altitudes aircraft using air-breathing power plants must operate at supersonic speeds, not only to provide sufficient lift but also to obtain adequate thrust. Because the thinner atmosphere offers less resistance (while still providing adequate amounts of oxygen), turboprops, turbojets, and ramjets, which lose range at low altitudes, perform best in the 20,000 to 45,000 feet zone, and presumably somewhat above. Yet at some distance higher up, there is not enough oxygen for any of these engines to operate. At an altitude of 100,000 feet, for example, the required speed for ramjets may be as high as 5 Machs, which means that the incoming air would have a stagnation temperature of about 2,000° F.

[3] H. Strughold, "Weltraumaequivalente Bedingungen innerhalb der Erdatmosphaere," *Weltraumfahrt*, January 1955.

Since energy must be imparted through this air at even *higher* temperatures, the heat limitations of materials and fuel may rule out the use of air-breathing power plants for high-altitude and speed flying. Rocket vehicles which carry their own oxygen may reach higher altitudes. Presumably they might fly as high as 265,000 feet and ultimately reach speeds of 14,000 miles per hour (or 3½ times faster than rocket speeds attained heretofore). Throughout the altitude band of 100,000 to 500,000 feet, however, flights with propulsion systems that can be envisaged at present will be of short duration, an hour or so, probably less time than is required for one revolution around the earth. The development of nuclear engines, naturally, may solve the high-altitude range problem; but since nuclear engines may be very heavy and since they may provide only low thrusts (though prolonged acceleration), composite engine systems may become necessary: for example, rockets to get the vehicles to altitude, atomic engines to provide extended cruise capabilities, and possibly a third set of engines to allow controlled landings.

NONPOWERED FLIGHT

The difficulty of long-range operations at high altitudes will make it desirable to investigate the possibilities of nonpowered flight. Such flight is predicated on the neutralization of gravity. Under static conditions, that is, if we should put a body on a tower erected over one of the poles, the earth's attraction would be reduced to one-hundredth at an altitude of about 190,000 feet. Absence of static gravity, it is assumed, would be encountered only far in space. However, movement can neutralize gravitational pull at lower altitudes. The faster the movement, the greater the reduction of gravity. A moving body would continue to move if its inertia were not overcome by friction. If there is no friction, the movement continues indefinitely. In the air, friction is produced by the collision of the moving body with the atmospheric particles. Yet above 600,000 feet the atmosphere has thinned out to such an extent that it no longer creates friction. Above this "mechanical boundary of the atmosphere," to use an expression by Heinz Haber, various types of nonpowered flights might become feasible. Naturally, the courses of vehicles on such flights must be "inertial" or stable. They could not have the ubiquity capability of aircraft, but like railroads or ships on an inland lake would be restricted to preset courses—aerial rails, so to speak. It would be another handicap of such vehicles that deflective pulls (resulting, for example, from the lunar-solar tidal forces) as well as navigational errors and changes of course would require the application of power. Hence while nonpowered flying should serve to lengthen range and flight duration, it will be possible only during the intervals between the setting and the correction of course.

NAVIGATION

The determination of location by pilot and instruments within the high-altitude vehicle, or by instruments from the ground, is partly influenced by electronic complications caused by the various ionized layers mentioned before. Furthermore, determination of location is made difficult by the distances which militate against the precision of the instruments. Suppose we want to determine whether a vehicle is over point A or B, the distance between those points on the ground being 415 miles. If A' and B' (the points directly over A and B) are at 50,000 feet, their distance at altitude is 416; at 500,000 feet, however, their distance has grown to 425 miles. This change in distance may

make it "easy" to establish from the ground the precise position of a vehicle but must make it very difficult from the air. The speed of high altitude vehicles is bound to complicate this problem further. Naturally, this does not imply that navigation must be inaccurate at high altitudes. Suitable navigational systems can be adopted, for example, celestial navigation. The point to remember is simply that the stars which will be visible will be dependent on the vehicle's geographic location and that high-altitude flight requires a space or astronomical—and no longer a terrestrial—field of reference.

Two other points must be considered:

1. In order to reach really high altitudes, rocket propulsion is necessary. Rockets cannot rise except along a unidirectional curve, that is, they cannot go up in a spiral. Hence during ascent as well as during descent, they will have to cover many thousands of miles (in terms of ground distance) and may have to go halfway or fully around the globe. Moreover, it is quite probable that the navigational controls—and possibly most other controls—of such flights will have to be done from ground stations. If so, many high-altitude flights will require a network of control stations which must be strung around large portions of the globe, if not the entire globe.

We should add that, in high-altitude flight, it may not be meaningful to describe a position as just a point in space; it may be necessary to talk about a position which is being passed at a given speed in a given direction. Otherwise it will be impossible, in view of the speeds of high-altitude flying, to correct course, among other reasons because it will be necessary to execute maneuvers in such a way that g forces will not become too powerful. Correction of course will have to be undertaken in a very wide area, along circles with radii of many hundreds of miles, and it will not be possible to complete them before a considerable distance has been traveled. It follows that it will often not be possible to set navigational errors right without flying into areas situated above foreign territory.

2. In cases of vertical take-offs for really high altitudes, the movement of the earth itself becomes a factor. Suppose the vehicle rises over A and does not alter its course. Hence after a lapse of time it may find itself "over" a point B located hundreds of miles distant from A. In many cases A will be in another country than B. In present-day flying, we assume the earth to be a fixed point of reference; the location of the vehicle is determined in relation to "immovable" places on the globe.[4] In high altitude flight, we will have to deal with *two* moving bodies, the earth and the vehicle; the "location" of a vehicle on a "vertical" course, except for its altitude, will be dependent on the movement of the earth.

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Now the question arises as to what all this means with respect to political and strategic problems. The first point to remember is that the race is on for ever higher altitudes, although in the minds of military planners this race may be subsidiary to the race for greater speeds. The point is that speed and altitude are interrelated: to gain greater speeds, one must reach higher altitudes, and to attain higher altitudes one must travel at greater speeds. The air force which can reach and operate at higher altitudes and speeds will gain very considerable military advantages, including greater safety from counter-

[4] Long-range ballistic and conventional navigational calculations, however, always must be corrected for the Coriolis effect which is caused by the earth's rotation.

action. The master of speed and altitude will dominate the battle area and will be far along the road to air, and hence global, dominion. In the near future, military power will have to be applied in the 50,000 to 100,000 foot zone. This will be the area where the next really important breakthrough of aviation will have to take place, and this breakthrough probably will be quite difficult.

AIR BOUNDARIES

If we posit, then, that a race for altitude and speed is under way, other interesting complications arise. In the period of land warfare, nations when negotiating about frontiers used to compete stubbornly for so-called "commanding heights"—elevations which permitted a good look into the neighbor's land. The "observation frontier" has now been placed in the air. How high can one fly without affecting the relative military capabilities of one's neighbors through the conquest of altitude above one's own territory? Paradoxically, the quest for security drives men into altitude, but the advance into altitude contracts distances on the ground and eliminates safety zones.

We have seen that in order to reach very high altitudes, ascent and descent trajectories of thousands of miles and widely dispersed ground control nets may be necessary. In some cases, therefore, altitude flights cannot be made "over" one country alone; the vehicle must fly over foreign territory—and rely on control stations in foreign countries—or it never will attain altitude. If it is to be prohibited from using foreign "air space," high-altitude flying would not be practical.

But the question is: Where does a nation's air space or air sovereignty end? At what altitude are we in no man's air or in no man's space? Do we have "open air" like the "open seas," and where? It would be preposterous to claim sovereignty over the air where air no longer exists. As a carrying and oxygen-feeding medium air ends somewhere in the 50,000 to 100,000 foot zone, yet in infinitesimal traces, air reaches up to tremendous heights. The discussion has shown that the upper atmosphere can be subdivided into multiple "layers" and "spheres" and that by about 700,000 feet, most, if not all, of the conditions of "space" prevail. The future of flying is dependent, in part at least, on the freedom of flight in higher altitudes. But what should be the criteria for drawing upper boundaries? It is apparent that simple line frontiers cannot be delineated in the air.

In terrestrial geography we have been accustomed to distinguish between plains and mountains, brooks and creeks, navigable rivers, canals, lakes, seas and oceans. We know that for each of these surfaces (which undergo seasonal changes) different means of transportation are necessary. Similarly, the atmosphere and the adjoining space can be subdivided into distinct parts. Each of these "aerial" zones requires different vehicles and instruments, just as the river requires a rowboat or a ferry and the ocean seagoing ships. The various purposes of flying must be accomplished, moreover, in different altitudes: short-distance travel is best performed at low altitudes, long-distance travel at medium altitudes, and research and combat at high altitudes. There are, in addition, many other purposes for which man takes to the air.

Let us conclude with the remark that the continuing progress of flying cannot be halted. As man reaches upwards to the outer atmosphere, new political problems arise, the nature of which we are as yet unable to grasp. Heretofore the relations between nations took place on what in practice was a plane. During the time of low-altitude flying, the relations between nations and military forces were determined by the geometry of a spheroid's curved surface. This period of close-to-the-ground flying was, and still is, characterized by the "polar concept." Henceforth, international relations will be geared to the more difficult geometry of the interior of a large spheroid enveloping as its core a smaller and impenetrable spheroid, the earth.[5] But even more confusing: the radius of the outer spheroid—symbolizing the aeropause or the altitude which man has attained at any given time—is expanding. The technologically most advanced nation will operate within the highest aeropause, while the spheroids circumscribing the aerial capabilities of the more backward nations will have shorter radii.[6] Hence, in the future, the geometry of power will be described by several enveloping spheroids of different sizes. It will be a far cry from the geometry of the battles of Yorktown and Bastogne, or even from the aerial battles of World War II. Truly, a new *Weltbild* is emerging.

[5] To be really accurate, we should speak of "ellipsoids" instead of spheroids.

[6] Aerial capabilities can be described by spheroids only after global ranges have been attained. Before that time, these capabilities will be portrayed more accurately by spheroidal sectors. The sector with the longest radius and the longest circumferential arc will symbolize the range, altitude, and speed proficiency of the technologically leading air force. The geographic location of the sector also will be of significance. (Note: The military strength of an air force depends on numbers of aircraft, trained personnel, and facilities, *in addition* to technological proficiency.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnett, Lincoln. "The Canopy of Air," *Life*, Vol. 34 (June 8, 1953), pp. 74–98.

———. *The Universe and Dr. Einstein.* New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948.

Haurwitz, Bernard. *The Physical State of the Upper Atmosphere.* Toronto: Royal Astronomical Society of Canada, 1941.

Lovell, Bernard, and J. A. Clegg. *Radio Astronomy.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952.

Miller, A. Austin. *Climatology.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1953.

Murchie, Guy. *Song of the Sky.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954.

Namais, Jerome. *An Introduction to the Study of the Air Mass and Isentropic Analysis.* Boston: American Meteorological Society, 1940.

Newell, Homer E., Jr. *High-Altitude Rocket Research.* New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1953.

Schaub, Werner. "Das Schwerefeld zweier Massen," *Weltraumfahrt*, Vol. 1 (1951), pp. 4–10.

Upper Atmosphere Survey of Data and Theoretical Analysis. Los Angeles: Institute of Geophysics, U.C.L.A., 1950.

"The Vertical Frontier," *Time*, Vol. LXIV (1954), No. 15, pp. 114–122.

White, Clayton S., and Otis O. Benson, Jr. *Physics and Medicine of the Upper Atmosphere: A Study of the Aeropause.* Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico, 1952.

Stefan T. Possony, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., has been since 1946 professor of international politics at the Graduate School of Georgetown University; he is also visiting professor, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. He served formerly as Carnegie fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Long a student of military air problems, he published in 1949 Strategic Air Power.

Leslie Rosenzweig, Washington, D. C., has been since 1946 employed as a geographer by the Department of the Air Force. During World War II he served with the Office of Strategic Services. In 1954, the Department of the Air Force presented him with the Award for Meritorious Civilian Service.

Some Fallacies Concerning Air Power

By Eugene M. Emme *

NO technological innovation in the long history of mankind has been more frequently misinterpreted than aviation as an instrument of national policy. Air power is not understood either as a weapon in general or restricted warfare, or as an agent of commerce and communication. Yet Americans can be said to be air-minded. The crucial race for air-atomic superiority, the heavy burden of military expenditures, and the threat of utter devastation hanging over the urban centers of North America—these are inescapable realities which readily appeal to both reason and emotion on all levels of society.

In determining the best means to support the genuine political interests of the United States in world affairs, air power commands universal attention. Americans are agreed on the paramount importance of air power. Yet this seeming unanimity succumbs to confusion when the capabilities and limitations of aviation are variously assessed by statesmen, humanitarians, politicians, military strategists, and popular opinion. When air power is evaluated in the democratic process of decision making, certain fallacies appear with monotonous regularity. Some of these fallacies derive from obsolete military doctrines or vested interests. Others are products of ignorance, real as well as self-imposed. These fallacies are harmful to the national interest, and thus also to the security of the free world.

* This article reflects the views of the author only and should not be construed as necessarily reflecting official views of the Department of the Air Force or of the Air University.

Perspective on Today

Thoughtful and prophetic speculations on the meaning of air power have not been lacking during the half century of the practical existence of aviation. Invented in an era of rampant nationalism and technically perfected in the crucible of wars, aviation has been primarily developed as a weapon. No nation, however, was prepared to exploit fully the capabilities of aviation as a weapon either in 1914 or in 1939. Likewise, the consistent failure of democratic nations to appreciate the role of aviation in the pursuits of peace, particularly in its maintenance, has been even more apparent.[1]

Early insights

Prior to World War I, high places of government did not abound in forward-looking opinions about aviation and its future. When Santos-Dumont was the first to get off the soil of Europe in a heavier-than-air craft in the fall of 1906, Lord Northcliffe, the British press magnate, fumed: "The news is not that man can fly, but that England is no longer an island." [2] The year before Louis Blériot's channel hop, H. G. Wells wrote in his novel *The War in the Air:*

> In the air are no streets, no channels, no point where one can say of an antagonist, "If he wants to reach my capital he must come by here." In the air all directions lead everywhere.[3]

Wells foretold that air power would revolutionize war as well as the social consequences of war. He considered air war to be a "universal guerrilla war, a war inextricably involving civilians and homes and all the apparatus of social life." In *The World Set Free* (1914), Wells foretold that air power would be raised to its ultimate decisive military role by atomic bombs. In 1909, an obscure Italian Major, Giulio Douhet, wrote:

> It must seem strange that the sky, too, is about to become another battlefield no less important than the battlefields on land and sea. But from now on we had better get accustomed to this idea and prepare ourselves for the new conflicts to come. . . . The struggle for the command of the air will be bitter; and the so-called civilized nations will strive to forge the most telling means to wage the conflict.[4]

And in 1916, a prominent American, Alexander Graham Bell, told the National Convention of the Navy League:

> We must realize that we are only in the infancy of aerial locomotion; that this is only the beginning of things. These are not matured machines that have developed their full offensive power; there is going to be further improvement, and if you will allow your mind to look ahead you can see that land power and sea power will ultimately be secondary in importance to air power.[5]

Impact on England

It was in England, the insular and spiritual homeland of sea power as well as of constitutional political tradition, that the revolutionary impact of aviation was to be first recognized. As diplomatic tension with Germany mounted during the "cold war" of 1912–14, German Zeppelins, massive in size but unproved in war, appeared as a "menace" in the eyes of the English populace. Rumors that German dirigibles had flown over England (possible in theory but pure fantasy in fact) aroused considerable concern. Ghostly flying machines were often observed after midnight. Because of aviation England had obviously lost the geographical immunity which twenty-odd miles of water had previously provided.[6]

During 1914–18, responsible leaders grappled with the realities of three-dimensional warfare. As First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914, Winston Churchill was charged with the defense of the United Kingdom proper. The British Army and its Flying Corps had been totally committed in the bloody deadlock of ground forces in France. Churchill foresaw that air warfare, even in this primitive period, did not possess clearly divisible categories such as offense and defense. He therefore immediately dispatched land-based naval aircraft "to deny the use of territory within 100 miles of Dunkirk to German Zeppelins." While the German Army and Navy fought between themselves over which Zeppelin service was to bomb England when the Imperial Chancellor raised the existing political

[1] For a definition of air power as an instrument of national policy, see E. M. Emme, "The Impact of Air Power upon History," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. 2 (Winter 1948), pp. 1–13.

[2] See Marvin W. McFarland, "When the Airplane Was a Military Secret—A Study of National Attitudes Before 1914" (reprint of an address), *United States Air Services*, Vol. 39 (September, October 1954), pp. 11 f.

[3] *The War in the Air* (London: George Bell, 1908), p. 247. On H. G. Wells's clairvoyance on air warfare, see Professor Edward Mead Earle's essay in E. M. Earle (Ed.), *Nationalism and Internationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 116–18.

[4] Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, translated by Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), pp. 27–28.

[5] "Preparedness for Aerial Defense" (address given April 10, 1916), *Navy League Pamphlet*, No. 73 (Washington, 1916).

[6] A not dissimilar phenomenon perhaps occurred when "flying saucers" were to appear at the same moment the United States lost its isolated continental position in a shrinking world. On "Zeppelin Menace," see John R. Cuneo, *Winged Mars*, Vol. I; *The German Air Weapon, 1870–1914* (Harrisburg: Military Service, 1942), pp. 121–27.

ban on such action, aircraft of the Royal Navy based in France destroyed several German Zeppelins on their home bases in the name of air defense of the United Kingdom.

When Gotha bombers roamed over London in 1916–17, Lloyd George appointed a special committee headed by Field Marshal Jan Smuts to investigate the serious plight of British air defense. While German bombs were falling on London (often evaluated after the war as a mere nuisance), the Smuts Committee unequivocally recommended that an independent air force be instituted immediately. This official report, called by some the Magna Charta of British air power, concluded:

> The day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.
>
> It is important that we should not only secure air predominance, but secure it on a very large scale; and having secured it in this war [1914–18] we should make every effort and sacrifice to maintain it for the future. Air supremacy may in the long run become as important a factor in the defence of the Empire as sea supremacy.[7]

The Independent Air Force of Great Britain for the conduct of a bombing offensive against Germany proper came into being the same year.

Air power during peacetime

For twenty years after its founding in 1919, the autonomous Royal Air Force was known as the Cinderella of the British armed forces. The vanquished nations were disarmed in the air and the League of Nations was delegated the task of regulating the peace for the victors. Under Winston Churchill as Secretary of State for Colonies in 1920, the infant Royal Air Force was adapted to peacetime tasks of the Empire. RAF squadrons served as police forces in the British protectorates and mandates of the Middle East, developing a system for "air control of underdeveloped areas." As the range and reliability of aircraft increased with technical progress in the 1920's, "air parity" became a vital strategic factor for European nations, first appreciated in England. It was determined by the Salisbury Subcommittee of the Committee on Imperial Defense, immediately after the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, that the Royal Air Force should always be strong enough to protect England against air attack by the strongest Continental air force within striking distance. Yet governmental policy based upon the assumption that there would be "no war in ten years" (established in 1924) actually provided for a Royal Air Force only one-half as strong in 1934 as the Salisbury Committee had recommended a decade earlier. Until the eve of World War II, appropriations for the Royal Air Force, though rapidly increased after 1935, were less than that for the Royal Navy and the British Army. In 1938, Britain was humbled at Munich largely because of her deficiencies in the air. Eventually, in 1940, Britain was forced to fight alone in the air for her very life.

Threat of aerial bombardment during peacetime

The diplomatic significance of the threat of aerial bombardment during the cold war of the 1930's is even now not fully appreciated. A brief summary of this painful episode may help provide perspectives for the reorientation of American policy today.

[7] Great Britain, "Second Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence Against Air Raids," August 17, 1917.

Atomic bombs are merely the second chapter of the air power story for most Europeans. Weapons of mass destruction were highly publicized long before and during the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments held at Geneva in 1932–33. Poison gas and bacteria rained down from aircraft conjured nightmares of what total war could mean in Europe. While Soviet Russia today propagandizes a desire to outlaw atomic bombs, there was an attempt made at Geneva in 1933 to outlaw all aerial bombing. In "air-forceless Germany" (to use Hermann Goering's expression), the political device of building air raid shelters and conducting civil defense exercises was used to consolidate the populace under the young Nazi government in 1933. While secret rearmament and public works solved unemployment and social discontent within Germany, Adolf Hitler and Air Minister Goering were forging a new diplomatic weapon, the *Luftwaffe*.

In March 1935, after the independent German Air Force was "pulled out of the hat" of secrecy in direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles, British diplomats hurried to Berlin. Hitler told them that Germany now possessed "air parity" with Britain. This boast—a brazen lie—shocked British public opinion and British leadership to the core. Widely disseminated statistics on Germany's "first-line aircraft" aroused in Britain a feeling of helplessness and a fear of air attack which thereafter were to congeal in British political appeasement of Germany until the blitzkrieg in Poland and in British military inactivity during the phony war until May 1940 when Hitler seized the military initiative in the West.

"The bomber will always get through" was not a quotation from a doctrinal manual of the Royal Air Force. It was a fatalistic statement made in rebuttal by Prime Minister Baldwin to one of Winston Churchill's regular attacks in the House of Commons upon the imperfect state of British air defenses in 1934. The Royal Observer Corps, the "Shadow Factory" scheme for widening the base of aircraft production, radar development, the Spitfire prototype, and the mass production of gas masks—all these were stimulated by the events of 1935–36. Yet Britain and France remained reluctant even at this late hour to rearm fully. The bombing demonstrations in Manchuria by Japan, in Ethiopia by the *Regia Aeronautica,* and in the Spanish Civil War by the *Luftwaffe* magnified popular revulsion against the horror which a general war would bring to all of Europe; likewise the boasts of Goering, the apparent expansionistic designs of the Nazi Reich, and the "shop window" tours of the *Luftwaffe* skillfully conducted by the Germans for foreign military observers. Anti-Communism, anti-Semitism, and prosperity in Germany were also not ineffective tools of Nazi statecraft in influencing public opinion abroad. Subtle suggestions and eventually intimidation, blackmail, and naked ultimatums backed by the threat of bombing held over the leaders of European nations characterized the increasingly prominent diplomatic role of the *Luftwaffe* between 1935 and 1939.

When in 1938 war was postponed at Munich, the belief held by British and French statesmen as well as their peoples that the German Air Force was an overwhelmingly powerful threat was of decisive importance in achieving Hitler's bloodless victory. Britain possessed only six Spitfires. In Paris there were not enough gas masks to go around. British and French leaders therefore recoiled before the inhumane evil of a horrible war. Virtually the last thing that Chamberlain said to Hitler at Munich was that he hoped that the *Luftwaffe* would not have to

bomb the women and children of Prague when the Third Reich absorbed the Sudetenland. It was thus that the threat of massive air attacks, albeit more inferred by democratic statesmen than explicitly advanced by the Nazis, proved to be of profound historical importance.[8] In March 1939, Goering pounded the table in front of the helpless Czech diplomats and stated that he would be chagrined to have to unleash his *Luftwaffe* to destroy the "beautiful city of Prague."

In the present day, the fate of the West seems to depend upon the response of peace-loving nations to the challenge of militant Communism with air-atomic power building up in its arsenal. The inherent vulnerability of democratic nations to threats of an atomic holocaust by an aggressor nation, not to mention the decisiveness of a surprise all-out atomic attack itself, only increases the urgency for collective security actions, adequate preparedness in the air, and, if and when necessary, the will to use decisive military force. This seems to be the harsh lesson taught by air power's contribution to the descent into World War II.

CONTRADICTIONS OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Past miscalculation and fallacies with respect to air power are not confined to those revealed by the conduct of democratic governments faced by the threat of air attack by aggressive-minded nations during periods of relative peace. A brief consideration of theories on air warfare reflects the impact of aviation upon the meaning of warfare. It also clarifies the divergencies and vagaries of military doctrine.

Early theorists on the military role of aviation in some instances can rightfully be called prophets. Their views, like those of most prophets, were dogmatic and were distasteful to most of their contemporaries. Though "Billy" Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard, and Giulio Douhet were each guilty of overestimating the technical capacities of aviation in their own time, some of their most controversial thoughts seem to possess validity in the present day. Their exaggerations of the presumable effects of tons of trinitrotoluene dropped from aircraft were the result of miscalculation. Yet the demonstrated role during World War II of tactical air forces in land battles, the effective TNT strategic air attacks, and the subsequent addition of atomic bombs appear to have verified their conclusions based upon empirical reasoning.

Neither Douhet nor Mitchell were military thinkers in the realm of high strategy and national policy like Clausewitz and Mahan. Douhet did essay a framework of strategic concepts which fits air-atomic realities fairly well. His views of air attack as a decisive action for the demoralization of a nation seem well founded. Mitchell had a global view of American security in the air age (he pointed to the importance of Alaska and predicted the attack on Pearl Harbor), and he defined air power as a national instrumentality in its broadest economic as well as its military sense. Neither their theories nor their historical fame need be elaborated here. It is sufficient to point out that in 1921 they were one in believing that air power as a military force had revolutionized warfare because it brought the heart of industrialized and urbanized nations into the battlefield. This basic belief challenged the traditional purpose of armies and navies and questioned their

[8] The most recent account is in Viscount Chilston's "The Rearmament of Great Britain, France, and Germany down to the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938," Veronica M. Toynbee (Ed.), *Survey of International Affairs, 1938*, Vol. III (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 460–603.

plans and structures. Douhet and Mitchell both insisted, at the cost of their careers (while Trenchard went to the House of Lords), that a nation should organize its aviation capacity in peace to assure "command in the air" in war.

The limited range and the unreliability of aircraft in the 1920's and early 1930's were not conducive to a rapid acceptance of air-age realities in a United States girded by broad oceans. With no more than five months' combat experience in World War I, a few American airmen nonetheless developed rich theories on a thin diet of meager appropriations and slow career advancement. By 1935, the United States had its four-engined B-17 (flying fortress) prototype in the air. In World War II, air armadas of four-engined bombers were to carry TNT war to German and Japanese cities. While both Germany and Japan began the war with startling employment of air forces, their leaders did not really understand the role of air power in war. Atomic air weapons reconciled the hitherto contradictory principles of "mobility" and "concentration of firepower." No longer are there any disputes about the decisiveness of strategic bombing in general war. No longer are there any disputes about the priority role of air forces in achieving "air superiority" over battlefields, in general or limited wars.

The Battle of Britain (1940) and the fate of Germany's air defense effort (1942–45), moreover, adequately demonstrated the crucial role of bombers in homeland air defense. The first raid of Bomber Command on Berlin altered decisively the course of the Battle of Britain—a fact not generally known. It caused an enraged Hitler to order the *Luftwaffe* to shift the attack from RAF bases and radar sites to the city of London. This was done at the most ineffectual moment of Fighter Command, which was also "their finest hour." The V-weapons failed to resurrect for the dying Reich any real hope of stemming the "air terror" of the Anglo-American bomber offensive. In the Pacific, the lack of range of Allied aircraft and the inaccessibility or unavailability of Siberian bases delayed the application of Allied air power to the task of obtaining the decision without an occupation of Japan by surface forces. The advent of atomic bombs merely underscored the revolutionary impact of air power upon general war. As one civilian military analyst recorded in 1946, the atomic bomb did not make air power more violent or more decisive: "A city can be as effectively destroyed with TNT and incendiaries—but it [the atomic bomb] will concentrate violence in terms of time."[9] The possible concentration in a general war of violence against an entire nation relegates military doctrine founded exclusively upon World War II or even upon the unique Korean experience to the realm of pure fallacy.

WELTER OF CONFUSION ON JOINT OPERATIONS

Questions regarding the role of air forces employed in joint operations with other military forces arouse the greatest confusion. Here, doctrinal traditions and service interests have been the chief source of fallacies both in the past and in the present. Military professionals have consistently thought of aviation in terms of their traditional war objectives. The airplane was tethered to surface forces. This was practicable during the infancy of aviation, but it affected adversely the organization and application of air power. A major intellectual road block raised by tradition-minded thinking in the

[9] Bernard Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), pp. 70–71.

past yet remains: so far, a comprehensive military theory of air power has not been elaborated.

The basic assumptions of conventional military thought as laid down by Clausewitz and Mahan remained impervious to the influence of air power until World War II. Admirals and Army generals viewed the airplane as eyes to protect their respective battleships or troops in the line until World War II, some until Pearl Harbor or North Africa. With aircraft ship based, naval airmen considered aircraft primarily as a weapon of sea power for sinking enemy battleships, and later for bombing U-boat pens and enemy aircraft carriers. Military air power, first with the piloted airplane and now with guided missiles, has been consistently regarded by Army and Navy authorities as range-extended artillery. Airlift provides increased mobility or logistical support for infantry. Air weapons, traditionalists reason, should thus be organically instituted within armies and navies.

Military capabilities of aircraft

The range, speed of penetration, and directness of air attack thus have been either totally ignored or, at best, limited in strategical or tactical significance to armies in the field and navies at sea. These unique military capabilities of aircraft and their military payloads, on the other hand, have been the stock in trade of professional airmen. The records of many lengthy and heated interservice debates, even though overtaken in detail by the pace of continued scientific advance, provide documentation for many contemporary controversies.[10] The more strongly the airmen voice their long-held views on the splintering of air power, particularly that of tactical and airlift units among the various American air forces, the more they appear to be charged with expressing their so-called "vested interests." The professional airman insists, in turn, that the only "vested interests" involved are those of the nation. Yet among the prominent political figures in the Western world only Winston Churchill took the pains in 1949 to repeat in timely and poetic fashion the fundamental assumption expressed by the Smuts Committee in 1917:

> For good or ill, air mastery is today the supreme expression of military power, and fleets and armies, however necessary and important, must accept subordinate rank. This is a memorable milestone in the march of men.[11]

Such words cannot be easily dismissed if one has read Churchill's memoirs of World War II and its cautious evaluation of the joint roles of the respective armed forces in that TNT war. Whereas airmen have been reluctant to press for the proper employment of armies and navies, their opposite numbers in the sister services have been quick to appreciate how air forces can provide powerful but ancillary support for surface forces.

The dynamic pace of technical progress indicates, with intercontinental aircraft and missiles a near reality (not to mention space vehicles), that even the earth's atmosphere is no longer the limit. All that the Congressional investigation of "Unification and Strategy" in 1949 could clearly record was that interservice differences with respect to the role of air power in military affairs "will continue because of fundamental professional disagreements on the art of warfare."

[10] See following reports (titles abbreviated): American Aviation Board (1919), Dickman Board (1919), Graham Committee (1919), Menoher Board (1919), Lassiter Board (1923), Lampert Committee (1924), Morrow Board (1925), Drum Board (1933), Baker Board (1934), Howell Commission (1934), Woodrum Committee (1944), Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense (1944–45), Eberstadt Committee (1945), and the House "Unification and Strategy" Hearings (1949).

[11] From Churchill's speech in Boston, "United We Stand," *Vital Speeches*, Vol. 15 (April 1, 1949), pp. 380–84.

ORGANIZATION OF AIR POWER

Concern with the inadequate organization of the air power of the United States under the National Defense Act of 1947 and its amendments has been clearly manifested by the Navy attack on the B-36's in 1948 and the post-Korean campaign of the Army for tactical aviation. A reluctance of airmen to voice *their* own dissatisfaction may have been based upon the fallacy that they had finally in 1947 won "Billy" Mitchell's battle. The belated creation of an independent Department of the Air Force (three decades, no less, after the creation of the Royal Air Force) was, however, coupled with the creation of the Department of Defense over the three services. Thus, the United States became the only major nation in the world possessing the questionable luxury of four separate military air services: the Naval Air Force, the Marine Air Force, Army Aviation, and the United States Air Force. As one independent critic sympathetic with the latter air force has pointed out:

> The National Defense Act which purported to create a Department of Air, custodial of air power, conversely dispersed air power and invited continuous dispersement.[12]

One central issue most copiously documented by the "Unification and Strategy" investigation of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee in 1949 was that revolving around the question of which American air force was to do what in the business of air power devoted to national security. There was no disagreement about the dominance of air power in national security. There was no disagreement about the dominance of air power in national military strategy or the requirement for "air superiority" in peace or varying degrees of war. Arguments over the feasibility of "strategic bombing" and how the inevitable "battle for the air" should be won revolved around the issue over which one of these several air forces could perform or should control this mission. These differences of opinion only compounded confusion on American air power as an instrument of national policy.

USAF

Neither the limited Korean experience and the creation of the prospect of future limited wars nor the announcement of the Soviet H-explosion in 1953 has appeared to cause any major alteration of America's basic organization for defense or the aviation tasks assigned to the various armed services as of 1947. All of the military services expanded during the Korean War. The United States Air Force (USAF) logically remains the primary military instrument of American air power. It is the American air service charged by statute with primary responsibility for the air defense of North America, as well as for maintaining what is not improperly called the "first line of national defense," the Strategic Air Command. It is also responsible for tactical aviation in joint operations with ground forces. Yet the Secretary of the USAF and the USAF Chief of Staff have no advisory seats in the National Security Council. The civilian Secretary of the USAF has no seat in the President's Cabinet. No airman from the ranks of the USAF has yet been named Chairman of the

[12] Gil Robb Wilson, "The Public View of the Air Force," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. 6 (Winter 1953–54), p. 4.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. No ex-Secretary of the USAF has been raised to be Secretary of Defense. With the exception of the Alaskan and Northeast Air Commands, neither of which possesses significant commitments of land or sea forces, no USAF officer has yet been appointed commander of a major overseas theater command. Sheer time may rectify some of these matters which, outwardly at any rate, seem to reflect the fact that the realities of air power may not have been properly represented in the national organization for defense. But if counsel and judgment on major military matters involving air power are desired at the highest decision-making level of government (perhaps civil control itself) the organization for defense should logically reflect this in personal military and civil responsibility at the proper level. Political organizations and military commands remain, after all, human institutions. There is no substitute in a democracy for the virtues of personal responsibility and leadership.

General wars and limited wars

Governmental organization for defense should accommodate the prominence of air power in the air-atomic age, so that the nation's military interests may be best served. These basic military interests of the nation, all seem to agree, are survival by the prevention of an all-out general war, or, if war is forced upon us, the decisive prosecution of limited wars or, in the last resort, of an all-out war. In terms of these explicit and indisputable military interests of the United States, wishful thinking seems to be giving rise to the fallacious hope of turning the strategic clock back to 1945. This fallacy now is clothed in a political-military doctrine that would ban the discriminate use of air-delivered atomic weapons in small wars limited by political and geographical circumstances. Nothing perhaps could more encourage future Communist aggression. The nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have apparently accepted the necessary role of air-atomic weapons in their defensive strategy. The decision not to use A-weapons in the Korean War appears to offer no precedent for future decisions concerning the prosecution of a limited war.

American military power is today committed to deter, or to fight if necessary, any Communist aggression supported by the implied threat or actual use of military forces be they guerrilla, conventional, or atomic. Appeasement of Communist aggression entails ultimate strategic disadvantages which might well approximate suicide for the United States and its allies. The lesson of British appeasement and military weakness and the decline of collective security in the 1930's (culminating in the temporary surrender at Munich, the fall of France, and the hairbreadth escape from defeat in the Battle of Britain) appear highly pertinent for today. Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott tersely expressed recently the crux of the matter as follows:

> I am afraid the new phrase, peaceful coexistence, means just that. You exist if you are too tough to tackle. You perish if you are weak and unready.[13]

The probability of World War III cannot be assumed. Such an assumption would only help to make it inevitable. But to organize and to plan military power for any less comprehensive contingency could be no less catastrophic. The only genuine deterrent to all-out war is the maintenance of retaliatory power as a means of punishment designed to fit that crime of aggression. The first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, formerly Secretary of the Navy, recorded in 1948:

[13] *New York Times,* November 28, 1954, p. E-1.

> . . . throughout my recent trip to Europe I was increasingly impressed by the fact that the only balance that we have against the overwhelming manpower of the Russians, and therefore the chief deterrent to war, is the threat of immediate retaliation with the atomic bomb.[14]

The Soviet possession of an air-atomic capability against the United States only increases the value of the deterrent role of the Strategic Air Command in American security. Yet there are those who appear to reason fallaciously that mutual capabilities for H-bomb destruction of the United States and the Soviet Union have eliminated the deterrent role of air power. The H-bomb deliverable by aircraft (including guided missiles) could be the greatest deterrent to general war ever known.

To organize and prepare military forces to fight *only* global general wars or *only* limited peripheral wars or *not* to fight at all, these are all fallacious concepts. Such fallacies merely point up the central dilemma of democracies in reconciling military and political means of survival. This is as true for the security of the United States itself as it is for the collective security of all free nations instituted in NATO or under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. It is a serious fallacy to reason that air power can be suitably employed only in total war. Nuclear weapons are weapons of air power, not substitutes for it. Moreover, atomic weapons are no longer the exclusive weapons of air forces. There are many other weapons possessing a multiplicity of firepower effects which can be used with discrimination for a variety of decisive military results.

[14] Dictated memoranda after European tour in mid-November 1948, "Points for the President," the first one being on the atomic bomb. Walter Millis (Ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 537–38.

No responsible airman in the last decade has asserted that air power can do everything by itself, or even anything entirely by itself. But the diversion to missions of limited war in support of ground and naval forces of tactical air forces inevitably weakens the strength of over-all air defense and the strength of strategic striking forces. This was demonstrated by the Korean experience. Tactical air forces are today long-range air forces and carry atomic weapons. Thus, tactical air forces should play an indispensable "close-support" role in both continental air defense and the strategic air offense in a general war. If there should be future Koreas or limited wars fought with air and naval forces, weakening of the ultimate military power of the Western nations must be minimized if World War III is to be prevented.

Unified air power

The "unity" of air power—incorporating all strategic, tactical, and defense air forces—must be considered, then, a prime organizational requisite for economic preparation for *both* World War III and such "brush fire" wars as American and allied military forces may be committed to. The requirement for homeland security appears of highest priority. Only unified air power satisfies the requirement of preparing to fight, if necessary, either general or limited wars. The rebuilding of North Korean airfields and the growth of the Red Chinese Air Force, for example, indicate the importance which Communists appear to give to "air superiority" in possible future localized conflicts. Air power was the military factor which shaped the nature of ground operations in Korea, a fact many seem already to have forgotten, since "air superiority" was primarily granted to United Nations forces by default. Properly uni-

fied, American air power could be hurt in limited wars, but it could not be destroyed.

After a detailed examination of the fate of the air arm of the United States Army prior to and during World War I, one cautious and dispassionate historian concluded:

> Thoughtful citizens, layman and specialist, politician, and staff officers, would do well to ask and ask again if the military establishment . . . is sufficiently well organized to develop and exploit . . . these newest weapons on the horizon [e.g., guided missiles]. Failing here, the nation will repeat the sorry pattern of the air weapon, wastefully groping forward with each innovation.[15]

Mobilization and power in being

The planning of national defense for future wars must be guided by the following axiom: In a future general war, the United States cannot again depend upon its allies for time to mobilize. The achievements in mobilization and production of the United States in two world wars offer no precedents for the solution of new problems posed by the threat of devastating air attack upon all major American cities within the space of a few days. The problem of strategic dispersal to meet the possibility of a wholesale atomic Pearl Harbor imposes a terrible burden upon the entire structure of our urbanized and democratic society. It is the problem of no less than dispersing an entire nation. This problem, whether it is posed in terms of a "long" or a "short," a "limited" or a "general" war, cannot be fully and completely resolved. Yet it must be faced squarely. One student of command and organization in modern war concludes as follows:

> The real danger of war to a democracy lies in the initial blow. Totalitarian nations, especially in this atomic age, are better fitted to plan and deliver a sudden and powerful assault than a democracy. If this trump card fails they become inferior to democracies, but the democratic state must be able to survive the first murderous blows. We must be defended by adequate and scientifically up-to-date forces. Our machinery for the higher direction of war must be capable of operating immediately under war conditions.[16]

To survive the "first murderous blows" presents problems which can only be clarified in terms of home-front battlefield realities. Their solution, like that of the entire problem of civil defense, rests with all the American people. There is obviously nothing economic or inexpensive about the strategic problems created by air power, either in terms of dollars or blood. No responsible airman has yet said that air power was a "cheap" way to prevent or to fight World War III or to fight even a limited war. The terrific pace of scientific advances and the rapid obsolescence of aircraft and weapons preclude "cheapness" in the face of the requirement for maintaining effective military forces-in-being. Realistic preparedness of an industrialized society for war prohibits fallacious thinking. It remains primarily a question of how much the nation can afford *not* to spend on readiness and dispersion, a figure which may best be determined by assessing the actual military threat and intentions posed by the potential enemy.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND AIR POWER

The relationships between politics and technology in this age of global-ranged air vehicles and their A-bomb payloads present highly delicate questions when one speaks of fallacies. Yet it seems that the capabilities of air power have been improperly evaluated throughout the whole period of its evolution, first exaggerated in immediate importance by its frustrated champions, then reluctantly and incompletely accepted by its jaundiced critics.

The decisions and actions which must be taken concerning air power today and tomorrow present a crucial challenge to democratic statesmen. It was possible for peaceful Britain to err in the 1930's and yet, with horrible cost and difficulty, survive in 1940. Now one aircraft with global range and one bomb may accomplish with ease more destruction than a fleet of TNT bombers were able to accomplish with difficulty in 1945. It would be a fallacy to assume that the existence of an intercontinental ballistic missile with a hydrogen war head changes the basic strategic problem of 1955 for the United States. A so-called "IBM" would merely be able to do more easily and more quickly what ordinary aircraft can be made to do now.

After tracing the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, an eighteenth-century historian held the comfortable view that the invention of gunpowder had so complicated the art of war that "barbarians" would have to become civilized before they could conquer. To Edward Gibbon, technological progress and moral growth were reciprocal developments. He could not foresee a time when man's scientific prowess would far outrun his political genius. Today, the entire world is influenced by a struggle between Western nations and militant Communism, and by the emergence of vast underdeveloped nations spurred on by nationalistic fervor. The United States stands as the leader of the Western nations in the struggle for the creation of a more perfect peace. Air power is the new military factor which has given to the most aggressive-minded nation decisive force with which to exploit the initiative. With the implied backing of force aggressors can exploit the political initiative with the subtle or naked *threat* of devastating force or, if they choose, the decisive *use* of overwhelming force. Instant or massive retaliation becomes meaningless if an aggressor air force can destroy with surprise devastation the total capacity or the will of a nation to retaliate.

Purposes of military power

Admiral Mahan clearly pointed out in his time the important distinction between the military offensive and the political initiative, which, he said, was one fundamental to any intelligent program of military preparedness. Mahan explained:

> A navy for defence only, in the *political* sense, means a navy that will only be used in case we are forced into war; a navy for defence only, in the *military* sense, means a navy that can only await attack and defend its own, leaving the enemy at ease as regards his own interests, and at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting.[17]

With respect to air power, these words might well be recalled when the terms "retaliation," "initiative," and even "air defense" are used without precise relation to political or military circumstances. The defensive political role of the United States air-atomic offensive capability, as well as the dominant but not exclusive role of air forces employed in wars that are limited politically, must be clearly defined both in terms of political objectives and of *all* available military means. The United States and its allies have no claim to that initia-

[15] I. B. Holley, Jr., *Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 178. Particular commendation here should be given Professor Holley's superb accounting of the sparseness of analyses of air power problems by serious scholars; see pp. 179–209.

[16] Sir Robert Saundby, "The Higher Direction of War" (lecture at London University), *The Aeroplane,* Vol. 74 (February 20, 1948), pp. 210–11.

[17] "Current Fallacies upon Naval Subjects," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine,* Vol. 97 (June 1898), p. 45.

tive in international politics which the Soviet and neutral powers of the world can exert at will, regardless of what the United States and its allies may do.

Air power employed with its full military capability should make the price of general world war virtually, though perhaps not totally, unacceptable. This seems particularly valid if one holds that man's ideas are of ultimately higher importance than man's machines of destruction. George Catlett Marshall reasoned:

> We have before us the greatest task ever faced by any generation of men in the fight to preserve peace. War, I say again, is no longer an evil. In this age, it seems intolerable. There is nothing to be said in favor of war except that it is the lesser of two evils. It is better than appeasement of aggression, because appeasement encourages the aggression it seeks to prevent; and it is far better than submission to tyranny and oppression, because without freedom and respect for human dignity, life would not be worth living.[18]

Traditionally, the purpose of military power of democratic nations has been to provide time for moral ideas to bring on peaceful change rather than to achieve change by force of arms. Weapons are not the sole means of determining national policy. Peace and war, however, are no longer absolute conditions. The threat of an atomic holocaust is here to stay. Communism continues to thrive and to threaten. At the moment of this writing, the best hope of mankind is that, whatever the role of force in the future, the most potent political ideas and military instruments, as well as the will to survive, may be on the side of the most peacefully inclined nations.

[18] Memorial Day Address, Washington, D. C., May 30, 1949.

Eugene M. Emme, Ph.D., Montgomery, Alabama, is professor of modern European history and international politics at the Air University and research adviser on the Air War College faculty. During World War II he was a civil flight instructor for the Army Air Forces and later a naval aviator and historical officer. He is author of studies and articles, and is completing a book on Luftpolitik: German Air Power, 1919–1939.

The Scope of United States Air Strategy

By THOMAS D. WHITE

THE United States Air Force is an instrument available to the American people for their common defense and for the advancement of their national interests. The often awesome achievements of science have made that instrument one of unprecedented power: the jet-nuclear Air Force of today constitutes the most potent assembly of organized military strength in history. Air power is a strong and ready tool of United States policy. It is the principal military means with which the American people can meet the perils of an age of danger. It seems worth the time of any American to consider how the United States air power can be used to reduce our common jeopardy, which is persistent and growing.

Air power is a component of the total national strength wielded by the President in an effort to achieve national security. The national program for security embraces many elements in addition to air power. The political, the economic, and the psychological factors play essential parts. Surface forces of the United States and the military capabilities of allies add their contribution. Requirements for national security pose vast and complex problems. There are no quick and easy solutions, no miracle cures. Air power is not *the* answer: it is but one of many vital components which must be employed in a co-ordinated fashion to bring us closer to our goal of national security, and in the process protect our basic freedoms.

In January 1955, President Eisenhower described his concept of the scope of United States air power as it was given to us by the facts of the atomic age. The President set forth the following fundamental propositions:

> We should base our security upon military formations which make maximum use of science and technology in order to minimize numbers of men.

Though the President did not call attention to the fact explicitly, it is true that air power, using modern technologies, can bring greater force to bear on an enemy at less exposure of United States personnel than can any other military force available to the United States. Science has given us nuclear munitions which permit *one* aircraft to deliver more explosive power on hostile forces than has been released in all wars since the invention of gunpowder. Not only can United States air power bring such volcanic devastation to the battlefield at small direct exposure of American manpower, but by doing so air power reduces the exposure of friendly surface forces to the full strength of the enemy. The enemy division destroyed deep in hostile territory by our air power is a division that will wreak no casualties on friendly troops. Of perhaps greater importance is the fact that the enemy bomber blasted to oblivion by our air power while it is loading a cargo of death will not deliver that cargo on our own personnel, civilian or military, nor on our cities.

AIR POWER AS DETERRENT

To continue with the President's conclusions:

> Due to the destructiveness of modern weapons and the increasing efficiency of long-range bombing aircraft, the United

States has reason, for the first time in history, to be deeply concerned over the serious effects which a sudden attack could conceivably inflict upon our country.

Here the President has put his finger on the monstrous capabilities of nuclear air power. These capabilities in the hands of the enemy pose the possibility of unprecedented damage, almost unthinkable damage, to the industrial heart of our nation, as well as to the true base of our strength—our nation itself. In all the wars of our history the American nation has suffered less than 600,000 men killed. In these wars, damage to the basic industrial plant and to the cities of the United States has been slight. Such effects of war as did occur, for example in our early wars, were inflicted on the United States over a period of years. Today and hereafter, however, full use of the nuclear capabilities possessed by our enemies could produce *in one hour* millions of deaths among our citizens and indescribable destruction of our national industry. To be sure, such damage to the United States is only a fraction of that which would be inflicted upon our enemies by our own counterattacking air forces. To say this is not to suggest a sour satisfaction that the enemy would suffer more grievously than we. Rather, it is to suggest that the enemy may be persuaded not to deliver the attack which would invoke our withering counterblow.

The next conclusion of the President is related to the preceding one:

> Our first objective must therefore be to maintain the capability to deter an enemy from attack and to blunt that attack, if it comes, by a combination of effective retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing effectiveness. These two tasks logically demand priority in all planning.

To deter an enemy from attack, one must pose a consequence of aggression so grave that the potential attacker dares not provoke it. The simple fact is that the United States possesses only *one* military capability *in being* which poses a deadly enough threat to our enemies. That capability is expressed in nuclear air power. There is another important facet of an effective deterrent —*immediacy*. A deterrent influence is at its greatest effectiveness when the consequences of invoking it are immediate rather than delayed. Here again, nuclear air power constitutes the only capability available to the United States by which a potential aggressor could be confronted instantly with the consequences of his aggression—consequences which would be most likely to be disastrous to him.

RETALIATION

If by misfortune our deterrent should fail to restrain our enemies, we must be prepared to deal with the ensuing deadly events. As the President has said, this problem requires a combination of effective retaliation and aerial defense. To be effective, retaliation against an attacker engaged in efforts to deliver nuclear weapons on American cities must virtually paralyze the aggressor and do so quickly. Such retaliation must destroy the bases and facilities supporting nuclear attacks against the Western Hemisphere, eliminate the systems of communications and controls within the aggressor country through which the assault is being directed, and break the industrial structure which provides the sinews of war to the enemy forces. This must be done with maximum speed. We dare not risk being hit by one avoidable hydrogen bomb for want of urgency in our reaction. If there is a military means of accomplishing these results rapidly other than with nuclear air power, I do not know what it might be.

Equally powerful and effective must be our operations to halt the movements of enemy forces into areas such as Western Europe and free Asia. In the past, air forces limited to trinitrotoluene munitions have found the task of dealing with, or stopping, advancing ground forces exceedingly difficult. The limited destructiveness of TNT explosives required great accuracy for any effect, and the small lethal radius of these explosives limited the results of even bull's-eye shots. With nuclear munitions, however, concentrations of enemy forces can be obliterated. Whether a nuclear bomb explodes five hundred feet to the right or left, over or short, will be of only statistical interest. It seems clear, therefore, that nuclear air power should be capable of denying to concentrated surface forces access to any area, by land or sea. This fact is the greatest single element of security for our allies.

CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

The President stated our need for a continental defense system with steadily increasing effectiveness. As it exists today and as it is planned into the future, our continental defense system rests primarily on the capabilities of the United States Air Force. Our Canadian neighbors have made and will continue to make substantial contributions to the defense of North America. Yet they will not judge it unreasonable when I say that the United States Air Force provides the primary elements of such defense.

Research and development continue apace in the field of antiaircraft missiles. But the manned combat aircraft remains our principal defensive weapon and will so remain for many years to come. None of our defensive-weapons systems have yet achieved such sureness that the offensive bomber can be prevented from reaching its target. Using every means of air defense available to the United States, and using them well, we can exact serious losses from the attacking bomber fleets. The odds remain with the attacker, however. Only by the establishment of defenses in depth and by exploiting fully the cushion of time afforded to us by our far-flung strategic deployments can we hope to reduce these odds.

New, and even more effective, methods of air attack are in the offing. One of the most formidable of these new weapons is the intercontinental ballistic missile. When this missile is added to the arsenal of an attacker, defending forces will be faced with a whole series of new and even more difficult problems. Today there is no known defense against it. Countering this weapon has been likened to tossing needles from opposite ends of a darkened hallway, with the hope they might collide.

Thus, the present substantial advantage of the air offense over the air defense may be widened to unbridgeable dimensions. Antimissile defense is, at best, a most difficult business. Advantages of initiative, surprise, and diversified methods of attack weigh heavily on the side of the offensive force. Accordingly, we must attach these very offensive advantages to our own cause by utilizing long-range air power to cripple the attacker at his launching bases before he can complete the destruction of the United States. Timeliness in this action is supremely important.

SUPPORT OF INDIGENOUS FORCES

The foregoing are the areas of military action in which the President has marked out crucial roles for air power. There are additional tasks which United States air power can and does perform. The President alluded to one of these as follows:

> To provide for meeting lesser hostile actions—such as local aggression not broadened by the intervention of a major ag-

gressor's forces—growing reliance can be placed upon the forces now being built and strengthened in many areas of the free world. But because this reliance cannot be complete and because our own vital interests, collective security, and pledged faith might well be involved, there remain certain contingencies for which the United Nations should be ready with mobile forces to help indigenous troops deter local aggression, direct or indirect.

Thus the President contemplates the need of assisting indigenous troops in their efforts to meet aggression. The immutable facts of geography place the United States at vast distances from those free world countries which might be threatened by an aggressor. If United States forces are to come to the aid of such countries before it is too late, great speed of movement is required. Because many friendly overseas countries are weak and because the potential aggressor is militarily strong, American assistance must not only be moved rapidly over thousands of miles; it also must display true effectiveness once it has arrived on the battlefield. The qualities of mobility and strength can be offered best from nuclear air power.

It is also true that the indigenous forces maintained by potential overseas victims of aggression are largely ground forces. The costly and complicated factor of military air power must be contributed in substantial part by the United States.

WITHIN THESE LIMITS

The President stated: "We will never commit aggression but we must always be ready to defeat it." This American philosophy of not exercising the strategic initiative imposes great handicaps to our military posture. Our American armed forces must stand prepared to deal with the hostile acts of a powerful and deceptive enemy whenever, wherever, and however he may attempt to strike us. Through bitter experience we have learned that the enemy's action may be sudden and surprising, as in Korea, and that it may be carried forward with the shock effect of overtly employed armed forces. Again, the enemy's acts may be slow burning and camouflaged in the false garb of spurious "civil war," as in Indochina. Or the enemy may strike in the political field, his actions being devoid of widespread violence, as in Hungary, or, lastly, he may employ his armed forces for blackmail, forcing decisions through the patent threat of their nearness, as in Czechoslovakia. Thus we are confronted with a deadly variety of Communist strategics. Yet we must be prepared to defeat Communist aims, despite the apparent handicaps imposed upon us by our own philosophy.

A normal reaction to such a difficult problem as given to us by our aversion against striking the first blow would be to strengthen our armed forces far beyond Communist strength, and keep increasing them as Communist capabilities for aggression increase. We should do this, I suppose, were we unmindful of a related proposition set forth by President Eisenhower: "True security for our country must be founded on a strong and expanding economy, readily convertible to the tasks of war."

Here is a quarrel with any concept of unlimited expansion of United States armed forces. What irony, to build our armed forces and the monumental burden of their support to such proportions as to collapse our economy! What price military strength, if that strength itself were to become the cause of a fatal erosion of our vital institutions?

Taken together, these last two considerations cited by the President mean that our United States armed forces must be capable of timely and effective reaction to enemy aggressive intentions, but at the same time must not be excessively burdensome on our economy. Thus we are constrained to support only those military forces which offer the greatest all-round utility and effectiveness against possible enemy actions. Moreover, we must support military forces which inherently possess great mobility, great effectiveness, and—above all—speed. It can hardly be doubted that such qualities are most apparent in nuclear air power.

SCOPE OF AIR STRATEGY

What, then, is the scope of air strategy in this nuclear age? Its scope is that of the slow-burning conflict smouldering around the divided earth. Its scope is that of our current and future national peril, which is greater by far than any ever before known. The scope of air strategy embraces the steady effort of the United States, with ready strength to deter war; it ranges from the lesser tragedies of local conflicts to the dread collision of continents in arms. With all Americans, the United States Air Force prays that there shall never be a time when the United States must use the instrument of air power in all its inhuman fury. Yet, should that time come, American air power will make of it a last, fleeting moment of frustration to those who plunged the world into disaster, an instant of realized error before they are enveloped in the fiery shrouds of our nuclear retribution. Such is our final strategy of survival, a retaliatory threat poised in the belief that its existence will prevent our enemies from taking the ultimate gamble of total war. Under the protective mantle of this fierce restraint upon aggressors, the United States is able to pursue many types of action contributing toward national security. American air power is a sharp and tested tool of American and world security. It stands ready to help shape the volatile stuff of these tense times into a just and stable peace.

General Thomas D. White, Washington, D. C., is Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. In the Air Corps since 1927, during World War II he was Deputy Commander of the Thirteenth Air Force in the South Pacific (1944–45) and Commander of the Seventh Air Force (1945–46). He served subsequently as Chief of Staff of the Far East Air Forces, Commander of the Fifth Air Force in Japan, Director of Legislation and Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at Air Force Headquarters, Director of Plans, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Air Force.

Air Strength of the United States

By Elton C. Fay

ONE American heavy bomber today can drop a single missile on an enemy with explosive energy surpassing that carried in all the planes of all the air forces, Allied and Axis, of World War II.

American air power began, however, by being too little and too late. Its early armament was a grenadelike bomb. World War I produced high hopes and low output: a call for 22,000 aircraft in the first year after American entry; an actual production of 13,894 in two and a half years, with the war long since ended. But the disillusioning experience paid. When two decades later the next war loomed close the United States objective was an annual production of 50,000 planes. The 1944, peak-year production of military aircraft was 96,318.[1]

Out of that first world conflict, too, came the rudimentary tactics and organization which today are American air power, deployed globally, armed atomically. Never before in the ancient history of war has a single force possessed the destructive power and the ability to deliver it which repose in the air arm of the United States military service.

World War I

There were valid reasons for the disappointing production at the inception of American military aviation.

When the United States entered World War I, the airframe and aircraft engine industry hardly warranted the name. There were no reservoir of skilled aircraft labor, no specialized machine tools, and nothing comparable to the materials priority system of World War II. Wood and fabric did not lend themselves to the high-speed processes of the next war, with metal extrusion, heavy presses, and multiple assembling gadgets. Even the automobile industry, from which had to come the cadre of skilled aircraft production workers, was itself tiny by the measure of the giant of these latter years.

In personnel, the picture was brighter. When World War I began, the aviation section of the Army consisted of about 130 officers and 1,000 men; at its conclusion there were over 195,000 officers and men. Virtually all of them, however, were citizen-soldiers, and when the war was over they went home.

Accordingly, American air power entered the first years of peace with a handful of career fliers of the regular military establishment, a collection of aircraft of which about 3,200 DH-4 planes were combatant, if obsolete, and an industry deflated immediately by contract cutoff. There also remained as surplus a really sizable fleet of trainer aircraft—an element to be helpful in the lean years ahead.

The war left another heritage. From it there had been gleaned the elementary facts of air warfare, weighted heavily to tactical support of ground forces. The doctrine of strategic air war still awaited the Douhets and Arnolds and Le Mays. Although most of the pilots left planes never to enter again except as passengers, a few took with them back into peacetime life the enthusiasm and skill of the war. They became the pioneers, the barnstormers, the early air-mail fliers and—a few—the men who emerged as leaders in today's air transport and manufacturing industries. These—the little band of airmen of the regular military establishments and the civilians who continued flying—were the men who kept the nation's spark of interest alive.

[1] *Aviation Facts and Figures, 1953* (Washington, D. C.: Lincoln Press, 1953), Chap. II, p. 16.

Civilian Aviation

When the war ended, the average civilian retained at least a mild curiosity in aviation, although he might have been cool to talk of more war and planes and pilots to fight it. The cow-pasture fliers, the stunt men, the wing walkers eventually lured him into the airplane. He came to watch their antics, then returned to fly twice around a field for three dollars. One day he found it was faster and not too much more costly to get to the next city by hiring a pilot and his open-cockpit, war-weary plane to fly him there. It was primitive and unorganized, but there was a lot of it. In 1925, still using war-surplus aircraft with a smattering of new models, the flying services accumulated 6,823,730 passenger miles. An air transport industry was being born.

The manufacturing industry, starving and all but nonexistent for a half decade, began to revive. New planes and, equally important, new designers appeared. Military aviation benefited. The research and development efforts of civilian aircraft designers were grist for the mill of aeronautical design. By 1926 the scheduled airlines were well established and in that year carried 6,000 passengers—a modest beginning but the forerunner of a year when 34,000,000 domestic and overseas tickets would be sold—the 1954 figure.[2]

[2] Air Transport Association, *Air Transportation Progress Report* (Washington, D. C., 1953), p. 3.

The Military and the Legislators

Nevertheless, the take-off and climb to altitude of American air power was slow and there was turbulence.

Many of the foremost military commanders of the country, who had helped win a great land war, still looked upon the airplane essentially as a handy device for battle-line observation, with occasional diversion to troop-support assignment. Successful tests of bombing against ex-German warships in the early twenties sharpened the civilian's attention to air power, but they also sharpened tempers within the military family.

Until this era of cold war, funds allocated by Congress to the military during peacetime were modest, even inconsequential. It would have been less than realistic if the land- and sea-service chiefs had not insisted that the great bulk of money go to the established branches rather than to a weapon so new and so little tried in war as military aviation.

With what they could get, the army and navy airmen managed not only to keep flying but to design and build a handful of new aircraft and work up new techniques. The Army's air service produced a heavy bombardment aircraft, a six-engined triplane. It was not a glittering success. The most remarkable feature was that the big and heavy airplane succeeded in staying in the air at a top speed of only 61 miles per hour.

Progress in the Twenties and Thirties

The progress of military aviation made a big jump in the latter twenties. Charles A. Lindbergh flew a single-engined monoplane from New York to Paris. Two army pilots flew a military plane from the United States to Hawaii.

There were round-the-world flights and endurance flights by military aircraft.

Those flights established the reliability and range of airplanes, pointing the way to strategic air warfare. If bombers could strike far, there was corollary need for countermeasures. The original, basic function of the airplane as a strafing, troop-supporting weapon broadened. The "pursuit" plane evolved and then mutations of that model. Although the bomber strategists of the 1930's might not have foreseen the requirement, even the stoutly armed B-17's and B-29's of the coming war would need escort protection on deep-penetration missions.

The first two years of the thirties brought the B-9 all-metal bomber with two 600-horsepower engines, the A-8 all-metal attack monoplane, and the B-10 bomber with 200-mile-per-hour speed.

The Army Air Force asked for a large, long-range aircraft to bomb from high altitude—a true strategic weapon. The design for the B-17 was ready in 1933. The first test plane flew in 1935. The first delivery to an operational unit was March 1, 1937. With big air power had come another problem, lead time—the months and years between the stating of a requirement and delivery of the first combat model. This was a factor which grew in importance with the growing complexity of aircraft, and one with direct bearing on the timing of decisive air campaigns in the next world war, in Korea, and, latterly, in making ready to meet the Soviet threat.

Army aviation had expanded to the point where it no longer could function as a mere adjunct of the Signal Corps. The office of Chief of Air Corps was created, primarily responsible for procurement and training. Then in 1935 the Army decided its air arm needed a special, operational command, and General Headquarters Air Force was formed. The tactical units were brought under command of GHQ, but the other, quasi-separate, office of Chief of Air Corps continued, with its responsibility for procurement and training—an arrangement productive of friction and administrative complications. The solution, not easily attained, was organization of the Army Air Forces in June 1941—an over-all air arm combining the functions of the Air Corps and GHQ.

When Pearl Harbor came, the United States Army Air Forces had 12,000 planes, 275,000 enlisted men, 23,000 officers, and 16,000 cadets. At peak strength, the AAF was able to put 13,000 planes in combat and had a personnel strength of over 2,411,000.

American plane designers and tacticians saw a prelude to modern air power in 1936. Germany and Russia sent planes and pilots to the Spanish Civil War, for actual battle test of aircraft, men, and maneuvers.

World War II

For fifteen months before World War II encompassed the United States, the designers and tacticians could assess the application of air power to the battlefield and its approaches. This was the advent of the Stuka dive bomber and its relatives, of fighter planes to attack dive bombers, of the precise timing and deployment of planes and masses of planes to pinpoint fixed and moving targets.

In the first phase, true strategic bombing was potential, even moderately applied, but it remained generally in leash while Hitler strove for quick victory with armor and tactical aviation. But the application of strategic air warfare followed fast. The Americans still were left a little time to observe before they were committed.

They did not agree with all tactics. They believed that all strategic bombing need not be under cover of darkness, that with the visual aiming then used daylight made for better bombing, and that "boxes" of bomber formations could with their own gunfire protect themselves against interception. They were right about daylight bombing, wrong about unescorted bombers.

Facets of Modern Air Power

When modern air power arrived for the United States it had many facets. Total air power is a complex of production, of huge bases scattered over the face of the earth, of supplies by the hundreds of thousands of tons, of personnel, of strategic and tactical bombing, of interception, of antiship and antisubmarine warfare, of transportation.

World War II established a pattern of commands which in large measure prevails today, with modifications and additions.

The Eighth Air Force of the European theater and the Twentieth Air Force of the Pacific were the wartime antecedents of today's Strategic Air Command—the medium and heavy bombers and long-range strategic reconnaissance aircraft. The Ninth Air Force of the European theater of operations and its Mediterranean and Pacific counter-parts evolved into the present Tactical Air Command of light bombers and fighter bombers. Developing partly as an offshoot of overseas tactical organizations and partly from the special requirements of continental security is the Air Defense Command—the jet interceptor force and its related radar warning and aircraft control system.

The Navy's primary mission is control of the sea and the air column above it. It applies its own air power in a variety of ways. One segment of naval aviation is attack—carrier-based aircraft assigned to detection and destruction of enemy combatant and merchant shipping and naval targets presented in bases and shipping ports. A second is antisubmarine operation, conducted both by land-based aircraft and carrier-based hunter-killer planes and helicopters. A third is long-range patrol—the search for targets for the attack planes and surface and subsurface fighting ships. The naval air force, including marine aviation, has a fourth function exactly like that of the air force's tactical outfits—the support of land troops in ground combat on or near coastlines. A fifth function is collateral support of strategic bombing, an assigned mission which has engendered interservice argument.

Military air transport

World War II gave rise to an element of air power which had existed neither in World War I nor in the interim, a world-wide system of military air transport. In practice, the system was two networks, the AAF's Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service. Under the service unification program of 1948 they were combined into the present Military Air Transport Service.

The motivation for the wartime development and swift expansion of a military air transport system was obvious. With war in two hemispheres, critically needed equipment and manpower had to be distributed quickly. Half of the less than four hundred aircraft of the commercial airlines were taken over, and the air force contracted with almost all of the seventeen scheduled lines to fly military routes. Simultaneously, the military services placed orders in large volume for their own transport aircraft, including designs bigger and of longer range than any operated by the commercial carriers.

Today's C-124 cargo plane, with its 25-ton load lift, and tomorrow's turboprop C-132, to carry 80 tons in trans-

oceanic operation, are the long-legged, weight-lifting descendants of the C-47, C-46, and C-54.

In the latter phase of World War II there arose another requirement for large-scale, although short-haul, transport. The American and British armies adopted airborne operations from the earlier limited but successful application of that adaptation of air power. However, paratroop planes and gliders used by the United States to put ground forces down in "airheads" behind enemy front lines were the specially equipped, specially manned aircraft of the overseas tactical air commands instead of the conventional military transport services.

Unification

The objective of the 1948 service unification program was to bring together under comprehensive top administrative and operational direction the three major military services, ground, sea, and air. In the process of unifying, the Army Air Forces acquired autonomy and coequal status with the Army and Navy, becoming the United States Air Force. The primary components of air power were thus brought into a single, co-ordinated force under central direction.

Curiously, one of the exponents of this doctrine is a man neither American nor an airman, Field Marshal Lord Montgomery. That soldier and strategist states:

> Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset—its flexibility.[3]

Flexibility is indeed the pattern of American air power. To meet commitments abroad and duties at home, it must be prepared to head forth instantly on one or many missions in many places. The task assigned may be to annihilate munitions cities and military bases of a major power with fission and thermonuclear weapons. Or it may be another unwanted but unavoidable bush war where the air power needed is tactical support of ground warfare. And always there is the vital assignment, air defense of the continental United States.

[3] Lecture by Field Marshal Montgomery at Royal United Service Institution, London, October 21, 1954.

PRESENT STRENGTH

American air power at present (May 1955) is composed of about 120 wings. When in June 1957 it attains 137-wing strength its forces are programed as follows:

Strategic, 54 wings. Of these, 11 will be B-52 heavy bombers, supported by jet tanker planes; 28 wings of medium B-47 jet bombers, also with supporting tanker planes; the balance will be reconnaissance units, long-range supersonic strategic fighters with atomic capability, like the F-101, and fighter units for defense of Strategic Air Command planes and installations.

Air defense, 34 wings. These are to include present subsonic interceptors and a high percentage of supersonic aircraft, among them the F-100 and F-102, the latter a delta-winged design intended for stratosphere interception. The Air Defense Command presently has slightly over 2,000 aircraft, all of them jets, operating in about 23 wings.

Tactical, 38 wings, a force built around jet fighter-bombers and light jet bombers. Within this command is the F-84G fighter, capable of carrying tactical nuclear fission bombs, and the B-47 and B-66 light bombers, all jet-engined. The nominally limited range of the F-84G is extended by in-flight refueling.

Airlift, 11 wings or the equivalent thereof in separate squadrons. These are the personnel and cargo carriers, to move heavy tonnages of high priority military cargo. Going into the airlift force now are the fast, long-range C-130 turboprop transports.

STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE

The air force judges strategic bombing its primary mission under present international conditions, on these grounds: (a) *deterrent,* a weapon maintained at such a state of readiness and with such instant and massive retaliatory capability as to make it military folly for an aggressor to attack; (b) *defensive,* a weapon to reach and destroy homeland bases from which enemy air attacks are being launched or through which they are staging.

In its less precise moments, the air force has called its present heavy bombers—the B-36 and the new B-52—intercontinental or global. They are that only with certain operational assists—forward staging bases offshore or overseas to serve as stepping stones or mid-air replenishment of fuel from flying tankers taking off from advanced bases and making rendezvous with the bombers near an enemy frontier. The combat radii of the two planes would not allow strikes from North American continental bases at targets in inner Eurasia nor even many outer zones unless the above-mentioned aids were used.

Even from bases in Canada and Alaska the distances to potential targets are impressive despite great-circle, high-latitude courses. From Goose Bay, Labrador, to Moscow is about 3,600 miles; to the oil-producing region around Baku, on the Caspian Sea, 4,700. A bomber taking off from Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska, and aiming for Irkutsk, the Soviet atomic center in the Lake Baikal area, would have 3,500 miles ahead of it.

Overseas bases

But start the bombers out on the final leg of their strikes from bases up near the top of the world or in North Africa or Spain, if English and German airdromes are too dangerously close: From Thule, on the northwest coast of Greenland, the route down over the roof of the globe to Moscow shortens to 2,500 miles. From Sidi Slimane, of the USAF complex of fields in North Africa, the mileage to Baku's petroleum farms is 3,100; to Stalingrad heavy industry, 2,700.

The B-36, currently the only heavy bomber in operational use by the Strategic Air Command, has a combat radius of approximately 4,500 miles with a five-ton load. Its speed, with six piston engines developing 3,800 horsepower each and four turbojets each producing 5,200 pounds thrust, is given officially as over 435 miles per hour. Practically, its cruising speed and probably its maximum speed are somewhat less.

The air force classes an aircraft as obsolescent when it is outmoded by the known advances of the enemy in development of counterweapons. On this premise, the jet interceptors of the Soviet air force have rendered the comparatively slow B-36 obsolescent.

The B-52, without using the in-flight refueling for which it is designed, has a present combat radius of about 2,500 miles, a range of 6,000. Air force officials say they hope to increase the range to 10,000, which would give a combat radius of about 4,000 miles. Powered with eight turbojets, the B-52 has been described by the air force as being faster than the B-47 jet medium bomber for which there has been a reported speed of 656 miles per hour.

It is evident, by comparison of target distances with radii of operation, that overseas bases are essential to the waging of strategic air war now—and will

remain essential for several years to come.

Definition

The Defense Department's definition of strategic air warfare is this:

> air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stock piles, power systems, transportation systems, communications facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.[4]

This official definition was written originally in 1948 and reflects some of the strategy of conventional weapons in World War II, including the delivery of standard high explosive and incendiary bombs by masses of bombers.

Thermonuclear bomb

Into a B-36 or B-52 bomber of today can be loaded a hydrogen bomb.

The test of a thermonuclear bomb in March 1954 produced power unofficially estimated at between 15 and 17 megatons (the equivalent of 15,000,000 to 17,000,000 tons of conventional trinitrotoluene explosive). Theoretically, the magnitude to which a thermonuclear bomb could be scaled up is virtually unlimited; practically, the possible ceiling might be on the order of 30 to 50 megatons.

The thermonuclear bomb is an area-destroying weapon. For more selective bombing of defined targets, the standard nuclear fission bombs, of magnitude up to about 50 kilotons, are available. They are weapons for the bays of medium bombers such as the B-47 and B-50.

Speed and altitude

The six-jet B-47 medium has much of the potential long-range characteristics of its bigger B-52 brother, being equipped for in-flight refueling from tanker aircraft. Its speed and high-altitude capabilities fit it for matching against jet interceptors: speeds well above 600 miles per hour, bombing altitudes well above 40,000 feet. Range of the B-47, without refueling, is over 3,000 miles. In a test using three aerial refuelings, a B-47 has flown slightly over 12,000 miles in 24 hours, dropping a dummy 10,000-pound bomb at the halfway point of the flight.

Under development is a supersonic medium bomber, the B-58, presumably to be capable of carrying nuclear bombs.

The speed of bombers, Soviet as well as American, has posed a profound problem of location and interception.

An air force official describes it in this manner: A jet bomber is approaching at 50,000-foot altitude at a speed of 600 miles per hour. The jet fighter heads toward him at the same speed. The combined or closing speed of the two aircraft is 1,200 miles per hour or twenty miles a minute. This is too fast for the human mind or muscle to work against. So the fighter is given electronic instruments to find the enemy bomber, aim at him, and fire the guns at the correct instant. There is only one pass. If the fighter misses, a great city may be destroyed by the bomber.[5]

The IBM

The problem (or advantage) of the jet bomber is a mere prelude to what is on the way—the intercontinental ballistics missile, short-named the IBM.

The prototype of those missiles, used by the Germans more than a decade ago, attained terminal speed of more than 3,500 miles per hour at the end of high trajectory flight. For intercontinental use, the zenith of the trajectory course would be several hundred miles high—beyond the range of any existing radar detection system. With existing detection and tracking equipment and with even the fastest currently operational or projected jet fighter types, the task of locating and intercepting would be hopeless. It is described as akin to two men standing at opposite ends of a hall and pitching needles at each other, in the hope the needles might collide. The search for countermeasures now is directed toward some vastly improved form of detection and tracking, using electronic computors to produce detection and aiming coordinates in split-second timing.

It may be assumed that the race for IBM's is being pushed by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Reports of a new Soviet rocket motor with the fantastic thrust of 264,000 pounds at sea level give a note of urgency to the contest.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

How soon will true intercontinental missiles appear, to make obsolete both the long-range strategic bomber and the jet interceptor? The guesses by men who might know have been in the early 1960's.

The ability of present jet bomber forces to strike suddenly with overwhelming atomic weight—and the looming prospect of intercontinental missiles with the same destructive power—raises questions about the value of stand-by production facilities for use after the outbreak of war.

There is one school of thought, numbering among its members many of the best air strategists, which holds that the next war will be determined by the weapons on hand at the hour of its inception. These men contend that there will be no time to get an industrial backup into operation, if indeed the reserve production facilities survive the first hours or days of war.

There is another side to the coin. The thought that hydrogen weapons have become so all-destructive that no belligerent would be so suicidal as to use them because of retaliation in kind was first expressed in philosophical circles. But this idea is now getting serious, calculating attention by the airmen whose business it is to plan for many possible forms of war. If thermonuclear weapons indeed cancel each other out of use, air warfare may not recede as far as the conventional high explosive and incendiary bomb but might be restricted to utilization of "standard" nuclear weapons—the fission bomb.

This could put massive strategic air power into a status of reserve and promote tactical aviation as the foremost weapon—the position it held when air power came into being almost forty years ago.

Elton C. Fay, Washington, D. C., has been since 1924 an Associated Press staff writer on governmental and political matters and beginning with World War II on military affairs in the United States and overseas.

[4] United States Department of Defense, *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D. C., 1954), Section VII: Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

[5] Address of Secretary of Air Harold E. Talbott, National Press Club, Washington, November 24, 1954.

The Foundations of Soviet Air Power: A Historical and Managerial Interpretation

By Ramsay D. Potts, Jr.

In 1952, Lieutenant General Thomas D. White, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Air Force, revealed to the American public that the Soviet Union was in possession of about a thousand bombers of a type similar to the United States B-29 Super Fortress. General White added:

> From bases in the northeast of Siberia or in the Arkhangelsk-Murmansk areas [these Soviet bombers] are capable of making one-way attacks on any city in North America. By [aerial] refueling . . . the Soviet bombers could carry out two-way operations.

President Truman, President Eisenhower, and various chairmen of the United States Atomic Energy Commission have repeatedly informed the world that the Soviets are acquiring nuclear weapons, which presumably these bombers or their successors could carry. Long-range atomic-air power thus has emerged as the greatest single military strength of world Communism; the only real strength, in any event, with which the Soviets can jeopardize the security of the United States.

Ironically, this most important threat to the American way of life and the values for which it stands is little understood outside very small professional circles. This reluctance to keep informed about the major danger to our country sets the stage for Soviet air power to do its most damaging work.

Sources of Information

Ignorance about Soviet air power often is explained on the grounds that little good information is available in public print. The very opposite is true, although, no doubt, documentation is somewhat scattered and by no means complete; nor is it necessarily accurate in every detail. The point is, however, that the most important facts of Soviet air power can be determined, at least in their broad outlines, exactly in the same way as our scholars have been able to bring out the salient features of Soviet economics, politics, ideology, and military doctrine. In 1950—and the documentation has improved since—Asher Lee, a noted English student of air power, stated that available literature on the Soviet air force was sufficient to disclose "a pattern which enables it to be assessed reasonably well, and permits of fairly confident prediction of future trends." [1]

Information about Soviet air power has been made available by the German, French, English, Swiss, Swedish, and American governments over a period of many years. American congressional and English parliamentary defense hearings reveal important data. Sources of pertinent information include furthermore a few, fairly representative, writings by knowledgeable Soviet defectors; numerous Soviet and German documents now in the various libraries of the Western countries, including libraries of several study centers specializing on the Soviet Union; frequent discussions in Western military publications; and, probably most important, uninterrupted and excellent news coverage of about a dozen English and American aeronautical trade journals.

[1] Asher Lee, *The Soviet Air Force* (2d ed.; London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1952), p. 1.

Preconceptions and Actualities

American lack of interest probably is due in part to an ineradicable skepticism concerning the ability of the Soviets to produce modern technical equipments, advanced jet bombers, and such complex devices as hydrogen bombs. To many, this Soviet air threat is a twentieth-century version of Potemkin's villages. Why, Russian industry is way behind American industry, Russia's national income is much lower than that of the United States, and there are no more automobiles in the Soviet Union than in the state of Massachusetts, or less than there were in the United States in 1915—forty years ago! Would it be unfair to suggest that such preconceptions can be dispelled only through extensive and objective research?

It may be granted that, at first glance, the existence of a first-rate long-range air force in an industrially underdeveloped country appears to be something of a paradox.[2] Yet a study of the historical antecedents of the present Soviet air threat reveals that the emergence of Soviet air power as a major factor in world politics was not a case of spontaneous generation. It is true that postwar aviation progress in the Soviet Union was amazingly fast, but Soviet air power as presently constituted is neither a miracle nor a fraud. It is the result of a long period of methodic and extensive efforts.

From its inception, Soviet aviation has been the creature of a state born in violence and eager to engage in permanent conflict, a state in which the alternative destinies foreseen for its future are "destroy or be destroyed." But the revolutionary purpose of the Communist government was only *one* condition making possible the development of Soviet air power. The other was the fortuitous circumstance that this government found the men to carry out its designs, or rather that there were experts so dedicated to the cause of aviation that they prevailed on the Communist leaders to give them a free hand.

The history of Soviet air power can be broken down into three general periods: the years between World War I and the great political purge in the thirties; the period of 1938–45, including the climactic experiences of World War II; and the period after 1945.

First Period of Soviet Air Power

In 1918, Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev and Nikolai Y. Zhukovsky joined forces to become the founding fathers of Soviet air power. These technicians persuaded Lenin to set up the two organs which have dominated Soviet aviation to this day: TSAGI, the Central Aerodynamics and Hydrodynamics Research Institute, and the Zhukovsky Air Academy,[3] the "Massachusetts Institute of Technology" or the educational arm of TSAGI (which offers a five-year postgraduate course). G. A. Tokaev, a graduate of the Zhukovsky Air Academy, recently described it as follows:

> It is a vast university which provides facilities for study and research at the highest level, and specialises in aeronautics just as European universities used to specialise in the humanities. It is no longer regarded as practical in the U. S. S. R. to have the many subjects necessary for the technology of aviation studied piecemeal,

[2] Russian achievements in the construction of tanks should convince skeptics that the Soviets are quite capable of producing complex weapons which are the equal of similar weapons produced in the West.

[3] G. A. Tokaev, *Betrayal of an Ideal* (London: The Harvill Press, 1954), p. 188.

as they still are in some countries; they are a 'world' of study and research in themselves. Indeed, they are so abstruse that students are admitted to the Zhukovsky Academy as a rule only after they have had a normal university preparation. The Academy, in other words, is a postgraduate university in the old sense. No doubt elsewhere the same higher studies and research are pursued, but the institutions where such work is done are not so centralised as in the Soviet Union, nor are they given such distinguished status.

Tupolev was appointed head of TSAGI. With an interruption during the purges, he has been the dean of Soviet bomber designers for over thirty years, thus assuring a continuity unparalleled elsewhere.

Tupolev and Zhukovsky went about their business methodically. They attempted to preserve the aeronautical know-how of czarist Russia, laid the groundwork for a native Russian aircraft industry, initiated the exploitation of foreign science and technology, set up training programs for designers and skilled workers, started systematic experimentation schedules, and, interestingly enough, embarked on a campaign to make the peoples of Russia air-minded.

Foreign assistance was of key importance. It was obtained largely from Germany. In 1922, Professor Hugo Junkers supervised the construction of a large aircraft factory near Moscow and shortly afterwards experimented with Tupolev in building one of the world's first all-metal aircraft. German air officers unable to function openly in disarmed Germany used Soviet schools to circumvent some of the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty but at the same time provided staff training to the inexperienced Soviet aviators. German concepts gained wide acceptance, and to this day Soviet aviation reflects this early German influence.

By 1923 sufficient progress had been made to establish the first squadrons of the Soviet Air Force. Simultaneously, a massive campaign of air education was undertaken. Hundreds of aeroclubs were organized, often attached to high schools, to provide the youth of Russia with semimilitary training in glider flight, simple aerodynamics, power-plant engineering, aircraft maintenance and navigation. This educational system has remained unique among the air-minded nations of the world, and it has given Soviet aviation a solid human base from which to draw its fliers, navigators, designers, engineers, technicians, and mechanics.

Decentralization

A five-year plan for the aircraft industry was announced in 1928. It marked a real step forward on the road toward the creation of genuine air power. As happens so often in Russia, accomplishments were not up to the level of planning. Progress was unsatisfactory, partly because TSAGI was overburdened as the central planning, designing, and managing authority. Quite undogmatic in fields where there are few doctrinal commitments, the Soviet government discovered that centralized planning was not, in the field of aviation, a particularly potent organizational device. Hence, by 1930, the government began to delegate and decentralize some of TSAGI's functions: within TSAGI, separate experimental and developmental departments for aerodynamics, engines, propellers, and hydroplanes were created; a separate aircraft trust for civil aviation was established; and a new institute, TSAMI, was given the complex and difficult task of engine development. In 1932, VIAM was set up as the central organization to supervise the quality of aircraft design and production. Under this organization, the Soviets produced their first

generation of native military aircraft.[4]

It was not long before the Soviets discovered that decentralization at the top level was not adequate and that actually downright competition was needed to assure continuous progress. This was quite a discovery in a state dedicated to "planning." Individual enterprises were allowed to set up their own design staffs outside the TSAGI monopoly. A Communist equivalent of a "capitalist" competitive structure arose, and it was through this new and unusual setup that the Soviet Union's air force rose to world prominence.

Second Five Year Plan

The period of the Second Five Year Plan, 1933–39, coincided with Hitlerian and Japanese saber rattling. Probably the most dramatic result of this effort was that the Soviet Union managed to re-equip its air force by 1936. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the German *Luftwaffe* did not complete its rearmament program until about four years later. Soviet timing had been "out of phase," and when the war came to the Soviet Union, by the time of the German attack their air force was obsolescent.

Soviet failure was especially marked in the heavy bomber field. The Soviets had been the first to attempt the establishment of a heavy bomber force, and they certainly were the first to place the heavy bomber fleet under the direct orders of the highest command echelon, making it "independent" of ground commanders. While General A. N. Lapchinsky, the USSR's first top theoretician of air doctrine, envisaged the "air armies" for ground force support which were adopted in World War II, he was also a bomber advocate. As early as 1926, he was calling for the creation of a separate bombing force.[5] There was emerging a gradually stronger preference among many Soviet officers for bomber aviation. Under General Khripin, commander of the Soviet air forces during the mid-thirties, the proportion of heavy bombers to other aircraft became much higher than in other countries. Tupolev was building his TB-1, TB-2, and TB-3 series of bombers at this time.

Aircraft engines

During this period, too, the Soviet Air Force made significant progress in the important field of aircraft engines. At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Soviet aircraft still were powered by crude copies of French Lorraines, U. S. Wright Cyclones, French Gnome-Rhones, and Hispano-Suizas. To overcome this dependence, a few promising native designs were standardized and improved systematically. The Soviets learned to build a strictly limited number of engines well and fitted these to bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance aircraft. At the same time—if we are to believe sources such as the noted rocket expert Willy Ley, Asher Lee, and Colonel Tokaev, a former officer of the Soviet Air Force—rocket research got under way within the Soviet Union. By 1937, TSAGI had established rocket development centers in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kazan. On a visit before World War II, Hermann Oberth, the "father" of German rocketry, found a thriving rocket research industry in the Soviet Union.[6]

[4] It is interesting to note that at approximately the same time the U. S. and Great Britain were experiencing great difficulties with their aeronautical organization, and particularly with aero-engine development. The American solution was the establishment of the *National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics*, better known as NACA, which, in some ways, is a parallel to TSAGI.

[5] Raymond Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), p. 343.

[6] Asher Lee, *op cit. supra* (note 1), p. 205.

PURGE

But at this point a catastrophe happened: the gradual growth of Soviet air power was disrupted significantly when Stalin purged some of his best air generals and dismissed some of the key aeronautical designers. There are indications that this reduction in influence of the Soviet "air enthusiasts" was caused partly by the purge craze and partly by a misreading of the tactical lessons learned from the Spanish Civil War, a misreading similar to that which was applied to Soviet tanks and which paralleled no less fallacious deductions made by Western strategists.

As a result, the Soviet Union lost its most effective and experienced bomber advocates. General Khripin was purged. Tupolev was temporarily shelved, and his advanced TB-6 and TB-7 heavy-bomber prototypes were delayed, arriving too late for World War II. The purge trials also took a heavy toll of the USSR's rocket technicians. The development of parachute forces and civil aviation[7] suffered similar retrogression, and only fighter aviation enjoyed continued high level support.

WORLD WAR II

At the time when Hitler got ready for his attack, the Soviet Union was producing over a thousand military aircraft per month. It had an operational combat force of well over six thousand combat aircraft, probably at that time the world's largest air establishment. The Soviet air force was supported by a large industrial base of aircraft and component factories, geographically dispersed in depth and operated by competent managers, engineers, and technicians. It was soundly organized into armies, divisions, and regiments, and designed as tactical air force with the primary mission of supporting surface battle. Lieutenant General A. Galland, one of the *Luftwaffe's* World War II aces, recently commented that as an "integral part of the Red Army," the Soviet Air Force "was perhaps better organized and suited to its purpose and better employed in action than the Luftwaffe. . . . We never managed to prevent the Red Air Force from doing this [giving support to Army] despite our superiority."[8] Many marked deficiencies remained, however. Relatively little progress had been made in electronics, radio aids, and navigational devices; fighter and reconnaissance aviation was still below German standards; and numbers and effectiveness of bombers did not meet requirements at all.

Many volumes could be written about Soviet air operations in World War II. The organization of a strategic bomber force as the core of future Soviet air power was initiated in the spring of 1942.[9] General A. Golovanov, a Civil Air flier, was placed in command of the Long Range Air Force. While its showing in the war was extremely poor, the Long Range Air Force nevertheless constituted an important beginning. Independent even of the Soviet Air Force command, it was placed directly under the Ministry of Defense. This diversion of effort in the midst of a deadly war provides an interesting clue to Soviet intentions.

With Malenkov as an expediter, aircraft production was increased greatly.

[7] This disorganization of Soviet transport aviation was overcome to a certain extent when Boris Lusinov, a Soviet engineer, was able after two years of study at the Douglas aircraft plant in Long Beach, California, to duplicate and produce in large numbers the famous Douglas DC-3 (C-47) twin-engine transport.

[8] Adolf Galland, *The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter Forces, 1938–1945* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1954), p. 80.

[9] A parallel decision was made in the field of armored warfare, the results of which became noticeable by 1944 and 1945.

The industrial base again was expanded and extended in depth, hundreds of thousands of technicians were trained, aircraft performance was improved, the aerial methods of the Allies were studied, and extensive battle experience was gained. But perhaps the greatest advantage which accrued to the Soviet high command was that it learned how to handle large numbers of aircraft. Despite heavy aircraft losses and the wholesale destruction of aeronautical factories which occurred during the early years of the war, the Soviet Air Force by 1944 was putting as many as 6,000 combat planes into the air. By the end of the war, the Soviets were producing over 3,000 combat aircraft per month and were manning 19 air armies comprising more than 600 combat regiments.

However, due to the loss of tempo suffered from earlier mistakes, support and fighter aviation dominated air operations throughout the war and relatively little experience was obtained in long-range strikes. Despite strenuous efforts, only insignificant progress was made in the all-important field of electronics. Nevertheless, defeated in 1941, the Soviet Air Force was a victor in 1945. The Soviet Union had become a regional, although not yet a global, air power.

Yet by 1945–46, the Soviet Air Force was getting ready to embark on the most revolutionary growth the history of air power has seen to date.

SOVIET DOCTRINE

What are the Soviet doctrines on the use of air power? In the field of armored warfare there has occurred a similar doctrinal dispute: Is the tank an infantry support or an independent "strategic" (or as the Germans and Russians call it, "operational") weapon? The Soviets made a Solomonic decision: The tank is *both*. Hence they allotted a tank regiment and a mobile gun detachment to each infantry division, and established several heavy-tank regiments, to be used as reserves and reinforcements of infantry in battle. But *in addition*, they created two types of armored divisions especially designed for "operational" missions: large-scale attack and breakthrough, pursuit and deep penetration.[10]

Needless to say, the adoption of such a double-barreled doctrine requires a huge industrial and training effort which, with respect to tanks, the Soviets apparently were able to undertake. The question is, Can a similar effort be successful in the far more exacting field of aircraft production? Perhaps not. But it is a fair presumption that a parallel doctrine guides the destiny of Soviet military aviation: bomber aircraft are needed *both* to support ground forces *and* to carry out independent strategic operations.

By the end of World War II, the strategic requirements of the Soviet Union had changed vastly. The enemy nearby had been eliminated; but a new "threat"—of a more illusionary type, to be sure—was developing at a distance of 5,000 miles. It is hard to see how the Soviets could have failed to conclude that the development of a strong and genuinely global air capability must become the highest priority objective of their military preparations. In any event, ever since 1946 or so, they have acted as though, indeed, such has been their objective. There exists a wealth of evidence to confirm the nature of the Soviet response to the new strategic challenge.

PRESENT SOVIET AIR POWER

The results were not slow in coming. Modern jet engines were developed;

[10] N. Galai, "Geschichte der sowjetischen Panzerwaffe," *Ost-Probleme*, January 21, 1955, p. 107.

medium and possibly heavy bombers were built; large air defense forces were set up; a massive and capable electronics industry came into being, thanks largely, presumably, to German assistance; and research work on guided missiles, both long- and short-range, was initiated. Since 1950 or so, the Soviet Air Force has displayed one modern aircraft after the other. There are disturbing signs that the Soviets are making good—and accelerating—progress toward the attainment of their goal. As of today, air power has rejuvenated Russian imperialism and re-created it as a global threat.

What are the expectations for the future? The story of Soviet aviation is not one of technological genius. The Russians still are only competent imitators, and they have only a few inventive pioneers. But their strength lies in their uncanny ability to utilize technological advances made in other countries, to carry on in their own plodding way systematic research with endurance and singleness of purpose, to devise solutions of expediency, and to design matériel which is well adapted to the general backwardness of the country. They aim to use sturdy and simple weapons which can be produced in large numbers and be maintained without difficulty.

SOVIET AERONAUTICAL DESIGNERS AND ENGINEERS

Air power is created by the application of brains and resourcefulness rather than only by industrial productivities. Soviet aviation is the child of a small group of aircraft designers and builders. From the early days of the Soviet regime, the aeronautical engineers, designers, and industrialists have been perhaps the most influential professional group within the Soviet Union. Their longevity attests to their political influence. By comparison with their American and British colleagues, they exercise enormously more authority. All of them hold high military rank coupled with substantial seniority. Many have had direct access to the Politburo. Together, they ensure considerable continuity and enviable coordination between political and military strategy, and between strategy and industrial production. They wear the triple hat of the scientist, the industrialist, and the general officer—a redoubtable combination of power. And even this description does not quite explain their position. These men compete against each other, and their competitive ardor is stimulated by a system of incentives far more "persuasive" than any in the West. The incentive comes in the form of wealth, living standards, status privileges, rank, and power, as well as—in the case of failure—demotion, punishment, and ruin.

Let us look at some of these capitalistic soldiers of Communism. Lieutenant General Tupolev is the leading Soviet designer, a topflight scientist and also the happy survivor of two purges. He has operated as the brain of TSAGI —except for short periods of disgrace— as main contact with German aviation specialists, and as a proponent of heavy bombers. He designed his first bomber in 1922 and since then allegedly has been responsible for over thirty aircraft designs, mostly in the bomber class. Under his direction, the Soviets reproduced the United States B-29 medium bombers in record time.[11] This duplicate, the well-known TU-4, is presently the main weapon of the Soviet Long Range Air Force. But Tupolev's career is not over yet: his staff reportedly designed the large jet bombers displayed publicly in Moscow in 1954.

[11] The equally rapid reproduction of German and British jet engines speaks highly of the effectiveness (though not the originality) of Soviet industrial engineering.

Ilyushin

Sergei Vladimirovich Ilyushin is Tupolev's counterpart in the light bomber field. He is best known as the designer and builder of what presently is the numerically largest fleet of light jet bombers, the IL-28, which presumably can reach most targets on the European continent, and in Japan and Alaska. He is a strong partisan of simple and rugged aircraft designs. (Having begun his career as an aircraft mechanic, he learned how to read and write when he was eighteen, while a common laborer at the Moscow airdrome.) As commanding officer of TSAGI's experimental factory, he is reported to have tested almost every Soviet aircraft when it was still in the experimental stage. He designed the IL-4 twin-engine bomber, the backbone of Soviet bomber aviation during World War II. But his greatest fame rests on his development of the IL-2, better known as the *Stormovik*, the well-nigh indestructible scourge of the German army. Allegedly, this design resulted from a dispute with N. N. Polikarpov and other "white-collar designers" who were unable to produce a suitable ground support plane. Challenged to do better, Ilyushin is said to have designed the *Stormovik* in three weeks. His air-power doctrine may be gleaned from a speech which he made in 1942, and which Asher Lee quoted as follows: "We have always thought that the main role of aviation was the support of ground forces." This "line" of the Ilyushin school is, almost certainly, at variance with the line of the Tupolev school. There is nothing "monolithic" about Soviet aviation. The USSR's obsession with rugged, simple, and easily produced and maintained aircraft becomes more understandable when viewed in the light of Ilyushin's career and the maintenance environment of Soviet aviation. It also cautions against measuring Soviet performance against United States standards.

MIG's

Together with Mikhail I. Gurevich, one of Russia's outstanding mathematicians and structural engineers, General Artem I. Mikoyan (brother of the First Deputy Prime Minister, Anastas I. Mikoyan) designed the well-known MIG group of fighters. The progression has gone from the MIG-1 (1940) via the MIG-5 (1944) and the MIG-9 (1945) to the powerful MIG-15 of Korean notoriety, and thence presumably will go to even better models. The MIG-15 is, historically, one of the most successful airplanes and, by and large, not inferior in performance to some of the best American fighters. The late General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, then Chief of Staff of USAF, commented in 1951 that the MIG's engine "is superior to any jet engine we have today in operational combat planes."

Lavochkin

Semyon A. Lavochkin participated in producing, together with Gudkov and Gorbunov, the LaGG series of fighters which were used during World War II. After the war, Lavochkin produced a string of piston and jet fighters and at present is reported to be working on an all-weather interceptor. His great strength lies in his unusual ability to select and manage design teams. Among German repatriates, he is noted for his successes in picking their brains.

Yakovlev

General Aleksander Yakovlev is fairly well known in Western aeronautical cir-

cles as a deputy minister of aircraft production and as designer of the YAK series of piston and jet fighters.

Ideology

These, then, are some of the typical leaders of Soviet military aeronautics. Each top designer controls, directs, and manages large competitive complexes of aircraft factories and laboratories. As such, they are without counterpart anywhere in the aircraft industries of the free world. Lest they be regarded as "pure and nonpolitical" scientists, it should be remembered that "there is not a single aeronautical engineer or specialist in the USSR who has not had a radical Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist grounding. Here is the fundamental difference between Western and Soviet experts." [12] The Soviet regime has treated its aeronautical elite with kid gloves. No wonder that these designers in general have been utterly dedicated to the aggressive aims of Soviet Communism—as well as to the future of Russian aviation.

THE NEW GENERATION

But these men are growing old now. Under their tutelage, a new generation of designers is emerging. Hence, the most significant question referring to the future of Soviet aviation is this: Will the Soviet regime treat the up-and-coming designers as it has treated the present generation? Will it continue to deviate from its normal behavior pattern? Will it allow them freedom of action and again place them at the top of the privileged classes in Soviet society?

It is too early to answer this question. There is no doubt, however, that the Soviet government has recognized the fact that technological superiority in the air rests, in the last analysis, on designers and engineers as its foundation. Hence, technological training has been vastly accelerated and has become one of the unique long-term elements of strength in Soviet aviation. While the United States has been turning out far more university *graduates,* the Soviets between 1928 and 1953 have graduated 150,000 *more engineers* than the United States. In 1928, the Soviets had some 26 institutions offering engineering training. Today, there are approximately 175 schools offering *training in engineering exclusively.* Their enrollment numbers about 300,000 students. By comparison, some 210 United States colleges offer engineering courses with an enrollment of about 194,000 students.

Progress in Soviet aeronautical engineering training is no less sobering. Since 1951, the Soviets have been graduating at least 1,200 to 1,400 aeronautical engineers per year. In 1954, the United States graduated 645 aeronautical engineers. The quality of Soviet instruction is very high by United States standards: the students get considerably more education in the general sciences, and especially in mathematics. Morale within the educational system is very high, too, owing to considerable incentives in the form of honors, better pay, better treatment, and greater promise for a future career with substantial rewards.[13]

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Behind the designers and scientists, however, stands a political leadership which gives unstinting attention to the development of military aviation. One can hardly imagine members of the United States or British cabinets holding long meetings to discuss aircraft and missile research, development, and production. Yet there is much evidence that for many years Russia's top rulers have assumed just such a direct role in support of aeronautical developments.

An ex-colonel of the Soviet Air Force —whom Sir David Kelly, formerly British Ambassador in Moscow, calls "the most distinguished of the 'Defectors' who have sought refuge in the West" —cites an interesting example of the Kremlin's direct interest in military aviation. G. A. Tokaev, formerly Chief of the Aerodynamics Laboratory of the Moscow Military Air Academy, was called to the Kremlin from his post in Berlin on April 13, 1947, in order to discuss the exploitation of German aeronautical science. Present were Stalin himself, Malenkov, Bulganin, Voznesensky, Vershinin (then Chief of the Soviet Air Forces), Artem Mikoyan, and Major General Lukin (Deputy Minister of Aviation Industry). Tokaev reports that Malenkov remarked to General Khrunichev:

"I was in Noginsk the other day and saw them trying to make V-2's," said Malenkov. "I was not impressed. The work is going very slowly, and anyway, the flying bomb is an outmoded weapon now. . . . We must complete it, but not to the detriment of work on more modern weapons. . . . The point is that the V-2 is good for 400 kilometers, and no more. And after all, we have no intention of making war on Poland. Our vital need is for machines which can fly across oceans." [14]

CONCLUSION

What conclusion must we draw from the widely known facts of Soviet air power development? Simply this: The major threat to our security is coming from the air. As Soviet atomic air power continues to grow, the United States and its political institutions are in ever greater jeopardy. We can ill afford to disregard this most deadly threat in our history.

[12] G. A. Tokaev, *op. cit. supra* (note 3), p. 194.

[13] Nicholas DeWitt, "Russia Threatens U. S. Engineering Leadership," *Aviation Age,* February 1955, pp. 17–21.

[14] G. A. Tokaev, *Stalin Means War* (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1951), p. 104.

SOURCES

Books

Arnold, H. H. *Global Mission.* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

Churchill, Winston S. *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), esp. pp. 361, 378.

Ely, Louis B. *The Red Army Today.* Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1949.

Fainsod, Merle. *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), Chap. 14.

Finletter, Thomas K. *Power and Policy: U. S. Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954), esp. pp. 23–29, 296–98.

Harris, Sir Arthur. *Bomber Offensive* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), esp. p. 53.

Kerr, Walter. *The Russian Army: Its Men, Its Leaders and Its Battles.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944.

Lee, Asher. "Communist Air Forces," *Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Year-Book* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954).

Liddell-Hart, B. H. *The German Generals Talk.* New York: William Morrow and Co., 1948.

Menken, Jules. "Soviet Policy and War," *Brassey's Annual* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954).

Schlaifer, R. and S. D. Heron. *Development of Aircraft Engines and Fuels.* Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, 1950.

Periodicals

American Aviation, January 17, 1955.
Aviation Age, July 1951; February, March, April, and October 1952; January, February, March, May, June, August, September, and October 1953; September 1954; and February 1955.
Aviation Week, August 1942; March 2 and October 26, 1953; May 24, 1954.
Flying, October 1953 and January 1955.
Naval Aviation News, October 1954.
Newsweek, August 17, 1953, August 23, 1954.
Science Digest, May 1953.

Ramsay D. Potts, Jr., Washington, D. C., is an attorney, a colonel in the Air Force Reserve, a member of the Hoover Commission Advisory Committee on Department of Defense Passenger Transportation, and president of Independent Military Air Transport Association, a commercial group of air carriers specializing in airlift for the military services. During World War II he served as squadron and group commander of heavy bombardment units and as director of bombing operations in the Eighth Air Force. Later he became chief of staff of the Military Analysis Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Mr. Potts's military and government career included a tour of duty as executive officer and special assistant to Secretaries of the Air Force W. S. Symington and T. K. Finletter.

A Steel Ring for the Iron Curtain: An Appraisal of Air Power in Other Nations

By EDWARD W. S. HULL

AIR power today is essential. It is a weapon which no one wants to use but which must always be ready for instant use. It is not preventive war but preventive mobilization. Directly, it does nobody any good. But indirectly, history may later record it as the guarantor of peace, the policy and the power that prevented the last war between men—the war of massive self-destruction—from ever occurring. Air power is the focal point of a counterbalancing power complex designed to force into peaceful accommodation a world sharply divided.

The current mission of Western air power is to make prohibitive to an aggressor the cost of attack. Its potential is military. It means ability to hit back hard in any local wars that break out, getting and holding local air superiority. But basically it means constant readiness to meet nuclear warfare by immediate counterattack in kind.

Western air power is built around the following:

The United States Strategic Air Command—over a thousand high-speed, high-altitude long-range jet bombers.

The incipient British Strategic Bomber Command.

A nuclear arsenal capable of destroying every military target in Russia within thirty days.

High-speed A-bomb-carrying F-84's based in Europe and the Far East.

A world-wide system of over two hundred air bases in addition to those within the United States.

More and more interceptor, fighter-bomber, transport, and reconnaissance squadrons.

An elaborate network of communications and support facilities in nearly every country of the free world.

A combined aircraft industry of vast and growing capacities.

It is not a paper plan. It is an existing, working complex—a gun that is loaded, cocked, and aimed, ready to fire, should Russia pull the trigger. For, in the final analysis, the decision that controls the trigger finger will be made in the Kremlin or Peiping, not in the White House or Whitehall.

The basic assessment of air power in other nations is this: The current state of readiness would not have been possible without their consent and cooperation. To build preventive air power from the resources—geographic, economic, and human—of the United States alone would be impossible.

NETWORK OF BASES

The crux of the West's preventive strategic concept lies in the global network of bases. Today, atom bombers by the hundreds can attack any part of Russia simultaneously from all points of the compass, taking off from the United States, Greenland, Britain, North Africa, Okinawa. Over target, if low fuel supplies preclude returning to base, they can keep on going to friendly airfields on the other side.

Not only is this system preventive in the simple enormity of its threat. In addition, the more A-bomb bases there are in the West, the bigger the effort needed to knock them out. Russia would not launch an atomic attack on the West's cities and industries without first trying to prevent retaliation.

As Russia knows from the chess her people play so well, the West also has the advantage of position. Russia is a single target, albeit a large one. She can be hit from all directions. She can attack the United States from only one.

To strike at United States industry, Red aircraft would have to fly thousands of miles across the polar cap and northern Canada even to reach the United States border. They would face the possibility of detection and interception all the way. Innermost Russia is a maximum of 1,500 miles from her nearest boundary. Most industrial centers are much closer. Her only buffers are the thin line of Eastern Europe and the bulge of China. Aerially, most of her perimeter is wide open. Her detection and interception problems are immense; those of the West, relatively easier. It is easier to watch a single point than it is to watch the whole world.

Outside of the United States and Canada, free world air power is strongest in West Europe. Under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is the most highly integrated. It is the best equipped, is spending more of its own money, has received the largest share of American aid, and has the greatest resources of industry and manpower. It is also an area that is very conscious of the danger that lies to the East.

NATO

Including North America, NATO covers some 400 million people, and nearly a quarter of the world's land and sea area; it ranges across the Atlantic to Iceland and Norway, down through West Europe and North Africa, and around to Turkey. The European line of defense alone is 4,000 miles long. It includes 200 million people, a dozen different languages, as many different sets of national customs and local political problems. Yet within five years, NATO has been built into a highly efficient fighting alliance, with the first emphasis on air power.

All told, over 5,000 fighters, fighter-bombers, light bombers, and reconnaissance and transport aircraft are available to NATO. Some 4,000 are specifically assigned, under direct NATO command. These totals do not include the 200-odd United States Strategic Air Command B-47's operating from Britain and North Africa. Nearly all NATO's front-line aircraft are jets, including over 2,000 subsonic F-84 Thunderjets, over 1,000 transonic F-86 Sabers, growing numbers of British-made Hunter fighters and Valiant bombers, about 600 twin-jet Canberras, over 400 French-made Ouragan and Mystère fighters, as well as obsolescent Meteors, Vampires, and Venom fighters.

On the ground to support these aircraft are eighty new bases built to NATO requirements with 7,000-foot runways, as well as eighty more old bases brought up to NATO standards. Of the 160, most were built jointly with common "infrastructure" (term for NATO support facilities) money to which all fourteen member nations contribute proportionate shares. About three dozen were built specifically by the United States, Britain, and France.

Deficiencies

In recent NATO exercises, deficiencies have shown up mainly in communications, modern air-power logistics, air transport, and quick achievement of air superiority. These troubles were not unexpected nor are they basic flaws.

The communications problem is largely mechanical. Too much reliance had to be placed on civilian telephone systems and jammable radio circuits. The remedy: a line-of-sight microwave network now being built which obviates

the need for telephone wires, precludes tapping and jamming, and minimizes the likelihood of sabotage.

Logistical troubles stem from changing concepts. To keep fuel flowing to NATO's jets—one 75-plane F-84 wing in operation consumes 100,000 gallons a day—nearly 4,000 miles of pipeline, pumping stations, and tank farms have been built.

But there is a growing body of opinion that, in the Age of the Atom, an increasing amount of supplies, if not all, should be airborne. Part of NATO's air emphasis is on the ability of ground support, interceptor, and bomber squadrons to move from one base to another, hardly missing a day's operations. That takes air transport and lots of it—not trucks, trains, and ships.

Only the United States has a large military air transport system. Though some C-119's are occasionally lent to Britain, for paratroopers' practice, this lift is assigned primarily to United States forces.

Actually, 100 per cent air mobility is an ideal goal rather than a practical expectancy. It is certainly not a formal NATO target at present. Efforts are being made, however, to raise abilities above present levels.

Air bases, communications, radar networks, pipelines, and so forth (but not transport aircraft) are all part of the infrastructure program. This has already cost close to two billion dollars, with the United States paying 55 per cent and other NATO countries the rest. Total European defense expenditures, 1949 through 1954, top forty billion dollars. The annual rate has tripled. The comparable United States total is about 200 billion dollars.

It is a statistical fact that in a European war, the biggest air power problem would be to achieve air superiority. It is a weakness that can only be remedied by more and better aircraft. The present total is too low, and too many of that total are obsolete. Both volume and quality, however, are rising.

Military co-operation

An important factor in West European air power is the relative smoothness and ease with which the different contingents work together. Obviously so many different nationalities cannot be developed into a flawless machine overnight. Military co-operation in the field is still far from perfect. But many of the men working together today fought together in World War II, Korea, and Indochina. Techniques and procedures are being standardized. There is the basic knowledge that "we've got to work together." And, as a result, in the air at least, the fourteen NATO countries work as an effective fighting entity.

Planes in combat readiness

With the exceptions noted above and the fact that Europe's aircraft production is still too low, NATO's general air power level is good. There are 185 tactical air squadrons deployed along the Eastern front. They are in combat readiness both to intercept and to give close ground support. Most aircraft are jets, but not all are the latest models. Not all are a match for the Russian MIG-15 and its successors. But the standard of air matériel rises daily. Once Europe's aircraft industry, particularly Britain's, finds its pace, the rate of improvement will accelerate.

European production

Right now the bulk of first-line aircraft are made and/or designed in the United States. But efforts are being made to make Europe more self-sufficient. Some F-84 parts and engines are being made in Europe. There are assembly plants in Italy, Belgium, and Holland. The Dutch are tooling for

full-scale F-84 production. Britain's Hunter seems free of bugs at last. Performance of this aircraft compares favorably with both the United States F-86 Saber and the Russian MIG-15, but it is appearing in squadrons four years later. Earlier this year, total orders for the Hunter came to only about 1,500, including Royal Air Force orders, 120 for Sweden, and about 1,000 for NATO forces, the latter partly paid for by the United States. Most orders are to be filled by the three production lines in Britain; the rest by two lines in Holland and Belgium.

About 600 Canberras of all types are already in service as high-speed light bombers, night interdicters, and reconnaissance planes. More are on order abroad and others are being built under license in the United States. As a light bomber its fighting ceiling is 45,000 feet; in reconnaissance roles, 45,000 to 50,000.

In France, Mystère II's and IV-A's are both in production for the French Air Force, but the order is limited to 350. The IV-A is a 700-miles-per-hour, 40,000-foot interceptor. It carries two 30-millimeter guns and fifty-five internally mounted rockets, besides thirty-eight rockets slung in two wing pods (or two 500-pound bombs for close support work) and two wing-mounted fuel tanks. France has completed an order for 350 jet Ouragan MD-450's. For an aircraft industry that hardly existed in 1945, this is not a bad record.

However, compared to the number of prototypes that have been made, few European designs are in operational production. West Europe is far from building aircraft in sufficient volume even to keep current forces up to date, much less to effect an expansion. It is a major weakness. The big job of NATO's aircraft industry is to build preventive strength now, not fighting strength after a war has started. For the chances are that either the war would be over before production got rolling or the industry would be knocked out in the first few days . . . probably both.

NATO's light fighter-bomber design competition is also aimed at getting Europe's aircraft industry out of the doldrums. It calls for a fast jet aircraft with an operational weight of less than 8,000 pounds. It must be able to fight in the same ring with today's heavies. Above all it must be simple—simple to fly, simple to maintain, and simple to build with labor and machinery already in being. It should also be able to double as an emergency interceptor. If the program works out, it could be the answer. But evaluation, design finalization, spreading of contracts through many countries, all take time. Any immediate solution must come from getting current models into production.

Britain

The largest single contribution to Western air power outside the United States and Canada comes from Britain. This is owing partly to the fact that she came out of World War II with a large air force and supporting industrial capacity very much intact. It is also owing to the fact that she has been able to take her postwar responsibilities more seriously than some others.

Since 1948, the Royal Air Force has boosted its strength from under a thousand to over five thousand planes of all types. RAF manpower now totals 270,000. Included in this aerial line-up are 375 Canadian and about 100 United States–supplied Sabers. Most of her equipment is British made, though old. Until the Hunter reached squadron service, there was not a British aircraft in operation to match either the Saber or the MIG. Much of the RAF's material is still "second string." Supersonic

fighters with capabilities of over 50,000 feet are not even near production.

Original RAF plans called for over a thousand Hunters and Swifts to be in operational service by this June. There are perhaps three hundred Hunters and no Swifts.

All told, Britain has half a dozen fighter and fighter-bomber designs with impressive subsonic performance claims, either as prototypes or struggling through early production stages. There is also one prototype fighter, the English Electric P-1, that has gone supersonic in straight and level flight. England has three V-class long-range atomic bombers, the delta-wing Vulcan, the Victor, and the Valiant. Only the Valiant is in operational production.

Britain's NATO contribution on the Continent along with Belgian and Dutch units is the Second Allied Tactical Air Force, equipped largely with Sabers and Venoms. Her radar network is ahead of schedule. And though nothing is yet in operational production, work on air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles shows signs of catching up.

By present-day standards, there is virtually no British military air transport command. There are no plans for either the massive movement of heavily armed ground forces or for materially improving the air mobility of RAF squadrons. Whitehall does, however, place some stress on the rapid air movement of lightly armed troops to any part of the Commonwealth and has ordered V-1,000 jet military transports for this purpose.

There is also a British effort to build a Strategic Bomber Command. The force now bearing that name is equipped with Canberras, and British-made nuclear weapons have been going into munitions dumps for about a year. For certain kinds of missions (tactical, mostly), it is an important and useful force, but right now it is only the shell of a strategic air force.

It does not have the right planes, or training. It also lacks many of the necessary supporting facilities for long-range strategic bombing. Britain first developed in-flight refueling, but she has no tanker squadrons nor are any in sight. Neither are there enough of the little black boxes, the radar so necessary to long-range high-altitude bombing.

There are now perhaps two squadrons (22 aircraft) of Valiants in service. If the aircraft existed in large numbers and were supplied with the same facilities, combat equipment, crew training, experience, and so forth, it would probably be a better aircraft than the B-47. But they are not, and supplying them takes much time and money. Suggestions have been made that Britain's efforts might be better directed towards building up its tactical power, or at least by building proven United States bombers under license.

British aircraft industry potential is considerable. At peak World War II production in 1944, British factories turned out 26,461 aircraft, of which 5,507 were heavy bombers, 2,396 medium bombers, and 13,669 light bombers and fighters for the RAF and Navy. It added up to 208 million pounds of airframe weight, as compared to 9 million in 1938. In 1953, the total was 15 million pounds. Employment in the industry today is 230,000.

There are a number of reasons—some more important than others—why output is so low. One certainly relates to procurement methods. All buying is done by the Ministry of Supply. To date, the Air Ministry has had no direct control over aircraft contracts. It has not been able to halt a program that has gone sour, as it would like to have done much earlier in the case of the

Swift. This aircraft should have been in service over a year ago. In the United States its troubles would have been righted within a reasonable period or the contract canceled. It is one reason Britain's Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, seriously considered reestablishing the wartime Ministry of Aircraft Production.

Other problems include:

The reluctance (due perhaps to pride) of some British manufacturers to accept technical advice and help from the United States on specific aerodynamic problems. The Swift interceptor and the Javelin all-weather fighter are both cases in point.

Too many different types of aircraft under development and too few prototypes of each.

The practice of placing production orders before the aircraft is proven.

An apparent unwillingness to freeze design at appropriate intervals in order to go into production.

Perhaps, also, there may be too much emphasis on aircraft for commercial export, though this can be strongly supported for economic reasons.

None of these reasons apply across the board, nor do all ever apply in one instance. But it is an admitted fact that the British aircraft industry has not been doing the job it could. Its contribution to Western air power is still below par. However, succeeding months should see gradual improvement.

Britain's lead in jet-engine design and development seems safe for a few years yet. But the United States will continue to supply volume production for use in aircraft "today" and "tomorrow."

In the long run, the most dramatic development in British air power is the abandonment of the balanced forces concept, with the scales tipping in favor of the RAF. For an island country that has been for centuries a major sea power, the change poses political problems. But the conscious decision has been taken, and succeeding budgets will see more money for air power, at the expense of other forces if need be.

France

France as an air power suffers primarily from the fact that with the end of the war there was no French Air Force as such. What is more important, there was virtually no aircraft industry. And what there was had to ask Britain for a glossary of terms before it could even talk in the jet age. It was a case of starting from scratch. Its growth has not been helped by the failure of the French government, largely through force of circumstances, to appropriate enough procurement money to warrant going into efficient production. Winning NATO's light fighter competition could do much to put the industry on its feet.

France has not yet watered down her effort by trying to build a strategic bomber force.

In the French Air Force, there are fewer than 2,000 first-line planes, of which 1,200 are contributed to NATO; between 150 and 200 are transports and the rest miscellaneous. France's transport command gained valuable experience in Indochina.

Her main contribution to Western air strength is bases—supplying the sites and helping to build and man them. There are forty-five NATO air bases in France alone. The four or five assigned to the United States Strategic Air Command in North Africa are of vital importance.

Other air forces in Europe taken individually are not impressive. Most of the countries are small. But collected together as they are under NATO they make a good showing.

West Germany

The real unknown, of course, is West Germany. Now admitted to NATO and urged to rearm, she will certainly supersede France as an air power and may, in time, come close to matching Britain. Officially, the West German air rearmament target is 1,200 fighters, 300 transports, reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, and so forth, but no strategic bombers. However, as the mass of German industry, technical know-how, and trained military manpower bring the program close to these levels, there is repeated historical basis for assuming the target will be expanded. Basic plans were laid for a new German Air Force even before French ratification of the London agreements. The United States is supplying many of the aircraft to start. Development will be rapid, and the present program completed in early 1957.

Other NATO countries

The rest of NATO Europe, eight countries—the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Portugal—account for half the NATO bases and half the assigned air strength, some 2,000 aircraft. These break down into about 300 F-86's, about 1,200 F-84's, and the rest older models. Perhaps another 1,000, though not assigned, are available to West European air defense and co-ordinate well with regular forces during NATO war games.

Though none of these countries has reached the stage of developing a family of home-designed aircraft, several production lines for making foreign types—F-84's, Hunters, Vampires—have been set up and are convertible to later types as they become available. Also jet engines are being made under license, as well as a wide range of spare parts and components. Personnel of these air forces is about 140,000.

SWEDEN

Sweden, not in NATO, has 1,200 fighter aircraft, including many jets (mostly Swedish-built Vampires). She has Hunters on order, and deliveries of her own SAAB-32 Lensens have begun. Her aircraft and engine industry is small but efficient, and is working on a new supersonic fighter. Should Sweden be drawn into another war, this force, if not destroyed first, would almost certainly be fighting on the side of the West. Her defenses are spread too thinly, and alone she could not protect herself.

SPAIN

Spain's main contribution is four—perhaps more later—strategic bomber bases populated with United States B-47's and later types as they come into service. Spain now has little more than an "internal" air force, made up mostly of old World War II German aircraft. However, she does have over 2,000 trained pilots who could fly jets, which will probably be supplied by the United States.

THE EAST

From the Eastern reaches of NATO, on through Asia to Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and Australia, there is virtually no air power. There are various national units for handling local troubles, but nothing that could really be considered an important contribution to free world defense. United States aid and bases in Pakistan may make this country an important outpost, but this program, held up by procedural problems, is just starting.

Except for Middle Eastern oil, which is covered by NATO air power in Turkey and British units in the area, there are few strategic air targets worth Rus-

sia's efforts. And land assault is almost precluded by the severest mountain range in the world, which separates Russia from southern Asia all the way from Iran to China.

The West's Far Eastern air power is primarily from the United States, with well-equipped units stationed more or less permanently in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and the Philippines.

Nationalist China's Air Force on Formosa is good for little more than hit-and-run raids along China's mainland coast and for harassing Red shipping. But there are about two thousand well-trained pilots, many with jet experience, whom modern United States jets could turn into a substantial force. They have been trained to United States Air Force standards. In a nonatomic war, the United States Seventh Fleet and its jet-manned aircraft carriers remain an important element.

Australia's Air Force is a peacetime operation, a small, highly trained, well-equipped nucleus that could be quickly brought to strength in an emergency. Much the same is true of her aircraft and engine industry. For a country with fewer than nine million people, Australia's effort is "up to standard." She has assembly lines working on small production orders of Avon-powered Sabers, Canberras, Vampires, and a number of jet engines. She developed on her own and has in production the Jindivik, a high subsonic medium-range pilotless aircraft. She is working on a delta-wing rocket—speed Mach 3—to intercept high-speed guided missiles. An important contribution is the rocket-testing station at Woomera, which is available to Britain. Another point is her isolation from the potential enemy; her factories and airfields would probably be the last to get hit in an atomic war.

Japan, like Germany, is still a potential air power. But that potential is great. She had one of the largest aircraft industries in the world. Contracts have already been signed with United States firms to build United States planes and engines under license. Her industry already has considerable experience in modern jets as a result of its repair and maintenance work on Allied aircraft during the fighting in Korea.

With her resources and manpower, she could build the third largest air power in the world, after the United States and Russia. It would take a lot of United States aid, however, as she has no raw materials of her own, and her balance of payments is precarious at best.

CANADA

Canada is an air power out of all proportion to its population of 14 million. It has twelve squadrons (300 F-86E Canadian-built Sabers) in Europe. It has contributed several hundred more to NATO as foreign aid. Its massive Northern wilderness is a vital element of North American defense. An extensive radar network is in being. Its air base program is moving at top speed. The high-performing CF-100 Canuck is Canadian designed and in volume production. On defense, the United States and Canada work together.

THE WEST AND RUSSIA

This, then, is the line-up in the West: a free world organized into a massive and growing display of air power—chinks, faults, and failings in the armor, but, over all, a formidable array. In terms of aircraft in combat units, the Reds have more: over 20,000 in Russia; 2,000 in East Europe; and another 2,000 in China. Most are tactical aircraft. The instance of jets is high and mounting. There are also large numbers of Il-28 twin-jet medium bombers, capable of carrying A-bombs over 1,800 miles.

Russian interest in strategic air power began almost as early as the West's. Development has been slower, but she does have about 700 Tu-4's (B-29 copies) and perhaps a couple of hundred Tu-200's, six-turboprop versions of the B-36. A four-engine turboprop bomber is also in production. She has at least one prototype of a four-jet swept-wing heavy bomber, with a total thrust of over 60,000 pounds, and swept-wing twin-jet bombers in squadron service. Late fighter models may be supersonic—the MIG-17, for example.

On the average, Russia's first-line aircraft probably perform just about as well as those in the West. But their operational availability appears to be lower; nor are they as well equipped with special combat gear. Her strategic air arm is no match for the West's either in volume or quality, but its ability to achieve some penetration to distant targets is a compulsory assumption. And "some" penetration with hydrogen bombs would be too much.

The Red aircraft industry has a tremendous capacity, though quality control in some important instances seems poor.

The West relies on quality, technological superiority in all phases of air power. Each aircraft, jammed full of armor, armament, electronics gear, skilled crews, and reliability under extreme conditions, stands a good chance of carrying out its mission. Authoritative opinion in Washington, London, and, apparently, Moscow is that these factors continue to maintain the air power balance in the West's favor, despite Red superiority in numbers.

Keeping this lead requires constant effort—tremendous expenditure on the best of technical manpower, research, industrial capacity, natural resources, and the lives of the men who, today, first fly tomorrow's service aircraft.

The future—peace or chaos—is man's choice. Within one hour of detecting Red bombers in free-world skies, the West's nuclear-armed strategic bombers would begin taking off from bases all over the world, hundreds of them, with one destination—Russia. Attacking Soviet aircraft would find the West's bases empty. No international conferences, not even a quick general staff meeting. The gun is loaded. It is as automatic as pushing a button. It could take even less to set it off; an accident, for example. An unavoidable risk.

This is the ability of the West. It is costly. It is unavoidable. For until the politics of reason finds the way to peace in the world, the politics of power is the only known means of a stalemate. The central force of that power today is air power.

Edward W. S. Hull, London, is bureau chief of McGraw-Hill World News. Educated as a physicist, he was a pilot with the United States Marine Corps during World War II. He was for three years a correspondent in McGraw-Hill Washington News Bureau, specializing in raw materials, all forms of transport, and military budgeting. Prior to going to London just over a year ago, he was for three years associate editor of the Whaley-Eaton Service, and during his last year there edited the Foreign Letter.

The Psychological Impact of Air Power

By Lewis S. Thompson

MOST of us can chronicle the development of air power. Not always so apparent, however, are the changes that it has made in the communication of ideas, international commerce, geographical isolation, and the waging of war. Man is a creature of the earth, and his perception, limited by this narrow environment, tends to view the world in linear planes. Even the dramatic displacement by aircraft of armies and battleships as symbols of national power and prestige has become circumscribed by traditional habits and concepts of warfare. The technical evolution of air power has made it a factor in the economic, political, military, ideological, and social development of every nation. Its extreme flexibility, range, mobility, and speed as a means of transportation; its capability for rescue and communication operations; and its destructive power have added a new dimension to personal and national security. The world that once was measured in terms of land mass and seas should now be conceived in terms of a boundless, borderless air mass. The interaction of these concepts and forces has created the psychological impact of air power.

There is probably no word that has been more abused and confused than "psychological." Loosely it can be defined as dealing with the mind—as a thing perceived or experienced. While this is an almost all-embracing definition, in relation to the word "impact" we are defining our subject as the force communicated or perceived through the medium of air power. And by air power we mean the aggregate of men, aircraft, weapons, air bases, facilities, and the industrial and technical resources that sustain flight. In other words, air power is the ability of a nation to fly, and we are discussing this ability in terms of its influence on human behavior.

In the velocity of our projection into world affairs through the development of air power, the United States has made most of the natural mistakes to which we are entitled, both by our youth as a nation and our enthusiasm as a people. With the world rapidly shrinking in time and space, international differences have assumed a new significance and are almost as personal and immediate as family quarrels. Commercial and diplomatic relations that once were conducted in leisure are now consummated on a global basis in minutes or hours. With two competing industrial systems producing nuclear weapons of terrific lethality, a new timidity is introduced into world affairs. If the Communist bear should sneeze in Moscow, a *Gesundheit* echoes around the world. Even our concepts of personal security and property are disturbed by the frustrations and fears concerning an adequate defense against aerial attack. But before discussing the reactions to air power, let us examine some of the reasons why people act like people.

Basically all human behavior is governed by "natural laws." The first of these laws or principles is that the strongest motivating force of individuals is instinct—survival (either spiritual or personal), hunger, sex, and so forth. People are secondarily motivated by emotions—love, friendship, hate, fear, greed, and so forth, and only thirdly is man motivated by reason. Imposed upon and modifying this biological behavior, however, are the society in which

an individual lives and the circumstances that surround a certain action. Human behavior is not haphazard and obstinate, but is generally systematic and purposeful: man attempts to maintain a state of equilibrium both internally and with his external environment. While this is an oversimplification of human behavior, it is in this framework that air power is particularly significant to our times.

The mere presence of a hostile aircraft is often conceived as a threat to the personal security of every individual in a community, and the emotional response to these weapons has often obscured reason and created distrust of United States motives or objectives. The presence of United States military forces overseas conflicts with the basic desire of the local population to control and direct their own destiny. In wartime these frictions are generally accepted as necessary to the accomplishment of a common goal. In peacetime this same mutuality of endeavor or interest must be established. Reason, which might be used to establish this community of interest, is often subordinated to prejudice and suspicion. It is these facts that often complicate understanding, but it is in consonance with these principles of human behavior that air operations must be planned and implemented.

Today we live in an age in which force has become the determining factor in international relations. Wars that once were considered a contest between professional groups and forces suddenly have completed the evolution to total war between civilizations. Air power has broken down cultural and national barriers and becomes increasingly important in everyday life. While air power is indivisible by peace or war, to identify the psychological impact of this technical revolution we have divided our subject into two parts: the impact of air power in warfare and its impact in times of peace. This arbitrary division should not be construed as making these psychological reactions mutually exclusive. The characteristics of one operation influence the other, and even the difference between peace and war has become almost academic in the current world crises.

Developing Techniques of Aerial Warfare

The introduction of air power into warfare during World War I was in itself a psychological as well as a physical factor in the waging of war. While the role of airplanes in those early days was primarily that of a reconnaissance platform and an incidental propaganda delivery agent, these uses did lead to the development of new tactics and strategy in exercising military forces to achieve political objectives. Aircraft extended the range of firepower, exposed key secrets and secured vital intelligence, and forced the development of mobility, dispersion, and camouflage in conventional forces. Even at the initiation of war, air power exposed to attack all of the resources of a nation that make war possible.

During World War II, the tactics which had been largely just ideas became established facts. Air power's efficacy as a weapon system was dramatically proven. During this period air attacks became not only the concern of military commanders but of the people as a whole. Aerial warfare created an attitude of hopelessness and defeat as community life was disrupted, as health and welfare organizations collapsed, and as essential utilities and key economic services were destroyed. Air power became identified as the *only* force that could attack and destroy *all* of the weapons of warfare—in the air, on land, or at sea. It could destroy the industrial resources that sustain an enemy's

war-making capacity. This flexibility of air power made it the dominant force in modern warfare.

As these tactics were refined, as aircraft increased their bomb loads and their range and speed, military strategists were developing the techniques to make aerial warfare a precision instrument of destruction. The concise formulation of objectives and the optimum employment of air power have made it one of the most rational and discriminate of military weapons. It is this development that has been largely unrecognized by the public. Haphazard, indiscriminate bombing is now recognized by military commanders as vandalism, extravagant of the most expensive resources of a nation and unprofitable in terms of the ultimate objective of war—peace. Aircraft are not employed to destroy a population but primarily to disarm a foe by destroying his industrial resources or his military forces in being. Killing is only incidental to the strategic purpose of air attack, not the objective. The claim that aerial warfare is inhuman and that the employment of atomic weapons is morally indefensible is without foundation in fact. With precise target selection and the instant ability to destroy the military, industrial, social, and psychological forces supporting war, aircraft and their atomic punch may well introduce a new humaneness into warfare—and a quick resolution of international conflicts. An emotional emphasis on the weapons of war should not distract us from the causes of war and should not be used to complicate the relations of military forces with the people they are designed to protect.

Analysis of Psychological Effects

At the conclusion of World War II a detailed survey was made in Germany and Japan to analyze the psychological effects of aerial attack. While no attempt was made to formulate definitive conclusions, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey did establish the general pattern of reaction. One significant conclusion was that the psychological effect of the atomic attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not differ in any substantial way from those produced by other types of bombing. In general, the reaction to bombing attacks followed this pattern: (1) temporary loss of inhibitory control, actions seeking survival but not particularly antisocial actions; (2) fear, emotional excitement, trauma induced by casualties; (3) anxiety produced by grief and personal loss; (4) worry produced by disruption of normal community life; (5) fear of repetition of attack; (6) motivation (within twenty-four hours after evacuation) to return to search for relatives, friends, and possessions; (7) survivor guilt; (8) apathy and/or resignation acquiescent acceptance of the inevitable consequences of war.

The primary reaction of all individuals to air attack was *fear*. In the atomic attacks on Japan that fear rarely led to unqualified terror, but the sheer horror, destruction, and suffering witnessed and experienced by the survivors had, surprisingly, a second reaction of admiration for the power and technical skill that produced such an awesome weapon. A third reaction, anger, was exhibited by only a small percentage of the survivors, and most of this anger was directed toward the regime for their failure to provide adequate warning or protection against such a disaster, and was not directed against the attacker.

Beside the psychological effect of the moral and material losses caused by aerial bombing and the variance caused by time (night or day) and intensity of attack, there are certain ancillary results from such operations that have a psychological influence. Among these are the following:

1. The destruction provides the opportunity for criminal acts and impairs the moral code to make it easier to commit them.

2. Under aerial attack the conditions for a strict enforcement of economic controls deteriorate rapidly. Money becomes less important as barter for essential goods increases. Living quarters have an inflated value. The disruption decreases the supply of consumer goods, increasing competition and prices for them. Loss of water, lights, and other utilities creates new economic needs and disrupts the economy.

3. People become jealous and suspicious of those who have not suffered an equal loss or deprivation.

4. The disruption of the communication media accelerates rumors that radiate from the area of disaster. Starting from conjectures on the weapons or causes, facts are magnified into rumors concerning the blame for such an occurence.

5. The social displacement creates tensions and anxieties that are emphasized under aerial attack.

6. Discriminate attacks on war industries, communication centers, and symbols of the ruling power are generally accepted as the "natural consequences of war" and often involve a personal dissociation from the regime.

Psychological Warfare and Propaganda

The mechanism that manipulates the above reactions in time of war is generally described as "psychological warfare." Psychological warfare can be quite simply defined as a method of communicating ideas. In the broad sense it applies psychology to the conduct of international relations, and in the narrow sense it is the planned use of psychological strategy and tactics in support of military forces. The word "propaganda" is often confused with psychological warfare and is sometimes considered synonymous. Propaganda is actually only planned persuasion by the written or spoken word—leaflets, broadcasts, posters, pamphlets, and so forth. It is only one part of psychological warfare, which embraces also actions or things that can be utilized to communicate ideas. It is in this more encompassing context that the psychological impact of air power can make a substantial contribution to the achievement of our national objectives.

The program to gain our objectives must be a continuous operation, indivisible by either peace or war. It is waged before, during, and after a war. But it is not controlled by the laws, usages, and customs of war; and it cannot be defined in terms of stockpiles, order of battle, or named engagements. Success or failure is often known only months or years after the execution of the operation. Yet success, though incalculable, can be overwhelming; and failure, though often undetectable, can be mortal.

U. S. Objectives

Basically, the objectives of the United States that affect these psychological warfare activities can be stated as:

a) To maintain a government under God that ensures the basic freedoms, dignity, and responsibility of man;

b) To secure the peace and security of our citizens through the maintenance of our economic strength, political liberties, social philosophy, and our institutions, principles, and leaders;

c) To gain understanding and support for U. S. policies, ideology, and objectives by the people of the world.

Conversion

Conversion is one of the most effective techniques which nations can employ to achieve their political objectives. A people can be converted from one

belief to another if given the choice between conversion and loss of personal status, stubborn individuals being exposed, scorned, and rooted out. A change in belief can also be accomplished by the peaceful development of social consciousness and responsibility. But to effect an initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies and formal language of a new faith is generally required. Sustained counterintelligence must remain alert against backsliders, but formal acceptance will become genuine if the new faith conforms to the natural instincts, desires, and needs of a people.

If immediate wholesale conversion should require military or political operations that were too extensive or severe, the same result could be secured more gradually by toleration of the objectionable faith combined with the issuance of genuine privileges to the new, preferred faith. The conquered people are left in the private, humble enjoyment of their old beliefs and folkways; but all participation in public life, whether political, cultural, or economic, is conditioned on acceptance of the new faith. In this manner all the uprising members of the society will in a few generations move over to the new faith in the process of becoming rich, powerful, or learned; what is left of the old faith will be gutter superstition, possessing neither power nor respect.

It is this contest to convert people to Communism or democracy that is being decided today. To assure a favorable outcome we must understand and utilize the psychological impact of air power. The international Communist conspiracy is seeking to achieve a conversion by force which they cannot win by reason. And they are backing up this force with a propaganda program that costs them almost one and a half billion dollars a year. This application of force and persuasion requires an equal utilization of the forces of the free world—military, political, economic, social, ideological, and psychological.

To its adherents, Communism generally offers prestige and opportunity. Communist propaganda has been quick to exploit any differences or dissension between the United States and the rest of the free world and has consistently and viciously attacked United States policies, principles, and activities. Communism purportedly offers to the "have-not" people of the world Western science and technology, a professed political democracy, popular education, freedom from familial or religious control, and other coveted aspects of Western culture. All this is wrapped up in an initial nationalism that is particularly attractive in many areas of the world. At the same time, the discontented and dispossessed of the world are offered membership in what the Communists describe as an inevitable and status-raising world revolution against the decadent aspects of Western civilization.

Lessons of Communist Propaganda

There are also a few lessons from Communist propaganda that deserve careful consideration in the formulation of our own psychological warfare operations. Communist propaganda is centrally planned and has long-range objectives. It is diversified in the channels through which it flows and is individually tailored to suit the audience to which it is addressed. It is unscrupulous in its methods and merciless in the exploitation of the weaknesses and shortcomings of its opponents. The themes of its propaganda may change—sometimes provocative, sometimes almost conciliatory—but the machinery, the operation does not. It has adopted and perverted the language of peace and aspiration. Communist propaganda is seasoned and professional, dependent on a powerful police state at home and on uneducated, underprivileged, or emotionally ill fanatics abroad, except for those few countries where Communism is so stable as to attract ambitious or practical men. And even in those countries, it relies on propaganda to prohibit dissent and control dissatisfaction.

Rules of Psychological Operation

Since most psychological operations, either Communist or democratic, are directed to the subtle niceties of thought by which people maintain their personal orientation and balance in an unstable, impersonal world, there is no substitute for common sense combined with detailed technical knowledge and accurate scientific information in planning or carrying out psychological operations. The propagandist must use the language of the mother, the schoolteacher, the lover, the bully, the policeman, the actor, the ecclesiastic, the buddy, the newspaperman. And propaganda analysis, in weighing and evaluating these persuasive actions or methods, must be even more discriminating in determining whether the propaganda is hitting its mark. The selection of approach or appeal to be addressed to a hostile or neutral people generally follows certain rules:

1. Psychological operations are a function of command.
2. Psychological warfare must avoid promises that may not be kept.
3. Propaganda must contain a simple, concise, objective statement of facts that appeal to the instinct, emotion, or reason of its target audience.
4. Almost all good propaganda is true. It uses truth selectively.
5. Propaganda must influence or persuade to some action.
6. Morale and the vulnerabilities of an enemy to our psychological operations are often identifiable through an analysis of the media of communication.
7. Basically people are interested in one thing—themselves. The most credible propaganda must be confined to simple, factual, and plainly honest statements on things affecting that individual. Pompousness, intricacy, and bad taste generally defeat their own purpose.
8. Propaganda is like news—it has to be timeless or brand new. In between, it has no value.

While the above is a compendium of the rules affecting psychological operations, it does indicate a few of the basic truths which may govern effectiveness. We cannot spout platitudes in a vacuum, nor permit our political and military operations and objectives to be maligned, distorted, and used against us. We cannot permit the natural aspirations of all people for peace to destroy the military power of the United States that prevents aggression. In time of war, air power must be utilized in consonance with the psychological reactions toward it, and our psychological operations should provide purpose to an individual's activity: control over the chaos of war and reason for personal sacrifice.

Air Power Is Peace Power

While the psychological impact of aerial attack and the techniques of psychological warfare are primarily the concern of military strategists, air power in time of peace has much broader implications to an almost universal audience. The combat capability of aircraft is multiplied in time of peace, by destroying the artificial barriers between nations, as an instrument for the peaceful development and prosperity of all nations. Represented by the theme "Air power is peace power," it demonstrates the unique capability of air power to serve humanity with its aircraft, air bases, facilities, and personnel.

AIR TRANSPORT

In the short span of three decades, commercial aviation has grown into a billion dollar business carrying more people overseas than ocean liners and increasing its volume of air freight over two hundred times since 1945. Air express, air freight, and air mail are now considered necessities for a modern, technological society—speeding communication as well as essential, critical, or perishable goods to every corner of the globe. But while this new mode of transportation has assisted economic development, it has also provided the machines, men, and skills necessary to political and psychological action.

In 1948, in an effort to remove Western influence, the Soviet Union imposed the blockade of Berlin. The Berlin airlift was one of the most dramatic examples of utilizing air power to wage a political and moral battle. It affirmed the determination of the Western nations to support Berlin as an island of freedom. It proved to the world our determination to resist aggression, to make no compromise of principle with Communist force and tyranny. The C-54's of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) became symbols of United States friendship and support to a grateful German people. The airlift demonstrated the swift capability of air power to support a great city logistically. It reaffirmed to our Western allies that the U. S. was willing to commit its military forces in peacetime to support the free people of the world.

Another example of air power's ability to satisfy a spiritual need and serve a political objective was the Mecca airlift of September 1952. Muslim pilgrims were stranded at Beirut, Lebanon, while making a pilgrimage to their holy city of Mecca. The "infidel" United States that had often been the whipping boy for the nationalistic angers of Muslim leaders became a hero. Upon the recommendation of Mr. Harold B. Minor, United States Minister in Lebanon, thirteen C-54's of the United States government provided a magic carpet for the pilgrims. A total of 3,763 Muslims became friends of the United States, as pilgrims from Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and North Africa gained a personal experience with which to counter Communist slander.

GOOD WILL

While we emphasize air power as a deterrent to aggression, and the chief weapons system for defense and attack, beneath this shield it has significantly contributed to the free flow of information in the world. And with this swift communication has been established a basis for mutual understanding and respect. Via the boundless airways, American tourists have immediate access to the remotest corners of the world; foreigners, often only vaguely understood, become people of diverse nationalities and races, known in person. One of the most significant employments of aircraft for this purpose was the good-will tour of Latin America, January–February 1954, conducted by the United States Air Force.

This "Wings for the America's" tour by fifteen jet fighters and five supporting aircraft visited eleven countries. In the initial press release announcing the tour, Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbott stated:

> Latin American countries have an abiding interest in problems of hemispheric defense and they have informed us of their desire to view some of the aircraft which the United States has produced to meet the threat of aggression in the hemisphere and in other parts of the free world.

But far beyond his expectations for this demonstration of United States air power was the enthusiasm exhibited by the hundreds of thousands of people who were given their first opportunity to see jet aircraft and the huge air transports of the United States. A technological development had captured the imagination of the youth of Latin America. With almost unprecedented enthusiasm, Mexicans threw their hats and coats in front of the taxiing jets; Peruvians and Chileans waved their handkerchiefs by the tens of thousands; Argentineans carried the pilots on their shoulders, and President Perón embraced and personally escorted their Commander; Nicaragua renamed its new airport at Managua and issued a series of postage stamps honoring one of the fliers. United States airmen were everywhere mobbed by autograph seekers. Far more than an exhibit of jet acrobatics and aircraft, it was a dramatic and effective operation showing United States partnership with Latin America in defense and technology. It indicated new horizons for the economic development and unity of the Americas.

RESCUE AND DISASTER RELIEF

Aircraft have also played an increasingly important role in international disaster relief and rescue. Their ability to surmount physical barriers, particularly with the development of the helicopter, has been proven over and over again. The gratitude and affection with which these activities have been received are creating a new attitude; the psychological impact of air power has a new warmth and depth.

The North Sea floods that inundated areas of Great Britain and Holland in 1953 graphically demonstrated the application of air power to humanitarian purposes. In a world in which air piracy and international banditry are common Communist practices, the United States Air Force's participation in this disaster relief was a convincing affirmation of our principles. In 1954, the Far East Air Forces evacuated about a thousand indigenous people for medical relief, airlifted medical personnel and supplies to Pakistan, and provided an emergency facility to every country in the area. The Caribbean Air Command flew seventy-nine missions for rescue, search, evacuation, and other purposes of mercy. Our Air Rescue Service rescued and airlifted foreign nationals within minutes after an avalanche in the Austrian Alps and from floods in Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras. An Eskimo was evacuated to a hospital in Labrador; 1,440 underprivileged West Berlin children were airlifted for a summer vacation in West Germany. The psychological significance of these acts cannot be measured in terms of people and property saved, but in the ever increasing dependence on air power as a friend.

PUBLIC SERVICE

There is another aspect of air power which usually makes no headlines but which is securely integrating itself into our way of life. Aircraft are now used in agriculture to seed, to exterminate insects, to seed rain clouds, to provide meteorological services, and to ensure the marketability of produce. They are used by our national forest service for fire surveillance and fire fighting. Aircraft are often the quickest, easiest, and most accurate means for mapping and exploration. All of these activities are contributing to the restructuration of societies by eliminating isolation, by developing backward areas, reducing urban concentrations, increasing productivity, and creating a freer, richer life. The psychological impact of this development can be measured only by future scholars, but it has created a new perception of unlimited markets, uses, and opportunities. Air power has reduced the psychological distances between individuals, peoples, and cultures, and minimized the significance

of national and geographical frontiers. While this is perhaps a mixed blessing, ignorance sometimes being construed as bliss, it seems better to face the frictions of living together than to retreat to the ignorance and suspicion that have bred so many wars in our past.

LONG-RANGE TECHNIQUES

While air power has emerged as the most powerful instrument of war, it is also being identified as the most effective tool to achieve our long-range objectives of peace and security. The only limits to its employment are the barriers of poverty and the artificial barriers of suspicion and fear. In the future we should look forward to a closer co-operation between nations—with realistic and not arbitrary regulations on the use of air space, with a new era of international co-operation in commerce. The psychological impact of aircraft has provided us with a new source of power to achieve these long-range objectives.

To utilize air power in this rather unconventional manner requires an increasing emphasis on sociological and psychological research. The industrial and technological facts of the world must become meaningful to all people. Nuclear weapons must be assimilated into our social environment and be understood and accepted. A new scale should be devised for evaluating public opinion, appeals, and responses. Social and anthropological research is needed to identify the goals of a society and to identify values and practices that can produce or destroy empathy between peoples. We need research to identify the dynamic forces within an individual and within a society which have formed and which are continuously modifying the determinants of human behavior. Data is needed on the ways and means that can be utilized to change the individual's perception of that environment. Psychological antipathies between nations and individuals must be catalogued. The art forms, symbolism, printing type faces, composition, color preferences and prejudices, and all the other myriad techniques and means that persuade people to action must be analyzed, documented, and then simply and concisely stated.

Some of these problems are now being met by research sponsored by governmental agencies and services in order to carry out their mission. Other research data have often been effectively utilized to support governmental programs. It is generally recognized that our knowledge and understanding of the world must keep pace with our international commitments. The recent London agreement, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and our alliance with Nationalist China further emphasize our interest in and knowledge of world affairs. It is to the task of making these agreements effective that so much of the resources of our nation are consigned, and it is upon the co-operation of science with government that our national and personal survival depends. As the President of the United States recently stated, our objective is ". . . to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

Lewis S. Thompson, Washington, D. C., is Deputy for Mutual Security Assistance Affairs in the United States Air Force. Previously he served as president of Research Associates, Inc., was associate director of the Eisenhower-Nixon Research Service, and in the Central Intelligence Agency. During the war he was in the Office of Production Management as a dollar-a-year man and went to London in 1943 as executive officer for the Mission for Economic Affairs and representative of the United States on the Combined Production and Resources Board.

Obstacles to the Development of American Air Power

By W. BARTON LEACH

"AIR power is the dominant factor in modern war"—this is the common currency of strategic discussion. But in this second decade of the atomic age, five years after the first Soviet nuclear explosion, the theoretical dominance of air power has not been realized in American force in being. It is well that we should examine the political, economic, professional, and administrative pressures that have repeatedly reduced and delayed the realization.

Actually the above quotation is incomplete. In its usual form there is an additional word: *but*. The *but* may appear in the same sentence, the following paragraph, three pages later, or next week's press conference. Yet appear it will. "Air power is the dominant factor in modern war . . . ***but*** we also need a navy second to none and an army adequate to fight all kinds of war, large and small; . . . *but* since there is no single year of crisis we must build in an orderly way for the long haul; . . . *but* the aircraft we buy must be the ones we need, not those that will be obsolete before we get them; . . . *but* in building our military power we must not undermine our economy and thus allow Communism to achieve its greatest triumph without firing a shot; . . . *but*, and so forth.

These *but* clauses are always unimpeachable verities. And each in its own way is a factor retarding the growth of national air power. Thus far the *but* clauses have had far too much success. Land power and sea power, at least since 1951, have had forces in being at the levels approved as the nation's strategic need. *This has never been true of air power since V-J Day.* Instead the country has been assured that "new emphasis is being placed on air power" and "our air power is greater than ever before in peacetime history." But the standard of evaluation must be the strategic requirement of the present, not the gross inadequacies of the past.

A QUESTION OF DEFINITION

In this article United States air power is defined as the United States Air Force—not because of its name or any theoretical concept that air power must be unitary but because of the military tasks that have been assigned to the Air Force, that it is organized and prepared (given the means) to perform, and that will not be performed at any significant level of effort except by the USAF. To avoid oversimplification some discussion of this definition now follows.

Broader terms have recently come into fashion in defining air power. National air power, it is said, is not only the Air Force but also the air elements of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard, our civilian airlines, and our incomparable aircraft industry.

Such a definition can be of some occasional use in pointing out the multiple uses of the air space in modern war. But it blurs the focus and can lead the unthinking to equate the organizations listed in the definition and conclude that a deficiency in the Air Force is cured by abundance elsewhere. It offers an anodyne for the agony of decision—the hard task of putting first things first, second things determinedly second, and third things out the window. It lets one say, "Of course, we all agree

that air power is the dominant factor in modern war. But all these things are air power. So we can give something to everybody—they are all so sincere and persuasive—and let each build air power in his own way." This is surely the pathway to self-delusion, perhaps to disaster.

If we are to surmount the perils that face us we would be well advised to sharpen the focus of our definition as follows: United States air power is military air power in being to (1) deliver massive attack upon any enemy anywhere as ordered, (2) defend the United States against enemy air attack, (3) provide tactical air power, the air component of the ground-air fighting team, and (4) provide global airlift of men and matériel for all military purposes.

These four military tasks are primary missions of the United States Air Force. With regard to each of them certain plus values may be contributed by others, but it is well that these should be precisely understood to avoid false inferences that if the Air Force is not given the means to do these jobs someone else will do them.

Massive attack

The massive attack capability—the deterrent to big war and a major war-winning factor if big war comes—is the job of Strategic Air Command. This does not mean that SAC hugs a monopoly to its bosom. It does mean that no other military force has the capability of delivering massive attack at the required level of intensity and continuity. Further, no other military force has indicated any willingness to accept firm responsibility for any defined part of the job. This appears to include carrier-based aircraft, which must be considered a plus value available fortuitously if at all.[1]

Air defense

The air defense of the United States is the job of Air Defense Command in so far as fighter aircraft and early warning systems on land are concerned. The Army contributes antiaircraft fire, especially ground-to-air missiles such as Nike. The Navy contributes seaward extensions of the radar early warning lines. Possible contributions of fighter aircraft by the Navy and Marines must be considered indeterminate plus values, unlikely to materialize owing to the necessity of building an air defense system around firm commitments, assigned responsibilities, and integrated training. If ADC does not have the means to provide fighter defense of the United States, this country has no fighter defense.

Tactical air support

Tactical air support of ground troops —protection against enemy air attack, interruption of the flow of enemy supply and reinforcement, attack upon battlefield targets—is in a somewhat different category. Basically it is the job of Tactical Air Command and the overseas tactical air forces. But the three Marine Air Wings (equivalent in total to about nine TAC wings) do much the same kind of job, tending to specialize in attacks upon battlefield targets. Marine Air and TAC units are usable together, the presence of the former reducing plane-for-plane the requirement for the latter, as in Korea. In some circumstances—notably, as in Korea, where the battlefield is near a coastline and the enemy does not employ submarines and attack aircraft—carrier-based aircraft may fill a need for tactical air forces. But this plus value is limited in quantity and, more important, in continuity. Nothing approaching a plane-for-plane reduction in land-based air requirement is produced by the carriers; under the best circumstances the air complement of a carrier replaces less than half its number of land-based aircraft (Marine or USAF). Field Marshal Montgomery has made it clear that tactical use of carrier-based aircraft has no significant part in North Atlantic Treaty Organization plans.[2]

Air logistics

The air logistics mission is basically the job of Military Air Transport Service (a joint command operating USAF and USN aircraft, the former in much greater quantity than the latter) and the troop-carrier units of TAC. There are supplementary sources of airlift, notably the Fleet Logistic Air Wings, the civilian airlines, and private transport aircraft. However, it is well to note that in a general crisis—as contrasted with such local crises as the Berlin blockade and the Korean War—there will be multiple demands for airlift, and a transport unit that is itself overtaxed will not have resources to send to the aid of its equally overtaxed neighbor.

Summary of USAF responsibility

To summarize: As to massive attack capability and continental air defense against enemy attack, American air power is for practical purposes synonymous with the United States Air Force. As to tactical support of United States ground troops American air power is synonymous with the United States Air Force to about the same degree that American land power is synonymous with the United States Army—the Marines add air wings and divisions to each. On each of these three missions carrier-based aircraft may provide plus

[1] Thomas K. Finletter, *Power and Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954), pp. 203–5, 224. Mr. Finletter, former Secretary of the Air Force, is an unimpeachable witness as to what decisions have and have not been made. He states (p. 203), "Now the point . . . is not that a wrong decision has been made as to the respective roles of the Air Force's land-based planes and the Navy's carrier-based aircraft, but that no decision at all has been made." It is a matter of common knowledge that the word has been passed in the Pentagon that there are to be no "interservice squabbles" and this is construed as forbidding a member of one service to express doubts as to the capabilities of weapons of another service. Mr. Finletter himself apparently felt that under this rule even the mild statement above quoted could not be made while he still held public office. In this country neither the Congress nor the public gets the benefit of the informed conflicts of opinion that are considered essential to sound decision in other aspects of national life; and Mr. Finletter's guarded statement suggests that a similar suppression of productive controversy governs the secret councils of the Pentagon. Almost certainly the suppression of Navy doubts as to atomic bombardment as a strategy and the B-36 as a weapon was responsible for the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949, a matter in which the present writer believes that the Navy personnel were fully justified in placing their views before the public. See *The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy,* Hearings before House Armed Services Committee, Eighty-first Congress, First Session (October 6–21, 1949). No such gag rule applies in England. See Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, "A Look Through the Window at World War III," *Royal United Services Institution Journal,* Vol. 99 (November 1954), pp. 512–13; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John C. Slessor, *Strategy for the West* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1954), pp. 95–104.

[2] Lecture before the Royal United Services Institution, October 26, 1954, reported in *Royal United Services Institution Journal,* Vol. 99 (Nov. 1954), p. 507. It is inconceivable that this lecture could have been given without the concurrence of the Field Marshal's superior, General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

In a land action such as that of the Korean War why should not the attack aircraft of the carriers be land based, thus eliminating the heavy requirement for air defense and antisubmarine defense of the carriers? If such action were taken the Navy could provide a plane-for-plane reduction of USAF-Marine tactical air requirement. But this question seems not to have been asked, much less answered. It is possible that both the Navy and the Air Force, for different reasons, would frown upon this suggestion.

values when the fighting starts, but do not reduce by as much as a single wing the USAF requirement. As to military airlift the picture is more complex, but the USAF must carry the major burden.

Thus, obstacles to the growth of the United States Air Force are obstacles to the growth of American air power in a straight-line relationship. Put it this way: If obstacles to the development of the United States Air Force are removed, the nation will have the air power it needs. Otherwise not.

DEVELOPMENT OF USAF BEFORE AND AFTER 1951

Prior to 1951 the national need in air power had never been determined, much less programed, by the Department of Defense. The Finletter Commission and the Brewster-Hinshaw Committee, reporting respectively to the President and Congress, had stated a *peacetime* requirement of seventy wings as of 1948. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff had annually been restricted to the exercise of dividing among their services a progressively reduced total defense budget—15 billion dollars, then 14, 13, and 12. This, in the days of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, was known as "cutting fat without cutting muscle." It is useless to bemoan the inadequacy of the resulting forces and the invitation to trouble they presented; the Korean War is its own best witness. But it is worth while to point out the folly of starting with a dollar sign and restricting our military professionals to the job of dividing the pot. This could happen again,[3] and it could have the same result.

[3] ". . . a balanced or reduced budget—long a goal of the present Administration—is a very major factor in the 'New Look.' Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey probably had more to do with service force levels than did the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, February 6, 1955.

In 1950–51 this country was apprehensive, and rightly so. In September 1949 we detected the first nuclear explosion in the Soviet Union. And in June 1950 the Korean War showed us what happens when we drop our guard. So, for the first time since V-J Day, the Chiefs of Staff were directed to state what forces the country needed—all forces, land, sea, and air. The process was started in January 1950 and completed in a National Security Council decision on October 1, 1951. The agreed and approved requirement was 21 divisions for the Army, 409 major combat ships for the Navy, 3 divisions and 3 air wings for the Marines, and—here mark well—143 wings for the Air Force to be achieved by June 30, 1954, and to be manned by 1,200,000 military personnel. These forces represented relatively small percentage increases for the Army, Navy, and Marines, but more than a doubling of the Air Force. For the first time military and civilian planners, accorded full opportunity to state the military need, had given real substance to the precept that "Air power is the dominant factor in modern war."

As all know, 143 wings never materialized and 1954 disappeared as a target date. The hard facts of the fiscal year 1953 budget produced a stretch-out to 1955. Then in the "Truman" budget for FY 1954 another stretch-out to 1956 was programed. The "Eisenhower" budget for FY 1954—the only one that really counted for that year—cut 5 billion dollars out of the Air Force, adopted an "interim" 120-wing program, and left the whole thing to a re-examination by the new Chiefs of Staff, all of whom were to be changed in the summer of 1953. The new Chiefs, operating with a problematical freedom of action, found that security airwise could be attained with 137 wings to be achieved by 1957 and to be manned by

975,000 military personnel.[4] The manpower figures are striking: someone discovered that with "better utilization of manpower" the Air Force could get:

in 1955	120 wings	with 970,000 men
in 1956	127 wings	with 975,000 men
in 1957	137 wings	with 975,000 men (*sic*).

That is where matters stand today. What happens now will depend upon how insuperable the obstacles, herein described, prove to be.

THE OBSTACLES

Obstacle One: The Air Force is in process of growth, having never achieved its planned strength. When a policy maker wants to reduce total Defense money and manpower—and this is a constant state of mind—it is far easier to cut back planned future force than to disband existing military units, scrap existing weapons, and discharge personnel already on the job. The fact that the planned future force is indispensable and the existing present force dispensable is not always a sufficient reason for building the former at the expense of the latter. The reluctance of Secretaries of Defense to accept split papers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to insist on JCS "agreement" loads the dice in favor of the status quo; if unanimity for change is unobtainable the situation tends to remain unchanged—existing forces stay; new forces are reduced, delayed, or both.

Obstacle Two: Air Power is expensive. Aircraft cost a lot and become obsolete fast. Take for example the B-36, the ten-engine intercontinental bomber. It cost 3 to 5 million dollars a copy, and it will probably pass into the junk pile before it ever sees action. Many find it difficult really to accept the principle that the B-36 has performed its mission—and can only perform its mission—if it never has to drop a bomb. Sir Winston Churchill can say, "It is certain that Europe would have been communized and London under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States." But this concept of an international revolver-in-the-cop's-holster is elusive. A battleship or a carrier is different. You can see it, even visit it on the Fourth of July. A division is different too; it marches—with guns. But a B-36 flies above visual observation, nobody is permitted to board it, and its crew is unimpressive in a parade.

Obstacle Three: Air power is the victim of a cultural lag. The end of the last paragraph could be the beginning of this, for they are related. Anyone will find ways to afford expensive things if he understands them well enough to be convinced of the need. Men now of mature age were boys when military force meant soldiers and sailors, ships and guns; these early impressions leave their mark—"the anachronistic power of saber and broadside."[5] Few have ever operated an aircraft; fewer still have flown in combat. Fortunately at the time but with unfortunate consequences now, Americans have never had the experience of living or fighting un-

[4] Quantity of air power is usually stated in numbers of wings, but this can be delusive unless other factors are taken into account. Principal among these are personnel, appropriations, and base structure. A reduction from 143 wings to 137 is a matter of 4 per cent; but if, concurrently, planned military personnel are reduced from 1,200,000 to 975,000 (19 per cent), the annual rate of appropriations is reduced from about 16 billion dollars to about 12 billion (25 per cent), and if a plan for dispersal over a larger number of bases is discarded, the reduction in national air power is much greater than 4 per cent. Managerial improvements may occasionally reduce manpower and money without reduction in strength; but experience suggests that such harmless reductions are likely to be in very small percentage figures.

[5] W. W. Haines, *Command Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1947), p. 109.

der skies controlled by an enemy. In the Great Debate of 1951, the subject was *"troops* to Europe." Discussions of rearming Germany deal with "twelve *divisions."* If air power is mentioned at all in these contexts it is in the second or third paragraph, and perhaps between parentheses. This is not ignorance; when reminded, all acknowledge that we must have air power—too. Rather it is a lack of instinctive understanding, that quality of the recesses of the mind that goes deeper than knowledge. Why does this lack of understanding persist? That leads to . . .

Obstacle Four: The military commentators were brought up in the older services. Compile a list of writers and broadcasters on military affairs arranged in the order of their influence on national thinking. Then see how far down the list comes the first who can wear silver wings on his chest. Wings on the chest are not requisite to a realistic belief in air power; both in this country and in England some of the firmest supporters of the Air Force have never flown a plane, and this includes some writers of national reputation. But too often the military writer, long familiar with the problems and command personnel of the older services, speaks in understanding, vivid terms of big ships and infantry tactics, reserving the *but* clauses and the confidence-sapping doubts for air operations.

Some readers of this article may be surprised that the present writer voices dissatisfaction with the development of United States air power. Readers of the daily press could easily get the impression that current policies lavishly nourish the Air Force while starving the other services. Some military critics feel a poignant sympathy for the "squeeze" upon the Army, Navy, and Marines produced by lowered budgets and manpower levels. But as to the Air Force they tend to focus on the single fact that Air Force manpower and money are programed at slightly increasing figures, ignoring the "squeeze" implicit in a directive to increase wing strength from 120 to 137 (14 per cent) with a manpower increase from 970,000 to 975,000 (one half of 1 per cent). All forces are squeezed by current policies—the surface forces by being directed to operate existing (or slightly lower) forces with men and money lower than existing levels, the Air Force by being directed to operate much larger forces with men and money increased only slightly. If a military writer recognizes the squeeze in the former case and not in the latter, his readers (who may well include key members of Congress) are to that extent given an unbalanced analysis.

Obstacle Five: The Air Force lacks representation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The key civilians in OSD are the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and nine Assistant Secretaries. None of the men now holding these positions has any Air Force background —and this has been true, with a single exception, since the first Secretary of Defense took office in 1947. The Army is only a little better off. Men with an orientation toward the Navy have consistently held most of the important posts, a legacy from the days when Secretary of Defense Forrestal simply imported his staff from the Navy Department. The all-important office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense is essentially a Navy office containing no responsible personnel with Air Force background. These civilian officials are not prejudiced against the Air Force, nor are they unwilling to learn. But an instinctive understanding of Air Force problems is not in their blood; they do not naturally seek the association of Air Force people; and when the chips are down it too often happens that the Air Force gets the short end of those very important decisions that are controlled by the staff of the Secretary of Defense. Attention has been repeatedly called to this imbalance of personnel, but appointments continue to be made which perpetuate it.

The single exception above referred to was Robert A. Lovett, Deputy Secretary, then Secretary of Defense from late 1950 to January 1953. Mr. Lovett, a naval aviator in World War I, served as Assistant Secretary of War for Air in World War II. It was during his regime in the Department of Defense that the 143-wing Air Force was authorized and the precept of equal division of money between the services temporarily discarded. But Mr. Lovett had not been out of office three months before the Office of the Secretary of Defense had shelved the 143-wing Air Force and cut 5 billion dollars from the Air Force share in the FY 1954 budget —all without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the statutory "principal military advisers" of the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. It is unlikely that this could have happened if men with Air Force background had been included in OSD personnel, particularly in the Comptroller's office.

For the most part OSD has been staffed with able men. But ability is not enough. A Supreme Court comprising the nine ablest lawyers in the country would not be acceptable if it turned out that all nine came from the Wall Street firms. Nor can any President choose a Cabinet without reference to geographical distribution and diversification of career background. Those who are led, governed, or judged must have confidence that all aspects of a matter under decision are understood and objectively evaluated.

Obstacle Six: The Congressional relations of the Air Force are inferior to those of the other services. In Great Britain the military services have no such relationships with Parliament as are commonplace between United States services and the Congress, and as an abstract proposition much can be said for the British practice. However, any such reduction of military-legislative contacts must take place across the board. If the Corps of Engineers, the Marines, the Reserve Officers Association, and the Navy have the number of watchful supporters in Congress they now enjoy, another service lacking such supporters will surely not be treated as "the dominant factor in modern war." The record of the Air Force in this matter is spotty. There have been periods when staunch support came from both parties in both Houses of Congress—for example, when in 1951 a greatly expanded Air Force was jointly sponsored by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and Representative Carl Vinson. There have been other periods, notably in the budget proceedings of early 1953, when Air Force support came from a few Democrats alone. More than a score of Air Force veterans were then in Congress; yet during this 1953 episode when General Vandenberg was subjected to a bullyragging never before inflicted upon a senior general officer and when 5 billion dollars were being cut out of the Air Force budget, no Republican veteran of the Air Force came to its support and some delivered denunciatory speeches on the floor. At the present time any observer of the Hill can identify Democrats who, with a firm understanding of air power, have backed the Air Force against all comers including a Democratic President and Secretary of Defense. But among the Republicans it is difficult to find those who can be counted Air Force supporters in the same sense that a dozen in the House of Representatives and a half dozen in the Senate can be counted Navy-Marine supporters.

Obstacle Seven: The Air Force is really the silent service. Its senior commanders do not write books and articles. As to the war in Europe there are books by Eisenhower, Bradley, Montgomery, Patton, and a host of junior commanders, but none by Spaatz, Doolittle, Vandenberg, Eaker, Twining, Norstad, Weyland, Anderson, or Quesada—and as a result, ten years after, several of these names are not even remembered by the public. No Air Force officer has recounted the strategic bombing effort that brought Japan to its knees—the first time in history when air power was a principal factor in causing a nation to surrender before its homeland was invaded and while its armed forces were intact. The same pattern appeared in the Korean War—some ten books about the Army, five about the Navy, four about the Marines, and one about a single squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force. But not one book about the United States Air Force. Those responsible for the development of national air power have not made use of the basic instrumentalities of information and enlightenment to get the public behind them.[6]

Obstacle Eight: The Air Force has been the most serious victim of stop-and-start planning. Air Force wings have been successively programed at 66, 55, 48, 42, 95, 143, 120, and 137—all in a period of about six years. No business in the world could operate under these conditions, nor can any government department. Dislocations are frequent, and when they appear, those who have been responsible for the forced reprograming often take the lead in criticizing the Air Force for the difficulties caused by the reprograming itself. Base construction has first been held up and then ordered forward on a crash basis. Everyone knows that money and time cannot be saved concurrently. Yet when the waste appears, the flood of criticism breaks forth. Sooner or later someone says, "If the Air Force can't use money any better than this, then we should cut their appropriations"—as if the money were going to the generals for their personal use.

Obstacle Nine: The Air Force appears reluctant to state its full case. The overriding national priority of the air-atomic power of Strategic Air Command has survived for a long time as these things go. But it has been under steady attack, and the integrity of SAC has not always been assured. Under these conditions the Air Force is understandably hesitant to make claims for additional force that might have to be satisfied out of SAC planes, money, and men. Let us suppose for the moment that, as serious commentators have suggested, the difference between adequate and less-than-adequate strength in the Continental Air Defense Command represents an additional 3 billion dollars a year for five years. The Air Force in deciding whether to request such a sum must ask itself where the money will come from. Certainly not from an addition to the total Defense budget; Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey is much too influential to permit any such dislocation of plans for a balanced budget and a 1956 reduction in taxes.

[6] That credit may be given where due, it is noted that the following Air Force generals published World War II memoirs: H. H. Arnold, George C. Kenney, Lewis H. Brereton, and Claire L. Chennault. However, no Air Force general has produced a volume on the principles of air power or on global strategy. Compare Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Tedder, *Air Power in War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947); Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John C. Slessor, *Strategy for the West* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1954). The excellent articles in *Newsweek* written by General Carl A. Spaatz since his retirement have the advantage of being current and the disadvantage of being fragmentary.

Certainly not from the Navy, which is much too firmly entrenched in positions of power in the Department of Defense. How about the Army? The Army has already been programed for a cut of some 300,000 men; and serious resistance in Congress and in the press has appeared. A further Army cut would not seem likely. So it appears that the funds would have to come from the Air Force. A cut in Tactical Air Command would be resisted by the Army, which could logically point out that a smaller army will need greater supporting air power to make up for its own reduced firepower. So, by a process of elimination, one suspects that the cut would come out of Strategic Air Command. Still fresh is the memory of that episode in 1948–49 when the Air Force, having performed the incredible feat of airlifting all supplies for Berlin through an entire winter, was congratulated—and told to pay most of the bill out of its own pocket. Some of that money came from SAC, and the same thing could happen again if big additional investment was required in Continental Air Defense Command. Strategic Air Command is no "mania of the bomber generals"; but SAC's ability to fight—and deter—is their responsibility, and they cannot look with indifference on a threat to its integrity.

OBSTACLES AND LEADERSHIP

Obstacles are things to be overcome, or to be proffered as excuses.

The obstacles here listed pose problems of leadership—some at the national level to be met by the President and Congress, some at Departmental level to be met by the Secretary of Defense, and some at Air Force level to be met by its civilian and military leaders. All of them put heavy demands upon determination and courage. Persuasive reasons for inaction or delay sprout in every file cabinet and blossom in every staff conference.

But air power is an instrumentality to be entrusted to men of war-leader stature with a wartime sense of responsibility and urgency. Under these conditions each of these obstacles, and all of them together, can be overcome.

W. Barton Leach, LL.B., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a professor at the Harvard Law School and the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration. Having served in the Army Air Forces as Chief of the Operations Analysis Division, he now holds a commission as Brigadier General, United States Air Force Reserve. He was a member of the War Department task force that presented the case for unification of the services in 1945–47 and was director-co-ordinator of the Air Force presentations in the "B-36 Hearings" of 1949. In collaboration with Harvard colleagues he now conducts a graduate seminar in Defense Policy and Administration in the United States. He has published numerous books and articles on his legal specialties in Property Law.

Air Power and Foreign Policy, Especially in the Far East

By Thomas K. Finletter

OVERNIGHT, on August 6, 1945, atomic weapons joined air power in a team of destructiveness which was to revolutionize the world position of the United States. Until this dreadful partnership came into being the United States could not be directly attacked by an enemy. After it came into being a direct attack of the most serious kind on the United States homeland became possible.

A foreign policy based on the military premise that no enemy can attack the United States homeland—and such was the pre-1945 premise—is one thing. A situation in which we must face the fact that Russia and China are now able, or soon will be, to deliver a most violent blow to the United States, and even to defeat us in war if we are not properly prepared militarily and politically, calls for quite another set of foreign policies. We are in the process of creating these policies. United States military power, and particularly its air power, will play a leading part in the final product.

Air power thus has heavy responsibilities; but it also has its limits. Air power brought this new set of problems to the United States; it is for air power to do what it can to solve them. And it can do much. But air power must not pretend to be able to do more than in fact it can, and it must not allow others to say it can do that which in truth it cannot.

In one part of the world, the Atlantic area, these responsibilities and limits are well defined. There the problem is simple and dangerous. It is to sustain and strengthen the political cohesion of the Atlantic community which the Communists are trying so hard to break. It is to defend this community militarily by presenting to the Russians a solid politico-military front which they cannot break through. By far the most important element in the military part of this front is the complex of forces whose purpose is to nullify the Russian air-atomic power, that is, to make the Russians realize that it would be a grave mistake for them to start a general war or allow one to start. Air power is the core of this military complex.

The responsibility of air power in this role is enormous. We can build an air power capable of meeting it. We can have an air power which will make any intelligent government, and the Russian government is intelligent, reach the conclusion that at all cost general war with the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies must be avoided.

We are lagging in building this air power. Very largely because we have been living in a time of United States monopoly or overwhelming superiority in atomic weapons and the aircraft to deliver them, and have not yet made our plans on the premise of the tremendous and highly dangerous air-atomic power the Russians will have in a year or so, we are continuing to load our military establishment with weakening compromises. As a result our air power is at too low a standard. But I shall not discuss the planning failure in this article, which is concerned with the political problems in which air power is involved rather than with the details of the power itself.

NATO—Political Solidarity and Air Power

Air power is one of the two indispensable actors on the NATO stage. If the NATO community fails to hold together politically, it will be Balkanized, and the United States will be backed into an enclave in a disordered and largely Communist world, and strains which may prove unbearable will be put on our American system of freedom as we busy ourselves getting ready to shoot it out with our backs to the wall.

The other actor on the NATO stage also is indispensable. It will do little good to have political solidarity in the NATO community if we fail to build an air power so overwhelmingly defended and capable of such an overwhelming counterattack that the Russians will not dare attack it or those whom it defends. Imagine what the Russians and the Chinese might do if their military experts were in a position to say to them that the Russians could knock out enough of our air power to make it possible for the Russian state to bear the resultant counterattack. The political position of the United States and the solidarity of the NATO community could not survive such a collapse in United States military power in the decisive weapon.

Western Powers and Asia

When we leave the NATO area we find a radically different set of conditions and therefore the need for radically different policies. The problems of the West in Europe are dangerous (because Russia has atomic weapons) but, in the broad line of the policies immediately required, simple. In the non-NATO area, the issues, as long as they involve only China, are not directly dangerous (China has no atom bombs of her own) but are of the utmost complexity and difficulty.

Thus in the area of NATO, as we have said, the political solidarity of the countries defending themselves and their homelands against Russia is vital. But, in the long line of contact between the free world and Communism outside the NATO territory there is little solidarity between the Western states and the indigenous peoples to lose. There may be friendship or respect or both, in some cases, but there is no common agreement among the peoples of the East and the Western powers to stand together against Communism, as the NATO countries have done in the Atlantic area. Indeed there are certain fundamentals which make very difficult, indeed almost abnormal, such a common front between the peoples of Asia and those of the West. It is the reverse of the condition in NATO, where a common society and a common tradition of long standing make it normal for European countries and the United States to stand together in the face of a threat from outside their own society. We of the West, who often do not understand this, are baffled when the Eastern peoples do not welcome us as brothers in a common fight against the Communist menace.

It is not just because East and West are of different societies and different races that it is hard for them to work together. It is also because until recently, and to some extent still, the West has been using its superiority in firearms to extend Western influence in Asia. The resulting bitterness makes it almost impossible to achieve a solid front of Asian peoples and Western powers, even when the purpose of such a front would be not at all to extend or perpetuate Western influence in Asia but to help the Asian peoples defend themselves from the new colonialism coming down upon them from China and Russia.

Note that it was this superiority in

weapons which made Western colonialism possible. Colonialism is one form of the imposition of the will of one political unit on the people of another. It is a form of conquest and is therefore based on military superiority. A colonial conquest is usually achieved without large-scale wars because colonialism assumes a high order of weapons superiority in the colonizing power. It is necessary to understand this fact if one is to study recent United States foreign policy in the Far East and to consider the role of military power in our future policy for the Far East.

OUTMODED POLICIES

The recent confusion and bafflement in United States policy in the Far East come in large part from a nostalgic devotion by some Americans to policies which were good enough in the time of overwhelming Western weapons superiority but are quite inappropriate for the present relative armaments of East and West. During most of the nineteenth century and well on into the twentieth, the types of weapons of the Western powers were so much more advanced than those of the Eastern peoples that the West was irresistible. Small demonstrations of naval power or the march of a small Western ground contingent to the capital of China could make the weak Manchu Empire and other peoples of the East yield to the demands of the militarily superior Western powers. Japan alone, for a while, wholly excluded foreigners, and armed rapidly on Western lines when she finally reverted to her earlier policy of allowing foreigners within her borders. But China, potentially the most powerful of the Eastern countries, was not only backward militarily but also was in one of those rare weak periods in her history, a weakness due in great part to her military inferiority.

This made for a pattern of Western policies toward the East which has survived into the present when the conditions which made these policies possible have radically changed.

During the days of Western weapons superiority and of the resulting colonialism, the attitude of the United States was different from that of the other Western powers. For various reasons, one of which was that we had a huge continent of our own to develop, and also, I think it may be said, because we decided against colonialism on its merits, we did not join in the scramble for colonies and did not use the weapons superiority we shared with the other Western powers to extend our influence in the East or anywhere else much beyond our own continental limits. We even got rid of as much of the territory we took in the Spanish-American War as we could, as fast as we could. Our anticolonial record was good. We got into trouble only quite recently, in Indochina and Formosa, and then not because we were trying to get something for ourselves but because we wanted to stop Communism from expanding. But we got into trouble just the same, because we acted on the false premise that the West still had the weapons superiority it used to have in the prosperous days of colonialism, and that therefore with practically no effort on our part and at very little cost we could use our Western military power to make the Easterners do what we wanted them to do.

Conditional battle cry

This fallacy, that we still have a weapons superiority which in fact we have not, corrupts our Asian policy. Tradition dies hard in such matters. In the past, United States as well as other Western thinking has always assumed, correctly, that it was much safer to be tough in the East than in Europe where, if we got into war, it would be against people as well armed as ourselves, or better. This is why many Americans who are isolationist-minded toward Europe are the most bellicose about China: it is safer, they believe, to risk war with China which has no atom bombs than with Russia which has them. It is why men talk of easy victory if we have to fight the Chinese. For you will note that those who want the toughest policy against the Chinese Reds always promise an easy victory at little cost to the United States. It would be an act of folly, which never could be thought of, they have often assured us, to send American ground troops to the continent of China. There is no substitute for victory, we are told; but there is a string to this stirring slogan. It is a conditional battle cry, and the condition is that victory is to be had with the utmost ease, with air and sea power alone. Elmer Davis says that only ground troops have mothers, which is a way of saying that American opinion knows that when the ground troops fight it is a tragic and bloody business on a mass scale; and the people of the United States will not take kindly to anyone who gets us into that kind of sacrifice of our young men unless the cause is extremely important. So if you are not only promising to be tough with the Chinese Reds in speeches but planning to beat them militarily if they challenge us, then you have to provide that they can be beaten quickly and inexpensively by a few flips of the wings of American air power. You have to promise, in short, that we still have an overwhelming weapons superiority over the Chinese Reds such as we used to have in the old days.

Atomic weapons

This of course brings us to the question of the use of A- and H-bombs by the United States as a part of its Far Eastern policy. Plainly, without using atomic weapons, it would be a difficult operation for us to bring the Communist Chinese regime to the point of surrender. If we could be sure that Russia would not intervene, we could win local victories, usually with TNT (trinitrotoluene) and incendiaries only (we could have won at Dienbienphu had we thrown in enough United States air power). We could do considerable damage to Chinese airfields and other military installations, and could destroy Chinese cities without using A- or H-bombs, provided, as I said, that the Russians did not come to the help of their Chinese allies.

But even if we could count on Russia's not helping China, an air and sea operation against China would be expensive; the attacking bombers would take considerable losses; the United States and other United Nations troops in Korea would be open to attack by the formidable Chinese Communist air force (which is one of the most modern large air forces in existence) and by the powerful Chinese ground armies; and Okinawa and United States naval forces in the area would also be open to attack from the Chinese Red air force. It is likely, if this kind of fighting once got started, that at some point along the line we should be driven to use atomic weapons. Then the damage to China would be beyond estimating.

Conditional weapons superiority

So one must conclude that as a strictly military matter we do still have a conditional weapons superiority over China, the conditions being that Russia will not interfere with us and that we are willing to increase substantially the likelihood of general atomic war.

And there is another condition, perhaps the most limiting of all. United States public opinion and the United

States government apparently believe that there ought to be some other way of carrying out our foreign policy in the East than by a mass killing of this kind. You will note that when it comes to making the hard decisions, the United States so far has shown a restraint which seems almost out of character when looked at against the background of the speeches and declarations of policy of our governmental officials.

So air power as it tries to find the role it is supposed to play in the Far Eastern policy of the United States has to give heed to what its government does even more than to what it says.

U. S. POLICY IN ACTION

The Korean War was a special case, and air power can learn little therefrom about its future role in United States foreign policy in the East. Korea was a collective operation under the United Nations in which, despite our preponderating role, we were acting under the juridical principles of the UN Charter. The purpose was to stop the aggression where it started, at the 38th parallel. There was therefore a substitute for victory in the Korean operation, if by victory we mean the unconditional surrender of Red China. The substitute was to give vitality to the commitments we had made in the UN Charter. And, since the principles of the Charter limited the UN's political objective, air power was limited accordingly. It was not air power's function to destroy the Red Chinese state or to bring the Chinese to unconditional surrender; nor was air power supposed to extend, petulantly, the war to the Chinese mainland unless this was necessary to accomplish what we were fighting for, namely to throw the North Koreans and Chinese back of the line where the aggression had started. Indeed a limited bombing of the Chinese mainland, say of the Chinese airfields over the Yalu, as was so strongly urged by some, would have hurt us more than it would have hurt the Communists, for it would have provoked Chinese air attacks on our UN sanctuary, namely all of South Korea, no part of which was attacked by Chinese air power at any time during the war. If this United Nations sanctuary had been hit by the Chinese the war then would have changed its character. We of course would have hit back hard and the war would have become general, certainly with China, perhaps with Russia as well. Air power was properly under wraps in Korea.

Korea, however, was unique. In no other part of the Far East has the fighting with the Chinese Communists been under the aegis of the United Nations. The resentment of the American people at the heavy casualties in Korea, intensified by the injection of the war into domestic politics, killed the possibility of limited wars of the collective security type under the United Nations, at least for the moment.

Massive-retaliation policy

A series of announcements by the United States government followed the truce in Korea in July 1953. If the Chinese Reds started the fighting again in Korea we would not continue to limit our air action to the Korean peninsula, the Reds were told by the unanimous declaration of the sixteen nations fighting in Korea; we would hit at the Chinese mainland itself. If the Reds moved into Indochina (this time the French and the United States alone making the threat) we would not hit back in the territory of Vietnam alone but would strike at the Chinese mainland with our air power. Finally (the United States speaking alone this time, with no ally joining in the declarations), we told Mao Tse-tung, the Russians, and the whole world that we would hit any further Communist aggression in Vietnam (the immediate danger spot) or anywhere else, whether the aggression was by overt military invasion or by covert aid, with all the force necessary. The United States would strike at such an aggression in a massive retaliation at times and at places of its choosing. The counterblow would be anywhere from the area of the local fighting to the communications, industrial, governmental, and population centers, and the weapons used could be anything from light convential ones up to and including the most destructive of the fission and fusion bombs.

Had this been the policy that United States air power was supposed to get ready to carry out, some important changes in Air Force and Navy planning would have been needed. An air operation against China might have been short and decisive, with the Chinese capitulating before the awful destruction which an all-out atomic attack would have wreaked; it might on the other hand have been a long-drawn-out affair with nonatomic weapons and with considerable attrition to United States planes; it might have spread to war with Russia as well as with China, and the United States might have been alone in that war, since the massive-retaliation policy had not been accepted by any of our allies. We thus would have had to increase our air power substantially to be ready for all these possibilities. We would have had to build a special air fleet for the East (since our present force levels are designed almost wholly to counter the Russian threat in the West), and we would have had to remodel and substantially increase our strategic air force in view of the possibility that we might find ourselves fighting the Russians without the aid of our NATO allies and without the availability of our strategic air bases located in NATO territory.

Dienbienphu

Apparently the massive-retaliation policy came near being put into action at Dienbienphu. We shall not know the full facts until history is written, but we do know that the Chinese Reds put our policy to the test when they sent into the Vietminh enough artillery and other equipment, plus technicians, to capture the French garrison at Dienbienphu. Apparently deliberately, they put themselves within the letter of the American threat; they knocked the chip off the shoulder of the United States. Naturally the temptation to hit back, massively, was strong, and there was much highly placed opinion in the United States government that we should do just that. We still had the old weapons superiority of the colonial days in the form of the atom bomb; why not use it, especially as we had said we would? But calmer counsels prevailed. There was talk of "united" action, that is, of consulting our Western allies. There also was some talk of blaming these allies for refusing to go along with our tough anti-Communist policy; we were ready to act, but our allies (whom we had not consulted about the steps which had led up to the difficulty) were delinquent, it was suggested. History will probably show that it was touch and go. We were close to something—whether to a quick surgical victory for the Vietnam, the French, and the United States, to World War III, or to something in between, one can only speculate. All we do know is that there was no retaliation by us, massive or otherwise, as the French garrison was conquered; that the Red Chinese exulted at Geneva in their sensational victory over French colonalism and its supporter, the most powerful nation of the West; and that United States air power was left considerably confused as to what it was to

get ready for in its planning for the Far East.

Formosa

No sooner had the Vietnam situation begun to settle down than Formosa stirred up all the same problems again.

The Red Chinese seem to be in a highly charged state of mind about Formosa, the Pescadores, and the inshore island groups of Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese Communist government has announced that it intends to take Formosa and its appendages within the year 1955. They already have attacked Nationalist-held islands near the Chinese mainland. The effect of all this has been to reinstate the United States policy of massive retaliation, which had been practically dead after its collapse at Dienbienphu. Our policy relating to Formosa is not called massive retaliation, but it comes to the same thing. Again it is the United States alone, without the support of its Western allies, using the threat of massive air and sea action against the Chinese mainland, with the commitment to the American people not to use ground troops if we do become involved in war. Again there is the question whether in fact we have weapons superiority over the Chinese, whether, that is, we can be sure that if we use our atomic weapons the Russians will stand aside and not come to the support of their Chinese allies with their own A-bombs.

At this writing the same dangerous possibilities we had in the Vietnam are in the Formosan situation. There is, however, this difference: the warning by the United States to the Red Chinese that it *will* fight if they attack Formosa and the Pescadores and *may* fight if they attack any of the other Nationalist-held islands has been made in a peculiarly formal manner. It is not the executive branch alone which has told the Chinese of our intention to hold the islands (as was the case when the Chinese took over northern Vietnam) but the executive branch plus both Houses of Congress, the latter acting after a full debate. Moreover, the physical circumstances around Formosa are such that it will be difficult for the Chinese to take Formosa and the Pescadores (this is not true of the Matsu and Quemoy groups) without clashing with United States military forces. The Chinese cannot invade the main islands unless they have air superiority over the Formosa Strait. They therefore are not likely to attack the islands except after having tried to take air superiority over the Strait from the United States by attacking the United States Seventh Fleet and any United States carrier- or land-based planes flying in the area. In Vietnam the Chinese were able to defeat the French without taking part in the war themselves and therefore without fighting United States military units. It does not seem possible that they can repeat this in the Formosa-Pescadores area. They therefore should not attack the islands unless they have decided to make war against the United States.

A tense situation

Perhaps the Chinese Reds have decided on war with us, or perhaps they mistakenly think they can repeat their triumph of Dienbienphu in knocking the chip off the U. S.'s shoulder. Their official pronouncements sound that way; and if that is what they have decided on there is no way of avoiding the war which some of our enthusiasts want. But even if the Chinese have not decided to provoke a general war with the United States, the situation in and around Formosa is so sensitive that there is much danger that the contending forces will blunder into a war unwanted by either side. The Chinese

held Formosa for many centuries, and the Chinese Communists are whipping up a jingoistic sentiment to get it back; the United States has drawn a line a few miles off the Chinese mainland and has told the Chinese not to step over it; and the powerful Chinese Communist Air Force, the United States Seventh Fleet, and the United States Air Force's land-based planes are about in the area. American air power obviously has to assume that something may happen and get ready for it.

What is this something which may happen? As in the Indochina crisis it runs all the way from local action in the vicinity of the contested area, through a "limited war" with conventional weapons only which may last a short time or a long one, to atomic fighting which may or may not involve the trading of atomic blows by Russia and the United States.

As long as the Formosan problem is not settled, American air power has, in military parlance, a heavy "requirement" to be ready for what may come out of it. And, although this article deals with air power alone, I add that as long as the United States and Chiang Kai-shek on the one side and the Chinese Reds backed by Russia on the other stand glaring at each other across the Formosa Strait, the chances of general war are so substantial as to increase the "requirements" of all the United States services, including the Army as well as the air services. No one can tell what kind of a war it is we have to be ready for. For all our hopes to the contrary, once the fighting starts, it may involve United States ground troops on the Chinese mainland.

OTHER PARTS OF THE EAST

The responsibilities of air power in the rest of the East seem to come down to the need to be ready for general war, of some kind or other. An attack by China or Russia on Japan presumably will precipitate general war by the two Communist partners against most of the free world. The Communist advance, if there is to be one, in Indonesia, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma is more likely to be by subversion than by military invasion by Chinese Red armies. In Malaya the British have sole responsibility, as the French did in Indochina. If it is to be United States policy to use our military force to stop Chinese expansion in Asia, whether the expansion be in the form of subversion or of orthodox military invasion (and it may be that this is our policy), United States air power will again be in the position it was in in Indochina. It may be called on to fight anything from a local engagement up to a general atomic war.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF AIR POWER

Air power thus is wholly unclear as to what it may be called upon to do in aid of United States foreign policy in the East. One fact only seems to be well established: United States foreign policy is relying for its military support in that area entirely on air power. The ground troops are to be kept out of the fighting at all costs.

Now in many parts of Asia the United States is acting alone, without allies, and the burden on United States air power is thereby made even heavier. Until the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed recently at Manila, the United States was acting alone throughout all of Asia except Korea. The chain of Pacific treaties (singly by the United States with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and now Formosa) was in essence only commitment by the United States to defend the respective signatories; the treaties do not require

the other countries to help the United States in fighting outside the area of the particular treaty. There has been talk of combining the several treaties into one over-all arrangement of collective security, but until that happens the Pacific treaties still leave the United States acting alone.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has, however, relieved the go-it-alone position of the United States. The eight signatories of the Treaty (United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan) have carved out an area in Southeast Asia where they have agreed to act together to resist further Communist advances. But the Southeast Asia Treaty is not self-executing as the North Atlantic Treaty is, and the United States will have to get the agreement in each case of its co-treaty-members before collective action can be taken.

Also SEATO is as yet embryonic. Defense planning for SEATO has scarcely begun. SEATO may sometime evolve into an effective collective organization for the defense of the limited area with which it deals. But if it does it will be United States air and sea power which will do it. "It is only the existence of powerful American naval and air forces in southeast Asia which can give SEATO any reality," a recent leader in *The Times* (London) pointed out.

Further, SEATO leaves vast areas of the East where there are no multilateral arrangements (other than the general collectivism of the United Nations, which has not been used in Indochina and Formosa and cannot be relied on, without regional arrangements to sustain it, to relieve the United States and the other Western countries from their piecemeal resistance to the Communist advance). The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have a collective arrangement of their own for Malaya, called ANZAM. But there are no multilateral agreements for the great area of Japan, Formosa, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, and India. If the Communists increase the pressure in any of those areas and the United States determines to use its military power to stop them, it will do so on its own, with such allies as it can pick up *ad hoc,* and relying apparently entirely on the might of its air power.

This is a signal honor which has been given to air power, and it will do its best within the appropriations it is given to be ready to carry out these difficult tasks. It is, however, the duty of air power to point out to those who make our foreign policy what it needs to perform the duties the foreign-policy makers are putting on it. It would be a serious error to have a foreign policy based on our having a certain military strength, if in fact we did not have it. This would be a policy of bluff and necessarily would be disastrous.

So air power must say and do what it can to have it understood that present United States foreign policy calls for a two-front air power—one for the NATO area, charged with the vital duty of nullifying the Russian air-atomic threat, and another to back up our Far Eastern policy. Air power must at the same time point out that we have not yet built the strength we need for the NATO front. We are still several billion dollars short of the amount we ought to be spending exclusively for the air power we need to handle the threat from Russia in the NATO area. The present United States military establishment, although almost wholly designed for the support of United States foreign policy relating to Russia, is not strong enough for that task, let alone for an additional deployment against China. There is nothing like enough air power in our present United States military force levels to back up our foreign policy in the Far East.

Nor can we safely borrow air power from the NATO area and send it to the Far East either on permanent deployment or from time to time when crisis occurs. The most important point of our strategy in the NATO area is that United States air power be poised, in position, ready to go at a moment's notice, so that the Russians will not think they can deliver a surprise knockout blow against the United States and the rest of the NATO countries. It would be a major Russian victory if we could be trapped into diverting to the Far East against China some of the air power which ought to be defending us against Russia in the Atlantic area.

And yet apparently this is what we are planning to do. Indefinite as our Far Eastern policy, perhaps necessarily, is, two points about it do seem to stand out: (1) That our political arrangements with our Western allies and the indigenous countries of Asia are embryonic; that because of this we are relying on United States military strength almost exclusively to block Communist expansion in the area; that this policy may involve us in some form of war which may be anything from a small local operation up to atomic war with Russia and China together; and that so far as our present plans go nearly all the burden of supplying this military strength in the Far East has been put on United States air power. (2) That we are not building a second-front air power for the Far East and accordingly, if the Chinese Communists put our policy to the test, we shall have to strip our striking power against Russia in the West and send to the Far East that air power which is so vital to the safety of the NATO community, including our own American homeland.

This is obviously not satisfactory. For it reveals a serious discrepancy between United States foreign political policy and United States military planning.

Nothing we could do would close this gap overnight, because it takes a long time to build operational air power. And in fact, as the present military budget shows, there are no present plans to build this second-front air power. Why is this? Is it that thought is being given to a change in our Far Eastern policy? For there are two ways in which this gap could be closed: one by building the additional air power needed, the other by bringing our foreign policy into line with our military capabilities.

IS U. S. POLICY CHANGING?

There is some evidence that, except in the special case of Formosa where our policy of defending the islands is clearly stated, U. S. foreign policy is evolving toward this latter alternative. The signature by the United States of the Manila Pact (creating SEATO) converted a United States go-it-alone line into a multilateral policy for an important part of Southeast Asia; and a multilateral policy in that part of the world will necessarily increase the emphasis on political and economic measures to resist Communism as against military measures. Our allies of the Manila Pact have much less confidence than we in military force as the principal means by which to block Communism in Asia. Also, it is being borne in on us by events and by our increasing understanding of the nature of the Far Eastern revolt against Western influence that military measures by the Western powers in Asia have a backlash unless they are carried out in such a way as to be wholly free from any taint of the old Western colonial attitude. The UN intervention in Korea should have been, and largely was, acceptable to the free states of the East, because it

was juridically sound (being based on the principle of collective security in the UN Charter which so many Eastern countries had signed) and because it was obvious that no Western power was seeking to feather its own nest in Korea. The situation of the United States in Indochina was something else. There was no juridical basis at all for United States support of the French and Bao Dai. Our motives were in fact noncolonial in that we were seeking no aggrandizement of our own position but only the blocking of further Communist advances. But we were supporting French colonialism just the same; our hard-won reputation for noncolonialism was badly hurt and United States prestige in the East went sharply downhill. Then followed the Formosan crisis and again we were seeking nothing for ourselves. We were, though, trying to dominate the domestic affairs of an Eastern country with United States military might; and this attempt, following as it did on the heels of the Indochina affair, looked to Asians painfully like the old Western colonialism. In the meantime the countries which the Western powers had left alone and had not tried to save by Western military help were doing well in their struggle to resist the Communist expansion and to remain free—namely, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia.

The impact of all this on United States foreign policy was to point the lessons: (1) that we shall do better in the East by acting multilaterally instead of in the old go-it-alone fashion; (2) that talking of almost nothing but military measures as the means of combating Communism in the East makes the Easterners think we still have the old colonial attitude toward the East and therefore is largely self-defeating; and (3) that the United States and other Western military forces can be effective in Far Eastern policy—unless we go to general war against Russia and China—only if there is first established the principle that the major responsibility for resisting Communism in the Far East must come from the Far Easterners who are still free, preferably acting collectively, and having been convinced that Western military power will no longer be used to perpetuate or revive the old domineering colonial attitude of the Western powers toward the peoples of Asia.

These lessons have not become a part of declared United States foreign policy. It will indeed be difficult to accept them, since they run counter to so many of the principles we have heretofore announced. But they may be in our official calculations more than the announcements indicate. If they are, they would point to the conclusion that United States policy in the Far East must now concentrate in its next phase on achieving the necessary political understandings with the countries of the East, including India and Japan on the two extremities, and that United States military requirements for local or partway wars against China should wait until these basic political arrangements are in fact in being. If this is or is soon to be our policy in the East, then it also is the explanation of our failure to provide the necessary air power to back up the policies we have been following to date in Asia. There is indeed no other satisfactory explanation.

Thomas K. Finletter, LL.B., New York City, lawyer, was Secretary of the Air Force from 1950 to 1953. He was minister in charge of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to the United Kingdom (1948–49), chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission (1947–48), consultant to the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference (1945), and special assistant to the Secretary of State (1941–44). He is the author of Can Representative Government Do the Job? (1945), Power and Policy (1954), and works on corporate reorganization.

Collective Security in the Air Age

By ROBERT D. MURPHY

THE principle of collective security represents the keystone of American foreign policy. It is sometimes difficult, however, for persons not intimately acquainted with the events of the last two decades to appreciate the extent to which this constitutes a revolutionary transformation in American thinking. If one had been asked, fifteen years ago, to select the single document which best characterized the foreign policy of the United States, it would have been natural to choose the Neutrality Acts, under which this country not only asserted its determination to avoid involvement in foreign quarrels but went so far as to prohibit the sale of military supplies to friendly nations for hard cash. If one were given a similar choice today, it would be reasonable to select the Mutual Security Act, under which the American taxpayer provides vast quantities of military and economic aid to other free nations without asking any recompense other than that these nations participate in the common effort to maintain their freedom intact. It is doubtful that the history of mankind has ever recorded so fundamental a shift in any nation's policies in so brief a period of time.

HUMANITARIANISM OR SELF-INTEREST?

Despite this thoroughgoing transformation in the American world outlook, there is some evidence that popular understanding of the basic premises of collective security is not so widespread as the overwhelming popular support for collective security might indicate. There are still many Americans who believe that collective security is good but not essential. In resigning themselves to the burdens of world leadership, many of our citizens have been guided more by an instinct of humanitarianism than by a profound appreciation of national self-interest. For example, it is probable that many Americans supported the Marshall Plan because of their sincere wish to help starving Europeans and had no more than a vague realization of the relationship between European economic health and American security.

It would be a mistake to regard the premises of our collective-security policy as a matter of purely academic interest. Actually, the premises we accept make a great deal of difference in terms of our policy choices in particular situations. In a true international crisis, those who believe that United States participation in collective-security arrangements is founded primarily upon a moral obligation, with others reaping the principal benefits, are likely to reach conclusions quite different from the conclusions reached by those who recognize the extent to which our own national survival is dependent upon these arrangements. Thus, it is clear that one of our continuing problems in maintaining a sound and consistent foreign policy which will have the unified support of the American people over an indefinite period of years is the fact that many of our citizens who are genuinely devoted to the principle of collective security nevertheless retain the belief that American air power and nuclear capabilities offer the United States the choice of "going it alone" in any situation where co-operation with allies is inconvenient.

It is possible, of course, to imagine cir-

cumstances in which the United States might be compelled to stand alone in defense of its freedom and its existence as a nation. Even if the remainder of this planet should pass under the control of an aggressive Communist dictatorship, it is virtually certain that the people of the United States would remain determined to wage a fierce battle for survival, however great the odds against them might be. The goal of our policy is to avoid such an unhappy situation. For all practical purposes, the policy of collective security is a *necessity*, and is more clearly so in the air age than ever before.

It is easy to see why this is true. Man's conquest of the air has made the American homeland vulnerable to attack and devastation in a manner that would have been inconceivable fifty years ago. When we remember that the air age has become the atomic age as well, and also that it is an era in which the techniques of economic and psychological aggression have been developed and refined to a point unprecedented in history, the proportions of this vulnerability become even more apparent. Finally, when we consider the vast human and material resources that have already been enveloped within the inflated Communist empire and visualize how the seizure of additional territories and resources, if not prevented, would add steadily to Communist capabilities for aggression, we can understand why the United States no longer can afford to be oblivious to events even in the most remote corners of the world.

Massive Retaliation

The notion that the circumstances of the air-atomic age offer special security advantages to the United States—that they permit us to rely exclusively upon our strategic air force and our nuclear capabilities and to minimize our dependence upon other nations—is both a gross misconception of United States policy and a naïve oversimplification of fact. It is indeed true that our superiority in long-range air power and nuclear capabilities, both strategic and tactical, constitutes the principal deterrent to an attack upon the United States and other parts of the free world. We must maintain at all costs our capacity for massive retaliation against aggression. While references to massive retaliation have unpleasant connotations, these connotations are not nearly so frightening as would be the case if present capabilities were reversed—if the Soviet bloc held clear-cut superiority in modern weapons and the means of delivery. For the foreseeable future, American strategic capabilities will represent the sine qua non of world peace and security.

But it is also important to avoid the fallacy that reliance on our strategic air power and nuclear capabilities offers a possible substitute for collective security. In the first place, it is quite obvious that the capacity for massive retaliation does not exist in a vacuum. It is a composite of many assets—mineral resources of various types, bases and other facilities for delivery, scientific and technological skills, trained military personnel, electric power and other forms of energy, and over-all industrial capacity. The United States has no monopoly on any of these underlying elements of power. We depend upon other free nations for many of the things we need. In the long run, moreover, our ability to maintain superiority over the Communist empire in the production and facility for employment of modern weapons of all types will depend very largely upon whether the people, the territories, and the resources of the rest of the non-Communist world remain free or whether they are enslaved by the Communist bloc and harnessed to the Soviet war machine.

Even more important is the fact that we cannot in any case rely upon massive retaliation as the exclusive means of deterring or defeating Communist aggression. No such reliance has ever been implied by the United States leaders. It is unfortunate that the doctrine of massive retaliation, as enunciated by Secretary Dulles and other official spokesmen of the government, has been sometimes read out of context. Insufficient attention has been given to the Secretary's reminder that local defenses will always be important, and to his repeated emphasis upon the multipronged nature of the Communist threat —to the tactics of political, economic, and psychological aggression and subversion and the need for appropriate means of countering all these tactics.

Varied Means of Defense

In a military sense, the key principle of our present strategy is that the free world must be able and willing to respond to aggression vigorously at places, at times, and with means of its own choosing. The power of choice obviously requires the existence of real alternatives. Secretary Dulles has already pointed out clearly that modern weapons possess such immense destructive power that "even the most reckless will pause before taking action which would bring modern weapons into play." He has declared further that our policy

> does not mean that any local war would automatically be turned into a general war with atomic bombs being dropped all over the map. The essential thing is that we and our allies should have the means and the will to assure that a potential aggressor would lose from his aggression more than he would win. This does not mean that the aggressor has to be totally destroyed. It does mean a capacity to inflict punishing damage.

So long as the Communist empire maintains its huge capabilities for pursuing its imperialist designs by a multiplicity of techniques, it would be highly dangerous for the United States or its allies to place sole reliance upon any single means of defense. President Eisenhower, with his vast experience as both warrior and statesman, clearly expressed the military aspect of this proposition when he said: "We must stay alert to the fact that undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to another." Our air-atomic capabilities are priceless assets, but this fact makes it all the more important that they be used to assure our country's safety and not become its "Maginot Line."

It is unnecessary to analyze in detail the numerous elements of power that are required to supplement and reinforce strategic air power and nuclear capabilities. They include the more conventional army, naval, and air forces, facilities for resisting and countering subversion, various kinds of economic capabilities, political and psychological instruments. The United States is far from self-sufficient in these supplementary elements of power and can achieve reasonable assurance of self-protection only by combining its own strength with that of other parts of the free world. For example:

1. Most of the world's land area still lies outside the Communist orbit. In many of the areas, bases have been established through U. S.–allied co-operation which serve not only to defend the immediate locality but the United States as well. In Communist hands, additional territorial gain would represent a potential base for attack upon the United States and its allies.

2. The human being is still the most priceless asset in any power ratio. He remains the most flexible and most ef-

fective of fighting machines. All economic production stems from his energies, and his brain is the source of all technological and scientific advancement. All hopes for peace and progress rest upon the unlimited potential of the human soul. Of the human beings on this planet, only 6 per cent live in the United States. More than 60 per cent live in other parts of the free world. The ultimate fate of both the United States and the Communist empire depends upon what happens to these people, what strength they possess and what choices they make.

3. The United States is increasingly dependent upon the economic resources of other free nations. We import substantial quantities of more than fifty vital commodities that are essential alike to our peacetime industry and to our defense system. Not a single ship, tank, or bomber has been produced without commodities that we are compelled to import.

4. Despite the vast industrial power of the United States, the factories, laboratories, and technical facilities of other nations cannot be regarded lightly. As allies, the industrial power of such countries as the British Commonwealth nations, the nations of Western Europe, Germany, and Japan greatly supplements our own. With these nations under Communist control, the ratio of industrial power would be turned against us. The seizure of Western Europe alone would give the Communist bloc the means of attaining industrial superiority over the United States.

5. Many of our friends and allies maintain sizable armed forces. The combined military forces of our European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, are larger than those of the United States. At present, our military aid programs are helping to maintain many divisions in various parts of the world. These forces represent a significant addition to the deterrent and defensive capacity of United States military forces.

The foregoing facts are not new. They have been cited many times, and are well known to a large number of Americans. Unfortunately, they are sometimes forgotten in controversies over particular issues of foreign policy. It is well to remind ourselves that the Communist leaders never forget them. In fact, the entire cold war may be described as a persistent effort to accumulate and exploit these basic elements of power for Communist purposes.

Purposes of Collective-Security Arrangements

In elemental terms of United States national interests, all collective-security undertakings in which the United States has engaged may be described as an effort to make sure that the human and material resources of the free world remain free and continue to serve the cause of freedom. These undertakings have assumed different forms, of course, and have been designed to serve various purposes. Some, such as the United Nations, have aimed at providing instrumentalities through which peace and progress can be pursued on a global basis through which all nations may resolve their differences and co-operate in common ventures to protect their security and enhance the well-being of their peoples. Others have been developed to meet specific problems or threats in particular regions. Some arrangements, like NATO, have involved the development of elaborate programs for creating and maintaining concrete means of joint defense. Others have depended for their deterrent effect primarily upon the pledges which the parties have given to take common action against aggression. Some have been concerned chiefly with the danger of direct military attack, while others have directed attention largely toward the threat of internal subversion.

One of the most significant differences among our different alliances is the wide disparity in the defensive capabilities of particular allies. While none of our allies could stand alone against the massive military power of the Communist bloc, some are capable of making a substantial contribution to their own defense and to the defense of the free world as a whole. Others are so weak at present, militarily and economically, that they can contribute little or nothing. It has sometimes been asked why the United States should pledge its word and expend its resources in defense of areas which, in terms of their physical capabilities, represent liabilities rather than assets. There are two answers to this question. First, it is well to remember that a given area may be a liability as a United States ally and nevertheless be a potential asset to any regime as ruthless and devoid of human considerations as the Soviet dictatorship. The Communists are past masters at squeezing blood from turnips and have no compunctions about exploiting the local population to extract a profit from an area where the United States would feel obligated to provide assistance. Second, the American people retain a strong moral interest in helping to preserve the freedom of any people who sincerely desire freedom, regardless of their physical capabilities or potential. The elements of power needed for the ultimate protection of the United States are spiritual as well as physical, and the role of Pontius Pilate is wholly foreign to the American character.

Implications of Collective Security

It is difficult to generalize about the various collective-security arrangements in which the United States participates. However, in adopting the course of collective security as the cornerstone of our policy, we find that certain general implications necessarily follow. If this course is to be successful, it is necessary for us to understand and accept these implications.

Working partnerships

First, it is important to recognize that the policy of collective security involves much more than a series of commitments to take action under certain hypothetical circumstances. Our collective-security arrangements are working partnerships, some of them involving immediate action on many fronts. They offer opportunities for peacetime co-operation to foster and maintain the conditions which will help to perpetuate peace, and also to pursue other objectives which will serve the common interests of American and allied peoples.

Long-term basis

Second, it is necessary to appreciate the long-term nature of our collective-security policies. They are not designed to meet an emergency situation but to protect American and allied interests in a nerve-racking cold war which may continue for fifty or a hundred years. We cannot participate in alliances successfully on an "in and out" basis, nor can we offer leadership one day and withdraw it the next. In some instances, consistency of policy is almost as important as its substance. More than a billion people in the free world realize that their destinies may depend upon decisions made by the United States government, and it is natural that these people should place great stress upon the need for a fundamental continuity of American policy. This does not mean that we can never change our mind, seek improved approaches to problems, or tailor our actions to fit changing circumstances. It does mean

that our claim to leadership requires that the key principles of our policy remain relatively constant and predictable, so that our friends in other lands can safely rely on these principles in planning their own policies and programs, both foreign and domestic.

Costs

Third, we must accept the fact that our collective-security policies cost a great deal of money and probably will continue to be costly for a long period of years. Contrary to the popular proverb, very few of the good things in life are really free—freedom least of all.

To date, our collective-security undertakings have involved the deployment of a large number of American military forces abroad and have also involved the expenditure of large sums for military and economic aid. It is important to note that the United States has not, in any instance, entered into a treaty which makes such actions a legal requirement. The need for an immediate commitment of this country's human and material resources has stemmed, like the treaties themselves, from an awareness of our own self-interest. It would be possible, without violating any of our obligations, to retain all American troops in this country and to eliminate all the economic and military assistance which we are giving. But it would not be possible to do these things and, at the same time, realize the benefits we seek from these collective-security arrangements. As is so often true, what the American people get out of such arrangements depends largely upon what they put into them. Our interests would not be served by waiting until a particular country or area had already been subjected to Communist attack before giving attention to its danger, nor by ignoring a nation's internal weaknesses until it had reached a stage of economic and political paralysis that left it teetering on the brink of collapse. Our hopes for preventing war, for checking Communist expansion, and for attracting enslaved peoples to freedom all depend upon the strength which the free world as a whole is able to develop and maintain.

It has sometimes been asserted by critics of collective security that American commitments of men and money to other nations have been designed "to buy friendship." This is an utter fallacy. It is more correct to say that they have been designed to buy strength. It is not enough that our allies remain free and remain friendly —our own interests as well as theirs demand that they be politically, militarily, economically, and spiritually strong. In some areas, where a limited expenditure of American resources enables an allied country to build and maintain military forces of much greater size and effectiveness than could be obtained by the expenditure of an equivalent sum in this country, such an expenditure by the United States is simply a matter of common sense. This point is well demonstrated by the development of the NATO military forces in Europe, where allied countries have spent three dollars of their own money for every dollar given them by the United States, and where the military vacuum that existed five years ago is steadily being converted into a position of genuine strength. The dividends we receive from our economic and technical assistance are not so readily demonstrable, perhaps, but they are no less real. It is an indisputable fact that there are many areas where a relatively small outlay of American resources can make the difference between a rising and a declining economic outlook for the entire population. And this difference, in turn, can make the difference between a nation able and willing to defend its own freedom and eventually to contribute to the security of the free world as a whole and a nation whose domination by Communism is only a matter of time.

The costs of collective security cannot be taken lightly. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have repeatedly emphasized their determination to hold these costs to a minimum—to achieve maximum security for the least possible amount of money. This determination has already been translated into substantial reductions in expenditures. But our leaders have also recognized that it would be foolhardy to cut our expenditures and commitments without regard to the consequences. All of the military, economic, and technical assistance which we have given to the entire world since the end of World War II has cost less than the cost of six months of World War II, and the cost is probably smaller than would be the cost of six weeks of an all-out thermonuclear war.

Requirements of leadership

Still another important implication of our collective-security policies is the nature of our relationship to our allies. The role of leadership in the modern world involves neither the domination of others nor the possibility of a complete freedom of choice for oneself. The requirements of leadership are complex and strenuous, and the essential requirement is a profound understanding of the obligations of partnership. In its dealings with allied nations, it will never be possible for the United States to have everything its own way. Nor is it possible, if the system of collective security is to survive, for the United States to "take its dolls and go home" whenever it encounters difficulties in achieving agreement with its allies. Our alliance can endure only on the basis of co-operation, mutual understanding, and mutual respect. Secretary Dulles made this point strongly and succinctly when he said:

> It is to our interest to assist certain countries. But that does not give us the right to try to take them over, to dictate their trade policies and to make them our satellites. . . . We do not want weak or subservient allies. Our friends and allies are dependable just because they are unwilling to be anyone's satellites. . . . To maintain a co-operation of the free is a difficult and delicate process. Without mutual respect and friendship it would be impossible. We do not propose to throw away those precious assets by blustering and domineering methods.

An equally important requirement of leadership is the quality of patience and restraint. The cold war which the Soviet bloc has thrust upon the world is largely a war of endurance. The problems which we and our allies are endeavoring to solve do not have easy solutions. Some of them will not be solved this year or next. However difficult they may be, the United States government is fully aware that the answer does not lie in warfare. As President Eisenhower said in 1954, there is no such thing as a "preventive war." Instead, he called upon his countrymen "to have the courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single avenue open to us in the hope even finally of leading the other side to a little better understanding of the honesty of our intentions."

NOT TO DESTROY

Admittedly, the path of collective security involves many difficulties. These difficulties are intensified by the fact that the Communist bloc, by its very nature, has certain undeniable advantages in waging its relentless attack upon the free world. It is able to expand its power not by solving problems but by creating them—not by

helping others to obtain peace and plenty, but by fostering conflict and misery. And it is usually easier to destroy than to build.

In another sense, however, this fact represents what may prove to be one of America's principal long-term assets. Whatever difficulties we face, we can take comfort in the fact that our security policies are in fundamental harmony with our moral principles and spiritual inheritance. The preservation and promotion of our national interests do not require us to do injury to others. Neither our prosperity nor our safety depends upon efforts to keep neighboring lands weak and insecure. On the contrary, both are greatly enhanced by the ability of our friends and allies to maintain their freedom, to preserve political and social stability, and to move forward toward a better life for their peoples. In pursuing the course of collective security, therefore, we have good reason for confidence in the eventual triumph of our cause. We can move forward with profound faith that a nation whose deepest self-interest is on the side of humanity will ultimately be able to withstand any challenge.

Robert D. Murphy, LL.M., Washington, D. C., is Deputy Under Secretary of State. He served as United States Ambassador to Japan (1952) and Belgium (1949–1952). Previously he was United States Director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs, Department of State (1949) and United States Political Adviser to Germany (1944).

Europe and Air Power

By RAYMOND ARON *

IN the current debate on air power, two phenomena, logically and factually distinct from each other, are being frequently mistaken for one another. The first consists of the rise of military aviation, which has modified the role of the two traditional arms, land army and navy; the second consists of the invention of a new explosive, atomic energy, which multiplies the firepower available for combat on land, at sea, and in the air.

The confusion can be explained easily: the two bombs dropped on Japan were launched from the air. Then public opinion, struck by the example of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, concluded spontaneously that nuclear weapons would be employed principally against urban agglomerations in the very heart of the enemy country and, therefore, brought to the target by strategic bombers. Now it has become plain that technological progress has invalidated this hasty conclusion. It is probable that, in a future conflict, nuclear weapons will be employed not so much against urban populations (a strategy which would issue in a kind of mutual annihilation) but rather against military objectives (airdromes, ports, launching sites of guided missiles and of strategic bombardment aviation). If one of the contending parties succeeded in depriving the other of the means of retaliation, it would have scored decisively: the threat of nuclear and thermonuclear bombardment would suffice to complete the surrender of the other party, which, having lost its retaliatory capabilities, would be at the mercy of its opponent.

Nuclear explosives need no longer be confined to large bombs. Technical progress has perfected lightweight bombs which fighter planes and fighter-bombers can carry, and nuclear projectiles which can be fired from large-caliber guns. Finally, there is a trend towards the substitution of electronically guided missiles for pilot-guided airplanes as a means for reaching targets situated at great distances from the likely theater of ground combat. This necessary distinction, however, should not lead us to a complete separation of the two phenomena: We speak of the "air age" and of the "atomic age." We should focus our attention upon the consequences which flow from the development of aviation in the atomic age and from the development of nuclear power in the air age, and thus emphasize the real relationship, as distinct from the erroneous identification of the two phenomena which are at the root of the military revolution of our times.

Europeans shared equally with Americans in the theoretical and applied research that resulted in the manufacture of the first atomic bombs, as well as in the efforts that went into the expansion of air power during two world wars. It was only in the Second World War that the United States hit its technological stride. Western Europe succumbed, in 1940, to German occupation, and the German research organization fell apart upon the collapse of the Third Reich.

EUROPEAN MEMORIES

The memories which the peoples have stored up from preceding conflicts and the presentiments which they now harbor as regards a future conflict account for the profound difference between the

* Translated by Robert Strausz-Hupé.

American and the European consciousness. For the United States, the two wars of the twentieth century were colonial wars. They were waged—especially the second one—according to the unwritten law of the American economy, namely, the reduction of human costs by the increase of expenditure on machines. A type of combat that does not count the costs of matériel in order to save the lives of soldiers will certainly not be squeamish about the destruction of enemy lives and property in theaters of operation. Such a war of matériel whenever it is being waged upon foreign soil will be waged efficiently, without scruples and without hesitation. It poses some pressing questions for these peoples whose countries serve as battlefields.

In World War II, Britons and Americans did not perhaps take the initiative in launching strategic bombing. The bombing of English cities by the *Luftwaffe,* interpreted by the British as an initiative, was intended perhaps by the Germans as a retaliation against the first "indiscriminate" attacks against the cities of the Ruhr basin. To be sure, the Germans were, at that time, in a position to extend this type of warfare. The British allocated to strategic aviation a large part of their resources, probably a larger one relatively than any other country at war. What was the effectiveness of strategic bombing during 1940–44? This question is of merely historical interest, given the novel kinds of explosives now available. It is a fact, however, that German war production increased in the face of constant and increasingly heavy bombing.

The systematic destruction of German cities—of residential sections as well as industrial plants—has seared the consciousness of the peoples of Europe. It is possible to argue that total national mobilization of economic and military resources, as practiced in World War I by all European belligerents, led logically to the selection of the sources of economic strength (towns and factories) as legitimate military targets. Furthermore, it can be argued that, in any case, the very lack of precision of air bombing effaced the distinction between military and civilian objectives and that the morale of a population constitutes a legitimate as well as a vulnerable target.

LIMITED WAR AND TOTAL WAR

The weight of these arguments notwithstanding, the peoples of Europe resented profoundly the disproportion between human costs of air bombing to those who practiced it and the human costs of air bombing to those who had to suffer it. Britain and the United States, following the traditions of sea power, engaged relatively small complements of men, equipped with expensive matériel, in order to obtain far-reaching results. But this evolution leads to a stalemate. The British people now see themselves as being exposed to the same dangers as the peoples of the Continent, and the American people, in their turn, are beginning to suffer the same anxieties. Every civilization known to the ages experienced the tribulations of war. But the *limitation of war* appears to have been one of the preconditions of the prosperity and the very survival of civilization. Neither Athens nor Sparta ever recovered from the Peloponnesian War. The religious wars, culminating in the Thirty Years' War, instilled in the combatants an abiding distaste for theological controversies conducted with firearms. The fall of the French monarchy closed a long epoch of limited wars—wars for limited objectives, conducted with limited resources and with weapons of limited destructiveness and by belligerents who scrupulously observed a common code of good manners. The French Revolution opened a quarter of a century of ferocious battles. In the nineteenth century, a happy conjunction of circumstances barred the geographical expansion of conflicts and the all-out mobilization of nations. The one conflict that came closest to being a total war in the modern sense occurred in the United States and figured as a civil war. Europeans, contemplating the employment of air power in World War II, believe that air power, reinforced by nuclear weapons, has guided mankind into a fatal path which must lead to the ultimate destruction of one or all of the belligerents.

Perhaps Europeans are wrong in assuming that nuclear and thermonuclear weapons constitute so original a departure from older techniques of warfare. After all, the most primitive weapons sufficed to annihilate Carthage. (It should be noted, however, that thermonuclear bombs represent not only a mere increase in firepower but also, if we accept the opinions of certain scientists, an unprecedented genetic threat to the human race.) Although the total destruction of cities may not be a novelty, there has occurred an essential change that sets off war waged with air and nuclear weapons from the warfare of the past: A war that issues in immeasurable destructiveness ceases to be a "reasonable" means for settling conflicts between political units and leads us back to the primitive struggle for simple survival.

The Americans are probably right when they remind us that there is, in the atomic age, one alternative which is worse than war, namely defeat. But Europeans are not wrong when they hold that, in this age, avoidance of war is better than victory. Nor are they wrong when they question the worth of a strategy which places greatest emphasis upon the preparation of that kind of war which would be so horrible that no one will dare start it—except as a last gesture of desperation.

EUROPE'S SMALLNESS

Western Europe cannot fail to develop an air and atomic outlook that differs significantly from that of the United States. In Western Europe, that is, Europe west of Berlin, distances are not so large as to permit aviation to modify radically man's awareness of space and the conditions of collective life. In 1954, one could—not counting political restrictions—travel overnight from Paris to Berlin by rail just as one could travel overnight from Paris to Nice. No doubt air travel saves many hours on the routes from Paris or London to Rome and Athens. But air travel does not change, within any national territory of Western Europe, the rhythm of human relations between region and region, and even relations between country and country are altered only slightly by air transportation. In the United States and the Soviet Union, aviation has made possible commodity exchanges and human communications which would have developed, had they depended on means of surface transportation, either much more slowly or not at all. This is not the case in France.

The political units of Europe are not designed to the scale of air warfare. This discrepancy between the technology of the twentieth century and the traditional politics of Europe manifests itself in three ways. Because of its inadequate "depth," no European country can defend its air space. If a bomber travels at the rate of 650 miles, then Paris lies within less than forty-five minutes' travel time from Soviet air bases in Eastern Germany. All European countries contain areas of human and industrial concentration which are essential to their existence as political and economic powers yet are ex-

tremely vulnerable to air-atomic attack, such as the Ruhr in Germany, the Paris region in France, and the London agglomeration in England. The density of European populations becomes an anachronism if the air age becomes the age of atomic wars. Lastly, the nations of Europe no longer possess the financial and industrial resources required for the development of a great aviation industry and a great nuclear power industry. Great Britain has allocated relatively large resources to both. She possesses a productive potential that exceeds substantially her financial capacity. The aviation budget of France has risen to about 750 million dollars and includes the entire research expenditure of the aviation industry. A European nation that seeks to maintain a large aeronautical industry must develop export markets—as does Great Britain.

Europeans cannot modify the natural limitations of their environment. Financial and economic limitations, however, need not be final. The lowering of production costs may enable small nations to manufacture nuclear weapons. Just as certain cheap weapons (bazookas and land mines) tend to neutralize expensive weapons (tanks), so certain types of missiles, manufactured at relatively low costs, may conceivably take the place of the extremely costly bomber. At present, the costs of scientific research and of weapons are very high; consequently, the big have a considerable advantage over the small. But this phase may be of short duration. When Switzerland and Sweden, too, are able to produce atomic bombs and electronically guided missiles, then science will be able to reduce the margin between smallness and bigness.

MONUMENTS

To the above considerations another one, albeit a trite one, must be added. All Europeans—Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, and Englishmen—are more deeply attached to old stonework than Americans. For most Americans, cities are tools—complexes of technical devices for ensuring human existence against climatic rigors. European cities are either themselves monuments (Venice and Bruges) or contain a large number of monuments, heirlooms of the ages. A kind of war that, even though most human beings could be supplied with safe shelters, blots out the accretions of the past horrifies the cultivated European.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

American public opinion is aware of these motives which shape European attitudes—quite unreasonably from the American point of view—towards air power. The vulnerability of Europe, lack of space, and the unique value of monuments—all these conspire to prevent the allies of the United States from viewing objectively the facts of the atomic age. Six years ago, Europeans dwelt upon the risks, if not the quasi certainty, of invasion and occupation in the case of a general war. The spokesmen of the Old Continent argued that American strategy would abandon Rome, Paris, and Frankfurt to the Soviet hordes, while confining itself to the destruction of Moscow, Kiev, and Kharkov. What would there be left to "liberate" after years of occupation, mass deportation, and the liquidation of the elite? Since 1950, American strategy, to still these protests, has erected a barrier in Europe itself. Several batteries of American atomic canons stand between the Iron Curtain and the Rhine. The spokesmen of Europe now profess themselves dissatisfied with that arrangement and denounce the weakness of the American barrier (which will be overwhelmed by the Soviet tide) and the ruthlessness of future land battles, fought with atomic weapons, which will leave nothing in their wake that is worth keeping.

American commentators rightly underscore the contradictions of these successive or simultaneous arguments. If one relies entirely on air power, one must reconcile oneself to the temporary occupation of territory close to enemy power. If one proposes to secure Europe against invasion, one must put large armies into the field or employ tactical atomic weapons. Since it was impossible, from 1950 to 1954, to obtain French consent to German rearmament and since, therefore, the effectives available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remained inferior to the minimum estimate of the General Staffs, opinion shifted inevitably to the inclusion of atomic weapons in military planning. Five years ago, it seemed reasonable to assume an eventual stalemate of atomic power, once both sides had accumulated large nuclear stocks, and hence an eventual return to conventional techniques of warfare. Today, this assumption has been replaced by another: Whenever and wherever war is waged between the Atlantic alliance and the Soviet orbit, it will be atomic. Again, Europeans raise their voices in protest: After such a war, there will be survivors, no victors. To win, must one lose the reasons for winning?

It is true that Europeans convey the impression of being equally hostile to each of the three possible strategies of the Atlantic alliance: concentration upon air power at the risk of the occupation of marginal zones; mobilization of a larger army in order to forestall atomic war; and the general use of nuclear weapons in order to offset Soviet superiority in conventional weapons and effectives. It is true that there seems to be no feasible fourth strategy. But it is no less true that American public opinion will be not much less reluctant than European public opinion to elect any of these strategies once the United States has to face up, on its own account, to the consequences of that strategy.

The strategy that staked everything upon strategic bombing was readily accepted as long as the Soviet Union lacked nuclear war heads or the means of delivering them onto American cities, or, in other words, as long as Europe, invaded and bombed, would have served the Soviet Union as hostage. On the day when American public opinion concluded—rightly or wrongly—that American cities would be struck no less severely than Russian cities, it displayed no greater enthusiasm for this kind of all-inclusive war than did European public opinion.

True enough, American public opinon consented to the expansion of ground forces, 1950 to 1954. This effort was not greater, measured by American resources, than that made by Europe. But American public opinion did not relish land battles fought with conventional weapons, and pressed for an armistice in Korea, although victory had not been won and cessation of fighting in Korea risked hastening the advance of Communism upon Southeast Asia. At this moment, American public opinion accepts readily enough the use of nuclear weapons in land warfare, since this strategy makes possible, for the time being, a reduction of the size of the Army and the Defense budget. Americans would hardly favor such a strategy were it to choose their own country as the theater of operations.

PRESENT SITUATION

I will be told that I am guilty of European "negativism" and that I refuse to take things as they are. This, I trust, is not the drift of my argument.

I do not venture to propose a strategy [1] in place of the one which the General Staffs have elaborated. I confine myself, here, to the description of the situation to which the development of air power and of nuclear explosives and the rivalry between the West and the Soviet empire have given rise.

This rivalry belongs to the species of great conflicts between sea powers and land powers which mark the course of history. Athens could not interdict Sparta's incursions upon the hinterland of the great trading port; Sparta could not interdict the attacks of Athenian triremes against the coastal towns and shipping of the Peloponnesus. Similarly, from 1945 to 1950, Soviet armies could occupy Europe, and American bombers could ravage the cities of Russia.

In 1950, the Korean War raised the specter of a general war, for then no one knew whether that war was merely a marginal conflict or the beginning of a world war. Then Europe became aware of her vulnerability. With American help, a barrier on land was lowered against the East. Yet for a variety of reasons that barrier remained fragile; the manpower superiority of the Soviets was too great and totalitarian government could always impose heavier burdens upon its peoples. But now the Soviet Union made up for its late start in the race for nuclear weapons and strategic air power, just as Sparta and her allies built ships in order to meet Athens at sea. The Atlantic camp, threatened from the air by Soviet progress and inferior on land despite its efforts, has sought to forge its defensive superiority from a tight integration of air power and land power, each endowed with nuclear weapons. This strategy represents a reasonable step in the dialectic process that flows from the relationship between land power, on the one hand, and sea or air power, on the other hand.

This evolution will be fraught, in the near future, with two consequences: it will make total war between the two coalitions less and less likely; it will make it impossible for both sides to employ the threat of total war as a political-diplomatic weapon. It follows that those regions where conflict cannot be localized will be relatively secure (Europe) and that, by contrast, those regions where the stakes do not warrant a general war will be relatively unsafe. Nothing will happen in Europe, because war could be fought with thermonuclear bombs, whereas, in Asia, Communism can advance unhindered, because neither Laos nor Cambodia nor Thailand constitutes a *casus belli atomici*.

The pressing question which this state of affairs poses is how to define a strategy suitable for the waging of a conflict that must not be settled by resort to total war. What arms can be employed effectively in local hot wars? What are the chances of the West's preventing Communist expansion in times of cold war?

This is the immediate question. The long-range question is graver still: Is it possible to go on indefinitely preparing for a war that will never take place? If we prepare for a kind of war that can be waged only by striking with the most terrible explosives at all the sensitive points of the enemy country, are we not entering upon a path that has no other ending than common catastrophe?

The above reasoning may run into one formidable objection. We assumed, in each instance, that the loss of life and property will, in a future war, be due to the intervention of air power. This proposition has not been verified. Can one not argue that it is inconsistent with experience? Is lengthy trench warfare not more ruinous for the belligerents than aerial operations of brief duration, yet of decisive consequences? I do not maintain that air power as such increases the costs of war. The war in France in 1940 was relatively cheap for the victor as well as for the defeated. Weapons that permit the application of a strategy of annihilation, that is, the rapid destruction of enemy *armies* and the enemy's will to resist, tend to reduce the costs of battles. This result accrues to the use of air power whenever the belligerents are unequally endowed with matériel, even when—as, for example, in Asia—the inferior party seeks to retaliate by recourse to another form of combat (guerrilla warfare). It is the indiscriminate attack against cities which, in the case of an approximate equality of air forces, increases immensely the costs of war. Since two atomic bombs were dropped upon cities the world awaits, perhaps wrongly, the repetition, in the case of total war, of these horrible massacres. It is difficult to imagine an atomic world war without envisaging the destruction of the civilization which we know.

[1] For one thing, this is not the place to explore what kind of strategy the West should choose.

THIS DANGER ZONE

It is possible to compress our findings into the following general statements: Strategies aimed at whole populations, and not merely at armies, have increased tremendously the terrors of war. Secondly, war threatens the very life of civilizations when it is conducted with means of destruction that are vastly superior to available means of construction, and when it effaces the traditions and withers the feeling of security underlying the existence of the human community.

We cannot rid ourselves of the dismal feeling that we have entered this danger zone. Are Europeans more deeply convinced that history has reached a crisis than are the American people? Perhaps. The nearness of danger often distorts judgment; it also sharpens awareness of the essential.

Raymond Aron, Doctor of Letters, Paris, is professor at the Institut d'Études politiques and the École Nationale d'Administration. He is contributing editor of Le Figaro and author of Le Grand Schisme (1948), Les Guerres en Chaîne (1951; published in the United States as The Century of Total War), and other works.



The Role of NATO's Air Forces

By Alvin J. Cottrell

THERE is little doubt that at the present time the prime deterrent to a Soviet sweep to the Channel is the possession by one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers—the United States—of superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Soviet policy in the postwar years has been concerned most of all with neutralizing this disparity. United States policy has been directed at the maintenance of a substantial nuclear advantage and at the reduction of the Soviet advantage in conventional weapons. The debates on disarmament in the United Nations Disarmament Commission reflect the conflicting views of the two countries. The Soviets have consistently urged that disarmament begin with the more "sensitive" areas (nuclear stockpiles) and proceed to less "sensitive" weapons (ground forces). The United States has just as consistently supported a reverse course. Thus each of the two great powers clearly recognizes the area of its own superiority.

In a war for the Communist domination of the world, happily still hypothetical, Western Europe would presumably be the area of first contention if not of final decision. But how is Western Europe to be defended? Under the rules of traditional or conventional warfare the role of the NATO tactical air forces would be to interdict the enemy's air and land power and so reduce the disparity between Communist and anti-Communist strength in the air and on the ground. NATO's air forces, which on paper number over five thousand planes, would thus serve as a screen which—it is hoped—would diminish the enemy's initial striking power to the extent that his forces penetrating the West's defense perimeter would at most equal in strength those of the Allied Air Command in the NATO area. But in view of the possible use of nuclear weapons would the tactical air forces still play the same role?

Nuclear or Conventional Warfare?

An objective analysis of the state of NATO's defense organization makes it obvious that sufficient conventional forces to defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion do not now exist under NATO's command. At the present time, Europe must be defended by nuclear weapons, else it cannot be defended at all. This view can be stated more precisely as follows: Either atomic-stockpile discouragement of large-scale attacks by the Communists will be successful, or the West's nuclear stockpiles will be required to destroy Communist predominance achieved by conventional weapons once war has broken out. In either case the decisive factor will be the relative strength of nuclear stockpiles.

A point might be reached in the nuclear race at which the supremacy heretofore held by the United States in air-nuclear power would be neutralized by the Soviet Union. At this point the anti-Communist states and especially the United States would be faced with a most important decision: If the Soviets move their forces either westward to the Channel or southwestward into the rimlands of the Mediterranean, should the United States attempt massive retaliation with nuclear weapons,

knowing full well that such a course would invite atomic destruction to her own shores? An answer in the affirmative might eventually save Europe and perhaps most of the world from enslavement, but the price might be a fearful one. American policy in the Korean and Indochinese conflicts suggests a negative answer, but on those occasions the blue chips were not down. Nevertheless, these two recent crises, particularly the Korean one, deserve some careful thinking. The United Nations action in Korea was an instance of limited warfare. As Bernard Brodie has pointed out, "It is noteworthy that narrow limits were imposed, and that it was obviously the stronger Power which imposed them and made them stick." [1] He adds that "these facts render dubious some of the easy generalizations of our time concerning the inevitable totality of modern war" and "the inexorable necessity to achieve total victory rather than more limited and modest goals." [2] The writers of our time are far too much inclined to hold to the inevitability of atomic warfare. In Korea, both sides restrained their power. Perhaps the Communists have revised their Marxist-Leninist doctrines to meet the world situation as itself revised by the development of nuclear weapons. They may now well settle for less than the world. They may settle for what has heretofore been an intermediate objective—the possession of Western Europe.

The policy of the Soviets is now one of slowly maneuvering the United States into a war with weapons of the Soviets' own choosing, that is, conventional weapons, which they would be certain to win. This implies an atomic stalemate, or rather an atomic-stockpile stalemate. The possibility of this has been stated by Dr. Robert Oppenheimer:

> I may, however, record my own casual, perhaps too rough guess as to how the U.S.S.R. stands in relation to us in the field of atomic munitions. This does not refer at all to other elements of armament. I think that the U.S.S.R. is about four years behind us. And I think that the scale of its operations is not as big as ours was four years ago. It may be something like half as big as ours. . . .
>
> The very least we can say is that looking ten years ahead, it is likely to be small comfort that the Soviet Union is four years behind us, and small comfort that they are only about half as big as we are. The very least we can conclude is that our twenty-thousandth bomb, useful as it may be in filling the vast munitions pipelines of a great war, will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two-thousandth. . . .[3]

If Professor Cecil F. Powell, British 1950 Nobel Prize winner in physics, is correct, a degree of neutralization in atomic weapons has already been reached. Addressing a meeting sponsored by the London Co-operative Society, Profesor Powell said that the United States had a stockpile of about four thousand atomic bombs and the Soviet Union one of about one thousand.[4] Perhaps the price the West and the United States must pay will be the loss of West Europe, for the neutralization in nuclear weapons returns the issue to conventional armaments.

NATO's Armed Strength

On paper, where no battles are really won, NATO's strength is not unimpressive. It possesses approximately 60 divisions (both infantry and armored) and upwards of 5,000 tactical airplanes. Only approximately 12 of the 60 di-

[1] Bernard Brodie, "Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32 (January 1954), p. 228.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31 (July 1953), pp. 526–28.
[4] As quoted by Drew Middleton, *New York Times*, February 27, 1955, p. 1.

visions are fully equipped and adequately manned to do battle with the Soviets. Russia's standing army reportedly consists of some 175 combat divisions, including 80 mechanized and tank divisions as well as 50 artillery and antiaircraft divisions. She has 20,000 combat planes. The combat divisions can be doubled in strength on short notice. Thirty of these present combat divisions, 20 of them motorized and armored, are held poised in the Soviet East German occupation zone as the possible first wave in any action in Western Europe. They are supported by 3,000 planes and backed up by approximately 70 satellite divisions.[5] Among its 5,100 tactical aircraft, NATO has fighters, fighter-bombers, light bombers, and reconnaissance planes. But the weaknesses of the NATO air forces may be seen by taking a look at the Royal Air Force contingent. Of the 1,500 aircraft marked for NATO by the Royal Air Force—next to the United States contribution the largest available to NATO—many units are still equipped with outdated Meteor and Vampire jets. Until these are replaced by Swift, Hunter, and Javelin fighters, the RAF contingent will remain short of its clear potential.[6]

IMPORTANCE OF GROUND FORCES

The most recent test of conventional tactical air action has been in Korea. At that time the United States probably did not possess tactical atomic bombs, but it did possess strategic bombs. They were not used. It is ridiculous to argue, as did some officials in high office, that the use of these bombs could not have brought China to her knees. Hiroshima and Nagasaki attest to the fact that atomic bombs contributed greatly to breaking Japan's will to fight. In Korea, the bombs were not used because of diverse nonmilitary considerations. At that time America's superiority was probably more massive than at the time of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts, when two bombs were all that she possessed. The lessons in Korea are worth studying, for they are relevant to any discussion of the role of tactical air power in the defense of Western Europe. While the Korean War amply demonstrated that control of the air is an essential precondition for successful large-scale military operation, it emphasized even more significantly the primary importance of ground forces. Total impotence in the air does not prevent armies from fighting offensively. The Chinese proved this in Korea, and later Dienbienphu fell though the Vietminh had no planes. Germany fought long and well on Italian, French, and finally on German soil in the face of overwhelming tactical and strategic air superiority. These are significant facts for those who would rely primarily on air power or who would stress air power above all other kinds of military power. Tactical air forces in Korea carried out well their mission, but it must be emphasized that numerical and qualitative superiority on the ground was not in the same unfavorable ratio as that which would be faced by the NATO forces.

TACTICAL AIR FORCE

The great difficulty in gauging the role of NATO's tactical air forces involves the question as to whether NATO's defense area can be protected long enough to afford these forces sufficient time to execute their mission. In World War II, despite the shortages of petroleum brought about by the Allied strategic bombing, first on Ploeşti and

[5] Axel von dem Bussche, "German Rearmament: Hopes and Fears," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 32 (October 1953), p. 70. The author is a former major in the German armed forces.

[6] Drew Middleton, "NATO Changes Direction," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 31 (April 1953), p. 43.

then on the Leipzig refineries, the Germans still possessed in the late stages of the war sufficient tactical aircraft to delay the Allies as they penetrated deeper and deeper into the Reich. In many instances, however, the swiftness of the American armored advance caught these planes before they were able to take off.

Part of the mission of the tactical air force in Korea was to drive from the skies the small North Korean air force. Although political decisions placed Manchurian targets beyond the reach of the United Nations air forces, sound tactics enabled them to prevent MIG's from approaching within seventy-five miles of the battle line. Along with its mission of driving from the skies the North Korean air force, the tactical air force was used in attacks against concentrations of supplies, matériel, and personnel deep in enemy territory. These tactics were highly successful, owing to the fact that it is much more feasible to deal with these elements when they are in rear positions than when they are dispersed and ready for battle.[7] Thus, barring a nuclear war, it appears that the mission of tactical air forces would remain what it was in World War II and in Korea: defense, counterattack aimed at blocking off the theater of operations, and tactical cooperation with ground units. The NATO air forces would provide close support for ground armies and launch an offensive action against enemy forces in the field and against enemy supply lines. This offensive could be carried out with either conventional or atomic tactical bombs. While the mission of tactical air force has not changed greatly, its relative effectiveness has been altered by the new instruments of warfare, by the development of new techniques, and—in Europe—by geography. The use of tactical atomic bombs, however, would in all likelihood lead to full-scale nuclear warfare. This prospect would tend to discourage their use.

DEFENSE OF WEST EUROPE

An active defense may not be effective against a surprise attack. The NATO defensive organization could be caught completely unprepared and thus rendered unable to carry out its mission in subsequent operations. Furthermore, the entire area could be effectively paralyzed by the use of nuclear missiles in a relatively short period of time. Airfields, communications, supply depots, and ports of debarkation all lie crowded together on a narrow strip of land where they are continuously vulnerable to attack by the Soviet air force. If West German territory were denied to the West the NATO forces would be reduced to a completely inflexible defense, a situation which would be even more disastrous under modern strategic concepts than under earlier ones.[8]

It is a fundamental tenet of anti-Communist strategy that West Europe should be defended as far to the East of the Rhine as possible. Hence geography, though frequently obscured because of the headlines given to German fighting units, has as much to do with the United States insistence on a German contribution to NATO as does Germany's economic and demographic resources. Soviet policy has not only been directed against the rise of a German army; it has also sought to neutralize Germany in order to diminish still further NATO's shallow area of deployment. Here again the lessons of

[7] Brigadier General James Ferguson, United States Air Force, "The Role of Tactical Air Forces," *The United States Air University Quarterly Review,* Summer 1954, pp. 31–32.

[8] Erich Dethleffsen, "The Chimera of German Neutrality," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 30 (April 1952), p. 369. The writer was a general in the German Army.

World War II are helpful. In order to absorb the initial German blow and prepare her own victorious comeback, the Soviet Union relinquished an area greater in size than the one the NATO forces are presently assigned to defend. There are now no natural barriers—the Rhine is not an effective antitank ditch against a Western thrust of Soviet forces.

The role of NATO's tactical air forces is theoretically clear, but their ability to execute their mission is doubtful because of the narrow base of operations and the inadequacy of the ground forces they will be required to support. Theoretically, Strategic Air Command, by a deep interdiction effort, would be cutting off the enemy ground offensive from its supplies and reinforcements while the NATO air and land forces would be charged with the responsibility for erecting an air barrier against the advance of enemy ground units and at the same time participating in mopping-up operations directed against advanced Soviet elements. Should the NATO tactical air forces be unable to sustain constant all-weather operations in conjunction with ground forces the NATO area could be swiftly overrun. Men who fought in the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944, as did this writer, will never forget that the Germans most nearly achieved a breakthrough when snowstorms grounded the tactical air forces.

OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

The anti-Communist states are on the defensive. Their only offensive capabilities have a twofold character: (1) to deter aggression by posing a threat which will make aggression too risky, and (2) to counter an attack. In the days when conventional bombs were the only ones available there was little difference between attacking and defending forces. While the opponents may have been in different states of readiness, once the initial assault had been absorbed it was possible to mobilize manpower and industrial resources to counterbalance the capabilities of the aggressor. This fact represents a fundamental difference between World War II and future wars. In World War II the United States had nearly two years to mobilize fully. It was nearly three years after Pearl Harbor before the United States was able to leapfrog its way across the Pacific to within striking distance of Japan. Future conflicts will not likely again afford such leisurely recuperative opportunities. In the next war the period of mobilization may be measured in hours. In World War II tactical aircraft operated with a range of 300 miles and an average penetration of enemy territory slightly over 200 miles. But "progress" has brought new achievements: recently a squadron of Thunderjets flew nonstop to England from United States bases nearly 4,000 miles away. Nuclear bombs delivered by air can shrink weeks or months of blitzkrieg into a few days or even a few hours of atomic exchange.

It is nearly impossible to determine the "absorptive capacity" of any nation today; and it is even more difficult to determine the "absorptive capacity" of nations of the size of Russia and China. Ten or twenty well-directed hydrogen bombs could make "ordinary organized life impossible" in Great Britain.[9] This judgment would also apply to a country like Japan. Without absorptive ability, an air force cannot get off the ground. Nor can the most formidable of armies stand off an enemy. NATO could lose World War III in a single attack. An unnamed high NATO official describes the urgency of the situation in the following manner:

[9] Cecil F. Powell as quoted by Drew Middleton, *New York Times*, February 27, 1955, p. 1.

At present, even if NATO force requirements were fully met, substantial portions of those forces, if deployed in conventional manner, would be destroyed or disrupted before they could be brought to bear against the enemy.[10]

What conclusions can we derive from these observations as they relate to the role of tactical air forces in NATO? Those forces are primarily a counter-attacking and not an offensive weapon. In carrying out their mission they suffer the disadvantage of operating from too narrow a base of operations against an enemy who is too close. The Iron Curtain descends at one point less than a hundred miles from the Rhine. This means that the period of alert vouchsafed to NATO would be practically nil. The ground forces which the tactical air forces are to support are inadequate for resisting the Soviet advance until such time as tactical air forces could go into action. Technologically, tactical air force is relying on too much outmoded jet equipment. The interceptor aircraft in service are better suited to defending areas a considerable distance from the enemy offensive air power than for close support of ground forces. These strictures pertain only to conventional warfare, for it is the contention of the writer that Europe is indefensible anyway in nuclear war.

DEFENSE THROUGH DETERRENTS

Sir Winston Churchill's hydrogen bomb speech in the House of Commons on March 1, 1955, hints at what Sir Winston believes is the only way by which Western Europe can be defended. The Prime Minister called the policy of his Conservative government one of "defense through deterrents." This, in fact, has been the West's defense throughout the five-year period of its atomic hegemony. But that deterrent is rapidly being neutralized by the ever growing Soviet stockpile of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. The West can be defended only if the deterrents are so formidable that they need not be used. Atomic weapons in the possession of the West have thus far served this purpose. Now, however, conventional weapons must be made equally formidable. While the Soviets have made a tremendously successful effort to better their nuclear position, West Europe has made little progress in improving its position against the Soviets in conventional armaments. The policy of the United States since 1950 has correctly placed its emphasis upon conventional armaments as the means for redressing the military balance of power in Western Europe. The United States will probably soon have enough deterrents in the form of atomic bombs, since it is possible in an atomic stockpile race to reach a point of diminishing returns. The primary race in the nuclear field will then be in the development of delivery systems.

The control of Western Europe would greatly improve the Soviet Union's delivery capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. America's decision to rely primarily on "massive and instant retaliation" at times and places of its own choosing was apparently prompted by the realization that unless the Western European nations contribute more conventional forces to NATO there is little use in trying to build conventional forces sizable enough to deter the Soviets if they intend to invade Western Europe. Certainly the twelve German divisions which have been the source of so much American-French tension will not be sufficient to redress the imbalance of conventional forces which at present so overwhelmingly favors the Communists in Europe. NATO's tacti-

[10] Robert Kleiman, "First Blueprint for Atomic War," *U. S. News and World Report*, February 25, 1955, p. 27.

cal air forces will in all likelihood acquit themselves well once NATO's other components have reached the stipulated levels of strength. They will still be at a geographic disadvantage, but little can be done to alter this fact without provoking the war which NATO strategy seeks to avoid. The demographic and economic structure of Europe could tolerate much larger ground forces than the European nations have thus far been willing to contribute. The risks of war must be made too great as regards not only nuclear but also conventional warfare. The only sound policy of "defense through deterrents" is to be strong in both kinds of weapons. If the NATO powers continue on their present course they will be at the mercy of the Soviet Union, and the rulers of that nation have no mercy. The West's only hope then for survival would rest on the unlikely contingency that the present struggle for power within the Soviet Union will prevent its rulers from taking advantage of the dilemma into which their diplomacy is so skillfully maneuvering the West.

Alvin J. Cottrell, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is instructor of political science in the University of Pennsylvania and research assistant in the University's Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served in World War II with the Sixty-eighth Tank Battalion, Sixth Armored Division, United States Third Army, in the campaigns of Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, the Rhineland, and Central Europe.

Air Power in the Modern Middle East

By PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

IN a world increasingly troubled by the specter of strategic bombardment while at the same time more keenly conscious of the tactical limitations of air power, the problem of the Middle East is indeed an interesting one.

It is possible to guess at the strategy of the future and such a guess can be as scientific and valid as any estimate about a strategy that has been elaborated theoretically but not applied practically. The strategy of the past, though valid in many fundamental respects, has been modified irreversibly by the appearance of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

Considered as an area, the Middle East [1] presents three outstanding and significant characteristics with respect to air strategy. First, it is a passive area. Second, it is a zone for air bases. Third, it is a petroleum source.

The Middle East is still a passive area in a world of air strategy. Though press reports from time to time indicate that Egypt is planning to undertake the manufacture of aircraft with the aid of German technicians, at present no Middle Eastern state has undertaken the manufacture of military or civil aircraft. Limited aircraft manufacture is probably feasible in Turkey. Israel possesses, at the least, the human and technological resources for the production of aircraft. But neither in these countries nor in Egypt nor in the more backward Arab states are aircraft actually being produced or likely soon to be produced. For the present and the near future air power will not really originate in Middle Eastern territory.

Whatever air power may be exercised will be exercised by air frames, engines, and weapons produced either in the free world or in the Communist world. In some cases the aircraft may operate under the actual name, flag, and legal ownership of the producers, whoever they may be. In other instances the title may be transferred to Middle Eastern states and the aircraft in turn be employed by those states. Such a dependence on externally produced aircraft does not augur the playing of independent roles as air powers by the Middle Eastern States.[2]

Secondly, the Middle East is an important forward zone of the free world. Possession of this zone is, resources apart, a vital element in the early-warning and forward-support-point tactics requisite to free-world strategy in the event of a conflict with Soviet power. The Middle East cannot be called a buffer zone if none of it is in Soviet hands and if its neutrality is a neutrality essentially unfriendly to the Soviet Union.

Radii of 1,000, 2,000, and 5,000 kilometers drawn from the major air bases of the Middle East comprise many of

[1] For the purpose of this discussion the Middle East comprises the Arab states of Arabia proper and the Persian Gulf, together with all the states of the Levant, including Turkey, Israel, and Egypt.

[2] The recent seizure of Burmese Spitfires by the Lebanese authorities is a case in point. The Israeli had allegedly sold the Spitfires because they had obtained more modern jet fighters and were able to secure a good price from the government of the Union of Burma. The government of Lebanon seized these Spitfires pending a clarification of their precise title and an examination of the military value to Israel of such a sale.

the most sensitive targets of the modern world in both the Soviet and free-world spheres of influence.

Third, the Middle East is vital to the interstrategy period of air power because of its role as a massive, even a decisive, supplier of petroleum.

RECENT MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIES

Western discussions of international affairs often overlook the fact, tragic for the peoples and leaders involved, that the Far East and Middle East lost their last pretenses to autonomous strategic existence only in the very recent past. For example, the final death of China as a great power can be marked either from the shocking destruction of the suicidal wooden fleets at Foochow by the French ironclads on August 23, 1884, or the arrival of the international army in Peking on August 14, 1900. In the Middle East, Turkey held on even longer than China and survived as some kind of a power on the world scene until the conclusion of the armistice at Moudros on October 30, 1918. At the end of World War I Turkey's strategic position underwent a profound change when the Ottoman Empire collapsed along with her ally, the German Empire, and dissolved at the same time as her ancient enemy, the Czarist Empire.

In the Far East, China collapsed in the very decades that Japan made a unique effort to reaffirm political and strategic independence by modernizing the Japanese weapons systems and their industrial and human bases. In a sense, therefore, the modern Far East has never been without some kind of a potential great power of local origin—first, China; then as China fell, Japan; then after the fall of militarist Japan, China once more, this time under Communist control. The Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the Japanese defeated the Americans in 1942, and then (in Chinese eyes) the Chinese defeated the Americans in 1950–53. The Far East has always had some kind of local military power in operational existence.

Middle East since World War I

No close parallel exists to this situation in the Middle East, even though Turkey and Persia alternated as centers of power for the Middle East in the centuries following the European Renaissance. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the appearance of the Arab states marked the very real end of an era. At the most, the Middle Eastern states might have exercised a feeble degree of influence on local strategy in the years between World War I and World War II. Their influence was never more than feeble and in no sense decisive on the world scene. When Rommel and Alexander fought historical battles which settled the fate of North Africa the Egyptians were scarcely more than bystanders, despite the notable assistance which many of them as individuals offered to the British Eighth Army.

The unfortunate attempt of Rashid Ali al-Gailani to bring Iraq into World War II on the side of the Axis provided only a limited and inconclusive test of the limits to which an air perimeter could be pushed.

It will be remembered that Hitler's Reich tried to support the anti-British Iraqi through Vichyite Syria, but that the German air lanes were too thin and the British sea lanes through the Persian Gulf too heavy to permit German air to do more than delay the inevitable victory of British surface forces.

Perhaps Hitler made a basic miscalculation by not regarding the Middle East as a double fulcrum for his global strategy. He might have tipped the balance of petroleum supplies in his own favor by attacking and conquering the Middle East down to Palestine and over to the Persian Gulf; the same physical terrain which would have given him almost unlimited oil supplies would at the same time have completed his encirclement of the European territories of the USSR. Both logistically and geographically, he lost a great deal by holding back from the Middle East and attacking Russia instead.

Even in the years that were crucial for Germany the leaders of Turkey, the Arab states, and Iran were unable to bargain effectively with the contestants in World War II precisely because these states did not have the strategic independence, measured by the possession of massive weapons of their own, with which to bargain. Their part of the world was held too closely in the Allied grip to give these leaders anything more than a nuisance value.

PRESENT-DAY STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

A sharp distinction must be made between strategic considerations which apply entirely within the Middle East and those which apply to the Middle East from the world outside.

Within the Middle East all other political considerations are subordinated to the unfinished (and perhaps unfinishable) war between the Arab states and Israel. This unfortunate political and military phenomenon has been frozen by a United Nations armistice arrangement, leading to a condition of neither war nor peace.

On Israel's side considerations of defense are, of course, paramount. The territory of the new state is not well designed for maximum strategic security. An adjustment of frontiers reducing the size of Israel would not be one which would appeal to the Israeli people or their leaders, while an extension of Israel's present frontiers would be certain to cause further difficulties with the Arabs.

On the side of the Arab states, there is a profound and often inarticulate resolution to do incompatible things. From a serious Arab point of view Israel is the latest of many European invasions of Asia. The Arabs have weathered other invasions in the past. Given time, they can weather this one. Such an approach causes them to take the "long view" of the situation and actually induces a considerable moderateness of behavior. Unfortunately a contrary view also applies which can be summarized in this way: The existence of Israel is an outrage to the Arab world; the Palestinian Arab refugees call for vengeance or for justice (depending on which Arab is speaking).

The minimum Arab program is a military assault against Jewish injustices and invasion, but there is an enormous difference between an assault which should take place next year and one which might just as well be planned for A.D. 2455.

All three of the local strategies just mentioned have their corollaries in air-power requisites.

Israeli air power

The Israeli position requires a peculiar and interesting adaptation of the air strategy of the small power—an adaptation reminiscent of Chiang Kai-shek's dominating the air space over continental China in 1930 with about 135 planes, precisely because his antagonists did not have more than one to five planes apiece and therefore did not dare fly opposing aircraft at all. As long as the Arab states have small or inadequate air forces it is only necessary for Israel to remain one step ahead of them, whatever that step may be, in order to retain air superiority and with

it an effective prevention against heavy surprise land attack and a corresponding potential of interference with an open land attack.[3]

Arab attitudes

An Arab strategy of the "long view" would involve substantial Arab postponement of the economic and financial burdens of supporting air power until the coming of an Arab version of *der Tag*. To a Sun Tzŭ or a Machiavelli it might seem wise for the Arabs to do nothing until a few generations or centuries have passed—on the assumption that as the destiny of all mankind changes the Arabs are sooner or later bound to find themselves once again in a very favorable political and strategic position.

Unfortunately, ordinary human beings are rarely constituted with the classic kind of patience so often attributed to the Vatican or to the Forbidden City in Peking. Though Arab leaders may be confident of an ultimate victory, most of them cannot forego the demands of honor, conscience, or opportunity requiring a present struggle.

Irregular or guerrilla warfare against Israel has been forestalled by the exchange of bestialities between the Israeli and the Arabs, each of whom profited by the use of terror and atrocity against the British and dropped such measures against each other only when they were met in kind.

Arab air-power potential

The worst unbalance between the Arabs and the Israeli today lies in the matter of air power, both actual and short-run potential. Immediate struggle on the part of the Arab states means that the Arab states with all their handicaps must develop their own power in the air. The first requirement for any kind of air power is ground personnel capable of maintaining the aircraft and the required ground installations. If civil aviation is any criterion, the Arab states have already made a beginning. The next requirement is participation in the expensive and nerve-racking competition of air readiness: the purchase and maintenance of more and better aircraft than those possessed by one's potential antagonists.[4] In this respect the Arab states are faced by a lamentable anomaly. Those states which through their possession of oil and the resulting bonanza from oil royalties can most afford to expend the surplus capital required for a modern air force are precisely those which have the fewest modern Arabs ready to go into service as mechanics, electronic engineers, airfield service crews, and pilots. The Arab states which are already modern to a high degree—Egypt, Lebanon, Syria—do not have the surplus income necessary to support air forces superior to those of Israel.[5]

Furthermore, it would be difficult for the Arabs to know at what point they had really outstripped Israel. An armaments race in jet fighter-bombers can become inordinately expensive. Arab use of "an ocean of men" tactics such as those developed by the strategists of the "Chinese People's Volunteer Forces" in the recent Korean War would offset part of a putative Arab inferiority in aircraft, but the humanitarianism of Islam might flinch at the sacrifice of one's own soldiers which the brutal Russian and Chinese Marxist dictatorships have been able to accomplish.

The outside world

Finally, it must be said that the internal strategy of the Middle East is virtually a playroom in an adult world. None of the Middle Eastern states possesses atomic armaments or the faintest immediate prospect of acquiring them. No local strategy makes sense unless it is based on the premise that the great atomic powers in the outside world would actually permit the local powers to fight the Palestinian issue to a conclusive finish.

Without a capacity to retain the advantages secured by war neither Israeli nor Arabs would be wise in undertaking one. While it is obvious that the Western powers would not permit intervention by Soviet military forces in the area, it is not at all obvious that the Soviet Union would obstruct the Anglo-Franco-American use of UN machinery to prevent either the expansion or the extirpation of Israel. Neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers nor the Soviet bloc have anything to gain by tolerating a purely local war in Palestine. Although the United Nations possesses no military forces of its own, it has at its indirect command a degree of military force which, so far as the Middle Eastern area is concerned, can be considered overwhelming. Opportunity for a conclusive decision for either side in the Palestine situation can be found only in a deadlock between the NATO and Soviet groups more complete than any deadlock thus far seen.

OUTSIDE STRATEGIES AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Anyone who has traveled recently in the Middle East will be impressed by the comforting reassurance that Middle Eastern air space still lies comfortably within the strategic territory of free world air power.

From Abadan and Dhahran in the east to Addis Ababa in the south, from Cairo in the southwest to Istanbul in the northwest, the area is traversed by military and civilian air lanes which provide an undisputed demonstration of existing corridors of Western civil and military air power. For the greater part the commercial aircraft are American or European in ownership and almost without exception they are American in origin. Military Air Transport Service planes are as common a sight in the Middle East as they are in many parts of the United States. (Local disturbances can at any time shut down any of these airports, but it is improbable that simultaneous local disturbances could close down all of them at one time.) For the time at least the Western world is predominant in Middle Eastern air.

What use can the West make of Mid-

[3] In any Arab-Israeli conflict the Arabs would be fighting along relatively long lines of communication for two-thirds of the distance around Israel; their lines to modern urban supply zones, seaports, and repair shops would be short only to the north in the direction of Damascus and Beirut. While sharp, short Arab raids could not be prevented by Israeli aircraft, anything in the way of a real Arab invasion could be hampered, if not interdicted, by Israeli possession of somewhat more modern and somewhat more numerous aircraft—providing, of course, Israeli land forces remained efficient and modern to make up for their shortages of number and breadth of defensive perimeter.

[4] When allowing for Arab weaknesses the Americans should not tip the scale too far. The ancestral memories of Americans include Old Testament images as well as novels of the Romantic period which make of the Near East a panorama of caravans, nomads, horsemen, and camels. The extensive motorization of a great deal of the everyday life of the Middle Eastern states is already an accomplished reality. Much of this could be transformed into motorized military power, providing the Arabs at least one of the ingredients of mobility necessary to offset Israeli superiority in the air.

[5] An organic union of all the Arab states or, at the least, an organic union of Saudi Arabia and Egypt would of course remedy this situation. Short of an organic union even a close and dependable alliance might turn the trick. There are rumors of close cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but nothing substantial enough to affect the Middle Eastern balance of power has as yet been forthcoming.

dle Eastern air? Three basic points can be observed:

Oil

Foremost, Western air power in the Middle East can deny to the Soviet world the opportunity for a land grab which would tip the world balance of petroleum resources, both actual and reserve, in favor of the USSR. It is possible at any time for the Soviet forces to start a war in this area; it is virtually certain that such an enterprise would meet with strong initial success; equally is it certain that a Soviet attack would gain the USSR nothing worth having as long as the West possesses deployable strategic bombers and the atomic weapons to destroy anything of value which the Soviets might obtain. No one has yet claimed to have invented the unbombable oil well or the invisible petroleum refinery.

It is especially noteworthy that this degree of security has been obtained without the elaborate machinery of a zonal defensive pact similar to the North Atlantic Treaty or the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Turkey is of course a member of NATO and the Turkish-Iraqi alliance pledges Iraq to support Turkey, while the covenant of the Arab League pledges each of the Arab states to support Iraq. It can be said that in this manner the NATO-Turkish-Iraqi chain of agreements indirectly and illegitimately attaches the Arab League to NATO. This is as much as can be said, since neutralism and standoffishness are still conspicuous threads in the pattern of Arab policy.

Keeping the peace

Second, the threat of Western air power serves to keep the peace. Sustained petty wars of the ancient Bedouin pattern are almost unthinkable. The Italians in Somaliland, the Ethiopians with their American and British pilots, the new parliamentary government of the Sudan, the Saudi authorities, the young kingdom of Libya—any of these could inflict severe punishment on a marauding tribe with the use of a very small number of aircraft. If aircraft are supplemented by airborne forces this potential becomes greater, since the wells and fields of the marauders' home oases lie at the mercy of the ruler modern enough to possess aircraft. Behind the tactical power of the small local air forces there stands the immense reserve of the strategic air forces of the Western nations. The combination is such that serious war will occur in the Middle East only if it is permitted to occur.

USSR and Western air power

Third, the entire security of the Middle East depends upon the Soviet Union's not feeling free to cancel and overcome the air advantage at present enjoyed by the Western powers in the Middle East.

Upon what, in Soviet eyes, does Western air power in the Middle East depend?

"Massive retaliation" may be found to offer its best exemplar in this area. Soviet aircraft are incapable of driving Western aircraft from the Middle Eastern skies while at the same time protecting the Soviet Union against effective Western retaliation. The land routes to the Middle East are blocked by a vigorously anti-Communist Turkey in the West and by the inhospitable terrain of Iran in the East. The Middle East or any part of it will become another Korea or Vietnam only if Western statesmen give the leaders in Moscow and Peiping reason to believe that the West will put up with local victories or will endure local defeats without serious danger of reprisal.

AIR POWER AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The Turks do not need to be told that the Russians are their enemies. The Turks have endured a great deal at the hands of the old Russian Empire. They stood against the combined threat of Nazi-Soviet imperialism during the dark years, 1939–1941. They are not apt to yield to bluster now. The Turks have the additional advantage of being closely allied to large numbers of people in the Soviet Union and Sinkiang. They have constantly replenished factual reasons for mistrusting the purposes and the behavior of the Russians.

Except for Israel in Asia, which is Hebrew, and Ethiopia in Africa, which is Christian, the states of the Middle East are Muslim. The religious tenor of Islam is not sympathetic to the militant atheism of the materialist dialectic. The Muslims have some connection with their coreligionists in the USSR and on the Communist-controlled mainland of China. This works both ways. The Marxist states export some of their doctrine, especially that of the popular-front variety, with a sugar-coating of pious but fraudulent Islam, but at the same time the Muslim world has its own peepholes into the human suffering and religious sterility of the Iron Curtain world.[6] The piety of the Muslim world runs counter to the materialism of Soviet appeals, but at the same time recollections which the Arab world has of recent French and British colonialism are such as to make Western talk about liberty, independence, and progress a little thin.

The most vehement opinions entertained within the area are those pertaining to local problems. The West appears important only because of its recent colonialism and its alleged potential of an imperialist *revanche*. The Soviet menace is conceded by a few very farsighted people, but to most ordinary men it is almost on a par with the strategic threat which might some day be posed to humanity by aggressive inhabitants of the planet Mars. The strategic appeal of the West concerns far more practical matters. In co-operation with the Western world the Middle Eastern states can make themselves substantially rich.

Psychological climate of Middle East

One young American remarked to the present writer, during the course of a motor tour of Damascus:

> Syria and Lebanon had no more business being made French mandates after World War I than did Croatia or Serbia. These countries aren't behind the Balkans. They are just as modern as a lot of Europe and to my way of thinking they're much more pleasant to live in.

The psychological climate of this part of West Asia is very different from the real gloom and real tragedy surrounding much of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. West Asia is entirely capable of modernization. The oil resources are capable of bringing in immense quantities of foreign currency. There is virtually no overpopulation in relation to the land, which is potentially irrigable—at least no overpopulation by Indian or Chinese standards. The problems of the area are real ones, but they

[6] The present observer has been impressed by the fact that Islam is far more vital in the Arab states than any religion has been in China. China's vulnerability to Communism can be found at least in part in the enervated atheism which characterized a broad majority of the Chinese people before 1949. The Arab world is far more like the West in possessing a religion which, though shocked by the intellectual and physical challenges of modernity, is still a vital force. Few Chinese or Vietnamese ever refer as seriously to religion as do the present-day Muslims of West Asia. It would be easy to make too much of this factor, since it can be pointed out that the Russians were before 1917 the most religious of all the great peoples of Europe.

are almost all of them soluble and there is every reason to believe that within the Western economic and political system the Middle Eastern states can offer an increasingly good life to their citizens in this lifetime, without waiting for another world or for future generations. The Middle Eastern states themselves show much of this buoyancy about their future. Soviet psychological warfare is not apt to make serious advances unless tactical blunders on the part of the West cause a recrudescence of anticolonial feeling or unless economic shocks cause severe local depressions.

The "when and if" of Soviet attack does not seem to lie in the short-range future. It may lie ten years ahead, perhaps more. Given effective Western cooperation, given the reappearance of Japan as a power in the world of air strategy, given the readiness of the American taxpayer to outbid the Soviet citizen in the purchase of that margin of aircraft needed for the reasonable safety of the free world, the Soviet world may never have enough aircraft to protect its home territories, attack Europe and the New World, and at the same time swarm into Persian, Arabian, and Turkish skies.

ROLE OF U. S.

A Spengler or a Toynbee might properly insist that there is nothing new under the sun, that every strategy is a repetition of similar strategy in the past. In the Middle East it is easy to believe this. The colonial rivalry of Germany, France, and Britain has led to the political disappearance of all three as effective military land powers in the Middle Eastern world. The Middle Eastern countries no longer provide the underpinning of an Ottoman Empire or the potential booty of European colonialism. The Middle Eastern states today play a role much more reminiscent of that of the minor Greek city-states in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War.

In order to avoid becoming the slaves of Sparta or of Athens the minor city-states had the choice of affiliating themselves with either against the other, of hoping that neutrality and innocence would shield them from the nakedness of power, of dreaming about creating third-force combinations big enough to resist destruction by the Peloponnesian War, or of changing sides rapidly enough to stay on the side of the victor.

In the realistic politics of the present, neither side enjoys a decisive advantage in strategic appeals. Russia is nearer in geographic distance, but farther away in strategic distance. The emigration of Syrians and Lebanese to the United States has provided close connections between America and the Levant. These connections have been further amplified by the recent expansion of the oil companies into the Arabian peninsula. The long-standing educational activities of the American colleges in the Eastern Mediterranean have yielded a great harvest of good will and sympathy between the United States and the Arab world.

The Russians have the strategic appeal of the old battle cries of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The Americans and their Western allies suffer from the obloquy they inherit from colonialism and they will find that their obligations to ensure that no Middle Eastern state sinks into absolutism, terror, or corruption so abysmal as to invite Communism will present them over and over again with the two-edged problem which they have already met in Nanking, Seoul, and Hanoi. If the Western powers undertake corrective action in an insufferably depressed or oppressed area they will be challenged as intruders or meddlers; if they do not intervene to take corrective action against the worst manifestations of reaction or corruption, they will be proclaimed the allies of decay, poverty, and corruption. Policy makers in the West will have difficult decisions to make. The best way of forestalling future difficulties is perhaps to develop the greatest possible degree of candor and friendship with each of the Middle Eastern states.

America and Russia both suffer in Arab eyes from their hasty recognition of Israel and in Israeli eyes for the uncertainty of their support of the new state.

PROBABILITIES AND PROVISOS

What appears probable is that air power in the Middle East can hold its present status for years or decades, provided:

That the Western World remains economically viable enough to prevent catastrophic local depressions in the Middle East;

That the Western world suffers no overwhelming diplomatic or military defeats in other parts of the planet;

That the Western world adopts corrective action if any one of the Middle Eastern states begins to disintegrate into Communism or to fall under the sway of a pro-Moscow government;

That the Indian and neutralist world is unable to structure its leadership so sharply and so effectively as to present a workable "third bloc" of sovereign powers as a reality in world strategy.

Final decision in the Middle East, as elsewhere, must await the outcome of the contest between the two great poles of present-day human political aspiration. In the weapons field, and no less in the psychological field, there are endless advantages open to the Soviet bloc or to the free world through the use of creative imagination, new design, bold and intelligent application of novel methods to unparalleled strategic situations.

Until a happy future, somewhere beyond tomorrow, in which the Middle East once again exercises that power which the talent of its inhabitants and the richness of its territory have so often produced, it must be said that Middle Eastern air strategy will remain dominated or resolved by forces operating from the outside.

Paul M. A. Linebarger, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is professor of Asiatic politics at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D. C., and visiting professor, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. He visited the Middle East in 1922, 1945, 1950, and 1952, and made two field trips to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and Greece in 1954. His most recent books are (in collaboration with Chu Djang and Ardath W. Burks) Far Eastern Governments and Politics (1954) and Psychological Warfare (revised ed.; 1955).

Strategic Concepts for the Nuclear Age

By T. F. Walkowicz

THE world is entering an era of great danger. The United States and the Soviet Union will soon possess the capability to wound each other disastrously. Although the United States is currently ahead in some respects, both sides will possess this capability to an increasing degree, regardless of practicable defensive measures taken by either side to deflect and blunt a potential attack. This central fact has been known in general terms by responsible officials for some years. However, the enormous complexities of growing United States and USSR air-atomic power, obscured by limited intelligence on Soviet capabilities and intentions and compounded severalfold by sweeping technological advances in weapons and delivery systems, have made analysis of this problem most difficult.

Several factors of major importance can be perceived: Soviet *strategic* nuclear sufficiency, United States *military* nuclear sufficiency, and technological changes in air power. These factors, together with economic considerations, point clearly to the need for continuous reassessment of air strategy as the world moves into the nuclear age.

With the passage of time (and thus with a growing, frightful strategic nuclear bombing capability on both sides), it will become increasingly difficult for a President of the United States to give the order to initiate strategic bombing, if the enemy has *not yet* bombed our cities. Yet, we are too prone to take it for granted that the enemy will solve the problem for us, that is, start immediately by bombing our cities.

The nuclear armament race is dynamic, and we can only dimly perceive the future. Thus, national survival demands a flexible air strategy to meet changing conditions. United States Air Force strategy already leans toward destruction of Soviet forces in being in the event of war; for example, Strategic Air Command's first priority mission is now elimination of its Red counterpart. However, there is an apparent tendency to think too largely in terms of all-out nuclear war and destruction of the Soviet economy or "will to resist." There is needed an objective analysis of (and development of military means for) the possibility of reacting decisively but *with discrimination* in the event of future local wars, without undue risk of all-out war or mutual city-industry bombing.

Soviet Strategic Nuclear Sufficiency

The USSR is now or will soon be militarily capable of delivering a heavy atomic attack on the United States which could cause billions of dollars worth of damage, result in the loss of millions of American lives, and destroy or seriously diminish the ability of the United States to support a major war effort. Against this threat, our active air defenses today possess a total "kill" probability of about 30 per cent, that is, about 70 per cent of attacking Soviet bombers would get through our defenses. Projected increases in defensive strength will lower the number of Soviet bombers getting through to 50 per cent or more in the next few years.

Such kill probabilities, when applied against reliable estimates of the Soviet atomic bomb production, do not indicate any decrease in the number of bombs theoretically arriving on United States targets. Even the present estimated

Soviet stockpile, if accurately placed on United States targets, would be a catastrophic blow. The USAF "Sunday punch," the principal ingredient of a countereconomy air strategy, has so far been an effective deterrent to *major* acts of aggression on the part of the Soviets. Now, however, the Soviets are approaching a position of symmetry with this vitally important SAC capability. For the Soviets, this will be a period of strategic nuclear sufficiency.

U. S. Military Nuclear Sufficiency

The United States stockpile of fissile material is growing rapidly. Furthermore, important advances in bomb technology are being made. Simultaneously, the actual cost of employing nuclear weapons against military forces and strategic targets is decreasing rapidly in comparison with that of other means of destruction. Thus—as the result of large-scale production of fissile material, technological improvements in atomic weapons, and the trend indicating continued reduction in costs of fissile material—an era of United States nuclear *plenty*, that is, *military* sufficiency, is rapidly approaching.

True, we must not become complacent about the adequacy of United States fissile material production and supply. The amount of fissile material needed to carry out a countereconomy mission is finite and relatively small. By contrast, the various counterforce and air defense missions require that fissile material be used much like ammunition; therefore, large amounts must be produced to ensure that enough is available at the right time in the right place.

However, we do now have nuclear weapons to employ against military forces; furthermore, this situation is improving steadily with time, and we can and must stay ahead of the Soviets in this regard. Therefore, our military strategy can be based on a nuclear capability adequate for *all offensive* tasks, and also for *critical* defensive operations.

Technological Changes in Air Power

The qualitative and quantitative nature of the required air delivery capability, and its cost, are constantly being modified by technological changes in air power. The advent of jet aircraft and near-sonic combat speeds has worked to increase appreciably the size and cost of military aircraft. The attempt to achieve intercontinental range and reasonable independence of air bases on foreign soil has further accented this growth. Simultaneously, however, various techniques of range extension—some still in the early stages of development—are increasing the number of aircraft, with a wide range of sizes and performance, which will be able to contribute to the long-range bombing job. Other nuclear weapons will further increase the capabilities of this added number of potential weapon carriers. The day will soon arrive when *all our combat aircraft, including high-performance fighter types, will become bomber strike aircraft possessing devastating firepower.*

Similarly spectacular changes are in prospect in the field of air logistics. It is now possible to plan for factory-to-advance-base delivery of supplies, using aircraft operating over ranges of 3,500 miles at speeds between 300 and 400 knots. These aircraft will be able to operate, from present-day airfields, at direct costs of three to four cents per ton-mile. The flexibility of air transport, in turn, will greatly accelerate and facilitate changes in the present logistics system (methods of ordering, packaging, inventory keeping, and so forth), thus acting as a catalyst in reducing the tremendous cost inherent in the long, surface supply "pipeline" situation. The

entire cost of an air logistics system appears to be appreciably less than the savings in spare parts made possible by it. This future air logistics capability will greatly enhance the operational flexibility of air power, since the same aircraft can also serve as in-flight refueling tankers.

Range-extended tactical combat aircraft, supported by a world-wide air logistics system, make operationally possible and economically feasible the rapid deployment of *task forces* to fight "brush fires" or "limited wars" anywhere on the Soviet perimeter. These *task forces* need depend only on minimum overseas stockpiling (largely fuel and lubricants stored underground) and on overseas bases maintained on "austerity-tenant" standards.

Thus, air power is in the sweep of a technical revolution which will profoundly influence the character of its aircraft, greatly increase its operational flexibility and striking power, and keep its over-all costs within reasonable margins.

Economic Considerations

The challenge of Communism, coupled with the neutralization by air power of our historic ocean barriers, has placed unprecedented strains upon the American economy. We face the prospect of maintaining armed forces in being of great magnitude and expense, for an indefinite period of time. The unexpectedly early Soviet atomic explosion in 1949, followed by the Korean episode in 1950, brought a then existing military economy drive to an abrupt halt and greatly accelerated a laggard United States rearmament program. Soon thereafter, the inevitable inefficiency of hastily conceived military programs and the waste inherent in their rapid implementation became apparent, and led to great emphasis on improving the efficiency of our national defense effort and balancing the budget.

In the Soviet Union, a police-state system is used to suppress consumer demand below normal levels. For this reason, the USSR presumably can continue military spending at a relatively high level for an indefinite period of time. Here in the United States it appears that tax rates cannot be safely raised nor deficit financing indefinitely continued without seriously impinging on the traditional American way of life. The resulting pressures to reduce the cost of the defense establishment are enormous, and the new administration has moved strongly to cut the costs of previous military force programs.

Forces in Being vs. Post-D-Day Mobilization

The key factor in winning World Wars I and II was the United States mobilization base. Therefore, it is difficult to discard this concept in planning for victory in the third world war.

Yet, the outcome of a war in the nuclear age will almost surely be decided by forces in being rather than through post-D-day mobilization. The tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons now makes it possible for *one airplane* to deliver in *a single instant* many times the explosive equivalent of the entire bombing effort of the Allied Air Forces in World War II.

Considerably fewer than a thousand nuclear weapons could render the Soviet economy impotent, and probably even fewer than that would do the same to the economy of the United States. The large-scale use of atomic weapons in countermilitary operations (two to three thousand) could reduce armies, air forces, navies, and their supporting logistic systems to relative insignificance.

Therefore, in a nuclear war, the combat potential of both sides may decline rapidly following D day, and the size of the mobilization base becomes practically irrelevant. The decisive phase of the war may have been fought almost before weapons still in factories on D day can be brought to bear on the enemy.

True, we dare not gamble that the first few months of any future war will be decisive. Thus, while concentrating on the war readiness of our forces in being, we must also place adequate emphasis on duplicating certain vital parts of the industrial mobilization base, and on dispersal of both industry and people. However, this is far different from the thinking reflected in the Vance Committee Report according to which the interests of the nation would be best served by substituting, to the greatest extent practicable, additional production facilities for stockpiles of military "end items."[1] Such thinking is not only obsolete, but extremely dangerous to the survival of the United States.

Producing the Forces in Being for Minimum Cost

Abandonment of the mobilization-base concept as the primary war-winning factor is an important first step toward minimizing the cost of a force in being. The present mobilization-base concept involves not only the building up of excessive productive capacity, but also the additional expense of using this capacity on a one-shift or less basis, that is, "maintaining living and breathing production lines."

Maximum emphasis must be placed on larger production runs and lower production costs in fewer producing units (that is, uneconomic spreading of orders must be avoided). However, the larger production runs must not be achieved wholly through reduced emphasis on development during production, but also in part through a reduction in the number of types of aircraft and equipment produced. Similarly, the stockpiling of selected, long lead-time, multipurpose machine tools is of great importance for the specific purpose of reducing development-to-production lead times.

Minimizing Vulnerability of the U. S. Economy and Air Power

At present, the over-all vulnerability of the United States to atomic attack presumably is greater than that of the USSR. The capacity of almost all of our important war and war-connected industries is two to three times larger than that of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, this bigger economic base is concentrated in fewer cities. Similarly, the offensive components of the Air Force, strategic and tactical, are extremely vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack. Drastic measures must be taken for their protection, or the effects of the first Soviet strike on our capability to deliver nuclear weapons could be catastrophic.

The tactical air force and any SAC wings deployed in the European theater can be expected to suffer heavy damage in the initial enemy strike so long as they remain concentrated on relatively few airfields. Even SAC wings based in the United States are vulnerable. The concentration of practically all of our SAC force on a relatively few airfields in this country (while Congress drastically slashes air-base construction funds) increases their vulnerability and reduces the deterrent effect of United States offensive air power.

The physical vulnerability of the United States economy and its urban population can be slowly reduced through long-term dispersal programs,

[1] "Production Capacity—A Military Reserve," a Report to the Director of Defense Mobilization by the Advisory Committee on Production Equipment, January 1953.

and national, state, and local governments should develop master plans for the decentralized location of *new* urban and industrial construction arising from the demands of a growing United States economy. In this regard, the United States enjoys a marked advantage over the Soviets through possession of a superior communications network which makes long-term decentralization of *new construction* a practical plan.

Our economy and the United States people must be provided with an air defense system which would exact a heavy toll on the enemy, even though loss of life and property will be magnified manyfold by World War II standards, in the event of a Soviet attack. In view of this, we must now take urgent measures to minimize loss of life in the event of Soviet attack by providing an adequate warning system and by implementing a program of evacuating all major cities at the initiation of hostilities. Furthermore, the present emphasis on air defense must be maintained and increased as the situation requires.

Simultaneously, reliable intelligence on Soviet air-atomic strength must become the prime determinant in setting a proper balance between present United States offensive and defensive air power. This balance between air offensive and air defensive strength is the cold-blooded business of our survival. The situation profits little from reckless charges of disinterest in air defense hurled against military officials who have been fighting for years for resources to do the job adequately. Rather, the science-industry-military team must continue to work effectively together to construct a defensive system which leaves no margin for Soviet miscalculation as to our ability to survive and strike back, if attacked. In addition, many measures suggest themselves for minimizing the vulnerability of United States air power to Soviet attack.

U. S. vs. USSR IN A COUNTERECONOMY WAR

A future war, with unrestricted use of nuclear weapons in countereconomy strategic bombing campaigns, can end only in destruction of both sides. It would be folly to assume that symmetry in countereconomy bombing will not exist during the nuclear age, when the number of bombs required on target can be measured in hundreds. It is of little consequence that we have the nuclear stockpile capability of destroying Russia several times, if Russia simultaneously has the capability to destroy us just once. This she can have with a reasonable investment—an investment she is obviously making. Even worse, the countereconomy situation will become highly asymmetrical in favor of the Soviets (even when they still have a "limited" number of bombs and bombers) because they are subject to fewer political constraints in starting a war. Furthermore, should the Soviets develop a ballistic-missile-delivery capability before we do, countereconomy deterrent strength could shift heavily in their favor.

An exchange of blows resulting in millions of dead and devastation of a large portion of our industrial and urban complex would endanger our national objective of preserving democratic concepts and institutions. This basic inconsistency between national objectives and unrestrained countereconomy warfare under conditions of United States–Soviet Union *strategic nuclear symmetry* demands that we explore objectively any alternative war-winning strategies which minimize the prospects of an automatic exchange of countereconomy nuclear attacks.

There are two very good reasons why we should concern ourselves with broader air strategy than that based too rigidly on the decisiveness of the countereconomy campaign. First, with symmetrical United States–Soviet Union countereconomy capabilities, the "Sunday punch" is not likely to be decisive. Secondly, we should not rule out the possibility of a political decision staying the delivery of the "Sunday punch." Facing up to these possibilities, we must exploit fully all elements of air-atomic power to prevent even greater emphasis on the conventional ground orientation of our strategy. For the nation, this is a *must,* because we will lose any future war unless we counter Soviet superiority on the ground, and the only effective and economic way proposed for doing this so far is through air-atomic power.

Suggestions for employing air power in other than the classical strategic role have not always been seriously considered since World War II, and too often have been lightly turned aside by the cliché: "Oh, you want to return the battle to the battlefields." During the period of United States atomic monopoly many in the Air Force considered it rank heresy—and correctly so—to have the slightest doubt cast upon the validity of the classical tenets of Douhet and Mitchell. Therefore, it is small wonder that the dynamics of the nuclear age and the significance of the passing of our atomic monopoly have not been fully appreciated, and that old concepts of air power continue to be rigidly embraced. Much broader horizons are now open to United States air-atomic power, and through their exploitation the devastation of countereconomy nuclear war can, we may hope, be avoided.

NEED FOR MAINTAINING COUNTERECONOMY CAPABILITY

There can be no guarantee that the USSR will not attack the United States economy first. They will undoubtedly have the initiative, and it would be sheer folly to rely on any agreement with the Russians to refrain from bombing cities. Hence, there will be an overriding need for a United States strategic force with such unquestionable capability that the Soviets will have no room to speculate about the outcome of launching a surprise attack against the United States economy. This requires that we maintain a strategic force relatively invulnerable to enemy offensive or defensive air power. It also requires that we exploit fully alternative delivery capabilities for striking the Soviet economy.

The Soviets must never be tempted to strike SAC and the United States economy on the assumption that SAC is highly vulnerable and that if SAC is destroyed our total capability to retaliate will have been eliminated. In other words, SAC, Tactical Air Command, or in fact *all* offensive United States air power can and should be flexible enough to do a variety of jobs, including countereconomy strategic bombing. This is the only effective and practical way of standing down SUSAC, the Russian counterpart of our Strategic Air Command.

But what would happen if an attack on Western Europe should lead to a mutual countereconomy war which, however, would forestall a Soviet seizure of large territories? If Western Europe were occupied and its political and intellectual leadership purged by the Soviets, we would then be faced with the necessity of "liberating" and "governing" it in the World War II sense of the word. Clearly, this would be impossible in the event that countereconomy blows have been exchanged, since there would be no healthy American economy and some millions fewer people in the United States to use in mounting a new expeditionary force. Furthermore, in the face of an enemy atomic capability, Normandy-type invasions are doomed to failure. Thus,

although the United States would not necessarily have "lost" the war, we would be in no position to win it militarily. And with Western Europe lost to us, the long-term political and economic factors would strongly favor the Soviets.

These possibilities point up the indecisive nature of a countereconomy campaign against the Soviets, when they can do the same to us. Furthermore, there is always some risk that, faced with devastation in the event of a nuclear war, the Soviet leadership may prefer the risk of national suicide if countereconomy bombing were to leave *both* sides with their economies destroyed but the Soviets in control of Western Europe—a better prospect for the elite than certain defeat.

Political Implications of Soviet Nuclear Sufficiency

As the Soviets achieve *strategic* nuclear sufficiency, their large ground armies and tactical air forces could, in a conventional military sense—unless we counter them effectively—shift the world balance of power in favor of the Soviets. With devastating punishment aimed at the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, the Soviets could be in a strong bargaining position to press for agreement to refrain from employing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, having the initiative, the Soviets might refrain from using nuclear weapons and simultaneously announce that city bombing would be resorted to only in retaliation. In the face of a known Soviet nuclear capability, it is highly unlikely that the NATO countries would, except in a dying gasp, initiate city bombing.

The possible courses of events outlined above would appear to favor the Soviets, with their large edge in conventional ground armies and tactical air forces. However, the reverse is possible if the United States takes full advantage of its large stockpile for mass employment of nuclear weapons by both tactical and strategic air forces against Soviet military forces in being and their direct supporting elements. A large and potentially decisive military advantage accrues to the United States in countermilitary force operations because of a larger nuclear stockpile; the probability of a greater variety of proven weapons and delivery systems; and a variety of proven delivery tactics and techniques. These advantages can and must be maintained for many years, and they can be militarily decisive during this period. This United States counterforce nuclear capability should enable us to overcome the Soviet advantage in numbers of conventional ground and tactical air forces.

Targets for Counterforce Operations

Combat forces, lines of communication, and supporting supplies constitute the principal targets for attack and destruction of counterforce operations. It should be clear that the use of nuclear weapons makes it difficult to distinguish between military and countereconomy targets. For example, major air bases are frequently located near cities; troops can be concentrated in cities; and submarine bases are associated with major seaports. Thus, even counterforce operations would inevitably lead to some destruction of cities. Furthermore, this situation presents especially difficult targeting problems when we contemplate using nuclear weapons against counterforce targets in Central Europe. Nevertheless, these targeting difficulties should not distract us from the basic objective of winning any war *primarily* through the destruction of enemy forces in being.

The targets of highest priority among offensive enemy combat forces are those

intended for the air delivery of nuclear weapons. The facts that combat aircraft spend some 90 per cent of their time on the ground, that they require servicing by highly skilled and trained personnel, and that they require certain fixed ground facilities render air installations particularly lucrative targets to attack by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the fixed nature of air installations permits the targeting and planning for their attack prior to the opening of hostilities.

The destruction of the enemy's air force is the essential prelude to the large-scale attack of his ground forces. The Soviets habitually employed massive attack formations in World War II. The centralization of authority and distrust of the initiative of smaller unit commanders in the dictator society of the Soviets may influence them to continue reliance, at least *initially,* on massive ground attacks. Air forces armed with enough nuclear weapons can now destroy such ground forces—quickly and completely. After—or perhaps, even before—an anti-ground-force atomic capability has been demonstrated, dispersal in both frontage and depth will be used to reduce vulnerability, but this will introduce serious problems of control and great losses in *striking power.* Hunter-killer, air-ground tactics—utilizing small, highly mobile, airborne forces—can and must be devised to force isolated enemy ground units either to remain dispersed, immobile, and ineffectual, or to concentrate and present lucrative atomic targets of opportunity.

The Soviet submarine force will undoubtedly engage heavily in interdiction of our sea lines. Their employment for closing important allied seaports with atomic torpedoes and for launching guided missiles with nuclear war heads against targets in the continental United States is also a distinct possibility.

Like aircraft, submarines are difficult to locate, combat, and destroy when operating in their own medium. Also like aircraft, submarines require elaborate home bases, spend a large fraction of their time in these bases, and require highly trained and skilled personnel for their operation and maintenance. These submarine bases are tough targets, so that the fissile material requirements per target are quite high. This is counterbalanced by the fact that these targets are relatively few in number and their destruction rapidly reduces the number of enemy submarines on patrol.

The logistics and communications systems necessary to support and give mobility to ground forces present targets of high military value. The destruction of the enemy's skilled engineer troops through timely attack of bridge sites constitutes profitable employment of tactical air-atomic capability.

There is general agreement that atomic strikes against fuel-production facilities can have little effect in blunting the initial onslaught of a Soviet attack. They can have only a relatively long-term effect. However, the larger fuel-storage sites nearer the combat zone are important targets for initial atomic attack. Munitions and supplies are so readily dispersed and camouflaged and their vulnerability is so low that their attack with atomic weapons is of doubtful profit. However, destruction and abandonment of munitions and supplies coincident with nuclear attack of troop targets are likely to be a major bonus.

American Air Power Requirements

Based on what has been said so far, it is now possible to summarize American air power requirements. First of all, America must be strong in its own right and must be able to project some of *its* retaliatory power from well-defended bases on this continent. However, granted that an intercontinental strategic capability of some magnitude

is vital to this country's survival, it is no longer of itself sufficient to guarantee our long-term security. Furthermore, in the long term, air power based on America alone *can be* impaired by military and political vicissitudes in other parts of the world. After all, if we depended solely on a long-range striking air force, we would be leaving the whole Eastern Hemisphere open to eventual Soviet domination. The balance of world resources, including trained manpower, industry, and strategic materials, would then heavily favor the Soviets, and our eventual defeat would be merely a matter of time—unless we were to initiate a preventive war, which has been ruled out as a policy for the United States. Therefore, we must have *both* adequate long-range air power—with bases in the United States—to retain reasonable independence of action and to keep from being coerced economically by our allies, and adequate shorter-range air power—with bases on allied territory—to keep the Soviets from blackmailing our allies and eventually capturing a major fraction of the world's resources.

However, to be effective, NATO tactical air power must rest on secure bases. And the West European countries must provide the assurance that neither parliamentary debates (Communist members participating) nor Communist sabotage will inhibit allied tactical atomic air power at the moment the Soviets attack.

Lest these views be misunderstood, two points should be made clear: First, SAC's long-range offensive capability is vital to our survival. SAC's budget should, if anything, be increased. Second, powerful shorter-range (tactical) land- and sea-based air-atomic power, a supporting air-logistics system, and highly mobile ground units have become equally vital, and here the budgetary deficiency is even greater. The dangerous fiction that nuclear weapons drastically reduce requirements for aircraft should be dispelled, for it is the size of the enemy's air force—and not the type of bombs we shall both use—which must primarily determine the size of our air arm. Soviet combat aircraft now number appreciably more than those of the West; and our marginal and fleeting qualitative superiority (supported by an inadequate air research and development budget) is too slender a reed upon which to base the serious risk of being outnumbered in the air.

COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY

A counterforce strategy in the nuclear age stands in sharp contrast to present strategy influenced by World War II and the "age of atomic monopoly," emphasizing the United States mobilization base and the SAC countereconomy "Sunday punch"; also to the American Fortress strategy which places heavy emphasis on air defense; and to the completely unrealistic and impractical strategies based on various atomic disarmament proposals.

Of course, we should frankly recognize that the Soviets may choose *not* to fight a counterforce war. If this should be the case, nothing is lost by adopting the counterforce strategy ourselves. In the first place, SUSAC remains as the highest-priority target under both the present and the counterforce strategy. Secondly, the tactical atomic-delivery capability which we develop for counterforce purposes can also be used for strategic bombing. Furthermore, the counterforce strategy gives us clear gains in the cold war and local wars. Finally, there is always some chance that our counterforce strategy may cause the Soviets to refrain from attacking our economy massively at the outset.

Technological revolution has created a discontinuity in the normal evolution of strategy. We must attempt to establish a trend toward basic compatibility between national policies and strategic concepts, taking into account the rapidly changing nature of our military capabilities. Proper implementation of a counterforce strategy will enable us to *hold* vital areas of the free world. If we can *hold* Western Europe and other vital areas, we will rally free people to our side by removing the present fear of "liberation," *after* Soviet occupation and liquidation. The counterforce strategy offers some possibility of limiting wars, and hence a higher probability of preserving our way of life.

It clearly distinguishes between Soviet-controlled peoples and the Communist regimes. The United States professes no animosity toward Soviet-controlled peoples. Consistent with this, the counterforce strategy does not seek to win the war largely by destroying them.

The foreign policy of the United States government seeks to *reduce the capabilities* of the Soviet regime below the danger point, or to *alter its intentions* through creating situations which represent courses of action more acceptable to the Soviets and more in keeping with our objectives. This also is precisely what the counterforce strategy seeks to do in a military way—reduce Soviet capabilities (military forces and stocks) and create an acceptable alternative course of action for the Soviets (surrender on reasonable, stated terms or perish).

The counterforce strategy presents a badly needed opportunity for American leadership to associate itself with a higher purpose than the blind use of United States military might. Propagandawise, and diplomatically, this circumstance can be used to attract to American leadership moralists in this country and Europe, in still neutral Asia, and among the people behind the Iron Curtain, all of whom we have yet to attract by the quality and character of our leadership.

In the air age, United States mobile air-atomic strength can be the equivalent of nineteenth-century British naval power. It would make a kind of global Monroe Doctrine, countering Soviet military aggression against the free world, a political possibility. American troops, now stationed in forty-nine countries of the world, can be withdrawn to a major extent and stationed in this country, leaving a ring of dispersed and lightly manned standby bases around the Soviet periphery. The United States can recover from its present awkward position of overcommitment of available surface forces around the world. Local national forces in Europe and Asia can carry out their share of the containment of Soviet power, backed by the shield of United States air-atomic power, which is committed to destroy Communist-inspired forces of aggression and some of which is based in countries allied with the United States as solid evidence of our commitment.

T. F. Walkowicz, Sc.D., New York City, is an aeronautical engineer on the staff of Laurance S. Rockefeller and a member of the Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences. He served as junior engineer, matériel division, Wright Field, Ohio; chief, glider flight research unit, Air Forces, U. S. Army; consultant, airborne armies, Headquarters, Washington, D. C.; technical intelligence officer, Europe and Japan (1944–45, 1947); staff officer, air command and staff school, Air University. He was executive secretary, Scientific Advisory Board, U. S. Air Force; member of the Defense Management Committee on the Research and Development Board; member of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group; and executive to the Special Assistant (Research and Development) to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force (1949–52).

Dropping the Pilot

By Donald T. Perkins

DURING the past ten years, there has developed the widely held belief that the future defense of our country and its institutions must be based principally upon technological advances in the field of push-button warfare. This belief has been fostered by frequent public accounts of the omniscient and omnipotent properties of guided missiles, glowing with optimism but shrouding the details in mystery and mumbo jumbo. One sees the guided missile in its offensive role as the relentless and ineluctable dealer of death and destruction; and in its defensive role as the sure savior from all who will harm us, the universal protector that encloses us in safety as with a magical cloak. (The fact that these two capabilities are mutually contradictory is frequently overlooked.) The appeal to blind faith of this sort is dangerous, and in no way justified.

From one point of view, one may regard guided missiles as an advanced form of artillery. However, when thinking in terms of air power, a more natural viewpoint (and the one adopted here) is to regard guided missiles as delivery vehicles whose primary distinguishing characteristic is the absence of a human crew. One is reminded, perhaps, of Tenniel's famous *Punch* cartoon on the resignation of Bismarck, "Dropping the Pilot." It is certainly pertinent to inquire whether dropping the pilot is a good thing; or, more generally, under what circumstances it may be a good thing.

Naturally, it is not intended here to argue that the only feature which sets missiles apart from piloted aircraft is the absence of the pilot. Rather, it is intended to begin with this definitive feature, and attempt to determine in a rather general sort of way what are its implications in the design and operation of weapons systems, and how these considerations fit in with the concept of air warfare in the future. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to clear away some of the semantic debris which has collected around the subject of guided missiles.

The Party Line

Almost every public utterance concerning missile systems stresses the pinpoint, all-weather capability of these systems as their chief endearing quality. Perhaps such statements are sometimes intended merely as advertising material and, as such, should not be taken too seriously. But the almost ritualistic uniformity of these contentions leaves one with the impression that pinpoint accuracy and all-weather delivery are the prime articles of faith of the missile enthusiast. Nevertheless, an examination of the real factors that have a bearing on accuracy and all-weather capability does not reveal any startling advantages which missiles have over manned vehicles in these respects.

Bombing accuracy

The only source of operational experience with missiles to which we can point is that of the German V-1 and V-2 firings during World War II. Incidentally, these missiles constitute prototypes for a broad division of missiles into two varieties which will be called here "cruise-type" and "ballistic": the cruise-type missile is characterized by the use of aerodynamic lift surfaces and

dependence upon air as an oxidizer; the ballistic missile is characterized by the absence of these two properties. Of course, there are gradations in between, but it is adequate here to consider only the two extremes, as exemplified by the small, pulse-jet-powered, winged V-1 and the larger, rocket-powered, ballistic V-2. Whatever these missiles may have proved concerning the bold and ingenious character of German military development, they certainly failed to provide examples of pinpoint bombing accuracy. It was, in fact, their excessive inaccuracy which prevented them from affecting the course of the war to any great extent.

It must, of course, be recognized that the German V-1 and V-2 were extremely primitive, and more advanced techniques of guidance will yield much better accuracy. One must ask, however, whether such improved guidance techniques give missiles a comparative advantage over manned systems. Considering first cruise-type missiles, it seems fairly clear that the missile guidance problem is very nearly the same as the navigation and bombing problem of the manned system—except that certain techniques, such as visual bombing systems and pilotage, are not readily available to missiles. The crude, dead-reckoning guidance of the V-1 was forced upon this missile system by the absence of a pilot, at a time when much better guidance systems were available and in use by manned systems. Sufficient improvement of the V-1 guidance system could tend to bridge this gap, but could never serve to the comparative advantage of the missile, since such an improved inertial system would be equally available to manned systems. In other words, dropping the pilot cannot improve bombing accuracy and will probably make it worse.

The guidance problem for ballistic missiles is somewhat different, and certainly does not invite comparison with manned systems. However, it is clear that a high degree of accuracy is not easily to be achieved, and becomes progressively more difficult with increasing range.

All-weather capabilities

The all-weather capabilities of missiles likewise are open to question. Here again the ballistic missile presents different, but not necessarily trivial, problems. For example, the launching of ballistic missiles under conditions of strong and gusty surface winds appears to offer difficulties at least as serious as the take-off and landing of aircraft under the same circumstances. Freezing rain is admittedly a serious hazard to aviation—would all go well with a missile launching under these weather conditions? It is submitted that nobody really knows. In the case of cruise-type missiles, one can anticipate the same sort of difficulties with the weather elements as are experienced with manned systems. Weather minimums for landing are an obvious exception to this generality, but this is not a major problem for aircraft in wartime operations.

In general, it is apparent that the pinpoint, all-weather capabilities of missiles, as advertised, are based largely on the incapacity of these systems to derive any benefit from human contributions en route, based upon vision, interpretation, and judgment. This is perhaps an interesting negative property, but can hardly be regarded as a positive recommendation. The case for missiles must be based upon something firmer than this—and a firmer basis will be outlined in the following sections.

Characteristics of Design

Guided missiles are distinguished from aircraft systems by the absence of crew members. This has far-reaching implications in the philosophy of design.

There are sizable savings in weight and space made possible by dispensing with the need for proper environment for the crew. Also certain safety factors can be relaxed, and the entire vehicle can be designed on a more austere basis than would be possible with human occupants. Since the missiles are planned for one-time use, the landing gear can be eliminated, and requirements for the service life of components can be relaxed. These effects are all of some significance—but a much more important advantage of unmanned offensive systems lies in the range capability inherent in the one-way mission. This makes possible the use of relatively small and inexpensive missiles as delivery vehicles at ranges that would be almost prohibitive for much larger manned systems, required to make the return trip.

In the case of defensive missiles, the comparison between manned and unmanned systems is much more complex. But here also, and for somewhat the same reasons as in the offensive case, a really major advantage of the unmanned systems emerges—namely, the clear superiority in altitude capability.

The utilization of guided missiles for one-way missions has already been mentioned, and this has another unique and important benefit—it includes the use of ballistic missiles, which is well-nigh impossible on a manned basis. The advent of ballistic missiles as long-range delivery vehicles clearly opens up a new order of in-flight invulnerability, and the effect of this will be discussed in the next section.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OPERATION

In comparing missiles with aircraft in the offensive role, one should notice first that cruise-type missile delivery is subject to approximately the same degradation from enemy action as is aircraft delivery; on the other hand, the high-speed, high-angle trajectory of the ballistic missile reduces greatly its vulnerability to active defenses. The advantage of manned aircraft is that their relatively high procurement cost can be amortized over many sorties. Under some circumstances that can easily be visualized this is an important advantage, and one that weights the scales heavily in favor of manned systems. However, there are at least two circumstances in which this advantage cannot be realized: first, when the decisive phase of the war is of very short duration; and secondly, when the active defenses are highly effective against aircraft. In the first case, missile systems will be preferable to manned systems because of their lower procurement cost; in the second case, ballistic missiles will be preferable to aircraft and cruise-type missiles because of their lower vulnerability in flight.

Human values

The circumstance of highly effective defenses has another important implication for offensive operations. It is characteristic of missile systems that they may be operated efficiently (from an economic standpoint) at loss rates in excess of 50 per cent, on the inbound flight only. Human considerations exclude the possibility of planning for this type of operation with manned systems —when excessive loss rates actually occur, the operation is drastically modified or halted. Consequently, campaign costs for manned systems against strong defenses are relatively high, because of the requirement to maintain loss rates below acceptable human standards.

It is perhaps appropriate to point out that it has been assumed here that manned systems are operated according to standards of human value prevalent in this country and other Western democracies. The effect of drastically altering these standards was illustrated by the record of the kamikazes during the last war. Most of what has been said in favor of guided missiles applies equally well to manned suicide systems, and even to less drastic manned one-way missions. Presumably this general idea will find no application by ourselves, but there is no assurance that it will not be used by an enemy.

Base vulnerability and mobility

One should not attempt to assess the over-all worth of missile systems on the basis of in-flight performance alone. Considerations of base vulnerability and mobility of tactical units are equally important. It is of course not possible to discuss these issues in detail, but some of the salient features may be noted. First, although guided missiles are comparatively light (at least in empty weight) and are launched more or less vertically, there is a strong tendency to accumulate impedimenta on the ground. Secondly, the deployment and resupply of missile units is made more difficult by the fact that the missiles themselves must be transported, rather than ferrying under their own power. Finally, it should be said that in spite of these (and other) complications, guided missiles appear to offer an excellent potential for mobile and dispersed operation. However, in order to realize this potential, it is necessary to approach the problems of base operations and logistics from a fresh standpoint, rather than attempting to fit missiles into the existing structure.

Flexibility

Another aspect of operations that deserves some attention is the potential flexibility of weapons systems. Here guided missiles stand at a distinct disadvantage. The superiority of the human mind over machines in performing many functions (such as visual recognition, evaluation of complex situations, decision based upon information derived during flight, and so forth) is well known and need not be belabored. In some applications such as tactical support operations and area defense, the inflexibility of missile systems militates strongly against their exclusive use at the expense of manned systems. In other applications such as strategic bombardment and point defense, flexibility is not at such a high premium and may allow extensive replacement of manned by unmanned systems.

Reliability

Some consideration must also be given to the reliability of missile systems. It is inherent in the general nature of these systems that high reliability is difficult to achieve, especially under the stresses of combat operations. In some instances where safety of friendly troops and populations is at issue, low reliability may be a crippling drawback; in other instances, low reliability may be regarded simply as increasing somewhat the cost of operations, and this may be entirely acceptable. In any case, it must be recognized that it is a long step from a laboratory item to an operational system. When this recognition is coupled with a requirement for maintaining air forces continuously in a state of operational readiness, it engenders a fair degree of caution in the rejection of manned aircraft systems.

FUTURE OF AIR WARFARE

The previous discussion has set forth some of the salient characteristics of guided missiles and their operations. It is now pertinent to inquire to what extent these characteristics make guided

missiles suitable for the type of warfare that one can reasonably visualize in the future, especially as this warfare is affected by the impact of nuclear weapon technology. The vastly increased firepower afforded by atomic weapons has the immediate effect of giving the offense an inherent advantage over the defense. This is true because the delivery of relatively few, but powerful, weapons on appropriate targets can constitute a severe and tragic blow even to a great world power. It is not likely that this can be entirely prevented by defensive action; it cannot even be prevented by striking the first blow, if the enemy has exercised reasonable care in providing exceptional protection for his offensive striking forces. Under these circumstances, the classical concept of air superiority becomes somewhat inapplicable. The potentialities of missiles for this kind of warfare were illustrated in the last war, when the Germans launched many thousands of missiles against targets in England and on the Continent, during a period when the Allies held almost absolute air supremacy. One need only translate this into terms of nuclear weapons to gain some inkling of the unsavory character of future warfare.

In spite of the horror with which all reasonable men must view the possibility of another major war, the present world political situation dictates that we maintain a high state of military preparedness. It is inevitable that the keynote of this preparedness should be the preservation of a well-established and well-publicized capability for delivering devastation upon any potential enemy—for in this way, the initiation of general war may be deterred. The characteristics of guided missiles are such that they are well suited to this role. This is true not only from considerations of military economy, but also because of the psychological value of the threat of attack by guided missiles. It requires very little imagination to regard a missile poised on the launching site as being effectively a pistol pointed at the heart, and the psychological value of this should not be underestimated.

Manned aircraft systems

In addition to the strategic forces, defensive and tactical forces are also necessary. In order to support the national foreign policy, there must be air forces designed to engage in such forms of limited warfare and in such areas as may be dictated by the changing exigencies of world affairs. The success of military forces in such conflicts, as well as milder measures such as economic and psychological warfare, may well spell the difference between ultimate peace and ultimate total war. The high degree of mobility and flexibility required to meet this military obligation must severely restrict the application of guided missiles in this role. Likewise in air defense, a mixture of manned and unmanned systems is necessary. Within the foreseeable future then, a sizable proportion of the national air power will continue to be vested in manned aircraft systems.

CONCLUSION

Guided missile systems have been found to have several important inherent advantages over manned aircraft systems. Principal of these are the greater range capability for offensive systems, greater altitude capability for defensive systems, more economic utilization in the face of strong enemy defenses and in campaigns of short duration, and psychological superiority as a deterrent. These advantages are bought at a price of reduced accuracy at long ranges, lessened strategic mobility, general lack of flexibility, and lower reliability. It seems clear that the price paid is well justified by the advantages gained for the performance of a large portion of the air force mission. The fruition of guided missiles into operational systems will require tremendous efforts, not only in research and development but also in the introduction of new operational and logistics concepts. The transition from manned to unmanned systems will necessarily be rather gradual, but will constitute a very significant advance in air power.

Donald T. Perkins, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Chief of the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of the Assistant for Development Planning in Headquarters, United States Air Force. He has served as chief of the Operations Analysis Offices of the Allied Air Forces in Central Europe and the United States Air Forces in Europe, deputy director of Scientific Services for the Air Weather Service; Air Force major (Reserve) during World War II; instructor in mathematics at Harvard University; and instructor in mathematics at Yale University.

Aviation and International Co-operation

By Robert Strausz-Hupé

THE development of aviation has given rise, from its very start nearly half a century ago, to the most extravagant expectations of future achievements. The spokesmen of the new industry, who as a group were the most articulate and enthusiastic among publicists of industrial promotion, claimed nothing less than that aviation would revolutionize civilization and unify the globe. In retrospect, the apostles of aviation now appear to have been sober, if not overcautious, realists.

It is no longer possible to conceive of aviation as merely one among several means of transportation. The impact of aviation upon the entire economic, social, and political structure of civilization has shattered traditional concepts of space and time. True enough, the speed of modern surface transportation exceeds by impressive multiples preindustrial rates of locomotion. But the increase of surface speeds has been, over a period of about one hundred years, relatively gradual, and modern surface transportation still follows, except for minor deviations, trails that have been blazed by preindustrial civilizations. In the United States, for example, the average railroad passenger train attains an average speed of 39.1 miles per hour; domestic scheduled air transportation has increased its average speed to 200 miles per hour. In addition, air transportation has clipped an average of 20 per cent from rail and highway distances between major American cities. Since, in the United States, systems of surface transportation are highly efficient, the margin of time-space superiority enjoyed by air transportation is probably the smallest anywhere in the world. Internationally, that margin is much greater; in the so-called backward countries it has reached staggering proportions. Moreover, the rate of increase of air speeds steadily widens, absolutely and relatively, the gap between air and surface transportation. While, in the United States, rail speeds per hour increased between 1939 and 1953 from 37 miles to 39.1 miles (5.9 per cent), air speeds increased from 153.3 miles to 200.6 miles (30.9 per cent). If, during the first fifty years, aviation has reduced, in point of time, the globe to the area of the European continent, it is more than likely that, before the end of this century, the earth will have shrunk to the time-space dimensions of one of the larger American states.

Impressive as are these figures, they are far from reflecting fully the present potentialities of air transportation as an agent of international and cultural change. Were current air speeds and available commercial transportation facilities fully integrated into the world economy, the world would be too closely knit to accommodate isolated communities. The fact is that the potentialities of existing systems of air transportation are far from being fully exploited. Moreover, existing systems do not employ the latest, albeit fully tested, techniques that scientific research and industrial production have developed. The restrictions on the present capabilities of civilian aviation and on the expansion of these capabilities within the limits of available techniques are mainly political and military, rather than technical and economic.

Development of Civilian Aviation

The progress of commercial air transportation from its haphazard beginning in 1919, when the KLM company (Royal Dutch Airlines) opened for business, has been truly fabulous. However, it has been uneven. It has been largely confined to a few Western countries. In 1938, the world's airlines transported 2.5 million passengers and achieved a total of 1.1 billion passenger miles. In 1953, United States domestic and international scheduled services accounted for 18 billion passenger miles and 250 million ton miles (freight). The corresponding figures for Britain were 1.5 billion and 35 million, for France 1 billion and 40 million. United States and European domestic and international scheduled services flew, in 1953, more than three quarters of the passenger miles flown by all the world's services. The annual revenue of the world airlines exceeded 2 billion dollars. Of this total, the United States accounted for approximately two-thirds. Commercial aviation is still largely a Western monopoly, with the United States controlling the largest share. It can be deduced from available figures that the Soviet Union's scheduled lines account for about 8 per cent of the passenger miles flown the world over. The Soviet Union does not operate an international commercial air service. Given the vastness of the Soviet Union's territory, more than three times the size of that of the United States, and its 200 million population, the Soviet effort in the field of commercial aviation appears insignificant when compared with the Western and, specifically, the American achievement.

There are in the world about 120,000 private aircraft. Most are used for auxiliary services by the airlines, by business firms, by flying schools, and for crop dusting, fire fighting, and surveying. Although the number of aircraft registrations has been increasing steadily and rapidly, the number of "family aircraft" is still relatively small: about one plane per 5,000 Americans. Modest as is still the role of the private plane in American business and leisure activities, the United States leads the rest of the world: Americans own about 80 per cent of the world's private aircraft.

Airplanes and Economic Progress

The unevenness of the world-wide development of aviation reflects international disparities of technological development and standards of living as well as international political divisions. Yet aviation itself could be a potent means for accelerating technological advance, for improving economic conditions, and for building bridges of understanding and friendship between peoples.

The organization of international air transportation has brought together in continuous co-operation the business firms of many countries. The airplane opens up heretofore closed areas, not only for tourism but also for economic ventures, new investments, exploitation of additional resources, and settlement. Air transportation has been a major stimulus to economic development in many areas, especially the underdeveloped nations. In the long run, the most significant contribution of aviation to world commerce will be the opening up of hitherto inaccessible regions to the continuous expansion of trade as regards both markets and resources.

The airplane facilitates the rapid advance of backward countries because it introduces them to the highest forms of modern technology and places them in the position to leap across historical

technological cycles directly into the most advanced stage of transportation techniques. Central Africa, parts of Central and South America, and parts of the Middle East (notably the Arab peninsula) have entered upon important industrial developments without launching upon extensive, costly, and time-consuming programs of rail and highway construction. In each case, the establishment of the air transportation system has been the indispensable condition of economic progress. In many backward countries, the very appearance of the airplane, the establishment of airports and repair and maintenance shops, and the recruitment of ground maintenance personnel from native populations have triggered psychological chain reactions resulting in the accommodation, within a matter of years, of preindustrial and, in some instances, of neolithic civilizations to the ways of twentieth-century technology. Although the impact of aviation on old and venerable cultures may not have been everywhere an unmixed blessing, it lessened the social and emotional strains and stresses of modernization by shortening the process and by introducing the backward peoples to most efficient and labor-saving techniques.

Africa

Nowhere, perhaps, has aviation facilitated a more rapid advance from primitive civilization to the machine age than in Africa. From the camel and the donkey Africa moved more or less straight into air transport. It is unlikely, to say the least, that the great transcontinental railroads which, fifty years ago, stirred the imagination of such empire builders as Cecil Rhodes, will ever be built. In Africa, the plane appears to be the most practical means of hauling freight to and from the interior. Roads in Africa cost about $25,000 to $30,000 per mile, and approximately 75,000 miles of highways would have to be built in order to meet present and foreseeable transport requirements. Under these circumstances the airplane, which can move straight in before other forms of transportation are developed, is bound to effect so large a saving in time and money as to suggest the concentration of available resources upon the expansion of air transportation rather than upon the construction of roads and rail lines. This trend is bound to affect profoundly not only the economic geography of Africa but also its political structure: it supplies a compelling argument for the federation and consolidation of many territories whose boundaries were drawn under the conditions of colonial rivalry prevailing in the nineteenth century. Then, coastal points served as bases for expansion into the interior, mostly along the great rivers such as the Nile, the Congo, and the Niger. Air transport now renders the interior regions of the African continent, heretofore inaccessible to each other except by roundabout routes via coastal terminals, increasingly independent of sea and river ports, and tends to draw them together economically, irrespective of their political allegiance.

International trade and industry

In the long run, aviation holds the promise of making economic protectionism increasingly difficult and of freeing world trade of its many, largely archaic, restrictions. Perhaps this view reflects an excessive confidence in the power of economic logic to dispel the parochial preconceptions of nationalism. Yet it is possible to discern current trends that point unmistakably in the direction of "airborne" internationalism.

Aviation has liberated the traveler from the necessity of following traditional routes. A German, for example, traveling to Portugal can now reach his

destination without crossing France and Spain. Air travel does away with the tedious formalities of border crossings, including visas and customs inspections. Private flying will make the conventional guarding of frontiers very difficult. Intercourse between contiguous countries will grow ever more intimate —as, for example, by the establishment of helicopter bus service between Brussels, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Cologne. To put it differently, countries have acquired many additional neighbors, and their historical borders are losing their functional significance —except in the realm of pure politics.

Air transport itself is a fully developed international industry stimulating the exchange of industrial products and raw materials and the progressive development of international communications. Air travel led to the organization of international enterprises in two forms: that of the Scandinavian Airlines System in which three countries have joined on the basis of parity in one firm, and that of the Pan American complex in which one large mother firm allows national affiliates to develop local traffic and to participate in international flying. Furthermore, there is the whole complex of international air traffic agreements concerning transit, cabotage, air bases, signals and communications systems, and rescue operations. Air transport, by virtue of its own developmental requirements, stimulates the expansion of international trade and—last, but not least—the exchange of information.

Political checks

Air transportation, by virtue of low passenger and freight rates and development of new markets, contributes directly to the raising of standards of living everywhere. Although present flight equipment is out of date technologically, it is being replaced gradually, albeit with exasperating delays, by aircraft allowing for cheaper travel not only for passengers but also for cargo. Moreover, as equipment becomes diversified, the slow-haul traffic links on the ground will ultimately be abandoned in favor of air routes. Prominent among the new types of equipment are the turboprops, presently used by the British European Airways Corporation and Air France, long-range high-speed commercial jets, short-range craft, and the rapidly improving "family plane." Air transport has not only invaded the field of passenger travel and cargo carriage (except heavy bulk); it has also created what may be called novel and special transport situations as, for example, the shipment of highly perishable goods between continents and the automobile ferry across the English Channel. Flying is essentially a cheaper mode of transportation in the double sense that it costs less than competitive forms of surface transportation, provided the distance traveled is longer than one to two hundred miles, and that it saves a great deal of time and fatigue. Again, the obstacles to reduction in costs and thus to the integration of aviation economics into world economics, are political in nature, rather than technical.

Although a good case can be made for the contention that the progress of aviation has been fostered by international conflict, an equally good case can be advanced for the argument that threats of war and ideological dogmatism now delay the full exploitation of technical improvements that would accrue, in a milder political climate, to civil aviation. The cost of air travel has not come down to its technologically feasible level because in some countries military aviation "hogs" the best equipment and because in other countries, especially in Europe and Asia, the doc-

trinaire socialization of air transport has saddled the industry with bureaucratic rigidities, noncompetitive languor, and unprofitable schedules that cater to national vanity rather than to customers' demands.

Contributions

It is tempting to dwell on the spatial and quantitative aspects of aviation, for eye-filling statistics support aviation's proudest claims to record achievements. The more enduring and significant contribution of aviation to the welfare of mankind must be sought, however, in the service it renders to the alleviation of suffering, to the conciliation of conflict, and to the making of that cultural synthesis which alone can render tolerable psychologically the economic interdependence of growing populations and supply the ethical basis for the peaceful coexistence of diverse political systems.

Relief and rescue

Perhaps aviation's most signal contribution to the alleviation of human suffering has been in the nature of disaster relief and emergency rescue as, for example, the American-British air operations—evacuation and food drops—on the occasion of the North Sea tidal disaster in 1953, and the airlift of diverse International Red Cross missions assigned to flood, famine, earthquake, and epidemic areas. Hardly a month passes without airplane flights, from one or several nations, to some country ravaged by one of these scourges, with food, medical aid (including airborne hospitals), seed grain, insecticides, and technical personnel. Planes, flying the weather, spotting vessels in distress, and participating in actual rescue operations, perform nowadays routine services that have become an integral factor of surface navigation: aviation has raised not only the efficiency but also the safety of international shipping.

Diplomatic mobility

Air travel has made possible frequent and virtually instantaneous contacts between statesmen. It is only natural that public attention should focus on those international conflicts that defy solution, and that a crisis resolved quickly loses its news value. A study seeking to determine how many times, during the last ten years, airborne diplomacy has succeeded in composing serious difficulties would be not the least interesting and instructive study in the field of political science. The machinery of the United Nations, and especially of United Nations organizations created for the mediation of international conflicts, is geared, to an appreciable extent, to the speed of air travel. And in virtually all cases of international conflict the speed with which mediatory efforts can be brought to bear upon the situation is of the essence. In the case of mediation in the Kashmir dispute and in the case of the personal intervention of the UN's Secretary-General in Peiping on behalf of the American airmen held by Red China, air transport was, in view of the pressing nature of the issues and the hazards of surface travel, the one and only practical means of transportation. Mr. John Foster Dulles's celebrated ubiquity owes as much to the efficacy of air transport as to the courage and stamina of that highly mobile statesman.

Modern coalition diplomacy and the rapidity with which American military and economic assistance has been made available to America's allies are inconceivable without the ministrations of aviation. The quick succession of high-level diplomatic meetings, now in Washington, now in Manila, then at Berlin, Geneva, London, and Paris, and policy consultations on short notice, such as the increasingly frequent conferences of the Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth, are characteristic features of the age of air travel. Negotiations and ratifications of treaties which, only fifteen years ago, would have required many months, are now consummated in a few weeks. The time budget of air travel is also of importance to a statesman who, were he to depend on other means of locomotion, must fear that he might lose control at home or who, like the President of the United States during sessions of Congress, must abide by constitutional provisions which limit the duration of his absence from the Capital.

The ease and speed of air travel may not have improved the quality of modern diplomacy; only the diplomats themselves can do that. But air travel has improved indeed the diplomat's chances of dealing effectively with emergencies: a "brush fire" crisis in a remote part of the world need not get out of hand because leaders of the so-called great powers are not able to consult personally and promptly or because teams of observers cannot supply in time firsthand information that precludes—or at least should preclude whenever all parties concerned are animated by a measure of good will—those factual misunderstandings which, in the past, have led to many quite unnecessary wars.

Cultural interchange

Air travel has made possible frequent contacts between scientists and scholars and the display in many places and in a short time of artistic productions. Whole symphony orchestras, operatic companies, and *corps de ballet* are now being flown from continent to continent; managers can schedule tours of a few weeks without interrupting the domestic season. Thanks to the airplane, many more people than ever before can partake of the best other countries have to offer in the field of music, dance, and drama.

Europe for the little man

More striking, however, than the new mobility of cultural productions is the new accessibility of individual national cultures. Air travel has wrought a revolution in the field of tourism that has begun to affect profoundly national attitudes and tastes. Air travel allows a time budget for trips that no other means of transportation can rival. The average traveler with a month's vacation is no longer restricted to travel in his local and national surroundings. This allows for a fuller understanding of other cultures and for the living experience, however brief, of diverse national ways of life. Overseas travel is no longer the privilege of leisure. In the America of a 350-billion-dollar national product, the problem of where to spend one's vacation is, for the average salaried employee and industrial worker, no longer a purely financial one; it is rather a problem of time, to wit, of how to compress the greatest amount of pleasure and recreation into the two to four weeks of the average vacation allowance. Scheduled overnight flights at low tourist rates have brought parts of Latin America and most of Europe within the range of large segments of America's working population. Admittedly, only a modest beginning has been made. Even the low tourist rates are still high enough to cause the average member of the middle- and lower-middle-income groups to think twice before venturing on a two weeks' spree in Paris. But there is no reason to assume that the practice of a Middle Western manufacturer who has launched a program of workers' flying visits to Europe in chartered planes will

remain for long a unique experiment in industrial relations. If past trends of air-travel economics are valid indications of future developments, then it is a foregone conclusion that, ten to twenty years hence, an annual vacation abroad will be well within the range of the average American worker's pocketbook and time budget.

World-Mindedness

The widening of the American political horizon and the very real growth of American world-mindedness are due to many causes, among which wartime experiences, the harsh lessons of the cold war, and the heavy burden of world power are probably the most potent ones. There can be no doubt, however, that air-mindedness and world-mindedness are kindred states of mind. International air travel is, by itself, education in international relations. The soaring airplane unfolds the map of the world; the mountain chains that separate nations and the great rivers that carry their trade, ships standing for blue-etched shores, and caravans moving across deserts compose vivid and comprehensive patterns of world geography—maps, so to speak, which are traced to the scale of nature. If it can be taken as axiomatic that any medium which conveys to man a sense of the interdependence of peoples and the arbitrariness of political boundaries serves the cause of peace, then the airplane deserves well of mankind.

PARADOX OF AVIATION

Like most things wrought by human ingenuity, the airplane carries the burden of a paradox. It ministers to the physical security and comfort and to the cultural aspirations of growing numbers of peoples everywhere; it owes its startling technical development largely to the international race for superiority in instruments of destruction. Air transportation could be one of the keys to unlock the bars to international understanding and co-operation—provided statesmen and nations are rational enough to put this rational device to proper and full use. It is one of the most flexible and economic devices for keeping abreast of the tremendous acceleration of such world-wide tendencies as the increase of international commodity exchanges and all peoples' increased dependence on world trade; the increase of populations and the increased demand for new opportunities of migration and settlement; the increased danger of "local" issues bursting into universal conflict and the increased need for coping with "local" conflagrations promptly; and the increased mixing of races and the increased urgency of creating a cultural framework that can encompass mass societies now uneasily jostling each other. Aviation is no panacea of international co-operation. At this stage of technical development, however, the proper use of aviation is an indispensable prerequisite of universal prosperity and peace.

Robert Strausz-Hupé, Ph.D., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is professor of political science in the University of Pennsylvania, director of the University's Foreign Policy Research Institute, and lecturer at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He is the author of Geopolitics (1942), Balance of Tomorrow (1944), Zone of Indifference (1952), and, with Stefan Possony, International Relations (1954).

Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1954

MEETINGS

YOU will remember that for many years the general topics of our annual spring meetings have related to international affairs. We have received suggestions from members that we should depart from this convention and take up some important domestic subject. After several discussions, your Board decided this year to organize the meeting on April 1 and 2 around the general theme of "Internal Security and Civil Rights in the United States." We are now engaged in recruiting an able panel of participants, including journalists, professors, and governmental officials. It is entirely possible that we shall return to an international subject in 1956.

The family of Edmund J. James, first president of the Academy, and later successively president of Northwestern University and the University of Illinois, has contributed a generous sum to the Academy to enable us, in conjunction with the University of Pennsylvania, to hold a conference to commemorate the centenary of his birth. The substantive topic for the conference, to be held May 20 and 21, 1955, will be "Methods of Financing Higher Education in the United States," and the proceedings will be published as part of the September volume of THE ANNALS. Also, they will be separately bound and distributed widely among university boards of trustees, legislative finance committees, foundations, and other interested groups. High-level financial policy officers, including a number of presidents, from the leading colleges and universities of the middle-western and northeastern United States have accepted our invitation to attend.

It is also our intention to hold a series of seminars on subjects of national interest as soon as the finances of the Academy are able to support them. These will be conducted in much the same way as the James Conference.

PUBLICATIONS

It is our intention to reduce slightly the size of THE ANNALS, partly to trim expenses and partly to encourage our members to read it regularly and throughout. The Book Review section will continue its adequate coverage.

THE ANNALS during 1954 covered these topics:

January	*New Goals in Police Management*
March	*Bureaucracy and Democratic Government*
May	*Prisons in Transformation*
July	*America and a New Asia*
September	*America Through Foreign Eyes*
November	*The Future of the United Nations: Issues of Charter Revision*

Total sales of our publications, as distinguished from circulation among members, amounted to $10,697 for 1954, which compares unfavorably with $11,747 for 1953.

MEMBERSHIP

During 1954 the Academy admitted 3,478 new members, compared to 2,513 in 1953. But 3,490 died or withdrew. We tried to ascertain the reasons for the withdrawals, and 31 per cent of those who did not renew replied to our questionnaire. Their reasons were

varied but reflected no appreciable dissatisfaction with our publication or meetings. Since we believe that the optimum membership of the Academy should be a little larger than the present 15,384, we shall increase our efforts to interest qualified persons in affiliating.

FINANCES

Our report for 1953 revealed that there was a deficit in Academy financial operations for 1952 and 1953. We instituted a moderate rise in dues in the early part of 1954, and this, coupled with certain economies in operations, reduced the deficit at the end of 1954 to a third of that of the previous year. But there is still a deficit in operations for 1954 of $7,173. Despite this, it is not our present intention to increase the dues further, nor do we presently intend to make overtures for foundation support. We shall try another year of operations at the present rates before we make a decision on changes.

CHANGE OF OFFICERS

We have granted our President a leave of absence for one year, to enable him to serve as Secretary of Administration of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. We took this action following a request made by Governor Leader and President Harnwell of the University of Pennsylvania. During our President's absence, Dr. Sellin will serve as Acting President, as well as Editor.

Respectfully submitted,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Thorsten Sellin, *Acting President*
C. A. Kulp, *First Vice-President*
Charles J. Rhoads, *Treasurer*
Raymond T. Bowman, *Secretary*
Jerome J. Rothschild, *Counsel*

Otto T. Mallery, M. Albert Linton, Alfred H. Williams, Stephen B. Sweeney, Norman D. Palmer, James C. Charlesworth

January 24, 1955

REPORT OF AUDITORS

January 20, 1955

CHARLES J. RHOADS, ESQ., *Treasurer,*
American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Sir:

We herewith report that we have audited the books and accounts of the *American Academy of Political and Social Science* for its Fiscal Year ended *December 31, 1954.*

We have prepared and submit herewith Statement of Receipts and Disbursements for the year ended December 31, 1954.

The Receipts from all sources were verified by a comparison of the entries for same appearing in the Treasurer's Cash Book with the records of bank deposits and were found to be in accord therewith.

The Disbursements, as shown by the Cash Book, were supported by the proper vouchers in the form of cancelled paid checks or receipts for moneys expended. These were examined by us and confirmed the correctness of the payments made.

As the result of our audit and examination, made in the manner above indicated, we certify that, in our opinion, the accompanying Statement sets forth the results of its operating activities for the period under review.

Yours respectfully,

(Signed) EDWARD P. MOXEY & CO.
Certified Public Accountants

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1954

Cash Balance January 1, 1954		
Unappropriated and Trust Funds on Deposit in Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank	$ 6,227.33	
Cash in Academy Office	46.36	$ 6,273.69
Receipts		
Members' Dues		$48,831.01
Students' Dues		3,098.50
Life Memberships		400.00
Subscriptions		
Individuals	$ 30.40	
Libraries	4,067.25	
Agents	17,676.46	21,774.11
Sales		10,697.18
Advertising		3,626.41
Income from Investments		11,605.49
Proceeds from Sale of Securities		37,379.62
Special Donations		45.51
Translation Royalties		29.22
James Fund		5,000.00
Refund of Excise Tax on Purchase of Asset		56.07 142,543.12
		$148,816.81
Disbursements		
Office Expense		$ 9,542.24
Philadelphia Meetings		5,766.88
New Membership Expense		15,565.99
Publication of Annals		50,492.24
Membership Records		7,432.73
Sale of Annals Expense		3,267.44
Property Improvements		195.00
Discount Collections & Exchange		1.05
Social Security Taxes		733.73
Prepaid Postage		74.53
Professional Services—President of Academy		5,000.00
Employees' Retirement Payments		5,558.30
Securities Purchased		23,268.97
James Fund Expense		77.91
Accounting Department Service and Expenses		4,867.53
Retirement Fund Expense		31.82
Advertising		1,022.07
Trust Agency Expense		471.46
Hospitalization		31.80
Prepaid Insurance and Bonds		76.85 133,478.54
Cash Balance December 31, 1954		$ 15,338.27
Represented by:		
Unappropriated and Trust Funds on Deposit in Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank	$15,221.20	
Cash at Academy Office	117.07	$ 15,338.27

Book Department

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT 144
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY 152
ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY 163
SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION 168
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 174
SPECIAL TOPICS ABROAD
- COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 178
- SLAVIC COUNTRIES 181
- WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 185
- OTHER COUNTRIES 188

CORRECTION 194
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 194
OTHER BOOKS 195

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. *A Study of History.* Vols. VII–X. Pp. xxxii, 772; x, 732; viii, 759; viii, 422. London; New York; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1954. $35.00.

The first six volumes of Toynbee's *Study of History* were published in 1934–39. Of the new (four) volumes completing this vast work, Volume VII gives a further analysis of the nature and role of the Universal States and the Universal Churches as the phases in the growth and decline of civilizations. Volume VIII deals with the Heroic Ages and the contacts of civilizations in space. Volume IX is devoted to a study of the contacts of civilizations in time, of the law and freedom in history, and of the prospects of the Western civilization. Volume X is made up of essays on eminent historians, on chronology, of acknowledgments, and index.

Since Toynbee's fully developed "philosophy of history" was given in the first six volumes, the reviewed volumes do not add much to his theoretical framework. Their novelty consists mainly: (a) of some new details concerning the Universal States, the Universal Churches, the Heroic Ages, and the interaction of civilizations in space and time; and (b) of the change of some of Toynbee's conclusions given in the first six volumes.

As to Toynbee's theory of history, it has its strong and weak points. In my previous criticism of his *Study of History* I have shown that Toynbee's framework is a variation of O. Spengler's scheme which, in its turn, is a variation of N. Danilevsky's theory of history published in 1863. All three theories make a fatal error in taking a vast dump of diverse social and cultural phenomena, not integrated together by meaningful or causal ties, for a real unified system called "Culture-Historical Type," "High Culture," or "Civilization." Not being integrated unities, such dumps of cultural and social phenomena cannot either be born or grow or disintegrate and die. For this reason, many of the conclusions of these authors concerning "the birth," "the growth," "the breakdown," "the disintegration," and "decline" of civilizations are built on a foggy foundation and crumble by themselves as soon as the fatal error is perceived.

The main changes in Toynbee's views concern two points. While in the previous volumes the Universal Religions were

viewed as "the bridges" between the great civilizations, in the new volumes the great civilizations are considered as the bridges between the great Religions. While before Toynbee interpreted all great civilizations as philosophically equivalent and contemporaneous, now he classifies them in chronological and evaluative order as the progressive steps for realization of the ever greater and higher religions. Since both interpretations are not so much a scientific description of the empirical relationship between civilizations and religions as much as the subjective evaluations of whether civilizations ought to be the means for the end-value of religions, or religions should be the means for the bigger and better civilizations, the significance of this shift in Toynbee's views lies beyond the sphere of science.

When we turn to Toynbee's empirical generalizations, many of these appear to be either platitudinal or onesided or fallacious. Thus he indefatigably repeats that "spiritual progress is subject to a 'law' proclaimed by Aeschylus" that we "learn through suffering," and that this "learning by suffering" is the only way to spiritual ennoblement of mankind. Stating so, he evidently forgets that suffering produces not only saints, but also criminals and "the worst of beasts"—human animals. He entirely overlooks the negative effects of suffering: suicide, mental and physical disease, agressiveness, criminality, brutalization, which "suffering-frustration" generates more frequently rather than spiritual ennoblement. Instead of the much more adequate "law of polarization" infrustration, suffering, and calamity, he thus gives us onesided pseudo law of the "learning through suffering" which does not stand an elementary empirical test. Another example. For corroboration of his preconceived theory that the "declining" civilizations go through the cycle of: "premonitory wars," a "general war," a "breathing space," "supplementary wars," and "general peace," he gives us five cycles of this kind for the period: 1494–1945. When, however, his data are checked by the number and duration of the wars, the size of the armies, the magnitude of war casualty for each of his cycles, several of his periods of "general peace" turn to be as belligerent as his periods of "general war," and *vice versa.* His theory of the cycles of war-peace is thus clearly contradicted by the relevant empirical data. Third example of Toynbee's empirical fallacies is given by his credulous acceptance of Jung's theory of the unconscious, by the identification of this unconscious with the divine element in man, and by Toynbee's classification of the great religions (Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism) as "introvert" or "extrovert." Contrary to Toynbee, the future of mankind would indeed be hopeless if its spiritual and creative progress were depending upon the unconscious biological drives and their instinctive-reflexological mechanisms given in all animal species. By definition the "unconscious" activity is automatic and fixed; it cannot think and cannot create because any thinking and creative activity are always conscious or supraconscious processes. Instead of investing his hopes for the future spiritual ennoblement of man into "the supraconscious"—which is the main source of all the great creative achievements of man—Toynbee expects the salvation from the least creative unconscious forces viewed by him as the divine element in man. As a fourth sample of Toynbee's empirical errors his diagnosis and forecasting of the future of the existing civilizations can be mentioned. According to his theory practically all civilizations, except the Western one, have been either dead for many centuries, or are in a hopeless mortal agony at the present time. This equally concerns the Hindu, the Chinese, the Russian, the Arabic, and all the other "fossilized" and disintegrated civilizations. The only hope for the future of mankind lies in the Western civilization which also is in a dangerous state.

If we take one by one of Toynbee's empirical generalizations, most of them will be found to be either onesided or fallacious. This is largely due to Toynbee's poor knowledge of a vast body of sociological, psychological, and anthropological studies in the fields of social and cultural mobility, migration, diffusion, and transformation; in the field of sociocultural rhythms and periodicities, social organization and disor-

ganization, cultural integration and disintegration, and so on. Despite vast literature quoted and referred to in Toynbee's volumes, they contain almost no references to hundreds of important studies by psychosocial scientists of the problems treated by Toynbee.

When Toynbee discusses such problems as "law and freedom in history," "the truth of science and the truth of religion," he rarely touches the fundamental points of this sort of problem. He rather goes around or dodges these points and delivers to us mainly the vague generalities and unclear conclusions often backed up only by numerous quotations from the Old and the New Testaments. His footnotes in these parts show again his limited knowledge of the most important philosophical and scientific works dealing with this sort of problem.

Viewed as a whole, these volumes represent an eclectic mixture of science of history, philosophy of history, ethics and politics, theology and religion.

Side by side with these shortcomings, the *Study of History* has many strong points. It contains a multitude of remarkable insights and excellent elaborations of several basic topics of historical and social sciences. It opens the new vistas on many dark problems of these sciences. Now and then it furnishes the fresh and strikingly fruitful interpretations of several historical and social processes. Even when Toynbee speaks as a prophet, religious thinker, philosopher, or moralist, his utterances deserve our full attention.

To sum up: in spite of an overabundance of misreadings of historical events and other shortcomings of Toynbee's *Study of History*, it is one of the significant works of the middle of the twentieth century in the field of historical and social science.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN
Harvard University

LOUIS J. HALLE. *Civilization and Foreign Policy: An Inquiry for Americans.* Pp. xxviii, 277. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $3.75.

Foreign policy by slogan is a familiar feature of the American scene. In recent months the concept of "massive retaliation," so popular a year ago, has yielded to "atomic stalemate" and "balance of terror." The vice of all such catch phrases is their tendency to conceal basic issues that cannot be resolved by clichés.

The present book represents a serious attempt to free the discussion of foreign policy from this tyranny of ignorance and oversimplification. The author has stated his premise clearly. "If we are to have an effective foreign policy we need to base it on a conceptual scheme that reveals and explains the world in terms that bear the test of practical application" (p. 52). The major portion of his book is devoted to the development of such a theory of foreign policy.

Mr. Halle has not written a manual or a handbook of formulas that can be factored into easy answers to complex international equations. Rather, he identifies the considerations that affect a nation's foreign policy and examines them in the light of existing conditions. American foreign policy must take into account the spirit of our institutions; the circumstances that made possible our early freedom from European political entanglements; the events that have removed these historic protections and projected us into international diplomacy; the alternatives now open to us: isolation, dominion, coalition.

After examining each of these alternatives Mr. Halle concludes that coalition offers the only reasonable policy of success so he proceeds to outline what he regards as the minimum essentials of a foreign policy to prevent our destruction in a hydrogen bomb world. These essentials include the maintenance of a nuclear offensive power to deter its use by an opponent; a defense against nuclear attack adequate to discourage an opponent from attempting to incapacitate us by a surprise attack; military forces capable of frustrating an attack of a more traditional nature in the event that nuclear power is not used by either side.

The book is meaty and thought provoking. In developing his argument he considers such diverse topics as the nature of political power, the validity of the balance of power concept, the growth and decay of cultures and civilizations; the conflict of nationalism and Communism in Soviet policy, the particularistic character of Chinese Communism and the problem this presents to Russia. Whether Mr. Halle has succeeded in constructing a theory of foreign policy may be open to question. That he has written one of the most informative and useful guides to this subject is certain.

LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN
Columbia University

ALFRED H. KELLY (Ed.). *American Foreign Policy and American Democracy.* Pp. 170. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne University Press, 1954. $3.50.

Of the five Franklin Memorial Lectures for 1952–53 that make up this volume Professor Quincy Wright's is the most stimulating. Entitled "American Foreign Policy and the Concept of International Law," it sets forth alternatives of American policy in terms of an irreconcilability between power politics and international order. At the end, however, after singeing the whiskers of those who advocate power politics, Dr. Wright justifies the respect which this reviewer and so many others hold for him by observing that we cannot expect enforcement of the international legal order "unless the balance of power is relatively stable." Power, having been thrown out the front door, is brought in again at the back.

The second lecture, on "Military and Strategic Aspects" of our policy, is by one of our ablest military thinkers, Colonel G. A. Lincoln. It deals more with psychological factors in international relations, however, than with military strategy. Perhaps this reflects the poverty of our traditional thought in this field (Mahan excepted). No American speaking on strategy has much to build on in the way of developed theory since the writings of that un-American and dated thinker, Clausewitz.

Professor Bossenbrook, in the next lecture on "The United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Nationalism," is so compendious and abstract that the reader must do some occasional stretching to maintain contact with reality.

Next, in "American Foreign Policy and its Critics," Professor Dexter Perkins takes issue with Messrs. Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan, but in such a pleasant fashion that he seems to be merely amusing himself by throwing pebbles in their direction.

Perhaps the most thoughtful of these lectures is the final one, on "American Foreign Policy and the Future of American Civilization." Here Professor Kelly offers an historian's opinion "that the ultimate solution to the cold war is that the dynamism of Western civilization and the inexorable march of time will ultimately make it irrelevant. If this seems a difficult idea to grasp, remember that for the historian, nothing is so certain as the proposition that the present, too, will die, that it will become part of the past, and that the men of other generations will have new problems. . . . We cannot know what these problems will be; we can only be fairly certain that they will not be those which cry out to us now."

LOUIS J. HALLE
University of Virginia

JACQUES FREYMOND. *De Roosevelt à Eisenhower: La politique étrangère américaine, 1945–1952.* Pp. 154. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1953. No price.

Reflecting the lively concern with American policy recently evident in Europe, this volume traces the revolutionary change in American foreign policy from isolationism to its present active involvement throughout the world.

Volume VI in the useful series of studies in economic, political, and social history, the book is essentially an analytical history of the major events in the postwar period—suitable attention is given the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, the Berlin blockade, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Chinese Communist issue, the "great debates" in Congress, Korea, and economic policy.

Although based on solid documentation (the author has examined an impressive quantity of government documents—some, such as *Resources for Freedom*, neglected in our own literature), its chief interest to Americans will probably derive from the comments rather than from the descrip-

tive content. In so short a study, there is naturally little new of the latter.

Neither neutralist nor apologist, Freymond feels that on balance the United States has done a remarkable job of rising to the responsibilities of its new power position. He finds, however, three major sources of weakness. First there is the relative weakness of our diplomatic personnel. He traces this to inexperience and lack of historical tradition in great power diplomacy, but feels we will improve with time and experience. Second, there is danger of excessive concern with domestic issues: American opinion must learn to subordinate regional and special group interests to national interests when there is serious conflict on important foreign policy. Third, there is a subtle source of danger from the very strength of the United States, from its unprecedented relative power: "the exclusive search for the national interest or national security, legitimate though it may appear, is full of dangers for the United States. It may lead, more or less unintentionally, from a policy conceived as basically defensive to actions felt menacing by the very ones they are meant to protect. The weight carried by the United States in world affairs is such —and the weakness of her partners so great—that if she does not herself take care to erect barriers to her power she may well risk crushing the others."

He finds evidence that even this last lesson is being learned: that American publicists and policymakers include many alert to such dangers and striving to remedy them. This conclusion is typical of a thoughtful and balanced work.

OLIVER BENSON
Northwestern University

THOMAS I. COOK and MALCOLM MOOS. *Power Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy.* Pp. 216. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. $4.00.

Apparently the object of this book is to demonstrate that Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" can be made to work (although no mention is made of the "Four Freedoms," and although their author assumed that Soviet Communism was in agreement with them). *Power Through Purpose* should be read as power through *moral* purpose, the "mission" of America being to establish a moral empire which shall girdle the globe and gladden the "hearts of peoples liberated with our assistance" (p. 212). Since Communist tyranny is irreconcilable with this mission, "coexistence" presumably being impossible, we must first "contain" it and then "overthrow" it. Cook and Moos assume that American foreign policy can move logically and deliberately from one position to the other, that other nations in the "free world" will move willingly in the same direction, and that Soviet (and Chinese) Communism will fall back with the same measured logic and deliberation. Joshua will march seven times around the city, the people will shout "with a great shout," and the Communists, like the defenders of Jericho, will be utterly destroyed!

It is difficult for an historian to criticize this new dialectic for "God's American Israel" (Reinhold Niebuhr's very apt phrase for the American concept of destiny). The reviewer confesses to a little awe and even respectful admiration for such learned exuberance and devout confidence. Cook and Moos fancy themselves as intellectual knight errants embattled against the so-called "power politics" school of American diplomacy which has worked out a different dialectic. Over and over again they proclaim that theirs is the only true realism. To this student, who refuses to see history as dialectic, the antithesis is not so apparent. Everyone, it seems, is a "realist."

Cook and Moos have furnished some challenging intellectual fare. It is Woodrow Wilson (or perhaps Don Quixote) in modern dress. In spite of their aversion to "power politics," the authors bow occasionally in that direction. They could hardly escape doing so, and yet invoke history to the extent that they have done. Britain is lauded for her past success in avoiding "the inconveniences of unadaptative legal principles" (p. 85), and America is exhorted also "to avoid the statist way." This sounds suspiciously like an injunction to play the balance of power. All eight chapters of the book are interesting and stimulating, though some of the historical assumptions are certainly open to challenge, and though it is difficult to discover a recommended foreign policy that differs in specifics from that which has been propounded by the "realists." The United States is depicted historically as a "social nation" rather than a "political nation," that is, a nation dedicated to humanitarian ideals in contrast to a national state concerned only with its own interests. This in itself is a bit of American nationalism on the part of the authors, and a very considerable oversimplification of history.

RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE
University of Southern California

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER. *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline.* Pp. x, 194. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. $3.00.

Under a new title, this volume deals with an old theme, the Pan-American theme. It contains eight chapters with the following suggestive titles: "Meaning and Origin of the Western Hemisphere Idea"; "Political Expression of the Idea: The American System"; "Divided America"; "New Synthesis: Sarmiento and Blaine"; "Drago's Economic Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine"; "Whose Hemipshere?"; "The Hemisphere of Peace"; "Two Worlds, New Style: Reunion with Europe."

It is remarkable what a well-informed and gifted writer can accomplish by assembling familiar facts under a fresh title and a rigidly logical frame of reference. The result is a significant and most interesting book. The conclusion is that the United States is no longer primarily interested in its Latin-American neighbors, and that they are not likely ever again to occupy a special place in its esteem. The world crisis that began in 1914 has made them subordinate to Europe and the Orient in the policies of their big neighbor.

The only important topic that Professor Whitaker fails to consider is the wisdom of this shift in emphasis, which became quite evident during the 1940's and 1950's. A discussion of this topic would probably begin with a consideration of the fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the United States, the objectives of security, and prosperity. Or perhaps it would start with the foundations of the platform of isolationism, the early advantages of isolationism, and the besieging forces that eventually impelled the government of the United States to abandon that platform: the drive for foreign markets and sea power; the search for investment opportunities abroad; devotion to democracy and peace in international relations; and the disturbance of the power-balance by the rise of Japan and Germany and the relative decline of Great Britain. An adequate examination of this topic would finally raise these fundamental questions: were the departures necessary and were they wise from the standpoint of national security and prosperity? An attempt to answer them would involve as much speculation as history, and the author chose to avoid the issue.

I grant him the right to delimit his subject, but I cannot help feeling that he should have included a final chapter setting forth the fact that Latin America is not being entirely neglected, nor is this region likely to be neglected in the future. Its resources and its strategic geographical position are too important to the United States. Latin America is included in programs of foreign investment, technical aid, and cultural relations; and if and when the power-balance is restored by means of regional alliances and an effective United Nations, the Western Hemisphere Idea may be resuscitated, or if this balance cannot be restored, Latin America may recover its primary place in the esteem of the United States as a significant part of fortress America.

On certain minor points, one might wish to argue with its author. Nowhere does he state clearly the limits of the isolationist policy, which never included any severe restraints upon foreign trade and investment. Nor was it as monolithic as he asserts down to the 1890's (p. 92), as might be suggested by the empolyment of the United States Navy to open the ports of Japan and Korea. But I shall refrain from dealing with trivialities.

J. FRED RIPPY
University of Chicago

JEAN-BAPTISTE DUROSELLE and others. *Les relations Germano-Soviétiques de 1933 à 1939.* (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, No. 58.) Pp. 279. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954. No price.

The relations of Germany with Communist Russia after World War I have concerned scholars and others before, during, and after that time. John Maynard Keynes warned his readers in 1919 that the Versailles peace terms would force Russia and Germany together, into a co-operation of danger to the victor powers. Writing in jail a few years later, Hitler bitterly attacked the Weimar Republic for establishing close treaty relations with Communist Russia and underscored the warning he himself was to disregard, namely, that Germans should not have friendly relations with a country whose purpose was to destroy Germany. And ever since 1939 students of history have been trying to understand the two decades that followed Versailles in an effort to make sense out of the relations Russian Communism had with the Weimar democracy and Nazi totalitarianism. For the historian the problem is a peculiarly bewildering and paradoxical one. Accustomed to a European history wherein the enemy of one war becomes an ally during the next, they find it difficult to arrive at an intelligible explanation for a situation where time fails in its work of partitioning events into simple tandem arrangements capable of being understood and allows avowed enemies to maintain rather close and friendly relations while entertaining the greatest fear of each other's power and ideology.

In this excellent study Professor J.-B. Duroselle and Professor Jacques Grunewald describe the diplomatic and economic relations of Germany and Russia from Hitler's advent to power, Grunewald dealing with the period down to the conclusion of the anti-Comintern Pact and Duroselle with that thereafter, down to the time Molotov succeeded Litvinov. Since the foreign policy of Russia in this whole period was directed by Litvinov, Professor Raoul Girardet tries to analyze the enigmatic career and character of the Russian who believed in collective security and in co-operation with the Western powers. The most important chapter in the book is the last one, in which Professor Georges Castellan gives a convincing account of the relations of the Reichswehr with the Red Army. Here he shows how Germany used Russia after 1920 to promote her own war industries and to provide military training for Germans in defiance of the provisions of Versailles. He also goes into a detailed investigation of the purge trials of 1936–38 to show that a number of people executed for high treason and for collaboration with Russia's enemies were guilty of no more than co-operation with the German army in accordance with Stalin's own wishes.

This story of Russo-German relations would have been fully told for the period if there had been an additional chapter describing the espionage activities of Russian Communists in Germany.

HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University

QUINCY WRIGHT and others. *Research for Peace.* Pp. xii, 296. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1954. $3.50.

In 1951 the Institute for Social Research in Oslo, seeking to clarify "the possible relations between scientific research and positive action in the mediation and solution of human conflicts," announced a prize contest for the best essay on "the Relevance of Scientific Research to the Peaceful Solution of International Conflicts." It has now sponsored the publication of the three prize-winning papers, and one of its members reviews them and comments on ideas contained in some seventeen other essays submitted in the contest.

The chief significance of this initiative lies in its recognition of the importance of applying as far as possible the methods of science to the peaceful solution of problems arising in the relations of national states. As such it reflects the trend in recent years to reject the deductive method characteristic of most pacifist thought of the nineteenth century and seeks to utilize the inductive approach of the physical sciences for the solution of social problems.

However, for man scientifically to study man in his social relationships is admittedly a far more exacting task than for the astronomer to study the stars in their courses. Momentous new scientific discoveries leading to greater understanding and control of the forces of nature have not as yet been paralleled by a growing understanding and control of human nature. Nevertheless, one must hope that even in the field of international relations if scientifically tested generalizations concerning specific social institutions and beliefs point to their inadequacy or harmful character, a new perspective may develop with respect to them. Thus they may be abandoned, although human nature itself has not changed.

It is universally recognized, however, and for obvious reasons, that it is much easier for the so-called exact scientists to agree on what they are looking for and how to find it than for the social scientists. In particular "the fluidity and boundlessness" of the field of international relations, as one of the essayists characterizes it, was well illustrated in the contributions to this contest. The essayists were far from reaching a consensus on priorities for peace research, and in some instances they even questioned whether research into the causes and prevention of war is as important as concentration on the positive requirements of peace. Moreover, although most of the contestants seemed to accept the continued existence of sovereign and independent national states, and tailored their essays accordingly, a few were disinclined to postulate for the future the fundamentals of the present order.

Pondering the views of the foregoing essayists, and especially the warnings of our most respected scientists, one has the uneasy feeling that it may, indeed, be later than we think, and that research of a more fundamental nature may be indicated. For while the pacifists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could argue that eternal peace was demonstrably in man's *interest,* nuclear scientists today tell us that it is necessary for our *survival.* If so, no tinkering with the present international order will serve.

FRANK M. RUSSELL
Berkeley, California

J. F. C. FULLER. *A Military History of the Western World: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto.* Pp. xiii, 602. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1954. $6.00.

This volume, the first of three which will constitute a military history of western peoples down to the present, is a reminder from the pen of one of England's leading military critics that war and not peace has been the characteristic state of international relations in the past; and that this together with the imminent threat of the outbreak of hostilities on a global scale today is adequate reason for a study of conditions which produce wars, the factors which determine their outcome, and the use or misuse of their success by victorious peoples. It is a sober, not a sensational narrative, and so all the more deserving of serious attention. Following an Introduction which gives a rapid survey of military developments from the fifteenth century B.C. to 490 B.C., twenty chapters are devoted to the analysis of as many campaigns culminating in decisive battles. These chapters are linked by nineteen short chronicles aimed at giving a politico-military background for the campaigns studied in detail. Quite properly, the author makes no distinction between battles on land and battles on sea, for in this period naval engagements followed the pattern of land fighting, and there was no real difference between the training and functions of a general and an admiral. One is glad to find both Marathon and Poitiers omitted from the list of decisive engagements, but will not so readily agree that Pydna was more significant in this respect than Cynocephalae and Magnesia. The analysis of military operations is lucid, in general convincing, and shows evidence of careful study of ancient and medieval sources. References to modern works indicate wide reading, but there is no bibliography and the footnotes do not reveal how completely the writer has mastered the

specialized literature of his subject. Naturally, specialists in military history will dispute details of battle plans and the like. For example, many will prefer the Kromayer-Veith disposition of the Greek fleet at Salamis to that adopted in the book. Professional historians will find more serious ground for challenging some of the many judgments pronounced on historical developments in the chronicles. What impresses most of all, however, is the evidence that the basic principles of warfare have not changed since the days of Salamis, and that politicians, military leaders, and indeed whole peoples have shown the greatest incapacity to profit by the experience of both their own and other countries either in the remote or the immediate past in the preparation for and conduct of wars or in the formulation of military policy.

A. E. R. BOAK

University of Michigan

AMELIA C. LEISS and RAYMOND DENNETT (Eds.). *European Peace Treaties After World War II.* Pp. xvi, 341. Boston, Mass.: World Peace Foundation, 1954. $4.75.

This very useful book is a supplement to the World Peace Foundation's series *Documents on American Foreign Relations.* Its second half contains the text of the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland. The first half is given to a narrative report on the negotiations leading to these five documents. There is a general account of the diplomatic setting and procedure, followed by the story of the actual negotiation broken down by chief issues regarding each of the treaties. The story is told from the official documents and some of the memoirs of the protagonists without any attempt to analyze, evaluate or appraise. The positions of the negotiating powers and their modifications in the course of the conferences are clearly outlined. It is a reference book which the student of diplomatic history can hardly afford not to have on his shelf. And the general reader may, with its help, reflect on how far things have moved from the order that those peace treaties intended to establish, and how little of the diplomatic accomplishment of 1946 still stands today.

GERHART NIEMEYER

Yale University

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

PAUL HORGAN. *Great River: The Rio Grande in North American History.* (Vol. I: *Indians and Spain;* Vol. II: *Mexico and the United States.*) Pp. xvi, 447; vii, 573. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1954. $10.00.

Mr. Horgan has written many books but none has been a greater achievement than this one. Years of meticulous research were spent in gathering material for the *Great River.* The author has lived for years in the arid area of the Rio Grande. At home in the Southwest, Mr. Horgan has written as a lover of the region.

Probably Mr. Horgan has had the most difficult assignment of all who have written of the rivers of America. He made his task a labor of love and has told a story that is unexcelled. His artistic skill is revealed in the vivid descriptions, whether he is writing about a pueblo dance or a river house. Typical of the author's talent for characterization are the pen portraits of Sam Houston and General Zachary Taylor.

The Rio Grande river has a twofold role in American history. It both divides and unites. It marks the boundary line between peoples of Spanish origin and folk of Anglo-Saxon derivation. It separates two vastly different cultures, two contrasting civilizations, yet these two peoples unitedly belong to the Rio Grande basin. They share the mountains from which enough water is squeezed to create the upper part of this great river. Throughout the long course of this meandering stream these different nationalistic groups share in the history of the Great River. All of this story may be gleaned from these pages, numbering almost a thousand. Although he is fair to the Anglo-Saxon, the writer is in love with the Spanish.

Each of these volumes is divided into two books. The Indian Rio Grande and the Spanish Rio Grande compose the first volume while the Mexican Rio Grande and the American Rio Grande constitute the second. The stream's history is told somewhat chronologically. The rich variety of content is seen in the chapter on the "Stuff of Life" in Book I, in "Hacienda and Village" in Book II, or in "Collective Prophecy" of Book IV. There are a total of eighty-four chapters in the two volumes supplemented by four appendices. Although both volumes contain maps and each volume has a list by chapters of the sources, the historian will regret that the literary artist in the role of a historian did not use the paraphernalia of the craft. In addition, the last volume has a general bibliography and an index. This is writing at its best and history in its most interesting form. The *Great River* may not receive the Pulitzer Prize but it will be a serious contender.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

University of Florida

EDGAR EUGENE ROBINSON. *The Roosevelt Leadership, 1933–1945.* Pp. 491. Philadelphia; New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1955. $6.00.

To appraise justly this stimulating book, one should note its origin. Chosen, under the terms of a substantial bequest, to write "a contemporary appraisement of the Roosevelt influence . . . without fear, favor or prejudice . . . ," the author (to use his own phrase) has written "the story of the influence" of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in one volume instead of several. The result is a vividly impressionistic, critical, yet fair, essay, with Yalta as its climax, about the impact of Roosevelt's personality on the nation and the world in his twelve years as President, and since.

The author has supplied a monumental bibliography, but he has omitted or inadequently rendered many relevant facts. He quotes, throughout, the opposing current partisan views of Hoover's and F.D.R.'s self-serving, often retroactively edited, "Public Papers and Addresses," leaving us to pick our way between them. He speaks of F.D.R.'s "tragedy" in being "overwhelmed by the inexorable forces of his time," somewhat as though his leadership had been that of a dedicated and martyred idealist. True, he moved greatly at a very few momentous junctures; but this resourceful, gay-spirited, zestful, and at times courageous, adventurer among expediencies, with his genuinely humane intentions and his dominant personal ambition, instinctively avoided lost causes and major risks after attaining power. In some problems, crucial for his nation or the world, such as labor, the currency, and neutrality, he withheld his strong leadership deliberately, or led wrongly for his own interest, until conditions, which could probably have been controlled earlier, had indeed become overwhelming. In some others, as throughout his dealings with Russia, from Stalin's immediate violation of the recognition agreement until after Yalta, his fatuous faith in his own judgment and in abilities which he did not possess, brought misfortune beyond remedy. The tragedy was his, as part only, of the ageless, generic one—mankind's progress being ever thwarted by self-bound man.

Was the bequest soundly understood or executed? Can one convincingly appraise a man's influence in a situation without giving its essential facts? The author says he attempted this for the sake of speed, in the belief that appraisals made today will be used by the lawmakers tomorrow—the historian's abidingly comforting illusion. One may wish that Professor Robinson, with his background of distinguished writings about the Roosevelt era, had developed a full-scale factual basis for his "appraisement"; yet, even with the handicap he embraced, he has made a real contribution to posterity's understanding of Roosevelt's leadership.

LOUIS B. WEHLE

New York, N. Y.

WILLIAM FRANK ZORNOW. *Lincoln and the Party Divided.* Pp. xi, 264. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. $4.00.

In early 1864 the Republican Party, operating under the name of the Union Party, appeared to have excellent prospects of success in the Congressional and the Presidential elections of that year. But the

Republican Party had been from its victory in 1860 deeply divided between the radical wing, whom the author calls Unconditionals, and the more conservative majority. This radical group were convinced that Mr. Lincoln was unsuited to complete the task of winning the war and especially the business of reconstruction. He desired to treat the vanquished humanely. They would be merciless.

Professor Zornow passes before us in review the three outstanding candidates of the Unconditionals—Salmon P. Chase, Benjamin Butler, and John C. Fremont—and reveals the maneuvering of each to prevent Lincoln's nomination and gain it for himself. Lincoln's finesse, his unsurpassed skill in political maneuver, rendered his nomination inevitable. These and the president's hold on the mass of Republicans also made the scheming and manipulation of his opponents for the nomination ridiculous, indeed pitiful.

After Mr. Lincoln's nomination the bloody failures of Grant in Virginia to gain victory and Sherman's inability in his Georgia campaign to pin Johnston down in the summer of 1864 carried Northern morale to the lowest point of the war. The Unconditionals tried in vain to have Lincoln removed as the nominee of the so-called Union Party and to substitute a more vigorous radical leader. With the Union victories of late August and early September—the capture of Atlanta and Mobile Bay—the Unconditionals began falling in behind his candidacy, but with the firm resolve to destroy the President and his program as soon as the war ended.

The Democratic Party was also bitterly divided between the Copperhead faction—extreme state rights champions and opponents of the war as unnecessary to restore the Union—and the main body of conservative Democrats. The latter opposed Lincoln's war policies as unconstitutional and destructive of civil liberty; they would continue the war, however, to preserve the Union, but would not make emancipation a condition of union. The Democratic Party would, as a first step to reunion, call a convention of all the states, including the Confederacy, to attempt to work out a settlement. Despite the fact that McClellan, who stood for the preservation of the Union, was nominated for the presidency, the Republicans were able to brand the entire Democratic Party as traitors and Copperheads—which has a very modern sound. The author is of the opinion that the false issue of domestic treason rather than the flagrant military interference at the polls enabled the Republicans to win the election, even though by a very narrow popular margin. It was, though a narrow one, a "popular endorsement of Lincoln the man" but not "necessarily an endorsement of the program for which the man stood." By his great skill he had held the Unconditionals in the party and thereby cemented its unity. "In holding the party together he did much to assure the ultimate victory of the Unconditional program he had so long opposed." This fixed for twenty years the unbroken rule of radicalism followed by another sixteen years of power after the Cleveland interlude and the triumph of big business. This was not what Lincoln had striven for.

Mr. Zornow has written a scholarly and important book. He is realistic and penetrating in dealing with unpleasant facts.

FRANK L. OWSLEY
University of Alabama

ROBERT J. MORGAN. *A Whig Embattled: The Presidency Under John Tyler.* Pp. xiii, 199. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954. $3.50.

There is no lack of historical scholarship concerning this period. The following three claims are made in justification of this new volume. It is the first study of a single presidency in all its aspects. It refutes the conventional picture of Tyler as a vain, ineffectual president by showing him as a courageous, articulate, but much misunderstood statesman. It brings a dramatic focus upon those perennial problems of authority and initiative which confront every President. The third point is most valid, and alone should be sufficient to justify purchase of a reasonably priced book.

Dr. Morgan analyzes in seven chapters: the effect of the precedent set when Tyler chose the title of "President" instead of accepting the suggested designation as "Vice-President, now exercising the duties of President"; Tyler's use of the veto; Cabinet crises, which, while producing a total of nineteen members to fill six offices in less than four years, nevertheless effectively thwarted a nascent swing toward parliamentary government in the United States, which had been engineered during the month of Harrison's administration through the technique of selecting a pliant President and filling his Cabinet with men subject to congressional influence; the prerogative; President Tyler's influence on foreign relations; Tyler's early efforts to conciliate the anti-Clay Whigs; and his failure to develop any effective, organized partisan support of his administration either from Whigs or from his own Democratic associates.

There is current significance in the description of Tyler's defense of the executive responsibility for conducting investigations, and his comparison of the relative functions and results of these inquiries and of those conducted by Congress. The President wrote, "the personal reputations of persons connected with the investigation may well be better protected when the work is done quietly . . ." by the executive department. Such inquiries must often be made in confidence lest "impertinence or malignity may seek . . . the means of incalculable and irremediable injury to innocent parties. . . ." During this debate, more than a century ago, there was no attempt to forbid wholly either executive or congressional investigations. There was an emphasis upon the dual responsibility, both executive and congressional, for preserving some degree of secrecy while preventing the covering up of "corruption and incompetence."

The author has shown skill in his choice of emphasis within a period already "thoroughly examined." No new sources have been available to him and, judged by the very adequate footnotes, over 95 per cent of his materials are from previously printed works. A score of items are cited from the Tyler manuscripts in the Library of Congress. There is an adequate selected bibliography, and an index which the University of Nebraska Press should have insisted on having in a more complete form.

CHARLES M. THOMAS
The Air University

LEONARD D. WHITE. *The Jacksonians: A Study of Administrative History, 1829–1861.* Pp. xii, 593. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $8.00.

For altogether too many years, students of the American past ignored the administrative aspects of our government. In 1948, Mr. White, professor of Public Administration at the University of Chicago, published a volume titled *The Federalists.* This was followed, three years later, by *The Jeffersonians.* These two volumes provided, for the first time, a scholarly assessment of the changing and developing administration of our national government. With the publication of this present volume, continuing the study down to the outbreak of the war between the states, Professor White has provided a trilogy that traces the evolution of our system of government through its formative years.

A sampling of chapter titles will give some idea of the scope of this study: "The Presidency," "The President and the Administrative System," "The Struggle for Power," "The Control of Appointments," "The Treasury and Customs Administration," "Decline of the Post Office," "Theory and Practice of Rotation," "The Consequences of Rotation," "The Rise of Examinations," "The Personnel System," "Government and the Public Economy," "Democracy and Administration." Declaring that "the most important influence upon the administrative system during the years from Jackson to Lincoln" was the broadening of the franchise and the parallel growth of party machinery and democratic sentiment, the author follows the complexity of the governmental structure and concerns himself with the forces that were at work and the changes that were taking place. "In these years of turmoil and anxiety," he notes, "the administrative system described by President Tyler as 'the complex, but at the same time beautiful, machinery of our system of government,' went steadily on its way, carrying on the

business of the American people as best it could."

The reader of this volume will be struck by the author's solid scholarship, his breadth of understanding, his delightful organization and style, and the hard core of common sense that preserves the balance of the study. The chapters will add to the understanding of the scholar as well as of the layman. In the twenty-five-page chapter on "The Theory and Practice of Rotation," for example, one finds not only a clear explanation of the pressures that resulted in the "spoils system" of Jackson's time, but a more unusual description of the ebbs and flows of public sentiment and of the way in which the successive political leaders reacted to popular pressures. The author's narrative is liberally sprinkled with quotations from both manuscript and contemporary periodical sources. It is this wealth of unusual source material that may appeal most to the general reader.

No serious student of the first seventy years of our nation's history will ever wish to overlook these three volumes. To the student of politics, to the practical politician, to the good citizen who wishes to know how our government functions in actual practice, this study of our developing administrative history will long remain of the first importance.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
State University Teachers College
Cortland, N. Y.

LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON. *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763–1775.* Pp. xiv, 287. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1954. $5.00.

The Coming of the Revolution is the most recent volume in the New American Nation series edited by Professors Commager and Morris of Columbia. This book, let it be said at the outset, confirms the impression already made by Wallace Notestein's *The English People on the Eve of Colonization* and Arthur S. Link's *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era:* that this venture will be, after all, a fit successor to the notable series of books produced a half-century ago under the guidance of Albert Bushnell Hart. Professor Gipson's magisterial narrative of the Revolutionary movement within the thirteen American colonies meets both the special needs of the editors and the high standards of the author—an achievement that is not, as we have learned from other books in other series, the easiest thing in the scholarly world to bring off successfully. Out of the massive rock of his knowledge and understanding of the British Empire in America, he has carved a gem of descriptive narration and reflective judgment. *The Coming of the Revolution* is "pure Gipson," that is to say, a book about early America that is documented with severity, written with clarity, and marked by a measured, one might almost say Franklinian, affection for the old Empire.

Were one to seek an argument with the author, it would not be with his final judgment on the causes of the Revolution —"it had its source fundamentally in the fact that America now embodied a mature and powerful English-speaking community with a mind of its own and a future that it considered peculiarly its own. British statesmen as a group were responsible for the breach, to the extent of their failure to realize that the old system of imperial control was no longer applicable to a society so highly cultivated, so extended, and so numerous"—but rather with the offhand manner in which he refutes all other and more restricted views of these causes and yet fails to make a strong and positive case for his own broad interpretation. It might even be argued that this book is a learned survey of the events and forces that did *not* lead to the American Revolution rather than of those that did. In the end, however, there is no mistaking Professor Gipson's opinion of the causes of the Revolution, an interpretation with which there are few historians now willing to disagree. The Revolution took place when and as it did because the American colonies in 1765 had achieved a society more open, an economy more fluid, a pattern of religion more tolerant, and a government more constitutional than anything Europeans would know for years or even generations to come. To tighten the bonds of empire on a people so free and mature, indeed so proudly conscious of their direct line of descent from the mother country, was to ask for and get a full-scale rebellion.

CLINTON ROSSITER
Cornell University

LINCOLN LORENZ. *The Admiral and the Empress: John Paul Jones and Catherine the Great.* Pp. 194. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. $3.50.

This book treats what may be called the Russian episode of John Paul Jones's life, during which, having accepted a commission from Catherine II, he served in the Russian Navy, participated in the Second Russo-Turkish War (1787–92), became personally involved with his superiors, and finally took his inglorious departure from Russia.

The author, using material from his previously published biography of Jones and from other sources, has prepared a study of broader scope than that attempted by others—for example, Golder in his *John Paul Jones in Russia.*

Lorenz handles his subject with a passion that does credit to his heart and often gives life to his story, but it is a passion so flaming as to weaken credibility. John Paul Jones, we are told, was a wronged man. He was the only effective commander in the naval engagements against the Turks; therefore Potemkin was led, through jealousy, to mulct him of his laurels and his command. Catherine compounded the evil first by refusing Jones a hearing and then by being party to a charge of rape that was trumped up to justify the scurvy treatment he was receiving. All were against him: "Potemkin the barbarian, De Ligne the courtier, Alexiano the pirate, Mordwinoff the boor, Suvorof the madman, De Ribas the tool, Cobentzel the intriguer, and Nassau the ass in lion's skin—this rapacious pack . . . lurking and snarling at the heels of Jones" (p. 145).

Never, we are urged to believe, was so honorable and brave a man so badly treated. As the case is presented, one is convinced that Jones was unfairly treated, but not that he was as blameless and his opponents as blameworthy as the argument implies. Lorenz' excess of passion leads him to make statements that do not agree with the facts. His acceptance of Jones's version of the story as the unvarnished truth and his disregard of Russian sources weaken his case considerably.

The author, moreover, shows a tendency to inject the current cold war into his reading of eighteenth-century history, seeking to prove that Russia is, has been, and always will be a land of tricks and tyranny. Absence of maps, a paucity of dates, and a lack of documentation also detract from the book.

In short, the faults of this work are of such a nature that they can be only somewhat mitigated by the author's vivid writing or by the intrinsic appeal of a little-known period in the life of a hero.

SIDNEY HARCAVE
State University of New York

ANTHONY HARRIGAN (Ed.). *The Editor and the Republic, Papers and Addresses of William Watts Ball.* Pp. xxii, 209. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954. $5.00.

When William Watts Ball died in 1952 at the age of 83, South Carolina probably lost its outstanding newspaper editor of the present century. Ball served as editor of the Columbia *State* from 1913 to 1923, and the Charleston *News & Courier* from 1927 to 1951. He sandwiched a four-year stint as head of the journalism program at the University of South Carolina in between his two active editorships.

Mr. Harrigan, a strong admirer of Mr. Ball, has collected and edited in book form a series of documents prepared by Mr. Ball for presentation at meetings of a number of South Carolina organizations, particularly the state press association and the Kosmos Club, a Charleston group composed of business men and university professors. The seventeen papers were presented between 1911 and 1945.

Mr. Ball's interests, in terms of the subject matter of the collected papers, were cosmopolitan. He seemed equally at home in discussing "dangers" to freedom of the press, the "crisis" in Christianity, the "folly" of the 18th Amendment, Calhoun, the U. S. Constitution, the economic posi-

tion of the Negro, and research in newspaper history.

When Mr. Ball's papers are examined with an eye to uncovering a central philosophy, there emerges a picture of an editor possessed of a conservatism which, while possibly sincere, seems hopelessly out-of-date. Mr. Harrigan states quite frankly that his subject "was a believer in the verities of the old Republic as it was in the days before 1860 when corruption in government was not prevalent."

Mr. Ball was an intense believer in the use of land to solve the problems of the day. He agreed with Chesterton that we must increase the proportion of people living according to ancient simplicity and then added "land is abundant for every man who loves freedom." This message was strongly emphasized by Mr. Ball whenever he discussed the status of the South Carolina Negro.

Mr. Ball was a staunch advocate of states rights and some of his preachments recall the debates in Congress prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. In a 1930 paper entitled "The Constitution Is Nullified," he suggested that the states adopt a parliamentary form of government with a new federal constitution the eventual aim, and after the advent of the New Deal he broached the idea of withdrawing all southern representatives from the Senate and House as an act of passive resistance.

It was Mr. Ball's good fortune to work for newspaper owners whose ideas must have coincided with his to a remarkable degree because he boasts of the editorial freedom he enjoyed. However, in "Of Chiefs and Staffers," Mr. Ball utters a mild confession when he says "I have not followed every impulse or seized the newspaper of which I am a trustee for my employer to express convictions opposed to his."

Credit must be given Mr. Harrigan and his publisher for placing the name of Mr. Ball before a public broader than his South Carolina following. Existing general histories of journalism do not mention his name. Now that the bright light of the printed word has been thrown upon it, inevitable assessments will follow. The conclusion seems likely that many of these will not view the subject with the kindness and sympathy shown by Mr. Harrigan.

FREDERIC E. MERWIN
Rutgers University

FREDERICK SHAW. *The History of the New York City Legislature.* Pp. vi, 300. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $4.50.

The volume represents the most complete history we have yet had of a municipal legislature in the United States. As such, it is most useful for its painstaking and detailed analysis of the evolution of the New York City legislature from 1851 (when "with the bestowal of the first trolley franchise . . . the Board of Aldermen embarked on a career of spoliation"), through the story of the Proportional Representation-Reform Council of 1937–49, to the Council of the 1950's which, "given an able and public-spirited minority," could perhaps "play a useful, but highly limited role in the city government."

The author's perspective is predominantly that of the municipal reformers who for more than a hundred years have labored to improve the City's legislative institution, but he tells the story of their efforts and the results with considerable objectivity and with impressive evidence of industrious and thoroughgoing historical research. His fundamental discovery is a paradox: as the city legislature, responding to the tireless work of the reformers, has risen in the quality of its individual members and in its public reputation, it has steadily declined in power and function. Today the Council is neither corrupt nor important; its role in the government of the City is passive and almost wholly ritualistic.

The Board of Aldermen exercised its greatest powers during the years 1851–1888 when, as "an unbossed assemblage of conniving politicians," it made its own bargains with the franchise-seekers and exploited other opportunities for its members. It was Croker, beginning in 1888, who became the first party leader to boss rather than buy the aldermen. Thereafter, the legal powers of the Board were slowly whittled away by the reformers, while the party organization transformed the individual aldermen into work horses for the district leaders. When the municipal reformers, under the long reign of the La Guardia administration, were able to replace the Board of Aldermen with a Council elected by proportional representation, they chose first to improve the quality and representativeness of the membership of the body before they gave it any real power. There was pronounced success in this cautious first step, but the experiment while still in its first phase was interrupted by the repeal of PR in 1947. Thus the Council, as elected under the new system of single-member districts in 1949 and subsequently, has no significant function or power-role in the City goverment; the governing of the City is the task of the Board of Estimate, the Mayor, and the administrative agencies. The Council's assignment is to consent, not to decide.

The author relates this story in a dozen well organized chapters—some of them chronological, but most of them topical (for example, "The Alderman and his Bailiwick," "The Ideology of P.R.")—and a chapter of summary and conclusions. As a historian, he emphasizes the ebb and flow of standards of morality and public ethics in and around the municipal legislative institution. As a political scientist, he might with profit have pursued with equal zeal the baffling enigma: what is the function of a legislative body in the governance of a great city?

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Columbia Universtiy

MILTON SYDNEY HEATH. *Constructive Liberalism: The Role of the State in Economic Development in Georgia to 1860.* Pp. xi, 448. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $7.50.

This fourth and last volume of a series on the relation of the states to economic development delivers the final coup de grâce to the formerly widespread notion that laissez-faire theory generally dominated state policies in the period from the Revolution to the Civil War. Previous studies of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Missouri, prepared under the direction of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Research in Economic History, all have led to similar conclusions. In no case did the widespread theory of a limited federal government have a corollary influence on the role of the states.

Professor Heath has produced in this volume an extensive economic history of Georgia prior to the Civil War. While attention is centered on the role of the state, that role is so great that it ramifies deeply into nearly every aspect of economic activity. Only in agriculture, it would seem, was there anything approaching laissez-faire—and even in that area the state's land policy and many of its promotional activities were of considerable import.

This volume differs from others in the series by reaching back into the colonial period. The author identifies five periods in which the currents of "constructive liberalism" were especially strong: under the colonial trustees, 1732–52; in the Revolutionary era, 1776–85; in the reaction against the Yazoo scandals, 1796–1819; in the railroad era, 1827–43; and in the administration of Governor Joseph E. Brown, beginning in 1857. The bulk of the book is devoted to the evolution of this program after the Revolution in the fields of land policy, banking, internal improvements, railways, corporations, educational and labor policies, and the role of the state as regulator of economic activity. While the device of the mixed public and private corporation was widely used, especially in banking and railroads, the state frequently resorted to state-owned enterprise in the promotion of economic development.

The book reflects thorough and painstaking research. Its well-documented findings demonstrate beyond question that virtually all political and economic groups in the state were willing to accept a large degree of state action in the economic field when they felt it contributed to the development of the state or to the advancement of their vital interests.

GEORGE B. TINDALL
Louisiana State University

DEAN R. CRESAP. *Party Politics in the Golden State.* Pp. xi, 126. Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1954. $2.50 cloth; $2.00 paper.

In his *Party Politics in the Golden State,* Dean R. Cresap undertakes to provide a "systematic discussion of party organization in California." He begins, appropriately, with the legal regulation of parties and moves on to describe party bodies at county and state levels. Then follow brief chapters on the role of party in the Legislature, relations with national politics, nominations, campaigns, and party leadership.

A useful purpose is served in bringing together scattered information concerning statutory rules governing the parties, and in providing a general description of party bodies. When it comes to probing into or interpreting what goes on behind closed doors, Mr. Cresap appears to lack the length of acquaintance and depth of penetration in California politics to make him a sure and mature observer.

The study demonstrates the difficulty of explaining California politics in terms of party. Group politics determines the pattern of California politics far more than does party politics.

His handling of the nominating process is made unsatisfactory by the timing of the appearance of the book: evidently the results of the 1954 primary, which indicated that the worst of cross-filing was over, were not available; Victoria Schuck's full-scale study of the device was not yet published; he missed the great increase in Democratic clubs and councils during 1953–54 and their transformation of the pre-primary endorsement situation.

Although the author sustains his main thesis that a more responsible party system would produce better government, the work is marred by a number of defects. Coverage is too much limited to the 1950–51 period when he did field work. Excessive reliance is placed on northern California newspapers, even for events in Los Angeles. Many names are misspelled: Kenny not Kenney, Tenney not Tenny, Werdel not Wardel, and others. The careers of father and son, Frank C. Jordan and Frank M. Jordan, are merged into one. Jack Tenney's opponent for Congress in 1952 was certainly not "a Warren Republican." In addition to the $1,250 reported in 1950 as received from the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, Richard Nixon later acknowledged that his committee received $5,000 from the Committee through Henry Grunewald, yet the author fails to record anything beyond the file at Sacramento.

The usefulness of the volume further is diminished by the lack of an index.

DEAN E. MCHENRY
University of California
Los Angeles

EDWIN C. MCREYNOLDS. *Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner State.* Pp. xii, 461. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. $4.95.

Professor McReynolds, a native Oklahoman, is well fitted by extensive personal acquaintance with the life and leaders of his state and by long teaching experience at the University of Oklahoma to undertake his stated task. He treats his subject in sober and conservative fashion. The first fifth of the book surveys the Spanish, French, and American explorations which passed more or less fleetingly through or near what is now the Sooner State between 1528 and 1832. Indian affairs, with much justification, receive twice this space. The remaining two-fifths is concerned with permanent white settlement, traced through a chronological sequence of state political administrations. There is a brief concluding chapter on Oklahoma culture.

The work follows closely the pattern set by Edward Everett Dale and Morris L. Wardell in their *History of Oklahoma,* published six years ago. Undoubtedly, it is a decided improvement over its precursor in format and illustration, though not in content. It brings the Oklahoma story smartly up to 1953; it is scrupulously accurate in details of workmanship; it makes a distinct effort to relate Oklahoma events to the major strands of national development. Nevertheless, there is so little here that is new either in factual material or in interpretation that one must ask why it was considered necessary to write the book at all.

It should be remembered that there are already eight scholarly histories of Oklahoma extant, three of them published within the last eight years. Professor McReynolds states his desire to give readers "a brief yet reasonably comprehensive account of the state's growth" (p. vii); the jacket declares that the author "has had no purpose other than the reader's full enjoyment of a unique and remarkable segment of U. S. history." On both counts, the book is disappointing. While sections on exploration and Indians are extensive, major themes in subsequent Oklahoma history are obscured by a forest of administrative and legal detail, or left out altogether. Thus, the development and role of the oil industry are scarcely mentioned, the cattle and wheat industries receive surprisingly brief treatment, and the ugly soil conservation problem is quite ignored. Often it seems that what is omitted contains greater reader interest, as well as more real significance, than what is discussed.

Admittedly, the writing of first-class state history is no easy task. Ever since nationalism triumphed over the doctrine of state supremacy not quite a century ago, historians who deal with state history have had to wrestle with a certain sense of inferiority. What to do? Should one seek aggressively to rehabilitate what is today generally regarded as a lost cause, or must he accept second-rate status with becoming meekness and deference? There are ways out of this dilemma. One of the most attractive is to build state history around socio-economic themes. When social history is generalized on a national basis, it tends to become platitudinous; but on the state and local level—seen from close up, as it were—it reveals great variety and vitality. As an exemplar, one may cite *Montana: High, Wide and Handsome,* by Joseph Kinsey Howard—a model closely paralleled by Angie Debo in *Oklahoma: Footloose and Fancy Free.*

A much more common approach is to side-step the issue altogether while distracting the reader with a deluge of local faces and facts, each of which represents a prospective buyer, as every small-town newspaperman knows. It is this technique which produced the justly condemned "mug book" state and county histories of the post-Civil War decades. Unfortunately, in spite of certain virtues, the volume here considered is much closer in spirit to that ancient form of state history than the present reviewer would prefer.

FREDERICK D. KERSHNER, JR.
University of Wisconsin

CLYDE E. JACOBS. *Law Writers and the Courts.* Pp. vii, 223. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954. $3.50.

The publication in 1942 of Benjamin R. Twiss' *Lawyers and the Constitution* provided a fascinating and significant narrative of how lawyers and some publicists took laissez-faire to the Supreme Court of the United States, and Mr. Jacobs' volume, though not written with the verve and suave humor of Mr. Twiss's book, is in many respects a worthy companion to it. Mr. Jacobs instead of dealing with the arguments of leading practitioners confines his study to three influential publicists of the last third of the nineteenth century and their impact upon American constitutional law, state and federal. The three publicists whose influence is traced by citation or quotation in numerous state supreme court decisions and a smaller number of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon.

After a general introductory chapter in which he depicts the conflicts between conservative principles and democratic reforms Mr. Jacobs devotes two chapters to the origins, development, and application of freedom of contract as a substantive limitation on legislative power, two chapters to the rise and decline of the "public purpose" concept as a limitation on the taxing and spending powers, and a final chapter to an evaluation of the contributions of the three writers to laissez-faire and constitutional law. Of the three publicists considered the most important was Thomas M. Cooley not only because his *Constitutional Limitations* was the most frequently cited authority on due process of law from its publication in 1868 until about 1900, but also because he contributed mightily both to freedom of contract and the doctrine of public purpose; whereas Tiedeman's contributions were confined to freedom of contract and Dillon's to the concept of public purpose.

Following a brief biographical sketch and a general summary of the major ideas of each of the publicists the author proceeds to analyze the principal federal and state cases in which the ideas of the publicists played a part in the ultimate decision. In this respect, therefore, the volume is much more a general history of the judicial development of the doctrines of liberty of contract and public purpose than it is an analysis of the major writings of Cooley and his valiant cohorts who succeeded so wondrously in equating liberty with economic license. Although the state courts were the first to embrace the principle of freedom of contract, the Supreme Court of the United States was the last to abandon it. The concept of public purpose was avidly accepted by the state courts as a bar to the rising tide of paternalism, but was resisted in the federal courts where it met with only a limited acceptance and then like freedom of contract went into discard unhonored, unsung, and unmourned.

In a relatively short volume Mr. Jacobs has provided a valuable account of a very important phase of American constitutional history, particularly the development of substantive due process of law in the state courts. He has also added to the understanding of judicial decisions as a process of imitation and borrowing. The volume has a brief index, a table of cases, and a very useful bibliography. Unfortunately, the publishers have had recourse to the increasingly frequent and frustrating device of placing the footnotes at the end of the volume.

ROBERT J. HARRIS
Vanderbilt University

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM. *American Security and Freedom.* Pp. vii, 84. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. $1.50.

This book states briefly the grounds for and the conclusions reached by Mr. Goldbloom on the appropriate relation of American security to the freedoms guaranteed in both federal and state constitutions. It concerns three areas where conflict in recent years has been most virulent—(1) federal, state, and local public and private employment; (2) general legislation respecting security; and (3) education. Mr. Goldbloom starts from the supposition that the United States is faced by a world totalitarian danger, Communism, against which it must plainly protect itself. But he means by "protect" the protection of civil liberties from destruction by Communism. Implicitly, he seems to mean that a totalitarian United States "protecting" itself against a totalitarian Communism would be devoid of any moral significance.

In the process of working out his recommendations, Mr. Goldbloom gives a history of civil liberties which seems to establish: (1) that legislatures—federal, state, and local—and the courts have imposed more and more restrictions upon civil liberties; and (2) the number of such restrictions has increased enormously since 1945. Mr. Goldbloom does not himself so generally estimate the history of civil liberties, but he does assess recent developments as seriously threatening the whole civil liberties structure. It is for this significant reason that he wrote the present work, and the *American Jewish Committee* supported the research on which it is based.

Mr. Goldbloom's conclusions may be summarized as follows. (1) The present security program, both in government and private industry, is a serious threat to all civil rights in the United States. It fails to provide objective standards for distinguishing between positions involving security risk and those which do not or between the various degrees of security risk. Even though he believes that no man ought to be legally guaranteed a job, he does not think a security program ought to endanger the livelihoods and reputations of dissidents, nonconformists, ex-Communists, or even Communists who do not occupy sensitive positions or engage in unlawful activities. (2) A security program need not grant all legal protections guaranteed criminals, but the maximum protection required ought to be guaranteed. (3) Nonsensitive positions ought to be removed from any security program. (4) Legislation should avoid punishing anyone for *beliefs*; punishment should be only for *acts*. Present legislation punishes persons for advocacy or belief, thus giving color to the Communist argument that social change is impossible without violence or the use of force. (5) No one who is a Communist should be permitted to teach at institutions below the college level. On the college level, judgment should be made purely on grounds of professional competence and teaching standards. (6) Illegal techniques such as wire tapping and unwarranted seizure should not be used in the investigation of Communists—largely because they are unsuccessful. (7) A federal committee of reputable men is needed concerned with safeguarding civil liberties.

A book so full of practical suggestions deserves full-size analysis. Unfortunately, we must limit ourselves to three observations: (1) the concept of "security" needs deeper clarification before its relation to civil liberties can be appropriately determined; (2) the statement "no man has a right to a job" is one that today, in particular, needs careful analysis; (3) the restrictions upon guaranteed freedoms and upon the conditions which serve to guarantee these freedoms also deserve more careful investigation: for example, freedom to teach as a facet of freedom on speech.

RUBIN GOTESKY
University of Georgia

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

JAMES W. PROTHRO. *Dollar Decade, Business Ideas in the 1920's.* Pp. x, 256. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954. $4.75.

The author is at pains to justify his choice of principal officers of the National Association of Manufacturers and United States Chamber of Commerce to represent business notions on public questions in the burgeoning "New Economic Era." He was obliged to limit his spokesmen arbitrarily, but those he lit upon invite objections. Grant that the period was one of overconfidence, with pride unsuspicious to the fall, it is still true that the pronouncements of these gentlemen were extreme on the side of self-righteousness. The wide field of their colleagues' views doubtless contained some more boastful and untaught, but for consistent ebullience commend me to these super-trade association executives.

It is not only in the wisdom of hindsight that they appear as braggarts. To any but their immediate members—and, let us hope, to many of them—they were clowns. At the time, the deliverances of the typical ones were ludicrous by any standards of information and sense. This turns the book into wry comedy. Finding himself in such company, the author, without effort, lets the reader enjoy the contradiction of crying up business initiative while reposing faith in protective tariffs, or shrilling the rightful autonomy of the elite while calling for vigilante treatment of workers' unions. With such easy targets his shots lose their victory.

And yet, as Mr. Prothro reminds, these presumptuous fellows were put in their conspicuous posts and kept there. Maybe it is the dizzy prosperity years at which we are to laugh, and not at the persons who made presidential addresses. Others besides themselves thought happy days would last forever. The egotism, forgetting sectors of the economy chronically in trouble and certain premonitory dips in business activity, was uncomfortably national. The sorry spectacle of peoples humbled by World War I was matched by the height of self-esteem to which this country was raised. The "Dollar Decade" was an inevitable, though not a righteous feature of the whirligig of fortune. It had its redress when our heads were bloody and bowed both.

The lesson is for now and for the future. We may wipe off our smiles at the expense of the business grasshoppers who took no account of winter to come, and remember rather what they taught us. Perhaps it was that propaganda may not long pose as philosophy, that selfish dogma is reproved by the demands of democracy, and that America is but one in a family of nations. Since the business bigwigs of Mr. Prothro's review held forth thirty years ago, the professors have come to claim more of the public ear. Are we doing better, as the atomic age will estimate us?

BROADUS MITCHELL
Rutgers University

J. D. GLOVER. *The Attack on Big Business.* Pp. xvi, 375. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1954. $4.00.

Because ours is a civilization dominated by "big business," criticism of the latter, in the opinion of Professor Glover, is necessarily criticism of business enterprise in general, and also of the entire range of economic, political, and social institutions which have grown up along with it, as well as of the cultural and moral values which it embodies or sets at naught. "Industrial civilization *is* the civilization of 'big business.'" If the reader falls into the "category of 'men of business'" of any sort, "when it comes right down to it, the critics are talking about *you*, about all the things they associate with *you*, about *your* civilization" (pp. 206–207, italics in the original).

"Written primarily for use by thoughtful business leaders" (Foreword, p. vii) the book purports to be a summary of the attacks made on big business with the declared objective being "to understand, not to rebut." The summaries, however, are inadequate to the point of being pitiable distortions. The critics, ranging from the early days of the Robber Barons and the trust busters down through to the writers of the Temporary National Economics Committee monographs and the monumental reports of The Twentieth Century Fund, are found to be generally ignorant of the elementary facts of business and are obsessed with the need of building "a case" in general disregard of the facts. They are charged with believing that profits are the sole business motive (pp. 288, 317); with having an entirely mechanistic approach (p. 291); being occasionally downright simpletons (p. 292); being hopelessly biased and mentally incompetent (p. 296); being dominated by the stereotypes of "prescientific thinking" (p. 301); or with employing the Nazi technique of defamation, substituting "big business" for the Jews (p. 300), and so forth.

No proof is offered for the dictum that "big business" speaks for all business enterprise; that it can and must speak for trade unions, co-operatives, farmers' organizations, and the like—all of which are part of contemporary society—as well. No real summaries are given in any place of the masses of evidence in question, although in many instances the relevant data read by the critics here being excoriated runs into hundreds of volumes of detailed and (not infrequently) sworn testimony. Certain lengthy and painstaking reports, notably those of the LaFollette Committee and those relating to the National Recovery Administration, are passed over without mention.

In rebuttal—and most of the book is rebuttal despite disclaimers to the contrary—we are told that "big business has served us well." It does not need so much to reform its ways as to take "positive action" to clarify its position to itself and the public. This appears to sum in the injunction to big business leaders to resort to "*new*, different, broader, more responsible thinking" (p. 337) about themselves, and the manner in which they are discharging their duties and responsibilities to the general public. What the author has to say sounds very much like the medieval notion of "trusteeship." Would he have scholarship cease its critical role and become apologetics as well?

ROBERT A. BRADY
University of California
Berkeley

MARTIN V. MARSHALL. *Automatic Merchandising.* Pp. xi, 275. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1954. $3.50.

As the subtitle indicates, this little volume of 275 smaller than normal size pages is the result of "A Study of the Problems and Limitations of Vending." Obviously, it was not intended to present a case for or against this relatively new development of retailing defined by the author as "a method of selling goods which employs a vending machine to complete automatically a sales transaction upon the insertion of coins by the customer." It is this fairly objective treatment that especially recommends it to students of marketing.

In presenting the subject the author proceeded logically and systematically. A careful definition of terms in the first chapter is followed by a brief history of the development of vending from its origin through 1954, with major emphasis on its current status in volume, types of merchandise, and organizational structure comprised of the machine manufacturers, operators, location-owners, and merchandise suppliers. In the next four chapters is given a rather clear and comprehensive picture of the functioning and problems of *established* vending machine operators with respect to the machines, locations, servicing, and operating results. The five chapters that follow deal with problems of new applications, especially by department stores, with emphasis on the unsuccessful experiments by Hudson's within the store and by Filene's in outside locations at air and bus terminals. The concluding chapter summarizes the major limitations to vending and its potentialities.

As personal selling cost tended to increase without an offsetting increase in productivity and problems and difficulties connected therewith multiplied, retailers have attempted, especially since the end of World War II, to resolve the situation by reducing or eliminating personal selling wherever possible. One such attempt is to be found in the several versions of so-called simplified selling variously adopted. Another attempt is the experimentation with automatic vending.

From this volume it is revealed that automatic vending is a relatively high-cost method of retailing; that retail gross margins on goods vended must be substantially higher than on the same goods sold through alternative methods; that vending increases the number of middlemen because the retailing functions are divided between operators and location-owners, respectively; and that the problems incident to vending, especially those arising from the machine limitations, are often much greater than those intended to be solved by substituting it for personal selling. Vending is obviously best used where no alternative is feasible, as a supplementary device, or as a substitute in special situations as on trains. Except where especially applicable, however, a substitution of vending for personal selling may be a case where the cure is worse than the disease. The special merit of this book, therefore, is in dealing with the subject in its proper perspective.

THEODORE N. BECKMAN
Ohio State University

The Nation Looks at Its Resources: Report of the Mid-Century Conference on Resources for the Future, Washington, D. C., December 2, 3, 4, 1953. Pp. 418. Washington, D. C.: Resources for the Future, 1954. $5.00.

This is a remarkably readable report on a conference of outstanding importance in its field. The original incentive for holding the conference and funds to support it came from The Ford Foundation; the conference was planned and directed by Resources for the Future, Inc., a new organization with a long-range program of research and education in this field. Focused on problems presented by the mounting pressure on natural resources, the conference had three major aims: to arouse interest in resource problems, to further understanding among the various interested groups, and to provide leads for further work by the sponsoring organization.

Working papers were prepared to guide discussion in the general and sectional meetings, but these papers do not constitute the body of this report. Rather the problems raised and some of the general conclusions are combined as introductions to the main divisions of the report, which consist in the main of expertly selected quotations from the discussions. The editors have effectively winnowed the chaff of free discussion from the grain, and have seen to it that a goodly number of the sixteen hundred persons present express their views.

The major themes were these: the increasing demands on the nation's land base; the best uses of rural land; water problems, ranging from competing uses to allocation of costs; domestic nonfuel minerals; energy resources; world resources from the American viewpoint; problems in resource research; patterns of co-operation, from grass roots to international levels; and public lands and our degree of dependence on foreign resources. This report is convincing evidence that the conference will

abundantly fulfill the aims set for it. Yet some readers will be dissatisfied, no doubt, with the scope and balance of this survey of resource problems and their solutions. The discussions seem, for example, to have been overly optimsitic, and too much concerned with the technical and physical aspects. One looks in vain for general recognition that the crux of resource-management problems is frequently found in man himself rather than in nature; one notes a willingness to look to government for aid but not for controls of any sort; discovery, development, and more productive use of resources get ample attention, but resource renewal and maintenance receive relatively little; and ideals of good stewardship of natural resources are lost sight of, at times, in the urge to provide for greater and still greater production.

The volume rings with vigorous clashes of opinion. One finishes the report with a feeling of having sat in on a spirited conversation among informed, keenly interested men of diverse backgrounds, and with a sense of gratitude that an expertly prepared record of this lively give-and-take is available for study at one's leisure.

J. RUSSELL WHITAKER
Peabody College

CLARENCE B. RANDALL. *A Foreign Economic Policy for the United States.* Pp. vii, 83. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1954. $1.95.

The author has stated vigorously and clearly the case for a more intelligent, soundly based, foreign economic policy for the United States. His business experience and his experience as Chairman of the President's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy have combined to give him an excellent grasp of the subject matter. His writing shows understanding of United States' needs, a perspective on the whole range of international economic problems facing the United States, and a sympathetic understanding of the problems confronting the other free world countries.

Mr. Randall's treatment of the subject is based on three principles: ". . . reliance upon private effort and intelligence called forth by proper incentives, the governing control of vigorous competition, and the registering of choices through the free market." He consistently and cogently applies these principles in testing the soundness of various aspects of our foreign economic policy.

Mr. Randall's style is clear and forceful. He pulls no punches. No matter how controversial the subject may be, he applies his principles with impartial vigor. He refers to our Buy-American policy as a concealed subsidy to companies already strong and prosperous; to our agricultural policy as madness; and he says our shipping policy should be direct and aboveboard rather than disguised.

His approach to the tariff issue might be criticized as overcautious in contrast to his basic convictions. He recognizes, however, that "the process is one of growth, not explosive change." He explains the need for an evolutionary approach to the problem as due to inadequate public understanding, and to the failure of the business community to place the national interest above self-interest.

The dominant plea in the book is for greater awareness of the critical importance of our foreign economic policy and the need for better public understanding of it. In his words: "the United States does bear an awesome responsibility even though she did not choose it, and the individual citizen can pay an awesome price if he and 160 million like him walk out on the problem and do not try to understand it."

Mr. Randall and his book illustrate the contribution that business statesmen can make to the formulation of sound national policies. His book and his example may well serve to stimulate the interest of other business leaders and result in other contributions from this source.

WILLIAM C. HAWKINS
Tufts College

ALBERT LAUTERBACH. *Man, Motives, and Money: Psychological Frontiers of Economics.* Pp. xiv, 366. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. $5.00.

Wesley Mitchell used to say that economics is a science of human behavior. Economists might therefore benefit by comparing their own lore with that of the psychologists. Albert Lauterbach has made a careful study of this borderline area. He sets out to answer three questions:

(1) To what extent does business behavior follow the rules of decision-making postulated by economists? (Answer. To a very limited extent.)

(2) Does economic instability prevent people from acting "economically"? (Answer. Often.)

(3) Does economic reform of any desirable kind presuppose a different type of human being from the one known in Western democracies? (Answer. No.)

These condensations of the author's questions and answers do slight justice to his careful qualifications and tentative conclusions, or to the course of reasoning by which he arrives at his judgments. Also they do not reveal the many interesting observations which he makes along the way.

Profit making, he asserts, is the chief incentive of small enterprises, but at least above a certain minimum it serves largely self assertion and the achievement of status, which can be found by other means as well. Large concerns need profit, too, but "desire for continuity, financial stability or expansion is more often influential than a striving for immediate and definite profit."

Current economic institutions are characterized by instability which interferes with the atmosphere of confidence required for full efficiency in production and distribution. Personal insecurity is favored by the incompatibility of religious and other prevalent moral codes with the experience of the individual in the economic world. "Whether an individual is basically conservative, reform-minded or indifferent depends on the degree of independence or conformity in relation to the prevailing ideology of his family life during childhood and to his cultural and group setting." It is the same human being who plays economic roles and non-economic ones. These and other observations will not be startling to thoughtful persons, but they are often too little regarded in the formal thinking of economists.

The book contains a useful appendix of supporting material, a full bibliography, and an index.

GEORGE SOULE
New York, N. Y.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946–1953. Pp. 273. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1954. $4.00.

Two years ago the Senate Banking and Currency Committee set for itself the task of surveying the foreign economic and financial activities of the United States government. One of the fruits of the initiative was this report, initially prepared by the Staff of the Bank in response to the Committee's request for a general description of the Bank's activities. As a result, the specialist in international investment will find little in the book that is new. On the other hand, the superficial reader may find it difficult to extract from its pages the easy vignette he wants. But a broad band of readers between these extremes will find it rewarding reading.

The book is not a critical analysis of the Bank's operations; staff writers associated with an institution are in neither the position nor the state of mind to provide this sort of objectivity. Nevertheless, it does contain some fairly skillful explanations of the more contentious policies of the Bank. Some of the rationalizations are so adroitly introduced, in fact, that the reader may not be fully aware that alternative courses of action exist, let alone their justification.

The basic policy choice for the Bank, of course, is its approach to prospective borrowers. A continuous spectrum of alternative approaches exists, ranging from that of the most conservative institutional investor to that of a politically-oriented foreign aid administrator. The Bank has managed to avoid these extremes in the face of heavy pressures. Its major accomplishment lies in the fact that it has managed to develop a raison d'être over the eight years of its operating life which commands the respect not only of the bankers of Wall Street and Lombard Street, but also of the planners of Santiago and Addis Ababa. But one could wish for a more critical exposition of the rightness of

the Bank's approach as compared with the alternatives.

Here and there, the staff labors overly hard to develop its defenses against real or fancied Congressional critics. The staff is at pains to point out, for instance, that the Bank's ties to the United Nations' governing organs give the latter no shadow of control. Though the Bank is a specialized international agency within the meaning of the United Nations charter, it is free to go its independent way.

More than once, too, the staff feels obliged to stress the fact that the Bank is altogether free of any philosophical bent toward statism; that it is an adjunct of private competitive enterprise, not a rival with such enterprise. In the year 1955, these seem old ghosts, well laid; but in earlier years they were issues which might have weakened the Bank's position with the Congress.

The most provocative chapter of the book comes close to being its shortest—that dealing with the Bank's incipient program of technical assistance. Force of circumstance has obliged the Bank to turn more and more of its attention to broad development programming in individual countries, and to the training of the countries' personnel. These are fields in which the complementarity of the Bank's activities with those of private investors is easy to discern. They are activities which will inevitably grow and which may yet represent the Bank's most valuable contribution to the process of private international investment.

RAYMOND VERNON

Milburn, N. J.

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

LYMAN BRYSON. *The Drive Toward Reason: In the Service of a Free People.* Pp. viii, 148. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. $2.50.

Lyman Bryson's *The Drive Toward Reason* discusses the role of the educator, and of adult education, in particular, in our modern society. The challenge we face today is one of dealing with the problem of what Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr. has called the broad base of the pyramid of culture—the common man in a democracy, emerging gradually, shaping himself, and being shaped, by the impact of mass media of communication, into a new creature whose final form is yet to be determined. Can this new man learn to enlarge the area wherein he can "use reason instead of trusting to the customs of the past"? If so, will the change prove beneficial to him, and to the civilization which is evolved in the process? Mr. Bryson's answer to these questions is a decisive affirmative.

Our technological progress has led to the material success which can give man the leisure necessary to make freedom a possibility. If this progress, in creating a greater awareness of our problems, has made this seem a more dangerous world in which to live, we must recognize, on the positive side, that a spiritual progress and intellectual growth such as man has never known are also within our nearer grasp. In order to justify our faith in the ability of man to build a better future, we must realistically appraise the past as well as the present, and courageously work for a better way of life.

Perhaps the first step in this appraisal, in regard to adult education, is an understanding recognition of the vulgarity of the taste of the common man. There is no justification for the theory that standards are being lowered. Heretofore the people had little leisure or opportunity to express their desires; in the instances where they did, there is no indication that their taste was higher than that of the common man of today. The intellectual elite, far from condemning derisively, must realize that the large mass of the people have now, as in the past, different standards and needs from those of the intelligentsia. What is encouraging in the modern scene is that we live in a mobile society, and one in which ideas are important and subject to change. Modern man, then, unlike the peasant, who lived in the rigidity of a stratified class order, can move quickly and learn to grow. Bryson believes that the educator can make this intellectual growth possible; the intelligent leader must

". . . meet each one where he is and offer him a hand he can grasp."

DOROTHY RUDY

Westboro, Mass.

JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EDWARD N. BARNHART, and FLOYD W. MATSON. *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution.* Pp. ix, 408. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954. $5.00.

Within a few months after the attack on Pearl Harbor our government, acting on the advice of military leaders, decided to remove from the West Coast all persons of Japanese ancestry. Ninety days after this decision was made more than 110,000 Japanese Americans—citizens and aliens treated alike—had been uprooted from their homes and placed under armed guard in detention camps. The majority remained in such camps throughout the war.

At the outset of the evacuation an interdisciplinary group of social scientists at the University of California began to study it. The book under review is the third major volume to appear by members of this group; and like the earlier volume, *The Spoilage* by Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, 1946; and *The Salvage* by Dorothy Swaine Thomas with the assistance of Charles Kikuchi and James Sakoda, 1952, it is likely to stand as the definitive work in its area.

The book is divided into three complementary sections; each of which could stand alone as a monograph. Part I, Genesis, presents a detailed and well documented account of the development of anti-Orientalism in general and anti-Japanese prejudice in particular. The thesis of this section is that a century of anti-Orientalism produced "a rigidly stereotyped set of attitudes towards Orientals which centered on suspicion and distrust." The activation of this stereotype by the war crisis generated the public hostility necessary for the evacuation.

Part II, Exodus, contains a comprehensive history of the evacuation together with an acute analysis of the reasons for it. The balanced presentation impresses. The camps are pictured neither as Boy Scout jamborees nor as American Buchenwalds. The same balance is evidenced when the question of responsibility is considered. The theory that it was a military necessity is effectively disproved. So also are the theories popular with liberal circles and students of minority group relations that the evacuation was due primarily to the influence of selfish pressure groups and self-seeking politicians. The exaggerations and outright fabrications by many writers who hold to these views are neatly exposed. Folly not knavery is the judgment here.

In Part III, Leviticus, the constitutional issues are considered. Basic here is the wartime relationship of civilians with their rights to the military with its obligation to wage war successfully. At stake here are major values in American life, for only the most sanguine can feel sure that these issues are not likely to arise again perhaps for a different and larger group of citizens. Professor ten Broek (who is primarily responsible for this section—Matson and Barnhart for sections I and II respectively) with deftness, logic, and a careful assessment of both the legal and social factors involved concludes that the evacuation and detention was a flagrant and unwarranted breach of constitutional rights: a violation compounded by the Supreme Court's support. "In this way did the United States Supreme Court strike a blow at the liberties of us all."

At a time when many scholars seem reluctant to own to any values, it is refreshing to encounter a book which openly espouses a whole series of values. Acceptance of the value orientation is not necessary to appreciate the factual record and thoughtful analysis of a unique chapter in American history.

DONALD P. KENT

University of Connecticut

ANDREW F. HENRY and JAMES F. SHORT, JR. *Suicide and Homicide: Some Economic, Sociological, and Psychological Aspects of Aggression.* Pp. 214. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954. $4.00.

This study of suicide and homicide is divided into three parts: 1) Aggression, Frustration, and the Business Cycle; 2) Some Sociological Determinants of the Choice Between Suicide and Homicide;

and 3) Some Psychological Determinants of the Choice Between Suicide and Homicide.

The authors consider suicide and homicide in general to be forms of aggression, the former turned inward, the latter outward. In closing Part One, they say: "We started out with the problem of internalization of parental demands and expectations and the associated inhibition of outward expression of aggression. And we are ending our discussion with the problem of projection. . . . Let us restate our sociological and psychological bases of legitimacy of other-oriented aggression. Internalization of harsh parental demands and discipline produces a high 'psychological probability' of suicide and a low 'psychological probability' of homicide. . . . The 'psychological' determination of the legitimacy of other-oriented aggression is a function of the degree to which childhood aggression threatens nurturance. Clearly this 'psychological' basis cannot in and of itself explain the persistent variations in the suicide and homicide rates at differing points in the social structure and the life cycle" (pp. 118–119).

As a way of accounting for "differences in rates of suicide and homicide at differing points in the social structure and the life cycle," the authors turn to the proposition that "legitimization of other-oriented aggression varies directly with the strength of external restraint over behavior of the adult" as a function of the "relational system and position in the status hierarchy."

The latter position is important because it saves the authors from too great a dependence upon the idea that degrees of external restraint upon the child which do or do not threaten nurturance are adequate to account for the inward or outward direction of aggressive responses.

It is possible that Henry and Short could profitably explore further the force exercised by cultural variations in patterns of response permitted by those who suffer from resentment. In the South, for example, the more favorably placed as well as those of lowly status are more given to crimes against persons than in non-Southern areas of the United States: a matter not of social structure but of codes of honor.

It is also difficult for some students to believe that all forms of suicide grow out of resentment against other persons turned inward. All suicides are the result of frustration, *but not necessarily of frustration by other persons.* Criminally aggressive responses in many instances may not be the result of frustration at all; may even be the mores of subcultural groups.

This capable and provocative treatment of suicide and homicide is a challenge to future research. It merits the attention of the serious student.

AUSTIN L. PORTERFIELD
Texas Christian University

CECIL G. SHEPS and EUGENE E. TAYLOR. *Needed Research in Health and Medical Care: A Bio-Social Approach.* Pp. ix, 216. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954. $5.00.

Needed Research in Health and Medical Care is based on a seminar on the same topic held at the University of North Carolina in September 1952. The three-day session of forty-seven scientists from various biological and social disciplines produced 600 pages of transcript. The authors have not, however, presented this in the undigested form made possible by modern recording techniques. They have organized the fruit of these discussions into a contribution to interdisciplinary research.

Much of the discussion consisted apparently in mutual absorption of concepts and attitudes, and otherwise learning to communicate with one another. Of the five chapters, the first deals generally with the purpose of bio-social research, and the last is a summary of conclusions. "The Fields of Bio-Social Research" (Chapter II) are delineated as major categories defined by disciplines rather than a conceptualization of the health field from an interdisciplinary viewpoint. It appears significant that one of the categories of research presented is social epidemiology, which is admittedly a redundant term, although considered necessary. Problems of the social organization of bio-social research appear to be paramount. "Problems in Methodology" (Chapter III) are considered broadly in terms of the utility of cross-sectional versus longitudinal studies, for instance, as practiced in various projects, rather than an abstract consideration of the utility of various logico-statistical procedures. "Special Organizational Problems" (Chapter IV) deals with financing, location (university or health facility), recruitment of researchers, and the research and societal roles of the social scientist and physician. There are appendices concerning the organization of the seminar, and three selected preseminar statements, which were invited to serve in lieu of formal presentations at the meeting.

The problems mentioned illustrate the various positions from which bio-social research is viewed and from which the book will be considered. For those actively working in such research, the book is heartening because of the number of projects presented demonstrating that the problems are surmountable and the approach valuable, although what might be more useful to those in the field is a further interchange of results and some development of theory. The book will be of major value to those contemplating bio-social research in health. While it does not go far beyond the social problems involved in establishing interdisciplinary research, it covers these thoroughly. By a frank presentation of the issues that must be faced, it should facilitate the necessary process of establishing rapport, and reduce the time required for discussions on projects. This would be a genuine aid to much needed research.

CHARLES A. METZNER
University of Michigan

HERBERT PARNES. *Research on Labor Mobility: An Appraisal of Research Findings in the United States.* (Bulletin No. 65.) Pp. xi, 205. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954. $1.75.

Research on Labor Mobility merits an important place on the shelves of social scientists, particularly those who have not done special work or have not had special interest in the field. The Social Science Research Council and the author have performed a valuable service in pulling together in summary form the concepts, methods, and findings of those who over the past two decades have done research on labor mobility.

There are six chapters. In the first the author develops a "framework" into which he proposes to fit the numerous individual studies. He makes it clear that short-run flexibility of the labor supply in relation to the allocation of the human resource in the 1930's and 1940's is his focus, rather than other possible foci, such as workers' goals and their ability to attain them, or the degree of fluidity in the class structure of society, or the effects of movement on workers and their families.

The five other chapters deal with the main conceptual and methodological problems involved in labor mobility research; the extent and character of labor mobility; the chief determinants of labor allocation; and suggestions for further research in the field.

In respect to the concept of labor mobility, useful distinctions are made among workers' ability to move; their willingness to move; and their actual movement. Content is also given to seven different sorts of movement: inter-firm; inter-occupation; inter-industry; inter-area; from employed to unemployed status, and vice versa; and movement into and out of the labor force. The validity and reliability of the sources of data on these items—including employees' case histories, employers' personnel records, and social insurance records on number and duration of jobs, wage rates and earnings, labor turnover, and other items—are considered.

To many readers the summaries of research findings on patterns of labor mobility and on the conditions—motivational and institutional—that determine these patterns will be of major interest. So also will the discussion of these determinants in relation to the assumptions and conclusions of economic theory on wage differentials and labor-resource allocation.

The author finds significant gaps and weaknesses in the empirical data available from the summarized studies. In order to test the universality of the conclusions reached by mobility research thus far, he suggests: (1) parallel studies in diverse

labor market areas, among specific occupations, and under varying economic conditions; (2) periodic surveys of the same labor market under changing economic conditions; and (3) sampling investigations on a national scale. He emphasizes the need for greater refinement of concepts and methodology, and he calls for more appropriate empirical tests of hypotheses relating to the institutional determinants of mobility, including seniority clauses and private pension plans. (In our judgment, guaranteed annual wage plans, if they become a widespread reality, will provide an especially rich field for this sort of study.) He ends by stressing the need for limited investigations addressed to specific problems; thus, he questions that research designed for the study of motivational factors in labor market behavior would be equally appropriate for the study of institutional factors like unionism.

CARROLL R. DAUGHERTY
Northwestern University

WILLIAM HABER and others. *Manpower in the United States: Problems and Policies.* (Industrial Relations Research Association, Publication No. 11.) Pp. xi, 225. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. $3.00.

As the editors have pointed out in their succinct Introduction, "manpower policy in any formal sense dates roughly from World War I." When the wartime problems became eagerly relegated to near oblivion, the "imposition of national quota limitations on hitherto virtually unrestricted immigration," returned manpower problems to the nation's awareness. World War II and the partial return of a war economy with the "police action" in Korea, and the never-ending "cold war" have sharpened that awareness and made it constant.

In this short volume the editors have brought together essays by the following authors, well-known in the field and several of whom have collaborated: Daniel Bell, Rensis Libert and Stanley E. Seashore, Solomon Barkin, Glenn W. Miller, Louis Levine, Gladys L. Palmer and Ann A. Miller, Seymour L. Wolfbein, Helen Wood, Irving B. Kravis, Gertrude Bancroft, Donald J. Bogue, Charles A. Meyers, Eli Ginzberg and James K. Anderson, J. Douglas Brown, Peter Heale, and Frederick H. Harbison and Albert Rees. The book is composed of sixteen essays rich in a condensed handling of the manpower problems of the national crises of the past and of many of the statistically measurable trends in the industrial structure; and several have presented stimulating attempts to peep into the future structural changes and particularly into the future relations between technology and the human factor.

It is impossible because of space limitation to point out the specific contributions and aids to thought in the several essays, especially since not one of them is lacking in one or another of these qualities. It will, therefore, be far more revealing of the reviewer's own interest than of an objective weighing of relative merits when he states that he has been greatly impressed by Daniel Bell's "Work in the Life of an American" and by Solomón Barkin's "Job Redesign: A Technique for an Era of Full Employment." In the former, the author has passed in intriguing panorama the industrial age from the Industrial Revolution through scientific management to the automation of our own day, and in a way which ties together the inventive in the mechanical sense with the deeply human. Solomon Barkin has boldly posed the humanistic question as to why our inventive genius should not be given the novel directive of adapting our mechanisms to the worker and to do so in an integrated and comprehensive fashion over the full extent of our machinery-using industry.

SELIG PERLMAN
University of Wisconsin

PHILIP TAFT. *The Structure and Government of Labor Unions.* Pp. xix, 312. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $6.00.

Professor Taft's latest volume carries a rather broad title which attempts in this manner to give an appearance of unity to some very divergent material. If he had followed an older manner of titling, the result would have been something like: "Essays on the Structure and Government of Labor Unions, Some Diversions on the Problem of Communism in Unions, and Some Thoughts on the Past and Future of American Unions." A glance at the chapter headings will elucidate this point. They are, in order of appearance (but in abbreviated form): union radicalism, opposition in union elections, dues and officer salaries, the unlicensed seafaring unions, the auto and steel worker unions, the future of the teamster union, and the present state of American unions.

The second, third, and fourth chapters have been the subject of previous works by Professor Taft, but not in such detailed and exhaustive form. In the chapter on opposition in union elections there is an excellent and cogent case made against viewing with alarm the long service records of the incumbents of the top offices. But it is doubtful if unions are as different in this respect, as Professor Taft believes, from many other organizations both business and fraternal. What might have been brought out by a closer study of the careers of the top officers is that the international president of today is the vice-president of yesterday, the secretary of the day before, the international representative, district council president, local union president, business agent, and so on down perhaps to the sergeant-at-arms. The top is ordinarily reached only after a long slow climb during which, as the data on salaries shows, the climber was frequently poorly paid when regard is given to the hours of work and the weight of responsibility. The opposition must work its way up in the same manner, or connect with someone already well up—there is no easy road on this score in any organization.

The problem of union discipline has never been an easy one, and it is likely to become more difficult in the future. Here, Professor Taft working from the union records differs with Professor Summers whose sources were the court cases. While there is more moderation in the former's opinions, there is still the problem of correcting even the infrequent abuses. As the unions have grown to encompass so many whose initial and continuing connection with unionism is no more than a contract requirement of membership, concepts of individual advantage, and organizational benefit or collective benefit clash more often. In this picture the Taft-Hartley Act limits union discipline except for nonpayment of dues. As a practical matter, therefore, the arm of government is thrown around the shoulder of the rule violator. It would be interesting to know in how many cases the "disciplined" member has simply refused to pay his fine and gone his own way.

The chapter on the auto and steel worker unions and that on the teamster union fit in, in a general way, with the sections discussed above. Why two unions (auto and steel), born in the same period, developed so differently is of interest. Professor Taft attributes the centralization and political quiet of the steel workers to its organization "from the top down." Here mature organizers and men of prestige in the labor movement came in at the outset and supplied the money and shaped the organization. The auto workers, on the other hand, did most of their own organization work, financed themselves, and were mighty suspicious of "outsiders." The teamster union is seen as presently in a state of flux —personality and technology are pushing for a larger role for the international, but it is too early to say they have triumphed, for the locals may yet have the final word.

The chapters on radicalism and the unlicensed seafarers stand away from the other material. Little here relates to either government or structure in the formal sense.

On the over-all view then, what we have are three cross-section chapters on structure and government, three unions which are studied from the aspect of government and structure, and added chapters on radicalism in general and in the seafarers unions. The data and discussion on government and structure provide valuable material for study and thought and much insight on the "insides" of unionism. It is this insight which puts Professor Taft's work much above the current plethora of "quantification" and raises hope that the American "Industrial Democracy" will someday be written.

HERBERT J. LAHNE
Washington, D. C.

KATE H. MUELLER. *Educating Women for a Changing World.* Pp. ix, 302. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954. $4.75.

American women in the past three decades have been assuming expanding responsibilities in the public and the business affairs of the nation leading to a perception of new dimensions for their lives. These dimensions are related not only to the realm of what they are doing, but to a perspective of the individual in a rapidly changing scene.

Professor Mueller from a rich background of teaching and counselling women students discusses the multiple roles of women and the implications for their education. With insight and keen wit, she analyzes the strains and tensions with which women are confronted as they fulfill their primary responsibilities in homemaking, in supervising the family, and as they seek an individualistic type of self-expression. The author reviews the available data on sex differences. She raises pertinent questions as to whether the current tendency to maximize the likenesses of men and women at the expense of minimizing their differences is wise. She makes the point that there must be curriculum provisions which will allow for the many differences in the life patterns and the social roles of men and women.

Professor Mueller indicates that most of the planning for women's education is concerned with the social concept of *the* American Woman patterned after the upper or upper-middle-class woman, a woman who represents only about 15 per cent of our population. The author with great clarity discusses the undercurrents of conflict in the attitudes of men toward the recent freedom of women. But the crux of the matter to Professor Mueller lies in the fact that our rapidly changing society no longer allows women self-fulfillment within the home. The mental health and social adjustment of more than half of the population are thereby affected. Simultaneously also are the national economy, the problem of manpower, and community welfare programs.

In outlining proposals for the education of women, Dr. Mueller approaches these functionally: education for earning, mating, homemaking, citizenship, politics, leisure. Her recommendations merit careful attention. There is a strong tendency, however, towards emphasizing the utilitarian purpose of education, although Mrs. Mueller does recommend that women's education should be centered around the liberal arts to give perspective, depth, and flexibility. Dr. Mueller has developed an interesting, well written, controversial, and significant analysis of women's current position and educational needs.

ALTHEA K. HOTTEL
University of Pennsylvania

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

BARBARA WARD. *Faith and Freedom.* Pp. ix, 308. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1954. $3.75.

The Western world, so we are sometimes told, is at a disadvantage in its dealings with the Communist East because of its lack of unity of doctrine and purpose. Though in certain respects this may be a very real disadvantage indeed, there is reason to rejoice in it rather than to lament it. It is a conspicuous weakness testifying to a hidden strength. Miss Ward, eloquent standard-bearer of Western civilization, is well aware of this paradox. She is deeply disturbed by a process of disintegration which threatens not only the unity but the very basis of our civilization, and she voices a grave warning: "the West will prove more vulnerable than any other society if it abandons the pursuit of visions and ideals for, more than any other community, it is the product not of geographical and racial forces but of the molding power of the spirit" (p. 263). But while summoning us to rally forces she does not indulge in a vain hankering after a unity of doctrine comparable to that of Marxist theory, and even the uncertainty about our fate, so different from the assuredness of Communist faith in the society of the future, she is willing to accept as "that unpredictability which belongs to the really creative activities of mankind" (p. 297).

The faith of the Western world is not to be circumscribed by the paragraphs of an ingenious system: its superabundant wealth is embodied in a more than millennial history. Accordingly Miss Ward's plea takes the form of a rapid historical survey, sketched with bold strokes and designed to throw into relief the basic ideas and tenets of Western culture conceived in the spirit of Christian humanism. As a historiographer she is a pupil of Toynbee's, and even the moral of her story is couched in terms borrowed from this master. She sees the human race rising above primitive and archaic society and a life under the sign of necessity to that consciousness of its dignity and freedom which is the noblest gift to man of civilized life and spiritual religion. And she sees the gain and promise of this development menaced by the oblivion to which modern man has consigned the very ideas to which he owes his emancipation. So he bids fair to relapse into a condition of unfreedom similar to his primitive condition but infinitely worse. We must "confront the fact that totalitarian government in its extremest forms has returned when the waning of religion left the altars of the soul empty and turned men back to the oldest gods of all —the idols of the tribe" (p. 265). In concluding the author holds out the saving hope of a renewal of the springs of faith and of a reunion of divided Christendom.

A worthy cause ably defended, the reader will feel. But he may also remember that Christ came to save souls rather than ailing civilizations, and that there is some danger for a Christian apologist in talking too much of civilizations; and for an analyst of civilizations to lean too heavily on theology.

HELMUT KUHN
Munich, Germany

W. MACNEILE DIXON. *The Human Situation: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Glasgow, 1935–1937.* Pp. 448. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. $3.50.

In *The Human Situation,* Dixon writes beautiful prose full of poetic symbolism and with much quoting of poetry. The structure of his thought is somewhat submerged beneath a torrent of language and many contradictory statements.

His central thought can be summarized in terms of Being and Becoming. Our conscious life is spent in a world of ceaseless change and struggle, pleasure and pain, triumph and defeat, hope and despair, life and death. But this conscious life is only a small part of the total self or soul. The body restricts consciousness to this stormy bit of flickering awareness in the sea of Becoming. The self or soul in its wholeness dwells in the realm of changeless perfection and this realm is called Being wherein all potenalities reside. The struggle and suffering of the world of Becoming are necessary to bring to consciousness in the sequence of time the infinite potentialities of Being.

The soul is eternal in the realm of changeless Being. At death it lapses into the realm of perfection and quietude and at birth comes forth again into the world of Becoming. Every individual, apparently, has many times been born into the world of Becoming and passed again into the realm of Being. This alternation of periods of unconscious rest in Being with periods of conscious struggle in Becoming is what our natures need, according to the author.

Fine art gives a glimpse of pure Being in its changeless perfection, and so also does the changeless past when viewed in retrospect.

God is incomprehensible. Therefore the wise man will hold that idea of God which best serves to give him the "strongest incentive to living, and rouses his highest powers" (p. 276). This incentive to living and this rousing of men to their highest powers seem to be the ruling concern of the author in all his writing of the book. The world is one vast miracle and mystery so that we cannot know what is true and false in matters of major concern. Consequently we should hold to be true those affirmations which seem to provide this incentive.

In the thought of this reviewer this is dangerous doctrine. With such reasoning the Nazis and Communists have as good ground for their beliefs as we for ours, if their faiths give them as much incentive

for living. Incentive for living according to Dixon is incentive to fight and struggle.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

Houston, Tex.

E. A. PARSONS. *The Alexandrian Library: Glory of the Hellenic World.* Pp. xii, 468. London: Clever-Hume Press; Houston, Tex.: Elsevier Press, 1952. $7.50.

This is the devoted work of an enthusiastic and wealthy friend and patron of the arts. It is a full-dress study of the famous library at Alexandria from the uncertain days of its first beginning by Demetrios of Phaleron, under the aegis of Ptolemy Soter, to its final destruction in the seventh century by the Arabs. Mr. Parsons has sought—and generally succeeded—to leave no possible phase of the story undescribed, no avenue unexplored. Every author, both ancient and modern, who has ever written anything on any related or contiguous theme is quoted or discussed. At times the result is somewhat akin to that nightmare of the teacher, the term paper, with its many: "Professor XYZ has weightily said: . . . ." But it is all done on the truly grand scale. All this does not tend to make the book conspicuously unified or nonrepetitious. Perhaps it does give it a taste of the encyclopaedic. There are a great number of lengthy asides. Some of them are of real interest and point, as the section detailing the other great libraries of antiquity. Others are of less consequence, as the lengthy but somewhat amateurish rehash of the Homeric Question. At any rate, the net result is a vast amount of material from which a mighty good book could be written. The whole work evidences clearly the hand of the zealous amateur rather than that of the trained professional scholar. The bibliography of twenty-nine pages is an amazing medley of pertinent and quite extraneous matter. In contrast the index —and a volume such as this needs a very full one—is totally inadequate, failing to list highly important matters in discussion in the preceding pages. A quite unsystematic way of citing authorities is to be found everywhere: Revelations II 13; 2 Mace. IV 33 are samples. The casual reference (p. 40) to Titus and the bronze cherubim he found in the Temple of *Solomon* or the remark on p. 183: "Jesus, as a child, was taught from manuscript rolls and verbal lessons of his native rabbins, the *Old Testament* from the Greek version, *The Septuagint*" will suggest that the reader will be wise to be on his guard if he is reading in a section outside his own domain. It would be ungracious to end on this sour note or to deny that in this labor of love—it must have cost a deal in time and money—much excellent material is to be gleaned. Certainly he has not erred by deliberately skimping on any part of the garment or its fringes.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Moylan, Pa.

LIONEL KOCHAN. *Acton on History.* Pp. 184. London: André Deutsch; New York: British Book Centre, 1954. $3.00.

The Acton boom continues. Half-a-dozen studies on this enigmatic English nineteenth-century historian have appeared since the war. Mr. Lionel Kochan's brief and suggestive essay is one of the best of them. It is based, as are most of the recent crop of Acton studies, on the great mass of the historian's working notes now available in the library of Cambridge University. Mr. Kochan takes even more emphatically than did Miss Gertrude Himmelfarb (*Journal of Modern History,* December 1949) the position that where there is a conflict between Acton's published opinions on a given point and his opinions as reflected in these notes, it is the notes that are the more faithful reflection of his mind.

For Mr. Kochan, after distinguishing between the first period of Acton's life up to the Vatican Council of 1870, when he was a hopeful and articulate Catholic Liberal, and the second period, when after the defeat of the Liberals on the issue of Papal Infallibility, he retired to a life of contemplation and note-taking for the famous unwritten *History of Freedom,* goes on to make as a main point Acton's alienation from his age. Acton failed to publish not because he couldn't write—he had proved abundantly that he could—not because of any "perfectionism" masking some psychological block, nor for any of the many other reasons that have sometimes kept great scholars from publishing, but because, in a sense, he did not dare publish his real opinions. In fairness to Mr. Kochan's subtle analysis, it must be noted at once that he does not attribute to Acton any vulgar fear of public criticism, nor even of being simply misunderstood, but rather a very fundamental feeling that he would not be listened to, would not really get into the Victorian mind at all.

He had begun, Mr. Kochan finds, as a romantic historian with the characteristic romantic aim of reliving history, of identifying himself by an "inward vision" with the past. But he saw very early that this vision led to "historicism," to the doctrine that there are no standards by which to judge the historical process. Acton's inward vision was complemented—indeed opposed in an almost Hegelian dialectic—by the "external vision" of morality. The historian can and must judge, and his standards must be those of the moral absolutes, and especially the most basic of all absolutes: thou shalt not kill. The historian thus possesses the key that will resolve the horrible paradox of historicism. He can hold up to men the ideals so long, so constantly violated in the course of history, until someday men will see the error of their ways—and there will then be no more history. "The choice remains with man—'Knowledge of history means choice of ancestors.'"

Perhaps Mr. Kochan sharpens the conflicts within Acton's mind overmuch, but there can be no doubt that there is in Acton a very strong strain indeed of theological and metaphysical absolutism. The last quotation Mr. Kochan makes from the unpublished notes is revealing: "Liberalism essentially revolutionary. Facts must yield to ideas. Peaceably and patiently if possible. Violently, if not. . . ."

CRANE BRINTON

Harvard University

WILLIAM O. SHANAHAN. *German Protestants Face the Social Question:* Volume I: *The Conservative Phase, 1815–1871.* Pp. xii, 434. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954. $6.75.

German Protestants Face the Social Question is a volume in the International Studies of the Committee on International Relations of the University of Notre Dame, to be completed in a study, covering 1871–1933. The entire research gives promise of being a penetrating analysis of how German Protsetantism passed from quietism to approval of Hitler, with many valuable insights and judgments added, including: the spiritual separation of Germany from Western Europe was finally accomplished by the influence of its idealistic philosophy between 1770 and 1840 (p. 11); "Hegel, in attempting to reconcile faith with reason, completed his task with such formidable thoroughness as to dispense entirely with theology and to end by identifying . . . Christianity with a world process entrusted solely to the state" (p. 19); "*Protestantism . . . had the special qualities necessary for coexistence with an omnipotent state . . .*" (p. 20); "Pietism began as the German phase of that interconfessional and undogmatic religious movement which included Quakerism and Methodism, and even embraced such Catholic manifestations as Jansenism and quietism" (p. 25).

The author sees the revolution of 1848 as bringing the Catholic masses to political power in Germany (p. 193) with the loss of interest of the urban and industrial groups in the Protestant clergy with their slogan of "rights from above" and "revolution from below." There were "no *unbaptized* proletarians." The great moment of 1848 was when Wichern made his eloquent plea for a "Volkskirche" in reply to the Communist Manifesto, becoming the first European churchman to foresee a deadly battle between Christianity and Communism for the soul of the proletariat" (p. 214).

But no united church resulted and the national proved of greater significance than the social question. Yet Prussia was painfully to discover that self-respect, civil freedom, human reason, law, and education were not the solution of the social problem. Not even the formal separation of the civil and ecclesiastical administration would do. Christianity would solve the basic *sin* by the conversion of individuals; socialism,

the basic *evil* by universal economic remedies (p. 268).

Here are some conclusions: "conservatism can only succeed as a political principle when men have lost confidence in the future. . . . Prussian conservatism denied man's sovereignty over himself in insisting that he accept his fate in a traditional, authoritarian, and all-encompassing corporative regime . . . a dangerous illusion. . . . At a decisive moment, German Protestantism had cast its lot with the authoritarian and the agrarian traditions of European life, openly scorning the urban-industrial and liberal world that was coming into being. *German Protestants thereby risked the loss of the common man's allegiance,* for by committing itself to monarchical authority, Protestantism could not take the side of the people" (p. 301); "there was actually less factory and social legislation in Germany than in other nations" (p. 415); "the chief weakness [of the evangelical-social movement] was the neglect of practical measures" (p. 413).

CONRAD H. MOEHLMAN
University of Southern California

CHARLES C. COLE, JR. *The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangelists, 1826–1860.* Pp. vii, 268. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $4.25.

The great influence of the clergy on American patterns of thought during the Middle Period needs to be understood if the crusade which culminated in the Civil War is to be placed in its historical perspective. Not only in the rural areas of a country predominately agricultural, but in the cities as well, the clergy were a major group in the formation of public opinion. Large numbers of them, especially those representing the evangelical sects in the North, spearheaded reform movements such as temperance, anti-slavery, the reformation of delinquent females, and the observance of the Sabbath.

Mr. Cole has attempted to describe and analyze the social ideas of these evangelists in the context of their period. The result is a study which is not always in focus. The problem of selecting representative evangelists for study is a task with which the author appears to have had some difficulty. The inclusion of Francis Wayland among the evangelists raises the question of how far one may stretch a definition. In any case, it should be pointed out that Mr. Cole seems to be aware of the pitfalls that face historians in attempting to isolate for development a series of ideas among a group of individuals.

Although the secondary literature dealing with the subjects covered by Mr. Cole in his monograph is extensive, he shows a preference for the original sources. Many excellent books have been written on the revivals, the refom movements, the anti-slavery movement, and the various religious denominations. One wishes that the author had indicated that he had made full use of these works. In addition, the book tends to be sketchy when discussing the social ideas of the evangelists and concentrates on some reforms while almost ignoring equally important ones. For a book of 242 pages of text, it would appear that 95 pages of background material before entering into the basic subject matter of the book is excessive. Perhaps the strongest impression left on the reviewer is that Mr. Cole has not developed fully enough the possibilities of his theme.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the author has gathered together the views of an important body of men and shown their influence in shaping the history of their times. As Mr. Cole makes clear, the evangelists were period pieces for which a post-Civil War America found little use.

ALBERT POST
Washington, D. C.

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

THOMAS JONES. *A Diary with Letters, 1931–1950.* Pp. xiv, 582. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1954. $4.80.

Educator, author, and civil servant, Thomas Jones was the confidential advisor to four successive Prime Ministers of Great Britain. He worked closely with Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Stanley Baldwin, and Ramsay MacDonald; rarely and much less closely with Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill. In 1916 he became a member of Lloyd George's War Cabinet Secretariat, and he continued to serve as a Cabinet Secretary until his retirement. When he retired from civil service in 1930 at the age of sixty, he began a new career, first as secretary and later as chairman of the Pilgrim Trust through which he administered funds to encourage fine arts and education. He travelled far, indeed, from the small Welsh mining town, where he was born in 1870, until he reached the high pinnacle of Cliveden where he enjoyed hospitality and friendship of Lord and Lady Astor and associated with the famous people who frequented their magnificent estate. Though he never regretted succumbing to the "plutocratic embrace" of Cliveden, he has continued to cherish "the hope of dying a reasonably poor man amidst the blessings of the Welfare State."

When Thomas Jones went to London to join the War Cabinet Secretariat, Sir Maurice Powicke urged him to help the historians of the future by keeping a diary. Jones began the diary at once and persisted in the strenuous discipline of daily record keeping until 1950, when he reached his eightieth birthday. The present volume is only one-sixth of his entire work; that portion which he wrote while in the Civil Service has been put on cold storage for his lifetime. When the whole diary is published, if the present part is indicative of the whole, it will establish the author as the twentieth century Greville.

Letters exchanged with many distinguished people of diverse interests interstice the diary. A substantial correspondence, relating to important questions of education, was carried on with Dr. Abraham Flexner, the first Director of the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey. Many letters with Mrs. Shaw and other persons interested in literature throw light upon the character of George Bernard Shaw.

Taken together, the letters and the diary afford a box seat at the stage of history's stirring drama. From the vantage of No. 10 Downing Street, Cliveden, and Whitehall, one gains a clear sight of the dramatis personae of the early 1930's; and one can live again those dismal days of the economic depression, and see again the abdication of Edward VIII, and witness again the rise of Hitler and Mussolini while England slept. The author and other members of the "Cliveden set"—an epithet which he rejects—had a hand in shaping the policy of appeasement. This book reveals wonderfully the mentality of those who knew every Hitler move and yet could not bring themselves to rearm England adequately to resist him. By setting down these events fully and knowingly, Thomas Jones has undoubtedly helped the historians of the future to read the tragedy of his time.

R. G. COWHERD
Lehigh University

GEORGE HILTON JONES. *The Main Stream of Jacobitism.* Pp. x, 275. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $4.50.

James II was the Stuart king who succeeded to the thrones of England and Scotland on the death of his brother Charles II in 1685. A convinced and openly avowed Catholic, James attempted to Romanize the two countries over which he ruled. This course of action created a strong opposition party, which in 1688 invited the Dutch king, William, to invade Britain; and when William arrived in England James II sought safety in flight to France. Since the king had thus "abdicated," Parliament offered the vacant thrones of England and Scotland jointly to Dutch William and his wife Mary, James II's daughter. Thus the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 was consummated.

Jacobitism is the name given to that movement which attempted to reinstate the Stuart House on the British throne. Its headquarters were at St. Germain, in France, where the exiled James II set up his court with the full approval of King Louis XIV. The Jacobite movement aimed at persuading certain Catholic governments of Europe, particularly that of France, to finance and equip an invasion of Britain, with which the native pro-Stuart faction in England and Scotland would co-operate. For most of the time Jacobitism did not get beyond the stage of intrigues—in which, among others, Winston Churchill's famous ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough, was

involved—and plots, for example, the 1696 plot to murder King William as he returned from a hunting trip. But after the accession to the British throne of King George I of Hanover in 1714, the Jacobites succeeded in mounting two small-scale invasions of Britain—in 1715 on behalf of James II's son, the so-called "Old Pretender," and in 1745 on behalf of Charles Edward, his grandson, the "Young Pretender." Both of these invasions, though they were joined by native insurgents, proved abortive; and after the 1745 rebellion, British Jacobitism was so thoroughly crushed, particularly in Scotland, that it survived only as a matter of nostalgic sentiment.

The present volume traces the story of Jacobitism from its beginnings in 1688 until the failure of the rebellion of 1745. Its author, Dr. George Hilton Jones, is familiar with the secondary works which deal with this movement. But he has also made a careful study of the abundant source material—both the manuscript sources, such as the voluminous Stuart Papers, and those which have been printed, like the Calendar of State Papers. And he has produced a clear, objective, and authoritative account of the Jacobite Movement.

NORMAN VICTOR HOPE
Princeton Theological Seminary

KENNETH GRANT CRAWFORD. *Canadian Municipal Government.* (Canadian Government Series, No. 6.) Pp. xii, 407. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954. $7.50.

S. J. FRANKEL and R. C. PRATT. *Municipal Labour Relations in Canada.* Pp. v, 87. Montreal: Published jointly by The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, and The Industrial Relations Centre, McGill University, 1954. $2.50.

Two new books on the subject of local government in Canada are another reminder of the revolutionary changes that have taken place in the Dominion since World War II. Canada is now the world's fourth largest industrial nation and its third largest trader. Her population has increased 22 per cent in ten years, and a country which was largely rural is now 57.3 per cent urban. That such rapid change is making unprecedented financial and administrative demands upon municipal authorities can well be imagined.

Professor K. Grant Crawford brings to his study of this subject wide practical experience in city government in Ontario. As Director of the Institute of Local Government at Queens University, Kingston, he is also keenly interested in training better municipal officers. His book, therefore, is a combination of textbook and guide, which can be equally useful to student, town clerk, or voter. Especially, it has the great merits of clarity and readability.

After an Introduction devoted to the general problems confronting Canadian municipalities, Professor Crawford points out the complications produced by the lack of uniformity in the local institutions of the ten Provinces. In Newfoundland, for instance, special financial enticements have had to be offered to the citizens to get them to organize any form of local government. The methods of election, organization, powers and activities of municipal councils, their committees and officers are therefore described in detail. Almost one half the book is devoted to the ubiquitous problem of financing municipal services. In Canada, as elsewhere, there is a growing tendency towards increased financial dependence of the municipalities upon the Provincial Governments, and a corresponding increase of supervision of local affairs by Provincial authorities. Professor Crawford ardently believes that "if a democratic form of government is to survive at the national level, it can only do so if it is built upon a foundation of local autonomy." Not the least valuable portion of his book is this discussion of the importance of local self-government as the grass roots of democracy. His proposed solutions to the vexed problem of provincial-municipal relations are both sane and practical. Indeed this book has much to say to the citizen of any industrial state.

In contrast with Professor Crawford's broad analysis, S. J. Frankel and R. C. Pratt of McGill University have concentrated on one of the many problems confronting municipal authorities in the new

Canada, namely municipal labor unions. Approximately 40,000 public employees are already organized into union in Canada, and there is every indication that the movement to negotiate with their employers by means of collective bargaining will continue to grow.

The authors point out that a number of problems which do not have to be met by the ordinary industrial union have to be faced by these municipal workers. As has often been said, "one of the difficulties of public business is that it is public." The authors outline, rather than discuss, the various methods, techniques, and weaknesses of collective bargaining in the public services in Canada. The laws of the ten Provinces are reviewed and certain changes proposed. Special attention is given to the difficult question of compulsory arbitration of disputes in which essential public services such as that of firemen are involved. Unfortunately, as the authors admit, "this slim volume is the result of what can only be termed a preliminary survey of a large problem." It is therefore incomplete, and to that extent an unsatisfactory study of a very important subject.

MAURICE W. ARMSTRONG
Ursinus College

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

JOHN PLAMENATZ. *German Marxism and Russian Communism.* Pp. xxiii, 356. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1954. $4.25.

Despite the author's promise, the two parts of this work are not fully cemented together in a coherent whole which effectively illumines the relation of a theory and its development to the practice of a regime. The first part consists of an extraordinarily able examination of the teaching of Marx and Engels. Plamenatz, while emphasizing the creative importance of Marxist doctrine, as well as its overwhelming influence, does a beautiful job of revealing its philosophical and analytical defects, its unexamined assumptions, and the delusiveness, which was also on Marx' part self-delusion, of some of its major concepts and celebrated phrases. Likewise, Plamenatz, in my view correctly, has seen Lenin as a strategist and a theorist of strategy rather than as a creative philosopher, though he perhaps does less than full justice to Lenin as a thinker. He correctly sees, too, that, though Stalin was important as the manipulator and enforcer of the system, and in a sense was its popularizer, he has no genuine claim as a political and social thinker. Again, he is probably on sound ground when he insists that, had it been confined to the West alone, Marx' teaching, for all its intellectual weaknesses, would have proved a creative error. It was the perversion and misapplication of that error, joined to other, more sinister forces and doctrines in Russia, that constituted, and constitutes, the real evil.

Nevertheless, Plamenatz is equally right in stressing the value of new insights in Marx, especially his concept of ideology, and in emphasizing the nature of present Russian appeal to still agrarian and backward peoples. But I think he seriously exaggerates when he claims that it was Marx who taught us that the proper study of politics is not man, but institutions. If man and institutions are placed in opposition, the claim may be correct, but the teaching was disastrous. If Mr. Plamenatz means that man must be studied in the context of institutions, then any claim of basic originality on Marx' part is not warranted: witness a whole line of thinkers from Aristotle to Tocqueville.

Quite apart from these criticisms, however, the most serious defect of the book, each of whose parts has much fascination, wisdom, insight, and critical acumen, is that the very theoretical analysis of the first part is at a considerable distance from, and only loosely joined to, the often very fine institutional analysis of the second, with its emphasis on the relation of doctrines to practice, need, and purpose. The conjunction in the title states a connection; the actual work does not unite or unify the conjoined themes, whether by demonstrating interdependence or by making clear a deeper irreconcilability.

THOMAS I. COOK
Johns Hopkins University

W. W. KULSKI. *The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice.* Pp. xiv, 807. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1954. $8.00.

Arnold J. Toynbee has argued that Communism is a "Jewish-Christian heresy," engendered by the failure of the West to fulfill its professed ideals. The stock-in-trade of Communist propagandists consists precisely of ironic contrasts between aspirations and practices in the democracies. This device in turn has evoked reams of Western anti-Communist tracts, contrasting Soviet ideals with Soviet realities. Professor Kulski of the Maxwell School at Syracuse, and formerly a member of the Polish government-in-exile, here offers us the most informative single contribution to this body of literature. He hopes that his book "will find its way to the young generation whose age warrants a search for a better world. They should avoid the pitfall of believing that a better world is being built in the Soviet Union." His volume is no ordinary indictment but a meticulously documented analysis based on Soviet sources, which he has mastered thoroughly and used honestly.

The result is a belated refutation of the Webbs' *Soviet Communism* (where ideals in documents were taken at face value) and a priceless work of reference, offering the most complete treatment yet attempted of Party and State, Citizenship, Elections, "Freedom," Courts, Family, Youth, Workers and Trade Unions, Peasants and Kholkhozes, and post-Stalinist developments. The portrait, albeit less dramatic, is as black as that drawn by Igor Gouzenko in *The Fall of a Titan.* Kulski, unlike Isaac Deutscher and Harrison Salisbury, sees little prospect of any "mellowing" of Soviet society. His very subtitle denies the Marxist postulate that Communism is a "far-off, divine event" toward which Soviet socialism is painfully groping and assumes that the ugly realities of the past and present are permanent. The picture is not "objective," for the author's motto is: see no good, hear no good, speak no good of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Yet this work is a factual compendium of vast scope and power which, for years to come, will prove invaluable to all students of the Soviet way of life. It is, indeed, the type of indictment which the Soviet oligarchs themselves would take seriously if they were as wise as they pretend to be. But this, for the present, is too much to hope.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

TIMOTHY SOSNOVY. *The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union.* Edited by David I. Goldstein. Foreword by Gregory Grossman. Pp. xviii, 300. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954. $4.25.

Next to a sufficiency of food, probably nothing is more essential to a decent life on the material plane than adequate housing. One of the most damning indictments of the "workers' state" which has succeeded to the power of the Tsar of All the Russias is the fact that, as all non-Communist students of the subject seems to be agreed, housing conditions in Russia are probably no better now, and perhaps even worse, than they were before the Revolution. Workers of the world, take note.

The present study by Dr. Sosnovy bears all the marks of a definitive study of this important subject. Based on a wealth of Soviet sources and statistics, it demonstrates irrefutably the steady deterioration of the urban housing fund which Soviet planners have allowed to occur through inadequate appropriations and maintenance. The natural result is that in 1950 an average of four persons lived in each room, with the actual figures varying sharply according to the social and economic status of the family. A private bathroom or kitchen is a rarity. As any one who has lived under such conditions can imagine, unsanitary conditions, quarrels, and fights are commonplace. And these are the conditions of the "free" section of the populace; those of the inmates of the forced labor camps are, of course, incomparably worse.

Projecting these discouraging trends into the future, we see no reason to think that, in view of the continuing and even increasing emphasis by the Soviet government on heavy industry and defense which the fall of Malenkov has rendered likely, the housing standards of the long-suffering Soviet people will do anything but decline further, or at best maintain their present unsatisfactory level.

It is no small achievement that this solid, even technical, study contrives to be not only comprehensible but interesting to the nonspecialist, or at least to this nonspecialist. This happy outcome is the result of careful organization and a thorough knowledge of the subject. In fact, Dr. Sosnovy's study could well serve as a model for other works of this kind.

HAROLD C. HINTON
Georgetown University

JOHANNES KAPS (Ed.). *The Tragedy of Silesia, 1945–1946: A Documentary Account with a Special Survey of the Archdiocese of Breslau.* Translated by Gladys H. Hartinger. Pp. 576. Munich: "Christ Unterwegs," 1952/53. No price.

Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Compilation and Introduction by Wilhelm K. Turnwald. Translated by Gerda Johannsen. Pp. xxix, 308. Munich: Association for the Protection of Sudeten German Interests, 1953. No price.

For some years various academic and political groups in Germany have been studying the mass expulsions of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe after World War II. Several volumes containing eyewitness accounts have already been published by the Göttinger Arbeitskreis, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher Interessen, and the German federal ministry for expellees. The present two volumes are English translations respectively of *Die Tragödie Schlesiens 1945–46* (Munich, 1952/53) and *Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen* (Munich, 1951). The merits and standards of the two works differ somewhat in accordance with the aims and purposes of the sponsoring organizations. The Silesia volume, compiled and published by a Catholic organization, is a collection of eyewitness reports by Silesian Catholics, many of them clergymen and members of religious orders. The accounts are the spontaneous, unpretentious, narrative statements by the participants in the events of that chaotic period. Thus they are not the product of systematic interviews, questionnaires, or opinion analysis. They stand on their own as forceful, moving human documents, classified merely according to region. They are remarkably free from expressions of self-pity and hatred although occasional passages, such as "Russian aggressor" (possibly an error in translation), "typically Polish (conditions)," and so forth reveal the naiveté of the narrator. On the other hand, both volumes include references to kindnesses shown to Germans by Russians, Poles, and Czechs. In this connection the reader is referred to a special compilation of such records of humanity published in 1950 by the Göttinger Arbeitskreis under the title, *Dokumente der Menschlichkeit,* which would serve as a counterdose to the almost unrelieved picture of brutalities described in the above two volumes. The *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans* edited by Wilhelm K. Turnwald and containing similarly arranged eyewitness accounts have more the character of a white book, not only because of the rather one-sided nature of the statements but also because of the editor's Preface. His aim is to show "the extensive participation of the Czech population in these misdeeds" (P. xxviii), and he demands the punishment of the guilty as "a condition for German-Czech co-existence." The documents in both volumes, however, tend to show that both in Czechoslovakia and Silesia it was the hastily organized "Revolutionary Guard" or militia, chiefly composed of young Communists and former inmates of Nazi concentration camps, that committed most of the inhuman acts described. The native Czechs and Poles often held aloof and condemned the behavior of these lawless elements. As some of the narrators in the Silesian volume appropriately pointed out, this behavior was partly the reaction to the treatment which these militia men had experienced in Nazi Germany as prisoners or slave laborers. The reader of these documents also craves to know something about the political background of the narrators and one cannot escape the feeling that what has been left unsaid is often more significant than what

has been printed. To insure maximum objectivity in future publications of this kind it might be advisable to set up an international board of editors. But in the final analysis one is forced to conclude that, no matter who committed the inhuman misdeeds described, or against whom they were directed, the fact that they could be committed at all constitutes a smashing indictment of our age and society. It brings to mind Zarathustra's statement, "Ye have made the way from worm to man, but much in you is yet worm." For while the individual testimony may be of doubtful value as a historical source, the sum of the thousands of statements already published and yet to appear eloquently corroborates the story of the Russian conquest, the takeover by the Poles and Czechs, and the expulsion measures.

CARL G. ANTHON
State University of Iowa

ALEX N. DRAGNICH. *Tito's Promised Land: Yugoslavia.* Pp. xii, 337. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University, 1954. $5.75.

American scholarship concerned with the contemporary interpretation of international relations is hardly ever interested in "what is," since the most popular approach is that which paints the current problem within the "black-white" framework. Thus, during World War II, Soviet Russia was extolled as a "true democracy," the historical United States-Russian relations were featured as always having been friendly, and Joseph Stalin was extolled as the best-meaning statesman in the world. Today, most articles and books tell us the "worst" about Russia and its rulers. A similar revisionism is now being written about Franco, whom we are treating in reverse; the former "bad boy" Franco is now being whitewashed. And we are just about due for a re-evaluation of Chiang Kai-Shek; President Syngman Rhee, whose "democratic" regime we saved; and the "dictator" Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar of Portugal (whom we need nearly as much as Franco).

Dragnich's brilliant survey of the origins and evolution of Tito's regime belongs to the "black-white" school. It is a most devastating and effective demolishing job among those already undertaken by several other scholars whose leadership has now been assumed by this American-born Montenegran. Thoroughly documented and based on the impressions and interviews that Dragnich was able to gather during his stay in Yugoslavia as cultural attaché in the American Embassy in Belgrade, it presents facts which appear significant and important, telling the genesis of Tito's rule with clarity amounting to brutality. The handling of the theme is competent and comprehensive, and the arguments presented not without a certain eloquence arising from Dragnich's own keen feeling on the matter.

The reviewer cannot criticize Dragnich's workmanship on the basis of his documents or his personal impressions of Yugoslavia. But it is only fair to point out that the general impression left by Dragnich raised certain definite questions. It appears that from the very moment when Tito started to organize the Partisans he has been fighting everybody—Michailovich, nationalistic and political opponents, the Serbian as well as the Croat people (p. 29), and when starting on his career even arguing with Stalin (pp. 287 ff.). This might all be true, but how is it possible that Tito has survived and that his regime is still a going concern? What are the Yugoslav elements, besides the standard Communist techniques of domination, that have allowed Tito's survival among his people? And is not Yugoslavia the only country in the former Cominform allowing tourists and even advertising for them? In this respect, Dragnich offers us no answer whatsoever. In short, it is a very good academic yarn, despite the purplish tinge of the writing, with the Tito novel plot ingeniously treated and worked out. It is true that "in reality, of course, the Communist leaders' primary aim was to seize political power, a fact now readily admitted by them" (p. 22). But what other aim has any political movement ever had?

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

FREE EUROPE PRESS. The Research Staff. *Satellite Agriculture in Crisis: A Study of Land Policy in the Soviet Sphere.* Pp. 130. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $2.50.

The productivity crisis in Soviet Agriculture and the 1953 "new agricultural course," designed to bring about greater farm output, have once more stimulated discussion regarding collectivized agriculture—including now the land policy in the entire Soviet sphere, coupled with its effects on Soviet power.

The authors present us with a concise study of the whys of the admitted shortcomings of the Soviet system of agriculture, especially in the satellite countries. There existed the concepts of revolution from above and by degrees which influenced every aspect of East European Communist policy. A bloody frontal assault on East European peasantry was to be avoided while gaining power. Collectivization was attempted in different fashions in each country. But peasantry expressed antagonism before the construction of the new society could be effected. This process is analyzed and supported with statistics for each country, including Yugoslavia.

The major turning point in the collectivization drive came when the mounting agricultural crisis in 1953 produced concessions: material incentives to peasant productivity, increased use of the open market, greater supply of consumers' goods, reduction of state delivery quotas, vigorous efforts to detach technicians from cities and send them to farms. These do *not* constitute fundamental policy changes. Yet they betray an inner anachronism: Soviet collectivization has been primarily designed to *redistribute* agricultural produce, rather than to *increase* it; to supply the urban group to which the Communists attached themselves, rather than to fill the needs of the peasantry or of the land; to effect industrialization in which the peasant would absorb the major shock. But the bedrock economic needs of an expanding industrial society call for ever increasing agricultural productivity, notoriously low on collective farms. Implicitly only free peasants will produce sufficiently and efficiently. Thus the authors contend that the present modus vivendi between the pleasantry and Communist regimes is a precarious and unstable truce of antagonistic social forces.

But they point also realistically to the changing character of Communism itself. The 1928 Stalinist elaboration of the intimate connection between Communist agricultural policy and the demands of construction of a totalitarian industrial economy may never be such a decisive issue for the satellite countries. The Communist "solution" to the land problem of Eastern Europe is no real solution at all; total collectivization may not be economically needed. In the meantime peasants and their traditions persist. One may expect very interesting developments which merit continued, closest scrutiny, like this study provides.

ERNEST F. WINTER
Iona College

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

PHILIP WILLIAMS. *Politics in Post-War France.* Pp. xiv, 500. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1954. $7.00.

The author, lecturer in Modern History at Oxford University, faces the choice of following British academic practice of complete political detachment, or that of French writers who, despite state control of the universities, are "less concerned to avoid . . . taking sides." Conceding "there is much to be said for both approaches," but "nothing for professing one and practicing the other," he holds bias dangerous "only when concealed or unconscious." Finding it neither possible nor desirable to "avoid acquiring preferences and prejudices," he writes, "as supporter of the moderate wing of the Labour Party."

The book covers the years of the Fourth Republic, 1947–1953, on the background of the Third Republic, 1875–1947, the period with a constitution held to be fitting a monarchical as well as a republican regime.

Within four overhead parts—Background, Parties, Constitution, Political System—there are twenty-four specialized chapters: "Basis of French Politics"; "War and Aftermath, 1940–1947"; "Search for a Majority, 1947–1953";—"Communist

Party"; "Socialist Party"; *"Mouvement Républicain Populaire";* "Radical Party"; "Conservative Groups"; *"Rassemblement du Peuple Français";* "Minor Parties";—"Constitutional Problem"; "Presidency and Premiership"; "National Assembly"; "Assembly and Government"; "Committee System"; "Budget"; "Council of the Republic"; "Other Constitutional Organs";—"Electoral Laws"; "Pressure Groups"; "Parties and Elections"; "Parties and Government"; "Conclusion."

Behind sober titles of chapters, diagrams, maps, appendices, the author develops dynamic themes and scenes of a sophisticated, ruthless show—somber, comic, tragic, never dull; but sometimes highly detrimental to the commonweal and every Frenchman's vital concern. Stress is laid on the hectic parliamentary and governmental behavior pattern conditioned by a surging multitude of parties, large, small, and in between, whirling about in ever changing combinations motivated by agricultural, industrial, political, social, religious, and colonial involvements. The scenery inevitably bares the individual Frenchman's yearning for, or fear of, the strong man, real or imaginary.

While foreign critics may take a dim view of France's future—not so the author. French democracy, he admits, faces more immediate external and internal dangers than Britain and the United States. Despite "superficial contempt for politics" French voters go to the polls "in proportion . . . far higher than their counterparts in the United States." Instability is not as dangerous as it seems. Recurrent *"crises"* appear "reshuffles," bringing new blood, and permitting the old to change direction, thus providing "the means by which solutions are found to the more intractable problems of policy." For the peace of the West, may the author be proved correct!

JOHANNES MATTERN
Johns Hopkins University

VAL R. LORWIN. *The French Labor Movement.* Pp. xiii, 346. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $6.00.

This study of the French labor movement is presented by a careful student who has a fundamental belief in the value to modern society of organized labor. He has an abiding faith, it would seem, in the ability of free peoples to work out a way of life for themselves. He sees the slowness of the trek along the path to social stability in France as unfortunate, but necessary. And he puts the story of French industrial relations into its proper international place.

He does all of this as a social scientist with a research report to make, leaving his conclusions to find their place at the end of the study where the authority of the analysis will give them significance.

The student of industrial relations who wants to compare American labor movements with those in France with a view to seeing why the French workers have not mobilized their strength against Communism as have their American brothers will find this study rewarding. The fact that the pro-Communist *Confédération Générale du Travail* is the largest and best disciplined labor organization in France does not seem to mean that Communism has been gaining effective strength in that country. The CGT has split and united and split and united and split again on the Communist question; but even now it is not led by Communists alone and is not synonymous with the Communist party. Neither is the *Force Ouvrière* controlled by the Socialist Party, or the Catholic *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* by the Catholic *Mouvement Républicain Populaire.* This seems to be true despite the fact that the union movement has achieved more strength in France through legislation than through collective bargaining.

The author thinks that the CGT works against the recovery of a democratic France, and that the free unions have to maintain what is in fact a negative fight against the Communist CGT, the shortsightedness of the employers and the "immobilism" of the government. He says that the workers' hopes have been so often frustrated by wars on French soil, in the Far East, and Africa that they are not accompanied by the faith that collective action can win much permanent stability for labor. Working men have a weakened confidence in their nation's political and industrial leadership; which fact, when coupled with a long history of the dependence upon short-term, ill-financed, and ineffectual strikes as their principal means of action, leaves them passive.

Professor Lorwin gives a very satisfactory analysis of the structure and process of the labor movement in France with emphasis on the years since 1946. The efforts at collective bargaining, more unsuccessful than we have sometimes heard, the success in gaining social security, the organization of local plant unions, of industrial unions, and national federations all receive good treatment. He notes the rejection of the principle of compulsory arbitration in labor disputes and the substitution for it of compulsory conciliation. But there are shortcomings in any compulsory action in France, even in the practice of requisitioning of workers by the government as a means to break strikes.

The author's conclusion seems to be that the long tradition and special character of labor struggles in France are in themselves the chief blocks to the solution of current issues. He leaves it to the employers, to the government, and to the labor organizations to overcome their own past.

W. HENRY COOKE
Claremont Graduate School

LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL. *The Scourge of the Swastika.* Pp. xii, 259. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $4.50.

This "Short History of Nazi War Crimes" is a compact documentary of the unspeakable barbarity and depravity of which men are capable and which happened but a few years back in civilized Europe, where—on the lowest computation—12 million men, women, and children were done to death; not in battle, not in passion, but in the cold, calculated, deliberate attempt to destroy. The book is intended to "provide the ordinary reader with a truthful and accurate account," and the author, a distinguished member of the British bar, is well equipped to present it, for he served as a Deputy Judge Advocate General, British Army of the Rhine, at the war crime trials in the British zone of occupation.

This is a completely unemotional, almost irritatingly commentless presentation of the basic records of monstrous murder and cruelty that still stagger the imagination and depress all optimism in the decency of man. Lord Russell seems to carry no personal grudge against the Germans, but he does feel that we should not too eagerly nor too soon forget the hideous horror of Belsen, Buchenwald, and Dachau, where almost three million prisoners were butchered in Auschwitz alone, with 10,000 people vanishing in the gas chambers per day. As a matter of fact, so strong does he feel about it that he refused to drop publication of this book even if it did result in his enforced resignation last August as Assistant Judge Advocate General in London. Perhaps the many books of apologia in behalf of the Nazis, which have recently appeared, have further irked his conscience to make these records known. There are sixteen frightening photographs, superfluous and yet necessary perhaps for those who still believe otherwise. The Nazis kept punctilious records—and while the author had access to them, he was wise not to try to encompass the entire sordid chapter, but offer just enough to make it a most damaging entry into the ledger of contemporary civilization. And it will take more than the expediency of the day, verbose politesse, and a favorable trade balance to atone for this so hurriedly evaporated genocide.

BORIS ERICH NELSON
Hampton Institute

ALFRED GROSSER and others. *Administration et politique en Allemagne occidentale.* Pp. xxi, 247. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954. No price.

This is volume fifty-seven of the *Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* and the first publication of the German section of the *Centre d'Études des Relations Internationales,* organized in 1952 as part of the *Fondation.* It is a highly selective compendium. If the nine chapters, written by seven French and German contributors, have anything in common, it is the theme of federal-state and municipal relations under the Basic Law of 1949. Several chapters, however, stress functional and operational aspects of state or municipal administration with only casual reference to the federal framework

while others, particularly the one on Lower Saxony, are almost exclusively devoted to the discussion of local government.

For the American student of German affairs, this volume contains much that is useful and new. It provides an insight into the practical aspects and real consequences of federalism in the second Republic. It points up some of the problems and difficulties arising from the operation of a state system, that is partly brand new, components of which are but artificial creations, lacking a raison d'être in the all-German frame of things, and hence is partly unreal, ephemeral, and transitory.

Second, the chapter on Lower Saxony and to some extent the introductory chapter on the first session of the Bundestag give a vivid picture of politics in the Federal Republic. In particular, the chapter on Lower Saxony unravels for the American reader the intricacies of coalition politics at the state and federal levels. It also sheds new light on the problem of correlating the activities of a centrally directed party organization, such as that of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands,* with the conflicting and divergent requirements of local politics under a federal system. The example of Lower Saxony shows that the conflict between the party-liners and their comrades in high state offices can at times have rather amusing consequences.

Third, the American reader is provided with an insight into the juridical, structural, and functional problems of state and municipal administration in the new Germany. In the chapters dealing with state administrations, the treatment is rather sketchy and usually focussed on only one particular aspect or problem such as the role and function of the civil service. But in Part III, devoted to local self-government in a federal state, the coverage is more complete. Here are close-ups of Trier, Düsseldorf, Göttingen, and Heiligenhof (Holstein), discussions of the concept of *Selbstverwaltung,* its constitutional basis under the Basic Law, and a fairly exhaustive treatment of administrative, legal, and political problems encountered in these self-governing municipalities.

Appended is an annotated bibliography on the Basic Law, the constitutional aspects of unification, and federal-state relations.

HENRY L. BRETTON
University of Michigan

OTHER COUNTRIES

W. W. ROSTOW and others. *The Prospect for Communist China.* Pp. xx, 379. New York: Published jointly by the Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and John Wiley and Sons, 1954. $5.00.

This superb book should be read by every one concerned with United States foreign policy or with Far Eastern affairs. Like its predecessor, *The Dynamics of Soviet Society,* it is the work of a team, it is the summary of a great deal of specialized material, it is analytic rather than interpretive, and it affords open American scholarship a glimpse into the workings of that formidable rival of traditional academic work, the new and mysterious world of classified scholarship.

Studies like this have been prepared for some years in the old Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, in the Office of Intelligence Research of the State Department, and in many other federal agencies. The simplification and collectivization of scholarship by characteristically American methods of teamwork is a phenomenon affecting the line of every scholar and man of affairs in this country. It can be said that this volume and its Soviet-area counterpart would be important landmarks in the history of American scholarship, whatever the subject matter. The fact that each deals with an extraordinarily sensitive and crisis-fraught area of American foreign policy and strategic position makes the two books all the more important.

The China volume does a great deal to dispel the myth of "the Far Eastern expert." The authors of this volume have consulted Far Eastern experts very widely, all the way from people whom Senator McCarthy admires to others whom the Senator abhors. They have demonstrated that it is possible to reach intelligent conclusions concerning what is happening in China without going into the elaborate and often unnecessary masquerade of esoteric wisdom which has so often and lamentably been regarded as a minimum requirement for serious Far Eastern scholarship.

The presentation is a balanced and extremely sensible composite of the recent past and the immediate present. A first part provides an extremely succinct and fair-minded summary of what happened in China between 1840 and 1949. The second part describes the evolution of Communist policy in the five critical years of taking and consolidating power, 1949 to 1954. The four remaining parts deal respectively with the Chinese Communist Government and the people under its control, with Sino-Soviet relations, with the economic structure and current economic problems, and with the prospects for Communist China. Ideological problems are treated skimpily. The conclusions reached are as sensible and modest as the body of the book. The authors reach the final conclusion that the destiny of China "rests substantially with the peoples of the Free World and their governments" (p. 314).

It is important that men new to the China field should have been able to put together so much sheer fact and to cement their conclusions with an impressive bibliographical apparatus. For specialists to have done this would have been remarkable. For outsiders to come into the Far Eastern field and do it is nothing short of miraculous. A performance such as this means, at least in part, that the American people have the skills which they need to follow a world of moving targets.

Far Eastern experts will find minor points with which to argue. The general reader will be satisfied with a panorama of China under Communism and will hope that the kind of disciplined teamwork evidenced by the production of this volume will continue to serve the public as well as the sensitive or strategic agencies of the American Government.

PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER
School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University

E-TU ZEN SUN. *Chinese Railways and British Interests 1898–1911.* Pp. viii, 230. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1954. $4.00.

This is a reliable and restrained account of railway projects and railway politics in China from the battle of concessions in 1898 to the Revolution of 1911 with special attention to British diplomacy and British finance. In contrast with the violent language of current discussion of such matters Mrs. Sun's account seems positively gentle. But the facts are set forth and the story cannot be called a cheerful one.

The development in China throughout the period was toward domestic financing and unification, but domestic financing failed and unification brought out opposition to the Manchu court and culminated in revolution.

The development on the British side was from independent contracts on the part of British corporations to co-operation with others and finally to the four-power consortium which entered into the Hukuang loan agreement of 1911. The culmination was in the sterile political manoeuvering of the Chinchow-Aigun proposal and the Knox neutralization plan.

Mrs. Sun summarizes in her concluding chapter the factors in the failure of more effective railway development in China before 1911. One of these was the growing international political tension, the cold war, of the period. The scene, observed from today, was one of Great Power irresponsibility and American immaturity. Another factor was the divided Manchu-Chinese government of China and the rising anti-Manchu temper of the Chinese.

Special attention may be directed to a double factor which is clearly set forth in this study, and which might have been more fully developed. It is the scarceness of capital in China and the efforts of the Chinese to mobilize what capital there was.

In western comments of the time the attempts to finance and build railways on the part of provincial groups tend to be set down as local agitation or to be given more dignity as rising Chinese nationalism.

Mrs. Sun uses the terms "gentry-merchant," "gentry capitalist," "the learned

and moneyed gentry" to describe these Chinese groups. That they did not have the means to finance extensive railway development is understandable, though it was not always understood by their own officials. What is more difficult to explain is the fact that they seem always to have been associated with the province and not to have thought of railways for the region or the country. Mrs. Sun points out that these gentry-merchants were wealthier and more numerous in some provinces than in others, that they were more independent of the officials in some provinces than in others. She has other things to say that should be pondered by those who sharply contrast gentry and merchant in traditional China. Gentry-capitalists *did* build the Shanghai-Hangchow railway which crossed a provincial boundary. If, in general, the gentry-merchants had not been so provincial, China might have mobilized more effectively what capital she had.

Mrs. Sun did well what she set out to do. When this has been said she should be urged to write more fully on the "learned and moneyed gentry" of the time.

CHARLES F. REMER
University of Michigan

WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD. *The Economic Development of Japan, Growth and Structural Change, 1868–1938.* Pp. xiv, 603. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. $10.00.

Rarely is a reviewer asked to comment on a book like this, for which the scholarship has been so prodigious and the resulting interpretations so brilliant. Most of the sources from which information has been gathered are by Western economists, but key studies by Japanese scholars have also been used. Many of the developments described have been treated in English before, but never yet with this over-all thoroughness and with such perceptive correlations. Moreover, Dr. Lockwood has skillfully placed topical analyses in the useful context of Japanese experience as a pioneer modernizer in Asia—a precursive grappler with problems which now confront other Asian economies, including that of mainland China, ones in earlier stages of agricultural and industrial advancement.

Few may read this nearly 600-page text thoroughly, but it will serve many well for information and interpretations about topics of their special interest. For example, the reviewer was particularly interested in the light that is shed on Japanese social stratification and mobility in relation to political behavior; and he was well rewarded. The author's chief regret (as expressed in the Preface): "that the impersonal statistics which crowd its pages fail entirely to convey a sense of the human aspirations, the personal leadership, the toil and learning and sacrifice which built the Japanese economy" is, of course, inherent in this kind of treatment; still it is possible to sense his appreciation of these factors and his sensitivity to policies bearing on problems of socio-economic justice. His style is remarkably lucid for this kind of writing.

The first two chapters provide a concise economic history of Japan from the Restoration to World War I, and then on to 1936, latterly with more emphasis on changing economic structure after the great depression and the occupation of Manchuria. Chapter III describes major aspects of economic growth during the seven decades before Japan became deeply involved in an increasingly total war. At one point, Dr. Lockwood concludes that "the pressure of population was being gradually relieved by the growth of income and wealth per person. This process went forward steadily with only temporary setbacks, until war destroyed the civilian economy after 1938 and produced an 'overpopulation' crisis of first-rate magnitude." Chapter IV, under the general title: "Technology," includes a description of the structure of Japan's labor force. The *zaibatsu* and problems of competition *vs.* collusion are also treated here. Reasons are given for economic combinations and concentrations of power; their positive functions as well as dangers receive attention. The next chapter concerning economic capital includes sections on distribution of income, capital accumulation and investment, and lessons to be derived from Japanese experience in the channeling of capital.

Not until Chapters VI and VII does the author concentrate on Japan's foreign trade, and then (especially Pp. 307–310) he convincingly corrects the common overemphasis on the dependence of Japan's economy on foreign trade. As he explains, the industrial revolution in Japan, though stimulated by trade and technology from the West, was a pervasive development, relying (except for an important sector—about 25–35 per cent) on domestic markets. As compared to most other major industrial economies, however, this is a rather high proportion. The second of these two chapters treats the role of overseas trade in prewar Japanese economic development. The role of trade with China—exchanges with net balances usually in Japan's favor—is seen.

Next come two chapters describing domestic and international factors influencing changes in the structure of the Empire's economy. Chapter VIII treats changes in incomes and expenditures, gives international comparisons, and interprets the effects of Japanese specialization for international markets. Chapter IX on employment of resources includes a summary analysis of the structure of the Japanese labor force. The final chapter: "The State and Economic Enterprise," includes analyses of the structure and distribution of taxes, trade policies, features of Japan's tariff system, public policies regarding group interests, and a concluding summary.

ALLAN B. COLE
The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy

DELMER BROWN. *Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis.* Pp. viii, 336. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. $5.00.

Professor Brown has written a well-documented, interesting, and scholarly book on Japanese nationalism, somewhat in the style of a text book. It is probably intended for use in a general course on nationalism and should be worthwhile for such a purpose, but it contains little if anything new to students of Japanese history.

The thesis presented is that nationalism is a type of group loyalty; that its growth in Japan was influenced by Japan's geographical separateness and the further elements of a common racial descent, language, religion, and government activated by social and political developments placing the members of the nation in a close interdependent relationship. These developments are associated with technological progress, economic expansion, political centralization, and cultural unification within the nation; and competition, rivalry, or danger from other nations. At the base of the present two-world struggle, the author tells us, is the incompatability of the open society with the closed society. In the former, where nationalism develops under conditions of long periods of unusual economic growth and freedom from foreign danger, it is less virulent and enjoys great political and social mobility; in the latter, where nationalism develops under foreign pressure with feelings of fear and hatred, the nation is not so realistic or rational in the appraisal of its own strength and that of other nations, and the established ruling groups usually remain in power.

For nine chapters, the author discusses succeeding periods of Japanese history with relation to the elements above-mentioned and endeavors to trace the growth of group consciousness, and the spread of nationalism from the ruling classes to the populace as a whole. For example, he points out that during the Bakufu period, internal political rivalries were as important as foreign pressure in bringing about the Restoration while, on the contrary, after 1936, nationalism was more engendered by a strong fear of foreign enemies and a powerful sense of mission to establish a new order in East Asia. However, being able subsequently to appraise the relative importance of each element in any given set of circumstances is not quite the same as being able to formulize the probable effect of each element in a new combination of them. Due to the sociological nature of the subject, predictions cannot be made with any degree of positiveness. Therefore, the study, while valuable as an historical narrative, provides no scientific or certain indication of the future direction that nationalism in Japan may take. The hope is expressed that it will not be

based on the fear motif which might possibly compel the Japanese to seek nationalist growth within the Communist orbit.

Certain observations of the author are open to question such as his statement that even after the collapse of Germany, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and the declaration of war by Russia, *most* Japanese were determined to fight on to the final battle (cf. Butow's "Japan's Decision to Surrender") but on the whole, the book is accurate and an excellent addition to the literature on the Far East.

ALBERT E. KANE

Washington, D. C.

A. CURTIS WILGUS (Ed.). *The Caribbean: Its Economy.* Pp. xix, 286. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1954. $4.50.

This volume contains the papers presented at the fourth annual conference on the Caribbean held at the University of Florida in December 1953, sponsored by the School of Inter-American Studies. The contributions are grouped under five major headings: Resources and Production, Manufacturing and Investments, Transportation and Marketing, Labor and Industry, Culture and the Economy.

A unique—and rewarding—feature of the volume is the attention given to problems of private investment. A number of business representatives discuss the Caribbean area as an outlet for North American capital and trade. John M. Mitchell, manager of the export division of the Aluminum Company of America, stresses the importance of personal attitudes and suggests certain criteria for United States investments in foreign countries, the most important being that "the investment should be a project that will benefit the recipient country and its people" and that it "should be expected to earn only a reasonable return." Statements which I suspect have a more familiar ring to Latin Americans are made by Percy C. Magnus, President of Magnus, Mabee and Reynard, an export-import firm of New York City, and Frank K. Bell, Vice President of the Alcoa Steamship Company. Mr. Magnus suggests that not only expropriation but even the threat of seizure is enough to shut off the flow of venture capital. "The pen strokes affixed to the expropriation papers are a screeching siren signal heard throughout the world, warning capital not to invest in that country. Such acts can never be construed to be 'in the public welfare.'" Mr. Bell argues that the Caribbean should be considered "an American lake." (". . . it is a sad thing that about 50 per cent of the shipping in the Caribbean is under flags other than those of the Americas.") To achieve this goal, U. S. shipping should have "the kind of support America gives to most of her products—patronage and the necessary government assistance."

Víctor L. Urquidi, of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America, in a thoughtful article on "Financing Investment in Mexico and Central America," suggests that the "new" Latin-American pattern of economic development—which focuses on the domestic market rather than on the exportation of primary products—necessarily calls for a substantial amount of public investment (especially for social overhead items) and the channeling of savings into private enterprise undertakings through official development corporations and banking institutions. His main conclusion is that the experience of Mexico and Central America shows that the methods of financing development in the economically more advanced countries cannot be copied or easily adapted by the lesser developed countries.

A comprehensive survey of mineral resources in the Caribbean countries is presented by Alan Probert of the U. S. Bureau of Mines. Professor Carl O. Sauer provides a sweeping review of agricultural, forestry, and fishery resources. He makes a strong case for the native *conuco* technique of planting and for the plantation system ("bigness is no more bad in sugar and bananas than it is in shoes or automobiles"). On the whole, however, agriculture—the mainstay of the Caribbean economies—receives amazingly little attention.

Possibly the most satisfying section in the book is the one on labor and welfare. Mary M. Cannon, of the Women's Bureau, U. S. Department of Labor, presents an understanding treatment of the relations between labor and government in the context of the special historical and cultural circumstances of the Latin-American countries. She explains how and why labor and government exist on terms of mutual suspicion, mutual support, and mutual dependence on lawyers "to tangle or untangle their problems." Ernest Schartz, of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, presents a comprehensive survey of labor organizations, covering each of the Caribbean countries. Clarence Senior offers a scholarly and well balanced treatment of housing problems and programs within the broad context of the demographic and economic factors which influence welfare in these countries. He stresses the implications for welfare of the continuing high birth rate and the sharply declining death rate. Housing, sanitation, and other welfare plans, he points out, will have a much better chance to succeed in raising levels of living if efforts are directed to the control of births. The remarkable progress which has been made by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, through its planned and integrated programs of development and welfare, is discussed in articles by Earl Parker Hanson and Felisa Rincón de Gautier. Puerto Rico stands out as the "Caribbean success story."

As if to underline the fact that man cannot live by bread alone, a section of the book is devoted to culture, including articles on Caribbean education, drama, music and poetry; Guatemalan arts and crafts, and archives.

In general, the volume leaves much to be said about the Caribbean economy; if the meat is a little spare, the *hors d'oeuvres* and the side dishes are quite tasty and the dessert at the end is a pleasant surprise.

HARVEY S. PERLOFF

University of Chicago

EARL PARKER HANSON. *Transformation: The Story of Modern Puerto Rico.* Pp. xxiii, 416. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955. $5.00.

Chester Bowles says in his Introduction: "At a time when we Americans urgently need to burn deeply into our private consciences and public policies a sympathetic grasp of the hopes and strivings of the underdeveloped world, it is both fortunate and arresting that Puerto Rico can teach us so much."

"The Puerto Rican experiment in non-independent independence is totally unique."

"The accomplishments of Governor Luis Muñoz Marín are striking. He calls his administration 'a government of the poor for the poor.' 'Bread, Land, and Liberty,'" is the rallying call of his Popular Democratic Party and of awakening peoples everywhere in Asia, Africa, and South America."

These themes are vigorously expanded in a dramatic narrative by Earl Parker Hanson, geographer, explorer of the Amazon, first head of the United States Economic Mission to Liberia, formerly on the staff of the Mississippi Valley Committee, and of the predecessor to the present Puerto Rico Planning Board.

Contemporary history, cheerful for a change, strides through these colorful pages, with the reader hard put to keep up with the pace. The story is of the transformation of Puerto Rico from a colonial poor house, a blot on the coat of arms of Uncle Sam, to an outstanding democracy with economic achievements unparalleled by the Caribbean colonies of England and France.

"With the world in a turmoil over the twin problems of abolishing colonialism and raising living standards of billions of peoples, Puerto Rico, with Washington's full cooperation, has set an important example of the manner and manners in which these problems can be solved. Visitors who see what Puerto Rico has done and is doing go home again saying, 'This is America's answer to Communism. . . .'"

Morris Llewellyn Cooke, the social engineer and ex-administrator of the United States Rural Electrification Administration, says of *Transformation:* "It is one of the most useful and interesting treatises on government I have ever seen."

Hanson commends Tugwell, the last continental governor of Puerto Rico, for his leadership and courage in advancing the self-government of Puerto Rico. Some other United States governors are handled without gloves, but an appealing character

is created for Governor Muñoz Marín, the idealistic young reformer who, after years of apparent defeat, finally won the confidence of the most suspicious forgotten people of Puerto Rico and out of them created a political party committed to definite economic reforms now largely consumated.

This anecdote about him, among others, is revealing. Muñoz, being driven by politicians after his election, retreated to a resort for privacy, and gave orders that no one was to be admitted except members of his family and *any* Jíbaro (peasant) *who might want to see him.* A poor old Jíbaro promised the Virgin that if Muñoz was elected governor he would make a pilgrimage and kneel at the latter's feet. After the election the old man sold his last two chickens and journeyed to see the Governor. When he told the Governor that he was going to kneel before him the Governor said: "There is no reason why I should not kneel with you." Afterwards, someone suggested that the old man having sold his only chickens to journey to the Governor, therefore the Governor should give him the money to get back home. The Governor said: "When a man offers you his soul do you give him change?"

The plain people are repaying Muñoz' love and respect by increasing majorities at each election.

Under Muñoz's leadership since he became Governor in 1948 Puerto Rico has been opening a new factory once a week, has doubled its per capita income, has eliminated malaria, built new schools, roads, and hospitals. All of this has been done as part of the United States with the understanding aid of the Federal Government, but without management from the continent. Contemporary Puerto Rico is the brightest feather in Uncle Sam's hat, a feather which should be more conspicuously displayed.

This is the aim of *Transformation,* a story of the upsurgence of the human spirit under democratic opportunity.

The United States Information Service should reprint *Transformation* in a cheap edition in languages read by people in undeveloped countries who are deluged with Russian claims of its own perfect system and of the alleged degradating exploitation by capitalist America.

OTTO TOD MALLERY

Philadelphia, Pa.

CORRECTION

Professor Pieter Geyl has asked the editor to call attention to the fact that his review of Alfred Cobban's *Ambassadors and Secret Agents* in the January 1955 issue of THE ANNALS as printed contained an error. On page 173, column 2, lines 11–12, ". . . the Patriots . . . could not count on the support of France" should read, ". . . the Patriots . . . could count on the support of France."

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

In his review of my book "Why Dictators?" (ANNALS, November 1954), Professor Odegard says that I "have not given an answer to the question the title poses," and that my book contains "not much in the way of theory or structure."

The answer to the question "why dictators?" is embodied in my basic theory which is outlined in the Introduction (pp. 1–6) and set forth in detail in the first sections of the first three parts.

In the Introduction I explain that the concept of dictatorship, because of its complex character, cannot be handled scientifically unless it is split up into a series of types, which then are sketched in a preliminary fashion. The Introduction also briefly indicates the place of these types in human history, and the fact that in spite of their intrinsic differences, they all exercise a function in the development of revolutions, typical of Western civilization.

Thus, while a single all-encompassing answer to the question "why dictators?" cannot be given, my book answers the question for each type. In doing so, it stresses the general principle that, while the often queer characters fit to enact the part of one or the other of these different types were as numerous as are bacteria, they could only become "socially virulent" when favored by the right circumstances, that is, by a revolution with an opening for the type in question.

On pp. 8–24 there is given the theory of the emerging of what I call the "classical" dictator type, meaning the middle-of-the-road man who comes to power through antiaristocratic uprisings of city folks and peasants, or peasant elements as whose leader he emerges. On pp. 24–66 historical material is then introduced for the purpose of testing my detailed theory on the rise of the "classical" dictator and of thereby also enhancing the general understanding of the individual cases concerned. This is followed (pp. 66–104) by a composite picture of the general characteristics of the "classical" dictator, comprising his ascent to power, the way he is financed, his political technique, and his relations to the leading social forces of his time.

In Parts II and III, the same procedure is followed with reference to the "ultra-revolutionary" type (that is, dictatorships caused by "revolutions from below") and the "counter and pseudorevolutionary" types (dictators who owe their rise to a co-operation with the classes on top). Both these parts start with my general theory of the emerging of these types (pp. 106–110, and 166–174, respectively) and then proceed to particulars. In the last part (No. IV) the general theoretical yardsticks shaped in the preceding parts are used for the analysis of present day dictatorships.

I am sending these lines to THE ANNALS in order to give your readers an adequate idea of my basic theory, the methods, and the structure of my book, and thus to enable them better to decide for themselves whether or not I have made my point. It might also be open to question whether my "canvas" is so full of sight-obscuring figures as Professor Odegard would lead one to believe. At least no other reviewer missed its symmetry and landscape.

My methods—based on Max Weber—can of course be used with reference to any social subject, but they might be found to offer a special interest when applied to a topic as important and timely as dictatorship.

GEORGE W. F. HALLGARTEN

Washington, D. C.

OTHER BOOKS

ADAMS, GEORGE P., JR. *Competitive Economic Systems.* Pp. xii, 516. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $6.00.

AUSTIN, JOHN. *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence.* Pp. xxi, 396. New York: Noonday Press. No date. $3.50.

BALDWIN, LELAND D. *Survey of American History.* Pp. xv, 786, lxxv. New York: American Book Company, 1955. $6.00.

BARKAN, MANUEL. *A Foundation for Art Education.* Pp. xi, 235. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $4.00.

BORDEN, MORTON. *The Federalism of James A. Bayard.* Pp. 256. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.00.

BRUNNER, EDMUND DE S., and WILBUR C. HALLENBECK. *American Society: Urban and Rural Patterns.* Pp. xviii, 591. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $6.00.

CAILLIET, EMILE. *The Dawn of Personality.* Pp. 232. Indianapolis; New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1955. $3.00.

CARR, ROBERT K. *American Democracy in Theory and Practice.* Pp. xxix, 957. Revised ed. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1955. $6.00.

CARTTER, ALLAN MURRAY. *The Redistribution of Income in Postwar Britain: A Study of the Effects of the Central Government Fiscal Program in 1948–49.* Pp. viii, 242. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955. $5.00.

Case Against 'Right to Work' Laws, The. Pp. 171. Published jointly by the Legislative, Legal, and Education and Research Departments of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. No date. $3.00.

CÉPÈDE, MICHEL, and MAURICE LENGELLÉ. *L'économie de l'alimentation.* Pp. 123. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954. No price.

CHALLENER, RICHARD D. *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866–1939.* Pp. 305. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.50.

CLAUNCH, JOHN M. *The Government of Dallas County, Texas.* (Arnold Foundation Studies. Vol. V. New Series.) Pp. 400. Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954. $5.00.

COLM, GERHARD, with the editorial assistance of HELEN O. NICOL. *Essays in Public Finance and Fiscal Policy.* Pp. xvii, 375. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $4.75.

COUPER, WALTER J., and ROGER VAUGHAN.

Pension Planning: Experience and Trends. Pp. x, 245. New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, 1954. No price.

CROCKETT, JOSEPH P. *The Federal Tax System of the United States: A Survey of Law and Administration.* Pp. xxii, 288. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.75.

CROOK, J. A. *Consilium Principis: Imperial Councils and Counsellors from Augustus to Diocletian.* Pp. xi, 198. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $5.00.

CROSSER, PAUL K. *The Nihilism of John Dewey.* Pp. xi, 238. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.75.

DANTE. *Monarchy, and Three Political Letters.* (The Library of Ideas, Vol. VII.) Pp. xxi, 121. New York: Noonday Press. No date. $2.75.

DASTUR, ALOO J. *Man and His Environment.* Pp. 296. Bombay, India: G. R. Bhatkal for The Popular Book Depot, 1954. Rs. 12/8.

DUNNER, JOSEPH. *Baruch Spinoza and Western Democracy.* Pp. xiii, 142. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.00.

EDEY, HAROLD C., and ALAN T. PEACOCK. *National Income and Social Accounting.* Pp. viii, 224. London: Hutchinson's University Library. (Distributed by Longmans, Green, and Company.) 1954. $1.80 text; $2.40 trade.

Employee Personnel Practices in Colleges and Universities, 1953–1954. Pp. 190. Champaign, Ill.: College and University Personnel Association. No date. $4.00.

FARETRA, A. P. *Dimensions of Life.* Pp. 59. New York: Pageant Press, 1954. $2.00.

FARIS, ROBERT E. L. *Social Disorganization.* 2d ed. Pp. viii, 664. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $5.50.

FRANCO, JOSÉ LUCIANO (Ed.). *Documentos para la Historia de Haití en el Archivo Nacional.* (Publicaciones del Archivo Nacional de Cuba, No. XXXVII.) Pp. 259. La Habana, Cuba: Archivo Nacional de Cuba, 1954. No price.

FRIEDLANDER, WALTER A. *Introduction to Social Welfare.* Pp. xvii, 683. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955. $9.00.

GERDNER, GUNNAR. *Parlamentarismens kris i Sverige vid 1920—talets början.* Pp. 568. Uppsala: Almquist och Wiksell, 1954. No price.

GORDON, MORTON, and KENNETH N. VINES. *Theory and Practice of American Foreign Policy.* Pp. x, 562. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $2.95.

Handbook on State and Local Taxes. Pp. 142. Washington, D. C.: Department of Education and Research, Congress of Industrial Organizations. No date. $3.00.

HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON, and others. *Readings in Anthropology.* Pp. xiv, 417. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $5.00.

HOXIE, R. G. and others. *A History of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University.* Pp. x, 326. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.50.

INFIELD, HENRIK F., and KOKA FREIER. *People in Ejidos: A Visit to the Cooperative Farms of Mexico.* Pp. 149. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $3.00.

Institutes and Their Publics: Proceedings of the International Conference of Institutes of International Affairs, New York, October 1953. Pp. viii, 156. New York: Columbia University Press for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1955. $1.50.

JOHNSON, JOHN L. *Income in Kentucky: County Distributions by Amount, by Type, and by Size.* Pp. xx, 310. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1955. $4.50.

KNODE, JAY C. *An Intellectual Primer.* Pp. 88. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $2.50.

KORNHAUSER, ARTHUR, ROBERT DUBIN, and ARTHUR M. ROSS (Eds.). *Industrial Conflict.* (Prepared for the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.) Pp. xi, 551. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954. $6.00.

LAZARSFELD, PAUL F., and MORRIS ROSENBERG (Eds.). *The Language of Social Research.* Pp. xiii, 590. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $6.50.

MACDONALD, AUSTIN F. *American State Government and Administration.* Pp. xiii, 672. 5th ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $6.00.

MACDONALD, AUSTIN F. *State and Local Government in the United States.* Pp. xvi, 667. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1955. $6.00.

MALLORY, J. R. *Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada.* Pp. xii, 204. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954. $5.00.

MARX, HERBERT L., JR. (Ed.). *Defense and National Security.* Pp. 192. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1955. $1.75.

MAXWELL, JAMES A. *Fiscal Policy: Its Techniques and Institutional Setting.* Pp. vi, 218. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955. $2.90.

MEEK, RONALD L. (Ed.). *Marx and Engels on Malthus.* Translated by Dorothea L. Meek and Ronald L. Meek. Pp. 190. New York: International Publishers, 1954. $2.25.

MOLEY, RAYMOND. *What Price Federal Reclamation.* (National Economic Problems, No. 455.) Pp. vii, 72. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Association, 1955. $1.00.

MOSES, ELBERT R. *Abraham Lincoln: "From Cabin to Capitol."* Pp. 139. Daytona Beach, Fla.: College Publishing Company, 1955. $2.95.

MUENSTERBERGER, WARNER, and SIDNEY AXELRAD (Eds.). *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences.* (Vol. IV.) Pp. 295. New York: International Universities Press, 1955. $6.00.

Muhammads People: A Tale by Anthology. Translated by Eric Schroeder. Pp. xviii, 838. Portland, Me.: Bond Wheelwright Company, 1955. $10.00.

MUND, VERNON A. *Government and Business.* Pp. xii, 738. 2d ed. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $6.00.

OLKHOVSKY, ANDREY. *Music under the Soviets: The Agony of an Art.* Pp. xv, 427. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1955. $6.00.

PEACOCK, ALAN T., and others (Eds.). *International Economic Papers* (No. 4). Pp. 229. London: MacMillan and Company; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $3.50.

PONIATOWSKI, MICHEL. *L'avenir des pays sous-développés.* Pp. 199. Paris: SEFI, 1954. No price.

RÄNK, RICHARD. *Einwirkung des Krieges auf die nichtpolitischen Staatsverträge.* Pp. 234. Uppsala, Sweden: Svenska Institutet för Internationell Rätt, 1949. No price.

RAPER, ARTHUR F., and others. *Urban and Industrial Taiwan—Crowded and Resourceful.* Pp. 370. Taipei, Taiwan, China: Foreign Operations Administration, Mutual Security Mission to China, and National Taiwan University. No price.

REITMAN, FRANCIS. *Insanity, Art, and Culture.* Pp. 111. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $3.75.

RENOUVIN, PIERRE. *Le XIXe siècle, I.: De 1815 à 1871: L'Europe des nationalités et l'éveil de nouveaux mondes.* (Histoire des relations internationales, Vol. V.) Pp. 420. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1954. No price.

RIDDLE, OSCAR. *The Unleashing of Evolutionary Thought.* Pp. xxi, 414. New York: Vantage Press, 1954. $4.50.

ROSSI, A. *La guerre des papillons: quatre ans de politique communiste* (1940–1944). Pp. 332, xlviii. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1954. No price.

SETH, RONALD. *Spies at Work.* Pp. 234. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $4.75.

SHEVKY, ESHREF, and WENDELL BELL. *Social Area Analysis: Theory, Illustrative Application and Computational Procedures.* Pp. vi, 70. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955. $1.75.

STOKES, MILTON L., and CARL T. ARLT. *Money, Banking, and Financial System.* Pp. vi, 670. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $6.00.

SWANSON, JOHN E., and FRANCIS A. MISKELL. *Public Employee Retirement in Texas.* (Public Affairs Series, No. 21.) Pp. xi, 147. Austin, Texas: The University of Texas, Institute of Public Affairs, 1955. $1.50.

SWETTENHAM, JOHN ALEXANDER. *The Tragedy of the Baltic States.* Pp. xi, 216. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $3.50.

TAFT, DONALD R., and RICHARD ROBBINS. *International Migrations: The Immigrants in the Modern World.* Pp. viii, 670. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $7.00.

TIMASHEFF, NICHOLAS S. *Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth.* Pp. xv, 328. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955. $4.50.

TURNER, HENRY A. (Ed.). *Politics in the United States: Readings in Political Parties and Pressure Groups.* Pp. xi, 436. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $5.25.

WALLIS, WILSON D., and RUTH SAWTELL WALLIS. *The Micmac Indians of Eastern Canada.* Pp. xv, 515. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $7.50.

WAYPER, C. L. *Political Thought.* Pp. xii, 260. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $3.75.

WHITE, J. E. MANCHIP. *Anthropology.* Pp. viii, 191. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $2.75.

WILLIAMS, ORLO CYPRIAN. *The Clerical Organization of the House of Commons, 1661–1850.* Pp. xv, 366. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. $5.60.

INDEX

INDEX

Africa
  air transport in, 136
  See also North Africa
Agriculture, use of aircraft in, 64, 135, 138
Air, *see* Atmosphere
Air bases
  and Western defense, 33, 35–36, 49–50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 71, 74, 81, 88, 89, 105, 109–110, 119, 120, 121, 126, 127
  location of, and bombing, 124
  Siberian, in World War II, 17
Air France, 137
Air mail, 31, 64
Airfields, viii, 136
  Chinese, 79, 80
  Middle Eastern, 113
  physical conditions of, effect on flying, 1
  See also Air bases
Airlift, *see* Transport planes
Airlines, commercial, 31, 33, 64, 67, 69, 134–135
Airplane design and manufacture, 49, 134–135, 137–138
  Australian, 56
  Canadian, 56
  European, 15, 41, 51–55, 98
  Japanese, 56
  Middle Eastern, 109
  Soviet, 40–46, 56–57
  U. S., 31, 32, 34–35, 41, 51, 67, 121
Alaska, 16, 20, 35, 45
Alexander, Harold R. L. G., 110
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Report of the Board of Directors to the Members, 1954, 141–143
Anderson, Orvil A., 74
ANZAM, 84
Arab League, 114
Arab states, 111, 115
  air power, 111–113
  and U. S., 116–117
  Arab-Israeli conflict, 111–113
Army (U. S.), 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 83, 89, 99
  air elements of (current), 19, 67, 68
  air power, in World War I, 30
  air services, between world wars, 31–32
  attitude toward air power, 18, 19, 31
  See also Army Air Forces
Army Air Forces (AAF), 32, 34
  Air Transport Command, 33
Army Aviation, 19
Arnold, H. H., 74
  cited, 47
Aron, Raymond, Europe and Air Power, 95–101
Athens, 96, 100, 116
Atmosphere
  air mass movements, 2–3
  composition, 3
  layers, 4–5, 10
  spheres, 3–4, 10
  winds, 1–3
Atomic bombs (fission), 23, 34, 37, 49, 57, 76, 79, 81, 82, 95, 107, 109, 120
  for defined targets, 36
  in limited wars, 20
  psychological effects of, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 60–61
  tactical, 104, 105, 126
  See also Nuclear weapons
Atomic Energy Commission (U. S.), 38
Australia, 55
  air power, 56
  ANZAM, 84
  ANZUS (U. S. treaty), 83
  Royal Australian Air Force, 74
  SEATO, 84

B-36, 19, 35, 36, 57, 68, 71
B-47, 34, 35, 36, 50, 53, 55
Baldwin, Hanson W., quoted, 70
Baldwin, Stanley, 15
Bao Dai, 86
Barnett, Lincoln, cited, 11
Belgium, 51, 52, 53, 55
Bell, Alexander Graham, quoted, 13
Benson, Otis O., Jr., cited, 11
Berlin
  airlift for children in, 65
  blockade and airlift, 64, 69, 75
  bombing of, 17
Bismarck, Otto von, 128
Blériot, Louis, 12
Bradley, Omar Nelson, 74
Brereton, Lewis H., 74
Britain, Battle of, 17, 20
British Commonwealth, 90, 139
British Empire, 14
British European Airways Corporation, 137
Brodie, Bernard
  cited, 17; quoted, 103
Bulganin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich, 47
Bunsen, Robert Wilhelm, 3
Burma, 83, 84, 86, 109
Bussche, Axel von dem, cited, 104

Cambodia, 83, 100
Canada, 27, 35, 50, 52, 56
Carrier-based aircraft, 18, 33, 56, 68, 69–70, 82
Chamberlain, Neville, 15–16
Chennault, Claire L., 74
Chiang Kai-shek, 83, 111
Chilston (Eric Alexander Akers-Douglas), 3rd Viscount, 16
China, 78, 110
China, People's Republic of (Communist, mainland, Red China), 50, 106, 110, 138
  Air Force, 21, 56, 79, 83
  and Formosan situation, 82–83
  and Indochina, 80–82, 83
  and Korean War, 80, 104, 113
  and Middle East, 115
  U. S. policy toward, 76–86 (*passim*)
China, Republic of (Formosa; Nationalist China)
  Air Force, 56
  U. S. alliance with, 66, 83
  See also Formosa
Churchill, Winston, 13, 14, 15, 18, 54, 107
  cited, 47
  quoted, 18, 71
Cities, *see* Urban communities
Civil War (U. S.), 97
Civilian aviation, vii, viii, 31, 64, 113, 134–140
Clausewitz, Karl von, 16, 18
Clegg, J. A., cited, 11
Coast Guard, United States, air elements of, 67
Collective security, 16, 20, 21, 80, 84, 86, 87–94
Colonialism, 77–78, 81, 85–86, 115, 116, 136
Communications
  in aviation and military defense, 5, 50–51, 61, 105, 122, 124, 125
  role of aviation in, 12, 58, 64, 137
Congress (U. S.)
  and air power, 18–19, 68, 70, 73, 75, 121
  and Formosan situation, 82
  military appropriations, 31, 75
Conventional forces and weapons, 20, 36, 89, 99, 102, 103, 105, 107–108, 124
  See also Surface forces
COTTRELL, ALVIN J., The Role of NATO's Air Forces, 102–108
Cuneo, John R., cited, 13
Czechoslovakia, 15–16, 28

Davis, Elmer, quoted, 79
Defense
  against guided missiles, 27, 37, 130, 132
  and air power, vii, 13–14, 17, 20, 21–24, 36, 105, 122, 126
  difficulties of, in air-atomic warfare, 22, 27, 36, 106, 118, 132
  guided missiles in, 128, 130, 131, 132
  of Western Europe, 27, 97–101, 102–108, 123–124, 126–127
  Western Hemisphere, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 34, 56, 68–69, 90, 118, 122, 126
Denmark, 55
Department of Defense, 19, 70–75 (*passim*)
  definition of strategic air warfare, 36
  See also Department of the Air Force
Department of the Air Force, 19
Deterrence
  by air-atomic power, vii, 20–21, 24, 25–26, 29, 35, 37, 68, 71, 76, 88, 89, 99, 100, 102, 106, 107, 108, 119, 121
  by conventional forces and weapons, 107, 108
  role of guided missiles in, 122, 132
  See also Collective security
Dethleffsen, Erich, cited, 105
DeWitt, Nicholas, cited, 46
Dienbienphu, 79, 81–82, 104
Diplomacy, and aviation, 58, 138–139
Disarmament, 15, 102, 126
Disarmament Commission (U. N.), 102
Disaster relief, *see* Relief and rescue
Doolittle, James H., 74
Douhet, Giulio, 16–17, 123
  quoted, 13
Dulles, John Foster, 89, 93, 138
  quoted, 89, 93

Eaker, Ira C., 74
Earle, Edward Mead
  cited, 13; editor, 13
Egypt, 109, 110, 112–113
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 38, 70, 74, 93
  quoted, 25–28 (*passim*), 66, 89, 93
Ely, Louis B., cited, 47
EMME, EUGENE M., Some Fallacies Concerning Air Power, 12–24
Emme, Eugene M., cited, 12
Engineering, schools and students, U. S. and USSR, 46
Ethiopia, 15, 114, 115

Fainsod, Merle, cited, 47
FAY, ELTON C., Air Strength of the United States, 30–37
Ferguson, James, cited, 105
FINLETTER, THOMAS K., Air Power and Foreign Policy, Especially in the Far East, 76–86
Finletter, Thomas K., cited, 47, 68
Fire fighting, airplanes in, 65, 135
Foreign policy (U. S.)
  and air-atomic power, viii, 12, 22–24, 84–85, 88, 126–127, 132
  in the Far East, 76–86
  toward Soviet Union and Communism, 20, 84–85, 127
  See also Collective security; Massive retaliation
Formosa, 78, 82–83, 84, 85, 86
  See also China, Republic of
Forrestal, James, 72
  quoted, 20–21
France
  air bases in, 54
  air power, 50, 52, 54, 55, 98
  and German rearmament, 99, 107
  and Indochina, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86
  commercial airlines and air travel, 97, 135, 137, 139
  in Middle East, 115, 116
  in World War I, 13
  in World War II, 20, 54, 101
  SEATO, 84
  wars of, limited and general, 96–97

Galai, N., cited, 43
Galland, Adolf, quoted, 42
Garthoff, Raymond, cited, 41
Geneva Conference (1932–33; armaments reduction), 15
Geneva Conference (1954), 81
Geography, aerial, 1–11
Germany
  air power in World War II, 17, 37, 42, 96, 104, 105, 110, 128–129, 132
  bombing of, in World War II, 17, 60, 96
  development of air power between world wars, 15–16, 41
  East, 97, 104
  in Middle East, 110–111, 115, 116
  in Spanish Civil War, 15, 32
  in World War I, 13–14, 110
  industrial power, 90
  influence on Soviet aviation, 40, 44, 45, 47
  West, rearmament program, 55, 56, 72, 99, 105, 107
Gibbon, Edward, 23
Goering, Hermann, 15, 16
Golovanov, Alexander Evgenevich, 42
Gorbunov, 45
Gravitation, 4, 7, 8
Great Britain
  air bases in, 49, 50
  air power (current and potential), 49, 52–54, 55, 98
  air power between world wars, 14–16
  and hydrogen bomb attack, 106
  commercial airlines, 135, 137
  in Middle East, 14, 55, 115, 116
  in World War I, 13–14
  in World War II, 17, 20, 52, 53, 96, 132
  military services and Parliament, 73
  North Sea floods, 65, 138
  nuclear superiority, vii
  See also United Kingdom
Greece, 55
Greenland, air bases in, 35, 49
Ground forces, *see* Surface forces
Gruenther, Alfred M., 69
Gudkov, 45
Guided missiles, 18, 21, 22, 44, 53, 56, 68, 95, 98, 122, 125, 128–133
  intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM), 18, 23, 27, 36–37, 122
  V-weapons, 17, 47, 128–129, 132
Gurevich, Mikhail I., 45

Haber, Heinz, quoted, 8
Haines, W. W., quoted, 71
Harnwell, Gaylord Probasco, 142
Harris, Arthur, cited, 47
Haurwitz, Bernard, cited, 11
Helicopters, 33, 55, 137
Heron, S. D., cited, 47
Hiroshima, 60, 95, 104
Hitler, Adolf, 15–16, 17, 32, 42, 110–111
Holley, I. B., Jr., quoted, 22
HULL, EDWARD W. S., A Steel Ring for the Iron Curtain: An Appraisal of Air Power in Other Nations, 49–57
Humphrey, George M., 70, 74
Hungary, 28
Hydrogen (thermonuclear) bombs, 26, 34, 79, 81, 95, 100, 109
  as deterrent, 21, 37
  capabilities of, 36, 106
  comparative cost of warfare with, 93
  Soviet possession of, 19, 39, 57, 107
  See also Nuclear weapons

IBM, *see* Guided missiles
Ilyushin, Sergei Vladimirovich, 45
India, 84, 86, 117
Indochina, 28, 51, 54, 78, 80–82, 83, 84, 86, 103, 116
Indonesia, 83, 84, 86
Instruments, 1, 5, 8, 36
  See also Navigation
International relations
  and aerial geography, 1, 9–11
  and aviation, vii, viii, 1, 9–11, 58, 59, 64, 65–66, 136–140
  and psychological warfare, 61–63
Iran, 111, 114
Iraq, 110, 114
Islam, 113, 115
Israel, 115, 117
  air power, 109, 111–113
  Arab-Israeli conflict, 111–113
Italy, 15, 51, 55

Japan, 45, 55, 56, 78, 83, 84, 86
air power of, 56, 116
as Far Eastern power, 110
bombing in Manchuria, 15
bombing of, 17, 60–61, 74, 106
See also Hiroshima
industrial power, 90
U. S. treaty with, 83
Johnson, Louis Arthur, 70
Joint Chiefs of Staff (U. S.), 70–71, 73
Chairman, 19–20
Junkers, Hugo, 40

Kashmir, 138
Kelly, David, quoted, 47
Kenney, George C., 74
Kerr, Walter, cited, 47
Khripin, V. V., 41, 42
Khrunichev, M. V., 47
Kleiman, Robert, cited, 107
KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines), 135
Korea, 55, 56, 83, 116
U. S. treaty with, 83
Korean War, 17, 19, 20, 21, 28, 32, 45, 51, 56, 69, 70, 74, 80, 85–86, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 113, 114, 120

Laos, 83, 100
Lapchinsky, A. N., 41
Latin America
air transport and industrial development, 136
U. S. air travel to, 139
USAF good-will tour, 64–65
Lavochkin, Semyon A., 45
LEACH, W. BARTON, Obstacles to the Development of American Air Power, 67–75
Leader, George M., 142
League of Nations, 14
Lebanon, 64, 109, 112–113, 115, 116
Lee, Asher, 41
cited, 41, 45, 47
quoted, 38
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 39
Ley, Willy, 41
Libya, 114
Liddell-Hart, B. H., cited, 47
Lindbergh, Charles A., 31
LINEBARGER, PAUL M. A., Air Power in the Modern Middle East, 109–117
Lloyd George, David, 14
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 73
Logistics, air, *see* Transport planes
London, 14, 17, 71, 98
London agreement, 55, 66
Lovell, Bernard, cited, 11
Lovett, Robert A., 73
Luftwaffe, 15–16, 17, 41, 42, 96
Lukin, Sergei Georgevich, 47
Lusinov, Boris, 42

McFarland, Marvin W., cited, 12
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 112
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 16, 18
quoted, 23
Malaya, 83, 84
Malenkov, Georgi M., 42, 47
Manchuria, 15, 105
Manila Pact, *see* Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
Manufacture, of airplanes, *see* Airplane design and manufacture
Mao Tse-tung, 80
Marine Corps, United States, 70, 72, 73, 74
air elements of, 19, 33, 67, 69–70
Marshall, George Catlett, quoted, 24
Marshall Plan, 87
Massive retaliation, 23, 80–81, 82, 88–89, 102–103, 107, 114
Matsu, 82
Mecca airlift, 64
Menken, Jules, cited, 47
Meteors, 6
Middle East
air power in, 109–117, 136
attitude toward East-West conflict, 115–117
defined, 109
oil in, 55, 109, 110–111, 112, 115, 116
Royal Air Force in, 14
Middleton, Drew, cited, 103, 104, 106
MIG's, 45, 51, 52, 57, 105
Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, 45
Mikoyan, Artem I., 45, 47
Military Air Transport Service (U. S.), 33, 64, 69, 113
Miller, A. Austin, cited, 11
Millis, Walter, editor, 21
Minor, Harold B., 64
Mitchell, William, 16–17, 19, 123
Montgomery of Alamein, Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount, 74
cited, 68, 69, 74
quoted, 34
Moon, flight toward, 4
Munich Conference, 14, 15–16, 20
Murchie, Guy, cited, 11
MURPHY, ROBERT D., Collective Security in the Air Age, 87–94
Mutual Security Act, 87

Namais, Jerome, cited, 11
National Defense Act (1947), 19
National Security Council, 19, 70, 73
Nationalism, 12, 23, 61, 64, 136
Navigation, 8–9, 129
See also Instruments

Navy (U. S.), 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79, 81, 89
air elements of, 19, 33, 67, 68–69
attitude toward air power, 18, 19, 31
naval air Transport Service, 33
Revolt of the Admirals, 68
Seventh Fleet, 56, 82, 83
See also Military Air Transport Service
Nepal, 84
Netherlands, the, 51, 52, 53, 55, 65
Neutralism, 117, 127
Neutrality Acts, 87
New Zealand, 83, 84
Newell, Homer E., Jr., cited, 11
Norstad, Lauris, 74
North Africa, 18, 50, 110
air bases in, 35, 49, 50, 54
North Atlantic Treaty, 84, 114
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 21, 81
air power of, 50–55, 69, 76, 84–85, 98, 102–108, 126
and nuclear weapons, 20, 99, 102–103, 105, 124
in Middle East, 114
military forces of, 90, 92, 99, 103–104, 106, 107–108
political solidarity of, 76, 77
North Korea, 21, 105
North Sea floods, air relief, 65, 138
Northcliffe, A. C. W., quoted, 12
Norway, 55
Nuclear propulsion, viii, 8
Nuclear weapons (atomic and hydrogen), 20, 66, 87, 89, 98, 104
and Middle East, 109, 113, 114
and U. S. Far Eastern policy, 76, 77, 79, 80–81, 82, 83, 84, 85
capabilities of, vii, viii, 25, 26, 36, 37, 49, 58, 60, 68, 97, 101, 106, 120
cost of, 93, 98, 101, 119
deterrent value of, vii, viii, 21, 26, 37, 71, 76, 88, 99, 100, 102, 107, 108, 119, 121
development of delivery systems, 107, 118, 119, 124
public attitude toward, 58, 60–61, 66, 79–80, 95, 97, 99, 101
relation to air power, 13, 15, 16, 21, 26, 49, 57, 76, 83, 95, 123, 125
research and development, 95, 118, 119, 126
retaliatory significance of, 20–21, 26–27, 29, 49, 95, 122, 123, 124
Soviet, 19, 39, 47, 57, 67, 70, 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 85, 99, 100, 102–103, 107, 118–127 (*passim*)
tactical, 27, 99, 104, 105, 125, 126
vulnerability of U. S. and West to attack by, 16, 22, 24, 50, 56, 76, 88, 97–98, 99, 105, 106, 107, 118, 120, 121–122
Oberth, Hermann, 41
Oil
German shortages, in World War II, 104–105
in Middle East, 55, 109, 110–111, 112, 115, 116
Okinawa, 49, 55, 56, 79
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, quoted, 103
Ottoman Empire, 110, 116

Pakistan, 55, 65, 84
Pan American World Airways, 137
Paris, 97, 98, 139
Patton, George Smith, Jr., 74
Pearl Harbor, 16, 18, 22, 32, 106
Peloponnesian War, 96, 116
PERKINS, DONALD T., Dropping the Pilot, 128–133
Perón, Juan Domingo, 65
Persia, 110
Pescadores, 82
Philippines, the, 56, 83, 84
Piccard, Auguste and Jacques, 7
Polikarpov, Nikolai N., 45
Political science, and aviation, vii–viii, 138
Portugal, 55
POSSONY, STEFAN T., and LESLIE ROSENZWEIG, The Geography of the Air, 1–11
Potemkin, Grigori Aleksandrovich, 39
POTTS, RAMSAY D., JR., The Foundations of Soviet Air Power: A Historical and Managerial Interpretation, 38–48
Powell, Cecil Frank, 103
quoted, 106
President (U. S.)
and air power, 70, 73, 75
and air travel, 139
and national security, 25, 73
and strategic bombing, 118
See also Eisenhower; Truman
Priestley, Joseph, 3
Private aircraft, 69, 135
Propaganda
air delivery of, 59
Communist, 62–63
relation to psychological warfare, 61
techniques, 63
Psychological warfare, 25, 61–63, 66, 88, 89, 115–117, 132

Quemoy, 82
Quesada, Elwood Richard, 74

Radar, 5, 15, 17, 33, 53, 56, 68
Radiation, 6, 7
Railroads, compared with aviation, 134, 136
Rashid Ali al-Gailani, 110
Red Cross, International, 138

Relief and rescue, aviation in, 58, 65, 137, 138
Retaliation and counterattack, 20–21, 26–27, 29, 35, 37, 49, 95, 106, 122, 123, 124, 125
See also Massive retaliation
Rhodes, Cecil John, 136
Rockets and rocket propulsion, viii, 4, 8, 9, 37, 41, 42, 56, 129
Rommel, Erwin, 110
ROSENZWEIG, LESLIE, *see* Possony, Stefan T., jt. author
Royal Air Force (RAF), 14, 17, 19, 52–53, 54, 104
Ruhr, 14, 96, 98
Russia, 110, 115
See also Soviet Union

Saber, 50, 52, 53, 56
Santos-Dumont, Alberto, 12
Saudi Arabia, 113, 114
Saundby, Robert, quoted, 22
Scandinavian Airlines System, 137
Schaub, Werner, cited, 11
Schlaifer, R., cited, 47
Slessor, John C., cited, 68, 74
Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 14
Somaliland, 114
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), 21, 66, 83, 84, 85, 114
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 84, 85
Soviet Union
air attack of, 50, 57, 99, 100, 106, 118
air power of, viii, 35, 37, 38–48, 56–57, 100, 105, 114, 116, 118, 122, 126
and Middle East, 109, 111, 114–117
and nuclear disarmament, 15, 102
commercial airlines, 135
early nuclear explosions, 19, 67, 70, 120
engineering and aeronautical schools, 39, 46
in Spanish Civil War, 32
initiative in international politics, 24, 49
nuclear capabilities, viii, 21, 39, 47, 57, 76, 77, 82, 84, 99, 100, 102–103, 107, 118–127 (*passim*)
superiority in conventional forces and weapons, 21, 99, 100, 102, 103–104, 107–108, 123, 124
Spaatz, Carl A., 74
cited, 74
Spain, air power and air bases, 35, 55
Spanish-American War, 78
Spanish Civil War, 15, 32, 41, 42
Sparta, 96, 100, 116
Spengler, Oswald, 116
Stalin, Joseph, 42, 47
Strategic air power, 21, 32–37 (*passim*), 49, 53, 54, 60, 74–75, 88–89, 109, 118, 123, 125–126
and guided missiles, 128–133 (*passim*)
definition of, 36
importance of, 17, 19
in World War II, 16, 17, 32, 96, 104–105
nuclear weapons in, viii, 17, 21, 27, 36, 57, 89, 95, 99, 100, 114, 121, 124
Soviet, 43, 57, 100, 123, 126
See also Air bases
STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, ROBERT, Aviation and International Co-operation, 134–140
STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, ROBERT, Foreword, vii-viii
Strausz-Hupé, Robert, translator, 95
Strughold, H., cited, 7
Submarines, and air-atomic power, 18, 33, 124, 125
Sudan, 114
Sun Tzŭ, 112
Surface forces
air-atomic defense against, 27, 33, 99, 101, 102, 105, 106, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125
in European defense, 99, 101, 103–108 (*passim*), 124, 126
in Korea and Indochina, 21, 104, 113
in possible U. S.–Chinese war, 79, 82, 83
integration with air power, 100
superseded in importance by air power, 13, 14, 16–17, 18, 58
support of, by air power, 17–18, 19, 21, 33, 34, 41, 43, 45, 51, 68, 69, 75, 105, 106, 107
U. S. overcommitment of, 127
Sweden, 52, 55, 98
Syria, 110, 112–113, 115, 116

Tactical air power, 18, 19, 32, 33, 34, 53, 68, 69, 75, 88, 109, 114, 120
and atomic weapons, 21, 102, 105, 121, 124, 126
and European defense, 102, 104–105, 106, 107–108, 126
and guided missiles, 131, 132
Communist, 56, 124
function of, 21, 33, 37, 105
in Korean War, 104, 105
in World War II, 16, 32, 104–105, 106
Talbott, Harold E.
cited, 36
quoted, 20, 64
Tedder, Arthur William Tedder, 1st Baron, 74
Tenniel, John, 128
Thailand, 83, 84, 86, 100
Thermonuclear weapons, *see* Hydrogen bombs
Thirty Years' War, 96
THOMPSON, LEWIS S., The Psychological Impact of Air Power, 58–66
Tokaev, Grigori A., 41, 47
cited, 39
quoted, 39–40, 46, 47

Toynbee, Arnold Joseph, 116
Toynbee, Veronica M., editor, 16
Trade, and aviation, vii, 12, 58, 66, 135, 136, 137, 140
Transport planes (airlift; air logistics), 18, 33–34, 34–35, 42, 50, 51, 53, 54, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 75, 113, 119–120, 126
Transportation
airplane, vii, 10, 31, 58, 64, 134–140
See also Railroads
Travel and tourism, contribution of aviation to, vii, 64, 135, 136–137, 139–140
See also Transportation
Trenchard, Hugh Montague 16, 17
Truman, Harry S., 38, 70
TSAGI (USSR), 39, 40, 41, 44, 45
Tupolev, Andrei Nikolaevich, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45
Turkey, 50, 55, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115
Twining, Nathan Farragut, 74

Underdeveloped countries, and aviation, vii, 135–136
United Kingdom, in ANZAM and SEATO, 84
See also Great Britain
United Nations, 84, 90, 102
and air travel, 138
Charter, 80, 86
in Korea, 21, 79, 80, 85–86, 103, 105
in Middle East, 111, 113
United States
aeronautical and engineering training, compared to USSR, 46
air bases in, 49, 125, 126
air power
and collective security, 88–91
before World War II, 16–17, 30–33
current, 25–29, 30, 33–37, 49, 50, 51, 67–75, 76–77, 79–80, 81, 83–89, 118–127
during World War II, 17, 33, 34
organization of, 18–22, 68–70
See also United States Air Force
and Europe, differing attitudes on military strategy, 95–101
and Middle East, 116–117
commercial aviation, 31, 69, 134, 135, 137
contributions to NATO, 50, 51
defense of, *see* Defense—Western Hemisphere
economy and institutions, preservation of, 28, 120
military philosophy, 28, 127
mobilization base, 106, 120–121
nuclear capabilities, vii, 21, 25, 26, 30, 49, 76, 79, 81, 82, 87, 88, 89, 98, 102–103, 104, 107, 118–127 (*passim*)
objectives in psychological warfare, 61, 66
percentage of world population, 90
private aircraft in, 69, 135
surface forces
overcommitment of, 127
public attitude toward, 79, 82, 83, 99
See also Army; Congress; Department of Defense; Foreign policy; Marine Corps; Massive retaliation; President
United States Air Force (USAF), 25, 27, 29, 56, 81
Air Defense Command, *see below* Continental Air Defense Command
Alaskan Air Command, 20
Caribbean Air Command, 65
Chief of Staff, 19
Continental Air Defense Command, 33, 34, 68–69, 74, 75
development program for, 70–71, 73
Far East Air Forces, 65
functions of, 19, 35, 67–70
good-will tour of Latin America, 64–65
inadequate representation of, 19–20
Northeast Air Command, 20
obstacles to development of, 19–20, 70, 71–75
rescue and disaster relief, 65
Secretary, 19
Strategic Air Command (SAC), 19, 21, 33, 34, 49, 50, 54, 68, 74, 75, 106, 118, 119, 121, 123, 126
strategy, 25–29, 35, 118
Tactical Air Command, 33, 69, 75, 121, 123
See also Military Air Transport Service
Urban communities
bombing of, 12, 17, 22, 34, 36, 38, 79, 95–99 (*passim*), 101, 118, 123, 124
dispersal of, viii, 22, 65, 121–122
European and American attitudes toward, 98

V-weapons, *see* Guided missiles—V-weapons
Vance Committee Report, 121
Vandenberg, Hoyt Sanford, 73, 74
quoted, 45
Versailles, Treaty of, 15, 40
Vershinin, Konstantin, 47
Vietminh, 81, 104
Vietnam, 80–82, 83, 114, 115
Vinson, Carl, 73
Visibility, relation to altitude and speed, 5–6
Voznesensky, Nikolai A., 47

WALKOWICZ, T. F., Strategic Concepts for the Nuclear Age, 118–127
Weather
and jet streams, 2
effect on flying, 1, 129
Wells, H. G., quoted, 12–13
Western Europe
attitude toward air-atomic power, 95–101
defense of, 27, 97–101, 102–108, 123–124, 126–127

Western Europe (*cont.*)
industrial power, 90
See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization; World War I; World War II; *and names of countries, as* France; Great Britain
Weyland, Otto P., 74
White, Clayton S., cited, 11
WHITE, THOMAS D., The Scope of United States Air Strategy, 25–29
White, Thomas D., quoted, 38
Wilson, Gil Robb, cited, 19
World War I, 96, 110, 120
air power in, 12, 13–14, 17, 22, 30–31, 33–34, 59
World War II, 30, 93, 110, 111, 115, 120, 123, 125, 126
air power in, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 23, 30, 32–34, 36, 41, 42–43, 45, 51, 52, 53, 59–60, 74, 95, 96, 97, 104–105, 106, 120, 131, 132
books on, by commanders, 74
V-weapons in, 17, 128–129, 132
World War III, 20, 21, 22, 24, 81, 106, 120

Yakovlev, Aleksander S., 45–46

Zeppelins, 13–14
Zhukovsky, Nikolai Y., 39, 40
Zhukovsky Air Academy, 39–40

7 - JUL 1955
STATE LEGISLATURE, MADISON

THE ANNALS
of The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE · INCORPORATED APRIL 4TH. 1891

LIBRARY
16 SEP 1955
STATE LEGISLATURE, MADISON

INTERNAL SECURITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Edited by

THORSTEN SELLIN, Ph.D., LL.D.
Professor of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania
Acting President, The American Academy of Political and Social Science

Copyright 1955, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1955

Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.



CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD vii
ADDRESS . . . . . *George M. Leader* 1

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

SCIENCE AND SECURITY . . . . . *M. Stanley Livingston* 4
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ON THE AIR . . . . . *Harold E. Fellows* 13
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER AND PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION . . . . . *Adolf A. Berle, Jr.* 20

PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DIGNITY

IS WIRE TAPPING JUSTIFIED? . . . . . *Patrick Murphy Malin* 29
PASSPORT—RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE? . . . . . *Joseph A. Fanelli* 36
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM—A GOOD SECURITY RISK? . . . . . *Philip E. Jacob* 41

SUBVERSIVE PERSONS AND GROUPS

SUBVERSIVES IN GOVERNMENT . . . . . *Francis Biddle* 51
CONTROLLING SUBVERSIVE GROUPS . . . . . *Ernest van den Haag* 62

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM . *Robert M. Hutchins* 72
THE DISMISSAL OF FIFTH AMENDMENT PROFESSORS . . . . . *Harold Taylor* 79
SECURITY THROUGH BOOK BURNING . . . . . *Charles G. Bolte* 87

JOB SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

THE OPERATION OF PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS . . . *Ralph S. Brown, Jr.* 94
DUE PROCESS IN SECURITY DISMISSALS . . . . . *Eleanor Bontecou* 102
MORALE IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE . . . . . *Marie Jahoda* 110

INVESTIGATIONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION . *Telford Taylor* 114
DUE PROCESS IN TRIALS . . . . . *Thurman Arnold* 123

BOOK DEPARTMENT PAGE

ABRAMS, CHARLES. *Forbidden Neighbors: A Study of Prejudice in Housing.* Frank S. Loescher ... 154

ALMOND, GABRIEL A. *The Appeals of Communism.* Elmo C. Wilson ... 149

ANDERSON, EUGENE N. *The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858–1864.* Robert Mueller ... 173

ANDERSON, WILLIAM. *The Nation and the States, Rival or Partners?* W. Reed West ... 136

BERNSTEIN, IRVING. *Arbitration of Wages.* John R. Abersold ... 147

BONER, HAROLD A. *Hungry Generations: The Nineteenth Century Case Against Malthusianism.* Frank H. Hankins ... 156

BRADY, JOSEPH H. *Confusion Twice Confounded: The First Amendment and the Supreme Court.* J. Warren Madden ... 161

BROGAN, D. W. *Politics in America.* E. Allen Helms ... 138

CADY, JOHN F. *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia.* William C. Johnstone, Jr. ... 178

CARMER, CARL. *The Susquehanna.* Ralph Adams Brown ... 143

CHAPIN, F. STUART, JR., and others. *In the Shadow of a Defense Plant.* Charles S. Ascher ... 150

CURTI, MERLE, and KENDALL BIRR. *Prelude to Point Four.* Richard H. Heindel 135

DAVIS, MICHAEL M. *Medical Care for Tomorrow.* Franz Goldmann ... 155

DE HUSZAR, GEORGE B. and Associates. *Soviet Power and Policy.* William B. Ballis ... 166

DIAMOND, SIGMUND. *The Reputation of the American Businessman.* Harold F. Williamson ... 146

ELDERSVELD, SAMUEL J., and ALBERT A. APPLEGATE. *Michigan's Recounts for Governor, 1950 and 1952.* Cortez A. M. Ewing ... 137

FERGUSON, LEROY C., and RALPH H. SMUCKLER. *Politics in the Press.* Malcolm M. Willey ... 138

FISHER, ROBERT MOORE (Ed.). *The Metropolis in Modern Life.* Maurice R. Davie ... 151

FLETCHER, JOSEPH. *Morals and Medicine.* Richard H. Shryock ... 155

FORTUNE, THE EDITORS OF. *The Changing American Market.* Margaret G. Reid 148

FULTON, JAMES STREET. *Science and Man's Hope.* Ernest Nagel ... 162

FUSILIER, RAYMOND. *Le Parti Socialiste Suedois: Son organisation.* Franklin D. Scott ... 170

Germany Reports. Eli E. Nobleman ... 171

HEALEY, GEORGE HARRIS (Ed.). *The Letters of Daniel Defoe.* John J. Murray 164

HODGMAN, DONALD R. *Soviet Industrial Production, 1928–1951.* P. J. D. Wiles 169

ICKES, HAROLD L. *Secret Diary.* Vol. III: *The Lowering Clouds.* G. C. Osborn 140

INSTITUTE FOR URBAN STUDIES, University of Pennsylvania, with the co-operation of the Bureau of Urban Research, Princeton University. *Accelerated Urban Growth in a Metropolitan Fringe Area.* Charles S. Ascher ... 150

PAGE

JANSEN, MARIUS B. *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen.* Herbert Passin ... 175

KAPLAN, A. D. H. *Big Enterprise in a Competitive System.* W. W. Hewett ... 145

KIMMEL, HUSBAND E. *Admiral Kimmel's Story.* W. D. Puleston ... 139

KOHN, HANS (Ed.). *The Mind of Modern Russia.* Arthur Prudden Coleman 167

LINTON, RALPH. *The Tree of Culture.* Cora Du Bois ... 157

LITVINOFF, BARNET. *Ben-Gurion of Israel.* Henrik F. Infield ... 177

LORIMER, FRANK, and others. *Culture and Human Fertility.* Bryce Ryan ... 158

LUBELL, SAMUEL. *The Revolution in World Trade and American Economic Policy.* Amos E. Taylor ... 146

MACDUFFIE, MARSHALL. *The Red Carpet.* George Denicke ... 168

MACMAHON, ARTHUR W. (Ed.). *Federalism: Mature and Emergent.* Harold M. Dorr ... 134

MILLER, J. D. B. *Australian Government and Politics.* Mary E. Murphy ... 165

MORGAN, DONALD G. *Justice William Johnson, the First Dissenter.* Paul L. Murphy ... 141

MORRIS, NEWBOLD in collaboration with DANA LEE THOMAS. *Let the Chips Fall.* Wallace S. Sayre ... 143

MURRAY, ROBERT K. *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920.* Arthur S. Link ... 142

NASSER, GAMAL ABDUL. *Egypt's Liberation.* Emil Lengyel ... 176

NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL. *A Policy for Skilled Manpower.* Sar A. Levitan 159

NICOLSON, HAROLD. *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method.* R. Smith Simpson 133

OESER, O. A., and S. B. HAMMOND (Eds.). *Social Structure and Personality in a Rural Community.* Thomas O. Wilkinson ... 153

OESER, O. A., and S. B. HAMMOND (Eds.). *Social Structure and Personality in a City.* Thomas O. Wilkinson ... 153

OGBURN, W. F., and M. F. NIMKOFF. *Technology and the Changing Family.* Clifford Kirkpatrick ... 158

PADOVER, SAUL K. (Ed.). *The Washington Papers.* Cecil Johnson ... 144

PASZKIEWICZ, HENRYK. *The Origin of Russia.* Anatole G. Mazour ... 170

PHILLIPS, WENDELL. *Qataban and Sheba.* Emil Lengyel ... 178

PULESTON, W. D. *The Influence of Force in Foreign Relations.* Martin B. Travis, Jr. ... 132

REYNOLDS, P. A. *British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years.* Henry M. Wriston ... 164

ROBEQUAIN, CHARLES. *Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo, and the Philippines.* Ernest Schein ... 174

Social Sciences in Historical Study, The. Willson H. Coates ... 163

SPENCER, JOHN. *Crime and the Services.* Hans von Hentig ... 160

STONE, JULIUS. *Legal Controls of International Conflict.* Quincy Wright ... 133

PAGE

VANCE, RUPERT, B., and NICHOLAS J. DEMERATH (Eds.). *The Urban South.* Noel P. Gist 152

VINSON, JOHN CHALMERS. *The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922.* Bradford Perkins 141

WEST, REBECCA. *A Train of Powder.* Louis L. Snyder 160

WHITAKER, ARTHUR P. *The United States and Argentina.* Russell H. Fitzgibbon 174

WINDELL, GEORGE G. *The Catholics and German Unity, 1866–1871.* Garland Downum 172

WRIGHT, QUINCY. *The Study of International Relations.* Richard H. Heindel 131

OTHER BOOKS 179

ERRATUM 181

INDEX 182

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index.*

FOREWORD

For more than one reason it is a pleasure to write this brief prefatory note to the July volume. This is the three hundredth volume of THE ANNALS, which began publication in 1890. It also marks a significant departure by the Academy from a practice which has been followed consistently since 1913—with one exception in 1920—of devoting its annual convention to questions of international relations. The papers contained in this volume were delivered at the Annual Meeting held on April 1 and 2 in Philadelphia. The topic, Internal Security and Civil Rights, shows the keen awareness of the Academy's program committee that this has become since the last war one of the most important public issues in the United States.

THORSTEN SELLIN

Address by the Honorable George M. Leader, Governor of Pennsylvania, at the Delegates' Luncheon, April 2, 1955

MR. President, Members of the Academy, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Ungenerous and vain as it may sound at the outset of my remarks, I want to say that the main feeling I have as I stand here before you is pride. Of course, I am pleased, too. But mostly I am proud, proud to be the governor of a state which is the home of an academy illustrious enough to attract such a distinguished group.

In addition, I am delighted that the American Academy has taken as the theme of its Fifty-ninth Annual Meeting the important subject of internal security and civil rights in the United States. As I looked into the history of your venerable society, I was struck with the number of names of men prominent in your activities who have distinguished themselves in the field of the social sciences. The work of men like Edmund J. James, S. N. Patten, S. M. Lindsay, L. S. Rowe, E. M. Patterson, J. H. Willits, and Thorsten Sellin—to mention only those who come more readily to mind—have bestowed upon your organization a tradition of sober and sound scholarship. In so doing they have resolutely refused to allow your organization to become the instrument of any special interest or propaganda activity. With so much hysteria in the country today on the subject of individual liberty and civil rights, it seems to me most appropriate that an organization with this solid reputation for dispassionate scholarship should address itself to a discussion of the sensitive subject of internal security and civil rights.

As many of you know, I am not a lawyer but a person trained in education, who turned to the poultry business and to the field of state government. Speaking as a layman in the field of your concern this week end, it has always seemed to me that civil rights are perhaps too much construed in the negative, as a protective device against invasion of individual freedom of action. As such, civil rights are traditionally associated with courts and lawyers and due process of law.

In the past twenty years, American society has suffered many trials, both in war and in economic depression. Regardless of the theories of some of our classical economists and sociologists, American society has become an organism, rather than an aggregation of individual persons. It seems to me, looking at this problem as a public servant, that since society has become so urbanized and so industrialized, and men have become so economically and socially interdependent, civil rights should assume more of the aspect of mutual obligations and should be a positive, vital, active concern of men in government and of the whole body of our citizens.

Certainly, men must continue to be protected as individuals as they go about their individual pursuits. But they must also be protected as members of groups, because in groups individuals lose their identity and are virtually helpless. There must be in government thoughtful people who are particularly sensitive to these issues—people who ponder them constantly and who have the courage to sustain their convictions.

It seems to me that scholars might well consider how the conventional tenets and procedures of civil rights can be integrated and articulated with the new social rights which are reflected in programs of public assistance, unemployment compensation, workmen's compensation, old age and survivors' insurance, and regulation of factory working conditions. I seem to remember from my studies in political science that when the Germans made their Weimar Constitution in 1919, they had a negative, that is, a conventional, bill of rights, and also a positive bill of rights, which emphasized the right to employment, the right to organize, and the right to live in a well-ordered community. This constitution anticipated the famous Third Freedom enunciated by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941—freedom from want. It is unfortunate that the mechanical parts of the Weimar Constitution were put together by inexperienced idealists and that they failed to work. But this failure of parliamentary and presidential machinery should not prejudice us against the great virtue of a positive bill of rights.

Let me see if I can illustrate by an analogy this rather vague concept of the implementation of traditional procedures in civil rights cases. The analogy must come from outside of the field of civil rights. Let us take the example of workmen's compensation. Before our system of benefits was established, an injured workman had his choice of accepting an ungenerous settlement offered by his employer or suing in the courts. Attorneys representing the employers were experts in delays, in appeals, in continuations, their tactic being to compel the hard-pressed worker, whose family was in want as long as his disability continued, to settle for less than his deserts. Justice delayed was justice denied. Now we have a Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, which does not sit in judgment on injury cases but is the worker's active friend and agent. The worker's ancient common-law remedy has been translated into a positive, automatic procedure, which keeps him out of court in almost 100 per cent of the cases and gives him immediate relief.

I certainly hope that minds more ingenious than mine can devise automatic and positive procedures to bring immediate relief to the victims of race prejudice, security hysteria, vicious investigations, censorship by majority stockholders, wire tapping, and related evils, just as we have modernized our methods of protecting those whose bodies are broken in our industrial operations.

You will understand that as Governor I am mainly concerned with getting good people into government. By good people I mean men and women to whom civil rights and human freedom are not dusty concerns of courts and lawyers and procedures. I mean thoughtful, courageous people who will be able to devise ways and means of deepening democracy among our citizens. I mean people like the distinguished Philadelphian who addressed you last night—the former Attorney General of the United States, Francis Biddle. I know a story about him which I think crystallizes my thoughts about the sort of person America needs.

He was, as he still is, one of the giants in maintaining civil rights. When he was Attorney General he was so much concerned with this subject that in Washington he was known to the inevitable group of jokesters as "Old Civil Rights Biddle." But this is an epithet of praise, not of derision. Shortly after Pearl Harbor President Roosevelt, in those dark and uncertain days, called an extraordinary Cabinet meeting. His Attorney General—Francis Biddle—was late in arriving, and Roosevelt, to

lighten the dismal atmosphere of the meeting, decided it would be appropriate to joke with him about civil rights. When the Attorney General arrived at the meeting—alone and conspicuous—the President addressed him by saying: "Francis, I am sorry you are late because during the first part of this meeting we decided that the situation is so grave that we will have to suspend civil liberties and rights for the duration of this emergency." General Biddle, whose great sense of humor never extended into the field of civil rights, blanched and said, "Mr. President, I think that is a terrible idea, and if you are serious I shall have to resign."

That is the kind of devoted public servant I should be grateful to find. Good men of this sort can bring imagination and courage to government. Government at its best assures good living to its citizens. Woodrow Wilson epitomized this thought when he stated: "Human freedom consists in perfect adjustments of human interests and human activities and human energies." These are the adjustments we all seek.

George M. Leader, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, was a state senator from 1950 and a justice of the peace. Earlier, he was chairman of the York County Democratic Committee. A graduate in education of the University of Pennsylvania, he took advanced work in the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce and in the Institute of Local and State Government of the University. He served in the Navy during World War II.

Science and Security

By M. Stanley Livingston

THE security system which has developed in this country is a social phenomenon of our times. It is a consequence of the severe political and social pressures associated with the emergence of this country as a world power and the rise of international Communism. The dramatic changes in the weapons requirements for defense, emphasized by the overwhelming destructiveness of atomic and hydrogen bombs, have forced the issue and added an element of insecurity. Our people grope for reassurance and grasp at straws, searching for some simple, understandable formula that will solve our problems and guarantee peace. Our leaders seem also to have been bewildered by the complexity and scope of their responsibilities, and all too often have slipped into the easier course of partisan recriminations. Demagogues have offered panaceas and scapegoats, which form unfortunately attractive alternatives to the continuing insecurity. In this atmosphere a few spies were exposed; investigations multiplied; newspaper headlines spread rumors of serious subversions; government orders were issued and punitive laws were passed. The security system, seeded by the need for military secrecy, flourished in this rank soil of uncertainty and suspicion and grew in a few years to tremendous proportions.

We now seem to have reached and passed a climax, and to have a breathing spell in which we can survey the situation and assess the consequences.

Scientists are members of one of the most "sensitive" of professions and have experienced some of the most severe frustrations and restrictions. For many years the Federation of American Scientists has served as a channel for bringing scientists' views to the attention of the public and of the appropriate government agencies. Study groups and committees of the Federation have gathered and published information about security regulations and procedures and have compiled individual case histories of those involved. My function in this symposium is to discuss the impact of the security program on science and scientists. Some of our problems are unique to those who work in or close to areas requiring security clearance, so such features may be rather heavily emphasized. However, in many respects the problems facing the scientist merge with those of the other professions, and I will also discuss these more general implications.

Our government security program is under attack on many fronts, by individuals and organizations representing a wide variety of professional and intellectual backgrounds. Although motives and purposes differ, a common basis for most of the criticism is concern over procedures which threaten our traditional liberties and the rights of the individual. Although this is a most important aspect of the growth of the security system, it is by no means the only one. A more basic question, which is frequently neglected, involves the philosophy and purpose of the security program. What is the security program intended to achieve? Can we agree on the meaning of the words we use in defining this purpose, such as security and loyalty, or can we define reasonable bounds for the areas in which secrecy is required? What kind of security procedures are best for this country? How can we make the most progress toward our acknowledged goal of world peace?

It is my hope that this conference will apply itself to the study of these more basic questions. If so, it may prove to be a significant step toward initiating a new and saner approach to the problems our country faces in the security field.

In this discussion I shall attempt to survey some of the more important aspects of the security problem as observed by the scientist, emphasizing those which bear most directly on the basic meaning and purpose of the security system. Criticisms of procedures cannot and should not be avoided in this survey, since they represent the factual evidence on which judgments must be based. The underlying purpose, however, is to illustrate the need for a fundamentally new approach to the philosophy of security.

Information Security

The security system originated in the need to protect vital military and state secrets. It involved compartmentalization of information, passes, guards, fences, and locked files. The basic concept was that existing military and technical information was so vitally important that it must be protected at all costs from loss by espionage or inadvertence. The military services are charged with the responsibility of protecting the country and of developing adequate weapons, forces, and tactics. Few would question the necessity or right of the military services to protect their essential secrets or their competence to judge the need for secrecy within strictly military areas.

With the growing complexity of military needs, however, this concept of the overriding importance of secrecy has been transferred bodily into many other areas of our national life. The area of responsibility of the military has become so broad as to include, for example, the possible genetic effects from radiation caused by H-bomb tests on generations yet unborn throughout the world. It is essential that we restudy the usefulness of the concept of secrecy at any cost in the present complex situation. The pertinent question is whether this emphasis on secrecy stultifies progress, resulting in an actual decrease in our national security.

There is reason to believe that secrecy has caused losses of strength disproportionate to the gains, even within the military system itself. Several examples have been cited from the past war to show that our military effectiveness was actually decreased by excessive use of secrecy. From my own experience as a civilian scientist within the Navy Department during the war I call to mind one example in which the use of a top-secret classification for a potent anti-submarine weapon so restricted and slowed its use in action in the field that it never made a "kill." Many other examples exist which illustrate the same point. To reverse the picture and bring it up to date, we can recall the published statement of Mr. J. G. Beckerley, formerly in the Security Division of the Atomic Energy Commission, to the effect that in his opinion the information gained by the Russians through espionage channels about our atomic-bomb project had a negligible effect on the development of atomic energy by the Soviet Union.

Scientific projects involving secret work now have a complex system of classification of information, in which the originator of the document makes the first decision, it is confirmed or changed by security officers, and eventually is acted on by a declassification board. The system works reasonably well within the policy framework in which it was conceived. But, in the view of many critics, because of this

basic policy it tends to overclassify too much information and is overslow to release material from classification. Failure to classify material carries severe legal and other penalties; on the other hand, there are no significant penalties for excessive security classification. My present purpose, however, is not to criticize the existing system or its proponents, but rather to suggest that a broader view of the significance of secrecy in the security program might change the underlying policy.

CHANGING MILITARY NEEDS

During the past war revolutionary new methods were introduced into weapons development. The scientific services (Office of Scientific Research and Development and others) were planned and organized to bring research scholars directly from their universities into the weapons program. Under the wise guidance of men like Drs. James Conant, K. T. Compton, and Vannevar Bush new organizational procedures were introduced, such as scientific advisory boards and relative freedom from detailed supervision or from irritating bureaucratic procedure. The result was amazingly successful. Scientists and engineers worked together with full freedom to explore all pertinent ideas, to invent new devices, and to discuss their problems freely with other experts. Money and technical assistance were plentiful. Speed was essential; time was telescoped. New ideas were frequently put into the laboratory for testing within a few days of their conception. A new and remarkably effective source of talent was injected into the age-old field of weapons development. There are few who will deny that these scientific weapons were instrumental in winning the war. One well-qualified analyst rates the three most important new weapons of the past war as radar, the influence fuse, and the atomic bomb. All of these and many more were developed either largely or in part in the OSRD laboratories.

Today we need such effectiveness and such progress even more, if we are to keep ahead in the rapidly changing race for superior weapons and systems of defense. Secrets represented by weapons in the field or even by plans in laboratory files become insignificant in comparison with the importance of new ideas and new concepts. This is true in all fields, not only the military. A significant new idea to prevent war is far more important than bigger bombs, at the present crisis. Peculiarly enough, some of the most valuable ideas in this field have been proposed by scientists. One example is Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer's influence in developing the original Acheson-Lilienthal proposals for international control of atomic energy, which formed the basis of the Baruch proposal to the United Nations. To achieve this effectiveness, this fertility in ideas, we must modify our security system to encourage and foster original thinking. We need fewer controls and hampering safeguards and more freedom of discussion between experts in all fields. The prevailing requirements of compartmentalization and conformity are dangerous. Achievement, at a rate to keep well ahead of a possible enemy, becomes more important than secrecy.

In this race for technological superiority, the most effective new concepts appear frequently on the advancing front of research science. And these new ideas become available to scientists throughout the world in the normal course of development of the science. It is frequently true that new scientific concepts develop independently and simultaneously in several places. An example from my own professional field of particle accelerators is the simultaneous proposal of the principle of the synchrotron by E. M. McMillan at Berkeley, V. Veksler in the USSR, and M. L. Oliphant in Birmingham, England, each arrived at independently. Science speaks in all languages, and a new idea becomes available to all qualified thinkers in the field.

Progress and leadership in science depend primarily on the number and quality of trained minds. Since it has now become almost necessary to equate superiority in weapons with leadership in science, we find that our major resource and our greatest security comes from our intellectual potential. So the changing military needs expose a new priority in weapons development, in which imaginative thinking and minds trained for research become of primary importance.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

We need reliable people in positions of responsibility, and especially in secret work. We cannot tolerate disloyal or subversive employees. We do not want drug addicts, blabbermouths, or alcoholics in positions where loose talk or external pressures could result in disclosure of secret information. The responsibility for choosing reliable personnel has always been a major problem for the administrator or director of a project or agency. It is obvious that there must be some mechanism by which the administrator can obtain information about a prospective employee; this has normally been provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the other intelligence services. The administrator also has the authority and responsibility for firing an employee if pertinent derogatory information is brought to his attention. This is a situation requiring judgment, and the test is whether the judgment is objective and fair.

Why, then, is there so much adverse publicity concerning personnel security procedures? We have all heard about cases where persons have lost their jobs through security actions; frequently these cases describe a sequence of decisions by administrators, security boards, and review boards, often reaching contradictory decisions on the same evidence. It is not my purpose to go into details to make this point. Many case histories have been described in published articles. An especially pertinent list is included in the April issue of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*. The reason for these criticisms is that in the opinions of many observers the security decisions are not objective or fair. In far too many cases the rights of the individual have been badly mauled, and in some instances it is now clear that innocent persons have suffered unjustified and severe damage to their reputations and to their opportunity to work in their professional fields.

A government agency operates under Executive Order 10450, which puts the responsibility directly on the administrative head of the agency. This order specifies that security clearance is to be "clearly consistent with the national security," and requires that any questionable case is to be resolved in favor of the government. One consequence of this delegation of responsibility is that individual agency heads tend to lean over backwards to be cautious in security cases. Another consequence is that the same rigid standards for security clearance used within the most sensitive agencies are imposed on other government bureaus in which there is no classified or secret work. But the most controversial result is the considerable variation in procedures used in the several agencies. There is no general standard to provide an objective basis of judgment, and no criteria for determining the degree of risk suggested by an individual's background. Some agencies supply lists of charges to the suspected employee; others have

fired employees for security reasons while hiding behind some administrative formula such as a reduction-in-force order. Some allow hearings before action is taken; others use summary suspension on unevaluated derogatory information regardless of the damage to the laboratory program or to the individual. And in an uncomfortably large number of instances successive security boards or administrators have drawn contradictory conclusions from the same evidence.

It is an understatement to say that personnel security procedures are in bad shape. What is needed is, again, a critical restudy of the entire program, out of which will come some fair and sensible standards and criteria. However, this attempt to modify procedures will only be significant if it is based on a philosophy of security which gives a proper evaluation to the significance of procedures as such and allows security decisions to be based on an appraisal of the whole man, including the country's need for his services.

Cloak of Secrecy

Unfortunately, secrecy has been used as a cloak to veil the operations and decisions of security officers, although there must be many instances in which this is unnecessary. A particularly unfortunate example is the use of secrecy to prevent accused persons from being able to confront derogatory witnesses in security hearings, usually justified by the claim that calling such witnesses might expose secrets of the investigating agency. It is obvious that many of these witnesses (landladies, for example) could be called without harm to the agency. It is also probable that witnesses would be more careful to give only the truth in their derogatory testimony if they knew they would be called for confrontation. President Eisenhower has stated that the accused must have "the right to meet [his] accuser face to face." Yet few have been called in security cases heard to date.

Security Officials

Many security officers are enthusiasts who consider their actions to be of vital importance. It is possible to understand how some might take pride in turning up large numbers of suspects and long lists of derogatory charges. In many cases lists of charges show poor judgment and no attempt at evaluation. In the Fort Monmouth investigations a charge brought against one scientist was that he had attempted to transmit a reprint of his published work (available all over the world), on request, to a scientist in Czechoslovakia. Another charge was that an employee had been reported as attending a Communist-sponsored meeting; in the hearing it was demonstrated that the dates proved this event to have occurred when the employee was twelve to thirteen years old. It may be of interest to note that the civilian security official responsible for writing these charges rose to his position of responsibility from earlier jobs as a chauffeur and as a uniformed plant guard.

Consider the problem of an agency director when presented with such lists of charges against valuable employees. He may find it difficult or impossible to cancel out items on the list, even though they seem stupid or inconsequential, in view of the obvious authority and responsibility of the security officer. No adequate procedures seem to have been developed for evaluating charges before they are presented to the accused employee (with his right to publish them if necessary) or to the security review board.

We conclude that there are many new problems in the field of security which do not have the guidance of tradition or experience. The necessity for more competent training of security officers becomes obvious. Such training must surely include appropriate instruction in the long-range philosophy and purpose of the security program.

Creeping Security

Some of the more flagrant abuses of the security system have followed from the introduction of the techniques and practices of security into areas and agencies in which there is no secret work, and for which the standards of employment should obviously be different from those in the more sensitive areas. The pressures which have caused this "creeping security" have been largely political, and this feature will be discussed further in a following section. A more specific cause is the broad generality of Executive Order 10450, which makes no distinction between government departments and agencies. In retrospect it seems that this Executive Order was intended to dilute the problem of disloyalty and subversion by lumping it with the general problem of untrustworthiness and incompetence, in an effort to take the stigma out of security hearings. Unfortunately, this was not the result; rather, government officials and the people as a whole chose to attach the stigma of disloyalty to all the unfortunates who came under the general category of security risk.

Over thirty persons have been fired or have resigned under pressure from the Public Health Service, as a consequence of security investigation. In most cases the charges were of suspect associations or political nonconformity. Many of these individuals were competent and valuable workers, employed in completely open work where they could not possibly obtain or transmit vital secrets. It seems necessary to search for some other reason than concern over the national security to account for these actions.

Grants for basic research from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Atomic Energy Commission have been refused to universities because a member of the research-project staff was considered unclearable. The most publicized case is that of Professor Linus Pauling at California Institute of Technology, whose application for a renewal of his research grant in biochemistry was refused. It was later granted when two of his colleagues, of lesser scientific repute, resubmitted the application.

Security decisions have disrupted freedom of travel and scientific intercourse in fields of basic science where no question of secrecy is involved. Foreign scientists requesting visas to attend scientific meetings in this country have been required to submit detailed information about their past political associations and have experienced frustrating and expensive delays. Such treatment has caused hard feelings abroad and has denied our own scientists much valuable scientific consultation. Many informed critics argue that the effect of the visa security program has been a net loss to this country.

This is not the attitude of a strong and freedom-loving country; it displays a morbid, almost hysterical fear—of what? The history of our country shows a reliance on full, free expression of opinion, with confidence that in open discussion truth will prevail over error and that our democratic system of government will survive the challenge of any fascist ideology. We can only understand the prevailing extension of security practices into these traditionally open fields as the consequence of a distorted view of the importance of secrecy and of political conformity in our national life. The use of the security system to serve the purposes of those who

desire to enforce political conformity is a strange manifestation. This threat to our heritage of freedom of opinion should not go unchallenged.

PUBLIC REACTION

The reaction of the public to the prevailing suspicions, worries, and fears has been responsible to a large extent for the overextension of security and the abuses of fundamental liberties. It has been easy for demogogues to exploit these fears by magnifying the dangers of internal subversion and to personalize the public resentment in the form of attacks on nonconformist individuals and groups. The urge to find a scapegoat is a human urge and is all too easily fulfilled. So large segments of the people acclaim the demagogues who denounce lists of individuals as traitors or security risks and make headlines with broad charges of espionage and subversion; then they clamor for more charges and more convictions. The newspapers and other public journals must also take some responsibility for utilizing these charges in headlines, without making adequate effort to confirm them. One of the most hopeful signs at present is the growing skepticism of loose and unproven charges displayed by all reputable news editors. In this area, at least, we can hope that the tide has turned.

Security investigations carried on in this atmosphere have been far from objective and often actually unfair. Those conscientious citizens who make up our security boards are also influenced by public opinion. Their objectivity has not been helped by the occasional threat of investigation of security-board personnel, when their decisions have not been acceptable to some pressure group or demagogue. Furthermore, these people seldom have legal training and are not familiar with judicial tests for acceptability of evidence. Their standards have varied, in many cases reflecting the individual bias of members of the board. There are several examples where security-board decisions have obviously been influenced by newspaper headlines and the prevailing public attitude.

Adverse security decisions have often received wide publicity, although the detailed charges and answers are seldom known. Large segments of the public have accepted these decisions as equivalent to court convictions for subversion or disloyalty, even when in many cases the charges or decisions carried no imputation of disloyalty. Social censure on the victims of such decisions has at times exceeded that accorded convicted criminals. The wife of a discharged employee at Fort Monmouth was insulted by neighbors in a local grocery store. The child of an accused official of the State Department was refused service of an ice cream cone. Whispering campaigns and neighborhood gossip amplify the damage and in some cases even initiate security charges, as in the case of Chasanow and the Greenbelt housing project.

Almost all persons who have had their security clearance revoked have had great difficulty in obtaining jobs proportionate to their ability, even in nonsecret employment. Few industrial companies are willing to accept a person who has been the target of security investigation. In at least one instance a company refused to consider a man who had been charged but later reinstated with full security clearance, claiming that in a future investigation the charges might be revived and cause trouble for the company. We have developed a small but significant group of second-class citizens, unable to get suitable employment; some of these are capable scientists whose services are lost to our government.

Public opinion has a subtle effect. The desire to avoid any potentially questionable association has led many people to shun their former friends or colleagues, once the latter have become involved in an investigation. Accusation alone, if widely publicized, brings the same social stigma; complete clearance in a review seldom erases the stain. The security charge has become the modern equivalent of the "scarlet letter," a brand which can never be removed.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

Political appointees of a new administration need people in their organization whom they can trust to carry out the new policies. Each new administration attempts to clear out old party supporters and put in their own. Yet the number of openings for replacement are usually considered inadequate. Civil-service policies and practice have expanded to protect the tenure of more and more government employees. The need to open up new jobs becomes a tangible pressure on the new administrator. In this situation it is difficult for an administrator to be too critical of a security officer who presents a list of security risks, documented by lists of charges, especially if the cleanup has the sanction of a Presidential directive. Unfortunately for the individuals involved, a security-risk charge offers the administrator an easy way out of his dilemma, and it is understandable that the charges are not scrutinized with objectivity or thoroughness.

We should be naïve if we did not recognize that this type of pressure has inspired the removal of several valuable government servants on security grounds. The dismissal of John Paton Davies, Jr., from the State Department is an instance in point; another is the case of Wolf Ladejinsky in the Department of Agriculture, in which the implication has been confirmed by his immediate re-employment in another department. Several responsible analysts have concluded that this was the basic motive in the case of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who has made such valuable contributions to our atomic energy program.

There has also been an unfortunate citing of numbers of old administration employees dismissed on "security" grounds, in party political speeches, without adequate recognition of the probability that the public mood would translate these general charges as "disloyalty" or "subversive activity." Responsible members of both parties should feel shamed by this distortion and abuse of the security program.

LEGAL ASPECTS

Security investigations, lists of charges, suspensions, decisions of security boards and review boards, all are items of great public interest. Even administrative decisions on security are no longer hidden within the private channels of employment divisions, as formerly, but are frequently widely publicized. For example, when Dr. E. U. Condon had his clearance revoked by Secretary Charles S. Thomas of the Navy Department, following four earlier clearances by competent security boards, he resigned from the Corning Glass Works in protest and announced his reasons to the press. So, although such decisions are technically administrative matters they are no longer private; the public becomes informed and makes its judgments, as discussed earlier, in which these decisions are taken as equivalent to court actions. Unless the public can be persuaded to treat these decisions as normal administrative acts and to withhold its censure and penalties, the government must find a way to protect the rights and privileges of the individuals concerned.

The legal and judiciary systems were

designed to protect individual rights. The law grows as our conscience grows, and we develop new legal procedures and precedents to meet changing conditions. We cannot rely on the law or the courts to protect our basic liberties statically and indefinitely, but must expect judicial practice to evolve and change to meet the needs. The abuses of the security system present a challenge which must be answered by some new evolution of our judicial processes. What form this may take is not clear at present, but able minds are now being applied to this problem. The Fund for the Republic recently made a grant of $100,000 to the New York Bar Association to study the problems of security. It may be in this area that we can hope to see the first definite results of re-evaluation.

CONCLUSIONS

After this broad-ranging survey of many aspects of the security problem I shall be brief in my conclusions. The phenomena we have been discussing have occurred many times before in history, even in this country. As on earlier occasions, the initial public reaction causes blunders and carries us to extremes. But eventually a time comes, as now, when thoughtful people try to assess the dangers and search for a reasonable and fair solution. We can be thankful that we have in this country a small, but we hope sufficient, number of people who have become concerned with these threats to the traditional rights of the individual and to the true security of the country. We observe a rising wave of criticism and hope that this means that something will be done.

In my opinion the first step in solving these problems should be a thorough re-evaluation of the meaning and purpose of the security program in this country. It seems unlikely that this can be done within the existing government agencies, despite their obvious desire to revise procedures in order to reduce criticisms, since they act under laws, orders, and policies established by Congress and by the President. It also seems unlikely that the present administration could initiate any fundamental changes in the security policies, acting as it must in a partisan manner and under the controlling eye of Congress. It is possible that the Commission on Government Security proposed by Senators Humphrey and Stennis,[1] and now being discussed in hearings in Washington, may be able to make a valuable start in this direction.

What we need is a new philosophy of security, based on a careful study of all the facts involved, which will guide our government to a revised and improved security program, one which will truly protect the national security and also preserve basic American rights.

[1] Senate Joint Resolution 21.

Milton Stanley Livingston, Ph.D., Cambridge, Massachusetts, professor of physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is chairman of the Federation of American Scientists. He was associated with Professor Ernest O. Lawrence at the University of California in the development of the original cyclotron, and in 1947–48 was chairman of the accelerator project at Brookhaven National Laboratory, responsible for the design of the three-billion-volt cosmotron.

Freedom of Expression on the Air

By HAROLD E. FELLOWS

BEFORE dealing with the subject assigned to me, "Freedom of Expression on the Air," permit me to qualify myself as a witness. I speak neither as a political scientist nor as a social scientist, making no pretense to be either. What I shall try to do is to reflect the opinion of broadcasters about the subject at hand—the majority opinion, if you will, since there is no unanimity about certain aspects of this difficult problem even among broadcasters themselves.

This is an appropriate environment, perhaps even a sympathetic one, in which to make such observations as I shall offer. For here lived Benjamin Franklin, the sage who contributed so richly to the heritage of a free press in the United States and who also, with a kite and a key, revealed a phenomenon which one day would lead to the development of another great mass medium.

WITHOUT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Let us assume at the outset, merely to establish a background for discussion, that freedom of expression were not permitted on the air under any circumstances. A ridiculous concept, of course, in light of the declarations and charters which assure freedom in our unique system; but a concept which, you and I know, might be looked upon with favor even in some quarters of this liberty-loving nation.

Were freedom of expression absolutely denied, the character of broadcasting would be in sharp contrast to that which exists today.

There would be no commentators. This, according to one's lights, might appear to be a blessing. Not infrequently we hear a citizen of determined political and economic persuasion say, "I dislike so-and-so personally, despair of his opinions, but I'm going to tune in on the scoundrel again tonight just to see what crazy theory he is now expounding." Psychiatrists may understand this urge toward self-induced torture in which the victim is powerless to do anything but mutter angrily at a vision on a screen or at the sound of a broadcast voice. I do not. At all events, let us assume "no commentators"—no well-known, coast-to-coast headliners, and none of the hundreds of others who broadcast locally in communities all over America.

In the total absence of freedom of expression, there would be no politicians on the air either. Office seekers would have to campaign without radio and television, resorting to the stump speech and assembly hall of another year. And officeholders would be barred from speaking on the air—for which among them could speak without expressing an opinion that would do violence to the prohibition against freedom of expression?

Naturally there would be no place for the pulpit, either. No faith or sect could be permitted to bespeak the virtues of its creed during such a blackout of opinion.

Surely we could not cover, by microphone or camera, the great political conventions, for these represent nothing but a cacophony of opinion, some good and some bad, but all born of conviction loudly proclaimed. It is very doubtful that a Presidential inaugural could be broadcast, and most certainly scientists,

scholars, and teachers would be forbidden.

Actually, in the strictest interpretation of the premise, if there were no freedom of expression whatever the air would be silent: for a drama of purest fiction can express a point of view, and even music may provoke thought.

But how long would such silence prevail? Not very long in this industry, for this industry—by necessity—is licensed by the federal government. Officeholders, the most innocent among them, would see quickly the usefulness of such a massive instrument of communication. Here, under proper control, the incumbent government could project its viewpoint without fear of contradiction, except in other media. Here would be the ready weapon of the unscrupulous man to perpetuate himself in office. Here would exist the pattern for dictatorships as, even today, we see it clearly in other nations.

LICENSING

Such speculation makes it apparent that broadcasting in a sense has supplanted the press of the nation as the first line of defense in the whole area of freedom of expression, for broadcasting is more vulnerable to attack through a licensing authority. During the thirty-odd years in which the medium has grown to its present stature, there have been many skirmishes between broadcasters and that licensing authority. Most of them have had to do with freedom of expression, basically; whether the broadcaster should be the arbiter of programing or the government; whether broadcasters should be permitted to editorialize; whether the broadcaster must be required to balance opinion by exposing all viewpoints on a given subject.

In other words, freedom of expression within this medium has been subject to greater restraints than have ever jeopardized the publishing industry since its final emergence from licensing authority. These restraints are likely to continue, whatever the identity of the party in power—for broadcasting will undoubtedly continue to be subject to licensing so long as its existence derives from the use of channels that require assignment.

WHAT MEASURE OF FREEDOM?

I believe we would agree that a broadcasting system which permitted of no freedom of expression whatever would be incongruously out of balance with our nation's concept of government by the governed. The air waves must remain free. What, then, shall be the measure of that freedom? Free, yes—but to what degree? A mechanic may give a different answer from a professor; a government career man a different answer from an editor; a political scientist a different answer from a lawyer. But all would agree, certainly, that there should be freedom in sufficient measure to neutralize any danger of usurpation.

As believing American citizens, they could give no other answer based upon logic—for this is not the freedom of the broadcaster we are considering, but the freedom of the people themselves. I am sure the implications of a free press and free speech as treated in the Bill of Rights are clear enough to readers of THE ANNALS, but it remains doubtful whether such comprehension extends to all of our citizenry.

The Constitution inveighs against the limitation of freedom of expression in the words which state that the right of free speech and a free press *shall not be abridged*. The Constitution's guarantee of these freedoms was not basically intended as a privilege for the publisher, but rather as a benefit and protection for the people at large whom the publisher serves.

It is true that the era of broadcasting had not dawned when those words were written, but they are clearly as applicable to broadcasting as to publishing. These two media perform like functions in unlike manners, one approaching the intelligence through the eye alone and the other approaching through both the ear and the eye. Both entertain. Both inform. Both are instruments of commerce. Both are diversely owned and of varying political and social persuasions. The very addition of the voice of radio and the picture of television gives balance to opinion, since they introduce new expressions of thought and opinion in the market place.

How free should broadcasting be? As free as the press. That is the answer—and no compromise upon it is consistent with a government which exists on the proposition that the governed shall be in control. For, as Chief Justice Earl Warren observed at the recent National Press Club inaugural dinner, speaking to both newspaper and radio and television correspondents who belong to that organization:

> May I say to you that this is a great breed—these newspaper people of America. They are the greatest friends that the public has—the greatest friends that people in office or out of office ever had. They are not public officials, but they are public servants. While they do not have a public position, they do have public responsibilities just as great as any man who holds public office and they discharge them with equal fidelity.

Freedom is not a piece of pie that can be cut into segments of assorted sizes and thus distributed. Each gets his equal share. Some are so ill-mannered, so disrespectful of its rewards, as to lose it altogether. As this applies to the individual, so does it apply to the medium. It is not difficult to stop reading a particular newspaper—or to stop dialing to a given radio or television station. Either action expresses your dissatisfaction with the product, and a sufficient rebellion will eliminate the producer.

The broadcaster thrives on the attention of the public and dreads inattention more than any other single thing. This is the true check, and the democratic one, against insolence of management or policy, as a person's vote is a check against insolence of office.

If such a premise is acceptable—that broadcasting should enjoy freedom no less than that of any other mass medium—what does the record show? Just how free is the medium in terms of its capacity to speak?

EDITORIALIZING ON THE AIR

The question must be considered in the context of regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, the licensing authority established by the Communications Act of 1934. But there must be weighed as well the activities of state and national legislative bodies, of the courts and certain professional organizations, with respect to the medium's freedom to report as well as to speak opinion.

Mayflower case

There was a time when the Commission said, in effect, that broadcasters should not editorialize on the air. The authority of the Commission to regulate such silence certainly is questionable, but this prohibition grew out of a Commission action on the hearing given a station for the renewal of license. The prohibition against editorializing, if it could be called such, was contained in dicta, as the lawyers say, and not spelled out in regulation. It could not have been spelled out, since the Communications Act specifically prohibits censorship.

The Commission, in this particular litigation—known popularly among broadcasters as the Mayflower case—held

that a station could not express a political opinion. The management of the facility, for example, could not go on the air and promote a specific bond issue or a particular candidate or cause without placing his license in jeopardy. Since radio and television licenses are subject to renewal every three years, it is obvious that this decision had the effect of stifling free comment by broadcasters.

Equal opportunity

Constant campaigning by the broadcast industry and thorough review by the Commission led to subsequent action, three years ago, which nullified the "raised eyebrow" caveat contained in the Mayflower decision. Now the Commission says, in effect: "You may editorialize but you must give equal opportunity for reply by those holding opposite points of view." Is even this freedom? I leave it to you who are political scientists to debate among yourselves. I can assure you that there has been much discussion of the subject among broadcasters. Some hold to the belief that the Commission, as the regulatory representative of the Congress and thus of the people, should demand such "equal opportunity." Most broadcasters believe that the rule of thumb should apply during political campaigns, but not all agree that it is meritorious otherwise. Whatever the virtue of either argument, it is true that such authoritarian advice does not apply in the printed media. No one tells a publisher, "You must give all points of view." The informed and experienced publisher makes every honest effort to do so, nonetheless, because he knows that prejudice begets enemies and enemies do not subscribe. We cannot proceed from the argument that broadcasters are less responsible than publishers, particularly in view of the fact that licensees are so thoroughly examined as to their personal, financial, and civic capacities before they are franchised.

At all events, you only occasionally hear a broadcaster—in the sense of a station manager, as compared to a publisher or editor—on the air with an opinion about a matter of controversy. I believe there may be a trend toward more and more such broadcasts, particularly in the smaller, well-knit communities. Perhaps this is good. There are over 2,600 radio stations and 400 television stations on the air. If editorial opinion by 1,800 daily newspapers is considered democracy in action, possibly the addition of 3,000 more viewpoints would be enlivening as well as enlightening.

I am separating this function, of course, from that of the commentator and analyst—as the editorials in a newspaper are separated from the observations of the columnist. The most successful broadcaster, at the network or station level, attempts to maintain a balance among commentators reflecting every possible opinion.

NEWS OR OPINION?

The arena of comment, whether by management or employee, is not to be confused, however, with another vital aspect of free expression on the air. "Freedom of expression" connotes not only the broadcast of interpretation of the news but the broadcast of the news itself. News improperly and unfairly presented can carry the effect of opinion. I like to illustrate the point by recalling the old town crier. He used to say: "It's three o'clock"—that is news —"and all's well"—that is opinion.

Broadcasters historically have been looked upon by some persons in public life with innate suspicion. One hardly believes that opprobrium was attached to the broadcaster himself but rather to the tools of his trade—the camera and the microphone. Politicians are likely to look upon these instruments of publicity with affectionate regard during campaign time, and once sworn in office to regard them with the waspishness of a thwarted spinster.

TELEVISION AND COURT TRIALS

Even now there are state statutes which absolutely forbid the use of microphones and television cameras in broadcasting public trials—although the precedent of the right to public trial is well established and accepted. The camera and microphone perform the function of making a trial more public than had been possible before their introduction into the craft of reporting. Broadcasters acknowledge that they must be used with wisdom and discretion and that their use should not impinge upon the issues or the individuals being tried. But to ban them capriciously, without thorough examination of the contribution they can make as against the inconvenience they may cause, is hardly the American way. Nor does it represent, in our opinion, a stride forward in the delicate domain of free expression.

The American Bar Association Canons of Ethics include one canon which condemns the use of cameras and microphones in courtrooms, although some farseeing and thoughtful jurists have overlooked this advice and broadcast proceedings with eminent success.

As to the annoyance which it is said might be caused by glaring lights and grinding cameras, a thorough exploration of modern day television techniques has never been undertaken. The truth is that a television camera is noiseless and that it can operate satisfactorily without artificial lights other than ordinary room illumination. In fact, a courtroom trial could be covered from beginning to end with a television camera lens peering through a wall aperture as a boy peeks through a knothole at a baseball game.

The basic consideration here is not the behavior of a camera, which could be considered exemplary as compared to that of some reporters who cover the courts, but the product of the camera's genius. How much of the truth should be told to how many? That, fundamentally, is the problem—and I am happy to report that even now the American Bar Association has organized a committee to re-examine this whole problem. One of the members of that committee is Edgar Kobak, chairman of the Freedom of Information Committee of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMITTEE

This NARTB committee, comparable to the one that exists among newspaper editors, is the watchdog of our industry in the field of freedom of expression. I should like to give in full the committee's statement of policy, which not only gives insight into the committee's objectives but reflects as well the nature of such dilemmas as do exist in this sensitive field among broadcasters:

> The Freedom of Information Committee is a standing committee of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters. It is advisory to the Board of Directors and the management of NARTB.
>
> Its purpose is to propose policies and encourage actions which will promote freedom of expression, particularly as such basic freedom relates to the responsibilities of radio and television broadcasters in meeting their public interest responsibilities.
>
> It is the Committee's further responsibility to oppose vigorously any action, whatever the source, which limits the capacity of broadcasters to cover public pro-

ceedings by use of microphones or cameras or other electronic reportorial devices.

The Committee will develop positive programs of action to illustrate the right of radio and television to serve the public by such news coverage. The Committee will also confer with professional societies where ethical standards relating to treatment by radio and television in this area of news dissemination may exist, to the end that such standards shall not mitigate against these rights.

The Committee will encourage and advise broadcasters in the development of improved techniques for broadcast coverage of public events to avoid unnecessary and unreasonable interference with the orderly procedures of those events.

The Committee will develop a positive educational program to demonstrate the ability of radio and television broadcasters to accomplish their work through modern mechanical and electronic methods which may be adopted to meet all reasonable requirements of jurisprudence and the orderly conduct of public business.

The Committee shall give guidance to and coordinate the activities of freedom of information committees of State Broadcasting Associations which desire such assistance.

The Committee shall counsel the Association where questions of dignity, ethics, secrecy, the rights of privacy, and other sensitive matters require consideration.

And finally, the Committee shall continuously remind broadcasters, the public at large, governmental officials, and organizational leaders alike that freedom of information, and free access to such information, is a necessity for the proper functioning of a free press and a free broadcasting service; that the widest dissemination of news and other information by these and other media is vital to the development of an informed citizenry; and that eternal vigilance and cooperation in these matters by all is essential to preserve our liberties.

RADIO STANDARDS OF PRACTICE

That statement spells out the objectives of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters and its members in the continuing search for freedom to inform. It is backed up by standards of practice which have been promulgated by these broadcasters themselves. In order that you may know of the broadcaster's sensitivity to his obligation to be fair, let me quote also—briefly—from the paragraph concerning editorializing contained in the "Radio Standards of Practice":

> Some stations exercise their rights to express opinions about matters of general public interest. Implicit in these efforts to provide leadership in matters of public consequence and to lend proper authority to the station's standing in the community it serves is an equal obligation to provide opportunity for divergent viewpoints.
>
> The reputation of a station for honesty and accuracy in editorializing depends upon willingness to expose its convictions to fair rebuttal.

This is not a command by government. This is an expression of the sum of experience of broadcasters—an ethic or canon, if you will, intended to guide and not to direct. Broadcasters believe that utmost freedom, based upon the principles of American enterprise, can be attained through such continuing self-appraisal.

General David Sarnoff, chairman of the Board of the Radio Corporation of America, recently has predicted the early development of a home television screen which will occupy no more than the area of a framed picture on the wall. There have been produced already radio sets that will fit in coat pockets and, with further use of the transistor, even smaller ones are yet to come. As radio now reaches nearly 98 per cent of the nation's people, so also will television attain such coverage. And in the case of radio, at least, news, information, and entertainment will not only reach us in the home but will find us wherever we are—for it will be as mobile as the package of cigarettes you carry in your pocket.

There should be no unreasonable restriction on a medium of such power and influence. Implicit in its existence, in its growing coverage, and in the free principles by which it may operate are the hopes of those who, nearly two hundred years ago, revolted in search of truth and peace and the pursuit of happiness.

In the battle against the insidious evils of silence and censorship, broadcasters have drawn their own battle lines; nor do I believe that they will waver in their obligation to the people to report fairly and comment freely.

Harold E. Fellows, Washington, D. C., is chairman of the Board and president of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters. Prior to assuming the presidency of the NARTB in 1951 he was manager of New England operations for the Columbia Broadcasting System and general manager of Radio Station WEEI in Boston. In 1945 he assisted in the development of the "Radio Standards of Practice," ultimately adopted by the members of the National Association of Broadcasters. He is currently national chairman of the Commission on Mass Communications, National Conference of Christians and Jews.

Concentration of Economic Power and Protection of Freedom of Expression

By Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

PROTECTION of personality is rightly a major concern of mid-twentieth-century America. There are problems emerging which require the utmost thought and attention.

The problem is, of course, essentially philosophical. Unhappily America of 1955 apparently cannot discuss philosophy save with groans of agony and prophecies of decline. The writer cannot qualify as entrant in the debate in the usual manner. I do not see that our civilization is about to dissolve or that our structure has lost meaning. If I cannot go along with the glossy-print, cliché optimism of the public-relations trade, neither can I join the Jeremiahs.

Our philosophers have treated us to a fancy line of gloom. They are frequently epic in their sadness. Mr. Arnold Toynbee, in a massive *Study of History,* catastrophizes in several volumes. Mr. Walter Lippmann in a recently published best seller, *The Public Philosophy,* spends seven chapters expounding "the decline of the West." The late Russell Davenport in a book *The Dignity of Man,* financed by the Ford Foundation and scheduled for appearance this month, discusses the collapse of the American ideal for want of philosophy. An excellent poet, Chard Powers Smith, recently published a book entitled *The Yankees and God,* tracing four separate and distinct declines of America, in each case drawing his moral from the weakening of the New England Puritan ideal. There are others. The drama of their assorted catastrophies is epic. As the Golden Dustman in Dickens' *Our Mutual Friend* observed of his tutor, "Professionally they decline and fall, and as a friend they relapse into poetry." (Apparently anybody can decline and fall these days. All you need is a good witch-hazel fork with which to stroll through American history to discover the exact point at which a decline sets in. Being apparently the open season for decline points, you can pick your own.)

The odd fact is that our observers choose to regard as beginnings of decline those areas in which personality was, not most restrained, but most free. Toynbee fixes a decline point of the Roman Empire in the Antonine Age, when Stoic philosophy brought tolerance to perhaps the highest point in ancient history. Lippmann is more specific: his precise reason for asserting decline is that the aggregate of individuals we call mass public opinion has come to make politicians and governors into transmitting agents of a kind of neo-Jacobin mob action. One gathers Russell Davenport had somewhat the same fear. In each case the point appears to be that as personality is protected in its free expression, a common basis of action ceases to exist. There is no agreed set of philosophical premises. So Western governments cannot act with decision; Western intellectual life goes nowhere. Meanwhile outside forces not bothered with personality and having a system that imposes a single set of premises plow straight ahead. So democracy welters in impotent inaction while totalitarians, Nazi or Communist, take Rhinelands, Koreas, and Indochinas.

Against this background we have to tackle today's problem.

The Shift Towards Collectivism

Gloom aside, there is a problem here which demands careful attention. It overpasses even the technical maintenance of civil liberties which we must consider in a moment. Briefly it is the growing problem of maintaining a society, or at least a stratum of society, in which free-ranging thought and new ideas can go steadily forward, entering the causative streams of civilized life.

The problem is never wholly absent, but just now it is intensified, in my view, by a deep, hazardous, yet inescapable trend in the world generally and in the American world in particular. We are slowly (or perhaps, in historical perspective, rapidly) changing our civilization from one based on individual ownership, enterprise, and expression to one based on collective property, organized activities, and huge aggregates of systematized power. This is a world trend. We are dealing merely with an American expression of it.

This is not the time to discuss so vast a problem or trace so deep a change. The writer feels justified in making the statement after spending several years studying the institution known as the American stock corporation. It is now quite clear that the shift towards vast organization and away from individual enterprise and activity is not limited to the United States, nor is it even a product of capitalism. The Industrial Revolution probably is the prime cause; in any case that revolution seems to have only two groups of heirs competing for the task of producing under it: socialist or totalitarian commissariats which predominantly conduct economic activity in great parts of the world and great nonstatist corporations sometimes organized into cartels which predominantly conduct them elsewhere.

Simultaneous appearance of the two phenomena in the twentieth century is, one surmises, not coincidence. Great areas of today's economic life apparently have to be carried on by large organizations. Such organizations can either be governmental (as in more or less socialist England) or extragovernmental as in the United States. There is, obviously, a difference between great economic organization combined with political government (as in the case of the Soviet Union) and similar organization distinct from, different from, and perhaps opposed to political government. But whether or not the organization is combined with the power to govern, the two types of organization—these types tossed up by the twentieth-century revolution—have a good deal in common.

The intellectual minority

Their emergence prompted the British novelist, Mr. J. B. Priestley, who has in the course of his intellectual career critically examined socialism, Communism, and free enterprise alike, to write in the current issue of *The New Leader:* [1] "This is beginning to look like a society of Bossmen and Massmen with neither of them caring a rap about intellectuals"; the intellectuals he thinks are: "a dwindling minority, neither Massmen who do not know what they want until they are told, nor Bossmen who enjoy the bullying and the bouncing." His concern is that this minority—the musicians, artists, poets; the philosophers, pure scientific inquirers, and freethinkers generally—stand on a shrinking platform. The Bossmen are too busy settling immediate problems of power to think far ahead; the Massmen hope not to have to think at all. So, thinks Priestley, the economic phase of politics which had its beginning not very long ago may already be in sight of its own end.

[1] March 28, 1955.

American scientists are also feeling the pinch: an article by Eric Hodgins in the April 1955 issue of *Fortune* [2] quotes Dr. I. I. Rabi as saying that while the influences supporting American scientific research have done very well in applied science, they have somehow left out provision for the great, ranging, nonconformist minds. As a result, today the top 5 per cent of scientists in Europe are ahead of the top 5 per cent of scientists in the United States.

Now this is a moment in history in which (despite the violences of a now retreating McCarthyism and the propaganda cries of Communist party liners) actual freedom of expression is probably as well protected by law and institutions as it ever has been in history. Clearly something deeper is going on here than can be found in Supreme Court decisions, in occasional censorship statutes, or even in legislative investigations frightening the timid into self-imposed silence or conformity—or frightening institutional heads into demanding silence and conformity from their staffs.

Conformity—too little or too much?

The paradox is complete. Lippmann sees the decline of the West because there is not sufficient conformity to a public philosophy to permit strong and effective political action. Priestley sees in presently imposed conformity the impossibility of maintaining a strong and growing civilization, in which men can produce (for example) anything as dynamic and beautiful as the romantic movement. There is truth in both contentions. An economic phase has dominated politics for the first half of the twentieth century. It has produced some at least of the results which Priestley decries. Philosophically, at least in the West, there has been an increasing disparatenes[illegible] of thought—a kind of galloping agnosticism in all senses of that word. Probably this has produced some of the political phenomena which sadden Mr. Lippmann and incline Arnold Toynbee toward his Wagnerian gloom. Taken together, the two points of view pose a problem to which philosophy and political science alike must pay some attention.

Personality, we know, must be protected, for the principle of the thing. But what is the end to be achieved by its protection? As Hector asks in Cole Porter's musical comedy, *Golden Apple: "What* is the thing it's the principle of?"

Personality and the Universal

Protection of personality has been considered one of the finest flowers of Western civilization. Yet, interestingly enough, when we speak of it, we think at once not of personality as an end but rather of a collection of procedures designed to protect personality. We think of the Bill of Rights; of the writ of habeas corpus; of due process of law; of the Supreme Court of the United States and its ability to strike down legislative, executive, and possibly other kinds of acts which deny to men freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom to think or to act in certain respects. One thing not commonly considered is why these procedures are important; why the personality should be protected at all.

It is dangerous for a teacher of law to enter the sacred groves of philosophy; and yet, for an academy of political science the philosopher is the essential premise giver. At some risk, I earnestly recommend that the time has come to restudy some of the thinking in this field. We might linger with the little volume written by Hegel for his students in 1821, translated in English under the name of *The Philosophy of Right*. For Hegel did state precisely this paradox.

Rights (such as the rights conferred by the American Constitution and similar documents), he recognized not as ends in themselves but merely as provisions or possibilities for individuals. "Personality" he considered as chiefly involving the "capacity to exercise rights." The imperative of right (Mr. Priestley's preoccupation) he expressed simply: "To be a person and respect others as persons." The state (Mr. Lippmann's preoccupation) he thought of as the actuality of concrete freedom. But he added:

> concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and particular interests not only achieve their complete development and give explicit recognition for their right . . . but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and for another thing, they know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit.

Apparently our paradox of today existed also in the period following the Napoleonic Wars.

Actually, I suggest that there is a dualism implicit alike in preserving personality and in achieving effective political organization. To be real, fecund, and dynamic, the individual must be himself, ranging with his own mind; like Prometheus, capable if need be of assaulting the gods. The scientific base of our technical progress has come from just such assaults, as have our artistic and spiritual achievements. Yet individual ranging thought must not only achieve a personality; it must overpass the limited ideal of expressing and realizing personality alone; it must be continually seeking correspondence with some conception of cosmic order which has universal quality. Granted that individuals can only approach cosmic order by infinitesimally minute advance; nevertheless the conception of it, and the intent to approach it, alone make free persons viable as social and political men. In other words, it alone affords men freedom instead of anarchy. It leads them to organize and maintain effective states—if need be, perhaps effective superstates. For this search and its realization, personality is kept free and must be protected.

In this analysis, Mr. Lippmann is right, and so also is Mr. Priestley.

Free-ranging Thought

The danger to personality inherent in American life is in my judgment great; but it is not the danger commonly described. We have had, we have now, and probably always will have, a continuing battle to preserve civil liberties. I do not think we will lose that battle. Brave souls like Roger Baldwin and Norman Thomas will continue to give their lives to this cause; we owe them a debt of gratitude. Great jurists like Oliver Wendell Holmes and Harlan Stone will continue to enrich the decisions of American law. Stout citizens in all parts of the country will fight perennially sprouting pressure groups who for reasons of their own wish to stifle free expression and impose their own forms of thought; and these stout citizens will, I think, continue to win victories.

But (reverting to Hegel) all they can do, and all that constitutions, bills of rights, statutes, and courts can do, is to preserve civil rights which are, in essence, permissions. They enable men to make choices and to express themselves. This is all.

The more dangerous threat to personality seems to me to lie in the piling up of forces influencing men not to make use of these permissions. These forces, because they are not clean cut, because they are not doctrinaire, be-

[2] "The Strange State of American Research," Vol. 51, pp. 112–115, 214–224.

cause they do not state demands, are perhaps more threatening even than the groups who wish to impose censorship or to brainwash their fellow citizens. They are the deadening forces which give every motive to an individual not to let his thought range, not to disagree, not to open unpleasant questions, not to shock or displease the group in which he moves. They add up to a sort of paralyzing miasma of opinion which seems to think men's lives and thoughts should come into the world without shock and leave it without velocity; and which expects men's intellectual work to come out like a ribbon, lie flat on the brush, and dissolve in suave foam and pleasant perfume.

Organizations and the controversial

Concentration of economic power has played an important part in developing this dampening cloud. The process was simple enough, and by no means immoral in inception. Briefly, we passed from the phase of individual and possessory property, like my great-grandfather's farm and forge on the banks of Lake Champlain, to the organization of economics in vast steel companies, great distributing organizations, and so forth. One hundred and thirty-five of these control roughly half the industry of the United States; and if production and a high standard of living justify organization, they have brilliantly fulfilled their function.

Now individual life does change quality under these circumstances. What happened was the replacing of hundreds of thousands of individual operations and enterprises by great pyramids of organization. Obviously life in an organization differs radically from life as an independent owner, possessor, or enterpriser. To attain high effectiveness in organizations men must, and should, get along with their fellows, at least in fulfilling purposes of the organization.

Somehow the idea spread that any expression of personality which is "controversial" spoils the perfection of this ideal "organization man." In industry, in banking, in the larger educational organizations, even in government, when a man comes up for appointment or promotion, the most damning thing which can be said of him is that he is "controversial." This merely means that somewhere, sometime, he had or expressed an idea or took a line with which some group disagreed. Any organized minority capable of making noise can, it seems, make any individual "controversial" by attacking him.

Privately we can all concede that a man who has never had ideas sufficiently important or well-defined to induce occasional disagreement is a man who either had no ideas at all or had not character enough to stand up for them. None the less, organizationally, when choice lies between a man who has fought out issues and taken sides and one who, apparently, never offended any substantial group, the latter is commonly chosen. There are noble exceptions: one thinks with pleasure of a conservative group of trustees like the Harvard Corporation selecting President Pusey as Harvard's president in the teeth of his controversy with Senator McCarthy. Unhappily, for a single case of that kind one can think of a dozen of the other. Only a few weeks ago the University of Washington canceled a lecture invitation extended to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer of the Institute for Advanced Study because he was "controversial." This was a case in which the situation was clear and overt, and the prompt expression of many men made it clear that the University of Washington, and not Dr. Oppenheimer, suffered from this bit of ineptitude. As a rule, as we all know, the "controversial" individual has been silently turned down in committee appointment, promotion, or recognition, and no one ever hears about it.

Universities and the nonconformist

We have rested a little overconfidently on the assumption that demand for conformity could never blanket certain strata of American life. We have liked to think, for example, that American universities would always be free ports of ideas in the future as in the main they have been in the past. But now the process of economic concentration is raising some problems even in this area. The great American corporations, rightly, have determined that a part of their revenues should be given for educational and philanthropic purposes. In the aggregate, the gifts made by a number of large American corporations are greater than the gifts made by the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford Foundations combined. Already there is a grouping of these activities into a kind of advisory council so the gifts shall be (as no doubt they should be) co-ordinated. The movement represents one of the enlightened and generous phases of business concentration in American economics.

But . . . and but . . . and but. When a university chooses a president, when a college chooses a dean, when a law school chooses a new professor, and when the institution in question relies (as certain great institutions frankly do) on gifts from this source, would they really be likely to choose a man whose views, stated and defended, differed widely from the views of the group from which continued support is expected? This is not, you will note, the problem of academic freedom. Practically all universities, in the writer's judgment, will fight to the death to defend members of their faculties against outside attempts from politicians, donors, or anyone to control their teaching or honest thought. Nor does this involve the classic question of defense of the right of an institution to choose a "Communist" or a "totalitarian." Almost any academic institution will deny, and rightly, that an individual who is pledged to subordinate his thinking and his personality to an outside group has a right to a position premised on a paramount obligation to seek truth freely and to express only the individual's own conclusions.

The danger is more elusive. It is that a series of influences have been building up, tending increasingly to push out men whose habits of mind or whose honest research or whose artistic expression or whose speculations tend to conflict with the even tenor of current operations or are antagonistic to current business thought.

Many of us have had the happiest experience in university life. As a young man my own views about a corporation were obnoxious to some of the business world; and I owe an everlasting debt of gratitude to Columbia University and to the late Harlan Stone, then dean of the Columbia Law School, who in the face of it offered me membership in its faculty. All of us know, too, that occasionally individuals having received this noblest of gifts, the right to speak their own piece, have abused the permission. Yet one cannot avoid feeling and fearing a certain subtle change. Too often the heads of great universities are not picked for scholarship—they are picked as administrators. Not often do great foundations seek philosophers for their heads as did the Rockefeller Institute when it chose Simon Flexner. Too often the philosophy of the corporation which wants a "smooth-working" team gets into universities which ought to want, in Priestley's phrase, "a group of hundred-headed instrumentalities."

Conformity and the corporation

In commercial life, of course, the situation has become sufficiently familiar so that books are being written about it—pro and con. *Fortune,* a businessman's organ, expresses concern; overemphasis on conformity is coming to be a recognized danger.

This writer believes that personnel officers of corporations and appointments committees of foundations, universities, and other similar organizations should add a new rule to their book. Instead of ruling a man out because he has been "controversial," they ought to insist that every candidate presenting himself for a job should have under his belt at least one first-rate controversy in which he has borne himself well. If their candidate has not shown enough personality to do that at least once in his life, he is not a good enough man for a good job.

My own impression is that to maintain their leadership, and for the most practical as well as for the most idealistic of reasons, the great American corporations need a great deal more nonconformity than they are now getting. Corporations, like universities, in their limited sphere can derive enormous profit by creating within themselves free ports of ideas of all kinds within their general scope. This might upset the public-relations agencies by which the views of the corporate world are generally transmitted; but that, too, might not be altogether bad. Part of General Electric's present greatness lies in the fact that in past years its greatest scientific mind was Steinmetz; and he was a Socialist who used to run for office as a Socialist in times when socialism was bitterly unpopular. The point need not be labored. There is a great and growing sector of American life—and this sector includes the chief centers of economic power—in which it is of advantage to be or appear to be conformist and in which it is dangerous to a career to push thought beyond an accepted framework. The protection of personality here is probably of first importance, and we have to get about it.

WHAT COMMON BASIS?

But all this leaves Mr. Lippmann's point unanswered. He knows, as do we all, that a society must be not only free but effective; and effectiveness means the ability to focus thought, to achieve organization, and, when necessary, to act rapidly. Particularly this is true when outside forces threaten, and when emergencies must be forcefully met. Mr. Lippmann seeks a common basis of action in what he calls "natural law," and he means by this a body of agreement among rational men which can be invoked, which commands authority, which is sanctified with authority by tradition, and which is translatable into political or other relevant action.

I think Mr. Lippmann is right, though critics may disagree with some of his reasoning and regret his use of the phrase, "natural law." In the Western world there has commonly been such a body of authoritative thought. It is ingrained in our history. Historically such thought was commonly expressed in the great religious organizations. In medieval times, the Catholic Church set up the power spiritual over against the power temporal, thus mobilizing moral and philosophical conceptions influencing action in so large a part of the secular organization that it could partially guide or check the exercise of power. Indeed, the symbolism still persists in England where the "lords spiritual," or bishops, still sit at Westminster alongside the "lords temporal," the peers who today increasingly come from the ranks of business and less and less from among military and political chieftains.

The history of the American Colonies and the early history of the United States saw similar though less formal emergence of the power spiritual: Chard Powers Smith's book rightly makes it clear that the practising Protestantism of New England was the driving power which made its colonization of the Northwest the expansion of a civilization rather than the migration of a horde of self-seeking adventurers. In later account, one can hardly imagine that the state of Utah could possibly have developed as brilliantly as it has were it not for the binding quality of the Mormon Church. In America, for excellent reasons, we have steadily demanded that the power spiritual should never be united with the power temporal. But it is one thing to say that, and quite another to say that the power spiritual should not exist.

Has the mechanism broken down?

Mr. Russell Davenport insists that with the elimination of transcendentalism we have lost any means of achieving a spiritual or philosophical consensus. and Mr. Walter Lippmann is only mildly optimistic in his hope that rationalism can be brought to perform the same function.

Nevertheless, I suggest that the United States has a higher factor of agreement on the elements of philosophical principle than perhaps any similar bloc of 165 millions of people; and this in spite of the disparity of philosophical explanation, the difference in symbols or expression, and the fact that some make their philosophical synthesis by believing in an omnipresent God expressing himself through revelation while others do not recognize a deity at all. It takes more than hedonism, existentialism, or accident of coincidental private interest to make it possible for me to buy a newspaper on Fourteenth Street in New York, leaving an unguarded nickel on a street-corner stand while the proprietor has his coffee in a neighboring restaurant. It is not an accident that any stranger, however ignorant or uncouth, finds immediate help in getting from one point to another. It is not an irrelevant fact that almost every community instinctively organizes when a condition of want or misery becomes evident. We may not accept a common ecclesiastical base for what we do; but there is an amazing uniformity of action throughout the country. Factually, the civilization of the United States has absorbed and given common habit of thought and action to more diverse waves of population, in shorter time, than any civilization now in existence. It might even be possible (the experiment would be worth trying) to put down in a single book the standards of conduct which are observed almost without question from California to Maine. Part of these may simply be those habits which William James called "the fly-wheel of society." But it seems to me that quietly, without benefit of conscious thought, the American "personality" does what Hegel said: it steadily seeks norms of universality.

Extending the frontier of the accepted

The problem, analyzed, is most puzzling when the task is extension of this body of common mores which spring from a more or less agreed conception of life in the cosmos. We are quite accustomed to a conception which expresses itself by insistence that the poor should have access to hospitals and that if there is not a hospital handy the community ought to get together to raise some money and build one. But our common conception does not give a base for action (for example) when a country on our borders is suffering from malnutrition and bad economic conditions or when the problem is raised of defending a faraway country from the aggression of a tyrannical neighbor.

It is permissible now to revert to

Hegel's dualism. The developed personality, the nonconformist, the man perhaps at war with current thinking, is precisely the individual most needed when frontiers of accepted concepts have to be extended. In science we have learnt this is true: to extend our material capabilities an Einstein must assault Newtonian physics, as in earlier times a Galileo assaulted the premise of fixed stars. In music we understand it: a Rachmaninoff, a Debussy, even an Irving Berlin must break the boundaries hallowed by Beethoven and by Bach. In poetry and literature we expect it: the Thoreaus and Walt Whitmans pushed beyond perspectives of beauty posed by Shelley or Matthew Arnold. In politics we dimly discern at least that it has happened: Abraham Lincoln looms as an authentic American saint as well as an authentic American statesman, and I think the late Franklin D. Roosevelt had similar qualities. Properly speaking, authority is always conquered—never given—although the conquest-right is intellectual, philosophical, and spiritual.

OUT OF THIS CONFLICT

Enough has been said here to suggest, first, that there must be at all times a will towards common action, and, second, a continuous demanding that personality be protected in its power as well as its right to challenge old concepts and smash old frontiers. The will of the group organizes a viable society; the extension of personality achieves extension of the field of common action and changes in existing mores. From the two forces grinding against each other we have what is called the progress of civilization.

Authority, surprisingly enough, is the result of past conflicts between free personalities and accepted norms. As of today political and commercial life cries down the intellectuals and the "egg-heads" who emphasize personality. But, when faced with new or difficult problems, invariably the intellectual or the "egg-head" is called in to marshal data and devise solutions. On the American record to date, the continuous conflict has been useful in and of itself. The "egg-head" owes everything to his enemies; his enemies justify their existence by fulfilling the "egg-head's" dreams.

In statelier symbolism of earlier times, the power spiritual stood over against the power temporal, and from that combination of conflict and confluence, civilizations were born.

In brief, it is time that the intellectual world defend personality and resultant controversiality but know why the defense is essential. It is time that the conformist world recognize in the controversialist the guarantee of its fruitfulness and its growth. Each of us, demanding the right of free personality, must recognize that the permissions he demands have as their proper end contribution and addition to the body of common concepts and mores which alone makes organized society viable and which in turn makes freedom possible.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr., LL.D., New York City, is professor of corporation law in the Columbia Law School and partner in the law firm Berle, Berle, Agee & Land. He was Assistant Secretary of State from 1938 to 1944 and Ambassador to Brazil in 1945–46. He is the author of The Natural Selection of Political Forces (1950), The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (1954), and other works.

Is Wire Tapping Justified?

By PATRICK MURPHY MALIN

THE Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

In 1928, in a dissenting opinion from within the minority of four in the Olmstead prohibition wire-tapping case, the late Justice Brandeis said: "The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of the rights of man and the right most valued by civilized men." [1] He had not forgotten what often seem to be the most forgotten amendments, the Ninth and Tenth, which not only conclude the Bill of Rights but also succinctly declare the American faith in a free society with a limited government: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people" and "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

But in 1954, Attorney General Brownell posed this question: "How can we possibly preserve the safety and liberty of everyone in this Nation unless we pull Federal prosecuting attorneys out of their strait-jackets and permit them to use intercepted evidence in the trial of security cases?" [2]

In dealing with this problem, I shall first refer briefly to the extent and mechanics and legal status of wire tapping. Then I shall outline the arguments for and against legalized police wire tapping, and my conclusions.

EXTENT AND MECHANICS OF WIRE TAPPING

No one knows how much wire tapping there is—official and unofficial, legal and illegal. But occasional formal and informal revelations—of which the most recent widely publicized one is that of the privately organized New York City Anti-Crime Committee—indicate that each day there are many thousands of wire taps in operation throughout the country, most of all in the larger cities.

As for mechanics, it is apparently still true that there is only one way to tap a telephone secretly, and that is by having an expert cut into the wire itself some distance from the instrument. But there are already electronic devices which, despite difficulty of concealment and other imperfections, considerably facilitate the practice. And the phone tap need not now have a listener taking notes, but may be connected to an automatic wire recorder. A recording can be edited by deletion, rearrangement, or even addition of words or even syllables; and thus may increase the problem of false evidence to terrifying proportions. But I am dealing here,

[1] Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928).

[2] "Statement by Honorable Herbert Brownell, Jr. . . . Prepared for Testimony before a Subcommittee of the [Senate] Judiciary Committee, April 20, 1954," p. 3.

not with that related problem, but with wire tapping itself, even if the evidence is accurate and fair.

LEGAL STATUS

Consideration of the legal status of wire tapping may begin with the 5 to 4 decision of the United States Supreme Court in the 1928 Olmstead case, which held that official federal wire tapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that evidence so obtained could constitutionally be used in federal courts. In handing down that decision, the late Chief Justice Taft said: "The Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants." [3] Literalism won, but by a slim margin, and not for long.

Opposition to that decision, as to prohibition enforcement practices generally, led Congress, when it passed the Communications Act of 1934, to provide in Section 605 that ". . . no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, meaning, [etc.], of such intercepted communication to any person. . . ." [4]

That is still the law, and on its basis the United States Supreme Court has held that wire tapping—though not unconstitutional—is illegal and that evidence so obtained (or even evidence obtained upon clues discovered by wire tapping) is inadmissible in federal courts. The Supreme Court has also held that Section 605 extends to intrastate communications, and thus would seem to have made assurance doubly sure that even such wire tapping as is authorized by the laws of a half-dozen states is illegal. But it has not yet explicitly said so, and it has explicitly said that evidence obtained in violation of Section 605 is admissible in state courts —because Congress did not intend to enact a rule of evidence for such courts, which often admit evidence obtained in violation of even their respective state laws regarding wire tapping or other methods.

Moreover, though the Department of Justice in 1940 announced its complete abandonment of wire tapping, it almost at once reversed itself, and it continues to operate on the basis of a narrow interpretation of Section 605. From the time of the late Robert Jackson onward, it has argued that wire tapping is forbidden only if followed by divulgence and that sharing of wire-tap information among officials of a single government is not divulgence from one "person" to another "person"! (No wonder there has been only one federal prosecution of even unofficial wire tapping, and only a few state prosecutions.) With all the respect I can muster for such arguments, I must say that I find the Supreme Court more convincing in its interpretation: "We nevertheless face the fact that the plain words of Section 605 forbid anyone . . . to intercept a telephone message." [5]

VALUES AND RISKS

So much for extent and mechanics and legal status. Let me now outline the arguments for and against legalized police wire tapping, and my conclusions. In doing so, I hope it will be clear from the beginning that—though I am on balance strongly opposed to all wire tapping—I take that position, not in disregard of its risks, but in considered choice of those risks as against the risks involved in even a small amount of wire tapping. Also, I hope everyone will note that I have some excellent company—including the *Wall Street Journal,* which has said this in a recent editorial:

> We see no need for chipping away at the rights and privileges of people who are not Communists in order to catch Communists. Perhaps the latter can be more easily trapped through wiretapping; certainly it will make the job of our police easier. . . . The job of the police would be made easier also if they could go about arresting anyone they chose and if they could break down any door and if they could hold in prison a suspect as long as they wished. But restraints were placed on Government and on police so that these things could not happen.[6]

Put it another way: All life is a choice among values, and among risks; and a free society—to remain free—must take almost all of its risks on the side of freedom.

ARGUMENTS PRO

The arguments for legalized wire tapping may be conveniently grouped under three headings:

No-novelty argument

Attorney General Brownell points to the fact that the law already admits evidence obtained by an informer, an eavesdropper, or a policeman hidden in a closet; even evidence obtained by means of a transmitter concealed on an agent's person. And, he says, "There is little, if anything, to distinguish between these approved methods of obtaining and admitting evidence, and wiretaps which are not admissible." [7]

Great-need argument

Mr. Brownell points to the fact that criminals may go free if wire tapping is the only way to obtain evidence against them, and it is forbidden; this may jeopardize national security, as in the case of Judith Coplon. Next to national security, the most frequently emphasized area of need is the prevention and punishment of kidnaping; about it, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, says: "I dare say the most violent critic of the FBI would urge the use of wiretapping techniques if his child were kidnapped and held hostage." [8]

Little-danger argument

Even among persons who fully recognize the risks involved in wire tapping, there are those who believe that the actual danger of abuse is slight. They point out that our federal and state and local governments are kept reasonably trustworthy by a combination of the ballot and freedom of speech and the press. They also stress that police officials have not thus far been guilty of much abuse of power, and are unlikely to be so guilty in the predictable future.

ARGUMENTS CON

The arguments against legalized wire tapping may also be conveniently grouped under three headings:

Immense-difference-in-degree argument

Many opponents turn Mr. Brownell's argument against him by pointing out that even some other methods of obtaining and admitting evidence, now fully approved by the courts, are bad and should be eliminated; then, they point out, how much more should wire tapping be opposed. As Justice Hofstadter of the Supreme Court of New York County said on January 11 of this year:

[3] Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 464 (1928).

[4] 47 U. S. C. §605 (1952).

[5] Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 382 (1937); the "first Nardone case." Also United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 921, 925 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).

[6] January 19, 1955.

[7] "Statement by . . . Brownell . . . ," p. 5.

[8] "Wiretapping: The Pros and Cons," *New York Times Magazine,* November 29, 1953, p. 32.

A tapped wire is the greatest invasion of privacy possible. . . . A telephone interception is a far more devastating measure than any search warrant. A search warrant is confined to a definite place and to specific items, or, at least, to items of a stated class or description. Those in possession of the searched premises know the search is going on and, when the officer has completed his search, whether successfully or not, he departs. Not so in the case of telephone interception. The interception order is obtained ex parte, and the person whose line is to be tapped is, of course, in ignorance of the fact. The tap is maintained continuously, day and night. Everything said over the line is heard, however foreign to the stated objective of the law-enforcement officers. The most intimate conversations, personal, social, professional, business, or even confidential, of an unlimited number of persons may be laid bare. In effect, the line of everyone who is called from or makes a call to the tapped line at any time is being tapped during the maintenance of the tap. When a line in a public telephone booth is tapped, as has on occasion been done, the conversations of people having no relation of any kind to the operator of the place in which the booth is situated or the person whose line is tapped are overheard.[9]

Thus, as Brandeis said in 1928, even "general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping."

Inadequate-result argument

Many opponents have pointed out that, even if there were known to be absolutely no wire tapping of any sort, the very nature of espionage and sabotage would cause spies and saboteurs to do practically all their work by personal presence and contact; and that the records of espionage and sabotage cases suggest, not only that little actual help has been gained from wire tapping in apprehension and conviction but also that other methods can be sufficiently effective. Remember that it was only one of the two Coplon cases in which the conviction was upset because the government's evidence derived from wire tapping; in the other case, there was a conviction on non-wire-tap evidence, and it was upset only because of a post-arrest wire tap on telephone conversations between the defendant and her lawyer.

As for kidnaping, even opponents of wire tapping acknowledge that the nature of the crime allows more scope for the use of the telephone, and therefore the possibility of greater help to be gained from wire tapping in apprehension and conviction. But they point out that, even if there were known to be absolutely no wire tapping of any sort, the mails would probably still be the chief means employed in attempts to extort ransom; and that, as would be true of police interception without consent of the mail received or dispatched by the distraught parents of a kidnaped child, the problem for a free society in the use of wire tapping is whether the gains would sufficiently overbalance the losses.

That is the very problem which a free society faces in regard to what I suspect is the fundamental reason why many of our law officers argue so strenuously for wire tapping: namely, to keep track generally of the doings of suspected criminals, to discover and develop leads in run-of-the-mill crimes. Here again it is pertinent to quote Justice Hofstadter:

> The application now made follows the general pattern of like applications heretofore made to me, which also, in the main, had as their objective the detection of gambling in some form. . . . Some years ago I instituted the requirement that . . . written reports of the results obtained from any interception ordered be thereafter submitted to me. . . . These showed some arrests and fewer convictions and then rarely, if ever, for a heinous offense. . . . It is melancholy to behold [our city] rife with violence, an admittedly lawless community, its inhabitants no longer safe by night or day, in their persons or their homes. To be redeemed as part of the great American community, its police department needs external aid, i.e., a larger force, with more pay for the men, and a renewed spirit from within . . . but not more wire-taps![10]

Overwhelming-danger argument

Many opponents start by pointing out that, given technological ingenuity and human nature, we should be in for bad trouble with unofficial and illegal wire tapping, even if the official and legal variety were completely removed from our society; and that official and legal wire tapping accentuates such trouble by stimulating technological development and by teaching more persons how to wire tap. Even now, according to Charles Grutzner of the *New York Times:*

> Federal wiretapping is nothing compared to that of local police and private investigators across the country. A former law enforcement officer told this writer a few days ago: "Detectives use wiretaps on maybe half of all the important police cases in New York, and many use wiretaps as a routine thing to pick up leads on bookmaking, prostitution and other crimes without bothering to get court orders or even to let their captains know they're tapping." Not all police, and certainly not all private investigators, limit their use of eavesdropped talks to those conversations they set out to hear. Blackmail and sale of business secrets, though incidental, have been found lucrative to crooked operators.[11]

Even if we could measurably solve the problem of unofficial and illegal wire tapping, say the opponents, we should be in for bad trouble with official and legal wire tapping. We may thank our lucky stars that the present head of the FBI is a man of integrity, and no alarmist; but some future head of that bureau might not be so scrupulous and intelligent. The way in which a policeman uses his gun can be pretty well checked on by the citizens who employ him and authorize him to use it in guarding public order; the way in which he uses wire tapping can scarcely be checked on at all. Nor is it only police wire tapping, and the enormous amplification of dossiers implied in it, which constitute an incalculably large threat to the private citizens of a free society. Wire-tapping surveillance has already been considerably employed, more or less legally, in public affairs—for example, by a Congressional committee and by a governor checking on a mayor.

This "dirty business," say the opponents in quotation from the late Justice Holmes, is—in quotation from the happily quite alive though retired Justice Roberts[12]—"inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty." It tends to corrode the morale and morality of a free society. Justice Hofstadter says: "As evil as an actual interception is the fear bred in the mind of the average citizen that he may at any time become the victim of one." Justice Brandeis said: "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their be-

[9] "In the matter of an application . . . ," text of opinion, *New York Law Journal,* January 12, 1955, p. 2.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 1, 2.

[11] February 27, 1955.

[12] This paper was read before Mr. Owen J. Roberts death on May 17, 1955.—EDITOR'S NOTE.

liefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations." Justice Frankfurter has warned us: "The contrast between morality professed by society and immorality practiced on its behalf makes for contempt of law." And J. Edgar Hoover said in 1940: "The discredit and suspicion of the law-enforcing branch, which arises from the occasional use of wiretapping, more than offsets the good which is likely to come of it."[13] I appeal from Paul drunk to Paul sober!

DESIDERATA

My conclusions are simple to state, however difficult to apply. I am, in considered choice among values and among risks, on balance strongly opposed to all wire tapping—by anyone, at any time, for any purpose. Like Senator Wayne Morse, I want the United States Supreme Court to reverse its 5 to 4 decision of 1928 at the earliest opportunity, and declare official federal wire tapping to be unconstitutional under the Bill of Rights. In the meantime, I want the Court or the Congress to make absolutely clear that all wire tapping is illegal, even when practiced by the Department of Justice or authorized by a state. I want prosecution of everyone who engages in it, or orders or allows it. I want the states to make wire-tap evidence inadmissible in court.

MINIMAL SAFEGUARDS

If those desires prove impossible of attainment, or are postponed, then I want the following minimal safeguards:

1. Wire tapping should be permitted only to federal officials, in cases involving treason, sabotage, espionage, or kidnaping. (In kidnaping cases, parents' wires should be tapped only with their prior consent.)

2. The authority to grant permission for wire tapping should be vested in one federal judge assigned by the Supreme Court for a ten-year period for each district.

3. Only the Attorney General should be allowed to apply directly to the judge for permission to tap a wire. All requests for permission should be channeled through him.

4. No wire tap should be authorized except upon sworn statement of fact demonstrating reasonable basis for belief of actual, as distinguished from potential, treason, sabotage, espionage, or kidnaping.

5. An application should include the names of the suspect and of the telephone subscriber, and the number of people who use the line.

6. Complete records of all applications and approvals should be kept.

7. Only recordings, sealed and preserved in a central place, should be used in evidence. If so employed, all recordings made in connection with an investigation should be made available to the defendant at government expense. Irrelevant material that might injure innocent outsiders should be excised, upon agreement between government and defendant. Recordings should be destroyed only on court order.

8. Taps should be authorized for a maximum of ninety days, with a ninety-day renewal permitted.

9. Strict penalties should be provided for any person tapping a wire illegally, and each year a federal grand jury should be convened to consider possible illegal tapping.

10. The present provisions of the law should remain in effect against any unauthorized tapping or disclosure of information obtained by tapping, whether authorized or unauthorized.

11. The press and public should be informed by monthly and annual reports of the number of taps sought for each type of case; the number granted; the number resulting in prosecution; and other pertinent data.

[13] Department of Justice release of March 15, 1940, quoted by Senator Wayne Morse, "Wiretapping Versus Freedom . . . ," *Congressional Record,* June 11, 1954, 7610.

INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT

But I am not satisfied with minimal safeguards; though not unmindful of the risks involved, I want all wire tapping abolished. I will bear my share of the risks involved in such abolition, as I have in the past—in peacetime and in wartime—borne some other risks for the American community and the American government, in token repayment of the vast debt I owe them and the immeasurable respect I have for them. I will gladly bear my share of those risks, not so much in terms of "the nicely calculated less and more" of reasons for and against as in the last analysis, because of commitment by faith to the defense and expansion of the grandest political achievement I know—the Anglo-Saxon principle of justice. In 1765, the elder Pitt said: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force of the Crown." In 1885, the United States Supreme Court said:

> It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitute the essence of the offence [by the government against a man's privacies of life]; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.[14]

[14] Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1885).

Patrick Murphy Malin, LL.D., New York City, has been executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union since 1950. He is a former member of the Faculty of Economics, Swarthmore College, and was vice director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, London (1943–47), price executive, Chemicals and Drugs Branch, Office of Price Administration (1942–43), and American director of the International Migration Service (1940–42).

Passport—Right or Privilege?

By Joseph A. Fanelli

PASSPORT—right or privilege? These are large words. Like the federal government's security standard one can get out of them about what one puts into them. So I attempt to define them, at least for the purposes of this discussion.

Let us first delimit the word "passport." Back in 1940, a story was current about the old man, a Jewish refugee from Hitler's Germany, who went to the counter of Cook's travel agency in Lisbon to buy transportation.

"Where do you want to go?" asked the polite clerk behind the counter.

"I do not know," said the old man. "This is not an easy question. I was lucky to escape from Germany. Here you have Salazar. In Italy and Spain, there are Mussolini and Franco. In Latin America, Trujillo, Batista, and Vargas are in power. And I hear that, in the United States, anti-Semitism is on the rise."

"Here," said the clerk, "is a map of the world. Go over to that desk and study it. When you have decided where you want to go, let me know and I'll sell you a ticket."

The old man studied the map of the world with care for some hours. At closing time, he returned the map to the clerk. "Please, sir," said the old fellow, "do you have anything else?"

The story shows the dreams of which humanity is capable even at the nadir. Had the old man wanted to visit and inspect some country as a possible future residence, he would have needed a passport to identify himself as a citizen of Germany, with a right to return and live in Germany. That he undoubtedly did not get from Hitler.

One function of a passport is to evidence the right of the holder, if abroad, to return and live in the country that issued it. At this hour, I am happy to report, a citizen of the United States can return to the United States from abroad at any time and in all circumstances, and he can get a passport for that purpose. Hence, it may be said that he has a right to that one particular use of a passport. But his passport rights, in that absolute sense, end there.

Restrictions

Under the law today, a citizen of the United States has no right in all circumstances to get a passport for the purpose of leaving the United States and visiting abroad. It is a federal criminal offense for a citizen to depart from the United States except in accordance with the passport regulations. Those regulations require a passport for all points outside the Western Hemisphere—Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, and so forth. Since the federal government regards passport issuance as a privilege to be extended or withheld from a citizen, there are a number of circumstances in which our Department of State will deny a passport. The result of a denial is to place the citizen in a sort of hemisphere jail. A citizen without a passport may travel to Canada, Mexico, and most Western Hemisphere countries. But the rest of the world is closed to him.

The State Department will deny a passport to a citizen under federal indictment or otherwise sought by outstanding compulsory federal legal process. I cannot quarrel with that. Nor would I quarrel with a denial of a passport to a citizen under a state criminal charge or sought by outstanding state legal process, although I should think that as a legal matter such action by our State Department would be invalid in the absence of more specific authority than the general discretion now conferred upon it.

But the State Department also denies passports to citizens who are merely under investigation for crime. The nature of investigators is to investigate at length, and in ever widening circles of involvement. In addition, we now have government officials who convict people of espionage by simply declaring them publicly to be spies. Given the present era when, in the words of the prophet Micah, "each hunts his brother with a net," denial of passports in the criminal area should be restricted to cases in which crime has been officially charged by indictment. A people who subscribe to the investigator's plea, "We know he is guilty but we cannot prove it," are already on the road to servitude. Anatole France puts this well in his classic *Penguin Island*. You will recall that the army officer assigned to investigate Pyrot reports to Greatauk that there is no evidence against Pyrot. "Let it be found," answered Greatauk. "Justice requires it. Have Pyrot arrested at once."

A second area in which passports are denied startled me when I learned of it. On the accusation of a wife against a husband of desertion and nonsupport, our State Department denies a passport to the husband until he settles his quarrel with his wife. Domestic relations in our state-federal system are the concern of the states and not of the federal government. And the State Department is ill-equipped either to judge family matters, or to force one party into settlement by the threat of withholding a passport badly needed for work abroad. I seriously doubt that this type of passport denial is valid in law.

The third area of passport denial is the controversial one today. Many citizens of the United States have applied for passports and received letters from their State Department rejecting their applications on the stated ground that granting of a passport "would be inimical to the best interests of the United States." No more and no less. They rushed to Washington to confer with the passport officials, only to learn from the highly agreeable officials that they would be glad to receive any evidence offered but could not divulge what was on their minds. In writing about this sort of thing, Kafka copies from life in the United States and not vice versa. In any event, it is a very frustrating experience. A couple of citizens, so treated, went to the courts. The courts held that the Department could not deny a passport to a citizen without first affording him a hearing.

Ineligible Communists Defined

As a result of these decisions, the State Department now publishes definitions of the Communist classes not eligible, in its view, for passports, and does advise a citizen fully and fairly of what is believed to be politically wrong with him. Let us see how this works out in practice.

The departmental regulations specify three classes to whom passports will be denied, except for direct return to the United States. The three classes are:

1. Current members of the Communist party, and recent members still under Communist discipline.

2. Persons who currently engage in activities which support the Communist movement, and do so as the result of Communist control.

3. Persons who are going abroad to engage in activities which will advance

the Communist movement and have that purpose in mind.

In sum, the three classes consist of persons who are currently Communist party members or currently under Communist discipline or currently working in support of a Communist party activity. America has traveled far from the principles of Jefferson. Many Americans, it may be, most Americans, would today agree that such persons should not get passports. However, few Americans would agree with the kind of inquiry that appears necessary to sift out the three proscribed classes.

INQUIRIES

In ferreting out the three classes, the Department is largely engaged in having citizens of the United States explain casual incidents in their lives that took place many years ago. The following types of State Department inquiry are derived from actual cases:

1. "It is alleged that when you were in college in the 1920's, you supported a Communist-dominated strike." The 1920's were a long time ago.

2. "In the 1930's, you were a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy, which the Attorney General has listed as subversive." That organization, as some of you may know, attracted many loyal Americans who were anti-Fascist and pro-Loyalist-Spain.

3. "In the 1930's, you were a member of the Los Angeles Anti-Nazi League, which was listed by the California Tenney committee." The Tenney committee, considered unreliable in respectable quarters, also listed the American Civil Liberties Union as subversive. It is an odd thing that the federal government has the Attorney General authoritatively, albeit invalidly, list the organizations considered subversive, but then inquires about any organization on anyone's list of subversive organizations.

4. "In the early 1940's, you subscribed to the magazine called *In Fact*." I am old-fashioned, and I shall never understand why my reading material is any business of the government's.

5. "In the 1940's you attended a dinner of the American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobigan, Inc." If Patrick Henry were alive today, I suppose he would say: "As for myself, I shall dine with whom I please."

6. "In the 1930's, you knew and associated with J. Worthington Pump and Mary Coldangels [the names are fictitious], who are alleged to be Communists. Please explain your acquaintance with them, and what you knew of their views." Let this be a warning that your present friendships are subject to federal government inquiry, even if you do not work for the government.

7. "You have denied under oath any Communist membership or connection since 1941, but we cannot grant a passport until you inform us whether you were a Communist party member prior to 1941, and if so, who your Communist associates were." Another invasion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

And all this in pursuit of current Communists.

When the Department's inquiries are directed to the events of recent years, they can still be troublesome to lovers of our traditions of liberty. "You want to go abroad," says the State Department to a passport applicant, "to write articles on the operations of the Marshall Plan for the Left-Wing press. Will your writings be constructive?" A very plain example of advance censorship in violation of the First Amendment.

Here is another one. The Department holds up a passport for a lawyer and seeks explanations, because, and solely because, the lawyer had been counsel for two passport applicants in connection with their passport difficulties—an attempted intimidation of counsel and a burden upon the citizen's right to counsel.

THEORY OF RELEVANCE

The theory of relevance has its broadest application in the field of belief and association. I do not say that the Department's inquiries are irrelevant. When you are trying to find out whether a man is really a Communist—that is, what he really thinks and what his motivations are—everything in his life is relevant: what he reads; what his religion is; who his friends are; and even what music, drama, and art he likes. This, I think, is true in logic. It certainly is inevitably true in practice, in the passport field, and in the closely related field of the government's security and loyalty programs.

Given the broad theory of logical relevance, the Passport Division of the State Department handles its inquiries with courtesy, fairness, and efficiency. For all I know, its inquiries may have resulted in some impediment and prejudice to the Communist party. And, I think, those who are not really Communists and Communist sympathizers today are usually cleared by the State Department and eventually get their passports.

But in the process the damage that is done to our free ways of life is immense. I pass over delays in urgent trips abroad, and the expense of seeking to clear oneself with the State Department. The injury to the fabric of American life goes much deeper. Who, when questioned about an innocent organizational membership or contribution in the past, will not tend to eschew organizational activity in the future? Yet, in a nation as large as ours, democratic processes can hardly continue without the association of Americans with organizations for a myriad of purposes. Who, when questioned about a past acquaintanceship, will not review his present friends and future acquaintances from the point of view of their orthodoxy? So confidence and trust among Americans lessen, and life dries up at its very roots. And who, when questioned about a view opposed to current foreign policy, will not try in the future to keep his unorthodox views to himself? And so the gray pall of orthodoxy gradually settles down upon the home of the brave.

The main fault lies not with our administrators in the State Department. Since we have the proscribed classes and the broad theory of relevance necessarily applicable to civil administrative proceedings of this nature, the maiming of our lives and body politic must result.

TRANSFER OF INQUIRY TO CRIMINAL COURTS

If my fellow Americans must insist on denial of passports to current Communists, I would suggest that the area of inquiry be transferred to the criminal courts. Let the passport application contain an oath that the applicant is not a Communist or Communist sympathizer. If the oath be subscribed, let the passport issue. If the oath be found false by those who investigate crime, let the applicant be indicted and tried for perjury. This procedure would reduce the damage; for the theory of relevance applicable in our criminal law is extremely narrow. You cannot in a criminal court introduce the friendships and associations of the thirties in proof of present-day Communist membership and sympathy.

UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT

But personally I would stand on the issuance of passports as a matter of absolute right to any citizen of the United States not wanted by outstanding legal process. Only forty years ago,

passports were not needed for travel. Today, a citizen of a small country has more freedom of movement than a citizen of the greatest nation on earth. Our criminal laws against espionage, sabotage, and so forth must and should be enforced. But in that pursuit the addition of passport denials is but a scatter-shot way of fighting Communist crime. And I worry about the trend. The trouble is that you cannot find the Communist unless you invade the lives of all applicants. In Washington today, a board is sitting to determine the political qualifications of an applicant for renewal of a license to deal in second-hand pianos. These things, of course, are not new. The rights of every American stand or fall, now, as in the past, upon the treatment afforded to the most hated citizen. I would make passports a right for every citizen not sought by legal process, a right—absolute and unconditional—and not a privilege which entails governmental invasion of life, family, religion, and thought. In any event, that is, in my opinion, the kind of liberty that befits an American.

Joseph A. Fanelli, LL.B., Washington, D. C., is a member of the law firm of Fanelli and Freehill, and has been engaged since 1944 in private practice, specializing in cases on immigration, nationality, and civil liberties. He was previously attorney, Office of the Solicitor General; Acting General Counsel, Railroad Retirement Board; chairman, United States Board of Immigration Appeals; special assistant to the Attorney General and to the Secretary of the Interior; and first assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Claims Division, Department of Justice.

Religious Freedom—a Good Security Risk?

By PHILIP E. JACOB

FREEDOM of religious belief and practice has been accepted as so integral a part of the American political and social heritage that to challenge its "loyalty status" appears heretical. Are we not the proud spiritual descendants of Pilgrims and Huguenots? A Congress dominated by an overwhelming orthodox Protestant majority pays its respects on appropriate occasions to papal authority, Jewish law, Quaker individualism, and Mormon revelation. We generally believe with Justice Douglas that the legacy of Madison and Jefferson as expressed in their Virginia "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" has become part of the American ideal; that, as he summarizes it:

> The community will tolerate every religion.
>
> The state will establish, favor, or support no religion.
>
> Each man's religion is his own affair.
>
> Religious freedom and sanctity of rights of conscience go hand in hand.[1]

SUPREME COURT OPINION

Indeed, this marriage of national unity to religious diversity is confirmed by our highest judicial authorities. Speaking for the Supreme Court in the second of the historic flag-salute cases, Justice Jackson found that " if there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." [2] If there should be question as to the relative claims of individual right and the authority of government, the Supreme Court majority has actually recognized a "preferred position" for the religious freedom, together with the other "First Amendment" freedoms. Not that they would admit an absolute freedom, even in regard to religious belief or practice, but that government, they insist, must not allow its sense of responsibility for public convenience and even the security of society a free hand at the expense of private conviction. To do so might well jeopardize rather than preserve the essential security of the national community. "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters," to quote again from Justice Jackson as he took a second look at the implications of compelling a Jehovah's Witness child to salute the flag in school. "Compulsory unification of opinion," he goes on to say, "achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." [3]

NEED FOR REAPPRAISAL

So we have the word of our courts and the testimony of our political credo that religious freedom can be cleared as a security risk. But is this enough? Time and circumstance—are they not different from the days of Madison's "Great Remonstrance" against the establishment of a "safe" state-approved religion in Virginia? At a time of exceptional crisis in the war for men's

[1] William O. Douglas, *An Almanac of Liberty* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1954), p. 210.

[2] West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).

[3] *Ibid.*

minds can we really count on individual religious freedom to buttress or at least not to impair the political and ideological foundations of our national commitments? Is not the political reliability of some persons' religious beliefs and practices open to question and, if so, should we not restrain those found to operate against the national interest regardless of religious considerations? Is it not time that we took a fresh look at this so-called preferred right of religious freedom, to see whether it is actually as "safe" as we blandly have thought?

If we conduct a security investigation of religious freedom, not only within the immediate American context but in the broader perspective of what is happening in other countries, we can detect four main tension points between state and church, government and religious believer: first, the opposition of religious persons and organizations to the established political order; second, the rejection of public duties on the grounds of religious belief; third, the challenge of religious proselytizing to public peace and morals; fourth, the enlistment of religion in the nation's service and the promotion of national interests.

RELIGIOUS CRITICISM OF THE STATE

First, and most dramatic, is the insistence of religious believer or organization on a political mission, a role of critic or opponent of government conduct which is considered morally wrong. How far can the government tolerate attacks on itself from behind the sanctuary of religious freedom?

House Committee on Un-American Activities

The House Committee on Un-American Activities, while denying any intent to "investigate religion," has proceeded on the premise that "a member of the Communist Party enjoys no immunity from investigation, regardless of his rank or calling" and that an individual member of the clergy identified as a member of the Communist Party (or as in the case of Bishop Oxnam, identified as associated with front organizations) shall be subject to the same security checks as anyone else. Said Representative Donald Jackson, defending the committee's activities in this regard:

> I feel no greater service can be rendered to God and man alike than to find out what men, if any, would place the thorny crown of the Kremlin upon the brow of the Prince of Peace. . . . A churchman who serves the Communist Party compounds his treason. . . . The man of God who treats with the conspirators betrays those things which are of transcendent importance—his oath, his moral obligations and his Creator. . . . Their responsibilities as citizens are no less than those imposed on other Americans in meeting the godless aggression confronting our people.[4]

In a public warning, the committee charged that Communists are trying to corrupt religion in the United States, that as a result there are clergymen and other church members who are Communists or play the Communist game as fellow travelers and that Communist propaganda is sneaked into church publications, sermons, and organizations. The committee viewed Communism as a "real" danger inside our churches, quoting J. Edgar Hoover as confessing "to a real apprehension, as long as Communists are able to secure ministers of the gospel to promote their evil work and espouse a cause that is alien to the religion of Christ and Judaism."[5]

[4] *Congressional Record,* Vol. 99, part 2, p. 2024 (Eighty-third Congress, first session, March 17, 1953).

[5] See House Committee on Un-American Activities, "100 Things You Should Know About Communism," released August 15, 1949.

Regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of the charge of subversive activity in a particular case, or the fairness of the procedures followed to determine such activity, the issue raised here seems to me fundamental. Unless a religious person is willing to abdicate all claim to moral responsibility for the political conduct of his country, he is bound to come, sooner or later, into conflict with what some others consider vital to the country's security—and hence to be viewed by them as a political threat. A Bishop Oxnam, no less than the churchmen whose sharper criticisms of American political and economic ways he disavowed, is suspect because he dared to protest, as a religious duty, the methods of security investigation adopted by a congressional committee.[6]

Soviet satellites

The same problem, though different in degree, has confronted religious leaders and their political counterparts in the Soviet satellites. To Cardinal Mindszenty, refusal to acquiesce in the Hungarian nationalization of church schools was a religious imperative and his letter condemning the government for abrogating fundamental freedoms was a pastoral duty. But to the Communist regime, the Cardinal was guilty of political offenses proscribed by law, and in particular—mark the phraseology—"of conspiring to overthrow the democratic regime in Hungary."[7] Again disregarding the question of whether particular charges were or were not true, a point of critical tension was reached because the government felt the security of its tenure imperiled by the thrust of a powerful religious opposition. To this challenge, the Communist political leadership gave a response identical to that of the House Un-American Activities Committee: "Being a Cardinal does not entitle a Hungarian citizen to commit treason and espionage."[8] "Freedom of religion does not imply that Church dignitaries should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts of their respective countries and that they could not be tried for criminal offenses, whether of a political or any other nature."[9] In other words, religious freedom is unexceptionable as a principle, but its exercise shall not be permitted to jeopardize the established legal and political order, whatever form it may take; and the proper limits of religious freedom shall be determined by political authority.

Communist and American attitudes compared

There is of course an important practical difference between the two situations—quite aside from the quality of the respective judicial processes involved. We in America start with the presumption of the political *inoffensiveness* of the religious critic and a profound suspicion of governmental interference with religious institutions and practices. The brashness of Representative Jackson's remarks and elaborate self-justification by Representative Velde, the committee's chairman, actually covered a quick tactical retreat from their venture into an investigation of religious subversiveness. But the Communist regimes presume a very real

[6] Eighty-third Congress, first session (1953), House Committee on Un-American Activities, *Hearings* . . . , Testimony of Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam.

[7] Andrei Gromyko (USSR) before the 201st plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, April 29, 1949.

[8] Juliusz Katz-Suchy (Poland) before the General Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Third Session, Part II, April 5, 1949.

[9] Joza Vilfan (Yugoslavia) before the 202d plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, April 30, 1949.

threat to their security in the opposition of organized religion, and indeed they might, if the churches steadfastly proclaim their rejection of totalitarian secular authority. With the security threat strong and imminent, the government is prone to move in upon the area of religious freedom more swiftly and drastically. The relative lack of tension at this point between religious expression and internal security in the United States should be attributed, therefore, not so much to general acceptance of a more liberal *principle* of religious freedom as to a kind of harmony of interests between religion and politics. Whether this is a reassuring state of affairs will be considered later.

PUBLIC DUTIES VS. CONSCIENCE

The second tension point between religious freedom and internal security arises from the resistance dictated by religious belief to demands of the state for the performance of public duties considered essential to its welfare or survival. How far may government properly go in compelling individuals to perform obligations of citizenship which conflict with their beliefs or conscience? This is the point at which American law and politics have wrestled most intensively with the implications of religious freedom.

Area of freedom

The trend in the last decade has veered strongly in the direction of an expanding area of personal freedom. The Supreme Court, we have seen, struck down the compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance to the United States as an invasion of "the sphere of the intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."

In addition there have been important advances in legislative and judicial recognition of conscientious objection to military service. No longer is citizenship denied to one who will not promise to bear arms. The Supreme Court, and the Congress by tacit consent, have apparently come to accept the former minority view of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes that "even in time of war one may truly support and defend our institutions though he stops short of using weapons of war." [10]

Furthermore, a person called to military service despite his claim to be a conscientious objector under the Selective Service Act may secure judicial review of his classification, a right he did not have in World War II. Among many grounds now accepted by the courts for throwing out inductions ordered by the Selective Service System are: (1) Mere disbelief by draft board or hearing officers. (2) Arbitrary or capricious ruling of hearing officers in regard to the validity of the C.O.'s claim. For instance, in one case a hearing officer threw out a claim by a Catholic to be a conscientious objector on the ground that in his judgment no Catholic could be a conscientious objector. That was held by the courts to be an arbitrary and capricious judgment on the part of the hearing officer. (3) Inferences from the registrant's attitude in regard to self-defense. (4) Indications of prejudice or discrimination on the part of the draft boards or hearing officers.

In a set of recent judicial decisions the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to be classified as conscientious objectors has been clearly established. "The test," declared Justice Clark for the majority, "is not whether the registrant is opposed to all war, but whether he is opposed, on religious grounds, to participation in war." Selective Service officials had denied conscientious-objector status on the ground that the Jehovah's Witness admitted he would fight in a theocratic war ordered by Jehovah to defend "kingdom interests," fellow members of the sect, and "our property"; though he would not engage in "the carnal warfare of this world" nor bear "carnal" weapons. Justice Clark noted, however, that the history of the sect recorded no divine command to war since biblical times and that "their theology does not appear to contemplate one in the future." This would seem to settle one of the main issues which landed some four thousand J.W.'s in jail during World War II.[11]

[10] See United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931); Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61 (1946); *In re* Wiebe, 82 Fed. Supp. 130 (1949); Cohnstaedt v. United States, 339 U. S. 901 (1950).

Limits of freedom

But there are limits beyond which we still will not go in allowing the individual to dissociate himself from the obligations of citizenship, and at some points we seem to be increasing the imperatives of political allegiance. Conscience is still considered a privilege, not a constitutional right, and this leaves to legislative discretion the area of exemption from the performance of public duties to be granted. The courts continue to sustain the decision of Congress to limit the type of conscience to be recognized. The nonreligious or unorthodox religious objector has only prison as an alternative to the armed forces even though he is willing to do civilian work or serve as a noncombatant. The absolutist objector, even if religious, also faces prison. This difficulty has been compounded by the fact that Selective Service and the Department of Justice have prosecuted these men again after they have completed prison sentences. Thirteen objectors have been convicted a second time. One of these served eighteen months in the payless civilian work of World War II, one prison sentence in World War II, and two prison sentences under the 1948 law.

A further limitation prohibits the counseling of conscientious objectors, when the intent or effect of such counseling is to cause them to refuse to register or otherwise disobey the law. The Department of Justice has secured the conviction of at least three persons for such action: a father who advised his son not to register, a stepfather whose advice was not followed by his son, and in the third case, a professor who counseled with a student who had already refused to register before meeting the professor. Conviction in the latter case was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in a 4 to 4 vote.[12]

The conscientious objector who lands in prison because of his beliefs may find a further penalty awaiting him when he asks for parole. The United States Board of Parole has recently ruled that they will not allow a so-called conscience clause in a parole argument. While pledging not to violate most laws, some objectors want explicitly to reserve the right to oppose the draft law, or they may state, for instance, that "in matters of obedience to laws, my associations with others, and other situations in which this principle might apply, my conduct will be governed, insofar as is possible within me, by my conscience—that is, my conception of God's laws as revealed by His Son, Jesus Christ—rather than by man's dictates and standards, when a conflict

[11] Sicurella v. United States and Witmer v. United States. Decisions announced by the Supreme Court on March 14, 1955.

[12] Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (1949); decision affirmed *per curiam* by the Supreme Court, 340 U. S. 857 (1951).

arises between these two." Be this candor or hairsplitting, individual parole boards found no real cause for alarm over releasing such men. But the national board now rules that only an unqualified commitment to be law-abiding, regardless of religious reservations, is compatible with the national security.[13]

Loyalty oaths

There is also the question of loyalty oaths. States requiring such oaths have fired from public employment those whose scruples of conscience would not permit them to demonstrate their loyalty in this manner. Faced with the choice of losing their jobs or maintaining personal integrity, scores of conscientious civil servants, nurses and doctors in public institutions, and teachers in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and elsewhere have done the latter.

The point of view of those who defend the necessity of these security limitations upon conscience is well summed up by Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent from the final decision in the flag-salute cases:

> That which to the majority may seem essential for the welfare of the state may offend the consciences of a minority. But so long as no inroads are made upon the actual exercise of religion by the minority, to deny the political power of the majority to enact laws concerned with civil matters simply because they offend the consciences of a minority really means that the consciences of the minority are more sacred and more enshrined in the Constitution than the consciences of a majority.[14]

Universal Military Training

So far, we have been concerned primarily with those public duties that are demanded of a few and the objections that have been raised on behalf of a few. But there is a current issue in which the opposition of religion to the performance of public duties is cast upon a much more general basis, the issue of Universal Military Training. The principal source of opposition now and in the past to Universal Military Training legislation is the concern of religious groups over the moral effects they foresee from the inculcation of militarism as a way of life. Regardless of their personal stand on participation in war, leading churchmen in the great denominations have insisted that there is a real danger of moral injury in any permanent universal subjection of youth to military training and indoctrination. The general moral health of the nation demands, they insist, the development of qualities of *self*-discipline, not imposed discipline, and respect for family and human values. It is these things which it is not the purpose or the effect of military training or discipline at an early age to produce. The character-formative years should be preserved, feel these religious organizations and leaders, from the impact of a public duty which in its nature presumes a destructive human mission.

At this point, we can see in its full import the conflict which can arise between the conception of public duty demanded by the security-minded and the moral reservations of religion.

PROSELYTIZING

The third main tension point which appears in the security file on religious freedom is the disturbance caused by religious proselytizing to public order and what one might call the "moral" security of the state. Thanks again largely to the determined zeal of Jehovah's Witnesses, the United States has had to reconsider during the last

[13] Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, Philadelphia, Pa., "Memorandum to the United States Board of Parole," [1955].

[14] *Op. cit. supra* (note 2).

ten years whether the exercise of religious faith can be tolerated if it jars accepted community standards and invades the personal privacy of the general citizenry. The Supreme Court has laid down on this issue an almost consistent line of decisions warning public authorities to keep hands off the religious evangelist, no matter how extreme his views or how displeasing to the community at large. We are told, in effect, that it is the responsibility of government to provide security *for* the proselytizer, not *from* him. He should be permitted to preach in public parks, to roam the streets with a sound truck, to ring doorbells and offer his literature to the residents of private homes or public housing, and to parade through the town. What he says or writes is his business, though he maligns the cherished beliefs of his listeners and infuriates them almost to the point of riot.[15]

Inroads on privacy and public order

The implications of all this for local peace and order did indeed cause concern to some of the Justices, especially to a former Attorney General such as Justice Jackson, who shuddered at the practical effect of a perpetual open season for proselytizing if all sects should exercise the rights conceded to the Jehovah's Witnesses. It was not unreasonable, he felt, for a city to protect the dignity of its residents against fanatics or to exercise control over a loudspeaker which could make life unbearable. Others questioned how far the proselytizer could properly carry his "intrusion into cherished privacy." But the prevailing (though small) majority steadily rejected any prior restraints on religious expression which might conceivably be used to discriminate against a queer or unpopular faith. Because of the closeness of recent decisions on this issue, however, freedom to proselyte may have reached its limit for the time being in the United States. The security-minded seem about ready to contain any further inroads on the public order—though just what further challenges there could be beyond those that have been brought is a little hard to imagine.

Security and an established church

While this issue seems so clearly settled on our domestic scene, freedom to proselyte is far from an established right in countries where the security of the public order is considered inseparable from loyalty to an established church. And because the religious affiliations of most Americans are to world-wide communions, the issue is precipitated into the international arena. In our relations with Italy and Colombia, for instance, we are obliged to decide whether to defend our concept of religious freedom as a universal right or to concede that other countries may insist on religious conformity and uniformity as an essential condition of their security. For it is on this basis—the inescapable dependence of the nation's security upon maintaining the integrity of the established religion—that these other governments have justified the arrest and intimidation of ministers, prohibition of religious announcements and signs, and similar denials of legal and civil rights to religious minorities.

Colombia

"Colombian democracy is based on the precepts of Catholicism," declared the

[15] See, for instance, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953).

Minister of the Interior. Hence in the interest of the nation and its security "neither ministers, pastors nor plain Protestant faithful can perform any religious activity in public or use means or propaganda outside the premises where worshipping is done." [16] Needless to say, American Protestant leaders vehemently protested that such an attitude "contravenes the principles of religious liberty maintained by most governments outside the territories under Communist rule and currently supported by the most authoritative religious voices, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox."

Italy

Meanwhile in Italy, an important decision by the Council of State indicates that the tide may be turning in the direction of the broader view of religious liberty, even in the church-states (where government is committed to the support of a particular church.) The Ministry of the Interior was ordered to grant juridical recognition to the Pentecostal sect and to other non-Catholic denominations. This will permit public services, tax exemption, and, in effect, legal rights equal to those enjoyed by the Roman Catholic Church. And a shift in Catholic outlook itself may be indicated in the statement of the Pope, concerning "International Community and Religious Tolerance," to the effect that a formula of religious and moral toleration may in some circumstances be justified for the Catholic jurist, statesman, and sovereign Catholic state in the interests of a higher and moral general good of the community of nations. I think this is an extremely significant statement which may spell the end for Christian countries of the sharp conflict over religious proselytizing.

[16] *New York Times*, January 29, 1954, p. 5.

Security and unity

The basic issue still remains, however: May not national security depend fundamentally upon national unity, and if the basic unifying element in the nation is an established church, will not the proselytizing activities of competitive faiths undermine, confuse, and divide? If so, must other countries sacrifice their *religiously* based security for the principle we consider just, the freedom to proselytize? Are we prepared to go just as far in sacrificing our *politically* based security whenever it comes up against a claim of freedom to oppose public policy or refuse public duty on religious grounds?

RELIGION AS HANDMAID OF THE STATE

This leads to the fourth and final tension point between religious freedom and national security—the positive role which religion is so generally expected to play in the strengthening of the nation. Though we shun a state-established or state-supported religion in any form, we continually assert our national respect for and dependence on religion. We appeal to religion to build the internal defenses of our country, form good citizens, support our national policies, and even wage ideological warfare. A Quaker is the religious director of the United States Information Agency and supervises the infusion of religion into the Voice of America. A Methodist bishop declares under oath that the churches deserve more credit than any other force for combating Communism. We look to religion to save—and to serve—the nation.

But how can this attitude of mutual respect and the practice of mutual support between the political and the religious communities result in an issue of religious freedom? The security of the nation would seem aided rather than threatened by such an exercise of religious faith. Yet what happens to the vitality and integrity of religion when it is linked in partnership with national political goals? Does religion unconsciously lose its own sense of mission in the national mission? Is not this the danger which we sense when the Eastern European regimes profess their support for a *nationalized* church which in turn is expected to accept and support the prevailing order? Does not freedom of religion quietly erode as it is exercised, even voluntarily, in direct support of the security interests of the state?

Perhaps the very absence of outward tension and conflict in the United States between the imperatives of religion and the demands of political security is a subtle symptom that real religion—the burning sense in the individual of a higher duty compelling his steadfast dedication to service beyond the call of state or government—has evaporated, and that what passes under the name of religion is no more than a satellite of our national polity. Candidly, do we conceive our national policies in moral and religious insights; or do we *use* the symbols and slogans of religion to justify to ourselves and others policies determined by quite other considerations? What actually calls the tune in our national conduct—fear for our own personal and national security or the fundamental moral standards of mankind?

I do not mean to suggest that there can or should be no close and meaningful relationship between the religious and the political worlds, or that the present role of religion in the United States is completely subservient to the politically determined line of national interest. I do question how long a state of peaceful coexistence between religious freedom and national security can continue unless one or the other becomes unimportant to the general community.

GOOD RELIGION A BAD SECURITY RISK

Good religion is a *bad* security risk in the modern state, whether it be Communist dictatorship, national democracy, or church-state.

Good religion is a bad security risk because it dares to condemn and resist, with all the force at its command, the actions of government which it holds to be wrong.

Good religion is a bad security risk because it rejects the authority of government to make the ultimate decision on what public duties the individual may properly be expected to perform, reserving that authority to the mandate of the church or the individual conscience.

Good religion is a bad security risk because it insists on the right to win the allegiance of all mankind, even if in so doing it disturbs the public peace or offends conventional moral standards.

Good religion is a bad security risk because it fails the state as an ideological or political weapon—and in my judgment it is right for religion so to fail the state.

CRUCIAL CHOICE

If this contention is sound, then we are faced with a crucial choice, reminiscent of the medieval choice of church *or* state. Should we accept the demand that individual believer or organized church work within an area defined by the state as compatible with its own security? What if this area should be labeled "strictly nonpolitical," as in the Communist states; or "strictly no proselytizing," as in the church-states? Or what if the state demands public duties offensive to individual conscience or ecclesiastical judgment; or conversely cor-

dially invites the close co-operation of religion in the advancement of its policies?

Should we not rather, in the fundamental interest of ourselves as human beings, declare that there are some things more important than national security and that the *state* may not overstep limits defined by religious belief and conscience? Whether such belief leads to outright rejection of political policy and nationally prescribed duties or merely to independent pursuit and practice of one's faith, there can be no more important act of political statesmanship today, it seems to me, than to recognize that a human society will be no stronger than the integrity of the individual faith of the persons who compose it.

Philip E. Jacob, Ph.D., Philadelphia, is professor of political science in the University of Pennsylvania and director of its College Collateral Courses and Summer School. He was formerly secretary of the Civilian Public Service Section of the American Friends Service Committee. He is coauthor (with Mulford A. Sibley) of Conscription of Conscience (1952), which was given the Franklin D. Roosevelt Award in September 1953, and was special editor of the November 1954 issue of THE ANNALS *on The Future of the United Nations: Issues of Charter Revision.*

Subversives in Government

By FRANCIS BIDDLE

IN the opinion of many American "liberals"—if I may be excused for using a word which is now, as it has so often been for the past two hundred years, in disrepute—Americans for a dozen years or so have been suffering from a curious sort of disease. That it is hard to define makes it no less discernible. That it seemed to many social psychologists to evidence immaturity, growing pains, the unstable state of adolescence, a sort of spiritual jitters, was at first a comforting diagnosis, until they began to realize that we were not growing up. The jitters did not stop, they increased. The fears spread. It was all very well to explain them in psychological and historical terms, to say that with the loss of our cherished isolation we found ourselves suddenly standing stripped of our comfortable assumptions in a tight world of conflicting nations, a new world heretofore hidden from our sheltered vision, of which we had suddenly become the center. We had, in a sense for the first time, bitten into the knowledge of evil which was part of the daily diet of the Old World. We were afraid—but of what? Not so much of Russia, apparently, as of ourselves. Was it true, as Senator McCarthy had said in 1951, that "the crimson clique in the government had engineered the Communist victory in China"? Were Americans betraying Americans? Was there a clear and present danger of revolution in our country?

Generalities are dangerous. Motives are mysterious and conflicting. Yet some conclusions must be reached before we can take the next steps. We must try to see our direction, steadily at least, if it is impossible to see it whole. So let us say, to start, that in *some* fields, among *certain* people in our country, since 1938 (to take as a convenient date the year when the House Committee on Un-American Activities was organized), there has been conviction that the government of the United States is "infiltrated," as the expression goes, with Communists; that in certain states the fear took the form of believing that young Americans were being taught Communism on campuses of colleges supported by their parents and the public generally; that in many universities, as Dean Millicent C. McIntosh of Barnard said, pupils had begun to believe that anything identified with peace, freedom of speech, or negotiations to resolve differences was identified with Communism, and were "becoming afraid to advocate the humanitarian point of view because it has been associated with Communism." Terror of Communism was at the base of it all. But the terror has turned backward and inward. It was no longer terror of a foe that could be seen and met, objective and measurable, but of the inner treachery of the mind, the worm of treason feeding in our own breasts—a cankerous growth, deep and dark. Were we doubtful of our institutions as we had begun to doubt them when the false heroes of fascism and nazism for a short while had shone with a spurious glow of accomplishment, and efficiency and good roads seemed tempting in the light of the slow, careless, and so often corrupted steps that dogged the progress of a democracy which no longer met the needs of a changing world? Most of us did not care. Between in-

difference and fear some balance of sanity had been lost.

It was not that there was nothing to fear internally, but the form that the fear took. The Hiss conviction, the ring of espionage that the Rosenberg cases revealed, the confessed presence of American Communists within the government, the activity of Communists in the moving picture industries, the far more serious leadership of Communists in certain labor unions, particularly in the CIO—these were serious and sometimes dangerous realities that had to be disposed of. Most of them dated from war days, when on the war front the Russian Communists were putting up such a magnificent fight against the Nazi invasion; it was hard for most Americans to foresee the threat of Russian imperialism and infiltration which was so soon to look over the shoulder of victory. By 1947 when Czechoslovakia fell the Russian outlook was stripped of its pretenses to all who were not too obstinate to think. And soon information about Russian concentration camps was added to the picture.

And by 1947, there are grounds to believe, the problem of espionage and subversion *within* the United States had largely passed. The American Communist party was a closely knit criminal conspiracy, but it had never in any true sense of the word been a political party, never had elected a governor or Congressman (the only fellow-traveling Congressman was defeated after a few terms), no member of a state legislature, no mayor. When Eugene Victor Debs ran for President on the Socialist ticket in 1920—he was a candidate five times—he received more than a million votes. By April 1953, the membership of the Communist party had shrunk, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to a little under twenty-five thousand. And by then Communists had been cleared out of the labor unions in which ten and even five years before they had been exerting a dominant leadership. They had been a security problem in those industries which would, in case of war, be mobilized for war production: the threat was the threat of sabotage. That danger is largely in the past. Yet as the threat subsided the fear and accompanying hysteria increased.

Official Hysteria

Let me give you one of the most recent examples of the hysteria, commented on by George F. Kennan in a letter to the *New York Times* of March 6 of this year. This is an instance of official hysteria, far more deplorable than public hysteria, out of which the public nervousness presently grows, and far less excusable.

Mr. Kennan points to the report of the *Times* Moscow correspondent that the Soviet government had ordered the Reverend Georges Bissonnette, a Roman Catholic priest stationed in Moscow, to leave the Soviet Union, and says that there can be no doubt that the action was taken in retaliation for the decision of our government not to permit Metropolitan Boris of the Russian Orthodox Church to live any longer in the United States. Was this action, Mr. Kennan asks, an example of American policy being distorted by persons responsible for internal-security considerations and not conscious of any other aspects of the national interest? This is a distinct loss in other respects, he suggests, to deprive the members of the little American colony in Moscow of the comfort and strength which Father Bissonnette had afforded it.

Mr. Kennan comments on another government action of like nature—the recently reported attempt of the United States postal authorities to prevent delivery of copies of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* to persons in this country "not authorized to receive them"—an ominous phrase. Mr. Kennan says that he has followed *Pravda* and *Izvestia* for some twenty-seven years and that reading them could not fail to sharpen the understanding of "those features of Soviet life and thought that are most unacceptable to American feeling and tradition." He concludes by asking whether

> . . . there are really people in our Government who believe that our own political philosophy is so unconvincing, our attachment to it so weak, our youth so bewildered and gullible—and the outlook of our adversaries, on the other hand, so forceful, so logical and so persuasive—that we must shield our people physically from every confrontation with Communist thought.

American Decencies

But I sense a change, in these last few months, in the attitude of the public, even if not in that of their government. It is slight. There is no reason to suppose that it will persist if the cold war becomes hotter. To describe the change, I would suggest that more people talk more rationally. They begin to ask questions. They are confused and some of them shocked to hear that we need more engineers, more physicists, more scientists to challenge the Russian advance in science, and that to meet the crisis the Atomic Energy Commission closes off Robert Oppenheimer, pre-eminent as an atomic scientist—a leader and superb organizer in his field—shuts him away from usefulness, at the same time pronouncing him loyal and discreet. The public would not listen when a few voices were raised to warn against professional informers—they must be used, but with care and caution—to warn against Elizabeth Terrill Bentley, J. B. Matthews, and Ben Gitlow; Whittaker Chambers, Professor Budenz, and Karl Baarslag; and Joseph Zack Kornfeder.

And now Harvey Matusow has stepped forward to testify.

I suppose the average man—if there is such a being—the average man felt a flush of anger and shame when Senator McCarthy attacked the Army; we all had a stake in the Army. At the Gridiron Dinner in Washington last autumn, I am told, the President, who is liked by the press, was greeted with the friendliest of cordiality. But when Senator Arthur Watkins walked in—a quiet man, rather shy, no hero to himself, and until then, no hero to others—the whole room rose and clapped and cheered, and would hardly let him sit down. He had kept his head high and stood up against the sheer brutality of a bully, he would not be cowed or hushed, he was not ashamed of American decencies. That was all—but it was refreshing.

I may have appeared to you to have wandered from the path I had undertaken to follow, the problem of subversives in the government. But without some feeling of the tangled emotions that are involved, and of how far we have thrown aside those American decencies, one cannot appreciate this long-endured nightmare. One must feel as well as think. Talk to any physical scientist and you will learn what it is doing to science. Talk to an educator and you will learn what it is doing to education. Talk to a lawyer who has represented a government employee in a security case—I have talked with many—and you will discover what the government programs (under President Truman the loyalty program, under President Eisenhower the security program) are doing to human beings who have chosen or would like to choose government as a career. Talk to any career man in the Foreign Service and you will discover what all this vast, amateur, and childish, yet brutal and stupid, mechanism for our protection

has done—irreparably, perhaps—to that service. Talk to John Carter Vincent.

SUBVERSION—MEANING WHAT?

Subvert—what is the primary meaning of the word? To overturn, to upset, to overthrow—like the American Revolution, or those who valiantly protested against the Eighteenth Amendment by buying, and drinking, hard liquor. We are not concerned, however, with the primary meaning, but with the actual meaning given the word by government officials dealing with employees or men working on government contracts charged—or suspected—of being "subversive." I suggest that the word is impossible to define in a way that would prove useful, and that attempts at loose definitions as well as use of the word without definition are dangerous and harmful. If it is narrowly defined—an attempt to overthrow the government by violent or unconstitutional means—it is useless as a tool. Government clerks, and even career men, just are not engaged in that attempt. If they are, they should be indicted and tried and sent to prison.

Do you remember the definition which a special committee set up by the House of Representatives in 1943 to investigate and report on the fitness of thirty-nine federal employees accused by Congressman Martin Dies of being fellow travelers—do you remember the definition which this committee, manfully struggling to be accurate, and inclusive, produced? "Subversive activity," the committee concluded, "derives from conduct intentionally destructive of or inimical to the government of the United States—that which seeks to undermine its institutions, or to distort its functions, or to impede its projects, or to lessen its efforts. . . ."[1] Ambiguous words, these. They might well be construed to include reciprocal trade agreements, federal health programs, or even criticism of the recent increase in salaries of government officials.

[1] Robert E. Cushman, "The Purge of Federal Employees Accused of Disloyalty," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 3 (Autumn 1943), p. 299.

SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS

Let me give you another example which shows the serious consequences to which the use of the word *subversive* may lead. In 1941 Congress appropriated one hundred thousand dollars to be used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate government employees "who were members of subversive organizations or advocated the overthrow of the federal government." What did Congress mean by "subversive organizations"? I was Attorney General at the time, and I was deluged with that question from the heads of government departments and agencies. It was my duty to advise them. Accordingly, I ruled that Communist and Bundist organizations came under the language. But that did not touch the "front" organizations. No one knew much about them. Therefore the departments were furnished with such information as the FBI had been able to collect about those organizations which might be construed as coming under this indeterminate formula. There were no formal determinations. The information was confidential. The departments were told that membership created no clear presumption or basis of discharge. Half a dozen years later, membership had become a ground for dismissal, and the organizations had been outlawed under President Truman's loyalty program—illegally, as the Supreme Court finally decided.

As Eleanor Bontecou points out in her admirable book, *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program*, the only safe course for a government employee is not to join anything, unless he wishes to follow the sage advice of one loyalty board official and join only the Methodist Church. When Martin Dies, then chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, finally cleared Fredric March, the actor, and his wife, Florence Eldridge, he admonished them that it would be safer "never to participate in anything in the future without consulting the American Legion or our local Chamber of Commerce." The wisest and most sympathetic critic of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, foresaw this result.

> When some kinds of associations [he wrote] are prohibited and others allowed, it is difficult to distinguish the former from the latter beforehand. In this state of doubt men abstain from it altogether and a sort of public opinion passes current that tends to cause any association whatsoever to be regarded as a bold and almost illicit enterprise.[2]

In the broader field of the public domain, the use of this mechanical proscription, the listing of "subversive" organizations, has already done infinite harm. Mr. Justice Black in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court called the lists "officially prepared and proclaimed Government blacklists [which] possess almost every quality of bills of attainder."[3] It is enough that a professor's name appear on the mailing list of one of the organizations, or that he have been a member for a brief time even if a dozen years ago the organization ceased to exist, for him to be pilloried on the university campus by some ardent state investigating committee, or subpoenaed to appear before a United States Senate committee convinced that the purpose of a congressional investigation is to accuse and to convict. Punishment in most cases can safely be left in the hands of the employer.

Fear of Russia, fear of revolution, fear of change, fear of subversion. Texas shields its electorate from the perils of the mind by proscribing associations "whose principles include any thought or purpose of setting aside representative government." Until the law was declared unconstitutional, Illinois excluded from the ballot groups "associated, directly or indirectly, with un-American principles." Pennsylvania in 1941 prohibited subversive organizations from nominating candidates for public office, denied state employment to subversive individuals, and later excluded them from welfare and public assistance, excepting, with a show of liberal mercy, pensions for the blind.

[2] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 329.

[3] Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951).

PHASES OF LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM

We have now had three phases of the loyalty-security program. The first period lasted from 1942 to 1946. An Interdepartmental Committee, appointed by the Attorney General, advised government agencies on methods followed by the FBI in its investigations, suggested procedures for examining employees and reaching decisions, and distributed the reports I have referred to on "front" organizations. Most of the departments set up review boards and followed the procedures recommended. In 1943, President Roosevelt appointed a new committee to take the place of the one organized by the Attorney General, similar to it in scope and procedure. Both committees consisted of high ranking government officials. The work of the committees was advisory. Administration remained—as indeed it must—in the departments and agencies. On the whole the program was satisfactory—quiet, rational, and

gradually developing principles of practice and standards which, more and more, the agencies began to apply.

Truman administration

The second stage began with the inauguration of the loyalty program by President Truman in 1947, and lasted until it was abolished by his successor six years later, when the present security program was substituted. There can be little doubt that President Truman attempted to meet congressional (and doubtless public) pressure for more extreme measures. Under the program the departments still had ultimate responsibility for deciding, but the Loyalty Review Board's decisions, although technically advisory, were actually determinative. The program dealt only with *loyalty*, not security, risks. The FBI made the investigations. Each department had its own loyalty board. Certain shadowy paper rights were given the employee, who sometimes got a fair hearing, sometimes did not. On the whole the Loyalty Review Board, at least while it was headed by Seth W. Richardson, did its best to prevent injustice, a supervision which afforded some protection. But under the order and regulations, charges were only as specific "as security considerations" would permit; the employee could introduce only such evidence as the Board deemed proper; could cross-examine witnesses—but not informants; had no right to subpoena witnesses; and appeared before a board in his own department which in fact was acting also as a prosecutor. There were two records, one which went to the employee and to the court if, as in the famous Bailey case, an appeal was taken. The other, the *real* record on which the action hinged, and on which the Matusows were designated simply by an *X*, anonymous shadows never under oath and never appearing before either board—on that record, which could not be reviewed, the case was decided, and determined, as Judge Edgerton said in his dissent in the Bailey case, on the "unsworn reports in the secret files to the effect that unsworn statements of a general sort, purporting to connect [Miss Bailey] . . . with Communism, had been made by unnamed persons," not on knowledge but on belief.[4]

The standard—so read the President's order—was that there were "reasonable grounds . . . for belief that the person involved [was] . . . disloyal to the Government of the United States." In 1951, when a new chairman had taken Mr. Richardson's place, President Truman, reluctantly, I believe, changed the grounds for dismissal from reasonable proof to a finding "that, on all the evidence, there [was] a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved." The burden of proof had thus shifted. The employee now had to remove any doubt which a lying or malicious accusation might have raised and which he in most cases had no way of meeting. The operation of the program did much to increase the emphasis on conformity.

And to what end? No spies were caught. After three years of operation, Mr. Richardson testified before a Senate subcommittee that the vast, complicated, expensive, and time-consuming project had not produced "one single case" of espionage or turned up any evidence "directing toward espionage." No indictment was filed against any individual who had been discharged or refused employment—in 1950, 246 in all. Were they Communists? Had they once joined the party? Were they in sensitive positions? We had spent approximately $21,500,000 by then, and we might have been entitled to know. But when President Truman appointed a Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights "to make a thorough study of the problem," Congress blocked the move by refusing to pass a law exempting the members, many of them businessmen and lawyers, from the federal statutes that prohibit a federal officer or employee from engaging in business with the government. The Nimitz Commission never functioned. The public is still in ignorance of what went on, and of what was turned up.

[4] Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (App. D. C. 1950).

"In the interests of national security"

President Eisenhower scrapped the loyalty program in 1953, under an executive order setting up the security program, in which loyalty is not mentioned. If during the investigation there develops "information indicating that the employment . . . *may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security*" (my italics), the head of the department must terminate the employment when he determines that it is "advisable in the interests of national security." We find the same impact and emphasis of proof in both programs—"reasonable doubt," "clearly consistent." The approach is the same, the intention that the employee shall justify his sufferance; he has no right—only a privilege—to be employed, as the order recites.

PRESENT SECURITY PROGRAM

That improvement is needed in the present system is indicated by Mr. Brownell's recent letter (March 4, 1955) to President Eisenhower, suggesting that certain procedural changes be adopted by the department heads, such as a personal interview with the employee before the filing of charges and the suspension which immediately and automatically follows. At present it takes six or eight months before a decision is reached. A very large number of employees, who like the rest of us have to eat and whose salaries are cut off on suspension, resign and seek private employment. And those who remain are subject to further investigation, whenever an administration changes or a new set of rules is devised. Mr. Brownell thinks government witnesses should testify and be cross-examined by the employee, "so long as the production of such witnesses would not jeopardize the national security." This vague criterion is in substance the same as that used under the loyalty program. You can cross-examine a witness if the government will let you. In practice the evidence of informers is still unsworn, anonymous, and of course not subject to cross-examination.

But the ultimate success or failure of the system lies in the quality of the men who sit in judgment. Comparatively few employees were discharged under the Truman administration, a relatively large number under that of President Eisenhower. Do these numbers suggest that the former method was more humane and exercised better judgment, or that the latter was more vigilant in its patriotic search for security? We do not know until we know more about the treatment of the individuals who were discharged. Security is a relative thing, and always must be under any system. And there has been, as former Senator Harry P. Cain, now a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board, states, an "unwarranted emphasis on security."

Informers

Just how could production of an informer prejudice national security? There are three types of informer. An FBI undercover agent's usefulness, in certain fields at least, would be at an end if he were put on the stand and his name and activities made public. Whether he should be called, however, is hardly a problem of national security,

but rather, I suggest, one of administrative convenience and efficiency. The second anonymous witness is the professional informer like Matusow, who makes his living from informing. He is generally known, he has testified many times before, he but adds to the list, and it is difficult to conceive that national security would be imperiled if he were forced to back up his secret charges by taking the stand. The third type of anonymous witness is the individual who in confidence, often reluctantly, tells the investigative officer what he knows, or thinks, or has heard about the employee. He may be a neighbor, the employee's janitor, or his divorced wife. His evidence, usually based on or greatly influenced by rumor, opinion, or even not infrequently personal vindictiveness, is peculiarly subject to inaccuracy or untruthfulness. It is not apparent why his anonymity should be protected. If it be said that a man will not reveal to an investigator what he really knows or thinks about a government employee if he faces the possibility of being put on the stand to back up what he believes, it may be conceded that this makes the investigative job more arduous. But again, such a consideration, honestly weighed, does not affect national security. It may be very important; but is it more important than the individual's right, and the state's duty, to get at the truth under the well-tried, thoroughly established, and American technique of cross-examination?

There is something extraordinarily repellent about many of these cases, when you take a close look at them. I know of a recent case where a man was discharged because the board believed him to be a homosexual—or that perhaps he was one. The action was based on the opinion of an acquaintance—nothing more. The informant's name was not divulged, but the employee guessed who it was and tried to get him to take the stand. He would not, and there was no way of forcing him to face cross-examination. The government should not be allowed to use that sort of testimony. "Why don't you resign?" an employee was asked at a recent hearing. But he refused, and was reinstated. Again we do not know how many Matusows have lurked in the files, how often informers have been shielded, and under what circumstances.

Association with subversive groups

Although the ultimate standard of decision is in broad terms, and probably should be, certain information, the order suggests, should be developed. As in the former order, association is used—"affiliation or sympathetic association with" any subversive group; and although the Attorney General's list has not officially been used since the listing was held illegal by the Supreme Court, there can be little doubt that if the employee belongs to a group which has been outlawed, this evidence would come under the order and would not improbably be conclusive.

But we do not know. Perhaps my assumptions about informers are mistaken. The reports of the Civil Service Commission, the last one on January 3, 1955, do not give us any basis for making an intelligent appraisal of whether or not these sweeping programs are accomplishing anything. I am not referring to the number of employees dismissed for felonies, misdemeanors, or sex perversion. Presumably these dismissals have always been made, although until the last two years they were not reported in the alluring categories now adopted by the Civil Service Commission. What is important to know is the number of employees who were discharged because, according to the Commission's language, their "files contained information indicating, in varying degrees, subversive activities, subversive associations, or membership in subversive organizations," and the actual grounds of their discharge under this language. Surely employees are discharged not merely because their files contain charges, but because the government believes the charges may be true. Yet it would appear that no real effort is being made to find out, apparently on the theory that if a charge is made sufficient doubt exists. How many were Communists? How many fellow travelers? What organizations? When were they members, and how long, and how long ago—five years ago, ten, fifteen? Have they resigned since then, or was the association terminated without formal resignation? Was it merely some fugitive and half-interested relation when the employee was in college? What are the facts?

Security, I believe, is a better category than disloyalty—"disloyal to the Government of the United States," as President Truman's order put it, without further attempt to suggest what loyalty—or disloyalty—was. Evidently the word was open to misinterpretation, for we find the Loyalty Review Board solemnly announcing that advocacy of change in the form of government or economic system of the United States was not disloyalty. But loyalty cannot be put into words to apply like a measuring stick. No rigid standard can be set up, and, as was to be expected, the test of loyalty varied according to the temperament of the individual who was judging. "Association" tended to become the only objective test of the program. And the ground of association, unless recent and active, throws little light on the standard of loyalty.

Atomic Energy Commission

Few complaints have been heard about clearance in the Atomic Energy Commission. For this there are probably three reasons: the members of its review board have been men of unusual balance and ability; the system is fair; and the standards are dictated by common sense. The original chairman was Justice Owen J. Roberts, of Philadelphia. He was succeeded by Charles Fahy, former Solicitor General of the United States. who retired from private practice when he was appointed to the federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. His successor is Ganson Purcell, a former chairman of the Security and Exchange Commission and a distinguished member of the District bar. All employees and applicants are entitled to a hearing before the board. Informers are called before the board and are not infrequently submitted to cross-examination. The standard, in the words of the Atomic Energy Act, is *"whether the common defense or security will be endangered by granting security clearance."* In the words of the Commission the decision is "an over-all, common-sense judgment, made after consideration of all the relevant information." Politics have never played any part in the organization or operation of the system.

BRITISH SYSTEM

There are two theories about the way to handle the problem of subversives in government. One is to give the reviewing officer or board a very broad discretion, without definitions or minutely spelled-out standards, which, as has been seen, are difficult to state and often mislead rather than control. Such an approach is typical of the British method. It is an *ad hoc* program aimed at eliminating the possibility of sabotage and espionage, under which Communists are transferred out of sensitive positions and to some extent out of sensitive areas. There are few procedural protections, cases are informally handled, sources of information are not revealed. There is an Advisory Board

of three former civil servants, men of standing. The system seems to have worked satisfactorily and fairly. A decision that a particular employee is unfit to fill a specified position carries no moral stigma.

CURRENT NEEDS

But basically the success of the system springs from the British sense of ministerial responsibility. It may be doubtful whether as a program it could be applied to this country, where that habit of political responsibility has not been developed. There can be little question that procedural protections should not be omitted in the United States, but strengthened. The use of a permanent review board is a feature of the Truman program which should be reinstated. The "association" technique should be greatly restricted. As Miss Bontecou says in the conclusion of her study: "The crucial question . . . is not that of membership but of the relationship between the Communists in the group and the person investigated." [5]

The policy and top administration should be in the hands of individuals of standing in their community, not connected with the government and therefore free from political pressure, a pressure which usually takes the form of waving the bloody shirt of Communism over battlefields where the foe has long been conquered in order to show the voters that under no circumstances is the government ever tough enough. On March 10 of this year the Washington *Star* reported: "High Department officials feel that there has been no let-up in the Communists' attempt to infiltrate the Government, labor unions and key industrial plants. They feel . . . that the activities of the Reds have been intensified." Such *feelings* have been reported regularly every year or two for the past ten years, particularly when the loyalty program of whatever administration happens to be in power is being questioned.

Former Senator Cain has made a clear and forceful analysis of the present situation. Speaking to the National Civil Liberties Clearing House on March 18, he said:

> We have grown somehow to consider legal justice to be one thing and administrative justice to be a different sort of thing. Until justice is understood to be indivisible, this Republic of ours will be mired in troubles.[6]

Citizens, he continued, have become bewildered by the contradictions between stated purposes and administrative results of the security program. Political considerations have been the major source of our diminishing confidence in authority since World War II. Twenty million Americans, he estimated, are affected directly or indirectly by security programs. Why should employees be suspended until their status is determined? Surely the national safety would not be imperiled by their retention, *with salary*.

But all this talk is in the field of speculation. My convictions—or yours—will carry little weight if the public has no knowledge of conditions as they are, not as they are said to be by Senators McCarthy and Jenner, and Martin Dies, by Mr. Brownell, by the professional experts, the ex-Communists, and the chairman of the Americanization Committee of the American Legion. Perhaps now there is a chance for the facts to come through. The Fund for the Republic is underwriting an investigation by the bar of the City of New York, and Senator Humphrey's subcommittee on government administration is engaged in a similar enterprise. The press of the country is generally alive to what is going on and will, I am convinced, welcome these efforts and give wide publicity to the result. But investigations and reports, a momentary flash of indignation, are soon forgotten in the flow of our restless indifference. The peril of this nation, as Charles Evans Hughes once said, is not in any foe, but in the people, who are "its power, its peril, and its hope."

[5] Eleanor Bontecou, *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 244.

[6] Press release, March 18, 1955.

Francis Biddle, LL.B., LL.D., Washington, D. C., is former Attorney General of the United States (1941–45); Solicitor General of the United States (1940); Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit; deputy chairman, Federal Reserve Bank; chairman of the National Labor Relations Board; and member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In 1942 he received the Four Freedoms award and in 1954 was decorated by the Italian government with the Order of Merit. He is the author of The Fear of Freedom (1951), Mr. Justice Holmes (1942), and other works.

Controlling Subversive Groups

By Ernest van den Haag

THE right to forbid incitement to revolution is inherent in the lawful authority which all governments claim. Democratic principle grants this lawful authority to governments which issue from the freely expressed wishes of the majority. In a democracy, therefore, incitement to revolution is unlawful and contrary as well to the substantive principles on which the law rests. Revolution would necessarily defy the wishes of the majority and thus not only the governmental principle of legitimacy but also the democratic principle of popular consent. Because opponents are free to urge the ouster of the government and if they grow into a majority to replace it by a peaceful vote, democratic governments cannot stay in power when opposed by a majority. Hence only groups despairing of persuasion and resolved to conquer power in spite of the wishes of the majority need urge violence. But in a democratic system, governments have the duty to safeguard the effective franchise of both the majority and the minority. Thus, while other governments may have the authority, democratic governments also have the obligation to ban incitement to revolution.

Perhaps the majority is only lukewarm, and democracy though fulfilling their wishes does not satisfy their wants. Santayana is probably right on this. But what government does? At least democracy does not allow the government to decide what the citizens want, by disregarding the wishes they express or forestalling expression. God reads our hearts' desire better than we do. But it is unlikely that governments will. And they might misread their desires into our muted hearts.

That much is settled doctrine. However, only advocacy of violence is barred. At present organized attempts to persuade citizens to bring antidemocratic groups to power by the ballot are lawful. Yet I believe that the pursuit of subversive aims even by peaceful means should be outlawed. The logic of democratic principles leaves no place in our system for parties which propose to abolish democracy even by a peaceful vote.

Even though the facts have sadly disproved his optimism, ritualists will go on quoting Jefferson to the effect that enemies of our system should be left "undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Yet in John Stuart Mill's words:

> It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth merely as truth has an inherent power denied error. . . . Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propaganda of either.

Where there are no "penalties" truth may not be suppressed. But there is nothing to bear out Jefferson that it will win. And one would have to share Jefferson's natural-law metaphysics—which strike me as absurd—to share his confidence that the "right" values will always prevail.

Perhaps you think that I am tilting against windmills nevertheless. Antidemocratic groups, you may say, could never hope to sway us peacefully. But Hitler came to power largely by persuasion. And we rightly worried about the outcome of some peaceful postwar

votes in Italy and France. We are not certain that Communism might not win free elections in some parts of Asia now. I submit, then, that the voters of no nation are naturally immune to antidemocratic persuasion—particularly if they suffer from national misfortunes.

Peaceful Antidemocratic Persuasion?

But is there such a thing as peaceful antidemocratic persuasion? As a matter of fact, Communists at least never come to power without using or threatening violence. They argue that they are only readying themselves for the violence they anticipate from the opponents they hope to defeat at the polls.[1] No doubt Communists intend to use violence aggressively while pretending defense. This is indeed logical. Those who feel entitled to stay in power without the consent of the majority surely must be willing to get power by the same violence by which they are prepared to keep it. But, as long as they are weak, Communist groups might well find it expedient not to advocate violence. And their intent to do so in the future does not count legally unless it is manifested in words or other acts which they might well become cautious enough to omit. Hence, the advocacy of violence should remain a sufficient ground for illegality, but not an indispensable ground. Otherwise we cannot forbid antidemocratic organization until it grows strong enough to bid for violence. We might then be too late.

Political violence can be renounced, moreover, only so long as political freedom is exchanged for it. Even if Communists were peaceful, democrats could not peacefully accept defeat by them. Defeat at the polls is acceptable as long as the losers have the implicit assurance of the victors that the game will go on. They can try again; there is always another election. But if Communists were to win, the losers would not be allowed to play again. The rules would be rigged so as to keep the Communists in power regardless of popular wishes, which democrats would no longer be allowed to affect.

Before considering these practical matters further let me show that democratic principles permit us to define and outlaw subversive activities without confining ourselves to advocacy of violence.

Freedom Is Inalienable

However important its nonpolitical effects, as a political system democracy is but the right of citizens to compete freely for a limited governmental power and to award it freely to one of the competing parties. This right is perennial and inalienable. To make it truly inalienable, the power of governments in a democratic system is so restricted that they cannot impair the ability of the citizens to oust them by a peaceful vote. Liberties required for this—freedom of speech, association, and voting—are therefore protected constitutionally and safeguarded by checks and balances.

The fathers of our Constitution were successful in protecting us against a government that might keep itself in power by taking away our rights. Less

[1] Stalin himself, in describing the overthrow of the short-lived democratic government of Russia, implied that this is argued only to deceive the gullible: ". . . the revolution attempted to carry out every, or almost every step of its attack under the appearance of defense. There is no doubt that the refusal to permit the transfer of troops was a serious aggressive act of the revolution; nevertheless this attack was undertaken under the slogan of the defense of Petrograd against a possible attack of the external enemy. There is no doubt that the formation of the revolutionary committee was a still more serious attack against the Provisional Government; nevertheless it was carried out under the slogan of the defense of the Petrograd Soviets against possible attacks of the counterrevolution.—*Errors of Trotskyism* (London, 1925).

attention was paid to the possibility that some citizens might *give away* their democratic birthright and invite others to do so, as large groups abroad have done. Yet if our right to choose the government freely is *inalienable,* then we are not entitled to *give* the right away any more than the government is entitled to *take* it away. We cannot then elect a government that does not recognize the right of the people to oust it peacefully or that denies the necessary civil liberties. Nor, if freedom is to be inalienable, can invitations to alienate it be recognized as a legitimate part of the democratic process.

Voluntary and involuntary servitude

Here I can imagine someone muttering that, basing my argument on the word "inalienable," I have made freedom compulsory: citizens are not to vote on it and no organization may tempt them to get rid of freedom. But the alternative—which would permit the use of our political freedom to abolish it—while seeming to pledge more freedom, actually would ensure less.[2] Laws that do not allow men to deliver themselves voluntarily as slaves guarantee more freedom than laws that allow them to be enticed into slavery. Therefore once we abolished involuntary servitude, we also refused to recognize any right to voluntary slavery or to enticement into it.

But there is more: by installing a government which is to be the irremovable and total master of their fate, those voting to become *voluntary* political slaves would necessarily compel some of their fellows into *involuntary* servitude. They would not only irreversibly mortgage their own future; they would also deprive of political freedom those who want to keep it. Now even if you should feel that your freedom is so absolute that you have a right to alienate it, with what right could you dispose of the freedom of others? You may be entitled to suicide, but not to homicide. Yet unless the decision to abolish political liberty is unanimous, the suicide necessarily would become homicide. Some would be deprived of their birthright—political liberty, which is but another name for democracy—against their wishes.

Democratic heritage

Nor is this all. Any vote by which we abdicate our right to future free election also robs our children of their heritage of freedom. To allow citizens to vote against democracy is to allow them to sell their children into slavery.

We are the beneficiaries of freedoms won in the past. We possess but we do not own this precious heritage. We have a right to use it but not to give it away or to destroy it. We are trustees, not owners; and we cannot give away what is not ours. As custodians of the democratic heritage, we have no more right to use our possession of democracy to give it up and deprive our children of it than any occupant of the White House has to sell it or to give it away.

Our heritage permits us forever to elect and to replace governments as we see fit. Our fiduciary duty requires us to keep this sacred trust intact for our children, to protect it against those who want to rob us of it by violence, as well as against those who want to seduce us to give it away. It is not ours to give. Hence, we have no business voting it away and no one has any business trying to corrupt us into doing so. We ought not to permit advocacy of the ballot to extinguish democracy any more than we can allow advocacy of resort to violence. For the end, the surrender of power to a group which would not recognize the right of our children to oust it, is vicious in itself regardless of the means used. And the means are tainted by the vice of the illicit end. To advocate violence to overthrow a democratic government is to propose illegal means for an illegal end. To advocate a vote to overthrow democracy is to advocate an illegal end to be achieved by means that lose their legitimate character to the extent to which they are used for that end.

[2] Compare John Stuart Mill, "The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom." Ralph Gilbert Ross in his penetrating and far-reaching "Democracy and Politics" (*Ethics,* January 1954) expresses similar ideas.

RISKS OF INTERDICTING SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA

But would it not be unwise to bar invitations to abolish democracy by a vote? Prohibitions, however well justified in principle, might not have the wanted effects or might produce injurious ones. Prudence enjoins us to make laws only when desirable effects seem likely to preponderate. What then can we hope to accomplish here and what evils are likely to attend the interdiction of organized subversive propaganda? Let me consider first the harmful possibilities which have hypnotized many nervous though well-meaning friends of democracy.

It is earnestly feared that free speech would be destroyed if invitations to destroy free speech—to surrender democracy—were disallowed. But could a law to preserve democratic freedom not be so drafted and interpreted that it does not defeat its purpose? Is it actually impossible to separate freedom of speech, which is to be protected, from organized propaganda against it, which is to be barred? We discuss and study quite freely many things now for which the law does not allow organized propaganda. We are free to discuss and study all crimes though none can be advocated. Why should our judiciary be unable, then, to apply a prohibition of propaganda against democracy without invading studies and free discussions of democratic and antidemocratic systems and ideas? Many of our institutions such as the universities and even the courts themselves rest on the conviction that expression of opinion, logical analysis, and fact finding can be separated from organized propaganda. If there were no difference between criminology and propaganda for crime, political science and advocacy of political systems, or if judges and teachers could not discern those differences, how could universities, how could any institution, offer courses and conduct discussions dealing with the numberless perversions of the human mind?

Actually we have always drawn a line between propaganda and discussion. The courts have always distinguished literary, scholarly, or conversational discussion, even personal advocacy, from organized propaganda and organized advocacy of illegal acts. Of course, we cannot forbid a man to think as a Communist or even to persuade his friends to Communist views. However, the courts have already held that he is not allowed to associate with others to prepare for or to advocate violence. We can as well forbid *organized* propaganda to abolish democracy by vote and the organization of groups and parties devoted thereto. The courts even decide whether a man alienates from another the affections of a woman—without noticeably impairing free discussion between the sexes. Surely then the courts can, without impairing freedom, decide whether an organized group, in concert, deliberately alienates the affections of the citizens from democracy.

The meaning of "antidemocratic" is hardly open to doubt. For instance, propaganda for socialism is not antidemocratic as long as the changes are to be accomplished through a free vote

and as long as the Socialist government does not propose to eliminate that free vote in the future. Nor would propaganda to change the manner of voting or restrict the franchise (for instance by increasing the voting age to twenty-three or by denying the vote to women) be antidemocratic. (An age or sex group is not a political group. However, income or occupational groups could probably not be disenfranchised without impairing democracy.) On the other hand, agitation to bar a democratic political group from voting, directly or indirectly, or to restrict freedom of political speech, other than antidemocratic propaganda, would become illegal.

The legal prohibition of subversive organization is far from unprecendented in democracies. I have not heard any liberals object to the German law prohibiting the organization of a Nazi party or to the Italian law prohibiting the organization of a Fascist party.[3] I do not know how effective these laws are. But nobody has contended that they interfere with freedom of discussion in these countries, nor have they impaired democracy there. Why should a law prohibiting both Communist *and* Nazi activities be more harmful? Because it would be more consistent? Or because it would guard against present and future as well as past dangers?

[3] Some liberals who at home ceaselessly assured us that such laws are incompatible with democracy promoted them abroad. Though freedom from consistency was never listed among our war aims, they must have won it.

Many liberals also supported the Nuremberg procedures by which branches of the Nazi storm troopers became criminal associations *ex post*, and men were found guilty of crime for acts which, however loathsome, were not illegal when committed. Granted the depravity of these acts, does it justify retroactive law fashioned by the victors and applied to the vanquished?

Some courageous and clearheaded liberals (and conservatives) objected. But most, undoubtedly, supported these "trials." Willing to punish Nazi activities as criminal retroactively, they insist that it would not be "due process" to outlaw Communist activities *ex ante* and to punish those who violate the prohibition after it has become law. Scarcely would the fathers of our Constitution recognize as legitimate offspring these products of miscegenation between vacillating lovers of liberty and errant social workers.

After Communism, liberalism?

Some liberals sincerely fear that if Communist propaganda were prohibited, their own activities might come next. Actually liberalism is as far removed from Communism as one political philosophy can be removed from another. Yet they fear that people might not distinguish. The psychology of that fear has a dreary fascination. A political psychoanalyst might translate the anguished lament of some liberal patient's subconscious about as follows:

> Half the fun of being a liberal was going out on dates with Communists. Of course, I didn't go all the way. Only debauched people, who *went* all the way—and came back—see anything obscene or dangerous in my flirtations. People who say I should discriminate just don't realize that I'd have no one left to be unafraid and broadminded with.

Or the patient's subconscious, being notoriously inconsistent, might splutter:

> I never could tell fellow liberals from fellow travelers and Communists. If I couldn't, it proves that no one else can. It is impossible, therefore, to distinguish Communists from liberals. They're out to get me!

Is this a correct psychological interpretation? It might hold for some and not for others. But we must restore the liberal subconscious to the fretfully waiting psychoanalyst, from whom we borrowed it.

The political effects of the liberal anxiety are not open to doubt. No greater disservice could be rendered the liberal cause than to suggest that liberalism is so hazy a matter that it is difficult to distinguish from Communism. Liberals who pretend that liberalism is nebulous, for the sake of denying that their mind was, who insist that the world is a dark place instead of admitting that they kept their eyes closed—such liberals either endow the world with their own confusion or deliberately sacrifice liberalism to their belief in their own infallibility. The original mistakes were venial, even engaging. For the perversely obdurate clinging to them I find no excuse. The worst enemy of liberalism could not damage that splendid and humanitarian cause as much. Compare the attitude I have described with that of the labor unions, which at one time also were blind to the danger of Communism, the very unions which, according to some liberals, are the "real target" of anti-Communist legislation. They opened their eyes, corrected their mistakes, and saw that it is possible to keep freedom in and Communism out. Indeed, one cannot have both.

Abuse of laws

Some of us dread that laws against antidemocratic propaganda might be abused to punish persons with unpopular ideas who either are not antidemocratic or do not engage in propaganda. Laws, indeed, can be abused. We have executed innocent men for homicide. Shall we then have none? Laws to bar subversive activities need not be less clear nor the court proceedings less careful than in homicide cases. The evil to be remedied, the danger to society, seem no less, while the chance of abuse is not intrinsically greater.

Public hysteria

Perhaps your fears fasten on the word "intrinsically." Yes, you might say, but what about popular hysteria and pressure? I am not proposing to have the law drawn or applied by Senators Humphrey and McCarthy. I am discussing a competently drawn law, applied by the judiciary. Nothing would reduce hysteria more than such a law. For hysteria, and hysterical fear of hysteria, come when people feel that the right laws are not on the books or are not applied.

McCarthy rode a wave of popular discontent. Some "liberals" who are certain that Communism in faraway China was caused by popular discontent do not like to think that McCarthy's quondam popularity was. Yet McCarthy, unlike the Chinese Communists, had no arms except his own unscrupulousness and the feeling of many people that the government could not tell a Communist from a liberal. The anxiety he so recklessly exploited was generated when people realized the dire threat to our institutions while ritualistic liberals simply denied it and hid their failure to take preventive measures by calling Communists red herrings or witches. They pretended or believed that Communists are like liberals. And they became hysterical when McCarthy pretended or believed that liberals are like Communists.[4]

[4] In *The Fear of Freedom* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1951), Mr. Francis Biddle wrote: ". . . I do not believe that their attempt [that of Communist government employees] to spread Marxian dialectic among the balance [of government employees] constitutes a serious threat to the government of the U. S. . . ." (p. 241). If we still had an Attorney General who believed that Communist employees are engaged in spreading "Marxian dialectic," it would indeed be "a serious threat to the government of the U. S." The trained incapacity of leading liberals to understand that Communists are engaged in a business very different from "spreading Marxian dialectics" explains McCarthy more than any other single factor, though, of course, it does not justify him.

BENEFITS OF PROSCRIPTION

If subversive organizations were prohibited even the most confused might learn to distinguish between the study of dialectics and membership in a group organized for the abolition of democracy. The law would serve as a beacon. And the clear statement and application of democratic principles would also abate hysteria. Finally, we would set an example abroad and help dispel genuine misunderstandings of our domestic policies, which have arisen mainly because we were vague and inconsistent.

Proscription of organized subversive propaganda would yield other benefits still. We are not free of blame for the fate of the Rosenbergs, of Greenglass, of Alger Hiss, of Whittaker Chambers. These victims of Communism, with many others, were lured into their final criminal activity by Russian agents. If we are to have law, responsibility must be personal. I am not trying to exonerate these people. But society did little to warn them. The United States government for the most part treated Communists as a group playfully engaged in Marxian dialectics. Are we not in duty bound to do our utmost to prevent Russian agents from enticing misguided persons into their nets? Must we not erect warning signs and rails shielding the incautious? Society must control Communist groups just as it must control rings of dope peddlers. And such controls need not interfere with the study or discussion of the opiates pushed by either group. If we do not make a reasonable effort to prevent crime we jeopardize our moral right to punish those we did not try to keep from being lured into it.

Significance of party membership

I need not take much time to show the gravity of the evil which confronts us. A few quotations suffice. The antidemocratic aim of Communism was stated admirably by William Z. Foster, chairman of the American Communist party: a dictatorship in which "all the capitalist parties—Republican, Democratic, Progressive, Socialist—will be liquidated, the Communist party functioning alone." [5] It is a universal Communist aim, already achieved wherever the Communists are in power. The facts are too plain to need rehearsing. The means to be used were stated quite plainly by Lenin when he told a delegation of foreign workers that when it serves the interests of the movement, they must resort to "any ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion and concealment of truth." [6]

The sad facts recorded by our courts prove that Lenin's advice was not taken to be a counsel of perfection. The commitment of American party members to live up to Communist precepts was stated lucidly by their chairman: "Care should be taken to select only those individuals who show by practical work that they definitely understand . . . and especially display a thorough readiness to accept party discipline." [7] The record shows that party members were sedulous. They could not otherwise remain in the party, as the following dialogue before the congressional Committee on Un-American Activities indicates:

MR. MATTHEWS: A member must carry out all decisions of the party or be expelled from the party?

MR. BROWDER: Yes, that is correct.

MR. STARNES: A party member does not have any latitude or discretion in the matter—he has to carry out orders?

MR. BROWDER: The party member has to carry out orders.[8]

[5] *Toward Soviet America* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1932), p. 275.

[6] *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers Company, Inc., 1945), Vol. X, p. 95.

[7] *The Communist,* September 1938, p. 808.

Clear and present danger

Still, you might think that Communists are few and therefore the danger recondite. This is an odd idea. If there are only a few people engaged in dishonest activities, should we not control them? Should we wait until there are more? Yet dishonesty is less infectious and less dangerous than Communism. For the Communists here are but one of the long arms of the Moscow octopus. It is a mistake to judge the peril from the size of one tentacle. Trials here, in Canada, and in England have left no doubt of the usefulness of these very few Communists to their Russian masters, whose main target now is the United States. Of course not all American Communists are spies. In the first place, they do not all have access to secrets and, in the second place, some are more useful as decoys and as more or less conscious spy procurers. All the more reason to eliminate organizations which are breeding grounds for spies. We close houses of prostitution even if the defense shows that the chambermaids engaged only in limited tasks.

Some of you, though satisfied that the danger is clear, may still wonder whether it is "present." The interpretation of the majority of the Supreme Court in the Dennis case [9] was that Mr. Justice Holmes's "present" did no more than reiterate his "clear." [10] The court rejected as absurd the contention that preparation for the overthrow of the government must have been likely to succeed if the danger is to be "present." For obviously the government could then act only when it might well be too late. The court also avoided interpreting "present" to mean "imminent," though I suspect that Holmes might well have had in mind the proximity of the danger. If so, I should agree with Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Dennis case: We should abandon the Holmes formula. If you are trying to kill your wife by feeding her poison it does not matter whether it is to be effective in an hour or in a year. How near death you brought her, or how fast, might influence the size of the penalty but is irrelevant to the criminality of the action. What matters is only that your attempt involved a *clear* danger. There can be no doubt that Communist activities do.

[8] *Hearings before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities* (76th Congress, 1st session).

[9] 1951.

[10] In the Schenck case (1919).

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

If the government need not tolerate subversive activities it surely need not keep subversive employees. Only questions of procedure can arise here.[11]

Some insist that the government, before dismissing an employee, must furnish proof of wrongdoing and act as a trial court would. I see no merit in this contention. Dismissal from government service is not punishment, even though it might involve a loss, just as dismissal from private employment might. An employee need not be guilty of anything to be discharged and surely not of any legally incriminating thing, nor need anything be proved. Nobody has a right to government employment. Mr. Justice Holmes pointed that out when sitting on the Massachusetts bench. Civil service regulations only

[11] A comprehensive and lucid discussion of the whole subject of subversion may be found in Sidney Hook's *Heresy Yes—Conspiracy No* (New York: John Day Company, 1953). I have learned a great deal from it, though, of course, Professor Hook is responsible only for what he taught. And I know that he does not share my views on many of the topics here discussed.

specify privileges which can be withdrawn. They exist not so much for the benefit of employees as to guard the government against hiring of incompetents and capricious firings not motivated by public interest. Except for the judiciary, the government retains the right to judge the fitness of its employees and to fire on grounds it deems relevant at least as much as a private enterprise. Surely the government has more reason to insist that its employees be loyal and competent.

No one, of course, believes that the government has always acted wisely in this matter. No doubt in trying to rid itself of undesirable, inept, disloyal, or doubtful personnel, the government lost the services of some loyal and competent persons. Perhaps matters will improve once a clear line is drawn between subversive activities and democratic rights. Those who complain should remember that we are confronted with an urgent, immense, and important task for which nothing in our history has prepared us. We can all fill books with anecdotes about foolish investigators. I reserve my respect for those who sincerely try to help the government to do better.[12]

PROFESSORS

What I have said about government employment [13] requires modification for professors vested with academic freedom in forming and professing their views. Academic freedom imposes an obligation to keep the independence it protects. Yet some think it is a license to surrender it! They became members of the Communist party and thus committed to "at all times take a position on every question that is in line with the policies of the party." [14] A professor who thus commits himself gives up his academic freedom and therefore forfeits his office. He has no more right to it than a monk has to his place in the monastery if he gets married. The university need not prove that he really consummated the marriage and fulfilled his pledge to "skillfully inject Marxism-Leninism . . . at the least risk of exposure." [15] For this would be irrelevant. The commitment itself is incompatible with academic freedom and is a sufficient ground for dismissal not, of course, because the professor associates with Communists but because he is committed to them and associated with them for the accomplishment of the objectionable common purpose. Ignorance of the true nature of his commitment might prove his innocence of Communism but it would also prove him guilty of irresponsibility, culpable neglect, or stupidity. A certain measure of these vices must be tolerated if we are not to decimate our ranks. But ignorance of the nature of such major commitments goes too far for one who is to dispel ignorance and teach responsible behavior.

Fifth Amendment

Finally, what about those merely suspected of not being true to their commitment to academic freedom? I think we must investigate such charges as carefully as we might investigate charges of incompetence or immorality. It is the professor's duty to co-operate with constituted authorities in this investigation. He has the same right as any other citizen not to incriminate himself by his own testimony. No court may take the use of this right as a confession of guilt. On the other hand, any citizen may draw inferences from the exercise of the constitutional privilege. The Fifth Amendment never was intended to offer immunity against nonjudicial inferences. Surely universities or school boards would be remiss in their duty if they kept a teacher who refused to tell whether he habitually corrupted his charges. He has a right to refuse. And the school board has a duty to fire him if he does.

A professor's status cannot rest merely on the inability of authorities to prove any past wrongdoing. That is enough to keep him out of jail. But to keep himself in office he must co-operate in reasonable inquiries into his continued fitness and his freedom from commitments contrary to his profession. A man unwilling to profess such freedom from bondage cannot be a professor. And his fear of incriminating himself would surely interfere with his teaching.[16]

Undeniably, the zeal of persons outside the academic world was often misguided. But so was the inertia of the faculties and their exclusive devotion to alibis for it. This smug inaction is largely responsible for the outside pressure we so volubly decry. Behind it, probably, is the confusion of liberty with its surrender and the cloudy liberalism I have already described. The best we can say for educators here is that they have not added much to it.[17] They share in our common vices without claiming more than their due portion. Only because they are more articulate do they seem to be ahead.

[12] Though the government has a right to fire on suspicion of incompetence, disloyalty, alcoholism, or what not, it ought to *label* bottles only when it is quite sure of the contents.

[13] The judiciary is, of course, in a very special noncontroversial position.

[14] Resolution of the Ninth Convention of the Communist party, U.S.A., 1936.

[15] *The Communist,* May 1937.

[16] One who without such a fear invokes the Fifth Amendment perjures himself. (Witnesses, of course, cannot stand mute for fear of being accused of false testimony in the proceedings in which they are testifying. Otherwise no witness ever would have to testify.)

[17] A case in point is the refusal of some professors at the University of California to swear an anti-Communist oath which the trustees foolishly wanted to impose. (Foolishly, because it would be of no use; misleadingly, too, because it gives the impression of solving a problem which the oath—rendered or refused—would leave unchanged.) They won in the courts because the California constitution enjoins that no oath be demanded as a condition of public employment, other than that of fealty to the Constitution. But I cannot see why the professors should have minded the oath. They were not Communists and said so. Because they were singled out? I should think such selection merely recognizes the importance of the teaching profession. Perhaps they had reasons of a more local nature than I cannot see from here. But the defense usually made of their action leads me to admire their courage more than their wisdom.

Ernest van den Haag, Ph.D., New York City, is an adjunct associate professor of social philosophy in New York University and a lecturer at the New School for Social Research. He was formerly on the faculty of Hofstra and Queens Colleges and the College of the City of New York; economist, the Econometric Institute; and propaganda analyst control editor, Office of War Information. He is the author of Education as an Industry (1955) and a forthcoming work on Contemporary Society.

The Meaning and Significance of Academic Freedom

By Robert M. Hutchins

THE arguments for academic freedom are the same as those for freedom of speech, and they rest on the same foundation. Here are the familiar words of John Stuart Mill:

> If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. . . . the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.[1]

Man is a learning animal. The state is an association the primary aim of which is the virtue and intelligence of the people. Men learn by discussion, through the clash of opinion. The best and most progressive society is that in which expression is freest. Mill said, "There ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered." The civilization we seek is the civilization of the dialogue, the civilization of the logos.

In such a society the intelligent man and the good citizen are identical. The educational system does not aim at indoctrination in accepted values but at the improvement of society through the production of the intelligent man and the good citizen. Education necessarily involves the critical examination of conflicting points of view; it cannot flourish in the absence of free inquiry and discussion.

In a democracy what the public needs to know about the teachers in the educational system is that they are competent. The competent teacher knows the subject he is teaching and how to communicate it to his pupils. Unlike the teacher in a totalitarian state, he is not supposed to purvey the prevailing dogma. He is supposed to encourage his students to use their own intelligence and to reach their own conclusions.

The definition of competence does not shift with every wind of prejudice, religious, political, racial, or economic. If competence had been the issue at Brown University during the free silver controversy, the President would not have been asked to resign because of his premature distaste for the Gold Standard. The modern note was struck there. What was requested of the President was "not a renunciation of his views, but a forbearance to promulgate them." And the reason was that these views were "injurious to the pecuniary interests of the University." On the other hand, the standard of competence did protect a professor at the University of Chicago who was a leading critic of Samuel Insull and the other local oligarchs of the time. He was doubtless injurious to the pecuniary interests of the university, but he and it lived through it, and he is today the senior Senator from Illinois.

[1] *On Liberty*, "Great Books of the Western World," edited by Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), Vol. 43, pp. 274–75.

Wrong Questions

We have been stifling education in this country because we have been asking the wrong questions. If you are asking the right questions, you ask about a subject of discussion whether it is important. You do not forbid students to discuss a subject, like the entry of Red China into the United Nations, on the ground that it is too important. The right question about a subject of research and the methods of investigation is whether competent scholars believe that the subject should be investigated and that this is the way to investigate it. You do not permit the Post Office Department to protect the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies from *Izvestia* and *Pravda*. The right question about a textbook is whether competent people think it can make a contribution to education. You do not ask whether incompetent people are going to be offended by passages taken out of context. The right question about a research man on unclassified work is whether he is competent to do it. You do not act like the United States Public Health Service and weaken the country by withdrawing contracts from research workers on unstated grounds that can only be grounds of loyalty.

As I have said, the right question about a teacher is whether he is competent. If we had been asking about competence we should have had quite a different atmosphere in the case of teachers who were Communists or ex-Communists, who refused to testify about themselves, or who declined to discuss the political affiliations of others. We have been so busy being sophisticated anti-Communists, detecting the shifts and devices of Communist infiltration, that we have failed to observe that our educational responsibility is to have a good educational system. We do not discharge that responsibility by invading civil liberties, reducing the number of qualified teachers available, eliminating good textbooks, and intimidating the teaching staff. The standard of competence means that there must be some relation between the charges against a teacher and the quality of his teaching. The standard of competence would have protected us against teachers following a party line or conducting propaganda. If a teacher sought to indoctrinate his pupils, which is the only circumstance under which he could be dangerous as a teacher, he would be incompetent, and should be removed as such. The standard of competence would have saved us from the excesses of the silly season, such as the refusal of the University of Washington to let Professor Oppenheimer lecture there on physics, and from the consequences of concentrating on the negative task of preventing one particular unpopular variety of infiltration. If we had used the standard of competence we should have been free to fix our minds on the positive responsibility of building an educational system, and with half the energy we have put into being scared to death we might have built a great one.

Since our guilty conscience tells us that there ought to be some connection between what a man does and the punishment visited upon him, we often try to pretend that this is the rule we are following. The Attorney General of the United States, speaking in New York three weeks ago, said that schools should not be sanctuaries or proving grounds "for subversives shaping the minds of innocent children."

This picture of subversives shaping the minds of innocent children has nothing to do with the case. The teachers who have lost their jobs in the campaign against subversives have not been

charged with doing anything to the minds of any children. The case of Goldie Watson here in Philadelphia is typical: testimony about the good she had done the minds of the children in her classes was rejected as impertinent. The only evidence allowed was as to whether she had declined to answer questions about her political affiliations. She had, and she was fired. The same procedure seems to be followed everywhere, even at Harvard. When a professor there is called on the carpet, the issue is whether he is a member of something or other, or whether he has lied or refused to answer questions about such membership. The matter of his competence in his field or what he has done to the innocent minds of the Harvard students is never referred to.

FEAR OF IDEAS

We are getting so afraid of ideas that we are afraid of people who associate with people who are said to have ideas, even if they themselves have not expressed them. The State Curriculum Commission of California is now studying investigators' reports on the authors of twenty-three textbooks. Dr. C. C. Trillingham, Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools and a member of the commission, said, "If an author is aligned with the Communists, we don't want his textbook, even if there is no Red propaganda in it."

We regard what a man says as irrelevant in determining whether we will listen to him. What a man does in his job is irrelevant in determining whether he should continue in it. This amounts to a decision that people whose ideas or whose associates' ideas we regard as dangerous cannot be permitted to earn a living or to make a contribution in any capacity to the well-being of the community. The Supreme Court of California has just taken this logical next step: it has held, in effect, that a Communist can have no contractual rights that the rest of us are bound to respect.

Not long ago at a dinner of the senior members of the faculty of the University of Birmingham in England, I sat across the table from a professor who is a member of the executive committee of the Communist party of Great Britain. The British appear to be getting value out of a scholar whom none of the great American universities could appoint.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

One of the more important advances in law and government effected by the struggles of our ancestors is that proclaimed by the Fifth Amendment. Why should the government demand that a man convict himself out of his own mouth instead of requiring the prosecution to make the effort to establish the charges that it has brought against him? All the Fifth Amendment means is: prove it. Injury is added to insult if there is no pretence that the questions asked must be relevant or proper. In some public school systems refusal to answer any questions by the Board of Education or any other public body is insubordination; insubordination justifies dismissal.

Surely the issue is whether the questions are legitimate. It cannot be insubordination to refuse to answer illegitimate questions. We have gone very far under the influence of one of the rollicking dicta of Mr. Justice Holmes, that there is no constitutional right to be a policeman; but not so far that public employment can be denied on a ground that has nothing to do with the duties to be performed. If the President were to refuse to employ bald-headed men in the federal establishment, the Supreme Court would find, I believe, that the bald had been deprived of their constitutional rights.

IS IT TOO LATE?

You may say that the issue I am discussing is academic in every sense: there is no use now in talking about the right of Communists, ex-Communists, or persons who decline to answer questions about their political affiliations to teach in the United States. Milton Mayer in his forthcoming book, *They Thought They Were Free,* tells the story of the way history passed Martin Niemoeller by. When the Nazis attacked the Communists, he was a little uneasy, but he was not a Communist, and he did nothing. When they attacked the Socialists, he was uneasy, but he was not a Socialist, and he did nothing. They went after the schools, the press, and the Jews, but he was not directly affected, and he did nothing. Then they attacked the Church. Pastor Niemoeller was a churchman. He tried to do something, but it was too late.

I hope it is not too late to point out where our preoccupation with public relations and our failure of courage and intelligence may take us. The *New York Times* on March 17 and the New York *Herald Tribune* on March 19 published editorials on the question whether teachers who decline to testify about others should be dismissed. The significant thing about the editorials is this: they both, perhaps unconsciously, extend the limits of the prevailing boycott. The *Times* condemns "adherence to Communist doctrine," thus adding theoretical Marxists to those automatically disqualified. The *Herald Tribune* comes out against Communists "or any other brands of subversives," thus opening vast new unmapped areas of investigation, recrimination, and confusion.

REECE COMMITTEE

These two newspapers bitterly attacked the Reece committee, appointed in the House to investigate foundations; but they appear to have succumbed to its influence, which is another evidence that if you say something outrageous authoritatively, loudly, and often enough you will eventually find yourself quoted in the most respectable places. The Reece committee includes among the subversives almost anybody who differs with the two members of the committee who constitute the majority. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., said at the University of Oregon last October, "The word 'subversive' has no precise definition in American law. It is as vague as 'heretical' was in the medieval trials which sent men to the stake." Leading the list of Reece committee subversives are those who do not share its philosophical prejudices. The committee condemned a philosophical doctrine, empiricism, and those who hold it as the fountainhead of the subversive tendencies now engulfing the country. If a philosophical position can be treasonable, particularly one as harmless as a preference for fact over theory, and if two politicians can make it treasonable, freedom of thought, discussion, and teaching may not be with us long.

By repetition the Reece committee is obtaining unconscious acceptance of another proposition, which, coupled with the proposition that politicians may declare a doctrine and its adherents subversive, still further imperils freedom of teaching and inquiry. This is the proposition that tax-exempt money is public money and that a tax-exempt institution is therefore subject to a special variety of public surveillance. An extension of this proposition is found in the California statute requiring all claimants of tax exemption to take a nondisloyalty oath. If carried to the logical limits hinted at in the Reece Report, this notion of the public control of private, tax-exempt corporations could deprive the independent educational in-

stitutions of this country of their autonomy, that characteristic which has given them their value in the development of the American educational system.

Tax exemption is conferred for the purpose of facilitating the performance of a public task by a private agency. A corporation that carries on education and research to that extent relieves the taxpayers of their obligation to finance such work in state-supported institutions. Tax exemption imposes no duty on colleges and universities except that of conducting teaching and research according to their best judgment of what good teaching and research are. It does not impose the duty of making sure that the teaching and research conform to the views of the majority of a legislative committee.

CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

Consider what those views might be. Richard E. Combs, Chief Counsel for the California Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, testified two years ago before a subcommittee of the United States Senate. He gave an account of how Communists reorient courses of instruction. He thought it worth while to report that the name of a course at a California university had been changed from public speaking to speech, and the books had been changed from Robert Louis Stevenson, Masefield, and Kipling to John Stuart Mill. The subversive nature of these changes may not be clear to you, but it was clear to Mr. Combs and, from all that appears, to the California committee that employs him and the committee of the United States Senate before which he testified. The appraisal of courses of study or of the performance of teachers is a professional job, not to be undertaken by the naïve and unskilled.

Consider the role of the California Senate Committee on Un-American Activities in the administration of California institutions of higher learning. The committee claims that a chain of security officers on campuses has been welded by its efforts. If its claims are correct—and they have been disputed —professors and students at eleven institutions are being continuously spied upon for the benefit of a legislative committee. The committee has an arrangement whereby it passes on the qualifications of members and prospective members of the faculties from the standpoint of their Americanism. The reason for this is said to be that the colleges and universities are not competent to assess the Americanism of their teachers, and the committee is. According to the committee at least a hundred members of these faculties have been forced to resign and at least one hundred prospective members have failed of appointment because of the committee's work. It is too bad that the committee has not disclosed the information that led to the interdiction of its victims. One shudders to think that it may have been enough to have been heard quoting John Stuart Mill.

BEHIND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

But the issue of legal control is not basic. Academic freedom comes and goes because of some conviction about the purpose of education on the part of those who make the decisions in society. The Kaiser gave professors freedom of research because he believed that this was one way to make Germany strong and prosperous. This freedom did not extend to professors who wanted to engage actively in politics on the wrong side, the side of the Social Democratic party. The Kaiser did not set a high value on independent criticism.

In a democratic community the question is what do the people think education is and what do they think it is for? I once asked a former Minister of Education of the Netherlands what would have happened if he had exercised his undoubted legal authority and appointed professors of whom the faculties of the Dutch universities did not approve. He said, "My government would have fallen." He meant that the people of Holland would not tolerate political interference with the universities: they understood the universities well enough to recognize interference when they saw it and felt strongly enough about it to make their wishes effective.

The public officers and businessmen who are the trustees of the provincial universities in the United Kingdom have legal control over them, but would never think of exercising it in any matter affecting education and research. They limit themselves to business. The taxpayers now meet more than half the cost of Oxford and Cambridge, but no Englishman supposes that this entitles the government to exert any influence in their academic affairs.

If the people believe that independent thought and criticism are essential to the progress of society, if they think that universities are centers of such criticism and that the rest of the educational system is intended primarily to prepare the citizen to think for himself, then academic freedom will not be a problem, it will be a fact. Under these circumstances teachers would not be second-class citizens, subject to limitations of expression and behavior that show the public thinks the teacher of today is the nursemaid of yesterday. A teacher would be appointed because he was capable of independent thought and criticism and because he could help the rising generation learn to think for itself. He would be removed only if those who appointed him proved to be mistaken in these matters. The proof of their error would have to be made to persons who could understand the issue —an out-of-hand administrative removal approved by a board of laymen without participation by academic experts is a denial of academic freedom.

ACADEMIC RESPONSIBILITY

The people of this country think that education is a perfectly splendid thing and have not the faintest idea of what it is about. The reason that they are in this condition is that educators have had no time and little inclination to explain. After all, the great desideratum of American education in the last thirty-five years has been money. If you want money, you do not talk about independent thought and criticism; you do not engage in it too obtrusively; you may even suppress it if it becomes too flagrant. To get money you must be popular. "He thinks too much" is a classical reference to an unpopular man. Or as a great industrialist once remarked to a friend of mine, "You are either a Communist or a thinker."

I have no doubt that much of the trouble of recent years about academic freedom has been the result of the cold war and our panic about it. As Professor Chafee has said, "Freedom of speech belongs to a people which is free from fear." But the basic issue is public understanding. If public understanding had been serious and complete, the cold war could not have thrown us off our balance.

I do not deny that many eloquent statements of the purpose of American education have been made. They cannot offset the impression created by the official propaganda of educational institutions, by their fatuous efforts to please everybody, and by their emphasis on the nonintellectual and even anti-intellectual activities associated with education in this country. Freedom of teaching

and research will not survive unless the people understand why it should. They will not understand if there is no relation between the freedom that is claimed and the purpose it is supposed to serve. If the teacher of today is the nursemaid of yesterday, he does not need academic freedom—at least the nursemaid never did.

Academic freedom is indispensable to the high calling of the academic profession. If the profession is true to the calling, it will deserve the freedom, and it will get it.

Robert M. Hutchins, LL.B., LL.D., Pasadena, California, is president of the Fund for the Republic. He was formerly chancellor of the University of Chicago (1945–51), after having been its president from 1929 to 1945; acting dean and dean of the Yale Law School (1927–29); and secretary of Yale University (1923–27). Among other works, he is the author of Education for Freedom (1943), Morals, Religion, and Higher Education (1950), The Democratic Dilemma (1951), and The Great Conversation (1951).

The Dismissal of Fifth Amendment Professors

By HAROLD TAYLOR

I SHOULD like to speak about the dismissal of professors in general before dealing with Fifth Amendment professors in particular. A Fifth Amendment professor is simply a professor with a special problem, and he has to be considered first of all as a professor. Dismissing professors is a serious and complicated affair, not to be carried on by the unenlightened. The complications run not just into matters of tenure rules and academic policies, but into psychological and social effects on the people not dismissed, on people outside the universities who read about dismissals and make up their minds about intellectuals and universities on the basis of what they read, on students who learn to take their attitudes to politics, to education, and to life by seeing what happens to dismissed and nondismissed professors.

There are other complications. For example, there is the nonreappointment of instructors and assistant professors, which may be another name for dismissal. There is the simple, straightforward nonpromotion. But the most complicated of all is the nonappointment of teachers. In some cases nonappointment may be the equivalent of immediate dismissal just before hiring; it might be called the doctrine of premature dismissal. The doctrine is applied in the case of professors who have been attacked, called before committees, threatened, publicized; who have expressed a liberal viewpoint; or who have otherwise become politically vulnerable.

As we all know, there are very few valid reasons for dismissing professors —incompetence, dishonesty, physical or mental incapacity, conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude (which is a name for personal habits which are disgusting and incurable and which are at the same time publicly known). To allow other reasons than these would be to put the professor at the mercy of the whims of individuals and of groups, both inside and outside the university. In consequence, once a man has received tenure, the tenure rules and the academic policies of the university community are usually strong enough to sustain him in his post indefinitely, no matter what level of achievement he may subsequently reach as a teacher or as a thinker.

There is no reason to change these rules of tenure or the academic policy of universities in the case of professors who invoke the Fifth Amendment before a committee of Congress. The man who in every respect has shown himself to be worthy of his post over a long period of time does not suddenly become a different person because of his refusal to answer political questions in public.

EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

When the teacher says in public that an answer to questions about political affiliation or association with the Communist party might tend to incriminate him, he certainly does arouse fears and indignation among members of boards of trustees and educators, negative comment in the general public, and anxiety among faculty members and students. But the criteria by which his continued membership in a university faculty must be judged are his worth as a scholar and a teacher, and his integrity and honesty as a member of the academic commu-

nity. Inferences and judgments made by those who are unfamiliar with his personal, intellectual, and moral qualities, and who know him only through his public refusal to talk about his political affiliations and opinions, are not relevant to a determination of his fitness to teach. There has been a predominant tendency on the part of university administrators and board members to desert the regular procedures of determining fitness to teach just when they need most to be applied—that is, when a man is under fire by a congressional committee. The tendency was given official status by the Association of American Universities not long ago in their statement entitled "The Rights and Responsibilities of Universities and Their Faculties." It turned out that the universities had most of the rights and the faculties most of the responsibilities. The statement reads in part:

> Legislative bodies from time to time may scrutinize [the universities'] benefits and privileges. It is clearly the duty of universities and their members to cooperate in official inquiries directed to those ends. When the powers of legislative inquiry are abused, the remedy does not lie in noncooperation or defiance; it is to be sought through the normal channels of informed public opinion.

Any witness who has been out where the winds of publicity blow would take little heart from the admonition to spend the rest of his life in jeopardy and his money in legal fees, as he is blown down the "normal channels of public opinion," informed or uninformed. No faculty member in his right mind could take much comfort from the admonition to co-operate with a committee whose stated intention is to show that he is part of what the committee refers to as the "Soviet conspiracy," and "the rule of Moscow over its adherents in the education world."

What would give him more comfort and would speak more in the name of justice would be a statement to the effect that as a respected member of a university faculty in the exercise of his lawful right to refuse testimony against himself before a congressional committee, he is entitled to the support and protection of his university until such time as the evidence produced in a body of his peers should prove that he is no longer worthy of the respect of his institution or a post among its members. To demand co-operation with a congressional committee, or to say as the Association of American Colleges said, "We welcome investigations . . . ," is to say that educators have abdicated their own responsibility for judgment of scholarship and truth and that they should welcome malice, ill intent, and political trickery into a community where mutual trust, respect, and honor are the true modes of life.

Politics and Education

Before dealing with cases of professors who have invoked the Fifth Amendment, I should like to go back a little to the prior issue of the relation between politics and education. Presumably, a government which wished to remain in office permanently without regard to the wishes of the people would be wise to make certain that all teachers in schools, colleges, and universities followed a political line set for them by the government. Conversely, a government which wished to remain in office by democratic means would count on the schools and universities to develop political ideas and views freely and to teach their students to be politically independent. It would therefore wish the universities to run their own affairs within the framework of the Constitution and the charters of their institutions.

The political intention of the congressional committees has not been to foster democratic political values, nor to help education in the conduct of its own affairs. The congressional investigation of college professors is not and has not been an effort to gather knowledge to aid the country's educational system by legislation. It has been in the nature of a prosecution of teachers for political opinion and past affiliation. It has been an effort to control the politics of the American intellectual, using publicity and the country's anxiety about Communism as the chief instruments, and it has been an effort to impose a political orthodoxy by men seeking political power. Unless the congressional investigations of college teachers are known by their true name it is impossible to understand the situation of the college teachers who appear before the investigating committees, whether they plead the First Amendment or the Fifth Amendment or tell everything the committees want to know.

Antecedents of McCarthy and Jenner Committees

The beginning of the recent series of investigations of college teachers lies with the Special Committee on Un-American Activities under Martin Dies, which proved so successful in attracting national publicity that imitators have been springing up ever since. The most immediate antecedents of the educational work of the McCarthy, Velde, and Jenner committees were the small pilot studies done by the Tenney and Canwell committees in California and in Washington. In 1948 when the University of Washington, under the impact of the Canwell committee, dismissed Professors Butterworth and Phillips because they admitted membership in the Communist party and not because there was anything wrong with their scholarship, their honesty, or their performance as teachers, the way was opened for the dismissal of professors in general and for the decline of scholarship at the University of Washington. At the University of Washington there is a direct line from the dismissals of 1948 to the banning of Robert Oppenheimer in 1955. Once political criteria are introduced as a primary cause for retention or dismissal of university professors, academic freedom has abandoned its first line of defense and must keep retreating to various unprepared positions, no one of which can be held for long under sustained attack.

Early Confusions

When the series of investigations of education and teachers by the McCarthy, Jenner, and Velde committees began two and one-half years ago, the biggest difficulty which professors and college officials faced was the fact that there were no precedents, and no one was very clear about what to do to protect the witness, to defend academic freedom, and to protect the reputation of the universities. The boards of trustees, university presidents, and deans were keenly aware of the damage which could be done to their institutions by national publicity which implied that Communists were teaching on their faculties. The degree of political, moral, and personal confusion which the investigations actually caused at the outset has to have been experienced to be believed. In the confusion many educators, teachers, and citizens lost their heads, reacted with fear and anxiety, and became committed to false positions before giving themselves a chance to make up their minds.

The strategy of the committee counsels, who were the genuine investigators and planners—with the chairmen acting as symbols of a democratic government protecting itself against the conspiracy of a foreign power—was designed to produce this confusion. The counsels, with the aid of research staffs, collected

leaks from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, newspaper reports, letterheads, catalogues of the Jefferson School of Social Science, back files from the Tenney committee in California, American Legion reports, statements from professional informers, stories from newspapermen, lists of membership in organizations on the Attorney General's list, names contributed by friendly witnesses, and information interchanged from the files of other committees. The names were then sorted by institution, and at a given moment all those from a given university whose names were in hand would be subpoenaed with a few days' notice, leaving little or no time for the witness to prepare himself with a lawyer or to decide how he would handle his own case if he felt he did not need legal advice. Those subpoenaed were then called to private sessions, asked questions about membership in the Communist party, past or present, about their political opinions, their writing, their immigration status where this applied, and the opinions and affiliations of their faculty colleagues. Those who stated that they were not and had not been members of the Communist party were often dismissed, although at any time remarks made in private session could be released to the public. Those who admitted former membership and provided names of others were either dismissed, or if they wished a public hearing were provided with one. Those who invoked the Fifth Amendment and those who refused to give names were scheduled for a public hearing at the earliest moment. The executive sessions were, in effect, screening devices for the location of teachers whose plea of the Fifth Amendment or whose political views and affiliations might evoke wide public interest.

In the beginning, very few lawyers knew very much about the Fifth Amendment itself, and those who did were not clear as to whether the law that worked in the courts was one that would work in the same way with congressional committees. Since no cases based on the use of the Fifth Amendment before congressional committees had been tested in law, everybody was making new law by speculation. There were lawyers who advised witnesses to say Fifth Amendment to almost every question asked, on the grounds that otherwise the committee chairman could claim that you had "opened the question," and "waived your privilege." This would mean that you then had to answer everything anyone asked, or be cited for contempt or trapped into perjury. Other lawyers would advise the witness to answer every question except one about actual membership in the Communist party. Then there were the lawyers who argued that unless the witness actually were in the Communist party, he had no right to use the privilege. Among the *aficionados* of the university freedom circles, the merits of taking the full Fifth, the partial Fifth, the straight First, and the No Answer Gambit were debated endlessly. Various moral attributes were assigned to each position, with the straight First Amendment, with no answer on political associates, most often coming first; an unfriendly Fifth with an unco-operative attitude and partial disclosure was second; and friendly co-operation with naming of associates a very bad last.

Since those early days, we have the good fortune to have at hand the work of Erwin Griswold and Telford Taylor on the Fifth Amendment and a recently published book by Alan Barth on investigations in general, with definitive pieces by Clark Byse and various scholars in jurisprudence. But when the investigations first began, there were so many differing views as to how best to protect oneself as a university professor that it is no wonder that university

presidents having to deal with alumni, many different kinds of faculty, boards of trustees, students, the government, and the entire American public should have been uncertain and confused as to where the right course of action lay.

FIRST FIFTH AMENDMENT DISMISSAL

In this situation, it is to be regretted that the first case of a Fifth Amendment dismissal should have resulted in a surrender to the political forces at work. This was the Rutgers University case, in which two members of the faculty were dismissed because they invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to testify before a congressional committee. A faculty committee, appointed by the President of the university, considered the cases and recommended to the President and the Board of Trustees that the two men be retained in the faculty. The President and the Board of Trustees set a deadline by which the men should either co-operate with the congressional committee or be dismissed. The men refused to comply and were dismissed. Because it was the first time that a congressional committee had secured the dismissal of faculty members it was a decision of very great importance, and it set a precedent that other universities, some of which were already predisposed toward such a solution, were willing to follow. The principle was very clear: if the men were to be judged through regular procedures as to their worth as teachers and as members of the Rutgers faculty, they should remain at Rutgers. If they were to be judged by the public, the Board of Trustees, and the President as men obligated to answer questions of a congressional investigating committee, they should be dismissed. For whatever reason, the university authorities failed to accept the judgment of those best qualified to pass on the merits of the defendants, and two good men were removed from their teaching posts for having exercised their rights as citizens. This is to me a betrayal of the responsibility of the university.

DR. NOVIKOFF AND THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

A second case is equally dramatic, and may serve to demonstrate the futility of allowing political investigations to determine who should or should not teach. It is the case of Alex Benjamin Novikoff, biochemist at the University of Vermont. Dr. Novikoff was called suddenly by subpoena at a time when he was ill in bed, to a private, then a public, hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security whose chairman at that time was Senator William Jenner. He appeared before the committee in both hearings without a lawyer, having decided that he would talk freely with the committee about everything connected with his political past except a time when he was a member of the Communist party. On that point, he invoked the privilege of the Fifth Amendment. He did so, according to his remarks later on to a trustee-faculty committee at the University of Vermont, because he did not want to implicate himself or his friends in further questioning about activities of a political kind in which he was involved eight years previously. Whether or not he should have done so was a decision of his own, since Dr. Novikoff took no lawyer and made up his own mind as to how he should proceed.

The trustee-faculty committee which reviewed his case reported that Dr. Novikoff is "an excellent teacher and scientist, and of great value to the Medical School." The committee commented on his honesty, candor, and willingness to co-operate and stated that there was no indication that while he had been at the University of Vermont Dr. Novikoff had been a member of the

Communist party or "directly or indirectly, or by implication taught Communist philosophy to any student therein"; and that

> . . . his failure to answer to the congressional committee was his method of protection against what seemed to him inquisitorial methods . . . ; that while he may have been in error because of confusion about the rights which the Amendment confers upon a person, and while legally, as well as technically, his position may not be wholly defensible, nevertheless he was convinced in his own mind of his moral rights in the matter.

The committee then voted five to one to retain Dr. Novikoff in the faculty. The President declined to accept the recommendation and, refusing the advice of his trustee-faculty committee, recommended to the Board of Trustees of the University of Vermont that Dr. Novikoff be dismissed, solely because he had invoked the Fifth Amendment. The Board of Trustees accepted the President's recommendation. The result was that the University of Vermont lost a good teacher, a good member of the community, and a good worker in the field of cancer research because the President of the university was not prepared to accept the considered judgment of Dr. Novikoff's colleagues and of a duly appointed committee of the faculty and trustees. The case was settled by a moral dogma that all teachers have an obligation to disclose publicly any information a congressional committee may ask. There are many more cases to which this dogma has been applied.

POPULAR OPINION

The statement which comes closest to representing popular opinion about the use of the Fifth Amendment by professors is that of William T. Gossett, Vice-President and General Counsel of the Ford Motor Company, a man who, as a lawyer and a businessman, has shown interest and concern in civil rights and public issues. Mr. Gossett says this:

> It seems to me, therefore, that if a teacher refuses under the Fifth Amendment to answer questions put to him by a congressional committee as to membership in the Communist party, the institution would be justified in taking appropriate action to protect itself from any adverse inference that might be drawn by the community from the teacher's action. This would include the dismissal of the teacher, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the institution that he is not a member of the party, and that if he ever has been, he has disavowed and repudiated its principles.[1]

This is a persuasive argument, since it is clear that the man who refuses to be candid with his own colleagues about activities which may be classified by the courts as illegal, and are certainly regarded by the public as subversive, may confuse his supporters, even within his own institution. But the argument does not quite meet the real situation. There have been in the past, and presumably are in the present, sincere Marxists who may have repudiated the Communist party but not Communist principles. There may be other faculty members whose lawyers have advised them not to speak to any formal faculty or trustee committee about political activities no matter how innocent or sincere, on the grounds that the record could be subpoenaed by an investigating committee and the witness' privilege not to testify against himself might thus be removed by his very candor with his colleagues. There is also the fact that, in the absence of evidence that membership in any political party by a teacher has involved espionage, illegal activity, or subversion, questions about political activities even by the teacher's colleagues are not the primary ones to be raised about his faculty membership.

[1] From an address delivered at Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, April 16, 1954.

The real situation is one in which the individual faculty member finds himself, regardless of his legal position. The latter may well be a technical matter connected with the particular lawyer he has retained to advise him. The teacher may be a man who on principle joined the Communist party and on principle left it, and on principle does not wish to identify associates or to involve himself further in political controversy. It cannot be determined by the fact that a member of a university faculty pleads the Fifth Amendment that he is a member of the Communist party or that he is a bad teacher. Even if the faculty member has had no connection at all with the Communist party or with organizations associated with it, he is damaged simply by being called before a congressional committee.

HARVARD AND PROFESSOR FURRY

The case of Professor Wendell Furry of Harvard University has in it all the diverse elements of political, moral, social, legal, and personal content which mark the situation of a witness before a congressional committee. It may serve as the prime example of the Fifth Amendment professor at bay. As a matter of fact, Professor Furry's case demonstrates the situation of the First Amendment professor as well. His is the case of a man who ultimately relied on no legal sanction for his position but on the single moral point that he would not involve his former associates in a situation similar to his by giving their names.

When Professor Furry was first called before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives on February 26, 1953, he invoked the Fifth Amendment as to his present or past membership in the Communist party. He chose his own lawyer. At that time, two committees, one of the Harvard Law School, one of the Harvard faculty, had differing views as to what position a man in his situation should take. These were informed committees, who reached differing conclusions using the same set of facts. Professor Furry not only chose his own lawyer but acted as his own press representative, and gave statements to the press about some aspects of his Communist party membership which he at first refused to give to the Committee on Un-American Activities and gave later at a second hearing before that committee.

The Harvard Corporation, on its part, invoked the principle that each case should be decided on its own merits, and after conducting its own hearings, using the regular academic procedures, decided to support Professor Furry's membership in the faculty with certain reservations about his public conduct and his past political activities.

In the meantime, Senator McCarthy took up the case in his Senate investigating committee, with a great many advance declarations about Harvard Fifth Amendment Communists, only to find to his chagrin that Professor Furry was now willing, for the sake of his allegiance to Harvard University and his colleagues, to waive his privilege under the Fifth Amendment, to answer all questions about his own political activities, and to face the possibility of contempt charges. These were subsequently pressed.

The most moving account of the process by which Harvard University and Professor Furry came to an understanding of each other is that set down by Edwin C. Kemble, professor of physics at Harvard University, in a statement published in the *Harvard Alumni Bulletin* of March 1954.

Professor Kemble says of his colleague, Professor Furry:

Professor Furry is an able physicist and teacher. Ever since he entered the department twenty years ago he has been known to his colleagues as a cooperative, high-minded person, free of self-seeking and exceptionally conscientious. In spite of the occurrences of the past year we continue to believe that he is a man of basic integrity and loyalty to our country.

After a short description of Professor Furry's own explanation of his political past, Professor Kemble says of Professor Furry's account: "This story seems to those who know Professor Furry an altogether believable one. It fits with all we know about the man and about his former associates." Then he describes the operation of the McCarthy committee and Professor Furry's conduct before it, and comments:

These considerations do not prove that Professor Furry's course is right, or in the best interests of himself or Harvard University. It does mean, however, that his decision was one of those difficult ones that every man must make for himself. In the opinion of the writer it is worthy of respect.

Although not everyone agreed with the wisdom of Professor Furry's course of action, it was also considered worthy of respect by the Harvard faculty and by the large body of American scientists.

I should like to conclude my remarks with Professor Kemble's own concluding statement about the case of his fellow scientist:

If the universities are to continue to serve the nation in the future as in the past, it is essential that they stand firm on the ground of their traditional procedures. Happy indeed is the institution like Harvard whose tradition of freedom is long and deep-rooted. We are bound to no state legislature and we are free from the enslavement of government contracts. We have a high reputation and an enlightened alumni. By maintaining our own position we can help those less favorably situated. The scholars and scientists of our sister institutions inquire anxiously, "Will Harvard stand firm?" They do not want Professor Furry to resign, for they realize that just because his case is a difficult one, it is a fine case to cite before their own boards of regents.

The Harvard Corporation is bravely sticking to the rules. The Faculty is proud of the fact that there has been no surrender.

LOYALTIES OF THE FREE MIND

This is the voice of the scholar, speaking of his work and of his tradition. It expresses simply and honestly the truth that the life of the free mind and the growth of knowledge can only exist where there are men and women of patience, generosity of heart, and good faith who will protect one of their number in a time of stress. If we have learned no more than this from the travail of the scholar in these recent years, it may well be that this is enough to give us, in the continuing stress of the present, the courage and strength we all need to do our best work.

Harold Taylor, Ph.D., Bronxville, New York, has been president of Sarah Lawrence College since 1945. He taught philosophy at the University of Wisconsin from 1939 to 1945, during the war serving also for a time as research associate in psychology in the Office of Scientific Research and Development. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Labor Education Service and a trustee of the Kosciuszko Foundation. He is the author of On Education and Freedom (1954), editor and coauthor of Essays in Teaching (1950), and a contributor to philosophical and educational journals.

Security Through Book Burning

By CHARLES G. BOLTE

I LOOKED for a text from the American humorists, because they so often illuminate our follies better than the sobersided do, and because if we laughed more often at the pygmies who are trying to take us prisoner, instead of treating and entreating them so earnestly, we might the better blow them away. I found two texts.

Mark Twain, of course, first:

It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them.

Then Walt Kelly, whose "Pogo" recently featured an exchange between a blameless owl and an inquisitorial badger, the latter supported by two junketeering crows:

BADGER: I won't *threaten* you, Mr. Owl. But here is a book that says: Owls migrate north about April first. . . . You got a day to pack.

OWL: Why, *you* jes' writ *that* you' own-self. . . . Where is Captain Wimby's Bird Atlas?

BADGER: *Dis*credited. It didn't agree with *our* observations. . . . Did it, men?

FIRST CROW: No sir, it's out of date.

SECOND CROW: *And* on fire.

BADGER: There's nothing quite so lovely as a brightly burning book.

CLASHING SYMBOLS

My theory is that we had all better be a little less prudential in exercising our precious freedom of speech and freedom of conscience, if we want to keep them. Like other rights, they grow weak when not used. This makes life too easy for those who enjoy the sight of brightly burning books.

The title assigned me is "Security Through Book Burning." A dear old lady I know asked a while ago, "What is all this bother about book burning? Why, I always dispose of my old books that way. How else does anyone get rid of books he doesn't want any more?" Well, ours is an age of symbols. The shortage of shelf space bothers us all, I hope. We shall simply have to get used to sending books we can no longer keep to the veterans' hospitals and the Merchant Marine Library. Offensive books can be buried. But burning is out.

This is now pretty generally realized. The Boy Scouts in Portsmouth, Rhode Island, decided to celebrate Lincoln's Birthday this year by burning "objectionable" books on the grounds of Fort Butts, a shrine of the Revolution. They ended by withholding the torch and consigning the offensive matter to the town dump instead, when the announcement of their proposed celebration received what the sponsors mildly called "adverse publicity."

This outcome supports my theory that we need to exercise our freedoms, and bellow and laugh more often and more loudly at those who have forgotten what country they are living in. Nobody denies a man's, or a Boy Scout's, right to junk a piece of printing which he decides, after reading it, that he does not like. But form counts for a lot. In any society, ideas without procedure are a mess; in our society, which has staked everything on the principle of government by laws not men, a breakdown in method means an unholy mess, and points to the end of our society as we have known it. Book burning is a symbol which denies the

validity of the symbols of Lincoln, the Revolution, or, one would have thought, the Boy Scouts.

However, American history can be read as a long succession of clashing symbols (spell it either way). We no sooner resolve one tension in our dark continent than we generate another. There are always enough of us sure enough that we are right to guarantee constant prayers to God to make our neighbors see the right as we have given Him to see it. "I'll make that fellow feel brotherly love if I have to kill him" is an old story with us.

The drive to achieve security through book burning has consequently never lacked supporters, nor is it likely to. A royal governor of Virginia wrote in 1671:

> I thank God there are no free schools nor printing, and I hope we shall not have any these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world.

Holmes

Two and a half centuries later the Supreme Court was still dealing with the problems caused by this view of the world. Holmes, with distaste but with understanding, wrote:

> Persecution for the expression of opinion seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a may says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises.[1]

I ration myself to one paragraph only of Holmes—this would not be a paper on my subject without at least that much—but I know you will all remember that it is the next paragraph which goes on to say that "time has upset many fighting faiths," that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas," and that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."

Holmes's was a dissenting opinion; it is not always clear that the majority of the country is with him even now. This need not shake our belief in the validity of his conclusion, since we have Thoreau's word for it that any man more right than his neighbors is a majority of one already. It only means that we need to be diligent in challenging the power and questioning the premises of all those, in or out of office, who want a certain result with all their hearts, even if it means destroying what is in ours.

Lenin

A year after Holmes's dissent in the Abrams case, Lenin set forth the Communist view:

> Why should freedom of speech and freedom of the press be allowed? Why should a government which is doing what it believes to be right allow itself to be criticized? It would not allow opposition by lethal weapons. Ideas are much more fatal things than guns. Why should any man be allowed to buy a printing press and disseminate pernicious opinions calculated to embarrass the government?

This quotation, to be found in Alan Barth's new book, *Government by Investigation*,[2] which I commend to you all, is offered free of charge to those who still want proof that any American who favors book burning is guilty of Communism by association.

If we could be sure that we were

[1] Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 624 (1919).

[2] (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), p. 183.

right, that the complex of our national policies and accepted truths added up to the truth for all time, then I suppose we could find security through book burning. Lenin was surely right in this, that "ideas are much more fatal things than guns" (if we can admit that there are degrees of fatality). Ideas *are* dangerous; and in a perfectly regulated world, new ones would not be admitted, to turn over the existing order.

But it is not in the cards for us to have this kind of certainty, this faith *à la russe*. We shall need to make do with what we have: a tough-minded faith, which accepts a pluralistic society, moving through trial, unafraid of error, receptive to new ideas.

Embarrassing the government is an old American tradition. For my part, surveying the press of national problems, I sense an absolute need for fresh thought. I am not persuaded that every one of our national policies is beyond all doubt the wisest for us in our present time and place and situation. I fear more harm from everybody thinking alike than from some people thinking otherwise. The nation needs more men who march to a different drummer, not fewer. We can dare to disagree even with decisions of the Supreme Court. After all, four of nine justices often do.

Safeguarding the Republic

The saddest thing about our censors is the evidence they give that they mistrust their neighbors and doubt the validity of American ideas. Is our own cause really so frail that we must be safeguarded from reading attacks on it? Is a textbook by a politically unpopular writer really going to turn the kids from little Republicans into little Comrades?

Are United Nations documents in the San Antonio library really going to undermine the Texas constitution? Are *Pravda* and *Izvestia* really going to provide ammunition for scholars to blow up bridges with? Is the Communist Manifesto in the Boston Public Library really going to supplant the Mayflower Compact in the affections of the next Massachusetts generation? Did it really safeguard the Republic when a security check was run on a private citizen who had written a pamphlet advocating more ground forces, before the pamphlet was circulated in the Pentagon?

Apparently so, in the view of the aroused citizens who have been attacking textbooks all over the country, the patriotic Texans who cried out against the United Nations documents, the Post Office officials who denied the mails to *Pravda* and *Izvestia* except to "authorized" addressees, the Bostonians—including two of five trustees of the library—who favored the removal of Communist literature from the stacks, and the officers who ran the security check on the professor before using his arguments on their side.

TEXTBOOKS FOR BOOK BURNERS

This kind of activity does, I believe, deserve that ugly epithet "un-American." Who are these un-American characters, seeking to tell us what we may not read and judging a book by its author's history instead of by reading the book? Some of them are dangerous pyromaniacs, who feel with the badger that there's nothing quite so lovely as a brightly burning book. Mostly, though, they are honest and worthy, if temporarily frightened, souls, who have just forgotten their history, and what America is all about. They perhaps need to be reminded, as Murray Kempton said a while ago, that the Bill of Rights was written by a revolutionary to protect bad literature and undesirable people.

Let us, therefore, not denounce their ignorance or condemn their motives: let us seek to improve their understanding.

Lead them gently to the Constitution; introduce them to Socrates, Milton, Voltaire, Jefferson, Mill, Holmes, and Hand; show them the passage beginning "Don't join the book burners" from Eisenhower's Dartmouth Commencement speech; remind them that, although the Devil can quote Scripture and make a profit at it, these are still the American scriptures, and must be lived by if we are to remain Americans. The price of our liberty is the free grant of it to those we suspect may be seeking to destroy it.

THE NEED TO KNOW

Aside from the Constitution and the American scriptures—what might be called the needs of the American psyche—there is the obvious pragmatic reason for this. The need to know is not less intense in this generation than it was in the last. A knowledge of Communism is obviously essential to any American who wants to be able to combat it effectively. A university president, challenged by an alumnus that they were teaching Communism in the college, is said to have replied, "Yes, and we teach cancer in the medical school." Yet the Post Office now intercepts mail from the Iron Curtain countries and destroys periodicals addressed to subscribers here, excepting only those institutions and individuals "authorized" by the Post Office Department. (Imagine being authorized by the Post Office Department.) It would be in the national interest if the Post Office, instead of suppressing *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* were to carry them free, and perhaps even make their reading compulsory (although this, on second thought, would be an infringement of that equally valuable freedom, the freedom not to read).

At a deeper level than this is the need for new thought about our own society and our conduct in the world. Salvation tomorrow may lie in the unpopular today. In the words of the Freedom to Read Statement issued a couple of years ago by the librarians and publishers, "No society of free men can flourish which draws up lists of writers to whom it will not listen, whatever they may have to say."

Yet this kind of listing, or blacklisting, is now widespread, especially in the field of textbooks. Texas requires authors of textbooks to declare that they are not and never have been members of the Communist party, and are not and have not for ten years been members of any organization on the Attorney General's list. Other communities, denied such helpful and clear-cut legislation, have had to content themselves with informal lists or the dropping of works whose writers are locally unpopular.

One thing about lists: it saves people the trouble of reading the books.

Melville puts a footnote on a fresh thought at the end of *Billy Budd:* "An irruption of heretic thought hard to suppress." I suspect most of us have been suppressing our heretical thoughts lately. It is precisely here, I believe, that there lies a danger far more grave than the circulation of the most insidiously concealed Communist doctrines. If thoughts heretical of the current official orthodoxy are suppressed, where are the new and saving ideas to come from?

PRUDENT AFTERMATH

There is not, in fact, much official suppression of political ideas in the country today. The crisis of that particular folly seems to have been at least temporarily passed two years ago, when those two young men made everyone laugh at their antic raid on our overseas libraries. Freedom of expression stands high in our courts. Most libraries and schools have withstood the open assaults on their collections and texts from the local vigilantes and the would-be brainwashers.

But these battles leave their scars. Our present danger, I say, is here: that the school superintendent, having fought off an American Legion raid on his textbooks, may limit his selections afterwards to books by writers who never joined anything; that the librarian, having maintained her right to have pamphlets of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the shelves, may not exercise that right on the next lot; that the publisher, having weathered the storm over a book by a writer who gave ten dollars to Spanish War relief in 1938, may decide his next book does not fit into the list; that the scholar, having observed the drawing and quartering of his colleague for a dispassionate study of recent Chinese history, may defer his own book on contemporary problems of the Far East and start revising his monograph on court customs of the Ming Dynasty; that the book-review editor, having received the document from the United States Atomic Energy Commission attacking the Alsops' book on the Oppenheimer case, may not review the book at all.

I do not say that any of these things have happened; although I am told that only three newspapers in the country have reviewed *We Accuse,* there were other factors involved in this case. I say only that it would be in human nature for things like this to happen. I do not believe that we are, as a nation, terrified; but I think some of us have got pretty cautious. If we have, so much the worse for us, and so much the worse for our country, which needs depth of insight, and boldness in speaking out, just as much today as it ever did.

Books—all kinds of books, expressing all kinds of views—are not a luxury but a necessity. They contribute to the strength of America. The best of them challenge our convictions and our settled ways of thought and make us learn not only what we believe but why we believe it. They cannot serve their most important social function if caution and prudence, even without censorship and suppression, serve to limit the range of ideas and of expression. Censorship, one student of the subject remarked recently, is like the common cold: it is a mild irritant, always with us, and there is nothing much to be done about it. If this is so, those who believe in free expression will at least avoid having the self-induced, or psychosomatic, sniffles when there are no germs about.

CENSORSHIP ON MORAL GROUNDS

They will also, if they are wise, take steps to combat the germs wherever they appear. At the moment, the chief censorship activity in this country is directed against publications not on political but on moral grounds. This seems, but is in fact not, remote from our topic. The local ordinance that is drawn to prevent the sale of horror and crime comics to children can be stretched to suppress *The Brothers Karamazov,* or the newspaper that gives the details of the latest love-nest killing. Aware of the latter possibility, but apparently unconcerned by the former, some legislative bodies have put language in their bills specifically exempting newspaper accounts of crime; a curious provision, considering that the First Amendment was drawn to protect not so much newspapers as books and pamphlets, and considering further that children are apparently affected more by what they believe to be the truth than by what they know to be fiction. The current morals laws do extend, either explicitly or implicitly, to magazines and books.

More serious than these laws, most of them of dubious constitutionality, is

the current rash of extralegal censorship by citizens' groups. The technique here is to use lists of "objectionable" publications—often the list compiled monthly by the National Organization of Decent Literature, a Catholic lay group—to purge the neighborhood newsstands and drugstores. Dealers are asked to "cooperate" with the citizens' groups by withdrawing from sale the books and magazines on the lists. The consequence of nonco-operation is nontrade. Most dealers go along.

The seamless web

These drives are avowedly aimed at protecting the morals of the young. However, some cities have banned the works of Freud and other writers on psychoanalysis. Begin with morals, and suppression on doctrinal or political grounds soon becomes too tempting. No one will contest the right of a church to prescribe what its followers shall read. But is it also to prescribe what its nonfollowers shall read? And shall adults be limited to what is thought suitable for adolescents?

Everybody understands that you can demand the protection of due process of law for a man accused of murder without condoning murder. But it is not always easy to make it clear that you can insist on due process for books accused of obscenity without harboring any sympathy for obscenity. Despite the risk of misunderstanding and consequent denunciation, I am suggesting that those who believe in free expression must take this position. A breakdown in due process for the publication we abhor makes it that much more likely that there will follow a breakdown in due process for the publication we esteem. There is no such thing as a little censorship. This is one web that really is seamless. The citizens who boycott the dealer for selling crime comics or William Faulkner may be around next week to demand the removal of *The Age of Jackson* because they do not like Americans for Democratic Action or of *American Diplomacy* because they do not trust State Department officials even when they have resigned.

Law enforcement and censorship

The distinction that needs to be made, I think, is between law enforcement and censorship. The police department fobs off its duty when it sets up a citizens' committee to advise it on what books are "objectionable." It moves away from law and into taste. The principle is the same for politics as for morals. Support of rigorous enforcement of the laws, and opposition to extralegal efforts, is the way to guard ourselves against those so sure they are right that they are prepared to take the law into their own hands. If a book is unlawful, this is to be established in a court. If it is not unlawful, it is improper for the state or for any group within the state to attempt to suppress by coercion what cannot be suppressed by law.

The observance of due process, so central to our society, is being overlooked today in the quite natural revulsion against the horrors of some of the comics and the quite natural concern about exposing the young to books their parents do not want them to read. People who would cry out against any effort to censor on political grounds are silent about the censorship of morals because it is difficult to develop much enthusiasm for anyone's right to publish some of the things that have lately been displayed. The danger here is that precedents will be established and that censorship will spread. This is not fanciful. A congressional committee set up to investigate "pornography" issued a report in which one book was criticized because the author appeared to advocate polygamy; another because the author did not seem to have the properly respectful attitude toward law-enforcement officers; another because the "author is obviously trying to cash in on the Scottsboro pro-Negro agitation which was Communist-inspired."

New York City Bar Association

The Committee on the Bill of Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York recently considered the suppression of books on political or moral grounds and concluded that, as a result of private censorship actions:

> . . . one group *within the community* is compelling the balance of the community to conform to its standards of what it thinks should or should not be read. The censorship thus exercised, since it is that of a private group, is without the benefit of the procedural safeguards established by law as necessary to insure the proper application of the proscriptive standard. . . .
>
> The wrong is basically public not private. What is involved is the infringement of a keystone of a democratic society: the preserving of a political system which permits the greatest possible freedom in the exchange of ideas.

The committee proposed a remedy:

> Legislation penalizing organized private action which interferes, as described above, with the distribution of reading material would cure this danger. Legislation such as this would compel private groups which wish to prohibit the distribution, or the maintenance on a library shelf, of a particular book or magazine to invoke action under the applicable local ordinance.

The Bar Association accepted this report last month and approved unanimously a resolution by which it

> . . . deplores and condemns the attempts of any individual or group, private or public, to interfere in any manner with the publication, circulation, or reading of any published matter, other than by means of regular applicable statutory procedures and standards; this resolution does not purport to limit the expression of views by any individual or group concerning any published matter.

THE RIGHT TO DECIDE

Our freedoms are involved: our right to decide for ourselves what we shall read. For us, there can be no security through book burning: only the rigid crust of conformity, and the end of that great conversation about who we are, what we are doing, and where we are going that is the essence of our national life. Let us see to it that the conversation continues.

Charles G. Bolte, New York City, has been executive secretary of the American Book Publishers Council since 1952 and is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union. He was formerly a member of the United States Mission to the United Nations (1949–52), organizer and chairman of the American Veterans Committee (1944–47), special writer for the Office of War Information, and newspaper writer. He is the author of The New Veteran (1945).

The Operation of Personnel Security Programs

By Ralph S. Brown, Jr.

THE federal government operates five distinct security programs, along with some minor loyalty programs and tests we shall not be able to discuss at all. The important ones cover:

1. Civilian government employees. This is the one we hear most about. It affects 2,400,000 people.

2. The armed forces—a million more numerous than the civilian employees.

3. Defense Department contractors and their employees requiring access to classified material (Confidential, Secret, etc.).

4. Atomic Energy Commission contractors in similar circumstances.

5. Sailors and water-front workers, under the supervision of the Coast Guard.

These last three programs directly affect some 3,000,000 people who are not government employees at all. The consequences of being held a security risk vary. If you are a government employee or a career military man, you will probably be dismissed. But if you were drafted, you will probably be kept in service at the lowest rank; you may get an unfavorable discharge. If you are a maritime worker, you probably have to find another occupation altogether. If you have been working on a defense contract, your employer may find other work for you, or he may fire you.

There are also differences in the operation of the various programs. But the basic pattern is the same; and since I do not have time to develop the differences here, I shall address myself chiefly to the program we know most about, the one for civilian employees under Executive Order 10450. I shall describe the main stages in a case, giving special attention to the role of a new and powerful figure in government, the security officer.

Investigation

A distinctive characteristic of federal programs is their routine resort to investigation—a laborious and expensive process—and their correspondingly slight reliance on oaths and other declarations by the employee or his superiors. Of course the employee supplies a detailed personal history when he first applies for a position; but the information that the employee supplies is used chiefly as a starting point for investigation.

Name check

The first step is a "national-agency name check," which means an examination chiefly of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Civil Service Commission, the military intelligence branches, and the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The purpose of this file check is to see if any "derogatory information" turns up. What is "derogatory information"? Anything, it may be said, that bears directly or indirectly on the ultimate question to be resolved: Is the employment consistent with the national security? And what has a bearing on this standard? This question raises intricate problems of relevance. It is fair to say that these problems are not faced at the name-check stage. The process seems to be increasingly mechanical, with some safeguards against mistakes in identity. Affiliations with suspect organizations, associations with suspect persons, reports of behavior, expression, and opinions that have been filed because they suggest sympathy with Communism, all are extracted. As the files grow more voluminous, and the kinds of information that are considered grow more extensive, the chances increase that derogatory information will be found. These untested data of themselves may lead to the rejection of a mere aspirant for employment, but routinely their discovery leads to a "full field investigation." Even without the appearance of adverse material in the file check, the present program requires a full field investigation for every sensitive position, a category that has been generously defined. For example, all State Department employment is considered sensitive.

"FBI report"

In such an investigation, "Friends, neighbors, fellow students, fellow employees, teachers and colleagues, even one's grocer or one's hairdresser may be interviewed."[1] Another round of file checking must also occur, for as the names of more of the employee's associates come to be known, it is considered necessary to establish whether there is derogatory information about *them*. The result of all this industry is a report popularly known as an "FBI report," though the FBI is not responsible for all the investigative reports that are assembled.

The composition of these reports is one of the most controversial aspects of the process. The FBI, the agency chiefly concerned, stoutly maintains that it is not an evaluating agency; it simply collects facts, opinions, and rumors—whatever people tell its agents—and reduces the mass to some degree of coherency. It is the job of the recipients to assess significance.

[1] Eleanor Bontecou, *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 83.

Four factors militate against this picture of detached, impersonal transmission of information. First is the imperfection of the interviewer, which of course varies with the capacity and predilections of each individual. Investigators take only sketchy notes, if any, during an interview; there are many instances of interviewees who claim to have been misrepresented. Second is the fallibility inherent when the "raw" files are edited to produce the finished report. Third (related to both the foregoing stages) is an almost unavoidable stress on unfavorable information. Though FBI reports are said to include whatever favorable material has been elicited, the primary object of the investigation, after all, is to discover if there is evidence of disloyalty or of security risk.

The fourth factor involves a policy that overshadows the entire process, the concealment of the identity of many of the FBI's sources. This is not the point at which to discuss the justification and ramifications of this policy. It is unquestioned that concealment of the source is widely practiced, whether the source is an undercover agent whom it would be hazardous to expose, a wire tap that is sub rosa, or simply a casual informant who does not wish his role to be known. The FBI protects them all and does undertake an evaluation of the reliability of the informant. If it did not, the anonymous information could be given scarcely any independent weight. So the report will state whether the unidentified informant is believed to be of known reliability, of probable reliability, or of unknown reliability. It certainly makes a great difference whether the source of a report that the employee is a Communist is labeled reliable or unreliable by the FBI. These judgments must also have some degree of fallibility.

"How Good is an FBI Report?" Alan

Barth asked in a magazine article. Not very, he concluded, on the basis of the scraps of information available to the public. Officials who have used the reports have expressed to me a remarkable variety of over-all opinions about their value. My point here is that under the best of circumstances they are imperfect.

EVALUATION AND DISPOSITION OF FBI REPORTS BY SECURITY OFFICERS

Some of the concern over the failings of investigative reports might be allayed if it could be said that the reports are used cautiously and skeptically. The judgments that are introduced into the reports may not be so important as the judgments that other people derive from them. These other people, in the first instance, are the security officers of the employing agency.

The security officer is not a familiar species of civil servant. The nature of his duties leads him to shun the limelight; public figures like Scott McLeod of the State Department are exceptional. Probably the one element of personal history common to all ranking security officers is that (so I have been told) their own records must be "lily-white." In security jargon, this means entirely devoid of derogatory information.

The immediate fruit of the security investigation is a decision by security officers as to what action is warranted. The following courses are open:

1. To appraise the derogatory information as insubstantial, and do nothing. Doing nothing requires a modest degree of bureaucratic fortitude, since the employee's retention may later be criticized and that criticism deflected onto the security officer. The terms of the Eisenhower and related security programs appear to discourage this course by requiring an affirmative finding that keeping the employee is consistent with the national security.

2. At the other extreme, a possible choice is to disqualify the employee or prospective employee on the strength of the FBI report, without inquiring any further. Security officers can and do summarily reject applicants; only the Atomic Energy Commission habitually gives a person applying for employment an opportunity for a hearing, though the Air Force may do so. The general practice means that an aspirant for federal employment may be rebuffed without any opportunity to overcome the appearance of derogatory information.

3. A third technique permits the employee to thresh out his problems with the security staff, under varying degrees of informality. It has been said that this common-sense approach has been neglected, that much technically derogatory information can easily be explained away, and that the subject of the investigation is uniquely qualified to make the explanations. There is, as usual, another side of the coin. Direct contact between security officer and employee permits pressure, either subtle or crude, to be brought on the employee to resign. The employee may also be informally urged to "co-operate" with the security staff by submitting to prolonged questioning, lie detector tests, or other indignities from which an impersonal procedure shields him.

4. A more common step is the submission of the derogatory information (in edited form) to the employee for written comment. These interrogatories are often effective in clearing up mistakes and misconstructions derived from the investigative reports. About one-third of all the cases decided by the old loyalty boards went in favor of the employee at this stage without further proceedings.

STANDARDS AND CHARGES

It is only when the employee begins to participate in the process of evaluation, by responding to interrogatories or defending himself in a hearing, that the effective standards of the program begin to emerge dimly—from the charges that are made and from the questions that are asked at hearings. We have of course no systematic collection of these materials; the government normally keeps them private, for the protection of the employee and of others who may figure in them.

Association and affiliation

The overwhelming preponderance of charges in both loyalty and security cases relate to associations with alleged Communists and affiliation with alleged Communist organizations. Charges that relate to more serious criteria—for example, attempts at espionage—are rarely encountered. Indeed, taking espionage as the offense most feared from government employees, we find no responsible claims that the loyalty-security programs have caught a single known spy. One does not encounter many charges having anything to do with treason, espionage, sabotage, compromise of classified information, or performance of duties so as to serve the interests of a foreign power. We therefore have little basis for saying what information would be disqualifying if it touched on these areas. The offenses themselves, if satisfactorily established, would without question warrant dismissal.

In the main stream of charges, those relating to questionable associations and affiliations, we can distinguish two polar situations. The first is a history that leads to a reasonable conclusion of present party membership or of Communist sympathies practically indistinguishable from membership. Here dismissal would presently be obligatory. At the other extreme is a single episode in the relatively remote past, which can be excused. In between, the prima facie case created by a longer list of charges can also be overcome. The employee has often, as is apparent from the number of clearances after hearing, been able to show that the association was in fact innocent or misguided, and that his present outlook and maturity dispel any doubts about his loyalty or reliability in security matters. But the employee, in the revealing phrase, has to clear himself. In addition to making whatever denials, qualifications, or explanations he can with respect to the specific charges, it seems fair to conclude that the process of clearing oneself —whatever the charges—has come to impose at least these burdens on the employee.

Conditions of clearance

1. He must persuade the hearing board and the reviewing authorities that he shares prevailing anti-Communist sentiments. It is not enough to disprove Communist sympathies. How anti-Communist must the civil servant appear to be? The answer varies with the times and with the judges.

2. He must forswear the associations and affiliations that got him into trouble. This obligation has reached the point where employees have felt obliged to cut off any connection with blood relatives.

3. He must exhibit a willing disposition to acquiesce in the demands of the security system. The Atomic Energy Commission made this requirement clear in the Oppenheimer case. The necessity for assent apparently extends to the very process from which the employee is trying to extricate himself, for employees are sometimes asked in hearings whether they think the security program is fairly administered.

These three conditions for clearance are nowhere, so far as I know, explicitly laid down. They are my own conclusions from the materials available.

In developing these conclusions about the effective standards of the programs

we have run somewhat ahead of our step-by-step description of the process, the main steps in which are investigation, evaluation, charges, hearing, and review. Let us return briefly to the matter of charges.

Communist sympathies

Closely related to Communist affiliations and associations are charges of Communist sympathies as expressed in conversation or writings, or as inferred from one's reading or other intellectual interests. In the seventy-five case histories analyzed by Miss Bontecou, charges with respect to sympathetic expressions occurred in fourteen cases; with respect to reading Communist literature, in ten.[2] The number of such charges, however, understates the significance of opinions and attitudes in the resolution of a case. Whether or not there are direct charges about the employee's beliefs, he will doubtless volunteer his political creed if he understands what is needed for clearance. If he does not, the hearing board will correct the omission in its questioning.

Reliability risks and pressure risks

The present security standard opens the door to two families of charges that do not imply Communist leanings on the part of the employee. These I call "reliability risks," and "pressure risks." Summarily, reliability risks are traits of character or personal history that could also disqualify an employee on grounds of general suitability; for example, dishonesty, criminality, or mental disorder. A reliability risk that comes closer to the special requirements of security is negligence or obtuseness in security matters; for example, losing papers. "Pressure risks" are associations or facts that are thought to expose the employee to coercion or blackmail. Russian control of close relatives is the classic example of liability to coercion; homosexuality, of liability to blackmail, and this vice is also said to have some relation to general trustworthiness.

These special security standards are not part of the main stream of cases. Even under a security program, the emphasis is still on Communist associations and affiliations.

Nature of charges

We now turn from substance to form. Do the charges, as drafted, adequately inform the employee of the derogatory information he has to meet? The trend has been away from vague charges like "You have shown sympathy with the Communist Party aims and ideology," [3] toward some specification of place, time, and content of the alleged exhibitions of sympathy. This trend is repeatedly checked, however, by the policy against revealing sources of information.

It should be said that there appear to be few cases in which knowledge of the source of accusations is absolutely crucial to the employee's cause; but there are many in which he is hindered by his inability, in the words of the Sixth Amendment, "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."

Our last observation about charges combines form and substance. The multitude of charges based on associations—"You knew A," "You joined X" —require some characterization of A and X. Here the jargon of security flourishes. A may be described as "a known Communist," when he is in fact nothing of the sort. But the files contain some informant's statement that he knew A as a Communist, so down goes A as "a known Communist." Sometimes boards take these thumbnail descriptions as gospel, so that the employee can only dissociate himself as best he can from unclean A; usually he will be permitted the laborious task of rehabilitating A (who will nevertheless turn up in other cases as "A, a known Communist").

The framing of charges that turn out to be preposterous or trivial imports more than the loose use of words or the uncritical acceptance of the investigative work product. It is another clue, I believe, to the effective standards of the programs. The whole is the sum of its parts; none of the parts can be taken lightly. Take the sort of charge we see in the case of Abraham Chasanow, a Navy employee who, after taking his cause to the public, was finally vindicated. One charge against him was that of association with P, "described as an individual having Communist tendencies, and it is of record that his wife signed Communist nominating petitions during 1939." Note first that this charge involves a technique that we may call "remote association": "You associated with P, who associated with Q, who . . ." No direct connection between the employee and Q is charged. Second, P is "described as . . . having Communist tendencies." Described by whom? What does this mean anyway? It may be a cautious description of P's political orientation; it may simply mean that he has leanings toward his wife, who, it is stated, signed "Communist nominating petitions in 1939." Third, consider the relevance of signing nominating petitions in 1939. If the employee had done so, it would have some bearing on his politics in 1939. He might have signed as a Communist; he might have signed as a non-Communist who thought that the Communist position should be put to the test of the polls. What is charged here is that P's wife, not even an acquaintance of the employee, signed the petitions.

That such tidbits are unearthed is a tribute to the mechanical perfection of the FBI files. Their inclusion in a set of charges, however, is the result of human judgment. The association with P, in the Chasanow case, it should be added, was at board meetings of a community organization. The inclusion of this casual relationship, and the further injection of the remote history of P's wife, were elements in a tentative decision that Chasanow was a poor security risk. They help us to sense the security officers' idea of a security risk.

Charges of this sort have appeared with increasing frequency under the Eisenhower security program.

HEARINGS

The primary purpose of hearings is to give the board a good look at the employee. He is usually the principal witness—sometimes the only one. If he brings on witnesses, their chief function is to corroborate the employee's portrait of himself. He cannot compel the production of unfriendly witnesses. If he knows who they might be, he can ask to have them invited to attend; but they may decline the invitation. The government infrequently produces witnesses in support of the charges. It does not need to; it can stand on the investigative report, which the hearing board sees though the employee does not.

In presenting himself for examination the employee of course hopes to strengthen the affirmative case that, if well-advised, he has already advanced in writing. He is anti-Communist, prospectively (if not retrospectively) free of bad associations, and obeisant to the security system. In making these claims, he invites challenges to explain his beliefs and attitudes. Questions from the board and its counsel are likely to be more sweeping than anything provoked by the charges. Whether or not the employee wants to put his political philosophy to the test, there seems to be little effort to confine hearings to narrow issues. Posers like this result,

[2] Bontecou, *op cit.*, p. 109.

[3] *Ibid.*

from an AEC hearing of a biologist: "Q. Do you think it would be possible for a person to be a deeply religious person and also to be a 'dyed-in-the-wool' Communist? A. Gee, there you got me. I really don't know."

REVIEW AND CO-ORDINATION

The old loyalty program afforded an employee who lost out at the hearing level an appeal to the Loyalty Review Board. This was a group of about twenty-five private citizens, mostly lawyers and educators of considerable standing, who sat usually in panels of three.

The principle of departmental responsibility, though subordinated in the loyalty program, has always dominated the security programs. The military departments especially have insisted that, since the Secretary is responsible for the integrity of his department, his word should be final. The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force do have appeals boards in Washington which make recommendations to the Secretary on all hearing-board decisions. This means that the employee has his case considered by a central board, which serves the further purpose of co-ordinating the activities of far-flung hearing boards. The Eisenhower program has, however, no interdepartmental review or co-ordinating agency comparable to the Loyalty Review Board.

I have no basis for estimating the extent to which, in the absence of a central review board, the various agencies are relatively tough or easy with their employees. A single standard of loyalty, if it could be made manifest, was presumably desired throughout the executive branch. But in a security program, the risk depends (or should depend) on the sensitivity of the job, so that only agencies or jobs of similar sensitivity could be compared in any event.

An increase in the number of stages through which a case must pass before final decision, whatever equities it may introduce, certainly introduces opportunities for delay. One of the most persistent criticisms of both the loyalty and the security program has been directed to the way the proceedings are often dragged out. From chronologies supplied to me by employees and their attorneys, it appears that intervals of a year, eighteen months, or even two years are not uncommon between the initiation of charges and the final decision. If the employee is at work all this time, the chief cost is in efficiency and peace of mind. But suspension without pay has been the routine first step in the security programs. Faced with the gamble that a long period of suspension may end well in clearance and an award of back pay, or may, on the other hand, end in dismissal, the employee must often feel constrained to abandon his defense and resign.

There is one other hazard. The appearance of new derogatory information reopens a case. A transfer to an agency that considers its standards more exacting than those of the prior place of employment reopens a case. A change in the security personnel or in the agency head or in congressional pressures may reopen a case. It is reported that John S. Service had been cleared seven times by the Department loyalty-security board before the Loyalty Review Board ordered his dismissal.

POWERS OF SECURITY OFFICERS

We have been talking about charges and hearings and review. We must remember that there are three features of the program which undercut whatever advantages these give the employee. In the following situations, the security officer's verdict is decisive:

1. Denial of hearings to applicants and probationary employees.

2. Routine suspension without pay of any employee against whom charges are brought.

3. Denial of access to classified material, without charges or hearing. This is a device that has not been mentioned before. It puts the employee in a sort of limbo if his normal occupation requires the use of confidential information. He is kept on the payroll, but the work that is found for him is probably unimportant. His incentive and his opportunities for advancement are both curtailed. It is a form of pressure that has been increasingly used.

With the security officers intervening at every stage of the proceeding, it is not surprising to hear that most stages can be bypassed if they exert even modest pressure. It is reported that in the State Department, where the new administration thought drastic action was necessary and put Mr. Scott McLeod in charge of effecting it, there was a practice of advising employees informally that charges would be brought against them in forty-eight hours, but that they were free to resign in the interim. There is no way of knowing how many resignations have occurred out of alarm or under pressure, or of estimating whether the people concerned could have met the standards of the programs at any particular time. We know that security officers do exert informal pressures and that some people resign without exercising the rights that the program gives them. Some observers whom I have talked to take this to be the main thrust of the program, behind the façade of regulations, hearings, and so forth. I think this position is exaggerated; but it would be an unrealistic picture that did not give considerable prominence to behind-the-scenes activities.

The influence of the new bureaucracy of security officers is probably evident in another trend that we have already noted. That is the growing "mechanization" of the program. You put a name in the investigative machinery. Along the way it may pick up derogatory information, mechanically defined. If there are two or three derogatory items on the processed product, it is stamped "security risk" and discarded. By comparison, a process that emphasizes hearings before persons who are not professional worriers about security is more likely to bring out the offsetting factors in the case.

We should, however, be skeptical of concluding that we have found the first cause of arbitrary decisions in the habits of security officers. They may simply be the faithful executors of a dominant public policy. That policy, which in turn has a multiple origin in our fears and alarms about security, boils down to a cautious phrase: Take no chances.

Whether this is a sensible policy is beyond the scope of these remarks. I have attempted only to explain briefly how these complex programs operate.

Ralph S. Brown, Jr., LL.B., New Haven, Connecticut, is professor of law in the Yale Law School, member of the New York Bar and the American Bar Association, chairman of the New Haven Civil Liberties Council, and member of the Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union. He is at present engaged in a study of loyalty and security programs and their effect on employment, supported by the Louis S. Weiss Fund, Inc.

Due Process in Security Dismissals

By Eleanor Bontecou

I WAS given as a topic "Due Process in Security Dismissals." Instead, for reasons that I shall make plain, I am going to discuss a slightly broader subject; namely, procedure as defined by Judge Curtis Bok when he spoke last year at the national book award ceremonies. "Procedure," he said, "is not only due process, but the proper relation between ends and means." He added that "unless people have an instinct for procedure, their conception of basic human rights is a waste of effort."

Due Process Defined

In so far as due process represents "the deep-rooted demands of fair play" it is a broad and untechnical concept. But it still is a matter of law. On the whole, that law finds its specific expression in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, in the Administrative Procedure Act, and in court decisions.

The requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are familiar. They are part of our custom and our tradition and our law. They provide that there shall be no double jeopardy; that no man shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; that an accused must be informed of the nature of the accusations against him, be confronted with the adverse witnesses, and have the right to counsel. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that in administrative tribunals even a man seeking benefits shall have the right to notice, hearing, counsel, full disclosure of evidence, and the right to cross-examine witnesses against him. He must be heard by an impartial tribunal in which the function of prosecutor and judge are separated and all presumptions shall be in his favor.

The constitutional requirements apply only to criminal prosecutions. Security proceedings, though certainly punitive in the nontechnical sense, are not criminal. The boards always say that they are not prosecutions but inquiries. The Administrative Procedure Act specifically excludes from its purview matters relating to personnel administration. So far, the courts have not developed standards of fair hearing in security dismissals. It seems, therefore, that as of today there is no due process of law in security cases. In the Peters case that is now before the courts the government is contending that there never can be. In these cases, they say, the President is the law.[1]

Rules for Conduct of Security Cases

The President has issued rules for the conduct of security cases. They permit double, treble, and quadruple jeopardy. In fact, an employee cannot be sure that he is out of jeopardy until he has left the government, and perhaps not even then—as Val Lorwin discovered. The accused is given only an imperfect right of disclosure of evidence, since it may be concealed in the interest of security. His right to a hearing, as that word is now understood in our law, is also imperfect. He is denied the right to be confronted with the adverse witnesses and may not even know their

[1] At the argument of this case before the Supreme Court the government abandoned this position.

identity. The separation of prosecutor and judge is partial only. The employee who in a security case invoked his constitutional right not to be a witness against himself would court immediate dismissal. The rule of the game is that all the presumptions are against him. In view of the extent to which security cases have been made a political issue the requirement of an impartial jury or tribunal cannot always be met. The pressure in particular cases may be too heavy. The only right now commonly looked upon as an essential part of due process that is unreservedly granted to an employee in a security case is the right to counsel. It would seem therefore that if I stuck close to my text I would have very little to talk about. I am glad to find an acceptable substitute in Judge Bok's concept of procedure, for there is plenty of procedure in these cases. Sometimes many days and several thousand pages of it.

Thurman Arnold, incidentally, takes the position that if we cannot have due process we had better let the procedure go.

Those who seek in the security cases to achieve a proper relation between ends and means are gravely handicapped by certain obstacles in their path. They are trying to do what Chief Justice Brian as long ago as the fifteenth century said was impossible for the Devil himself; what Gordon Gray called "searching a man's soul without violating his civil rights." Under the rules, they must find a way to reach fair decisions when relevant facts are concealed from them as well as from the accused person who is before them. Many of them have had no experience in the curious hybrid proceedings of security, which are neither interrogations nor adversary proceedings but smack of both. There now seems to be no common agreement as to the ends they seek, no generally accepted definition of the concepts "national security" and "security risk."

The Government's Position

In its brief in the Peters case the government takes the position that in the security program it is doing the very best it can. It says "The program has been carried out in the fullest possible conformity with the basic Anglo-American traditions of individual liberty" and claims that the government has provided "the maximum hearing process consistent with the paramount objective of the program."

The government says further that it cannot give a man the right to face his accusers in these cases because it cannot produce witnesses without disclosing "necessary sources of delicate information" and "extremely delicate and confidential techniques." It then contends that it meets the demands of basic fairness in the circumstances in that it provides that decision shall be made by "Boards carefully selected," who engage in "the most careful examination and sifting of all available material," and make their decisions on the basis of "information satisfactorily evaluated."

I think it will be useful to examine these contentions. For though the government is speaking of the loyalty program, what it says applies equally to the security program. It is quite true that these two programs were devised as a kind of preventive counterintelligence operation. I think that the government expected through them to uncover Communist agents in its ranks, as well as to prevent further infiltration. As a matter of fact, it has not worked out that way. Apparently, the Communist agents had been separated from the government before the program began to function—or else they have not been uncovered. Seth Richardson testified at the end of his service as chairman of the Loyalty Review Board that they

had not found "a single syllable of evidence to show that any employee was involved in espionage."

As Miss Perkins put it, almost no big fish have been caught in the net, although hundreds of little ones have. This being so, we may well ask whether techniques designed to catch barracuda really apply to fishing for minnows.

VARIATIONS IN PRACTICE

An examination of the record of many loyalty cases suggests that the government's contention that it has provided "the maximum hearing process consistent with the objectives of the program" is not correct. I say this because a few boards have gone much farther in the observance of Anglo-American traditions of individual liberty than they were required to by the rules laid down. Before a hearing began, they informed the accused fully as to the derogatory information in their files. They gave him the names of the nonconfidential witnesses against him and tried very hard to bring the adverse witnesses into the hearings. Some of them traveled to various cities to make this possible. There was never any suggestion that the government was hurt by these practices, but neither were they made obligatory for all boards. Today some agencies try to bring in witnesses; others do not.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The most serious departure from the tradition of due process in the security program is the refusal to inform the accused fully as to the information against him or to give him the right to face his accusers. What are the "delicate sources of information" and the "delicate techniques" that the government says would be destroyed if this were done? They certainly include the following: the genuine undercover agent, the paid informant, the casual informant who seeks to have his identity concealed, the files of investigative agencies other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including the local police and such records as telephone taps, dictaphone tapes, and letters extracted from the trash or perhaps turned over to investigators by employees turned informer. Symbols in the report indicate the character of the various sources but these symbols are not explained to the boards.

UNDERCOVER AGENTS

The undercover agent is certainly an important instrument of counterintelligence and probably a reliable informant. It is true that once his identity is disclosed his usefulness is over. We cannot expect an investigative agency to consent to that disclosure and so far as this class of informants is concerned the government's argument is valid. It is probably true, however, that in the great majority of cases the undercover agent plays no part. Ernest Angell, who was chairman of the Loyalty Review Board in New York, said that this was the case in his jurisdiction, and Shippen Lewis reported the same thing in the Philadelphia region. Undercover agents, moreover, are bound to turn in information about things they hear, as well as things that they know. It is also possible that they may misinterpret the things that they know. This seems to have been the case when Mrs. Markward, who certainly is a reliable and conscientious informant, testified that Mrs. Annie Lee Moss was on her list for the District of Columbia. The name definitely was there, and apparently it referred to the Annie Lee Moss in question. But it must have got there through some hocus-pocus of which Mrs. Markward knew nothing. When she and Annie Lee Moss finally faced each other they both agreed that they had never seen each other.

EX-COMMUNIST WITNESSES

The paid informer and the professional anti-Communist witness present a different problem. Most of the ex-Communists fall in this class, and Whittaker Chambers himself has described the inherent weakness in the testimony of even the most reliable members of this group. When questioned by the McCarran committee several years after he had first been brought into the open, he said that he could no longer be sure in many cases whether he was speaking of his own knowledge or whether he was simply repeating things that he had been told after he had left the party. Not many of these witnesses are capable of this kind of self-analysis.

The bizarre case of Harvey Matusow, who now says he lied 245 times when he testified against alleged Communists, highlights the extreme possibility of false witness in such cases. There are other examples of unreliability. Paul Crouch has been under investigation by the Department of Justice for alleged false statements. George Hewitt was indicted for perjury because of his testimony before the Canwell committee in Washington State. In the case against Ralph Bunche in the United Nations, Manning Johnson—a regular witness in deportation cases—discovered that he had been basing certain testimony on false premises and did not really know what he was talking about. Certainly at best these informers are not wholly disinterested witnesses. In deportation cases they were required to appear and face the accused. The whole question of their anonymity in security cases would bear looking into. Once they have appeared in the open as informers, no matter whether before the courts, in administrative proceedings, or in Congress, they certainly should not be permitted to wear the cloak of anonymity simply because they request it.

ORDINARY CITIZENS

The ordinary citizen who requests anonymity is probably the most prolific of informers in security cases. Much that he has to say is a matter of opinion. Sometimes it reflects malice, ignorance, or bigotry. But this is not always evident on the face of the record. It is one of the unshakable tenets of all the investigative agencies that if these people are obliged to stand by their statements openly the sources of information will dry up.

Again, chairmen of loyalty and security boards have felt that careful analysis of the bulk of the cases would show that the information actually obtained from this group of people is not worth the price that is paid for it. Just what can happen in such cases is dramatically illustrated in two cases recently made public—that of Abraham Chasanow and that of Val Lorwin.

CHASANOW OF GREENBELT

Mr. Chasanow is one of the most respected citizens of Greenbelt—a little Maryland town that began as a low-cost housing project. It was put down in the middle of nowhere and in order to provide for their daily needs for groceries, gasoline, and so forth, its citizens organized a co-operative that now runs all the Greenbelt business enterprises. As a result, some of the people that came to live at Greenbelt did so because they were evangelical believers in the co-operative movement. Others accepted it simply as a practical solution to their problems. The custom grew up of referring to the first group as the radical co-operators. When Congress decided that all the federal housing projects must be turned over to private ownership, the Greenbelt citizens organized to buy their own homes, and Mr.

Chasanow acted as attorney for the housing association they formed for this purpose. Eventually, this was turned into a co-operative because better financing terms could be obtained.

But there were some hot arguments for and against co-operative ownership. A group of the residents who had always lived on subsidized rentals bitterly opposed the idea of purchase and concluded that those who supported the co-operative were subversive, since by their activities they were hurting the economic interests of their opponents. The opposition group reported its suspicions to their Congressman, investigation was started, and apparently a rather bulky file was developed for Mr. Chasanow, whose name appeared as attorney on the eviction notices which were sent out to some of the recalcitrant tenants.

When the new administration took over, charges were filed against him under the security program. Apparently, according to the file, several of the town officials had given unfavorable information about him but were willing to appear at his hearing. They did so, and proved to be his strong supporters. They had described the shades of opinion in the co-operative controversy, and their testimony had been twisted to mean that anyone who worked for the co-operative group had associated with a Communist group. This distortion occurred in at least three instances. There was nothing in the file to indicate such misreporting to the board. The final outcome, after much delay, was a clearance and a public apology to Mr. Chasanow. Unless his accusers had appeared in person this would never have happened.

VAL LORWIN

The Lorwin case is perhaps an even more dramatic illustration of the ill effects of concealment of identity of accusers. Val Lorwin when he came to Washington in 1935 joined the Socialist party and soon became a very active anti-Communist. He fought to oust the Communists from their control of the United Federal Workers of America (UFWA) and some other organizations. Later he rendered valuable service to the Office of Strategic Services and to the State Department by his ability to distinguish the Communist elements in the foreign labor movement and in the resistance movement in France. He evolved policies that were useful in spiking the guns of those who opposed the Marshall Plan in Europe and in gaining the support of the American unions for that plan.

When the loyalty program began he received an interrogatory from the State Department based largely on his necessary association with some of the Communists who had been in UFWA. He was quickly cleared. He was on leave from the State Department and in Paris working on a study of the French labor movement when he received a letter of charges from the State Department and was ordered home at once for a hearing. He was charged with having admitted Communist membership in 1935, having held a Communist meeting in his house, and having displayed his party card. He was told that this information had been given to the FBI by a thoroughly reliable witness who was willing to appear before the State Department board, but not in Lorwin's presence.

After going over some fifty names of people whom he knew in 1935, he and his wife decided that there was only one who could have been at a meeting at his house at that time and have so misunderstood the situation. He planned his defense on the theory that this person, who hated equally Socialists and Communists, was the informant, but he was never sure about this.

In the course of the hearing, he discovered that according to the file there were two other confidential informants who alleged that he had been a Communist, and he was asked how he could explain this—obviously it bothered the State Department loyalty board.

After this first hearing, he was cleared on grounds of loyalty but was labeled a security risk, apparently because of the doubt raised by unknown informers. He asked for a rehearing and presented detailed, conclusive evidence of twenty-five years of anti-Communist activity. After a long delay he was cleared on both scores.

He then resigned from the government and went to a teaching position at the University of Chicago. After he had been there about four months, there was an announcement on the radio that Lorwin had been indicted in Washington for making false statements as to his Communist record. Now that the case was in the courts, he had the right to see the documentary evidence against him. It turned out that he was right in his conjecture as to the identity of the principal informant. Suddenly his case took a dramatic turn. The head of the Criminal Division appeared in court and asked to have the indictment dismissed. He explained that the Grand Jury had been told that the testimony of the principal informant would be corroborated by two undercover FBI agents. Actually, there were no such persons, although according to the file they appeared to exist. The FBI had been asked to reinterview these supposed informants. It then turned out that one was only repeating something he had heard and the other stated that he had been falsely reported. None of this appeared on the face of the file. The prosecutor, who had obtained the indictment in spite of this report of the FBI, said that he did it because he thought it would be better to get it by hook or by crook than to have to explain to a Senate committee why he had failed to get it.

QUESTIONING INFORMANTS

There is absolutely no way of knowing in how many cases the supposed informants are equally unreliable or have had their information wrongly reported. My examination of a number of transcripts of loyalty and security cases suggests that it is an appreciable number—say about 8 per cent.

In view of the booby traps presented by the files, I think we must conclude that in any critical case the information cannot be satisfactorily evaluated unless the board itself can question the informants and in many cases not unless the accused can cross-examine him—at least by submitting questions to the board for the board to put to the witness.

FIRST EVALUATION BY FBI

There is another obstacle to satisfactory evaluation by the boards. In the case of the undercover agent and the paid informer, Mr. Hoover admits that the FBI itself makes the first evaluation. The board gets a predigested report of their testimony. The Bureau summarizes the material in its files and deletes anything that it thinks might reveal the source of the information and the manner in which it has been obtained. It does not say whether the information has come from an undercover agent, a paid informant, or a telephone tap, whether it amounts to first-hand information or hearsay. The Bureau evaluates further by describing the source as a reliable informant, someone who has given reliable information, and so forth, but unless questioned further says no more. The pitfalls of this system are illustrated by the Lorwin case. Imperfect evaluation is the result.

TECHNIQUES OF INQUIRY

Techniques of inquiry are very important. Curiously, very little attention seems to have been given to this problem. When the boards say that they are concerned with an inquiry and not a prosecution, some of them do not seem to understand the meaning of the words they use. Too often the techniques are those of prosecutions. The employee and perhaps his witnesses are subjected to rigorous cross-examination—sometimes of the bullying variety that is intended to confuse a jury as well as to break down the witness. He has no countervailing privilege, and we discover that when cross-examination is one-sided it tends to defeat its own purpose. The truth is obscured rather than made plain.

Many boards adopt the practice of questioning an employee on matters as to which they have full information in their files. This soon becomes evident and the employee feels that they are trying to trap him into making false statements. If he becomes wary and tries to qualify his answers—which often relate to matters that occurred many years ago—he may be accused of evasion and ordered to say "Yes" or "No." He may then act like an undergraduate taking a true-false examination and guess—perhaps guess wrong. The result is an angry, frightened, or confused employee from whom the boards will not get the full story that they need in order to judge him. Those who use the techniques described seem to lack the instinct for procedure, and, as Judge Bok points out, their concern for human rights is a waste of effort.

LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CRITERIA

It is hard to see how basic fairness can be achieved until we develop well-defined standards that apply equally in all cases. There is a special difficulty in security cases in achieving this objective, since the degree of sensitivity of the work that is to be done must always be taken into account. There can, I think, be common agreement as to definition of terms, and this does not yet seem to have been achieved in the security program. In the days of the loyalty program the term "security risk" was reserved for persons who held sensitive positions. The questions to be asked were whether the employee was loyal and whether he was able to keep secrets. In the Oppenheimer case these criteria were definitely rejected by the hearing board, and apparently by all but one of the commissioners. But there was no agreement on any other definition. The Wolf Ladejinsky case seems to make it clear that no such definition exists. Ladejinsky is a Russian-born American citizen who came to this country when he was eighteen years old. He has served the federal government since 1935. During the occupation of Japan he worked on General MacArthur's staff and there put through a land reform that was said to have done more than any one thing to prevent the Communists from making headway in Japan. When the treaty with Japan was signed, he became our first agricultural attaché in Tokyo, serving under the State Department, and was cleared for security by the redoubtable Scott McLeod. Then jurisdiction over agricultural attachés was transferred to the Department of Agriculture. The duties of the attaché were not changed, but Ladejinsky found himself ousted from the position and labeled a security risk. This happened, it developed, largely because of a curious letter written by a White Russian who hated Jews. The State Department refused to accept the Agriculture label and kept Ladejinsky on its rolls. Recently the Foreign Operations Administration hired him to continue his good work in land reform in the sensitive areas of Southeast Asia. The White House then said, in substance, that everyone was right about him. Until the ends of the program are more precisely, more realistically, defined, either by Presidential order or by some central review body, I do not think that we can hope that basic fairness or a just relation between means and ends can be achieved.

Eleanor Bontecou, J.D., Ph.D., Arlington, Virginia, is the author of The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (1953). She was formerly assistant director of research of the Cornell Research in Civil Liberties; dean of Bryn Mawr College; professor in the Graduate School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago; attorney, Civil Rights and Research Sections, Criminal Division, Department of Justice; and attorney-advisor, War Crimes Branch, Civil Affairs Division, War Department. She is a member of the bar of New York State and has practiced law in New York City.

Morale in the Federal Civil Service

By Marie Jahoda

THE nationwide debate on the security measures has over the last several years frequently focused on the issue, What is the net effect of these programs? Some people maintain that the effect is disastrous; others say that there is hardly any harmful effect.

Let me first give you two arguments supporting the latter view.

If we take the official statements on the number of people dismissed from government service for security reasons —and I realize that there are some peculiarly difficult arithmetical problems to solve in counting such persons— there is general consensus that only a very small fraction of federal employees in government service has been directly affected by security measures. Thus, some people argue, the number of those who may have suffered innocently from security procedures is so small as to be socially insignificant.

Those who use this argument are also often inclined to point to the absence of a general hysteria in the population at large, as evidence that the security measures have done no harm to the country. In the light of a recent study,[1] the factual point of this argument appears to be correct. Only a minute fraction of the public—at best 2 per cent—expresses any concern with civil liberties or Communism. People worry about many things, but certainly not about the consequences of the security measures.

On the face of it, such facts might suggest that some of us get unduly excited about the social climate of the country.

However, there are weightier arguments in favor of a less complacent conclusion. Indeed, I want to suggest that one of the consequences of the security program is that it has affected not only the people who have lost their jobs— some innocent individuals, some who should not work for the government in difficult times—but that *the morale of the entire civil service has probably been undermined,* even though only a minute fraction of government workers has been directly and personally affected by the programs.

What is the evidence for this statement? At this point I am afraid I have to apologize because my evidence is not up to date. More than three years ago we made a study in Washington, D. C., among federal employees of professional rank to try to discover the impact of security measures on their morale.[2] This was an exploratory study resulting in ideas and suggestions rather than in exact quantitative statements. The only justification for presenting this material to you is that nobody else has apparently been in a position to appraise the psychological effects of the security measures on the civil service since then.

The study concentrated on those federal employees about whom no derogatory information emerged from the universal routine investigation conducted for every federal employee. We have distinguished three major areas in which

[1] Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of America Speaks Its Mind,* Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955.

[2] Marie Jahoda and Stuart W. Cook, "Security Measures and Freedom of Thought," *Yale Law Journal,* Vol. 61 (March 1952), pp. 295–333.

psychological effects of security measures can be noted. These three areas are: the generally accepted code of the behavior for a government employee; the level of suspicion and confidence in personal relations; and the emergence of new marginal groups in society.

Do's and Don't's

Let me briefly describe to you what we found in these three areas. In every bureaucracy, and particularly in a governmental bureaucracy, there are certain regulations and prescriptions about the do's and don't's appropriate for a position. No society could function without such generally accepted rules. But the code of behavior described to us by federal employees had undergone a change in terms of being more concrete and more narrow than it had been before. No longer was appropriate behavior defined in terms of general principles such as discretion, decorum, or responsibility. Rather federal employees said: You should not discuss the admission of Red China to the U.N.; you should not advocate interracial equality; you should not mix with people unless you know them very well; if you want to read the *Nation* you should not take it to the office; if you bring it to the office, you should explain in considerable detail why you have it with you; you should take certain books off your private bookshelves; and so forth. The very concreteness of this code seemed to encourage excessive conformity.

Personal Relations

Let me go on to the second area, suspicion and confidence in personal relations. At work and in social contacts outside the job, suspicion seemed to have replaced confidence. The interviewers themselves were occasionally suspected of being agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Communists. But more important from the point of view of efficiency within governmental departments, confidence in colleagues and supervisors seemed to be on the decline. We asked people, for example, whom they would expect to come to their support if they themselves were involved in a security investigation. Many answered, "Nobody, and certainly not my colleagues." The respondents themselves often said they would not offer any help in such a situation, in part because they felt that others could not be trusted, in part because they felt that the demonstration of trust in such a situation might have dangerous consequences.

Marginal Groups

The third area apparently affected by the security situation is the position of certain groups within the larger community. Some groups which previously had been fully accepted now became frequently the target of suspicion. The most outstanding example of the effect of the security measures in this area was the changing position of participants in voluntary organizations. Anybody who was active in an organization concerned with social reform or the spread of ideas was said to be a target for suspicion.

In our democracy certain groups have always had a marginal status: Negroes, for instance, and the Jews, and various other groups. While the position of such traditionally marginal groups is improving in many ways, new groups are becoming marginal in response to the climate of suspicion.

Climate of Conformity

If the impact of the security measures in these three areas is as strong as the exploratory study led one to believe, the

efficiency of government service is undoubtedly diminished. It should be noted that such effects go beyond the officially proclaimed purposes of the security procedures; they are largely unanticipated by-products of measures intended to safeguard internal security. How can we understand the reasons for such widespread effects in areas not relevant to internal security and among people not directly exposed to special investigations?

In summary fashion the two preceding articles in this issue have implied these reasons. Federal employees felt the need to react in an overcautious way because the procedures of the security program were vague, unpredictable, and not based on clear criteria of innocence or guilt.

Let me try to make this clear. The punishment inherent in a security investigation is meted out long before it has been established whether a punishable act has been committed. Salaries are suspended. Reputations are attacked. Job opportunities outside the civil service are undercut by the publicity of security investigations. A fine (in terms of having to hire a lawyer) is imposed. Everything that the clearance procedures intend to do for suspected individuals is undone already in the process of investigation.

Since government employees not themselves involved in special investigations watched what was going on around them, they became convinced that establishing one's innocence was of no avail. Avoiding the process of investigation, even if it meant final clearance, became the important thing.

This is one reason for the exaggerated effect of the security procedures on the morale of civil servants. There were others too. At that time in Washington many federal employees *unwittingly* intensified the climate of conformism, whatever their own attitude toward the security measures. The results of the security program were the content of innumerable discussions. Everybody was concerned with it, and everybody spread stories about it. Some people for example said with apparent approval: "Nobody who reads Marx can stay in government service." Others expressed their disapproval in spreading the same story by saying: "Isn't it terrible that people lose their jobs, if they read Marx?" The net effect of either statement was to make others believe that it was dangerous to read Marx.

Out of the Past

Another reason for their overcautious behavior was the fact that employees were judged not in terms of their current activities but in terms of activities in which they had engaged years ago. In 1939 an organization may have been generally respected; fifteen years later this organization is regarded as suspect. Those who belonged to it in the past are put in a situation of helplessness. What they had done in the past, supported by the climate of the thirties, they cannot undo now; it may nevertheless confront them at this moment as a current accusation.

This time factor is indeed a very serious point also in another respect. I understand that at one time or another there were something like 700,000 people in the Communist party of this country. If we assume that about 200,000 people have died, it leaves about half a million persons with this black mark on their record, even though they may have been members only for a few months many years ago. It is indeed understandable that such persons overdo their caution and conformism; for having rejected the mistakes in their past is no help in their predicament.

Intensifying and Mitigating Factors

I should like to add one word about factors which increased and factors which diminished these effects.

We talked to government employees from about fifteen different departments, including departments on sensitive and on nonsensitive work. However, the degree of sensitivity of the task bore no relation to the degree of effect. Even in the most sensitive agencies some employees seemed to be very little affected by the climate of fear and conformity. In other agencies where work was not related to security problems we found the most widespread fear and suspicion. Apparently the general atmosphere at work, apart from security implications, had much to do with how employees reacted to the security measures. One relatively high-placed government official told us that he had to write out a report explaining what the reason was if he was five minutes late in the morning. He clearly implied that this did not make for an ideal working situation. His conformism and fear were of the highest order. In other government departments, where human and working relations were more satisfactory, the impact of the security measures on the climate of thought was not quite so extreme.

Perhaps the most powerful factor affecting the morale of the civil service was the explicit attitude a supervisor at work took with regard to security policy. In cases where superiors had discussed with the people under them what the situation was and said that they would try to help and stand by them, much less harmful effect could be noted than where this was not the case.

This, then, is a brief summary of an exploratory study. Its most telling lesson has, unfortunately, not yet been implemented: if we want to appraise the security program, more comprehensive and definitive studies on the impact of current procedures should be available. There can be little doubt that the security program did not intend the consequences I have briefly sketched. Solid evidence that they nevertheless occur may be the best way of bringing about their radical revision.

Marie Jahoda, Ph.D., New York City, has been since 1949 professor of psychology at New York University and associate research director of the university's Research Center for Human Relations. She was formerly research associate at Columbia University, member of the Scientific Department of the American Jewish Committee, and fellow in social psychology at Cambridge University.

The Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

By Telford Taylor

THE preceding article by President Taylor of Sarah Lawrence College covers very fully and clearly the question of the impact of the Fifth Amendment in the academic world. University presidents and professors, however, need not feel lonely in this field, for in my own profession there is now a strong movement in some quarters to disbar all lawyers who plead the Fifth Amendment. Indeed in the State of Florida it has already been held that a lawyer who pleads the Fifth Amendment should be disbarred. I am pleased to say that in California, whether because of greater common sense or of jealous rivalry with Florida, they have come to the other conclusion and have held that this is not in itself grounds for disbarment.

But this problem as to what is going to happen to somebody who pleads the Fifth Amendment is not by any means restricted to the learned professions. A few days ago I saw in the newspapers that a secondhand piano dealer in the District of Columbia who had pleaded the Fifth Amendment before a meeting of the House Un-American Activities Committee had been denied a renewal of his license to deal in secondhand merchandise.

Things are no better in New York State. Recently the State Senate unanimously passed a bill which would authorize all employers to discharge all employees who plead the Fifth Amendment—an authorization not restricted to defense work or government work or any other especially sensitive areas.

You can see, then, that when we are talking about the Fifth Amendment it is no abstract or dry legal question that we are discussing. This is an intensely human problem which is now having a broad impact on American life.

Since that is the nature of this question, I do not propose to deliver myself of a sort of law school type of lecture, carefully analyzing all the fine legal points that could be brought up about the use of the Fifth Amendment. What I want to try to do is to illuminate how we ought to view the Fifth Amendment in the context of the theme of internal security and civil rights.

Before we can do that, before we can approach this question of what inferences we may draw from the use of the Fifth Amendment, we have to have some common ground, some common understanding of what the nature and purpose of this amendment is. Of course, when I say Fifth Amendment I mean that part of it which contains the privilege against self-incrimination, the actual words being, ". . . nor shall any person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ."

For the Innocent or the Guilty?

It is a misunderstanding about the basic purpose of this provision of the Constitution that lies at the root of a great deal of the angry confusion now prevalent in the public mind. Indeed we encounter violent disagreement at the very threshold of the question when we ask for whose benefit this provision is intended: Is it for the benefit of the innocent or for the benefit of the guilty?

The old British judges who first called this privilege into being said it was for the benefit of the innocent, and Elmer Davis also in one of his recent books speaks of it as being for the benefit of

the innocent. But Judge Arnold's partner, Mr. Abe Fortas, has written an article saying that the guilty are the ones who are really entitled to the benefits of the Fifth Amendment. Certainly that is closer to the point of view of most of our congressional committees today. These committees have a nice little formula. They call a witness to the stand. If he pleads the privilege against self-incrimination when asked whether he is or has ever been a Communist, then the chairman says, "Well, you see, that shows that you must be a Communist because if you were not a Communist then you would answer 'No' and it would not incriminate you. Therefore the only implication that the Committee can draw from your pleading the privilege is that a truthful answer would be 'Yes'; and we don't deny that you are entitled to plead this privilege, but we do say that we therefore conclude that you are indeed a Communist."

If the privilege is for the benefit of the innocent, why do they need it? Or if the privilege is for the benefit of the guilty, why do they deserve it? What is the point of letting them utilize this privilege if they are indeed guilty? This leaves us in a dilemma, for if the innocent do not need it and the guilty do not deserve it, what is it doing in the Constitution at all?

A Page of History

I think that this dilemma yields quite readily to a moment of history. Justice Holmes is the author of the probably too frequently quoted aphorism that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." Here is a case where about one page of history will, I hope, pretty well clear up the question.

English origins

The origins of this privilege against self-accusation are well known. They go back to the thirteenth century and the document we call the Magna Charta. In origin this concept was simply that a man could not be required to be his own first accuser. At that time the methods of trial were rigorous and arduous indeed. They did not have juries and lawyers to examine and cross-examine; they had trial by battle and trial by ordeal, of fire or water. If you were accused of a crime, it was more than likely that you would be asked to walk barefoot over red-hot plowshares. Nobody found this any fun, and it put people at the mercy of some vengeful bailiff or legal functionary who might invite one to stand trial at his own sweet will. In order, then, to protect people against that kind of thing, it became pretty well settled that nobody could make you stand trial unless there was already some evidence against you. In church law, too, torture was frequently used in heresy trials; we have the coldly comforting principle laid down by Pope Gregory IX that torture shall never be resorted to until some evidence has been introduced.

For several centuries the principle that you could not be your own first accuser persisted in the law, but it did not go further than that. If there was some evidence to start the ball rolling you could be called upon to take the stand and say whether you were guilty or innocent and to testify further.

The privilege in its present form of an absolute protection against being called to testify came about in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, when there was a great development of criminal law and procedure. A whole parcel of principles were evolved at that time to protect the individual in various ways. Protections against political and religious persecutions and provisions to ensure fair trial, as we know them today, grew up during that period. This privilege against

being required to testify against yourself is one of that whole parcel of legal concepts that sprang into being during those years. It is a part of the historical establishment of a balance, a balance between the power of the state and the rights of the individual, which I suppose more than anything else is the essence of modern democracy.

In the United States

The privilege grew up, then, and passed across the ocean, and we find it in our own colonial law well before the establishment of this government. It was written into the federal Constitution and into most of the early state constitutions, and indeed it is now found in every state constitution except two, those of New Jersey and Iowa. But even these two apostate states recognize it as a matter of common law.

Balance between state and individual

Now let us acknowledge immediately that although this privilege is well established in constitutions, its wisdom is not universally acclaimed. For instance, the great philosopher Jeremy Bentham said it was a very unscientific sort of rule, that if you were really going to try to determine whether a man was guilty or innocent you ought to be allowed to make him testify. There is no need to rehash all the arguments pro and con on that point, because these arguments, I think, overlook the basic principle, namely, that this privilege, like those other privileges that I have mentioned, is part of the balance between the state and the individual.

Law enforcement

After all, the process of law enforcement is not the only thing in life, and indeed law as a science is not a science merely of finding out who is guilty or who is innocent. It is also a matter of establishing a system of justice that does not disrupt everything else in life. I suppose that Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* seemed so horrible to us because everything in life was geared to law enforcement. We could probably avoid a good deal of crime if every telephone were tapped and every room had a microphone in it, but there would be a lot less life. We could avoid a lot of fires and explosions if we had no heat in our buildings and no power in our trains, but we should have a lot less life too if we did that. We pay that small price—tolerance of some undetected crime—in return for the social atmosphere and the political freedom that we want to preserve. And that is one purpose of this privilege.

FOR BENEFIT OF THE ACCUSED

Now, after this short historical excursion, let us come back to the main question: Is this rule for the benefit of the innocent or the guilty? I think once we get that out of the way, the rest will be relatively clear sailing. It may help us if we look at the other guarantees of freedom that are in our Bill of Rights, because this privilege is in there along with many others: jury trial, right of counsel, and a lot of other things. Are those rules for the benefit of the innocent or the guilty? Immediately the question sounds rather silly.

I suppose in the ultimate sense all these legal rules are to protect the innocent and apprehend the guilty, because that is the ultimate purpose of law; but this does not mean that these rules come into play only when it is known in advance that the person is innocent, because if we knew that in advance there would be no reason to have trials or rules at all. This, I think, guides us to the answer. These are rules for the benefit of the *accused* before it is known whether he is innocent or guilty. It makes no sense to speak of them as being for the innocent or for the guilty: they are both. They are for the benefit of the accused and they are part of the very process of deciding whether or not he is guilty—what you might call prophylactic rules, part of the judicial process.

To use a homely illustration: If any of you are worried about your weight, I hope you do not blame it on the scales. The scales tell you whether you are heavy or light. Just so, this principle and others are the principles that we apply in determining whether a charge is true and whether a person is guilty or innocent. It follows that pleading the privilege does not establish guilt. It is one of the things that is applied in the process before we arrive at the answer.

Perhaps you will say that all this is fine in legal theory, but let us talk common sense. Why does an innocent man really need this privilege? Does it not raise the inference of his probable guilt if he uses it? Why does he not stand up like a man and say what the facts are?

I think on this point we now have to recall that whether you are guilty or innocent is not a philosophical absolute; it is what the jury decides. And what the jury decides might be right or might be wrong. They decide it on the basis of the evidence before them. If you yourself under accusation are the source of evidence which arouses suspicion, which might establish guilt, then you have put yourself in a worse position before the jury.

TWO EXAMPLES

Examples are readily come by. I should like to give an abstract one very briefly and a concrete one at a little more length. If you are accused of murder, the question of motive is important and the question of your proximity to the crime is important. It may be that you yourself are the only possible source of evidence as to where you were or as to your having a motive, and if you yourself took the stand and said where you were and what your motive might have been, then to establish your innocence you might have to go forward and show that in fact somebody else did it or that you had killed in self-defense. One of these things might be true, but it might be difficult for you to prove it and to make the jury believe it, and so you would really have imperiled yourself by giving that testimony to establish the evidentiary basis which then called upon you to come forward in defense.

Let us now get away from abstractions and use a concrete case which brings us right back to the academic pastures. This is an actual case that occurred at Cornell University sixty years ago, when the habits of Freshmen and Sophomores with respect to hazing were somewhat more violent than they are today, I hope.

At all events, at Cornell University in 1894 the freshman class gave its annual banquet. The Freshmen, of course, were an object of scorn to the Sophomores, and it had always been part of the game for the Sophomores to upset this banquet. In this particular year they took some rather drastic steps. They had all been taking chemistry, so they put two large jugs underneath the banquet hall where the banquet was to be held, bored holes through the floor of the hall, ran tubes up, and then created a lot of chlorine gas in these jugs. The chlorine gas went up the tubes and into the banquet hall, and very effectively disrupted the freshman banquet. But it did a good deal more than that. It made nearly all the Freshmen very sick indeed. Further, it most unfortunately killed the cook in the kitchen.

The result of this prank having been homicide, the grand jury was called into the situation to look into who was responsible for this chlorine gas affair.

They called a student (another Taylor) before the grand jury. He was not even the chief suspect. He was not the person who was thought to be responsible, but he was the roommate of the boy who was the chief suspect. He was a Sophomore, and he had been studying chemistry, and he admitted under examination that he knew how to make chlorine gas. At that point he pleaded the Fifth Amendment, because they went on to try to question him about where the jugs were bought, how much was paid for them, who bought the jugs, and all that kind of thing. At that point he said No, he would testify no further, and pleaded his privilege against self-incrimination.

As I have said, he was not the chief suspect. So it is a case of an innocent person finding himself in a situation where he needed to plead the Fifth Amendment, and the Court of Appeals in the State of New York in a very excellent and full opinion noted that even though he was innocent, things had reached a point where it was reasonable and proper for him to plead the Fifth Amendment, because otherwise his testimony might have built up such a circumstantial case against himself that although innocent he would have had grave trouble in meeting it. The court said at the end:

> It is quite conceivable that a person may be placed in such circumstances connected with the commission of a criminal offense that if required to disclose other facts within his knowledge he might, though innocent, be looked upon as the guilty party and convicted.

This case is as good an illustration as I know to bring out the necessity that an innocent person may in some circumstances have to plead this privilege.

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

Everything I have gone through so far has been, one would have thought, familiar to lawyers for a long time and taken for granted. Now to bring the question a little closer to our theme: What application does all this have to congressional investigations and to security problems?

There never has been much question but that the privilege against self-accusation may be invoked by a witness in a congressional investigation. Indeed, the first time it happened, so far as I know, was right here in Philadelphia, and the person who did it bore a very distinguished Philadelphia name; to wit, Biddle. Nicholas Biddle, president of the second United States Bank, was the first person to invoke the privilege in response to a demand from a congressional investigation. The second one—poetic justice—was Andrew Jackson, upon whom a demand was made a few years later for information about the spoils system.

Then, finally, the third example, so far as I know, and a rather amusingly contemporaneous one, was President Ulysses S. Grant. He was fond of taking long vacations, and the last two years of his second term of office he took the entire summer off and came up to Long Branch, New Jersey, right near Fort Monmouth. Having spent the entire summer there, he then went back to the capital and was confronted with a resolution from the House of Representatives asking him for a list of every executive act he had performed at a distance from the White House. (I hope Governor Leader is taking due note of this little problem.) Of course, the purpose of this demand was to emphasize the absentee character of his administration. Grant replied by saying he could see no legitimate legislative purpose for it and therefore it must be, he thought, for purposes of impeachment. That being so, he begged to inform the House of Representatives that there is a constitutional provision which protects

everyone in the land, from the President to the humblest citizen, against being made a witness against himself. He declined to give the information.

I suppose that our present-day friends would call President Grant a Fifth Amendment loafer, but nobody at that time said anything like that. It was taken for granted as a perfectly respectable thing to do.

THE CRIMINAL ACT

We next have to examine what criminal act is involved when a person is called before a congressional committee and asked whether he is or has ever been a Communist; or, rather, what the possible crime is, what the hazard of prosecution that he may be confronting.

Since 1940 we have put on the books a succession of laws that create this hazard. In 1940 we put the Smith Act on the books, making it a crime to conspire to overthrow the government or to conspire to advocate its overthrow or to be a member of a group that advocates the overthrow, knowing that it does so. These clauses are pretty broad, and it has now been fairly well established that a responsible membership in the Communist party is indictable under the Smith Act. Ten years later the Internal Security Act of 1950 was passed, in which Congress declared:

> It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to the establishment within the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, . . . the direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by or under the domination or control of any foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign individual: *Provided, however,* That this subsection shall not apply to the proposal of a constitutional amendment.

A lot of us may have very different ideas about what sort of conduct tends to establish a totalitarian government in this country. I can think of a number of people that I might have on my list. You can see how broad your vulnerability to prosecution may be under that law.

Who is a Communist?

As if that were not enough, at the closing session of Congress last year there was enacted the Communist Control Act of 1954, which has added various new penalties and also has set up fourteen criteria by which Communists can be detected. All these fourteen things are things that you can submit to the jury as evidence of the fact that you are a Communist.

One of these criteria, for example, reads: "Anyone who has indicated by word, action, conduct, writing, or in any other way a willingness to carry out in any manner and to any degree the plans, desires, objectives or purposes of the Communist Party." If you think back to all the points of view that have been prevalent in this country since the middle thirties—economic reforms and the depression, the Spanish Civil War, the united front against nazism, the alliance with Russia in World War II, various peace movements since World War II, German rearmament, racial discrimination—all these are matters and issues upon which there have been many parallelisms between Communism and anti-Communism or non-Communists. Indeed, I cannot think of anyone who has played a responsible part in public life and taken a position on political issues who is not now in a position to plead the privilege. I certainly think our President is. He wears the Order of Suvorov. He has been allied with Communist

governments in a number of very important ventures, and successful ones. I can think of many other high officials of the present administration who could be vulnerable under those provisions.

What we have done by these laws, in other words, is to broaden the field of criminal vulnerability on charges of Communism or subversion to a point where a very wide variety of associations or past actions may be evidence of Communism and may go to the jury on that basis.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

If that is so, it seems to me we can now come to three conclusions. In the first place, a person may have reason to plead the Fifth Amendment when asked about Communism even though he may not be or may never have been a Communist. Second, pleading the privilege does not establish or support the conclusion that the person is guilty or, in fact, a Communist. Third, this expression which has become so prevalent and so popular—Fifth Amendment Communist—is a gross perversion of law and logic and is a subversion of the Constitution itself. Congressional investigating committees that have popularized the phrase and have tried to make out that they have exposed as a Communist everyone who has ever pleaded the privilege are indulging in an entirely meretricious occupation.

Public office

Where has this argument taken us? Are we then to entrust the secrets of the Central Intelligence Agency to Fifth Amendment pleaders, or atomic secrets? Certainly not. But for quite a different reason. It is not because if they plead the Fifth Amendment they are guilty. It is because if you undertake public office, if you undertake to discharge public responsibilities requiring access to national secrets of that kind, you have duties that go far beyond those of the ordinary individual in the witness box. You have a duty of full disclosure about yourself and your political past, and if you do not choose to make that full disclosure, for whatever reasons—and whether you are, in fact, innocent or guilty—it is only part of wisdom to say that you shall not be put in that kind of position of trust until you have made full disclosure and the situation can be gauged openly.

A common example is the policeman who is accused of bribery or corruption and declines to answer. We do not want policemen on the force who do that. The New York State constitution, I might say, draws just that distinction between the ordinary person in private life and the public official. The public official is liable to dismissal if he pleads the Fifth Amendment.

Illegitimate pleaders

One other thing. By no means does it follow from what I have been saying that every private person called before a congressional committee should plead the Fifth Amendment when asked about Communism. Quite the contrary. Most people have no basis for so doing; they have a duty to co-operate with congressional investigations. I think many people who have been pleading it have been doing so for unwarranted and insufficient reasons—to avoid discomfiture, out of fear, out of some illusion that they are challenging the power of the committee by doing so, though, of course, they are not.

None of these reasons is satisfactory, and I would add that anyone who pleads the Fifth Amendment without the most solid legal and practical necessity for doing so is simply playing into the hands of those extremists who are trying to make the Fifth Amendment synonymous with guilt and subversion.

Fair practice

But there will always remain a few cases where the person does have to plead it. How are we to treat them? The question brings us to the final point. There are people who want to fire all teachers or to disbar all lawyers who invoke the Fifth Amendment. And some go much farther. I have already mentioned the secondhand piano dealer in Washington. I do not know what the upshot was, but anyhow that is a matter that lies in Judge Arnold's judicial circuit. Perhaps he can find out. He is going to deal with another aspect of this matter, due process in congressional investigations. I do not want to trespass on his territory, but I cannot resist leaving with you one little item.

As you may know, the House of Representatives recently adopted some rules of fair practice and in the course of the debate Congressman Doyle in all seriousness stated:

> I am quite sure that my several years that I have spent on the House Committee on Un-American Activities have fully convinced me that we need basic House rules below which House committees cannot go.

NEW YORK NADIR

I want to end, therefore, with one example below which we cannot go, and that is the proposed New York statute I have mentioned. This statute—fortunately, however, it is not a statute yet; it is only a bill—this bill provides that any employer may discharge or refuse to hire any employee who pleads the Fifth Amendment at a hearing involving subversion.

It is a very revolutionary proposal. It manifests, I think, all the vices and all the misconceptions that I have tried to cover in the course of my remarks. As you can see, it has at its root the conception that equates pleading the Fifth Amendment with guilt, as one and the same thing, and then proceeds to punish everybody who pleads the Fifth Amendment by making them subject to discharge from employment in any capacity whatsoever.

It is not only bad law; it is a most astoundingly Draconic penalty for something which is not even an offense at law. It is likewise, I think, clearly unconstitutional, because what it amounts to is an effort to wipe out the Fifth Amendment by indirect means—not by trying to repeal it but by making its use so hazardous and so damaging that nobody can afford to use it.

This very point came up in the Supreme Court of Illinois: the court very definitely said that to make it impossible to use a privilege because the consequences are so disastrous in fact wipes the privilege off the books entirely.

Finally, what this bill says, in effect, is that the Fifth Amendment pleader cannot enforce a labor contract. It denies him access to the usual processes of law to enforce a contract and thereby it approaches what was known in times long past as outlawry. We have all read about the legendary outlaw Robin Hood; it was in his time that outlawry was most popular. It has not been part of American law for centuries; it is obsolete in England. The current New York bill really does come close to denying anyone who pleads the Fifth Amendment the benefit of legal protection, and one might just as well frankly call it outlawry.

The bill passed the New York State Senate unanimously and without debate. How much attention did it attract? A couple of inches in the *New York Times*. Every day thereafter the *New York Times* published a list of major bills introduced in the Legislature. It has never been listed. There has not been an editorial about it in either the *Times* or the *Herald Tribune*.

Fortunately, however, the little gem was noticed. Steps have been taken and the bill, according to my last information, was successfully blocked in the Assembly. But it could easily have been overlooked.

It seems to me that the fact that a bill like this could pass the upper house of the New York State Legislature unanimously and without debate is an ominous sign of a confused and fear-ridden legislature. The great vice of this kind of thing is that it tries to punish people outside the law. It is, in effect, punishment by legislative enactment after inquisition, and in many ways it resembles very closely the people's courts that we saw under both the Nazis and the Communists, to enforce what they called healthy standards of public outlook. I am old-fashioned enough to think that such a bill is really un-American, that we have tried and established ways of determining whether a person is guilty of a crime and whether he should be punished, and that legislation of that sort cannot possibly safeguard security.

To return in conclusion now to the theme of internal security and civil rights: it is bad security because what it really does is to destroy by the security mechanism itself the very thing that we are trying to safeguard—the freedom under law that is the essence of democracy.

Brigadier General Telford Taylor, LL.B., New York City, member of the law firm of Landis, Taylor & Scoll, was formerly administrator, Small Defense Plants Administration (1951–52); United States chief of counsel for war crimes, Office of Military Government (1946–49); military intelligence officer, European Theater of Operations (1943–45); and general counsel, Federal Communications Division (1940–42). He is the author of Sword and Swastika (1952) and the recently published Grand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations.

Due Process in Trials

By THURMAN ARNOLD

MY subject is the role of an American fair trial by due process in providing stability and a sense of security in our society. I am first going to explain what the ideal means to us, how it is a necessary part of the emotional background of a proper relation between an individual and his government even for those who have never been inside a courtroom, how it gives sanctity and dignity to civilized government. I am then going to speak about the tendency, particularly strong in times when men fear and distrust dissenting ideas, to degrade the process of fair trial by maintaining its trappings and façade while at the same time abandoning its fundamental requirements. And finally, I am going to talk about what has happened to that ideal in recent years, how it is being used as a cloak for the prosecution of heresy, and what the social results of this degradation are.

EFFICIENCY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUSTICE

A trial by due process is a cumbersome and inefficient way of investigating facts. It is not and cannot be objective. No scientist would attempt to discover the truth by confining his research to the advocacy of two partisans each presenting an extreme view. A realistic investigation has no exclusionary rules. It does not limit itself to any single written record. It carefully avoids pomp and ceremony aimed at impressing the public with the dignity and importance of the participants. It escapes from the tyranny of precedents instead of eagerly embracing them as judicial procedure does. Real investigation of facts refuses to give finality to any conclusion. There are, therefore, those who claim that the American trial is based on a sporting theory of justice and who insist on realistic short cuts in our cumbersome trial procedure. Little do such people realize that this is the first step on the road to a police state.

Too much efficiency in government, too much disregard of ceremony, eat out the cement which binds human institutions together. Government cannot be the product of any consistent theory. Like the human personality it must contain in balance all sorts of conflicting ideals. And over them all, keeping each contradictory social attitude in its proper place, there must be spread the philosophy of justice. That philosophy can never be defined. To put it in words only creates the confusion which is always found in learned treatises on jurisprudence. The only way that it can become real and make itself felt is by the ceremony of a trial by due process of law. Justice Holmes once said that law was not a brooding omnipresence in the sky. He was wrong. It is and must be a brooding omnipresence in the sky.

The ideal that every man is entitled to a fair and impartial trial is the cornerstone of civilized government. Before this ideal every consideration of efficiency in government administration must give way. This is because the significance of the ideal of a fair public trial in our culture is tremendous. It includes the humanitarian conviction that the underdog is always entitled to a chance. The American trial is our only public ceremony which symbolizes the idea that the rights of the individual

are superior to the convenience or even the security of the sovereign.

Only an infinitesimal proportion of our citizens ever become participants in a public trial. Nevertheless, the existence of this institution gives the man of affairs a sense of security both from attacks from his fellows and intermeddling by the government. For most people it is the criminal trial that overshadows all other symbols as the dramatization that this is a government of law and not of men. It represents the dignity of the state as the enforcer of law and at the same time the dignity of the individual even though he be an avowed opponent of the state, a dissenter or radical, or even a hardened criminal. So important is the public trial to the whole ideological structure of any government that the adoption of more efficient and speedy ways of punishing individuals is a sure sign of instability and insecurity.

DRAMATIZATION OF SPIRITUAL VALUES

Let me illustrate the importance of the American trial in dramatizing the spiritual values which hold the nation together by our treatment of the defense of insanity in a criminal case. It is an important spiritual value to us that we do not punish the sick for the consequences of their illness. That idea used to be expressed in terms of right and wrong. An insane man could escape conviction if his insanity was of such character that he did not know this moral difference. Recently in the District of Columbia the rule was changed by the Court of Appeals. The science of psychiatry no longer recognized the old test. Expert psychiatrists could not testify in these terms. The Court of Appeals adopted a test which is equally indefinite but more in line with modern ideas of mental illness. The rule was laid down that a man is not guilty where his conduct was the product of mental disease.

The decision created a storm of comment among adherents of the old and proponents of the new. It was headline material and the topic of leading editorials. Much of the discussion was on the question whether more or fewer criminals would escape under the new rule. Actually I am convinced that it will not make the slightest difference. The essential question at the base of both rules is whether the jury can be induced to blame the defendant or say that it is not his fault. The real difference between those who favored and those who opposed the new rule lay in the moral values which each side wanted the criminal trial to express.

These are spiritual rather than practical values. From a practical point of view it may well be asked why dangerous people like the boys in Brooklyn who killed for mere cruelty should be kept alive at the expense of the state and given hospital care because a jury could be induced to believe that these seemingly rational people were insane. Nor is there any reason to believe that the decision of the jury on insanity can be anything other than guesswork, or that psychiatrists cannot be found half of whom will insist that the man be kept alive while the other half insists that he be executed.

I am using the illustration of the criminal defense of insanity not for the purpose of discussing whether the new rule is an advance over the old rule, but rather as an illustration of how a trial represents to countless people who have never seen a courtroom the moral values which they so deeply hold. The controversy between the proponents of the old rule and the new is the ever-present controversy in American life between those who believe in a secular religion represented roughly by the psychiatrist and those who prefer an expression of moral values in terms of a higher faith. The importance of the illustration here is the extent to which the American trial represents to the people who read about it in the newspapers the spiritual values of a nation.

If we abandon this dramatic process which portrays our most important moral ideals, if we treat criminals from a practical standpoint, we shall have lost immeasurably. We shall have fallen below the standards of a humanitarian, civilized society.

More important than the minor issue of insanity in the role of the trial as dramatization of the relationship between free individuals and their sovereign are the procedural safeguards which are the protection of the accused in a trial by due process. Here the state puts itself under a real handicap in its pursuit of criminals by dramatizing the moral principles which it professes to follow. Through the institution of the trial the state says to its citizens, "I am fair, I am just. I give to each man due process of law. In protecting the state from its enemies I am respecting the inalienable rights and dignity of the individual at the same time." Only in the drama of a trial can the people of a nation find symbolized the heaven of justice which lies beyond the insecurity, cruelty, and irrationality of the everyday world. If a government destroys or damages that heaven of justice it does irreparable harm to the structure of society.

There are two essential elements of a fair trial. The first is that the accused be confronted with the witnesses against him and have an opportunity to examine them. The second is that he be tried for something he has done and not for his opinions, his associations, his character, or even his loyalty to his government in the absence of an overt criminal act.

In the absence of either of these elements no government has a moral right to impose any imprisonment, any fine, or even any serious stigma or disgrace on any of its citizens. Any civilized society which does so will pay a heavy penalty indeed in impairment of its moral leadership at home and abroad. And no alleged claim that disgrace or stigma can be imposed by the state without a fair trial in these two senses can ever be justified on the ground that it promotes national security.

CHARACTER TRIALS

Times of world revolution and cold war are times when ideals are fanatically held and fears of opposing ideals are intense. In such times the temptation to depart from these two ideals of a fair trial becomes severe indeed. Men are no longer content to penalize accused persons for their acts alone. They want to impose a stigma and disgrace on those whose character, opinions, associations, and beliefs they regard as dangerous. They demand that such men be branded as quasi-traitors. Merely discharging such persons from the government in an informal manner without imposing this brand is not enough. And so the first essential element of a fair trial goes out the window and character trials begin.

Take the strange case of Dr. Oppenheimer. There was no reason in the interests of national security for the American government to present this spectacle to the civilized world. If there was one secret which should have been zealously guarded in the Oppenheimer case it was the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer was no longer to be trusted. It was obvious to a sensible person that such a disclosure would destroy the morale of scientific research. No scientist could be sure that his character might not be publicly destroyed in a mock trial in which the issue was not whether he had disclosed secrets but only his general worthiness to serve his government. It was equally obvious that

the disclosure would split the American people on the question of whose character really was superior, that of Oppenheimer himself or the members of the commission. And finally, the disclosure was bound to throw a cloud over our atomic research from the beginning.

Why then was Oppenheimer not permitted to go in peace on the simple and unarguable formula, "I do not like you, Dr. Fell"? What induced the government so to violate the ideal that no man should be tried for his character, his opinions, or his associations?

The reason may be found that only by trial procedure can the acts of the government be given both finality and sanctity, because the public trial is such an important symbol that those who conduct it become elevated above public criticism. Political attacks on a judge because of unpopular decisions cannot be made. This is because though people know there are mistakes in the judicial process the institution as a whole is fundamental to our society and must not be made the subject of attack. A dismissal which had the appearance of an executive act would not have shielded the executive from criticism. Dress it up in the mantle of an impartial trial and the executive feels secure. And so throughout history character trials are instituted in times of fear of dissenting ideas in the hope that the trappings of judicial procedure will give them respect and authority. Thus it was that Hitler tried to use the Reichstag trials to give an appearance of law and order to his regime. The Russian purge trials are a similar attempt to give the appearance of law and order to political assassinations.

Corrupting power

The degradation of the ideal of a fair trial involved in a judicial determination of the character of the accused always boomerangs on the person who attempts to use it. There are many reasons. No man should be permitted to pronounce official judgment on the character of his fellows. The power to make such judgments and impose disgrace as a result of them is the most utterly corrupting power in the world. Loyalty, depending as it does today on the views and associations of a lifetime, permits the tribunal to condemn by using hindsight on historical events. We passed through a period of hatred of Russia prior to the Hitler invasion, of enthusiasm for Russia's war effort during the war, of acceptance of Russian participation in the United Nations and the Nuremberg trials, and of the present hatred for Russia during the cold war. Yet a loyalty hearing involves a judgment of the views of the accused and his associations during all these periods, and such a judgment is impossible. The loyalty hearing has destroyed the morale of our scientists and has hurt American moral leadership in the world by damaging, misusing, and distorting our greatest tradition—the tradition that no government is entitled to impose the penalty of disgrace of any kind by trial of a man's opinions, beliefs, and associations.

This is the lesson of the Inquisition. It is the lesson of the Star Chamber. And yet thoughtful men today are saying that a fair procedure can be devised to fit a loyalty hearing. It is as impossible to do this as it was to devise a fair procedure for the trial of Joan of Arc.

Joan of Arc's trial

No court ever more sincerely attempted to make its procedure fair than the court which tried Joan. It did not put her to the torture as was customary at that time. It allowed her to state her case fully. It used no secret testimony. It gave her an appeal to the University of Paris, and even the defense of insanity was carefully considered. The record was published.

There is no doubt that Joan by the standards of our present loyalty program was a security risk and a subversive. As such there were plenty of ways of disposing of her other than by a public trial of her character. Why were these ways not used? It was for the same reason that Oppenheimer was tried. It was for the purpose of giving dignity and sanctity to the disposal of Joan. Thus her enemies thought they could achieve the kind of protection that a Supreme Court decision gives today. And no doubt those who tried Oppenheimer reasoned in the same way.

Their trouble was that they did not realize that to try a man's character or his opinions flies in the face of due process itself. Neither good procedure nor unbiased judges can give sanctity to a character trial. It was for this reason that both Joan's trial and Oppenheimer's trial blew up in the faces of those who instituted them and damaged the moral leadership of the governments who permitted them.

SECRET EVIDENCE

Nothing deteriorates so rapidly as the quality of character trials once they are started. The original loyalty order of President Truman seemed to give government employees every reasonable protection. In that order the standard for finding of disloyalty was that reasonable grounds for belief in the bad character of the accused must be "on all the evidence." But it soon appeared that the word "evidence" as used in the President's order was to take on a new meaning alien to every American tradition. The President's commission and then the court held that the word "evidence" in a loyalty case could include secret reports from informers not known to the board, vouched for only by a government police agency, and never disclosed to the accused. And thus the second element of an American fair trial went out the window—the requirement that no man shall be convicted on a secret police report containing information from informers who are not produced at the trial.

The Attorney General of the United States is now urging that such procedures are necessary in order to make the loyalty program protect national security. The findings of unworthy character may be based upon secret police reports containing derogatory information from informants unknown to the accused. The drastic nature of the domestic crisis imagined by the Attorney General is illustrated by the fact that he will not disclose even to the board which sits in trial on the government employee the identity of the secret informer on whose judgment their findings must be based. Thus the board's judgment is not its own. Operator X-22 was certified by the secret police to be reliable. The board never gets a chance to see him. Nor does the board see even the agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who certified as to the reliability of the informer. The employee's career may thus be ruined by the unexamined opinion of an unknown FBI agent.

This procedure was first sanctioned as part of the loyalty program of President Truman in the Dorothy Bailey case. Dorothy Bailey was charged with disloyalty. A hearing was had and voluminous evidence introduced. She had never held any job which could by any stretch of the imagination be called secret or sensitive. She wrote printed programs to help employment services in various states to train personnel. These were public documents and could be found in public libraries. Never in her life had she had access to secret in-

formation. She was charged with having had some undefined relationship with the Communist party. No details were given, no places, no dates. Against this shotgun charge she was forced to review her whole life, and she did.

The sole evidence against her consisted of information which was part of a secret FBI report which she never saw. She was not permitted to know who the informers were. Neither was the loyalty board which heard her case. The chairman said at the hearing, "I haven't the slightest knowledge as to who they were. . . ." Yet on this evidence she was convicted of probable disloyalty, a conviction which ended her career. Never since has she been able to obtain work commensurate with her ability or in her chosen field. She took her case to the United States District Court. Her counsel argued that the word "evidence" in the President's order could not be degraded to include a secret dossier supplied by informers whom the board did not know and which had never been disclosed to the accused.

The lower court held against her. The Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. The Supreme Court split 4 to 4, thus affirming the Court of Appeals because it could not find a majority to reverse.

The procedure thus sanctioned is the same procedure, conviction on a secret dossier, that aroused the indignation of the civilized world in the Dreyfus case. It is the same procedure that President Truman's own tribunal, sitting in the trial of the Nazi judges at Nuremberg, condemned when they said that reliance upon secret Gestapo reports was "the final degradation of the judiciary."

Since the Dorothy Bailey case, decided in 1951, this kind of procedure has spread through every government department. It has its undoubted conveniences from the point of view of the prosecution. Oppenheimer's character was tried on evidence which was disclosed to him. Had he been convicted on secret evidence no one would ever have known the kind of case he had in his favor. The country might not have been split into two violently opposing opinions. The impression would have been given that there was something so serious against Oppenheimer that no conscientious official could avoid branding him as a risk to national security.

ARE SUBVERSIVE IDEAS OUR GREAT DANGER?

But once we admit that the real danger to America is the impact of subversive ideas on our government and citizens, McCarthyism has won its case. If we must hold trials on political beliefs and associations to maintain our institutions, our Constitution no longer meets our problems. Certainly Russia, if it adopted the fair trial, would see the security of its present government impaired. That is what the Attorney General says will happen in America if we grant fair trials in loyalty cases. Can it be that we actually believe this is true also in America?

Of course no American really believes this. We have just become confused by the noise. My own proposed treatment would be similar to that with which a friend of mine once subdued a dragon he was leading down the garden path at the end of a short clothesline. Suddenly the dragon got out of control, knocking down the shrubbery and flower pots with his tail and creating general havoc. My friend turned to him and said sternly, "Either you be a good dragon and walk down this path in an orderly way or I will take a couple of aspirins and there won't be any dragon any more."

The utilization of secret evidence has created the necessity of recruiting an army of spies, gossips, and investigators for the delicate matter of the character of federal employees. Their judgment of what opinions these employees should have held at the various stages of our relationship with Russia can spell disgrace and the ruin of a federal official's career. And further, this procedure has spread through every department of the government down to the rank of janitor. It is used in agencies which have no conceivable connection with national security. Assuming that some typist in the Labor Department could conceivably be a danger these character trials have become a worse danger.

No one disputes the importance of the FBI's collecting information and keeping it secret. On the other hand, no one can justify the use of that secret information to ruin the career of an individual by branding him as a quasi-traitor without producing the witnesses against him. There are plenty of other ways to protect the security of this country against persons who may be suspect. An Army officer cannot have his commission taken away from him on secret evidence. He has a right to court-martial in which the evidence is disclosed. The easy remedy if a court-martial is not held is to remove him to a less sensitive post. But the Attorney General is saying that a janitor in an agency which has no secrets may be removed and stigmatized without due process.

How can we account for the deterioration of our ideal of fair trial that has occurred in our loyalty hearings? Are people like McCarthy to blame? My answer is No. McCarthy simply took over the procedure which had been instituted by well-meaning idealists anxious to pursue wicked people and to take their property without the cumbersome safeguards of due process of law. This idea was prevalent among many New Deal thinkers, who tried to devise systems by which judicial review of administrative decisions could be avoided. They lost, and the administrative commissions are the better for it.

AMERICAN JUSTICE IN GERMANY

The degradation of a fair trial got its greatest impetus through our justified hatred of the Nazis. One essential element of a fair trial is an impartial tribunal. Yet it was the United States which instituted, in collaboration with Soviet Russia, the Nuremberg trials where criminals were judged by their enemies. No doubt they deserved what they got. But this is not the test of a fair trial. A trial by due process is a procedure which protects the worst possible offenders.

Some find it difficult to become indignant about the principal Nuremberg trials. But few Americans know what happened after the famous cases, when President Truman sent a horde of minor judges to Germany to serve as military tribunals. They picked from the millions who no doubt deserved punishment a selected few who were indicted. Hundreds of innocent men were incarcerated. Inevitably this hit-or-miss procedure punished many innocent Germans and permitted influential Nazis who deserved punishment to escape.

I was called to Germany to represent Baron von Weizsaecker who had been Hitler's Under Secretary of State and later Ambassador to the Vatican. He had been one of those who attempted to plot against Hitler. On his behalf Lord Halifax intervened, Sumner Welles, the Bishop of Norway, and an emissary from the Pope. He was nevertheless convicted. Part of the testimony against him was given by a German named Gaus, who had been Ribbentrop's secretary. He was told that unless he testified against Weizsaecker he would be turned over to the Russians; the person responsible was the American prosecutor in the case, a man unknown here but famous in Germany. The doc-

ument reporting that story was discovered by the defense, and was spread over Germany by a committee of German bishops as an example of American justice. This was and still is regarded by Germans as an example of how the Americans tried the Germans.

There were other procedures in which the military tribunals appointed by President Truman degraded our traditions of a fair trial. In one proceeding involving about twenty defendants there were sixty-five German lawyers. They were allowed only one telephone. Their witnesses had to be summoned by notifying the American government. Witnesses called by the defense were frequently arrested and interrogated in secret. When the defense desired to interrogate them they could do so only in the presence of counsel for the prosecution.

We spent about forty million dollars teaching the Germans how American justice worked. At that point Congress got tired and refused to vote further funds. Whereupon the American tribunals got in a hurry and decided to take depositions at the same time trial was going on. German defense lawyers protested they could not be in both places at once; their protests were overruled. On a lower level there was the denazification process. In these proceedings my liberal friends attempted to classify Germans in four categories—major offenders, minor offenders, offenders, and followers. The higher grades got imprisonment. The lower grades, including schoolteachers, were forbidden to pursue any other occupation than manual labor. The lower grades were tried not for what they had done during the war but for what they thought during the war. Neighbors were encouraged to bring in gossip. These were character trials of the worst sort.

POETIC JUSTICE AND REAL JUSTICE

Liberals who supported this kind of procedure in Germany are now complaining about it at home. The lesson they should learn is that he who degrades the American ideals of fair trial should not be surprised if the procedures he approved contrary to that great ideal are taken over by his enemies and used to destroy him. There is a certain poetic justice in the fact that President Truman, who instituted the proceedings which convicted Dorothy Bailey on secret evidence, should find himself branded by the Attorney General of the United States on the basis of equally secret papers. The trouble is I do not like poetic justice. I believe that nothing but real justice dramatized by our institution of due process will give America back the moral leadership which this sort of proceeding has so greatly impaired.

Thurman Arnold, LL.B., LL.D., Washington, D. C., is a member of the law firm of Arnold, Fortas & Porter. He was formerly Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (1943–45), Assistant Attorney General of the United States, in charge of the antitrust division of the Department of Justice (1938–43), professor of law at Yale University (1931–38), and dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University (1927–30). He is the author of The Symbols of Government (1935), The Folklore of Capitalism (1937), Democracy and Free Enterprise (1942), and other works.

Book Department

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY 136
ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY 145
SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION 149
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 160
SPECIAL TOPICS ABROAD
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 164
SLAVIC COUNTRIES 166
WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 170
OTHER COUNTRIES 174
OTHER BOOKS 179

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

QUINCY WRIGHT. *The Study of International Relations.* Pp. xii, 642. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. $6.75.

This wide-ranging volume stems from an advanced course which Professor Wright has given at Chicago since 1947 to assist "integration of the field of international relations"—"today a discipline in process of formation." How far this provocative treatise will itself consolidate that integration and discipline remains to be seen. But there is no doubt it will be a key reference which will for a long time be examined by serious students and practitioners. (Its leisurely length, inevitable in an effort to state the assumptions and major conclusions of each of the sixteen disciplines considered relevant to the subject, may deter some persons likely to benefit from these mature thoughts of an experienced scholar.)

The book is divided into five parts: The Meaning of International Relations, Objectives in the Study of International Relations, Practical and Theoretical Analyses of International Relations, and *Toward* [my italics] a Unified Discipline of International Relations.

Some of the flavor is conveyed in the opening sentences to Chapter XXX, "Conceptions of International Relations." "International relations, as a discipline contributing to the understanding, prediction, evaluation, and control of the relations among states and of the conditions of the world community, is at the same time a history, a science, a philosophy, and an art." (Whether the journals in each of these fields will review this book is another matter.) "The effort to unify the study of international relations resembles the effort to unify all knowledge."

For the most general synthesis, Wright favors the concept of the world "as field" though he believes the concept of the world as plan, as spiritual community, as equilibrium, or as organization, has each been useful in certain situations (pp. 531, 567). He also adds that the discipline "may prove more useful for research than for either general education or practical action" (p. 582).

In answer to the contention that the foreign relations of each state is unique, he explains that "the thesis is accepted in this book, as it has been in general practice, that general disciplines exist in the field of international relations. These disciplines [e.g., international law, international economics, and so forth] have proved useful to statesmen and citizens of all countries and their synthesis is at least conceivable" (p. 7, 8). He adds that useful as the discipline of

international *politics* is in the present situation of the world it "is of little value for long range prediction and control" (p. 145).

One of Wright's hopes is expressed thus: "The relativism, pragmatism, adaptability, and moderation observable in the healthy organism, in the well-adjusted personality, and in the stable culture, is needed in the world community. . . . It should be the function of a discipline of international relations to analyze the entities, processes, forces and relations in the international field, and to seek means for so regulating and balancing them that the opportunity for individuals and groups to achieve their values may be maximized" (p. 59).

There is much intellectual history in this book.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL
University of Buffalo

W. D. PULESTON. *The Influence of Force in Foreign Relations.* Pp. xii, 254. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955. $4.50.

Contemporary United States foreign policy has emphasized military, economic, and moral considerations in its formulation. The thinking of the moralists has been adequately developed by international lawyers and exposed by Hans J. Morgenthau. Various economic approaches may be as sophisticated as Keynes and Viner or as naive as Humphrey and Wilson. But the military mind has been neglected until recently. Little yet has been forthcoming from the large scale research financed by Carnegie, Rockefeller, and the Twentieth Century Fund. Captain Puleston's latest book, therefore, is all the more welcome as an excellent illustration of a military analysis of foreign policy.

The author, a retired naval captain (Annapolis, 1902), cannot be accused of forsaking his church—the United States Navy, nor his god—Admiral Mahan. As a technician he tends to emphasize the role of the specialist over that of the generalist; his scope therefore can be characterized as narrow rather than broad. Perhaps typical of the military mind, Puleston stresses the short run (expedient and efficient) as against the long run (political and psychological). Likewise he emphasizes the material aspects of power, and tends to neglect the importance of the psychological aspects (both morale and allies). Like navy writers in general (including an unmasked Hanson Baldwin) he appreciates potential power and depreciates an overstated air-force evaluation of the immediate destructiveness of H-bombs. Withal, Captain Puleston would disagree that the atom bomb created a technological revolution in warfare; he uses the history of preatomic wars for predictive purposes.

The book's eight chapters include an Introduction which sketches the contributions of Clausewitz and Mahan; a chapter on the relative role of the land, air, and sea forces (emphasizing the latter); a consideration of the joint responsibility of civil and military leadership, taking particular exception to the thought that wars are too important to be fought by generals; a case study of the diplomatic rivalry between the United States and Japan in which he stresses power more than pride (United States immigration policy) as a motivating factor for the Japanese policy; the impact of the H-bomb in which defensive mechanisms are emphasized on the one hand, and a modified preventive war policy on the other ("we should strike only if the enemy did not cease preparing to attack us by a certain time!"); an unflattering analysis of the leadership in Britain and the United States as compared to Russia in World War II; and an assessment of all the futile efforts to eliminate force from the first Hague Conference in 1899 through the United Nations.

While this reader disagrees with the author's approach, as well as his conclusions, it must be admitted that Puleston gives a pungent criticism of idealistic thinking. It may be that the flaws in this militaristic realism are all too apparent and for that reason the author does not quite earn the title of "Devil's advocate."

Nevertheless, the book deserves to be required reading for all students of foreign policy—particularly in connection with Sapin and Snyder's *The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy.*

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.
Stanford University

JULIUS STONE. *Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes-and-War-Law.* Pp. iv, 851. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1954. $12.00.

This improtant book is about half devoted to problems concerning the nature of international law, the settlement of international disputes, the prevention of aggression, the punishment of war crimes, and other issues involving the interpretation of recent treaties such as the League of Nations Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Nuremberg Charter, and the United Nations Charter. The other half sets forth the traditional law of war and neutrality. The author's main conclusions on the law are dealt with in the main text of the book, leaving to thirty-four "discourses," following many of the chapters, arguments in a practical spirit on the more controversial issues.

This procedure gives the reader the benefit of jural analysis and practical criticism without confusion of the two.

Recent international law had been marked by a divergence between the norms to which states have committed themselves in treaties and actual international practice. The gaps may be closed by restrictive interpretation of these commitments to harmonize them with practice, or by a more effective utilization of international organization to conform practice to the norms. In view of the indifferent success of efforts of the United Nations and other agencies to follow the latter alternative during the "cold war," Stone adopts the first alternative and interprets broad commitments to prevent aggression, punish international crimes, and protect human rights restrictively by reference to what international machinery can be expected to accomplish in the light of its relatively inoperable procedures and the continued dominance of extreme nationalistic sentiments. He notes particularly that the United Nations, though equipped with ample powers to stop aggression, is unable to exercise these powers because of the veto and the failure of the members to make agreements committing forces to United Nations service. As a result the states have substituted, by the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, procedures which he interprets as similar to those of the system worked out by the League of Nations, leaving responsibility to act against aggression to the members individually, and utilizing the international agencies, in this case the General Assembly, not to compel but to co-ordinate their efforts. As a result he considers it probable that clear pronouncements distinguishing the aggressor and the defender in future hostilities will frequently not be made and consequently war in the traditional sense, in which the belligerents are considered equal, will occur and should be regulated. The law of war and neutrality will therefore continue to be important. He does not discuss, although he alludes to, the problem of the applicability of portions of the law of war even in case hostilities have the formal character of policing action against agression.

The tone of the book is not optimistic but its keen analysis, clear insight into the nature of the society of nations, and careful exposition of the realities of procedure, not to mention the voluminous references to jural materials, makes it an outstanding contribution to international law. The author, now Challis Professor of International Law and Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney, is well known for his important contributions in the field of jurisprudence and international organization. The present book will be widely used for reference to which it is well adapted since about a third of each page is devoted to footnotes, and over a hundred pages at the end include lists of case citations and of treaty citations, a name index, and a subject index.

QUINCY WRIGHT
University of Chicago

HAROLD NICOLSON. *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method.* Pp. 93. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $2.25.

In this luminous essay, Sir Harold Nicolson analyzes diplomatic methods from ancient times to the present. Under his polished microscope pass the methods of the Greeks and Romans in ancient times, of the Italians in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of the French in the seventeenth–nineteenth centuries, and of the luckless Americans in the twentieth.

To the French perfection of the art of diplomacy, Sir Harold justly pays tribute. This perfection brought a centralization and certainty to diplomatic methods which they had lacked before and which they have never enjoyed since. American practice, on the other hand, invites Sir Harold's criticism. He feels it has brought a good deal of confusion to the art. We have no centralization of diplomatic authority; and our "belief" that it is "possible to apply to the conduct of *external* affairs, the ideas and practices which, in the conduct of *internal* affairs, had for generations been regarded as the essentials of liberal democracy" has opened a veritable Pandora's box. Finally, "although the Americans in recent years have been in process of creating an admirable service of professional diplomatists, these experts do not yet possess the necessary influence with their own government or public."

To some of this one can say "amen," but there will be many to feel that Sir Harold makes too much of Wilsonian ideas or even of American peculiarities. He attempts to explain too much of the present evolutionary stage of diplomacy in such terms. Other factors have been more basic, such as the spread of education throughout the world; inventions in communications, giving rise to a widespread press, wire services, instantaneous printing, radio, and television; along with a variety of economic and social phenomena including what Ortega y Gasset calls "the fact of agglomeration." One might add also the emergence of the USSR as a world power and, for modern times anyway, the somewhat unique problems which it has introduced in the normal intercourse of nations. All of these things explain why the masses have advanced from the background of the international stage and jostled others—including the diplomats—from the footlights. This would have occurred whether Woodrow Wilson or America had existed.

Sir Harold believes that diplomacy should be left to the diplomatists. But what is diplomacy today? Decisions as to the conduct of foreign affairs now affect the whole political, economic, and social life of the peoples of the world. It is inconceivable that peoples will permit such decisions to be made without the fullest discussion, in which they themselves participate.

Is it less inconceivable that many will question whether the implementation of these varied decisions can be left to professional diplomatic services? The answer obviously will lie in the composition and management of these services. Many skills, many talents, many experiences are involved in the conduct of international relations these days. The cultural and economic life of the world is rich and vast. To deal effectively with it, as well as with political questions, requires something more than the diplomatic methods and services of Louis XIV.

Sir Harold has done well to remind the twentieth century that it still has a good way to go before it can claim to have acquired a polished mastery of diplomatic methods under modern conditions. The sooner it approximates that mastery the easier we shall all be—including those of us engaged in the service of diplomacy.

R. SMITH SIMPSON
Lourenco Marques
Mozambique

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON (Ed.). *Federalism: Mature and Emergent.* Pp. xi, 557. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955. $7.50.

Federalism: Mature and Emergent is a symposium-type publication, but one which fortunately avoids most of the shortcomings which too frequently plague publications of this kind. The book is, in fact, the edited report of a carefully planned and well-conducted symposium. Twenty-three (including the editor) recognized scholars prepared chapters on selected aspects of the general topic. The chapters were circulated in advance among sixty-odd persons who attended a three-day conference "for a quiet meeting of minds." Thereafter each essay was revised by the original author. A stenographic record of the conference was available to the editor. This masterful planning and close coordination of efforts are obvious throughout the book. Much of the unity, continuity, and perspective may be attributed, however, to the skillful editing and the series of analytical and interpretive chapters (four of twenty-six) contributed by Professor Macmahon. The study is presented in four parts: Part I, Federalism: Its Nature and Role; Part II, Basic Controls in a Maturing System (The Political Process, the Courts and the Law, and Legislative and Executive Responsibilities in Managing a Federal System); Part III, Functional Channels of Relationship (Illustrative Studies of Functional Fields, and Over-all Aspects of Functional Relationships); Part IV, Supranational Union in Western Europe (The Economic Background and Functional Developments and The Project of a Political Community).

The purpose and direction of the study may be read from the organizational pattern. The primary objective is a re-examination and re-evaluation of federalism in its legal, political, and functional aspects to determine its political usefulness in the rebuilding of a war-shattered world. Although several of the chapters are directed to an examination of historical aspects and theoretical concepts, the principal areas explored are those from which practical applications of the federal principle can be evaluated. The specimens examined are drawn mostly but not exclusively from North American experiences. The evaluations follow largely the traditional pattern: federalism may be a hybrid, even unstable system, yet on the whole it has served a useful purpose in providing political stability among diverse elements, in preserving a functional balance of interests, and in discouraging concentrations of power—both political and economic. There are, however, dissenters.

Professor Franz L. Neumann in a short but caustic chapter is sharply critical of the advantages usually accredited to federalism.

Neumann's doubts concerning the inherent qualities of federalism are not widely shared, but doubts of the general applicability of the principle are raised by those who examined the possibility of its extension to some geographical areas—say Western Europe. Professor Kenneth C. Wheare asserts almost unequivocally "that no successful federation has been formed from states that have existed as independent nations for a considerable period of time." Among the other essays are several which explore "emergent federalism" in the European community. In the concluding chapter, Professor Carl J. Friedrich sounds a warning and injects an optimistic note in suggesting European unity along federal lines, provided the architects of that unity will cleanse their thinking of static concepts and regard federalism as a "process" rather than a "form."

The symposium was one of a series of five conferences sponsored by Columbia University during 1954 as a part of the Bicentennial celebration. Many of the chapters are well documented. In some cases the notes, collected at the end of each chapter, carry explanatory excerpts from the stenographic record. There is an adequate index. The book also carries brief biographies of the conference participants. All in all, this is a significant contribution to the literature of federalism.

HAROLD M. DORR
University of Michigan

MERLE CURTI and KENDALL BIRR. *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas 1838–1938.* Pp. xi, 284. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1954. $5.00.

The period 1838 to 1938 is a necessary "prelude" to contemporary technical missions overseas—"necessary," no doubt, as seed ground for today's complex activities and as "briefing" for the thousands of persons involved in this kind of work.

By numerous case studies, with broad sweep and fascinating details of this underworked field of American transitional history, ten chapters cover such topics as "Missions to Japan," "Cuban Experiments," "Missions Multiply" (the era of 1912–29), "Public Health and Education," and, courageously, "The Meaning of the Missions." One may see how Americans carry and modify their assumptions (usually middle-class) when operating abroad, for example, the American influence working toward

centralization on one hand and decentralization on the other, in various spheres.

American attitudes to these technical missions have varied. The nitrogen survey of Chile and the survey of the Amazon River basin (1923), "official American ventures designed to serve the needs of the American economy, with incidental benefits to the underdeveloped areas . . . carried further the evolution of the overseas technical mission" (p. 143).

Some of the generalizations which flow, in temperate spirit, from this history may be noted here to incite complete reading.

"Perhaps the most important period in the life of any mission was its origin" (p. 204). And "no problem was as serious as that of proper administration" (p. 212). The missions varied widely in scope, subject matter, and objectives. American motives were not always clear-cut. "There seems to have been no close correlation between the scope of these missions and their success" (p. 208). However, "The limited objective type with a pragmatic approach can sometimes be of considerable use and certainly involves less risk of failure with all that this might mean for relations between the two countries involved. On the other hand, the comprehensive program is probably the only type that offers any hope of really solving the fundamental problems underlying the world's ill."

The American expert, whose attitude toward his foreign colleagues was of crucial importance, was generally well paid. "The information and skills brought by the Americans generally proved reasonably adequate," especially in the natural sciences, but "the usefulness of American knowledge in the realm of the social sciences and social policy seemed somewhat more dubious" (p. 211). Perhaps this is improving.

Finally, "There were few missions that were clearly successful, few that were total failures. . . . What is clear is that technical aid abroad is no simple or sure method of improving international relations" (pp. 216, 218).

American historiography is enriched because Professor Curti himself, and in the encouragement of his students, has added the American impact abroad to his purview. Possibly in due time, material such as is in this fruitful collaboration will get into our textbooks. A more constant evaluation and recognition of overseas services by our citizens may do much to improve such service. These missions, obviously, are not the total of American influence in, or cross-cultural relationships with, any one country or period, but they are an important segment carefully treated in this work.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL
The University of Buffalo

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

WILLIAM ANDERSON. *The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners?* Pp. xvi, 263. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $3.75.

A member of the President's Commission of Intergovernmental Relations, Professor Anderson, in this volume, gives evidence of the moderation that mature study is likely to bring to any problem. In general he defends the extensions of federal power that have taken place and doubts that weakening the national government will strengthen the state governments. The problem is not one of conflict between two elements, the federal government against the states, but rather one of allocating functions among three—national, state, and local. The decision as to which is to exercise control in any instance depends upon time and circumstances. This approach is the one that the country has been following, and Professor Anderson believes that, on the whole, results have been good.

The author's interpretation of the effect of the Tenth Amendment converts it into something of an anti-states-rights guarantee. Adopting from the preamble the view that the Constitution was the creation of the people rather than of the states, he argues that the Tenth Amendment consequently is the product of the whole people, and in incorporating this reservation of rights in the Constitution the states accepted the view that their "reserved" rights were in fact only a grant from the nation. This view he believes is borne out by the fact that some three-fourths of the states have subsequently been admitted to the Union and could not have had any prior inherent powers. Congress may be the best defender of states-rights, as is witnessed by its action after the Southeastern Underwriters insurance decision, and the off-shore oil decisions.

On the practical side, he opposes any new constitutional limits on the federal taxing power, believes it is not feasible to separate arbitrarily the subjects of federal and state taxation, opposes the earmarking of taxes for specific purposes, except for some pension and retirement trust funds, and believes it is not feasible normally for the federal government to collect taxes for the states. Some of the opposition by governors to federal grants-in-aid he ascribes to the fact that federal contacts upon these grants may be with subordinates of the governor or with legislative committees, thus by-passing the official head of the state.

In sum, Professor Anderson believes that we are doing very well under our present allocation of powers and has no proposals for drastic constitutional changes.

W. REED WEST
George Washington University

SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD and ALBERT A. APPLEGATE. *Michigan's Recounts for Governor, 1950 and 1952: A Systematic Analysis of Election Error.* Pp. viii, 178. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1954. No price.

The unusual occurrence of recounts in successive gubernatorial elections (1950 and 1952) presented a fruitful opportunity to study the administration of elections in Michigan. In both recounts, G. Mennen Williams, the Democratic candidate, emerged as winner. In the 1950 race, Williams' original plurality was 1,154 votes in a total poll of 1,879,382. Before the recount was completed, the Republican candidate conceded when the Williams' plurality reached 4,010 votes. The Republican candidate withdrew from the 1952 recount when Williams' original plurality of 8,618 had grown to 10,760. In each case, the recount procedures were invoked only in specific precincts, the Republicans challenging the returns from preponderant Democratic districts and the Democrats from those overwhelmingly Republican.

The authors found that 2 per cent of the total 1950 vote was affected by error of some type. The incidence of error was fairly general, running in 86 per cent of the precincts recounted. Three of every four errors resulted from negligence or incompetence of election officials. Only one-fourth of all errors could be attributed to the voters. Official errors included failure to initial ballots, improper initialing, inaccurate counting, and carelessness in protecting the security of the ballot boxes. The most frequent voter error was in using a check mark rather than a cross. Violations of ballot security alone involved more than 123,000 votes. Many boxes were not sealed, some were not locked, and others did not contain the official pollbook as required by law.

The investigators discovered that the ratio of election-officials' errors was highest in rural counties which were preponderantly Republican, and that there was a distinctly partisan flavor to these mistakes. This partisanship showed itself in several phases —in the long count for the majority party, in the short count for the minority party, and in decisions involving invalidation of individual ballots.

Most of the irregularities in the two elections sprang from the incompetence of the election officials. So long as they are recruited through patronage and so long as elections are administered at the local level, there will be inconsistencies, errors in election-law interpretation, and pure and unadulterated partisanship. It should be remembered that politics is much more casual in a rural neighborhood than in legislative halls. What are constitutions and laws among people who speak to each other almost every day? If there is a weakness in this excellent monograph, it is that the authors have not attributed sufficient importance to the persistent informality in American politics. The study

contains a map and sixty tables of quantitative data.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING
University of Oklahoma

D. W. BROGAN. *Politics in America.* Pp. 467. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $5.00.

Commentaries on our political institutions and processes by competent observers from abroad have contributed much to the better understanding of ourselves. Such observers are less likely to get lost in details. Consequently, they may have clearer perspectives of the whole. The monumental works of DeTocqueville and Bryce are not alone in this respect. Harold Laski and others have also made significant contributions. It is always good to have Professor Brogan's analyses. He is professor of political science at the University of Cambridge; moreover, he is no casual observer of American politics. He comes here often and gets about extensively. There is a standing joke around Cambridge that he should apply for a Fulbright assignment and spend a year at Cambridge.

From previous publications in newspapers and periodicals, it is apparent that Brogan knows every nook and cranny of our nation; it is also apparent that he knows American politics. However, this study is not intended to be anything particularly comprehensive. On the contrary, as the title indicates, he has undertaken mainly to decipher politics rather than to describe institutions and processes. Moreover, he has limited himself pretty largely to the national level and has not undertaken to do much with the state and local levels.

Professor Brogan does have a chapter, it is true, on "Machines and Bosses" but it is decidedly not the best chapter in the book. It is largely historical and seems to be a bit out of date. An up-to-date chapter on pressure politics would have been better. There are also chapters on the "Party System," "Morality and Politics," "The National Conventions and the Campaign." These are often entertaining and sometimes enlightening. His best chapter is one on "Congress and the President." Here is where the competent student of both the British and American systems is able to make some really intelligent and informative observations. A chapter on "Politics and the Courts" is also well done.

To American readers the factual material in Professor Brogan's work will seem to be largely common knowledge. Nevertheless, Americans will find the book well worth reading and exceptionally readable. The style is lively and Professor Brogan has an unusual flair for facetious remarks, amusing anecdotes, and interesting incidents. The pages of his book are filled with these.

There are a few minor errors. Warren G. Harding in 1920 was scarcely a dark horse at all, much less "the only really dark horse" (p. 212). What about Garfield? Harding was an active candidate for the nomination and had substantial support from the first ballot. Garfield was not a candidate at all and had almost no support until the thirty-fourth ballot. Someone should also explain to Professor Brogan that the "open primary" and "cross-filing" are *not* the same thing (p. 89). Moreover his statement that the delegates to the national nominating conventions are "largely poor men and women" (p. 210) is not entirely accurate. At least it is not supported by our study of the delegates from Ohio in 1952.

On the whole, the errors of fact or judgment are indeed minor ones and relatively insignificant. One is more impressed by the accuracy of his information, by the keenness of his wit, and by the brilliance of his observations.

E. ALLEN HELMS
Ohio State University

LEROY C. FERGUSON and RALPH H. SMUCKLER. *Politics in the Press.* Pp. 100. East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State College, 1954. No price.

This is not a general discussion of how the American newspaper reflects the political scene. It is, rather, a meticulous research analysis of the contents of a selected sample of Connecticut and Wisconsin newspapers in a six-week period preceding the elections of 1952. Further refinement limits the study to the senatorial campaigns. The book is not for the general reader, but for specialists, particularly those interested in techniques of newspaper analysis and their application to a quantitative study of the political process. The volume "is the first basic research publication of the Governmental Research Bureau" of Michigan State College. It is premised on the assumption that such detailed, basic research is the essential initial step in an understanding of politics and in constructive political action.

The authors are commendably cautious in stating the limitations of their work. They are likewise explicit in describing the rather elaborate methods they have employed. Their conclusions are presented with great restraint, and they admittedly resist the temptation to speculate as to their implications. This is a scholar's book for scholars.

Certain major findings of more general interest do emerge from the data. The study reveals that policy issues figured in the appeals to the voters much less than appeals based on personalities or generalized issues such as Communism. It shows that there were few instances in which opposing candidates focused on the same issues, and even candidates of the same party were not consistent. Party identification of candidates was not stressed, rather their individuality and independence. Newspapers tended, the data indicate, to reflect editorial policy in their news coverage. Headlines reflected partisanship more than total news coverage.

Interesting as these limited conclusions may be, the main contribution of the book is in methodology and in the related suggestions for further study.

MALCOLM M. WILLEY
University of Minnesota

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL. *Admiral Kimmel's Story.* Pp. xvi, 207. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. $3.75.

In February 1941 President Roosevelt suddenly relieved Admiral J. O. Richardson as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and appointed Kimmel in his place. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor he as summarily relieved Kimmel and then appointed the Roberts Commission to ascertain any "derelictions of duty or errors of judgment" leading to that military debacle. The Commission formally exonerated the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy Departments; the Chief of Staff of the Army; and the Chief of Naval Operations; and inferentially acquitted the President from any blame by placing complete responsibility for the disastrous defeat upon Admiral Kimmel and his Army colleague General Short.

Kimmel's *Story* told in terse language is as dramatic as any Greek tragedy. Unexpectedly summoned to command our most powerful fleet he diligently prepared it for its assigned tasks in the event of war, simultaneously striving to insure its security in case of a Japanese surprise attack. Unjustly sacrificed with Short to shield the shortcomings of the President and High Command in Washington, who as Stimson has revealed sought to entice Japan into striking the first blow where it would do little injury, he patriotically remained silent, only regretting that he had not foreseen "what happened on December 7." Lay readers will find the *Story* an absorbing tale of the triumph and tragedy of an American Admiral; professional readers will be better prepared for high command by comparing this account with the conclusions of the Roberts Commission, the Army Board, and the Navy Court of Inquiry.

The Army Board held that General Marshall had withheld vital information from General Short, the Navy Court charged Stark with depriving "Kimmel of a clear picture of the existing situation"; it cleared Kimmel of the accusation made by the Roberts Commission of failing to co-operate with Short. Most important it approved his measures for preparing the fleet for war, while taking all feasible means of insuring its security during a surprise attack.

Stark and Admiral Turner admit that they did not supply vital information to Kimmel because they both *thought* he was receiving it from other sources. The Naval Court concluded it was a matter of conjecture what further action Kimmel would

have taken had he been furnished with the information available in the Navy Department; in chapter IV, Kimmel relates the additional measures he is confident he would have taken *if* he had been properly informed; he had proved his ability to increase the efficiency of the fleet, in all probability he could have reduced our losses and inflicted heavier losses on the enemy if these measures had been taken. Kimmel's modesty, his long sufferance in silence, and his proven abilities make his many civilian and military admirers regret that he relied too confidently on Stark's assurance of providing him with all available information during the critical period preceding the Japanese attack. He had many means of communications; radio, cable, even a telephone were available; he could get a message to Stark almost instantly; he could get an officer courier there by plane in a day. He should have regularly demanded information as the crisis obviously approached.

There is a still bigger lesson for commissioned officers of the Navy; because our torpedoes could not operate in shallow harbors we assumed the Japanese could not; with one exception, Admiral Turner, no officer of the High Command in the Pacific Fleet or Washington claimed to expect an air attack on Pearl Harbor. By almost elementary security measures the Japanese High Command completely concealed their intention to attack the Pacific Fleet.

W. D. PULESTON
Captain, USN Retired
Lake Wales, Fla.

HAROLD L. ICKES. *Secret Diary.* Vol. III: *The Lowering Clouds.* Pp. 695. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954. $6.00.

The Lowering Clouds covers the period from September 1939 to December 1941, approximately twenty-six months, and is the third volume of the most illuminating diary thus far published of the New Deal Era. Certainly others high in the councils of the nation in this period kept diaries but none will surpass the Secretary of Interior's ability to preserve for posterity the bitter, often petty, feuds which went on backstage. Nor will anyone outstrip this curmudgeon in easy frankness, in obvious sincerity, and in uncanny ability to turn a phrase.

Of those few whom Ickes admired he wrote in glowing terms. Robert Jackson, for example, "was too much of a gentleman" to have "dead political cats wrapped around his neck." The author had great respect for his "Chief" but at times the official relations between Roosevelt and Ickes were indeed strained. On one such occasion the author confided to his diary that the President was "being so damned onery."

Ickes denounced bitterly those whom he disliked or mistrusted. Chairman Doughton of the Ways and Means Committee was "an old fuzzy-wuzzy" whose mental capacity was "not only well below par, it has become atrophied." No one grated on Ickes' sense of activity or interfered with his policies as did the slow-moving Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Ickes labelled Hull as "a false alarm," denounced his colleague's inertia and in desperation wrote "Goddam the Department of State."

One of the first to propose that F.D.R. run for a third term, Ickes played a significant role in preparing the way for the President's third nomination. When Garner turned against the President, Ickes urged dropping him from all cabinet meetings and withholding from the Garners all invitations to White House social affairs. As evidence accumulated that Farley was using National Democratic Headquarters and party money to gain the nomination for himself, Ickes prodded Roosevelt to dismiss the Postmaster General. Ambitious to be the President's running mate in 1940, Ickes could see why he was defeated, but he could not visualize why Wallace was selected. Ickes early realized Willkie's possible nomination and his potential strength as an opponent. He called Willkie an American fascist and declared that if elected the Republican nominee would create a corporate state in the United States.

Repeatedly Ickes urged curbing the selling of scrap iron and petroleum to Japan and the strengthening of our defensive fortifications in the Pacific. Moreover, he was convinced that we would eventually enter the European war and opposed permitting Hitler to control our entrance by providing the incident for which the President was apparently waiting.

This volume, as the two preceding volumes of the diary, will be widely read and will be referred to constantly as one of the best day-to-day personal records of the age of the New Deal.

G. C. OSBORN
University of Florida

DONALD G. MORGAN. *Justice William Johnson, The First Dissenter.* Pp. xv, 326. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1954. $6.50.

If the greatness of a man's career is to be measured by the applicability of his concepts and actions to a future age, Justice William Johnson must rank high among leaders of the early national period. A controversial figure, called by John Quincy Adams "a restless, turbulent, hot-headed, politician caballing judge," and characterized by Professor Morgan as "proud, aloof, and impulsive," Johnson, whose ideas seem surprisingly topical today, had gone without an adequate biography since his death in 1834.

In a sense this is easy to understand. Foreshadowed in his day by Marshall and Story, later biographers of these men handled him as a pawn with which to show their figures' greatness, overplaying the partial misconception that Jefferson's first Republican appointee became, under Marshall's tutelage, an extreme nationalist and opponent of the man who appointed him. Further, Johnson, a slaveowner, who regarded slavery as a necessary evil, was an outspoken foe of nullification in his home state of South Carolina and hence had little appeal either to extreme Northerners or Southerners. As a critic of complete laissez faire, who rejected absolute freedom of contract, his ideas were also antipathetic to postwar generations endowed with the unassailable sanctity of private property.

The balance on Johnson has been redressed admirably by Professor Morgan. Working without personal papers, he has revived an important figure and in the process has thrown valuable light on both Marshall and Jefferson. He acknowledges that Johnson was often influenced by Marshall as evidenced by his acceptance of Marshall's McCulloch ruling, and his concurring opinion in *Gibbons* v. *Ogden,* where he went further than the Chief Justice in proclaiming the breadth of national authority under the commerce clause. He is careful to make clear, however, that in a number of important areas the two men differed sharply. Johnson's sympathy toward vested rights did not prevent him from frequently supporting state regulation, and influenced, especially in his later career by Thomas Jefferson, he took a sharply distinct view on the role of judges and their fallibility, the power and superceding authority of legislatures, and the value of the individual in society. Further, his contributions in molding court procedure and defining the jurisdiction of Federal courts rank with those of Marshall in establishing important legal precedents.

Professor Morgan avoids the tendency in judicial biography toward either excessive legalism or oversimplification. With the forthcoming studies of Stone and Harlan, the steadily growing literature on our Supreme Court justices should begin to assume respectable proportions.

PAUL L. MURPHY
Ohio State University

JOHN CHALMERS VINSON. *The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922.* Pp. xi, 259. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955. $4.50.

While competent scholars, notably C. Leonard Hoag and Harold and Margaret Sprout, have studied the movement culminating in the Washington Conference of 1921–22, Dr. Vinson is the first to concentrate upon the activities of the Senate in the struggle for disarmament and security. Briefly, his theme is the differences between the Senate and the Executive and the eventual triumph of isolationist Senatorial principles in the Four Power Treaty, which sharply limited American commitments in the Pacific. This is an in-

teresting story and one well worth telling.

Dr. Vinson's search for materials has been broad and imaginative. He has examined many manuscript sources not used by the Sprouts in their broader treatment, which appeared while Dr. Vinson was working on the present study as a doctoral dissertation. While this wide research did not result in startling new revelations, it does somewhat broaden our picture and goes far to confirm that the major outlines of this subject are now established. On only one substantive point of importance does Vinson seem open to challenge; he virtually ignores the part played by Arthur Meighen of Canada in the Commonwealth decision to seek abrogation of the Japanese alliance and wrongly mentions instead W. R. Hughes of Australia.

The verdicts which Dr. Vinson passes are interesting and often provocative. Some may feel that his critical—even sarcastic—treatment of the Senate and its sincerity is overdone. Others may feel that a deeper analysis of party factions and motivation is required; there is here, for example, no indication that it was the staunchest Wilsonians, those who stuck with their chief in the vote of March 1920, who provided the bulk of the voices against the Four Power Treaty. More fundamentally, while recognizing that the Senate, like the people, was "chiefly concerned in defeating, as easily as possible, two old enemies, war and taxes," readers may challenge Dr. Vinson's further assertion that the Washington treaties reflected untrammeled Senatorial isolationism and were therefore unrealistic, unwise, and basically hypocritical. In short, was the Washington system a "Parchment Peace" or (to borrow the Sprouts' title) a move "Toward a New Order of Sea Power"? Was it the structure itself, or the failure to develop and execute it, that was responsible for later tragedy?

Dr. Vinson's book is a concise and admirably written study. As such, it is a positive contribution to the literature on the Washington Conference.

BRADFORD PERKINS
University of California
Los Angeles

ROBERT K. MURRAY. *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920.* Pp. xii, 337. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $4.75.

Mr. Murray, assistant professor of history at the Pennsylvania State University, has written an absorbing account, as far as it goes, of one of the most important episodes in recent American history—the Red scare that convulsed the American government and people during 1919 and 1920 and survived in various violent manifestations into the 1920's. Altogether, it is an astounding story of the way in which fear of a largely mythical Bolshevik danger stimulated wholesale federal, state, and private assaults against civil liberty and free thought and expression. Mr. Murray analyzes the whole phenomenon with considerable precision and understanding.

Having said this, however, the reviewer must also say that the book has certain defects that should not be ignored. To begin with—and the following observation obviously reflects the reviewer's personal judgment—Mr. Murray was so impressed by certain similarities between the Red scare of 1919–20 and the one that followed World War II and so determined to expose the folly and disastrous consequences of unreasoned fear that he often wrote more like a prophet than a scholar. He frankly tells us in his Preface that his approach to history is "mainly moral" and that he makes "no pretense of having completely achieved historical detachment." This reviewer does not object to morality; nor would he argue that it is possible to achieve complete historical detachment. It is all a matter of degree, and there is a difference between a "moral" approach and a didacticism that becomes in this book at times a little wearing.

The second and by far the gravest defect of this study, however, stems not from the author's point of view, to which he has a clear right, but from the way in which he limited his research in the main to published sources. He simply overlooked, or concluded that it was not worthwhile to work through, the great manuscript collections bearing on his subject—the Wilson Papers, the Justice Department Papers in the National Archives, the Papers of Colonel House, and the Oswald Garrison Villard Papers, to mention only a few of them.

The result of the author's failure to research widely enough is a book that records the events of the Red scare competently but lacks depth and such understanding as the scholar can obtain only from private sources, and in its coverage does not go much beyond the work of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Frederick L. Paxson, Frederick Lewis Allen, Mark Sullivan, and other men who have written on the same subject.

ARTHUR S. LINK
Institute for Advanced Study

NEWBOLD MORRIS in collaboration with ANA LEE THOMAS. *Let the Chips Fall: My Battle Against Corruption.* Pp. xiii, 308. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. $4.00.

This autobiography of an important New York City reformer and political leader, prepared in collaboration with a professional writer, centers upon the era of the La Guardia administration in which Newbold Morris had a leading part. The story traces his career from his youth as a member of one of New York City's patrician families, through Groton, Yale, the Yale Law School, into his father's law firm, and his father's place on the Republican party committee in the upper East Side "surtax" district, then into the Board of Alderman, and then city-wide election as president of the City Council. His 1945 and 1949 candidacies for mayor, and his brief experience as a special investigator for President Truman in 1952, are largely anticlimactical. Of special interest is a chapter on the New York City Center of Music and Drama, which may well prove to be Newbold Morris' most enduring contribution to the life of his city.

The approach and tone of the volume are indicated by its subtitle: *My Battles Against Corruption.* From this reform perspective the story is told with sincerity and integrity, and with impressive faith in the reformers' diagnosis and remedies for governmental shortcomings.

But it must be noted with regret that the autobiography does not probe very deeply nor produce new insights into the political and governmental life of New York City. The volume suffers from its dependence upon secondary materials and twice-told stories, and from its lack of new and intimate information. There is surprisingly little of the kind of significant firsthand information and the revelation of personality which marked, for example, the autobiographies of Theodore Roosevelt and Robert M. LaFollette. This failure may be illustrated by the fact that the two central figures in the author's political life—Kenneth Simpson, the Republican leader who first sponsored Morris, and Fiorello La Guardia, who gave him greater prominence—do not emerge from Morris' account with any new dimensions; instead, they remain stock figures in a conventional reform drama. There is, too, an absence of reflective detachment and self-criticism, demonstrated most clearly perhaps by the failure of the narrator to see any contradiction between his long battle for individual rights and dignities, and his plan to subject all federal employees in 1952 to a questionnaire and a prospective inquisition which was an affront to their self-respect.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Columbia University

CARL CARMER. *The Susquehanna.* Pp. 493. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1955. $5.00.

When, in 1937, the late Constance Lindsay Skinner planned the *Rivers of America* series, she was inaugurating not only a series but a trend. Since then we have had series devoted to mountains, trails, lakes, regions, and cities. The appetite of the American reading public for books dealing with folk history seems never to be satiated. In this original series alone we now have, counting the present volume, forty-eight books. The present author, whose earlier volume on the Hudson was widely acclaimed, is now general editor of the series.

Flowing out of Otsego Lake, in south-central New York, the Susquehanna drifts

lazily through New York and Pennsylvania and briefly through Maryland until it enters Chesapeake Bay. Its course roughly approximates that of the Greek *sigma*. Never important as a means of transportation, with the possible exception of the ark and raft era of the early lumbering days, the Susquehanna becomes important and colorful chiefly in terms of the people who have lived along its banks. Mr. Carmer tells the story of the river in twenty-three chapters, of which the first twenty-two occupy roughly two-thirds of the volume.

These twenty-two chapters contain many unusual and colorful tales. Beginning with John Smith in 1608, Carmer writes of the strange doings of Lord Talbot, and of the romantic story of the French nobles who founded the Gallic city of Azilum. Here are thundering good tales of the Revolutionary era, of Tory and of Whig. The activities of the Molly Maguires and the Pinkertons, the massacre at Wyoming, the struggles over conflicting land claims, the rumors that turned to panic when it appeared that the Confederacy had successfully invaded (and colonized?) the peaceful Susquehanna valley—all of these are good reading, good folk-history in the tradition of the series. The final chapter, a third of the volume, follows the river down stream, recounting story and myth as the river flows along. In many ways this is the most interesting part of the volume.

No one can doubt that Mr. Carmer is an excellent writer. His volume about the Hudson River is one of the best in this series; his *Stars Fell on Alabama* and *Listen for a Lonesome Drum* entitle him to his high place among American folklorists. Yet this is, in spite of interesting sections, a disappointing volume. The early pages contain much forced writing, a seeming attempt at scholarly and thorough presentation that results only, it seems to this reviewer, in clumsy and dull passages. There is a single and unsatisfactory map. Yet there are sections, the last chapter in general and the description of Coopertown in particular, that are fascinating. Mr. Carmer can certainly write superbly; it is unfortunate that he has not chosen to do so throughout this volume. If not the worst in the series, this is far from the best.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
State University of New York
Cortland

SAUL K. PADOVER (Ed.). *The Washington Papers: Basic Selections from the Public and Private Papers of George Washington.* Pp. 430. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $5.00.

The character of this volume and the editor's purpose in producing it are clearly indicated in the concluding lines of the Introduction. "Here are Washington's speeches and addresses, his essential diaries, many of his more important letters and comments. The editor has tried to eliminate the irrelevant but to omit nothing that is of importance for an understanding of the essential Washington. Here we see him in his capacity as surveyor and planter, as general and patriot, as President and Statesman, as family man and friend. The editor's aim has been to produce a one-volume treasury of Washington, to show him in his fullness and many-sidedness." The Introduction contains an excellent character sketch and Parson Weems' classic of the cherry tree which Dr. Padover calls the "most famous Weemsy."

The papers are arranged topically and there is a minimum of editing; characters are rarely identified; seldom is background material furnished; and extracts of letters are usually given without regard to context. One may question whether a different plan of organization, which would have presented complete letters in chronological sequence connected by brief explanatory notes, would not have resulted in a work of more interest to the general reader. Washington's cumbersome eighteenth-century style does not contribute to the general readability of the volume.

The papers show that Washington was proud of the new nation which he had helped to bring into existence and that he had optimistic expectations of its economic and political future. His trials in the Revolution as well as the weaknesses of the Confederation had impressed upon him the need for a strong central administration; he was pleased with the success of the government under the Constitution of 1787. He was a strong advocate of a national university where the mingling of potential leaders from all parts of the country would lessen the danger of sectionalism; such an institution, he thought, would cause fewer young Americans to go abroad for study and exposure to political ideas unfriendly to republicanism. He was, in his way, deeply religious. He was interested in improving farming methods and was a correspondent of Arthur Young, the famous agricultural reformer. He had a high and affentionate regard for Lafayette. His strong sense of family loyalty and responsibility is attested by the sound advice and substantial aid that he frequently gave relatives and by the bequests of his will.

We are indebted to the editor for making available in a convenient volume this representative collection of Washington Papers.

CECIL JOHNSON
University of North Carolina

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

A. D. H. KAPLAN. *Big Enterprise in a Competitive System.* Pp. xii, 269. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1954. $4.00.

Are the presence and growth of big business compatible with the survival of the competitive system of American capitalism? This is the fundamental issue explored by Dr. Kaplan in the interesting volume under review. After a careful and extensive study of the *structure* and *performance* of big business, the author concludes that big business has been functioning in a highly dynamic, market determining economy; and that all the available evidence indicates it will probably continue to do so. A high degree of vigorous competitive activity has been retained. The giant corporations operate in a competitive environment where the development of alternative products, the use of new substitute materials, and a constantly shifting product-mix are responsible for continuous adjustment to consumer choice patterns. Even in the area of pricing, while increasing stability of prices for short periods is evident, the secular reductions in the prices of such products as rayon, dyestuffs, tires, gasoline, and the new "wonder drugs" show a strong downward pressure. The fear of Berle and Means in 1932 that the projected growth rates of 200 giant corporations would, by 1950, result in their control of half the total national wealth, has not been realized; and the small firm has continued to play an important role in our economy.

Dr. Kaplan begins his book (Chapter I) with one of the finest short reviews I have ever read of the growth of American public opinion and public policy towards monopoly and big business. An astonishing amount of specific detail and stimulating interpretation has been compressed into fifty-two pages. This historic survey is followed by an interesting chapter on the "rationale" of competitive enterprise—concepts of free competition, free enterprise, free markets, imperfect competition, and oligopoly. Against this broad background a series of chapters develop in detail the growth of big business in relation to industrial concentration, financial concentration, price competition, the drives of competition, and the size and integration of firms. An excellent summary chapter concludes the volume. All data is presented effectively, but the study is not intended as a source book for data on the American economy.

There have been many books written since the 1920's calling attention to the dangers inherent in the rise of big business and concentration in industry. Dr. Kaplan, while clearly aware of these dangers, gives a lucid analytical picture of the other side of the issue. He emphasizes the necessity for a more realistic and workable concept of competition. The classical concept developed in an era of small business and relatively simple industrial technology is not a very satisfactory tool for the study of the modern dynamic economy, constantly reoriented by innovations in methods and basic materials used. Dr. Kaplan has given us a stimulating volume.

The reviewer intends to make considerable use of this work and believes others will find its study equally rewarding.

W. W. HEWETT
University of Cincinnati

SAMUEL LUBELL. *The Revolution in World Trade and American Economic Policy.* Pp. xvi, 143. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $2.50.

The Revolution in World Trade and American Economic Policy is written in protest against the deceptive illusion, "oversold" to the American public, "that the world's economic problems can be remedied simply by lowering United States tariffs and lifting the trade restrictions of other nations." With vigorous and lucid analysis the author reviews the major forces behind the economic revolution currently reshaping the world, urges the substitution of leadership through mutual understanding among the allied free nations for leadership by example, and outlines a series of proposals designed to assure an integrated foreign economic program.

A series of four chapters, based on both firsthand observation and careful study, deal with the nature of the economic forces at work in the major world areas and deserve a wide reader audience. Here the author analyzes: (1) Asia's dollar problem which stems less from an inability to sell what she produces than from a desire to import so much more than ever before; (2) Britain's real battle, the difficulties of which involve not her economic relationship to the United States or the dollar area, but rather her concentration of exporting and investment energies for the achievement of a favored position within the sterling trade bloc; (3) Western Europe's diversion of resources not for reintegration into the world economy, but for the integration of the resources and markets of dependent areas with those of the home countries; and (4) the pressing by the Soviets of a deceptive trade policy designed to split the free-world allies by exploiting the tensions and rivalries among them. Thus we see emerging a world trade pattern consisting of a number of trade blocs each in partial conflict with the other.

In the sections of the book dealing with solutions, the author is more certain in the statement of objectives than in the outline of methods. Having been declared an illusory means for closing the "dollar gap," the lowering of United States tariffs appears to be ruled out entirely. Included in the aims are many which are implicit in existing foreign policy. The difficulty of freeing "major currencies" appears in bold relief throughout the author's own analysis and the desirability of convertibility can hardly be dissociated from the whole complex of other proposed measures. On the proposed expanded program of foreign investment to stimulate the growth of underdeveloped countries, one might also wish that the author had been more explicit and detailed. The suggested plan of understanding among the allied free nations for limiting trade with the Iron Curtain countries runs counter to a well reasoned opinion which permits no simple solution. These unanswered questions, however, simply add to the unique significance of a book which deserves the attention of student and policy maker alike.

AMOS E. TAYLOR
Washington, D. C.

SIGMUND DIAMOND. *The Reputation of the American Businessman.* Pp. 209. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $4.00.

The author of this book set himself a two-fold task. One was to analyze the conceptions held by various groups in the United States at particular times regarding the significance of the entrepreneur and the ingredients of entrepreneurial success. The other was to examine the changing conception of the entrepreneur's significance in America over time. Subject to the limitations of determining the exact nature of public opinion, a problem explicitly recognized by the author, the book succeeds admirably in meeting these objectives.

No one will quarrel with the choice of Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor, Cornelius Vanderbilt, J. Pierpont Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and Henry Ford as subjects for the sort of analysis proposed. The careers of these men were well spaced over the 116 years that separated the death of Girard from the demise of Ford. While they achieved success in somewhat different fields, each was an outstanding, if not the outstanding, businessman of his generation.

For somewhat obvious reasons the author has drawn heavily on statements made at the time of the death of each of these men. He disclaims the use of any "sophisticated notions of sampling" in gathering his data. But an extensive coverage of available sources, and the great care in securing a cross section of opinion, leave little to be criticized in respect to methodology.

The findings of the study can be briefly summarized. In the early nineteenth century the entrepreneur in America was described as a man with certain personal qualities that made for success; qualities that would have made for success at any time, in any place, under any circumstances. His nonbusiness acts were private and not "deemed suitable for discussion or even relevant to an understanding of the man" (p. 178). The destination, not the source of his wealth or the methods used in acquiring it, largely determined whether public reaction was favorable or unfavorable.

By the end of the century the standards for judging the significance of the American businessman had shifted. The roles he had in common with the rest of his countrymen were now considered relevant in explaining his status. "The individualism of the entrepreneur, which once meant his personal uniqueness, now means his conformity with qualities possessed by all" (p. 181). "Business enterprise itself, not its by-product in the form of philanthropy, becomes the basis for the twentieth century evaluation of the businessman" (p. 179). Moreover, it was argued that without the economic system—capitalism or free enterprise—entrepreneurial success would be impossible.

This shift in the symbolism of the businessman, the author believes, was in response to growing attacks on the entrepreneur and the economic system. The fact that the defense or rationalization has been quite successful indicates the continued vitality of the functions performed by the entrepreneur in America. "For only as a symbol takes on new meanings relevant to new social conditions may it live" (p. 182).

Because of the fresh and original treatment of a somewhat familiar subject this reviewer fully agrees with the statement on the book's dust jacket, "Businessmen, their public relations counselors, journalists, and the general public will be as interested in this book as will the historians."

HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON
Northwestern University

IRVING BERNSTEIN. *Arbitration of Wages.* Pp. xiii, 125. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954. $3.50.

Basically the author has drawn his material as well as his conclusions from an analysis of all of the reported arbitration decisions, in which at least one of the issues involved was wages, reported in the Bureau of National Affairs "Labor Arbitration Reports," Volumes I-XIV, covering the period 1945–50. In addition he has skillfully woven into the text pertinent observations by other writers in the field. He cautions the reader in the Preface that his work is not intended to be the arbitrator's "handy guide" because his source of material is limited to the principles that have been determined by arbitrators in a limited number of cases, that is, 209. Moreover, he recognizes wisely that there is no final word in an area as fluid as wage arbitration.

The author concludes that to understand wage arbitration one must take account of three basic considerations. The first is that the arbitrator's judgment replaces that of the parties in framing the wage fraction of the collective agreement and at the same time serves as a substitute for work stoppage. In consequence, he must behave as the parties would have if they had not

needed him, in order to make his award acceptable. Secondly, when the parties elect to submit the wage issue to arbitration each has concluded that it can gain its own vision of the wage no more effectively by any other device. Thirdly, that since the criteria of wage determination are something less than definitive their shortcomings are as hazardous to the arbitrator as they are to the parties. In consequence, "his problem is not to lay out a yardstick and measure off an amount, but, rather, to balance contesting standards in an exercise in responsible judgment."

The author's analysis reveals that the criteria of wage determination are given sharply differing weights by the parties and arbitrators in the cases studied. He concludes, however, that the order of weight given to the most frequently used wage criteria by arbitrators appears to be: comparisons, normally intra-industry and less often inter-industry; cost of living; and financial condition of the employer. Other wage criteria that are rarely utilized by arbitrators include differential features of work, regularity of employment, money value of fringe items, substandard wages, productivity, and hours of work.

The book is exceptionally well-written, well-documented, and contains a wealth of material that can be extremely useful to employers, unions, arbitrators, and students who have any concern with the complex problems involved in the arbitration of wage matters.

JOHN R. ABERSOLD
University of Pennsylvania

THE EDITORS OF FORTUNE. *The Changing American Market.* Pp. 304. Garden City, N. Y.: Hanover House, 1955. $4.50.

This book presents with some revisions a series of twelve articles that appeared in *Fortune* between August 1953 and 1954. The editors hope that it will prove to be "an exciting new kind of travelogue for everyone interested in America as well as a statistical source book for the trained student of the United States economy" (p. 7).

Lay readers who like to have facts about changing consumption in quantitative terms will find much of interest. Market analysts who want a broad survey of many types of consumer markets will find the book a mine of information. Information from many sources has been brought together and interpreted. Many charts are included in the text; tables have been relegated to the appendix out of the way of the readers gathering impressions, but available for those wishing to make a closer appraisal. Many of the charts suffer, however, from being condensed from the format of *Fortune* magazine to that of the book.

The book is full of optimism about the future, exemplified in such chapter titles as "The Rich Middle Income Class," "The Lush New Suburban Market," "The Fabulous Market for Food." Consumption levels have been high and are to be higher in the future even though marked increases in population are in prospect. The authors are nevertheless very candid about the probable decrease in the demand for some types of consumer goods, the kind of competition traditional lines are likely to encounter from new products that the technology develops, and the shifts in demand occurring because of the greater equality of the incomes.

The travelogue is one of many short stops rather than a few long visits. A few readers as they hurry along may sense certain paradoxes in the facts and the interpretations. What meaning should be attached to low income families in 1947 spending 90 per cent of their income for food? (p. 280). Does income going to food or to any other consumer goods signify tendencies if income was underreported or if it was an abnormally low year for the families concerned? Such families were probably spending during the year of the survey $150 for every $100 income reported. Much is said about the increase in "discretionary" income that has occurred with the recent rise in real income. The recent rise in income has been spectacular. It seems important to bear in mind, however, that American consumers have been experiencing a rise in real income for several decades, the thirties bringing a break in a long run trend. It has been shown over and over again that comforts and conveniences rather quickly become an established part of a consumption pattern.

MARGARET G. REID
University of Chicago

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

GABRIEL A. ALMOND. *The Appeals of Communism.* Pp. xix, 415. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. $6.00.

Dr. Almond and his colleagues have applied the methods of social science research in a brilliant study of the Communist movement.

The scholars who designed the research which has led to *The Appeals of Communism* hypothesized that not only would the Communist recruits differ from their fellow men in significant ways, they would also take on to some extent at least the character of the societies in which they operated. Thus, the research concerned itself with both the small deviational party movements of the United States and England, and with the mass working class parties of France and Italy. The differences between the two types of movements, as revealed in the analysis by country, lead to some of the book's most stimulating conclusions.

The authors employed a number of research tools in reaching their conclusions. From a painstaking content analysis of selected Communist publications they were able to establish models of the movement at various levels of ideological indoctrination. Through this process they were able to lay the ground work for a set of hypotheses about the reliability of different types of Communist party members, and the conditions which are likely to put their loyalties under strain.

Next they interviewed in immense detail a sample of 221 "former Communists, which included Frenchmen, Italians, Englishmen, and Americans; workers and middle class; those who had joined in the period before the Popular Front and those who joined after; and those who had served in the various echelons of the party, the high, the low, and the rank and file."

And finally, a group of American psychoanalysts who had had Communists as patients provided thirty-five clinical case histories for study.

While the authors make no claim to statistical validity for the resultant findings, they are understandably proud of the fact that they are based on the largest and most carefully selected body of empirical data so far collected on these aspects of the Communist problem.

The methodological approach which led to simultaneous research into the parties in all four countries gives new and revealing evidence of the vast differences in susceptibility of the four populations. More important, it suggests methods for coping with the threat in each nation.

On this latter point the authors find the British and American Communist parties "standing in the sharpest contrast to those of France and Italy. . . . They do not touch the real fiber of the British and American societies. Communists may infiltrate other movements such as trade unions, or 'capture key points' by . . . placing agents in sensitive jobs, but there is no mass susceptibility to Communism in Britain and the United States."

On the other hand, "The continued attraction of Communism for intellectuals in countries such as France and Italy may be attributed to the deep and apparently chronic social crises characteristic of those countries which confront the intellectuals with problems of decision which are more complex and exacting than those which confront their colleagues in England and the United States."

While acknowledging the need to alert the public to the nature and threat of Communism in the United States, the authors find much to criticize in recent U. S. policy. Congressional investigating committees which have violated the "humane and libertarian tradition of the West" have been one of Communism's biggest assets.

In France and Italy, Dr. Almond and his colleagues find the Communist parties holding the countries in a state of virtual political siege. Only by aiding in the de-

velopment of a "militant left" will the West hold the front in these two areas.

"For obvious reasons, this is not a campaign for the United States government to undertake. To inspire confidence the main leadership must come from the peoples of these countries themselves. However, such a movement can be sparked, and financed, and advised by the powerful free trade union movements of the United States, England, and the European continent."

These challenging ideas reflect only a small part of the solid research and solid thinking which have gone into this meaty report.

ELMO C. WILSON

International Research Associates

F. STUART CHAPIN, JR., and others. *In the Shadow of a Defense Plant: A Study of Urbanization in Rural South Carolina.* Pp. xvi, 260. Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, 1954. $2.50.

THE INSTITUTE FOR URBAN STUDIES, University of Pennsylvania, with the cooperation of the Bureau of Urban Research, Princeton University. *Accelerated Urban Growth in a Metropolitan Fringe Area: A Study of Urbanization, Suburbanization and the Impact of the U. S. Steel Plant in Lower Bucks County, Pennsylvania.* Vol. I, *Summary Report,* Vol. II, *Project Report.* Pp. ix, 63, xx; xxv, 262. Vol. I, $2.00; Vol. II, $4.00; Two vols., $5.00.

World War II's boom towns fascinated students of urbanization. Despite the difficulties of research in wartime, teams of social scientists were deployed as participant-observers in Willow Run (Carr and Stermer), Seneca, Illinois (Havighurst and Morgan), Hampton Roads (Marsh and others), Charlestown, Indiana (Field and Stoner), and elsewhere. They reported the dismal failure of rural local government to respond to the needs for new public services, lack of co-ordination in the actions of state and federal agencies, social conflicts between the old settlers and the new in-migrants, and disruption of community life. But, of course, this was wartime: what could one expect?

On November 28, 1950, The Atomic Energy Commission announced that about 315 square miles of land along the Savannah River would be evacuated to become the site of the world's largest industrial plant, bringing into a predominantly rural area a construction force of 36,000 and a permanent labor force of over 6,000.

In the summer of 1950, it became apparent that an unidentified agency was about to undertake a major development in lower Bucks County, Pennsylvania, announced by the United States Steel Corporation on December 27, 1950 as the world's largest integrated steel works. Here was no mass evacuation; 3,800 acres of truck farms were acquired in an area already in the throes of suburbanization lying between the expanding centers of Philadelphia and Trenton.

Alert urbanists at universities in the two regions obtained the support of the now defunct Division of Research of the United States Housing and Home Finance Agency to send well balanced teams of sociologists, planners, political scientists, social workers and land economists into the areas to watch what would happen over the next two years. The stated purpose of research was the development of guides for urbanization in metropolitan areas affected by the building of large industrial plants.

The guides appear in these able and interesting reports. The South Carolina report sets forth "Lessons for the Future," for the relocation of the displaced families and for rapid urbanization of open areas. Alas, the lessons of the extensive Tennessee Valley Authority relocation experience (in reservoir clearances) were written plain for AEC to see; but, in the words of the report, in the name of security for the nation, there resulted unwarranted threats to individual security of the displaced families. Our principles of compensation were and are totally inadequate. The Bucks County report lists sixteen pages of "Guides to Urbanization": a check list of steps that must be taken to provide for orderly growth and the provision of needed services.

Yet the reports of the 1951–53 experiences read frighteningly like the wartime reports. No use blaming a school board in Bucks County for not building schools fast enough. As the authors say, no school board in the United States is geared to complete a new school every ninety days—to meet the rate of population growth in Levittown! Most distressingly, it almost seems that the basic decisions on plant location have to be made in ways that militate against planned and orderly absorption of the shock. United States Steel had to act secretly until it had assembled its 3,800 acres—or rampant speculation would have driven land costs out of sight. Still, as the Pennsylvania-Princeton team points out, if there had been a county planning board in Bucks County, if there had been more logical boundaries to the units of local government, if . . ., if . . ., the trauma would have caused less human pain. The prescription for a cure is well presented. How can these studies in pathology lay the basis for preventive hygiene in the next areas where the shock of industrialization will fall?

CHARLES S. ASCHER

Brooklyn College

ROBERT MOORE FISHER (Ed.). *The Metropolis in Modern Life.* (Columbia University Bicentennial Conference Series.) Pp. xiii, 401. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955. $6.00.

These writings grew out of the first conference, under the chairmanship of economist Ernest M. Fisher, held in 1954 in connection with the bicentennial celebration of Columbia University. Consisting of sixteen principal papers and nineteen commentaries, they have been well ordered and edited by Robert Moore Fisher, who has contributed an Introduction to each of the eight parts of the volume.

The general question to which the conference was addressed was how to enhance the advantages and to minimize the disadvantages of the modern metropolis. It seemed to be generally agreed that the metropolis provides a richer and fuller kind of living than is possible anywhere else—due to the greater diversity, specialization, efficiency, social mobility, and other characteristics of the large city—and that these advantages outweigh the disadvantages of congestion, noise, crime and immorality, anonymity, political and social apathy, and similar conditions which exist in greater degree in the metropolis than in small communities. While the conference was concerned with understanding the metropolis rather than with solutions of metropolitan problems, it assumed that the latter could be lessened through the application of science, technology, and planning.

The volume begins with "the dynamic role of the city in social development" and proceeds to discuss the political, economic, and legal influences and effects of metropolitan concentrations and the adaptations occurring in response to new and changing conditions—the strongest section in this reviewer's opinion. The influence of science and technology on the metropolis is next considered in a general way, followed by a more specific discussion of the impact of the metropolis on the professions, in which the main theme is the trends in increasing specialization and in interprofessional cooperation. The last two sections are addressed to the effects of the metropolis upon spiritual life (which doesn't say very much) and the search for the ideal city (which has some interesting commentaries).

In view of the origin and nature of this volume, a comment on the personnel may be in order. Of the sixteen principal contributors, five came from Great Britain and two from France; the remaining nine from various parts of the United States. Of the nineteen commentators, one was from abroad (Denmark), the others hold positions in this country. The disciplines and fields of activity represented range from archeology to theology, with law, the social sciences, and city planning in numerical prominence. Besides professors, who are the most numerous, the group included university administrators; directors of foundations and institutes; and a few business executives and others from the world of affairs. Though symposia always present certain inherent problems, the output here seems hardly commensurate with this array of talent. The reader who is a specialist in a given field will not be greatly enlightened by the section of the volume con-

cerned with his specialty, but he may profit by perusing the essays in other fields.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

Yale University

RUPERT B. VANCE and NICHOLAS J. DEMERATH (Eds.). *The Urban South.* Pp. xii, 307. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. $5.00.

The growth of southern cities and the impact of urbanization on social life in the South are the themes developed in this symposium published under the auspices of the University of North Carolina. The volume is the latest of a long series of regional studies of the South.

Part I consists of chapters by Heberle, T. Lynn Smith, Thompson, Hitt, and Dinkel on the growth of cities, occupational and economic changes, migration, and demography. In Part II, Organizational Aspects of Southern Cities, there are two chapters on ecology (Vance and Sara Smith, Demerath and Gilmore), a chapter on social stratification (Kaufman), and one on crime (Porterfield). Part III, labeled Urbanism, Change, and Tradition, includes chapters on race relations (Bullock), southern politics (Ewing and Titus), community organization (Hunter), city planning (Chapin), and "Possum Trot" (Nixon).

Anyone who has experienced the agonizing frustrations of planning and editing a symposium (as has the reviewer) is probably disposed to view with kindly tolerance the efforts of others to achieve effective academic co-operation. Most undertakings of this type lack uniformity in the quality of contributions, and this book is no exception. Furthermore, there is a flavor of warmed-over potatoes in T. L. Smith's chapter, which was reprinted from his textbook, and in Heberle's chapter, a slight revision of an article written several years ago.

Some of the chapters are based on fresh research data, or at least unpublished data concerning southern cities. Particularly impressive are those dealing with occupational shifts and economic changes, metropolitan dominance and integration, urban ecology, and race relations. Some interesting data and interpretations concerning the impact of urbanism on southern politics are also provided. Kaufman's chapter on social classes falls below his usual standard, probably because he had limited concrete data upon which to base his discussion of an extremely complex phenomenon. Likewise, Hunter's discussion of community organization is so highly generalized that there is really nothing new in it; hence a contrast to his extremely valuable monograph on power and community structure. Chapin might well have been more concrete in his discussion of city planning in the South.

A spirit of optimism pervades most of the writings. The South is on the march. It is recovering from its feeling of inferiority and is now prepared to take its proper place in the national picture. It is no longer the problem area of the nation. The growth of cities is symbolic of progress and a harbinger of the new order of things. "Possum Trot is dead." Not much is said about the unlovely aspects of the South, things that have made this region "reputedly one of the more backward areas." Even racial discrimination is handled so discretely that bigoted Southerners could hardly object to the treatment.

One is tempted to raise the unorthodox question as to when interest in regionalism tends to become provincialism, or at least when it fosters provincialism. To state the matter differently, do we need regional studies of the "urban Middle West," the "urban Pacific Coast," or "urban New England"? There seems to be some risk that preoccupation with regionalism may lead to a kind of cultural myopia so that the position of regional phenomena in the larger national and international setting is obscured. One of the weaknesses of American sociology in general is its geographic and cultural provincialism because of its focus on things American almost to the complete exclusion of things elsewhere. American sociologists are beginning to peer over their national boundaries to have a look at other societies and forms of social organization, although lagging behind the anthropologists in this respect. Regional sociologists likewise should keep an eye on the larger society so that things may be viewed in their proper historical and cultural setting. At present there is a need for studies of urbanization in world perspective. *The Urban South* should be seen as one of the elements of this world-wide trend.

Sociological studies in the South have been largely slanted to rural society. Now that the South is going urban in a big way, it may be hoped that this volume will encourage sociologists of that region to expand their researches to take into account the great changes accompanying the shift to a city-dominated area.

NOEL P. GIST

University of Missouri

O. A. OESER and S. B. HAMMOND (Eds.). *Social Structure and Personality in a City.* (Studies of Social Behaviour, Vol. I.) Pp. xxii, 344. $4.50.

Social Structure and Personality in a Rural Community. (Studies of Social Behaviour, Vol. II.) Pp. xiii, 279. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $3.75.

Numerous studies have appeared which describe the world-wide shift of population from rural to urban areas and its broad economic and political consequences. Detailed explorations of the consequences of this shift in terms of changing social contexts for the emergence of individual personalities are a good deal less numerous. These volumes, based upon research largely supported by UNESCO, are a useful addition to the latter type of study. They present a collection of working papers on rural and urban personality structures in Australia by a group of University of Melbourne social psychologists. The emphasis is upon ideological differences in personality make-up rather than upon a complete over-all picture of Australian life. That is to say, the orientation is a selective socio-psychological one, not an exhaustive anthropological one.

In undertaking the study the authors have avoided the pitfalls of exploring too broad a field. They recognize the unwieldy nature of any such unit of analysis as "the Australian individual." Rather, they limit their focus to two phases or age segments within an individual life span: children aged ten to twelve years and their parents. They address themselves to the question of how the personality structures of these selected groups are influenced by the Australian mode of life and whether, within this mode of life, there are significant rural-urban differences.

Individual personality structure is defined as a system of values, needs, and modes of response; the differences in patterns of social expectations and pressures which condition this personality structure are explored in sample rural and urban communities. Individuals within the sample were interviewed to assess the extent and character of their participation in family, school, and other community groups. The data from those interviews are subjected to various techniques of small group analysis. There emerges first a contrast between urban and rural families in terms of group activities. For both rural parents and children, the family household is the focus of a larger proportion of day-to-day activities than is the case for urban family groups. This in itself is no new discovery, but the authors define this contrast in meaningful empirical terms. For example, they have constructed indices for the assessment of tensions associated with the intra-family activities for both parents and children.

Farm youths, with heavier household participation scores than the urban youths, show lower degrees of tension associated with these activities. This, in addition to the fact that the over-all tension score for urban families is greater than that for rural households. By pursuing still further the factors associated with this contrast, the authors conclude that the basic orientations of the children are functionally related to the place of the family within the larger social organization. Urban children find themselves oriented more directly towards their peers, even though the family represents their "strongest emotional ties and contributes much more to meeting their basic needs." Adult urban existence makes stronger demands in the direction of getting on with others largely in secondary contacts rather than in the direction of family solidarity. Children brought up

within this framework of expectations are being conditioned for the individualistic life they will lead as urban adults.

Farm children, in contrast, are prepared for adult expectations in precisely the opposite manner. Rural family solidarity increases the child's foreknowledge of the manner in which he will be expected to behave as an adult. This period serves as a sort of apprenticeship, or as the authors phrase it "anticipatory socialization—a preparation for participation in adult life as a farmer or as a farmer's wife."

There is a great deal of useful information to be had from these studies, but one might wish for more editorial cohesion than is here displayed. The volumes are the work of a staff of researchers and difference in style and focus is frequently apparent.

THOMAS O. WILKINSON
University of Massachusetts

CHARLES ABRAMS. *Forbidden Neighbors: A Study of Prejudice in Housing.* Pp. xi, 404. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $5.00.

"*Apartheid* in America" would be an appropriate title for this vivid description of residential segregation of racial, religious, and nationality groups.

Charles Abrams is a lawyer, author, university lecturer, journalist and, presently, New York State rent administrator. The book is interesting, readable—and disturbing.

Forbidden Neighbors is the most comprehensive treatment available of housing segregation and discrimination as practiced against Americans of Chinese, Japanese, Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Negro descent. The chapters on the roles of realtors, financial institutions, property owners' associations, and government agencies reveal plainly the discrepancy between the American creed and the American deed. The accounts of mob violence in Chicago and Miami are shocking. Abrams' review of promising experiments with interracial housing, and his recommendations for education and action show that something is being done and much more can be done.

Abrams weakens his case by attributing evil motives to the public and private elements in the power structure of the housing industry. These people are no more prejudiced than are the people who buy houses in the Levittowns and thousands of other all-white suburban communities. Questions about property values puzzle banks and insurance companies that are responsible for investing other people's money. Abrams breaks down the problem and shows that there are many possible responses to the movement of Negroes into a white area. But because enough research has not been done, he cannot state what actually happens to property values under various conditions.

Abrams shows how prejudice makes housing the chief commodity in America not available on the same terms to whites and Negroes. Residential segregation makes for school segregation. It contributes to physical separation in recreation and worship and, above all, to separation in our thinking and feeling.

This is wrong, and we need to find ways to spur more Americans to work on this complex problem. The cessation of building during depression and war, our growing population, the urban migration, the rising level of incomes, and the competition for the limited supply of housing aggravate urban racial tensions. Most important, social controls with respect to numerical proportions are lacking in the field of private housing. In employment, management can integrate on a gradual basis. In housing, the white group feels unable to extend a neighborly hand because of its fears of being inundated. It is significant that in interracial public housing and cooperative housing, quotas are usually set on the number of Negroes. As long as so many whites feel the way they do about colored people, exhortation is no answer to the question of numbers.

Abrams has broken new ground in the crusade for equal opportunity and equal treatment of all Americans. The number of people working for integration is increasing. Abrams' book will enlighten and strengthen them.

FRANK S. LOESCHER
Philadelphia, Pa.

MICHAEL M. DAVIS. *Medical Care for Tomorrow.* Pp. x, 497. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $6.50.

Among the many recent publications on the sociology and economics of medicine, Dr. Davis' book stands out as the most comprehensive, the most scholarly, the most courageous, and the one most likely to rekindle the flames of controversy over national health insurance. The first three parts, dealing with basic elements in medical services, evolution in organizations, and evolution in economics, present a detailed description and an incisive analysis of the many and varied forces that have shaped the policies followed by society in its efforts to adapt medicine and the related sciences to social needs and uses. Acknowledging progress, Dr. Davis nevertheless is forced to conclude that the present balance is too uncertain to be durable. He believes the time has come to envision goals desirable alike for medicine and for society and to work toward their achievement. After studying the present situation through a microscope Dr. Davis takes a telescope to scan the horizon, and what he sees there is recorded in the final part of the book. Dr. Davis is convinced that the demand for comprehensive medical care will be persistent and growing in intensity, that the American people can afford to spend on medical care all they need (p. 322), and that the long-range interests of medicine and the interests of the public are against the fee-for-service method of remunerating physicians (p. 337). He is fully aware of the fact that the problem of organizing payment for comprehensive medical care is interrelated with others, such as creation of a service organization providing for the necessary profesional personnel and physical facilities and for attainment of teamwork through group practice and regional organization of hospitals. He realizes the importance of educational processes, especially the need for changing the climate of opinion in professional schools. "The basic issue . . . is not the survival of individualism, but *the maintenance of individuality within organization*" (p. 428).

Without a "broad and frontal attack on the economic problem of medical care, that is, the methods of paying for it," the author expects but "slight and spotty progress in developing widespread group-practice units, regional organization, adequate supply and distribution of needed professional personnel" (p. 395). Discussing the chief alternatives in developing group payment, Dr. Davis is certain "that we shall have neither all insurance nor all taxation, but some of both" (p. 430). He favors national health insurance, proceeding by stages, and makes a strong plea for "*expedited* gradualism, expedited and directed by those who view medicine not merely as a healing, or even a preventive agent but as one of the chief creative and reconstructive forces which physical, chemical, biological, psychological, and social sciences are now marshaling for mankind" (p. 433).

FRANZ GOLDMANN
Harvard School of Public Health

JOSEPH FLETCHER. *Morals and Medicine.* Pp. xvii, 243. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. $4.50.

This is a study of the "ethics of medical care," as distinct from "medical ethics" in the ordinary meaning of the latter term. The author, who is professor of Christian ethics at the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, states that little systematic writing on his subject has been produced in Protestant or Jewish circles. He also finds the treatment of such genuinely ethical questions as appear in professional codes to be ambiguous or evasive. These codes, moreover, focus on the rights and actions of physicians, whereas the author is concerned with the rights of patients. There is, on the other hand, a large and pertinent Catholic literature, to which the present study is offered as "counterpoint."

The author's views are founded on an extensive knowledge of the sources—both historical and contemporary. They are also based on the belief that choice and responsibility are "the very heart of ethics." Patients, like all men, are moral or immoral to the extent that they are free. They therefore have a right to be treated as free beings; that is, as persons rather

than as cases. They are entitled, for example, to be told the truth about diagnosis and prognosis so that they may make their own plans and decisions. The only exception to this relates to the care of those who are psychotic or emotionally disturbed.

Dr. Fletcher deplores, in this connection, the tendency among physicians to treat diseases rather than persons—an impersonal approach which he ascribes to specialization and a resulting indifference to human values. It may be added, however, that this attitude derived originally from the nineteenth-century emphasis upon a localized, specific pathology, which logically focused attention on diseases as such. The situation is being modified today, quite apart from its moral aspects, by a partial return to a generalized pathloogy of "the whole man."

Science, Dr. Fletcher declares, has extended man's freedom by widening the choices available in medical matters; while theology has usually limited freedom by rejecting each new alternative in turn. Chief among these alternatives are those relating to life and death; and Dr. Fletcher therefore poses in succession the controversial issues of contraception, artificial insemination, sterilization, and euthanasia. He examines Catholic opposition to each of these procedures and ascribes it to a particular concept of "natural law." This concept, it is held, has come to identify what is right with what ordinarily occurs in nature—rather than with moral values in themselves. Dr. Fletcher rejects this "materialistic and animistic doctrine," and concludes that free choice in each of these issues raises man about brutish or fatalistic attitudes to a level of personal integrity.

The argument throughout is primarily moral in tone, but the humane advantages of the proposed practices—individual and social—are also noted. The appeal is to reason rather than to dogma, and no attempts are made to shock the reader or to arouse feeling against those who think otherwise. The study impresses the reviewer as an unusually clear, timely, and courageous one.

RICHARD H. SHRYOCK
Johns Hopkins University

HAROLD A. BONER. *Hungry Generations: The Nineteenth Century Case Against Malthusianism.* Pp. viii, 234. New York: King's Crown Press, 1955. $3.75.

Hungry Generations is a survey of the literature touching on the Malthusian controversy from Godwin to Wells. Through the writings of editors, publicists, economists, novelists and poets, the author traces the rise and decline of the authority of Malthus' ideas. Authors receiving most attention include Carlyle, Dickens, Disraeli, Godwin, Kingsley, J. S. Mill, and Southey; but many others are included. This is not a scientific treatise, but literary criticism. Its thesis seems to be that the ideas of Malthus were utterly false, were accepted because of their utility to the ruling class, but finally were exposed as full of glaring fallacies by the literary critics. The survey conveniently stops short of the revival of Malthusianism following World War I.

The "Malthusian controversy" was marked by much heat, hair splitting, and logomachy with much neglect of facts or even scorn of them. This war of words is here interestingly traced with acuteness and general impartiality though leaving the basic issues where they were. Hence it is a work of scholarly futility. The basic fault lies in the narrow interpretation of Malthusianism. While no systematic statement is anywhere made, the author adheres rather consistently to the following: Malthus held that poverty is inevitable and incurable, and that the poor are themselves responsible because of their inherent imprudence in breeding; hence, a Socialist-Communist utopia is unattainable; moreover, poor relief should be abolished because it undermines prudence, subtracts from the well-being of the prudent, and harms the imprudent by spreading poverty over larger numbers; this suffering of the poor is part of the mysterious designs of Providence.

This may come close to the views of the first edition of the *Essay,* but since Malthus was fully aware of criticisms of his ideas and made substantial alterations in the second edition, it is not possible to hold him to such a harsh interpretation. The proof is found in this survey, for it classes among those who undermined what the author considers "Malthusianism" numerous persons who considered themselves Malthusians and were so considered by their contemporaries; in some cases they are dubbed even by our author as "Malthusians with a difference." These include such names as Place, the Mills, Ricardo, Senior, and others.

What Malthus persisted in from first to last was his central contention that poverty is inevitable *unless* the poor restrict their multiplication. He did not contend that all the poor were hopelessly imprudent; he was one of the first to suggest that a higher standard of living encouraged prudence. To contend that he held that nothing could be done to alleviate poverty is to set up something of a bogeyman. His central contention was admitted by nearly all his opponents. It is clearly a truth of first-rate social significance as the workers of the West have at long last learned, and as the hungry generations of the Orient are now beginning to understand.

Finally, it may well be doubted whether or not the often fierce contentions of the critics had much to do with the decline of Malthus' authority. If that were true, how would one account for his present revival? Far more important were the great technological advances, the vast increase in trade, the abundant food from America, and the obvious improvement in the conditions of the working class. Far from "the Malthusian minority" dwindling "into its present obscurity" (p. 174), it now stretches around the globe and finds in Malthus one of the major prophets of all time.

FRANK H. HANKINS
Smith College

RALPH LINTON. *The Tree of Culture.* Pp. xiv, 692, xvi. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. $5.75.

This posthumously published book is based in part on lectures delivered by Linton as Sterling Professor at Yale. The final processing of the volume was done by Mrs. Linton who states in the Preface that the title refers, not to familiar evolutionary tree, but to the banyan "whose branches cross and fuse and send down adventitious aerial roots which turn into supporting trunks. Although the banyan tree spreads and grows until it becomes a miniature jungle, it remains a single plant and its various branches are traceable to the parent trunk. So cultural evolution, in spite of diffusion and borrowing and divergent development, can be traced to prehistoric origins."

This statement sets clearly the mood and scope of the volume. It is the mixture of geographically defined culture areas, of scientific conceptualization, and of historical specificity that characterizes much of anthropological thought in the last fifty years. It is, in other words, a mature anthropologist's view of world cultures. Historical reconstruction as well as actual history, archaeology, and ethnography are blended in synoptic sketches of six major culture areas: Southeast Asia including Oceania; Southwest Asia including the Semitic cultural florescence, and Neolithic Europe; the Mediterranean complex including Islam; Africa in its prehistoric, Egyptian and indigenous contemporary civilization; the Orient meaning India, China and Japan; and finally the New World of both tribal and high cultures. The scope is frankly as pretentious as anthropology and world history. It belongs with Kroeber's *Anthropology* although its presentation is less scholarly, and its topical coverage is less complete. To the reviewer the richest aspects of the book are Part II: Evolutionary Processes and Part III: Basic Inventions. These 150 pages are not only masterly in their selective condensation, but are by that very fact creatively elucidating.

This is not a thought-provoking volume for the professional, but rather suggests itself as a text for a course on world ethnography. Also, the non-anthropologist who wants a lucid survey of how the professional organizes cultural data in historico-geographic terms will have here an instructive, poised, and knowledgeable presentation. He will also find the necessary maps, illustrations, and index as well as a carefully selected guide to further reading.

This is a good book, but it does not rank

with Professor Linton's distinguished contributions to the ethnology of three major world areas nor with some of his more creative volumes such as *The Study of Man* and *The Cultural Background of Personality*.

CORA DU BOIS

Cambridge, Mass.

W. F. OGBURN and M. F. NIMKOFF. *Technology and the Changing Family*. Pp. v, 329. Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955. $3.75.

The well-known veteran team of Ogburn and Nimkoff has produced a readable, well-organized book which is accurately described by its title. The conceptual framework of the book is distinctively sociological and, as might be expected, centers about technology as a prime mover having impact on family functions. Many ideas are familiar, but writings of Shakespeare seem full of "quotations." It should not be forgotten that Ogburn was the pioneer who originated, some thirty years ago, many concepts now taken for granted by younger sociologists.

Rather than tracing the social consequences of a single invention, the authors devote themselves to a scientific analysis of the causes of family change. They ask questions about causes and seek to answer them by organizing empirical evidence, largely statistical, and by shrewd deduction and extrapolation when evidence is inadequate.

In Part I the authors are guided in their selection of important changes in the family by opinions of experts, in spite of some diversity of "expert opinion." The second chapter contains a lucid explanation of causes and criteria of relative importance in causation. Special stress is laid on clusters of converging causes which may include ideologies as well as inventions.

The eight selected family changes analyzed in the nine chapters of Part II are indicated by the titles, "From Economics to Romance," "Starting Earlier," "Toward a Smaller Family," "Shrinking Functions," "More Working Wives," "Away from Authority," "Accent on the Child," "More Disruption," and "How and Why the Family has Changed." Only one who has worked with Federal statistics can appreciate the labor expended by the authors who do not just copy available tables, but rather seek out pertinent documented material, reorganize it to bear on questions, and finally subject it to sophisticated interpretation in terms of the causation concept. The final analysis stresses the family as a whole with respect to causation clusters, such as urbanism, birth control, and ideologies. The authors reject biological constants as causes of variables and show an inclination to trace back the web of causation to science and technology.

The final section of the book consists of two brilliant and stimulating chapters on the future of the family as affected by technology and scientific discoveries. Imagination, insight, and wide knowledge of recent developments here are combined with respect for facts and reluctance to pass value judgments.

The book should be required reading for those who regard family sociology as preachy advice to persons wanting simple answers to not very thoughtful questions.

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK

Indiana University

FRANK LORIMER and others. *Culture and Human Fertility*. Pp. 514. Paris: UNESCO, 1954. (Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.) $4.50.

This work was produced under the auspices of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, and was financially supported by UNESCO. Its purpose, in the words of Professor Lorimer, is that of "an examination of cultural conditions affecting fertility in different non-industrial societies in the context of their social organization and cultural values—especially with respect to the organization of the family and kinship relations. . . ." The work is avowedly tentative and exploratory.

The first half of the volume is devoted to a generalizing essay by Lorimer based on a wide range of secondary sources. This is followed by a series of culturally specific research reports including a demographic field study in Ashanti by Meyer Fortes; an analysis of Brazilian birth rate statistics by G. Mortara; a report on fertility in Buganda and Buhaya by Audrey I. Richards and Priscilla Reining, and a brief paper on the relation of social conditions to fertility in the Gold Coast by K. A. Busia. Thus, with the exception of Mortara's Brazilian analysis the field researches all bear upon African populations.

The fact that Lorimer discusses his conclusions in terms of hypotheses suggests the exploratory character of his work. Moving from a consideration of procreative capacity and natality levels, Lorimer treats the relations of kinship systems to fertility, developing hypotheses associating corporate kinship structures with high fertility. Fertility-related values and mores are discussed in a wide range of societies living under differing environmental, cultural, and technological conditions. His concluding chapter is on the cultural conditions of the demographic transition in Europe, colonial America, and other regions.

Stimulating as is this survey, it would have gained greater coherence had it been oriented to an explicit sociological conceptual framework. The probability that Lorimer's generalizations will stand considerable qualifying is, however, scarcely a handicap for they pose many fruitful lines of research in the field. Many of the structural and dynamic social and cultural factors to be given account in such research are suggested.

Except for Mortara's essentially statistical analysis, each of the research studies represents an integration of ethnologic and survey techniques. Meyer Fortes' report is not only substantively important, it is a fine demonstration of the power in integrated ethnologic and survey type methods. The Richards-Reining study suggests the importance of comparative research within a generally similar cultural milieu. A signal importance of the volume is its manifestation of collaboration among demographers and ethnologists and the cross fertilization in research methods.

BRYCE RYAN

Wayne University

NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL. *A Policy for Skilled Manpower*. Pp. xxv, 299. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $4.50.

This is the fourth report of the National Manpower Commission, which was set up under a Ford Foundation grant in 1951. The Council consists of sixteen representatives from education, industry, and labor.

The present volume is divided into two parts. The first part presents the recommendation of the Council, headed by Mr. James D. Zellerbach. It suggests means to strengthen the nation's resources of skilled workers and technicians. The second part consists of about nine-tenths of the volume and presents the facts and underlying issues upon which the recommendations were made. It was prepared by the Council's research staff under the directorship of Professor Eli Ginzberg of Columbia.

The study is concerned with the inadequacy of skilled manpower in our labor force. In case of a national emergency shortages in skilled manpower might be critical. The volume discusses in detail several factors that have combined to reduce the reservoir of our skilled and technical manpower.

Our vocational schools have proved to be deficient in training skilled workers and technicians. These schools have succeeded in attracting the least intelligent students and their training is frequently limited to preparing their students to the performing of single tasks rather than rounded skills.

Possibly the most serious obstacle to the development of skilled workers in adequate numbers, according to the study, has been the decline in wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor. The narrowing differentials have apparently robbed young workers of the incentive to learn skills. The wage rates of apprentices are considerably lower than those of unskilled workers, and the wage advantages that accrue from learning a skill do not appear to be large enough to warrant the temporary sacrifice of income entailed by entering apprenticeship.

A Policy for Skilled Manpower suggests some means by which the government at the national as well as state and local levels can aid in strengthening our skilled manpower resources. The measures in-

clude: the establishment of an effective military reserve system; radical changes in our immigration restrictions, which would favor in practice skilled workers and technicians regardless of national quotas; more vigorous government-supported apprenticeship programs; and an educational campaign aimed at the elimination of discrimination against minority groups, which would broaden the base from which skilled workers might be drawn.

The study does not attempt to set up yardsticks for measuring the desirable and needed strength for skilled manpower. The heavy reliance upon government as an active agency for increasing the numbers of skilled workers and technicians might be objectionable to some. The stress laid upon the supposed impact the declining wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers have upon the drop in the number of skilled workers needs further examination.

Nevertheless, the National Manpower Commission has performed a vital service. It has called the nation's attention to a serious weakness in our national security. The facts concerning the deficiencies in our manpower utilization are presented concisely and lucidly. The program suggested by the Commission and its staff deserves the serious attention of all those engaged in shaping our manpower policies and resources.

SAR A. LEVITAN
Library of Congress

JOHN SPENCER. *Crime and the Services.* Pp. xii, 306. London: Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1954. $6.00.

Crime and the Services can claim the credit for having introduced finer shades into the broad simplification of "war." There is an essential difference between barrack-square and battlefield, home service and oversea service, the serviceman who had been wounded, was prisoner of war or had worked as waiter at the Officer's mess at the Isle of Wight, had been in the army, the navy or the airforce, not to speak of the distinction between peace and war. The term used by the writer covers all the activities and experiences of the man who has been put into uniform. Spencer rejects the tradition of the "brutal and licentious soldiery." He is inclined to find criminogenic influences of service life rather in the breakup of the family, the interruption of working life, and contrasts in the standard of living. At the same time, the writer is quite aware of other precipitating factors: the effects of the all-male community (involving drinking, promiscuity, gambling, and so forth), the changed attitudes toward property, the training in the school of aggressiveness, destructiveness, and physical subduing. The brutal type is given every opportunity of lawfully, even meritoriously expressing his atavistic impulses. The author does not think that Commando training will set free brutish instincts. I do not quite agree. I have known rapists in the United States who gave the excuse that they just had performed a "raid," as they had been taught in battle courses, where overwhelming is practised and all technical details are picked up. The author, himself, mentions the case of a man who had been given Commando training in blowing safes with a minimum of noise. He was sentenced in 1951 for safe blowing at home.

He touches upon a crucial issue. Since half of the military crimes consists of desertion, and since living underground demands a chain of criminal activities would an amnesty, perhaps not justified in itself, cut short this unavoidably "appended" delinquency, and thereby be sound criminal policy? I have referred to only few of the problems involved which may be of general interest—John Spencer has written a book which, I hope, will be as provocative to the services as it is to the criminologist.

HANS VON HENTIG
Bonn, Germany

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

REBECCA WEST. *A Train of Powder.* Pp. 310. New York: Viking Press, 1955. $3.75.

This latest book by Cicily Isabel Fairfield, known throughout the world as Rebecca West, makes it clear once more that she is one of the really great reporters of the twentieth century. This extraordinarily gifted, brilliant, and cultivated English woman has helped raise the profession of journalism to an art; in her hands reporting becomes literature. She works like a scientist, patiently amassing the particularities and facts, and, at the same time, possesses the rare ability to step back from her subject and regard it in perspective. The result is first-rate reading for lovers of good writing, as well as magnificent, three-dimensional raw material for the historian.

A Train of Powder consists of six reportorial essays, of which three concern Germany since 1946. "Opera in Greenville" describes the trial of thirty-one men (of whom twenty-eight were taxi drivers) in Greenville, S. C. for the brutal lynching of Willie Earle, a 24-year-old Negro who had killed a cab driver. The final two essays recount two notable British trials: that of Brian Donald Hume, an English "spiv" who was accused of neatly dissecting the body of a black marketeer and from a rented plane throwing the pieces over the North Sea; and William Martin Marshall, a young English telegrapher in the Foreign Office, who was duped into becoming a Soviet spy.

Far from being disconnected essays, these reports have a significant common denominator. Miss West is deeply concerned with the problem of legal authority, the motives of those who defy it, the study of socio-psychic cause and effect, and the nature of trials. With subtle skill she moves from cases of treason to cases of individual and group violence, always seeking for the over-all pattern of defiance of the law and its relationship to human reason and the social order. She is intrigued by the combination of fantasy and reality that leads to violence in our lawless times ("Most trials result from a collision between a fantasy and reality" [p. 284]). She presents the reader with an illuminating account of human behavior and also convinces him that no individual human behavior is without links to the whole situation of mankind.

The three essays on Germany are important for the professional historian. Included is Miss West's classic treatment of the mighty drama of the Nuremberg trials of 1946 with their symbolic meaning for our time. There are also two essays concerning the state of affairs in Germany in 1949 and 1954—effects of the Allied occupation, the amazing industrial revival, and the nature of Soviet totalitarianism. In these reports the author effectively demolishes the arguments of revisionist historians that the Germans really understand Anglo-Saxon ideas of justice and parliamentarianism. The titles: "Greenhouse with Cyclamens, I, II, and III" refer to a theme skilfully expressed again and again as in a symphony. In a greenhouse at Nuremberg, Miss West observed a one-legged man who grew enormous cyclamens with the help of a child of twelve. "He terrified because his absorption in industry left a vacuum in his mind which sooner or later would be filled" (p. 248). To the author this symbol of beaver-like activity describes a people desperately seeking to forget its past and sublimate its guilt feelings by a highly neurotic concern with work, work, and more work.

Miss West's style is a thing of beauty and a joy for 310 pages. She writes with a mixture of common sense, wit, and satire. She has a poetic flair for the striking figure of speech. Above all, she possesses insight and intuition as her sensitive mind probes into the psychological background of criminal situations. Her discursiveness, marked by seeming digressions from the matter at hand, is patently planned and carefully designed to fill out the canvas of her art and provide it with a proper frame. Considering her excellent craftsmanship, one need not take too much issue with Miss West for sending her readers to the dictionary (in the first chapter there are: ambience, cantrip, stravaig, commination, epicene, cunctative, palimpsest, fecundated, and quiddity). Nevertheless, this is, in more simple words, a fascinating book—a certain best-seller.

LOUIS L. SNYDER
City College of New York

JOSEPH H. BRADY. *Confusion Twice Confounded: The First Amendment and the Supreme Court.* Pp. 192. South Or-

ange, N. J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1954. $3.00.

Confusion Twice Confounded treats only the ten opening words of the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The "Confusion Twice Confounded" is found in two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: *Everson* v. *Board of Education of Ewing Township,* 330 U. S. 1, the parochial school bus fare case, and *McCollum* v. *Board of Education,* 333 U. S. 203, the "released time" for religious classes case. The author's position is that although the decision of the Court was right in the Everson case, the discussion in the majority opinion showed that the Court had a completely mistaken view of the history and purpose of the constitutional provision, which mistaken view was soon thereafter embodied in the *McCollum* decision, which was wrong.

The author's view is that all that was intended by the constitutional provision was that Congress should not, by law, create an established church or an established religion for the nation; that the provision had nothing to do with the matter of nondiscriminatory support or encouragement of religion in general.

An obvious criticism of the book is that there is substantially nothing new in it. The book, *Religion and Education Under the Constitution,* by J. M. O'Neill, published in 1949, expresses the same attitude toward the subject and uses the same historical and other factual information. The O'Neill book even anticipates the current one in its indignant, intemperate, and disrespectful attitude toward the Justices of the Supreme Court. The essays in the symposium on Religion and the State, in Volume XIV, No. 1, of *Law and Contemporary Problems,* especially Judge Fahy's essay on Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, cover much the same ground.

The historical and factual data given by the author are marshaled with skill and acumen and are quite convincing. A strong case is made that Jefferson, by his "wall of separation between church and state" observation, had no such idea, for his own State of Virginia, as that which emerged from the *McCollum* opinion. And Madison's subsequent conduct seems to show that he had no such idea for the Federal Government, to which the First Amendment was directly applicable.

Those who defend the *McCollum* decision and the *Everson* dicta do not say much about the historical facts. They urge that the law as laid down by the Supreme Court is a wise law for current times, and that it is not important that it goes farther than the constitutional fathers may have intended. Whether the text "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" is that kind of a flexible text, like "due process of law" or "commerce among the several states," the meaning of which may vary from time to time, is highly debatable.

J. WARREN MADDEN
The United States Court of Claims

JAMES STREET FULTON. *Science and Man's Hope.* Pp. 179. New York: Bookman Associates for the Rice Institute, 1954. $3.25.

This book seeks to present an inclusive moral ideal ("man's hope"), and to determine the source and character of moral knowledge. The view proposed is that the human good is realized in the "moving creativity of life," the ideal culmination of "constructive decision" consisting in an alert sensitivity to every reality according to its kind. It is also argued that although moral knowledge is "rational," such knowledge stems from an "inward" insight and is radically different from conclusions obtainable by the methods of empirical science. According to Dr. Fulton, who is professor of philosophy at the Rice Institute, science is incapable of supplying normative moral principles. For science cannot define the ideals of life, even if science can discover some of the instrumentalities for achieving human blessedness, and even if the life of science is itself a splendid illustration of human effort "to become fully alive by becoming alert to the full reach of the processes which sustain our existence."

Dr. Fulton writes with passionate eloquence and conviction, and he exhibits a fine sensitivity to certain aspects of the phenomena of moral experience. His appraisal of the habits of mind essential for the pursuit of science is appreciative and perceptive, and his comments on a variety of historically influential doctrines on the relations of science and moral knowledge are frequently acute. Moreover, although he thinks there are limitations in scientific reason in respect to moral knowledge, he also refuses to follow current philosophies of irrationalism which renounce the use of intelligence in any form as a guide to moral living.

Dr. Fulton's presentation of his central theses is nevertheless not convincing. At crucial points his writing has an inspirational rather than an analytic quality, and he never squarely states how the *validity* of moral "insight" is to be established. In particular, despite his professed allegiance to "reason" as a guide, he nowhere explains how, granting the 'inward" source of moral *perceptions,* the adequacy of moral *judgments* is rationally adjudicated, especially when such judgments are mutually conflicting; and he simply ignores the relevance of empirical knowledge for the *evaluation* of moral claims. In any event, his account of the inclusive moral ideal is fatally vague; and while his description of certain aspects of moral life and scientific endeavor is sometimes to the point, his conception of moral and scientific experience strikes the present reviewer as a feverishly romantic one, only rarely faithful to the facts of moral deliberation and scientific inquiry.

ERNEST NAGEL
Columbia University

The Social Sciences in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee for Historiography. (Bulletin No. 64.) Pp. x, 181. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954. $2.25 cloth, $1.75 paper.

If this second report of the Committee on Historiography is representative of the present opinions of American historians, then the changes in attitude towards the objective potentialities of the historical method since the early twentieth century have spiraled. Historians have moved from a concept of their discipline closely analogous to that in the natural sciences, through a relativist and skeptical phase, to the affirmative and optimistic view of the "social science historian" as revealed in this work.

The first chapter, written by Mrs. Jeannette Nichols, surveys the reception given to the report of the earlier committee in Bulletin 54; the last chapter is an adaptation of the provocative article by Thomas Cochran, published in July 1948, on "The 'Presidential Synthesis' in American History." The five chapters in between constitute the body of this new report, mainly the work of Cochran, Hugh Brockunier, Hugh Aitken, Shepard Clough, and Bert Loewenberg. It is a successful co-operative venture in summarizing the present status of the social sciences and their applicability to history, and in analyzing the concept of change and the methods of the historian. Frequently the footnotes provide an excellent select bibliography. Among the intellectually attractive features of this report are the committee's preference in historical reconstruction for the conscious employment of theory, for the restricting of hypotheses to testable proportions, and its awareness of the possibilities of a "cumulative analysis" in history comparable to that in science.

I am disposed to criticism, not on fundamental grounds, but on points of emphasis. It seems to me that the members of the committee are overly deferential to the scientific standing of the social sciences, confine themselves too much to techniques available only to the historian writing of recent times, develop insufficiently the fact that the historian has found his own way, and that he is still concerned with narrative, and with his relations to the humanities. The relevance of philosophy to history is briefly recognized, but there is no suggestion that if the methods of any other discipline have been adapted to the historian's uses it is probably, more than the social sciences, those of a much older discipline—that of the detective and juridical processes.

The weight of such criticisms, however,

is reduced by the whole tone of the volume —by the writers' recognition of the problem-raising and question-asking character of the historical enterprise. This is a rewarding book for any reader willing to devote time to its careful perusal.

WILLSON H. COATES
University of Rochester

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

P. A. REYNOLDS. *British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years.* Pp. xi, 182. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1954. $2.25.

British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years by P. A. Reynolds is wholly unpretentious. It was designed as a textbook and conforms to the better tradition of such writing. The style is lucid and uncluttered; the sentences are explicit, and statements are made without hedging. The author is given to recapitulations and summaries at frequent intervals, as one does in a good textbook. In the front there is a chronology for ready reference or for memorization. At the end a bibliography carries some critical comment; nearly all the books mentioned are in English, a few in French (mostly memoirs), and none in any other language. The volume makes no pretense at originality of interpretation or point of view and is itself heavily dependent upon secondary works. There is virtually no reliance upon documents, except on those which have been published by the British or American government or by Chatham House.

The account takes for its major premise the decline in the position of the United Kingdom after World War I—economically, politically, and strategically. This decline is attributed to the loss of Great Britain's industrial pre-eminence, the weakening of its political position as a consequence of the enhanced status of the Dominions within the Commonwealth, and the growth of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the colonies. The strategic position of Britain had been undermined by the development of new weapons, the shrinkage of the globe. The author emphasizes that despite its changed status the basic objectives of Britain's foreign policy—command of the seas and a balance of power in Europe—remained unchanged; they were indeed intensified. But command of the seas had to be shared with the United States, and the effort to produce a balance in Europe led to sharp differences in policy between Britain and France. "The most disastrous feature of British policy in the inter-war years was the rigidity with which an understandable policy of caution towards widely conceived collective security in the 'twenties was pursued and intensified in the 'thirties . . . to the point of surrender of one of her traditional aims—the prevention of mastery of the Continent by a single power." The disappearance of the United States from the tripartite guarantee among France, Britain, and the United States led to Britain's abandonment of this guarantee; the lack of an Anglo-French alliance dominated French policy and, in a sense, dominated world politics between the two wars. Lack of cohesion among those three opened the way for Hitler and the Japanese jingoes.

The book is admirably adapted to the audience for which it was intended, and for the general reader who wants a clear, brief survey.

HENRY M. WRISTON
Brown University

GEORGE HARRIS HEALEY (Ed.). *The Letters of Daniel Defoe.* Pp. xxii, 506. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1955. (Distributed by the Oxford University Press, New York.) $6.75.

These 251 letters of Daniel Defoe represent all of the known extant letters of that prolific writer. Most of the letters have already been published either in the Historical Manuscripts Commission's *Report on the Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland,* or elsewhere. Notwithstanding, Professor Healey has done a real service in bringing all of the letters together and in providing clean and well-edited texts of them. Defoe was the author of 235 letters, while the additional sixteen were addressed to him.

The great bulk of the correspondence concerns Defoe's relationship with his benefactor Robert Harley, Speaker of the House and later Lord Treasurer and Earl of Oxford. From 1703, when Harley saved Defoe from prison, up to the death of Queen Anne in 1714, Defoe wrote Harley long accounts depicting conditions in England and Scotland. Defoe described his unique position as Harley's man thus: "Methinks I look Very Simply when to my Self I reflect how I am your Messenger without an Errand, your Ambassador without Instructions, your Servant without Orders" (p. 131). In his own mind he carried out Harley's tasks well: "In my Mannagemt here I am a perfect Emissary. I act the old part of Cardinal Richlieu. I have my spyes and my Pensioners In Every Place" (p. 211).

Political scientists will read with profit and pleasure Defoe's ideas on the prime ministership as it had developed historically, his thoughts on naval affairs and naval administration, his penetrating judgments and descriptions of the violent party warfare that was so prevalent in eighteenth-century political life, his stand on freedom of the press and of conscience, and his insights into the duties of a British secretary of state and into the operation of the British electoral system. For the historian, the letters will be complementary to Defoe's *History of the Union* and an invaluable source for Dissenter attitudes toward the leading issues of the day. His observations on foreign affairs are expressed to better purpose in the *Review* or in his pamphlets. Economists will discover his economic digressions, especially his project for advancing Scottish trade and for founding a colony in Chili, to be both interesting and enlightening. Literature students will find the notes and letters most valuable in their quest to fathom the doings and the character of the author of the *True Born Englishman* and *Robinson Crusoe.*

The editorial effort expended by Professor Healey has made the book highly usable. The text is lucid and the index full. A bibliography would perhaps have added to the value of the work. This is of course a minor criticism. Professor Healey's edition of *The Letters of Daniel Defoe* henceforth will be consulted by all students interested in Queen Anne's England.

JOHN J. MURRAY
Coe College

J. D. B. MILLER. *Australian Government and Politics: An Introductory Survey.* Pp. 240. London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, 1954. 15 *s.*

Australia's rise in national unity and international prestige has been beset with many difficulties, as the volume by J. D. B. Miller, assistant lecturer in international relations at the London School of Economics, amply demonstrates. The reviewer spent eight months in Australia in 1953 as a Fulbright professor. To the visitor, and perhaps to a certain extent to the citizen, Australian political life presents a bewildering variety of institutions: three tiers of government and a multitude of statutory bodies. There are thirteen Houses of Parliament and 680 Members of Parliament to govern nine million people. Sometimes these facts are quoted to prove that Australia is over-governed. But part of the reason for the elaborate framework of government "lies in the inhospitable nature of the country," Mr. Miller argues, "in the remoteness of one center of population from another, and the sparseness of population between the main centers; the political expression of this has been the demand of the faraway areas for special representation in their local parliaments, equal representation in the Senate, and a place at the Premiers' Conference."

There are three Australian political parties which have been significant in any of the parliaments—Labor, Liberal, and Country—and only one outside parliaments—the Communist Party. One feature which all of the parties display and which distinguishes them from British political parties is that they are organized primarily at the state level, and only secondarily at the national level. Each party, in fact, "has reproduced the Federal pattern on which the present governmental system is based, in that each began as a series of independent State organizations which created a na-

tional organization in order to operate effectively in the Federal parliament. In no case does the central organization have anything like the power possessed by the central organizations of the British parties." Another characteristic of the three Australian political parties is that each is supported by easily identifiable organizations of people whose economic and vocational interests have induced them to band together for action to their common advantage: such as trade unions, associations of manufacturers and traders, and farmers' and graziers' unions, which exercise constant influence over party policy.

Isolated from other countries and sparsely populated by a single European racial group conscious of a high standard of living, Australia for more than a century developed a high standard of living and an organized system of political institutions which, in many ways, are unique in the world. Over the years, this system tended to concentrate on economic problems: land, employment, irrigation, taxation, industrial disputes, transport, marketing, water supply, and social services; to disregard theories in face of a discussion of concrete proposals; to distrust political leadership, except in times of crisis; and to exhibit a willingness to experiment in forms of government, but with a strong bias to group loyalty.

The first war led Australia to membership in the League of Nations, and to the inception of independent external policy. However, she continued to accept British leadership during the 1920's and 1930's, being content with consultation on major matters. In the second conflict, Australia's exposed position in the Pacific involved her in diplomatic activity and military cooperation on her own account, especially with the United States.

Since World War II, Australia has been plagued with the problems emanating from a booming economy, heavy immigration, inflation, and industrial unrest. The position of the Australian Communist party and the enlarged influence of Communism in Europe and Asia have been subjects of constant argument. Religious issues, too, have appeared in national politics for the first time since the 1920's, creating deep differences of opinion within the Labor party. In 1949, 1951, and 1954 a Liberal party coalition under Mr. R. G. Menzies was given charge of the Government. Mr. Miller emphasizes, however, that "the Federal Government is now the custodian of the economic health and external security of Australia, in a world where these two conditions are influenced primarily by forces outside Australia's control."

The relations of Australia with other Commonwealth countries since the last war have been largely economic, although they have also involved a friendly reception to the new Asian Dominions and an attempt, through the Colombo Plan, to show that Australian goodwill to these nations is practical. Economic problems within the Commonwealth have continued to be dominated by serious problems within the sterling area. In the 1950's the international economic problem for Australia is still in essence what it was in the 1930's, namely, the problem of heavy dependence upon exports of a few primary products whose prices depend on world markets.

MARY E. MURPHY
Los Angeles State College
of Applied Arts and Sciences

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR and Associates. *Soviet Power and Policy.* Pp. x, 598. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1955. $8.75 Trade; $6.50 Text.

George B. de Huszar has brought together some fourteen different specialists writing on various aspects of the nature of Soviet power. In the editor's words, "since no one person can discuss with authority the several phases of Soviet power and the Kremlin's policy of expansion, this volume is a cooperative venture in which each aspect of Soviet power and expansion is discussed by a specialist."

The first chapter entitled "The Success of Kremlin Policy" by de Huszar begins with the sweeping generalization, "Soviet Russia was the only real victor of World War II." This kind of writing, justified as it may seem for text book purposes, which is essentially what this work is, characterizes so much of the book. In the last ten years, Soviet studies in the United States have burgeoned so fast that a large number of excellent monographs and specialized works on different aspects of the Soviet Union have been published. To summarize these monographs and works and incorporate their distillate is no small task for a panel of specialists. Except for the provocative *USSR a Concise Handbook* edited by Ernest J. Simmons and published in 1946 and the very informative issue of THE ANNALS on *The Soviet Union Since World War II* edited by Philip E. Mosely and published in 1949, and notwithstanding the excellent collection of papers in *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism,* edited by C. Grove Haines and published in 1954, there has not been until de Huszar's book as extensive a compendium of political, economic, and foreign policy articles on the USSR.

The main value of the book is that it is a handbook of current data concerning the USSR. Material on land, population, economic development, transportation, foreign trade, political and administrative structure, ideology, Communist party organization, the system of controls, armed forces, and foreign policy are all discussed. The latter part of the book is concerned with Soviet expansion in Eurasia, preceded by a discussion of the strategy and tactics of Soviet expansion, written by the editor. Separate chapters are written on Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Near and Middle East, and Northeastern Asia. The book is concluded with a chapter by de Huszar on the geopolitical position of the USSR and Soviet position toward the United States.

Since so many different writers contribute to this volume on so many different topics, there is an unavoidable unevenness in the style and contents of the volume. Some of the articles are filled with masses of data such as in the economic and transportation chapters while those on politics, administration, and controls are characterized more with broad analysis than with detailed description of facts. If the reader will go through these six hundred pages of information on the USSR, he will receive a very extensive exposure in one volume to the basic information on the USSR, critically presented.

WILLIAM B. BALLIS
University of Washington

HANS KOHN (Ed.). *The Mind of Modern Russia: Historical and Political Thought of Russia's Great Age.* Pp. xii, 298. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955. $5.50.

Not long ago I was talking of small and inconsequential matters with a Russian when suddenly he broke off the conversation to put the question, despairingly and as it seemed to me with childish naiveté, "Why, oh why is it the Poles hate us Russians so?"

In Professor Kohn's useful and compact compilation we can find a rather good answer to the question. Although not stated in so many words, the answer is there by implication, not only as to why there is ill feeling between the Russians and their immediate neighbors on the west, who happen to be the Poles, but between themselves and the West generally.

The volume is not, as might be imagined from its title, a study or exposé of "the mind of modern Russia" at all, but a gathering together of writings by various Russians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the single theme of "Russia and the West." Always the question asked by my friend, though here not in reference to the Poles, is just beneath the surface. "Why," we hear Danilevsky phrasing it in his important study of *Russia and Europe* (1869), "why doesn't Europe love Russia?"

If all those speaking in this compilation for the mind of modern Russia were of the Chaadayev-Herzen-Soloviev stripe, Europe would love Russia perhaps better even than she loves herself. All these were harmonizers, who saw in Europe not only the evil which we all know exists, but the noble and the exalted as well, and in their own country the same, the bad along with the

good. And these three recognized the deep need of each for the other. But, despite Herzen's statement to the effect that "a citizen of North America" is almost the only non-Russian in the world capable of understanding the Russian people, it is hard to see how the North American can ever really *understand* (in the sense of *sympathize* with, as is meant here) a race, the majority of whose spokesmen from Pogodin down through the Slavophils and ending with Stalin, find a warlike spirit only in the West, and in Russia only gentleness, goodness, and light. How, in another connection, can a North American even "understand" a race which does not believe in a political opposition party?

Why Professor Kohn lugged in Mickiewicz's involved and diffuse lament from the *Books of the Polish Nation* it is hard to see, but Havlíček's contribution is of great value, and perhaps the best answer we have to the question of which we have spoken. This is why the West does not love Russia: because a noble and potentially fruitful idea, that of Slav reciprocity, whenever it appears, is invariably turned to evil and betrayed by being transformed into an instrument of Russian imperialism. It is the same with other schemes of cooperation.

There are many strident voices speaking in Professor Kohn's volume. From knowing Russians personally, and finding them to be people of warm, rich natures, good and bad as ourselves, we hope the strident voices are not the true echoes of "the mind of modern Russia." Yet we fear that if these are what the Russian people are listening to, and that if they listen to these long enough, understanding between them and ourselves will grow ever less and less. And so we close the book with a shudder. No light has been shed. Only darkness.

ARTHUR PRUDDEN COLEMAN
Alliance College

MARSHALL MACDUFFIE. *The Red Carpet: 10,000 Miles Through Russia on a Visa from Khrushchev.* Pp. xiv, 330. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1955. $4.50.

It is refreshing to read this volume so full of direct unadulterated observations and so free of any preconceived judgments. Marshall MacDuffie came to Russia not to look for evidence for or against any theory, but with the desire simply to see as much as possible. And he succeeded to see much more than most foreign travelers. Of course, he did not see all he wanted. However, he was wise enough not to be deceived by what he did not see. He writes in the last chapter of his book: "I saw no signs of unrest among the Soviet people—but then I saw chiefly the surface of life in Russia. I'm not kidding myself. If there had been rebellion brewing all around me, I doubt that I could have seen it." And he adds: "I was denied a chance to visit Soviet prisons and slave-labor camps. But I didn't have to see oppression to know it was there; the testimony of those who have suffered from it is indisputable." To register exactly what he saw and not to deny what he did not see—this approach of Mr. MacDuffie is the most sound for one who was able to see only the surface and was conscious of it. And it is the surest guarantee that Mr. MacDuffie has been no superficial observer.

In 1946 Mr. MacDuffie spent several months in Russia, mostly in Byelorussia and the Ukraine as Chief of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration mission. He saw devastated areas of the country just arising from the depths of their misery. In the fall of 1953 he saw a part of the same areas already fully reconstructed. Comparisons with past impressions were unavoidable. The change, of course, was tremendous. But it did not make the author uncritically enthusiastic for the achievements of the regime and blind to the dark sides of the picture—as far as they could be seen on the surface, he was able to observe. Speaking about Russian homes he was invited or allowed to visit, Mr. MacDuffie makes the following remark: "experts who have analyzed my experience believe . . . that the guides who escorted me had general permission to take me into some flats and knew perfectly well that those they were showing me were in an acceptable show-place area. If this speculation is true, the show places I saw reflect badly upon what was unrevealed." What this remark reflects is the cautious attitude of Mr. MacDuffie, which prevails with a few exceptions in his book.

It is finally worth mentioning that the reader will find in the book many very valuable data about such topics as, for instance, prices on free "Kolkhoz" markets or wages and salaries in various state enterprises—all noted by the author on the spot.

GEORGE DENICKE
Washington, D. C.

DONALD R. HODGMAN. *Soviet Industrial Production, 1928–1951.* Pp. 241. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $5.00.

Since this book is entirely specialized and quite unsuited for laymen, it is reviewed as such. Professor Hodgman sets out to compile an index of Soviet industrial production from the individual published series of physical outputs, using Soviet weights. As far as is humanly possible, he has succeeded. He puts his index through all the correct tests. How does it compare with the official index year by year? If the latter shows more inflationary bias in one year than another can this be rationally explained, say by some statistical reorganization? How and why does his index differ from those of other foreign scholars? What does it imply for labor productivity? Is it compatible with the movement of mineral consumption and freight transportation? All these questions the author ought to have, and has, asked and answered. His work is very satisfying: honest, complete, and competent.

Criticism, then, can only be of the niggling kind. To a reader of S. Schwarz's *Labor in the Soviet Union*, it is barely credible that fewer hours were worked in 1932 and 1937 than in 1928 or 1950 (p. 116). Secondly, it is not mentioned or allowed for that the output of new coal mines received new 1926–27 prices, not those applicable to the same quality coal from old mines (p. 62). Thirdly, the use of forced labor in industry—mostly excluded from official statistics—is neglected in the estimation of the growth of productivity. To be sure it is impossible to estimate, but it certainly rates a mention.

On the theoretical side, it is perhaps worth saying that there is *some* defence for including new goods in a production index with inflated weights, as the Soviet authorities did until 1950. The resulting upward bias over more ordinarily calculated indices, especially in a period of rapid industrialization when there will be many new goods, is not purely bogus. This is for a reason that, curiously enough, Soviet ingenuity has never urged in excuse: a new good is better that the old one for which it is a substitute, yet costs the same or less (or it would not be introduced). Therefore, to weight it by its cost, or by a price fixed on the basis of its cost (as opposed to a perfectly competitive price) is to weight it too low relatively to the old substitute, if that is similarly weighted. Therefore, all cost of living indices have an upward, and all production indices a downward, bias compared with an ideal index based on social utility weights; wherever technical progress has taken place. Arbitrarily, unconsciously and very badly, the Soviet official index does make an allowance for this.

The weights are Soviet wave-costs in current rubles for 1934. This middling date is certainly better than 1926–27, but it cannot be accepted either that Soviet relative wages are "rational" in the welfare economics sense or that wage-costs alone are anything like suitable weights. The proportion of wages to net value added differs very much from product to product. But space forbids that these objections be elaborated here.

Finally, there is not enough guesswork. The author is too choosy about weights. He neglects, for instance, a perfectly good lumber output series on the ground that he does not know what weight to give it (p. 57). But since lumber output employed very many men and increased much less than average, it is very important to include it, even if only with a guessed weight. Moreover it is impossible to see why the data given in the footnote (p.

180) do not directly provide something better than a guess.

P. J. D. WILES

Oxford University
England

HENRYK PASZKIEWICZ. *The Origin of Russia.* Pp. xii, 556. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $10.00.

This impressive study covers the period of the ninth through the fourteenth century of Eastern Europe. It is an important era during which the destiny of Russian statehood was shaped. The entire work consists of four parts, beginning with a discussion of the term "Rus" and of Eastern Slavdom, ending with the ascendancy of Moscow. It is followed by a most extensive bibliographical list—forty-nine pages of neatly packed references—and should be invaluable to the student of history laboring in this field. Two maps, five genealogical tables, and a most extensive index enhance the value of this work further. The entire book is carefully and profusely supported by lengthy quotations and references to numerous and various sources.

The subject of Russia's origin has long been a controversial one. It has been discussed at great length on many occasions by various scholars. Professor Paszkiewicz approaches the subject from a different angle—the ethical aspects and the prevailing form of political life. The dawn of Slavdom centered within the region of two great rivers, the Volga and the Dnieper. The ethnic groups that came to play a decisive part in this early period of history vary: the Scandinavians, the Finnish tribes mingled with the Byzantines, Tartar, and Slavic peoples. All of them leave significant imprints upon the later course of Russian national development. The author's sources are the twelfth century Nestor Chronicle, the *Tale of the Raid of Igor* (*Provest vremennykh let*), and many others.

The main thesis of Professor Paszkiewicz undoubtedly will be challenged by many scholars who hold other views. The link between ascending Moscow and "Asia" is a thesis that is never tired of and is particularly common among Polish writers. It emerges perennially and is especially prone to crop up in time of strenuous relations between the two neighboring states, Poland and Russia. What is further interesting to note is this: the Soviet historian, M. Pokrovsky, has never been held in too high esteem by historians of the Paszkiewicz school. When, however, Pokrovsky's writings seem to support their thesis of the Muscovite state as a "prison of nations" Pokrovsky is faithfully quoted.

Academic freedom is a precious possession and the right of every writer to be his own historian is characteristic of democratic society. If, however, some of the highly hypothetic theories assume the form of political dogmas that might seriously affect world policies, it is necessary to call for alertness. Highly hypothetical theories can quite easily turn into false instruments of national policy with sorrowful consequences for all concerned.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR

Stanford University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

RAYMOND FUSILIER. *Le Parti Socialiste Suédois: Son organisation.* Pp. 372. Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1954. 900 *fr.*

The choice lies between a modus vivendi reached by toleration and compromise in a free society or authoritarian suppression of all views but one. In Sweden both principle and the even balance of forces prevent the authoritarian solution. The Swedes are inclined to be practical rather than doctrinaire, whether they are socialist, liberal, or conservative. Their ability to live with divergences and to make progress through co-operation is a phenomenon that perhaps appeals especially to a Frenchman.

Dr. Fusilier has produced a lucid and thorough analysis of one of Europe's most effective political parties. The work is descriptive and comparative and deals primarily with the organization of the party; it is not a study of causation or of issues. It contains, nevertheless, an excellent survey of the rise of the Social Democratic party since its founding in 1889. Socialism is a foreign importation which took root in Sweden and grew like a strong indigenous pine. The steady accretion of strength is traced to 1917, when the socialists first took part in the administration, and on to 1954, a period in which the party has held sole or partial responsibility for twenty-eight of the thirty-seven years. If the author has a thesis, it is that "political parties strongly organized are not an obstacle but rather the prerequisite of an efficient democracy" (p. 309).

The author uses English and American literature in political science, but his real contribution comes from his study of the literature and archives of the Social Democratic party itself. He marshals statistical data for such purposes as charting the party strength in different parts of the country, studies of the median age and occupational background of members of the *Riksdag*, and analyses of the support given the party by the several social classes. He reveals that although it is a working class party, it receives one quarter of its support from the middle social group. This fact, plus its actual achievements and its repeated coalitions with the farmers' party, indicates the moderation in which it exercises political power. The discipline of the unions helps to develop the political consciousness of the workers and of their wives; 80 per cent of them now go to the polls (though this still is less than the 86 per cent of Social Group II and the 93 per cent record of Social Group I). The tie-in between unions and party is not compulsory, but it is close: two-thirds of the socialists are "collective members" through unions, and only one-third are individual members. Here is a penetrating political study.

FRANKLIN D. SCOTT

Northwestern University

Germany Reports. Pp. 367. Germany: Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government (original publication date, 1953). No date for English translation. $3.00.

Germany Reports is a well-documented account of developments in Western Germany from May 1945 through September 1953. Issued by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany as an official account of its accomplishments and objectives, it is based upon information compiled by appropriate governmental departments and contains thirty-two chapters, eighty-one charts, eighty-four statistical tables, and forty-six full-page photographs. It deals with virtually every phase of German life.

The book opens with a chapter which summarizes Germany's major geographic features: economy and raw materials, history, area, and population. This is followed by chapters dealing with foreign policy developments, Germany's relationship with other governments, problems involving the continuity of the Reich, state and local government, the Berlin situation, regeneration of the law, the internal safeguarding of a democratic state, public opinion, war victims and war losses, refugees, budgets and finance, housing, various other economic and fiscal matters, transport, Marshall Plan aid, education, religion, youth, cultural life, and literature.

Most of these chapters are concisely handled and the information is often largely statistical or, at least, well documented by the latest statistical information.

Although, at first glance, *Germany Reports* appears to be merely an official activities report, it is much more than that. To the German people, it is a frank appeal by the Adenauer Government for patience and support. To the foreign reader, it is intended as an assurance of lofty motives and objectives. More than that, it is an expression of the determination of the German people to take their place in the family of nations.

Throughout the book, no opportunity is lost to stress the ultimate objective of a reunified Germany, the great destruction of its economy and the tremendous problems which face the West German Government in achieving its goals. Throughout, no punches are pulled and a spade is called a spade. Thus, in his Preface, Dr. Adenauer states quite frankly that the col-

lapse of the National Socialist dictatorship freed innumerable human beings throughout the world and in Germany from a nightmare and left in its wake unimaginable devastation. "The very basis of sustenance seemed destroyed and the millions of dead and crippled made even the biological survival of the German people doubtful. But what weighed equally heavily was that Germany had lost the confidence of the world."

Continuing, he does not hesitate to take full credit on behalf of the German people for the country's miraculous comeback, at the same time paying some tribute to the effect of foreign aid. Thus, he states, "In looking back over the few years that have passed . . . the change that has come over Germany appears almost impossible to grasp. Through the perseverance and diligence of the whole German people, through the efforts of the communes, the counties and the *laender,* and through the painstakingly (sic) planning and daring policy of the Federal Government, reconstruction in all sectors has been achieved to an extent nobody would have believed possible in 1945. Foreign aid produced blissful effects on the economy and food supply."

He concludes by stating that the day of the collapse of the Nazi dictatorship "will also be recorded by history as the day when the division of Germany began, through which a source of disquietude has been created in the heart of Europe. The obliteration of the unnatural boundary between West and Central Germany will be the primary concern of every German Government. Reunification can only be achieved by peaceful means. Until this is accomplished the whole German people will have no peace and no economic means of livelihood nor will the people of the Soviet occupation zone attain freedom from want and liberty of thought."

With equal frankness, Dr. Felix von Eckardt, Chief of the Press and Information Office, in a Foreword which purports to state the purposes of the book, asserts that it is merely a record of the sequence of events since the collapse of the Reich in May 1945. He continues, however, with the statement that "the government wishes to assure the German people that their political leadership has neglected nothing during the past to build up their social, state and economic life again, and that its efforts will be successful in the future as well. . . . To foreign countries who regard this rapid reascent of Germany with understandable doubts and often with concern, the Federal Government desires to offer, through the dispassionate reporting of facts, the possibility of checking and experiencing the successive stages of this path in order to arouse understanding for the German people and their unique position."

Space does not permit the quotation of a large number of pithy remarks and characterizations relative to the Saar problem, political reconstruction, denazification, and, above all, Soviet Russia.

Germany Reports is a valuable collection of historical fact, reliable statistics, interesting narrative, and what may be termed "justifiable pride." It is the latest and most complete factual picture of the situation in Western Germany. Students of the subject will find it most useful. Persons merely seeking information will find a substantial amount. Care should be taken, however, to assess the characterizations which occasionally take on the flavor of a chamber of commerce report.

ELI E. NOBLEMAN
Washington, D. C.

GEORGE G. WINDELL. *The Catholics and German Unity, 1866–1871.* Pp. xii, 312. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954. $5.00.

Here we have a closely written, detailed account of the role of Catholicism in the politics of building the German Empire from the Austro-Prussian War, 1866, to the proclamation of the empire five years later. This book is well worth the reading. The author writes with such historical evenhandedness that he conceals his own confessional preferences. His treatment is competent; his style, though not lively, is neither pedestrian nor unclear. His lengthy bibliography, predominantly of German titles, shows how full a book may be produced without recourse to archives. The usefulness of his extensive index would have been greater had all individuals (many of whom are obscure) been identified. The chart showing the informative religious census of 1871 would be more satisfactory had it broken the heterogeneous Prussia of the 1860's into regions, for Prussia, like Texas, is something special. To have described church-state arrangements in Germany would have helped most readers.

George Windell's account is so single-mindedly political that it neglects such spiritual-intellectual forces as liberalism, materialism, ultra-Montanism, secularism, and amorality. Only in chapter VII, "Bismarck and the Church, 1866–1870," do we find much of the *zeitgeist* as we trace the interactions among the Vatican Council; German political and religious dogmas; and German, French, and Italian foreign policy. Resistance to unification expressed not only particularism but also resistance to secularism, Lutheranism, and militarism. It was more than Rome versus Wittenberg.

The great gain from reading this book is a sharp realization, supported by details, that Catholic politics per se were vigorous, powerful, and organized. Windell shows conclusively that the *Zentrumpartei* reaches back to the days following Sadowa, and that Bismarck's policies and tactics were affected by the necessity of countering Catholic forces to an extent seldom suggested in standard accounts. Bismarck was not the sole actor on the stage. Finally, as Windell points out at great length, Catholic parties broke unity party strength in Bavaria, ousted Prince Hohenlobe from the Bavarian chancellorship, and came within two votes of preventing Bavaria's entry in the empire. In these years the *Kulturkampf* was seeded. Unfortunately for him, Bismarck's realism was such that he was slow to grant that religious beliefs, which to him were lacking in realism, could be important to others. We should hope for a comparable study of Lutheranism and German unity to complement this useful work.

GARLAND DOWNUM
Arizona State College

EUGENE N. ANDERSON. *The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858–1864.* (University of Nebraska Studies, New Series, No. 12.) Pp. x, 445. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1954. $5.00.

Students of nineteenth-century Prussian history will be indebted to Professor Anderson's painstaking and carefully documented study of the six years bridging the abdication of the demented Frederick William IV and the entrenchment of the Bismarck government. The value of the book is enhanced by the author's success in interpreting political developments in their social setting. Prussia's political awakening is pictured against the backdrop of an expanding economy and rapid industrialization.

Professor Anderson writes sympathetically about Prussian liberalism and the Prussian Liberal party. In its composition and conduct, the Liberal party reflected the desire of the majority of the Prussian people to eliminate the last vestiges of eighteenth-century mercantilism and to break the shackles of Hohenzollern Junkerdom—as represented by the small but powerful Conservative party.

The first part of the book deals with Prussian society with reference to castes and privileges, police state features, militarism, and the political and economic forces striving for the unification of Germany. Judiciously using a wealth of contemporary sources, the author demonstrates how political and economic reform issues affected the roots of Prussian society. The question remains unanswered as to the extent of agreement between the elements in the Liberal party who strove for unification for purely patriotic and nationalist reasons, and those who regarded unification as an advantage to industry and commerce. The struggle over army reform is well described. We see here how a resurgent military caste—relatively dormant since 1815—clashes with a vocal middle class. A vivid characterization is given of Roon, the stalwart War Minister, the tenacious reactionary who, in 1861, persuaded William I to appoint Bismarck Prime Minister.

The second part of the book examines the structure and strength of contemporary Prussian political organizations, emphasizing Prussian "grass roots" party machinery and the electoral and voting systems. The

author's talent for introducing pertinent details sometimes leads one to think that he might have been an eyewitness. His sympathy for the Liberal party and its courageous struggle for reform against the host of Hohenzollern reactionary forces is convincing. The question is left open, however, if the progressive program of the Liberal party for electoral reform and political equality was genuine, in view of their surrender to Bismarck when he too espoused German unification. This surrender was at its worst a sign that the Liberal party was insincere in championing a progressive program. At best it was a demonstration of weakness. The party thus showed that only the tenuous cord of the unification issue held together its divergent groups.

Excessive and long quotations impair somewhat the refreshing flow of the narrative. Direct translations are often stylistically awkward and idiomatically inaccurate. Examples of these weaknesses are the use of "under-officer" instead of "noncommissioned" officer (pp. 107, 237), "unselfconscious" (p. 285), and "handworker" which is used throughout the book. The book has no index. However, these flaws and the numerous typographical errors do not seriously detract from the value of the study.

ROBERT MUELLER

New York, N. Y.

OTHER COUNTRIES

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER. *The United States and Argentina.* Pp. xv, 272. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $4.75.

The United States and Argentina is the fourteenth volume in "The American Foreign Policy Library," initiated by Sumner Welles and now edited by Donald C. McKay. It is the fourth of those volumes dealing with Latin America; relatively little of the panorama of the twenty republics now remains to be covered.

It seems to be a general directive for the authors of the series that they set the stage for consideration of the problems of *The United States and*—whatever the country or countries in a given volume happens to be. This makes for confusing and seemingly contradictory titles for the volumes individually and for the series as a whole. Thus, in Professor Whitaker's excellent volume on Argentina the "United States and" part is limited to two chapters and parts of one other; it is hence, at least quantitatively, a minor portion of the whole volume.

Granted that restrictive premise, little of a critical nature can be said about the volume under review. Much that is superlative would have to be included in any detailed review of the book. It is written in Professor Whitaker's customarily brilliant style and with his broad grasp of the intricate interrelationship of factors and problems as they affect the country with which he is dealing.

In the initial chapter he sets the stage in terms of land and people. Four following chapters trace the relations with the United States and the domestic developments in the pre-Perón period. Four more deal with the Perón era and a concluding one seeks to look into the future. An excellent brief bibliographical essay is added.

A few unimportant points of fact might be questioned but will not be at this point. This reviewer must respectfully protest, however, against identifying Juan Manuel Blanes as an Argentine painter even "by adoption." Blanes in residence, inspiration, and allegiance was Uruguayan; as his eminent biographer Salterain y Herrera says of him, *"Vive con los ojos puestos en la patria,"* and the *patria* was definitely Uruguay.

This book complements well Blanksten's *Perón's Argentina.* The two remain easily the best books of recent years dealing with this strong and puzzling country of South America.

RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON
University of California
Los Angeles

CHARLES ROBEQUAIN. *Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo, and the Philippines.* Translated by E. D. Laborde. Pp. xi, 456. London; New York; Toronto: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1954. $6.00.

Bandung, the name of a mountain city in Java, suddenly has become a household word. Remotest corners of the Orient have emerged from story-book land into the realm of our immediate concerns. It is opportune that there should appear at this particular moment a significant book on the fundamental, geological, economic, and cultural structure of a substantial portion of Southeast Asia which the author calls *Le Monde Malais.* It is to be hoped that it will reach a greater audience than its rather forbidding scientific outline may invite.

The author, a professor of colonial geography at the Sorbonne, has reported the results of his scholarly research in Malaya, Sumatra, Java, the Celebes, Borneo, Eastern Indonesia, and the Philippines. These areas, from the evidences of geological formations and ethnic relationships, seem to be a unit in the Asiatic world, each part bearing a closer similarity to the others than to the remainder of the Far East. Statistical details involving land structures, climate, vegetation and fauna, anthropology, and movements of population are not permitted to grow boresome through the generous use of pictures and a deft literary touch, which has lost very little in the excellent translation from the French by E. D. Laborde.

It is a temptation to oversimplify the remedy for the ills of Asia in terms of education for backward people. Education is a two-edged sword which should also cut in the direction of those who are striving to understand and help their less enlightened brethren. This book on advanced geography should contribute invaluably to the equipment of those who are charged with the responsibility of cementing friendly relationships between the Western and Eastern worlds.

Above all, the lessons of this book should answer the occasional contention that there is a power vacuum in the Malayan world into which various political influences may be sucked. The history of colonialism and the current displays of individual nationalism should form a strong argument in the negative. Moreover, a geological background of common antiquity with the rest of the world: ancient customs, deep-rooted religious beliefs which have compromised with rather than yielded to outside influences, local customs responding to the impulses of nature, all form as living and breathing a part of the universe in the Malayan world as any to be found elsewhere. The people are counterparts of other populations. In such a place, dealings with local groups must be on a man-to-man basis and not on the level of patronage. As the author points out, the native "should be regarded as a human being and should be treated as such."

ERNEST SCHEIN

Washington, D. C.

MARIUS B. JANSEN. *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen.* Pp. viii, 274. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $4.00.

The West has never fully been able to understand how the Japanese were able to deceive the nations of Asia into believing, even for a moment, her Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere propaganda. For Japanese policy, which appeared so transparently expansionist to the West, looked entirely different to an Asia in the throes of resentment against Western imperialism.

Thus the idea of uniting all of Asia under Japanese leadership in order to combat Western imperialism did not appear such a farfetched idea to Asians, as we have learned to our dismay over and over again —from the Aguinaldo rebellion of the 1890's to the Japanese New Order of World War II. Japan, as the only Asian nation to meet the West on its own grounds, held a great fascination for an Asia suffering under the complex humiliations of colonialism. As Sun Yat-sen once said, "the day when the unequal treaties were abolished by Japan was a day of regeneration for all Asiatic peoples."

On the Japanese side, Pan-Asianism has always been the point of intersection of diverse political views. It was shared by reactionaries and expansionists who saw a united Asia under Japanese rule, and by liberals who saw a united, free, and

democratic Asia brought to independence through Japan's benevolent example and guidance. Thus it was that Sun Yat-sen, the very symbol of Chinese nationalism, was able to draw inspiration and help from Japan, Chinese nationalism's greatest enemy.

The problem always was, as Sun Yat-sen and others learned through bitter experience, whether Japan would rule or lead. For Japanese ultranationalists, the dividing line was never entirely clear. Japan wanted a nationalist sentiment strong enough to drive out the Western imperialists, but not strong enough to defy Japanese rule. It was this confusion that ultimately compromised the good will that Japan had to its credit in every country of Asia.

Dr. Jansen has given us an extremely valuable understanding of the process whereby the attraction of Japan for Dr. Sun was gradually replaced by an inevitable, if reluctant, hostility. As long as Japan could make use of the radical nationalists to weaken Western power, to hamper the unification of China, and to further her own economic and political advancement, it was willing to help. But when Chinese nationalist aspirations seemed to conflict with Japan's aims, then they were junked. In the same way, Japanese political sentiment itself was split. For the "liberals," Pan-Asianism was more than a mere expedient: it represented a genuine, if somewhat confused, ideal. But for the ultranationalists, Pan-Asianism meant only an Asia united under the Japanese Empire. Dr. Sun learned eventually to deal with the reality of Japanese expansionism, but he always reserved the hope that Japan would return to her role of "leader," not "ruler" of Asia.

Dr. Jansen's book lies in that extremely difficult area of study—requiring as it does command of both Japanese and Chinese language sources—between Japanology and Sinology. It promises well for what we may expect from this field in the future.

HERBERT PASSIN
Ohio State University

GAMAL ABDUL NASSER. *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution.* Pp. 119. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. $2.00.

In this slender volume Premier Gamal Abdul Nasser traces his own political evolution and outlines the future tasks of Egypt in the Arab world and the global community. A young student in 1935, he took part in demonstrations clamoring for a constitution and the end of British rule in the Land of the Nile. He called upon leading Egyptian statesmen to prevail upon them to help unite Egypt. The National Front was formed as a result.

During World War II, seven years later, he grew bitter against the British imposing their way upon the young king and his determination waxed to see his country gain full independence. The time appeared to be propitious during the Palestine campaign in 1948, when Egypt seized arms to vanquish the Israelis. Instead of that Egypt was defeated.

Nasser, a young army officer, helped to create the Free Officers' organization which ousted King Farouk on the historic July 23, 1952. This appeared to be the right time to realize the national ambitions.

The vanguard had done its work and now it was the masses' turn to close ranks and turn against the enemies of the country. Instead of that hordes of politicians descended upon the leaders of the movement, each of them complaining against the other and offering mass executions as the remedy of the country's ills. Nasser and his associates were deluged with petitions for personal favors. Nobody said "we," everybody said "I." This was an orgy of egotism.

Yet, Egypt needs great force and will power, as Premier Nasser sees it, to play a historic part. He sees his country destined for a majestic role. First, it has to seize leadership in the Arab world, linked together with bonds of a historic heritage, and which is to be cemented into a common destiny. Then Egypt must remember that she is an African country and cannot remain indifferent to the fate of the "Dark Continent" again besieged by self-seeking "white people." Egypt must assume leadership in Africa.

Finally, Egypt must also play a large role in the Islamic world. That part must be large because of Egypt's special status among the Arabs, since she occupies the most strategic location in a very vulnerable area. The area's importance is enhanced because it produces a fabulous oil wealth at a fraction of the cost of production in the Americas. For all these reasons, Premier Nasser sees Egypt's task as the removal of the obtacles in the way of Arab unity.

This is a strange and in some ways disturbing little book. In the Introduction, Miss Dorothy Thompson presents Nasser as a man of stature in the Arab world. Such a man is, no doubt, badly needed. However, this book provides no indication of Nasser's greatness. On the contrary, in some ways he appears to be very petty. He writes no word about the role of former President Mohammed Naguib who, not long ago, was Egypt's most representative man. Then, the role Nasser foresees for his country looks very much like a new type of imperialism in the Arab, African, and Islamic worlds, the Egyptian version of the white man's burden. While he packs the book full of patriotism, he breathes barely a word about his nation's tremendous economic and social problems. What, for instance, should be done about land reform? And what a contradiction there is between his vision of Egypt's cosmic role and the morbid worship of the sacred "I" he pans. Also, the "statistics" of the Premier are evidently inspirational. He credits Pakistan, for instance, with a population of nearly 100 million Muslims while, in reality, the total population of the country amounts to only 75 million and of these more than 10 million are Hindus. The impression Premier Nasser makes is not improved by his jejune nationalistic nostalgia of another age, reveling in words, removed from reality.

EMIL LENGYEL
New York University

BARNET LITVINOFF. *Ben-Gurion of Israel.* Pp. xii, 273. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $4.00.

Ben-Gurion of Israel is one of those rare books that hold more for the reader than their title would lead him to expect. This biography of the first Prime Minister of Israel, primarily the story of his life, is at the same time a most incisive, critical, and dispassionate analysis of the forces, personalities, and events that helped shape the present, in many respects unique, phase of Jewish history.

Evidently, it is the very character and stature of the man who is the subject of this life-sized portrait that invites such treatment. Ben-Gurion's part in the sequence of historic events that led to the establishment of the State of Israel is not so lofty as that of Theodor Herzl, who turned Zionism into a movement of political consequence, nor as that of Chaim Weizman, who won public recognition for its chief goal, the National Home in Palestine; but it is possibly more decisive. These statesmen of Zionism used their talents to gain diplomatic victories for their people. Ben-Gurion devoted his to translate these victories into political reality. He was, when necessary, an agitator, but he was always an organizer of the Zionist youth in the little Eastern European townlet where he was born, as David Green, in 1886; of the workers in Palestine, where he immigrated in 1906; of the military struggle against the Arab forces in 1948; and of the government and administration of the new state in his "hour of triumph." In tracing his long and, more often than not, stormy career of a party politician, his biographer can hardly avoid touching upon all the intricacies of Zionist politics, sometimes bordering on the miraculous, and too often on the profane. That he does so candidly, with a perfect mastery of the relevant and the revealing material, makes Mr. Litvinoff's book a source of invaluable information for the student of recent Jewish history.

With all his virtues and shortcomings Ben-Gurion, as this biographer convincingly demonstrates, has done more than any other single individual to bring about the establishment of the State of Israel. Concluding his study of both the man and the state, Mr. Litvinoff retains his sympathetic, but detached objectivity. He shows Ben-Gurion, the party leader, at his worst —at the time when he was "ready to bar-

gain away hallowed principles for a truce with Revisionism" (p. 111); and at his best—in his determined stand during the riots caused by the acceptance of reparations from Germany, in 1952 (p. 235). Neither does the careful chronicler try to gloss over the dangers that beset the new state. "Today" we read, "the balance of power in the Middle East is heavily loaded against Israel. She disposes of an excellent army, well-trained, intelligent, and prepared to defend the state and the cause identified with it. It is nevertheless difficult to see what this will avail against a synchronized attack, launched by air, sea and land, of nations sharing the humiliation of a combined defeat, better led than previously, and far less arrogant" (p. 235). In other words, the outcome of the militant and militaristic politics may prove to be far less final than they would appear to be in the light and glory of their present success. It can only be hoped that some fortunate turn of events will prevent the destruction of what these politics so spectacularly helped to create.

HENRIK F. INFIELD
Group Farming Research Institute,
Poughkeepsie, N. Y.

JOHN F. CADY. *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia.* Pp. xii, 322. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. $5.00.

Eastern Asia of the nineteenth century still offers the historian a fertile field for research. John F. Cady has demonstrated this by his detailed study of the bases of French imperialism in this area during the three decades from 1830 to 1860. This book is important, not only for what it reveals of French policy and the motivations for French expansionism, but also for its excellent synthesis of the diplomacy of the European powers with respect to both European and Asian questions.

Professor Cady concludes that "the taproot of French imperialism in the Far East from first to last was national pride—pride of culture, reputation, prestige and influence" (p. 294). The conclusion is documented in detail in this book which was begun before World War II, but remained unfinished because the war prevented the author's completion of his archival research. Although access was not obtained to the archives of the French Ministry of Marine and Colonies, it is probable that this material would only have served to provide more detail rather than modify the author's analysis and conclusions.

For the student of Eastern Asia, Professor Cady's study is indispensable mainly because through it he will be able to grasp the principal elements in the very tangled relationships of the European powers and the United States in the period when Western policies towards China and the countries of Southeast Asia were being formed. The careful analysis of French support of their missionary efforts in the area involved shows that such support was not always consistent and was frequently the result of factors in France and in Europe that had nothing to do with Asia. The role of French missionaries in bringing pressure on the government in Paris to provide them protection and even to engage in territorial adventures is carefully set forth.

New light is thrown on the position and policies of successive French governments and their representatives with respect to China and the Chinese treaty ports in particular. The role of the French in the first treaties with China and in the subsequent treaty settlements is made clear by this book and should serve to correct misstatements by other authors who have not done the detailed research in the relevant archives. Throughout, the importance of the prestige of France and the high value which French representatives placed upon the export of French culture is clearly shown. It is hoped that the author may continue his research to cover subsequent decades of the nineteenth century or, at least, that his book will stimulate further research in the important last two decades of that century by other scholars, for France's role in Asian international relations needs to be understood.

WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE, JR.
School of Advanced International Studies

WENDELL PHILLIPS. *Qataban and Sheba: Exploring the Ancient Kingdoms on the Biblical Spice Routes of Arabia.* Pp. xvi, 362. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955. $5.00.

Qataban and Sheba is the story of trips of exploration into Southern Arabia in 1950 and 1951 under the leadership of Dr. Wendell Phillips, President of the American Foundation for the Study of Man. The initial exploration was undertaken at Beihan el Qasab, in the ancient kingdom of Qataban, whose life span seems to have encompassed some eight centuries up to the beginning of the Christian era. The frankincense route traversed this region, close to what is today to the southeast corner of the Kingdom of Yemen. The drought, sand and native bullets, the author asserts, had defied the work of explorers. With his superior equipment and enterprising spirit he hoped to unearth evidences of pre-Christian cultures. The photographs he produces show that the work of his expedition was not in vain.

The second expedition was undertaken in the ancient Kingdom of Saba and the work was concentrated in Marib, reputed capital of the Bible's Queen of Sheba. The photographic evidence of results is again impressive. The great moon temple was exposed to view.

Marib is within the boundaries of jealously guarded Yemen which none but the personal invitation of its King can open. The royal favor shone on Dr. Phillips and his party at first, but then their time of troubles began. Among other nefarious acts, the explorers were accused of spying and in the end they barely escaped with their lives. Undaunted, the explorers moved into the Dhofar province of Oman, frankincense capital of the ancient world, where they unearthed such treasures as a bronze bull representing the moon god and bronze female dancers imported from India.

The book is written in a rushing narrative in which hairbreadth escapes and near miracles play important roles. Speaking of a British colonial officer, Dr. Phillips tells the story of how he escaped death when a would-be assassin's knife plunged into his chest. "Miraculously, the blade entered near one side of the heart and pushed it aside instead of piercing it."

Dr. Phillips describes a microfilm project on Mount Sinai in which he had a hand as one that "made available the largest and most important body of research material ever revealed in a single operation," and about which hundreds of books will no doubt be written. He describes Professor William F. Albright, archeologist of the first trip, as the "author of over eight hundred books and articles on the Bible and the Middle East." As all the world knows, the accomplishments of Professor Albright need no such gilding.

The publishers describe Dr. Phillips as "America's foremost Arabian explorer." Whatever else he is, he is also a brilliant salesman. When describing the vehicles his caravan was using, he never omits to make specific mention of the manufacturer and the brand of tire. He also names the brands of the typewriters, refrigerators, and nonalcoholic cold drinks he presented to native Kings and commons.

He tells us that the scholarly caravan included two very beautiful girls on its expeditions. The first one was a ravishing blonde while the second one was a "raven-haired beauty," both of them fetchingly photographed. In view of this and also because of the front-page news excitement caused by the caravan's escape from Yemen it would be surprising if this book, highly praised, among others, by Lowell Thomas, would escape the sharp eyes of Hollywood talent scouts.

EMIL LENGYEL
New York University

OTHER BOOKS

ADAMS, LEONARD P., and THOMAS W. MACKESEY. *Commuting Patterns of Industrial Workers: A Study of Experience Since 1940 in the Northeast Region.* Pp. v, 135. Ithaca, N. Y.: Housing Research Center, Cornell University, 1955. $2.00.

Administrative Practice of Social Insurance. Pp. 86. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1955. $1.00.

Administration, Supervision, and Consultation: Papers from the 1954 Social Welfare Forum, National Conference of Social Work. Pp. 114. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1955. $1.50.

ANDERSON, EUGENE N. *The Prussian Election Statistics, 1862 and 1863.* Pp. xxxi, 147. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1954. No price.

BESTOR, ARTHUR, DAVID C. MEARNS, and JONATHAN DANIELS. *Three Presidents and Their Books: The Readings of Jefferson, Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt.* Pp. ix, 129. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955. $2.50.

BROWN, FRANCIS J. (Ed.). *Approaching Equality of Opportunity in Higher Education.* Pp. ix, 132. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1955. $1.50.

CLELAND, SHERRILL. *The Influence of Plant Size on Industrial Relations.* Pp. 65. Princeton, N. J.: Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics and Sociology, Princeton University, 1955. $2.00.

CONOVER, HELEN F. under the direction of HARRY J. KROULD. *The United States and Europe: A Bibliographical Survey of Thought Expressed in American and British Writings of 1951–1952.* Pp. vi, 255. Washington, D. C.: European Affairs Division, Reference Department, Library of Congress, 1953. $1.75.

CORTI, EGON CAESAR CONTE. *Alexander von Battenberg.* Translated by E. M. Hodgson. Pp. x, 320. London: Cassell and Company, 1954. (Distributed by Oxford University Press, New York.) $4.80.

COOPER, GORDON. *Forbidden Lands.* Pp. 165. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $4.75.

CROUCH, WINSTON W., and others. *Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration.* Vol. XIV: *Finance and Taxation.* Pp. vi, 150. Los Angeles, Cal.: The Haynes Foundation, 1954. $2.75 cloth; $2.25 paper.

CROUCH, WINSTON W. *Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration.* Vol. XV: *Intergovernmental Relations.* Pp. ix, 160. Los Angeles, Cal.: The Haynes Foundation, 1954. $2.75 cloth; $2.25 paper.

DE SAINTE LORETTE, LUCIEN. *L'Idée d'union fédérale européenne.* Pp. 204. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1955. 250 *fr.*

FINK, ARTHUR E., and others. *The Field of Social Work.* Pp. ix, 630. 3d ed. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955. $5.25.

FONER, PHILIP S. *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass.* Vol. IV: *Reconstruction and After.* Pp. 574. New York: International Publishers, 1955. $5.00.

GEMMILL, PAUL F. *Current Introductory Economics.* Pp. xii, 711. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $5.50.

GEORGE, PIERRE, and JEAN TRICART. *L'Europe centrale.* Vol. II: *Les États.* Pp. 297–753. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954. 1,800 *fr.*

GREER, PAUL. *Co-operatives: The British Achievement.* Pp. xiv, 171. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $3.00.

GYORGY, ANDREW, and HUBERT S. GIBBS (Eds.). *Problems in International Relations.* Pp. xiii, 330. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955. $3.00.

HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE F. *Cultural Anthropology.* (An Abridged revision of *Men and His Works.*) Pp. xvi, 569, xxxiv. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. $5.00.

HOGENSON, PALMER T. *The Economics of Group Banking.* Pp. vii, 199. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. $5.00.

HOLLY, J. FRED, and BEVARS D. MABRY. *Protective Labor Legislation and Its Administration in Tennessee.* Pp. 216. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1955. No price.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. *Systems of Social Security: United States.* Pp. 106. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1954. 75 cents.

Irish Pound, 1797–1826, The. A Reprint of the Report of the Committee of 1804 of the British House of Commons on the Condition of the Irish Currency. Pp. 136. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1955. No price.

JACKSON, FREDERICK H. *Simeon Eben Baldwin: Lawyer, Social Scientist, Statesman.* Pp. xiv, 291. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1955. $5.00.

JONES, CLARENCE F., and RAFAEL PICÓ. *Symposium on the Geography of Puerto Rico.* Pp. xxviii, 503. Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Press, 1955.

KEEN, BENJAMIN (Ed.). *Readings in Latin American Civilization, 1492 to the Present.* Pp. ix, 447. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955. $3.60.

KETTNER, FREDERICK. *Biosophy and Spiritual Democracy: A Basis for World Peace.* Pp. xxvi, 222. New York: Vantage Press, 1954. $3.50.

KUKIEL, M. *Czartoryski and European Unity 1770–1861.* Pp. xvii, 354. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $6.00.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *Soviet Civilization.* Pp. xxx, 447. 2d ed. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $5.00.

LANDIS, PAUL H. *Making the Most of Marriage.* Pp. xii, 542. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. $5.50.

LINEBARGER, PAUL M. A. *Psychological Warfare.* Pp. xv, 318. 2d ed. Washington, D. C.: Combat Forces Press, 1954. $6.00.

LINGELLE, MAURICE. *L'Esclavage.* Pp. 110. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. No price.

LOETSCHER, LEFFERTS A. *The Broadening Church: A Study of Theological Issues in the Presbyterian Church Since 1869.* Pp. 195. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954. $4.75.

MASON, LESTER B. *The French Constitution and the Social Question in the Old Regime, 1700–1789.* Pp. 124. Buffalo, N. Y.: Published by the author, 1954. $1.75.

MEEHL, PAUL. *Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence.* Pp. x, 149. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954. $3.00.

MILLER, JACOB. *Soviet Russia: An Introduction.* Pp. 190. London: Hutchinson and Company, 1955. (Distributed by Longmans, Green, and Company, New York.) $1.80 text; $2.40 trade.

MUNK, ARTHUR W. *Perplexing Problems of Religion.* Pp. 176. St. Louis, Mo.: Bethany Press, 1954. $2.75.

PATON, JEAN M. *The Adopted Break Silence.* Pp. 180. Philadelphia: Life History Study Center, 1954. $3.00.

PETRAZYCKI, LEON. *Law and Morality.* Translated by Hugh W. Babb. (20th Century Legal Philosophy Series: Vol. VII.) Pp. xlvi, 335. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $7.50.

PHELPS, ORME W. *Introduction to Labor Economics.* Pp. xiv, 554. 2d ed. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $6.50.

PLACE, ROBIN. *Down to Earth: A Practical Guide to Archaeology.* Pp. xvi, 173. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $7.50.

RIEGEL, ROBERT E., and DAVID F. LONG. *The American Story.* Vol. I: *Youth.* Pp. x, 522. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $6.00.

RITTER, WILLIAM EMERSON. *Charles Darwin and the Golden Rule.* Compiled and edited by Edna Watson Bailey. Pp. xxi, 400. Washington, D. C.: Science Service; New York: Storm Publishers, 1954. $5.00.

SAMUELSON, PAUL A. *Economics: An Introductory Analysis.* Pp. xxii, 753. 3d ed. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $5.75.

Selected Studies of Negro Employment in the South. (Prepared for the NPA Committee of the South.) Pp. x, 483. Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1955. $5.50.

SHAULL, M. RICHARD. *Encounter with Revolution.* Pp. xiv, 145. New York: Association Press, 1955. $2.50.

SILVERT, K. H. *A Study in Government: Guatemala.* (Publication 21.) Pp. xi, 98. New Orleans, La.: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1954. No price.

SMITH, HOWARD R. *Economic History of the United States.* Pp. x, 763. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $6.00.

SPINDLER, GEORGE D. *Sociocultural and Psychological Processes in Menomini Acculturation.* Pp. vi, 271. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. $3.50.

SWINDLER, WILLIAM F. *Problems of Law in Journalism.* Pp. xxii, 551. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $5.75.

TALBERT, ROBERT H. *Spanish-Name People in the Southwest and West.* Pp. vi, 90. Fort Worth, Texas: Leo Potishman, Texas Christian University, 1955. $2.00.

TARSHIS, LORIE. *Introduction to International Trade and Finance.* Pp. x, 536. New York: John Wiley and Sons; London: Chapman and Hall, 1955. $6.00.

THOMAS, S. B. *Government and Administration in Communist China.* Pp. iii, 196. Rev. ed. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1955. $2.75.

THOMPSON, ARTHUR W. *Gateway to the Social Sciences.* Pp. viii, 374. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955. $2.90.

THORPE, LOUIS P. *Child Psychology and Development.* Pp. v, 709. 2d ed. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955. $6.00.

UNITED NATIONS. *Demographic Yearbook, 1954.* Sixth Issue. New York: United Nations, 1954. (Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.) $7.50 cloth; $6.00 paper.

WAINGER, BERTRAND M. *The American Adventure.* Pp. v, 727. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $4.20.

ERRATUM

In Volume 296 (November 1954) of THE ANNALS, *The Future of the United Nations: Issues of Charter Revision,* page 20, column 2, line 1, *for* the same civilization, later the con- *read* aid of the victim; and that, finally, the. The sentence as corrected then reads: The first condition is that in case of unqualified aggression by a state the Security Council be unanimous in recognizing the aggression and in designating it as such, and unanimous in calling upon the Member States to come to the aid of the victim; and that, finally, the Member States have both the determination and the military capacity to coerce the aggressor and punish him.

INDEX

Abrams case, 88
Academic freedom, 25, 70–71, 72–78, 81
Acheson, Dean, 6
Administrative Procedure Act, 102
Administrators (agencies, departments, superiors), role in loyalty-security programs, 7–8, 11, 54, 55, 56, 57, 94, 100, 113
Air Force, 96
Alsop, Joseph and Stewart, 91
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vii, 1
  See also ANNALS, THE
American Bar Association, Canons of Ethics, 17
American Civil Liberties Union, 38
American League for Peace and Democracy, 38
American Legion, 55, 60, 82, 91
Americans for Democratic Action, 92
Angell, Ernest, 104
ANNALS, THE, vii
Armed forces, and security programs, 94
Army (U. S.), McCarthy's attack on, 53
Arnold, Matthew, 28
ARNOLD, THURMAN, Due Process in Trials, 123–130
Arnold, Thurman, 103, 115, 121
Associates, testimony concerning, in security investigation, 38, 73, 75, 82, 83, 85, 111
Association
  freedom of, for maintenance of political democracy, 39, 63
  with subversive individuals, and the loyalty-security programs, 9, 11, 38, 39, 58–59, 60, 70, 74, 88, 94–95, 97, 98–99, 106, 111, 120, 125, 126
Association of American Colleges, 80
Association of American Universities, 80
Atomic bombs, 4, 5, 6
Atomic energy, international control of, 6
Atomic Energy Act, 59
Atomic Energy Commission (U. S.), 5
  contractors, and security clearance, 94
  research grants from, 9
  security clearance procedures, 59, 96, 100
  See also Oppenheimer, J. Robert—dismissal from Atomic Energy Commission
Attorney General (U. S.), 34, 47, 55, 67, 127, 128, 129, 130
  list of subversive organizations, 38, 54, 58, 82, 90
  See also Brownell, Herbert, Jr.

Baarslag, Karl, 53
Bach, Johann Sebastian, 28
Bailey, Dorothy, 56, 127–128, 130
Baldwin, Roger, 23
Ballot, *see* Elections
Barth, Alan, 82; cited, 88, 95–96
Baruch plan, 6
Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio, 36
Beckerley, James G., 5
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 28
Bentham, Jeremy, 116
Bentley, Elizabeth Terrill, 53
BERLE, ADOLF A., JR., Concentration of Economic Power and Protection of Freedom of Expression, 20–28
Berlin, Irving (Israel Baline), 28
BIDDLE, FRANCIS, Subversives in Government, 51–61
Biddle, Francis, 2–3; quoted, 67
Biddle, Nicholas, 118
Bill of Rights, *see* Constitution (U. S.)—Amendments 1–10
Bissonnette, Georges, 52
Black, Hugo L., quoted, 55
Boards, of loyalty-security programs, 97, 98, 99–100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 127
  loyalty, 56, 96, 105, 106, 107, 128
  review and appeals, 7, 8, 11, 55, 59, 60, 100
    See also Loyalty Review Board
  security, 7, 8, 10, 11, 105
Bok, Curtis, 103, 108; quoted, 102
BOLTE, CHARLES G., Security Through Book Burning, 87–93
BONTECOU, ELEANOR, Due Process in Security Dismissals, 102–109
Bontecou, Eleanor
  cited, 54–55, 98
  quoted, 60, 95, 98
Book burning, significance of, 87–88
Boris, Metropolitan of Russian Orthodox Church, 52
Boston Public Library, 89
Boy Scouts, 87, 88
Brandeis, Louis D., quoted, 29, 32, 33–34
Brian, Chief Justice, 103
Broadcasting, 13–19
Browder, Earl, quoted, 68, 69
BROWN, RALPH S., JR., The Operation of Personnel Security Programs, 94–101
Brown University, 72
Brownell, Herbert, Jr., Attorney General, 31, 57, 60; quoted, 29, 31, 73
Budenz, Louis Francis, 53
Bunche, Ralph J., 105
Bush, Vannevar, 6
Butterworth, Joseph, 81
Byse, Clark, 82

Cain, Harry P., quoted, 57, 60

California, 74, 75, 114
  See also Tenney committee
California Institute of Technology, 9
Cambridge University, 77
Canwell committee (Washington, Legislature, Joint Fact-finding Committee on Un-American Activities in Washington State), 81, 105
Capitalism, 21
Carnegie Foundations, 25
Censorship, 15, 19, 22, 24, 38, 52–53, 73, 74, 87–93
Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., quoted, 75, 77
Chambers, Whittaker, 53, 68, 105
Chasanow, Abraham, 10, 99, 105–106
China, People's Republic of
  Communism in, 51, 67
  UN membership for, 73, 111
Clark, Tom C., quoted, 44–45
Classified material, 5–6 97, 101, 127–128
Clemens, Samuel L. (Mark Twain), quoted, 87
Coast Guard, 94
Codes, professional, 17–18
Cold war, 53, 77, 125, 126
Collectivism, 21–22
Colleges, *see* Education; Universities and colleges
Colombia, 47–48
Columbia University, 25
Combs, Richard E., 76
Comics, attempts to suppress, 91–92
Commission on Government Security (proposed), 12
Communication, mass media of, 13
  See also Press; Radio; Television
Communications Act (1934), 15, 30
Communism
  and the churches, 42–43, 48
  opposition to, necessary for security clearance, 97, 99
  principles of, support of, 67, 70, 84, 88
  sympathy with, as charge in security hearings, 95, 97, 98
  See also Universities and colleges—and Communism
Communist Control Act, 119
Communist infiltration, 42, 51, 52, 60, 73, 103
Communist literature, reading of, 52–53, 73, 89, 90, 98
Communist movement
  Lenin on, 68
  support of, and passport issuance, 37–38, 39
Communist regimes, and religious freedom, 43–44
Communist party (U. S.)
  as a political party, 52, 68
  membership and members, 37–38, 39, 42, 52, 56, 68–69, 70, 74, 79, 81–85 (*passim*), 90, 97, 106–107, 112, 119
Communists, government definitions of, 37–38, 119
Compton, K. T., 6
Conant, James B., 6
Condon, Edward U., 11
Conformity
  and the security system, 9–10, 22, 39, 56, 81, 111–113
  dangers of, 6, 22, 23–24, 39, 41, 89, 90, 93
Congress
  and loyalty-security programs, 12, 54, 57
  and religious tolerance, 41
  House of Representatives
    and U. S. Grant, 118
    Committee on Un-American Activities (1945–), 42–43, 81–83, 85, 94, 114
    [Kerr committee], definition of subversive activity, 54
    rules of fair practice for investigating committees, 121
    Special Committee on Un-American Activities (Dies, 1938–44), 51, 55, 68–69, 81
    Special Committee to Investigate Tax-exempt Foundations (Reece), 75–76
  investigation of pornography, 92–93
  Senate
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations (McCarthy), 81, 85, 86
      See also Fort Monmouth
    Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary (McCarran and Jenner), 76, 81, 83–84, 105
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), Communists in, 52
Conscientious objectors, 44–46
Constitution (U. S.), 29, 33–34, 41, 46, 63–64, 66, 90, 128
  Amendments 1–10 (Bill of Rights), 14–15, 22, 89, 116
    First Amendment
      and censorship, 91
      and passport applicants, 38
      and religious freedom, 41, 44
      pleading of, by professors, 81, 82, 85
    Fourth Amendment
      and wire tapping, 29, 30, 34
      text of, 29
    Fifth Amendment
      and passport applicants, 38
      guilt or innocence of pleaders, 70–71, 82, 114–115, 116–118, 120
      origin and development of, 115–116
      pleading of
        by goverment employees, 103, 120
        by lawyers, 114, 121
        by piano dealer, 114, 121

Constitution—Amendments 1–10—Fifth Amendment—pleading of (*cont.*).
by professors, 70–71, 79–86, 114, 121
in congressional investigations, 82, 118–119, 120
New York State bill on, 114, 121–122
recent literature on, 82
requirements of, 102
significance and purpose, 70–71, 74, 114, 116–117, 122
Sixth Amendment
on confrontation with witnesses, 98
requirements of, 102
Ninth Amendment, text of, 29
Tenth Amendement, text of, 29
Eighteenth Amendment, 54
Cook, Stuart W., cited, 110
Coplon, Judith, 31, 32
Cornell University, 117–118
Corporations
a facet of shift to collectivism, 21, 24
attitude toward nonconformists and the controversial, 24–26
attitude toward security-investigated individuals, 10
gifts to education, 25
Counsel
intimidation of, 38–39
right to, 102, 103, 116
Courts
and civil rights, 1, 11–12, 23, 90, 102
and conscientious objectors, 44–46
and distinction between expression of opinion and organized propaganda, 65
and Fifth Amendment pleading, 70–71, 82, 118, 121
and loyalty-security procedures, 127, 128
and passport regulation, 37, 39
See also Supreme Court of the United States; Trials
Crouch, Paul, 105
Cushman, Robert E., cited, 54
Czechoslovakia, 52

Davenport, Russell, 20, 27
Davies, John Paton, Jr., 11
Davis, Elmer, 114–115
Debs, Eugene Victor, 52
Debussy, Claude, 28
Dennis case (1951), 69
Department of Agriculture, personnel, and security investigations, 11, 108–109
Department of Defense, contractors, and security program, 94
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 9
See also Public Health Service
Department of Justice, 105
and conscientious objectors, 45–46
and wire tapping, 30, 34
See also Attorney General; Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of State, 92
and passports, 36–40
personnel, and loyalty-security investigations, 10, 11, 95, 96, 101, 106–107, 108–109
See also Foreign Service
Department of the Air Force, 100
Department of the Army, 100
Department of the Navy, 5, 11, 100
See also Chasanow
Departmental responsibility for loyalty-security programs, *see* Administrators
Dickens, Charles, quoted, 20
Dies, Martin, 54, 60, 81; quoted, 55
Dies committee (House, Special Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938–44), 51, 55, 68–69, 81
[Dostoevsky, Feodor M.], 91
Double jeopardy (reopened cases), under loyalty-security programs, 10, 11, 57, 100, 102, 106–107, 108–109
Douglas, William O., quoted, 41
Doyle, Clyde, quoted, 121
Dreyfus, Alfred, 128
Due process of law, 1, 22, 66
absence of, in loyalty-security proceedings, 102–103, 127–129, 130
and character trials, 127
definition of, 102
for books, 92–93
in trials, 123–130
protection of worst offenders, 129

Economic power, concentration of, and freedom of expression, 20–28
Edgerton, Henry White, quoted, 56
Education
and loyalty-security investigations, 53, 70–71, 73–76, 79–86, 114
financial concerns of, 25, 72, 77
gifts to, from corporations and foundations, 25
loyalty and anti-Communist oaths, 46, 71, 75
purpose of, 72, 77
standards for teaching and research, 24–25, 72–74, 76, 77, 79–80, 81, 83–84, 86
tax exempt institutions, 75–76
Virginia governor on dangers of, 88
See also Academic freedom; Politics—and education; Textbooks; Universities and colleges
Einstein, Albert, 28
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 53, 119–120
quoted, 8, 90

security program, 53, 57, 96, 99, 100
See also Executive Order 10450; Security program
Eldridge, Florence (Mrs. Fredric March), 55
Elections (ballot; voting), free, and antidemocratic groups, 55, 62–66
Employment difficulties, of investigated individuals, 7, 10, 74, 112, 121, 128
England, 7, 21
Communism in, 69, 74
development of individual rights in, 115–116
outlawry in, 121
universities, 74, 77
See also Great Britain
Espionage, and security programs, 4, 5, 10, 32, 34, 37, 40, 43, 52, 56, 59, 69, 84, 97, 103–104
Evidence
and self-incrimination, 117
concealment or disclosure of, 7–8, 56, 58, 95, 96, 98, 102, 104–107, 126, 127–129, 130
evaluation of, 8, 10, 95–96, 98–99, 103, 107
See also Wire tapping; Witnesses
Executive Order 10450, 7, 9, 57, 94

Fahy, Charles, 59
FANELLI, JOSEPH A., Passport—Right or Privilege?, 36–40
Fascism, 51, 66
Faulkner, William, 92
Fear and hysteria, in relation to loyalty-security programs, 2, 9, 10, 51–52, 52–53, 55, 67–68, 73, 77, 81, 91, 101, 108, 110–113, 122, 123, 125, 128
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 111
and wire tapping, 30, 33
information from, 7, 52, 82, 94, 106. *See also below* investigations of government employees
investigations of government employees, 54, 55, 56, 95–96, 99, 107, 127, 128, 129
undercover agents of, 57–58, 95, 107
Federal Communications Commission, 15–16
Federation of American Scientists, 4
Fellow travelers, 42, 52, 54, 59, 66
FELLOWS, HAROLD E., Freedom of Expression on the Air, 13–19
Fifth Amendment, *see* Constitution—Amendments 1–10—Fifth Amendment
Flag salute, as issue of religious freedom, 41, 44, 46
Flexner, Simon, 25
Florida, and Fifth Amendment pleading, 114
Ford Foundation, 20, 25
Foreign Operations Administration, 108–109
Foreign Service, effect of loyalty-security program on, 53–54
Fort Monmouth (N. J.), investigation, 8, 10
Fortas, Abe, 115
Foster, William Z., quoted, 68
Foundations
administrators and personnel of, 25, 26
gifts to education, 25
investigation of, 75–76
Four Freedoms, 2
France, Anatole (Jacques Anatole Thibault), cited, 37
France, 63, 106
Franco, Francisco, 36
Frankfurter, Felix, quoted, 34, 46
Franklin, Benjamin, 13
Free speech, 14, 31, 51, 63, 65, 66, 72, 77, 87, 88
See also Freedom of expression
Freedom
and American democracy, 9–10, 14, 26, 28, 122
inalienable nature of, 63–65
Wilson on, 3
Freedom of expression
and American democracy, 9–10, 89–91, 93
and concentration of economic power, 20–28
and education, 72, 75, 77
and organized propaganda, 65–66
and scientific thought, 6–7, 9–10
logic of opposition to, 88–89
on the air, 13–19
protection by law and legal procedures, 22
See also Censorship; Conformity; Free speech; Press—freedom of; Proselytizing
Freedom of thought, 6, 21, 23–24, 25, 26, 40, 65, 75, 77, 88, 93
See also Conformity
Freud, Sigmund, 92
Fund for the Republic, 12, 60
Furry, Wendell H., 85–86

Galileo, 28
Gaus, Friedrich, 129
General Electric Company, 26
Germany
academic freedom in, 76
denazification in, 130
rearmament, 119
Reichstag trials, 126
U. S. military tribunals, 129, 130
Weimar Constitution, 2
See also Hitler; Nazism and Nazis; Nuremberg trials
Gitlow, Benjamin, 53
Gossett, William T., quoted, 84
Government employees
applicants, procedure for, 7, 59, 94–95, 96, 100
effect of loyalty-security programs on, 9, 10–11, 53–54, 57, 94, 110–113, 127–128
resignations, under investigation, 9, 57, 96, 100, 101

Government Employees (*cont.*)
standards for, 1, 2–3, 7, 24, 111
suspension without pay, during investigation, 8, 57, 60, 100–101, 112
tenure, and loyalty-security programs, 11
Grant, Ulysses S., 118–119
Gray, Gordon, quoted, 103
Great Britain
Parliament, composition of, 26
security system, 59–60
See also England
Greenbelt (Md.) housing project, 10, 105–106
Greenglass, David, 68
Gregory IX, pope, 115
Griswold, Erwin N., 82
Gromyko, Andrei A., quoted, 43
Grutzner, Charles, quoted, 33

HAAG, ERNEST VAN DEN, Controlling Subversive Groups, 62–71
Halifax, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 1st Earl of, 129
Hand, Learned, 90
Harvard University, 24, 74, 85–86
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 22–23, 27, 28; quoted, 23
Henry, Patrick, 38
Hewitt, George, 105
Hiss, Alger, 52, 68
Hitler, Adolf, 36, 62, 126, 129
Hodgins, Eric, cited, 22
Hofstadter, Samuel H., quoted, 31–32, 32–33
Holmes, Oliver Wendell (1841–1935), 23, 69, 74, 90; quoted, 33, 88, 115, 123
Hook, Sidney, cited, 69
Hoover, J. Edgar, 107; quoted, 31, 34, 42
Hughes, Charles Evans, quoted, 44, 61
Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr., 12, 60–61, 67
Hungary, 43
HUTCHINS, ROBERT M., The Meaning and Significance of Academic Freedom, 72–78
Hutchins, Robert M., editor, 72
Hydrogen bombs, 4, 5
Hysteria, *see* Hysteria and fear

Illinois, 55, 121
Individualism, 21, 24
Industrial Revolution, 21
Industry, *see* Corporations
Informers, in loyalty-security investigations, 31, 53, 56, 57–58, 59, 82, 95, 98, 104–107, 127
Inquisition, 126
Insanity, as a defense in trials, 124–125, 127
Insull, Samuel, 72
Intellectuals, minority status of, 21–22, 28
Internal Security Act, 119
Italy, 47, 48, 51, 63, 66
Izvestia, 52–53, 73, 89, 90

Jackson, Andrew, 118
Jackson, Donald L., 43; quoted, 42
Jackson, Robert H., 30, 47, 69; quoted, 41
JACOB, PHILIP E., Religious Freedom—a Good Security Risk?, 41–50
JAHODA, MARIE, Morale in the Federal Civil Service, 110–113
Jahoda, Marie, cited, 110
James, Edmund J., 1
James, William, quoted, 27
Japan, Ladejinsky's service in, 108
Jefferson, Thomas, 38, 41, 62, 90; quoted, 62
Jefferson School of Social Science, 82
Jehovah's Witnesses, 41, 44–45, 46–47
Jenner, William E., 60, 83
Jenner committee (Senate, Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary), 81, 83–84
Joan of Arc. trial of, 126–127
Johnson, Manning, 105
Justice, ideal of, 35, 60, 80, 116, 123, 125, 130

Kafka, Franz, 37
Katz-Suchy, Juliusz, quoted, 43
Kelly, Walt, quoted, 87
Kemble, Edwin C., quoted, 85–86
Kempton, Murray, 89
Kennan, George F., 52–53, 92 (*American Diplomacy*); quoted, 53
Kidnaping, and wire tapping, 31, 32, 34
Kipling, Rudyard, 76
Kobak, Edgar, 17
Kornfeder, Joseph Zack, 53

Labor unions, subversion in, 52, 60, 67
Ladejinsky, Wolf I., 11, 108–109
LEADER, GEORGE M., Address, 1–3
Leader, George M., 118
Legislative investigations (loyalty-security), 22, 76, 80, 82
congressional committees, 43, 55, 79, 80–86, 107, 115, 118–119, 120, 121
See also under Congress, *by committee names*
state committees, 38, 55, 76, 81, 105
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, quoted, 68, 88–89
Lewis, Shippen, 104
Liberalism and liberals, 51, 66–67, 71, 79, 130
Libraries and librarians, and freedom to read, 90–91
Lilienthal, David Eli, 6
Lincoln, Abraham, 28, 87, 88
Lindsay, Samuel M., 1
Lippmann, Walter, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27
LIVINGSTON, M. STANLEY, Science and Security, 4–12
Lorwin, Val R., 102, 105, 106–107
Los Angeles Anti-Nazi League, 38
Loyalty boards, *see* Boards, of loyalty-security programs

Loyalty oaths, 46, 75
Loyalty programs
definitions of criteria, problems of, 4, 9, 10–11, 54, 56, 59, 108, 126, 127, 128
Truman administration loyalty program, 53, 54, 56–57, 59, 60, 96, 100, 103–104, 127–128, 130
under Eisenhower security program, 94
Loyalty Review Board, 56, 59, 100, 103–104

MacArthur, Douglas, 108
McCarran committee (Senate, Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary), 105
McCarthy, Joseph R., 24, 53, 60, 67, 85, 129; quoted, 51
McCarthy committee (Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations), 81, 85, 86
McCarthyism, 22, 128
McIntosh, Millicent Carey, 51
McLeod, Scott, 96, 101, 108
McMillan, Edwin Mattison, 6–7
Madison, James, 41
Magna Charta, 115
MALIN, PATRICK MURPHY, Is Wire Tapping Justified?, 29–35
March, Fredric, 55
Maritime workers, and security programs, 94
Markward, (Mrs.) Mary Stalcup, 104–105
Marshall Plan, 38, 106
Marx, Karl, 112
Marxism and Marxists, 67, 68, 70, 75, 84
Maryland, loyalty oaths, 46
Masefield, John, 76
Matthews, J. B., 53; quoted, 68
Matusow, Harvey M., 53, 56, 58, 105
Mayer, Milton, cited, 75
Mayflower case, 15–16
Melville, Herman, quoted, 90
Mill, John Stuart, 76, 90; quoted, 62, 64, 72
Milton, John, 90
Mindszenty, Joseph, 43
Mormon Church, 27
Morse, Wayne L., 34; cited, 34
Moss, (Mrs.) Annie Lee, 104–105
Motion picture industry, Communist activity in, 52
Mussolini, Benito, 36

Nation, 111
National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, 17–18
National Organization of Decent Literature, 92
National security
and concealment of evidence, 57–58, 102, 127, 129
and fair trials, 123–130
and religious freedom, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47–50
and weapons development, 4, 5–7
and wire tapping, 29, 31
interests of, as test for security clearance, 7, 9, 57, 94, 96, 103
See also Classified material; Espionage; Sabotage; Secrecy—military and state secrets; Security program; Security risks; Sensitive work
Nazism and Nazis, 51, 52, 66, 75, 119, 122, 128, 129–130
Netherlands, the, universities, 77
New Deal, 129
New York City Anti-Crime Committee, 29
New York City Bar Association, 12, 60, 93
New York (State), and Fifth Amendment pleading, 114, 118, 120, 121–122
Newton, Isaac, 28
Niemöller, Martin, 75
Nimitz Commission (Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights), 57
Norway, Bishop of, 129
Novikoff, Alex Benjamin, 83–84
Nuremberg trials, 66, 126, 128, 129–130

Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), 6
Oliphant, Marcus L., 7
Olmstead case, 29, 30
Oppenheimer, J. Robert
dismissal from Atomic Energy Commission, 11, 53, 91, 97, 108, 125–126, 127, 128
influence on international atomic-energy control, 6
lecture at University of Washington canceled, 24, 73, 81
Orwell, George, 116
Outlawry, 121
Oxford University, 77
Oxnam, G. Bromley, 42, 43

Parole, or conscientious objectors, 45–46
Passport issuance, 36–40
Patten, Simon N., 1
Patterson, Ernest Minor, 1
Pauling, Linus C., 9
Pennsylvania
laws on subversion, 55
loyalty oaths, 46
Perkins, Frances, 104
Personality, protection of, 20, 22–23, 26, 27–28
See also Conformity; Freedom of thought
Peters, John Punnett, 102, 103
Phillips, Herbert J., 81
Philosophy, in present-day U. S., 20, 22, 27–28, 75
Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, quoted, 35
[Pius XII], pope, 48, 129
Police, and wire tapping, 31, 33

Politics
and broadcasting, 13–14, 16, 17
and education, 72–77 (*passim*), 79, 80–81, 83
and loyalty-security programs, 9–10, 11, 12, 59, 60, 103
Pope, the, *see* Gregory IX; [Pius XII]
Porter, Cole, 22
Post Office Department, censorship by, 52–53, 73, 89, 90
Pravda, 52–53, 73, 89, 90
President, the, and loyalty-security programs, 11, 12, 102, 109
See also Executive Order 10450; Eisenhower; Roosevelt; Truman
Press
and loyalty-security issues, 4, 10, 11, 61, 121
freedom of, 13–18 (*passim*), 31, 88, 91
newspapers, number of, 16
Priestley, J. B., 22, 23; quoted, 21, 25
Privacy, rights of, 18, 29, 32, 35, 40, 47
Procedure
academic, on faculty tenure, 79–80, 83, 86
historical development of, 12, 115–116
in loyalty-security investigations, 4, 5, 7–8, 12, 43, 55, 57, 59, 60, 69–70, 94–109, 112, 126, 127–128, 130
significance of, 22, 87, 92–93, 102, 103, 108, 123, 125, 127
Propaganda
Communist and subversive, 22, 42, 65–69, 73
of educational institutions, 77
Proselytizing, 46–48
Protestantism, 27, 41, 48
Public Health Service
personnel, and security dismissals, 9
research grants from, 73
Public interest, and freedom of expression, 14–15, 17–18, 19
See also Proselytizing
Public opinion
and government, 20
and loyalty-security investigations, 10–11, 12, 51–52, 53, 56, 60–61, 79–80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 101, 110, 114, 126
of education, 76–78, 79
pressure toward conformity, 23–24
Publishing, and freedom to read, 90–91
See also Censorship; Press—freedom of
Purcell, Ganson, 59
Pusey, Nathan M., 24

Rabi, I. I., 22
Race relations, 111, 119
Rachmaninoff, Sergei, 28
Radar, 6
Radio
and freedom of expression, 13–19
audience coverage, 18–19
licensing of, 14, 15–16
stations, number of, 16
technological developments, 18
Reading
freedom to read, 38, 90–93
of Communist literature, as charge in security hearings, 98
See also Censorship; Press—freedom of
Reece committee (House, Special Committee to Investigate Tax-exempt Foundations), 75–76
Relevance, theory and problems of, in loyalty-security investigations, 39, 74, 94, 99
Religion (and conscience), freedom of, 22, 40, 41–50, 87, 115
Research
government grants for, withholding of, 9, 73
standards for, 73, 76
Review boards, *see* Boards, of loyalty-security programs—review and appeals; Loyalty Review Board
Revolutionary War, 54, 87, 88
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 129
Richardson, Seth W., 56; quoted, 56, 103–104
Roberts, Owen J., 59
death, 33
quoted, 33
Robin Hood, 121
Rockefeller Foundation, 25
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, 25
Roman Catholic Church
and religious freedom, 47–48
influence in Middle Ages, 26
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 2–3, 28, 55–56
Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel, 52, 68
Ross, Ralph Gilbert, cited, 64
Rowe, Leo S., 1
Rutgers University, 83

Sabotage, and security programs, 32, 34, 40, 52, 59, 97
Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, 36
Santayana, George, 62
Sarnoff, David, 18
Scapegoat psychology, 4, 10
Schenck case (1919), 69
[Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.], *Age of Jackson,* 92
Science and scientists
and nonconformity, 22, 28
effect of loyalty-security programs on, 4–12, 53, 83–84, 85–86, 125, 126
independent development of scientific concepts, 6–7
Secrecy
and broadcasting, 18

military and state secrets, and national security, 4, 5–6, 7, 9, 108, 120, 125–126
See also Classified material; Sensitive work
of charges, evidence, and informers, *see* Evidence—concealment or disclosure of
Security boards, *see* Boards, of loyalty-security programs
Security officers, 5, 8–9, 76, 94, 96, 99, 100–101
Security program
acquiescence in, necessary for clearance, 97, 99
definition of criteria, problems of, 4, 7, 9, 10, 54, 69, 108–109, 119–120
divisions of, 94
number of individuals affected, 60, 94, 110
operation of, 5–6, 7–9, 57–59, 94–109, 127–129
length of proceedings, 57, 100
reopening of cases, *see* Double jeopardy
variations in, 7, 10, 97, 100, 104, 112
philosophy and purpose of, 4–5, 8, 9, 12, 103–104, 112, 126–127
Security risk, 9, 11, 56, 94, 95, 99, 101, 103, 107, 108, 127
Selective Service System, and C.O.'s, 44–46
Self-incrimination, privilege against, *see* Constitution—Amendments 1–10—Fifth Amendment
SELLIN, THORSTEN, Foreword, vii
Sellin, Thorsten, 1
Sensitive work, 56
failure to distinguish from nonsensitive, 7, 9, 114, 127–128, 129
in Great Britain, 59
security program for, 95, 100, 108, 113
Service, John S., 100
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 28
Smith, Chard Powers, 20, 27
Smith Act (Alien Registration Act), 119
Socialism and Socialists, 21, 26, 52, 65–66, 75, 106
Socrates, 90
Southeast Asia, 109
Soviet Union, 21
and atomic bombs, 5
purge trials, 126
science in, 7, 53
U. S. relations with, 51, 52, 55, 119, 126, 129
Spanish Civil War, 38, 91, 119
Stalin, Joseph, quoted, 63
Star Chamber, 126
Starnes, Joe, quoted, 68
States
and Fifth Amendment pleading, 114, 118, 121–122
and wire tapping, 30, 34
investigating committees, 38, 55, 76, 81, 105
jurisdiction of, 29, 30, 37
loyalty and anti-Communist oaths, 46, 71, 75
Steinmetz, Charles Proteus, 26
Stennis, John C., 12
Stevenson, Robert Louis, 76
Stone, Harlan F., 23, 25
Stouffer, Samuel A., cited, 110
Subversion
definition, problems of, 10, 11, 54, 58–59, 75, 84–85, 106, 119–120
not a serious problem after 1947, 52
"shaping the innocent minds of children," 71, 73–74
state laws, 5
subversive ideas and McCarthyism, 128
See also Association—with subversive individuals; Subversive organizations
Subversive associations, *see* Association—with subversive individuals; Subversive organizations—membership in
Subversive organizations
and political democracy, 55, 65–69
listing of, 38, 54, 55, 58
membership in, 38, 39, 42, 54–55, 58, 59, 60, 68, 74, 82, 90, 94–95, 97, 98, 111, 112
See also Communist party—membership and members
Supreme Court of the United States, 89, 102, 127
and Bailey case, 128
and lists of subversive organizations, 54, 55, 58
and freedom of religion, 41, 44–45, 47
and wire tapping, 30, 34
on "clear and present danger," 69
protection of civil rights, 22, 35, 74, 88

Taft, William Howard, quoted, 30
Tax exemption, of educational and philanthropic organizations, 75–76
Taylor, Frederick L., 118
TAYLOR, HAROLD, The Dismissal of Fifth Amendment Professors, 79–86
Taylor, Harold, cited, 114
TAYLOR, TELFORD, The Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 114–122
Taylor, Telford, 82
Television
and freedom of expression, 13–19
audience coverage, 18
licensing of, 14, 15–16
stations, number of, 16
technological developments, 18
Tenney committee (California Senate, Fact-finding Committee on Un-America Activities in California), 38, 76, 81
Tenure
academic, 79–80
civil service, 11

Texas, restrictions on freedom of expression, 55, 89, 90
Textbooks, censorship of, 73, 74, 89, 90, 91
Thomas, Charles S., 11
Thomas, Norman, 23
Thoreau, Henry David, 28, 88
Tocqueville, Alexis de, quoted, 55
Torture, in trials, 115, 126
Totalitarianism, 20, 21, 25, 44, 72, 119
Toynbee, Arnold J., 20, 22
Transcendentalism, 27
Travel, freedom of
  effect of security program on, 36, 39–40
  importance to science, 9
Treason, and security programs, 34, 43, 45, 51, 75, 97
Trials
  broadcasting of, 17–18
  character trials, 125–128, 130
  development of procedure for, 115–116
  fair trial, significance of, in relation of state and individual, 116, 123–126
  of Communists, 69
  See also Nuremberg trials
Trillingham, C. C., quoted, 74
Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leonidas, 36
Truman, Harry S.
  Attorney General's accusation of, 130
  loyalty program, 53, 54, 56–57, 59, 60, 127–128, 130
  tribunals of, in Germany, 128, 129–130

Un-American Activities, House Committee on, *see under* Congress
Undercover agents, 57–58, 95, 104–105, 107
United Federal Workers of America (UFWA), 106
United Kingdom
  universities of, 74, 77
  See also England; Great Britain
United Nations
  admission of Communist China, 73, 111
  documents, in Texas, 89
  Secretariat, loyalty investigations, 105
  Soviet Union membership, 126
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 91
United States Civil Service Commission, 58–59, 94
United States Information Agency, 48
Universal Military Training, 46
Universities and colleges
  and Communism, 25, 51, 70–71, 74, 79, 81, 83–84, 85, 90
  and distinction between free discussion and organized propaganda, 65
  and loyalty-security investigations, 55, 70–71, 73–76, 79–86, 114
  attitude toward nonconformity and the controversial, 24–26
  European, 74, 76–77
  financial concerns of, 25, 72, 77
  government research grants, 9
  tax exemption, 75–76
  teaching and research standards, *see* Education—standards for teaching and research
  tenure, 79–80
University of Birmingham, 74
University of California, 71
University of Chicago, 72
University of Vermont, 83–84
University of Washington, 24, 73, 81

Vargas, Getulio Dornelles, 36
Veksler, V., 7
Velde, Harold H., 43
Velde committee (House, Committee on Un-American Activities), 42–43, 81–83, 85
Vilfan, Joza, quoted, 43
Vincent, John Carter, 54
Violence, advocacy of, as test of subversion, 54, 62, 63, 65
Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 41
Voice of America, 48
Voltaire (François Marie Arouet), 90


Warren, Earl, quoted, 15
Washington (State), *see* Canwell committee; University of Washington
Watkins, Arthur V., 53
Watson, (Mrs.) Goldie E., 74
Weizsaecker, Ernst von, 129–130
Welles, Sumner, 129
Whitman, Walt, 28
William II of Germany (Kaiser Wilhelm), 76
Willits, Joseph H., 1
Wilson, Woodrow, quoted, 3
Wire tapping, 29–35, 95, 104, 107, 116
Witnesses
  confrontation and cross-examination of, 8, 56, 57–58, 98, 99, 102–103, 104–107, 108, 125, 127, 129
  witness against oneself, *see* Constitution—Amendments 1–10—Fifth Amendment
Workmen's compensation, 2
World War II, 5, 6, 44, 45, 119, 126


VOLUME 301 SEPTEMBER 1955

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*





HIGHER EDUCATION UNDER STRESS

Edited by

FRANCIS J. BROWN, Ph.D., Litt.D., H.L.D.
Staff Associate and Director of the Leaders Program
American Council on Education
Washington, D. C.

THORSTEN SELLIN, Ph.D., LL.D.
Professor of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania
Acting President, The American Academy of Political and Social Science

Copyright 1955, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1955

Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.

1955

CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD vii

GENERAL VIEW

A Long-Range View of Higher Education . . . . . *Francis J. Brown* 1
The Purpose of Learning . . . . . *Gordon Keith Chalmers* 7
Meeting Manpower Needs . . . . . *M. H. Trytten* 17

SPECIAL AREAS

Changing Patterns of Administrative Organization in Higher Education *John Dale Russell* 22
Recent Developments in State and Regional Planning of Higher Education . . . . . *A. J. Brumbaugh and Redding S. Sugg, Jr.* 32
Higher Education and the Federal Government . . . . . *J. L. Morrill* 41
Campus Issues and Problems . . . . . *Harry J. Carman* 46
The Flowering Curricula of American Higher Education . *Harold W. Stoke* 58
The Accreditation Problem . . . . . *Fred O. Pinkham* 65
Academic Freedom: A Decade of Challenge and Clarification *Harry D. Gideonse* 75
The Role of the University in International Relations *Howard E. Wilson* 86

METHODS OF FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION

A Conference Commemorating Edmund J. James

Program 95
Participating Institutions and Their Representatives 96
The Career of Edmund Janes James . . . . . *Ernest Minor Patterson* 97
Government Support of Public Universities and Colleges . *John A. Perkins* 101
Government Support of Private Colleges and Universities *Carter Davidson* 112
Alumni Support and Annual Giving . . . . . *Ernest T. Stewart, Jr.* 123
Corporation Support . . . . . *Wilson Compton* 140
Trends in Tuition Charges and Fees *Herbert S. Conrad and Ernest V. Hollis* 148
How Much—and How—Should Students Pay for Higher Education? *John F. Meck* 166
Standards of Service in University Management . . . . . *Harry L. Wells* 175
Operating Costs and University Management: Methods to Effect Economies . . . . . *Richard M. Paget* 184
How to Finance Higher Education in the Future . . . *Henry M. Wriston* 196
Recent Developments in Financing Higher Education . . *John D. Millett* 205

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

ARMSTRONG, JOHN A. *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945.* A. O. Sarkissian ... 243

BARATZ, MORTON S. *The Union and the Coal Industry.* Gordon S. Watkins ... 225

BARKER, CHARLES ALBRO. *Henry George.* John W. Caughey ... 220

BELLUSH, BERNARD. *Franklin D. Roosevelt as Governor of New York.* William Starr Myers ... 217

BELSHAW, CYRIL S. *Changing Melanesia.* Ward H. Goodenough ... 257

BEVERIDGE, LORD. *Power and Influence.* R. G. Cowherd. ... 238

BUCHANAN, NORMAN S., and HOWARD S. ELLIS. *Approaches to Economic Development.* Max F. Millikan ... 223

CABOT, JOHN M. *Toward Our Common American Destiny.* Howard C. Perkins 214

CALDWELL, LYNTON K. *The Government and Administration of New York.* Wallace S. Sayre ... 216

CHAPMAN, BRIAN. *The Prefect of Provincial France.* Gordon Wright ... 248

COMPAGNA, FRANCESCO, and VITTORIO DE CAPRARIIS. *Geografia delle elezioni italiane dal 1946 al 1953.* Ferdinand A. Hermens ... 250

CRONON, EDMUND DAVID. *Black Moses.* J. P. Shalloo ... 228

DINERSTEIN, HERBERT S. *Communism and the Russian Peasant.* David Mitrany 240

DONAHUE, WILMA (Ed.). *Housing the Aging.* Clark Tibbitts ... 231

DOUGLASS, ELISHA P. *Rebels and Democrats.* Jennings B. Sanders ... 218

DULLES, FOSTER RHEA. *America's Rise to World Power, 1898–1954.* George C. Osborn ... 212

EDGELL, DAVID P. *William Ellery Channing.* Conrad Henry Moehlman ... 236

EMERSON, RUPERT, and others. *Representative Government in Southeast Asia.* John F. Cady ... 252

European Yearbook. Norman Hill ... 211

FISHWICK, MARSHALL W. *American Heroes: Myths and Reality.* Alice F. Tyler 217

GARNETT, A. CAMPBELL. *Religion and the Moral Life.* Louis W. Norris ... 236

GREEN, HELEN D. *Social Work Practice in Community Organization.* Joseph W. Eaton ... 232

HAINES, C. GROVE (Ed.). *Africa Today.* Daniel F. McCall ... 258

HALLGARTEN, GEORGE W. F. *Hitler, Reichswehr und Industrie.* Ralph H. Lutz 244

HAMBIDGE, GOVE. *The Story of FAO.* Wilfred Malenbaum ... 215

HARTZ, LOUIS. *The Liberal Tradition in America.* James Burnham ... 234

PAGE

HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J., and BERNICE L. NEUGARTEN. *American Indian and White Children.* John J. Honigmann ... 230

HECKSCHER, ELI F. *An Economic History of Sweden.* Translated by Göran Ohlin. Franklin D. Scott ... 249

HENDERSON, H. D. *The Inter-War Years and Other Papers.* J. F. Bell ... 225

INFIELD, HENRIK F. *Utopia and Experiment.* Jonathan B. Bingham ... 229

JEFFERSON, THOMAS. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson.* Vol. X: *22 June to 31 December 1786.* Leslie Lipson ... 220

KATZENSTEIN, CAROLINE. *Lifting the Curtain.* Leon T. Stern ... 222

LETTRICH, JOZEF. *History of Modern Slovakia.* Vlastimil Kybal ... 243

LINDSAY, MICHAEL. *China and the Cold War.* Paul M. A. Linebarger ... 254

MCKENZIE, R. T. *British Political Parties.* Sydney D. Bailey ... 237

MAYER, MILTON. *They Thought They Were Free: The Germans, 1933–45.* Norbert Muhlen ... 246

MAYERS, LEWIS. *The American Legal System.* Leo Pfeffer ... 215

NAGUIB, MOHAMMED. *Egypt's Destiny.* Emil Lengyel ... 256

PAPI, GIUSEPPE UGO (Ed.). *Teoria e politica dello sviluppo economico.* Domenico Vittorini ... 251

PEARMAN, JEAN R., and ALBERT H. BURROWS. *Social Services in the School.* Francis J. Brown ... 233

PRATT, JULIUS W. *A History of United States Foreign Policy* Foster Rhea Dulles ... 213

PYRAH, G. B. *Imperial Policy and South Africa, 1902–10.* Vernon J. Puryear 239

RACKMAN, EMANUEL. *Israel's Emerging Constitution, 1948–51.* Milton R. Konvitz ... 257

ROSSITER, CLINTON. *Conservatism in America.* James Burnham ... 234

SCHAPIRO, LEONARD. *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy.* Bertram D. Wolfe ... 241

SCHEPIS, GIOVANNI. *I Sistemi elettorali.* Ferdinand A. Hermens ... 250

SCHILLER, A. ARTHUR. *The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945–1949.* Philip W. Thayer ... 251

Science and Freedom. Conway Zirkle ... 235

Six Approaches to Psychotherapy. W. G. Eliasberg ... 231

SMITHIES, ARTHUR, and others. *Economics and the Public Policy.* Emerson P. Schmidt ... 224

PAGE

SOLO, ROBERT A. (Ed.). *Economics and the Public Interest.* Emerson P. Schmidt 224

SOMERS, HERMAN MILES, and ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS. *Workmen's Compensation.* John Perry Horlacher 227

STEGNER, WALLACE. *Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the West.* John W. Caughey 222

STIMSON, GRACE HEILMAN. *The Rise of the Labor Movement in Los Angeles.* Vaughn Davis Bornet 226

STIPP, JOHN L. (Ed.). *Devil's Diary.* William Ebenstein 245

STOUFFER, SAMUEL. *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties.* Angus Campbell 228

TENG, SSŬ-YU, JOHN K. FAIRBANK, and others. *China's Response to the West.* George E. Taylor 255

THOMPSON, J. M. *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire.* R. D. Challener .. 248

THOMPSON, VIRGINIA, and RICHARD ADLOFF. *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia.* Rupert Emerson 253

TREADGOLD, DONALD W. *Lenin and His Rivals.* E. C. Helmreich 242

ULLMANN, RICHARD K., and SIR STEPHEN KING-HALL. *German Parliaments.* Henry L. Bretton 247

WARD, JOHN WILLIAM. *Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age.* Frederick B. Tolles 219

WEBB, LEICESTER. *Communism and Democracy in Australia.* C. Hartley Grattan 239

WESTERFIELD, H. BRADFORD. *Foreign Policy and Party Politics.* Marian D. Irish 213

WHITING, ALLEN S. *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924.* H. Arthur Steiner .. 254

WILLIAMS, ROBIN M., JR., and MARGARET W. RYAN (Eds.). *Schools in Transition.* Preston Valien 233

OTHER BOOKS 259

INDEX 264

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index.*

955

FOREWORD

This issue of THE ANNALS was planned primarily in relation to the conference on Methods of Financing Higher Education sponsored by the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the University of Pennsylvania. The conference was convened to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Edmund J. James, the first president of the Academy, and was held on May 21 and 22 in Philadelphia.

The editor was informed of the general character of the conference and was requested to select topics and authors to make possible an issue which would present as comprehensive a picture of higher education as possible within the limitations of the space available. Since it was necessary to plan the balance of the issue and to have the articles completed by the time the conference was held, it was impossible to correlate the two parts of this issue other than by informing each writer of the theme of the conference and of the other articles.

This inability to plan the issue as a whole is not as serious as it might appear. All discussions of higher education are now influenced by the one overriding fact of the increase in the number of persons of college age who are just now beginning to arrive on the campus. That these numbers will increase beyond those of any prior period, including even the peak of veteran demand, is now acknowledged by the most skeptical. The basic problem facing higher education is what shall be done to meet this demand.

At this point there is wide divergence of views among educators. Some assert that the demand for higher education should be met by greater selectivity, ignoring the ever increasing numbers who would thus be barred from a college education. At the other extreme are those who believe that democracy and our rapidly changing needs for college-trained personnel make it the first responsibility of the college to provide opportunity for a college education to all whose further education is in the national interest and who have the intellectual ability to profit from it.

These differences in assessing the basic function of higher education in our democracy result in different answers to many of the problems now facing our colleges and universities. It is well, then, that there are different points of view expressed in this issue. It is hoped that bringing them together in this way will provide an opportunity to appraise each, to find the extent to which the various viewpoints can be reconciled in relation to the total problem, although not for each institution, and to take such steps as may be necessary to attack realistically this new problem of youth and of our nation.

The first three articles present the over-all picture. The others were selected to treat the more specific areas of administrative organization, state and regional planning, the role of the federal government, campus issues, the curriculum, accreditation, scholarship and academic freedom, and the international responsibilities of higher education. The conference report covers the problems of financing our colleges and universities.

Each contributor was left entirely free to express his own opinions in his own way. It is hoped that the issue as a whole will make a contribution to each insti-

tution of higher education by assisting its administrative staff and faculty in working out the role their institution will play in the expanding demands already being made upon our colleges and universities. It is hoped that the volume will also interest some of the many individuals outside the immediate field of higher education whose understanding support is essential if higher education is to meet the challenge of the years ahead.

FRANCIS J. BROWN

A Long-Range View of Higher Education

By FRANCIS J. BROWN

AT fifty-one minutes and fifty-one seconds past 7:00 A.M. (Eastern Standard Time) on May 27, 1955, the huge population meter in the Department of Commerce Building in Washington, D. C., turned to 165,000,000! This was the population of the United States at that moment and a new person has since been added each twelve seconds. A baby is born somewhere in our nation every eight seconds; a person dies every twenty-one seconds; an immigrant arrives every two minutes and an emigrant departs every twenty-four minutes. These facts have significance for our colleges and universities, since the eighteen years to 1973 will come all too soon.

But if we look back eighteen years the facts take on even more significance. After a period of actual decline in the number of births in the United States, the curve changed direction in 1936.




FIGURE 1. ANNUAL NUMBER OF BIRTHS IN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, 1930–1954

(*Statistical Abstract of the United States*, with supplemental data from the Bureau of Vital Statistics)

While there were fluctuations, as shown in Figure 1, the trend for the future is clear and there appears no reason to suppose it will again reverse. There were 130,000 more babies born in 1954 than in 1953 and the first six months of 1955 indicate that this increase will at least be equaled. The proportion of unmarried adults is declining, young people are marrying at an earlier age, and now for the first time in four decades, the average size of the family is increasing.

But this is only a part of the picture. Three other factors are also important: decrease in mortality, motivation, and mobility.

LOWER MORTALITY

It has been said that in the advances of medicine, the first quarter of this century will be known as the "age of the child" and the second as the "era of geriatrics." While it is true that most of the great advances in the prevention and cure of infant and childhood diseases were made prior to 1925, and that much effort since then has been expended on adult causes of death, the percentage of mortality among infants and young people will continue to grow smaller. Thus the increase in the number of persons of college age will be greater than the past increase in relation to the number of births eighteen years earlier.

But the changes in the upper end of the age scale in Figure 2 also have significance for higher education. The increase in the number of persons over sixty-five is now at the rate of 400,000 a year and is increasing annually. This has a twofold bearing on the problems




FIGURE 2. POPULATION GROWTH BY AGE GROUP, 1940–1960

(United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Vital Statistics)

* Projected; assumes continuation of 1950–53 birth levels.

of higher education: first, there will be a continuing number of persons who become dependent; and second, it is a challenge to our educational system to re-educate some for other employment and to enrich the lives of all in the autumn of their years.

The demand for maximum education is clearly indicated in the over-all data. Those between eighteen and thirty-five will actually be fewer in number in 1960 than in 1950, yet they will be in the productive age and required to support a vast increase in dependents at both ends of the age span.[1]

[1] For a more detailed analysis see Francis J. Brown, *Educational Sociology,* Revised Edition (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), Chap. 8.

MOTIVATION

The second major factor which will determine college enrollment is that of motivation. If the technical requirement of eligibility through procuring a high school diploma is an index of motivation then it becomes important to note that in 1900, only twenty out of each one hundred young people entered high school and ten graduated. In 1951, eighty-six out of each hundred entered our secondary schools and in June of 1955 fifty-six graduated. This proportion is continually increasing, and some predict that by 1960, ninety-five of each hundred will enter high school and seventy-five will receive a high school diploma in 1964. But predictions are not necessary to bring into clear focus the vastly greater numbers of young people who have met at least minimum requirements for entrance to college.

There have been many attempts to measure motivation to attend college; again a backward glance indicates a consistent trend. In 1900 only four of each one hundred young people entered our colleges and universities and but two graduated. In 1951, twenty-six entered and last June thirteen received their first earned degree.

Frank H. Bowles, Director of the College Entrance Examination Board, in an address, "Facing the Increasing Demands of Higher Education," delivered at the 1955 meeting of the New Jersey Association of Colleges and Universities, summarized the facts in this way:

> In the forty-year period 1870–1910 population increased by 130 per cent, while college graduations increased by 260 per cent, followed by another forty-year period during which population increased by only 65 per cent while college graduations (excluding allowance for veterans) increased by a whopping 660 per cent.

Dr. Samuel Brownell, Commissioner of Education, in an address to the Higher Education Group of Washington, D. C., on June 7, 1955, stated that in the fall of 1955 there will be thirty-one out of each one hundred persons of college age who will enter our institutions of higher education.

The most significant fact in the Office of Education data on enrollment in the fall of 1954 was that while the number of eighteen-year-olds increased less than 1 per cent, the number of persons in college for the first time increased approximately 10 per cent. Of course there were other factors than motivation in this striking contrast, but it would appear that the trend of the past fifty and more years is accelerating and that the maximum prediction of 30 per cent of the age group who will apply for admission is already demonstrated to be too conservative! [2]

MOBILITY

Over-all figures, although interesting and significant nationally, are not a reliable guide to planning on the part of each institution or of a state or region. Mobility must also be taken into account. Bureau of the Census figures show that if each family that changed its place of residence was a different family instead of some moving several times, every family would be in a different home each five years and in a different state or region each fifteen years.

Were the in-migration of a state counterbalanced by equal out-migration, mobility would not be a significant factor in calculating the college age population. But this is not the case. Dr. J. F. Wellemeyer, Staff Adviser on Personnel Studies, American Council of Learned Societies, in an unpublished study compared the number of college-age youth based on a projection of birth data with the actual number as given in the 1950 census. The wide variation is shown by the two states at the opposite extremes. The census data for North Dakota is only 73 per cent of the estimated figure based on projection of births. For California the census figure is 185 per cent of the projection figure. Other states showing a number less by 10 per cent or more are Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and West Virginia. Those showing a plus of 25 per cent or more are Arizona, Florida, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. The major factor producing this differential is family migration.

Student migration adds a further variable, but this factor has more bearing on the demands upon specific institutions than upon state-wide student population. It must, however, be taken into account in meeting the expanding demands for higher education.

[2] *The Impending Tidal Wave of Students.* Prepared by Ronald B. Thompson, Ohio State University, for the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers.

FUTURE COLLEGE ENROLLMENTS

Many predictions of college enrollments have been made reflecting the basic educational philosophy of the proponent or the degree of his optimism. But for the nation as a whole the number of persons who will be of college age each autumn is a *projection* not a *prediction.* They are here with us as infants, children, and adolescents. There will be 2,300,000 eighteen-year-olds in 1955; 2,800,000 in 1960; 3,700,000 in 1970; and 4,000,000 in 1975!

As indicated in the Foreword, the question is what proportion of these will be admitted to our institutions of higher education. The answer will need to be given by each institution in the light of

its own purpose. But the answer for the nation as a whole will depend primarily upon the educational values of three groups: trustees, administrators, and staff of our colleges and universities; youth and their parents; and the general public. To a considerable degree, the first reflects the personal point of view of the individuals responsible for the policies of each institution; the second is based upon both personal values and the increasing demands of our changing cultural patterns; and the third, perhaps more accurately than either of the others, reflects national needs for manpower at the level of a college education.

The first presents a confused and confusing picture for the nation as a whole, although many institutions are seeking to formulate a clear policy. In the recent report of the Carnegie Corporation, President John W. Gardner states:

> We send great numbers of our youth on to college each year without any clear notion as to what they will get out of it, but simply in pursuance of a vague notion that "college is an opportunity that should not be denied them." This makes no sense at all.

Conversely, there are many leaders in higher education who, with equal conviction, believe that the rapidly changing world in which we live demands that higher education expand to provide educational opportunity for all able students. They point to the expanding demands of our economy for persons with a college education, to the need for a deeper understanding of human values in our relationships with others both in day-to-day living and in our national and international affairs, and to the necessity for developing in an even larger number of our youth the cultural, moral, and spiritual values essential both for the individual and for a democratic society.

The educational values of youth and their parents seem clear. Whatever may be the motivation, a larger proportion, as pointed out above, is knocking at the doors of our institutions. By June 1, 1955, almost all institutions report a significant increase in the number of freshman applicants over even a year ago; many have already reached the number they can accommodate. Constantly rising costs to the student as described by one of the conference speakers seem as yet to be no deterrent to the desire to go to college or the value which young people and their parents place upon it.

Probably the most important question for the future is the educational values of the general public, since its attitude is immediately reflected in the financial support essential to meet expanding demands. Thus far, though with some exceptions, state legislatures, private and foundation donors, church organizations, and alumni have made it possible for institutions to expand in proportion to the demand. But if the vast increase envisaged for the future is to be possible, greater attention even than now must be given to enlisting public concern for the needs of our colleges and universities. This development of public concern will not be easy, since our expanding population also makes its demands for more elementary and secondary schools; new facilities for medical and health care for all, but especially for the very young and the aging; recreational facilities and social welfare services; vast networks of highways; extension of public utilities. Higher education must compete with these and many more. Some of the ways in which it is seeking to compete are described later in this issue and need not be pointed out here.

Competition in an expanding economy is more than fiscal. It is equally important, as Dr. Trytten points out in his article, in the field of manpower. Much more needs to be done than is done at present to encourage able young people to seek college teaching as a career. At the other end of the age span, more thought should be given to the continuing employment of the increasing number of faculty members who are still intellectually alert and physically strong at the traditional retirement age.

APPRAISALS AND RE-EVALUATIONS

Institutions of all types resist change. This is both their strength and their weakness. Through such resistance they perpetuate basic values which would otherwise be lost to society. Conversely, they may hold to traditional structure and procedures when a courageous re-evaluation is essential in the light of the changes in the total social structure.

The veteran's impact upon our institutions of higher education was an emergency situation involving only temporary adjustments. The present and future demands will be continuous and of a positively accelerating character. Institutions must find the middle ground between preservation of the basic values which have made our colleges and universities so vital a force in American life and planning for such changes as are essential if they are to continue to render maximum service.

This re-evaluation will involve many changes. Will the universities of the next decade sharply decrease their number of freshmen and sophomores and become primarily upper-level, graduate, and professional institutions, with the junior colleges accepting a major responsibility for the education of young people during their first two years of college? This is, in effect, what is happening in California and in a number of institutions in other states. Should it be accelerated by much more deliberate planning?

Should the whole concept of degrees based upon credit hours and time be reappraised? Surely enough is now known about measuring achievement to warrant careful experimentation on a national scale with the awarding of degrees on other bases than timeserving. If the time factor is retained, would it not be possible, as Dr. Arthur S. Adams suggested in a recent address at the University of Virginia, to give every student a feeling of success by setting variable goals of one, two, and three years of college, with proper recognition of such achievement, as well as the four-year course for the A.B. or B.S. degree? Again, something of the kind has already occurred in the establishment of the one-year terminal programs and the two-year Associate in Arts degree and in the long-existing three-year hospital training programs for registered nurses. But little has been done to make a realistic appraisal of what may be accomplished in a broad range of academic fields in one, two, three, and four years, or to provide academic respectability to students who because of limited ability or interest complete less than the full college course. They now are failures both in their own eyes and in those of the academic community.

There are many other areas requiring reappraisal. Should the large institutions continue to establish residence off-campus centers or should there be a resurgence of the establishment of new urban or private institutions, especially to provide instruction at the community college level? Is it desirable for independent and church-related colleges to seek to retain their present percentage ratio of enrollment or should they seek only to retain their present numerical and academic importance and anticipate that the major share of the expansion will be absorbed by public in-

stitutions?[3] How may the relatively new media of television, both educational and commercial, be more effectively used to meet the impending demands upon higher education? With the rising costs of higher education, what further steps should be taken to provide scholarships and thus keep economic status from becoming a primary factor in who goes to college?

No Piecemeal Approach

These are but a few of the questions which need to be asked by higher education and for which more comprehensive answers are needed than are now available. Other questions are raised in the succeeding articles. It will not be enough to seek answers on a piecemeal basis. The whole field of higher education needs to be reviewed by a carefully planned and continuing program of research and experimentation. Such a program should enlist the cooperation of all higher education. Certainly if our colleges and universities are to resolve the problems they are now facing and will face with increasing magnitude in the years ahead it is imperative that each institution conceive itself an integral part of the total system of higher education. Of course it must retain its autonomy, which has been one of the great strengths of American institutions. But autonomy should not result in an attitude of vested interest on the part of any institution or any group or type of institution.

Higher education has adapted itself to meet the needs of two world wars, an extended depression period and the postwar veteran enrollment. In the spirit of service and with increasingly co-operative planning it will make such further adaptations as are proved essential to resolve the problems which lie ahead.

[3] For an interesting historical analysis, see Guy M. Snavely, *The Church and the Four-Year College*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955.

Francis J. Brown, Ph.D., Litt.D., H.L.D., is staff associate and director of the Leaders Program of the American Council on Education, where he has been employed since 1940, and visiting professor at Johns Hopkins Unviersity, educational consultant at the American University, and national president of the undergraduate educational fraternity Kappa Phi Kappa. Prior to his association with the Council he served for ten years as associate professor and professor of educational sociology at New York University and for seven years as a faculty member in education at the University of Rochester. During leaves from the Council he planned and conducted the International Conference of Universities at Utrecht, Holland, in 1948, and was secretary of the Education Committee of the Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation and executive secretary of the President's Commission on Higher Education. He is author of Sociology of Childhood (1940), Educational Opportunities for Veterans (1946), and Educational Sociology (revised edition, 1954), editor of Our Racial and National Minorities (1937) and One America (1945), and special editor of two prior issues of THE ANNALS*—Refugees (May 1939) and Organizing for Total War (March 1942).*

The Purpose of Learning

By GORDON KEITH CHALMERS *

ANY who propose radical redirection of American education must face the risk of destroying something precious to our country. We never had it so good. Neither did the world. The very boyishness of American education and its naïve fascination with engineering won the war. Dr. Salk and the colleagues to whom he so generously accorded their share of credit were most of them products of American schools and colleges. Not only this. So are the millions of parents who, unlike their ancestors of the early days of smallpox vaccine, soberly accept and act on the advice of competent scientists. Let any who propose radically to change American mass education reflect on the intellectually and spiritually depressed populations of countries committed to the education of leaders only.

But we should not forget that the good is the chief enemy of the best. Our world responsibilities imply that, for America, good education will not now be good enough; that to maintain our self-respect as Americans and to offer brave men the world over the example and support in the fight for freedom which if provided can come only from us we must overcome our enemy the good in order to approach, at least, the best in our educational system.

American education is friendly, relaxed, sentimental, humanitarian, imprecise, and amiable as a spaniel puppy. It assumes that kindliness and gentle curiosity will always be met by a neighborly smile. The pleasant thing about America for the three-quarters of a century following Reconstruction is that within our borders this has largely proved true. We have been rich enough and secure enough to indulge for three generations in flattery. Religious leaders have flattered people into church by offering easy "peace of mind." Business has flattered people into buying Cadillacs because they owe it to themselves. Politicians have flattered the electorate until there is now a divinity that doth hedge a voter.

The near disaster to which this orgy of spiritual self-indulgence has brought us is outlined in Mr. Walter Lippmann's distinguished book, ***Essays in the Public Philosophy,*** in which he recounts the great emotional blunders which we have committed because of our unwillingness as a people to discipline ourselves. The book has been misread by political commentators who assume that because it discusses world politics it is merely a political book. It is about *paideia*, about the education of mind, feeling, and will in America, largely in school but also in the talk, dispute, and worship out of school which make us what we are. Unconditional surrender of Germany, its consequent destruction, and the necessity within ten years to rebuild its army are a result of such American emotionalism. Failure to see realities in the Far East must be put down to the same cause. And this is not merely the natural emotionalism of children. It is a kind of prepared emotionalism for which there is a concerted and organized philosophy directing schools and universities.

The fact, for example, that the most vocal of the learned editors, ministers, scholars, publishers, and writers who

* An address delivered at the seventieth annual meeting of the Ohio Historical Society, April 30, 1955.

made it their business in the twenties and thirties to tell us what was really happening and what should be expected in Russia almost universally were wrong is surely no accident. What these publicists failed to state was not the theories but the facts, facts which they traveled to Russia and saw with their eyes but refused to see with their minds. The error, perhaps the most colossal error in all history on the part of a highly literate nation provided with hecatombs of libraries and printing presses, stemmed from this same relaxed, friendly, sentimental, and humanitarian education—not simply in the schools and universities but in most articulated American thought. The cost of that error has not yet been revealed to us, but we have known since the start of the Korean War that the cost will be great.

REFORMIST PRINCIPLES OF 1910

The good American education which we have, so good, for example, that it is slowly and without bloodshed accomplishing desegregation in the whole country, is officially operating on principles developed to meet conditions of 1910. These principles are called a philosophy, but they are really a reform. Rather than an affirmation of the nature of man, of human experience, and of the great purposes of American life, they are essentially a comment and criticism of the social abuses of the late nineteenth century. They are footnotes to a chapter of American history, and they belong historically beside the social criticism of Ibsen, Bernard Shaw, Lincoln Steffens, the muckrakers, and Upton Sinclair. The world they attacked was the world of "Meet Me in St. Louis." The success of the social reformers from 1910 to the present merits the highest praise. We no longer have the twelve-hour day or child labor; women have the vote; medical services are now generally available to the poor; unemployment and impoverished old age are less dreaded than they were. Most school-age young people are now in school.

But what should we do with them, now that they are there? This is a question for philosophy, not for mere reform or commentary. Comment is the vine on the wall; we and the world now need no fragile vine, but a rampart.

The reforms of education developed from 1910 to 1920 which still constitute the official "philosophy" of American education are dated all through, and they should be displaced by fresh, affirmative, and workable statements of the aims of learning in all its parts: ethical, scientific, literary, human, social. No mere qualification or revision or emendation or patching up or reinterpretation of those old slogans will do, for those reforms concerned the internal social and economic problems of an expanding nation which was becoming ever more urbanized and industrialized. On the intellectual side they confronted nineteenth-century scholarship, which was largely antiquarian, desiccated, snobbish, and unconcerned either for the new science or the new society. On the spiritual side the reforms faced fundamentalism and the literal spirit of little authoritarians. The world of 1955 is different. It is characterized by a splendid and ever more powerful natural and physical science, religion so liberalized that we and our countrymen are in imminent danger of plunging into a new set of absolute dogmas and doctrine, and a wholly new dimension of American concern: world power and politics. Then the British guaranteed the freedom of the seas; today the Russians threaten to order the lives of more and more of the world's inhabitants. We loved in those days to twist the lion's tail. Today we reckon with world Communism, a political dogma so potent in its evil that our worries about the British and German Empires now seem mere mosquito bites. In intellectual and spiritual terms we have been challenged with ideas, not mere military power—a new experience for us; and the scare which the ideas of Communism have thrown into us is not honorable. As a nation we have always been ready, or knew we soon could get ready, to face armaments. Having gone to school in institutions which are boyish, relaxed, imprecise, and sentimental, we are now acting like boys in the face of intellectualized evil.

For the model-A ideas of 1910 we now need not a new tire here and a sparkplug there, but a wholly new machine. It would be surprising if reformist principles leveled at domestic Victorian injustices *could* prove adequate to America faced with wholly new conditions abroad; and *they do not*. What passes for educational "philosophy" in our country is inadequate to the second half of the twentieth century for two basic reasons: its account of man is sentimental and so is its account of democracy.

NATURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF MAN

That historically important reformer's book, John Dewey's *Democracy and Education* (1916), assumed a naturalistic account of man. "Since growth is the characteristic of life," wrote Professor Dewey, "education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself."[1] Growing here is organic growing, and Professor Dewey used the metaphor of a growing organism without reference to standards of good or right, leaving grave uncertainty whether the growth stimulated by education would, for example, be partial, one-sided, bad, or good. This is still the official assumption of the official aim of learning in American schools. The account of man is clear: that he is naturally good, being liable to evil only if affected by bad social arrangements, that he is a child of nature, and that the child in his innocence should provide the central preoccupation of all *paideia*.

But the American Constitution, said Harry Gideonse, was written on an opposite assumption.

> It was written on the basis of a realistic conception of the nature of man, wholly aware of the fact that man is potentially good—that's why we trusted ourselves with free government institutions—but also deeply aware of the fact that man who is potentially good is also potentially a beast! *Therefore* we should not trust the government we set up with unqualified power. *Therefore,* we established governmental institutions that separated power and dispersed control. The reason we separated power and dispersed control is that we did not trust man with unqualified power, power that was not dispersed. You see, we had a realistic theory of the nature of man. We saw him not just as mind, but we saw him as *potentially* evil; we saw even the potentially angelic element in man as, under the trust of complete power, most vulnerable indeed to the temptations and the lusts for power that bring out the bestial. This is perhaps the crucial weakness of modern liberalism—its illusion about the nature of man, its illusion that the evil in man is all due to unfavorable circumstances for which he is personally not responsible.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> If you look at the nature of man realistically, and that includes a full allowance for his emotional potentialities for good as well as for evil, you run straight into the major intellectual and moral bellyache that is brought about by the wishful thinking of modern liberalism.[2]

[1] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1916; twenty-sixth printing, 1953), p. 62.

[2] Harry D. Gideonse, "Reason and Emotion in American Discussion of Education," *Proceedings 1954 National Convention American Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation,* p. 19.

(I believe that President Gideonse considers himself a liberal, as I consider myself, and I think he would agree that the great task of thinking people is now to restore liberalism to ethical realities.)

DEMOCRACY AS AN IDEAL

The account of man implicit in the 1910 reforms of American education is sentimental. The second basic weakness of these reforms lies in their account of democracy. John Dewey, to refer again to the chief of the great social reformers of the first quarter of our century, was concerned rather with society than with government. He referred to democracy as an ideal. "A democracy is more than a form of government," he said in *Democracy and Education;* "it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience." [3] It consists, he said, of shared common interest and reliance on the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The widening of the area of shared concern, he said, was "caused by the development of modern manufacture and commerce, travel, migration, and intercommunication which flowed from command of science over natural energy." From this view of democracy as primarily a social characteristic, there follows a conclusion which many of John Dewey's followers are reluctant to admit: that one of the chief heroes of social democracy is the late Henry Ford.

The John Dewey reforms were part and parcel of a populist movement in American political thinking which espoused election of senators, initiative, referendum and recall, social reform by means of federal law, notably the Prohibition Amendment and the Wagner Act, substitution of security for freedom, the packing of the Supreme Court, aggrandizement of power by the executive, and all the changes of political structure suggested by Vice-President Wallace under the slogan, Century of the Common Man. The tendency toward tyranny and the denial of liberty of all movements of mass democracy is suggested by the fact that it was by means of the direct primary, introduced into Wisconsin by the elder La Follette, that Senator McCarthy came to power. However, in spite of this and similar misfortunes, after the self-correction of the American constitutional republic and the revisions of the reforms executed in the direction of extreme democracy, I think it likely that history will conclude that the net result of these social reforms has been good. We appear now to have better-regulated banks than we had, and we hope we have a better-regulated stock market. We evidently have a more responsible labor movement and a considerably chastened and vastly more responsible industrial management than in 1910.

When, however, we consider whether the slogans, tracts, and party lines which produced the reforms can now do service as the educational philosophy of the second half of the twentieth century, we must observe the single, naïve, and uncritical direction of the naturalist, instrumentalist, egalitarian principles whose bones are now dry and brittle. Those dry bones cannot possibly live. Those dated and limited ideas cannot possibly affirm the purpose of learning for the second half of the century.

CONSTITUTIONALISM

Our liberties are not secured primarily by democracy. They are secured by constitutionalism. As Mr. Lippmann says, they antedate by two hundred years the modern mass elections. "Without constitutional government," he says, "there is no freedom."

> Large mass electorates [says Mr. Lippmann] are something quite new, much newer than the ideals, the ideas, the institutions and the usages of the liberal state. Political orators often assume that the mass of the people voted their own liberties. But the fact is that they acquired the vote after they had acquired their liberties and, in fact, largely because not being able to vote was felt by free men to be incompatible with their equal dignity. The Bill of Rights (1689) is more than two centuries older than universal suffrage in Great Britain. The enfranchised people did not establish the rule that all powers are under the law, that laws must be made, amended and administered by due process, that a legitimate government must have the consent of the governed.
>
> I dwell upon this point because it throws light upon the fact, so disconcerting an experience in this century, that the enfranchised masses have not, surprisingly enough, been those who have most stanchly defended the institution of freedom.[4]

For half a century the official leaders of American educational thought have promoted with religious zeal the reformist idea that the chief and all-encompassing concern of education should be with the natural-rights half of the tradition of the American government; that is, with the expansive principle expressed by the Declaration of Independence. Jacksonianism and the more sentimental teachings of Jefferson have smothered concern for the other half, the half best represented by the great decisions of the Supreme Court under John Marshall, by *The Federalist* papers and the work of Hamilton and John Adams, the restrictive half represented in the division of powers defined in the Constitution. The party political implications of this one-sided reformist concern need not bother us here, where our subject is a viable philosophy of education for the second half of the twentieth century. Surely it would be dangerous to correct the extreme of the half century of the Common Man with a half century of aristocrats. But we must soberly consider the genius of our liberties, the government constructed to secure them, and the ethical principles from which they stem, if we are to talk realities in a world now half mobilized for the destruction of all liberty.

DEMOCRATIC GAINS

Before considering the relation of the idea of American democracy to the purpose of education, I must add one more compliment to the reformers who have expanded the opportunity of schooling to nearly all American youth, including the definite prospect of common schooling for Negro students in nonsegregated schools. The American Ambassador to Germany, Dr. James B. Conant, when president of Harvard, reiterated the John Dewey slogans concerning a fluid society, stressing the importance of easy movement of young people upwards in social position and into the callings which used to be reserved for the gentry. This doctrine for forty years has supported the expansion of the opportunity to go to school and college. It is an old American doctrine, present in the frontier colleges and frontier society in many parts of our country from the first clearing of the forests. Dr. Conant ably employed it to alert the nation to the need for university and college scholarships supported both by the government and by private individuals and groups. To no small degree we have him to thank for pointing the way to the science scholarships of the National Science Foundation and the more recent establishment by such great corporations as the Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Union Carbide and Carbon, and Procter and Gamble, to name but a few, of free scholarships for sons and daughters of employees and for young people of whatever parentage who prove

[3] Dewey, *op. cit. supra* (note 1), p. 101.

[4] Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (Boston, 1955), p. 40.

their need and their potential for college work.

If the radical reform of the official purpose of American education should entail reduction of these important democratic gains in American society we should view them with the greatest suspicion and even fear. But the needed reforms run no such risks.

The basic assumptions of the 1910 reforms of educational philosophy involved an inadequate notion of democracy because they considered democracy an ideal, not a working principle, because they considered the social aspects of democracy to the neglect of the governmental, and because the implications for government treated the expansive, egalitarian, unchecked, and populist elements of American government to the neglect of the ethical and constitutional ones.

UNDERSTANDING OF JUSTICE

When we Americans witnessed the rampage of tyranny in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, it gradually dawned on us that the center of freedom is the courts, or, as Mr. Lippmann has said, that constitutionalism preceded mass enfranchisement and stands at the center of political liberty. In a time in world history when the great organized forces both of intellect and of military power are mobilized against the universality of law and due process, it is clear that the central intellectual task of lovers of freedom is the understanding and exposition of these things. Such understanding is the more difficult half of the intellectual problem of free government. It is easy to preach natural rights, social security, the absolute power of the electorate, majority rule. America is now popularly thought to be nothing but majority rule. It is, of course, no such thing, for that is the definition of tyranny. America is the rule of the majority tempered by justice.

Here is posed the educational problem which has been throughout the ages the most difficult of all—the understanding of justice, which for Americans and all free peoples entails the even more difficult idea, liberty. That this understanding has a discipline, a series of set problems, indeed a series of set books, has been denied by the official philosophy of education for forty years. The popular idea of liberty in the schools is absence of restraint, to such an extent that W. C. Brownell said that the loud liberals who prate about their liberty are not truly emancipated but merely unbuttoned. Robert Frost says that to be free is to be loose in harness. When in 1945 the justly famous Harvard Report, *General Education in a Free Society,* proposed an ethical and humanistic view of the great political and social problems of our time, it contained a statement so radically at odds with the conventional understanding of liberty in the schools and many universities that the statement, so far as I have observed, was ignored—perhaps because it was not understood. Far from treating liberalism as a matter of eliminating more and more barriers, the report states that freedom is submission: "Freedom is submission to the best and fullest truth that can be known; yet is also recognition that truth is not fully known."[5] Education in liberalism can never result from following youthful whims, for it "has a pattern of its own."[6] There are some things, says the report, of which the liberal is not free to be ignorant.

The necessaries to the study of political liberty express themselves largely in the ethical and political principles underlying the key decisions of the great

[5] Harvard University Committee on the Objectives of General Education in a Free Society, *General Education in a Free Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1945), p. 105.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

courts of law and underlying the historic constitutions and contracts by which rights of men have been prescribed. These necessaries give character to the American Republic and to a degree must be understood by millions of citizens if this constitutional democracy is to survive. To study the human experience which shows forth these principles and to state the realities of human nature expressed in them requires abandonment of talk about dreams, visions, and ideals—all very well for patriotic calendars or for advertisements but hopelessly inadequate to the warfare of liberty confronted with tyranny. Such study of man, of history, and of political principle must lie at the center of common education for the second half of this century. Its purpose is so different from the humanitarian purposes of the 1910 reformers, and the world in which we must live now is so different from the antimacassar world which they set out to change, that we must now develop and affirm a new philosophy of education by which the learning of our children and grandchildren will be put into focus.

DUAL NATURE OF MAN

I have described the problem of the purpose of learning in political terms because it has been by means of political events of the past decade that we have come as a nation to see the ethical bases of American life. The foundation rock of all learning is the ethos, the accepted standard of right and respect, and this can be understood only in the light of a realistic account of man and his nature. As Dr. Gideonse said, we are dual in our nature, not single. That is the radical proposition of the Christian doctrine of man and lies at the root of all the delicate and complex problems of the current dispute concerning Church, State, and School. A positive, modern, ethically realistic, and thoroughly American purpose of education in the public schools must be based clearly on the classic understanding of the dual nature of man, which characterizes not only Christianity but Greek tragedy, Roman law, and historic Hebrew and ancient Indian thought. Establish the philosophy of education in this fashion and you will have taken a major step toward resolution of the legal and social problem posed by religion and the public schools.

The nature of man and of the conception of democracy being so poorly and sentimentally analyzed in the official philosophy of education, the ethical weaknesses of the presiding purpose of the school system show up not only in the realm of political theory but in all the major departments of American thought and life. There is time to mention but two of these, and I shall name the central ones: the humanities and science.

THE HUMANITIES

Since the job of stating the purpose of education entails a realistic account of the nature of man, one would expect that he could walk over to the humanities departments of learning and there find principles readily applicable to our present need. Alas! The humanities have been gnawed by the same worm which has eaten the vitals of social reform. They share with educationists the Jean Jacques Rousseau illusions about the noble savage, the glories of sensation, and the single nature of man. The humanities have gone aesthetic. Like the educationists, many literary scholars and writers love noble savages and the beautiful soul of the innocent child. They are concerned with fantasies, not reality. Ethical problems, many a learned literary scholar will tell you, are merely quantitative problems of society. Fifteen years ago the writers

chiefly considered by literary America to be moral were the Communist poets and novelists who thought it sinful to fail to reveal in their earnest writings the party line. It was fashionable for most other writers to pretend that right and wrong do not exist. Happily, a revival of concern for the great central content of literature has begun among writers, and critics have acknowledged the mighty moral stature of such poets as Robert Frost and such dramatists as Thornton Wilder. The Book of Job is enjoying a fresh reading, and the literati are less afraid than they were to think of mankind finding out salvation under wrath. A few university scholars like Douglas Bush have always revealed the central position in world literature occupied by Right Reason and have never denied, as the eighteenth-century sentimentalists did, the war in the cave, that is the eternal warfare in the human breast between what makes us rise and what condemns us to fall.

Oddly enough, the movies have probably done as much constructively in this particular as any one group, for with all their grotesque absurdities and sugary never-never land, they now and then tell a genuine story. When we reflect that the best that mankind has ever had, to show us liberty, humility, and love, we have had by way of stories and by no other way, we surely owe a debt to any storyteller who truly tells a tale.

There is alive among American scholars and teachers of the humanities a firm, old, and central tradition of the great ethical import of all literary study. It was voiced by Mr. Churchill in his warning to the learned world:

> Scientists should never underrate the deep-seated qualities of human nature and how, repressed in one direction, they will certainly break out in another. The *genus homo*—if I may display my Latin—is a tough creature who has traveled here by a very long road. His nature has been shaped and his virtues ingrained by many millions of years of struggle, fear, and pain, and his spirit has, from the earliest dawn of history, shown itself upon occasion capable of mounting to the sublime, far above material conditions or mortal terrors. He still remains as Pope described him 200 years ago:
>
> Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
> A being darkly wise and rudely great;
> . . . . . .
> Created half to rise, and half to fall—;
> Great Lord of all things, yet a prey to all—;
> Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd;
> The glory, Jest, and riddle of the world![7]

Man the riddle, the jest and glory, provides the foundation study of all liberties, since these are established directly on unquestioning faith in the dignity and preciousness of each individual person.

The riddle arises from man's dual nature. If we argue that liberty cannot be known without some understanding of why each individual is precious and must be respected, we oblige ourselves to put the study of man and his nature at the center of education. To do this requires a treatment of reading, literature, language, and history wholly different from our present instruction in these subjects. The study will be guided by a rough rule of thumb usefully if too sharply stated by Emerson as follows:

> There are two laws discrete
> Not reconciled,—
> Law for man, and law for thing;
> The last builds town and fleet,
> But it runs wild,
> And doth the man unking.

A far cry indeed from Professor Dewey's naturalistic statement, "Education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself"!

[7] Winston Churchill, *New York Times*, April 1, 1949, p. 10.

To understand American liberties requires some familiarity with the law for man. If the law for man *is* the center of studies, the child must begin to read literature not as an aesthetic picnic of the sensations but for what it is, the contest within men's own hearts. If he is to do this, his teachers must respect language and the word. History describes society, true; but if man and his nature is to be the foundation study of liberty, history must first be presented as one of the humanities—that is, as a central study in the quest to find out what manner of creature we men and women are.

SCIENCE

The plight of science is a very different story. Science is better off than our understanding of man or man in groups (the humanities or social science). Its dangers lie in predatoriness, in the belief that it is the proper subject of strategy by organized teams of researchers, and the idea that unlike poetry it can dispense with the imagination. The public affection for science is a wholesome thing. True, we are short of scientists. But I am inclined to think that if we recall the whole concentrated strength of schooling to its ethical center and treat language with the respect it deserves we shall find genuine scientific work also respected early in a child's development. If we do this we shall not continue to distract potentially fine scientific minds into the trivia of the minor mechanics of commerce.

TEACHING THE TEACHERS

Where shall we find the new philosophy of education so desperately demanded by our country and the times and so needed by the thousands of able and dedicated teachers who now do a heroic job in spite of obstacles? How many excellent teachers of the sciences, humanities, and social sciences turn in a performance a hundred times better and more realistic than the official philosophy which presides over them! The danger lies in the fact that the official philosophy influences the training of new teachers, with its talk about adjustment to life and a dozen sentimental slogans. That fine historian and maligned critic of educational philosophy and practice, Arthur Bestor, has pointed the way. To hear the catcalls, you would think he had recommended a St. Bartholomew's massacre of grandmothers. But all he has proposed is that the great masters of education in historical thinking, that is, the historians, be considered among the chief educators of the land, and the same for the masters of thinking in chemistry, mathematics, literature, biology, and so forth. There is excellent common sense in this proposal, and in making it Dr. Bestor is well aware of the serious dereliction from duty on the part of almost all American scholars and scientists of great stature and genuine leadership. It is our neglect, now fifty years old, of our personal and direct responsibility for thinking about all education, from primary school through the doctor's degree, and our neglect of the job of guiding the training of teachers and of teaching them ourselves.

If historians, literary scholars, and mathematicians in impressive numbers now begin to do their duty, a longish period of study awaits them to familiarize themselves with the social and political realities of American schools today. Their usefulness is not likely to be great in technical and managerial matters, but the principles which govern our private and public lives have been the object of their study and reflection for a lifetime, and it is here that they

can be truly useful, for these principles must now stand at the center of the philosophy of education for America.

THE STUDY OF LIBERTY HAS A PATTERN OF ITS OWN

As Mr. Lippmann has said, there are many learned and thoughtful men and women in our country who have never doubted the existence and availability to our present need of the Public Philosophy of civility. This philosophy sometimes referred to as Right Reason or, in the pre-eighteenth-century sense, as Natural Law, can be revived and renewed. Its revival and renewal is at once an intellectual, spiritual, and moral enterprise. All three aspects of its revival involve American education, and the purpose toward which our whole establishment of schools and universities could and should be directed is just this revival, rediscovery, and renewal.

The American educational system is still operating under its 1910 slogan: opportunity. The philosophy of opportunity has produced important changes in the management of education, but it has permitted great deterioration of its content into egotism and materialism, which are the basis of flattery, and into the fatalism which inevitably follows. The *purpose of learning* is to learn how to find out what is important to think about and to think about it in appropriate terms. In our country the last decade has taught us again that the central concern of thought should be liberty and justice. It will be the business of school to teach the human experience which makes this conclusion possible and to equip the young with the grammar and arithmetic of these subjects so that they may understand them with some precision. The words and the center of the new purpose of learning should be the ancient words *liberty* and *justice,* words which stem not from the era of the Marseillaise and the French Revolution, which led swiftly to the orgy of the guillotine. The justice and liberty which Americans understand has little to do with fraternity and equality, deriving as they do from Roman law. For the half century of threat of tyranny, Americans, whose strength and courage must encourage and strengthen the free world, must find a philosophy of education worthy of our greatness as a nation and our great mission in history. For Americans, the central purpose of such learning is *liberty,* the study of which, as the Harvard Report affirms, "has a pattern of its own."

Gordon Keith Chalmers, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., L.H.D., Gambier, Ohio, has been president of Kenyon College since 1937. He was president of Rockford College (1934–37) and instructor and subsequently assistant professor of English at Mount Holyoke College (1929–33). He has been vice-president of the Franco-American Audio-Visual Distribution Center since 1948, director of the College English Association since 1950, after having been its president in 1949–50, and chairman of the school and college study of admission with advanced standing since 1951 and of the Problems and Policies Committee of the American Council on Education since 1953. He was a member of the national committee on Fulbright awards in 1951. President Chalmers is author of The Republic and the Person: a Discussion of Necessities in Modern American Education (1952) and of articles on education and on seventeenth-century literature and thought.

Meeting Manpower Needs

By M. H. TRYTTEN

HIGHER education especially, but perhaps all education, may be looked at from two points of view. One of these envisions the educational process as a means whereby individual students may be aided toward self-realization and self-improvement, so that they may enjoy the fullest and most useful lives. Their probable contributions to the community and the state, while not overlooked, are not the primary foci. From another point of view the educational system is seen as the means of producing all the doctors, dentists, scientists, professors, lawyers, economists, all the learned, professional, and other vocational types the nation needs; if these needs are not met the system is not functioning properly. The needs of each student, while not forgotten, are not a primary concern.

Probably neither point of view should take absolute precedence over the other. Nor is it impossible to serve both ends simultaneously. Yet there are many whose personal predilections move them strongly to one pole or the other of this duality. Unquestionably, historically, most Americans have tended strongly toward the former point of view.

EMPHASIS ON NEEDS OF SOCIETY

Recently, however, the dramatic demands of defense and the needs of the community have begun strongly to direct attention to the second view of education. It seems clear that attention may have to be focused increasingly on meeting the needs of our society and its security. It can only be hoped that this will not mean that the best interests of the individual student will be forgotten or ignored or even submerged in the interests of a more general purpose. Yet the needs of our nation, its welfare and its defense, the needs of our highly organized society and the needs of its people for personal services in a complex world, will of necessity come in for more and more attention. Perhaps the result will be gross influences which will increasingly affect individual choices of careers.

Even more will the public attitude toward the support of education change in the future. In the past the motivation in the support of education has been perhaps more in the interest of providing opportunity to individuals than any conscious attempt to supply the nation's demands for specialists. It is evident now, in the consideration of the needs of education in the public press, in the halls of Congress, in the directorates of industrial organizations and elsewhere, that the latter point of view is in the ascendancy. Industries, faced with shortages in trained personnel, are questioning whether they should not support education and in so doing are most concerned about the adequacy of the flow of trained personnel from our schools.

This changed point of view is a phenomenon mainly of the past decade, and to a large extent is due to the strain put upon our manpower resources by the needs of a great war of a highly technical nature. The result has been to focus great interest on the quantitative aspects of the problem. If specialized knowledge has become so important to the functioning of our economy and its defense, it is important to know how many of each type is too few or enough or too many. And this in a

loosely regulated economy, largely free of rigid standardizing restrictions in its training institutions and in its employment processes, is a moot issue.

ADEQUACY OF SUPPLY

The question of adequacy of supply in any given field is one of great difficulty. It is probable that we shall never see our society so stable and so unchanging that we can predict the future demand for any given profession or specialty with even rough approximation over a period of time. This is one of the antitheses which are inherent in the situation—it takes about twelve years, from beginning high school to emerging from graduate or professional school, to train a scientist, a medical doctor, an economist, and many other types of specialists. Yet to predict twelve years in the future what the demand for any particular specialty may be is virtually impossible in a highly fluid society.

That this is true is clear after a moment's reflection. Had the most experienced chemists or engineers been asked to predict, say in 1915 or 1925 or 1935, what the demand in their fields would be in twenty years from the date of prediction, the estimate would invariably have been far too small. Certainly no physicist in 1935 could have guessed the number of persons working in nuclear science in 1955. The same can be said with varying degrees of predictability of all fields of specialization.

This does not mean that the future is a hopeless enigma. In retrospect one can now see some pattern to the changes wrought in our society and their effect on the employment of specially trained persons. Not always can one extrapolate into the future with assurance. But neither do the rivers of time jump their banks or change their courses with great capriciousness.

It is commonplace now to say that our civilization has changed more in the past half century than in many previous centuries. And yet this is probably the most significant fact in present-day history. While it is customary to say that this change is due to the effects of modern science, it is probably more correct to state that it is due to the accumulation and application of systematized knowledge in all fields that contribute to man's ability to understand and to control his environment and to live cooperatively with his fellow men. The best measure of the future demand in all the areas of specialization arises from an understanding of the present and the past.

POPULATION AND TECHNOLOGY

The dynamics producing the present-day world are, among others, the growth of populations and the rise of technology. They have gone hand in hand, each dependent on the other. And here technology is used to connote also the whole area of technical knowledge, including the modern advanced knowledge in social and economic organization, human relations, health protection, legal and other procedures in control of the complex human environment of today, and many other areas of knowledge.

That the population dynamic will continue seems predictable. The world's population has doubled in a century and bids fair to double again in seven or eight decades. The rise of technical knowledge has steadily accelerated over recent decades. For the vast major part of our scientific information one need not go back more than ten or twelve generations to the time of Galileo and Newton. For the major part of our applied sciences, and our industries based on them, one need only go back to the past two or three generations. It is in these latter days that specialized knowledge has become indispensable in almost all activities of the nation.

Among those industries based on modern scientific technology, the pattern of events has been fairly common to all. While the degree of scientific knowledge involved in industrial processes varied from industry to industry when they were founded, the practice in all cases has been to apply more and more scientific knowledge to all processes. This has been due to the increasing availability of such knowledge, the press of competition, the increasingly rigid requirements resulting from new technological developments, and so forth. The net result has been a steady increase in the number of specialists needed by industrial and governmental activities in research and production, and also an increase in the level of education required among them.

Thus in each industry the percentage of persons with advanced training, such as engineers and scientists, has steadily increased through the last fifty to a hundred years. But it is also true that the number of industries using such personnel has steadily increased as the demands of modern industry have forced more and more types of industries to embrace in their activities an enhanced technology. Thus there has been not only a need for a greater percentage of scientists and engineers in the personnel of each industry but also a horizontal spread of such employees into more and more types of industries. The result is graphically portrayed in Table 1.

OTHER GROWING COMPLEXITIES

It must not be thought, however, that the rapid development of technology is the sole or even the most important development leading to a need for increased specialized training. Together with the growth of technology and not necessarily resulting from it has been the growth of our economic and social institutions, our transport and communications network, our governmental structures, and all the vast complex of our highly integrated lives. These all present new demands for more and more highly trained people.

As an example one may cite the fact that the newly developing nuclear engineering activities of the nation could probably absorb thirty to forty thousand scientists, if they were available, to meet needs which would exist if the manpower resources existed. But they will also absorb management personnel, legal talent, personnel specialists, and a number of other types.

As another example, the development of these great new activities has a profound effect on our way of living. Whole new communities arise. Problems of social, economic, and human re-

TABLE 1—INCREASE IN POPULATION AND IN TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT, 1870–1950*

	1870	1910	1950
Population (in thousands)	39,818	91,972	151,179
Labor force (in thousands)	12,925	37,371	60,429
Labor force per thousand (population)	325	406	400
Number of professional persons in the civilian labor force in thousands	342	1,634	5,111
Professional persons per thousand population	9	18	34
Employment in science and technology in thousands	12	186	1,019
Employment in science and technology as a per cent of all professional persons	3.5	11.4	20.0

* National Science Foundation, unpublished "Fact Book on Scientific Manpower."

lations arise, creating the need for many persons with special training. The dramatic road program recently proposed by President Eisenhower is an example of auxiliary requirements arising out of a new technological development—in this case, automotive transportation. While such a program would undoubtedly demand 250,000 man years of engineering directly, it would also create many other demands in many fields and for a very long time.

SPECIFIC DEMANDS

It would be possible to present a few sample statistics to predict specific demand levels in selected fields, and this has in fact been done in *America's Resources of Specialized Talent*.[1] Such predictions, however, could be only tentative and would probably shortly be meaningless. The important fact is that demands have been increasingly great in a wide variety of fields and will probably continue to increase faster than we expect.

More generally, however, certain indications may be noted. In these remarks *America's Resources of Specialized Talent* is followed. In the physical sciences the rapid rise in research expenditures and in capital outlay by technological industries indicates increasing demand. Federal expenditures for research tripled between 1930 and 1940, then jumped from 67 million to 2,200 million dollars between 1940 and 1953. Similarly, in industry a sharp increase occurred between 1940 and 1954. Recent studies by the National Science Foundation[2] indicate severe shortages in scientific manpower in large essential industries. At present no indications of supply overtaking demand are visible.

In such fields as psychology and the social sciences, because of the great dispersal of graduates into a wide spread of fields of activity, demand at the level of the bachelor's degree is without sharp meaning. At higher levels of specialization, however, there is every prospect for a rapid increase of personnel, especially at the level of the doctorate. Industry and government have shown accelerating demands owing to the many new complexities of their activities. This is particularly true of economics and psychology.

The demand for engineers has been highly publicized and needs no comment beyond the observation that it remains high.

In applied biology, such as home economics and agriculture, because of the increased call for teachers and the needs of a rapidly rising population, demand seems likely at least to match supply.

In the health fields, including nursing, the relation between supply and demand is intimately related to the development of social institutions and public policy. In view of the rise of public consciousness of health needs, implemented by political action, it seems probable that demand will exceed supply for an indefinite period.

Of all remaining fields two more may be singled out because of the large numbers involved. In business and commerce the tendency for persons to seek added specifically relevant training and for employers to seek out trained personnel has been a notable development. In 1943 there were only 175,000 living graduates of collegiate schools of business. By 1953 there were 580,000. This rapid increase in the number of trained persons has not yet shown any signs of oversupplying the demands of business or commerce.

In the field of teaching at both pre-college and college levels the demand is so far ahead of supply, when due attention to quality is given, that it is idle to quote statistics or evoke other authority. Reports by the National Education Association[3] have adequately documented the great need for teachers. From the point of view of employment opportunities, this field is wide and open.

[1] Dael Wolfle (Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 77.

[2] Alan Waterman, "A National Survey of Scientific Research and Development," National Science Foundation Release, June 6, 1955.

MOBILITY IN PROFESSION

Two points may be added. American college graduates have always displayed a remarkable mobility from one field of activity to another. A surprisingly large percentage of engineers, for example, do not follow engineering as a career. Wolfle[4] shows that less than two-thirds of all engineering graduates prior to 1953 were in engineering in 1953. Only 21 per cent of physical science graduates prior to 1953 were in the physical sciences professionally in 1953. The rest were in engineering (7 per cent), business and commerce (10 per cent), education (21 per cent), administration (5 per cent), advanced study (12 per cent), and scattered other occupations. Other fields show wider diversities.

This is important in that it indicates a flexibility in our system which is most desirable in itself and also a safeguard against the ill effects which would result from overproduction in a specialty if graduates were less adaptable to other tasks and opportunities.

QUALITY THE MAJOR PROBLEM

As one looks to the future, there seems to be every likelihood that our technical problems will increase, as will our problems of human organization and relationships. Personal services of all kinds will unquestionably be in rapidly increasing demand as we become a more integrated and articulated society and people consequently become more dependent on others.

Our major problem in the future as in the past will be one of quality more than quantity. We increasingly need able people and people with more training. Consequently, we should be more concerned about a failure to find, motivate, and train enough able people. There will never be too many able people.

[3] "Report of the Seventh Annual National Teacher Supply and Demand Study," *Journal of Teacher Education*, March 1954.

[4] *Op. cit. supra* (note 1), p. 303.

M. H. Trytten, Ph.D., LL.D., Washington, D. C., has been director of the Office of Scientific Personnel, National Research Council, since 1944 and assistant professor of physics at the University of Pittsburgh since 1928. He has been chairman of the Advisory Committee on Scientific Personnel, United States Civil Service Commission, since 1945, secretary of the Committee on International Exchange of Persons since 1948, and a member of the Commission on Human Resources since 1949.

Changing Patterns of Administrative Organization in Higher Education

By John Dale Russell

UNTIL the last quarter of the nineteenth century the pattern of internal administrative organization in the institutions of higher education in the United States was simple. The enrollment of almost every institution was small by today's standards. The curriculum was standardized and consisted almost exclusively of required subjects, with limited substitutions allowed in the "classical" course for students taking the "modern" or "scientific" course. The "faculty" consisted of a president and rarely more than three or four other professors. Such a situation did not require an administrative organization, and the president was the only official with executive responsibilities.

Development of Administrative Organization

Research [1] on the history of the development of administrative offices in the colleges and universities of the United States indicates that the first of the modern array of institutional administrative officers to be differentiated, after the presidency, was that of librarian. The office of librarian began to appear rather regularly by the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The listings indicate clearly that some member of the faculty was in practically every instance assigned this responsibility. Compared to the complex administrative job of operating a modern university library, the duties of the early college librarian were simple. He carried the key to the room where the books were kept and saw to it that this room was tightly locked except during the few periods of the week when students were permitted to use the books.

Registrar

With the coming of the elective system in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, academic bookkeeping became a necessary chore. Prior to the elective system, in the days of the fixed curriculum, the number of years a student had been in attendance indicated accurately the stage of his academic progress. But the elective system changed all this. Colleges found it necessary, in order to determine the progress of a student toward graduation, to have records of courses taken and completed. Someone had to be appointed to look after these records. The title that was commonly given this officer was "registrar." Officials by that title continue even today to be key members of the administrative organization in the colleges and universities of the United States.

Deans

The registrar's office soon developed as a strategic center for institutional planning, for here were the records and the data on which an alert official could base sound conclusions about institutional development and academic policies. Out of the registrar's office, with its primary function of record keeping, there developed the function of academic leadership. For this office the title of "dean" came to be used. At first the combination title of "dean and registrar" was frequently used, but gradually the record-keeping function came to be somewhat divorced from the function of academic leadership as set up in the office of the college dean.

Only a few pioneering institutions had developed coeducation by the end of the second third of the nineteenth century. Immediately following the close of the Civil War, however, large numbers of institutions, particularly those under state control, became coeducational. The acceptance of women students brought certain problems and responsibilities which the existing institutional staffs were unprepared to handle. It became the custom to appoint an additional staff member to take care of these responsibilities. This official in the earlier days was given some such title as "lady preceptress" or "lady principal," but later the title "dean of women" came to be generally accepted.

It is curious that recognition for the need for similar service to men students did not come generally until after the beginning of the twentieth century. Many institutions even today have never used the title "dean of men" for a member of the administrative staff. Following the close of World War I, however, there was a very large expansion of the noninstructional service to students. The recognition of the responsibility of the institution for something other than classroom teaching of students has led to a large-scale development of what is commonly known as student personnel services. The officials who provide this service appear under a wide variety of titles.

Business office

Problems of business management and finance in institutions of higher education began to be increasingly important near the end of the nineteenth century. Enrollments were increasing, and income from student fees was increasing correspondingly. The faculties were getting larger and the burden of caring for payrolls required something more than the casual attention of an officer such as the president. The physical plant was no longer a single building, in which students had their dormitory rooms as well as their classrooms and laboratories. Instead, a large campus with a whole series of buildings was becoming the common pattern, and the care and maintenance of the physical plant required supervision. Privately controlled institutions were beginning to accumulate endowment, the management of which called for ability not customarily found in the college institutional staff of those days. These and other circumstances required the setting up of the business office with a full-time staff member in charge.

Director of public relations

Perhaps the latest member to be received into the institutional administrative family is the director of public relations. The development of this service has come almost entirely since the end of World War I. Although the development came late, it has been rapid. Today practically every institution of any consequence has one or more staff members to whom are especially assigned responsibilities for publicity and public relations.

Faculty Origins of Administrators

From a review of the evolution of administrative offices in colleges and universities in the United States three or four generalizations may be drawn. The first of these generalizations is that, in the main, administrative offices and officers have had their origins in the teaching staff. In some quarters today a

[1] Earl J. McGrath, "The Evolution of Administrative Offices in Institutions of Higher Education in the United States." Doctor's Dissertation, Department of Education, University of Chicago, 1936.

sharp dichotomy is drawn between college administrators and faculty members, as if the two were entirely different subspecies of *genus homo*. But the history of the development of administrative officers shows clearly that administrators for the most part are simply faculty people upon whom have been laid certain nonteaching responsibilities. The transition to administrative status may, it is true, change behavior patterns, but probably the basic intellectual anatomy of the individual remains much the same whether he is in administrative work or in teaching. Particularly in the areas of academic administration it is rare to find a dean or department head who has not previously been a member of a teaching and research faculty.

The principal exception to this generalization, that administrative officers have been developed from the faculty, is in the field of business management. Even in this area it is becoming increasingly common to find as business manager someone who was formerly a professor of business administration or accounting. It is even more common to find the chief business officer and possibly some of his subordinate staff members, whatever their origins, given assignments to teach a class or two in some subject in which they have competence.

The office of the dean of women also had its origin outside the faculty. But as women with scholarly attainments began to be added to institutional faculties, these female faculty members have become the principal source of recruitment for the office of dean of women.

The two administrative positions that have probably become the most highly professionalized, the librarianship and the registrarship, have moved somewhat away from their origins in the faculty. It is still the common practice, however, to give such officers faculty status even though they may often have no responsibilities for class teaching.

The presidency is the one office that is frequently filled by someone who does not trace his career through beginnings in a college or university faculty. The church-related colleges have long chosen their presidents from the ministry about as often as from academic life. Independent universities and state universities have sometimes chosen great military leaders or industrialists or statesmen (sometimes politicians). State teachers colleges often choose as president someone who has followed a career in public school administration.

Despite the exceptions that have been noted, the generalization still holds that for the most part the administrative offices and officers in colleges and universities in this country have their origin in the faculties of the higher institutions.

INCREASE IN SIZE OF ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

The second generalization is one that is rather obvious to anyone who is at all familiar with institutional administrative organization over the past thirty or forty years. An enormous increase has occurred in the number of administrative officers in practically every college and university. The increase in the size of the administrative staff tends to be approximately parallel to or possibly somewhat less than increases in the number of students enrolled and the number of members on the faculty.

INCREASE IN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES

The third generalization is that, as an institution takes on a new function (or begins to recognize a function that has gradually been developed), a new administrative office is almost always added to supervise that function. For example, if the institution begins to offer extension courses, it must have a director of extension. If a new professional school is added, or developed out of a former liberal arts department, then someone must be employed as dean of the new unit. If the courses in speech and dramatics and journalism are separated from the parent department of English, new department headships must be created for each of the new departments. If the college begins to provide health services for its students, a director of student health soon appears in the listing of administrative officers in the institution's annual catalogue. If the institution formally recognizes the responsibility to help students to find positions after they graduate, a placement office with a director in charge is almost certain to be set up. The first half of the twentieth century has been a period in which large numbers of new functions have been added or recognized in institutions of higher learning in the United States. This situation, along with the increases in student enrollment and faculty members, accounts for the large increases that have occurred in the number of administrative officers in the typical college or university in the United States.

VARIABLE NOMENCLATURE

The fourth generalization is that the nomenclature used for administrative titles has not been standardized. Likewise there has been no standardization of functions of administration officers with a given title. The writer occasionally gets a letter from a worried inquirer who, after stating that he or she has just been appointed as registrar (or dean, or director of student personnel services, or what not), asks to have a list of the duties of this position. Sometimes the inquiry raises a question about institutional officials with different titles both of whom claim responsibility for a certain function: Will the referee or umpire please decide to whose office this function belongs? The only answer that can be given to such inquiries is that there is no authority anywhere in the United States to say definitely what the title of an administrative officer should be or what functions one with a given title should perform.

In its "divine right" of local autonomy, each institution decides for itself what titles it will bestow upon its administrative officers and what duties it will assign each of them. As a result, a given official, such as the one in charge of the business affairs of a college or university, may appear in the listing of administrative officers in different institutions under any one of sixty or more different titles. Research studies have been made of the duties of officials, such as the dean or the registrar, in institutions of higher education. Such studies, if based upon data from a sufficient number of institutions, nearly always show that the composite list of duties for any given officer includes practically every administrative duty that is to be performed anywhere in an educational institution. The condition results in large part from the tendency to assign duties in terms of individual capabilities rather than in terms of some predetermined list of functions appropriate to a given title.

It is true there are modal titles for at least the major areas of administrative responsibilities, and modal practice can be shown with respect to the officers to which given functions are assigned. But the whole situation of administrative titles and duties of administrative officers appears very chaotic, especially to one unfamiliar with the practice in institutions of higher education in the United States. It is sometimes difficult to explain to an educator from another country why we prefer such confusion to the alternative of having some bureaucrat in a federal ministry of educa-

tion in Washington issue authoritative lists of administrative titles, with definite assignments of functions and responsibilities that must be associated with that title in every institution in the country. The only answer that can be given is that in this country we cherish greatly the autonomy of each institution of higher education. Lack of uniformity in administrative titles and patterns of organization is preferable, we think, to the loss of autonomy that would inevitably result if some central authority were given power to issue definitive pronouncements on such matters.

SPAN OF CONTROL

The second and third generalizations listed above have stressed the growth in administrative staff members in the colleges and universities in the United States. As institutions expanded their administrative staffs, particularly when the occasion for such expansion was the addition of a new function, the tendency was to make the new official responsible directly to the president. When a new function is added, particularly if the operation has not yet become routinized, there is nearly always the feeling that it must be watched closely by the highest level of administrative authority. Once such a supervisory relationship is established with the highest level of administrative authority, the later subordination of the operation under some official of lesser status becomes increasingly difficult as time goes on.

Over a period of years the addition of many new functions thus tends to result in a condition technically known as an overexpanded span of control; that is, too many subordinate officials are responsible to the highest level of administrative authority. In the University of Chicago survey in the early 1930's, for example, it was found that some seventy officials (some of them committees) were supposed to be responsible directly and only to the president of the university. Such a condition inevitably means either that many functions are without any adequate supervision or that the overworked president is swamped with a mass of detail, to the neglect of the larger aspects of institutional policy and development.

According to sound theory of administration concerning span of control, a complex organization such as a modern university should have no more than eight and preferably as few as four major administrative officers reporting directly to the highest administrative authority, the president. Recent efforts at reorganization in colleges and universities in the United States have been in line with this principle. A rather definite organizational pattern has emerged, by which four major areas of administrative function are recognized. These four areas are the academic program, student personnel services, business and financial management, and public relations. The current tendency is to group all administrative functions under these four major areas and to put each in charge of a high-level officer, frequently with the title of vice-president and always with that status. This results in an institutional administrative organization with four officers directly responsible to the president: (1) the academic vice-president; (2) the director of student personnel services; (3) the vice-president for business affairs; and (4) the director of public relations.

COMPLICATIONS OF TRANSITION

In large numbers of institutions the transition to the pattern outlined above is incomplete. For example, a vice-president for the academic program and a vice-president for business management may have been appointed, but the student personnel services and the public relations may not yet have been placed under co-ordinating officers. In the smaller universities and colleges the president himself often holds the additional portfolio of vice-president for public relations. In some of the smaller institutions the vice-president for academic affairs serves also as the vice-president for student personnel services.

Many institutions have found it easier to make the transition to the ideal organization by taking one step at a time than by a wholesale reorganization all at one time. Personalities have to be considered in making any reorganization. The personnel situation that facilitates reorganization does not come about at one time in all the areas affected by the four major groupings.

Most institutions that have put into effect a reorganization along the lines suggested above have found a certain amount of resistance, especially among the older members of the administrative staff. Thus a dean of women, who has long enjoyed direct access to the president's office on all problems affecting her administrative responsibilities, may resent the introduction of a dean of students or vice-president of student personnel services to whom she is required to report in the future instead of to the president. Similarly a registrar, who may also have a long history as one of the major administrative officers of the institution, feels that he is being kicked downstairs when he is told that hereafter decisions affecting his responsibilities will be made by a vice-president rather than by the president. A librarian, long accustomed to go directly to the president to beg his funds for books and staff, feels frustrated when the reorganization places him under an academic vice-president. Consideration for the feelings of valued members of the administrative staff, with long records of faithful and effective service, has caused many institutions to delay the inauguration of a desirable plan of administrative reorganization until retirements or resignations make the transition less painful.

FRINGE AREAS

Although the pattern described above reduces to four the number of administrative officers reporting directly to the president, in practice it usually develops that some fringe areas do not fit into the theoretical pattern. Sometimes the president himself believes he must retain direct contact with certain important functions that might, in theory, be subordinated under one of the four major areas. Thus in a college or university that depends for a substantial portion of its income upon gifts or endowment earnings the president usually wants to retain direct touch with the officer who heads the solicitation for funds, although in theory this officer may well be a subordinate of the vice-president in charge of public relations. Such a situation may result, in effect, in creating a fifth vice-president.

In institutions that have much of a program of intercollegiate athletics, the president nearly always has to retain direct contact with the official or committee in charge of this important activity. It will be observed that the athletic program has certain aspects which would classify it within the area of academic administration. It has certain other aspects that are clearly a part of the student personnel service. The important financial problems that are involved in intercollegiate athletics necessitate some contact with the area of business management. And finally no one would deny that a tremendous public relations problem is involved, particularly if anything like "big time" athletics is maintained. Possibly it is this lack of sharp definition of the administrative area to which intercollegiate athletics should be assigned that has led many institutions to set this func-

tion up as a direct responsibility of the president. The gravity of the criticism that descends upon an institution when its athletic program is unsatisfactory may lead the institutional authorities to believe that only the highest executive level can finally be responsible for such an important operation.

Some time ago the writer had an interesting conference with a promising scholar who, some eight months previously, had been inaugurated as president of one of the medium-sized state universities. Upon being questioned as to what he had accomplished during the eight months he had been in office, the president replied unhesitatingly that his only achievement had been to hire a new football coach. Soon after taking office he found it necessary to find a satisfactory replacement for a popular figure who had resigned to take a better-paying position, after bringing fame to himself and the university by a series of winning teams. Subsequent reports on the sports pages indicate that the president spent his first eight months wisely. And he is still president.

As a result of the separation of certain fringe areas, the typical pattern of administrative organization now generally includes three or four major administrative units besides the four areas of academic administration, student personnel services, business management, and public relations.

REORGANIZATIONS AT LOWER LEVELS

At the next lower level of administration within each of the four major areas, there has also been some tendency toward reorganization and regrouping. This is particularly evident in academic administration. The rapid growth of subject matter available for teaching, the tremendous expansion of research interests, and the increasing number of widely diversified occupations and professions into which graduates from colleges and universities may go have resulted in a large increase in the number of specialized schools and departments within the academic program. Thus the university vice-president in charge of academic affairs, with a dozen or more deans of schools and colleges responsible to him, may also come to have a span of control far too large for effective management.

Grouping of professional schools

Some institutions have grouped certain of their professional schools under an officer one echelon higher than the dean of the school itself. Thus all the professional schools related to health may be grouped under a single administrative officer to whom the dean of the medical school, the dean of the dental school, the dean of the school of nursing, and so forth, may be responsible. Accrediting associations in certain professional fields have resisted this arrangement and have stoutly insisted that their dean shall always be responsible directly to the highest level of administrative authority in the institution.

Departmental organization

The tremendous expansion in subject matter has particularly affected the departmental organization of the colleges of liberal arts in the larger institutions. Departments have multiplied by a sort of process of mitosis until today it is common to find twenty-five or thirty or even more departments and department heads in a college or university. Here obviously also the dean of the college of liberal arts is likely to have a greatly overexpanded span of control. One device that has been used for correcting this situation has been the introduction of a divisional organization whereby related departments, such as the social sciences, the physical sciences, the biological sciences, and the humanities, may each be grouped under a single administrative officer for the respective divisions. The divisional organization has been introduced both for administrative convenience and to facilitate better integration of the curriculum. In many institutions where the divisional organization has been introduced it exists only on paper, and the institution actually does not operate either administratively or in relation to the curriculum on a true divisional basis.

In a large university even a single department may become so large, in terms of the faculty members and diversified services, that some administrative subdivision is necessary below the level of department head. Thus within a department of English there may be a grouping of all the work in freshmen English composition under a director of that subject. Similarly there may be more or less official recognition of faculty members who head up such areas as world literature, American literature, English literature, and other broad areas of specialization within the department.

STAFF OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

At the other end of the administrative ladder the office of chief executive itself has grown into something more than a president with a stenographer or secretary. (Even the provision of a secretary for the president is a comparatively recent innovation.) Most institutions of any considerable size now have a staff associated with the office of the president. These staff officers may bear such titles as assistant to the president, secretary of the university, provost, director of institutional studies, consultant—or others in wide variety. Such additions are necessary to relieve the president himself of what becomes an intolerable burden of detail, even though the maximum use has been made of delegation of authority to subordinate officers in the line of command.

As long as the functionaries attached to the president's office retain purely a staff status, the administrative organization is not thereby complicated. But there is a great tendency to begin to assign small but expanding administrative functions to these persons in staff positions in the chief executive's office. When this is done, considerable confusion is likely to result in the organizational pattern. After a time, if such practices are followed, the whole administrative organization must be restudied, and the result is another reorganization in the interest of efficient management.

THE FACULTY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL

Space is lacking in this article for the discussion of other areas of internal administrative organization in which changing patterns seem to be emerging. One is tempted, for example, to refer to the question of the place of the faculty in the control of the institution. Long-time trends seem to be away from the strong man, dictator-type of executive control, in which the college or university is viewed as "but the lengthened shadow of one man." The trend seems to be toward a much wider sharing with the faculty of responsibility for policy decisions. Certain groups have insisted that the interest of democratic administration can be served only if faculty members hold positions as members of the controlling board of trustees or regents. There seems to be no tendency, however, for institutions to follow such a suggestion. A few institutions have created faculty committees that are advisory to their boards of trustees or have created joint faculty-trustee committees for the study of problems, but even this arrangement is by no means the common practice. Although faculty members generally do not hold membership on the boards of trustees of their institu-

tions, in actual practice in most institutions the faculty as a group either has full control or at least an important voice in all matters that are vital to the academic program. This whole problem of the relationship of the faculty to institutional control cannot be discussed here in detail and is cited merely as one illustration of the numerous problems of a similar sort in which changing and developing patterns of administrative organization are found in the colleges and universities of this country.

CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL TYPES

The discussion in this article has dealt almost exclusively with the changing patterns in the internal administrative organization of institutions of higher education. There are many phases of organization and administration, other than those related to the executive control within the individual institution, that cannot be discussed here for lack of space. Two or three developments outside the area of internal administrative organization will be mentioned briefly.

Evolution of the normal school

New institutional forms in higher education have appeared in considerable variety during the past fifty or sixty years in the United States. An interesting case is the evolution of the normal school, which was originally an institution not recognized as being of college grade. Gradually its entrance requirements were raised to include high school graduation. A four-year college-level curriculum was then developed, leading to the bachelor's degree. At this stage the institution usually became officially known as a "teachers college." Currently in large numbers of these institutions the word "teachers" has been dropped from the title. State colleges that have grown up on the foundations of the old normal schools now commonly maintain multipurpose curriculums and seek to serve a wide variety of educational needs in their region or state. Some of these institutions now bear the title of "university."

The community college

Another interesting development of a new institutional form in higher education is the community college. The term "junior college" is losing favor. The trend seems to be toward an institution tied very closely to the local public school system and serving broadly the educational needs of the community, not only for college-credit courses, but for advanced vocational training and for a broadly conceived offering of noncredit courses for adults.

SUPRAINSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS

The growth of suprainstitutional controls has been an interesting phenomenon during the past half century. One such control is the accrediting agency, which is discussed in another article in this volume. Currently much thought is being given to the place of agencies of state government in the control of higher education. Alarm has been expressed at the tendency to infringe upon the traditional autonomy of state-controlled colleges and universities by the assignment of certain control functions to noneducational agencies in the state government.

INDICATIONS OF FUTURE CHANGE

The great expansion in the variety of services rendered in institutions of higher education during the past half century in the United States and the general increase that has taken place in the size of student bodies and teaching staffs have been the basic causes of marked modifications in the pattern of administrative organization of these institutions. Certainly the end of such developments has not yet been reached. With the prospect of almost incredible enrollment increases in the next fifteen or twenty years, and the great probability that the variety of services rendered and functions performed will also continue to expand, it may be confidently expected that still further modifications will be made in the pattern of administrative organization in the country's institutions of higher education.

John Dale Russell, Ph.D., Santa Fe, New Mexico, is chancellor and executive secretary of the Board of Educational Finance, State of New Mexico. He has served on the faculties of the departments of education at Indiana University, Ball State Teachers College, the University of Kentucky, and the University of Chicago. At the University of Chicago he was also dean of students and associate dean of the Division of Social Sciences. From 1946 to 1952 he was director (later associate commissioner) of the Division of Higher Education, U. S. Office of Education. He is author or coauthor of College Organization and Administration (1929), Efficiency in College Management (1931), The Liberal Arts College (1933), The Evaluation of Higher Institutions (1935), Vocational Education (1938), The American Educational System (1940), The Finance of Higher Education (1944; revised edition 1954), and other books and articles.

Recent Developments in State and Regional Planning of Higher Education*

By A. J. Brumbaugh and Redding S. Sugg, Jr.

PLANNING at state and regional levels has developed in higher education as rising enrollment and diversification of programs have made competition among colleges and universities uneconomical. Pressure of numbers long since brought about state-wide co-ordination of elementary and secondary education. Only since the 1920's, however, has this pressure reached higher education and begun to produce a similar effect; and it is chiefly since World War II that the scope of planning has passed state boundaries. The chief problem posed by mass college enrollment—a phenomenon which the statisticians project with virtual certainty indefinitely into the future—is how to achieve high quality and sensitivity of program in the face of quantitative expansion. Graduate education in particular, with its multiplying specializations, small enrollment units, and comparatively great unit costs, demands new dimensions for planning. One response to this is interstate or regional study and action supplementing individual state efforts.

Comprehensive studies of higher education aimed at the rationalization of institutions into state-wide systems which can be efficiently managed have increased since World War II. They typically focus on recommendations for co-ordination of state programs of higher education, recognizing the complementary role of private colleges and universities, and on particular modifications and developments at existing and potential institutions. The more complete studies provide information, not only about the activities of colleges and universities, but also about the states' resources for higher education, their needs, and their enrollment prospects. In every instance co-ordination to greater or lesser degree is recommended, despite a general concern for institutional identity.

The theory of co-ordination or of what might be called system making in higher education has evolved from experience. During the past quarter-century nineteen states brought their colleges and universities into systems of one kind or another. It has become possible to categorize systems. The most complete co-ordination is provided by systems which feature a central board of control that delegates executive functions to an officer, usually titled chancellor, to whom the heads of the several state institutions report. The Oregon system is an example. Other systems, Mississippi's for instance, have the heads of institutions reporting to a central board that employs an executive officer, usually titled secretary, to whom less responsibility is delegated than to chancellors. A third type of system includes a board and chancellor, but retains in addition local institutional governing boards to which the presidents are responsible for the internal operations of their schools. Oklahoma's system is of this kind. A fourth type, also featuring board and chancellor, is limited in function; the New Mexico system, for example, is limited to the co-ordination of financial functions. As other states undertake studies and move toward co-ordination of higher education, the tendency is to choose and modify these models on the basis of particular situations.

* Editor's note. No reference is made in this article to the voluntary state associations of colleges and universities. Many are primarily concerned with financial support, and their activities were included in the conference program. Those not primarily concerned with fund raising vary widely in scope and function; their most frequent activity is an annual conference.

Minnesota and Louisiana

Both the basic similarity of goals and the local differences of emphasis may be observed in state-wide studies recently completed, currently under way, or planned. It may be illuminating to look first at the studies in Minnesota and Louisiana, as examples of states where no co-ordinated system existed at the time of the investigations. These states are not strictly comparable, since the Minnesota studies began in 1945 and culminated in 1950 with the publication of a substantial volume, whereas Louisiana has only just adopted the plan for a comprehensive survey. Nevertheless the Minnesota study and the plans for the Louisiana one give an idea of the motivations and the scope of the work regarded as prerequisite to soundly based recommendations on the co-ordination of higher education.

In 1947 the state commissioner of education was directed by the Minnesota legislature to appoint a commission representing all phases of higher education in the state, "for the purposes of studying higher education." The resulting book, which incorporates two earlier publications, was meant to help Minnesota face the rapidly growing demand for college education and to formulate a "clear pattern" for planning. It is an editorial integration of sections by several hands, all Minnesotans. The study begins with a discussion of the social and economic background of the entire educational system and proceeds to an account of what happened to two recent classes of high school graduates, regarded as the "student potential" for higher education. The junior colleges, liberal arts colleges, teachers colleges, and the state university get a section apiece, and the volume concludes with essays on the future of higher education.

The Minnesota study, though elaborately conceived and plainly motivated by a felt need for co-ordination of the work of the colleges and the university, reveals perhaps more clearly than other recent studies an ambivalence toward centralization. Instead of coming out for a board and an executive and recommending an unequivocal organizational chart, the study ends with a listing of "long-term objectives" which might be expected of a co-ordinated program. According to the concluding section:

> It is clearly evident that the progress of higher education toward its long-range objectives will depend on the efforts that individual institutions make. . . . There is great need for better co-ordination, although voluntary co-operation will be the keystone of co-ordination. Autocratic organization or unified state control would destroy the freedom that is the heart of education in a democracy . . . no formal program of institutional co-operation could be adequately developed without considerable further study. . . .[1]

Louisiana, on the other hand, includes both managerial and educational efficiency as the objective of the comprehensive study which the legislature has authorized the Commission on Higher Education to undertake. Like many other states, Louisiana faces increasing enrollment, problems in recruiting and retaining faculties, and rising operational costs without, at present, any co-

[1] Minnesota Commission on Higher Education, *Higher Education in Minnesota* (Minneapolis, 1950), p. 406.

ordinated plan of action. The study is frankly designed to produce such a plan.

The Louisiana study will be based on nine assumptions briefly set forth in the plan, which has appeared as a brochure graphically laid out to engage public as well as professional support. The nine assumptions may be taken to constitute as complete a theory of co-ordinated planning and administration of higher education as any of the recent studies has offered. They are as follows:

1. Higher education should contribute to the development of the state's cultural and economic resources.

2. Public and private institutions should provide both practical and liberal education appropriate to the state's needs.

3. Plans should be made "to achieve maximum efficiency and highest quality for dollars spent," maintaining a proper relation between expenditures for higher education and for other government functions within the financial capacity of the state.

4. Private institutions should continue to play an important role "which will be recognized in determining the magnitude of the responsibility of public instruction."

5. Full account should be taken of facilities available in the region of which the state is a part and at non-educational installations.

6. The proposed study should recommend an administrative organization and allocation of functions among the state institutions.

7. Professional and lay leaders should join in identifying the state's needs for higher education and in planning to meet them.

8. Long-range plans for higher education, running as far ahead as twenty years and including priorities for action, should be prepared.

9. The proposed study should be the beginning of a continuing study process which will keep higher education sensitive to needs growing out of the socio-economic life of the state.[2]

ARIZONA

The study of higher education in Arizona completed under the direction of Ernest V. Hollis in 1954 contributes an equally succinct list of the problems with which legislatures have difficulty in the absence of aid from a state-wide, co-ordinating, screening, and planning body. The justifications of such a central authority as the Louisiana assumptions imply are here in effect summed up. Arizona is of further interest as an example of a state which has established central machinery without getting it into satisfactory operation. The Board of Regents of the University and State Colleges authorized the study because of ". . . the conscious lack of adequate educational leadership, committed to a co-ordinated state-wide program of higher education." The entire study is based on the assumption that the Board will employ a full-time executive officer and a staff with sufficient status and resources to help the legislature make decisions in the following areas:

1. Where the programs of two or more institutions involve undesirable and expensive duplication of services.

2. Where the programs of all the institutions omit important recognized needs of the state for higher education.

3. Where institutional policies may vary unjustifiably on such matters as faculty salaries, student admission requirements, student fees, or the quality of instruction.

4. Where significant differences exist in the effectiveness with which the several colleges and universities organize, present and defend their respective budget requests.

5. Where the combined requests of institutions for operating funds or new facilities exceed the total funds the legislature is able or willing to devote to higher education.

6. Where the legislature is put under specific pressures to add an entirely new program at an existing institution, or even to change the basic purpose and scope of an institution.

7. Where the legislature is confronted with unwholesome competition among the State-controlled colleges and their friends.[3]

[2] *Cf.* Louisiana Commission on Higher Education, "What Does Louisiana Face in Publicly Supported Higher Education?" (mimeographed; Baton Rouge, 1955).

FLORIDA

Florida's situation is similar to Arizona's in that the Board of Control for Florida Institutions of Higher Learning, although exercising certain co-ordinating functions, is felt to be inadequately staffed and insufficiently authorized to handle prospective expansion. The Council for the Study of Higher Education in Florida, appointed by the Board of Control at the direction of the legislature last year, has published an initial report recommending plans for co-ordinating the government of higher education and for relating private and public education. As in Arizona, the key recommendation is that the central board be made by statute a policy-making body, delegating executive and administrative functions to a professional staff headed by a chancellor. A final report, the details of which will depend in part on the action which the legislature takes with respect to strengthening the central board, will be issued in March 1956. This publication will propose an allocation of functions among the several state institutions and describe the nature of the educational programs required to meet the needs of the state.

Noting that Florida must expect a tripling of its 1953–54 college enrollment of 36,013 by 1970, the Council's initial report stresses the need for deliberate effort to attain quality of program in times of quantitative expansion. It suggests that private colleges and universities be encouraged to maintain high quality programs and to expand their enrollments consistent with their purposes and resources. It further recommends the expansion of the existing public institutions and an ambitious program to supplement them by establishing public community colleges in strategic population centers. The Council believes the state can accommodate the first contingents of the rising enrollments at the existing institutions and in the proposed community colleges. It foresees, however, a need for additional four-year state colleges, which should be planned now but opened only when it is clear that maximum use is being made of the existing institutions and community colleges.

The emphasis on community colleges is of special interest. The Council recommends that a Community College Commission be established at once to begin the development of a community college system and to exercise sole responsibility for co-ordinating it. As the Council conceives them, the community colleges would provide terminal, two-year programs with a strong vocational cast, would identify able students who can be aided to continue their formal education, and would offer adult education programs. The community colleges would help avoid congestion at the state universities and proposed state colleges, and they would be comparatively economical, both for the state and for their students, most of whom could live at home.

[3] Ernest V. Hollis *et al.*, "State-controlled Higher Education in Arizona" (mimeographed; Board of Regents of the University and State Colleges of Arizona, 1954), pp. 90–91.

OTHER STUDIES

In Mississippi, which has one of the older co-ordinated systems of higher

education, the organization of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning is regarded by some educational administrators as ideal in many respects. All the state institutions are under the Board, whose members serve overlapping twelve-year terms relatively free of temporary political influences. The study of higher education in the state directed by John E. Brewton and published in December 1954 is "a practical, workable guide to the planning of a long-range program." It rather carries forward work well under way than recommends radical administrative reorganization. It recommends, however, the addition of a Director of Planning and Research to the Board's staff and the maintenance of a continuing assessment of the system leading to a more exclusive concentration on policy making.

A number of other states, notably California, New York, North Carolina, and Texas, have recently completed studies of a scope comparable to those already mentioned. Still other states are engaged in more limited studies, and several states are including surveys of higher education in preparation for the White House Conference. They do not present striking variations on the ones we have discussed.

REGIONALISM: THE NEW ELEMENT

The newest element in the state studies of higher education is a growing consciousness of regional action as an alternative to be considered in planning. The Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi studies specifically take into account the program of the Southern Regional Education Board. The more recent program of the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education is referred to in the Arizona study. Thus the state studies are beginning to occur, not in isolation or in simple imitation of earlier ones, but in a larger context which allows great flexibility and unprecedented option in the development of plans for state systems of higher education.

The Florida study includes among the assumptions which it has adopted as the basis of its work one stating that "full account will be taken of regional facilities and of non-institutional facilities and resources within the State, in determining the expansions that will be required to meet the needs of Florida." The Council also assumes that "Florida will assume its share of responsibility in the fields of regional, national and international education."[4] Especially with respect to graduate and professional programs, the Council feels that because the field is so large there is no valid reason for uneconomical duplication in the development of new programs among Florida institutions. According to the report

> A further means of effecting economies and at the same time achieving high quality in graduate work is to make maximum use of all the facilities in the State and region . . . [which involves] taking full advantage of the arrangements for inter-institutional and inter-state cooperation.[5]

Similarly, the Mississippi study recommends that assessment of needs in the region as well as the state be the first consideration guiding the central board in establishing new policies and procedures for graduate study and research. The state is advised to undertake advanced programs for training only those professional and technical personnel who "cannot be prepared more economically and effectively through the Southern Regional [Education] Compact or through grants-in-aid to graduate students who study in specialized fields outside the state."[6] The plan for the Louisiana study is equally cognizant of the regional context.

[4] *Initial Report of the Council for the Study of Higher Education in Florida* (Tallahassee, 1955), p. 22.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

INTERSTATE COMPACTS

A total of forty-five states and two territories have shown interest, to varying degrees, in co-operative planning, sharing of facilities, specializing within complementary patterns, and avoiding unnecessary duplication in advanced education. Through these approaches the states can supplement their individual efforts to discharge the frequently overwhelming task of developing the full range of advanced instruction and research at their universities. Twenty-four of the states and one territory have entered into statutory regional compacts for mutual planning and development, particularly of graduate and technical education.

Fifteen of these states have given legislative approval to the Southern Regional Education Compact of 1949, while nine states and one territory have ratified the Western Interstate Compact for Higher Education of 1953. The Southern Regional Education Compact involves the area stretching from Delaware on the north to Texas and Oklahoma on the southwest; the Western Interstate Compact includes Alaska and Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. California, Nevada, and Hawaii are also expected to participate. Meanwhile a New England Compact on Higher Education has been approved by the Massachusetts legislature and is under consideration in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, and Rhode Island. In addition, twelve midwestern states are scheduled to confer in July on the desirability of interstate co-operation to develop veterinary medical education and perhaps also medical and dental education.

In resorting to the interstate compact, educational and political leaders are demonstrating the flexibility of one of the oldest of American public administration devices. It provides expanded opportunity for state initiative within the federal system. During recent decades such compacts have been used in river sanitation, forest-fire control, criminal probation and the control of juvenile delinquency, and water and oil rights; undoubtedly the educational compacts are the most ambitious, for their application is limited only by the scope of education itself.

EFFECTS OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

What does regional co-operation in higher education do for the states? In general, it enlarges the geographical, and hence the fiscal and administrative, area for planning. Individual states which would experience frustration or mediocre results in attempting all things can concentrate their resources on given fields within patterns which assure the citizen of each co-operating state of access to the full range of offerings. In so doing they find it advantageous to maintain an inventory of their needs and resources as the basis for reciprocal arrangements with other states. As individual state studies of higher education are beginning to take regional facilities into account, the Southern Regional Education Board is encouraging the states in its area to initiate continuing studies.

At its 1954 meeting the Board's director, Dr. John E. Ivey, Jr., noted that projected enrollment increases will make careful planning necessary if the states are to provide for them without jeopardizing the quality of their programs. He also stated that the problem is so great that "the resources of the region must be used to maximum efficiency"

[6] John E. Brewton *et al.*, *Higher Education in Mississippi: Digest of the Survey Report* (Jackson, Miss., 1954), p. 36.

and pointed out that "research into the basic problems of educational programs is extremely limited." Each of the participating states has been urged to "undertake a long-range study of its total needs for elementary, secondary, and college programs and explore the most efficient educational, financial, and organizational procedures for meeting projected needs, including the more effective use of the regional education compact." The Board provides assistance to such projects on request, and Dr. Ivey has further suggested a joint effort of the states to develop educational research.

In addition to consultation the Southern Regional Education Board has contributed two important aids to state planning of higher education. In 1954 it published *Future School and College Enrollments in the Southern Region,* which includes enrollment projections to 1970 for each of the states in the compact and which will be revised periodically. This year the Board published a detailed tabulation of *Doctoral Programs Offered by Southern Universities,* which it also intends to revise from time to time. This bulletin was designed to provide colleges and universities with information to be used in student counseling. It also helps to publicize the doctoral programs and aids the institutions which offer them to plan their work in relation to that of their neighbors in the region.

At its own annual meeting, at the annual Legislative Work Conference which it conducts, and in upwards of twenty-five academic fields, the Southern Regional Education Board not only fosters intrastate as well as interstate planning but also disseminates and interprets the results of research and planning to a growing variety of groups. The Board includes the governors of the participating states and three other persons appointed by each. College presidents, legislators, and prominent citizens are typical members. The Legislative Work Conference is attended by delegations of legislators appointed by the governors. It has devoted itself to reviewing regional education programs, to passing judgment on the desirability of new ones, and to general questions of educational policy.

SOUTHERN REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Within academic fields, the Southern Regional Education Board has worked only through existing institutions without attempting to establish new ones. The oldest activities are the contract programs in medicine, veterinary medicine, dentistry, and social work. States which lack schools in these fields contract through the Board for quotas of places at institutions which have such schools, agreeing to pay the institutions $1,500 a year per student in medicine and dentistry, $1,000 a year per student in veterinary medicine, and $750 a year per student in social work. The institutions use this money only for operational expenses—to raise professors' salaries and otherwise improve the schools beyond what would ordinarily have been possible. The gain to the students is primarily access to a school. No scholarships are provided, although out-of-state fees are waived. At present over 1,042 students and about $1,365,000 a year are involved. It has been conservatively estimated that it would cost about $64,000,000 to build new schools in the compact states providing the same facilities and about $9,000,000 a year per state to operate them.

An equally important type of program is carried on under Memoranda of Agreement which commit the participating institutions and the Board to co-operate in planning and developing advanced scientific and educational programs. The memoranda, which bear the signatures of the heads of the participating institutions and the Board director, establish Regional Committees in various academic fields. The committees usually consist of the deans of the schools concerned and a representative of the Board. Such groups now guide regional programs in city planning, forestry, research library development, the marine sciences, nursing, and the petroleum sciences.

Achievements under the memoranda include the establishment of a uniform preforestry curriculum, the launching of co-operatively planned master's programs in nursing at six universities with the aid of grants from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation and the Commonwealth Fund, and the initiation of regional graduate summer sessions in statistics and the petroleum sciences, as well as joint efforts in several fields to recruit students, raise funds, and co-ordinate research.

An even more inclusive kind of regional educational activity is in prospect as the result of the resolution of the 1954 Southern Governors' Conference which requested the Board to establish a Southern Regional Council on Mental Health Training and Research. The council, which was organized July 11–12, 1955, is advisory to the Board and will be supported by special appropriations at the rate of $8,000 annually from states which elect to participate.

Sixteen states took part in the surveys which resulted in the proposal that the council be set up. So far it appears that at least eight or ten states will support the council. In March the National Institute of Mental Health granted $73,600 to the Southern Regional Education Board to supplement support from the states during the next two years—appropriations from some of the interested states must wait for legislative action in 1956. The Southern Regional Education Board will employ a staff and assist the states in developing interstate planning and collaboration to advance training and research in psychiatry, clinical psychology, psychiatric nursing, and psychiatric social work. This spring the National Institute of Mental Health also allocated funds to the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education to help finance preliminary surveys which it is expected will lead to a similar program in the Far West.

WESTERN DEVELOPMENTS

Like the Southern Regional Education Board, the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education gets its basic support from legislative appropriations. Membership of the Commission is predominantly educational; unlike the Southern group the Commission does not include the governors. The Western Interstate Compact specified that the Commission's first efforts should be to arrange contracts on the Southern model in dentistry, medicine, veterinary medicine, and public health. Currently there are 101 contract students in medicine, veterinary medicine, and dentistry, with 250 prospects for 1955–56. The Commission is co-operating with the United States Public Health Service and the W. K. Kellogg Foundation in a regional survey of dental manpower. It has recently received a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health to conduct a regional survey of mental health training and research. With its initial obligations in the health fields well in hand, the Commission is preparing regional programs in marine biology, nursing, educational television, journalism, and social work.

CONCLUSION

It is to be observed that the motivations and patterns of the state studies and planning carry over into regional

action, which so far centers on graduate and professional education. As the primary impetus of the state studies is the prospect of doubled and tripled college and university enrollment and the patent need for economical use of resources in accommodating it, so in regional planning is the necessity of economy paramount. But in regional planning perhaps more clearly than in that limited to particular states the concern for the maintenance and improvement of the quality of advanced education is manifest. The quality of advanced programs, which has been associated with highly individualized instruction, is in danger from the effects of an unprecedented quantity of students. As regional action tending to foster the study of basic principles of education and educational administration continues to develop, it is likely to be increasingly devoted to the problem of quality in mass higher education. The Southern and Western regional programs, and such others as may come into operation, should be watched not only for particular achievements in academic fields, but also for the development of a broad conception of what constitutes excellence. The traditional tendency to associate quality only with accomplishment in areas calling for verbal and abstract intellectual aptitudes may come into serious question as the educational structure accommodates large numbers of persons with other aptitudes requiring other standards of value.

A. J. Brumbaugh, Ph.D., LL.D., L.H.D., Tallahassee, Florida, is director of the Council for the Study of Higher Education in Florida. He was a member of the education faculty of the University of Chicago from 1927 to 1944, as professor from 1936, and also served there in various deanships in the College of Arts, Literature and Science and in the University. He was vice-president of the American Council on Education (1944–50) and president of Shimer College (1950–54). He has been a member of numerous educational commissions.

Redding S. Sugg, Jr., Ph.D., Atlanta, Georgia, is a staff associate of the Southern Regional Education Board. He has edited a weekly newspaper and taught English at the Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of Texas, and the Atlanta Division of the University of Georgia. He was a Fulbright scholar in Paris in 1951–52.



Higher Education and the Federal Government

By J. L. MORRILL

RELATIONSHIPS of higher education with the federal government have become a major preoccupation in the American college and university world. They enter significantly into financing and policy. Historically this has been true of the land-grant colleges and universities from their beginnings, but within the past fifteen years federal involvements have spread into the whole academic-administrative realm.

World War II gave overwhelming impetus to this trend. The federal government found the colleges and universities indispensable for training specialized military personnel and for scientific research and development. Since the war federal involvement in higher education has widened and intensified.

Educational benefits for World War II veterans (and now for veterans of the Korean conflict) brought federal relationships to almost every campus. The government declared draft deferment of better-than-average students while they pursue college work to be in the national interest. The Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC)—Army, Navy, and Air Force—has been expanded far beyond its earlier principal affiliation with the land-grant colleges, and is now definitely regarded, at long range, as the major source of officers for the active military forces.

Federal support of research, initiated by the Hatch Act many decades ago in agriculture, is now pouring into the universities in an amount exceeding $150,000,000 annually in medicine and health, in the natural and biological sciences, and for defense purposes which include not only "weapon research" but the most basic investigations in nuclear and atomic fields. The government has moved into long-range loans for campus housing, into world-wide support of educational exchange, including the reorganization and rehabilitation of higher education abroad, into the specialized training of civilians and military personnel as well as veterans—all these with highly complex and diversified contract and fiscal relationships.

This changing pattern is significant, indeed. No cliché about "creeping socialism" is a sufficient explanation. Higher education has become an instrument of national policy in ways never intended by the founders of the Republic or the founders of early American colleges and universities themselves.

The expanding needs of a diverse and specialized social order which, surprisingly, not only science but also scholarship has been found uniquely useful in meeting, are a major factor in the situation. And the idea that public money should be spent or loaned exclusively through public agencies has been considerably revised, not only in higher education but also in many other types of operation. The privately supported institutions, like private business, have been a party to this revision.

The whole notion, indeed, of organized education as a social function—public and private—has assumed new political overtones. This is understandable in the fears and tensions of this divided world. The spiritual and economic crisis of Communism with its educational implications, for example, becomes in practical terms a political crisis. Even in a democracy as contrasted with a totalitarian state—indeed especially in a democracy dependent

upon public opinion as the basis of decision—education becomes a force of political consequence. Both the federal government and state governments become concerned with education in new ways. They are more and more inclined to take a hand in it.

EDUCATIONAL COMPLAISANCE

It should not be assumed that the increasing involvement of the federal government with higher education has taken place despite strenuous objections of the institutions, both public and private, directly concerned. Quite the contrary. American colleges and universities of all types have welcomed arrangements to train military personnel, contracts and grants for research, deferment policies on behalf of their students, support of veterans and foreign students, and other federal programs combining tangible benefits with the satisfaction of operating in the national interest. There have been some voices raised in protest, but the number of institutions declining to participate has been small indeed.

DANGER SIGNALS

And yet, certain dangers in this situation have become apparent in recent years and have caused considerable concern. For example, the ROTC, originally a plan by which the Army assisted colleges and universities with their own programs of military training, has now become so integral a part of the officer-procurement plans of all the armed forces that control has, in effect, passed to the Pentagon. The obnoxious "loyalty oath," instituted last year by the Army and the Air Force for freshmen, was one symptom of the change. The Army directive was based on the assumption, stated by the Department of Defense, that these students were in some respect members of the armed forces, even though many of them were enrolled by compulsion under state laws declaring military training to be merely academic instruction.

The Department of Defense also asserted the right, in contracts for correspondence courses offered colleges and universities in 1953, to relieve an employee of the institution from further responsibilities under the contract for "security" reasons without presenting evidence or the opportunity for self-defense. The same right has been asserted by more than one federal agency in connection with research contracts, even when no classified information is involved. This principle, if applied generally, could carry over into every kind of contractual relationship between the federal government and the colleges and universities—into ROTC instruction, the agricultural extension service, vocational education, even veterans' education, and could consequently affect nearly every faculty member in the United States. Whatever the motive, the procedure is clearly an invasion of the institutional autonomy without which there is no protection against political control.

In another sphere, the financial benefits from some of the federal research programs are now recognized as illusory, especially in institutions where concentrations of contracts and grants have stimulated large-scale operations. Since a number of federal agencies pay only a part of the cost of research projects they sponsor, the effect has been, in some instances, to impel the institution to use its own resources in ways that have resulted in unbalanced over-all research programs, diversion of funds from faculty salaries and other essential purposes, and partial neglect of the teaching function.

In the larger context the issues, pro and con, of government support and government control are not so simple as many suppose. They are empirical; and indigenous to the times and to the nation or state in which they arise.

We can jump to conclusions too quickly. The syllogism—to mix aphorisms—that the hand which controls the purse strings will rock the cradle is not necessarily true. On the other hand, the axiom of eternal vigilance as the price of freedom is true, beyond doubt or debate.

LESSON OF THE LAND-GRANT COLLEGES

The group of colleges and universities with probably the longest experience of federal relationships is the federally aided land-grant college group. Generally speaking, that experience has been a sound and satisfactory one, as I can testify from some twenty years of administrative responsibility in three land-grant universities. That it has been generally satisfactory is accounted for by two things—the fact that the relationship is a co-operative one between the states and the federal government, with the final decision on the methods and policies of co-operation reserved to the institutions and the state legislatures; and the fact that the land-grant colleges, individually and in concert through their strongly organized and competently staffed association, have steadily, militantly, and successfully resisted the undoubted although only occasional tendency of the federal government to intervene and to control.

Most of these problems have arisen, for the land-grant colleges, in the federal appropriation and administration of funds for agricultural extension and research, to which the states also contribute millions of support. Today for both publicly and privately supported institutions the horizon of federal relationships has expanded far beyond the land-grant agricultural area. There is, long range, the same possibility and prospect of a reasonable relationship if buttressed by the eternal vigilance of those involved.

There is evidence of this fact from the later developments in several of the examples cited earlier. The Department of Defense has recently withdrawn the objectionable loyalty oath and substituted a brief affirmative declaration that satisfies most of the critics. The objectionable clause in contracts for correspondence courses under the United States Armed Forces Institute Program has been eliminated. At the request of the White House, the National Research Council has agreed to study the security problem in government-sponsored research and to make recommendations for elimination of abuses. Congress has likewise interested itself in the problem. And a number of federal agencies sponsoring research are considering, under the leadership of the National Science Foundation, changes in their financial contract formulas.

All of these results have come, in large part, from the efforts of higher education itself, working through such agencies as the Association of American Colleges, the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, the Association of American Universities, the National Catholic Educational Association, the Association for Higher Education of the National Education Association, and the American Council on Education. Higher education need by no means be a helpless pawn in the hands of the government, provided that it is alert and united.

EDUCATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

For the eggs of education are in one basket. Educational institutions stand or fall together at every level—the schools, the colleges and universities—in the American scene and scheme. It is proverbial—and democratic—that educational institutions differ in their philosophies of education, in the special objectives to which they are variously committed. As the British observer Denis Brogan has written, the glory of

free societies is that "they produce a great many people of all kinds because they let them produce themselves." Education, surely, must be the proving ground of that principle.

But it is shortsighted to consider the great issues involved in federal relationships in the small terms of a divisive competition of interest between the publicly supported and the independently supported colleges and universities of the country. It is folly to confuse currently popular propaganda with common sense by attributing to the privately supported institutions primarily the virtues of "private enterprise." It is similar folly to attribute to the publicly supported institutions any exclusive concern and responsibility for the "public interest." All depend upon each other. Nationally, the distinguishing merit and success of American higher education in the whole Western world are not nearly so much its competitive as its complementary character—the balanced diversity of institutions differently motivated, controlled, administered, and supported.

QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Assuming that higher education will continue to be an instrument of national policy and that the institutions of higher learning and the organizations that speak for them will stand together on critical issues, the central questions for the future are these: Will the American public still sustain the traditional aims of "the advancement of learning and the search for truth"? Will it resist the prejudices of anti-intellectualism? Will it stand steadfast against political intervention, protecting the independence and autonomy of our institutions?

The totalitarian view we know from experience in our own time: the indoctrination of youth, the coercion for conformity, the anesthesis of intellectual freedom.

Historically our own outlook has been otherwise. Education has been the buttress of that enlightenment needful to democratic success, the free mind regarded as indispensable to American advancement. To be sure there was no mention of education, as I remember it, in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. No national university such as James Madison urged has ever been established.

But we remember the historic mandate of the Ordinance of 1787, and Washington's Farewell Address in which he admonished his fellow citizens of the struggling new republic to "promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge." We remember Jefferson's lifelong preoccupation with the University of Virginia; John Quincy Adams' plea for the public support of "scientific research and inquiry" towards, as he phrased it, "the improvement of agriculture, commerce and manufacture, the cultivation and encouragement of the mechanic and elegant arts, the advancement of literature, and the progress of the sciences, ornamental and profound."

Are those convictions still the American view of education—of higher education especially—as an instrument of national policy? Within the expanding realm of federal relationships, can public understanding be somehow mobilized and relied upon to circumscribe the actions of Congress and the executive agencies?

Clearly our institutions of higher learning are challenged to make themselves more strongly felt for what they really are amid the confused and competing pressures which too often crystallize in practical political decisions. Immediately useful today, their larger usefulness in the time to come must somehow be publicly perceived and protected.

In our always evolving democracy, new problems constantly emerge. Integral to the American social order—more so, perhaps, than in any other nation—have been the establishment and unparalleled development of colleges and universities. Their increasing governmental relationships are an instance of inevitable logic, it would seem. They pose the problem of sound adjustment, to which the resources of institutional diversity are one safeguarding answer. Beyond these are the ancient integrity of the academic tradition in the whole Western world, and the genius of our democracy to make wise and needful adaptations.

J. L. Morrill, LL.D., L.H.D., Minneapolis, Minnesota, has been president of the University of Minnesota since 1945. He serves currently as chairman of the American Council on Education Committee on Relationships of Higher Education to the Federal Government and president of the Association of American Universities. Before going to Minnesota he was president of the University of Wyoming (1942–45) and vice-president of the Ohio State University (1932–41). He has also served as president of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities (1947–48), chairman of the American Council on Education (1950–51), and chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange (1951–54).

Campus Issues and Problems

By Harry J. Carman

THE issues and problems confronting every institution of higher learning are numerous and vexing—more so on some campuses than on others. Within the limits of this brief article it is quite impossible to do justice even to the more important of those issues which have not been treated elsewhere in this volume, much less to all of them. Consequently, we shall confine ourselves to those which are of major concern to every person interested in higher education. These are institutional objectives; admission of students; faculty recruitment, tenure, teaching load, opportunity for intellectual and spiritual growth, standards and values; library facilities; housing; counseling; student government and student participation in academic policy.

Institutional Objectives

In his celebrated "House Divided Against Itself" speech of 1858 Lincoln said: "If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it." This famous epigram admirably summarizes the matter of educational goals or objectives. Too many of our institutions of learning flounder along like a rudderless ship without a sense of direction or ultimate goal. If the teacher is to be effective he needs to have clear objectives and to relate these to the objectives of the institution in which he teaches. This is possible, however, only if the institution has itself clarified its corporate objectives, its basic philosophy of education, and its conception of the proper role of its several departments and courses. A visit to many colleges in which teaching is inferior convinces one that no single factor has contributed more to this failure than a general aimlessness of purpose on the entire campus. One searches in vain for some relation between the purpose of this or that specific course and the stated functions of the college. Sometimes the college has failed entirely to attempt to formulate its objectives; often the printed formula is trite and unilluminating. In these colleges a teacher could hardly be blamed for not relating his own courses helpfully to the over-all college program. A statement of goals or purpose can help the college to give a maximum account of itself. Often even a statement of partial or intermediate objectives is helpful. And because we live in a world that is changing so rapidly it is especially important that objectives be reconsidered from time to time. Administrative machinery—it need not be complex—should be established whereby new members of the staff may become familiar with the objectives of the college. Members of department staffs should be encouraged to remember that they are part of the college and that their courses and instruction should conform with the objectives of the institution. Were this done, courses which do not so contribute could and should be eliminated.

It is important, too, that the students have knowledge of the objectives of the college, of its several departments, and of individual courses. The student selecting a college or professional school would be well advised to ascertain the objective of the institution. He should want to know about its program and whether it affords him opportunity to

obtain a balanced, well-rounded education. The extent to which there is student-faculty-administrative co-operation should be of prime concern to him. In this connection he should be strongly attracted to the institution where student opinion and suggestions about the curriculum and other activities of the institution affect the educational atmosphere and reputation of the place. He should be interested in knowing whether a spirit of teamwork or authoritarianism prevails. He should try to ascertain whether he will have the opportunity and responsibility for a goodly share of his own education, a responsibility which will contribute to his intellectual maturity, personal enrichment, and social usefulness. Lastly, he should want to know whether the institution is concerned with the problems of moral and ethical values.

Increasing Competition for Admission

Not only should the student be interested in selecting his college or professional school but in these days of ever increasing college population our institutions of higher learning should be no less concerned about whom they admit. With the swelling number of those seeking admission it seems evident that no one should be admitted who is not qualified in terms of character and competence. Because of keen student competition for admission our colleges and professional schools will increasingly cease to admit marginal students or at least those who are bad risks. Increasingly, too, they will weed out the loafers and playboys whose places can easily be filled by those who will make better use of the educational opportunity. In other words, requirements for admission will be more exacting and, once admitted, standards of performance will be higher. Only in those institutions to which for financial or other reasons more students are admitted than they have staff or physical facilities to accommodate are standards of performance likely to be jeopardized.

In the future as at present, the majority of our colleges, in all probability, will seek a student body national and even international in character. Experience has already demonstrated that where a student body is drawn from a variety of economic, social, religious, and racial groups, thus representing a wide range of personalities, interests, and achievements, a much healthier educational climate prevails. Students with a diversity of background contribute much more to their own education than those who come from a more restricted area where this diversity is lacking.

It seems likely, too, that the requirements for admission will be further broadened in the years ahead. Increasingly many colleges are convinced that scholastic records, however satisfactory, do not cover all the qualifications which a candidate for admission should possess. Substantial weight is, therefore, being given to such personal qualities as willingness to work, social adaptability, community spirit, honesty, breadth of interests, and promise of social usefulness. Increasingly, the common denominator for all who are admitted is likely to be good character, demonstrated scholastic ability, and an inclination to make effective use of the opportunities which the institution offers.

Faculty

No institution of learning is any better than its instructional staff.[1] The quality of education which it makes available to its students depends in large measure upon the character and

[1] For a more extended treatment of this topic see Aura Edward Severinghaus, Harry J. Carman, and William E. Cadbury, Jr., *Preparation for Medicine in the Liberal Arts College* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1953), Chap. IX.

competence, the vision and conviction of its faculty. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that the institution attract, hold, and develop as many able and devoted teachers as possible. We realize that all the teachers in the land—and especially at a time when there is a teacher shortage—cannot be equally able. The firmament is not filled with first magnitude stars. We are sure, however, that many more young men and women with a capacity for first-rate teaching who are now going into other professions or vocations might be attracted into teaching. And we are also convinced that far more can and should be done than is being done at present by college administrations to select their faculties wisely and to promote their maximum growth and effectiveness as teachers.

The problem of teacher recruitment and replacement is becoming more acute with each passing year. College enrollments, as already noted, are increasing. The other professions are offering higher education more and more competition for the services of our ablest citizens. Teachers are continually being lured away from the college campus and potentially first-rate teachers from their proper calling. In addition, normal vacancies must be filled every year and we need to replace inferior with superior teachers. In short, we need far more college teachers of outstanding ability than we now have. How can these teachers be found?

Faculty recruitment

First of all, a nationwide effort must be made to present the challenges and rewards of teaching more persuasively to the young men and women of each college generation when they are deciding upon their life work. The Woodrow Wilson Fellowships for one year of graduate study, conceived of as a sampling experience without initial vocational commitment, are a fine step in this direction. This program, initiated by Princeton University and now administered by the Association of American Universities, has already sent many of our ablest college graduates to graduate school and some of them are now happily embarked upon a career of teaching. The proposals of Dean Frank R. Kille of Carleton College to bring home to our thoughtful and able college seniors the joys of teaching and scholarship and the tremendous potential contributions of higher education to our larger democratic cause merit enthusiastic support.

Meanwhile, all the colleges, the best as well as the poorest, can select their teachers much more wisely. It would be interesting to know how many liberal arts teachers in this country acquired a teaching post entirely on the basis of correspondence, the president, dean, or departmental head relying wholly upon the recommendation of the major professor, who in turn has never seen the candidate teach and has no real proof that he will be a successful teacher. Reliance is placed on the usual criteria: Does the candidate have a Ph.D. degree? From what institution was the degree obtained? How much has the candidate published? What is his reputation among scholars in his field? These are important considerations but they are not enough. Such procedure is, at best, fraught with risks. How can a college administrator ascertain with any exactness on the basis of an exchange of letters such important qualifications as intelligence, personality, temperament; ideology, outlook, and the like? With few exceptions our graduate schools have proceeded on the assumption that knowledge of the subject and ability to do research in a chosen field of interest are sufficient. As a rule those who are recommended for college teaching are recommended on the basis of scholarship only. Often those who write the recommendations have never seen the candidate teach and have no proof that he will be a successful teacher.

How much more sensible for the president, dean, or departmental head to visit the candidate's institution and to talk with him and his associates. Even better, the candidate could be invited to visit the campus of the institution which has him under consideration. He might even be invited to give a lecture or attend a seminar or a conference. By recourse to devices such as these opportunity would be afforded for "sizing up" the candidate for the post which the institution wishes to fill. Fortunately, there is growing evidence that our colleges are endeavoring to mend their ways in this matter of selection.

No less important, our institutions of higher learning should realize that they can also create on their campuses working conditions and an atmosphere more conducive to the intellectual growth and pedagogical efficiency of their faculties. They can do so, however, only if they have (1) a clear understanding of the qualities which make a fine teacher; (2) a well-defined educational goal; (3) a willingness to assess their present faculties with imagination and candor; and (4) a determination to take whatever steps may be feasible to remedy defects and make advances. Let us look briefly at these four prerequisites for the improvement of college teaching.

Qualities of the able teacher

What are the characteristics of an able teacher? He must have, first of all, mastery of his subject matter, a sincere belief in its importance, and a strong desire to extend the frontiers of present knowledge through study and research. The three-year postgraduate discipline leading to the Ph.D. degree is today the normal and most effective way of laying a foundation for that scholarly inquiry which, if the teacher is to grow intellectually and not stagnate, must continue throughout his teaching career. Such unflagging scholarship, if it is focused upon important problems in his field, need not make him a less effective teacher. On the contrary, he will have something worth saying in the classroom year after year only if he continues to nourish himself intellectually and spiritually in significant study and research. Herein lies one of the weaknesses of many college teachers. Taking the point of view that they are "teachers and not researchers," they fail to add to their intellectual stature by additional study, research, and meditation.

Such scholarship and such teaching involve the power to apprehend significance, to go beyond mere facts to interpretations and conclusions of real human import. The able teacher is a person of intellectual and spiritual stature who has studied with imaginative comprehension the basic elements of our own culture in the context, so far as possible, of other cultures. He is a person who in his own thinking and judging exemplifies emotional maturity and the ability to face man's perennial problems with integrity, wisdom, and fortitude.

An able teacher is also a skilled craftsman in the art of teaching. He knows how to impart his own insights to others, how to fire them with his own enthusiasm, and, above all, how to help his students to do their own thinking, to make up their own minds on controversial issues, and to participate in their own education.

Such pedagogical skill, in turn, will be put to good account only by one who is profoundly interested in his students. It must be the teacher's dominant concern to know his students and to open up new vistas to them and to help them to develop the capacity to use their

factual knowledge and their isolated evaluations in the growth of wisdom. He must be eager to help them to formulate for themselves a valid and workable philosophy of life. He must be anxious to strengthen their faith in themselves and in the possibility of a world of diminishing fear and increasing hope. He must be able to see his own subject so steadily in the context of reality, truth, and human values that he will never forget its significance for them as unique persons and for all human beings everywhere.

The ideal teacher will have an attractive personality, a happy disposition, a sense of humor, high moral integrity, and spiritual humility. He will be the kind of person whom his students will regard with affection and respect as "a grand human being," well qualified to be their guide, philosopher, and friend. His intellectual attainments—his insight, his sensitivity, and his perspective—will direct and motivate his decisions and actions and will thus reflect a total personality of cultural and spiritual depth.

The able teacher will have an understanding of the psychology of adolescence and youth. At the college level his students are in the late adolescent or postadolescent period of life when many of them are striving for complete social, intellectual, and emotional emancipation. He will understand that there are variations in the rates of growth and attainment of maturity, and that these variations are influenced by psychological, social, economic, and geographic factors. He will know something of the tumult of adolescent emotional experience so that he can deal with his students warmly and yet with objective understanding.

The alert teacher will also feel a sense of responsibility to the institution with which he is associated. He will know its history and its educational objectives. By "knowing" we mean something more than reading the formal statement of aims which usually appears in catalogues and other college bulletins. In the better colleges educational aims do not emanate *ex cathedra* from the office of the president or the dean; they are developed gradually and co-operatively by the entire college community. Administrative officials can and sometimes do play an important role in such matters, but in a healthy academic community common objectives are formulated primarily by those who teach and those who are taught. Such institutional objectives are often more clearly revealed by the actual practices of the faculty than by official statements written for publication, helpful as the latter may be. Corporate objectives are best clarified when faculty and students have a voice in discussions of over-all policy, of new programs, and of new experiments in teaching, and in checking upon student progress. Teacher and students thus become conscious of what the educational objectives are and should be.

The teacher in the community

Finally, the able teacher is community-minded. He participates in campus and community life, and the wise administrator encourages him to do so, allowing him time for this purpose as well as for his family. The essentials of democratic living, as the late President Day of Cornell University pointed out shortly before his death, find expression in a variety of ways. Participation by all citizens is an essential of enduring democratic government. Especially is this true of the local community, where problems assume more concrete form and possible solutions are more readily understandable. Even in the larger community of city, nation, and world, the college teacher can in numerous ways help formulate and execute policies and programs which are of far-reaching consequence.

Earmarks of failure

Many teachers approach very closely the ideal just outlined, but there is a distressingly large number of second- and third-raters even among the young and supposedly vigorous members of the instructional staff of many colleges. There is not only variation in teaching performance as a whole but also variation within a single institution and frequently within a single department. Sometimes the gap between educational intent and actual achievement is wide and discouraging. Here we can do little more than list the more important causes for the widespread failure in college teaching today.

1. Preoccupation with research at the expense of teaching. In many colleges faculty members give the impression that teaching is and should be of secondary interest. Some look upon teaching as a means of financing research. They draw their salaries for teaching but devote no more time to it than is absolutely necessary. Many colleges emphasize research almost exclusively in granting tenure and in making advances in rank and salary and are largely indifferent to miserable teaching. Undergraduates, especially in colleges which are parts of large universities, are often neglected.

2. Sheer pedagogical incompetence. This means human wastage that should never take place in any classroom of any educational institution, much less in a college. Visiting college classrooms one frequently witnesses neutral, humdrum, pedestrian, and uninspired teaching. Many teachers seem to be almost incapable of dedicated commitment to the search for truth, of human fellowship, of sensitivity to and concern for the creation of a more perfect society. Some boast of their scholarship but fail to see that it is not in scholarship but *through* scholarship that the minds and souls of youth are served.

3. Exhibitionism and timidity. Mental dexterity and wit may entertain but they should never be thought of as substitutes for the nourishing intellectual diet which the student needs. Dull teaching bores the student; exhibitionism ultimately disgusts him.

The teacher without conviction and without courage to face controversial issues is also a weakling, especially if he hides behind the cloak of being "objective." College students need to learn how to wrestle with social, economic, moral, and political issues. They should not be allowed to avoid important issues merely because they are controversial. The college teacher who, by his example, encourages such avoidance, severely limits his usefulness. The college campus should be a training ground for young men and women who are learning how to use controversy for enlightened action. The able teacher knows that the college should be a free market for ideas—a citadel for those who are interested in the search for and dissemination of truth, most of all, on matters of great human importance. By the same token, it should never be regarded as a place for inculcating and spreading insidious propaganda.

4. Lack of self-criticism. The ablest teachers are those who are most self-critical. Every teacher should take inventory of himself from time to time. He should do so in order to discover whether he is becoming a slave to a self-satisfying though inefficient and meaningless routine; whether he is ceasing to be curious, questioning, and contemplative; whether he is living in a little devitalized world of his own; whether he is losing perspective and ceasing to grow intellectually and spiritually; whether, above all, he is doing the best possible educational job for his

students. Is he making use of all available techniques to interest and stimulate his students, to evoke their curiosity, and to encourage self-reliance on their part; or does he put his students to sleep by listless, droning lectures which do not go beyond material available in the assigned text?

5. Inadequate use of helpful facilities. Many teachers do not adequately inform themselves concerning the rich possibilities of the use of audio-visual materials as instructional aids. Moreover, too few of them are aware of the wide variety of evaluation devices which if employed wisely would improve the validity and reliability of their examinations. Many do not realize the full potentialities of the learning process.

Behind poor teaching

The causes for these failures in effective college teaching are as numerous as are the failures themselves. Some of the more obvious contributing factors may be noted. Gravely inadequate budgets make it impossible for colleges to appoint the ablest teachers and to hold them in competition with other institutions and the nonacademic world, and frequently necessitate overcrowded classrooms and the serious overburdening of the teaching staff. They also explain many inadequacies in physical facilities. The poverty of the institution may also preclude or jeopardize an enlightened policy of faculty leaves, faculty reimbursement for attendance at conferences, and faculty retirements.

Poor administrative practice is another leading cause of poor teaching: conformity to established ways, inbreeding, unwise methods of selection of faculty personnel, lack of educational goals, inadequate evaluation of teaching, failure to stimulate teachers to do a more effective task. To these serious administrative shortcomings should be added the activities of pressure groups both off and on the campus which often tend to undermine the teacher's sense of security and consequently his morale.

Tenure

Faculty morale would also be strengthened by adoption of a wise policy of tenure. Tenure provisions at present range all the way from the complete absence of any definite rules to acceptance of the tenure policy advocated by the American Association of University Professors. Some administrators continue to insist that members of the instructional staff should serve at the pleasure of the trustees. A much larger number believe that annual appointments should apply only to those below the rank of assistant professor. Most members of the teaching staff favor the early application of permanent tenure. Thus the municipally supported colleges of the City of New York have permanent tenure after three years of continuous teaching service. Many administrators oppose granting tenure on so short a period on the ground that two or three years is too short a time in which to make a wise decision as to whether a person should have tenure or not. Those who take this position advocate a period of from five to seven years before granting permanent tenure. Increasingly, our better colleges are adopting the policy that any instructor who is not to be promoted should not be retained beyond a four- or five-year period.

Aids to morale

Nothing is more conducive to good teaching than good faculty morale, and nothing will undermine college teaching more rapidly and more devastatingly than bad morale. As all teachers and college administrators know, morale is very elusive and intangible, hard to maintain and harder to repair. It is affected by many factors—by administrative leadership, by the presence or absence of corporate responsibility in the faculty, by the prevailing attitude of the alumni, and by traditional attitudes of the undergraduate body. It is, in subtle ways, a product of all these factors and, in turn, the most powerful single determinant of good or bad teaching.

Were we to single out one academic procedure more likely than anything else to improve faculty morale and to maintain it at a high level, even when salaries are low and teaching schedules are heavy, it would be a forthright policy of regular sabbatical leaves and additional fellowship grants for study, writing, and travel. It is, we believe, absolutely imperative that the able and ambitious teacher be given the opportunity every so often to refresh himself intellectually and spiritually in order to re-create himself as a person, a thinker, and a guide of youth. Summer vacations help; without them, many teachers would sink into complete exhaustion and sterility. But they never suffice as periods of refreshment and renewal. The Fund for the Advancement of Education was fully aware of this fact when it established its Faculty Fellowship program, which has been of inestimable value as a morale builder, as have also the Visiting Internships program of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

The Conference on Improving the Effectiveness of College Faculties, at its meeting in Chicago in December 1950, listed ten factors which can contribute significantly to faculty morale and to better college teaching. Here is the list: [2]

[2] Conference on Improving the Effectiveness of College Faculties. Sponsored by the American Council on Education and the United States Office of Education, Chicago, December 1950. See "Summary Reports and Suggestions."

1. An atmosphere of freedom of thought, inquiry, and expresssion conducive to creative productivity.
2. Extensive faculty participation in the planning and management of the affairs of the institution and its community.
3. An understanding of realms of responsibilities of all members of the professional family—the governing board, administration, the instructional staff, and special services personnel.
4. Generous recognition for faculty services, promoting a sense of belonging to an important group and a feeling of satisfaction for work accomplished.
5. Policies of promotion, tenure, and retirement that will reduce the fear and frustration arising from economic and social insecurity and help to maintain academic mobility.
6. Opportunities for responsible student participation in those aspects of the educational program in which students might be expected to make a definite contribution.
7. Maintenance of a free flow of information, ideas, and suggestions within the institution and between the institution and outside agencies.
8. Active promotion of studies dealing with teaching and other important issues that relate to teacher effectiveness.
9. The distribution of committee work so as to avoid overburdening any individual or interfering with effective teaching.
10. Sufficient clerical and technical service to permit individual faculty members, including preprofessional advisers, to make the most effective use of their time, energy, and professional talent.

Were the colleges of the United States to be rated on the basis of their teaching effectiveness, we would place at the top of the scale those colleges in which the conditions here listed prevail in the highest degree.

LIBRARY AND LIBRARIANS

The university or college library and its librarians are closely related to instruction, especially in these days when greater emphasis is being placed upon the responsibility of the student for his

own education. Instead of being the recipient of predigested summaries presented in the form of lectures, the student, under guidance, addresses himself to problems whose solution is to be found in the library and the laboratory. Consequently, the library facilities should be adequate in terms of space, lighting, and accessibility of materials. Instead of being a mere repository for books, the library should be organized for use rather than conservation of its contents.

Similarly, a librarian should no longer be regarded as the mere "keeper" of the books—a kind of supernumerary, an academic castoff. The librarian should be thought of as a valuable member of the instructional staff and an important part of the total educational system. Wise is the administrator who entertains the point of view that the college librarian should be broadly educated and have a place on the curriculum committee, that college librarians should no longer be "handmaidens of the learned world" but part of it. In this matter all of us would profit by reading Dr. Jesse H. Shera's admirable address delivered at the Eastern Conference of Librarians last November.[3]

Accrediting agencies and even some of our learned societies, as for example Phi Beta Kappa, have long been concerned about the number of volumes in the library. The concern should rather be, in the opinion of a growing number of educators, not with mere numbers but with titles and quality. The primary need is for a good working library. Space now cluttered with materials valuable, perhaps, to the bibliophile and the university specialist might well be given to more needed products of recent scholarship.

[3] *The Role of the College Librarian—A Reappraisal,* 40th Conference of Eastern College Librarians, Columbia University, November 27, 1954. Published by the Association of College and Reference Libraries, Chicago; Monograph No. 13.

HOUSING

The last three issues that I wish to mention briefly—housing, guidance, and student government—are interrelated.

Many college educators have long been aware that it was highly desirable for all students to live on the campus, since those who reside at home and commute a considerable distance must forgo many campus activities and experiences contributing to a rounded college life. Two factors have prevented complete realization of this ideal, namely, the economic status of the student and the lack of housing facilities of the college, both stemming from want of adequate finances. To overcome in part the drawback of nonresidence, many colleges have established student centers where it is hoped the nonresident students will enjoy certain contacts they might not otherwise have. Where new student housing is feasible there is considerable tendency to provide smaller units housing from forty to sixty rather than to build large dormitories housing sometimes hundreds of students. The smaller unit appears to be more advantageous educationally.

Any discussion of college student housing should take into account fraternities and sororities. On some campuses these organizations house a large proportion of the student body. In a broad sense their purpose is educational as well as residential and social. In organization they bring into intimate relationship the undergraduate, the alumnus, the men and women of kindred spirit from other colleges and regions. Their impact upon the life of the colleges where they exist is important and sometimes far-reaching, but there is currently considerable difference of opinion as to the character of their total contribution to their members and to the college. Consequently, the Commission on Student Personnel of the American Council on Education, established in 1952, proposes that a study be made of the characteristics and potentialities of fraternities and sororities with a view to assisting administrators, teachers, and the fraternal organizations themselves to appraise or evaluate the significance of the fraternity in higher education generally and in specific campus situations.

It should also be noted here that several colleges have addressed themselves to the problem of adequate housing for members of the faculty. Assistance in the form of loans for building or purchase and the building or acquisition of properties by the college for rental to faculty are the principal efforts that have been made by the colleges to relieve this often difficult problem.

STUDENT GUIDANCE AND COUNSELING

The impending increase in college student population not only makes the problem of housing imperative but highlights the whole problem of student guidance and counseling.

To date two schools of opinion on this question have prevailed. One school holds that student guidance and counseling are highly technical skills and, therefore, require trained specialists who have talent and competence for this work. To these specialists, this school of thought insists, should be entrusted entire responsibility for these important and exacting duties.

The second school entertains an opposite view. It believes that the guidance and counseling of students should rest with the members of the teaching faculty and that professional specialists should be kept to a minimum. Those who align themselves with this school, though admitting that all classroom teachers are not equally gifted for the discharge of these particular functions, nevertheless maintain that it is educationally unsound to compartmentalize teaching and guidance.

For the benefit of both of these schools four observations may be made:

1. All education should be student centered. Every activity should be focused on and around the student: objective, policies relating to admission, curriculum planning, guidance, instruction, housing, cocurricular activities, health, recreation, self-government, discipline, publications, financial assistance, evaluation of performance—all these and others should revolve around those being taught.

2. The main function of the school or college should be the stimulation of growth and development of the individual student—physically, intellectually, spiritually. We should help him to discover himself—his likes and dislikes, his strengths and weaknesses, his talents and aptitudes. We should broaden his perspectives, deepen his sense of aesthetic and spiritual values, and make him more aware of his responsibilities to himself and to others with whom he comes in contact, whether in home, school, neighborhood, or larger community.

3. This stimulation of growth can best be effected by the able teacher,

4. Whether a member of the teaching faculty or of a guidance personnel staff, it is of the utmost importance that the counselor have a sense of belonging to the college community and display cooperation and teamwork with everyone in the community, including students. Failure to co-operate opens the door to snobbery, high-hattedness, artificial divisiveness, and community retrogression. Fortunately, an increasing number of colleges are realizing that teamwork is imperative; and it must always be borne in mind that the primary objec-

tive is each student's understanding of himself, of his human needs both within and outside the classroom, and of his relation to the institution of which he is a part.[4]

STUDENT GOVERNMENT

Everyone agrees on the importance of student self-government. On the other hand, in many colleges student self-government is almost entirely wanting or primitive in character. Although there is wide agreement that the students should participate in the affairs of the college community, there is apparently no one best pattern of student self-government. Tradition, faculty, and student interest and attitude and environmental needs are highly determining factors. In Washington and Lee, Princeton, and other institutions where students work seriously at self-government it has functioned efficiently for many years and has come to be regarded as a traditional part of the permanent machinery of the institution. But if emphasis is placed chiefly on who gets elected to the student governing board, and the board subsequently is inactive or has trivial duties until the next election, student self-government is not well thought of by either students or faculty. There are a number of colleges in which a somewhat authoritarian atmosphere prevails either in the administration or the faculty or both, with little or no opportunity for student self-government.

Members of student self-government bodies are usually chosen directly or indirectly by vote of the student body; sometimes class officers, particularly the class presidents, are members of the student governing group. (Incidentally, in institutions which have fraternities the elections to the governing boards as well as to other posts are frequently keenly contested.) In a few colleges governing bodies are composed jointly of students, faculty, and administration. At Ohio Wesleyan, for example, where a high degree of democratic control prevails, students and faculty work together in this manner. Social discipline is shared by the students and the deans of men and women. Academic discipline is likewise handled jointly by the office of the dean and students. At Earlham College the governing body of the college community is the Senate, composed of twenty-two students, five faculty members, and the academic dean. On one occasion the president of the college appeared before this body for violation of one of the rules of the college.

The authority enjoyed by student governing boards varies greatly. In some institutions it is limited to control over minor social matters; in others it extends to all social matters; in still others, the students share authority with faculty and administration in some academic matters. In a few instances, these student self-governing groups may extend their influence even to matters of curriculum. At Columbia College the student governing board has a committee composed entirely of students, known as the "Committee on Academic Affairs." This committee concerns itself primarily with questions of curriculum changes and improvement in instruction. From time to time it is invited to report on questions of curriculum change and teaching quality to the Committee on Instruction of the College and to sit in on staff deliberations. Notable improvements in the effectiveness of the college have been initiated by this student committee. Reed and Haverford are other examples of colleges where students have a voice in educational as well as other matters. Many educators hold that faculty and administration are too paternalistic in attitude toward college students and that, with advice and guidance, responsibility commensurate with demonstrated capacity should be placed upon the students to an increased degree.

Personally, I am strongly of the opinion that inasmuch as the college should exist for the benefit of the students, the student should participate fully in shaping its policies and decisions. Such participation, after all, constitutes a part of his total education.

[4] See E. O. Williamson, *New Frontiers in Counselling College Students*. Pasadena, Calif.: Western Personnel Institute, 1955.

Harry J. Carman, Ph.D., L.H.D., LL.D., Lit.D., D.P.S., New York City, formerly dean of Columbia College and until recently Moore Professor of History at Columbia University, is presently devoting part of his time to work as a college consultant. He is a member of the Board of Higher Education of the City of New York (1938–) and of the Board of Trustees of Bard, Earlham, Morehouse, and Rollins Colleges, Atlanta University, Parsons School of Design, and the Free Europe University in Exile; until recently he was a member of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of International Education, which he still serves in an honorary capacity. He was for many years (1940–52) president of the New York Adult Education Council. Since 1943 he has been a member of the New York State Board of Mediation. He is author or coauthor of several volumes in the field of American history and of the report entitled Preparation for Medical Education in the Liberal Arts College (1953).

The Flowering Curricula of American Higher Education

By Harold W. Stoke

If one wishes an impression of the volume and variety of activities of American higher education, one can get it from an inspection of curricula more quickly than by any other means. Even a review of budgets and enrollments will not convey it so well. And if the curriculum describes most accurately what American institutions of higher education are doing, one must use the plural form, for our colleges and universities are not confined to anything which could be described as a single curriculum.

The most important, as it is the most obvious, observation to be made about the curricula of American higher education is their enormous size and complexity. The "branches of learning" would long since have become an impenetrable jungle were they not traversed by some discernible lines of organization, and if the growth had not been brought about by deliberate cultivation. Both the volume and the complexity of curricula in higher education must be explored if one is to get a sense of what the colleges and universities are doing. Perhaps college catalogues are as good a mirror as any other in which to see what has been taking place. Catalogues are much larger than they were twenty years ago, for almost nothing has been dropped out of college curricula and much has been added—new schools, new divisions, new departments, and new courses. And the increase in volume of activity has also been accompanied by an increase in complexity of organizations, requirements, and interrelationships. Catalogues of most institutions have become handbooks of reference for the expert rather than guides for the uninitiated.

The growth of curricula in American colleges and universities falls into three fairly identifiable patterns—the expansion of established fields, the development and addition of new ones, and the formation of new combinations and groupings. The process by which these patterns emerge appears to be continuous and inevitable so long as there are change and vitality in the colleges and universities and in the society which they serve. Each of these methods by which the curricula of higher education grow deserves some consideration.

Expansion of Established Fields

The expansion of curricula by the growth of established fields may be illustrated as well by biology as by any other. The parent fields of botany and zoology, which dominated biological curricula a generation ago, have subdivided into something more than fifty divisions which lay claim to identifiable places in the curricula of the colleges of arts and sciences, medicine, agriculture, and pharmacy. Only the broad classification "life sciences" could possibly comprehend them all, and with recent developments in scientific analysis, which blur the distinctions between organic and inorganic matter, even this characterization has begun to lose its usefulness. Here are a few of the emergent biological interests which have demanded and obtained separate recognition in organized curricula: bacteriology, biochemistry, biophysics, cytology, embryology, entomology, genetics, immunology, microbiology, parasitology, plant

physiology, radiology, toxicology; the host of others covers the range of the alphabet. Some of these subdivisions originate in techniques rather than in content but they nevertheless now present separable aspects of biological study. Nor do these subjects merely represent accumulations of biological knowledge; they reflect changes in scientific interests and purpose, shifts in the methods of study, and changes in the uses to which biological knowledge is put. The early preoccupation of botany and zoology with problems of taxonomy has now been overshadowed with current interests in such fields and subjects as heredity, ecology, physiology, the structure of the cell, nutrition, and resistance to disease. Until the curricula of biology are measured not only in volume but in terms of these new complexities, it is not possible to understand what has taken place in the teaching and research of this old and established field of study.

What has taken place in the development of biological curricula is reflected in virtually all other established fields. In the social studies and the humanities, knowledge has also been expanding, less perhaps from the mounting accumulation of facts and data which characterizes the natural sciences, than by the continuing necessity for replacing old ideas with new ones, for interpreting accumulated data, and for giving attention to new interests, values, and problems. Ideas, events, and discoveries alter the content of curricula. For example, war exerts a powerful influence upon the study of every field of knowledge, but its effects upon history, the social studies, and the humanities are particularly immediate and profound. War can bring about the rise of the study of one language and literature and the decline of another; history may get itself rewritten; new war-forced problems of organization compel the attention of economics, political science, and sociology. The two wars which American education has endured within a generation have left profound effects upon the curricula.

War is only one of the compelling forces constantly shaping curricula. Every aspect of a changing society—depression, prosperity, propaganda, education, invention, population growth, religion—has its impact upon higher education and its preoccupations. The curricula of the social studies are inclined to take their color from the passing scene, to reflect the current interest and preoccupations of society. This is particularly true in sociology, economics, and political science, but even the student of history is more and more tempted to measure the importance of his subject by its illumination of the present. As the current scene changes, the curricula of the social studies in particular and even of the humanities will tend to reflect it. The tendency may be illustrated in sociology. Here a score of specializations have grown up —social statistics, the study of group behavior, the family, population problems, race relations, rural sociology, urban sociology, public opinion, communications, penology, and social psychology. Even these do not exhaust the broad areas in which the sociologist may concentrate. And as each of these fields expands it makes its demands upon others for skills and training in such fields as statistics and other techniques of investigation, psychology, anthropology, and education, thus setting in motion other pressures toward curriculum expansion.

New Fields

In addition to the proliferation of established fields, the curricula of higher education have grown by the addition of entirely new fields which have never be-

fore existed. These come about through such forces as discovery and invention, political change, the demands of emerging occupations, and changing ideas. A major scientific "breakthrough," for example, can not only affect the instruction of many different established fields; it can introduce entirely new dimensions into curricula. The development of nuclear physics is a case in point. Almost every field of science has been directly affected by developments in atomic energy; almost every other area has had to take it into account. Quite naturally there have followed new courses of study, not only in physics, but in biology, medicine, chemistry, and engineering, courses which are leading to the invention of new and separate degrees such as those in atomic engineering and radiobiology.

Other inventions and discoveries, new occupations and activities, exert similar, if not equal, influences on curricula. Aviation and television inevitably make their educational demands. Consider the names of recognized professions and occupations which today must be accommodated in curricula of higher education but which were scarcely known to our vocabulary twenty-five years ago: radio announcers, television engineers, social workers, psychiatrists, automation engineers, social science analysts, and scores of others. As the list grows, the pressure for curricula to supply the raw materials of their education will likewise grow.

NEW COMBINATIONS

Finally, curricula in higher education grow by a process of combination, which finds established fields regrouped to serve purposes or ends which cannot be served by any single one of them alone. History, literature, political science, economics, and others, for example, may be combined as the study of American civilization. In such a case knowledge from older fields is organized from a fresh point of view, but for all practical purposes something new has been added. This is the origin of such area studies as Latin-American studies, Near Eastern or Oriental studies, and a variety of others. New focal points may give rise to the establishment of such organizations as institutes of labor studies, institutes on population trends, wherever a point of interest emerges which is sufficiently strong to justify a new and useful combination of studies. New schools may make possible new combinations of studies as schools of social work have brought together such diverse interests as sociology, psychiatry, and child psychology. It is quite likely that the "special interest" form of additions to curricula will become increasingly numerous and useful.

INCREASING COMPLEXITY

Enough has been said to indicate the nature of the growth of curricula in higher education in volume, but its development in complexity needs some further elaboration. Here again biology is a good illustration. Where once biology was a descriptive science devoted to the observation of nature, largely as it appeared to the naked eye, its study has now undergone an almost complete transformation. This has happened through developing, borrowing, and applying tools of analysis which in many respects it possesses in common with chemistry, physics, and mathematics. "Method" has become for the scientist a field of study apart from "content," equipping him with a kit of techniques which enable him to move more easily from one field to another but which also impose upon him new and heavy requirements of study before he can be really successful in any. The well-trained biologist today must have more than a smattering of chemistry; he must know something of physics and mathematics. He must know the analysis of organic matter, he must have some knowledge of complicated photographic and microscopic processes, and statistical operations must be no mystery. Hence, to curricula in biology, much is essential which must be borrowed from other subjects.

This increasing complexity is by no means limited to the sciences; it is true of almost every field. Art, for example, has been affected by studies as diverse as psychology and optics. Speech has incorporated both physiology and physics into its subject matter. Statistics has imposed itself as virtually a requirement in every social study; and psychology, while borrowing more from neighbors than perhaps any other field, has returned its borrowings just as generously. Anyone who wishes to understand what has been happening to curricula in higher education must understand that they have grown not merely in size; they have been transformed in content.

GROWTH OF RESEARCH

While the growth of curricula in higher education is an awesome phenomenon and might profitably be reported in detail, it is less the immediate purpose here to describe it than to understand and to interpret it. What accounts for the exuberance of such growth and what are some of its educational effects?

It has been pointed out that curricula grow primarily by the expansion of knowledge and by the necessity to make our knowledge serve new purposes. A number of factors of varying significance contribute to this process. One of the most important of these is the growth of research as a preoccupation of higher education. Of course the teacher or scholar has always regarded it his responsibility to add to the sum total of knowledge, but never before has there been anything like the devotion of time, energy, and money which is now being given to research. Research activities in our colleges and universities have reached almost feverish proportions, with marked effect upon curricula development. To be a "productive" scholar has become an essential part of the academic pattern of success, and one of the most efficient ways of accomplishing this is to make teaching and research coincide as nearly as possible. Consequently a faculty preoccupied with research tends to add courses and seminars to curricula which represent research interests perhaps more than they represent instructional necessities. Graduate students are frequently encouraged to share with the faculty in co-operative research as early as their training will allow, and the curricula grow by the addition of these highly specialized activities.

To the normal interests of the faculties in research, there has been added recently the terrific pressure of research to be done under contract or grants for the federal government or for industry. Such research has proved exciting, sometimes because of its intrinsic nature, sometimes because of the financial assistance it has provided either to faculty members directly or to institutions. The sheer volume of research activity, together with the development of a broader range of subject matter now regarded as proper for investigation, has had great effects upon the development of curricula.

PASSION FOR TEACHING

A second factor contributing to curricula growth is the passion of American higher education for teaching. While there is always some grumbling about heavy teaching loads, the fact remains that the average college teacher

looks upon "working up" a new course as an intellectual challenge. It is almost as if our colleges held the view that whatever is known must be taught and that any omission from the curriculum is consequently a dereliction of duty. When this point of view of faculties and of institutions is coupled with the conditioning of students by the time they reach college that nothing can be learned except in a course, the result is a powerful stimulant to the addition of new courses.

PREPARATORY SCHOOLING

Another factor which has added to the size of curricula is the accommodation which higher education has been compelled to make to the changing pattern of college preparation. The high schools have become far more than college preparatory schools (there are those who charge that they have, in fact, ceased to be such), and this has forced upon the colleges and universities the necessity for providing a larger amount of beginning work, especially in mathematics, sciences, and languages. Students now entering college bring with them a greater variety of preparation in quantity and quality than ever before and to accommodate this variety of preparation higher education has been compelled to develop not only more elementary work but more advanced courses which recognize diversity of backgrounds. Chemistry, for example, must provide beginning courses for those who have not had chemistry in high school as well as for those who have, and the number and shape of advanced courses are also likely to be affected by that fact.

COMPETITION

Another pressure for the expansion of curricula is institutional competition. "Keeping up with the Joneses," educationally speaking, is by no means wholly bad. In fact, it may be quite the contrary, but it does have the effect of adding new segments to curricula. The competition for the best students and staff, in which all institutions are engaged, can frequently turn on the opportunities offered for the expression of individual interests—a wide variety of studies for the student, of fields of instruction and research for the faculty member. Hence, every institution attempts to provide, within the means at its disposal, as great a number of such opportunities as possible. The establishment of an "institute" by one institution is promptly followed by the establishment of similar institutes by others. Even the addition of a piece of specialized equipment, an electron microscope or a synchrotron, or the acquisition of a specialized library may lead to new courses, seminars, or research enterprises. Institutional prestige and esteem are, in part, established by such evidences of vigor and originality revealed in new enterprises and curricula, and there are few institutions which do not find it wise to try to keep up with the parade.

OUTSIDE PRESSURES

Finally, there is a whole set of pressures originating outside the campus which tend to widen the curricula of higher education. Among these are the growth of adult education, advanced training for specialized professional groups, services to the armed forces, both in research and training, and services to industry. All of these have been impressive developments of the past few years. Indeed, they have added new dimensions to the whole of higher education. The passion for "upgrading" in teaching and in government service has attached itself largely to the colleges and universities, while the professional schools of medicine, business, law, and engineering have been called upon to devise ways—short courses, institutes, conferences—which would make available to the practicing professions the latest in educational developments.

"EDUCATION" FOR THE UNDERGRADUATE

One cannot possibly explore in brief compass all of the ramifications of the tremendous expansion of curricula in the colleges and universities, but there are some questions resulting from the expansion which are insistent. One of these is the question as to how from all this welter of proffered knowledge the undergraduate is to get an "education." This question, of course, assumes that there is something "central" to a college education and that the colleges and the students should undertake to find it. With the expansion of curricula, with the limitations of time facing the student, with the increasing specialization in all fields and the resulting fractionation of courses, the identification of something "central" in an education is becoming increasingly difficult. There is a growing skepticism as to the view that everything in the curriculum is born free and equal in educational value for students or faculty and a growing conviction that it is time a new conception of educational management should be developed as an offset to the sovereignty of the "free elective" system. The general education movement has its origin in this problem.

INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES

A second consequence of the continuous expansion of curricula is the tax which it places upon the resources of an institution in money and in personnel. The quality of the educational result is likely to suffer by the very effort to do too much, and the attempt to include all manner of activities in the curricula of higher education is to blunt the sense of discrimination as to what has prior claims upon its resources. There appears to be a strong tendency to regard all activities carried on in the name of higher education as equal in their claims for attention, merely because they are all associated in the same institution. The overexpansion of curricula can result in the inclusion of the trivial with the important, and can also create the danger that there will be no distinction made between them. The overtaxing of the staff and finances of higher education by undertaking too many new things or things which might better not be undertaken at all can reduce educational effectiveness in everything.

IMPROBABILITY OF CONTROL

If one assumes that the growth of curricula should be controlled and directed, the question naturally arises as to whether it can be. Possibilities for control will arise from two major sources. The first of these is a philosophy of education and the second, the institutional resources of money and personnel. However, the current philosophy of American higher education will place few restraints upon the expansion of curricula, and there is little to be expected from this source. Our institutions of higher education are governed by a spirit of service which extends to almost every type of activity in which educational institutions can be useful. Indeed, the very variety of these activities threatens to transform colleges and universities from educational institutions, in the traditional sense of the phrase, into general public-service institutions. Our prevailing educational philosophy actually encourages rather than represses curricula expansion.

If limitations are to be made, they will then arise chiefly from limitations of budget and personnel, but even these are only temporarily effective. It is true that most institutions are constantly faced with limits of money and

staff, but when this is the case, such being the philosophy of service which characterizes American higher education, it becomes the duty of administrators in charge to secure the resources of money and staff in order to provide the "services" which the institution, presumably, should perform. To ask American colleges and universities to limit their curricula is to ask them to govern themselves by a different philosophy from that which prevails, and virtually to become institutions different in character from what they now are. So long as American colleges and universities serve the variety of purposes they now serve, they will continue eagerly to add to their ever growing curricula.

Harold W. Stoke, Ph.D., Seattle, Washington, is dean of the Graduate School of the University of Washington. He has served as professor of political science at the Universities of Nebraska and Wisconsin and was, for brief periods, engaged in government service in the Tennessee Valley Authority and in the Bureau of the Budget. He served as president of the University of New Hampshire from 1944 to 1947 and as president of Louisiana State University from 1947 to 1951. He is the author of a number of books and articles in political science and has contributed to numerous educational publications.

Dr. Stoke will become dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of New York University in the autumn of 1955.

The Accreditation Problem

By FRED O. PINKHAM

IN its simplest mechanical form, accrediting[1] is the process of setting standards for educational institutions, judging the institutions in light of those standards, and publishing a list of the institutions and programs which are judged to comply satisfactorily with the criteria.

Accrediting serves many masters, and its nature varies a little with the motives of the members of the group employing it. There are voluntary collegiate organizations, such as the six Regional Accrediting Associations, that are made up of virtually all nonprofit institutions in their respective areas. There are organizations of specialized schools, such as the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business. There are organizations of specialists in some form of institutional management, such as Collegiate Registrars and Extension Directors. There are organizations of professional practitioners, such as the American Bar Association. There are combined councils and committees of educators and practitioners, as in the Engineers' Council for Professional Development, and there are dozens of quasi but none the less real accrediting bodies, such as the American Association of University Women, the magazine *Good Housekeeping*, honor societies, and church councils. In all, over one hundred agencies participate in some form of accreditation of colleges and universities. For some agencies, accrediting is the sole function. A few conduct accrediting as but one function among many organizational activities, while other groups merge accrediting with other services to such a degree that it is impossible to discover where accrediting ends and other services begin.

[1] There is no outstanding single reference in this field. Most of the significant records are in the form of minutes or verbatim records of meetings. The best library and reference source on the subject is located in the National Commission on Accrediting, George Washington University, Washington 6, D. C.

BEGINNINGS OF ACCREDITING

At the close of the nineteenth century, higher education in America was still an opportunity limited to the few, but its value as a steppingstone to bigger and better things was widely recognized. Since there were virtually no controls over higher institutions from "outside" forces, quality and content differed widely from college to college. The federal government, philanthropy, foreign countries, professional organizations, and the institutions themselves soon, and all about the same time, felt the need to identify the better colleges and universities.

As early as 1870 the United States Bureau of Education published a list of all colleges and universities authorized by the states to grant degrees. Thirty-five years later the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, which has since sponsored research leading to the establishment of several accrediting programs, issued a list of educational institutions which had met certain quantitative criteria. As American students flocked to European universities, requests came to America for a "guide" to colleges and universities in this country which would enable foreign institutions to assess the educational records presented to them by visiting students.

As knowledge became more organized and specialized, and as the services of

the professions were more and more recognized and demanded, the need for supervision of practice and control of training increased immensely. Quack practitioners and fraudulent or low-standard schools were "fleecing" the public and misguiding well-meaning students. In the interest of public safety, and for the protection of honest practitioners, the professions, led by the American Medical Association, began "to clean house." Accrediting was their most effective tool.

As the American population became more mobile, it became increasingly important for students to be able to transfer from one institution to another. Colleges and universities which were banding into national and regional organizations for the purposes of mutual aid and protection were given further impetus to accredit by the difficulties inherent in exchange of students between institutions. For these associations of institutions, membership meant accreditation.

Thus accrediting came into the American scene as a natural development out of the needs of the times. It is important to note three significant factors about the birth of accrediting: (1) It was established voluntarily, not by government order; (2) the same process was begun from two sources simultaneously—by professions from without and by institutions from within higher education; and (3) accrediting by both types of organizations was the outgrowth of genuine and sincere efforts to answer serious problems of the times.

BENEFITS FROM ACCREDITING

The benefits to be derived from accrediting vary with the type of agency. Professional organizations speak more of professional benefits to graduates. Associations of institutions speak more of institutional improvements. The key benefits cited by accrediting agencies are:

1. Assurance and recognition that the institution meets or exceeds minimum standards, thus facilitating exchange of students, selection of institutions, and prediction of capabilities of graduates.
2. Institutional self-evaluation; exchange of ideas and information and other items of mutual concern.
3. Direct assistance to the institution by experts from the national office of the accrediting agency.
4. Privileges to graduates in the profession.

EDUCATORS' OBJECTIONS

That accrediting was effective cannot be denied. The history of the medical profession in America stands as undisputable proof. However, from the start, educators whose institutions were undergoing accreditation saw the undesirable by-products of the system. A simple process became a scheme by which a national organization, in the name of protecting and serving the public, restricted its membership and limited its recognition to institutions complying with prescribed standards. On-the-spot inspections were made, and a list of the approved institutions was given national distribution. Thus a select group of institutions which maintained programs and conducted procedures outlined by the agency was identified. Institutions offering something less than or different from prescribed requirements or otherwise judged unqualified were labeled inferior by implication, and the public was encouraged to avoid them and their graduates. Effective penalties—pressures which prevented graduates from receiving such benefits as license to practice, employment, advancement, and membership in professional societies—were invoked against those institutions not "voluntarily" complying with the standards or

inviting inspection. Used in this way, accrediting became a powerful device for protecting and promoting a selected group. Further, since the standards applied were the same for all institutions, the threat of overstandardization loomed in the minds of those educators who knew how essential diversity is in American democracy.

Once the precedent for control of colleges by "outside" groups had been established, and once those groups had learned the effectiveness of accrediting in eliminating competition, and in bringing about professional unity, control, public recognition, and special privilege, accrediting became the order of the day for all major professional organizations.

Association protests

Immediately, educators raised their voices in a chorus of criticism and alarm. They spoke out against the "evil tide" of accrediting. In 1924 the National Association of State Universities set up a special committee to formalize and publicize the sentiment of its members against accrediting. The charge given the committee, as quoted from unpublished minutes of the Association, states:

> The National Association of State Universities has viewed with increasing concern the rapid increase in the number and variety of organizations which have undertaken to standardize procedures and policies in one or another branch of higher education. Not only does it feel that actions in matters vitally affecting the policies of state institutions have too often been taken by such organizations without sufficient provision for consultation with the institutions concerned, but it is further of the opinion that the movement toward standardization in higher education in America, while it has accomplished great good, is assuming such a character as seriously to limit both local initiative and that freedom of experimentation which is necessary for educational advance.

Other institutional agencies expressed their concern over the same situation, and, one by one, joined forces with the NASU. By 1949 the Association of Land-Grant Colleges, the Association of Urban Universities, the Association of American Universities, and the Association of American Colleges had formed a joint committee to control the impact of accrediting upon higher education.

Chief complaints

Chief among the educators' complaints were these: [2]

There are too many accrediting agencies. Practically every organization formed to promote a specialized interest in higher education has turned to accrediting as the basis for its operation. When asked to name the agencies which brought this process to their campuses, college presidents listed over two hundred organizations. There were as many as six agencies seeking to set standards and to accredit the same specialized segment of higher education.

Understandably, an "outside" agency is primarily concerned with only one particular segment of an institution. Typically, little concern is shown for the institution as a whole. Little attempt is made to view the segment in the perspective of the total institution. Thus, there may be found as many as a dozen groups arriving on the campus of a complex institution on a dozen different occasions, each making demands for special consideration with little regard for the objectives or stability of the institution as a whole.

Most of the professional accrediting agencies manage to back their demands with state licensing laws, grants of

[2] National Commission on Accrediting, Unpublished Report, George Washington University, Washington 6, D. C.

money, blacklisting, discriminatory hiring practices, and other inducements, including prejudicial treatment of alumni. These are the things which put teeth into accrediting, and all of them are beyond the control of the individual college. Thus it is that local autonomy and freedom to experiment and to be different, the most vital essentials in our democratic system of education, are being usurped by unseen pressures which institutions themselves are often forced to support through annual fees and dues.

In their attempts to control a certain portion of higher education, namely, that part which provides the immediate training of their potential members, organizations draw up criteria or standards which deal with curricula, staff, facilities, administration, textbooks, and so forth. These standards include matters of administration which properly should remain within the authority and responsibility of the constituted governing body of the institution. Items such as salary, hiring practices, faculty code, grading systems, and retirement plans rightly belong within the province of local faculty and staff—not within that of national special field organizations. Division of authority and responsibility tears administration apart and threatens the very existence of good institutions. Further, arbitrary application of fixed national standards to institutions serving different constituencies and purposes works against the basic tenets of the democratic ideal.

In the flood of questionnaires which precede accreditation, the same information is sought by each accrediting agency. But each agency requires its data in a different form and order. Some large universities keep a man occupied full time in collecting, arranging, and rearranging data for accrediting agencies. Much of the material which must be provided bears little demonstrable relationship to the real quality of education being provided by the faculty of an institution. There is a place for quantitative information. However, important as such details are, the real worth of an educational institution will not be found in the cubic feet of space per student, the number of picture slides, the salary of secretaries, the purity of drinking water, or fireproofing of file cabinets.

In the effort to raise standards, professional organizations frequently concentrate upon minimum standards and minimum requirements. Their time and energies are drawn to the institution which is trying to reach the minimum level. This has two unhappy consequences: (1) it tends to standardize educational programs, and (2) it fails to provide stimulation and assistance to all institutions. That is, accrediting tends to become a police function, an inspection rather than a consultation. It becomes a mechanical process of checking to see that all institutions maintain the minimum standards rather than a constructive process of helping all institutions to improve beyond their current level of achievement.

Accrediting forces institutions to adopt objectives derived nationally by national organizations. Evaluation of an institution is usually made in terms of what a specialized national agency says the college ought to do rather than in terms of what the institution itself purports to do. Institutions are gradually being shaped by national codes. Individuality, diversity, and local autonomy —the very sources of strength in higher education in America—are being lost through accrediting designed to promote national professional groups. All educators want to help the professions to improve, but higher education must not be sold out in the process.

With ever increasing specialization and standardization in the scientific world, increasing demands are made for

larger portions of curriculum time to be devoted to professional-technical training. These demands are backed through accrediting by strong national accrediting organizations. General or liberal education, quite properly, is not supported by agencies which can coerce colleges into offering specific courses and sequences. Thus, the flanks of general education are vulnerable to attack by professional studies hungry for more curriculum space. It must be said that there is a growing desire for more general education on the part of many professional people. But in trying to fix the point of balance between technical and general education, accrediting is too often used to add weight only on the technical side.

Accrediting costs too much. Although several agencies make no direct charges to institutions for their services, enough do to make the cost burdensome. The returns to the institution from accrediting do not warrant the cost involved. Moreover, legalists do not agree that state tax dollars or private donations should be used to support national agencies over which the contributing institutions have no control and in the budgeting of whose funds they often have no voice.

In spite of the objections raised by educators, these conditions persisted. Accrediting had proven too useful to be abandoned.

PARADOX AND AMBIVALENCE

Accrediting is inextricably ingrained in higher education. Its growth has been undisciplined for half a century, and it has found its way much deeper into the heart of American education than most people realize. As in other branches of society, there has been a trend in the professions toward increasing centralization of administration and control, toward systemization of license, and toward standardization of preparation. How much the nation's progress has been the cause of this centralization and standardization, how much the result, or how much has been achieved in spite of this general trend is difficult to discern. Higher education, in any case, has had its part in this trend of the times.

It is not that the professions do not understand the educator's point of view. The situation is not a simple case of the lion and the lamb. The true difficulty lies within the American custom of looking to "voluntary" agencies for advice about purchasing, and within the nature of accrediting itself. Just as Americans look for the Duncan Hines, AAA (American Automobile Association), Underwriters, Good Housekeeping, Consumers' Research, and other seals of approval, so they look for seals of approval for colleges. Just as businessmen know that such seals attract customers, so colleges and university administrators know that accreditation attracts students. Thus, educators are faced with a paradoxical and ambivalent situation.

The university president may show real concern over the inroads upon his administrative powers made by powerful professional agencies but, at the same time, point with pride to the fact that his institution is fully accredited by all appropriate professional organizations.

The college dean may express alarm over the degree to which a professional organization is imposing a standardized curriculum upon his school and, at the same time, point with pride to the backing he received from the same organization in his efforts to secure much needed financial allotments from his institution's budget committee.

The faculty member may be disturbed by minute curricular requirements imposed by a certain professional agency but, at the same time, happily

accept an increase in salary demanded of his institution's administration by the same agency.

The graduate of a nonaccredited institution becomes irate when he finds himself deprived of certain privileges given to graduates of accredited institutions if he "knows" that his training is superior to that of a fellow worker who graduated from an accredited institution.

Transfer students show despair when they find that a fully accredited institution will not accept at full value the credits earned at another institution which is also fully accredited by the same accrediting agencies.

It is possible to find evidence to support almost any claim, for or against accrediting. Although accrediting has accomplished much, it has left greater problems in its wake. Although it may mean a great deal on a national scale, for the individual student it may mean nothing. What he gets out of his college experience may be controlled by factors wholly unrelated to the accredited status of the institution he is attending.

National Commission on Accrediting

In spite of these conditions, the voices of educators were without effect until the formation of the National Commission on Accrediting.

The Commission has seven constituent associations in its membership. These are the Association of American Colleges, Association of American Universities, Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, Association of Urban Universities, National Association of State Universities, Association of Teacher Education Institutions, and American Association of Junior Colleges. The six Regional Associations are not members of the Commission. No accrediting body is a member of the Commission, and membership in the Commission has no direct bearing upon the accredited status of an institution.

Each of these seven constituent associations has elected six members to sit on the executive body of the Commission. Each association replaces two of its six representatives each year as part of a rotating membership plan.

To broaden the base for study and service and to provide a means for financial support, institutional membership in the Commission is extended to institutions holding membership in any one of the constituent associations. There are now approximately one thousand institutional members in the Commission, making it the largest organization representing institutions of higher education in the country.

The National Commission on Accrediting should not be confused with the National Committee of Regional Accrediting Associations. The latter group came into being prior to the Commission as a result of earlier studies of accrediting problems by the American Council on Education. The NCRAA is a committee composed of two representatives from each Regional Association. There are no other national committees or associations of the Commission's type representing institutions of higher education for the purpose of solving accrediting problems.

The Commission's declaration

The preamble of the constitution of the Commission is an important declaration in higher education. It states that the strength of higher education in America derives in large part from the unique and diversified contributions of individual colleges and universities. It claims that this strength can be maintained and extended only if institutions are free to set their own objectives and to experiment in the ways and means of education. It holds that institutions of higher learning must be free to exercise both responsibility and authority in administering their programs. Believing these things, and seeing them threatened by accrediting as it now operates, the colleges created the Commission and gave it the mandate to study the accrediting situation and to devise a plan which will preserve and strengthen what good there may be in accrediting while eliminating the evil or destructive features.

The Commission met with all of the important accrediting agencies and conducted many studies in the field. It soon became clear to all who saw the record that some form of control and co-ordination was needed if accrediting was going to help rather than hinder higher education.

Statement of principles

Following a careful study of all facets of the situation, the Commission issued the following statement of principles: [3]

1. Historically, accrediting has contributed much good to higher education and, properly handled, it can and should continue to be a constructive force for improvement in higher education.

2. If accrediting is to be of most worth, it must be made to serve and strengthen the best interests of all higher education. No one program within an institution should be promoted at the expense of institutional stability and in spite of institutional objectives. No one educational field should be promoted nationally through accrediting at the expense of other equally legitimate educational programs.

3. Colleges and universities should be the responsible and supervising authority for evaluation of higher educational institutions.

4. Channels through which the counsel and suggestions of the professions and employers of graduates can continually reach the institutions should be maintained.

5. Accreditation costs and the number of visitations should be reduced. For accrediting purposes, not more than one organization should represent a field of training.

6. Improvement of higher education in all its parts is best achieved when based upon thorough self-evaluation prior to examination by outside specialists.

7. Institution-wide aims and responsibilities should be given primary concern, and evaluations should be concerned with the institution as a whole as well as with its various segments.

8. Evaluation of an institution should be based upon the aims and objectives of the institution and should emphasize qualitative as well as quantitative features.

9. Accrediting should not be limited to an inspection of a segment of an institution with a view to imposing upon and measuring that segment in terms of national, arbitrarily applied standards. Accrediting should be, rather, an educational enterprise, the major aim of which is to stimulate institutional growth and development through self-evaluation and expert assistance primarily conditioned by what the institution is trying to do.

[3] National Commission on Accrediting, Mimeographed Report, 1953. George Washington University, Washington 6, D. C.

The Commission's plan

The Commission's plan is primarily a scheme for bringing together the various parties concerned in order that policies and procedures can be developed in the best interests of all. Recognizing the need for administrative control, but not wanting centralization under a federal agency, the Commission turned to the six voluntary Regional Accrediting Associations. Although the Regionals were known to be relatively "weak" compared to the tightly controlled professional agencies, and although they varied greatly in their readiness to handle an expanded role in accrediting, the Commission believed they offered more potential in administrative organization and philosophy than any other available group. Through the National Commit-

tee of Regional Accrediting Associations, the Commission asked the Regionals if they would be willing to accept the responsibility for supervising all accrediting in their respective areas. The responsibility was accepted and a set of guiding principles drawn up.

The national professional organizations, representing the various fields in which institutions of higher learning maintain educational programs, have been asked to join with the Regional Associations in developing standards and criteria, in eliminating duplication, and in evaluating institutions. Under this plan, each institution is to be evaluated as a whole institution, but each part is to receive the benefits of traditional "segmental" evaluation (experts in legal education evaluate the law school, experts in medical education assess the medical program, et cetera). That is, the evaluators, representing the various professional agencies concerned, act as a team studying each part in its relation to other parts and in the perspective of the whole institution. Under the direction of the Regional Association, duplication of effort in evaluation is removed and institution-wide policies, procedures, and objectives are given proper concern. Professional agencies issue their own lists and the Regional Associations publish their lists of institutions approved on an institution-wide basis.

Recent Changes

During the last three years certain changes have taken place, primarily as a result of the Commission's work.

Attention has been called to the chaotic accrediting situation, and people are now alert to it and are thinking about it. Practically every educational and professional organization is putting forth effort to understand the problem and to do what it can to help. At the suggestion of the Commission, a faculty committee to receive, study, and advise on accrediting problems has been set up in nearly every college and university in the country. These committees are proving very helpful in promulgating an understanding of the problems and remedies in accrediting which involve faculties, and in bringing various faculties together to discuss institutional problems and to look at their own particular fields of learning in the perspective of all higher learning.

Institutions have renewed their interests in Regional Associations and are taking measures to strengthen the Regionals as service organizations of immediate use to them.

The increased responsibilities for the Regional Associations require many basic constitutional and procedural changes. The necessary legislation is being or has been enacted in each Regional. With the assistance of the National Commission on Accrediting and the National Committee of Regional Accrediting Associations, a set of fourteen guiding principles for the establishment of comprehensive evaluation procedure has been adopted.

To date, written working agreements have been made between one or more Regional and twenty-two major accrediting agencies representing over seventy-five professional organizations and 1,441 institutions. Generally, the co-operative arrangements provide for joint study and planning, combined evaluation visits, and exchange of confidential information. In some instances, questionnaires have been drastically reduced and combined into one simplified single document. The working conferences between the Regional Associations and professional agencies are having a quiet but profound effect upon accrediting philosophies, policies, and practices.

Several experimental institution-wide team evaluations have been conducted. Techniques are improving with each undertaking. Where these have occurred, institutional, Regional, and professional personnel who participated acclaim the values received. They state that the new type of accrediting offers much more than was possible under traditional accrediting.

Many organizations wishing to enter the accrediting picture for the first time have been deterred. In order that for accrediting purposes a single unified voice might represent a single field to higher education, numerous organizations which were formerly competitors have joined in the formation of single representative councils or committees.

At present, the whole field of accrediting is in a state of change. Regional and professional organizations are experimenting in joint activities. Differences among parties of apparently incompatible points of view concerning the control of accrediting are gradually being set aside in genuine efforts to collect facts, explore proposed solutions, and bring about improved practice wherever possible.

As a "force" stimulating the reconsideration of educational philosophies, devices, and systems designed to control higher education through accrediting, the Commission has identified and explored many basic issues and problems attending upon all areas of higher education. In the study, planning, and carrying out of a co-operative evaluation of higher education, a wide variety of viewpoints and experience has been brought together and machinery for co-operative democratic action set in motion. These contacts continue to bring into sharp focus the nature of competing motives, philosophies, and techniques. Perhaps the greatest benefit thus far obtained from all the negotiations and joint visits stems from the exchange of ideas and sharing of experience in all fields of higher education. Whether in local faculty meetings or in national conferences, the give and take among thinking people has done much to improve accrediting and higher education.

The National Commission on Accrediting has made its mark, but its task is by no means finished. Very basic problems remain untouched and unsolved.

Basic Issues

Essentially, accrediting is an evaluative process. It presupposes certain objectives and criteria in terms of which higher education is assessed and toward which it is guided or coerced. By its very nature, accrediting rests upon the preconceived notions and assumptions of the accreditors.

There being no clear-cut definition of higher education, it falls to the accreditors to set the limits and point the way. Thus, one group may view a university as an arrangement for expediting administration of autonomous faculties, while another group may view a university as an institution which has purposes and values greater than those of its parts. Most professional agencies operate from the first premise. Associations of institutions, such as the Regional Accrediting Associations, operate from the second. Should each department and professional school be evaluated *in vacuo* in terms of its own objectives? Or should the whole institution be evaluated in terms of the broader aims and functions of the institution as a whole? Both? Suppose the department is backed by a powerful national agency which can bring pressure upon the institution sufficient to warp the entire budget and program in its favor? This is often the case. When the two conflict, which shall take precedence?

Who is going to define and lead higher education? Unless educators come to the front in the accrediting struggle, higher education may be torn apart by shortsighted specialists.

To what extent should a group of people banded in promotion of a common social good (medicine, law, dentistry, teacher education) be allowed to give direction and movement to that good through various forms of pressure upon society? Where does healthy persuasion end and coercion begin? Where does social interest end and self-interest begin? The first important act of the newly formed accrediting agency in teacher education, the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, was to sign an agreement with the National Council of Chief State School Officers. This agreement calls for recognition by all states of certified teachers graduated from institutions which have been accredited by the NCATE. This is a move in the direction of placing control of all teacher education under one national accrediting agency. The implications of the move are immediately clear to the student of democracy. Yet why should it not be allowed in teacher education when national control is already a fact in medicine, law, veterinary medicine, dentistry, and other fields? Each year more state legislatures under pressure from professional agencies are passing regulations requiring graduation from professionally accredited schools as prerequisite for license to practice.

Control through accrediting by "outside" groups tightens about higher education in much the same way that the rise in cost of living squeezes the value out of the dollar. If higher institutions in America are going to remain free wellsprings of intellectual leadership, the basic issues and alarming conditions underlying accrediting must be resolved.

The Association of American Universities stated last year in instructions to its representatives on the National Commission on Accrediting that higher education in the United States has reached a degree of organization and maturity entitling it to a much freer hand in exercising self-direction and self-discipline.[4] This declaration reflects the thinking of present-day educational leaders. But it is clear that the desired freedom will be achieved only under dynamic, wise, patient, and inspired leadership. Our American democracy is not yet sure just how free and autonomous its "free" institutions shall be. It will be up to the educators to develop a plan of self-discipline which will replace the accrediting controls by "outside" groups.

No other country in the world has a similar system of voluntary accreditation. Although the federal Office of Education comes closer to a policy role in education each day, few thinking educators want government control of colleges and universities. Has the day come for higher education to take a stand for freedom? Can it bear the responsibilities that go with freedom? Is not the accrediting problem the crucial problem of higher education? Is it not the process of defining democracy itself? From whence shall come our leadership?

[4] Association of American Universities, Resolution, Special Spring Meeting, 1954.

Fred O. Pinkham, Ed.D., Ripon, Wisconsin, is president of Ripon College. He was formerly assistant to the president of George Washington University in Washington, D. C., and for five years executive secretary of the National Commission on Accrediting. His addresses and articles have appeared in publications of national, regional, and state educational and professional organizations.

Academic Freedom: A Decade of Challenge and Clarification

By HARRY D. GIDEONSE

THERE is," says Sidney Hook, "more sloppy rhetoric poured out per page about academic freedom both by those who believe they are supporting, and those intent on criticizing it, than on any other theme with the possible exception of democracy."[1] Another generation has discovered for itself that freedom is not inherited as a youth acquires property rights in a house from his parents. Freedom can only be inherited in the sense that every succeeding generation has the opportunity to hammer out for itself, on the anvil of its own experience, the framework of unavoidably interwoven rights and responsibilities within which freedom in the sense of self-expression and freedom in the sense of self-control can be for such a generation a working faith.

ORTHODOX CASES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

In recent years we have, of course, had our normal quota of orthodox academic-freedom issues, cases in which a teacher is dismissed because he addresses a Wallace-for-President meeting, or in which a trustee interested in dairy farming argues that a campus supporter of the removal of fiscal handicaps for oleomargarine is unfit to serve a state university. There have not been more issues of this type than in any other decade if the reports of the American Association of University Professors are a trustworthy guide, and even a valiant and responsible spirit of professional self-policing could hardly be expected to eliminate these altogether in our sprawling system of higher education with its decentralized and varied controls. Our preoccupation with the issues—false and real—of Communism in education has even tended to promote underemphasis, in recent years, of a few startling abuses of academic freedom of the vulgar variety.

One of the many merits of Russell Kirk's "essay in definition," entitled *Academic Freedom,* lies in the balanced discussion of the two "most shocking" cases of the violation of academic freedom in recent years, that is to say the effort to impose the views of professional "educators" upon the rest of the faculty by President Minard W. Stout of the University of Nevada in the so-called Richardson case in 1953, and Chancellor Hutchins' removal on less than a day's notice—in the fall of 1950—of Mr. W. T. Couch as director of the University of Chicago Press.[2] The feeble and belated intervention of the American Association of University Professors in these cases may itself have been due to the Association's preoccupation with the issues presented by membership, past or present, in the Communist party. It is not without interest that the national officers of the organization did not take a hand in the Nevada case until it appeared that some members of the Board of Regents might attempt, without any foundation whatsoever, to insinuate that there was

[1] Sidney Hook, *Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No* (New York: John Day Company, 1953), p. 13.

[2] Russell Kirk, *Academic Freedom* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955); cf. Chap. II (on President Stout) and Chap. III (on Chancellor Hutchins).

a "Communist" or "fellow traveler" angle to the case.

There is nothing new about the "orthodox" cases of academic freedom in recent years. Arthur O. Lovejoy's authoritative article on academic freedom in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* and an able summarizing article on "Academic Freedom" in THE ANNALS of November 1938 [3] by Henry W. Tyler and Edward P. Cheyney can still be cited as the best sources for historical and philosophical documentation, with appropriate stress upon the valuable and creative role of the American Association of University Professors in the formative years.

NEW ISSUES

The new issues in academic freedom arising from membership in the Communist party came to the fore in the late thirties in New York City, and they received their earliest formulation in connection with the Rapp-Coudert investigation of public education in New York City from 1940 to 1943.[4] To the country as a whole these remained "special New York City" issues until the University of Washington dismissed several professors in 1949 on the ground that they were guilty *as members of the Communist party* of violating the principles of academic freedom and therefore of "conduct unbecoming a teacher." [5] The classical formulations of the principles of academic freedom by the American Association of University Professors contemplated no such development. Neither the 1925 nor the 1940 "statement of principles" [6] foresaw a hazard to academic freedom in the ideological commitments of the teachers themselves. They speak of the university or the college as the party that "may not place any restraint upon the teacher's freedom of investigation" or "impose any limitation upon the teacher's freedom in the exposition of his own subject in the classroom or in addresses and publications outside the college."

It is true that the 1940 "statement of principles" postulates that the "common good" of institutions of higher learning depends "upon the free search for truth and its free exposition," and recent experience has demonstrated with tragic emphasis that political organizations as well as the federal government itself may place more effective restraints or limitations upon the teacher's freedom of investigation or his freedom of exposition than were ever contemplated by colleges or universities themselves.

The struggle for academic freedom takes a new form as the intellectual, ideological, and cultural landscape changes. The essence of the tradition must be restated and redefined by every generation in the light of current facts, current challenges, and current abuses. Those who live in an atmosphere that is comparatively static will abide by the received verbal formulations. Those who live in a climate of opinion deeply affected by new developments—such as, say, in the modern scene, a university with a real experience with Communist infiltration or a large number of teachers in the physical sciences affected by federal security regulations—will find little help in a parrotlike repetition of the old words and phrases. If they are to be a living chart—and not an empty verbal shell covering an alien content—

[3] Vol. 200, pp. 102–18.

[4] Cf. T. E. Coulton, *A City College in Action* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955) for a detailed study of the impact upon a large public college.

[5] Cf. *Communism and Academic Freedom: the Record of the Tenure Cases at the University of Washington*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1949.

[6] Reprinted in the *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1949), pp. 66–72.

their meaning must be defined anew in the light of developing experience. In such a period of restatement and redefinition, it is inevitable that there will be an interval of confusion and even chaos arising from the differences in thought and emotion evoked by old and new verbal symbols, and only a process of sharing and analyzing the new experience will contribute to a basic clarification of the issues involved.[7]

CURRENT DEFINITIONS

After six years the initial storm of confused and essentially uninformed comment and discussion has settled down to a professional agreement that covers a remarkably wide area. In recent years authors who are as far apart in their basic philosophical views as Sidney Hook and Russell Kirk have arrived at a reasoned view of freedom under professional responsibilities in the face of the new challenge of totalitarian discipline of scholars that is in all essentials in agreement with the statement on "The Rights and Responsibilities of Universities and Their Faculties" unanimously adopted by the Association of American Universities in 1953.

Sidney Hook

It may serve a useful purpose to compare the definitions of academic freedom which have been formulated in the light of the new experience. Sidney Hook, who deserves a great deal of credit for the tenacity of purpose and the clarity of mind with which he has sought to make the general public as well as the academic profession understand the full meaning of the experience to which New York City was exposed earlier and more intensively than the country as a whole, develops the thesis that it is our moral obligation in a free society to tolerate dissent, no matter how heretical, and not to tolerate conspiracy, no matter how it may be camouflaged. He offers the following definition:

> What is academic freedom? Academic freedom is a specific kind of freedom. It is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence, without any control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truth is established. Insofar as it acknowledges intellectual discipline or restraint from a community, it is only from the community of qualified scholars which accepts the authority of rational inquiry.
>
> Like every other freedom, academic freedom, although it has an intrinsic value, is not absolute. It must be judged by its consequences on a whole cluster of other freedoms (values). The *justification* of academic freedom must therefore lie in its fruits.[8]

Russell Kirk

Russell Kirk, who offers a sympathetic and reasoned criticism of Hook's definition, accepts the definition of W. T. Couch that "academic freedom is the principle designed to protect the teacher from hazards that tend to prevent him from meeting his *obligations in the pursuit of truth*," [9] and then suggests that it should be anchored in a commitment, made in a spirit of dedication, not of suspicion,

> . . . to adhere to the Truth, according to the light that is given to the teacher; a promise to conserve the wisdom of our ancestors and to extend the empire of knowledge as best a teacher can; a promise to guide and

[7] For a detailed examination of the issues as they presented themselves after the University of Washington decision, cf. Harry D. Gideonse, "Changing Issues in Academic Freedom in the United States Today," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 94, No. 2 (1950), pp. 91–104.

[8] Sidney Hook, *op. cit. supra* (note 1), p. 154.

[9] Russell Kirk, *op. cit. supra* (note 2), p. 1. The italics are mine.

awaken the student, but not to indoctrinate; a promise to abide by the principles of social order, as expressed in the country's constitution; and a promise always to put freedom of the mind above material advantage and the passions of the hour. What the Hippocratic oath is to the physician, such an oath ought to be to the teacher, and more; and no further oath ought to be required by any authority.[10]

Association of American Universities

Some of the key paragraphs of the unanimous statement of the Association of American Universities reflect both the consensus of professional opinion—unchallenged by any responsible governmental authority—and the nature of some of the problems inside and outside of the profession itself. After a statement of the "unique" role of the modern American university, the defining paragraphs read as follows:

A university must . . . be hospitable to an infinite variety of skills and viewpoints, relying upon open competition among them as the surest safeguard of truth. Its whole spirit requires investigation, criticism and presentation of ideas in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual confidence. This is the real meaning of "academic" freedom. It is essential to the achievement of its ends that the faculty of a university be guaranteed this freedom by its governing board, and that the reasons for the guarantee be understood by the public. To enjoin uniformity of outlook upon a university faculty would put a stop to learning at the source. To censor individual faculty members would put a stop to learning at its outlet. . . .

Timidity must not lead the scholar to stand silent when he ought to speak, particularly in the field of his competence. In matters of conscience and when he has truth to proclaim the scholar has no obligation to be silent in the face of popular disapproval. Some of the great passages in the history of truth have involved the open challenge of popular prejudice in times of tension such as those in which we live. . . .

Appointment to a university position and retention after appointment require not only professional competence but involve the affirmative obligation of being diligent and loyal in citizenship. Above all, a scholar must have integrity and independence. This renders impossible adherence to such a regime as that of Russia and its satellites. No person who accepts or advocates such principles and methods has any place in a university. Since present membership in the Communist party requires the acceptance of these principles and methods, such membership extinguishes the right to a university position. . . .

"Academic freedom" is not a shield for those who break the law. Universities must cooperate fully with law-enforcement officers whose duty requires them to prosecute those charged with offenses. Under a well-established American principle, their innocence is to be assumed until they have been convicted, under due process, in a court of proper jurisdiction.

Unless a faculty member violates a law, however, his discipline or discharge is a university responsibility and should not be assumed by political authority. Discipline on the basis of irresponsible accusations or suspicion can never be condoned. It is as damaging to the public welfare as it is to academic integrity. The university is competent to establish a tribunal to determine the facts and fairly judge the nature and degree of any trespass upon academic integrity, as well as to determine the penalty such trespass merits.[11]

Hazards of political discipline

The stress in all these definitions on key words such as "truth," "conscience," and the "discipline of the community of scholars" springs from the new awareness of the hazard to free scholarship that may be inherent in the acceptance by individual teachers of political discipline in matters of learning

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[11] These paragraphs are excerpts from the full statement as quoted in the *New York Times*, March 31, 1953.

and academic organization. Thus the national clarification of standards and values arrived at a conclusion which matched the decision of the New School for Social Research in New York City in its adoption of a bylaw many years ago stating that "no member of the faculty may be a member of any political party or group which presumes to dictate in matters of science or scientific opinion."[12] This is a reflection of a new tough-minded liberalism which refuses to permit the destruction of free institutions by their totalitarian abuse, and it is morally rooted in the acceptance of the ideal of the search for truth as the evidence and your conscience may teach you to see it, not as a political party or ideological discipline may force you to twist it.

COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP

The significance of the new formulation of academic freedom is its insistence that fitness to teach must be decided primarily on intellectual and educational rather than on political grounds, and that membership in the Communist party is relevant because of its educational and intellectual, rather than its political, implications. There is no issue concerning teaching about Communism or about Communist ideas—every student in a free society should be exposed to their study and their criticism—and it is least of all a matter of fear of meeting such ideas in open discussion, since actual experience with members of the party who are members of a faculty reveals a deliberate and disciplined policy of concealing their identity and of teaching "at the least risk of exposure." The rejection of members of the Communist party as members of the teaching profession is not a matter of ideas but a question of professional *conduct*.

When the nature of the Communist party is understood—and even the carefully nurtured ignorance of some of our more extreme libertarians begins to yield to the wealth of evidence concerning the party's insistence that all members must "at *all* times take a position on *every* question that is in line with the policies of the party," that they must "display a thorough readiness to accept party discipline," and that inactive or "bad" members are expelled because they do not have "any latitude or discretion in the matter"—it becomes plain as a pikestaff that membership in the Communist party is *prima facie* evidence of *professional unfitness* to teach. Sidney Hook has summarized a large amount of the relevant evidence from party documents, official hearings, espionage cases, and so forth.[13] It has taken sev-

[12] The effort to confuse the issue by comparing the disciplinary relation of the Communist party with its members to that of the Roman Catholic Church with its communicants is adequately analyzed by Sidney Hook (*op. cit. supra* [note 1], pp. 219–20). It is also discussed with great cogency in Ernest van den Haag's paper, "Academic Freedom and Its Defense," published in *Strengthening Education at All Levels*, Report of the Eighteenth Educational Conference sponsored by the Educational Records Bureau and the American Council on Education, Washington, D. C., 1954.

[13] Hook, *op. cit. supra* (note 1), Chaps. I, III, IX. The argument that professional competence should be based upon evidence "from the classroom" is, of course, an invitation to initiate the type of educational policing that is itself—and rightly so—the subject of the most acute "liberal" attack. Teachers who perjure themselves or who engage in scurrilous and anonymous libel of their colleagues are unfit for membership in the teaching profession, irrespective of their performance in the classroom or as practitioners of their scholarly specialty. In any case, Communists who attempt to conceal their membership in accordance with party instructions are likely to use the classroom to "spot" likely candidates for recruiting purposes who are then "solicited" later (and outside the classroom) by student leaders. Also, faculty members have other-than-classroom contacts with students, in guidance and in service on faculty committees. Cf. Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 186 ff.

eral years for the evidence to convince some of our liberals, who are frequently more hostile to anti-Communists than they are to Communists, but it is now quite generally agreed that "membership" in the Communist party is not in any significant sense similar to membership in any other legal party.

To be a registered Republican or Democratic voter—which is presumably the meaning of "membership" in such a case—does not imply the assumption of iron discipline in executing the party leaders' orders even in intellectual matters as politically remote as biology, the history of philosophy, or the theory of music, whereas "membership" in the Communist party really means that the individual becomes the *agent* of the party—this is the phrase Lenin always used to describe "members"—in every field in which it is seeking instruments to achieve its power purpose. While excesses may have occurred under the doctrine of "guilt by association," it is misleading to speak of party membership in these terms, since this would be true of membership in the free society's sense of the term, whereas membership in the Stalinist sense means a dedicated commitment to accept the discipline of the group, *which is active co-operation and not association.*

There is no warrant, either, for the confusion of past and present membership in the Communist party, since the academic agencies have been as insistent upon the protection of the rights of teachers who proved the bona fide termination of their membership as have the senatorial investigators. Justice Douglas, in his dissent from the United States Supreme Court's decision declaring the New York State Feinberg Law constitutional, spoke of "the threat" of the New York City procedure as raising "havoc with academic freedom" because "youthful indiscretions" and "misguided enthusiasms" would "become the ghosts of a harrowing present." The law—and the procedures—make it very clear, however, that Justice Douglas' fears have no closer relation to the facts than his views as to the real nature of the Communist party.

CONFUSIONS

There has been a good deal of distressing evidence of abuse of intellectual freedom in the years of clarifying discussion and experience that have led up to the present emergence of a new consensus. In the exaltation of rights and the minimizing of responsibilities which have been so characteristic of free society in recent generations, it is possible for a distinguished professor of sociology in one of our major universities to tell the *New York Times* that "freedom is either unqualified or it does not exist"; it is possible for a distinguished professor of history to say that after a decade of incessant snooping only "two real live Communists" have been found in American colleges and universities, although evidence available to any newspaper reader would have told him of over a hundred such cases in his own city; and—to cite only one further example from a wealth of similar evidence of professional irresponsibility—it is possible for four distinguished academic personalities to sign a letter to the *New York Times* in which they speak of "faceless informers" who are used to convict New York City teachers of perjury although the record conclusively shows that no teacher has been convicted of perjury without an open trial in which the witnesses against him were subject to public cross-examination, and in which there was always the opportunity for an appeal to the State Commissioner.

Meanwhile, Robert M. Hutchins—and others of comparable standing could be cited—tells the world that "everywhere in the United States" university professors are "silenced by the general atmosphere of repression," [14] and that the "entire teaching profession of the United States is now intimidated." [15] In lectures to Swedish and Canadian universities he made similar statements about the position of "intellectuals in America." [16] Although these statements correspond as little with the facts as his description of John Dewey's influence, they lend credibility to the views of Bertrand Russell, who tells his audiences that American professors of economics are considered "subversive" if they "know" what the doctrines of Communism are, or that if the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its "perpetual snooping" should hear a teacher quote with approval some remark by Jefferson, he "would probably lose [his] job" and find himself "behind bars." [17]

To an American reader, it is of course clear that Mr. Hutchins and Mr. Russell were acquainted with selective samples of the American teaching profession, and Sidney Hook's comment is surely relevant that:

> . . . the facts are that no professor who was in the habit of speaking up five years ago has been silenced, many who were silent five years ago are speaking up, while those who were silent five, ten, fifteen years ago and are still silent cannot be regarded as victims of a reign of terror. It is not necessary to picture the situation as ideal—or to deny the episodic outbreaks of intolerance towards professors with unpopular views (when was the U. S. free of them?) to recognize Mr. Hutchins' statement as a fantastic exaggeration, and no more accurate in its description of the situation than a characterization of the state of academic freedom at the University of Chicago under Mr. Hutchins would be if it were based only on Mr. Hutchins' outrageous dismissal of Mr. Couch.[18]

[14] R. M. Hutchins, "Freedom of the University," *Ethics,* Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1951), p. 95.

[15] R. M. Hutchins, "Are Our Teachers Afraid to Teach?" *Look,* Vol. 18 (March 9, 1954), p. 28.

[16] R. M. Hutchins, *The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society* (New York, 1953), p. 17.

[17] Cited by S. Hook, *op. cit. supra* (note 1), p. 59 and pp. 66–67.

Assorted nonsense

Every year the annual crop of assorted nonsense about "dangerous thoughts" and "radicalism" which is produced as an inevitable by-product of a free society by folks with whom "liberals" do not agree frightens those who are easily intimidated and makes it easy to confuse the distinction between real and imaginary threats. Cultural vigilantes occasionally make fools of themselves by insisting that Robin Hood is a "subversive" book—the fact that they failed to convince the Indiana school authorities of the validity of their claim is not usually mentioned—or ignorant politicians sometimes make themselves ridiculous by describing the Tennessee Valley Authority or unemployment insurance as "Communistic," or a group in Congress, which needs to be reminded of the vital distinction between conservatism and reactionary radicalism, apparently assumes in an "investigation" of the foundations—without, however, securing the support of the House as a whole—that it might be an appropriate function of Congress to decide whether an empirical or a philosophical approach is more rewarding—or even patriotic—in scientific research.[19]

Ethical questions

None of this irresponsible conduct on the part of nominal conservatives disproves the fact, however, that there is such a thing as a real Communist conspiracy, with all of its unpleasant links

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 61.

[19] Cf. Harry D. Gideonse, "A Congressional Committee's Investigation of the Foundations," *Journal of Higher Education,* Vol. 25, No. 9 (December 1954), pp. 457–63.

to conspiratorial conduct, to anonymous and scurrilous libel of colleagues, to perjury and even occasionally to espionage and murder. The fact that spurious patriots exploit the public concern about real professional abuses, as defined by any reputable academic body, by casting doubts upon the members of scores of more or less innocent "front" organizations which were deliberately designed to enroll the idealistic and the gullible does not explain away the indisputable fact that perjury is intolerable in a teacher, irrespective of his or her political associations. It is not morally edifying to hear a plea for the avoidance of relevant testimony by a college professor on high grounds of "conscience" when the preceding day's testimony clearly *and admittedly* included evidence of perjury by the same individual at an earlier session. These only *appear* to be political issues. They are in fact *ethical* questions that strike straight at the core of the viability of a free society.[20]

It may seem to be a pity that so much energy has been spent in recent years on the clarification of elementary values in academic and in free society. In a larger sense, however, the rethinking of the philosophical foundations and the moral prerequisites of free society may be strategically more vital than the development of our foreign policy or the perfection of our armament.

Standing citadels

In recent years the most glaring weaknesses in the tradition of academic freedom have not appeared as a result of the arguments of its enemies but have been revealed in the philosophical and historical illiteracy of some of its advocates. The record at the University of California, the University of Chicago, and Harvard University makes it clear that our enemies may be sufficiently strong to win an occasional battle but they do not win the war. In New York City's municipal colleges academic freedom is as real as it is anywhere else in the country or in the world, in spite of a determined effort to make it appear otherwise by some misguided "liberals" and fellow travelers. Harvard University is a citadel of strength in the defense of intellectual freedom in spite of Senator McCarthy's envenomed attacks, and Mr. Hutchins' prophecy that donors would "hesitate to give money to the university" has been emphatically disproved by the munificent gifts Harvard received immediately after the most vicious phase of the campaign of attack.

Congressional investigations

The best-known congressional representatives of the idea that there should be no rules inhibiting a congressional investigation have encountered a firm check in public opinion as well as in the restraints imposed by their legislative colleagues. If we examined the report of the subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary which has handled most of the cases related to education, we would find a statement of rules and objectives that is in line with the best democratic and professional tradition, including the provisions of the statement of the Association of American Universities. The detailed cases described in this committee's report of July 17, 1953, under the title, *Subversive Influence in the Educational Process,* indicate a form of unprofessional conduct which would be so defined by any reputable academic authority, and in any case the committee has left the final judgment concerning such evidence to the discretion of the appropriate educational agencies and authorities.[21]

Philosophical and political illiteracy

The philosophical and political illiteracy of a defense of freedom which is anchored in a plea, by a founder of the American Association of University Professors, that scholars act "as agents of the people," and that their responsibility "is ***not to the truth***" but "to the people who need the truth," [22] or the argument by a leading sociologist that "freedom is either unqualified or it does not exist," [23] points to a weakness in the prevailing theory of a free society which promises to be far more dangerous than any of the attacks by outsiders that we have experienced thus far. Such views are a characteristic by-product of a rising secular religion of democracy, in which it becomes possible for intelligent men to teach that "there is nothing wrong with democracy that more democracy will not cure." These men do not understand that they are thereby denying the basis in political principle of the Bill of Rights, and that they are incidentally undermining the philosophic basis of the distinction between the so-called "people's democracies" of the Soviet type and our own variety, which is anchored in the limitations imposed upon what Jefferson called "majoritarian despotism" by the Bill of Rights.

This situation is perhaps an unavoidable outcome of a century of scholarship in which students of jurisprudence have glorified "positive" law in continual efforts to prove that the very idea of natural law was a hoax, in which sociologists have spent their energy demonstrating that the very idea of community—and its related values and moral standards—is ideological in character, and in which psychologists have treated "conscience" as if it could be illuminated by conditioning experiments with rats and—of course—dogs. Academic life has been crowded with scholars who have spent their lives eagerly sawing off the branches upon which they themselves—or their colleagues—were sitting.

Freedom is anchored in the relative autonomy of the associational liberties, the significance of which Tocqueville and Burke understood so well, and this is, of course, the reason for our renewed interest in their views. When scholars accept the status of "agents of the people," the door has been opened to all forms of populist, majoritarian, or totalitarian control. The philosophical vacuousness of certain types of contemporary philosophy and social science may constitute a greater hazard to free society than any of the conspiratorial activities of the more easily recognized enemies to which we are devoting so much of our attention.

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBLE CHOICE

Freedom is not the absence of restraint or the right to do "as you please." It is the presence of responsible choice. It is anchored in a capacity for self-control. Freedom emerges historically—as academic freedom developed in the medieval universities *because* they *shared* the values of medieval religion—when internal checks can be substituted for external constraint, and, conversely, freedom is endangered when

[20] For typical evidence of legalistic straining at a gnat, and simultaneous willingness to swallow a camel of the appropriate ideological family, see Sidney Hook's discussion of the sworn evidence in the Rapp-Coudert investigation as it is explained away in Dean L. H. Chamberlain's volume, *Loyalty and Legislative Action,* published in 1951 in the Cornell University series (Hook, *op. cit supra* [note 1], pp. 186–201).

[21] For details, cf. Harry D. Gideonse, "Are Congressional Investigations Helpful?" *The Educational Record,* Vol. 35, No. 2 (April 1954), pp. 104–7.

[22] Professor Alexander Meiklejohn as quoted in Russell Kirk, *op. cit. supra* (note 2), pp. 31–34. See also Sidney Hook, *op. cit. supra* (note 1), pp. 233–38.

[23] Professor Robert S. Lynd of Columbia University as quoted in the *New York Times,* April 8, 1953.

a free society's shared values are no longer sufficiently vigorous to preserve the moral cohesion on which the discipline of free men rests.

We must somehow restore the quest for the sources of responsibility to a strategic place in our intellectual activities. Free society and its opposite cannot be distinguished by the absence of authority in the one case and its presence in the other. It is, rather, a question of inner checks in the first case and external control in the other. This is not merely a question of intellectual understanding; it is essentially a matter of moral commitment. Just as Tocqueville taught that "despotism may govern without faith but liberty cannot," we must learn to see that a free society is not an "open" society but, on the contrary, a society strictly committed to a distinctive set of beliefs which are widely regarded as obsolete in the free world today, and perhaps most commonly among scholars.

We must—as Michael Polanyi has phrased it in a seminal and groping book—

> . . . learn once more to hold beliefs, our own beliefs. The task is formidable, for we have been taught for centuries to hold as a belief only the residue which no doubt can conceivably assail. There is no such residue left today, and that is why the ability to believe with open eyes must once more be systematically reacquired.[24]

It was the fall of liberty in Europe—or the threat of its loss—that aroused a new consciousness of the basic beliefs on which these liberties rest. But "the beliefs remain nevertheless logically prior to these liberties" and "the coherence of science must be regarded as an expression of the common rootedness of scientists in the same spiritual reality." To Polanyi, "the principal belief underlying a free society is that man is amenable to reason and susceptible to the claims of his conscience."[25] Free men can never be nihilists. Free men are always—in the moral sense—committed men. The problem of freedom lies in the understanding of the nature of their essential commitment.

There is a jungle of philosophic and semantic confusion crying for systematic cultivation here. The quest for total "objectivity" is so deeply rooted in the best of our Western tradition that it will call for a major reorientation to recognize its relationship to the moral insecurity and normlessness that are the intellectual breeding ground of totalitarianism. There is nothing novel about the cultural pattern, however, to anyone who is aware of the Jewish, the Christian, and the Greek sources of our culture. Aristotle knew that anomic libertarianism was an immediate predecessor of despotic government, which conceals the symptoms of normlessness by imposing an iron framework to prevent disintegration.

The problems of academic freedom are in this sense merely a special example of the larger problem of restoring the vitality of free society in general. Ranging all the way from the quest for a philosophical foundation for our foreign policy on a world scale to the need for an indigenous restatement of the theory of general education on the local campus level, we can only escape the confusion of a congeries of conflicting material and power motives by a recognition of the need for clarifying the order of our priorities in the moral or philosophical field. To refresh the

[24] Michael Polanyi, *The Logic of Liberty* (London, 1951), p. 31. See also the proceedings of the Congress for Cultural Freedom held in Hamburg on July 23–26, 1953, published under the title, *Science and Freedom* (London, 1955), and containing papers by M. Polanyi, John R. Baker, Raymond Aron, and others.

[25] M. Polanyi, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

sources of responsibility is the primary challenge to free society in its struggle with domestic obscurantism as well as with its totalitarian adversaries in world politics. In this emphasis we are merely returning to the theme of John Dewey's remarks in 1915 as the first president of the American Association of University Professors, in which he described issues of academic freedom as not more than "an incident of the activities of the association *in developing professional standards,* standards which will be quite as scrupulous regarding *the obligations imposed by freedom* as jealous for freedom itself."[26]

[26] Cited by Russell Kirk, *op. cit. supra* (note 2), p. 25. The italics are mine.

Harry D. Gideonse, LL.D., Brooklyn, New York, has been president of Brooklyn College since 1939. Previously he was professor of economics and chairman of the Economics Department of Barnard College (1938–39), associate professor of economics and director of social science courses in the College, University of Chicago (1930–38), assistant professor of economics, Rutgers University (1928–30), and director of international student work in Geneva, Switzerland (1926–28). He is president of Freedom House and of its Willkie Memorial Building and a member of the Board of Directors and past president of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation. He has been interested in the use of radio for education, as one of the originators of the University of Chicago Round Table Program (NBC) and a frequent participant in the People's Platform and Invitation to Learning (CBS). President Gideonse is the author, among other works, of The Higher Learning in a Democracy (1937) and joint author of United States Foreign Policy—Its Organization and Control (1952).

The Role of the University in International Relations

By Howard E. Wilson

THE role of the American college or university in international relations is neither simple nor static; within this century institutions of higher education have become as complexly and pervasively involved in world affairs as has the nation itself, and their adjustment to the involvement is a continuing and uncharted process. The involvement arises in part because all such social institutions as universities are intimately subject to the developments and needs and trends of the general society, in part because the personnel of universities—both students and faculties—are peculiarly affected by manpower requirements and priorities essential to the national security, and in part because the intellectual and aesthetic substance—the arts and sciences—with which modern universities deal is now consciously employed in the conduct of world affairs in a degree and on a scale hitherto unknown.

Entire University Involved

The university's concern with world affairs is not limited to specialist preoccupation with a particular subject field. In a sense, the university's interest in world affairs is more a reaction to outside events and pressures than to internal academic developments, although there have been notable, internal, scholarly developments resulting in the evolution in recent decades of international relations as a special field of learning. If one looks realistically at the activities characteristic of the university's work on world affairs, he looks at every aspect of the institution.

The university is a center of research bearing on foreign policy, cultural interrelations, and international action. It trains specialists in international relations, in the study of world areas, and in the international ramifications of established disciplines and professional fields. It has responsibility for widening the horizons of the great body of its students, both by formal instruction and by informal influences. It is caught up in the very center of farflung programs for the interchange of persons across national boundary lines. It has a role in adult education about foreign policy and world affairs, particularly important as adult education in these years "comes of age" in America. The university becomes heavily involved in relations with government in all these matters—financing research, admitting foreign students, arranging for faculty leave of absence for government work training for the Foreign Service, and so forth—and it is developing widening patterns of international relations of its own under the impact of such agencies as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Association of Universities, and the contract programs of the Foreign Operations Administration.

Recognizing the range of these academic involvements in international relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace developed a program in 1950 focused on cross-sectional analysis and appraisal of the role of colleges and universities in international relations. After exploratory surveys had been made in eight co-operating institutions, a "handbook" [1] was prepared

[1] Howard E. Wilson, *Universities and World Affairs* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951), pp. 88.

for the use of faculties which might be interested in assessing the role and the operations of their own institutions under the gathering impact of the nation's heavy involvement in world affairs. Since that time, seventy colleges and universities, widely distributed and representative of the range of American institutions, have completed self-surveys and appraisals of their activities and resources bearing on world affairs. Much of the material presented in this discussion is based upon these institutional self-analyses.[2]

Research on International Relations

In the ordinary functioning of universities a great deal of research is being carried on which has relevance to the serious study and the responsible conduct of international relations. This research is carried on by individual scholars, by academic departments, by research bureaus; it frequently involves the co-operation of foundations or of government; it is often related to the programs and needs of intergovernmental agencies such as the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is increasingly interdisciplinary and interuniversity in character. In its research role the university is a focal center for the accumulation and interpretation of data, for the development of conceptual insights, and for the structure of research designs and methods in international relations—the essential elements in organizing a new and specialized field of systematic study.

[2] The surveys have been issued in mimeographed form by the Carnegie Endowment for the use of co-operating institutions. From them and related studies will be issued a series of topical volumes dealing with selected aspects of the work of universities in this field. The volumes will be published during 1955 and 1956 for the Carnegie Endowment by the American Council on Education.

Two aspects of the university's role in research deserve specific mention. International relations is obviously rooted in studies of a historical, political, and economic nature. The research materials classified within these disciplines are relatively easily brought together and interrelated. But other research areas have not so readily been brought into focus—materials from psychology, cultural anthropology, demography, sociology, for example. Yet as the study of international relations proceeds, the pertinence of these fields seems to be clearer. A task in the research work of universities which is in the category of unfinished business is the focusing and co-ordinating of these scattered materials on world affairs.

Another task in research operations is that of finding the best means by which research data can flow into the forum of public action, the actual conduct of world affairs. Research studies published in book form for library use by scholars and students is a traditional operation, and an essential one for universities. Additional channels for utilization of research data may be necessary. Some of these may be found in research asked for by agencies of government and paid for by governmental contract—an application to the social sciences of the research contract arrangements now common in the natural sciences. The problems in respect to such contracts are the obvious ones of "applied versus pure" research, of the danger of an unbalanced research program, of the nature of governmental controls over academic work, and of the timing and scheduling of research in terms of the need for it.

But even without specific governmental aid or stimulation, much research now carried on in academic communities could be made more useful and be more used by government agencies. The director of one university institute in in-

ternational relations feels that the best contributions of his staff have been made in the form of specific studies placed in manuscript form upon the desks of public officials specifically responsible for dealing with the topics studied. The work of the Department of State in establishing a liaison office for accumulating bibliographical material on current research, while promising in its beginnings, has currently suffered from economic stringencies. The creation of machinery by which research data can be accumulated and funneled into action—and without making research simply a tool for politics—is a matter of continuing importance.

TRAINING OF SPECIALISTS

The university is, of course, the primary center for training specialists in international relations for the public service, for certain industrial and professional posts, and for research and teaching. The number of institutions giving advanced degrees in this field is increasing, but analysis of the programs offered indicates that most of them are focused on training for academic rather than public careers. Lack of adequate articulation between training programs and job requirements is a problem of basic importance.

In this connection, it should be observed that most posts in public and business life involving the actual conduct of international affairs require specialization in such fields as law, economics, agriculture, engineering, commerce, education, and medicine. The task of training these specialists with a view to the application of their work in international situations is one which relatively few institutions have been able to attack successfully. Certain graduate schools of business, public health, and agriculture have perhaps been most successful, but even so the current interest in orientation problems for American civil servants and industrial or educative posts abroad is an evidence of inadequacy in the university preparation of most specialists.

In the education of area specialists the universities have been more active in recent years, though the co-ordination of area-study programs with programs devoted specifically to international relations leaves much to be desired. It should be noted, too, that the duplication of area-study offerings—as, for example, in the Latin-American field in universities in the southern part of the United States and in Asiatic studies in the institutions of the West Coast—is probably excessive and, in the long run, uneconomical. There has not been sufficient national planning or co-ordination for the developing area-study centers.

With all the shortcomings which might be pointed out, it is nevertheless to be emphasized that the universities of the United States have been extraordinarily sensitive to the need for specialized personnel in international relations. The development of institutes, bureaus, departments, centers, and program concentrations under the impact of phenomenally rising American interest in world affairs during recent decades is an extraordinary chapter in the history of higher education. It is significant that a specialized discipline in international relations has been evolving during this urgent period in which the United States has been forced from isolation to participation in world affairs. The role of the university in training needed specialists is not being ignored; its achievement is in a pioneering stage, characterized both by problems and by substantial promise for the future.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN LIBERAL EDUCATION

The formal curricular contribution to the thinking of the great majority of students about world affairs is most commonly made along two lines—first, in the foundation courses in social sciences and humanities in which an interpretation of human experience is undertaken and, second, in vocational or professional programs which stress the international relations of a given field. There is no standard curriculum for American institutions as a whole, and the variety of courses that go under the label of liberal education is enormous and unpredictable, but there is assuredly an influence on orientation toward world affairs arising from the general college experience. Reports on college graduates indicate that, on the average, they are more interested in and more informed about international relations than are nongraduates. In this orientation of American leaders toward concepts and values and judgments underlying participation of educated men and women in the development of foreign policy and international relations, the colleges and universities have an important role to play.

Within the general program of courses offered as parts of liberal education, a good many standard offerings have been greatly modified in recent decades under the impact of world affairs. The whole program of language instruction, for example, seems now in a stage of extensive readjustment. Standard courses in world history have been widened to include the background of Asiatic history —or have been renamed more accurately as courses in the history of Western civilization. Programs in literature now deal with writings from cultures formerly outside the academic literary ken. And the development of courses in Asiatic studies, Latin-American studies, Russian studies, and the like in recent years has been phenomenal.

The number of colleges and universities offering undergraduate courses in international relations as a part of the general program in liberal arts is now legion.[8] There has been a steady shift from concept of these courses as introductory and preprofessional in character toward the concept of "terminal" courses as aspects of liberal education for the general student. In the general education program of San Francisco State College, for example, this development has progressed to the point where one semester of a four-semester sequence in social science required of all freshmen and sophomores is devoted to the study of international relations. While most of the undergraduate courses in international relations are organized within the framework of political science or economics, a number—apparently increasing—are organized in the philosophy and religion departments or in connection with anthropology and geography.

However, it is unfortunately true that these courses expressly devoted to world affairs, however organized and scheduled, are ordinarily taken by relatively few students. The college graduate who has taken a course in international relations is the exception rather than the rule. It is also true that the adjustments and developments in courses generally devoted to the liberal arts have taken place unevenly, and influence students in somewhat unpredictable fashion and degree. While in general it is possible to say that college graduates think more about and think more deeply about international relations than do nongraduates, the curricular reasons why this is so on any large scale are by no means obvious. The changed outlook on the world of college graduates may be as much due to nonformal, off-campus influences as to the courses of study to which they are exposed.

[8] See Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947.

INFORMAL EDUCATION

In considering the possibilities of collegiate education about world affairs for all students the informal influences of the college as a way of life are of more importance than most college people assume. Each institution, large or small, urban or rural, public or private, has a somewhat distinctive body of traditions and pattern of mores which influence in high degree the intellectual as well as emotional development of "members of the college." The extracurricular life as well as the curricular—or the merging of the two which is indicated in the term "cocurricular"—must be considered in determining the program of higher education about world affairs. College life is a form of inculturation for prospective leaders of the national society, and college life may condition the point of view toward matters international for very large numbers of students.

College seniors report that they think they received particularly substantial contributions to their understanding of world affairs from a number of out-of-class sources within the college community, including lectures they have heard, discussions in which they have engaged, and informal contacts they have had with foreign students and with faculty members having experience in some form of international work. It is customary in many institutions to bring to the campus periodically as lecturers leaders experienced in the actual conduct of international affairs. Too frequently these all-campus lectures are planned on a catch-as-catch-can basis and are poorly attended. A few institutions have begun to experiment with carefully developed sequences of lectures, at which attendance is expected if not required of students and in which an examination is given at the end of the series "to lift the lectures to the status of a course." Such lectures, planned systematically as complementary to basic course programs in institutions, may reach all students in smaller colleges or fairly large cross sections in the larger institutions. In a sense they may be the obverse of the large lecture class broken periodically into sections, in that they may be occasional focal points bringing together students from a variety of classes. Informal series of lectures, planned as a part of the institution's program of general education, seem to be highly important in reaching large numbers of students.

In terms of discussions, the means by which the power of the "bull session" can be harnessed for education about world affairs is no inconsequential matter. The programs of many College Unions, which have moved toward emphasis on informal educational activities from the romantic emphasis on social recreation of the 1920's, can be systematically planned to contribute toward this end. The housing arrangements for students, the discussion groups and forums scheduled by religious centers in the collegiate community, the semi-seminars in which selected students meet with faculty members—all of these may be molded into a college life which contributes substantially to understanding of other cultures, of the development of foreign policy, and of the conduct of international relations.

Among the out-of-class experiences for students in this field should be listed some of the activities of the student government association and some of the organized clubs and associations of the campus. Many of the structural arrangements by which students participate in college government make careful provision for activities devoted to international matters. Among these are campus philanthropic drives, the reception of foreign students, the organization of special campus events on such occasions as United Nations Day, and the

scheduling of lectures and forums on international topics. A member of the cabinet of the student president of the University of Florida, for example, is the Secretary of International Relations who has responsibility for stimulating and co-ordinating activities in this field. The National Student Association is particularly active in stimulating campus interest in world affairs and in managing a growing travel program of its own which involves extensive relations with student organizations in other countries. While many student clubs are concerned in one way or another with activities bearing on international matters, a few are devoted entirely to work in this field. Among these are the International Relations Clubs, which have had a continuous existence in American colleges of more than forty years. Now organized as an Association of International Relations Clubs and closely affiliated with the Foreign Policy Association, the clubs number in their membership at least twenty thousand students. And on many campuses the clubs assume some responsibility for developing a program of interest and value to the entire college community.

FOREIGN STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS

The number of foreign students and foreign professors and research workers on American campuses has increased substantially in recent decades. We have now reached the point where systematic research analyzing the effect of an American sojourn on the academic visitors is beginning to take form. Many institutions make elaborate arrangements for receiving and counseling foreign students. Governmental and nongovernmental agencies have developed programs for handling exchangees in this country with tact and skill. But the effect on the visited as well as the effect on the visitors may be a significant chapter in American education—and that is a field in which virtually no research has been done. The role of college life in educating students is rooted in the character of the membership of the college; association with students from other lands is itself an education, as is readily attested by students and faculty who have analyzed this situation. The role of the college or university as a meeting place for persons representing diverse cultures and nations is a significant role in education about world affairs.

UNIVERSITY AS A CENTER FOR ADULT EDUCATION IN WORLD AFFAIRS

The university in America inevitably has a role in adult education, which seems likely to loom larger as adult education itself becomes more important to our society. In numbers of institutions, the relations with alumni have become increasingly educational—as, for example, the lectures and forums at the meetings of the Associated Harvard Clubs or the special institutes for alumni organized in key cities by Stanford University. In one sense alumni are an adult captive audience for institutions of education. The founding of university presses in an earlier day has now led to university radio and television stations and, even more frequently, university sponsorship of round tables, news summaries, and other educational broadcasts. The extension divisions of universities have grown enormously. The power of the university in shaping public opinion through direct contact with adult citizens as well as by education of the younger citizens is not to be minimized. And, in this role, the distribution of information and ideas about world affairs plays a prominent part.

University policy in respect to adult education, for the most part, is not clearly formulated. Perhaps the most common policy is that of approving the activities of professors as individuals in

adult education about world affairs—so long as the professor does not arouse too much controversy. Encouragement of faculty members to become active in the field is not so common, and the policies involving their doing so are not reduced to written precision as widely as is desirable. In this area academic freedom, academic responsibility, and public relations are all involved. So also is the need of the public for reliable sources of information and counsel on questions of foreign policy having great portent for all of society.


CONCLUSION

The role of the university in respect to world affairs, then, is not simple or easily fulfilled. It involves the entirety of an institution; it is focused on research which advances man's knowledge of other countries and of the relations among countries; it is equally focused on the training of young persons—most of them as leaders in civic and vocational fields on which world affairs have direct bearing, some of them as responsible public officials, some of them as specialists in the further development of international relations as a field of systematic study. It leads, too, to the function of the university as a counselor to society, a voice in the formation of public opinion. In all these capacities, the institution faces complex problems both of policy and of operation. But unless all of them can be realized, the nation's participation in world affairs will be severely handicapped.

Howard E. Wilson, Ed.D., Washington, D. C., is executive secretary of the Educational Policies Commission, which is jointly sponsored by the National Education Association and the American Association of School Administrators, and also consultant for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with responsibility for completing the Endowment's current program in the field of higher education. Dr. Wilson was for seventeen years on the faculty of the Harvard Graduate School of Education. He has been chairman of committees on international relations of the National Education Association and the American Council on Education, served in London and Paris as deputy executive secretary of the UNESCO Preparatory Commission (1946) and subsequently for two terms on the United States National Commission for UNESCO, and represented this country at UNESCO conferences in Mexico (1947) and Havana (1950). He is author of Universities and World Affairs (1951) and coauthor of Learning the Ways of Democracy (1941).

METHODS OF FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION

The following papers and addresses were prepared for a conference on the above topic held in Philadelphia on May 20–21, 1955, under the joint auspices of the University of Pennsylvania and the American Academy of Political and Social Science to commemorate the centenary of the birth on May 21, 1855, of Edmund Janes James, first president of the Academy (1889–1901), first editor of THE ANNALS (1890–1895), and professor of public finance and administration in the Wharton School of Finance and Economy of the University of Pennsylvania and professor of political and social science in the Department of Philosophy (graduate faculty) of the University (1883–1896).



This conference was made possible by a grant from Mr. and Mrs. George E. Frazer, Winnetka, Illinois, daughter and son-in-law of President James.

PROGRAM

Friday, May 20, 1955

LUNCHEON

Welcome by Roy F. Nichols, Vice-Provost and Dean, Graduate School, University of Pennsylvania, and Thorsten Sellin, Acting President, The American Academy of Political and Social Science

FIRST SESSION, 2 P.M. GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Chairman: Robert T. McCracken, Chairman, Board of Trustees, University of Pennsylvania

PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES: *Discussion Leader,* John A. Perkins, President, University of Delaware

PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES: *Discussion Leader,* Carter Davidson, President, Union College

RECEPTION AND DINNER

SECOND SESSION, 8 P.M. GIFT SUPPORT

Chairman: M. Albert Linton, member of Board of Directors of The Academy and Associate Trustee, University of Pennsylvania

ALUMNI SUPPORT: *Discussion Leader,* Ernest T. Stewart, Jr., Executive Secretary, The American Alumni Council

CORPORATION SUPPORT: *Discussion Leader,* Wilson Compton, President, Council for Financial Aid to Education

Saturday, May 21, 1955

THIRD SESSION, 9:30 A.M. PAYMENTS BY STUDENTS

Chairman: Alfred H. Williams, member of Board of Directors of The Academy and Trustee, University of Pennsylvania

TRENDS IN TUITION CHARGES AND FEES: *Discussion Leader,* Herbert S. Conrad, Office of Education, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

HOW MUCH—AND HOW—SHOULD STUDENTS PAY? *Discussion Leader,* John F. Meck, Treasurer and Vice-President, Dartmouth College

LUNCHEON

FOURTH SESSION, 2 P.M. OPERATING COSTS AND UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT

Chairman: Roy F. Nichols, Vice-Provost and Dean, Graduate School, University of Pennsylvania

STANDARDS OF SERVICE: *Discussion Leader,* Harry L. Wells, Vice-President Emeritus and Former Business Manager, Northwestern University

METHODS OF EFFECTING ECONOMIES: *Discussion Leader,* Richard M. Paget, Cresap, McCormick & Paget, Management Consultants

COMMEMORATIVE DINNER

Thorsten Sellin, Acting President of The Academy, presiding

THE CAREER OF EDMUND J. JAMES: Ernest Minor Patterson, President Emeritus of The Academy

FIFTH SESSION, 8 P.M.

Chairman: James C. Charlesworth, President of The Academy

PROSPECTS FOR STRONG AND STABLE FINANCING: Henry M. Wriston, President, Brown University

A REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: John H. Millett, President, Miami University

PARTICIPATING INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY—Hurst R. Anderson, President
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES—W. Terry Wickham, President, Heidelberg College
BOSTON COLLEGE—Thomas Fleming, S.J., Executive Assistant
BOSTON UNIVERSITY—Quentin Leisher, Director of Office of Planning and Development
BROWN UNIVERSITY—Thomas B. Appleget, Vice-President
BRYN MAWR COLLEGE—Charles J. Rhoads, President of the Board of Trustees
CARNEGIE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY—Walter J. Blenko, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees
CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF—Ralph C. Bursiek, Dean of University Administration
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY—W. Emerson Gentzler, Associate Provost
COMMISSION ON INTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools—George A. Brakeley, Vice-President Emeritus, Princeton University
CORNELL UNIVERSITY—Paul L. McKeegan, Controller
COUNCIL FOR FINANCIAL AID TO EDUCATION—Wilson Compton, President
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE—John F. Meck, Vice-President and Treasurer
DELAWARE, UNIVERSITY OF—John A. Perkins, President
SAMUEL S. FELS FUND—Frederick P. Gruenberg, Treasurer
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY—Kevin O'Brien, S.J., Investment Administrator
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY—Charles J. Foley, S.J., Director of University Development
HARVARD UNIVERSITY—James R. Reynolds, Assistant to the President, and Lewis Gard Wiggins, Comptroller
HAVERFORD COLLEGE—William Morris Maier, Treasurer
HOWARD UNIVERSITY—Mordecai W. Johnson, President
ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF—Robert W. Mayer, Chairman, University Senate Budget Committee
INDIANA UNIVERSITY—J. A. Franklin, Vice-President and Treasurer
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY—J. Douglas Colman, Vice-President
LINCOLN UNIVERSITY—Austin H. Scott, Business Manager
MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF—C. L. Benton, Director of Finance and Business
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY—Joseph J. Snyder, Vice-President and Treasurer
A. W. MELLON EDUCATIONAL AND CHARITABLE TRUST—Philip S. Broughton, Assistant to the President
MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE—Merrill R. Pierson, Assistant Comptroller
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE—Samuel S. Stratton, President
NEW HAMPSHIRE, UNIVERSITY OF—Jere Chase, Office of University Development
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY—Gerald P. Burns, Development Office
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY—William S. Kerr, Vice-President and Business Manager
NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF—John J. Cavanaugh, C.S.C., Director of Notre Dame Foundation
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY—Jacob B. Taylor, Vice-President and Business Manager
PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF—Chester E. Tucker, Vice-President for Development and Public Relations
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY—Kenneth R. Erfft, Associate Comptroller, and C. S. Wyand, Executive Assistant to President
PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF—G. S. Rupp, Comptroller
PURDUE UNIVERSITY—Lytle J. Freehafer, Business Manager and Assistant Treasurer
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY—Mason W. Gross, Provost
ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION—Arnold J. Zurcher, Executive Director
SWARTHMORE COLLEGE—Edward K. Cratsley, Vice-President in Charge of Financial Operation and Control
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY—Hugh C. Gregg, Vice-President and Treasurer
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY—Millard E. Gladfelter, Provost and Chairman of the Budget Committee
VERMONT, UNIVERSITY OF—Robert H. Kroepsch, Dean of Administration
VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF—Vincent Shea, Comptroller
WAYNE UNIVERSITY—Olin E. Thomas, Vice-President for Business and Finance
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY—Irvin Stewart, President
WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY—John F. White, Vice-President in Charge of University Development
WISCONSIN, UNIVERSITY OF—William H. Young, Professor of Political Science and Special Budget Assistant to the President
YALE UNIVERSITY—Charles M. O'Hearn, Assistant to the President

The Career of Edmund Janes James

By ERNEST MINOR PATTERSON

EDMUND J. James was born in Jacksonville, Illinois, on May 21, 1855. From 1883 to 1896 he was professor of public finance and administration in the Wharton School of Finance and Economy of the University of Pennsylvania and professor of political and social science in the University's "Department of Philosophy," as its graduate work was then designated. During this period Dr. James organized the American Academy of Political and Social Science, serving as its first president from 1889 to 1901, acting *in absentia* from 1896. He was editor of THE ANNALS from 1890 through 1895, and one of the associate editors thereafter through 1898. He went from Philadelphia to the University of Chicago, was president of Northwestern University from 1902 to 1904 and of the University of Illinois from 1904 until his retirement in 1920. On June 17, 1925, he died in Covina, California.

Any appraisal of Dr. James should be made with a realization of his background. His father was a Virginian, and most of his life was spent in the Middle West. He studied at Harvard University (1874–75) and at the University of Halle for the next two years, receiving there the degrees of M.A. and Ph.D. He was in Philadelphia, as we have seen, from 1883 to early in 1896.

During the early years of his life the Civil War was fought, and the subsequent years were the turbulent ones of the Reconstruction period. The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a time of rapid industrial development —the growth of railways, the introduction of the telephone and the use of electricity, the increasing power of organized labor.

Such changes as these were, of course, accompanied by demands for changes also in economic and political organization and by demands for reform. A greater concentration of labor in industrial centers helped make more effective the organization of the American Federation of Labor, led for many years by Samuel Gompers; the growth of population and the development of the West increased the value of natural resources and aided Henry George with his advocacy of the Single Tax; the decline in prices from 1873 to 1896 meant a larger audience for William Jennings Bryan with his protests against "the cross of gold" and his advocacy of the "free coinage of silver." To some at least Edith Wharton erred in characterizing the eighties as "The Age of Innocence," and the "Gay Nineties" was equally a misnomer.

DR. JAMES AND THE WHARTON SCHOOL

In what ways these great changes influenced the thinking of Dr. James on particular issues only those closely associated with him can say, but his general outlook is clear. From his years in the Middle West, interrupted only briefly (1874–77), he came to the University of Pennsylvania in 1883 with a strong conviction that collegiate education should be modified to provide academic training for young men planning business careers.

His own statement about the "Wharton School of Finance and Economy" in an address before the American

Bankers' Association on September 3, 1890, clearly expresses his views:

> It was these considerations then that determined Mr. Wharton to establish this school. First: the belief that the business classes of our country need a higher training as much or more than any other classes; second, the view that the commercial or business college, however valuable its curriculum, is by its very nature unable to give this higher training; third, that the American college, however real and valuable its higher training, does not in its present form furnish a kind of higher training which appeals to the business sentiment of the community, as is shown by the fact of the small number of youths looking to business careers who enter college.

Because of his outstanding competence he was sent to Europe by the American Bankers' Association and in 1892 submitted a report to its Committee on Schools of Finance and Economy. In this report he gave a careful presentation on higher commercial education in Vienna, Prague, Paris, Leipzig, Antwerp, and Venice and in England.

But Philadelphia was not the Middle West. Most Philadelphia leaders, including the trustees of the University and many members of its faculty, were conservative. Collegiate training with emphasis on economics and political science and with courses in accounting, banking, and business law was not readily accepted. Hostility was common and the leaders of this new movement had to face a strong opposition. In addition to Dr. James mention may be made here of Robert. Ellis Thompson and Simon N. Patten.

Dr. Thompson was dismissed in 1892 and Dr. James in 1896. Dr. Patten remained until his formal retirement in 1917 but he was continually the object of criticism. In his *History of the University of Pennsylvania,* which appeared in 1940, Dr. Edward Potts Cheyney observed:

> The departure of both [James and Thompson] was a serious and unnecessary loss to the University; it has not had too many men of their stature, and neither need have gone if greater reasonableness had been exerted.

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

Dr. James by no means limited his activities to formal undergraduate training. He was a leader in organizing the American Economic Association and served for a time as vice-president and as its president in 1910; he was elected to membership in the American Philosophical Society when only twenty-eight years of age; his leadership in connection with the American Academy of Political and Social Science has already been mentioned.

The American Academy undertook a broader field of work than the American Economic Association and the other societies whose members are primarily specialists in their respective fields and accustomed to a technical terminology and an advanced presentation not easily grasped by the layman. The general public in a democratic society must frequently express itself at the polls and otherwise. Thoughtful presentations at "the college level," to be read by the general business and professional public and representing all leading points of view, were being sought, and the American Academy in its sixty-five years has endeavored to meet that demand. Probably the only closely comparable organization is the Academy of Political Science in New York City, associated with Columbia University.

Starting and operating the American Academy was no easy task. The minutes of the business meetings of those early years reflect the many difficulties —financial and otherwise—that had to be faced and overcome. The struggle was and is a hard and continuing one. Perhaps record should be made of the fact that the American Academy is not a part of the University of Pennsylvania. It has its own Articles of Incorporation and operates independently. Many of its directors, however, are members of the faculty of the University; others are Philadelphians outstanding in business and the professions.

Although Dr. James left Philadelphia in 1896, he continued as president of the Academy until 1901. He was succeeded for a short time by Dr. Samuel McCune Lindsay, who was followed by the late Dr. Leo S. Rowe, who also served *in absentia* from 1917 to 1930. Under different leaders and with political, social, and economic life constantly changing, the Academy of today is of course different in detail from that of sixty years ago. It is a tribute to Dr. James, however, that its basic approach is the same as it was under his guidance.

The conference on Methods of Financing Higher Education is a tribute to him, and the papers there given would have inspired him. The one defect is the absence of Dr. James himself. Had he been present the rest of us would have gained.

THE WHARTON SCHOOL TODAY

First we should like to have seen him in Dietrich Hall, the building now occupied by the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce. Presumably he would be impressed by the size and by the conveniences of the building, but more important would have been his reactions if told that there are now over 2,000 students in attendance, or about 5,000 if there are included those in the Evening School of Accounts and Finance, in the Extension Schools, and in the Graduate Division of Business and Public Administration, all part of the Wharton School.

He would have been welcomed by the faculty and its administrators and by the leaders of the University. The Wharton School has the largest enrollment of the numerous schools of the University. Until 1912 it was not on a par with the other schools but was a part of the College with a director in charge. Since that time it has been under a succession of deans and has multiplied many times the courses offered.

This writer taught for forty years in the Wharton School but in the quiet of retirement is no longer familiar with the many issues now under discussion. But if Edmund James were present his proposals would be most valuable. Probably there would be opposition to him and criticism of him, as was the case years ago. But his ideas about organization and curriculum, even though they were not accepted in full, would be a valuable guide to those who now have the responsibilities for decision and action.

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY—1889 AND 1955

Second, we should like to have shown him the American Academy. Today that organization has a membership between 15,000 and 16,000 scattered all over the world. In addition to sending THE ANNALS to its members, the Academy sells thousands of copies each year to individuals and to organizations. Of one issue only a short time ago 19,000 copies were printed. Today the Academy owns its own quarters not far from the University of Pennsylvania and has a considerable staff of permament employees.

But for the Academy too the world is different from 1889. Communication has changed fantastically in techniques and timing. Some of us can remember the ridicule we heaped on "Darius Green and his flying machine," but today

transportation in the air is commonplace. At a meeting of the Academy a few years ago this writer heard President Beneš of Czechoslovakia addressing us by radio from Prague. As we listened, an engineer present quietly observed that if we were close to the amplifier at the front of the hall we would hear the voice of President Beneš before he could be heard by those who were in the same room with him in the palace in Prague.

In this altered world our traditional habits of thought are undergoing an upheaval, and it is not easy to make the adjustments called for in a rapidly changing society. An enormous number of organizations is today endeavoring to reach the general public. Some are objective in their approach, but many are attempting to influence public thought in ways that will be to the advantage of the groups they represent. Emotions are tense and criticisms are bitter. *Non sequitur*'s are more abundant than ever and the *argumentum ad hominem* is a commonplace. Objective presentations of social issues are increasingly difficult. In many ways the task of the Academy is greater than in the past. Costs are much higher and balancing the budget is far from easy. What Dr. James would propose we cannot know, but we do know that the leaders of the Academy today would welcome his counsel if he were here to give it.

FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION

A third contribution Dr. James could have made in May 1955 is to the subject of the conference on the financing of higher education. This paper has been limited primarily to his contributions to the Wharton School and to the Academy. But from 1902 to 1920 he served as a university president—first of a private and then of a state institution. He would doubtless have been impressed by the magnitude of the financial problems of higher education today, but with his vigorous mind and with his experience as an administrator his contributions would have been great.

We pay tribute to the services of Dr. James and wish we still had his advice and his guidance.

Ernest Minor Patterson, Ph.D., LL.D., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is president emeritus of the Academy, having served as its president from 1930 to 1953. He taught in the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, from 1910 to 1950, and was chairman of the Department of Economics from 1919 to 1932 and of the Graduate Group Committee in Economics from 1919 to 1936. He was vice-president of the American Economics Association (1936), secretary of the American Philosophical Society (1943–48), and an official arbitrator of the American Arbitration Association. He has lectured widely in this country and abroad, and was visiting professor at the Institut universitaire des hautes études internationales, Geneva (1929) and lecturer at the Académie de droit international, The Hague (1931). He is the author of numerous articles and books in the field of economics, including An Introduction to World Economics (1947), and was special editor of many issues of THE ANNALS *during his presidency of the Academy.*

Government Support of Public Universities and Colleges

By JOHN A. PERKINS *

IT is my assignment to consider governmental financial support of public universities and colleges in the United States. To make a sharp distinction between public and private institutions of higher learning, especially on the basis of their means of support, is illusory. American colleges and universities do not lend themselves to such clear-cut classification. Court decision surprisingly declared the University of Maine to be private, although it was "chartered by the state and fostered by it." Harvard, now considered to be the prototype of the private university, was dependent upon public funds from the Massachusetts General Court for its establishment and early maintenance. The first state university, North Carolina, was given considerable impetus by a munificent private gift, and many state universities have come to have sizable endowments. Some public colleges, as do private ones, campaign for funds annually and for special projects sporadically. Private institutions such as Cornell have certain of their schools or colleges heavily subsidized by public money, and such states as Pennsylvania and Maryland regularly appropriate to institutions strictly private in character. Recently federal and state funds for student housing have been made available to private as well as public institutions.

"It takes money to make the mare go." Whether public or private, universities have not found additional dollars needed to do their task adequately. They will, in the future, be even harder pressed for funds, owing to what President Harold W. Dodds of Princeton has so aptly called the coming "Bull Market" in higher education. This tremendous need for funds plus a backlog of financial problems, coupled with the existing tax system and the increasing tendency of wealth in the United States to distribute itself over a large number of people rather than to gravitate to the few, may easily make all our higher education increasingly dependent upon appropriations, tax exemptions, governmental loans, governmental scholarships, and other forms of public largess.[1] Hence, institutions of higher learning, howsoever traditionally classified and supported, are not in a position to be, nor are they apt to be, very selective about the sources of their income. A real danger, to be discussed later, is that both private and public institutions may become so desperate in their scramble for money that some of each genus may be pressed to sacrifice vital elements of independence. The magnitude of the

* In the preparation of this statement, I have had the valuable help of my administrative assistant, Mr. Daniel W. Wood.

[1] The impending situation in enrollments in higher education and the likelihood that government money will be of greater importance seem predictable on the basis of what happened in the 1930's with respect to welfare activities. Before the poverty and distress of the Great Depression became overwhelming, welfare was supported in large measure by private philanthropy. The development of the social service state and the cold war have left us with a heavy tax burden upon wealth, whether accumulated or currently earned. This may make available for higher education even less private help, as has been true in late years in welfare campaigns of the Red Feather–Community Chest variety.

financial problem confronting higher education behooves us all as educators to have as a background some understanding of public higher education and of governmental support of it.

ENROLLMENT CRISIS

While the proportions of the enrollment crisis are generally known, its immediacy and certain aspects of it warrant emphasis. In each of the last three years, college and university enrollments have increased; in 1954, by 10 per cent. The present college generation was born in the low-birth-rate era of the 1930's. These larger enrollments simply represent the increasing percentage of youth going on to college and in no way reflect the increased birth rate since 1940 that brought this country the biggest baby crop ever, 4.1 million in 1954. When children born in the last sixteen years come to college, they will create a problem that cannot be solved by temporary overcrowding such as was done to accommodate the GI's in the 1940's. By 1970 it is predicted that college enrollments for the country as a whole will be up more than 70 per cent, with approximately five million students seeking some alma mater.

Will private institutions expand?

For the great percentage, that alma mater may, of necessity, be a public one governmentally supported. This conclusion is reached after a look at the statistics and after reading statements by leaders of private higher education. For approximately thirty years college students were divided evenly between public and private institutions. In 1953, however, 52 per cent were in public colleges and universities; in 1954, 55.8 per cent. Also, in 1954, 65 per cent of all new students were enrolled in public institutions. Officers of private institutions frequently indicate they have no funds to accommodate greatly increased enrollments. To do so on present resources would jeopardize their traditional quality. Only Chancellor Henry T. Heald of New York University seems to have made an optimistic public statement about potentialities for growth in endowments. Should the added funds be forthcoming, a few private institutions may be willing to expand considerably.

Adherence to present size is defended on other than financial considerations. Officials of the small college imply it is the last hope of quality education and of a truly liberal education. Another implication is that the forthcoming greater enrollments are owing to a willingness on the part of some colleges to lower their standards. Apparently the same percentage of youth born during the recent high-birth-rate period are not expected to be as capable of benefiting from college as those of earlier generations.

BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

Such positions recall some of the reasons public higher education came into being. The first state universities—North Carolina, Virginia, and Michigan—the land-grant colleges after 1862, and the early municipal universities were all the result of new philosophical tenets which rejected, at least in part, the existing tendency to transfer decadent classical scholasticism to American higher education. These tenets still evoke little enthusiasm from those who hold to the tradition that Dr. Benjamin Fine has characterized as "aristocratic and classical." The philosophy that inspired the founders of our public institutions of higher learning is expressed by Thomas Jefferson: "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be." That education must be broadly disseminated for the general welfare of the state, a premise advanced by Diderot, Condorcet, and other men of the French Enlightenment, found ready acceptance among such republicans as Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and George Washington. Our public higher education also has ideological roots in romanticism, which stresses the dignity of man and his infinite worth. This meant full educational opportunity not for everyone but for everyone with the desire and mental ability, whatever his station in life or vocational aim. Higher education was no longer limited to those entering the learned professions. It was opened to those entering the newer vocations, many of which have come to be called "sciences."

Senator Justin S. Morrill, finding the states all too slow in developing opportunities for higher education, brought into being, with President Lincoln's help, laws giving the states grants-in-aid if they would broaden the scope of higher education. This father of the land-grant college system thus explained the whole matter:

> The land-grant colleges were founded on the idea that a higher and broader education should be placed in every state. . . . The design was to open the door to a liberal education for this large class of people [those from the lower and middle classes choosing industrial vocations] at a cheaper cost from being close at hand and to tempt them by offering not only sound literary instruction but something more applicable to the productive employments of life.

The higher education that has so proliferated from this philosophy is largely dependent upon state government for funds. Aside from the Service academies, there are few federal institutions, and only a handful of the four-year colleges are supported by municipalities. Today, institutions which are both land-grant and state universities receive their support from the following sources: state governments, 42.7 per cent; federal government, 13.2 per cent; student fees, 28.5 per cent; endowment and other, 15.6 per cent. Other types of publicly supported institutions such as separate state universities, teachers colleges, liberal arts colleges, and junior colleges receive a higher proportion of their income (as high as 70.4 per cent) from the states. This is particularly true of teachers colleges and junior colleges where student fees are minimal.

EXTENT OF FEDERAL SUPPORT

So far as the education of students is concerned, the federal government's support of public higher education is now relatively small. The Morrill Act of 1862 provided a college in each state with a land endowment of 30,000 acres for each representative and senator. This endowment was to provide for the operating expense of these institutions. State governments were to provide only the buildings and grounds.[2] These colleges were unable to operate on the income thus provided and eventually were given operating appropriations by the commonwealths. Such appropriations have grown steadily, amounting in 1950 to approximately one-half billion dollars. The federal government upon only three occasions authorized an increase in the annual grants to constitute "further endowment" for these colleges for resident instruction: the Second Morrill Act in 1890, the so-called Nelson Amendment in 1908, and the Bankhead-Jones Act in 1935. The total federal money for instructional purposes given to the land-grant colleges from these acts amounted to approximately seven million dollars in 1951–52, only 3.43

[2] House Report (2697, 51st Congress, 1st session, p. 6) states: "The theory of this provision evidently was that the states should furnish the material required for the proposed institutions, while the funds contributed by the United States was intended to make adequate provision for the actual cost of the instruction."

per cent of total expenditures for instruction. This is but a pittance in view of the intention of the original Morrill Act and its affirming amendment.

The federal government has been much more generous in providing money for auxiliary activities within the responsibility of the land-grant institutions, especially for co-operative extension services and agricultural experiment stations. These substantial subventions (close to fifty million annually) are often mistakenly thought to contribute directly to the instruction of students. They most certainly do not. They may even divert limited state appropriations from instruction to these activities supported on a "matching basis." [3]

STATE EXPENDITURES

Because of the extensive development of the grant-in-aid system in many other fields of governmental activity, influence of the federal government upon the fiscal well-being of public higher education of all types has been largely negative. State expenditures for higher education dropped from roughly 10 per cent of all state expenditures in 1915 to only 4 per cent in 1949. This was accompanied by a rise in the percentage of state expenditures on welfare and health programs and highway construction, all of which were greatly stimulated by federal matching grants. Thus, state services supported by federal grants-in-aid gained ground, while public higher education, which enjoyed no substantial federal grants for instruction, fell behind.

[3] The full implications of this point can readily be appreciated by educators in public and private institutions alike. A similar effect is created within the university budgets by another bonanza of the federal government, the research grant which does not carry adequate provision for overhead.

Further, the national government's expenditures, hence its taxes, have increased so rapidly, owing first to the depression and more recently to hot and cold wars, that state taxation, upon which publicly supported higher education ultimately and primarily depends, has not been able to keep pace with state needs. In 1929, federal taxes absorbed 11.4 per cent of the national income; in 1953, 27.4 per cent. In 1929, state governments took 2.3 per cent of the national income. This percentage rose to an all time high of 4.5 in 1937 as the states increased taxes to match federal grants, but this larger state income went to functions other than higher education. Since World War II a tax-conscious public, heavily burdened with federal taxes, has kept state taxes nearer 3 per cent than 4 per cent of the national income. Meanwhile, public higher education has had to share these limited state resources with other activities primarily dependent upon the state and with other governmental services heretofore completely supported by local taxation. Money subvened to local governments by state governments more than doubled in the last fifteen years. Thus, public higher education has been ground between the upper millstone of federal fiscal policy and the nether millstone of state aid to local governments.

PLIGHT OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

It is especially important that there be a greater understanding of public universities at this time. The newly formed federations of independent colleges such as the Empire State Foundation of Independent Liberal Arts Colleges and the penchant of the Council for Financial Aid to Education and at least one great foundation to aid only the private institution may somewhat distort the picture of public higher education.

The financial plight of public higher education is about as serious as that of private higher education. Unfortunately, private colleges, in pleading for the alleviation of their fiscal plight, have made it appear that institutions publicly supported are "in the clover." Realistic appraisal of the situation indicates quite the opposite.

Faculty salaries

While the general working population has enjoyed an increase in real income of over 40 per cent since 1940, teachers in state universities and colleges have suffered a 5 per cent decrease in their real income. The top salaries paid in higher education today, as has always been true, are in the large private institutions, *not* the state universities. The better private liberal arts colleges often pay their faculties better for comparable work than do state institutions. It is misleading to compare salaries of professors in state universities having many professional schools with those in private liberal arts colleges. To compare the atrociously low salaries of a marginal private institution with the pay scales of the University of Michigan is unfair unless at the same time salaries of Salisbury State Teachers College are compared with those of Harvard. To hold and attract quality faculty, private institutions can, if need and daring are commensurate, improve salaries even if it means showing a deficit. Half of the private colleges purport to have such deficits. The state institution must operate within its budget, however inadequate, even at the risk of losing key personnel or hiring people unqualified academically or personally. To ignore a budgetary balance in the public institution is to break the law and invite possible prosecution.[4]

[4] Many states are themselves operating in an unsound fiscal manner with annual operating expenses running in excess of incomes. Between 1946 and 1952, the combined state indebtedness climbed from $17 per capita to $45.

Where appropriations go

Simply to divide the state appropriation of a public institution by the number of students enrolled conveys an illusion of prosperity which does not exist. The state university or college may be compelled by charter to offer so many programs that it cannot operate at a reasonable cost per student. A considerable part of the appropriation may go to agricultural extension and research, the support of geological surveys, and other public services, some tangential and some quite unrelated to undergraduate instruction. Moreover, state institutions usually have more than their share of the costly specialized and graduate curricula such as engineering, medicine, veterinary medicine, home economics, and laboratory sciences. Many state colleges are not permitted to collect tuition and sometimes when they are such fees must be turned over to the state treasury.

Capital needs

Moneys for capital needs of public institutions are as deficient as operating funds. The fact that most institutions have not sufficient space indicates that building construction has not even kept pace with present needs.[5] Since the war, higher education has been expected to house not only the teaching function but a considerable part of the nation's research activity as well. Research has undoubtedly stimulated col-

[5] The President's Commission on Higher Education reported that postwar crowding had resulted in an average of 110 square feet of space per student. The prewar average was 155 square feet and the U. S. Office of Education recommends over 180 square feet per student. Engineering and other laboratory curricula require over 200 square feet per student if adequate facilities are to be provided.

lege teaching, especially where graduate instruction is concerned. But government and other contractors have been reluctant to provide adequate operating overhead and have "sponged" on already limited instructional space with no thought of adding to it. It is not fantastic to suggest that higher education in the next fifteen years will need as much new plant as was built in the previous three hundred years of its history. To summarize the public institution's plight: state-financed higher education already has accepted more students than it can adequately accommodate in either dormitories or classrooms and has added more staff than it can properly compensate.

STATE TAX DIFFICULTIES

The uninitiated might think the answer to future enrollments and adequate financing thereof is simply to raise state revenues and appropriate the money to higher education. Of course it is. What are the difficulties? The chances of raising taxes and securing them for the support of post-high-school education are not good. The reasons are:

First, in spite of the expressed desire to cut federal expenditures, a balanced budget is no longer confidently predicted in Washington. We can expect no great relief from the federal tax burden to make it easier for the states to increase their taxation.

Second, the tax systems developed by the states are in general of the regressive variety and commonly employ direct rather than indirect levies. These features make the taxpayer even more resistant than usual to those "hateful exactions of government" known as taxes.

Third, most taxes are already being imposed at two or three levels of government.[6] This overlapping has been furthered of late by the propensity of states to increase the taxing authority of local jurisdictions.

Fourth, many states are precluded by their constitutions from fully exploiting certain tax sources. During the depression state constitutions were amended to restrict the use of the property tax. Strict court interpretation of so-called uniformity clauses in tax articles have proscribed the use of graduated income taxation in such states as Florida, Illinois, and Michigan.

Finally, special interest groups, dissatisfied with legislative appropriations usually tightly controlled by finance committees, have secured, sometimes by constitutional amendments, the dedication of certain lucrative taxes to their vested interest. This unsound fiscal practice has been justified on the basis of relating the tax collected to the corresponding expenditure, for example, gas taxes for highway construction. Thus, the so-called general funds of many states have been substantially reduced. Legislatures, if they would, are not able to budget for state services on the basis of proportionate need.

STATE GOVERNMENTAL WEAKNESSES

More fundamental than these tax difficulties are some basic weaknesses common to many state governments. These sometimes work against responsible development and execution of public policy even when the need is recognized. Legislatures often overrepresent territory and underrepresent people; therefore, policies desired by the majority often do not prevail. Governors are misnomered chief executives: actually, they commonly share executive leadership with other officials who may thwart the governor's policies but are not themselves held closely accountable by the people. Constitutionally, responsible state leadership is scattered, so that it is easy to ignore pressing problems and difficult to solve them. Under the American governmental system, it is in the state that we find the power centers of the political parties. As a result, state policies and administrations may be occasionally abused if to do so gains advantage for a political party in the ever approaching national elections which determine the grand prize—the Presidency.

[6] The 1954 report of the Committee on Intergovernmental Relations on Overlapping Taxes in the United States explains that 80 per cent of the taxes in the ten major tax categories are collected at two or more levels of government.

PRESSURE GROUPS

Political considerations being uppermost, executive leadership being poorly defined, and legislatures so often being unrepresentative, pressure groups, sometimes more powerful than the state in which they are located, can dominate. Such special interests may thwart an intelligently conceived policy, educational or other, designed for the public good. Corporations, through their lobbyists, sometimes sit on the state tax lid and unwittingly upon public higher education. At the same time, they are so concerned about the general well-being of higher education that in their own interest they make gifts to both private and state institutions.[7] To a certain extent, higher education has commanded unusual respect among politicians. On the other hand, as pressure groups have become more significant and the political maelstrom more turbulent, higher education, which has never developed a parent-teachers' association or similar champion, has had difficulty in securing adequate appropriations.

[7] Private higher education, to its great credit and financial gain, has discovered that corporate wealth obtains the same altruistic satisfaction from philanthropic giving as does the individual who pridefully displays the Red Feather in his lapel for community giving but who invariably gnashes his teeth when confronted with taxes rising from the legitimate costs of the state performing the same or equally vital community services.

PUBLIC SENTIMENT

People in the United States, whatever their political affiliation or economic interest, feel kindly toward higher education. It is within the reach of every man's child. It keeps the country truly a land of opportunity. A few tax facts, however, indicate that this feeling is not accurately reflected in state support of higher education. In 1953, higher education in Idaho and North Dakota was not well enough financed for colleges in these states to be cited as exemplary. Yet these two states reduced their taxes substantially. Delaware barely ranks in the top third of the states in the order of support to higher education, although it has the highest average individual income and the lowest combined state and local tax burden of any of the forty-eight states.

MORE AID FROM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT?

What are the possibilities of the federal government's financing public higher education? From past performance, not great. The federal government is trying to bring its budget into balance rather than add to its expenditures. No feasible plan has even been evolved to aid either students or institutions. Private colleges having indirectly benefited from federal aid to the GI might now oppose a federal aid plan unless they are included. Federal payments to all higher education, when approximately 80 per cent of the private institutions are church related, raise difficulties about the separation of church and state. Without pausing to speculate on the inevitable intricate secular controversy, one is able to predict that the federal budget balancers will use this

issue as a means of escaping still another expenditure burden.

The issue could be avoided, of course, by aiding the student directly. Two points come to mind in this approach. First, the federal government has been willing to aid *veterans*—not students. Second, in aiding veterans who are fee-paying students, the financial dilemma of higher education is not solved. Possibly it is complicated even further. Students, it has been argued, have a tendency to gravitate to those colleges and universities with minimal fees. The United Kingdom has demonstrated the feasibility of a limited program of national scholarships. Scholarships there have been a boon to the student—not the colleges. All British universities have had to receive additional help from Parliament through the University Grants Committee.[8]

NEED OF INDEPENDENCE

This administrative device may nevertheless recommend itself to higher education in the United States. It suggests a way of mitigating the threat to academic freedom implicit in appropriations direct to institutions. In receiving public money, especially federal funds, colleges and their need for autonomy encounter basic theories upon which representative government developed. The power to tax calls for representation. Expenditures from the public purse must be justified and accounted for to the satisfaction of the legally constituted governmental powers that be. These powers, especially when constituting one national government, may not tolerate the freedom that higher education must have if it is to make its inimitable contribution. So far, many state governments, prompted by the competitive situation among themselves and their institutions and between public education and private higher education, have permitted their universities considerable autonomy. Some state constitutions make the university an independent entity. In other states, corporate charters have given public institutions self-government. No such independence is likely to develop vis-à-vis the national government.

As the cost of higher education has risen, even a few of the states have lost sight of its need for autonomy. They have vested in nonacademic agencies certain fiscal controls over higher education. Colleges and universities have been increasingly subjected to control by centralized state purchasing and accounting and by uniform state personnel policies. In a few instances, controls over state printing have required state authorization of scholarly publications. Pre-audit of expenditures enabled a Governor of Florida to block effectively the Board of Control's choice for the university presidency. He threatened to withhold his signature from the salary check of the chosen appointee. Those properly concerned for academic freedom should be much more alarmed over these developments than they are.

To be worth while, learning and the institutions which foster it must be free and uninhibited. For this reason, Americans have been loath to place their schools at any level in a situation in which they might be subjected, either directly or indirectly, to the whims of those who might pervert them to selfish or political ends. It would be tragic to jeopardize higher education purely out of zeal to finance greater educational opportunity. If faced with the choice, we might better have less educational opportunity and maintain freedom. Colgate W. Darden, Jr., President of the University of Virginia, and a former Governor of that commonwealth, in discussing the relationship between higher education and the state said:

> . . . publicly supported educational institutions should not be administered as other branches of the state government because educational activities are quite different from other state operations. While teamwork and close coordination are required [with other state agencies], they are more apt to lead to mediocrity than to progress in educational institutions.[9]

STATE PLANNING

Fortunately, educators are a sanguine lot. Where are the signs of hope?

In the past few years two-thirds of the state governments have had commissions, patterned after the first Hoover Commission, studying their need for governmental reform.

Several states have so far recognized fiscal problems in the offing that they have made studies and reported on the probable pattern of their taxes and expenditures.[10]

All commonwealths are holding conferences to determine the magnitude of the educational job ahead on all levels and the finances which will be needed. These will culminate in the White House Conference on Education in the autumn of 1955.

A few states are taking other appropriate steps more especially related to the future well-being of higher education. Florida, Illinois, and California have pointed the way. In Florida, the Board of Control of Higher Education has employed a competent professional staff to embark on a planning and development program to relate that state's collegiate needs during the next twenty-five years to the industrial, natural, and cultural resources of the state. Illinois and California have initiated state-wide studies on birth rates, anticipated growth in higher education, and the needs resulting from them. The Governor of Michigan has convened the presidents of the publicly supported institutions of higher education there and asked them to develop a comprehensive plan to meet the impact of enrollment increases in the next fifteen years.

INTELLIGENT ECONOMIES

The public money now appropriated for higher education may be made to go even further. To accomplish this, sentiment, vested interest, local pride, and prejudices will need to be put aside for fiscal considerations. Some states have altogether too many state colleges and even with greatly increased enrollments they are not organized to educate their youth properly at a reasonable cost per student. In some states identical but inferior educational programs are offered by several public institutions. Some state-supported educational programs are competing for students among themselves and with well-established programs in private institutions. When students are divided among too many institutions, none of them, be they public or private, can operate at an optimum cost. Meanwhile, other specializations needed by students in a geographical area are ignored altogether.

Some states have committed themselves by law to certain educational programs when there are not enough students or funds to warrant them. Only poor-quality education or high-cost education can result. For example,

[8] A plan before Congress would permit substantial income tax reduction for parents of all college students. Such tax reduction has never been urged as a form of federal aid to colleges and universities, but inasmuch as it would permit them to raise fees, it would, in effect, amount to aid.

[9] See "Summary of Prepared Addresses," 32nd Annual Meeting, Association of Governing Boards, November 15–19, 1954.

[10] The most significant is the Temporary Commission on Fiscal Affairs of State Government of the State of New York, headed by Frederick L. Bird, Director of Municipal Research for Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., which issued its report in January of this year.

experts have estimated that a population of two million is needed to give adequate public support to a medical school. Five states with less than this minimal population are struggling to support accredited medical schools. An expensive-to-operate technical school may be supported by a state long after the state is surfeited, for example, with mining engineers and its minerals depleted. Such programs might well be consolidated with others in engineering to make at least one pre-eminent school of engineering in the state. Low-fee institutions to provide teachers for commonwealths have not altered their fee structure but they have enlarged their programs to become liberal arts colleges and even graduate schools. Half of the degrees they award do not lead to a teaching certificate.

Within each college and university efficient management must be given greater consideration. Respect for academic freedom does not give teaching personnel the right to determine the hour of day at which they will teach, the number of students to be assigned to each class, the number and variety of courses offered, or the number of hours per week to be taught. Management consultant services along with understanding on the part of faculty and administration of the crisis that confronts higher education should stimulate determination to make some internal savings.

POTENTIAL REVENUES

Another hope stems from the apparent ability of the states to support higher education. There is a lack of correlation between tax-paying ability and tax effort. This indicates there are potential revenues to be had for colleges and universities in many commonwealths. Half of the *top* ten states in terms of per capita income are among the *lowest* ten in per capita revenue collected. Nor is there any correlation between the per capita income in the states and the per capita expenditure for higher education. Of the top ten states in terms of per capita income—generally accepted as a satisfactory measure of ability to support governmental services—only California is found in the top ten in terms of support of higher education. If higher education is to face its future with confidence, tax collections must more nearly approximate the ability to pay and the percentage of state expenditures that higher education enjoyed in the 1920's must be regained.

Some additional revenues may be collected even though tax rates are not increased and tax payments in terms of ability are not measurably improved. The President's Council of Economic Advisers estimates a gross national product by 1970 in excess of 500 billion, a gain of 35 per cent. While attainment of this goal may be a boon to higher education, the economy is in turn dependent upon higher education if this growth is to be achieved. Thomas B. McCabe, former chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, suggests that to reach this goal individual productivity will have to be increased 40 to 50 per cent. This will not be done simply by people working harder and in greater numbers. It will be achieved only by better methods and by fundamental and applied research which are the fruits of trained minds in a free society.

VENTURE CAPITAL

The people of the United States must realize that funds for higher education represent the true "venture capital" of the nation. Higher education, whether public or private, must no longer suffer from financial malnutrition. Too much depends upon its well-being. Our problem today is not a lack of sufficient potential resources for higher education. Rather, it is a lack of appreciation of the unique role higher education plays in the nation's future. When this is understood, the funds will be available.

John Alanson Perkins, Ph.D., Newark, Delaware, has been president of the University of Delaware since 1950. He was previously controller, Department of Administration (1948–49), and budget director (1946–48) of the State of Michigan, assistant professor of political science and secretary of the Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, assistant director, International City Managers Association (1945), assistant professor of government, University of Rochester (1943–45), teaching fellow and instructor in political science, University of Michigan (1939–43), and secretary to Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg (1936–37). He is currently a trustee of the Winterthur Museum and a member of the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

DISCUSSION *

In the discussion there was apparent agreement that the division between public and private institutions was artificial, that tax exemption was a form of governmental subsidy shared by privately controlled institutions, and that in many states direct grants-in-aid or contracted services were common among universities and colleges usually referred to as private.

The extraction of funds from state legislatures is increasingly difficult. Tax sources available to states are diminishing under the competition of federal and local cesses. Political problems harass the university official representing the cause of higher education in the state legislatures. In some states, the composition of the legislature is not such as would favor the colleges and universities even though the public as a whole might be more generous. It was pointed out that there is no special pressure group equivalent to the parent-teacher associations interested in promoting general funds for higher education. The few pressure groups available are seeking funds for specialized schools and training programs within the universities.

The question of state interference in the internal affairs of the university was raised, and the conference concluded that except for a few extreme cases, state support has not implied state control in the educational aspects of the school. However, the number of expensive subsidiary services which the school is required to provide vastly complicates the administrative and budgetary problems of state universities. It was felt that there was little chance of introducing an ideal type of state aid such as is exemplified by the British educational grants system, which gives funds for general educational purposes without political control.

* The papers were distributed and were read by the conference participants prior to each of the scheduled sessions. Discussion from the floor was entertained by each of the authors.

This summary of the discussion and all summaries on later pages have been prepared by Dr. Richard D. Lambert, Assistant Editor of THE ANNALS.

Government Support of Private Colleges and Universities

By Carter Davidson

As we look into the history of government support of higher education, we discover that the line between public and private higher education has not always been very strictly drawn. For example, Harvard, Yale, and many other colonial colleges were supported by colonial grants in the early days. Even after the Revolution and the establishment of the Constitution of the United States, the various states made appropriations to colleges which are now considered completely independent. For example, in New York State both Columbia and Union received appropriations from the state legislature during the early years of the nineteenth century. The distinction was sharpened considerably in the year 1816, when the state of New Hampshire tried to make Dartmouth College the state university. This was resisted by the Trustees, and under the leadership of Daniel Webster was successfully fought through the Supreme Court of the United States, resulting in the famous 1819 decision.

Land-Grant Program

A few years later, when the public-lands problem began to grow large upon the horizon, the states felt that one of the best ways of using the public lands was to support higher education; therefore the land-grant program was put into effect. Although grants of land were occasionally made to colleges with private charters, most of these land grants were made to public institutions. In place of the land grant, many private colleges were given complete tax exemption on any land that they might hold within the state. These old "tax-exempt charters" have become very valuable in later years. In 1862, after many years of legislative activity, Senator Morrill of Vermont managed to get through Congress the famous Morrill Act, decreeing that 30,000 acres of the public lands, then largely in the West, be given to each state for each member of Congress from that state, for the establishment of public "land-grant colleges" within all the states of the Union. Apparently the original idea was that these land grants were to serve as endowment, but many of the lands were sold off before they increased greatly in value, and the proceeds were put into buildings and the establishing of the institutions.

Cornell University, which considers itself a combination of a private institution and a state college, has profited most from the land-grant endowment. In addition to Cornell, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Vermont, and Rutgers University, all of which were considered private universities, were included under the land-grant provisions. It is interesting to note that within recent years both Rutgers University and the University of Vermont have been formally taken over in toto by the State of New Jersey and the State of Vermont respectively as their state universities. In at least two cases out of four, therefore, the granting of federal governmental support through the land grant has led eventually to the taking over of the institution by the state. All

other land grants were made to state universities or to establish new "state colleges" throughout the nation. These were supplemented by grants from the federal government in 1887 for the establishment of agricultural experiment stations, and appropriations beginning in 1890 for annual support of the program, particularly in agriculture.

Reserve Officers' Training Corps

Aid from the federal government to higher education has been definitely "programmatic"; through the Morrill Act, aid has been given for the development of agricultural and mechanical education, with the later addition of home economics. In 1918, in the emergency of World War I, the federal government established a Student Army Training Corps, which lasted only a few months, but was then reorganized as the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, on the campuses of both public and private institutions. It was required, however, that all land-grant colleges should have the ROTC. Previous to World War I the federal government had, of course, supported the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and the United States Military Academy at West Point, and had given encouragement to military schools in the individual states. The purpose of the Reserve Officers' Training program, however, was not to help the colleges financially, but to provide trained manpower for the armed forces. It was usually necessary for the colleges to supply the buildings and secretarial assistance for the ROTC programs, though the government paid the salaries of the faculty members who were sent in from the armed forces personnel. The ROTC arrangements have worked fairly satisfactorily for thirty-seven years, since World War II in an expanded form.

National Youth Administration

Seeking to solve the problems of unemployed youth during the depths of the depression, the federal government established in 1934 the National Youth Administration, which continued for nine years to pay modest wages to boys and girls attending colleges and universities, as well as to some attending high school, for part-time work which they did in connection with their college duties. During the nine years that this program was in operation 620,000 students received aid amounting to more than $93,000,000. The colleges provided the supervision of the work without extra compensation, a very satisfactory arrangement, although it may have given some faculty members a habit of relying upon student assistance. I served for several years as an NYA co-ordinator on a college campus, and I must say that it helped many students to go to college who would otherwise have been unable to attend.

Effects of Prewar Federal Aid

As we look back over these activities of the government before World War II, we see certain patterns emerging. Perhaps as a result of the land-grant program, the federal government now has a practical monopoly over all agricultural education. Could it be said that as a result the farmers trained in these land-grant colleges are more amenable to federal assistance in the total agricultural program than they would have been if their education had not been supported by the federal government? ROTC programs on our campuses have certainly modified the curricula at many colleges, and at times the granting or withholding of an ROTC unit has been used as a club to force colleges into changing their require-

ments or even increasing their enrollments. The NYA program was discontinued in 1943 because World War II did away with the unemployment problem among American youth.

STATE AID

There have been interesting experiments in the various states of the Union to give state aid to the independent colleges. Before 1942 and the outbreak of World War II, the chief state aid to private higher education was the privilege of tax exemption, though in some states, such as New York and Minnesota, there was a modest program of state scholarships which could be used at either the private or public institutions. In New York State the state government established "contract colleges" of forestry at Syracuse University and of ceramics at Alfred University, in addition to the contract colleges at Cornell. More recently this formula has been modified by the establishment of the State University of New York, which includes all these contract units. Some are, however, still operated in cooperation with the independent colleges. Pennsylvania, in addition to supporting Pennsylvania State University and a number of teachers colleges, has been making annual appropriations to the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Pennsylvania, and Temple University, particularly for medical education. Virginia made appropriations to the College of William and Mary for teacher education, and now lists that institution as one of its state teachers colleges. California has located tax-supported junior colleges on the campuses of independent senior colleges, as at Stockton.

FEDERAL PROGRAMS SINCE WORLD WAR II

These and other experiments were pushed into the background when World War II descended upon us. Under the stimulus of the defense program, the federal government began to pour billions of dollars into educational and research programs; they were, however, still programmatic in nature. For example, in the year 1950 there were nineteen federal departments which were carrying on educational programs; namely, the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, Justice, Commerce, the Treasury, Agriculture, and the Interior, and the United States Maritime Commission, the Federal Works Agency, the Veterans Administration, the Federal Security Agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Atomic Energy Commission, the War Assets Administration, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. It should be emphasized once again that these programs were established, not in order to give financial aid to the educational institutions, but in order to provide services to the departments of the federal government concerned.

Veterans Administration educational program

Of all these programs the largest in number of individuals affected and in its total cost was, of course, the Veterans Administration program of education for those who had been in the armed services. Through Public Law 16 those veterans who had been in any way incapacitated by military service were given an opportunity to rehabilitate and prepare themselves for useful occupations. The stated purpose of Public Law 346 was to enable the veteran to make up for the time lost in military service, upon the assumption that his education had been interrupted by the war. Although it is true that the great increase in student enrollment threw a heavy burden upon all institutions, it was at the same time an unprecedented opportunity for service and for growth for many institutions which desired to expand. The formula of paying tuition fees plus a maintenance allowance enabled the independent colleges to charge fairly high tuition fees without severe handicap to the veterans.

The program had many good points, including freedom of choice of the institution attended, but it would be willful blindness on our part if we indicated that there were no difficulties involved. Dozens of meetings were held between representatives of the Veterans Administration and of the colleges and universities to try to iron out misunderstandings on a variety of questions, such as the equitable definition of a "change of course," the out-of-state tuition charges made by state institutions, the delays in payments, the suitability of certain courses for college credit, and the restrictions placed upon colleges because of the flagrant abuses by "fly-by-night" institutions below the college level.

Out of some of these difficulties came the regulations of Public Law 550, for the education of veterans of the Korean conflict, which made all payments direct to the veteran so that he would himself control the tuition charge and maintenance allowance. Some private colleges have insisted that the form of Public Law 550 has forced many veterans to attend public rather than private institutions to make their allowance cover the cost. To this the government can answer that P. L. 550 is "programmatic," intended to help the veteran, not the college.

Training of federal employees

Since World War II the federal government has continued to use private universities and colleges for in-service training of federal employees, including a large number of those in the armed services who are sent there while on active duty for training in particular fields. During the year 1950, there were more than 60,000 such federal employees receiving training in American colleges. In selecting these institutions, the federal government seems not to discriminate against the private institution.

Contract research

In the area of contract research, the war stimulated government grants for this purpose, and they have grown rather than decreased since the end of hostilities. In addition to the major installations such as Los Alamos and the Argonne Laboratories, for which the government has contracted with the University of California and the University of Chicago respectively, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission are spending over $100,000,000 a year on research projects, and the majority of these are in private rather than in public institutions. The United States Public Health Service is spending over $11,000,000 a year, most of this in the private medical colleges. The National Science Foundation, which eventually may spend $15,000,000 and whose program may become a permanent part of our national picture, has also made grants without discrimination to private institutions and to individuals studying in private institutions. As a result, over two hundred institutions are carrying on research on contract from the federal government for over $132,000,000 a year, this amount constituting more than 70 per cent of all the research being carried on in these institutions.

The question might well be raised as to whether such a large amount coming from the federal government on the basis of annual appropriations does not make the colleges and universities heavily dependent upon the ups and

downs of the federal budget. The institutions are also handicapped in the employment of personnel for these research projects, since tenure as members of the faculty cannot be granted to these men and women, yet they may be on the university staff for a long period of years, so that a moral obligation is established. The Public Health Service has also made grants for teaching, particularly in the fields of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and psychiatry, which have done much to improve the teaching in the medical schools, but which have made the medical school budgets heavily dependent upon this support. Withdrawal of such grants would create a crisis in the budgets of most of the medical schools of the country. Although the private colleges are inclined to complain about the uncertainty of federal grants for research, they are the first to admit that without these grants the amount of research going on on our college campuses would be greatly reduced, and progress, particularly in scientific fields, would be slowed down immeasurably.

Surplus supplies

Toward the end of the war the armed forces discovered that they had vast amounts of supplies which were in surplus, and they began offering these, either as gifts or at a great discount in price, to the colleges and universities. The various offices of distribution in the country seemed to have different policies for distribution, and as a result some institutions profited greatly while others were left out entirely. Eventually these discrepancies were alleviated, and today the distribution seems to be a fairly equitable one throughout the land. Many colleges have equipped their shops and laboratories with such surplus equipment, and there are still billions of dollars worth of it awaiting distribution. It is to be hoped that the federal government will exercise wisdom in this distribution, to see to it that not merely the squeaky wheels are greased but that those institutions which can make the best use of the materials and are in greatest need of such help are adequately supplied.

Housing

When the veterans in their millions descended upon the campuses in 1946, housing was such a severe problem that the federal government had to step in and erect many temporary dwellings as dormitories for single students and apartments for married veterans. Through the Public Works Administration there were also a number of classroom buildings erected for the use of the veterans. Most of these were temporary structures, and many have now been demolished or are approaching demolition. Others will probably remain on our campuses for many years to come.

To take care of the problems of permanent housing, Congress passed a bill in 1950 authorizing the Housing and Home Finance Agency to lend up to a maximum of $300,000,000 to the colleges and universities of the country for the erection of dormitories on a long-term loan basis at a very low rate of interest. To date about half this amount has actually been taken up by the colleges, and the rest will undoubtedly be used as it is released by the federal authorities. This aid has gone to private institutions in the main, because the public colleges can issue their own tax-exempt bonds at a rate of interest lower than that provided by the federal government.

Income tax deduction

Congress has given further help to private education by increasing the percentage which can be deducted from personal income, in reports to the government for tax purposes, by those individuals who wish to contribute to charity. As yet the results of this increase in percentage have not been clearly visible. Modifications have also been made in the dependency regulations for federal income tax to enable the student who is in college to work in the summer and during term time and still be considered a dependent of his family.

EMERGENT QUESTIONS

As we look back over the happenings of the last fifteen years in the United States, we must ask ourselves several very basic questions about the effect of federal policy upon our private institutions. Is the gradual shifting of our total college enrollment away from the private institutions to the public institutions due to the aid being given by the federal government to tax-supported land-grant institutions? Does the fact that twelve private universities, the California Institute of Technology, the University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell University, Harvard University, the Illinois Institute of Technology, Johns Hopkins University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, the University of Rochester, and Stanford University, plus five state institutions, the University of California, the University of Illinois, Iowa State College, the University of Michigan, and the University of Minnesota, received almost 90 per cent of all the money given in contract research indicate that the federal government is interested in encouraging the larger institutions at the expense of the smaller, the universities at the expense of the undergraduate colleges, or could it be argued that the programs of use to the federal government can be carried out only in the larger and more fully developed professional and graduate schools? Is it fair to say that the federal government seems to be interested only in vocational and professional educational services rather than in the liberal arts? Is the heavy stress on the sciences and engineering justified in view of the major social problems with which our civilization is faced? Can the government reduce its stress upon applied science and give more attention to basic scientific research?

PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE FEDERAL AID

These questions and others like them lead us to a consideration of various proposals which have been made for future federal aid to private education. Public Law 346 and 550 veterans will soon disappear from our campuses. What will be the pattern of the future?

What concerns are national?

As we look to the future we ask ourselves, "What concerns in the educational area are not national in nature?" If we accept the argument that since there was no mention of education in the federal Constitution all educational matters should be left on the local level, then the programs previously described, such as the land-grant college program, are hard to justify. Our past experience would suggest that the federal government should not grant aid to education except to carry out a program which is distinctly federal in nature and of direct assistance to the federal government, such as contract research and the rehabilitation of war veterans. There is a strong feeling that if we do not stick to this principle of programmatic aid there will be no limit to the invasion of local autonomy by federal activities. To avoid this possibility, some have suggested that the federal aid should not be given to individuals or to institutions but to states, who would then distribute it to individuals and institutions. Although this

may seem to avoid federal interference, is it not really a subterfuge? Does this not merely multiply the problems by forty-eight or more, as local conditions and prejudices enter into the picture? Would a state-administered veterans-aid bill have been better or worse than what we have experienced? Will the issue of the separation of church and state, which is already rearing its head in New Jersey and elsewhere, make it impossible for state authorities to grant aid to denominational colleges?

Is medical education, which has often been pointed out as an area of federal concern, really a special case? True, there is a United States Public Health Service, but if the principle of making medical education a national concern is accepted, could not the same case be built up for teacher education or engineering or business administration or social work or political science? Is federal aid to medical education merely a back door to the nationalization and socialization of all medical services? The mere fact that medical education is in a more desperate financial condition than some other forms of education hardly seems justification for calling in the federal-emergency pulmotor.

State need as a basis

Does the argument really hold water that since some of our states are unable to take care of their educational needs alone the federal government must step in? In any given year it might be shown that Mississippi and Arkansas are having a harder time than New York or California to see a high percentage of their young people through high school and into college, but are these differences so permanent in nature that they must be treated by federal surgery? It has been argued that changes in the economy during the last ten years have revised the picture of the needy areas very markedly. It is also argued that the less wealthy states could take care of their educational needs more satisfactorily if they would revise their tax structure in the direction followed by some of the more wealthy states.

Pressure toward federal scholarship program

Ever since the publication in 1947 of the six-volume report of the President's Commission on Higher Education, entitled *Higher Education for American Democracy*, the major pressure for federal aid to higher education has been in the direction of a federal scholarship program to increase the percentage of young people of college age in attendance at our American institutions. The President's Commission argued that 49 per cent of the age group seventeen through twenty-one have the intellectual ability to finish the junior college level of education, and 32 per cent have the ability to finish the four years of college or specialized professional education. The achievement of these percentages would bring about an immediate doubling of the number of students in college, and as our population increases would step the figure up even higher. The President's Commission felt that the chief deterrent to entering college for this age group was financial and that therefore the only means by which the percentage could be increased would be a system of scholarships. It believed that scholarships from private sources would be inadequate to meet the need, and that therefore the federal government would be the only possible source from which such scholarships could come. This report stirred up great debate among educational leaders, but no action has as yet been taken by Congress, because Public Law 346 kept our colleges more than filled to the end of 1950, and in that year, just as the discussion of a federal scholarship program was growing warm, the Korean conflict broke out, which has kept the federal government in the student-aid business ever since. Now that Public Law 550 is going to come to an end the agitation has begun again that we should use these two great veteran scholarship programs as models upon which to build a citizen's scholarship plan. There is no doubt whatever that many colleges are in favor of a federal scholarship program. A survey made by the National Education Association in 1949 reported that 83 per cent of the private colleges and 80 per cent of the public colleges approved of the program.

How great is the need?

Let us ask ourselves some pertinent questions. Do a very large number of able and interested students now actually remain away from our college campuses because of their financial inability? Frankly, this is rather hard to believe in a period of high levels of family income, unprecedented savings in banks and government bonds, opportunities for summer employment and for part-time employment during the college year, millions of dollars in unused college loan funds, and the recent heavy growth of scholarships sponsored by private corporations and foundations. It was estimated by the Commission on Financing Higher Education that in 1949–50 124,000 undergraduate students were receiving over $27,000,000 in scholarships. A study reported in the April 1955 number of the *Educational Record* by Mr. John N. Schlagel indicates that in twenty-five selected colleges and universities during the year 1952–53 there had been an increase of more than a 100 per cent in the scholarships over a four-year period. We can infer, then, that there is certainly more than $50,000,000 in scholarships being distributed through the colleges themselves to students during the current year. In addition, there have been millions of dollars set up by corporations, such as the Ford Motor Company, Union Carbide, and General Motors, to supplement the college scholarships. The legislature of New York State has just doubled the number of state scholarships of $350 a year awarded each May to graduating seniors. This year 3,388 new scholarships will be awarded, plus 300 special scholarships for nurses.

Do we have clear proof that such philanthropy is going to be insufficient to meet the need for student aid in the years ahead? Is it not true that many of the students who stay away from college do so not for lack of money but for lack of motivation? If we assume that the average cost of attending a college in this country for a year is $1,200, does it not seem reasonable to expect that the family or relatives or friends should put up one-fourth of this amount? One-fourth could come from the student's savings or summer earnings, one-fourth from earnings during the college year, and the final fourth from either a scholarship or a loan. Although it may be pleasant for a student to go to college without any responsibilities other than study and enjoyment of extracurricular activities, there has been abundant proof that a limited work load of not more than fifteen hours a week can be carried without damage to either the academic record or the participation in student affairs. Although a student might hesitate to go heavily in debt in order to start college, there is good reason why, as he approaches graduation and employment, he should be willing to finance his college education at least in part on loan funds. These loan funds are usually set up so that the rate of interest is very low indeed and often does not become effective until a year or two after the student has been graduated.

Is not the proper way to help more

students through college to give the aid to students who really need it rather than to those whose parents want the prestige of a prize scholarship award or whose families feel they need a new automobile or television set more than they need a college education, or to athletes who think that the world owes them a free education? Would it not be better to work out an integrated program of aid for students who wish to go to college by which they will use family and personal savings during their first year to get started and then will gradually move over into the field of work and loans to finish the job? The Commission on Financing Higher Education felt that if all our present resources were sufficiently utilized, there would be very few able and properly motivated students who could not attend college, and for these very few other states of the Union might very well follow the pattern set by New York State.

Federal scholarships—proposals and objections

In the 1950 Congress, Senator Thomas and Representative Barden introduced a bill for a federal scholarship program. Similar bills have been introduced into succeeding Congresses with some modifications in the direction of defense-related aid. The Thomas-Barden bill prohibited federal control of the educational institutions to which the students went and placed the administration of the program in the hands of the Commissioner of Education, with the aid of an advisory council of twelve members. No discrimination was to be allowed on the basis of race, color, or creed, but awards were to be made on scholastic merit and stipends were to be granted only if financial need could be established. An appropriation of $15,000,000 per year per class would allow 75,000 students to be assisted with an average of $800 a year in outright scholarships, which could be supplemented by loans up to $2,400 in a four-year period, to be repaid within ten years after graduation.

This bill and others since have been attacked on the basis that they open an avenue for political favoritism toward groups in society or toward favorite institutions. It has also been argued that any system of scholarship tests would obviously militate against those students who had attended the poorer secondary schools and might result in injury to minority groups. Others have felt that subsistence allowance should be separated from tuition allowance, so that the student would have more freedom of choice of the institutions he might attend. In order to avoid the dangers of state politics, President Milton Eisenhower, of Pennsylvania State University, has advocated the prorating of these scholarships among colleges and universities on the basis of their enrollment, leaving the award and administration of the scholarships up to the institutions. This would be following the pattern used by the National Youth Administration during the depression. Others have advocated that the NYA work grant is a good pattern to follow, but the fear of federal control of the colleges still lies at the bottom of much of the opposition. The report of the President's Commission stated as follows:

> Sound public policy demands that the state be able to review and control educational policies in any institution receiving public funds. The acceptance of public funds and thereby public control by private institutions would tend to destroy the competitive advantages and free inquiry which they have established and which are so important in providing certain safeguards to freedom.[1]

[1] United States, President's Commission on Higher Education, *Higher Education for American Democracy* (Washington, D. C., 1947), Vol. V, p. 58.

British grants to universities

Some friends of federal scholarships have wondered whether we might not learn a lesson from the British, who through the University Grants Committee have been making national grants direct to the British universities over a considerable period of years. Today the British universities are largely dependent upon these grants. A study made by President Dodds and others for the Commission on Financing Higher Education reported, however, that although this program had worked well for the British universities, it was not one for export to the United States, where the number of institutions was so much greater and local political pressures were much more common.

CHANGE IN DIRECTION IMPROBABLE

In conclusion, it would be fair to say that a change in federal policy in the direction of outright grants to private educational institutions for support of the liberal arts rather than the practical sciences and of scholarship grants to students on the basis of academic ability and need rather than on the basis of service to the armed forces or other federal agency would mark a severe break with the past. At the present moment such a change does not seem likely to come about.

Carter Davidson, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., L.H.D., D.Sc., Schenectady, New York, has been president of Union College (Schenectady) and chancellor of Union University (Albany) since 1946. He was president of Knox College from 1936 to 1946, after ten years of college English teaching. President Davidson was chairman of the Board of the Empire State Foundation of Independent Liberal Arts Colleges, president of the New York State Association of Colleges and Universities, and member of the Committee on Relations between the Federal Government and Higher Education and of the Board of Trustees of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. He was a member of the Commission on Financing Higher Education (1949–52). He is coauthor of Poetry: Its Appreciation and Enjoyment (1934) and Colleges for Freedom (1947).

DISCUSSION

The conference was concerned about a growing tendency in local governmental bodies to whittle away at the areas of tax exemption open to institutions of higher education. Although some of the participants felt that the private institutions were not exploiting to the fullest extent their power to acquire tax-exempt real estate, others urged caution and tact in the use of this device. Pointing out that the purchase of tax-free real estate was a hidden form of subsidy without governmental control and at the discretion of the institution, they argued that the public frequently objected strenuously to the acquisition of new properties under the tax-exempt clause and that educational institutions are usually defeated in long, expensive legal battles. In some municipalities, laws have been passed to bar further removal of property from the tax list by requiring a local vote to exempt real estate purchases by educational institutions. As a result, the private colleges have at present mixed holdings of taxable and tax-exempt properties. Nevertheless, it was felt that endowments of real estate taken over tax free are a fruitful means of combating growing deficits.

The conference raised a number of detailed objections to state and particularly to federal programs purportedly in aid of higher education. The federal government, it was alleged, is interested only in specific services and programs such as ROTC, agricultural extension, and contract research

rather than in general education. Under the "general welfare" clause in the Constitution the way was legally open for more general support. The discussion leader enumerated a series of difficulties experienced by colleges in dealing with federal government programs. Nineteen different federal agencies conduct separate programs in the colleges, and each is eager to have its program isolated from those of other governmental departments. They further insist on taking a direct hand in the educational administration of these programs and require short-run and highly visible evidence of success. Of all the programs, the NYA drew the most praise, inasmuch as the funds were given directly to the colleges to dispense in student aid. Some objected that NYA was a made-work program and did little to assist the colleges themselves.

There was a strong feeling among some members of the group that government aid, in particular federal aid, was not only unsought by the privately controlled schools but was potentially damaging. Scholarship aid to individual students, unless it is accompanied by supplemental grants to the institution, covers only a fraction of the expenses of educating the student, and the school has to bear the rest of the financial burden.

Opinion was divided on the desirability of the proposed federal scholarship scheme. It was argued that present resources were adequate and that the resulting governmental bureaucracy required to select and administer the scholarships would spend three dollars for a task the private institutions could do for one dollar. Moreover, the tendency of control to follow funds appeared inescapable. Others felt that there was no other way to handle the forthcoming "Bull Market" in higher education.

Opinion was also divided on the contribution that contract research is making to financing higher education. It was felt to be particularly useful where graduate students were numerically high in ratio to the total student body, for contract research is a form of subsidy for graduate training. Otherwise, it frequently does not adequately cover operating expenses. The emphasis in contract research is heavily on the technological and applied sciences rather than on basic research. There are variations among the different contracting agencies. The Office of Naval Research in particular is more likely to finance basic research than most other governmental divisions. However, so long as the governmental agency itself carries a practitioner's label, on occasion it was free to sponsor essential liberal arts and humanistic studies.

Opinion was uniformly favorable to the proposed legislation granting tax deductions to families who were supporting college students.

It had been anticipated that the change of the GI Bill provisions under Public Law 550 would operate to induce veterans to select public colleges and universities where tuitions are considerably lower than in private institutions of equal status. In the case of four-year colleges, surveys do not bear this out, although a long-term trend in the direction of state schools has continued.

The discussion leader listed several other questions which were of interest, but could not be debated in the time available:

1. Would there be any improvement in programs if federal government programs for higher education were handled by the states?

2. Is there any justification for the heavy emphasis on financing medical education to the exclusion of others?

3. How justifiable is the expenditure of federal funds to support higher education in the so-called "needy states"?

4. Why do not state institutions increase tuition charges to lower the general tax burden and equalize the competition between public and private colleges?

Alumni Support and Annual Giving

By ERNEST T. STEWART, JR.

IN its efforts to further the cause of the annual alumni fund, the American Alumni Council may well have done a disservice to itself and to our college and university alumni. For in reporting the steadily rising total of gifts to such funds, we have conveyed the impression that these amounts represent the sum total of alumni support. Lost sight of are the millions of dollars which alumni bequeath or give outright each year to colleges and universities for new buildings, increased endowment, or other capital purposes. Only as we recognize that these gifts too represent alumni support do we gain the proper perspective on this major element of educational philanthropy.

For every dollar contributed by alumni through the annual funds, at least two alumni dollars reach the institutions directly or through other channels. Such are the findings of the latest American Alumni Council Fund Survey, which, for the first time, has made a determined effort to uncover and publicize the figures for total alumni support. Though some of the 352 institutions reporting did not have adequate records to provide a complete figure, most could give the desired totals and others agreed to report in the future. So it is that two-dollar totals are receiving equal billing this year: $21,619,035 as the amount contributed in 1954 by 791,008 alumni (20.3 per cent of those solicited) to their annual funds, and $62,902,852 as the total of alumni support to these institutions. (About one-fourth of the degree-granting colleges and universities are included in the report.) It may well be true that the beneficiaries of higher education are not yet fully facing their financial responsibilities. Nevertheless, the figures are gradually being made available that ensure fairer evaluation of the share of educational philanthropy represented by alumni support.

Though the American Alumni Council takes pride in its yearly survey, it faces real difficulties in reconciling individual reports. Some colleges use the alumni fund as the receiving agency for all current gifts from whatever type of donor, be it parent, friend, church, or corporation. Some assign to the fund all alumni contributions of whatever type, including bequests and capital gifts. The diversity that characterizes our system of higher education applies equally to the fund-raising approaches and bookkeeping systems in use on the various campuses. In general usage, however, the terms "alumni fund" and "annual giving" are synonymous; each is defined as a plan under which substantially all of an institution's alumni are solicited for contributions every year, in whatever amount the individual chooses to give and usually for unrestricted purposes or for operating expenses. Since these are for the most part recurring gifts, the funds live up to their description as "living endowment." In his forthcoming book on *How to Raise Money for Higher Education*, John A. Pollard cites the $21,619,035 figure of the 1954 survey and observes:

> If this annual giving were capitalized at 5 per cent, it would represent roughly $430,000,000, or about one fourth of the aggregate endowments now possessed by all of America's colleges and universities.

1954 SURVEY

In this 1954 survey, the reporting institutions were listed by types of institutions. Here are the statistical highlights of the eight groups.

The 140 private coeducational institutions reporting received $7,846,280 from 18 per cent of the alumni solicited. An additional $9,629,514 contributed by graduates and former students was not credited to their funds, bringing the total of alumni giving to $17,475,795.

The 62 private men's institutions were close behind in fund gifts, with $7,676,568 from 36 per cent of the alumni. Total alumni giving, however, was far larger, reaching $29,520,350.

The 51 private women's colleges reported $2,403,568 from 35.4 per cent and $5,939,921 all told.

Though only 7.2 per cent of their alumni responded to the appeals, the 37 state universities and land-grant colleges barely trailed the women's institutions in both categories, with $2,177,106 and $5,895,249.

The other four groups, in order of their dollar totals in alumni fund contributions, were: 27 secondary schools with $735,487; 10 Canadian universities with $430,413; 14 other tax-supported institutions with $265,749; and 11 junior colleges with $83,864.

In the matter of individual performances, private universities in the East once again tended to dominate the so-called honor rolls based on the Fund Survey. By combining the totals of its various graduate schools with the College results, Harvard emerged on top in the category of alumni gifts to the fund with $1,233,448. Yale continued over the million dollar mark in second place, followed by Notre Dame, Columbia, Princeton, Dartmouth, Vassar, Wellesley, Cornell, and Stanford in that order. Harvard, with 30,402 alumni contributors, also led that honor roll, with Yale once again in second place. Ohio State, Princeton, Dartmouth, Pennsylvania, Cornell, New York University, Smith, and California followed. Princeton edged Dartmouth for honors in percentage of alumni participation, with 67.9 per cent to Dartmouth's 67.7 per cent. Other colleges up among the leaders were Mount Holyoke, Regis, Amherst, Connecticut, Jefferson Medical, and Worcester Polytechnic Institution. Because of a large bequest from George Davison, Wesleyan with $7,030,291 led all others in total alumni giving during the year. Harvard, Cornell, Yale, Smith, Princeton, Union, Dartmouth, Rutgers, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology shared the remaining places on the honor roll.

LANDMARKS IN ALUMNI GIVING

Even though the major share of alumni support still comes through other channels, the growth of alumni funds and of the annual-giving concept has been encouragingly steady. Seventeen years ago, when the annual survey began, only eighty-six funds were known to exist; these reported a total of $2,815,130 in annual gifts. As for the future, most observers probably agree with Dr. Wilson Compton of the Council for Financial Aid to Education, who believes that alumni fund giving will, by 1970, exceed $100,000,000 annually as it "becomes more general, more systematic, and more dependable as a major continuing form of support of higher education."

The organization of the first alumni association, at Williams College, dates back to 1821, and beginnings of many other features of this distinctly American contribution to education are found in the records of the next half century. Yet in times of financial difficulty it was the trustees and not the graduate groups who were counted on to make up the deficits. Just before the turn of the century, however, a few imaginative and resourceful leaders at Yale University found the key that was to open the door to alumni support. James E. Armstrong of Notre Dame puts it this way: "College presidents wrote all the chapters of the old testament of fund raising in the first 250 years of financing higher education in this country. Then Yale discovered the alumni."

It was as early as 1870 that a Yale professor, William Graham Sumner, put forth the novel argument that college graduates felt under obligation to their alma mater for their education and might be willing to do something about it. In elaborating his views, he wrote:

> Many can never pay the debt; a few can become munificent benefactors. There is a very large number, however, between these two, who can, and would cheerfully, give according to their ability in order that the college might hold the same relative position to future generations which it held to their own. The sense of gratitude, the sense of responsibility, the enlightened interest in the cause of education, which are felt by these men, constitute a source which has never yet been tried, but which would yield richly.

Twenty years later Yale alumni decided to put this theory to the test. In a pamphlet mailed to all Yale men in 1890, a group of leaders reported the establishment of the Alumni University Fund Association in the following terms:

> A widespread sentiment has existed for some time among Yale graduates in favor of some systematic endeavor to increase the resources of the University. While opinions may have differed somewhat as to terms, the fundamental idea common to all plans suggested has been to seek contributions from the largest possible number of alumni, to be continued yearly at the will of the givers and to be devoted preferably to University uses as distinguished from special uses of any departments.
>
> The special feature of this effort to benefit our University, in which it differs from all previous efforts, is that it not only furnishes an opportunity to accumulate principal, the income of which can be used as it is needed, but especially invites annual contributions which, continued from year to year as the majority of them are likely to be, will themselves form the income of what may be fairly deemed a permanent endowment and an income which can be immediately applied to current needs.

Thus was born annual alumni giving, heralded by some today as "the very rock on which all other giving must rest."* Its virtues were slow to gain recognition, however, and it was fifteen years before Yale reached the $104,500 goal it had originally set and nearly twenty-five years before similar fund operations were set up on other campuses—at Brown, Union, Illinois, Cornell, Dartmouth, and Wesleyan. And even today, sixty-five years after that pioneering step, less than a third of our colleges and universities appear to have made a serious effort to establish and operate an alumni fund.

After 1890, the next important date in recording the development of alumni support is 1904–5, when the Harvard alumni responded to a challenge from President Eliot to increase endowment funds for faculty salaries and allowances, and raised $2,400,000 in one year. About two thousand contributed in response to personal interviews and to letters and circulars sent to all graduates. It was the most successful capital fund effort that had yet been organized for an educational institution and was the first to go over the million dollar mark. A year later another bench mark was laid when Harvard's Class of 1881 made a twenty-fifth anniversary or reunion gift of $113,777 to the University, the income to be used for unrestricted purposes. Soon after that Princeton's Committee of Fifty, organ-

ized to secure pledges for current expenses and endowment for Woodrow Wilson's Preceptorial System, collected $4,079,693. And in 1914–15 the alumni of the University of Michigan organized and successfully carried out a campaign to raise a million dollars for a student union building. With alumni committees set up to work throughout the country, it was the most highly organized campaign up to that time and served as a model for many that were to follow.

THE CAPITAL FUND DRIVE

The years immediately after World War I proved to be the heyday of the intensive capital campaigns, mostly for permanent endowment. Basic techniques had been perfected for such campaigns as a result of the drives initiated by the Young Men's Christian Association and developed during the war. Conditional gifts from the General Education Board stimulated the efforts. Professional fund-raising organizations came in to work with alumni and administration in directing the operations. Most of the campaigns succeeded, and by 1926 sixty-eight of them had raised 149 million dollars for higher education. Yet even before the outburst was curbed by the depression, resentments were beginning to arise. Alumni were growing tired of paying the same old debt over and over again. It soon became clear that there was a limit to the number of intensive campaigns that could be conducted among any one group of alumni or friends. The constant pressure, the vigorous salesmanship, the inspirational meetings, and other trappings eventually produced a reaction of bad feeling against high-powered efforts. One such effort a decade seemed to be about the absolute limit.

President Seymour of Yale used to tell a story illustrating the point about two nice old ladies who visited a silver fox farm and took a tour with the owner as their guide. Near the end of the visit one lady asked him how many pelts they were able to get from each silver fox. "Lady," he replied, "we find that if you skin them more than once a year, they get very, very nervous." And so it was with alumni.

Gradually alumni and educational leaders began to see the virtues of annual giving as a method of raising funds on a continuous basis to meet the urgent needs of the institutions without alienating the alumni. They came to realize that they were trying to meet a continuing need with an intermittent technique. Urgency was its basis, and a constant state of emergency becomes commonplace. So it was that many discovered the annual alumni fund and, as a supplement to it, the development program concerned with all forms of giving and all types of givers.

This is not to say that the capital fund drive has gone out of the picture. As the needs for new buildings, new programs, and endowed projects kept bearing down on hard-pressed colleges, many saw no recourse but to launch intensive campaigns. In the process, budding alumni funds were knocked off like sitting ducks. As a result, all too frequently in the past, friction has developed between the alumni officers and the professionals brought in for the drives. Those on the scene have resented the red-carpet treatment accorded to the outsiders: the generous budget, the large staff, the unlimited services of the president, the full cooperation of administration and trustees —in short, all the support, actual and moral, that they had sought in vain in their efforts to make a significant operation out of the annual fund. In addition, there was resentment that the campaign organizers were capitalizing on long years of alumni cultivation without acknowledging the debt. And at the end, those at home were faced with the prospect of picking up the pieces and trying to regain momentum for the alumni fund and the long-term selling job it does on a comparatively low-pressure basis.

RELATION OF ANNUAL GIVING AND CAPITAL GIFTS

Fortunately, such friction has lessened in recent years. The parties concerned seem to be developing a better mutual understanding of the need for diversified fund-raising programs. And new techniques are being developed to join the alumni fund to the capital gifts effort. One of the "joining" techniques calls for a certain percentage of alumni gifts to capital to be credited to the annual fund; another has the alumni fund picking out a specific capital project, such as a dormitory, within the over-all program for development. It is significant to note, however, that a growing number of institutions have decided to limit capital solicitation to the relatively small group of alumni who are in a position to make substantial gifts. An analysis of most campaigns shows that 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the givers usually account for about three-fourths of the dollar total in a major effort. Is it not more logical, then, to limit capital gifts solicitation pretty much to that group and seek the annual support of the rest for the annual fund? Yale has made that decision and states the case frankly to its alumni. In the words of the chairman of Yale's Committee on Endowment and Gifts:

> The alumni fund is being granted absolute priority in the quest for additional support for Yale. We want every Yale man to contribute. . . . Second, and wholly distinct, is the University's appeal for capital gifts. . . . We recognize that there are those among us who, quite aside from making a thoughtful, proportionate annual gift to the alumni fund, are in a position to make substantial capital gifts to special needs of Yale. No alumnus will be encouraged to contribute to Yale's endowment program if such a gift would preclude his annual and thoughtful support of the alumni fund. We who have the responsibility of bringing new capital support to Yale understand that the alumni fund comes first in Yale's plans. It is the hope of all of us that the fund will rank high on the annual list of all Yale almuni giving.

Even though there is often the need of some sort of special campaign to excite the imagination of alumni and friends and provide the opportunity to seek special gifts, complete disruption of a successful alumni fund will probably be avoided by most colleges in the future. Many presidents now seem to agree with their colleague who recently wrote: "As time goes on, I am impressed with the fact that the steady growth of an alumni fund is more important to the college than a periodic capital gifts drive."

INGREDIENTS OF THE SUCCESSFUL FUND

What then are the characteristics of a successful alumni fund? What are some of the benefits it brings to the institution? Why is it that more and more frequently it is being assigned priority over any other kind of fund raising?

A recent leaflet put out by the Council for Financial Aid to Education lists these common denominators of successful operations: "Active and effective leadership, informed and enthusiastic volunteer solicitors, a timely and convincing base in behalf of alumni contributions, a goal related to the giving potential of the alumni, and competent staff and promotional procedures." In addition, the blessing of the board of trustees of the institution concerned and the strong encouragement of the president are important.

Too often college officials, enchanted

with the results of alumni fund raising but woefully ignorant of the theories, have launched solicitation without developing other facets of an institutional alumni program. The shock when it came was rude, for you cannot raise funds in a vacuum. You cannot expect to get anything from your alumni without giving something to your alumni. Alumni service is a two-way street. In the words of Loren L. Hickerson of Iowa, current president of the American Alumni Council:

> Alumni loyalty and support must be earned, positively and actively, as a permanent part of the college program. In a realistic sense, the function of the alumni fund raiser is that of systematically and sensitively collecting the dividends of what the college itself has earned over the past years. If he is effective and if the program he heads is effective, then the nature and extent of the return is a fair measure of how well the institution has done its job.

This particular presentation will not attempt to analyze the various features of the student experience and the general alumni program that help to produce solid alumni support. It will not go into the matter of records, addresses, class and club organization, undergraduate cultivation, continuing educational opportunities, informative and interesting publications, and all the other features of a good alumni program today. Instead, it urges acceptance of the word of all experts in the profession that such a program is the foundation on which dependable alumni support must always rest. The dangers of a fixation on fund raising to the exclusion of all else have been stated by no other expert so picturesquely as by Mr. Armstrong of Notre Dame, who writes:

> The alumnus who once resented being considered an alcoholic cheering unit will not be flattered by his newly threatened identity as an institutional blank check. Single track fund raising will lead you to an ultimate dead end. . . . But if we make our Wall Street office just a branch of the Main Office and just a part of our major operation, we can not only live, but live happily ever after. . . . When the intellectual banners are unfurled, when the athletic colors continue to warm alumni hearts, and as the personal friendships between student, faculty and administration grow by increasing contact and sharing, then financial support will come as naturally and as surely and as adequately as quo involves quid.

Institutional support of alumni program

A great many of the imperative basic services to alumni, it is significant to note, are now being provided only because the institution has agreed to foot the bill. Throughout the country the trend is running strongly away from dues and from the concept of an independent, self-supporting alumni association. Interdependence is now the watchword. In exchange for alumni support through the annual fund, the alert college is now underwriting all expenses of the alumni program and granting full privileges of membership in the association, including the alumni magazine, to all graduates and former students. The amount of the subsidy may seem heavy for a while. Yet almost invariably that phenomenon occurs which has been an inspiration to so many: the gap between the total subsidy and the funds received quickly narrows and soon the alumni fund becomes a source of substantial, dependable funds second to none.

Why then are so many alumni funds continuing to operate in low gear? Sometimes it is the alumni association that is shortsighted on the potentials of an expanded but subsidized program; sometimes it is the president and administration; sometimes it is the board of trustees controlling the purse strings. One of the most discouraging letters ever received at our office came from an able alumni executive announcing his resignation and offering the following explanation:

> The association is beginning to achieve some stature at last. Our fund drive this year was more successful than ever before. Sumptuous new quarters are planned for us. Yet the governing board shows no sign of doing the things that they should be doing. Their attitude is that if we raise the money, then they will subsidize us. You know that it works the other way, and so do I. There is a limit to what one can do on an extremely small budget. We have reached that limit. Having reached what I consider maximum potential on the money available to me, there seems to be no point in sitting around.

Though nothing could be done in this particular case, the only answer for the conservatives and skeptics seems to lie in keeping constant reminders in front of them of what others are accomplishing. Some maintain that what has worked for others will not work for them because "our school" doesn't have a long history of loyal and devoted alumni interest and support. Mr. Hickerson characterizes this as "the weakest kind of rationalization," and argues:

> "Our school" never will have that kind of history unless we set out to build it, in our own places and at our own levels, through the only investments which will do this or any other great job—brains and money.

STATE UNIVERSITIES

One of the major developments of recent years in the growth of alumni support is the rapid strides that tax-supported universities have made to set up successful annual funds and to operate with great effectiveness in areas once thought of as the province of the private institutions. No legislature ever provides all that is needed, even though appropriations will always be looked to for primary support. As one president has noted, "There is every reason to believe that genuine greatness will be realized only as private benefactions also begin to play their part." Spurring developments in this area has been the record of the Development Fund of the Ohio State University Association, which in its first fifteen years has received 167,968 gifts totaling over $4,000,000. Today it records annually over 20,000 alumni contributors—more than those ordering football tickets during a season—and has 3,000 volunteers at work soliciting throughout the country. Much of the money raised has gone into scholarships, fellowships, and similar programs. Much has been raised as "venture capital" needed for research in the development of the first electron microscope, a new magnetic cooling system, cobalt-60 needles for cancer treatment, a radio telescope, and other advancements in nuclear science. Though Ohio State pioneered in this area, it no longer stands alone. Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa State, and others are moving rapidly in alumni fund raising and may yet take over the lead.

BEQUESTS

One of the important by-products of annual giving is its service as a feeder line. For once an alumnus forms the habit of annual giving, he is far more likely to consider his college for a bequest. The Sterling bequest to Yale and the Murphy bequest to Northwestern are usually cited as exemplary of this relationship. But Ohio State provides a more recent example in the late Ralph D. Merson, an active alumnus and the largest individual contributor to the Development Fund from the start. When his will was filed, it was learned that he had left the bulk of his large estate, exceeding $7,000,000, to Ohio State University.

CORPORATION SUPPORT

The recent emergence of business and industry as a source of financial support for education has had a mixed effect on alumni giving. Certain colleges who were on the verge of making a real effort to enlist the aid of their graduates seem to have been diverted by the prospects of corporate gifts. Why bother with the alumni, some reasoned, when the corporate giants will come to our rescue with generous checks? Some alumni may have acquired similar ideas in feeling that they were soon to be relieved of the necessity of providing support. These were negative reactions, which fortunately seem to be on the wane. On the positive side, the prospects of gifts from business and industry, particularly through such devices as the General Electric Corporate Alumnus Program, may eventually prove to be one of the most effective spurs to alumni support ever devised. For administrators and alumni alike are beginning to realize that an institution which has not demonstrated alumni support cannot make an effective case for help from business and industry. It must be ready with affirmative answers to the questions that are now inevitably asked: What are the alumni doing to help? Do those who enjoyed the benefits of what the college has to offer believe in it and give it their enthusiastic support?

Much has been done to convey this idea to the alumni in seeking their help. One college president notes that "gifts from outside the family depend largely —sometimes wholly—on the degree of alumni support." Another urges alumni to be aware that theirs is the first responsibility, since "there can be little incentive for others to help if the beneficiaries themselves are not actively interested." But the one quotation which continues to be used by dozens of funds with greatest effectiveness is a statement made nearly forty years ago by President Eliot of Harvard, who said:

> It is, of course, largely by the extent of the support accorded to a college by its own graduates that the world judges of the right of that college to seek cooperation of others in planning for the future. An institution that cannot rally to its financial assistance the men who have taken its degrees and whose diploma is their passport into the world is in a poor position to ask assistance from others. It is not merely what the alumni give; it is the fact that they *do* give that is of supreme importance.

SETTING UP AN ANNUAL GIVING FUND

As a device for covering quickly some of the current developments and issues in the field of alumni support, we might assume briefly the task of an able and informed administrative officer who has been handed the assignment of setting up a comprehensive fund operation for Alfalfa College. Fortunately, a good general alumni program and magazine have paved the way for the steps he plans to take and he has the backing of his president. He has no illusions that the task will be easy. The Commission on Financing Higher Education concluded that "one of the peculiarities of private philanthropy is that effort is required to obtain it." He feels this may well prove to be the understatement of the year.

He starts by accepting the verdict of his new colleagues that "the full development of alumni potential in annual solicitation is the cornerstone for all other efforts." He is determined that his fund will be more than a vehicle of alumni affection, that it can and should be big business. But many decisions must be made. First, what should its title be? If he calls it the Alfalfa Alumni Fund, will he be able to get parents, friends, and other groups to join with alumni in using it as the medium for their annual gifts? Should he plan on separate programs to be set up later with such names as Alfalfa Parents Fund and Corporate Friends of Alfalfa? Would one over-all Alfalfa Annual Fund or Annual Giving Fund or Living Endowment Fund be better? Should it be the channel for all alumni philanthropy, including large capital gifts? Does it offer sufficient motivation for the potential large giver?

What about organization? Who should be on the advisory board? If there is merit in the argument that the fiction of independence should be maintained, so that alumni believe they are responding directly to the appeals of fellow alumni rather than to their alma mater, should the fund be set up technically as an organization outside the Alfalfa administration? What about objectives? Should funds be raised for unrestricted purposes or should there be multiple objectives that will appeal to all tastes? Would scholarships and faculty salaries have the greatest appeal? Does the average alumnus prefer to give for buildings or other brick and mortar so that he can look at the finished product, beat his chest with pride, and say: "I helped build that, and there's my name on the plaque to prove it"? What about specific participation and dollar goals? Should he follow the lead of Tulane, which never makes its goals public for fear of hurting the morale of alumni if they are not achieved; or of Barnard, where they are deliberately set low to raise all spirits by going over the top; or of Princeton, where the sights are set high—a million dollars from 70 per cent of the alumni—and a confident "wait until next year" spirit develops as the charts steadily creep up toward those figures?

Should he run his fund for a full calendar year or concentrate his efforts on a shorter campaign? What about the theme of his general mailings? Should they invariably be straightforward and serious, or are a little humor and even an occasional gimmick called for? Should a system of class agents be the basis of his solicitation effort, or has personal solicitation proven so effective that it alone is the answer? Can the two systems be combined? Should personal solicitors be used only to approach special gifts prospects in advance or used as a cleanup detail? How extensive an organization can the main office service until the program is running in high gear? What about special alumni reunion gifts, for the fund or for capital purposes? How best to keep in front of alumni the tax features of such forms of giving as stock certificates, life insurance, and annuities? What about parent solicitation? Can he emulate the record of Carleton College, which pioneered in this endeavor and now receives about $60,000 annually in gifts from the families of current students and graduates of recent years? What about bequests? Should he limit himself to keeping lawyers well supplied with data and publishing frequently suggested testamentary forms? Or should be try to set up a counterpart to Dartmouth's Estate Planning Program, where alumni in all classes out twenty-five years or more are encouraged tactfully and effectively to provide bequest funds for Dartmouth, and where at least 20 per cent of the members of thirty-eight classes are known to have drawn wills leaving the College sums that range from $200 to $250,000?

Personal solicitation

One of his most important decisions may prove to be the one on personal solicitation, generally regarded now as the most promising new technique for effective alumni fund solicitation. Central mailings from the campus continue to be important, as are the letters from class agents. Yet increasing evidence

is developing that there is no substitute for a personal visit from one alumnus to another and that regional committees are worth all the time and effort they entail. The job of setting up a personal solicitation program is akin to that of establishing branch offices for a national sales organization. Normally, it is wise to start slowly, establishing regional committees in the areas of major alumni concentration first and then gradually expanding into a more ambitious, nationwide program. No solicitor probably should be asked to visit too many prospects—some put the maximum at ten—and a constant effort to reduce the number assigned to each worker is all to the good. In fact the real goal, as one enthusiast describes it, is to lower the ratio every year until the point is reached where every alumnus solicits personally only his own gift. For the task of raising money for his alma mater usually does more to capture and maintain the interest of the average alumnus than any other program. He comes to know more about his college; he takes a positive interest in its well-being; he is honored to be asked to work for it.

PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION

Some alumni funds are concentrating now on increasing the percentage of participation with only a secondary concern for the amount that is raised. Primarily, they want to develop the habit of giving among alumni, and they are taking to heart Dr. Eliot's view that "it is not merely what the alumni give; it is the fact that they do give that is of supreme importance." Personal solicitation can do a major job here. Whether used as a cleanup or as the heart of the fund effort, personal calls can pick up many of those who do not respond to a mail appeal, even from a classmate or a good friend. It is particularly effective with that frustrating group known in the trade as "LYBUNTS," those who gave last year but not this. Most of these and many of the others not responding to mail fully intend to make a contribution but somehow let it slip by—unless a personal solicitor drops around to pick it up. As for raising the level of giving, nearly all philanthropic agencies have come to believe that a personal visit and a verbal explanation —ideally supplementing good literature on the subject—will almost invariably produce a larger gift than a mail appeal. In moving in this direction in recent years, alumni fund raisers are only following the trail blazed by their own capital campaigns and by such agencies as the Red Cross and community chests.

VARIED APPROACHES

As the annual fund movement begins to come of age, much thought is going into the question of how best to approach these millions of alumni to enlist their support for education in a measure closer to their true giving potential. More and more able people are being assigned to this important task; the necessary budgets and staffs are being provided; new techniques are being developed all the time. And success is being achieved on additional campuses with each passing year. But are we really getting over to these graduates and former students the need for assuming a lifetime financial obligation to their alma maters? Are we really convincing them that the old school tie must become a strong bond of obligation as well as a symbol of sentiment?

The approaches continue to be varied. Some cling to the "roll call concept," asking alumni to report in every year as a matter of habit. Some keep reminding alumni of the hidden subsidies in their education, and by overemphasizing the obligation argument lose sight of La Rochefoucauld's advice: "Do a favor, make an enemy; let him do you a favor and make a friend." Some use

the crisis technique: Give or the college will close down or, worse yet, the federal government will take over. Some put major emphasis on sentiment, secure in the belief that nostalgia has always been and always will be a potent weapon with alumni. Some rely on gimmicks, on clever devices, realizing that the average person is besieged with solicitations and something eye-catching is needed to make him respond to any appeal.

Accentuate the positive

Yet clear evidence is developing that the strongest case can be made for those appeals which "accentuate the positive" and "eliminate the negative." As Princeton's George J. Cooke points out, "the sooner we can disassociate ourselves from the idea of alms taking and put the operation on a positive basis, rather than negative, the better off we will be." Harvard's David McCord describes the virtues of this approach in enlisting the alumni volunteers:

> We do not go to our class agent with a plea, we go to him with a challenge. Today he does not face the distasteful task of dunning his classmates; he faces the rewarding opportunity of enlisting their support in free education in a free land.

A valuable new asset of alumni fund raisers these days in their efforts to increase the extent of alumni support is the phrase, "thoughtful and proportionate giving," and an affirmative presentation created by Harold J. Seymour, one of the country's top fund consultants, for the Yale Alumni Fund. It is a check sheet for thoughtful and proportionate giving outlining the four main philanthropic areas: (I) religion, (II) education, (III) community services, (IV) world services. Accompanying the sheet is this suggestion, presented after consultation with officers of various community services and with churchmen of all faiths. "Anyone with a balanced interest in all four areas," it reads, "could start with an arbitrary yardstick of 30-30-30-10 per cent for Areas, I, II, III and IV respectively—modifying these proportions to suit individual loyalties and interests." How is it working? It is too early to tell. Yale's Charles Watson points out:

> Like everything else we try, it will take time to educate our alumni on it thoroughly. But as a vehicle, this formula will in later years certainly be recognized as an important step forward to increased thoughtful and proportionate giving to the Yale Alumni Fund.

Yet one point should perhaps be made, parenthetically, in behalf of negative appeals. On at least two occasions alumni have been asked ***not*** to support an institution unless the administration complied with certain demands. One came from William F. Buckley in his book *God and Man at Yale,* which demanded that alumni withhold their support until the University took action on his evidence of socialistic and atheistic teaching. The outcome of this negative effort—the Yale Alumni Fund went over the million dollar mark for the first time. More recently, Mrs. Aloise Buckley Heath, writing on the letterhead of the Organization for Discrimination in Giving, urged many of her fellow alumnae of Smith College to exercise such discrimination until certain members of the faculty were dismissed. The result —an outpouring of letters, checks, and other expressions of solid alumnae support comparable to nothing before in the history of the College.

Traditional wails

Even as shifts are made from a low-pressure fund operation to a really professional effort, some of the trappings of the former logically remain. One is the occasional appeal to sentiment combined with the positive, forward-looking

approach. A second is the continued goal of cheerful giving—the result of creating in the alumnus an honest desire to make his annual contribution willingly as his means, his time, and his heart permit. And the third is a change of pace, an art that is just as important in alumni relations as in baseball. Unless very well handled, appeals at reunions and at class and club meetings continue to be taboo. And interspersed with any written fund appeals must be good alumni magazines and other interesting and informative mailings. One fund raiser is so concerned about his postal budget that he refuses to let a single mailing go out to alumni—even a Christmas card—without a fund reminder and some kind of pledge card or return envelope. Most recognize the virtue of the change of pace in forestalling the traditional alumni wail, "The only time I ever hear from my college is when they are asking me for money."

There is a second traditional wail: "My college always seems to need money." There is only one answer to this, and it must be impressed upon alumni. If it is a good college, it will always need money. By their very nature, educational institutions are, or should be, insatiable. As has been pointed out to a group of presidents: "Any person will tell you, however reluctant he is about passing the hat, that the fully endowed church has lost its vitality. This is equally true of the educational parishes over which you preside." Just as the alumni fund movement was getting started, the pioneers at Yale anticipated this complaint and wrote:

> There are perhaps some who object that Yale always wants funds. But is not this the proof of her progress in life? When she ceases to have wants, when she has not at least a dozen purposes for which she would gladly use money, she will no longer be worthy of her past history or of our present devotion.

JOINT EFFORTS

Over the years alumni fund raisers have worked closely together, primarily through the American Alumni Council, in furthering this important movement. There has always been much to learn and a constant influx of new ideas and new techniques to analyze and absorb. Since each was dealing with his own alumni body, there was essentially no competition and no possible reason to hold back on the good ideas that each was developing. In addition, they all had and still have a tremendous stake in spreading the alumni fund movement to every institution in the country. As one veteran, Allen Hawley of Pomona College, noted nearly ten years ago:

> The reason is simple and fundamental. It will help me to raise more funds from my constituency. As all graduates from all institutions become more aware of the problems of education, it will become easier for each one of us to raise more money from greater numbers of his own alumni. . . . What I want to see is a feeling that it is the accepted thing for alumni everywhere, regardless of the type of college or university from which they graduated, to help support their respective institutions.

Some fund raisers have gone on from there to advocate one big national alumni fund effort, with a few even suggesting a single collection agency like the United Negro College Fund. Most, however, are thinking of the community chest type of organization in advocating national publicity and promotion for the separate campaigns. The virtues and the needs of education must be sold, to alumni specifically and to the public in general, and they argue that no one college can accomplish this alone. They are grateful for the fine efforts of the Council for Financial Aid to Education and other existing organizations. Yet they feel that some new agency must be set up, or the American Alumni Council vastly expanded, to do this job.

NO SUBSTITUTE FOR ENDOWMENTS?

As a lengthy postscript to a presentation that already runs long, I want to advance a personal belief: the real future of alumni support lies in selling the concept of alumni giving less to the alumni than to our leading educators. I have in mind those who continue to hold fast to the view that there is no substitute for endowment—for the tangible invested assets—as a guarantee of an institution's future financial stability. They are the ones who stand in the way of the potential development of annual giving by failing to accept it as a full-fledged partner of endowment in twentieth-century educational financing. They appear not to recognize it as "living endowment," a system which enables a great many generous and interested persons to do with small contributions what a few big gifts would do in the form of endowment; or as a means of giving the interest on a capital gift rather than the capital gift itself.

Much has been written of the demise of the big giver, the wealthy philanthropist whose gifts once formed the bulk of support for American education. The reports of his death, like those of Mark Twain's, may well be exaggerated. But even if the day of the large individual giver is not over, the day of multiple gifts which together make a large total has definitely arrived. It was a day heralded as early as 1870 by that same farsighted Professor Sumner of Yale:

> When we get tired of waiting for the rich man's thousands, we can begin to take the poor man's dollars. We have examples enough before us of success in business which has been won by seeing that there was more money to be made out of the pennies of the million than out of the dollars of the upper ten thousand. . . . If every graduate who could afford it should give the college ten dollars, and others should give more in proportion . . . we should reach results which we can never attain by waiting for the tardy generosity of a few men of extraordinary wealth.

For nearly three centuries, endowment, along with income from student fees, has been viewed as the most dependable financial resource of virtually every privately conducted college or university. The depression years brought abrupt changes. Endowment is still important, particularly to the six private universities and the sixteen liberal arts colleges that receive about half of the one hundred million dollars of income from the two billions in endowment held by educational institutions today. But it has not proved itself a particularly salable commodity for gifts —except for bequests—since 1929.

Only gradually are college presidents being weaned away from their enchantment with endowment funds. Such views as Alfred P. Sloan's are beginning to give them pause. Speaking at a meeting of the Council for Financial Aid to Education in July of 1954, Mr. Sloan said:

> Let's cut out gifts to endowment. . . . I do not believe that relying on endowments is making the most effective use of your money. You need capital now—not only money for expansion and development but money to take care of the deficits that you are facing. I feel that you will be better off to get as much money as you can now, use it up in ten years, and then trust to your competence and your efforts and the work of those who are helping you to carry the institution along at the end of the ten-year period. This is the point of view of one who is tremendously interested in higher education and who is earnestly seeking ways and means to make it more effective.

In a particular situation—that of providing increased scholarships for the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University through annual giving—Mr. Sloan's views were echoed recently by Dean Courtney C. Brown:

> As we have thought of this matter, we have gradually come around to the view that that is the proper way to handle student assistance. Endowment funds are all right if they are in hand, but they can tie up a very large amount of money for the amount of current assistance that can be made available. More and more colleges and universities are coming to the realization that the substitution of continuity of giving must take the place of endowment income in these days of smaller personal fortunes and lower returns on investment. We are going to look to the alumni to be our principal support in this effort.

Continuity and a broad base

It is this same Dean Brown who has made one of the most effective arguments yet advanced in behalf of the alumni fund by stressing its continuity and the fact that the base of its support is broad. "An annual alumni drive, if properly organized," he believes, "can be relied upon with some confidence because it has many small sources. It is not dependent on one big source that might from year to year show a high degree of variability."

Because of this stability, it is significant to note that at more and more colleges the annual alumni fund is coming to be looked on as a "budgeted asset." At Dartmouth, for example, the trustees in setting the budget for the academic year estimate the College's needs and then request the Alumni Fund to furnish a certain amount of the revenue. The surplus—and recently there has always been a surplus—goes to the College's scholarship program.

WHICH ROAD?

The whole movement of alumni fund raising has reached an important juncture. One road leads to new emphasis on annual fund raising, a spur to increased effort greater than any ever provided in the past, including the imaginative Corporate Alumnus Program. A second leads to a subordination of alumni fund raising to a search for millions of dollars in capital funds. The decision as to which road will be taken is not left to those who direct annual giving operations. It is one that is to be made by the officers, directors, and advisory committee of the Ford Foundation and such other foundations and philanthropic agencies as are energized to similar action by the Foundation's $50,000,000 offer of conditional grants to help raise faculty salaries.

Though the Ford program will be limited to a group of private colleges and universities, it promises beneficial results throughout the field of higher education out of all proportion even to the initially large size of the grant itself. As the *New York Times* noted editorially, it constitutes "an extraordinarily timely, effective and wise way of improving the whole structure of American education." Though the detailed plans have not yet been announced, it is known that the grants which go to the institutions are to be used as endowment, with the income earmarked for undergraduate faculty compensation. To qualify for a grant, each institution will be asked to match it with funds from other sources in various matching ratios—one, two, or three dollars for each dollar offered. Each must demonstrate its capacity to raise funds, by virtue of the Foundation grant, that it would not otherwise raise.

Here is the decision affecting the future of alumni fund raising that lies with the Ford Foundation officials. Will their insistence on matching dollars virtually force colleges to launch intensive capital campaigns for the several hundred million dollars that will be needed? Or will they give the colleges the chance to turn to their alumni with a significant new challenge—to raise the level of annual alumni giving by $40,000, or $80,000, or $120,000, with faculty salaries as the objective, and demonstrate that this new figure is a floor and not a ceiling? Despite the evidence of the stability and continuity of alumni funds, such a decision may seem like a gamble. Yet if this Foundation action is to have "a cumulative effect charged with a high potential," is not some measure of vision and courage required?

Inspiring examples

There are inspiring examples.

In 1948, at a time when Princeton's Annual Giving had settled on a $250,000 plateau, the Board of Trustees made a dramatic announcement. A badly needed increase in salaries had been voted for all members of the faculty, to be paid for out of funds which Princeton did not have. Would the alumni come to the rescue? Would they that year double their annual giving to provide the additional $250,000 that was needed? Would they ensure—in a sense "endow"—the funds for the future by keeping Annual Giving at a minimum figure of $500,000 in the future? The response was so enthusiastic there was little doubt about the outcome. The $500,000 goal was surpassed, and the curve, after one slight dip, has continued to climb. Today Princeton's Annual Giving has passed the $900,000 mark and is nearing a record-breaking 70 per cent in alumni participation.

In a recent report by the head of the Vassar Alumnae Fund, Mrs. Helen Couch described the dilemma Vassar faced in 1949: to go all out to secure an additional $10,000,000 in endowment or to accelerate alumnae giving to the level of $350,000 annually—"roughly the equivalent of the $10,000,000 which we then would never have to raise." She noted that the suggestion was greeted with apprehension:

> Instead of capital funds in the bank producing a safe yearly income, the only securities would be the intangibles of continuing loyalty, affection and concern on the part of her alumnae for Vassar College. It was on these intangibles as security that we decided to gamble. Actually, as has since been abundantly proved, there never was a gamble.

In 1954, the Vassar Alumnae Fund recorded $520,386, and Vassar received a total of $744,868 in alumnae gifts.

In that same year, when the Yale Alumni Fund was bringing in a half million dollars a year, its Board of Directors made a decision of great significance. Within two years (that is, by 1951 when Yale would begin to mark her 250th Anniversary), the Fund would aim for the million dollar level in annual giving. Once it was achieved, the objective would be to maintain it as a permanent plane of giving. The schedule was met, and the University continues to receive this annual income that is the financial equivalent of $12,500,000 of invested endowment and an expression of confidence in the Yale of today that money cannot buy.

READJUSTMENTS

If these and other examples influence the decisions that are being made on implementing the Ford Foundation program, a new day in alumni fund raising could be dawning. There would be some necessary readjustments, of course. Some funds now operating completely independently of the college might have to surrender sovereignty in the interests of close co-ordination and efficiency.

Some would have to abandon their low-pressure concepts. Many would have to change their objectives, with the so-called unrestricted funds as the major casualties. Yet in most cases the changes may work to the fund's advantage. A dollar for faculty salaries and a dollar for unrestricted purposes are of equal value. And the experience of many alumni funds indicates that an appeal in behalf of the faculty and the cause of better teaching has a strong pull for most alumni. Recently a public opinion research organization polled five hundred leading citizens in Chicago for a local university. The results showed that a majority of those who make gifts to higher education prefer to see the money used for faculty salaries.

"We won't be able to do what we should for the teacher," one observer recently noted, "until we can show that the alumni are strongly behind the program. No other leadership group has one tenth their power." What better way to rally alumni strongly behind this cause, I submit, than to turn over to them the opportunity to match the grants and share in this move "to strengthen American education at its base—the quality of its teaching"?

Ernest T. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., has been executive secretary of the American Alumni Council since 1951. He was previously editor of the Princeton Alumni Weekly, following four years' service in the United States Navy as an air combat intelligence officer.

DISCUSSION

The discussion was concerned with the programs and problems which develop when a university seeks extensive and continuing alumni support. Several formulas were suggested whereby the administrator could gauge the amount of alumni support he could reasonably anticipate. One suggestion was that 1 per cent of the annual income of each alumnus is a fair standard. Another suggestion claimed for education 30 per cent of all charity gifts made by an individual alumnus. An earlier scheme which called for a dollar for every year since the alumnus graduated was considered too limiting for large gifts and not persuasive enough for small gifts. Dartmouth's scheme of advertising a giving curve with a peak in the middle age group seemed a more flexible device. It was generally agreed that to win the support of 70 per cent of the alumni in any fund drive is a reasonable goal.

The raising of the level of alumni support is not without problems. At least 10 per cent of an increase in income must be expended to obtain the increment. The university should take over and finance an alumni magazine and must sponsor other alumni functions. The magazines should not be direct vehicles for solicitation. Another set of problems arises out of the relationship between annual giving campaigns and sporadic capital fund drives. The speaker urged that the two be of equal standing, but kept separate and carefully co-ordinated so that one does not interfere with the other. The practice at Yale University where no one is encouraged to give to the capital fund if it will diminish his support of the annual fund was mentioned with approval. Middlebury College has compromised by allocating one half of all that is received to each of the uses—capital and current expenditures.

Both the high- and the low-pressure fund-raising techniques were discussed. It was remarked that professional solicitation agencies generally please neither the campus nor the alumni. Roll call alumni drives which seek to enlist the support, however small, of every member of the alumni are useful at the outset. Thereafter, low-pressure techniques which establish the habit of giving are preferred. Appeals based upon the obligation of the alumni to the school soon lose their effectiveness. The University of Notre Dame has introduced a novel system wherein token gifts of five cents each are solicited from the current student body to encourage a donation tradition for future alumni. Personal solicitation is used at different schools for different purposes. Sometimes it follows repeated central mailings to exert final pressure on the remnants, sometimes it is restricted to "big givers," and sometimes it is spread through all organized alumni groups. Class agents are an especially useful device. It was pointed out that the alumni respond best to appeals for funds earmarked for faculty salary increases.

The general increase in alumni financial gifts to tax-supported institutions was remarked, and a question was raised as to whether the state governments would decrease their budgetary allocations accordingly. It was reported that Ohio State University's experience was to the contrary, that increased state appropriations have followed increased alumni giving.

Corporation Support

By Wilson Compton

Financial aid by business corporations to the colleges and universities is sound business policy. It is an opportunity for them, as well as a responsibility. It is not a charity but an investment in their own future. Its basic legality has been settled by the courts. It should be handled separately from their ordinary contributions and donations. It should be based on policy determined at their highest levels of authority; and should be regarded as a continuing function of their business management. Business concerns should accept a reasonable share of financial aid to higher education but not exclusive support. They should pick the institutions with care and then keep "hands off" their internal affairs.

THIS sounds arrogant, does it not? It would be if it represented an outsider "preaching" to business concerns and undertaking to tell them what they should do. But it is not that. This is the voice of fifty of America's principal industrial leaders, including the heads of many of the largest corporations, talking among themselves only a month ago about the problems, the importance, and the opportunities of corporate support of higher education in this country. These gentlemen from coast to coast, representing some of the most respected corporations in America, were meeting in a two-day conference at Arden House, the seat of the American Assembly, under the auspices of the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University and the Council for Financial Aid to Education. They were meeting for purposes not unlike the purposes of this notable conference, to explore the widening range of common interests and mutual needs of industry and higher education in this country.

Interdependence of Business and Higher Education

What happens to American education will eventually happen to America. Businessmen know that. There are now in the United States more than eight million college graduates. In all of its enterprises our country is becoming more and more dependent on college-educated men and women. This always has been true of the so-called "learned professions." But during the past half century, and especially since World War I, it has gradually become true in business and industry, in political life, increasingly in agriculture, and now even in labor. College graduates constitute about 10 per cent of our adult population. But they head three-fourths of our biggest industrial and commercial enterprises. During this century they have provided nearly three-fourths of our national leaders; all but two of our Presidents; nearly one-half of the members of the Congress; three-fourths of our Cabinet officers; and four-fifths of our judges. Nearly seven-eighths of our oncoming business executives nowadays have college or university origins.

We often think and speak glowingly of our twentieth-century industrial revolution, which is still under way. Less often do we think or speak of our twentieth-century revolution in higher education. It is, to be sure, less visible, less spectacular, less dramatic. Yet it is more significant and more revolutionary than the revolution in industry itself! If higher education were today to be subtracted from American industry there would soon be no industry from which to subtract it. At the same time business corporations, small and large—hundreds and thousands of them—are providing the opportunities for livelihood to two-thirds of our population, and gradually more and more of the earnings and savings of the American people are in the custody and at the disposal of American business corporations.

This is not a prelude to a dissertation on sociology or political economy. It is merely a recognition of the scope and the magnitude of the interest of higher education in what happens to business and of the interest of business in what happens to higher education. Both are interested in productivity. Both are interested in freedom. Both understand that freedom, private enterprise, and public education are segments of the same circle.

Technology and Liberal Education

Some weeks ago the head of one of the most respected industrial concerns in America was speaking to the Johnstown Chamber of Commerce. He was talking about "automation." This is a new and fashionable word for one of the oldest facts of industry—mechanization—the substitution of machines for men, the lifting of labor from the backs of men and women, a process which has been going on for centuries, accelerated in recent years by man's increasing inventive genius and his increasing mastery of the mysteries of nature. Machines make more jobs, he said. "As mechanization has increased the output and the purchasing power of people, it has multiplied enormously their demand for services . . . more doctors and dentists, more engineers and scientists, and more clergymen and preachers." "Had technological progress stopped in 1908," he added, "it would cost $65,000 to build a contemporary auto car at today's wages." This was the voice of modern technology.

Some weeks before, the same gentleman in behalf of the great enterprise which he headed had announced in these words a broad financial aid-to-education program:

> We are aware that a large number of the private liberal arts colleges in the United States are today operating at a deficit. It is quite apparent that these colleges and universities operating without tax support urgently need capital and general operating funds to provide for growing student bodies, to strengthen independent undergraduate education, and to improve the incentives now offered for the highest quality of free and independent teaching.

Then in announcing grants of unrestricted funds to nearly 250 colleges and universities (this year increased to 450) he added:

> If such support should become general, high standard liberal arts colleges everywhere will benefit, and free educational institutions will remain free.

This was the voice of liberal education.

The speaker was Benjamin F. Fairless, chairman of the Board of the United States Steel Corporation and of the United States Steel Foundation, son of a coal miner in Ohio, schooled in a small liberal arts college, a civil engineer, and one of the most articulate spokesman in America of what Adolf Berle in his latest book calls its "twentieth-century capitalism." There are also many other business leaders today in whom the voice of technology and the voice of liberal education are being combined. There is, among American businessmen generally, a growing recognition that freedom is indivisible; that, as was said long ago, "the safety of the nation is in the education of her youth"; and that training without education is

of as little significance to business progress as is education without training. This is not to abandon technology but to fortify, broaden, and humanize the technology which is at the core of our twentieth-century industrial revolution.

CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP

Many of you will recall a few years ago the mixture of cheers and jeers which greeted the first public suggestions that businessmen should regard financial aid to colleges and universities as an appropriate interest of business corporations, as an opportunity for "corporate citizenship," even as an "obligation" to their stockholders, customers, and employees. I was then the president of one of the state universities. My immediate concern was with a state legislature. It had been making good provision for the institution for which I was responsible. So I was not directly concerned, except that the increasing prospect of financial support from industry added to the possibilities of improving the quality of our educational enterprise and of gradually lifting its level of excellence.

But as a graduate of a church-related liberal arts college, believing earnestly in the value of such institutions to American society, I had always been interested in the maintenance also of our private universities and colleges. So the idea of "corporate aid to education" then advanced by eminent businessmen like Frank W. Abrams, chairman of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and trustee of Syracuse University; Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., chairman of General Motors Corporation and member of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Irving S. Olds, chairman of United States Steel Corporation and long-time member of the Yale Corporation, was interesting and encouraging. It seemed logical and sensible and important. Some corporation executives, however, regarded the idea as "preposterous" and said so. Some said, "It is illegal." Some even called it "socialistic."

That was hardly five years ago. What do we see now? Well, if the idea was "preposterous" thousands at least now approve and accept it, hundreds are practicing it, and hundreds of others are diligently considering it; and their numbers among business concerns both large and small are continually increasing. If it was "illegal" the courts evidently have not known it. And if it was "socialistic" it evidently was of a kind with strong appeal to many of America's most conservative business leaders.

Financial aid to higher education if it is "conservative" is conservative at least of one of America's greatest "glory roads." If it is "liberal" it is liberal at least in the sense that it contributes to what the dictionary calls "independence of opinion, not servile, befitting or worthy of a free man." No business leader needs to be told what "independence of opinion" has meant in American industry and in American life. More and more are businessmen aware of the extent to which this country owes its progress, its strength, and its moral force in a shaky world to its public education, and fundamentally to its universities and colleges; and more and more are they aware nowadays of the extent to which the maintenance of a climate encouraging to "independence of opinion" is dependent on public education which never will be stronger or safer than the colleges and universities from which it springs.

Out of this background of developing opinion originated the Council for Financial Aid to Education, a unique adventure into the future of American higher education. It was founded not by educators but by businessmen. It is financed not by the colleges and universities but by some of the most respected foundations: the Fund for the Advancement of Education, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the General Education Board. The Council itself neither solicits nor accepts nor disburses funds for the support of education. Its aim is to promote wider public interest in, and wider financial support for, American higher education. Its objectives of course are of great importance to our colleges and universities. They are of equal concern to American business.

The interest of business corporations in what is happening to the colleges and universities may be a novel idea. But it is reasonable and sensible, is likely to be continuing, and, in the long run, it may be a decisive factor in determining the future structure of American higher education. At present voluntary financial support by corporations, most of it now to private institutions, is between 6 and 8 per cent of their revenue. The total is between 75 million and 90 million dollars annually.

Last year the Council secured a great deal of information from several hundred leading national corporations regarding the nature and extent of their financial support of higher education, and from most of the colleges and universities regarding their financial status and financial needs.

TRENDS IN CORPORATE GIVING

These surveys show some interesting facts. Predominantly the corporations now aiding higher education prefer to furnish funds for current operations rather than for capital purposes, student aid, or special services such as research, product testing, work-study projects. The composite ratios of preferences expressed are:

Operating funds	1.00
Capital funds	.49
Student aid	.46
Special services	.43

This shows a marked change from the former more general preference for research grants and other special services; also a growing awareness of the financial dilemma of higher education.

Among the companies not now financially supporting higher education but "willing to consider" doing so the corresponding ratios are:

Operating funds	1.00
Capital funds	.55
Student aid	.75
Special services	.79

Among companies now aiding higher education those giving some financial support to various classifications of higher institutions are:

To technical schools	73%
To private universities	72%
To liberal arts colleges	71%
To other professional schools	52%
To state universities	37%
To junior colleges	15%

Among the companies not now aiding higher education but "willing to consider" such support the comparable percentages are:

To technical schools	73%
To private universities	67%
To liberal arts colleges	65%
To other professional schools	60%
To state universities	26%
To junior colleges	28%

Of the reporting companies giving any financial support to higher education 63 per cent were giving to the United Negro College Fund; 49 per cent to the National Fund for Medical Education; and 41 per cent to the state Associations of Liberal Arts Colleges. Of those "willing to consider" doing so the comparable percentages were 50 per cent, 47 per cent, and 45 per cent. Fewer than one-third of the companies were "willing to consider" giving to a national pool fund or "Bank of Philanthropy" even if one were established to operate on a national scale to seek, re-

ceive, and disburse corporation grants in aid of higher education.

At present geographical considerations have a dominant part in determining the selection of beneficiaries of corporate financial aid. Three-fourths of the selections now are based evidently on location of plants or employment or markets as the predominant criteria of company interest; or in some instances on the principal sources of the donor company's college-educated personnel. In one-sixth of the cases the selection of beneficiary is being determined by the "best judgment" of the responsible officers without geographical or other fixed criteria. The proportion of these is increasing. Last year the proportion of total contributions by these leading national corporations designated for education, as distinguished from other purposes for which tax-exempt contributions are admissible, was evidently about one-fourth as compared to the estimated one-sixth four years ago. These trends in corporate giving are constructive and encouraging.

FACULTY SALARIES

But the interest of corporations goes much farther than these simple figures would seem to imply. For example, there is growing recognition that many colleges and universities in the "red" and hundreds of them technically in the "black" are being financed in substantial part by "borrowing" from their faculties by paying appallingly low teaching salaries. One of the leading publishing concerns in America recently published an article entitled "Our Colleges and Universities Are Living on Borrowed Time—Time Borrowed from Underpaid Faculty Members." It showed in terms not of dollars only but of purchasing power the contrast between the course of faculty salaries during the past fifteen years and the earnings of other callings and professions:

Lawyers	plus 10%
Physicians	plus 80%
Industrial workers	plus 48%
Faculty members	minus 5%

The reports to the Council for Financial Aid to Education show great differences even in the average faculty salaries of the groups of American colleges and universities. Between 1939 and 1954 general prices of goods and services were almost doubled. During the same period average faculty salaries were increased in approximately these proportions:

In state (or municipal) colleges (113)	96%
In state (or municipal) universities (54)	88%
In professional or technical schools (26)	82%
In church-related (non-Catholic) colleges (125)	77%
In Catholic colleges (84)	76%
In Catholic universities (21)	74%
In nondenominational liberal arts colleges (184)	71%
In church-related (non-Catholic) universities (26)	65%
In private universities (66)	57%

These are the salary figures which are recording the gradual drift of best minds "from campus to commerce," the increasing difficulty of recruiting qualified college teachers, and the ominous prospects of greater shortages during the next fifteen years.

STUDENT AID

The reporting colleges during 1953 spent nearly $50,000,000 in student aid. Of this amount nearly 60 per cent came out of the general operating funds so urgently needed for improvement in faculty salaries and for other purposes. The same colleges showed total operating deficits for the year of nearly $25,000,000, equal in the aggregate to half the amount which they had paid out in student aid.

ENDOWMENTS AND CAPITAL FUNDS

The same colleges and universities in 1954 had total endowments of

$2,538,180,000 and stated that in the next ten years at "rock bottom" they needed additional endowments totaling $3,175,456,533 and additional capital funds for buildings and equipment during the same period of $2,533,799,922. These additional endowment funds in the view of the colleges and universities are needed primarily for two purposes: (1) improvement in faculty compensation and (2) financial aid to students. These needs are shared alike by tax-supported institutions and institutions independent of the state.

These needs of the colleges and universities are of great concern to business corporations. They know that whatever the extent of their brick and mortar the colleges and universities will never be any better than their faculties. And as long as 40 per cent of our most talented youth do not go to college because of lack of financial means, they know that America is forfeiting much of its ablest potential manpower. This is important unfinished business of both American higher education and American business.

ESTIMATES FOR THE FUTURE

How much of a part will American business corporations take in fortifying the financial support of our colleges and universities? A minority part, I hope and believe, but perhaps a decisive part. So I am venturing some formidable estimates which may perhaps put in better perspective the problems, opportunities, and prospects of financial support of our higher education. These you may well take with caution. They are personal opinions. They may be based on wide observation. But they are not official views of the Council for Financial Aid to Education.

1. The present bona fide combined operating deficits of the private colleges and universities now are less than twenty-five million dollars annually and are steadily being reduced.

2. Average college faculty salaries will be increased by at least 25 per cent or college teaching as a learned profession will continue to wither.

3. At present rates the widening gap in private colleges and universities between student tuition and educational expense per student by 1970 will have reached nearly 500 million dollars. This gap will be filled in part by increasing the scale of student charges, supplemented by scholarship and loan funds. But most of it will be filled by voluntary financial aid.

4. College education in both private and state-supported higher institutions will be made more nearly self-supporting through higher student tuition and fees. Reasonable income-tax credits for college tuition payments is a sensible and appropriate form of public financial assistance to higher education. Eventually it will be adopted as a part of the Internal Revenue Code.

5. American higher education, not including its auxiliary activities and miscellaneous services, now a two billion dollar a year enterprise, within a short generation will be at least a five billion dollar a year enterprise. In the meantime, capital outlay for new physical facilities will exceed ten billion dollars.

6. Alumni giving to colleges and universities will gradually become general practice. In time college students generally will understand and respect the obligation inherent in their acceptance of opportunity for college education *at less than cost*. As alumni they will accept the implied responsibility to help others as they themselves have been helped. Eventually alumni funds will cover at least half of the gap between tuition and cost.

7. Unless federal and state tax laws are fundamentally changed (an unlikely event) endowment funds as a ma-

jor source of *new* financial support to expanding higher education will gradually dwindle. In their place will be more corporate and individual foundations, larger short-term grants, and fewer commitments of capital funds. Endowment funds will continue to come largely from estates and bequests. There will be fewer sources of such funds and more foundations. Educational finance will gradually change. Many of the sources and conditions of financial support will be different. More and more of the burden of providing facilities for higher education will fall on the institutions of the state, hence on tax funds. But ample funds will continue to be available to assure the maintenance in vigor of higher education financed and directed independent of the state.

8. The participation of business corporations in financial support of American higher education, through capital grants, through current funds for various purposes, and through student aid, will have reached by 1970 a half billion dollars annually. Business is one of the chief beneficiaries of a diversified competitive system of higher education, is increasingly dependent on it, has increasing means of aiding it financially, and will not let it wither for lack of financial support.

Wilson Compton, Ph.D., LL.B., LL.D., L.H.D., New York City, is president of the Council for Financial Aid to Education, Inc. Previously he was president of State College of Washington and the State Experiment Station (1944–51), professor of economics, George Washington University (1934–41), secretary and general manager, National Lumber Manufacturers Association (1918–44), economist, Federal Trade Commission (1916–18), assistant professor of economics and political science, Dartmouth College (1915–16). He was a member of the Advisory Committees of the Forest Products Division, Department of Commerce (1929–45) and of the U. S. Timber Conservation Board (1930–45); vice-president and manager, American Forest Products Industries, Inc. (1932–44) and founder and president, Timber Engineering Company (1933–44), and he has been honorary director of these companies since 1945. He was a member of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan (1946) and a delegate to the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations. He was administrator, International Information Administration, Department of State, and chairman of the Psychological Operations Co-ordinating Board (1952–53).

DISCUSSION

To court a share in the corporation funds currently being made available to universities, institutions must muffle talk about budgetary deficits and be prepared to answer searching questions about the efficiency of their management and organization. The great growth in corporation giving has produced a large variety of plans under which funds are distributed. There is some tendency to seek new schemes which will bear the corporation's name and bring credit and publicity as a partial reward for the gift. For most corporations, support of higher education is a new type of enterprise, and they have neither the personnel nor the past experience on which to draw. It is hoped that the selection and planning will be done at the top management level. There is a danger that corporation programs will be formulated entirely by personnel departments and that those departments will tend to dole out scholarships as fringe benefits for employees.

The reluctance on the part of business firms to choose specific recipients has led to the formation of consolidated funds. These fund pools distribute gifts on a proportional formula to all institutions within a given area such as a state or county, or to selected institutions within a given category such as liberal arts colleges or Negro institutions. To the businessman, this has the advantage of absolving him from the selection process and giving him an outside organization of professionals who are responsible for proper administration. It has disadvantages from the educational point of view in that it tends to support the marginal schools which may be low in instructional level; moreover, the fund-pool system does not provide the risk capital best spent upon encouraging the leaders. As yet it is impossible to determine whether the trend is generally toward the consolidated fund system of disbursement.

A discussion of the decline in the part played by large private gifts in financing higher education revealed that while there may have been no quantitative decline, nevertheless in comparison with other sources of support the large individual donor is losing in importance. Few new fortunes are being made and the charities of old ones are frequently channeled through intermediary foundations. The funds are administered by the foundation personnel rather than by the college trustees.

Trends in Tuition Charges and Fees

By Herbert S. Conrad and Ernest V. Hollis

TUITION charges and fees are of special interest to a conference on Methods of Financing Higher Education, since these charges and fees are the one major source of income that can be controlled directly by the college or university itself. This paper will attempt to present such facts as are available with regard to trends in the following areas: (1) undergraduate tuition rates; (2) the relation between such tuition rates and students' ability to pay; (3) the total amount received from tuition and fees; and (4) the relation between receipts from tuition and fees on the one hand, and various expenditures by institutions of higher education on the other. In so far as available data permit, the facts will be presented separately for publicly and for privately controlled institutions of higher education; and separately for the different curricular-organizational types of institution (universities, liberal arts colleges, and so forth). Attention will also be given to differential tuition rates for in-state versus out-of-state students in publicly controlled institutions of higher education.

The main sources of data employed are: college catalogues; the United States Office of Education's Biennial Survey of Education; unpublished recent data from the Office of Education; and the "Annual Survey of Business Management Statistics" by the Central Association of College and University Business Officers, conducted for 1954–55 by W. Robert Bokelman. Supplementary sources include an article on "Size Distribution of Income since the Mid-Thirties" by Selma Goldsmith and others in the February 1954 issue of *The Review of Economics and Statistics* and conventional economic-statistics sources such as the periodical, *Economic Indicators,* and the *Statistical Abstract of the United States.*

The period covered extends from 1939–40 to 1954–55 in the case of tuition rates compiled by the Office of Education, and from 1947–48 to 1954–55 in the case of data from the study by Bokelman. With respect to the total amount received from tuition and fees, the period covered is 1929–30 to 1951–52 (the last year for which nationwide systematic data are available).

Tuition Rates

Data from catalogues

Tuition per student. A study (unpublished) has been made of tuition and required fees for a number of fairly large institutions—namely, 196 institutions each with a total college-grade enrollment of 2,000 or more in the fall of 1953.[1] Only those institutions were included for which catalogues were available in the Library of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for *each* of the academic years, 1939–40, 1949–50, and 1954–55. The purpose of this study was to obtain, with minimum effort, data covering a maximum number of students.

[1] None of the institutions had a full-time resident undergraduate enrollment of less than 1,000 in November, 1953. The 196 institutions—120 publicly controlled, and 76 privately—account for about 55 per cent of resident undergraduate enrollment in the United States (about 65 per cent of such enrollment in publicly controlled institutions and 45 per cent in privately controlled), and for a larger percentage of graduate enrollment.

The average tuition rate per student in the 196 institutions, and average rates for students in subgroups of the 196 institutions, are given in Table 1.[2] Examination of the table shows a steady, long-time increase in tuition rates. In the fifteen-year period from 1939–40 to 1954–55, the increase in the 120 publicly controlled institutions was from $70 to $132—a rise of $62, or 89 per cent; the increase in the 76 privately controlled institutions was from $328 to $599—a rise of $271, or 83 per cent. In broad terms the rise has been about the same, percentagewise, in the publicly and the privately controlled institutions; but has been much larger, dollarwise, in the privately controlled institutions.

Details for the different curricular-organizational types of institutions are included in Table 1. These do not seem to require special comment, other than the caution that the number of institutions in certain of the subgroups is small, and the results for these subgroups correspondingly subject to sampling error.

Tuition per institution. Data similar to the figures in Table 1, calculated on a per institution basis, are given in Table 2. The findings in this table are not, in general, very significantly different from those in Table 1.

[2] For the academic years 1939–40 and 1949–50, the resident undergraduate enrollment at the end of the academic year was employed for weighting the tuition rate in each institution; for the academic year 1954–55, resident undergraduate enrollment as of November 1954 was employed, since enrollment data for the full academic year were not yet available at the time of the study (May 1955).

TABLE 1—Tuition Rate per Student in 196 Higher Educational Institutions, by Type of Control and by Curricular-Organizational Classification, 1939–40, 1949–50, and 1954–55

(*Catalogue study*)

Type of Control and Curricular-Organizational Classification	No. of Institutions	Tuition Rate per Student			Amount of Increase			Percentage Increase		
		1939–40	1949–50	1954–55	1940 to 1950	1940 to 1955	1950 to 1955	1940 to 1950	1940 to 1955	1950 to 1955
All institutions	196	$165	$249	$305	$84	$140	$56	51	85	22
Publicly controlled	120	70	109	132	39	62	23	56	89	21
Privately controlled	76	328	468	599	140	271	131	43	83	28
Publicly controlled:										
Universities	69	83	123	158	40	75	35	48	90	28
Liberal arts colleges	19	29	56	71	27	42	15	93	145	27
Technological schools	4	104	151	165	47	61	14	45	59	9
Teachers colleges	17	61	92	108	31	47	16	51	77	17
Other professional schools	1	72	103	137	31	65	34	43	90	33
Junior colleges	10	10.74	15.77	18.27	5.03	7.53	2.50	47	70	16
Privately controlled:										
Universities	57	327	465	600	138	273	135	42	83	29
Liberal arts colleges	14	294	426	525	131	231	99	45	79	23
Technological schools	5	389	598	736	209	347	138	54	89	23

Data gathered by Mrs. M. G. Fullam, S. C. Craigie, C. G. Lind, and Mrs. D. Holladay under the direction of Mrs. Mabel C. Rice.

TABLE 2—TUITION RATE PER INSTITUTION IN 196 HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BY TYPE OF CONTROL AND BY CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION, 1939–40, 1949–50, AND 1954–55

(*Catalogue study*)

TYPE OF CONTROL AND CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	NO. OF INSTITUTIONS	TUITION RATE PER INSTITUTION			AMOUNT OF INCREASE			PERCENTAGE INCREASE		
		1939–40	1949–50	1954–55	1940 to 1950	1940 to 1955	1950 to 1955	1940 to 1950	1940 to 1955	1950 to 1955
All institutions	196	$168	$249	$311	$81	$143	$62	48	85	25
Publicly controlled	120	78	112	135	34	57	23	44	73	21
Privately controlled	76	310	465	590	155	280	125	50	90	27
Publicly controlled:										
Universities	69	97	138	168	41	71	30	42	73	22
Liberal arts colleges	19	56	80	96	24	40	16	43	71	20
Technological schools	4	92	142	164	50	72	22	54	78	15
Teachers colleges	17	59	89	106	30	47	17	51	80	19
Other professional schools	1	72	103	137	31	65	34	43	90	33
Junior colleges	10	16.70	17.70	21.40	1.00	4.70	3.70	6	28	21
Privately controlled:										
Universities	57	306	457	587	151	281	130	49	92	28
Liberal arts colleges	14	285	439	542	154	257	103	54	90	23
Technological schools	5	420	626	751	206	331	125	49	79	20

Data gathered by Mrs. M. G. Fullam, S. C. Craigie, C. G. Lind, and Mrs. D. Holladay under the direction of Mrs. Mabel C. Rice.

Question immediately arises as to the representativeness of the 196 institutions from which the results described above were obtained. Some empirical evidence on this point is available by comparison of the tuition rates for 1954–55 in Table 1 (based on the 196 institutions) with the tuition rates for 1954–55 in Table 3 (based on 1,526 institutions, which is nearly 80 per cent of the total number of higher educational institutions). The comparison yields some reassurance but also points to some discrepancies. Data based exclusively on rather large institutions cannot be depended upon to reveal accurately the facts for smaller institutions, even though one may conjecture that the smaller institutions tend eventually, if not immediately, to follow the tuition pattern set by the larger institutions. As already mentioned, the 196 institutions for which data are presented in Tables 1 and 2 include about 55 per cent of the resident undergraduate enrollment of the country, and a larger proportion of the graduate enrollment. The results in Tables 1 and 2, then, may be said to apply to a majority of the college-grade students in the nation.

Data from Office of Education questionnaire

For the years 1953–54 and 1954–55, additional data are available from a questionnaire sent to all institutions of higher education, requesting the approximate charge in tuition and required fees for the academic year, with reference to the "typical undergraduate, non-veteran, in-state, full-time student." At the time this is written, returns are available from 1,526 of approximately 1,950 institutions of higher education for the academic year 1954–55; for the same institutions, returns are also available for the academic year 1953–54. The results are given in Table 3. As shown in the last two columns of this table, the increase in tuition rate from 1953–54 to 1954–55 was identical dollarwise in the publicly and the privately controlled institutions ($13), but larger percentagewise in the publicly controlled institutions than in the privately controlled (10.9 per cent versus 2.6 per cent).

Table 3 also contains data for the separate curricular-organizational subgroups of higher education: universities, liberal arts colleges, and so forth. Space is lacking for comment on the data for these separate subgroups.

Data from questionnaire study by W. R. Bokelman

Under the sponsorship of the Central Association of College and University Business Officers, W. R. Bokelman,[3] serving as chairman of a study committee, received 330 usable questionnaire returns from higher educational institutions in all parts of the United States. As in the case of the 196 institutions included in the Office of Education catalogue study, the institutions in the Bokelman study are fairly large; the average enrollment in the 330 institutions was 2,366.

The data supplied by Bokelman provide a comparison of tuition rates for the academic years 1947–48 and 1954–55 (see Table 4). According to Table 4, the percentage rise of tuition rates from 1947–48 to 1954–55 has been virtually identical in publicly controlled and privately controlled institutions: namely, 38 and 37 per cent, respec-

[3] Dr. Bokelman is now specialist for College Business Administration in the Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

TABLE 3—TUITION RATE PER STUDENT IN 1,526 HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BY TYPE OF CONTROL AND BY CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION, 1953–54 AND 1954–55

(*Questionnaire study—U. S. Office of Education*)

TYPE OF CONTROL AND CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	NO. OF INSTITUTIONS	TUITION RATE PER STUDENT		INCREASE, 1954 TO 1955	
		1953–54	1954–55	Amount	Per cent
Publicly controlled	530	$119	$132	$13	10.9
Universities	70	153	173	20	13.1
Liberal arts colleges	65	90	100	10	11.1
Technological schools	19	129	143	14	10.9
Teachers colleges	145	97	103	6	6.2
Other professional schools	10	215	274	59	27.4
Junior colleges	221	55	59	4	7.3
Privately controlled	996	503	515	13	2.6
Universities	52	575	593	18	3.1
Liberal arts colleges	562	463	476	13	2.8
Technological schools	20	618	622	4	.6
Theological schools	88	193	200	7	3.6
Teachers colleges	21	335	358	23	6.9
Other professional schools	92	512	528	16	3.1
Junior colleges	161	345	371	26	7.5

Data drawn from 1,526 questionnaires returned by institutions of higher education in 1953–54 and 1954–55 as part of the Office of Education's statistical surveys in higher education.

TABLE 4—TUITION RATE PER INSTITUTION IN 330 HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BY TYPE OF CONTROL AND BY CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION, 1947–48 TO 1954–55

(Questionnaire study—W. R. Bokelman)

TYPE OF CONTROL AND CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	NO. OF INSTITUTIONS	TUITION RATE PER INSTITUTION[a]		INCREASE, 1948 TO 1955	
		1947–48	1954–55	Amount	Per cent[b]
All institutions	330	$130	$179	$49	37
Publicly controlled	143	55	77	21	38
Privately controlled	187	188	257	69	37
Publicly controlled:					
State universities with enrollment of 5,000 or more	32	59	77	18	30
State universities with enrollment of less than 5,000	33	67	92	25	37
State teachers colleges	50	34	46	12	35
State liberal arts colleges	17	63	89	26	42
Municipal universities and liberal arts colleges	11	95	150	55	58
Privately controlled:					
Universities	47	195	262	67	34
Liberal arts colleges with enrollment of 500 or more	80	191	262	71	37
Liberal arts colleges with enrollment of less than 500	60	178	245	67	38

[a] The tuition rates in this table are per semester or quarter.

[b] Calculated from average tuition expressed in dollars and cents, instead of rounded dollars as in the present table.

tively. In dollar amounts, the rise for publicly controlled institutions was $21 and for privately controlled, $69.

Bokelman also inquired as to *anticipated* increases in tuition from 1954–55 to 1955–56. The results are shown in Table 5. The percentage rise anticipated by publicly controlled institutions is on the average 4.6 and by privately controlled institutions is 1.9 (see last column of the table). Bokelman does not convert his percentage data on anticipated increases into dollar amounts; but if we apply the percentages to the average tuition rates in Table 4 ($77 and $257, for public and private, respectively), the calculated dollar amounts are $3.54 and $4.88, respectively. Because of the subjectivity of "anticipated" increases, it would doubtless be preferable to think of these figures as roughly $3.50 and $5.00, respectively.

ABILITY TO PAY

The figures in Tables 1–4 reflect the significant increases in tuition rates in recent years, and Table 5 indicates that, on the average, this rise will continue in the immediate future. Question arises as to the relation between increases in tuition rates and the ability of students to pay such increases.

Changes in the ability of students to pay tuition and required fees will depend, of course, on changes in income. Such changes, it is recognized, are not uniform from state to state, nor from urban to rural communities, nor from industry to industry within urban places.

Lack of detailed, specific data, however, compels us to deal with income on a national basis. We shall be concerned, in general, with income after taxes, since that is the only kind of income available for the payment of tuition and required fees.

Table 6 presents data on (*a*) increases in tuition rates (as reported in Tables 1–4) and (*b*) changes in disposable income. It can be quickly seen in Table 6 (bottom quarter of the table) that between 1939–40 and 1949–50, per capita disposable income rose 136.5 per cent, whereas tuition rates rose in the neighborhood of only 50 per cent (56 per cent for publicly controlled institutions, and 43 per cent for privately controlled). In recent years, however, tuition rates (both in publicly controlled and privately controlled institutions) have been rising at a more rapid rate than has per capita disposable income. This fact is likely to create some resistance to further tuition rises.

Since college students are probably drawn mainly from the upper two-fifths of the population with respect to income, it is pertinent to inquire whether disposable personal income in the top and the second fifth has risen as rapidly as the national average. The answer (Table 7) is that disposable personal

TABLE 5—ANTICIPATION OF INCREASED TUITION RATES FOR 1955–56 BY 313 HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

(Questionnaire study—W. R. Bokelman)

TYPE OF CONTROL AND CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	NO. OF INSTITUTIONS REPORTING	NO. OF INSTITUTIONS ANTICIPATING—		INSTITUTIONS ANTICIPATING AN INCREASE, AS PER CENT OF TOTAL INSTITUTIONS REPORTING	PERCENTAGE RISE ANTICIPATED BY THOSE ANTICIPATING AN INCREASE	ANTICIPATED PERCENTAGE RISE, ALL INSTITUTIONS
		No increase	An increase			
All institutions	313	254	59	18.8	16.3	3.1
Publicly controlled	133	113	20	15.0	30.7	4.6
Privately controlled	180	141	39	21.7	9.0	1.9
Publicly controlled:						
State universities with enrollment of 5,000 or more	30	26	4	13,3	21.0	2.8
State universities with enrollment of less than 5,000	28	27	1	3.6	30.0	1.1
State teachers colleges	49	39	10	20.4	34.1	7.0
State liberal arts colleges	18	14	4	22.2	35.8	8.0
Municipal universities and liberal arts colleges	8	7	1	12.5	15.0	1.9
Privately controlled:						
Universities	46	39	7	15.2	8.0	1.2
Liberal arts colleges with enrollment of 500 or more	75	58	17	22.7	8.8	2.0
Liberal arts colleges with enrollment of less than 500	59	44	15	25.4	9.6	2.4

TABLE 6—COMPARISON OF TUITION RATES AND PER CAPITA DISPOSABLE INCOME, FOR SPECIFIED YEARS BETWEEN 1939–40 AND 1954–55

School Year	Amount			Dollar Rise			Per Cent Increase		
	Per capita disposable income[a]	Tuition rate per student		Per capita disposable income[a]	Tuition rate per student		Per capita disposable income[a]	Tuition rate per student	
		Publicly controlled institutions	Privately controlled institutions		Publicly controlled institutions	Privately controlled institutions		Publicly controlled institutions	Privately controlled institutions
1953–54	$1,564	119[b]	502[b]	—	—	—	—	—	—
1954–55	1,569	132[b]	515[b]	5	13	13	0.3	10.9	2.6
1949–50	1,310	109[c]	468[c]	—	—	—	—	—	—
1954–55	1,569	132[c]	599[c]	259	23	131	19.8	21.0	28.0
1947–48	1,226	55[d]	188[d]	—	—	—	—	—	—
1954–55	1,569	77[d]	257[d]	343	21[e]	69	28.0	38.0	37.5
1939–40	554	70[c]	328[c]	—	—	—	—	—	—
1949–50	1,310	109[c]	468[c]	756	39	140	136.5	56.0	43.0

[a] *Figures on per capita disposable income are based on data in Economic Indicators* (April 1955 and earlier issues), published by the U. S. Government Printing Office. The figure for 1954–55 is an estimate based on data for the last half of calendar year 1954 and the preliminary estimate for the first quarter of calendar year 1955.

[b] Based on a questionnaire study by the Office of Education. See Table 3.

[c] Based on a catalogue study by the Office of Education. See Table 1.

[d] Based on a questionnaire study by W. R. Bokelman. Figures give tuition per institution, on a semester or quarter basis. Other figures in these columns give tuition per student, on an academic-year basis. See Table 4.

[e] Based on unrounded tuition rates for 1954–55 and 1947–48.

TABLE 7—AVERAGE FAMILY PERSONAL INCOME AFTER PAYMENT OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX, FOR QUINTILES OF CONSUMER UNITS RANKED BY SIZE OF AFTER-TAX INCOME, 1941 AND 1950

Quintile	Income after Payment of Federal Individual Income Tax		Increase in After-Tax Income, 1941 to 1950	
	1941	1950	Amount	Per cent
All income groups combined	$2,110	$4,090	$1,980	94
Highest	4,940	8,880	3,940	80
Fourth	2,430	4,690	2,260	93
Third	1,680	3,440	1,760	105
Second	1,040	2,360	1,320	127
First	450	1,060	610	136

TABLE 8—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IN-STATE AND OUT-OF-STATE TUITION RATES IN 120 PUBLICLY CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 1939–40, 1949–50, AND 1954–55

(*Catalogue study—U. S. Office of Education*)

Curricular-organizational Classification	No. of Institutions	Average Difference Between In-State and Out-of-State Tuition Rates in—			Amount of Increase in Difference from—			Percentage Increase in Difference from—		
		1939–40	1949–50	1954–55	1940 to 1950[a]	1940 to 1955[b]	1950 to 1955[c]	1940 to 1950[d]	1940 to 1955[e]	1950 to 1955[f]
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Publicly controlled	120	$ 66	$146	$171	$ 80	$105	$ 25	121	159	17
Universities	69	81	182	192	101	111	10	125	137	6
Liberal arts colleges	19	38	84	119	46	81	35	121	213	42
Technological schools	4	82	100	265	18	183	165	22	223	165
Teachers colleges	17	41	120	159	79	118	39	193	288	33
Other professional schools	1	200	300	300	100	100	0	50	50	0
Junior colleges	10	34	59	86	25	52	27	74	153	46

Data gathered by Mrs. M. G. Fullam, S. C. Craigie, C. G. Lind, and Mrs. D. Holladay under the direction of Mrs. Mabel C. Rice.

[a] Column 4 minus column 3.

[b] Column 5 minus column 3.

[c] Column 5 minus column 4.

[d] Column 6 divided by column 3, times 100. The first entry in this column is to be read: The *increase* in the difference between average in-state and out-of-state tuition rate from 1939–40 to 1949–50 (*viz.*, $80, column 6) was 121 per cent of the average difference existing in the school year 1939–40 (*viz.*, $66, column 3).

[e] Column 7 divided by column 3, times 100. The first entry in this column is to be read: The *increase* in the difference between average in-state and out-of-state tuition rate from 1939–40 to 1954–55 (*viz.*, $105, column 7) was 159 per cent of the average difference existing in the school year 1939–40 (*viz.*, $66, column 3).

[f] Column 8 divided by column 4, times 100. The first entry in this column is to be read: The *increase* in the difference between average in-state and out-of-state tuition rate from 1949–50 to 1954–55 (*viz.*, $25, column 8) was 17 per cent of the average difference existing in the school year 1949–50 (*viz.*, $146, column 4).

income has risen just about as rapidly as the national average in the second fifth of income level, but *less* rapidly in the top fifth. It seems beyond question that the top fifth sends a larger proportion of its children to institutions of higher education than any other income group. This again is a factor which may be expected to create some resistance to further tuition rises.

It will have been noted that the presentation above has been phrased in terms of current dollars (rather than dollars of stable purchasing power). This is appropriate, since all tuition rates have also been expressed in terms of current dollars.

STATE RESIDENCE AND TUITION

It is well known that the differential between tuition rates for in-state and out-of-state students attending publicly

TABLE 9—NONRESIDENT TUITION RATES IN 108 PUBLICLY CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 1947–48 AND 1954–55

(Questionnaire study—W. R. Bokelman)

CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	NO. OF INSTITUTIONS REPORTING	NONRESIDENT TUITION RATE (semester or quarter basis)		INCREASE, 1948 TO 1955	
		1947–48	1954–55	Amount	Per cent
Publicly controlled	108	$ 94	$105	$11	12
State universities with enrollment of 5,000 or more	28	103	131	28	27
State universities with enrollment of less than 5,000	25	100	104	4	4
State teachers colleges	36	90	90	0	0
State liberal arts colleges	12	85	94	9	11
Municipal universities and liberal arts colleges	7	69	101	32	46

TABLE 10—ANTICIPATION OF INCREASED NONRESIDENT TUITION RATES FOR 1955–56 BY 132 PUBLICLY CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

(Questionnaire study—W. R. Bokelman)

CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	NO. OF INSTITUTIONS REPORTING	NO. OF INSTITUTIONS ANTICIPATING—		INSTITUTIONS ANTICIPATING AN INCREASE, AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INSTITUTIONS REPORTING	PERCENTAGE RISE ANTICIPATED BY THOSE ANTICIPATING AN INCREASE	ANTICIPATED PERCENTAGE RISE, ALL INSTITUTIONS
		No increase	An increase			
Publicly controlled	132	118	14	11	58.7	6.2
State universities with enrollment of 5,000 or more	30	25	5	17	72.8	12.1
State universities with enrollment of less than 5,000	28	26	2	7	40.0	2.9
State teachers colleges	48	43	5	10	47.6	5.0
State liberal arts colleges	16	15	1	6	100.0	6.2
Municipal universities and liberal arts colleges	10	9	1	10	40.0	4.0

controlled institutions of higher education has been rising. In 1939–40 this differential averaged $66 per institution per academic year, according to an unpublished study based on the catalogues of 120 publicly controlled institutions by the Office of Education (Table 8). A decade later, by 1949–50, the differential had risen to $146; and by 1954–55, it had risen to $171. The rise in the last five years, however, has been at a considerably less

TABLE 11—RECEIPTS FROM TUITION AND FEES IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

(In thousands of dollars)

SCHOOL YEAR	ALL CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS	UNIVERSITIES, COLLEGES, AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS	TEACHERS COLLEGES AND NORMAL SCHOOLS[a]	JUNIOR COLLEGES[a]
	Publicly and Privately Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	$145,164	$133,149	$ 6,795	$ 5,220
1939–40	200,897	178,868	10,988	11,040
1941–42	201,365	180,748	9.675	10,942
1943–44	154,485	138,765	6,418	9,302
1945–46	275,519	244,699	10,698	20,123
1947–48	669,328	591,556	31,210	46,561
1949–50	701,936	626,805	34,769	40,362
1951–52	593,491	533,595	26,684	33,212
	Publicly Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	33,563	27,807	5,237	519
1939–40	47,989	43,055	9,213	2,721
1941–42	54,893	44,392	7,969	2,533
1943–44	38,157	31,176	5,501	1,480
1945–46	73,213	60,357	8,126	4,730
1947–48	245,600	192,901	28,437	24,262
1949–50	229,396	181,158	30,756	17,483
1951–52	173,847	137,298	22,998	13,551
	Privately Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	$111,600	$105,342	$1,558	$ 4,701
1939–40	145,908	135,813	1,775	8,319
1941–42	146,471	136,356	1,706	8,410
1943–44	116,328	107,589	917	7,822
1945–46	202,305	184,341	2,572	15,392
1947–48	423,728	398,655	2,773	22,300
1949–50	472,539	445,647	4,013	22,880
1951–52	419,643	396,299	3,686	19,661

From material prepared by Mr. Henry G. Badger.

Figures for publicly and for privately controlled institutions may not sum to total for all institutions (top tier of figures) because of rounding.

[a] Normal schools are classified with junior colleges from 1949–50 on.

TABLE 12—RECEIPTS FROM TUITION AND FEES IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF EDUCATIONAL AND GENERAL EXPENDITURES (EXCEPT EXPENDITURES FOR SEPARATELY BUDGETED RESEARCH)

SCHOOL YEAR	ALL CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS	UNIVERSITIES, COLLEGES, AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS	TEACHERS COLLEGES AND NORMAL SCHOOLS[a]	JUNIOR COLLEGES[a]
	Publicly and Privately Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	42.9	49.0	12.8	39.9
1939–40	40.6	42.1	25.2	42.0
1941–42	37.4	39.0	21.4	37.2
1943–44	25.8	26.2	14.9	35.9
1945–46	37.6	38.1	21.8	48.4
1947–48	54.3	55.3	39.0	55.9
1949–50	47.4	48.9	34.4	40.8
1951–52	37.0	38.4	23.4	32.8
	Publicly Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	20.6	25.9	10.8	8.0
1939–40	19.2	22.3	22.4	17.9
1941–42	19.9	20.6	18.6	14.4
1943–44	13.1	13.3	13.2	10.0
1945–46	20.6	20.9	17.8	22.0
1947–48	39.0	38.2	37.3	49.3
1949–50	25.5	24.7	32.1	25.6
1951–52	19.7	19.5	21.2	19.1
	Privately Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	63.6	64.1	33.7	71.8
1939–40	59.5	58.6	71.1	75.1
1941–42	55.9	55.0	74.9	70.4
1943–44	37.8	36.4	57.4	70.4
1945–46	53.4	52.0	72.9	76.6
1947–48	70.3	70.6	72.0	65.4
1949–50	58.4	57.7	76.4	74.6
1951–52	58.3	58.0	64.5	65.2

From material prepared by Mr. Henry G. Badger.

[a] Normal schools are classified with junior colleges for 1949–50 on.

rapid rate than in the decade from 1940 to 1950.

Data from the Bokelman study also point to a rising differential between tuition rates for in-state versus out-of-state students (Table 9); in Bokelman's data, however (based on 108 publicly controlled institutions), the rise is less rapid than in the data from the study by the Office of Education. According to Bokelman, a further substantial rise in the differential tuition rate is planned by several institutions (Table 10). Over-all, the increase in 1955–56 (for all publicly controlled institutions in Bokelman's sample) is expected to average 6.2 per cent.

RECEIPTS FROM TUITION AND FEES

Table 11 presents data on receipts from tuition and fees, from 1929–30 to 1951–52, the last year for which systematic, nationwide data are currently available. In general, the big jump in receipts came after 1945–46, with the arrival of the large World War II veteran enrollment (a dash line after this year has been drawn in Tables 11–13 to

TABLE 13—RECEIPTS FROM TUITION AND FEES IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES[a]

SCHOOL YEAR	ALL CURRICULAR-ORGANIZATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS	UNIVERSITIES, COLLEGES, AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS	TEACHERS COLLEGES AND NORMAL SCHOOLS[b]	JUNIOR COLLEGES[b]
	Publicly and Privately Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	30.2	33.7	9.9	30.1
1939–40	33.2	34.4	20.6	33.5
1941–42	32.3	33.4	19.9	32.8
1943–44	22.6	22.7	14.2	33.5
1945–46	30.9	30.9	20.0	42.9
1947–48	39.4	39.7	29.5	45.2
1949–50	33.1	33.6	25.9	32.5
1951–52	25.5	26.0	17.1	27.5
	Publicly Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	14.8	17.8	8.3	6.7
1939–40	14.4	16.4	18.2	14.2
1941–42	16.7	16.8	17.2	13.1
1943–44	11.4	11.3	12.7	9.3
1945–46	17.2	17.1	16.4	20.0
1947–48	27.4	26.2	28.0	41.1
1949–50	19.5	18.9	24.0	19.8
1951–52	13.2	13.6	15.5	15.9
	Privately Controlled Institutions			
1929–30	43.9	44.1	27.8	48.7
1939–40	53.4	52.9	67.4	60.7
1941–42	50.0	49.3	71.6	60.0
1943–44	33.3	32.1	52.8	65.1
1945–46	43.4	42.0	61.2	66.3
1947–48	52.8	52.9	65.6	50.8
1949–50	49.8	49.1	64.7	63.9
1951–52	41.3	40.7	47.2	55.4

From material prepared by Mr. Henry G. Badger.

[a] Educational and general expenditures plus expenditures for plant expansion. Expenditures for auxiliary enterprises (such as dormitories and dining halls) and "noneducational expenditures" (such as annuities and scholarships) are not included.

[b] Normal schools are classified with junior colleges from 1949–50 on.

TABLE 14—CHANGES IN TUITION RATES AND FACULTY SALARIES, FROM 1947–48 TO 1954–55

CLASS OF INSTITUTION	AVERAGE INCREASE IN TUITION RATE FROM 1947–48 TO 1954–55 (per cent)	AVERAGE INCREASE IN FACULTY SALARIES, 1947–48 TO 1954–55 (per cent)
State universities with enrollment of 5,000 or more	30.3	33.0
State universities with enrollment of less than 5,000	37.4	34.7
State teachers colleges	34.9	36.6
State liberal arts colleges	41.7	34.7
Municipal universities and liberal arts colleges	58.3	35.3
Private universities	34.3	30.3
Private liberal arts colleges with enrollment of more than 500	37.3	32.4
Private liberal arts colleges with enrollment of less than 500	37.7	32.2

emphasize this fact). Between 1945–46 and 1947–48, the receipts from tuition and fees in publicly controlled universities, colleges, and professional schools rose from $60 million to over $190 million, and in privately controlled, from about $185 million to nearly $400 million. The rise in publicly controlled junior colleges, after 1945–46, was especially pronounced, but the subsequent recession has also been more pronounced in this group.

There has been some complaint that, with a decline in other sources of income, receipts from tuition and fees have become a disproportionately large fraction of educational and general income. It has seemed to us that perhaps more significant conceptually than the relation between tuition and total income is the relation between receipts from tuition and fees and *expenditures* (or, still better, *needs*, if a good measure of needs were available). Table 12 shows the relation between receipts from tuition and fees and "educational and general expenditures (except expenditures for separately budgeted research)." The complaint regarding the rise in the prominence of tuition and fees does not seem justified, at least through the school year 1951–52. The percentage of educational and general expenditures accounted for by receipts from tuition and fees has, in fact, been declining in the two bienniums of our data since 1947–48. In the school year 1951–52, the percentage was generally close to its value in 1939–40—or lower. Of course, the situation may have changed between 1951–52 and the present; and in some individual institutions the trend will not conform with the national average.

Table 13 presents the relation between receipts from tuition and fees and an approximation of *total* expenditures. Here, too, the complaint that tuition and fees account for a rising proportion of expenditures seems unfounded, for institutions of higher education as a whole.

If one examines the top and bottom line of each tier of figures in Tables 12 and 13, one gains an impression that the different types of institution are drawing more closely together in the proportion of expenditures represented by tuition and fees. The privately controlled junior colleges and teachers colleges still stand out as meeting a comparatively large fraction of their expenditures from receipts from tuition and fees.

The statistics in Tables 11–13 may seem "dry." The set of figures (from Bokelman) in Table 14, on changes in tuition rates and changes in faculty salaries, may suggest the human values implicit in the financial statistics of higher education.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In studies of tuition rates of institutions of higher education, it is desirable to distinguish between tuition rate per student and tuition rate per institution (when dealing with a group of institutions). It is suggested that the tuition rate for the "typical undergraduate, nonveteran, in-state, full-time student" be generally adopted as a kind of "standard" figure—to be supplemented, as needed, by tuition rates for graduate students, for extension students, for students in selected professional schools, and so forth. As another methodological suggestion, it is recommended that changes in "ability to pay" tuition and required fees be measured in terms of "disposable personal income." If the purpose is to compare disposable income with tuition rates, no correction is needed for changes in purchasing power of the dollar.

2. In the fifteen years from 1939–40 to 1954–55, tuition rates per student, in a group of 120 publicly controlled institutions, rose from an average of $70 to $132—a rise of $62, or 89 per cent. The comparable rise for students in a group of 76 privately controlled institutions was from $328 to $599—a rise of $271, or 83 per cent. Other data, from questionnaire studies by the Office of Education and by W. R. Bokelman, show that, in the main, the rises in tuition rates in publicly and in privately controlled institutions have been roughly the same on a percentage basis but much larger in the privately controlled institutions on a dollar basis. According to Bokelman's data, the trend toward higher tuition rates will continue at least into the next academic year.

3. During the decade from 1939–40 to 1949–50, per capita disposable income rose from $554 to $1,310—a rise of over 136 per cent. Tuition and fees in this period rose only about 50 per cent. In recent years, the rise in tuition rate has been appreciably more rapid than the rise in per capita disposable income, especially for those in the top fifth of income. This may be expected to create some resistance to further tuition rises.

4. The differential between in-state and out-of-state tuition rates increased rapidly in the decade from 1939–40 to 1949–50, and more slowly from 1949–50 to the present (1954–55). Further significant increases in the next academic year are anticipated in some institutions.

5. Total receipts from tuition and fees rose sharply after 1945–46, with the arrival of World War II veterans on the campus. In general, however, receipts from tuition and fees have dropped in the two bienniums since 1947–48. The complaint that receipts from tuition and fees constitute a rising proportion of income and expenditures (owing to a drop in income from other sources) does not seem to be borne out by the data through 1951–52.

The "rising tide" of enrollment and associated receipts from tuition and fees should help to solve some financial problems of higher education. The "rising tide," however, will not swell for several years; and in any event, other solutions beyond increased receipts from tuition and fees may quite possibly be necessary.

DEFINITIONS

Tuition rate

The phrase "tuition rate" is intended to refer to tuition and required fees

charged to the typical undergraduate, nonveteran, in-state, full-time student in an institution of higher education. The following types of charge are excluded or ignored in the present limited study: tuition for graduate work; tuition for summer sessions, extension courses, adult education, short courses, and so forth; one-time and special fees not charged all undergraduates (such as matriculation fees for freshmen, late-registration fees, laboratory fees charged only to students in certain courses); voluntary fees for student activities, intercollegiate activities, and so forth; and charges for room and board. The restriction of the term "tuition rate" to "tuition and required fees for undergraduate, nonveteran, in-state, full-time students" provides a significant concept which is broadly applicable on a reasonably comparable basis to all [4] institutions of higher education. Except for charges for room and board—which, as living costs, clearly do not belong in the same category as the tuition rate—none of the excluded miscellany of fees is of major importance as a source of income for higher education as a whole. In a few institutions, tuition for graduate work is a considerable item; but graduate students (both full-time and part-time together) constitute only about 10 per cent of all resident college-grade students; [5] and of course a larger proportion of graduate education is subsidized by fellowships and other means than is the case with undergraduate education.

[4] The only exception is the quite rare instance where student services may take the place of all or part of tuition and required fees. Even in these cases, good accounting practice would credit the imputed value of such services to the tuition account.

[5] See Herbert S. Conrad and William A. Jaracz, *Resident, Extension, and Adult Education Enrollment in Institutions of Higher Education: November 1953*, Office of Education Circular No. 414. Washington: D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

The report by Bokelman does not define "tuition," but the meaning of this word in his report is probably similar to the usage described for "tuition rate" in the preceding paragraph.

In data reported from studies by the Office of Education, "tuition rate" refers to the tuition rate for the academic year (two semesters or three quarters). In the Bokelman data, the figures for "tuition" apparently refer to the rate per semester or quarter. Either set of data, it should be noted, is equally suited to reveal *trends* (for example, the percentage rise in tuition rate from one year to another).

Tuition rate per student and per institution

An important conceptual distinction should be noted between tuition rate per institution and tuition rate per student. The first simply averages the tuition charges made by institutions, with each institution (whether large or small) given equal weight. The second weights the tuition charge in each institution by the enrollment in the institution. To illustrate: Suppose that institution A, with 9,900 students, charges tuition at the rate of $100 per student; and institution B, with 100 students, charges tuition at the rate of $900 per student. Then, for this group of two institutions, the tuition per institution is simply $\frac{\$100 + 900}{2} = \$500$. The tuition per student is

$$\frac{(9{,}900 \times \$100 + (100 \times \$900)}{10{,}000} = \$108.$$

The difference between $500 and $108 is, of course, significant.

In general we have been more concerned with tuition per student than with tuition per institution, since a change affecting, say, 9,900 students may usually be considered more important than one which affects only 100 students. It should be added, however, that in actual practice the two types of tuition rate for a given group of institutions will usually not be very far apart, if the number of institutions involved is at least moderately large (say 50 or more; see Tables 1 and 2), and especially if differences in size of institutions in the group are limited. The Bokelman data refer to tuition per institution; but Bokelman generally takes precautions to avoid unlimited range of size of institutions in a given classification, so that the likelihood of a large discrepancy between tuition per student and tuition per institution in his data is rather slight.

Receipts from tuition and fees

The term "tuition rate" is to be sharply distinguished from the accounting term "receipts from tuition and fees." The phrase "receipts from tuition and fees," as used in the present paper, refers to receipts from *all* tuition and fees which, in conventional college accounting, fall in the category of "educational and general income." (Fees or charges collected in connection with auxiliary enterprises, such as dormitories and dining halls, are not included.)

Expenditures

Receipts from tuition and fees are compared, in this paper (Tables 12, 13), with two types of expenditure. The first of these is "educational and general expenditures (except expenditures for separately budgeted research)." The second is an approximation of total expenditures, obtained by adding expenditures for plant expansion to educational and general expenditures. "Educational and general expenditures" include expenditures for (*a*) general administration and general expense, (*b*) instruction and departmental research, (*c*) libraries, (*d*) organized activities related to educational departments, (*e*) operation and maintenance of the physical plant, (*f*) extension and public service, and (*g*) separately budgeted research. "Expenditures for plant expansion" relate to purchases of land, the construction or purchase or remodeling of buildings, improvements other than buildings, furniture and equipment, and construction inventories.[6]

The reason for separating educational and general expenditures from total expenditures is that receipts from tuition and fees are generally expected to contribute to expenditures in the "educational and general" category, while gifts or appropriations are expected to take care of requirements for expansion of the academic plant. The reason for making use of a figure in which separately budgeted research is removed from "educational and general expenditures" is that full support for such research is generally obtained from non-student sources (federal funds, grants from foundations, gifts from corporations, and so forth). Finally, the reason for making use of total expenditures (or an approximation thereof) is that there is some legitimate interest in a single figure which embodies, so to speak, the over-all expenditure problems of higher education.

Ability to pay

Students' ability to pay tuition and fees has been inferred, in general, from national data on per capita disposable

[6] Institutions of higher education differ to some extent in their definitions of the various expenditure items and in their accounting practices. But there is sufficient uniformity to permit an appraisal of basic national trends or changes.

income (income after taxes). Special attention should be given to the upper two-fifths of the population in income level, since it is from this group, it is believed, that the majority of college students are drawn.

Herbert S. Conrad, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., has been chief of Research and Statistical Standards, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, since 1948. He was statistician and research associate, Institute of Child Welfare, University of California (1928–43) and assistant professor of education (1933–38) and associate professor of psychology (1938–43) in the University; research psychologist (1943–45) and technical consultant (1945–48), College Entrance Examination Board; chief, Examination Analysis and Statistical Unit, United States Civil Service Commission (1945); and expert consultant to the Secretary of War (1947). He has been editor of Psychological Monographs: General and Applied since 1948, served as chairman of the Council of Editors of the American Psychological Association in 1952, and is on the editorial board of Psychometrika and the Journal of Psychology and a contributing editor of Journal of Experimental Education.

Ernest V. Hollis, Ph.D., Litt.D., LL.D., L.H.D., Washington, D. C., is chief of College Administration, Office of Education, since 1944, after serving as co-ordinator of the Commission on Teacher Education, American Council on Education (1940–44). Prior to these dates he had been professor, dean, and president of colleges. He is author, among other works, of Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education (1938), Toward Improving Ph.D. Programs (1945), College and University Building Needs (1948), and Social Work Education in the United States (1951).

DISCUSSION

The discussion took the form of replies from the floor to a series of provocative questions and propositions drawn from the paper. First the speaker pointed out that even within the same geographic area, attendance at colleges and universities did not vary inversely with the cost of tuition. On the contrary, in Milwaukee for instance, precisely the opposite is true: the high tuition schools have the highest enrollment. From the floor several explanations of this seeming paradox were offered, and the Milwaukee situation elaborated in greater detail. It was concluded that the motivations involved in the selection of a college or university were highly complex, and that tuition was only one and frequently not the most important factor in the decision.

The speaker pointed out that there had been an increase of 136.5 per cent in expendable per capita income during the decade 1940–50, but in the same period tuitions in publicly supported schools had risen by only 56 per cent and in private schools by only 43 per cent. In the face of mounting deficits, why were not tuition increases proportionately as great as increases in the available income? A number of extenuating circumstances were mentioned for the apparent underpricing of higher education. During the war, government units were placed on many campuses and under the original contracts, tuition rises were severely restricted. At the same time, the coeducational colleges and universities were competing with the women's colleges for a single source of students. High tuitions would have endangered their competitive strength. After the war the influx of veterans and the Veterans Administration ceiling on tuition prevented radical increases. Some discussants quarreled with the implications of the statistics presented, holding that the percentage increase in expendable income was not nearly so great among the middle-class groups, and it was from this class that recruits for the college population were drawn. It was pointed out that the cost of living had gone up approximately 90 per cent since 1940 and that tuitions had increased by about the same proportion. It was also remarked that the proportion of the annual budget drawing upon tuition income had not appreciably changed. The consensus was that tuitions had in fact been raised close to the feasible limit.

Next, attention was directed to the growing disparity between the tuitions charged by public and by privately supported institutions, and within the public institutions themselves the growing differentiation between in-state student and out-of-state student tuitions. Although it is true that the low tuitions charged by state colleges and universities tend to depress tuition charges at the private institutions, the public colleges fill a gap in education left by the ever more expensive private universities. It was alleged that even in the present years of low ebb in numbers of students graduating from high schools, the annual 5 per cent increase in enrollment has been maintained and is directly traceable to the public universities and colleges. Not only did the in-state, out-of-state student differentiation appear to be here to stay, but most state legislatures were under considerable pressure to increase the disparity even further.

1 NOV 1955
MADRAS

How Much—and How—Should Students Pay for Higher Education?*

By John F. Meck

THE question "How Much—and How—Should Students Pay for Higher Education?" is of vital importance in the context of 1955 and of the years which lie ahead. Factors of major significance are the impending increase by as much as 100 per cent in the numbers seeking college education by 1970, the relatively favorable economic conditions which make it possible for more parents to bear a larger portion of their children's education expenses, the significant growth in scholarship and other sources of financial aid (especially the marked uptrend in corporate and similar scholarship programs), and the likelihood that Congress in the near future may look favorably on providing some measure of tax relief for educational expenses.

Cost of Higher Education

At the outset of this "How Much" phase of the discussion, it is desirable to define clearly the type of costs which students should pay. Broadly speaking, the costs of higher education are principally educational expense (instruction, libraries, administration, plant operation, and organized research) and the expenses incurred in operating the auxiliary activities (dormitories, dining halls, intercollegiate athletics, and related enterprises). A third element in the total cost of higher education is that of providing scholarship assistance for students unable to pay their full share of the foregoing costs.

The total current operating expenditures for higher education in the United States today exceed 2.5 billion dollars per year,[1] three-fourths of which represents educational expense and nearly one-fourth of which is auxiliary activities expense.[2] Auxiliary activities have been segregated traditionally because they are expected to be virtually self-supporting in that the direct charges to students and other patrons ordinarily defray at least the current operating costs. The dormitory resident is expected to pay rent and the dining hall customer is expected to pay for the food he consumes and the services he enjoys, in the same way that he (or his parents) would be expected to meet such expenses should he not live and eat in college facilities.[3] On the other hand, as campus living accommodations are developed as an integral part of the educational program, serving to encourage the intellectual purposes of the institution by making the social life of the academic community a part of the educational life, a portion of the cost of operating certain of the auxiliary activities may justifiably be considered an element of educational cost.

* For a more complete analysis of the subject than is possible in this paper, reference should be made to publications of the Commission on Financing Higher Education, 1952–53, and to the studies of the General Education Board before World War II.

[1] Office of Education, "Statistics of Higher Education: Receipts, Expenditures and Property, 1951–52," *Biennial Survey of Education, 1951–52* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office), Chap. IV, Sec. 2.

[2] John D. Millett, *Financing Higher Education in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 104.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

Inherent in a discussion of how much students should pay is the further question of whether sources other than student fees can and should be developed to meet a larger share of the costs of higher education. Some of these other possible sources are being considered at other sessions of this conference. For purposes of this discussion, it can safely be assumed that student payments, particularly for most private institutions, will continue to be the basic source of financial support.

Educational Costs and Student Payments

In terms of income to meet educational costs as previously defined, student fees are the largest single source of operating revenue for private institutions, and they are an increasingly significant source for public institutions.[4] The Commission on Financing Higher Education found that, as of 1950, private institutions as a group and public institutions as a group obtained about 68 per cent and 30 per cent [5] respectively of their educational income from student charges.

Despite this high percentage, virtually no student or his parents pay (at least during the period he is enrolled) the full cost of his education. Historically this cost has been met from a combination of sources in addition to student charges, including mainly endowment income, state and federal grants, and private benefactions. At least two factors have forced both public and private institutions over the past decade to place increasing dependence upon meeting a growing percentage of their educational costs from student charges: (1) the higher cost of education due to decreased purchasing power of the dollar and development of more expensive and specialized curricula; (2) the failure of endowment income and state support to keep pace with expanding enrollments.

[4] Richard H. Ostheimer, *Student Charges and Financing Higher Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 27. (In 1950 student charges yielded one-fourth of educational income of public institutions and three-fifths of that of private institutions.)

[5] John D. Millett, *op. cit. supra* (note 2), p. 304.

The Relevant Considerations

At this point it is to be assumed that student charges are a logical and indispensable source of financing the educational costs of higher education. "How much," or perhaps "How much more," of such costs should be financed in this manner is affected by three major considerations: [6] (1) the effect on enrollment and on quality of students; (2) the effect on the individual student; and (3) the effect from the standpoint of the interests of society as a whole.

Effect on enrollment and quality of students

The Commission on Financing Higher Education, in a staff study, has estimated that a 25 per cent increase in student charges might be expected to result in a decrease of only 5 per cent in student enrollment.[7] In other words, the demand for higher education is relatively "inelastic," although many factors other than price influence actual enrollments. In the opinion of the Commission, student fees could have been increased as much as 100 per cent in the period 1940–52—the actual rise was only about 75 per cent—without any substantial adverse effect on enrollment.[8] As 1970 with its prospective larger number of students seeking higher education draws nearer, the likelihood of further increases in student charges having an adverse effect on enrollment diminishes further.

[6] Millett, *ibid.*, Chap. 22.

[7] Ostheimer, *op. cit. supra* (note 4), p. 101.

[8] Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 386.

On the other hand, excessive reliance on student fees as a source of income presents the danger that educational standards and objectives may be compromised in order to maintain a profitable volume of enrollment. Admission standards at some institutions conceivably might have to be lowered in order to take in a sufficient number of students able to pay the fee, and the type of courses offered may tend to be determined primarily on the basis of their "sales appeal."

Effect on the individual student

From the standpoint of the student, the costs of higher education, including room, board, and other similar expenses, as well as the charges for educational services, are highly relevant in a very personal sense. A further indirect but nonetheless real cost to the student and his family is that resulting from forgoing the student's earning power while he is in college.

At the same time, higher education costs are relatively less today than prior to World War II. Increases in student charges have not kept pace either with the rise in per capita income or with the rise in cost of living.[9] Furthermore, the cost of a college education has generally been well worth the student's investment in terms of subsequent increased earning power and in the future should become even more so. Indeed, it has been estimated that a college graduate will have a lifetime income $100,000 in excess of that of a noncollege graduate. Too frequently students overlook this aspect when charges are increased.

Several factors are present today which should tend to relieve further the student's burden of meeting increased charges or which brighten the prospect for such relief in the future. The first is the general economic well-being of the country. The changes in American society since World War II have increased the number of families who are able to finance college educations for their children. The same economic well-being has served to enhance substantially the ability of a student to earn a portion of his educational costs through remunerative employment opportunities during the academic year and especially during summer vacations.

A second factor in easing the student's burden is the sharp increase in scholarship and other financial aid programs. From the standpoint of the student, as distinguished from that of the institution, opportunities for financial aid have tended to increase at least in proportion to increases in student charges and in some instances at an even faster rate. Particularly noteworthy has been the rapid growth in corporate scholarship programs during the last three years, which, through a variety of plans including competitive or open scholarships and "in-company" scholarships, are opening up an entirely new resource of financial aid for college and university students.

A third factor is the possibility of some measure of relief from the federal income tax for taxpayers who incur heavy expenses for their children's education. One proposal, which is receiving widespread support from colleges and universities and, also, from organizations such as the American Council on Education and the Association of American Colleges, is a plan whereby a taxpayer would be entitled to a credit against his federal income tax for up to 30 per cent of the tuition or other similar charges for educational services for his child. This would be subject to a maximum credit of $450. Under this proposal, a taxpayer with a gross income of $10,000 per year, who has four dependents (including himself) and who takes the standard deduction, would pay a tax of $1,372 at the 1954 rates. If he had one child at a college where the tuition was $800, he would be entitled to reduce his tax by $240, making it $1,132.

Tax relief along the foregoing lines would afford substantial help to students and their parents, especially those of moderate means who too often have just enough income or other resources to disqualify them for scholarship aid under the programs of most institutions. The highly qualified child with little or no financial resources is often better able today to finance his college education by virtue of the scholarship assistance available to him than an equally qualified child from a family of moderate means.

Interests of society

The objectives of higher education, from a financial standpoint, are twofold. The one is providing the highest quality education possible to meet society's present needs for developing leadership and professional talent. The other is to provide as equal an opportunity as possible for each individual, regardless of social, economic, and religious background, to receive a college or university education.[10] Reconciliation of these two objectives means that since both the individual student and society in general benefit from the cost of his higher education, both should contribute toward financing that cost. The student should do so through payment of student charges and subsequent gifts, while society should do so through public appropriations and private contributions in order to keep the ever increasing cost of education within reach of as many as possible who have the interest and capacity to benefit from higher education.

POSSIBILITIES OF FURTHER INCREASING STUDENT CHARGES

In the light of the factors considered above, it can be concluded at this point that student charges should continue to be the principal source of educational income for private institutions and a significant source of income for public institutions. In both cases student charges should continue as a minimum to meet the same proportion of educational costs as prior to World War II. The question then becomes whether student charges should not begin to bear a higher proportion of educational costs than they are now bearing.

One basis which has been advanced for increasing student charges is a system of differential fees based on actual costs of varying programs. As a result the programs involving lower faculty-student ratios and more expensive laboratory facilities would involve higher charges to students enrolled in such programs. If the foregoing situation is coupled with a field of study in which the assurance of future income is good and in which a demand exists for trained men, as in the case of the medical school student, there is probably some justification for higher student charges. On the other hand, to establish student fees solely on the basis of cost of the particular program might affect society's interests adversely. Such a policy could have a tendency, on the one hand, to lead some students to pursue lower cost programs for reasons of "price" and, on the other, to encourage other students to go into higher cost programs because of higher future earnings possibilities. Also, using the medical school example again, high student charges, without offsetting financial aid programs, could result in students from low income and even medium income categories being excluded from certain careers. These consequences could be highly undesir-

[9] Ostheimer, *op. cit. supra* (note 4), pp. 133, 190–91.

[10] Millett, *op. cit. supra* (note 2), p. 394.

able for society generally as well as for individual students.

A different basis for increasing revenue from student charges is founded on the thesis that students should pay the full cost of their education. As is well known, Mr. Trevor Arnett in 1940, after years of study in the field, reached the conclusion that private institutions should "make their fees commensurate with the cost of providing the education, excluding interest and depreciation on plant investment." [11] Under this plan all students would be charged for educational services on the basis of cost, with those able to pay in full being required to do so, and those unable to pay the full charge being given financial assistance. The recent uptrend in scholarship and other financial aid programs noted above has tended to reawaken interest in this idea. Further support for charging closer to the full cost may be derived from the current movement among a number of institutions to agree upon common standards for determining the existence and extent of a scholarship applicant's financial need.[12] Such a system might well result in some redistribution of established scholarship funds by eliminating grants to students not justified on a financial need test, and thereby make existing scholarship funds go further.

A partial step toward the goal of making student charges commensurate with educational costs has been given serious consideration by some private institutions. This step is based on two principles, first, that a number of families who are financially able to do so sincerely wish to pay for the cost of their children's education and, second, that no qualified student should be denied an opportunity for higher education because of lack of financial resources. Proceeding on these principles, the plan calls for fixing the tuition charge as close to the full cost of educational services provided as is possible, granting a "general" scholarship for students requesting it without any proof of financial need and granting an additional "specific" scholarship for students who establish financial need in the usual manner. For example, in the case of an institution with a tuition charge of $800 and a cost per student of $1,500, the new tuition charge would be fixed at $1,500 and be applicable to all students. Any student, however, would have the privilege of electing a general scholarship of, say, $500, merely on the basis of a statement by him and his parents that the $1,500 charge is a burden. A student who needed additional financial aid would apply for a specific scholarship by an application in the usual form, which would include proof of his financial need.

This plan has not been and may never be tested in practice because it would be feasible only where competing colleges and universities adopted it simultaneously. Objections to the plan have been made on the ground that parents able to pay full cost would prefer to do so by paying the normal tuition and making a tax-deductible gift for the difference between such tuition and the actual cost. Pending tax proposals to give relief to taxpayers for educational expenses might tend to weaken this objection to the plan.

RATIO BETWEEN CHARGES AND COSTS

The foregoing discussion indicates that student charges in general must continue to meet a substantial portion of educational costs. Furthermore, in the light of possible inability to augment institutional revenues from other sources, it seems entirely feasible for student charges to be further increased without any undue adverse effect on enrollment, the individual student, or society as a whole. This would be especially true if the present trend toward larger resources in scholarship and other financial aid continues. Each individual institution, however, will have its own special problems in terms of the sources from which it draws its students, its other sources of income, and policies of its competitors.

SPREADING OF DUE DATES OF STUDENT CHARGES

The second question is *how* a student can meet his share of the cost of his education. Despite the factors referred to above, which tend to afford relief to students in financing their educations, in individual cases tuition and other charges still remain a serious obstacle to the obtaining of a college or university education.

The practice at a number of institutions has been for student charges, including not only those for tuition and other educational services, but also for room, board, health service, and the like, to be payable in a lump sum either prior to or shortly after the beginning of each semester. A larger number follow this practice on tuition and like charges, but spread due dates for board and room charges over the academic year. At virtually all such institutions extensions are obtainable in individual cases on the basis of proof of hardship. Still others, and the number has been increasing since World War II, have spread due dates for all types of student charges over the academic year, thereby considerably easing the difficulties of students in making payments when due.

The spreading of charges by institutions, however, is not the only means by which parents may ease the burden of meeting their children's educational expenses. Since an individual's college education, like the purchase of a house, represents a long term and, indeed, a lifetime investment, it is natural that various efforts to "amortize" the high short-term educational costs over a longer period have developed. Various forms of endowment insurance are available for those parents able and willing to save for their children's education in advance of the actual payment dates. Other plans go even further, such as that of one private organization which, since 1938, has extended monthly financing at a fee of 4 per cent of total charges. Under this plan the organization pays the student charges as they come due during the academic year and the parent reimburses the organization, plus the 4 per cent fee, in equal monthly payments spread over the same academic year. Hence, this plan is essentially a "pay-as-you-go" plan and not a deferred payment plan.

There is also in operation at least one plan of tuition insurance which, through a life insurance feature, provides for full payment of the student's charges from the date of his acceptance throughout his college course regardless of the parent's death or permanent disability.

Except for student loan funds at institutions which have such funds available, there does not appear to be in operation any regular and readily available plan whereby payments for a student's college education can be stretched out beyond graduation.

FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS

Virtually all institutions today have some form of financial aid programs, including scholarships, loans, and student employment.

Financial aid in the form of scholar-

[11] Trevor Arnett, *Recent Trends in Higher Education in the U. S.* (New York: General Education Board, 1940), p. 33.

[12] A central agency known as the College Scholarship Service has been established in this field by ninety-five colleges and universities. At least fifty additional institutions have expressed interest in participating. This organization receives and evaluates financial information from scholarship applicants.

ships, as discussed earlier, has grown substantially since World War II. Undoubtedly, the necessity of filling the gap created by the winding up of the veterans program contributed to this growth in scholarship programs. Another significant factor is the growing competition for the outstanding student who has intellectual as well as physical qualifications, and who gives promise of assuming a position of leadership in later life. At the same time this latter development has, in some degree at least, tended to lead to financial assistance in cases where it cannot be justified on the basis of financial need. The development of common standards for determining need, which was referred to earlier, would help eliminate such abuses and in effect make existing scholarship funds go further.

One danger spot in scholarship programs based primarily on financial need is that probably only the outstanding needy student is being helped. The good but not outstanding student must be given more consideration as colleges and universities, foundations and corporations, move ahead with their scholarship programs.

Loans are a second form of financial assistance to students in meeting the costs of higher education. Certain institutions, particularly the technical schools and others offering primarily professional training, have been highly successful in operating financial aid programs which rely almost entirely on loans. In other institutions, however, such as liberal arts colleges, loans may not have been adequately utilized as a means of helping students finance a college education. Even at these institutions, it does not seem inappropriate to expect a student to "bet" on himself to a reasonable extent. If properly administered with low interest rates and flexibility in scheduling due dates to take graduate work and other like factors into account, it is believed that loan programs can be an effective way of helping to enable students to "amortize" the high short-term costs of their education. Indeed, the view has been expressed that the size of an institution's loan program is a good index of the "efficiency" of its over-all financial aid program.

The practice of working one's way through college has its roots deep in American tradition. Most institutions today have special student employment offices to assign jobs to students or assist students in finding work both within and outside the institution. Here again much is being, and more can be, done.

Relative roles of scholarships, loans, and employment

The relative roles scholarships, loans, and employment should play in enabling students to finance their higher education is a complete topic in itself. As one educator has pointed out, each method alone has its merits and its disadvantages.[18] Scholarships are an important means of preserving equality in educational opportunity and of making a college education possible for a gifted but needy student. Awards, however, which are excessive in terms of family resources deny opportunities to other deserving candidates. Loans, in turn, in reasonable amounts may not only help finance a student's education but also may serve to inculcate a sense of responsibility in the student borrower. Too large a debt burden, however, may actually weaken the borrower's sense of an obligation to repay. Employment likewise, if reasonable in its extent, can be significant in helping a student, but if it involves a sacrifice by the student in terms of academic accomplishment or extracurricular activities or both, such employment can become a detriment rather than a help.

[18] "Report of the President for the Year 1951," *Swarthmore College Bulletin*, vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 7–16. This discussion by Dr. John W. Nason is stimulating and valuable.

MEANS OF MEETING PAYMENTS

The student (or his parents) has essentially three means of meeting the higher student charges with which he is faced:

1. To prepare for meeting them well in advance of his actual entrance through savings or some form of endowment insurance, or to assure payment after his acceptance under a plan of tuition-payment insurance;

2. To pay as he goes by use of accumulated savings and earnings from part-time and summer employment (monthly payment plans can ease the burden to the student to some extent);

3. To postpone payment by securing loans scheduled for repayment after graduation or scholarships which he may subsequently be able to "repay" in the form of gifts or bequests.

Whatever method, or combination of methods, the student chooses to make his payments, it is probable that the growth in sources of financial aid and opportunities for remunerative employment during and after graduation will, as time goes on, tend to keep students in an economic position relatively as good as, if not better than, before World War II. It does not appear that higher student charges would create greater economic barriers to a qualified student desiring to obtain a college education than has heretofore been the case. At the same time there is a real need for colleges and universities, foundations and corporations, to develop aggressively further means by which students can finance their college education. This is particularly important as the student population sharply increases, so that the needy student of good but not outstanding qualifications is not denied the educational opportunities available to the student able to pay his way but of no better, and often inferior, qualifications.

John Foster Meck, LL.B., Hanover, New Hampshire, is treasurer and vice-president of Dartmouth College. He practiced law in New York and Washington; was assistant and associate professor of law (1937–41) and assistant dean at the Yale Law School (1939–41); chief counsel, Bureau of Naval Personnel (1945–46); and executive secretary, staff director Foreign Affairs Committee, Hoover Commission (1948–49). He is a contributor of articles on legal and public administration subjects in law reviews and other publications.

DISCUSSSION

The proper question about tuitions is not how much, but how much more. At present tuitions cover only a small proportion of the costs of educating a student; the problem of closing the gap between cost and tuition is a complex one. Every rise in tuition must be accompanied by additional university scholarships so that needy students will not be deprived of a full education. About 24 per cent of Dartmouth College students are now enjoying scholarships. Corporate programs are taking some of the drain off university scholarships. They are especially welcome when they are accompanied by general funds to cover the full cost of education in addition to tuition. The proposed federal scholarship system would have the same effect.

The most promising legislation under consideration is a bill allowing tax deductions to families sending children to college. Such a bill, if passed, would enable the schools to raise tuition closer to the total cost. Several schemes now being consid-

ered are intended to raise the tuition rates to cover full costs. Some parents want and can afford to pay full costs. Under these schemes, the tuition rate would be set high, and to cushion the blow, general scholarships would be available for the asking for students who could not afford full costs. Another alternative is to encourage the parents to make up the difference in tax-deductible gifts to the college.

In general most colleges have encountered little resistance to tuition increases and no loss of student attendance. Several colleges and universities are devising plans for distributing the costs to the student beyond the actual years he spends in college. A preliminary step is to amortize the tuition bill over a full year so that installments can be paid periodically rather than in one or two lump sums during the year. Some universities are requiring that the student borrow up to a stated limit from loan funds before scholarship money is available to him. These loans are of low interest or interest free and are not due until after his graduation. It has been proposed to set up a central organization to pay tuitions for students, and in turn the parents will spread the payments over a number of years in the manner of insurance policies. Another plan starts needy freshmen at full scholarships, and in successive years gradually converts more and more of the amount into a loan. Some of the corporations, notably General Electric, are encouraging the six months of school alternated with six months of work plan. The last two years of education under this plan will be fully subsidized full-time work. One drawback to all of the amortization plans is that it immediately makes inroads into alumni annual giving funds.

Standards of Service in University Management

By HARRY L. WELLS

THE background experience of your discussion leader—equally divided between industrial and educational business management—requires a frank preamble for this particular discussion. I cannot excuse educational administrators for their failure to establish more adequate and realistic standards for measuring the effectiveness of the services they are rendering. Even more critical am I of the carelessness in the simple rudiments of accounting for the stewardship of the tax and gift dollars upon which education survives. Time is too short to belabor my conviction, but you are entitled to know that I have it.

Other fields of human endeavor have faced appraising assignments just as difficult as education and have evolved amazingly accurate measuring units to guide them in increasing their effectiveness. The potential and nature of the function, the relative position of an individual institution within the field, the efficiency of manpower, and the utilization of space and equipment are no more baffling in education than in any other major business. Cost standards for even minute operations are possible and in many instances are available. They await only the willingness to use them. As we face the greatest demand for increased facilities and staff that educators have ever encountered we find ourselves not only without standards but without convictions. For a group which has as its main objective preparing leaders to have been found so handicapped at this time warrants a full measure of chagrin and should fire us with a determination to do something about it. This conference is timely and from it, we all hope, will come constructive advance.

OVER-ALL STANDARDS

We shall hope that in these discussions we may draw a boundary within which to develop some standards and convictions and then suggest specific approaches to certain of our major areas. Before we consider standards for measuring specific services rendered we need to examine the over-all function and pattern of education and agree upon some standards for the total operation. As a background, therefore, the following observations are proposed for your consideration:

Expanded junior college program

1. At the risk of duplicating some of the discussions of earlier sessions of this conference it seems essential to consider a standard for weighing the over-all demand for higher education which will confront us in the next ten years. We are living in a country where freedom is taken for granted and the right to "try anything" has common acceptance. Through compulsory school attendance laws, we insist that every boy and girl must "try" high school. We have accepted a pattern for higher education which will provide facilities for every high school graduate who wants to try college. This poses a very interesting survival problem for private education. If the load ahead of us is absorbed by tax-supported institutions, the position of private education will be significantly dwarfed.

An over-all standard for measuring

the potential must deal with the fact that all high school graduates may insist upon trying higher education in some form, even though the greater percentage can never travel the difficult road of profound scholarship. This is an age of minute specialization, and most young people will insist upon training for at least limited specialties. Stating such a concept of the potential is the beginning of standards for measuring it. We have data sufficient to throw light upon the percentage of those trying college who prove equal to carrying on in the more advanced educational programs. The remainder should therefore fall into shorter programs directed toward less exacting fields. The dividing line is, of course, not fixed and shifts in each direction must remain possible. We must set a workable standard which can be applied and refined by experience.

It is not pertinent to this discussion, except in so far as it limits or magnifies the problem, to call attention to the great need at the completion of high school for the kindly and sympathetic guidance needed to siphon off many youngsters who will be further ahead if they go into a job rather than waste a year or two in discovering their academic limitations.

From the records of college enrollments and performance it would seem that approximately 35 per cent of all who try college education complete the four-year course. There are many factors other than ability which influence this percentage but it remains a fairly reliable guide.

If we were to provide facilities in four-year colleges for only 35 per cent of all those who want to try college, our existing four-year institutions could meet the entire requirements projected during the next ten years. What would happen to the 65 per cent who will try college but who will fail to finish? They are now attending junior colleges and other short-course programs or are being flunked out of state universities which have, because of political pressure, been denied the selection in admissions which prevails in private schools. This, it seems to me, points very clearly to an expanded junior college program similar to the California plan in order to relieve the four-year colleges of this wasteful expense and to protect the youngsters from this brutal junior college within the state universities where the only diploma is failure. I submit that we need conviction upon this problem and a rough standard such as suggested to determine the direction of the expansion program required to meet the increasing enrollments.

Junior colleges should be community institutions without housing requirements for students. Naturally the programs for such schools will have to combine subjects of the four-year-college level with specialized courses of a limited kind which can be adequately covered in a two-year period. The California experience furnishes ample guidance for such a development.

A strong majority conviction on the part of educators on this area of our task is the most pressing assignment before us.

Balance of private and public support

2. Now let me call your attention to a situation which has been overlooked and needs speedy consideration. I refer to a sound appraisal as to the balance between private and publicly supported education at the four-year university and college level. Forty years ago private education provided 70 per cent of these facilities and public support carried 30 per cent. Today the situation is reversed and public support provides approximately 60 per cent and private gifts 40 per cent of the facilities. If the great demands ahead of us are

provided by new or enlarged state universities in four-year programs, privately supported education may well drop to a 15 per cent position. There is ample evidence that this would be a tragedy at the college and university level from which pioneer research and new knowledge must emanate. The most tangible proof of the imperativeness of private support for these risk ventures in research is the growth of endowment funds and private gift solicitation now being promoted by state schools. Educators from both state and private schools should jointly evolve a workable standard for this relationship. If they face it, courageously, I predict it will result in a standard favoring the predominance of private education either through privately supported schools or in privately supported programs within the state schools. Here again a statement of the problem is the beginning of standards. First, the right of selection on the four-year university level should be an accepted standard for both state and private schools. Secondly, the pattern for meeting the enrollments which we foresee should include largely an expansion of community junior colleges to relieve the four-year state universities from the wasteful and brutal practices of flunking 40 to 70 per cent of their freshman classes. For this conviction, time is of the essence if we are to avoid breaking out in a rash of expanded four-year programs.

Tax support and tax exemption

3. To implement what has been suggested to this point in our discussion we must venture into a very touchy field, one clouded by lack of understanding on the part of citizens and looked upon with skepticism on the part of politicians. Tax support and tax exemption are two forms of taxes granted for the purpose of carrying on services which the government insists should be performed. In the case of education, the government's position is that the service will be performed even if the entire load must be tax supported. Recognizing the value of the private way of accomplishing their objective, federal authorities have been very liberal in providing tax exemption on gifts designated for educational purposes. In fact, under the present provisions of the income tax laws more than ample funds have been made available to carry the entire educational program on a privately supported basis. Nevertheless, our lawmakers still fail to recognize that all private support should be subjected to the same standards as those applied to tax support. If taxes to meet all or part of a student's tuition in a state school are a deductible expense, then private support to the same extent by a parent or donor is equally a legitimate deduction. Education is an either-or choice. If the job is not supported privately it will be added to the tax load. All that is needed to prove the right to a common standard of treatment for private gifts and tax support is to call attention to what happens if you shift the load from private to tax-supported institutions. We should have integrated the alternatives of this dilemma long ago in a common standard of treatment. May I add parenthetically that the representatives of state schools recognized and supported this viewpoint long before private school administrators discovered their competitive handicaps?

Voluntary giving is cheaper

4. It is essential for the completion of the line of reasoning being followed to examine one more basic fact. It has been contended in this statement that gift support of education is simply a form of taxation, voluntary rather than enforced. Further, it is clear that if the program is not provided on the

voluntary basis, it will be added to the citizen's tax load. It is not generally understood that voluntary giving in actual experience follows the same pattern as the tax contributions. That is, the people and corporations who pay large taxes are also the large donors to education. The problem therefore is—which way does the man or corporation prefer to make the payment? The blind spot in this choice is due to the failure to understand that direct giving by each taxpayer is by large odds the cheaper way to accomplish the goal. This is not a criticism of the state schools; it is simply recognizing the mathematical accretion of overhead and handling charges which builds up in relation to the number of links in the chain connecting the taxpayer and the ultimate use of his money. This standard of conviction endorses wholeheartedly the program of greater private support for both state and private schools. An honest attempt to understand this fact will lead, in my opinion, to a new conviction as to the direction our efforts and endorsement should take.

You will recognize that the standards being discussed here up to this point are not units of measure but rather standards of conviction and direction which shape the pattern for all standards within the field of education.

FORD FOUNDATION COST STUDY

With the consciousness that our overall function needs integration we can now look at the basis for standards within our educational institutions. Fortunately there is now in progress a cost study supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation. It is unwise to attempt here to prejudge their findings or recommendations. It may help us, however, in our co-operation in these studies if we discuss the areas in which the survey must reach conclusions.

Observations on standards

Permit me to state a few observations about standards garnered from business and educational experience.

Standards are worthless in any atmosphere where top administrators do not believe in them. A determination to use standards sets the boundary for their effectiveness.

Standards do not need to be perfect to be of inestimable value. They are improved only by use, and approach accuracy in no other way.

Standards at any level of accuracy are but flags which indicate the direction of services and alert management for action. Rigid and inflexible standards will break under their own sluggishness.

Historically, educational progress has been subject to expediency and accident rather than to constructive development. Political pressures and donors' interests have been very effective.

Because standards have not prevailed in education, departmental jealousies, bad traditions, and seniority and tenure rights have delayed progress in this field. "Sacred cows," to use the accusation expressed in the last few weeks by a college president, are still handicapping educational progress.

California and Big Ten Conference Committee summary

The most satisfying summary of the cost and standard problem with which I am familiar was written by a committee known as the California and Big Ten Conference Committee. It was part of the statement to the Ford Foundation asking for a grant to carry on the cost study referred to above. The conclusions reached may be summarized as follows:

The common units of comparison, such as clock hour, credit hour, and per student, would not be meaningful, helpful, or useful on a university-wide basis in institutions of higher education of the magnitude and complexity involved. Such units on an all-university basis, which would merely reflect the differences in organization, program, and policy that we know exist, would be of doubtful and limited value for comparative and internal administrative purposes and could be harmful in the hands of people unfamiliar or unsympathetic with higher education.

The prospect of useful and comparable costs and data would be enhanced if the proposed study were undertaken in terms of the *elements* of total costs in such areas of university functioning as administration and general instruction and physical plant. These elements of cost in the several areas, using appropriate units of measurement as indicated in the detailed reports, can be compared in the several institutions with, we believe, a reasonable degree of reliability. These elements of cost could also perhaps be assembled in the several institutions to provide clock-hour or credit-hour costs by departments, by colleges, and by curricula. At this stage in the study this assembling is not contemplated or recommended, for it is our present judgment that the unproved and arbitrary bases involved in a distribution of administration, physical plant, and other indirect costs to the instructional program would make the resultant figures of very doubtful value for comparative purposes. We are entirely agreed that the assembly of these elements of cost into institutional clock-hour or credit-hour costs would be of no value for comparative purposes.

Scope of cost study

The presently proposed scope of study does not embrace extension, auxiliary, or research activities, which, of course, loom large in many of our institutions. However, it should be noted that subsequent studies of these activities will be necessary, for inherent in the proposed study is the allocation to these activities of an appropriate share of administration, physical plant, and other indirect costs.

Purpose and techniques

Throughout our discussions it has been clear that in addition to providing valuable internal guides, the study should be designed to advance understanding and confidence in the soundness of our operations in the minds of governing board members, legislators, donors, and the public generally. There is unanimous opinion, however, that general publication of all costs and data assembled should not be an objective of the study. Such publication, in the absence of detailed recitals of the differences between our institutions, could be more harmful than helpful. Each institution should determine the use of its own costs and data and, in our judgment, should have access on a confidential basis to the costs and data of other participating institutions.

This study, if undertaken, will develop procedures and techniques which should be of long-time interest and help to higher education.

It has always simplified my thinking in problems of this nature if the issues are approached in the sequence in which they would occur if we were building a completely new institution. The following comments follow that pattern.

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE

The minute we make the decision to start a new college we are faced with administrative expenses. Whatever outlays are involved in directing the overall program fall into this classification. The first problem for the cost study is to secure a meeting of minds as to

which items are general administrative expense and therefore are to be spread over every segment of the college budget, and which pertain to one or a few segments and therefore belong to the departmental budgets. The next assignment is to attempt to reconcile nomenclature so that terms mean the same thing wherever used. Once these classifications are agreed upon, the determination of the amount of general administrative expenses is a simple bookkeeping routine.

The basis upon which it will be applied for cost accounting purposes to each segment is more complicated. One rather widely used method is to allocate general administrative expense in the percentage that the actual costs of a segment bears to the total costs of the college—in other words, a uniform percentage for every segment. The cost study may reach some other basis. The only pertinent factor for the present discussion is that this area of accounting has been under adequate control for a long time, even though we have not been consistent as to the items included in this classification or in the nomenclature used. Therefore any attempt at comparisons between institutions, or even between departments within an institution, is misleading. We may very well discover in the cost surveys that standards for comparative purposes between institutions are meaningless, and actually dangerous, and yet for control purposes within an institution, very accurate and valuable. It is impossible to make either items or nomenclature conform to the variables of geography, climate, class of schools, and many other situations which exist in individual schools. We must not permit our hope that standards can be determined for comparative purposes between institutions to discourage their use for control and guidance within an institution.

Over the years, experience has indicated that the percentage of general administrative expense ranges from 7 to 10 per cent of the total cost of operating a college or university, a variation due largely to institutional variables. The goal should always be toward comparable figures and a lower percentage, for the drift to top-heavy administration is an easy one.

PLANT EXPENSE

Plant expense encompasses the outlays for maintenance of land and maintenance and depreciation of buildings and equipment. Greater progress with costs and standards has been made in this area than in any other phase of educational accounting practice, largely because we can apply the experience of industry to educational plant situations. Nevertheless there has been wide difference of opinion as to what unit of measure should be accepted as a standard. In the case of land and buildings, "cost per square foot used" has the widest acceptance, although it has been weighted for height of ceiling, weather conditions, and other variables. Many standards have been used and are available for application in this field. Perhaps the cost study will win acceptance for a particular standard.

The amount of land and building area needed for our new college, even if standards of measure are accepted, is faced immediately with a "herd of sacred cows." Size of classes, hours of use of buildings, teaching loads, and rearrangement of class schedules—all must be realistic and flexible if wastes are to be avoided. Top management must accept the responsibility for resolving these difficult prejudices and traditions. The solutions will pay great dividends in efficiency and in lessening personnel tensions resulting from inequities in teaching loads.

As to equipment costs and standards, I think the cost study under way will discover that this problem centers in a rental concept. If each piece of equipment were rented from an outside firm, the accounting and costing would be simple. It is possible to apply the same thinking to an internal plan where all equipment belongs to the college and is rented to the departments. Costing on this basis is simple, but standards to determine needs and use are not workable. Experience with the rental basis has proved very effective in encouraging the release by departments of unused equipment, particularly if released funds are available for other departmental purposes. This incentive is perhaps the most effective standard available. I recall one instance where its application immediately released a large number of typewriters which obviously did not warrant a rental charge.

INSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH

This is the field in which the cost study will be most difficult, because the problem can be stated in all gradations from a simple base to an impossible confusion. The confusion arises in my opinion because we have failed to place the variables in their proper relationship. Too often we try to make variable hours produce the same mental load. This, of course, is an attempt to evaluate the mental capacity of Professor X and Professor Y and weight them by a variation of hours of work expected. Certainly industry has faced this identical problem, and the hours were fixed so that the variables occur in the amount of services rendered and the commensurate compensations established. The argument of the educators to which I have listened over the years paints a picture of the long hours of preparation and research required of teachers. The successful businessmen I have known have spent just as many extracurricular hours keeping abreast of their field and preparing for their job as have been spent by the college professors I have known. The cost study will, in my opinion, be forced in the direction of a more consistent pattern of fixed hours of teaching load if space and equipment are to be efficiently used and if students are to receive a consistent quality of instruction. The better minds cannot be released from reasonable hours in their main task of teaching. The problems of higher salaries, additional plant needs, and gift and tax support all rest upon an intelligent measuring of this basic phase of the college program. Legislators and donors are becoming more critical of mounting requests for support without evidence that it is needed. The Ford Foundation Cost Study sprang from this very criticism.

Administrative expenses and plant expenses can be adjusted to any single all-university cost standard which might be agreed upon. If a single measure is found, however, it will in the opinion of all accountants with whom I have worked be established in the instructional section of the budget. Whatever we are doing in our college program has its base in teaching. Therefore the common unit, if available, will arise in the teacher-student relationship.

We seem to be doing one of two things: either (1) furnishing teacher "contact hours" for students, or (2) providing "student credit" hours for graduation. Either of these units may become a single unit of measure to which we can apply all other standards. If the cost studies can reach an agreement on one or the other, and if college administrators will faithfully use it, we may make a real contribution toward a sound expansion of facilities to meet the projected increase in enrollment.

PAST WORK ON COST-STANDARD NEEDS

There has been a tremendous amount of energy expended by business manage-

ment in education on the cost-standard needs. Many books and hundreds of speeches and articles are recorded in the records of conferences and institutes. Not, however, until the last few years has a demand emanated from educators that something must be done about it. The cost study referred to offers a hope that something will at last be accomplished.

In view of the cost and standard study no attempt is made in this discussion to offer specific standards or the voluminous bibliography which is available on this topic. *The Manual on College and University Business Administration* just published by the American Council on Education, Dr. John Dale Russell's *The Finance of Higher Education* published by the University of Chicago Press (revised edition 1954), and other literature in the possession of the American Council on Education will furnish ample information for anyone desiring to make further studies.

May I repeat in closing that this is a timely conference and those who conceived it deserve praise and our thanks. The topic of financing higher education is urgent and calls for speedy consideration; the conference will have added a new conviction toward a solution.

Harry L. Wells, LL.D., Evanston, Illinois, is now vice-president emeritus of Northwestern University, after active service as its business manager (1934–54) and vice-president (1937–54). Prior to his connection with the University he was vice-president and general manager, Bauer & Black Division, Kendall Company (1929–34) and operating executive of Hart, Schaffner & Marx (1917–29). He is a director of Hart, Schaffner & Marx and of the Washington National Insurance Company, a trustee and director of the Chicago & North Western Railway, and a trustee of Lawrence College.

DISCUSSION

The speaker outlined the general features of educational reorganization which he considered necessary to meet the increasing demand for higher education. The bulk of the increase should be met by two-year nonresidential junior colleges supported by the states. A much smaller percentage of future students should enter four-year colleges and universities. A much more rigorous screening of applicants would serve to reduce the high "wastage" whereby only 35 per cent of the entrants today actually finish a full degree course. This situation has turned the state universities and colleges into "brutal junior colleges." Several possible explanations of the high mortality rate were offered, and it was asked how many of the 65 per cent losses left college because they did not have the ability to finish. If lack of ability is the primary factor, then the curricula of junior colleges must be set up at a much lower level of difficulty than are present freshman and sophomore courses. If on the other hand the factors inducing the high percentage of withdrawals were other than ability, then perhaps the junior colleges should be shorter and more specialized versions of the four-year curricula in the major colleges and universities. In either event, a formula must be developed which would bar all but the most capable of the junior college trainees from transferring to four-year colleges. Some progress has already been made in creating municipal junior colleges in Michigan and California.

In internal organization of the educational institutions a system of cost accounting must be developed to produce more rational and less expensive operation. It was pointed out that in any large organization there are a series of privileges and perquisites accumulated by the personnel, such as tenure, shorter hours, seniority, departmental prerogatives, which are inevitably opposed to the organizational requirements for constant audit and rearrangement of duties on the basis of optimum efficiency. The speaker maintained and the conference agreed that in the academic world a series of highly inefficient practices had been elevated to the status of "sacred cow," and that the density of the sacred cow population was seriously hampering the efficient management of educational institutions. Several areas were mentioned where the least utilitarian standards are those most admired by academicians, such as low-teaching load, small class sizes, and the greater the seniority the less the load. The speaker urged that particularly where the charity dollar is concerned, some mass bovicides are in order. It was agreed that the problem of setting standards of output per man was a difficult one, encumbered by questions of quality versus quantity of instruction and problems of interuniversity comparisons.

Operating Costs and University Management: Methods to Effect Economies

By Richard M. Paget

At the risk of oversimplification, it seems to me that the major problems facing higher education in this country today lie primarily in two areas. The first is in the social, economic, and political atmosphere of the times and is concerned with the need to maintain true freedom to pursue educational objectives. The second is the area of responsibility for seeing that the total resources—human, physical, and financial—of our educational institutions are fully and effectively used to attain these objectives. Problems in this category can be described as pertaining to management and administration.

Among the basic aims of all colleges and universities worthy of the name are to search for and impart truth, to train minds, and to develop values. The principal resources needed to realize these goals are good teachers and sound, fundamental research. Physical plant, equipment, and service functions of various kinds, while important, are secondary factors in the over-all situation.

Although the fundamental objectives of free universities have remained essentially the same through the ages, the conditions and processes involved in attaining them have undergone significant changes in recent years. We live at a time when universities and colleges are being subjected to many kinds of pressures which threaten true academic freedom. While I recognize the gravity of this possible corruption of truth and learning, it is not within the province of this paper to discuss all the implications of this category of problems affecting higher education. It is of the utmost importance, however, to recognize that the best thought, the energies, and the resources of our educational institutions should be directed to the attainment of the objectives which are their reasons for being.

Management a Positive Function

The area of management is important because good management and administration are one way of assuring that the energies of our colleges and universities can be directed to where they are most needed; that is, to maintaining freedom and to the search for truth. Weak or unskilled management disperses resources and diverts energies from these vital purposes.

Management in higher education is a positive function. It is the intelligent and effective exercise of the responsibility to direct and use the human, physical, and financial strengths of the institution for the realization of its objectives. Management provides the supports and the services necessary to carry on teaching and research programs. It is the function of management to participate in the selection and development of personnel and to provide physical facilities and money. It also is the function of management to provide those services which make it possible to house and to feed students and to operate the auxiliary enterprises in which the college or university is interested. Management is responsible for handling funds and investments. All of these functions are essential to the operation of our colleges and universities.

There can be no assurance, however, that these functions always will be performed in a manner that is best suited to the welfare of our educational institutions. Where there is bad management there is likely to be faulty organization, waste, and energies diverted from fundamental goals. The problems resulting from weak administration should be identified, analyzed, and corrected just as they should be in any business or industrial organization. Good management, on the other hand, will provide an organizational structure that meets program requirements, and will use resources effectively to further the institution's policies and purposes.

Deficits and donors

Good management and administration are important for still another reason. Soundly administered colleges and universities attract financial support. Many of the problems confronting nonprofit organizations today result from the economic conditions of our time—inflation, high operating costs, and high income and estate taxes. Colleges and universities are finding funds more difficult to obtain than they did some years ago, and are seeking to reduce expenditures for certain supporting services and operations so that more money will be available for faculty salaries, professional development, and research. There was a time when educational institutions were not unduly concerned by annual deficits. Usually, donors could be found who would make up the necessary amounts.

Today, nonprofit organizations cannot afford the luxury of deficit operations. Although substantial private funds still are available to assist educational institutions, donors now have a greater interest in granting funds to well-organized and soundly managed institutions than had many of their predecessors. The colleges and universities whose objectives are not clear, whose programing is not sound, whose organization is loose, whose facilities are not effectively or fully used, whose staffing patterns are not geared to need, and whose costs are poorly controlled are not likely to fare well at the hands of individual, foundation, or corporate givers, or at the hands of legislatures.

Effecting Economies

Thus far, I have tried to emphasize the thought that management and administration should be constructive functions. The subject assigned me for discussion—"Operating Costs and University Management: Methods to Effect Economies"—may imply an overemphasis of the negative aspects of administration. This topic also may suggest a detailed consideration of specific tools or methods to be used to make savings. It would be unfortunate if we dwelt only on techniques and on the negative when the need to comprehend the positive aspects of management is so great.

Effecting economies is essentially a negative thing. Even poor management can sometimes make savings, although this may be done in a way which impairs the attainment of objectives. In contrast, good management, by positive action, seeks to reduce or to eliminate conditions which are wasteful or unproductive. Such action is the expression of the constructive character of management.

With regard to methods or techniques to be used to effect savings, I doubt that there is a single answer or formula which produces desired results in all cases. A direct application of identical methods to all institutions would not work. Colleges and universities differ in many ways. They vary in size; they organize differently to carry out their objectives; some operate extensive auxiliary enterprises while others engage

only in a limited activity in this sphere; some are coeducational while others are not; state-supported institutions have problems peculiar to themselves while privately supported colleges and universities have still other problems. These are some of the obvious differences among our educational institutions.

Further, educational institutions are not unlike individuals. They often emphasize different values. Some individuals may forgo an expensive automobile in order to build up a library of classical music. Similarly, some educational institutions may decide that a high level of maintenance is not as important as having more funds available for instructional purposes.

A blind approach to the problem of effecting savings is neither desirable nor possible. As in business, there probably is not a college or university budget that could not be reduced in some respect. But if in blindly reducing budgets we destroy values or impair objectives, we may find ourselves in the classical position of the surgeon who reports the operation successful despite the death of the patient.

I should like to deal briefly with five important aspects of management and administration in which there are opportunities for constructive action. The five areas are as follows: the functions of the governing body in policy guidance and control; the organization for administration; the organization for controls over administration; the organization for the continuous review of costs; and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to change. Generally speaking, these are areas in which, if we find management weaknesses, it is almost certain that monetary savings can be made. These also are areas in which there are tremendous opportunities for constructive, positive action by sound management.

THE GOVERNING BODY—POLICY GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

The role played by the governing bodies of colleges and universities is one of the most significant elements affecting the type of administration which prevails. Where there is misunderstanding concerning the function of these bodies unfortunate situations often result.

Size and composition of the board

Governing boards vary in size from five to a hundred members in the almost 1,900 institutions of higher learning. Board members are chosen in several different ways: some are popularly elected, some are chosen by legislatures, some are appointed, some are selected by alumni organizations, some boards are self-perpetuating. Board members may or may not have specific knowledge of educational problems. However, the governing bodies of our colleges and universities generally are composed of public-spirited and culturally minded citizens who usually give their time without compensation.

A policy-making body

It is the primary function of boards of trustees to establish objectives and determine policies, and to see that the policies adopted are carried out. A distinction must be made between policy making and administration. The board should not be an administrative body but should accept the fact that its principal contribution to the institution is in the area of policy determination. Where the functioning of the board has not been thought through clearly, the governing body often gets into strange fields, such as involving itself in details of curriculum matters and approving purchases of items even in small amounts. The boards of some colleges and universities, for example, concern themselves in great detail with the appointment of almost all new personnel, including wage employees. Consideration of matters such as this takes the time of the board and yet does not result in effective policy control, since the board members cannot possibly pass on the qualifications of all the employees.

The governing body which involves itself in the details of administration stultifies its own usefulness in the area in which it should make its major contribution, and frustrates and hampers internal administration. In these circumstances, the president of the college or university will function in an atmosphere of uncertainty, and his initiative in administration will give way to a state of paralysis.

On the other hand, there are rare occasions where the circumstances are reversed and where the president of the institution has sought to perform the policy-making functions of the board as well as his own functions in the sphere of administration. In such instances, there usually is not a close working relationship between the president and the board. In fact, efforts are made to withhold information from the board. This type of relationship, with confusion of responsibilities, is unsound. It is harmful in the long run, for when the strong leader departs, indecision and management confusion enter.

Sound management is based upon clearly defined roles for the governing body and the president. The governing board, by concentrating its efforts in the area of major policy, can gain sufficient control to enable it to meet its responsibilities. To refer again to the illustration given above of the board which sought to control personnel policy by approving the appointment of all new employees: governing bodies interested primarily in policy formation would have proceeded in a different manner. Boards in some educational institutions have asked that positions be classified, have adopted minimum standards for selection for each grade, have approved salary ranges for each grade, and have then fixed organizational responsibility for carrying out these approved policies in the field of personnel. In this manner, such boards have gained effective control over the entire personnel process and also have a bench mark against which they can measure the success with which it is administered.

The principle involved here should be applied to other important aspects of administration. This type of relationship between the governing body and internal administration contributes to good management, reduces the likelihood of providing opportunities for unsound administration, and thereby limits the opportunities for the development of uneconomical and wasteful situations. Where responsibilities have been thought through clearly, the functions and scope of the governing body and each part of the institution are defined, the future of the major organizational units is outlined, and the means of financing and operating them are approved. Thus, new programs which do not have board approval are not added, and splinter programs which later cannot be financed are not begun. In these circumstances, the funds available to the institution are more likely to be used for its determined primary purposes, and competing activities are kept to a minimum.

Committee system

The effective governing bodies usually carry on much of their work through active committees, the type and number of which vary considerably among boards. Some governing bodies establish committees in accordance with major functional activities, such as instruction and curriculum, buildings and grounds,

finance, athletics, and alumni and public relations. Others have established committees which correspond, generally, to the major units of the college or university, such as a committee for each of the professional schools, the graduate school, and the undergraduate college, in addition to committees for various functional activities. Many boards, especially the larger ones, find an executive committee to be an effective tool of management.

An effective committee system provides additional links between the governing body and the institution. Active committees are channels of information which keep the governing body informed of needs in the policy area. A wise board will make sure that it is well informed and will draw upon the president and the faculty for advice in establishing objectives and policies.

The governing bodies of our colleges and universities require skillful staff assistance. The members of these bodies often have full-time responsibilities elsewhere. They usually meet infrequently and are not in continuous touch with the affairs of the institution on whose boards they serve. In a sense, the president and other key officers of a college or university are, in part, staff officers to the board. However, it is the secretary to the board who is in a position to provide full-time staff service. The secretary should be very much more than a keeper of minutes and records. Among other responsibilities, he should see that the vertical channel of communications is working properly, that there is follow-up on action taken by the board, and that materials for board consideration are adequately prepared in a manner that will make it possible for board members to handle items of business expeditiously.

There should be a flow of concise reports to the board, of such a nature that its members can determine if policies are followed and with what degree of success. The board and the president should determine the type of reporting required to accomplish this purpose.

In summary, I should like to point out that a strong, active board, whose relationships with internal administration have been clearly defined, is an asset because of the contribution it can make to good management. When it comes to determining what credit should be given to strong boards for effecting economies in operations, it is difficult to assess the situation precisely. It usually is impossible to trace specific economies to a properly functioning governing body. It can safely be said, however, that in the college or university in which there is good top management, errors are less likely to be made and therefore the opportunities for effecting monetary savings are not so likely to be present.

Organization for Administration

A second area in which positive action can make for effective management is in the organization for administration of the college or university. A sound organizational structure is basic to effective and economical operations.

It appears to be a historical fact that some educational institutions have developed over the years with little consideration of the manner in which they have organized themselves to carry out their work. Sound principles of organization often are not followed. Lines of authority generally are far from clear, responsibilities may not be defined, the scope of authority of various officers often is not precise, and frequently needed functions have not been specifically assigned to anyone. These failures to follow good standards of organization have resulted in duplicated effort, in frustrated personnel, and in deficiencies in essential services.

Many of our colleges and universities have not been so alert to the importance of sound organization as American business has been. This may be because the importance of organization has not been recognized so generally among educational administrators as it is among business executives, or it may be because the proper organizational structure sometimes requires a larger expenditure of funds for administration. Even when there is a desire to correct organizational weaknesses, it is extremely difficult for those inside the organization to make these changes effectively. Motives often are suspected, weight of authority is questioned, and, in many instances, comparative knowledge of organizational principles and practices is limited.

The role of the president in a college or university is a difficult and a complex one. He has a dual role to fill. First of all, the president is expected to provide leadership and, in a sense, to personify the institution. He is responsible for its academic programs, including research, instruction, and educational objectives. Secondly, he is an administrator who is responsible for seeing that funds, personnel, facilities, and services are provided to support these programs. He must watch income and expense closely; he must raise funds; he must see that facilities are properly maintained; he must see that supporting services are adequately provided; and he is responsible for sound, internal organization and operations.

These are responsibilities which are too great for one man to discharge effectively. His task is lightened in the institution whose organization for internal management is soundly conceived, and where able lieutenants are available to assist him.

The colleges and universities that are soundly organized have grouped related functions as nearly as possible into homogeneous organizational units, in order to avoid jurisdictional problems and to eliminate duplication of effort. Officers responsible to the president have been put in charge of these functional areas and have been given clear delegations of authority. Their responsibilities have been determined, as have the functions of their subordinates. Such an organizational structure is designed for effective administration to support educational objectives, and the investment to obtain it is well worth while.

Sound organization makes savings a possibility, as the illustration which follows indicates. In a state-supported college, economies of more than $200,000 per year were identified as the result of rearranging major functions, eliminating duplication which came to light during the course of the organizational study, and fixing responsibilities more clearly. This institution believed it had been financially starved for more than a generation; and it is significant to note also that it had been struggling with the problem of how to increase faculty salaries. The savings referred to permit an average increase in salary to each member of the faculty of over $1,000. If, as here, the savings obtained from good organization and economies in the business and service areas are used whenever possible to strengthen the faculty, constructive measures will have been taken to further the primary objectives of the college.

Organization for Control over Administration

A third area in which management can take positive steps to improve administration is in establishing adequate internal controls. Sound controls are necessary to determine compliance with policy and to assure effective performance. Controls have been standard practice in industrial enterprises for many years, and our colleges and uni-

versities are gradually coming to accept their value. Controls probably will be more widely accepted when educational institutions learn that effective controls make it possible to detect costly operations which incur deficits and to identify waste so that corrective action may be taken.

There are many areas in university administration which can be subjected to internal operating controls. For example, in one university the registrar's function had been a decentralized operation for a number of years. When this operation was subjected to cost measurements on a unit basis, it was found to compare unfavorably with unit costs in well-run institutions of a similar character. Some consolidation of the registration and student-records functions was made; savings in salaries for personal services and at the same time more satisfactory operation resulted.

To take another illustration, it was found at a certain university that a disproportionately high percentage of the budget was being used for maintenance and repair. The head of the buildings and grounds department was given assistance in establishing standards of maintenance and a maintenance schedule to carry out those standards. Production levels then were established on a unit basis for certain of the personnel: principally painters, carpenters, and custodians. Performance then was watched carefully. Under this system it was disclosed that the buildings and grounds department was overstaffed, and in the first year the services of ten men were dispensed with at an approximate savings of $30,000. The head of that department is of the opinion that further savings are possible.

The area of food service for students readily lends itself to controls. Many colleges and universities now have broken down their food-service costs into cost for raw food, labor and other preparation and service costs, and total cost per meal. They now keep accurate meal counts to assist them in determining unit costs. They have introduced portion control. In some cases the costs for student feeding have been reduced and the quality of the food has been improved as the result of supervision of this type.

In a college where there had been no agreement as to priorities in the construction of new buildings, the program for the construction of new classroom facilities is now based primarily upon data derived from controls over space utilization. In this particular college, the enrollment figures have been projected for several years ahead. Each year a detailed study is made of the utilization of present classroom and laboratory space. The enrollment and space-use data are checked annually to note any change in trend, to test for accuracy, and to determine demand. When space utilization reaches a predetermined point in terms of present and anticipated enrollment, it is planned to begin the construction of new classroom facilities. It is hoped in this way to have the appropriate facility available at the time it is needed. In contrast to this approach is a situation at another college where several millions of dollars in new buildings are being provided for a program for which demand has steadily declined in recent years, and where enrollment has fallen off sharply. In that same institution, the facilities are inadequate in certain other areas where there has been a marked increase in demand during the postwar years.

Control in the academic area

It undoubtedly would be agreed generally that operating controls are desirable in the areas just referred to. There is not a similar general acceptance, however, of the idea that controls should be applied to instructional costs or to academic programs. It seems clear that the factors involved in matters of curriculum are so different from business or industrial operations that it would be a grave mistake to determine their value exclusively in terms of dollars and cents. Some institutions do exercise a close control over the budgets of instructional departments by applying measurement in terms of student enrollment, credit hours taught, and the percentage of fees for which its enrollees are responsible. Such measurements are imperfect and have many disadvantages, because they do not take other factors, such as cultural objectives, into consideration. Certainly, decisions as to instructional programs should not be based upon cost measurements alone.

However, with certain qualifications, there may be some validity to cost studies in the academic area. Even in our teaching and research programs we have a tendency to fall into bad habits. We may build facilities we do not really need; we may not spend wisely for equipment; we may add new majors; or we may multiply the number of courses offered when there appears to be little justification for so doing. These things result in higher operating expenditures. Cost studies in the academic area may be necessary and valuable, therefore, if they are not the sole measurement relied upon as a basis for reaching decisions, but are accepted only as one of the factors to be taken into consideration in making judgments. This is an area of management control, however, which requires additional study and improvement in techniques.

CONTINUOUS REVIEW OF COSTS

A fourth area in which management can take positive action to strengthen administration and thereby avoid waste or effect economies is in providing an organization which makes it possible to review costs and performance. It is not common practice among even many of the larger educational institutions to assign responsibility for the continuous study of the costs of operating the college or university. There still are institutions where budgeting is thought of as a function of one of the fiscal officers for a few weeks each year, and where it is believed that a good budget job has been done if at the end of the year total income and expenditures approximate the original plan.

Year-round budget activity

In well-managed institutions, the budget function is a year-round activity. The budget is the expression of the policies and objectives of the college or university in terms of a financial plan. The budget process, therefore, should take into account long-term plans as well as annual operating needs. One of the purposes of good budget planning is to see that the financial resources of the educational institution are concentrated in the areas that further its major objectives. Conversely, funds should not be diverted needlessly to activities that are inconsistent with those objectives.

From an organizational standpoint, the responsibility for budget making, for budget execution, and for the review of costs should be fixed in an officer who reports to the president. In larger institutions, segments of the budgetary and cost responsibility should be delegated to designated officers in the major functional areas. There may be further delegations within these areas to various supervisory levels or to various activities. These officers all have the responsibility for reviewing performance, for studying costs, and for gathering data that are relevant to the budget process. The annual budget then is not a "crisis" operation but be-

comes a point in time when the financial plan of the institution is prepared.

The absence of a fixed responsibility for the budget and for continuous review of costs contributes to weak management and to waste. For example, in one small institution there were sixty-six mimeographing machines and five automatic addressing machines. This represented approximately a 50 per cent overinvestment in equipment; yet some offices in the institution still did not have the services of these machines available to them. There had been no review of expenditures for this equipment in terms of over-all need. In a larger institution, there were 163 major machine tools located in thirteen different machine shops, all serving the research activities of the university. By combining some of the equipment and personnel, it was possible to reduce the requirements for equipment and to effect a saving in personnel which amounted to over $25,000 per year. Neither of these educational institutions had a full-time budget officer, with the result that costs had been excessive for personnel and equipment without providing satisfactory service. A competent budget officer, reviewing requests for equipment and personal services, and reviewing costs, could have prevented such waste.

Good management recognizes that the budget is one of its most useful tools to control operations and to evaluate accomplishment. Modern management cannot be successful without the benefit of periodic financial reports derived from the budget. In form, the budget should make it possible to determine with ease the expenditures and income for the major areas of activity of the college or university. A budget, in turn, should be supported by a chart of accounts, which readily lends itself to the preparation of periodic financial reports pointing out variances from anticipated performance. Such an arrangement also facilitates budget making.

Procedural simplification

Another means for continuous study of costs not commonly found in educational institutions is through the recognition of the procedures and methods function. Certainly, the larger institutions could well afford full-time staff assistance in this area. Such a staff position might be used to study methods, review and develop procedures, design and control forms, determine the means of reproduction of printed matter, study means of effecting work simplification, and prepare procedures manuals. Continuous work in these areas often leads to savings. For example, in one university the cost of the supply of forms used in the president's office was reduced $1,100 by combining a large number of forms into one. It was not possible to calculate the additional savings resulting from the reduced time needed to handle one form instead of several by the many offices which processed this material from the president's office. Further, the requirements for filing space were considerably reduced.

There are many other areas in which procedural simplifications might strengthen management as well as produce savings. Included in these areas are the processing of work orders, of purchase orders, and of records and procedures relating to personnel.

Combined methods for economies

The more substantial and the more dramatic savings made through sound management result from a combination of good organization, effective operating controls, and a continuous review of costs. In one large university, which is now well on the road to becoming an excellently managed institution, ways to effect economies of several hundred thousand dollars were pointed out. Some months later, the university reported that savings on an annual basis of approximately a half million dollars already had been effected. The principal savings in this particular university involved the buildings and grounds activities, the accounting processes, the registration procedures, the consolidation of library facilities, printing and duplicating activities, and other business services. Once the management of that institution was properly equipped, it proceeded to take necessary action to recoup funds which could be used for the major educational objectives of the university.

CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO CHANGE

A fifth area in which strong management can contribute to sound administration is to assist in creating an atmosphere conducive to change. In spite of the spirit of inquiry which characterizes the academic atmosphere of educational institutions, many are traditionally resistant to change in management techniques and concepts. This resistance appears to be a natural human trait and is found in almost all organizations. American industry, however, generally seems to be aware that management and administration are not static and that there is a hazard in maintaining the status quo. Many firms have discovered that it is unreasonable to expect employees to make suggestions to improve operations unless they are convinced that top management is sincerely interested in bringing about changes and improvements. Progressive industrial leaders have adopted sound suggestions made by their employees. This atmosphere has focused the attention of substantial numbers of personnel on the need for a continuing identification of opportunities to improve administration. Only rarely have colleges and universities shown similar ingenuity in their appoach to administration.

In our educational institutions there should be a more widespread understanding of what management is and what it contributes. It is important to remember that teaching, research, and management are part of a whole. Management assembles, organizes, and maintains the resources to be used to achieve the fundamental objectives of the college or university. As we have seen, it is vital to make the flow of resources which support major goals as large as possible. In order to find the maximum amount of funds for this purpose, operating costs must be controlled and opportunities to effect economies should be seized.

To state it another way, management may be regarded as a means of testing whether the college or university is using its resources effectively. It is the responsibility of management to see that the educational impact of the institution is the maximum possible within the limits of its available resources.

Top management should demonstrate that it is alert to the needs for dynamic and better administration by a continuous review of management problems and by improving the efforts to solve them. With a better understanding of the purposes of management and administration, college and university personnel should be encouraged to participate in efforts to strengthen and improve them.

To assist the persons in the institutions of higher education who are sincerely interested in strengthening administration and in conserving resources, I should like to call to their attention twenty areas included among those in which we have found the most

frequent opportunities to effect savings. These areas are as follows:

Admissions office
Athletics
Bookstores
Buildings and grounds operations
Business machine operations
Business office
Equipment and farm machinery operations
Food services
Health services
Libraries
Mail and messenger services
Motor pools
Official publications
Printing and duplicating
Purchasing
Registration and records
Stenographic services
Student housing
Student placement, guidance, and testing
University press

Each of these areas or activities does not always offer the possibility of savings. Furthermore, the opportunities for savings and the extent to which economies may be made are dependent, in part, on the amount of money budgeted for each of these activities. These are areas, however, in which objective and systematic analysis has been rewarding.

CONCLUSION

Two generations ago even the greatest universities in our country were small in size and simple to manage. The community of scholars was self-governing, with little need for a formal organization to provide specialized services to assist in the attainment of educational objectives.

Today, even the smaller institutions of higher education are relatively complicated organizations with many complex services and problems. The larger universities now approach the complexity of our giants of industry. The value of the physical plant, the size of operating budgets, and the amounts of endowment and investments often run into millions of dollars. With the prospect that the enrollment of students may double in the next fifteen years, the continued growth of our colleges and universities during this period will make past growth in any similar period seem insignificant. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the problems of management in our colleges and universities will become more rather than less complex.

Already there have been signs of a growing recognition that sound administration is essential. Possibly the financial stringency of recent years has contributed to this development in American colleges and universities. It is a healthy condition when there is greater awareness that money spent for any purpose should be evaluated in terms of the contribution that expenditure makes to the over-all objectives of the institution. The spread of this awareness means that the importance of management is being more generally recognized. In short, good management and sound administration are coming of age in the field of higher education.

Richard M. Paget, New York City, is a partner in the management consulting firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget. He served as management engineer of the Navy Department during World War II and in the decade prior to the war was in private practice. For nine years, he and his firm have been working with the special management problems of educational and other nonprofit organizations. He is a director of the Atlas Powder Company and The Kemper-Thomas Company and a trustee of the Parsons School of Design.


DISCUSSION

The speaker maintained that the budget should be a continuing process and not a yearly spasm. Predicted costs should be constantly contrasted with actual expenditures. A contrary suggestion was made that the budget might well be confined to a limited period since it was inherently a frustrating process. In a large university the lower levels are always trying to make the segmental budgets larger. The problem is to motivate the lower echelons to demand less than they would require to fulfill their most imaginative aspirations. The discussion leader suggested that a proper balance might be achieved by strengthening budgetary control in the hands of a central comptroller and by making individuals in the lower echelons responsible for segmental budgets. In order to allow scope for maximum savings, such faculty-made expenses as office space and telephone costs should be directly chargeable to departmental budgets. Machinery and equipment can be rented to individual departments to reduce excessive immobilization.

One very real danger was the tendency of administrative costs and overhead to far outdistance instructional costs. At Wisconsin, for instance, about one-third of the cost dollar goes into instruction. There are many reasons for this. Educational institutions, in particular land-grant and state-supported institutions, have been required to take on numerous subsidiary services such as agricultural extension and experimentation stations, research programs, military training—which are high in overhead compared to more traditional liberal arts subjects. Also growing student enrollments have forced the centralization of many functions, such as student counseling, which used to be part of the faculty's responsibility. Expansion of alumni and fund-raising activities has also swelled the central overhead. One of the most futile of current administrative expenditures arises out of the large volume of admissions on scholarship applications. Many of them are duplicates of applications submitted to several other colleges. In spite of the understandable need for increased administrative services, the danger of overloading the budget with administrative costs is a serious one and must be continuously controlled.

The most difficult problem, of course, is the evaluation of the instructional program, for it is here in most colleges that the bulk of the expenditures occurs. There is no easy standard for measuring instructional efficiency, but several methods of promoting efficiency were mentioned. The Harvard visiting committee and Board of Overseers system was suggested as a possible model. The speaker pointed out that management counselors called in to survey university operations were not the proper ones to examine the educational program. Curriculum review boards, however, might well combine academicians with lay specialists in applied fields. In addition to providing useful advice, such boards could function as liaisons between the institution and influential sections of the public.

At the close of the session the chairman made three brief comments. Creative activity thrives best in a little chaos. Sacred cows sometimes give good milk. Filet mignon costs more than hamburger.



How to Finance Higher Education in the Future

By Henry M. Wriston

I REGRET not having been able to attend all the meetings of this important symposium, but the Charter of Brown University contains a provision that the President shall not occupy the same bed two nights in succession. While this may be a matter of custom and habit in other institutions, it is law in mine. I have, however, had the opportunity to read the papers of the other participants and have been impressed with the learning and insight they have brought to the various phases of the subject before us.

They seem to be in general agreement that the children who are going to make us trouble are already born and, though the United States has not ratified the Genocide Convention, there is no available legitimate way to cut down the number. We must, therefore, face the grim problem of educating them. If the percentage of the age group who go to college continues to increase at the rate it has during the last fifty years, the pressure will be enormous and will require marked readjustments on the part of institutions of higher education.

The prospect of such a situation invites alarm, and symptoms of acute anxiety are not missing among those most deeply concerned. It has been postulated as obvious that, in the limited time available, it will not be possible to double the present facilities, which have required over three centuries for their accumulation.

I regret that none of the speakers seems to me to have attacked this problem with such boldness and imagination, with such reach and grasp, as to give us what we need, namely an integral solution. No less a solution is tolerable in our epoch. They have made suggestions here and there, all of which are valuable in themselves, but they fall short of the sweeping and radical change that is necessary.

One idea which has been proposed elsewhere as the key to a solution is rapidly to increase the number of students admitted while enlarging the staff of instruction to a much lesser degree. This would involve a sharp alteration in student-faculty ratio. Important agencies now propose to seek techniques and instrumentalities to facilitate this change. They hope to make it an advance toward educational perfection, rather than a retreat.

Lecture and Textbook

I should like to make a comprehensive proposal for the attainment of this worthy goal. To that end I begin by observing as settled fact that the dominant mode of college instruction today is the lecture with a supplementary textbook assignment. So far as the latter half of that combination is concerned, my proposal would have the effect of reducing the number of different textbooks used, but it would increase the size of the editions. This would produce economies, for the larger each printing the lower the cost. It would also eliminate some (but not all) frightfully bad textbooks.

Lecturing is a different matter and our habits must be more drastically revised. Current practices are shockingly wasteful as well as woefully inefficient. A great lecturer today has, at best, a

very limited audience. Some lecture halls have loud-speakers, and the class can be somewhat expanded. But there are only a few universities with auditoriums large enough to make any real impact on the problem before us by that simple method. As yet nothing has been done to meet this issue with wired television. However, if an article in the current issue of *Time* is accurate, this oversight is to be corrected in the new Air Force Academy soon to be constructed in Colorado Springs.

The inefficiency of the lecture system as now practiced is even more serious than the costly waste. Different professors vary enormously in their grasp of subject matter as well as in the effectiveness of their presentation. Why not have the leading men, really first-class scholars, put their lectures on film with sound track? If a great man's voice is not pleasing, but his appearance is satisfactory, the sound can be dubbed in by an announcer borrowed from radio or television; wisdom that is mellifluous clearly has an advantage over the dry cackle of a savant too long accustomed to captive audiences.

Such films with sound effects would be available to every college and university in the nation. By this process every student in every institution everywhere would "see" and "hear" not a second-rater, but the very best man in each field. At last the ideal that Charles William Eliot set for Harvard more than half a century ago would be realized, not only there but everywhere else: "the best of everything and everything of the best." The student would still maintain about as close and human a contact with his teacher as he now does in typically large lecture classes.

Some of you, with a regrettable tendency to levity, may try to make sport of this proposal by suggesting that the material be piped directly to a television screen in the student's room, so that he can learn in bed, thus fulfilling the cynical comment of a sophomore who, after hearing a dull lecture, said, "I should have stood in bed." But we know, or seem to, that learning is a gregarious process, that students absorb more in a crowd. There is another reason why a dormitory-room television set would be inadequate if this innovation is to be really effective. The professor, being a great man, should be projected on a big screen as more than life size. He ought not to *look* smaller than Jane Russell, let us say. There is a fitness in these things, which we will overlook at our peril.

Attendance could be taken by automation—a modern word which should quickly find a niche in modern education. Each student's thumbprint would be on file. As he entered the lecture he would merely thumb a piece of wax; the fresh impression would be electronically compared with his master print. Thus no substitute would gain learning at another student's expense. Once in the room he could not leave without setting off an appropriate alarm.

Examination System

Present examination practices are another evidence of waste and inefficiency. We all know from experience that most examinations are incompetently written by people who are scholars in the subject but are not skilled in how to examine students in it. Every study of examinations has shown that grading is, to a considerable extent, visceral, and that the grades assigned are almost quixotic. It is clear that there is need for both greater economy and higher efficiency.

My proposal is that examinations be set nationally, prepared at a central bureau by experts in devising objective tests. They might not know much about the subject, but they would know how to find out how little the student

knew about it. The long drudgery of reading papers would be ended, for all tests would be scored electronically. Thus a junior taking Advanced Microtome Technique 316 could learn in due course that his national standing was 16,952nd out of 22,124. By knowing his relative position in the national scale he might be challenged. At least he could not say that the grading was unfair.

It may be objected that without essays as a requirement, students would not learn to write well. Who will make the assertion that they now do? Indeed, it is a fact beyond challenge that in most large lecture courses no essay of any considerable length is now required. The objection, therefore, may be instantly dismissed as without merit.

ACCREDITATION

This national lecture and national examination process, applied to all fields of instruction, would quickly solve one of the stickiest and costliest of our present difficulties—accreditation. One of the largest and fastest of available electronic brains would assemble all the test results in every subject for every university, college, and junior college. By simple calculations—simple, that is, to the calculator—the relative over-all position of every institution within its class would be accurately determined. An established cutoff point would automatically determine which institutions should be accredited and which should remain in outer darkness.

The same process could also be applied subject by subject; this would reveal unerringly which institutions should be accredited in chemistry or in engineering—or any other field. The criterion would be the only valid one—the achievement of the students, not the number of books in the library or the number of square feet in the laboratories or the number of Ph.D.'s on the faculty or any other irrelevant fact. The new procedure would be a guarantee that the graduates of one institution knew something and that graduates of another institution knew less. This has long been regarded as the basis on which institutions should be accredited, if only the data were available.

The proposed accreditation technique, furthermore, would relieve institutions with satisfactory scores from being visited from time to time by inspection teams in numbers reminiscent of the descent of the locusts. The amount of time and money saved would be great, and the gain in reliability even greater.

STUDENT COUNSELING

Skeptics among you will demand to know how student counseling could be carried on under such a regime. This is another point where economy and efficiency could go hand in hand. No one can deny that the present system is time-consuming and therefore wasteful. We know that under current practices the same student problem presented to two different counselors produces widely variant suggestions. Obviously, if they are different, one suggestion must be wrong; there cannot be two different correct answers; that carries relatively a step too far. Unhappily we cannot be sure that either of the two answers is right. A third or a fourth counselor might well come up with still different curricular proposals. This confusion of counsel is not only expensive and inefficient, it is grossly unfair to the student. He is entitled to know that the curriculum prescribed for him is really suited to his "felt need."

There are several manufacturers capable of designing a machine to end these costly confusions. Let each student set down his objectives in life; he could do this by check marks upon a properly constructed form. Those could readily be coded to the machine; out

would come the precise curriculum perfectly adapted to meet his objectives. His studies would be tailored exactly to his "felt need." Similar objectives would get similar results—no fumbling, no guesswork. There would be a vast psychological gain as well as perfect vocational efficiency. The student would be in instant emotional harmony with the prescribed program because he knows that these machines do not make mistakes; they have inexhaustible memories and infallible logic.

CURRICULUM PROBLEMS

This method would put an end to one of the most expensive of all present procedures—the infinite number of course changes recorded in the first two or three weeks of the college year—a process that makes for confusion and inefficiency. It would also make unnecessary one of our most wasteful practices, curriculum committees; their members engage in endless departmental logrolling under the very thin pretext of intellectual review and discussion of courses of study.

One final, and I believe clinching, argument for my broad reform remains. Today a student in a small college may be deprived of some course for which he has a "felt need" because the college cannot have a faculty large enough to cover every conceivable subject. I met such a one on the train between Portland and Seattle: a young lady had been forced to leave Stanford University because it did not offer a complete major in microbiology, and she did not want to mess up the precisions of her knowledge in that field with what she regarded as macrobiology.

Under the proposed plan, if the curriculum calculator said a student should have a course in psychoceramic indices, the college could readily rent that course reel from the central pool. Even if he were the one student interested in identifying crackpots the cost to the college need not be prohibitive. It is true that he might have to watch the professor on a small screen; that would be his only loss. If the normal class rhythm had conditioned his mind to learn only at the well-known alternate day interval between lectures, he could go to the same spot three times a week, register his thumbprint, and throw the switch.

Is there anything wrong with this proposal, save lack of imagination on my part in suggesting new electronic marvels for education by automation, which might be adopted as our new national project?

IS THE LECTURE-TEXTBOOK TECHNIQUE EDUCATION?

Granted the lecture-textbook assumption upon which it is based, I cannot puncture it successfully—it is like some modern tires, tubeless and filled with goo. It can be rejected only by attacking the major premise—that the lecture-textbook technique is the proper universal standard. I would go further and doubt that the dominant current practice is even education in the best sense of that word. It *tends*—I do not want to overstate the case—it *tends* to induce passivity in the student. He tends to learn by adsorption; material clings to the surface of his mind. He is not drawn out; his response is not vocal; he gains no power of expression, save possibly by imitation. And, if he imitates a good many university lecturers, he will lose by the process.

I do not go so far as to say that lecturing should be banished. In the right context, as when the professor and student are well known to each other, and with the right follow-up, a lecture often provides inspiration to intellectual action. But in a large class where the human equation is reduced to the vanishing point, the lecture is merely informative. Moreover, it is information

delivered by an inefficient means, at a pace too slow for some, too rapid for others. The same material could be read and understood by many students much more swiftly; bright minds would not be held back. Slower minds could proceed at their own proper pace.

What is the relevance of these satiric observations to the problem before us? It is that, if we are to draw out the student and cultivate within him a critical mind, one sensitive to values and even to nuances in value, there is no substitute for the direct contact between the student and the teacher. Moreover, the more intimate the contact, the more effective it will be. The student-faculty ratio is already too high and should be reduced. The student should use materials far more worthy of his attention and intellectually challenging than any textbook. It is not too much to say that the better the materials, the better the instruction.

Since it is the student who is to be educated, the more he participates in the process, the less inert he is, the less receptive in the passive sense of the word, the better. Today we have too many students who are overinstructed and undereducated. Many proposals now being brought forward will make that situation worse instead of better.

Economies in Instruction

This brings me to my central thesis—admittedly a hard gospel: you cannot economize in instruction. The effort to spread instructors thinner and thinner is just that; it means that the educative process loses impact. Consequently we must train more teachers in many disciplines; we must not reduce the rigor of their training. We need not only more teachers, but better ones. The idea of a cheaper and easier degree than the Ph.D. has been around for thirty years. It would assuredly produce poorer teachers, and where tried it has had that result. We must see to it that there is not less but more competition in the teaching field, so that the inefficient, the ineffective, the unlearned will have difficulty in finding employment—indeed, they should fail of employment.

There is, of course, another thing to be said: We can and should throw more of the burden of learning upon the students. Spoon-feeding has gone far—much too far—in American higher education. Because the students have not had college preparation as such—interpreted in the most formal sense—in the high schools and private preparatory schools, there is a tendency to underestimate their knowledge. Even more serious, there is a strong tendency to underestimate their capacity to acquire knowledge.

It is forty-three years since I did my first teaching. In all those years I have never seen standards raised too high. Of course, false standards can be raised too high in some stilted fashion so that a student may fail to know a full thousand dates in a history course or may lack some precise knowledge such as the complete conjugation of one of the least used and most obscure irregular French verbs. But when it comes to being able to seize an idea, work it over, digest it, and make it his own, the student has only to be stimulated enough and he will astonish us.

I have heard it argued and have even seen it "proved" (indeed there is a sizable volume to confirm it) that students can learn more science by demonstration lectures than by work in laboratories. That particular experiment was a typical instance of economic determinism. The object was not really to find out what the student learned; the "research" sought to validate what the officers of the institution felt its finances required to be proved. There is no question that by shaping a certain kind of examination a student may appear to learn more by a poorer method than by some other better one. This is particularly true when the "other" instruction is in overcrowded laboratories, supervised by graduate students with no instructional experience or interest, who go through the motions in order to gain money for their survival.

If the colleges are not interested in stuffing the students in order to measure by examinations their retention of the stuffing, if, in short, they seek to stimulate the students' intellectual and moral growth, nearly all the economy devices in instruction are bound to be revealed as efforts to shortchange the students for supposed economic rather than sound educational reasons.

Economies in Living Arrangements

I am making no plea for wastefulness in instruction nor am I defending inefficiency in the business operation of institutions. You can "save money" in the dormitories and dining rooms, however, at the cost of deteriorating the environment within which the student lives and works. If you are interested only in his having a cot on which to sleep and food to sustain life, if you have no concern for the cultural future of America or for the urbanity which should go with learning, there are striking "economies" available.

You can save space and time and money by running a kind of automat and by stowing the students in triple-tiered bunks. There are an almost infinite number of devices to impoverish their surroundings in the name of thrift. But it is nonsense to insist that the American economy is built upon a rising standard of living and then adopt devices designed deliberately to lower the standard of student living; they inculcate habits which are inconsistent with our stated ideal.

Past Financial Difficulties

Having said so much, how do I suggest that the bills be paid? The first step is to make every institution worthy of support. This requirement comes even ahead of efficiency. Let every college determine its objectives and then hew to that line. This has been hard to do during the last twenty-five years because nearly all institutions, the rich and the poor alike, are ultimately dependent on student fees for that final margin which balances expenditures and income. Student fees may be a principal source or a lesser source; they constitute nonetheless the difference between a balanced budget and one out of balance.

The depression accentuated this situation. Then inflation, which decreased the value of old endowments and retarded the growth of new, reinforced the same trend. Many colleges, therefore, began to debase their currency; they would announce themselves as liberal arts colleges but infiltrate the curriculum with vocational and semivocational subjects. In short, they spread vocational bait to bring enough students to pay enough fees to help balance the budget. Some of our most scandalous educational sophistries were used to make the changes appear to have educational rather than fiscal bases.

Unique Opportunity

The present moment and the years just ahead offer a supremely good opportunity—a unique opportunity—to make profession and practice square with each other. There is to be a surplus of students; that is a fixed point in our calculations. A college can get all the students it can serve and still be completely honest in its program and its professions. The liberal arts can be made the real as well as the ostensible objective, and whatever deviates from

that ideal can be dropped without an adverse effect upon the budget through decline in student fees. This is the first time in a quarter century when that could be said with complete assurance.

There is a second reason why many an institution can henceforth follow this sound practice. There not only has come a sharp change in the market for college graduates; there has arisen a new desire upon the part of industry to employ liberal arts graduates. Anyone who has followed this subject closely will realize that in the last five years there has been a marked shift in emphasis. Business is now reaching out for those whose training is broader, more deeply infused with the ideas and the ideals which come from a sound liberal arts program. Moreover, the professional schools, and particularly the medical schools, are no longer discriminating against the arts graduate. A recent review of experience showed that those who did not take a premed undergraduate concentration not only were admitted to medical schools, but their achievement there, as indicated by grades, was as good as—or even better than—those who specialized earlier.

There is also a third reason why this reform can now be undertaken better than at any recent time. When the Commission on Financing Higher Education was working upon its studies and drafting its report, it had to consider whether corporate gifts would flow to the liberal arts colleges or whether they would continue in the future, as they had in the limited giving of the past, to serve primarily as a subsidy for technological and scientific training. In this respect the last three years have seen a tremendous shift in interest.

This year corporations are contributing roughly a hundred million dollars. That is more than a third of the way toward the goal which the Commission on Financing Higher Education set. It is a more rapid approach to a stated objective than anyone could have dared to predict three years ago. Even more striking than the amount of this giving is the marked emphasis upon support of the liberal arts.

Here then are three reasons for the simplification and purification of the programs of literally hundreds of institutions. First, they will not lose in student attendance and, therefore, in student fees. Second, they will not be put in an adverse position in marketing their graduates. Third, they will not suffer discrimination against them on the part of corporations making donations to higher education. It is, I repeat, a unique opportunity for great qualitative advance in their programs, which can be attained without disastrous fiscal results. All the reasons that have heretofore been used as excuses for debasing their coinage have recently disappeared. If they do not now reform, it is because they have lost faith in their own professions. If they have deteriorated in sincerity they do not deserve support.

CHURCH-RELATED COLLEGES

It may be remarked that historically many of the colleges were church related. It is commonplace knowledge that under the stress of what was regarded as fiscal necessity some fled from those relationships. As their programs became more commercialized and less concerned with values, church support declined or was entirely withdrawn. These trends, also, can be reversed; indeed they have been in certain instances. If institutions with religious and even churchly traditions will cease to be ashamed of them and develop their programs in the spirit of the liberal arts, church sources of revenue will revive and become a more valuable resource than ever before.

FIRST OBLIGATION OF THE COLLEGES

The first obligation, therefore, of the college, as distinguished from the university, is to purify its program, to develop the intimacy of teachers with students to a degree which will reverse the decline in contact that has marked the last thirty years. It may not be possible to re-establish social relationships upon the basis which was said once to exist (though I never experienced it). But it will be possible to re-establish intellectual contacts and to give the student both more incentive and more leeway to educate himself than have been stressed since the onset of the depression.

I am not suggesting that the small colleges should not grow; I am only emphasizing the fact that growth is their secondary obligation, that their primary duty is to advance the quality of their work through better teaching, simplified and more coherent curricula, and sharper selection among the vast hordes of students who are going to be seeking admission. None of these steps will have an adverse effect upon their fiscal position in the new atmosphere within which they will work. As a matter of fact the pressure of student population will facilitate an increase in tuition and improve finances.

UNIVERSITY CURRICULA

As for the larger institutions, none of them (not even Harvard with all its resources) can hope, as President Eliot suggested, to do everything and everything at its best. There has been far too much effort to keep up with the Joneses, far too little manifestation of self-confidence in shaping programs within a reasonable scope and leaving different functions to others. Probably no nation in the world has heard so much about cooperation among institutions of higher learning or has done so little. When one thinks, for example, of the library problem, one of the costliest and most complex of the difficulties facing universities, it is both astounding and disheartening to see the disparity between proposals for co-operation and the realities. What is true in that particular field applies to many more.

The undergraduate curricula of universities have been expanded into fields quite inappropriate to undergraduate instruction, and undergraduate specialization has been carried much further than educational considerations could possibly justify. No one with any experience would pretend that the pattern of undergraduate elections reflects real intellectual interests or even sound vocational preparation. Time of class meetings during the day, whether a given course involves Saturday sessions, and a host of other irrelevancies and trivialities often have more weight in determining individual programs than sound educational objectives.

The overexpansion of offerings has advanced costs beyond all reason, and immense savings could come from reform. In every institution there is the spectacle simultaneously of enormous lecture courses at the undergraduate level and inefficiently small, costly, advanced undergraduate courses with far too few students to justify the expense. In one institution with which I have some familiarity there are lecture courses with over four hundred registrants; yet 40 per cent of all courses are too small for efficiency. This reveals a maldistribution of faculty time and effort not conducive to the best educational results. Simplification of the curriculum and a redistribution of teaching assignments would produce much better results for both faculty and students with no added cost. Furthermore, sensible class schedules would save the costs of construction and maintenance of aca-

demic buildings that are not really needed.

WORTHY OF SUPPORT

Standards raised at all levels, curricula purged of excess and of irrelevance, teaching stressed and improved, undergraduate environment made an integral part of the educative process—all these will have the effect of stimulating alumni pride and evoking alumni support. Most institutions are only at the threshold of alumni giving. It can be enlarged by skillful promotion and improved technique, but both those tricks of the trade will be more effective if they are in a position to exploit an honestly reformed educational program.

What applies to alumni giving applies also to public support, which can be greatly increased, and to assistance from the foundations. It was about fifty years ago that Andrew Carnegie set out to improve the salaries and retirement allowances of professors. The dramatic announcement of a fifty million dollar gift by the Ford Foundation is symptomatic of renewed appreciation of the centrality of this problem.

The country is fully able to support all the education its youth can absorb. The wealth of the nation is advancing; its productivity is going forward by leaps and bounds. In the reduction of the amount taken from their territory by federal income taxes alone the states have had taxable resources made available to them to supply enough money to finance any necessary expansion of their programs of higher education.

In summary, it is time to stop viewing with alarm, to reverse the recent pessimistic attitude, and to demonstrate that educational institutions are worthy of the support which is available if only we will fully justify it.

Henry M. Wriston, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., L.H.D., Providence, Rhode Island, has been president of Brown University since 1937. After eleven years of teaching history in Wesleyan University (1914–25), he was president of Lawrence College (1925–37) and director of the Institute of Paper Chemistry, Appleton, Wisconsin (1929–37). President Wriston is a trustee of Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company and of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching; until 1954 he was also trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was public governor of the New York Stock Exchange (1950–52), president of the Association of American Colleges (1935–36) and the Association of American Universities (1948–50), and a member of the executive committee of the American Council on Education (1941–44). He is author, among other works, of The Nature of a Liberal College (1937) and The Strategy of Peace (1944).

Recent Developments in Financing Higher Education

By JOHN D. MILLETT

IN its report issued in November 1952, the Commission on Financing Higher Education summarized the financial difficulties of higher education as fivefold: (1) inflation, (2) the expansion of educational services, (3) fluctuating student enrollments, (4) need for enlarged and modernized physical facilities, and (5) uncertain sources of income.[1]

Certainly, in the three years which have intervened since the presentation of that report, no miraculous solution to these difficulties has appeared. Nonetheless, the years have brought some changes, and even some improvements, in the financial circumstances of our colleges and universities. These are worth examining in turn.

INFLATION

It would require an economic soothsayer to claim that our postwar inflation has run its full course and that our economy may now look forward to an era of steady growth with some degree of price stability. Yet the fact remains that the price index has remained fairly steady in the past three years. Our institutions of higher education have had a breathing spell in which to catch up with the consequences of seven years of rapid price change in which the purchasing power of the dollar was reduced to almost exactly half.

Three years have not been long enough, however, to repair all the damage. We must remember how far our colleges and universities fell back. In the one item of faculty salaries, as an illustration, the nationwide advertisement of McGraw-Hill, which appeared in March 1955, pointed out that in terms of dollars of constant purchasing power faculty salaries in 1954 were 5 per cent less than in 1940. This is an average. Some colleges and universities have succeeded in doubling their salary scales in the past ten years. Few have done any better than that. Others have not done that well. And a doubling simply means that faculty salaries have stood still. In this period some professions have substantially increased their compensation in real terms. The average remuneration of industrial workers has risen nearly 50 per cent.

To what extent should our college and university faculties share in the general advance of our economy which has occurred in the past fifteen years? There is no single, so-called objective guide for answering this question. Educational administrators are nevertheless well aware of several factors which may help to provide an answer. First of all, the highly trained, specialized personnel from which faculty members must be drawn is in short supply. This shortage promises to become more acute over the next few years. Furthermore, the competition from business, from the practicing professions, and from the federal government for highly educated personnel is such that university needs are suffering. University professors do not engage in teaching solely because

[1] Commission on Financing Higher Education, *The Nature and Needs of Higher Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 59. A private agency, the Commission was sponsored by the Association of American Universities and financed by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

of the monetary remuneration involved. But we cannot expect our top young talent to choose an academic career as opposed to other opportunities to make use of their abilities if a major economic sacrifice to themselves and their families is to be exacted for such a decision.

Faculty salaries may be in the process of catching up with inflation. They have not caught up with the demand for highly specialized abilities in our society as a whole.

Another victim of inflation in our college and university administration has not fared even so well as faculty salaries. The maintenance of buildings and the replacement of equipment have definitely and even dangerously fallen behind at almost all institutions of higher education. Wages of maintenance employees have risen with the general trend in industrial wages. The prices for materials and equipment purchased by a college or university are the same as those paid by all consumers. With income lagging and with costs rising, administrators have had no choice except to cut back on maintenance activities. It is safe to say that scarcely a college or university in the country has had an adequate maintenance program in the past ten years. To the accumulated deferred maintenance of war years has now been added that of another ten years resulting from inflationary pressures. The capital plant of higher education has been steadily deteriorating, and there is little evidence to suggest any substantial change in this situation in the past three years.

If price stability has been in large part realized in the past few years, our colleges and universities have not yet caught up with their needs. The breathing period has been helpful. It has by no means brought an answer to all the problems which inflation created or aggravated.

EXPANSION OF EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

The greatest single change in the educational activity of our colleges and universities to occur in this generation was the sudden demand for a large expansion in scientific research. World War II first made it apparent that industry and government had dire need for stepped-up technological development. Much of our technology in turn depended upon the advancement of fundamental knowledge. As a result, our great universities in particular were asked to organize and expand their research efforts on a scale never before attempted.

Since 1945 this demand has continued almost unabated. Higher education is still working overtime in the field of scientific research. By and large, especially since 1952, government agencies have now accepted the general proposition that reimbursement of research costs incurred by a university must extend to indirect as well as direct elements of expenditure. A few years ago some government agencies argued that they had only a minor obligation to help universities in meeting the overhead costs of sponsored research. Now it is fairly generally understood that the volume of sponsored research in our universities created serious financial burdens. These are now being met by more adequate government underwriting of research activities. The problem has been by no means entirely solved, but the situation appears to be improved.

Apart from research, our colleges and universities have been subjected only to the more or less normal pressures to expand their services. The number of four-year medical schools has grown from seventy-two to seventy-six in the past three years. The enrollment capacity of all these schools has also been increased. Yet the adequate financial support of medical education has not yet by any means been forthcoming. A nationwide demand for more doctors must still be accompanied by greater financial assistance to medical education.

Our colleges and universities have been under a great deal of pressure also to educate more public-school teachers, more engineers, and more scientists. Two of these are costly fields of service, and more should certainly be spent on the proper preparation of our school-teachers.

If, then, no new demand comparable to the tremendous impact of augmented scientific research has been thrust upon higher education in recent years, nevertheless more and even improved programs of certain particular educational efforts have been expected. The educational services demanded by our society show no indication of contraction. The exact reverse is the case. And these expectations continue to complicate the financial administration of our colleges and universities.

FLUCTUATING STUDENT ENROLLMENTS

When the report of the Commission on Financing Higher Education was released, our colleges and universities had experienced two successive years of declining student enrollment. In terms of the customary autumn count, our colleges and universities had seen their student bodies reduced from 1,400,000 in 1940 to some 700,000 in 1943, only to swell after the war to a peak of 2,450,000 in 1949. This number then fell back to about 2,100,000 in 1951. Immediate future trends were uncertain.

Interestingly enough, with the veterans about to disappear, with the war in Korea still being waged, and with the total college-age population at a record low, college enrollment gained somewhat in the autumn of 1952. It continued this upward trend in 1953 and 1954. It appeared evident that the proportion of eighteen-year-olds in the population who were graduating from high school was increasing somewhat, and the proportion of high school graduates going to college was also larger. Furthermore, in 1954 there was a larger influx of Korean veterans than had been expected. Moreover, with a state of at least semipeace prevailing in the world, the manpower demands of our armed forces could be relaxed. The expected crisis in meeting military manpower requirements did not materialize.

Yet these changing circumstances in the past three years have not meant a sudden return to prosperity for our colleges and universities. Almost all institutions were greatly extended in order to accommodate the peak enrollment of 1949. As the numbers subsided, many colleges began to study an "ideal" size in terms of available facilities, educational objectives, and financial well-being. Often they projected a desired size somewhat smaller than the enrollment of 1951. They made plans to accommodate some such load in the general expectation that the whole decade of the 1950's would see higher education at a postwar ebb.

Before facilities and programs caught up with the first bulge, a second expansion began. Moreover, the probable duration and magnitude of this new growth were almost entirely unpredictable. To make matters even worse, the American Association of Collegiate Registrars in 1953 published a little volume warning colleges and universities what they should reasonably expect in the decade of the 1960's. The birth statistics of the 1940's indicated that by 1965 there would be 50 per cent more young people of college age in the United States than in 1952 and that by 1970 the number would be 70 per cent greater.

There was little satisfaction for America's colleges and universities in either the sudden change of direction or the sharp warning of greater loads ahead. Rather there was a good deal of confusion and some dismay. Just how large a proportion of our youth should higher education embrace in any event? Was higher education getting more students rather than better students? These and other questions had no commonly accepted answers. Moreover, although rising enrollment meant more income from student fees, this was by no means ample by itself to answer all financial needs.

The plain fact is that fluctuating enrollments are still with higher education, but the fluctuation now appears to be all in one direction—upward. Higher education must now clearly undertake to find the financial resources for a steadily, even rapidly, expanding student body.

PHYSICAL FACILITIES

Although most colleges and universities have been able to make some improvements in their physical plant in the past three years, they are still far behind their needs. The available plant in 1949 was not adequate for that enrollment. The downward trend, lasting only two years, provided no period for real improvement in the situation. An upward swing now for three years has simply aggravated the situation.

Enrollment in higher education increased during the depression years of the 1930's. Few colleges and universities received much in the way of enlarged plant resources in these years, except in those states where state universities were enabled to take advantage of the federal government's public works program. The war virtually halted all construction. At the end of the war, construction controls remained for a time, while rising building costs made it more difficult to meet plant requirements.

Only the intervention of the federal government saved the day. War surplus buildings, mostly from army camps, were made available; the government even helped in moving the buildings. In this way colleges and universities met the enrollment bulge. Today those temporary buildings are dilapidated, inadequate, and unsightly. They are still being used on many campuses all over the country.

Now colleges and universities face increasing enrollments before they have been able to meet present-day needs. Moreover, so much attention has been given to difficulties in meeting current operating costs that plant requirements have often been neglected. In the past three years this situation has been more generally understood and corrective action begun. A good many capital-giving campaigns have been launched, legislatures in many states have provided funds to state-supported institutions, and private borrowing has helped immensely in financing residence halls.

Yet the sad fact remains that most of our institutions of higher education are not yet ready to face the needs of the future. To be sure, conditions have improved. They have not improved nearly enough.

UNCERTAIN SOURCES OF FINANCING

The last three or four years have seen some substantial improvement in the financial support of higher education. No one pretends that that support has yet become embarrassingly generous. There is still much to do. But at least the situation today does seem better than it was at the beginning of the 1950's.

The outstanding development has been the great expansion of corporation support of higher education. For 1950 the staff study for the Commission on

Financing Higher Education estimated that perhaps as much as forty million dollars was contributed to colleges and universities by private corporations. If anything this figure was too high. In the current year it is estimated that corporations will be giving about a hundred million dollars to higher education.[2] This means an increase of more than 150 per cent in the past five years.

The creation of the Council for Financial Aid to Education, Inc., has undoubtedly helped in building support for the idea of corporation giving to higher education. Improved solicitation devices have also been beneficial. The colleges have done a better job in presenting their needs. Changes in the federal income tax law have encouraged corporation philanthropy. The New Jersey test case has helped to clarify the law. All in all, real advance has been made in this area of financial support.

Alumni giving continues to increase. The latest report of the American Alumni Council indicates that in the year ending June 1954 organized college alumni funds obtained nearly twenty-one million dollars in contributions. This is a long way from the approximately three million dollars which was the extent of alumni giving before 1940. Yet here too much more is still to be done. The average effectiveness of alumni solicitation is still only 20 per cent. Less than a dozen institutions succeeded in obtaining contributions from more than 50 per cent of their alumni solicited. The average gift is still only $27.

Reluctantly, colleges and universities have for the most part increased their student charges to fairly high levels. In a number of Eastern institutions tuition charges per year in 1955–56 will be $1,000, compared with $400 in 1940. In many midwestern colleges and universities, tuition will range from $600 to $800 a year, compared with $250 to $350 before World War II.

A larger number of families enjoying improved income status, and greatly expanded support of scholarship funds, mean that these increases have not decreased the opportunity to go to college. On the one hand, our private institutions have augmented their income. On the other hand, many families have also realized that higher education entails substantial economic sacrifice.

State institutions too have been increasing their fees little by little, and no doubt will continue to do so as their income needs expand. To the extent that state legislatures do not provide the necessary support, state institutions have the difficult alternative of raising their charges in order to maintain their quality.

Another major development has been the increased interest on the part of foundations in providing capital funds to colleges and universities, and in diminishing the overwhelming preoccupation with support of research. The outstanding illustration has been the Ford Foundation's action in creating a fifty million dollar fund to be distributed on a matching basis to private institutions for the endowment support of faculty salaries. Surely similar action by others will follow in the next few years.

The interest in support of higher education by the federal government appears to have subsided in the last three or four years. Financial assistance to those who have served in the armed forces and then go to college is likely to become a continuing program, at least as long as we have selective service, and would seem to be desirable. Federal support of research appears now to be fairly well accepted. If more of this support could be provided for basic

[2] A. H. Raskin, "The Corporation and the Campus," *New York Times Magazine*, April 17, 1955.

research, our educational institutions would be happier. Time-honored assistance to agricultural research, extension, and education may be expected to continue.


But no interest at all has been aroused in the suggestion for general subvention by the federal government of state higher education, and there seems to be little demand for a national scholarship program. This situation should create cause for general thanksgiving, since general federal support could only lead to undesirable intervention in educational affairs.

CONCLUSION

In general, our colleges and universities have survived a trying period without major disaster. They still have crucial current financial needs. They face an immense challenge in the next fifteen years.

The capacity of American society to protect and improve the status of higher education should not be despaired of, and the inclination to do so will surely not falter in an age when higher education is indispensable to national survival.


John D. Millett, Ph.D., LL.D., Oxford, Ohio, is president of Miami University. He was formerly a member of the staff of the Social Science Research Council (1939–41) and of the National Resources Planning Board (1941–42), assistant to the executive director of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1948–49), executive director of the Commission on Financing Higher Education (1949–52), associate professor and professor of public administration, Columbia University (1945–53). He is author of The Process and Organization of Government Planning (1947), Financing Higher Education in the United States (1953), and other works.



Book Department

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT 211
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY 215
ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY 223
SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION 228
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 234
SPECIAL TOPICS ABROAD
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 237
SLAVIC COUNTRIES 240
WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 244
OTHER COUNTRIES 251
OTHER BOOKS 259



INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

EUROPEAN YEARBOOK. (Vol. I.) Pp. xxv, 584. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff N. V., 1955. (Published under the auspices of the Council of Europe.) Guilders 28.50.

Scholars and laymen interested in European affairs or in the broader subject of regional organization will be delighted to know that this volume is but the first of an annual issue to be published under the auspices of the Council of Europe. The editors, Dr. B. Landheer and Dr. A. H. Robertson, have compiled the book under the supervision of an editorial committee, a group of five men acting in an unofficial and nonpolitical capacity and not authorized to express opinions on any aspect of international affairs. The various articles, documents, and bibliography have to do with European regional developments from 1948 to December 31, 1953; the second volume, scheduled to be off the press late in 1955, will cover the year 1954.

The editors explain that the necessity of dealing in one volume with a period of six years compelled them to omit documents and information which they would have liked to include; they plan to take up the Central Commission for the Navigation on the Rhine, the Benelux Customs Union, and the Customs Cooperation Council in Volume II. United Nations agencies operating in the European area are omitted for the reason that information about them is already available.

The first 187 pages of the book present ten articles dealing with selected phases of European co-operation. Three of them, written by Minister of State, E. N. Van Kleffens of the Netherlands, former Prime Minister Robert Schuman of France, and Professor Basilio Cialdea of the University of Rome, respectively, discuss the basic problem of European unity. Three articles on the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.), one on the Council of Europe, one on the Coal and Steel Community, and one on the European Convention on the Rights of Man are also included, each of which was written by a man officially connected with his subject. The final article by Mr. C. W. Jenks of the International Labor Office takes up the relation of European integration to world organization. Some of the articles are in English and some in French; each is followed by a brief summary in the second language.

The "Documentary Section" of the book

consists of the basic documents, in both English and French, of eight organizations, together with explanatory material; the Brussels Treaty Organization; the O.E.E.C.; the Council of Europe; the Coal and Steel Community; the Northern Council; the Conference of Ministers of Transport; the Organization for Nuclear Research; and the Conference on the Organization of Agricultural Markets. The third and final section of the *Yearbook* provides a well-selected bibliography on the many phases of European integration.

NORMAN HILL
University of Washington

FOSTER RHEA DULLES. *America's Rise to World Power, 1898–1954.* Pp. xx, 314. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $5.00.

Professor Dulles, author of several books, has, in *America's Rise to World Power,* made his contribution to the New American Nation Series. This series, which will contain forty volumes when completed, gives promise of becoming one of the major collaborative works of the mid-century.

In this volume the author has dealt with the leading personalities and their contributions to the development of our foreign policy since 1898. Influenced certainly by Alfred T. Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge the initial step toward world power was taken. Despite these jingoists, business leaders hesitated, but popular magazines accepted more articles on imperialism. With our easy war against Spain, the imperialists were elated. Mark Hanna's conversion to colonialism marked the altered opinion of business. The revolt of the Filipinos revealed the liabilities of our new foreign policy.

The writer's hero, if he has one in this book, is Theodore Roosevelt, who for eight years pursued an aggressive foreign policy. He doubled the size of the navy, took Panama, added a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, maintained the Open Door Policy, acquiesced in Japan's taking Korea, established the Treaty of Portsmouth, and bested the Kaiser at Algeciras.

Taft, less aggressive, dedicated himself to promoting arbitration treaties and pushing "dollar" diplomacy. Wilson is correctly revealed as having planted his foreign policy in the soil of moralistic idealism which, when cultivated by himself and Bryan, bore fruits of trust and faith. With numerous problems pressing at home Wilson, the precedent-maker, attended the Paris Peace Conference. The President got the League of Nations in the treaties dictated at the Conference. When the opposition defeated the treaty in the Senate, Wilson prophetically declared that rejection of collective security meant another global war.

Professor Dulles summarizes our position in 1919 as the stabilizer of world power, the foremost creditor nation, the earth's financial capital, the greatest economic imperialist, and the giant of the Western hemisphere. Due to these achievements, there was a need for alteration in our foreign policy, but the author laments the fact that mid-Western provincialism triumphed over internationalism.

Throughout the 1920's and until the 1930's the American ideal of peace through disarmament was not realized. We suffered disillusionment in the mirage of neutrality. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 our actions revealed our sympathy for the Allies. In 1941 Congress enacted the Lend-Lease Law as Franklin Delano Roosevelt prepared his Arsenal of Democracy speech. The challenge was met in the popular way. Our entrance into the war was forced in the Pacific not in the Atlantic.

During World War II meetings were held to seek solutions for postwar problems. A second attempt at collective security was made in the United Nations. Perhaps the most fundamental change in America in this century was in the general acceptance of world leadership and the United Nations in 1945.

In this book only the barest mention is made of any phase of our history except foreign affairs. There is no attempt to treat economic phases of our international relations. The book is limited to the treatment of the political evolution of the world's foremost Democracy from continentalism to world leadership. Our basic problem, national security, is always easily seen in the background.

GEORGE C. OSBORN
University of Florida

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD. *Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea.* Pp. x, 448. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955. $6.00.

This is a problem study—how to achieve democratic control of American foreign policy. The author believes that generally democracy is served best through the regular party process which allows the electorate to choose between alternative programs. In foreign affairs, however, he fears that strong partisanship might endanger the international position of the United States which must appear to the world as united, dependable, yet flexible. He therefore considers two alternatives to partisanship—bipartisanship and extrapartisanship. Bipartisanship, as commonly understood, involves some measure of consultation among the leaders of both parties to the end of dampening opposition both in Congress and in the elections. Extrapartisanship places the initiative for policy-making with the President who, while mobilizing the support of his own party, seeks to prevent counteraction by consulting influential members of the opposition party.

The author concludes that extrapartisanship is the preferable solution in foreign policy. He arrives at this conclusion by a three-way approach. First, statistical analysis of roll calls relating to foreign affairs between 1943 and 1950 shows a consistent pattern of voting in Congress; a Coastal-Interior split in the Republican party, a North-South cleavage in the Democratic party which makes partisan policy too uncertain either under present alignment or any realignment in the foreseeable future. Secondly, examining the congressional organization for foreign affairs, he finds it loose and disjointed, but in this very weakness and dissidence he sees a presidential opportunity to utilize extrapartisanship. Thirdly, he traces the record of the parties from Pearl Harbor to Korea: the impact of war, organizing the United Nations, "getting along with Russia," "getting tough with Russia," European recovery, the China problem, foreign policy issues in the elections of 1944 and 1948; a history of rising harmony and bipartisanship in the war years; growing discord and increasing partisanship in the postwar peace.

Mr. Westerfield's text is relentlessly factual; the evidence carefully collected; the interpretation highly reasonable. Much of the groundwork was done while he was serving as a Congressional interne for the American Political Science Association. It is too bad that out of this personal experience he was not prepared to put into his writing some of that "human interest," or individual motivation which is the *elan* of politics. This is not to say, however, that he disregards the key roles of such persons as Marshall, Dewey, Vandenberg, Taber, Connally, Wallace, Dulles, Acheson, Pepper, Fulbright, and many others in the making of foreign policy. His is an impersonal and thoughtful appraisal, a scholarly and dispassionate analysis, a constructive contribution to the study of foreign policy controls.

MARIAN D. IRISH
Florida State University

JULIUS W. PRATT. *A History of United States Foreign Policy.* Pp. xxiv, 808. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955. $6.95.

This new and comprehensive textbook on the history of American foreign policy is scholarly, well organized, and clearly written. Following a generally conventional chronological pattern, that begins with the diplomacy of the revolution and concludes with a very full treatment of developments in the mid-twentieth century, it nevertheless incorporates one valuable innovation. Before swinging into his fast-moving narrative, Professor Pratt has three chapters that successively take up "the aims of foreign policy," "the tools of diplomacy," and "the tools of force."

In his narration of the more controversial features of recent policy, the author is fair and objective. His technique is to give a straightforward factual account, and then to append a brief section which explicitly defines the controversy and suggests his own interpretation of events. After discussing the defeat of the League of Nations, for example, he gives us a brief section entitled "Who Was to Blame," and then on World War II developments, provides a "Note on Pearl Harbor" and "Criticism of Yalta."

In spite of the good things that may be said about this book, it is still in some

respects rather disappointing. The time would appear to be at hand for a more complete rewriting and fresh evaluation of the history of American foreign policy than Professor Pratt has chosen to undertake. His emphasis, as in other comparable texts, is primarily on diplomacy rather than on the forces that have more basically accounted for the evolution of American foreign policy. There is less discussion than one might have desired on such phenomena, if they may be so called, as isolationism, imperialism, and internationalism. The great transformation that has taken place in the American approach to foreign affairs during the past half century consequently tends to be obscured in the detail of more specific developments. Perhaps the pressure to make a textbook complete makes it all but impossible to avoid this submergence of the general in the particular, but there still remains the question of how much the student will really learn of the basic conflicts in the evolution of our foreign policy by this approach.

It is true that Professor Pratt assigns nearly half of his book to the period since the Spanish-American War and has no less than five chapters on the very recent postwar years. This is a distinct gain in throwing his account as a whole into better perspective. One is still left, however, with the feeling that the story is merely brought up to date rather than newly appraised from the vantage point of the momentous happenings which have marked the final shift from a traditional isolationism to responsible internationalism.

FOSTER RHEA DULLES
Ohio State University

JOHN M. CABOT. *Toward Our Common American Destiny*. Pp. xvii, 214. Medford, Mass.: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, n.d. $3.50.

The seventeen papers here reprinted fall between October 9, 1952, and February 23, 1954. Thirteen were originally presented in the United States and four in Latin America. They vary in length from two pages to twenty-two; all are concerned with the theme of inter-American ties and dependence, with differing emphasis on politics, economics, and culture.

John Moors Cabot is a career diplomat who has spent seventeen of his twenty-eight years in the Foreign Service on assignments relating to Latin America. He speaks of that area as his "chosen field," and of his departure from it in early 1954 with "deep personal regret." He said of his leaving that "my very going may paradoxically advance the cause for which I have always earnestly worked: our continental solidarity; friendship and understanding between the American republics." Supposedly, "these writings constitute . . . an official statement of American policy toward Latin America as set forth during the first year of President Eisenhower's Administration."

Cabot declares his first allegiance to the national interest of the United States, but he feels that the pursuit of that interest leads Toward Our Common American Destiny. The common interests of the American republics, plus the fact of Latin America's development at a pace "so rapid that it must in a short span strongly affect the balance of world economics and military power," point the course of United States policy. That policy calls for North American stimulation and assistance in the promotion of the Latin American economies. But government grants have a limited usefulness and the great burden must fall upon private capital, domestic and foreign. The new partnership implies a renunciation of the tactics of intervention and imperialism. All such earlier meddling was foredoomed to failure: democracy must grow from within; it cannot be imposed from without. The most effective encouragement must take the form of respect for national dignity, of mutual esteem and tolerance, of technical assistance, and of enlarged trade and investments. Foreign business interests have been guilty of abuses, but the limits on foreign investments in Latin America have been for the most part imposed by the panaceas of irresponsible governments in the southern republics themselves. Let us each put his own house in order, and let us take counsel together when problems affect us all. Let us remain loyal to our great regional organization and our many inter-American agreements. Finally, let us stand together against the threat of international Communism. We have a "rendezvous with destiny." Such is the liberal and good neighborly creed of Eisenhower's erstwhile Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, now curiously Ambassador to Sweden.

HOWARD C. PERKINS
University of Pennsylvania

GOVE HAMBIDGE. *The Story of FAO*. Pp. xii, 303. Toronto; New York; London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955. $6.50.

"Most people at present are farmers, and most farmers are . . . badly off. . . . This is one of the things drastically wrong with the world . . ." (p. 30). The reduction in the proportion of people in the world directly dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood, and the growth of the productive potential and the level of living of those remaining—these might well be considered measures of the success of current world development efforts. And many persons would agree that the prospects for peace and economic advance throughout the world will improve essentially as these objectives begin to be achieved.

Such emphasis on the size and economic well-being of the world's farm populations does not mean that the tasks are primarily agricultural, or indeed primarily economic and demographic. Rather, the economic problems lie at least as much in the field of industry, transport, and other service activities. Cultural and political development are intimately interrelated with the demographic and economic. Mr. Hambidge makes clear that Food and Agriculture Organization, the "food and agriculture" of its name notwithstanding, must deal with the whole complex. In fact, I suspect Mr. Hambidge is somewhat over-impressed with the role of industrial growth, at least for the near future. On the other hand, the book might have been more explicit on the problems of planning in an admittedly over-all approach: food and agriculture programs in a country's total investment budget, for example, or in the total expenditure for technical assistance by the United Nations and all its specialized agencies.

The Story of FAO is the story of the origins, objectives, growth, and accomplishments of the oldest postwar specialized agency of the United Nations. FAO had to deal with the age-old problem of hungry people against the backdrop of postwar economic crises and political strife. It had to do something about hunger and agriculture's dislocation and backwardness while the world was evolving a pattern of international-national relationships. In particular, it had "to try on for size" various ideas for appropriate international programs, ranging from the responsibility for a major operation like that of a World Food Board to primarily research and advisory activities. Mr. Hambidge's book is therefore more than the story of FAO; it it a candid analysis of some major postwar problems as seen by a person trying to deal with them on an international basis.

No reader will fail to be impressed with Mr. Hambidge's craftsmanship. In a relatively brief study, he presents a scholarly treatment of the big issues. But he also tells the day-to-day story of FAO, of its technicians, frequently by name and nationality, and of their work, by country and region. The book is thus a happy combination of a convenient basic reference on FAO activity and of a valuable analysis of its major problems. A high standard has been set for the writers of The Story of IBRD, WHO, and others!

WILFRED MALENBAUM
Massahusetts Institute of Technology

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

LEWIS MAYERS. *The American Legal System*. Pp. ix, 589. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $6.50.

This is a comprehensive study of the institutions that administer justice in the United States. Its purpose is to present an integrated exposition of the instrumentalities of American law. The author has served as counsel to a New York State joint legislative commission and as research consultant to the New York State Law Revision Commission. He is now professor of law at City College in New York. His book reflects not only the fruit of his experiences in the codification and

revision of the law, but also the result of extended class room testing, since in mimeographed form it has long been used as a text in the author's classes at City College.

The author describes the structure, personnel, and operations of the American legal institutions: civil, criminal, administrative, military, and arbitral. The allocation of coverage reflects the rapid change in the administration of law that has been going on in this country during the past quarter century. Before the advent of the New Deal and the cold war, a study of American legal institutions would have been devoted almost exclusively to the judicial system. Professor Mayer, on the other hand, devotes almost one-third of his book to an examination of nonjudicial tribunals —administrative bodies, military courts, and arbitration boards. In view of the multiplication of administrative bodies as an incident of the welfare state, the advent of peace-time conscription and possibly universal military service, and the ever increasing extension of commercial and industrial arbitration, Professor Mayer's allocation of treatment appears justifiable. Nevertheless, this results in what the reviewer believes to be an inadequate treatment of some important aspects of the judicial machinery.

For example, the rule-making power of the courts deserves more than a cursory paragraph. Chief Justice Vanderbilt in New Jersey has completely revised and modernized an outmoded civil procedure by the exercise of this power; and in New York, summary judgment procedure, exclusively a product of the rule-making power, disposes with conclusive finality of thousands of cases without according the litigants an opportunity to testify and present their witnesses in open court. Again, the revolutionary creation of a Federal common law by *Swift* v. *Tyson* and its counter-revolutionary abolition a century later by *Erie Railroad* v. *Tompkins* is discussed with such conciseness that it is probably largely unintelligible to the author's major audience—the college or university student with little or no legal background.

This, however, is a minor criticism (as is the rather strange omission from an otherwise adequate bibliography of such readable classics as Hughes' *Supreme Court,* Holmes' *The Common Law,* and Pounds' *The Spirit of the Common Law*). All in all this is a splendid work, comprehensive, accurate, and well written. What is particularly gratifying is that the author does not hesitate to express value judgments, with most of which this reviewer would agree. Gratifying too is the author's perceptive appreciation of the social factors that mold legal institutions; although this reviewer would suggest that the author fails to recognize the necessary role of the civil jury as a corrective to the archaic notion that compensation for automobile and other nonindustrial accidents must depend upon one party's fault and the other's complete lack of guilt.

While this book appears to have been intended primarily for classroom use in advanced political science, pre-law, and first year law courses, it would be a pity if it did not receive much wider distribution and acceptance. This reviewer would heartily recommend it to every citizen seeking an integrated and comprehensive exposition of the American legal system.

LEO PFEFFER
American Jewish Congress

LYNTON K. CALDWELL. *The Government and Administration of New York.* Pp. xviii, 506. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. $5.95.

This volume in the *American Commonwealth Series* is the first to deal with the government and administration of one of the most populous, urbanized, and complex states. The task of mere formal description is accordingly a formidable one, but the author has accomplished this in competent fashion. The total state government of the Empire State has never previously had such a thorough and well organized exposition.

The author divides his treatment into three main parts: the frame of government, the administrative system, and the public services. In part one, he devotes a chapter to each of the following nine topics: the Empire State (a brief survey of its land, economy, people, and politics), the state constitution, the political parties,

the legislature, the executive, the courts, local government, the City of New York, and the state and the Union. In part two, attention is given in five chapters on the administrative system to: organization and management, public revenues, financial administration, personnel administration, and forms of administrative action. In part three, eight chapters are used to appraise the government and administration of law enforcement, education, health, social services, public works and housing, agriculture and natural resources, labor, business enterprise, while a final chapter considers public service and citizen participation. A highly useful statistical appendix and a select bibliography complete the volume.

"The purpose of this book," the author notes in his Preface, "is to inform rather than to interpret." The emphasis is, accordingly, upon the factual exposition of the more formal aspects of the government and administration of the Empire State. The reader is given a clear blueprint of its machinery of government but no comparable understanding of the motors which propel the machine forward or backward, of the political fuels which provide power to these motors, nor of the men and the forces competing for the driver's seat. The "politics" of the Empire State are for the most part left unexplored. This more crucial half of the story of the government and administration of New York State ought to be a tempting subject for a second useful volume.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Columbia University

BERNARD BELLUSH. *Franklin D. Roosevelt as Governor of New York.* Pp. xiii, 338. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $5.00.

Doctor Bellush has done an excellent service in writing this book, for it fills a long-felt want in picturing accurately Franklin D. Roosevelt's background before he came into national prominence as President and author of the so-called New Deal. It is a matter of interest that Dr. Bellush does not hesitate to say that "the seeds of the New Deal were first planted by . . . Governor Alfred E. Smith. It blossomed forth, however, under the affirmative and competent guidance of a Harvard product, a pragmatist who had devoted his entire political career to becoming President of the United States. Roosevelt carried on the work initiated by the Happy Warrior" (p. 284).

Dr. Bellush writes from the stand point of an admirer of Roosevelt, and, it appears, is definitely a convinced New Dealer. However, he does not let his work descend into the field of propaganda. And he does not hesitate to criticize Roosevelt on several counts. Thus, "during the conflict between "Smith" and "Walker-Curry" Democrats, Roosevelt maintained a policy of benevolent neutrality. Opposed to the philosophy and practices of the Walker-Curry elements, Roosevelt nevertheless granted patronage for deserving New Yorkers through Tammany Hall. Although he had led the fight against Tammany while State Senator and Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt was now more practical minded. In fact, as a result of a contribution to the 1929 building fund of Tammany Hall, Roosevelt automatically became a member of Tammany after writing, "I am very glad to send you a check . . . and I regret that I cannot make it larger" (pp. 153–4). Dr. Bellush also says, "both the Republicans and Roosevelt must be indicted for having failed, in 1930, to comprehend the implications of continued neglect of stricter regulation of thrift accounts in commercial banks" (p. 113).

The author's admiration for Roosevelt is both pardonable and proper, for to write this type of biographical history, one should be at least in sympathy with the subject, if he is to produce a good and adequate piece of work. Also, Dr. Bellush has used original and new sources for his study, and the book is likely to stand for years as the authority for this period of Roosevelt's life. There are, also, adequate footnotes and index.

WILLIAM STARR MYERS
Princeton, N. J.

MARSHALL W. FISHWICK. *American Heroes: Myths and Reality.* Pp. viii, 242. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954. $3.75.

Those who work in any one of the disciplines included in the relatively new academic area of American studies are conscious—and at times puzzled—by the growing interest in the realm of abstraction called, variously, the "image," the "myth," the "stereotype," or the "symbol." The terms seem to have crept in *via* the field of American literature, and have in common a vagueness of definition and of usage that confuses rather than illuminates the subject under examination. The old contrast between myth and reality is lost, "image" and "myth" become just the accepted body of ideas concerning a man or an event—true or not—and the "symbol" may easily be something of which the writer of the work examined was possibly totally unaware.

It is a pleasure to read this clear straightforward account of the method of creation of a hero in which the lawmakers are carefully scrutinized and the differences between fact and fiction, as well as the factual basis for a burgeoning fiction, are carefully set down. The ease with which history becomes saga and the quickness with which fact can be embroidered by contemporary admirers of a folk hero are carefully illustrated. The methods used by Professor Fishwick are the same for statesmen like Washington and Lee and for Daniel Boone and Billy the Kid. The growth of the myth—or development of myth—from a small amount of fact by skillful creators of folk heroes seems to be the same for figures of real historic stature as for tawdry charlatans or folk villains. A close examination of the evidence in each case can either enlarge the "hero" or diminish him. The minute study given the life of Washington by Douglas Southall Freeman has produced a man greater in every way than the myths-embroidered father of his country created in early accounts of his life. Recent biographies of Captain John Smith seem to have rescued him from his long condemnation as liar and braggart, and certainly the hero makers of Daniel Boone had much more to go on than those who worked so industriously on Davy Crockett.

The "folk heroes" Professor Fishwick has chosen might not be the ones to appear on a list made up by another historian. The inclusion of Mickey Mouse, for example, may seem strange; and the presence of Henry Ford instead of his creation, called "Tin Lizzie" many years ago, seems unjustifiable. Because of the diversity of figures selected, it is difficult to form any conclusion as to the author's criteria as to what constitutes a "hero," and what proportion of myth and reality are mingled in his creation. The end result, however, is clear and the process apparent.

The hero-making process and the creation of folklore are subjects of interest to all the fields covered by the general area of American studies. But it is obvious that they are not limited to that area. Both heroes and folklore know no national limits, and there is no evidence that Americans "hero worship" more than other people or that the growth of legend differs radically elsewhere. In any case, the effort to recapture reality from myth and to re-create an approximation of the real man who played a very real part in the events of his day is admirable, and Professor Fishwick has selected a wide variety of "heroes" for such examination.

ALICE F. TYLER
University of Minnesota

ELISHA P. DOUGLASS. *Rebels and Democrats: The Struggle for Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule During the American Revolution.* Pp. xiv, 368. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1955. $5.00.

Some of those Americans who supported the movement of the 1760's and '70's that culminated in the Declaration of Independence were quite willing, once British rule had been overthrown, to allow the political order to continue much as it had been before. Indeed, to this group, the principal purpose of the movement was to free America from British rule. Other Americans, however, looked beyond this limited objective. To them, independence was but a necessary first step toward an overhauling of the colonial political system along equalitarian lines. Plural office-holding, suffrage restrictions, and inequitable representation were among the illiberal features of the system which they wished to see pass with the authority of the British crown. The struggle between these two groups, the one wishing to preserve the old order largely intact, the other wishing to establish an order that more nearly recognized the dignity and worth of the individual man, constituted an internal revolution in the colonies of great moment. To some extent, notably in the Carolinas, New York, and Pennsylvania, this phase of the revolution was a continuation of movements that had started without reference to the Stamp Act and other Parliamentary measures that precipitated the revolution proper.

It is to the political phase of this internal revolution that Mr. Douglass addresses himself, stressing especially the constitutional developments in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, but giving some attention to similar developments in Georgia, South Carolina, Maryland, New York, and New Hampshire also. A chapter is likewise devoted to Jefferson's constitutional plans for Virginia. While nowhere was the equalitarian movement a complete success, it did temper and restrain the conservative forces that gained the ascendancy during the revolution and helped produce state constitutions that alleviated some of the grosser political abuses of the colonial period. The liberal progress thus made provided a foundation for further reform during the early national period.

In developing his theme, Mr. Douglass has made good use of monographic literature dealing with political and constitutional change during the revolutionary era, and to the findings of earlier writers he has added others resulting from his own researches in manuscripts, newspapers, and printed documentary sources. This reviewer knows of no other work that brings together in a single volume so much that is significant in the political history of our revolutionary period. The book is well written and well documented, and is an example of sound historical workmanship.

JENNINGS B. SANDERS
Kensington, Md.

JOHN WILLIAM WARD. *Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age.* Pp. xii, 274. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $4.75.

How to grasp the essence, the true inwardness of a people in a given age? Mr. Ward believes that one way is to understand the mental icons it erects, the irrational but meaningful constructs of its imagination. Whatever may be the historical truth about Andrew Jackson the man, there can be no doubt that the symbol of Andrew Jackson possessed and dominated the minds of Americans in the 1820's and '30's. Basically, Mr. Ward submits, the symbol was a constellation of three ideas—Nature, Providence, and Will. Historians of ideas have made us familiar with the genealogy of these concepts. Mr. Ward shows us how they provided, to use his own violent metaphor, "the ideational skeleton of the ideal Andrew Jackson."

To his contemporaries the Hero of New Orleans appeared as one of Nature's noblemen, a simple cultivator of the soil, equally removed from crude savagery and from decadent civilization. The filiation with the eighteenth-century stereotype of the American yeoman farmer (so ably delineated by Mr. Ward's acknowledged master, Henry Nash Smith, in *Virgin Land*) is obvious. Less obvious, but persuasive, is the connection Mr. Ward establishes between the natural intuitive genius that contemporaries ascribed to Jackson and the "Reason" of the transcendentalists. But the Jackson of the myth was also the instrument by which Providence wrought America's destiny. Here, in the image of Old Hickory as "God's right-hand man," Mr. Ward finds the age's unblushing justification for its expansionism, its unhypocritical sense of a duty to "extend the area of freedom." But this simple man of the soil, this charismatic leader (the embodiment, as it were, of Nature and Nature's God) was also—and quite inconsistently—a prime mover himself, a self-reliant "man of iron," the personification of Will, the inner-directed master of his own soul and of outward events. In this facet of the Jacksonian image Mr. Ward sees reflected

the American cult of success, of the self-made man.

Mr. Ward's sources are newspaper articles, Fourth-of-July orations, funeral sermons, stump speeches, popular ballads, campaign songs, and political cartoons. Skilfully, appreciatively, he exploits their color and humor; subtly, perceptively he analyzes them, with an eye always to their bearing on his main theme—what the image of Jackson reveals about the people who fashioned it. The result is a clear and valuable insight into the mind of America in an era miscalled the Age of Jackson. "The age was not his," Mr. Ward insists—and his book amply demonstrates; "he was the age's."

FREDERICK B. TOLLES
Swarthmore College

THOMAS JEFFERSON. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson.* Vol. X: *22 June to 31 December 1786.* Edited by Julian P. Boyd. Pp. xxx, 654. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. $10.00.

The test of a series such as this lies in its capacity to sustain interest. The scale of the work may be gauged from the fact that the newest volume—nearly 700 pages long—covers only the second half of a single year, 1786. Definitely, however, this gigantic enterprise of scholarship and publishing justifies itself. This is due to two considerations. One is the loftiness of the subject that arises both from the quality of Jefferson's mind and from the importance of the matters contained in his papers. The other is the impeccable standard of the editorial work and the commentaries and notes that accompany the text.

For Jefferson and Adams the principal diplomatic problem of this period, as judged by the quantity and detail of the correspondence, had to do with the piratical powers on the Barbary Coast. An interesting exchange of views takes place between the two Ministers, in which they discuss the pros and cons of buying off the North African Muslims or building a navy to attack them and thus protect American commerce. A contemporary parallel may be observed in the point that the United States was concerned then as now to secure the release of Americans who were held as prisoners.

To build a navy of sufficient power called for plenty of money. But in this essential commodity the government of the United States was then deficient. Weakness at home spelled weakness abroad. The letters that flow to Jefferson from Madison, Monroe, Jay, and others are eloquent in their exposure of the political and fiscal weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. The disturbances in Massachusetts are discussed. Also, there appear the first gleams of hope—for a meeting is to be held in Philadelphia in 1787.

The other sides to Jefferson's intellect and personality are equally well revealed in this tenth volume. The scholar is honored by the conferment of degrees. The scientist discourses on physics, botany, zoology, anthropology—to name but a few. The father supervises his daughter; the uncle advises a nephew. Moreover, the man of affairs is for a moment captivated by a charming, but married, lady to whom are sent some notable letters full of romantic implications.

LESLIE LIPSON
University of California
Berkeley

CHARLES ALBRO BARKER. *Henry George.* Pp. xvii, 696. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $9.50.

"No other book of the industrial age dedicated to social reconstruction and conceived within the Western tradition of Christianity and democracy commanded so much attention as did *Progress and Poverty,*" by Henry George (p. viii), says the author. Marx's *Das Kapital* is partly comparable, he admits, and I would add *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* The intellectual influence of Henry George (1839–97) has been largely forgotten, but it was world-wide in its day. He influenced such people as Leo Tolstoy in Russia, Philip Wicksteed, Joseph Chamberlain, and George Bernard Shaw, and many Fabian Socialists in England, Hamlin Garland, Brand Whitlock, Tom Loftin Johnson, and several of Woodrow Wilson's cabinet and close advisors (Tumulty, House) in America, and leading figures in Australia, Ireland and Scotland.

Professor Barker has written his biography from the substantial Henry George collection in New York, from George material in many university libraries, and from files of west coast newspapers with which George was associated. The result is a scholarly work chronologically presented. The author delves deeply into every important phase of George's life. Professor Barker is thoroughly familiar with the economic history of George's time and with the developments then taking place in economic theory. And he writes well, makes reasonable judgments, and does not hesitate to criticize Henry George although it is clear that he admires him. Henry George was a journalist by profession, and a Jeffersonian Democrat in his politics. He would be catalogued today as a "liberal" or "do-gooder." Although he worked with socialists and influenced them, George was basically a capitalist with strong sympathies for the laboring man. He gave up his job on numerous occasions, with real financial distress the consequence, rather than compromise his own convictions. Slight in build, red-bearded, outwardly calm, he was a very persuasive speaker and writer.

During his lifetime Henry George wrote eight books, ran unsuccessfully twice for mayor of New York, and travelled widely, especially to England. His greatest book, *Progress and Poverty,* came at about the midpoint of his adult life. It was an economic plea, with religious overtones, for government ownership of land. George was incensed that in the 1870's a small number of Californians owned so much of the land there (p. 191). He regarded getting rich from a rise in land values as the worst kind of robbery. George's idea of freeing people from paying economic toll to landlords came soon after the freeing of negro slaves, and thus had more respectability than it might otherwise have had. The idea had a surprisingly great appeal. Incidentally, he did not develop the "Single Tax," that is, tax on economic rent, until ten years later (1888–90). The socialists incorrectly thought that George was one of them, but generally he balked at nationalizing industry and always at outlawing interest. In addition to nationalizing land, he wanted to promote free trade, and to reduce corruption in government. The Australian secret ballot was his device for doing the last. Professor Barker has written the first really definitive biography of a man who was a great force for reform and human rights in his day.

It may be doubted that George and his ideas would have been as influential in another age, say in the eighteenth century when land and resources were plentiful, or in the mid-twentieth century when the problem of human needs is being cared for by our generous supply of capital. He preached more equal enjoyment of land in an age when growing population was causing land values to rise rapidly.

DONALD L. KEMMERER
University of Illinois

WALLACE STEGNER. *Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the West.* Pp. xxiii, 438. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954. $6.00.

John Wesley Powell's most obvious claim to fame is for his descents of the Colorado and its canyons. As performed in 1869 and 1871 this was hard and perilous work and, in proportion, high adventure. The first reports on these exploits attracted great interest. Fraudulent claims that others had preceded Powell in running the river opened a controversy that led to still more publicity. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that Powell went to the Colorado unknown and returned famous.

No biographer could resist dwelling on the canyon voyages. Stegner narrates them not just as an adventure, but as an experience that added greatly to Powell's knowledge and understanding. It was there, for example, that he saw the proof that the course of the river was older than many of its mountains, and that as they are gradually uplifted, the river had been able to cut its channel through. Stegner records the voyages magnificently, with a sureness of touch that reflects an extraordinary familiarity with the river and the plateau province through which its course is threaded. Another quarter of his book describes the subsequent surveying of this region as managed and directed by Powell.

A special feature is the analysis of the work of artists Moran, Holmes, and Hillers in depicting this exposed geology, and samples of their best work are included as illustrations.

For Powell's youth, his struggle for an education, his teaching, his Civil War experience, his early naturalizing and collecting, there is far more adequate coverage in William Culp Darrah's *Powell of the Colorado* (1951). Darrah also recognized that the most important part of Powell's career was post-Colorado. Stegner agrees, and argues the point even more vigorously. Descending on Washington, Powell devoted the rest of his life to mustering science, and especially government-supported science, to inventory the natural resources of the nation. The great Southwest, which he had probed, offered many tantalizing questions, for example, in physiography, geology, and ethnology. But the same could be said about the West in general—hence Stegner's title; and the systematic application of scientific study to this larger area was "the second opening of the West" to which the subtitle refers. In this work Powell sometimes took to the field, but mostly he was the planner, the administrator, the procurer of appropriations, the politician for science. As such he was the prime mover in the establishment of the Geological Survey and the Bureau of American Ethnology. He was responsible for the stress on gathering data for the topographic sheets that were intended to blanket the nation. He had much to do also with engaging the federal government in forestry and reclamation and moving toward a system of land law more suited to the arid area.

Powell's later career could be studied on the level of political technique—how he marshalled the community of scientists, how he angled for executive support, how he got Congress to pass the necessary enabling acts and appropriations. Stegner includes such information, but in his treatment the drama of these final decades is seen in the struggle to gain and to solidify government support for a program of scientific fact finding, and on this basis to achieve a wiser national policy on use of resources.

JOHN W. CAUGHEY
University of California
Los Angeles

CAROLINE KATZENSTEIN. *Lifting the Curtain.* Pp. 376. Philadelphia, Pa.: Dorrance and Company, 1955. $4.00.

Lifting the Curtain reviews the campaign for woman suffrage stressing the climactic years from 1910 to 1920, the decade that ended the forty-two years struggle which began when the Susan B. Anthony Amendment was first introduced into the Congress in 1878.

The book is impressive, vivid, most readable, and well documented factually. It is a socio-political history describing also methods and techniques used in a campaign which stirred the nation. Both men and women participated. Dudley Field Malone, Collector of the Port of New York, dramatically resigned because of intransigent President Wilson who withheld his support until the very last moment.

The author, a national leader in the movement herself, presents her account in two parts. The first focuses, in the main, on the struggle in the states and ends with the defeat of Pennsylvania's state amendment in 1915. The second half stresses federal legislation and ends with the victorious passage of the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution in 1920.

But the victory was not easy. There were constant demonstrations in Washington, deputations to the President, picketing of the White House and the capitol. Pickets carrying lettered banners addressed to President Wilson were unchallenged for more than five months. Then suddenly the District authorities changed tactics but, despite police warnings of arrests, picketing continued. The women were now beaten by the police and by mobs, thrown into Occoquan Workhouse, a filthy, verminous, rat-infested jail. The women smuggled out of Occoquan the moldy and wormy bread which was their diet and sent it to Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, renowned government food expert. Commented Dr. Wiley drily, "a diet of worms won one revolution, and I expect it will win another."

Alice Paul, chairman of the National Woman's party, was mentally examined for commitment to St. Elizabeth Hospital. Dr. William A. White, famous psychiatrist and head of the institution, talked with her at length about suffrage and found her perfectly normal.

The leaders who won the political war were not only intrepid and able but, as the book's illustrations show, many were very beautiful and appealingly feminine.

The appendices are of value as political science documents on: the famous Seneca Falls Convention of 1848; the 19th Amendment to the United States Constitution adopted in 1920; and the proposed Lucretia Mott National Amendment to give women equal rights with men.

Caroline Katzenstein not only reviews American political history, but also tells in excellent fashion a worthwhile story.

LEON T. STERN
Philadelphia, Pa.

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

NORMAN S. BUCHANAN and HOWARD S. ELLIS. *Approaches to Economic Development.* Pp. xiv, 494. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955. $5.00.

This is unquestionably the best general book on the problems of economic development that has appeared to date. For the student and the general reader unfamiliar with the field it summarizes in a sensible way the major considerations, both economic and noneconomic, which must enter into any analysis of the development problem. It contains a large number of relevant tables and the footnotes constitute a useful selected bibliography of the literature.

Nonetheless this reviewer comes away from it with the same sense of disappointment and frustration one gets from most of the literature in this field. Everyone who works on either the theory or the practice of development comes to recognize the truth and importance of a host of common sense observations of a qualitative sort. There is a problem of mobilizing capital which can be tackled in a variety of familiar ways: external economies play a major role, population growth will affect the outcome, the social and cultural context is important, education and the acquisition of administrative skills are a prerequisite to growth, entrepreneurship and an innovative spirit must appear, and so forth. But to go beyond a catalogue of the relevant variables to a quantitative understanding of their magnitudes and their complex interaction requires the formulation of an analytic framework much more rigorous than anything which has yet appeared.

It is perhaps churlish to complain that authors who have done such a good job of organizing and summarizing the state of current thinking on development have not gone further and contributed to the intellectual breakthrough which is so badly needed. The first hundred and twenty pages of this book cover the principal factors affecting development The next section, about equally long, attempts to draw the available lessons from the history of development in England, Western Europe, Japan, and the USSR (a notable omission is a systematic look at United States development). The final section examines a series of policy problems both for the underdeveloped areas themselves and for the United States and other developed countries concerned to promote development abroad.

The policy conclusions will be more controversial than the outline of the problem. The authors support labor-intensive investment, urge a heavy concentration on agricultural development, and defend the gradualist as against the massive dose approach. On financial policy they are much more worried about inflation than about underutilization of resources, and they believe much more in the possibilities and beneficent effects for development of a classical international free trading system than would this reviewer.

But on these as on all points their position is so balanced and sensible that it is not easy to disagree with it sharply. The real question this book leaves one with is

whether balanced and sensible common sense advice is likely to be of much help in answering the tough questions facing the policy makers at home and abroad on development questions.

MAX F. MILLIKAN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ARTHUR SMITHIES and others. *Economics and the Public Policy: Brookings Lectures, 1954.* Pp. vii, 157. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955. $2.00.

ROBERT A. SOLO (Ed.). *Economics and the Public Interest.* Pp. 318. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955. $5.75.

These two volumes, being multi-authored, are likely to get less attention than they deserve. Six distinguished economists were invited by the Brookings Institution to discuss the various aspects of public policy as it is concerned with economics.

Arthur Smithies discussed "Economic Welfare and Policy"; Joseph J. Spengler discussed "From Theory to Public Policy"; Frank H. Knight entitled his lecture "Economic Objectives in a Changing World"; John Jewkes carried the subject further in "The Economist and Economic Change"; Jacob Viner addressed himself to "International Trade Theory and Its Present Day Relevance"; Lionel Robbins discussed "Freedom and Order."

Robert D. Calkins provided the Preface. Each essay is timely and relevant. Economists would be well advised to examine the several essays as possible supplements for a number of different intermediate and advanced courses. All are high-grade. Both theoretical problems and questions of application are dealt with. The prestige of economists is evaluated by Jewkes. The book lacks an index.

The second volume, in honor of Eugene E. Agger, long connected with Rutgers University, was written by twenty authors. There is something useful in the book for almost any economics course. The volume is divided into four parts: (I) The Method and Purpose of Economics; (II) Economics in the Empirical Analysis of Modern Society; (III) Economic Policy and Social Control; and (IV) Economic Growth and Development.

Arthur F. Burns, once connected with Rutgers University, contributes a short eulogy to Professor Agger. Well known economists contributed to the volume: Milton Friedman, Harry Gideonse, Geoffrey H. Moore, and others.

The essays are of unequaled length and quality. One of them entitled "Rain-Making and Monetary Policy," by Anatol Murad, is a somewhat intemperate diatribe against changing monetary policy as a tool in economic stability. It appears to be an endorsement of direct over-all control and planning to replace the free market. With the "rediscovery" of monetary policy in the last decade by ministers of finance in much of the world, this essay reflects a cultural lag of some sort.

On the other side, the essay by Professor Friedman on "The Role of Government in Education" develops a new way of financing and improving general education. Recognizing the public interest in universal education, Friedman suggests that the state give each child, through his parents, a specific sum to be used solely to pay for his general education. The parents would be free to spend this sum at a school of their own choice provided it met certain standards laid down by the appropriate governmental unit. Such schools would be conducted under a variety of auspices including enterprises operated for profit, nonprofit institutions, religious bodies, and some even by governmental units. A wealth of experimentation would follow. This essay is in the best tradition of the philosophy of freedom and the dispersal of power which has come to be associated with Chicago University.

Geoffrey Moore addressed himself to "The Diffusion of Business Cycles." He brings to bear some of the more recent research on the measuring and timing of turning points. This is a useful addition to our knowledge. The same can be said for a number of the other essays.

This volume, too, ought to be in every college and university library. Most of the essays are written in intelligent layman's language and should receive considerable general reading.

EMERSON P. SCHMIDT
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States

H. D. HENDERSON. *The Inter-War Years and Other Papers.* Edited by Henry Clay. Pp. xxvii, 445. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $6.75.

This is a collection of some of the best writings of Hubert D. Henderson (1890–1952), edited by the late Henry Clay. The materials were selected to bring out the fine reasoning of the author on many phases of contemporary life. Henderson was editor of *The Nation* from 1923 to 1930; Joint Secretary of the Economic Advisory Council from 1930 to 1934; advisor to the Treasury from 1939 to 1945; and Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford from 1945 to 1950. These varied experiences gave him a close insight into national problems, the inner workings of government, and the shaping of economic and political policies. Henderson left no major work, but his contributions to periodicals and official memoranda were both important and distinguished.

Each of the five parts of the book presents selections which highlight the particular work or service in which he was engaged. Part I has ten of his editorials which appeared in *The Nation.* They deal with monetary policy, tariffs, employment, economic trends, and issues which plagued Britain at that time. The essays are short but pointed and appear to be of greatest interest to an English economic or political historian.

Part II consists of thirteen longer articles which were memoranda written when Henderson was Secretary to the Economic Advisory Council, 1930–34. They deal mainly with the pressing contemporary issues and were not written for publication. These four years contributed heavily in shaping his economic views which were published later.

Part III presents three essays done while he held a research fellowship at All Souls College, 1934–39. Of the three essays the one of greatest interest is entitled, "Mr. Keynes's Theories," which was a review of his friend's, Keynes's, *General Theory.* The reader will be amply rewarded to have a look at this essay. He was extremely critical of Keynes, who, he said, had "invited the world to throw upon the scrap-heap a large part of the orthodox economic theory in which I still believe" (p. 161). He seems to have regarded it his duty to disagree completely with the Keynes theses, or, as he says, confine himself to a "purely destructive task" (p. 177). Nor did he accept the views of Keynes on policy.

Part IV consists of six memoranda prepared between 1940 and 1945 while serving in the Treasury. These were the war years, and the views expressed in the essays reflect war-induced issues of employment and postwar commercial policies. The greatest postwar problem, he believed, was international economic relations. He violently opposed a return of economic laissez-faire, which he thought would be disastrous. He was very critical of policies, as we can now see, but at the time only those in government circles knew his views.

Part V, entitled Post-War, 1945–1951, presents eight essays which were either given before a learned society or published in a learned journal. They reflect his uninhibited views when serving in the Drummond Chair at Oxford. In many respects these essays are the best of the collection. They reveal Henderson at his best as an economist. This book will prove to be an historical document of importance. It is a fine tribute to a great twentieth-century economist and to a skillful editor.

J. F. BELL
University of Illinois

MORTON S. BARATZ. *The Union and the Coal Industry.* Pp. xvii, 170. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955. $3.75.

Economic historians, labor economists, and government commissions have found the American coal industry and the vigorous United Mine Workers interesting and fruitful objects of investigation. The pres-

ent study is a further effort to discover and appraise the forces that determine the varying fortunes of the industry.

The inquiry is concerned primarily with the impact of an aggressive union, the UMW, upon a severely competitive industry. The analysis covers the structure and behavior of coal industry, the characteristics and importance of the Appalachian region, significant developments in the industry during the period 1890–1950, the policy objectives of the UMW, political aspects of the union-management relations, the effect of the union upon the wage level, the relation of the union to interregional competition, union policy and interfuel competition, and the general consequences of union policy and action. Statistical data are skillfully used in support of the analysis, and there is a carefully selected bibliography.

In the intense interrregional competition involving the mines of the Appalachian area north and south of the Ohio River, freight rates and wage levels are the principal weapons. In this competitive struggle for markets, the UMW has entered not only to obtain higher wages and stability of employment, but improved physical conditions of work and numerous "fringe" benefits, especially adequate pensions.

Cold realism obviously has motivated UMW leadership in the formulation and application of union policies. Recognizing the relation of excess production to prices and employment and of wages to accelerated mechanization and labor displacement, the union has philosophically accepted reduction in the number of miners, elimination of marginal producers, and conscious adjustment of the labor supply to demand. The objectives always have been higher wages and stabilized employment.

The analysis reveals that despite the comparative effectiveness in attaining its main objectives, the union is subject to economic forces and realities, such as the nature of the demand for the product, the possibility of fuel substitution, the structure of the market, and the ease of entrance into the industry.

The whole study is an excellent example of scholarly, objective investigation; it will prove extremely revealing to the economist and the lay reader with a special interest in the coal industry.

GORDON S. WATKINS
University of California
Riverside

GRACE HEILMAN STIMSON. *The Rise of the Labor Movement in Los Angeles.* Pp. xvii, 529. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. $6.00.

This book tells a detailed factual story and presses a thesis. Its many new facts should be accepted with thanks for mountainous research surmounted; the thesis needs further investigation.

Dr. Stimson, Research Associate, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles, aided by research assistants and Haynes Foundation funds, has produced a documented account of Typographical Union Local 174 and labor relations in the Los Angeles printing trades to 1912, having gained access to the minutes of the typographers. Little correspondence is cited. Work in Central Labor Council minutes, 1909–12, and strenuous research in newspapers deserve high praise.

The author's indefatigable pursuit of her subject, trade unionism *vs.* businessmen in Los Angeles, 1875 to 1912, produced significant economic and political history. Yet her orientation makes it doubtful if the book will greatly further the Institute's objective of creating "a better understanding of the problems in the relationships between labor and management," for the worries and motives of entrepreneurs are little discussed. Inability or unwillingness to raise wages, to consent to a closed shop, and to agree to union demands whenever presented are attributed to blind anti-unionism. The book dwells on the battles between the unions and Harrison Gray Otis of the Los Angeles *Times,* with Otis a stereotype of evil, unworthy of any biographical treatment. (See *Dictionary of American Biography.*) Despite some academically qualified conclusions in final paragraphs, Otis is portrayed as the creator of reaction in Los Angeles, not as a powerfully persuasive swimmer on its surface. Little stressed

are retarded industrialization, geographical and psychological isolation, population mobility and conservatism, climate, and "the easy life" (p. 428). Radicalism and socialism in the local labor movement are tacitly acknowledged, but discounted as reasons for slow growth and anti-union sentiment in strongly Republican Los Angeles. In picturing unions as "almost helpless" against "such an array of wealth and influence" as business associations mesmerized by a newspaper, the author seems to postulate pro-union sympathy elsewhere in the nation which clearly did not exist in those years.

The fifty overly sympathetic pages given the McNamara case, interestingly written from the Burns, Darrow, vainglorious Steffens memoirs, and the local press, sent this reviewer back to the multicolumned New York *Times* coverage of the bombing of the Los Angeles *Times* and the trial of those who engineered eighty-six other bombings. An unromantic treatment of this clash between a handful of violent men and American society is needed.

Equally desirable, whatever has been said above, are more books like this one, which raises city and county history to a stature it deserves—but seldom attains—at the hands of those unwilling or unable to research and write on historical subjects of a highly controversial nature.

VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET
Menlo Park, California

HERMAN MILES SOMERS and ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS. *Workmen's Compensation.* Pp. xv, 341. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954. $6.50.

The jacket blurb says this is a definitive book. A publisher's judgment is subject to a normal discount of at least fifty per cent but in this instance it may be accepted at face value. As an up-to-date statement on the earliest social insurance venture in the United States, it is at once compact and comprehensive. No important phase of workmen's compensation is neglected, from the history of the transition from common law liability to the most modern developments in rehabilitation. Coverage, the benefit structure, insurance arrangements, administration and litigation, safety and occupational health—each is surveyed with painstaking care and the facts marshalled in a concise account which sacrifices neither essentials nor readability. More important, the facts are subjected to a critical appraisal which utilizes the values of a social philosophy infused with the moral concern out of which workmen's compensation was conceived originally.

The book is aimed at a diverse readership: the various groups professionally concerned with occupational disability, the beginning student, and the interested layman. It is a tribute to the authors' skill that they succeed in hitting such a heterogeneous target. The book is written simply and engagingly enough to be useful as an introductory text yet its insights are sufficiently penetrating and fresh that an attorney or insurance specialist with long years of practical experience in workmen's compensation will find its pages rewarding.

Not the least of the merits of this study is its adequate recognition of the transcendent but neglected importance of rehabilitation. To provide monetary compensation and medical care to a man who has lost the sight of both eyes is minimal, and an accomplishment of which we need not be too proud if he remains a functionless member of society with his self regard permanently impaired. In the authors' own formulation, "what we cannot or do not prevent, we may be able to repair or rebuild."

Nowhere within so short a compass is there to be found a more trenchant or challenging analysis of the dimensions of the problem, the public and private programs in operation, and the economics and bureaucratics of rehabilitation. This analysis leads to the conclusion that a new concept of medical care in occupational disability is essential, a concept of "total medical care" which requires the doctor to reassess his traditional role and find his place as one co-operative element in a total complex of specialists co-ordinated toward the single objective of restoration.

In only one respect would I change the emphasis in the concluding chapter—"Workmen's Compensation at the Crossroads"—wherein the authors assess with

considerable discernment the current issues in this field. Although it is implicit on many pages, what seems to me to be the overriding issue in workmen's compensation is not drawn with the sharpness it deserves. That issue is whether or not workmen's compensation is to be engulfed in its own legal and common law system, thereby returning the problem of industrial accident and disease to the disastrous conditions from which the social invention of administrative law and procedure was supposed to have rescued it.

JOHN PERRY HORLACHER
University of Pennsylvania

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

SAMUEL STOUFFER. *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind.* Pp. 278. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955. $4.00.

Throughout the period of the 83rd Congress public figures in this country behaved as though they thought the American public was in a white heat over the presence in government, industry, and the schools of Communists, ex-Communists, and people called Communists. The clamor created by certain highly vocal politicians, newspapers, and commentators was apparently taken as evidence of widespread public demand for summary treatment of these nonconformists. Few private citizens and even fewer public officials were willing to speak out against it.

We now know from Professor Stouffer's detailed study that this presumed public outrage was in large part an "empty phantom," a great façade with only a small minority of angry people behind it. We have all been party to a mass expression of a phenomenon psychologists call "pluralistic ignorance." Misled by the headlines in the mass media each of us assumed that other people were running a high fever regarding domestic Communists. If we did not share this position we tended to keep quiet about it, thereby permitting those around us in their turn to make a false assumption about our opinions. Thus a vast fiction was created because none of us really knew where the others stood.

Professor Stouffer's volume is, however, far more than merely a documentation of the relatively low level of public excitement over the Communist issue. It is by far the most intensive study available of public tolerance of political nonconformity. It is based on interviews taken with a national sample of 5,000 adults and with a special sample of 1,500 "leaders" selected in communities of 10,000 to 150,000 population. This latter sample makes possible a comparison of leadership and rank and file, an important type of social analysis which is very uncommon in survey studies.

Not everyone who examines the data presented in this book will find them reassuring. Although the author gives a relatively optimistic interpretation of the findings, based largely on his belief that the increasing educational level of the population will be reflected in greater respect for civil liberties, the reader may well take a much darker view. While the number of people who are greatly disturbed about presumed subversion is relatively small, the proportion of the population who say they are prepared to deny the right to teach, to speak, and even to work to various kinds of nonconformists is appallingly high. Even though one discounts some of this intolerance as sheer verbalization which is not likely to be carried into action, it is still apparent that public understanding of the concepts of civil liberty is limited indeed.

Professor Stouffer's book ought to be read by a very wide audience. He has brought us a wealth of information on a vitally important issue and he has written it so that it can be read. He and the Fund for the Republic whose grant made the study possible deserve a vote of appreciation.

ANGUS CAMPBELL
University of Michigan

EDMUND DAVID CRONON. *Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association.* Pp. xvii, 278. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955. $5.00.

Marcus Garvey, "a short, stocky, largely self-educated but supremely confident black man," was born in the little town of St. Ann's Bay on the island of Jamaica, August 17, 1887, and died in London on June 10, 1940. He has been described as the most colorful Negro leader that has yet attempted to improve the lives and conditions of the American Negro. Arriving in the United States at the age of twenty-eight, he organized the most ambitious enterprise to establish a Negro nation in Africa. That the enterprise failed in no way dims the grandeur of his dream or the remarkable organizing ability of Marcus Garvey. His venture in shipping, which would carry Negroes back to Africa and connect the new state with the world commercially, may today seem fantastic, but in the 1920's, with sufficient and honest support, it had real possibilities. Disasters were almost inevitable in view of the lack of experience and the inability to obtain funds or credit. Stock was sold in the enterprise when no capital assets existed. Garvey was hounded by creditors, insurance companies, and jeers from his own people. Huge sums were wasted on unseaworthy vessels that failed to move or, having moved, had their boilers blow up in the high seas, or rust and corrode in Caribbean ports, as Garvey tried desperately to stave off creditors or raise funds to repair the Black Star vessels. The Universal Negro Improvement Association, as Garvey called the movement, encountered numerous intraorganizational difficulties and the Pan African movement came to an inglorious end when Garvey was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to the Federal Penitentiary for using the mails to defraud. The Negro press applauded the verdict against Garvey, referring to him as a "self-convicted criminal" and "a gigantic blunderer." The government regarded him as a "dangerous alien." Despite the opposition, Garvey received widespread support from Negroes, who poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into the enterprise. No accurate estimate can be made of the membership. Garvey claimed 11,000,000, with 3,000 branches throughout the world. Other estimates ranged from 80,000 down to 9,000. Whatever the number, it is safe to say no Negro had ever roused the racial consciousness to such an intensity as did Garvey. One might liken Garvey to a Savonarola exhorting his people to act for their own salvation before it was too late, only to see his own people turn away with calculated indifference as his enemies prepared his funeral pyre.

Mr. Cronon, a member of the History Department at Yale, has done a competent job in running down the details of Garvey's life and hopes. He tells the story of a great and courageous leader quietly and sympathetically. He evaluates Garvey's contribution to Negro life in these words: "The creation of a powerful feeling of race pride is perhaps Garvey's greatest and most lasting contribution to the American race scene" (p. 201). Why did the movement fail? Mr. Cronon gives the most sensible and acceptable reason: "Garveyism failed largely because it was unable to come up with a suitable alternative to the unsatisfactory conditions of American life as they affect the Negro. Escape, either emotional or physical, was neither a realistic nor a lasting answer" (p. 224).

J. P. SHALLOO
University of Pennsylvania

HENRIK F. INFIELD. *Utopia and Experiment: Essays in the Sociology of Cooperation.* Pp. 319. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $3.50.

The first part of this book describes and compares various types of modern cooperatives, including the Kibbutzim of Israel, co-operative farms in Saskatchewan, the pre-Communist Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, and others. Because it consists of essays written and published over a period of time, there is considerable repitition and the organization is queer. Thus in Chapter VII, entitled "Pains of Growth in Israel," the reader suddenly encounters an historical sketch of Robert Owen and the Rochdale Weavers. Moreover, some of the material is out of date. For example, the brief item on the multipurpose co-operative at Nilokheri north of New Delhi in India contains no inkling of the difficulties that co-operative has had in recent years.

The descriptions betray a strong bias in favor of the co-operative idea. Thus, a section on the Hutterite colonies in South Dakota includes the following statement: "It was gratifying to see the more articulate of these future farmers take such a definite stand in favor of cooperation as a way of living." Only rarely does the author appear to recognize the degree to which this type of community must buck the social tides of the day. At one point, he does state the dilemma succinctly: "To avoid the pitfalls of isolation, a community must keep in step with the world around it; to preserve its identity, it must know how to shield itself against adverse influences. In short, it must succeed in being at the same time a world within itself and a part of the world as a whole."

The second part of the book describes the use of various tests designed to measure the degree of success in a given co-operative community and also indicates the lines along which an improvement in the community might take place. Of particular interest are a "sociometric test" to indicate the attitudes of individuals in a small community toward each other, and a "co-operative potential test" to reveal the relative interest of the community members in the satisfaction of individual needs versus social needs.

The discussion makes clear that the restricted co-operative community can be to the sociologist what a primitive tribe is to the anthropologist and offers real opportunities for the development of sociological techniques generally. Accordingly, these chapters are of interest to the student of human behavior, whether or not he is a member of what might be called "the co-operative persuasion."

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM

Albany, N. Y.

ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST and BERNICE L. NEUGARTEN. *American Indian and White Children: A Socio-Psychological Investigation.* Pp. xiii, 335. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $5.00.

In 1941 began the Indian Administration Research Project, an investigation into the relationships existing between American Indian personality, education, and administration. A final report by Laura Thompson, *Personality and Government,* appeared in 1951. Several tribal studies made as part of the project have also been published. Now comes a report of information produced by five psychological techniques used to study the moral and emotional development of Indian children. The techniques are the Emotional Response Test; Moral Ideology Test, including questions concerning the source of rules; a test for animism and belief in immanent justice, and an attempt to get at a world view through free drawings. Children six to eighteen years old belonging to the Hopi, Zuni, Zia, Navaho, Papago, and Sioux tribes responded. A sample of several hundred Midwest white children provide a sort of baseline control group for most measures. The reliability of the various techniques is also discussed, while an appendix takes up responses to some of the techniques made by New Zealand white children.

One limitation with tests that inquire about sources of happiness, fear, or other emotions, or that ask about good and bad deeds, is that one cannot be certain that the respondents' answers correspond to customary behavior. Such instruments are nevertheless useful for getting at the ideals of a culture, and if one happens to be interested in belief systems then the approach is a sound one. For example, one of the most interesting chapters deals with beliefs about rules of the game. Malinowski and other anthropologists have stated that magic declines with technological control. If magic is defined as a tendency toward absolutist thinking (as has been suggested by Godfrey and Monica Wilson), then we discover that children in all Indian tribes are indeed not equally magical, but that magicality is not inversely correlated with the degree of white contact. Zuni children stand highest in the belief that rules of a game cannot readily be changed at the will of the players, followed by Papago, Sioux, Zia, Hopi, and Shiprock Navaho. Isolated Mountain Navaho children, however, are unanimous in saying that rules of *native* games cannot be changed, because they come from "the holy people."

For any social scientist interested in comparative data intelligently discussed with reference to cultural background, this book provides a great richness. Most of the techniques are simple to administer and many sections constitute a useful manual for field workers and analysts.

JOHN J. HONIGMANN

University of North Carolina

Six Approaches to Psychotherapy. Pp. v, 402. New York: Dryden Press, 1955. $3.75.

Six approaches to psychotherapy currently used most frequently are described in this book by experienced practitioners such as Frederick Thorne, who discusses directive and collective personality counseling; Nicholas Hobbs, clients centered and non-directive psychotherapy; and J. L. Moreno, psychodrama.

There is a summary by Daniel Sheer in which the attempt has been made to integrate the material thus expounded on the preceding 340 pages. The last chapter, comprising forty-five pages, is a serious attempt at organizing the *disjecta membra* of psychotherapy. In the first section of the summary it is pointed out, on the basis of experimental research mainly done by F. A. Fiedler, that the differences between expert and nonexpert therapists, in one and the same branch of psychotherapy, are more outspoken than those among expert therapists of the various branches. Expert therapists of all approaches agreed more consistently with one another than with nonexperts of their schools. This finding is also apt to emphasize the importance of expertness in medicine in general and to shed some light on the vital problem of opposing expert opinions.

In the division on theory and techniques it is shown how Slavson bases his theory of group mechanisms on individual psychoanalytic principles, such as: transference, catharsis and so on; in other words, he considers group psychotherapy as basically individual psychotherapy under specific conditions. Similar basic orientations prevail for the psychoanalytic, the directive, and the nondirective approaches. "The therapeutic objectives, theory, and techniques of any single approach are highly inter-related." The practitioner of the nondirective approach is not inclined to start with diagnostic considerations; he is in favor of an indication 100 per cent. The other schools have gradually seen the light of clinical method and, therefore, limit their indications of one specific method. On the other hand, the evaluation of success has been lacking in the other schools, while in the nondirective approach one has tried to measure the achievements more exactly.

As for common orientation the program for the future is outlined as follows: the therapist-variable and the basis of aberrant learning. The facilitation of aberrant learning will have to be evaluated in experimental investigations. "There is simply no substantial and clinical data available today upon which to base definite comparisons."

W. G. ELIASBERG

New York, N. Y.

WILMA DONAHUE (Ed.). *Housing the Aging.* Pp. 280. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1954. $3.75.

Interest in housing facilities designed to meet the needs of older people has developed considerably over the past two or three years. Much of the underlying awareness was precipitated by the Fifth Annual University of Michigan Conference on Aging which is reported in this book.

Part I reviews the characteristics of the older population and their present living arrangements and includes a summary by Dr. Donahue of the expressed housing desires of older people, themselves. Part II considers matters of community location, dwelling design, and experience in a limited number of communities.

The third section of the book examines the housing needs of the infirm and long-term ill. With these people, of course, housing and medical care become inextricably interrelated and the capacity of the individual to pay reaches its most acute level.

There is uniform recognition among the authors of this section that more older people means more who will need prolonged medical care and special living arrangements. All urge the point, however,

that complete breakdown can be avoided for most, and that rehabilitation together with suitable institutional programs and home services can maintain the majority of frail older people in functional status in the community. Thoughtful community planning is urged in order to obtain fluidity and efficiency among the services offered and availability for older persons at all income levels.

Financing housing for older persons is the subject of Part IV. The six papers reflect the recency of recognition of special housing needs of older persons and the persistence of fixed attitudes, but they also present a good deal of honest soul-searching for new procedures. Knottiest problem is, of course, the low incomes of older people, pointing, according to several of the contributors, to greater government participation in both individual and congregate facilities.

The final section, Part V, deals with housing standards, community services to enable more older people to remain in their own homes instead of seeking institutional care, and organizing the community for action. This section includes, also, a thirty-page description of housing developments designed expressly for older people. Though incomplete now, it remains the nearest thing there is to a national inventory of such facilities.

One must come to the conclusion that housing an aging population is a complex matter beset with difficult problems. These are reasons for finding solutions, however, as the Conference was designed to suggest, rather than to avoid the issue.

CLARK TIBBITTS
U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

HELEN D. GREEN. *Social Work Practice in Community Organization.* Pp. 253. New York: Whiteside, and William Morrow and Company, 1954. $4.00.

In this clearly written and well-organized posthumously published text, Helen Green points out that *Community Organization* is a field of social work practice largely identified with community chests and councils, as well as with state and national welfare co-ordinating agencies, such as the Child Welfare League of America or the National Conference of Social Work. It has increasingly widened its jurisdiction to include any "social work process directed toward intergroup relations" in a variety of new settings, such as neighborhood councils. It covers application of primarily three types of action:

> The *social intergroup work* process, which involves the co-ordination of groups, first to understand each other and develop mutually satisfactory relationships, and second to work towards social goals selected and accepted by the groups involved.
> The *administrative* process, by which objectives of an organization are determined and plans are made and executed for the achievement of these objectives.
> The *educational and promotional* process, where the primary focus is on the achievement of an objective selected and set forth by specific groups.

Virtually two-thirds of the book is devoted to three summarized process records of social intergroup work in a neighborhood council, a young adult council, and a teenage group council. They illustrate problems of applying the social work point of view, which differs from that of other community workers, as political leaders and public relations experts, in that the focus "is not on 'doing for' or on controlling, but on helping or enabling people" (p. 81).

Miss Green believes that practice should be based on knowledge from all the behavioral sciences, particularly sociology, anthropology, psychology, and psychiatry, but does not attempt to show how this goal can be accomplished. Her case histories are more descriptive than analytical, and are not presented to provide a basis for formulating generalizations which could be applied to the field as a whole. These limitations of the book for use in didactic teaching reflect the fact stressed by W. I. Newstetter in his excellent foreword: "The development of social intergroup work as a professional social work practice has only begun and this book is an initial attempt at definition. It is the documenting of our ideas as we put them into practice" (p. 12).

JOSEPH W. EATON
Western Reserve University

JEAN R. PEARMAN and ALBERT H. BURROWS. *Social Services in the School.* Pp. x, 218. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. $3.75.

The basic premise of this important contribution to the non-academic services of the school is that any factor which reduces the freedom of the child to learn reduces his learning. These factors are physical, psychological, emotional or social. The social worker is concerned with each of these, and his work is consequently a vital contribution to the educative process.

Although the authors present the history, basic philosophy, and legal bases of social work, the entire volume may best be described as a "handbook." Utilizing the case method to a considerable degree, it includes specific and concrete recommendations regarding: administrative organization, special tools and techniques including suggestions for interviewing and recording most desirable working conditions, and proposals for more effective school-community relations.

Special chapters are devoted to specific areas of social work including: the troubled child, juvenile delinquency, the problems of sex, and alcoholism and drug addiction. The content of the chapter on delinquency is illustrative of the content of much of the volume. It begins with an analysis of the conflicting educational philosophy of Thorndike and Dewey and its bearing upon the development of social work in the schools. Delinquency is carefully defined both from the sociological and legal points of view, and a great deal of relevant and significant statistical data are presented. The section dealing with causes of delinquency reviews the literature and carefully analyzes the controversy between those who believe that the tendency to delinquency is inherited, and those who assert it is solely or primarily the result of environment. The steps toward the reduction of juvenile delinquency include: emotional insight by the teacher into the behavior of the child; a better understanding of home and community background; character education; religious teaching; and a recognition of the important role of social work services.

The volume concludes with an excellent chapter on child-guidance clinics and a general review of the developments and further needs for school social work. "Training in the pertinent disciplines in order that every teacher may acquire an understanding of the emotional needs of the individual, the symptoms and dynamics of common emotional and behavior difficulties, and the resources needed to help with serious problems is a *sine qua non* of modern education."

The only negative comment on the volume is that the authors might wisely have used more case material of children of school age in place of the adult cases which are given.

FRANCIS J. BROWN
American Council on Education

ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR. and MARGARET W. RYAN (Eds.). *Schools in Transition: Community Experiences in Desegregation.* Pp. xiii, 272. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954. $3.00.

This is the second publication of what has become known as the Ashmore Project of the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education. The first publication was *The Negro and the Schools* by Harry S. Ashmore, and while this initial publication utilized some materials from the field studies made by research teams in twenty-four communities which had recently desegregated their schools, it was left to the volume under review to present the detailed community case studies.

This book reports the experiences of twenty-four communities in six states (Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio) which had moved in recent years from racially segregated toward racially integrated public schools. Part I deals with the general problem of desegregation, with particular attention to the role of law in determining patterns of racial separation and integration in American school systems. Part II treats selected communities in states having "mandatory"

laws which permitted either segregation or integration. Part IV briefly summarizes a few main findings and suggests some conclusions that may have applicability beyond the communities which were studied.

While upon first examination the individual studies appear to present a wide variety of experiences, the following common principles are among those suggested:

1) A recurrent theme in all the communities studied is the essential role played by the school officials; where they were in a real sense community leaders, potential disturbances seldom developed. Wavering and fearful school administrators were unable to control either the school situation or community reaction to it (p. 48).

2) Those communities having open channels of communication between white and Negro leaders seemed to have made the transition from segregation to desegregation with relative ease (pp. 237 and 241).

3) In none of the communities studied does the piecemeal approach to desegregation appear to have worked as harmoniously as a complete change under a careful plan of action. Of the administrative practices developed, well-defined districts and clear-cut transfer rules seemed most effective for desegregation and for operating efficiency (pp. 152 and 172).

4) The success of public school desegregation is only loosely correlated with the apparent racial attitudes or prejudices of the population. Successful public school desegregation has been carried out in places where supposedly the prevailing attitudes favored segregation (p. 241).

5) The studies show that in the actual situation of faculty integration, where it has been tried, professional standards soon take precedence over previous racial attitudes (p. 245).

6) The experience now at hand shows that where desegregation has been tried, the typical outcome has been its eventual acceptance (p. 248).

The book has some limitations which should be noted, although they do not vitiate its general value. One limitation appears to be generally a failure to relate the desegregation process to the social structure of the community. This is reflected in the relative absence of treatment for most communities of the moral or religious influences and the political climate as they affected the nature of the transition. Also, while some objective social facts are given for most communities, these are seldom related to the desegregation process by the authors.

This book is valuable as a record of the experiences of communities in approaching the problems and opportunities inherent in one of the great challenges of our times in the area of democratic human relations, but there is still need for more intensive studies of the desegregation process and its relationship to the social structure of individual communities.

PRESTON VALIEN

Fisk University

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

CLINTON ROSSITER. *Conservatism in America.* Pp. 327, xii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. $4.00.

LOUIS HARTZ. *The Liberal Tradition in America.* Pp. lx, 329. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1955. $4.75.

Even so short a time ago as fifteen years, "conservative" was an ugly word to apply to a fellow citizen—closer to slander, certainly, than "radical." But it is beginning to look as if we are all conservatives now. The disputes shift verbal ground. Now we argue over claims to "real" or "true" conservatism.

Professor Rossiter is attached to the ideological screening unit of the conservative army that is commanded in the field by General and President Eisenhower. This army occupies a narrow front, according to Professor Rossiter's chart, and has got to maintain a tireless watch to keep its flanks untangled. Its Left almost merges with the Liberal divisions that stretch on toward radicalism and revolutionary radicalism. To the Right lie entrenched the black cohorts of standpattism, reaction and revolutionary reaction. The Rossiter tactic, in keeping with the Eisenhower strategy, is to seek alliance with liberalism against the menace of the extremes.

Conservatism in America is the more convincing the more distant it remains from political and social fact. There is an adequate statement of the traditional doctrine of conservatism, with a good summary of its expression in several of the Founding Fathers and their pre-Civil War successors. But as Professor Rossiter closes in toward the present, he becomes more and more troubled by the gulf between the abstract conservatism which he champions and our actual conservative forces, which he rejects with horror. At all costs he must strip Senator McCarthy of every conservative insignia. And not only McCarthy. The norms of the Rossiter conservatism are "dailies like the *New York Times,* periodicals like *Fortune,* and columnists like Lippmann." By those criteria he must also shove the Hoovers, Knowlands, and Brickers into the outer darkness of the lunatic fringe. "The commands of common sense call upon conservatives to associate with moderate liberals in 'the vital center.'" Thus, if I may adapt the Stalinist thesis of social-facism, Professors Rossiter and Schlesinger, Jr., turn out to be not opposites but twins.

Somehow it can't be that simple. Dr. Rossiter himself recognizes that an American conservatism must come to terms with American business, that "most new conservatives will be businessmen or professionals in allied fields. Indeed, a conservative movement that fails to enlist the conservative businessmen can have little influence on the future of the Republic." Agreed. But at the same time Dr. Rossiter is not willing to admit into his restricted quarters the kind of rough-and-ready conservatives that American businessmen usually turn out to be.

Professor Hartz would explain the difficulty by arguing that there cannot be a genuine conservatism in the United States. His new book, *The Liberal Tradition in America,* is a set of elaborate variations on a theme by de Tocqueville: "The great advantage of the American is that he has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and that he is born free without having to become so."

Feudalism never existed in America. Therefore, there is no historical basis for a true Burkean conservatism, which rests on a traditional aristocracy. Nor can there even be a healthy Whig (bourgeois) conservatism, because this sort of conservatism must have a feudalism to struggle against. Finally, there cannot even be a valid Left, at least not a radical or socialist Left, because a Left presupposes a Right, and there is no Right. What remains is a bare and unique "liberal community." All doctrines and political movements outside of the liberal boundaries are aberrations, "frauds," and "betrayals."

The author's development of his thesis, though rather tricky and doctrinaire, is intellectually interesting—or could be if it were not for some lamentable qualities of his style. The patronizing tone he uses toward all American writing of the pre-Hartz era on politics, from Adams and Jefferson to Wilson and Beard, is almost too much to be borne. The phrase "of course" (averaging about two and one half per page) appears, on conservative estimate, 750 times, closely followed by "needless to say," and "it is not accidental." The slapdash way in which he applies psychiatric jargon to political events suggests a basic flaw in historical understanding as well as a crudity with words.

JAMES BURNHAM

Kent, Conn.

Science and Freedom: Proceedings of a Conference Convened by Congress for Cultural Freedom, and Held in Hamburg on July 23rd–26th, 1953. Pp. 295. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955. $4.50.

Some hundred scholars and scientists from nineteen different countries met in Hamburg to combat the assaults on the freedom of science which have become so serious since World War II. As Michael Polanyi states in the Preface: "It was our task to consolidate a small sector of the intellectual front advancing on this historical line toward the reconquest of freedom. This task presented three aspects. First, we were concerned to reveal to the whole world the cruel suppression of intellectual freedom under totalitarianism. Second, we tried to examine those faults which

exist in the organization of scientific activities in free countries and to explore the possibilities of reform and improvement in this field. And finally, we attempted to clarify the philosophic foundations to the idea of freedom and science."

A total of six sessions was held where formal papers were read. The presentation of papers was followed by a general discussion. Indeed, much of the interest in the published proceedings is found in the reports of these informal remarks and arguments. The sessions covered such topics as the organization of science, science and the state, science and its method, science in chains, and science for the citizen. A general session, in which the whole subject was unified and reviewed, brought the meetings to a close, and a fraternal message was sent to the scientists behind the Iron Curtain.

While many of the facts and principles, which emerged from the Congress, were well known to the scientists, the eloquence and clarity of the presentations made the reading of them a real pleasure. After all, the speakers were all leaders in their fields. But the chief value of *Science and Freedom* is educational, and our intelligentsia desperately need this type of education. It is true, of course, that the belief that science should be free and that scientists should be allowed to investigate what interests them is more fashionable today than it was in the nineteen thirties and forties. Recent events have not been too kind to those who wished to advance the "socialization of science." The attempt to plan science so that it would conform to a party line and not conflict with a state supported philosophy has had such disastrous sequelae that even the Communists themselves are now seeking a way out of their dilemma.

CONWAY ZIRKLE
University of Pennsylvania

A. CAMPBELL GARNETT. *Religion and the Moral Life.* Pp. viii, 223. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $3.50.

When a man has already written books on the philosophy of religion and on moral value, he may be expected to speak with authority in a volume on the relation of the two. This Garnett does. Even his critics must grant that he knows the literature well and refers to it as one whose thought sweeps beyond particular books.

Basically, morality comprises duties whose validity holds regardless of one's theology or metaphysics, says Garnett (p. 26). But motivation needs the impetus of a power, not ourselves, if it is to make for righteousness in a Christian sense. One may see the good but not do it. Religion adds the inspiration to achieve what is seen to be good.

Probably Chapter V is the heart of the book. Under title of "The Faith of Theism," Garnett gives a clear and persuasive delineation of how conscience, which first makes cowards of us all, takes on the role of a friend that lures us beyond our natural powers (pp. 117–18). The sequence of events must be love, hope, then faith, rather than the reverse as St. Paul and Aquinas would have us believe. The insights of moral conscience give reason, when critically scrutinized, to believe that the universe is on the side of values.

Readers of other philosophic persuasions may find that Garnett has said too little about the place of physical nature in personal theism and about the relation of finite persons to God. Evil makes trouble in many philosophical systems, and Garnett should have told us more about what to do with it. Traditional philosophic rationalism leaves us with contradictions (pp. 154–57) between the love and discipline of God. But what is better? Presumably the "agape" of Jesus' teaching leads to a faith that there is an answer to evil (cf. p. 168). But we would be grateful if Garnett would spell this answer out.

While there is little color in Garnett's style, it is lucid, balanced, and simple. We get down to business on the first page and stay there throughout. This book is good reading for the nontechnical philosopher as well as the more initiated. The very thesis that there is more to religion than morality will make this book important to many.

LOUIS W. NORRIS
MacMurray College

DAVID P. EDGELL. *William Ellery Channing: An Intellectual Portrait.* Pp. xv, 264. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955. $4.00.

Channing died in 1842. He has been much commented upon. His collected works come to six volumes and have called for twenty-two editions. France, Italy, Hungary, Sweden have paid attention to his significance. In 1903, Chadwick published his last biography. The twentieth century passed him by except in occassional review articles. Edgell felt that the full significance of Channing had been missed, and so he has sought to recover the real Channing as he lived and wrought by an examination of new materials and a sober revaluation of old, by the use of up-to-date methods, by a critical study of the interpretation of Channing's contemporaries, and by a fresh approach to the journals of Emerson and of Alcott. He has succeeded very well in his twofold objective: to appreciate Channing as a man of his times, and to master his thought as a "synthesizer of intellectual and ethical theories."

Fortunately, the volume is equipped with an extensive bibliography, very accurate notes, and above all with an eleven-page index making reference to desired passages very simple.

He apparently approved of progress in education, did not confound cramming with increasing competency to interpret life. But strangely, he was so bound by class distinctions as to disapprove of universal taxation for universal education. For to deprive the wealthy of their holdings without their consent was morally wrong. It must be voluntary giving, benevolence, a gratuity! Education of the lower classes must include manual labor lest they take too easy a view of life. "There is no need of costly institutions for universal education." Believe it or not, Channing regarded the depression of 1837 as resulting from too much education!

"Whether Channing's acceptance of labor was the result of a subconscious Calvinist identification of worldly prosperity with a state of grace, or whether it sprang out of an agrarian conviction that work on the land was the only socially profitable source of income, we cannot know; we can, however, be sure that it was a cardinal point of Channing's social thought" (p. 198).

Channing preached a sermon on "The Ministry for the Poor" in 1835. Two quotations follow:

"That some of the indigent among us die of scanty food, is undoubtedly true; but vastly more in the community die from eating too much, than from eating too little; vastly more from excess, than starvation. . . ."

"Our daughters are oftener brought to the grave by their rich attire, than our beggars by their nakedness. So the poor are often overworked, but they suffer less than many among the rich who have no work to do, no interesting object to fill up life, to satisfy the infinite cravings of man for action. . ." (p. 161).

Here is evidence as the author admits that Channing "never completely transcended his class background."

Theodore Parker's sermon on "The Transient and the Permanent" then stirred as much criticism as Channing's own Baltimore Sermon had in 1819. They are both fundamental documents of Unitarianism today. Parker was accused of being tainted with "egomittism," self-sent Messiah. Channing was disappointed too, granting Parker freedom of speech but sorry he had said it. Then he feared that Parker didn't believe in miracles, but "without miracles, Jesus becomes a mere fable," never appreciating that the validity of truth is not dependent upon miracle (p. 148).

Yet Emerson's remark is worth recalling: "In our wantonness we often flout Dr. Channing, and say he is getting old; but as soon as he is ill we remember he is our Bishop, and we have not done with him yet."

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN
University of Southern California

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

R. T. MCKENZIE. *British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties.* Pp. xv, 625. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955. $7.50.

The party system constitutes an aspect of political life in Britain which until recently had been neglected by scholars. Mr. McKenzie's study of the two major parties is the most substantial work in this area to be published since Ostrogorski's classic book *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* first appeared in English translation more than half a century ago. Mr. McKenzie is not concerned, as was Professor Duverger in his recently published study, to provide a general theory of political parties. His aim has been to examine what he calls "the distribution of power" within the Conservative and Labor parties. The Liberal party has been relegated to a two-page appendix, a harsh but no doubt inevitable act in view of the declining role of that party in British life during the past third of a century.

To the casual observer, the striking difference between the British Conservative and Labor parties relates to the leadership. The leader of the Conservative party appears, on the surface, to be an autocrat who dictates policy and selects his own subordinates without interference. In the Labor party, by contrast, it is supposed that policy is made and the leaders chosen by the democratically-elected Annual Conference. Anyone who has been active in British politics knows that this difference is more apparent than real, and this is the conclusion to which Mr. McKenzie comes after a careful study of the facts. "In reality the distribution of power within the two parties is overwhelmingly similar" (p. 582).

Moreover, Mr. McKenzie is a detached observer—though his detachment is admirable and his observation acute. He draws attention to certain "sources of concern" in the functioning of British parties. He believes, for example, that both parties should be more willing than they are to encourage the honest expression of dissent within their own ranks.

Mr. McKenzie has written a first-rate book. His style is effective because he knows what he wants to say. This is one of the half dozen most valuable books on British politics to have appeared in the past decade.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY

New York, N. Y.

LORD BEVERIDGE. *Power and Influence.* Pp. xi, 448. New York: Beechhurst Press, 1955. $5.00.

Lord Beveridge takes up the story of his life in 1901 just after he had finished four years at Oxford and when he had reached the age of twenty-two. Following the example of his father, who had gained distinction as a judge in India, he began the study of law. But he soon forsook this when it began to appear that the career of a barrister meant "a sale of the next twenty or twenty-five years of my life for the chance of doing something with the remainder" (p. 13). After turning from law, he became the subwarden of Tonybee Hall, a settlement in the slums of London which had been designed to acquaint the privileged classes of the West End with the appalling poverty of the East End. In this position he acquired the knowledge and experience which opened the doors of power and influence. He soon left the work at Tonybee Hall and became a special writer for the *Morning Post* on subjects relating to unemployment and social insurance. His informed and persuasive articles for the *Post* brought him to the attention of Winston Churchill, then the president of the Board of Trade, who appointed him in 1908 to the Board "as an expert inventor of schemes" and in the next year made him Director of Labor Exchanges. As a civil servant, Beveridge continued to promote the causes of labor exchanges and unemployment insurance until the emergency of World War I moved him into the Munitions Ministry and later into the Food Ministry.

Shortly after the end of the war, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who had originally recommended Beveridge to Churchill, persuaded him to become the director of the London School of Economics. He accepted their offer because he wished to be a writer of books, rather than government reports, and spent the next eighteen years of his life in remaking the London School and in relocating London University on its present Bloomsbury site. Though he successfully enlarged the facilities of both the School of Economics and the University, he failed in his major endeavor to place economics on a scientific basis. Because of this disappointment, he eagerly accepted an invitation to return to Oxford where he was given a chance to try his hand at transforming the social studies into a science; but before he had gone far on this new quest, war descended upon Oxford, disrupting his scholarship and drawing him again into the whirl of government service.

During World War II, Beveridge served the government as a roving critic of men and measures so effectively that he became "an uncomfortable companion to departmental colleagues and their chiefs" (p. 295). He expressed such strong preference for Lloyd George's type of war cabinet that he quickly alienated both Bevin and Churchill, the dominant personalities of the wartime coalition. Though cut off from vital administrative work, he was appointed chairman of an inter-departmental committee on social insurance, and its report, under his signature, brought him national popularity and international fame. Because of his dramatic crusade for social insurance, and his distinguished leadership at London University, Lord Beveridge's autobiography, *Power and Influence,* which so admirably illustrates how things are done in a democracy, will be compelling reading for civil servants, educators, and social reformers in many countries.

R. G. COWHERD

Lehigh University

LEICESTER WEBB. *Communism and Democracy in Australia: A Survey of the 1951 Referendum.* Pp. 214. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $5.00.

In this book Leicester Webb, head of the Political Science Department of the Australian National University, presents as detailed an analysis of what happened in the Australian constitutional referendum of September 22, 1951 as could be managed with the research facilities currently available to him. The purpose of the referendum was to obtain for the Government the power necessary to put on the law books fairly comprehensive anti-Communist legislation. The Government had sought such legislation from parliament earlier, had, after rather amazing political gyrations on the part of the opposition, obtained it, and then had seen it declared unconstitutional by the High Court. The Government again suffered defeat in the referendum and was thereafter forced to confine its anti-Communist legislation within the existing constitutional limitations.

While the title of the book focuses the attention on Communism, and while the whole episode in all its ramifications circles around the Communist question, readers who take the book up expecting a systematic exposition of the place of Communism in Australian life, will be somewhat disappointed. Rather the book should be read as an exceptionally vivid illustration of what can happen, under democracy, when the question of how to handle the Communists is put to all the voters in a referendum. Indeed, students of referenda can derive great profit from the book regardless of whether the Communist question particularly interests them or not.

As a study in politics the book is at once dramatic, replete with fierce personal conflict between the major leaders, R. G. Menzies and H. V. Evatt, and gaudily colored throughout. As the referendum had a prehistory which was strange and wonderful, so the Communist question has had postreferendum history hardly less remarkable. This book provides very important light on the genesis of the war within the Australian Labor party, a war which may well keep the party out of power for a decade. Mr. Webb's book is an interim battle report. It is a fine job, indispensable to an understanding of politics in Australia today.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

Katonah, N. Y.

G. B. PYRAH. *Imperial Policy and South Africa, 1902–10.* Pp. xvi, 272. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $5.60.

This serious and scholarly study fills gaps in the worldwide story of Britain's imperial development. South Africa is taken as the illustration, because of its importance during and after the war there. British policies studied for that country stress the peace settlement in 1902 and the concession of self-government to the Transvaal and Orange Free State in 1907. South Africa was to follow Canada and

Australia and form itself into a federation, the union of 1910 anticlimaxing a great phase of British imperialism.

By studying the policies of the Liberal party in particular the author is seeking to discover links between Gladstonian imperial policy and the emergence of the Commonwealth idea in 1917. The problem here was how to combine British sovereignty with local autonomy for the Afrikaners. The essay opens with an analysis of the general lines of Liberal pronouncements from 1899 to 1911. Succeeding chapters include Unionist views also and show how far the announced theories of both parties were put into practice.

The Liberals proved themselves throughout to be more acutely aware than the Unionists of the force of colonial nationalism. They confined themselves to political problems conunected with imperial unity, the Unionists to economic considerations. Liberals and Unionists differed in policies concerning the methods which ought to be followed to strengthen imperial ties. Obviously neither party could advocate imperial disintegration. Whereas both parties denied political rights for the non-European majority, the author inquires into the problem of whether the Liberals were conscious of any obligations of trusteeship toward the native, colored, and Indian populations of South Africa.

The Liberals condemned but supported the war in South Africa and afterwards worked for a reconciliation with the Dutch. Campbell-Bannerman, as leader of the party (returned to power in 1906), had the responsibility for the constitutional settlement whereby responsible government came to the ex-Boer republics. Winston Churchill, who became Lord Elgin's Undersecretary in the Colonial Office, had a part to play in reversing the policy of Chamberlain and Lyttleton. The British were singularly fortunate in having a man such as Botha with whom to deal.

Resolute Sir Alfred Milner, the high commissioner during and immediately after the South African war, might be expected to be the villain of the piece. Instead, the author presents favorably his economic and social policies. There is no condemnation of Milner, no tracing of the heated debates of 1906 wherein he narrowly escaped a direct vote of censure in Parliament for the bringing in for the gold mines of the thousands of Chinese laborers whom the Liberals repatriated.

VERNON J. PURYEAR
University of California

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN. *Communism and the Russian Peasant;* LEON GOURÉ and HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN. *Moscow in Crisis: Two Studies in Soviet Controls.* Pp. xviii, 254. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $4.50.

Soviet Russia is held up by Communists and sympathizers as a model economic system, but paradoxically Soviet attitude makes it impossible for others to emulate it. No one can follow a model if he is not allowed to see how it is put together and how it works. The general practical results are bound to become known sooner or later, but not the reasons for success or failure. Mr. Dinerstein's study throws much light precisely on the working of the agrarian sector, and while he can add nothing new to the facts and figures revealed with such startling frankness two years ago in the speeches of Malenkov and Khrushchev, he adds light and shadows to the picture by filling it in from the human side. Mr. Dinerstein, who is responsible for the first section, has used original sources and also interviews with undisclosed Russian visitors and refugees to such good effect that everyone can now see why a collectivized system cannot work in a sector in which human labor, individual effort, and care is the first condition for good production.

Much of the attention of those responsible for agriculture, both at the center and locally, had therefore to be continually devoted to incentives and rewards. Their efforts at times had actually the paradoxical result that in the past heavier burdens were laid upon the more efficient *kolkhozes* than upon the lazy ones. It is not surprising to discover that the system also bred a multitude of officials and agencies, and that these in turn called for elaborate arrangements for verifying their activities and results. As an essay in popular attitudes towards government and official policy, the first study would seem to suggest that neither is solidly established on the land. It is just as well, therefore, to have the corrective of the second essay, the joint work of Mr. Dinerstein and Mr. Gouré—an intensive examination of conditions and attitudes when the Germans were outside Moscow—with its firm conclusion that "at the height of the crisis the majority of the population of Moscow did not rebel against their rulers" and, what is more, "had no intention of doing so."

Both these summaries of contemporary evidence were well worth putting together and the work has evidently been done with great care. One adds, therefore, with some regret that the brief historical Introduction does not reach the same standard and in some respects is actually misleading. To say that during the nineteenth century those who wanted westernization were inevitably driven towards revolution is to overlook that the most numerous and relentless revolutionaries were Slavophiles. In view of the failure which Mr. Dinerstein's essay describes, it is also misleading to say that except in the immediate postrevolutionary period there was no heart-searching within the party as to the soundness of Soviet policy; what then was the meaning of the whole Trotskyite "heresy," of the fearful trials and purges of the thirties, and indeed of the far-reaching changes in persons and policy since Stalin's death? On a point of detail, but an important one, it is inaccurate that the *mir* was essentially to be found only on lands owned by the Crown or by monasteries; and as regards Siberia, where it is said to have been weak, it is a remarkable fact that the peasants who migrated to Siberia, legally or mostly illegally, generally organized themselves into a *mir* even where land was not scarce, just as they did after the Bolshevik revolution on land they took over from private landlords. That egalitarian and communal tradition had strong roots among the peasants, and yet it has not proved a steppingstone to agrarian collectivism.

DAVID MITRANY
Oxford, England

LEONARD SCHAPIRO. *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase, 1917–1922.* Pp. xvii, 397. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $7.00.

The peculiar persuasiveness of power and success makes many contemporary historians vulnerable to the official and widely spread versions of the victorious. But the truths of the defeated, which are always a significant part of the over-all historical truth and a key to its meaning, have to be sought in obscure pamphlets, scattered leaflets, stifled and muted cries. It is these truths of the defeated that Leonard Schapiro's remarkable study brings back into the picture of the Russian revolutions of 1917 and the subsequent rise of Communist autocracy and totalitarianism.

Mr. Schapiro's style is quiet and dispassionate. His skill in exhuming what has been buried under successive layers of defeat, dispersion, calumny and oblivion is such that the documentation speaks for itself and affords the reader the pleasure of keeping several jumps ahead of the author in deriving his own conclusions.

The organization of the work is quite simple. Part I deals with the democratic February Revolution of 1917, and the fatal weaknesses of the Provisional Government arising from its dogmatic adherence to total democracy in time of war and siege; and its superstition that the enemy of democracy was to be found only on the Right.

Part II surveys the fate of each of the opposition parties after the Bolsheviks have overthrown the Provisional Government and seized power. First we watch the Left Social Revolutionaries prepare their own undoing by accepting minority dictatorship and permitting their little group to obscure the fact that it is really a one-party dictatorship. Then we watch the downfall of the Social Revolutionary party,

which had behind it the overwhelming majority of the people but perished because it thought that it could substitute "nobility" and "service to the popular will" for a program of using its majority to take power. Next we follow the fortunes of the Menshevik Social Democrats, handicapped by their dogmatic acceptance of the Bolshevik "revolution" and of the Soviet "legality" which the Communist ruling party no longer respected. The Mensheviks "perished without firing a shot," yet the state propaganda machine branded them as "counter-revolutionists and White-Guardists," and only recently Professor Carr's history has retailed the official version that they were outlawed because they were unwilling to accept "Soviet legality."

Part III surveys the fate of each of the Communist groups which accepted party dictatorship yet fancied they could keep democracy alive inside a dictatorial, minority party. These prepared their own undoing; the police they had sanctioned and even urged on against all other groups and parties finally entered the Communist party to exterminate the heretics who insisted on taking seriously the original ideals and programs of Communism which had been used to win power.

Only in Part IV does Mr. Schapiro suggest his own conclusions. But it is the triumph of his method of presentation that these almost seem superfluous, for the facts and documents themselves have already presented with the rigor of a syllogism the conclusion that this outlawing of all other parties and of inner party democracy in the minority ruling party is the obverse of the rise of the Communist autocracy and of Communist totalitarianism. From this inner connection between obverse and reverse of a unitary historical process comes the lengthy dual title of the book.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE
Brooklyn, N. Y.

DONALD W. TREADGOLD. *Lenin and his Rivals: The Struggle for Russia's Future, 1898–1906.* Pp. 291. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $5.00.

This is a book on the growth and development of political parties in Russia. Whereas in most countries parties arose only after a parliament had been established, in Russia parties came into being before the establishment of the Duma in 1905–06. The parties according to the author arose out of the efforts of the intelligentsia "to set the people free" from the autocracy of the Tsars. They had their origin in Herzen's exhortation to go "to the people" and spread the gospel of political enlightenment. The leaders of the movement were filled with concepts of political parties taken directly from the West. Objectives were "framed in purely western terms like 'constitution,' 'legislative assembly,' 'universal suffrage,' and the 'freedoms,' concepts with whose embodiment Russia was almost wholly unacquainted" (p. 57).

The transition of Populism, which is equated with peasant socialism, into the Social Revolutionary movement led by Chernov is given in detail. Chapters are then devoted to the formation of the Social Democratic party and how this split into the Menshevik and Bolshevik wings. The Liberal party under Miliukov was also plagued by division. The differences between these various groups in regard to theory and tactics are not always easily discernible. The one thing which all the groups had in common was opposition to the government. It was the cement which, to use the terminology of a later period, led to the first Popular Front in 1905. But even at this time Lenin, who considered the Tsar defeated, had come to center his attention on the Liberals as his chief enemies. The Kadets were the first to discover that it was not possible to cooperate with the Bolsheviks.

To be definite and precise on indefinite things is not proper, and the origins of political parties are never clear cut. Nevertheless, even within these limitations the author does not seem to achieve an over-all picture. This book is for the specialist, and it is easy to get lost in the detail. All too often men as well as minor events in Russian affairs, which will not be known to the general reader, are mentioned without explanation. The author, for example, repeatedly refers to a "Four-Tail Constituent Assembly" and "Four-Tail Suffrage," but does not explain until page 131 that this stands for universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage. Tsar Nichloas II by the way took office in November 1894 rather than in January 1895 (p. 20). Footnotes are grouped in the back of the book, but there is no separate bibliography. An appendix gives a list of the principal conferences of various political organizations.

E. C. HELMREICH
Bowdoin College

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG. *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945.* Pp. xi, 322. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $5.00.

The idea of nationalism has had its day, and today we may be witnessing its doom, for it is being mangled and mutilated by the cosmopolitan-minded intelligentsia partly because the idea eloquently elaborated by Mazzini is often misunderstood and misinterpreted. One hardly hears Mazzini mentioned in this connection; instead, we usually have the idea coupled with racialism, chauvinism, fascism and nazism. Recently the nationalism engendered and nursed by small nationality groups has been studied. Mr. Armstrong's book, issued for the Russian Institute of Columbia University, is such a study.

The author traces the origin of nationalism among the Ukrainians and finds that the idea struck root rather late. Only in World War I it took definite shape in the minds of certain leaders, but they were at odds both as to the goals of Ukrainian nationalism and their realization. That was one reason why the short-lived independent Ukraine (1918–20) had the support of only one nationalist faction. After 1920 the country was sovietized and nationalism should have disappeared. During the interwar years, however, it was nursed and kept very much alive, thanks to the inhuman policies of the Kremlin. At the outbreak of the last war nationalist leaders, both in the Soviet Union and those in the West, hoped to realize their long cherished dream. Until the outbreak of Nazi-Soviet hostilities they paid heavily in the Soviet Ukraine for the ideas they held. Thereafter they hoped to see the day of Ukraine's liberation. All nationalist groups were willing to help the Germans to free their compatriots from the Soviet yoke, but Nazi leaders were not ready to have the Ukrainians fight with the Germans side by side; this was against the Nazi creed. Worse was to follow when some 2,000,000 Ukrainians were conscripted in labor force for work in Germany and in the West. This caused bitter resentment, but poor Ukrainians were not in position to defy German authorities. In 1943 when Germans were losing ground in the Ukraine many nationalist leaders were caught in the Soviet net. Those able to flee with the retreating German forces still looked forward to the eventual liberation of the Ukraine. Some had put great faith in the Atlantic Charter. As late as January of 1945 there were several hundred thousand Ukrainians fighting against the Red army, but as the war drew to its close, a part of this force surrendered to the Western powers, and, as they were not subject to the Soviet Union, we did not commit the error of turning them over to Soviet authorities.

The author states that the "Ukrainian nationalism is but one thread in the immense tapestry of the Second World War." He could have added that it is a red, bloody thread, which is well described in minute details and fully, if somewhat cumbersomely, documented.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
Library of Congress

JOZEF LETTRICH. *History of Modern Slovakia.* Pp. 329. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $5.00.

This is a succinct, clear and well-documented political history of a small nation which occupies a strategic position between the Polish plain to the north and the Hungarian plain to the south. The author is a Slovak lawyer who was chairman of the Slovak Democratic party which was opposed equally to the Communists and to the separatists, the latter favoring a separate Slovak state. In the first postwar elections in 1946 the Slovak Democratic party gained 62 per cent of the votes cast in the province.

Students of power politics will be interested in the first place, in Mr. Lettrich's account of the struggle between the Slovak Democrats and the Communists which

shows on a small scale the tactics used by the latter, and the role played by their fellow-travelers. These tactics finally lead to the coup d'état of February 1948 when Czechoslovakia became a Soviet satrapy. Despite the majority support enjoyed by the democrats, the Communists surpassed them by their aggressive and well-planned line of action as well as by the fact that they held effective power. As Mr. Lettrich points out, the Communists in Slovakia controlled the army, the police, the partisans, and the armed workers' militia "from the instant the first Soviet troops had entered Czechoslovak territory." The democratic front's weakness was also due to the heterogeneity of its component elements, and as a consequence, due to the Communist Putsch, the Democratic party ceased to exist (p. 260). In spite of this, Dr. Lettrich advocates, at the end of his book, the necessity of the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia on the basis of equality of the partners Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians, thus excluding both the system of centralization and the separatist chimera of a Central-European federation.

Three chapters in Mr. Lettrich's book deal with the last hundred years of Slovak history. The first deals with the despotic Magyar régime, lasting until 1918, which oppressed the Slovaks from a political, cultural, and economic standpoint. The latter was reflected in a large emigration, directed particularly to the United States. The remarkable development of Slovakia achieved in all fields, during the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918 to 1938), is summed up in Mr. Lettrich's evaluation: "The twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic were the finest in Slovak history."

The period since 1938 is the main topic of the book. Mr. Lettrich describes the turbulent development of the Slovak People's party which under the leadership of Jozef Tiso finally led to the separation of Slovakia from the already mutilated Republic and the establishment of a puppet Slovak state, cast in the opprobrious Hitler mold. There is also an interesting description of the unsuccessful Slovak uprising of 1944.

This background largely explains the division of the Slovaks into three camps—democrats, separatists and Communists—which will constitute one of the main obstacles to a reconstruction of Slovakia should Communist tyranny come to an end. This, according to Mr. Lettrich, should take place within the framework of a Czechoslovak Republic, based on the principle of equality of the three people that inhabit it—Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians. He is equally opposed to a centralistic régime in the hands of the Czechs and to the revised aspirations of the separatists, according to which there would be an "independent" Slovakia which would be member of a supposed Central European federation. According to Mr. Lettrich the separatists in demanding the destruction of the viable Czechoslovak entity are going counter to European development which moves from the existing small, medium, and large states towards an ultimate European union.

VLASTIMIL KYBAL

New York, N. Y.

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

GEORGE W. F. HALLGARTEN. *Hitler, Reichswehr und Industrie: Zur Geschichte der Jahre 1918–1935.* Pp. 139. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955. D.M. 7.50 cloth; 4.80 paper.

This monograph is an historical study of Hitler's relations with the German army and industry from 1918 to 1935. The first part is concerned with Hugo Stinnes, General von Seeckt, and Hitler. It is based upon documents from Seeckt's papers, formerly in the army archives at Potsdam, and documents from the general records of the American Department of State, now in the National Archives, Washington. The second part of this study, Hitler and the German Heavy Industry, is largely a translation of an article which Dr. Hallgarten published in an American journal in 1952. A number of American and German documents supplement the text, and the author's scholarly footnotes enable the reader to note the sources for every important statement of fact.

This study throws new light on the French invasion of the Ruhr, Hitler's plan for a march on Berlin, and General von Seeckt's dream of establishing a reactionary dictatorship in the autumn of 1923. Especially valuable are the author's conclusions concerning this complex of intrigues, negotiations, and quarreling factions. It may be noted that the author has not used the frank revelations which Seeckt made when he visited the United States nor certain sources that would have indicated reserves of strength, which the Weimar Republic had available in the crises of 1923.

The author observes that the end of Hitler Germany and the rise of new international conflicts after 1945 have revived many of the basic questions of 1923. Again we are confronted with the problem of creating a democratic German army, a viable democracy for a united Germany, and a party system which can co-operate with the Western democracies. Dr. Hallgarten has doubts about the present plan for rearmament, which is perhaps the most crucial issue of the German Republic. Moreover he notes that the German heavy industry is far stronger now than it was in 1923. The steel kings, the coal barons, and the various other manufacturers are again in control of a vast industrial empire, which has recovered its former place in the world market. Will it support or undermine a democratic republic?

The second part of this book is a brilliant study of Hitler's relations with the German heavy industry and especially of the financial support which many industrial leaders gave to Hitler and his movement. The principal supporters were the directors of the great banks, Hjalmar Schacht, the group of industrialists in the United Steelworks, and the directors of the chemical industry. "Although Hitler was strongly supported from the funds of the industrialists," concludes Dr. Hallgarten, "one cannot say that they had 'made' his movement."

RALPH H. LUTZ

Stanford University

JOHN L. STIPP (Ed.). *Devil's Diary: The Record of Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression.* Pp. xv, 236. Yellow Springs, O.: Antioch Press, 1955. $3.75.

The reality of Communist imperialism has forced the free nations to include Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other defensive arrangements. If ten years ago anyone had dared to predict that by 1955 Germany would become one of the main bulwarks against the flood of aggressive expansion, his political foresight and sanity would have been seriously questioned. Yet the Soviet Union managed to bring about this fundamental change of events by a series of reckless aggressions and threats of aggression. As a result, German military strength is not only tolerated by the Western Powers which vanquished her in World War II, but the Germans are asked to rearm as fast as possible and as intensively as possible. It would be grossly unfair to see in this *volte-face* of Western policy any Machiavellian scheming or, much less, profascist sympathy; not Eisenhower and Churchill, but Stalin and Molotov are the authors of German rearmament.

Yet the danger of accepting the practical necessity of German rearmament in the present world crisis lies in forgetting all too soon and all too completely what the German people did, and stood for, only a short ten or fifteen years ago. Professor Stipp has therefore performed a valuable service in editing, at this time, the *Devil's Diary: The Record of Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression.* The book is a collection of key excerpts from the monumental collection published by the United States Government after World War II under the title *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,* and containing the basic evidence used against the German war criminals at the Nuremberg trials. However, as the average size of these volumes (nine in all, with additional supplements) runs over a thousand pages, only specialists have so far been able to comb through the mass of material. Professor Stipp's slim volume of slightly over 200 pages is not meant to be a *Reader's Digest* version of the many thousands of pages on which it is based, and the scholar will have to go back to the multi-volume original edition of the United States Government. Yet even the

short excerpts supplied in the present anthology are quite sufficient to indicate the character of German policy prior to, and during, World War II. The book opens with the famous "Hossbach Notes," which show—in Hitler's own testimony—how, in 1937, Germany planned a war of conquest while publicly professing peaceful intentions. With typical German *Gründlichkeit* all steps of conquest were laid out well in advance. In the subsequent chapters Professor Stipp shows—always in the words of the Germans themselves—how they planned the annexation of Austria, the Sudeten crisis, the disintegration and colonization of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland, the attack against Denmark and Norway, the violation of Holland and Belgium, the frustrated plans against England, and, finally, the most fatal decision of Germany's war lords, the invasion of Russia. What makes the record so gruesome is that it is based enitrely on German documents and statements of German leaders. Any commentary would merely weaken the effect.

Since the translation of the German documents was done at top speed, it is regrettable that Professor Stipp decided not to change obvious lapses of elegance or accuracy. Thus, *Parteibewegung* (p. 43) is rendered as "Movement Party," which is both wrong and slightly confusing. However, these are minor blemishes in an otherwise useful book.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN
Princeton University

MILTON MAYER. *They Thought They Were Free: The Germans, 1933–45.* Pp. xii, 346. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. $4.75.

When Milton Mayer, a writer from Chicago, paid his first, brief, and only visit to postwar Germany, he gathered the material for the larger part of his book. In a Hessian town at whose University he lectured as an American guest professor he had many talks with ten man who once were members of the Nazi party. "As an American, an American of German descent, a Jew, a newspaperman," Mr. Mayer writes, he wanted to find out "what the Nazi had been and how he got that way." Happily, Mr. Mayer differs from the many American intellectuals who—despite their proud claims of familiarity with social psychology, and despite their even prouder claims of freedom from prejudice—seemed to deal with the subject of Germany in a passionately prejudiced way. Mr. Mayer's description of his talks with ten ex-Nazis and of their views, actions, lives before, under, and after Hitler has the ring of authenticity. From these talks, at least one facet of totalitarian reality does emerge.

Yet sources of misunderstanding remain in Mr. Mayer's report. They are based on the size of his sample and the choice of his cross-section. Both are rather arbitrary and, as anyone conversant with German political and social geography would suspect, rather untypical. To consider his ten men in a particular Hessian university town (pop. 42,000), as "the Nazis," seems about as valid a generalization as to present the views and actions of ten men in, say, "Middletown, Mississippi" as those of "the Democrats" of this country, if not of "the Americans."

In a short second part, called The Germans, the author sketches some observations and generalizations of "German national behavior." With pleasant facility, yesterday's Germany is compared with, and explained as, the new boy in the neighborhood—insecure, therefore given to bullying, painfully conscious of his own shortcomings and weakness. The parallels Mr. Mayer draws between Germans and "the Jews" are thought-provoking, as are quite a few of his other—not necessarily provable or valid—random remarks.

Unfortunately, Mr. Mayer in the third and topical part of his book turns from an amateur anthropologist in the field taking notes about a strange people, and from a writer of stimulating aperçu, into a political pundit. In a discourse on present-day American and German policies, he warns against West German rearmament in defense against Communism and against America's support of West Germany. Apparently, his bitter denunciations are mainly based on a few newspaper clippings (with the political character and reliability of the quoted sources often badly mistaken,

such as when he introduces the very liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* as a "very conservative" newspaper, the violently anti-Adenauer *Frankfurter Rundschau* a "pro-West" newspaper, and so on), and on a few general impressions which, though they were correct when he gathered them in 1952, have ceased being true today (particularly with regard to economic conditions, to a certain nostalgia for the "good old times" of Hitler, to the general political temper). Recovery which then still seemed a surface mirage has in the meantime proved to be a reality. Readers, I hope, will come to distrust Mr. Mayer's evidence (much of which is factually wrong) after reading his statement "The newest wrinkle in psychoanalytic lingo is 'charismatic leader.'" From an error of that kind if it would seem that Mr. Mayer, while he explains German society, has never ventured into the field of German sociology, nor in that of German political history in which the "charismatic leader" has been a byword since Max Weber.

The same personal bias which leads Mr. Mayer to rather valuable observations on yesterday's Nazis misleads him into rather erroneous views of the present. A convinced, doctrinaire pacifist, Mr. Mayer rebelled against the stereotypes circulated in and after the war about "the Nazis" and "the Germans," and tried to come closer to the truth. Still a convinced doctrinaire pacifist today, he rebels against the present-time Western defense organization and its German link, which he tries to denounce. What emerges from his protest is only a parochial editorial lacking familiarity with foreign facts.

NORBERT MUHLEN
New York, N. Y.

RICHARD K. ULLMANN and SIR STEPHEN KING-HALL. *German Parliaments: A Study of the Development of Representative Institutions in Germany.* Pp. iv, 162. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. $4.00.

This is an important book primarily because it fills a gap in the literature on German political institutions. It offers extensive proof that contrary to widespread belief, Germans have had some forms of representative institutions at least as long as their Anglo-Saxon cousins, and that, therefore, it would be incorrect to say that the conception of representative government is foreign to German thought. To be sure, the authors attach a rather broad interpretation to the term "representative government is foreign to German thought. To be sure, the authors attach a rather broad interpretation to the term "representative," including in their account distinctly unrepresentative parliamentary bodies of earlier German history and excluding some of the lesser, but no less interesting parliaments that existed from time to time in certain principalities and dukedoms. Nevertheless, the book calls to mind that if democracy in Germany has an unsatisfactory record of performance, this was not because German representative institutions lacked historical antecedents.

The line of German, and for that matter British, parliamentary institutions is traced back to the "oak-woods of Germany," the Teutonic assemblies of freemen in earliest German history. Throughout the succeeding periods, the era of feudal and then imperial estates, there are evidences of the practice of representative government. The trend culminates in the ill-fated liberal revolution of the 1840's. Beginning with that tragedy, the line of representative institutions then moves in cycles, emphatic and pronounced for a period, then obliterated by counter-revolutionary pressures, reappearing again only to run once more into a reactionary cataclysm. The story is brought up to date with the discussion of the parliamentary institutions in the two competing republics of present-day Germany. One might add, largely because the authors do not with sufficient emphasis, that the so-called German Democratic Republic of East Germany is as unrepresentative as some of the diets in Germany's feudal past.

When it comes to pointing up some of the reasons why German representative institutions failed to acquire the solidity and permanence of a House of Commons, the authors are not consistently convincing or complete in their coverage. Perhaps, they should not have ventured that far into the controversial waters of political behavior

analysis. Their contribution would not have been less welcome had they restricted themselves to a purely historical account of the structural and procedural aspects of German representative institutions.

HENRY L. BRETTON
University of Michigan

BRIAN CHAPMAN. *The Prefect and Provincial France.* Pp. 246. London: George Allen and Unwin (distributed by the Macmillan Company, New York), 1955. $4.25.

Mr. Chapman, with two books on French local government published in quick succession, is well on the way to becoming the world's leading authority on the subject. His earlier volume, somewhat broader in scope than the present one, filled such a vacuum that it was promptly translated into French. This second work likewise has no real competitor in any language.

Nonspecialists are likely to feel that an entire book devoted to the prefectoral corps offers more information than they want or need. The serious student of French government, on the other hand, will find this study of real value. So many aspects of local life are linked in some fashion with the prefecture that a clear understanding of the prefects' unique role is essential. Mr. Chapman has pulled together a great deal of detailed information, which he presents in sober, lucid fashion. If anything is lacking, perhaps it is the human element. Occasionally, Mr. Chapman does enliven his analysis with brief examples of the problems faced by the prefects in their multifold relations with the politicians, the ministry of interior, the mayors and local councils, and the general public. The more frequent use of such case studies might have leavened the mass of administrative detail.

Mr. Chapman is, on the whole, a defender of the prefects against their many critics. He contends that the corps has done its job well—better, indeed, than the politicians, whose "freedom to be irresponsible is often due to the Prefects' efficiency." He approves the government's recent decrees which broaden the prefects' powers at the expense of the central administration in Paris. On the other hand, he is skeptical about the transfer of more local authority to elective bodies or officials, in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. A decade ago, pressure for more local self-government was great enough to get the principle of decentralization written into the new constitution; but Mr. Chapman believes that this article will remain a dead letter. Indeed, he argues that "a strong and active Prefectoral Corps is the best way of retaining . . . the virility of local government," since any reduction in the prefects' power would probably strengthen the ministries in Paris rather than the local governmental units.

A few minor errors detract little from this thorough and judicious study. It should remain for a good many years the standard work on the subject.

GORDON WRIGHT
University of Oregon

J. M. THOMPSON. *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire.* Pp. 342. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. $4.50.

"Machiavelli himself . . . would have had nothing but praise for the Second of December." Such was the enthusiastic judgment of the Empress Eugénie on the *coup* by which Louis Napoleon gained the mastery of France. But later historians have been less positive; they have found it difficult to assess not merely this particular incident but, in fact, the entire Second Empire and its enigmatic Man of Destiny. Was Louis' regime merely an illegal despotism by a second-rate imitator and was its destruction in 1870 simply the working of inevitable justice, or were there solid achievements and noble ideals, and was the whole fabric destroyed by forces which not even a Man of Destiny could control?

J. M. Thompson, the British historian of the French Revolution and the First Empire, is the latest scholar to attempt a portrait of Louis Napoleon—"a fascinating but puzzling character." His study is more a biography of the man than a history of the times, and it is better on politics and diplomacy than on economics. Aside from the addition of many details based upon his intensive use of English source materials, Thompson does not—and doubtless

did not intend to—reach any striking new interpretations. Nor does he present many final judgments although he does demonstrate, once again, that the problem of the Second Empire is too complex for easy answers or facile generalizations.

Napoleon III emerges as an idealist who believed in both repression and progress, a dictator whose rule suffered from his own lethargy and later ill health, a fatalist who trusted in his "star" but who was often guilty of star gazing, a conspirator who relied too heavily on bad friends, a Hamlet who was too weak to accomplish the deeds he knew were necessary. But, like virtually every modern biographer of the Emperor, Thompson is compassionate in his estimate. Louis Napoleon was not merely a despot. "At the back of all his twists and turns . . . . he held close in his mind and warm in his heart the will to be great and the wish to do good." Because of his basic integrity of mind and generosity of purpose, "he must be judged, if at all, by the ends he tried to win more than by the means he took to win them."

Thompson's unique contribution is that he comes to the Second Empire after years of studying the First. It is all too tempting for the twentieth-century historian to see 1848 as a great watershed in European history and, hence, to rely on recent analogies—to compare Louis Napoleon to Mussolini and his draining marshes, to Hitler and his rigging of plebiscites, and to Wilson and his faith in nationalities. Thompson, however, rightfully emphasizes Louis' indebtedness to and dependence upon the example of the first Napoleon. "This was a life ruled from first to last by a great name," he writes. "Louis' political aims never strayed far from what he had learnt from meditating on the career of Napoleon." Thus, to cite but one example, because Louis erroneously interpreted the *acte additionel* of the Hundred Days, his own Liberal Empire was "a misinterpretation of the First Empire in the light of 1815" and, hence, a failure. Because Thompson's book is oriented toward the early nineteenth century and not toward the twentieth, it is, therefore, one of the most significant of recent studies of Louis Napoleon and his empire.

R. D. CHALLENER
Princeton University

ELI F. HECKSCHER. *An Economic History of Sweden.* Translated by Göran Ohlin. Pp. xii, 308. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $5.00.

Professor Heckscher, perhaps the greatest of economic historians, has been known chiefly for his studies of mercantilism and the Continental System. Yet the work that absorbed him most, and which his death in 1952 prevented him from completing in its multi-volume form, was the economic history of his native Sweden. In 1941 he published a one-volume abridgement; this *Svenskt Arbete och Liv* has now been excellently translated for an English-reading audience.

Some of Sweden's uniqueness is salutary for such a study: Sweden has the earliest and most complete statistical records of any country; population figures began in 1721 and became especially thorough in 1749. This was the work of the clergy, who may have paid little heed to the social gospel, but who pioneered in social statistics. Such records, plus the financial accounts of government and private estates, make possible enlightening comparisons such as that of food budgets and caloric consumption in the sixteenth century and the twentieth century, and of harvests, prices, and foreign trade.

The book treats well the peculiar aspects of Swedish development—the minting of the huge and heavy sheets of copper money, the alienation of crown lands to the nobility and the sudden reversion with its accompanying effect of restoring freedom to the peasants, the Swedish application of mercantilism with a special emphasis on private enterprise, and so forth. Until after 1870 Sweden was relatively backward economically; she has become one of the most prosperous nations. This transformation gives her story special interest.

Heckscher's breadth of knowledge concerning the economic history of Europe

and the United States gives force to his generalizations and period characterizations; even more important is his acquaintance with economic theory, for he was a man thoroughly qualified in each of the fields which his discipline straddled. He used economic theory to give meaning to history, and he used historical method to give validity to theory. For him historic fact was essential, especially "secular statistical time series." Richness of material and the insight of the author combine therefore to give this study both historical significance and an immediate relation to universals. Heckscher had a genius for putting his finger on the vital issue and for finding the relevant evidence. The book has been given added value by a final chapter on the period since 1914 by his son, Professor Gunnar Heckscher, and by a forty-page evaluation of Heckscher's total work by Alexander Gerschenkron.

FRANKLIN D. SCOTT
Northwestern University

GIOVANNI SCHEPIS. *I Sistemi elettorali: Teoria-Tecnica-Legislazioni positive.* Pp. lxiii, 249, 356*. Empoli, Italy: Editrice Caparrini, 1955. 4000 *lire.*

FRANCESCO COMPAGNA and VITTORIO DE CAPRARIIS: *Geografia delle elezioni italiane dal 1946 al 1953.* (*Il Mulino.*) Pp. 71. Bologna, Italy: S.p.A. Poligrafici "Il Resto del Carlino," 1954. 300 *lire.*

Professor Schepis, who teaches statistics at the University of Rome and is, at the same time, connected with the Italian Ministry of the Interior as a specialist in electoral systems, has set himself the goal of presenting a factual exposition of the various systems of voting which compete for attention in the democratic world. The first section of his carefully written volume deals with the "theory and technique of electoral systems." It does not limit itself to the major forms of the majority system and of proportional representation, but treats, in detail, the deviations from the major principles of each, as well as systems which aim at being a mixture of both. These systems are important ingredients of recent discussions, and of recent legislation, in Continental Europe, not to mention the continued application of the single-nontransferable vote in Japan.

The second section presents the major features of electoral legislation in all major, and most of the minor, countries of the world. Professor Schepis approaches this task with a keen appreciation for the actual effects of a particular system, always probing below the surface. Thus, he rightly characterizes the German electoral systems of 1949 and 1953 as "preponderantly proportional," concessions to the majority principle which they contain being too small to justify the assertion, made so frequently, that these laws constitute a half and half combination of the two major systems.

These advantages make Professor Schepis' volume an excellent up-to-date handbook of electoral legislation. The question is whether he might not have gone beyond this in order to present, on the model of the two volumes published by Karl Braunias in 1932 (the usefulness of which is attested by the fact that they had to be reprinted recently, although they were out of date in regard to many details), evaluation of the actual implications of the various electoral systems. Braunias applied this principle also to his country by country treatment of actual legislation. That method makes possible, in the first place, critical analysis of the terms used which, in this field, is all important, because accepting the terminology of consistent supporters of one electoral system or the other means accepting their major conclusions. In the second place, Braunias was able to discuss the political dynamics of the countries with which he was dealing, which made their successive steps in electoral legislation more intelligible. It is possible that Professor Schepis, aiming at worldwide coverage, rather than at a treatment of Europe alone, did not follow Braunias' approach because it would have meant exceeding the space available to him. Still, one wonders whether a cooperative international effort should not be made to supplement what Professor Schepis has done along the lines of an up-to-date, worldwide, and consistently systematic Braunias.

Geografia delle elezioni italiane dal 1946 al 1953, the slim booklet by Compagna and De Caprariis sets itself the goal of promoting "knowledge of the political realities" of Italy. The authors' analysis of changes in the electoral strength of the various Italian parties in the postwar period is scrupulously objective. They present much valuable detail, particularly so far as the difference between, on the one hand, the Center and North of Italy, and, on the other, the South and the Islands is concerned. Their most important contribution to the discussion is this analysis of developments in the areas most affected by land reform. They reach the conclusion that this reform has not been a political failure; that, in fact, it has managed to slow down the growth of Communist and left-wing socialist votes in the region concerned as a whole, and has actually been followed by a reduction of that vote in some of the communities most affected by the reform (pp. 52–4). In the concluding paragraphs (pp. 68–9) they step, in their own opinion, beyond the bounds of strict objectivity in order to express regret over the concentration of political strength in Italy on the Communist-Socialist bloc and the Christian Democrat party, but they could have reached somewhat similar conclusions on the basis of an exposition of the logical requirements of a party system adapted to the functional needs of the democratic system rather than to preponderantly ideological factors.

FERDINAND A. HERMENS
University of Notre Dame

GIUSEPPE UGO PAPI (Ed.). *Teoria e politica dello sviluppo economico.* Pp. 567. Milano, Italy: Antonino Giuffrè, 1954. 3,000 lire.

This large volume, edited by Professor Giuseppe Ugo Papi of the Law School of the University of Rome, is a symposium on the theme of economic development in its twofold aspects of theory and practice. The basic query deals with the deviations from pure theory when theory is applied in practice in the very complex world of our time.

The study of this process has been stimulated and even determined by the concern of the United Nations over the economy of backward countries, and the aid that the United States has generously and providently offered them.

Each article is preceded by a summary in Italian, English, and French, a symptom of the international mindedness that has developed in our day after the tragedy of World War II. The ratio between good and evil does not change in the historical process whereby humanity walks towards its always new destiny.

The first three essays deal with the theoretical aspect of the problem of economic development. A second section of this well-planned symposium deals with the various factors that are at work in the field of economic development of backward countries.

Special attention has been given to Southern Italy which, as is generally known, is industrially behind the rest of the country and especially of the northern sector where industry and commerce are highly developed. The United States is intensely interested in Southern Italy, and large capitals from our country have been invested there in the hope of stimulating the industrialization of the region, and thus achieving a higher level of economic well-being in which the deadly microbe of Communism will not develop.

One of the positive characteristics of this book is the theoretical background on which economic development has been studied. Special chapters have been dedicated to concepts of economic life from the classical thinkers (Adam Smith and the physiocrats) to Marx, Schumpeter, and contemporary thinkers.

A broad vision of international cooperation is presented in the book. There rings in it a note of tempered optimism, through the consideration of the new consciousness of co-operation that has arisen in our time, be it in the mist of political considerations.

DOMENICO VITTORINI
University of Pennsylvania

OTHER COUNTRIES

A. ARTHUR SCHILLER. *The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945–1949.* Pp. x,

472. The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1955. 15 *Guilders*.

Professor Schiller, already an authority on the customary law (*hukum adat*) of Indonesia, planned to visit Holland and Indonesia in the spring of 1949 in order to study developments in the law during the Japanese occupation and the postwar period. Even before leaving Holland, it was becoming evident that the available materials were too scanty to make such a study successful and this was confirmed after his arrival in Indonesia.

Professor Schiller found, however, that there was a great deal of interest in the nature and structure of the future state of Indonesia and that the moment was ripe "to undertake the study of a state in the process of its establishment." The final steps were being taken which would culminate on December 27, 1949, in the establishment of Republik Indonesia Serikat, the federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia. A unique opportunity was indeed presented to trace the development of the federal idea and of its progress toward fruition in the years since 1945.

History records that the resulting federal state was of very short duration. Coming into existence with some twenty federated units, the number was reduced by merger to four within as many months, and the whole experiment collapsed with the creation of the unitary state of Republik Indonesia on August 17, 1950. History may decide also that federalism did not reflect the wishes of the people and had little correspondence to the realities of the existing situation.

All this does not detract, however, from the genuine value of Professor Schiller's work. He has analyzed with painstaking industry a tremendous mass of documentary material and has assembled his conclusions methodically and with meticulous care. In the result he has been able to present a study of central and local governments, of the distribution of powers, and of the administration of justice which will be of major interest to students of Indonesian history and political development for a long time to come. Parliamentary elections are to be held in Indonesia in September, and plans are being made for a constituent assembly which will be charged with the drafting of a Constitution to replace the provisional document signed in August, 1950. The influence of the federal period on the structure of Indonesian government, already far from inconsiderable, may prove yet to be of even more significance.

PHILIP W. THAYER
School of Advanced International Studies
of the Johns Hopkins University
Washington, D. C.

RUPERT EMERSON, and others. *Representative Government in Southeast Asia.* Pp. vii, 197. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. (Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.) $3.50.

Professor Emerson's discussion of representative government in Southeast Asia is informative, judicious, and timely. He is less concerned with governmental forms than with the ability of citizens of high or low degree to make their voices heard on public affairs and to regard their governments as neither remote nor alien, but rather as a living process in which all can participate on equal terms. He examines the situation in terms of conditions prevailing locally. In separate chapters, Willard Elsbree covers the Philippines, and Virginia Thompson local government.

Democratic institutions on the Western pattern are alien to the traditions of Southeast Asia. Even at the village level, where considerable self-government once prevailed, political vitality stemmed not from any atomized individualism, which equated all men's votes, but rather from a highly structured social order now sadly in decay. The governing policies of the prewar colonial regimes afforded little training in representative government save for a beginning made in the Philippines, and Burma's brief experiment with self-rule. Japanese conquest aborted all European plans and stimulated nationalism rather than democracy.

Professor Emerson stresses the encouraging postwar vogue among nationalist elite groups in support of constitutional forms. He explains it in terms of prewar struggles for greater democratic privileges which were regarded as touchstones of political progress and independence. He suggests that if current democratic tendencies represent nothing more than the inertia behind such long-deferred hopes, the vogue will inevitably disappear. But if democratic aspirations possess sufficient vitality to arouse among the people an appreciation of their worth, and if governmental leaders are willing to risk the fate of their pet development schemes and their personal roles by staging free elections, then democracy can survive and grow. The prospects are exciting but not encouraging; short-cut totalitarian methods provide tempting alternatives.

Each country is examined in detail. The Philippines are making progress despite serious political problems, while Thailand is retreating in the direction of a military dictatorship. Burma's U Nu is committed to the principle of popular sovereignty, and his *Pyidawtha* self-help program has encouraging possibilities. Although Indonesia is challenged by political instability and separatist tendencies, President Sukarno, like Nu, is a staunch advocate of the democratic creed. The politically bankrupt Bao Dai regime in Vietnam cannot even enlist nationalism to stem the Communist tide much less develop a democratic governmental structure. Malaya is trying to be born as a state outside the matrix of nationhood.

The authors are undogmatic and designate many topics calling for more detailed study, but they are abreast of present knowledge and deserve a wide hearing.

JOHN F. CADY
Ohio University

VIRGINIA THOMPSON and RICHARD ADLOFF. *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia.* Pp. viii, 295. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955. $4.00.

The events of World War II and its aftermath in Southeast Asia inevitably conspired to rouse into active turbulence all the issues concerning minority groups and peoples which could lie largely dormant and concealed in the calmer prewar period. The Japanese occupation, the return of the white man, the independence of India and Pakistan, the Communist take over in China, and, perhaps most significant of all, the flowering of passionate nationalisms, all worked to sharpen the distinctions and multiply the tensions which must unhappily play so great a role in the future of this part of the world.

It is to these events and problems that Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff have addressed themselves in the latest of their contributions to the literature of Southeast Asia. With only occasional reference to the remoter past, they have concentrated on the developments of the last couple of decades and have brought their study as far up to date as the last minute news reports would allow. Although they have necessarily done some picking and choosing among the minorities with which they deal, on the whole they have given a broad interpretation to their theme and include much valuable material and comment on the contemporary state of affairs —as, for example, in relation to the activities and attitudes of India and China and the politics of Southeast Asian countries— which a narrower reading of their task might have excluded.

Nearly half the book is taken up by the first two chapters which deal respectively with the Chinese and Indians, both in general in the region and on a country by country basis. Here, as in their conclusion, the authors draw a sharp distinction between the Indians, whose numbers and economic importance have declined in Southeast Asia since the war, and the Chinese who, despite severe immigration restrictions, have forged ahead on both these scores as well as in political significance. The contrast is heightened by Nehru's conciliatory policies as compared with the more aggressive pressures of the Chinese Communists who have, the authors assert, organized the machinery for dealing with their overseas brethren on a far bigger and more efficient scale than did the Kuomintang.

If the over-all outlines of the Chinese and Indian story are reasonably familiar, newer ground is broken in the chapter called "Buddhists vs. Buddhists," which delves into the frequently obscure recent history of Cambodia, Laos, and adjoining areas which only rarely catch the head-

lines. This chapter also has a useful bringing together of materials concerning the alleged plans of Communist China to penetrate southward, particularly through the utilization of a new and loose concept of the Thai people which offers the possibility of a large-scale reconstruction of much of mainland Southeast Asia.

Among other minorities which are dealt with are Eurasians and Christians. As is all too often the case, it is to be regretted that there is no map.

RUPERT EMERSON
Harvard University

ALLEN S. WHITING. *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924.* Pp. x, 349. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $5.50.

Mr. Whiting's scholarly contribution to the Studies of the Russian Institute of Columbia University is an important guide through the complex relations that developed between the Soviet Union and China in the period between the October Revolution (1917) and the conclusion of the basic treaty establishing diplomatic relations and settling other contentious issues (1924). As its title suggests, the study is developed from the point of view of Soviet policy and interest with respect to China, and the principal sources of information are Russian-language materials.

Although he handles his facts most scrupulously, Mr. Whiting correctly emphasizes that "it is not the facts but the way in which men view them that conditions policy." Consequently, in searching for an understanding of the motivations of Soviet policy in the early years, Mr. Whiting points out that "far from being monolithic, the Soviet structure of the early twenties presents a fascinating picture of clash and conflict, rooted both in theoretical differences and in political intrigue" (p. 9). His interpretations of theoretical questions and his appreciation of complex political forces and motivations show that Mr. Whiting has fully mastered his subject; and his book is skilfully and sensitively written.

The shift in Soviet policy from doctrinaire rejection of the Tsarist heritage to a calculated defense of some of the imperialistic spoils of Tsarist policy is reflected in the repudiation, in 1920, of Karakhan's pledge of the previous year to return the Chinese Eastern Railway "without compensation of any kind" (July 25, 1919). Mr. Whiting sees in this repudiation an early example of the tendency of Soviet leaders to give higher priority to defense of the interests of the "Socialist fatherland" than to the advancement of world revolution. Much of his story concerns the efforts of the new Soviet leaders to develop imperialistic aspirations at China's expense, especially after 1921; and Mr. Whiting helps to demolish some of the myths that have developed around the notion of Soviet disinterestedness. He draws the conclusion, well established by the documentation, "that Soviet intentions in 1917 and Soviet pledges in 1919 proved inoperative once Russian power became established in the Far East" (p. 251).

H. ARTHUR STEINER
University of California
Los Angeles

MICHAEL LINDSAY. *China and the Cold War: A Study in International Politics.* Pp. xv, 286. Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $3.75.

This rare, thoughtful book will come close to making conservatives and Leftists in the United States agree on the developments which have taken place in the last six years on mainland China. The book is closely reasoned and is based on the author's firsthand experience of Chinese life, almost unparalleled among our American China experts. Lord Lindsay was—and to some degree, still is,—a sympathizer with the Chinese Communists, but he is an honorable and a rational man first and foremost; his sympathies are therefore transparent and candid; his arguments are addressed to the timeless best in the Western mind; he explains China with a love for the Chinese and, more importantly, with a respect for the intelligence and reasonableness of the human brain.

It can even be said that Michael Lindsay is an odd bird, one of those uncommon Englishmen who range far places and then speak their heartfelt version of the truth, despite the noble threat of death or the subtler, nastier threat of unpopularity. Lindsay knows that he is talking to Americans and to Britons, so that his book amounts to an explanation of the Communist system in mainland China, written by a man who has been the friend of Mao Tse-tung and who knows both China and Communism well enough to explain the tremendous price which the Chinese are paying for Communist rule.

What is the price? Totalitarianism.

The Chinese have fallen victim to an Orwellian *1894* already. Lindsay says, "The only hopeful feature of the situation is the possibility that a high proportion of the Communists are more irrational than fanatical—that for possibly a majority of Communists the drive for power is not an ultimate objective but the result of irrational behavior produced by a faith in Marx-Leninism" (p. 142).

In order to explain Chinese Communism, Lindsay had to explain the lodgment which this movement had in his own sympathies. His chapter, "An Analysis of Communism," is a rebuttal not only of the Chinese version but of Marxism-Leninism (pp. 66–99). It makes this the only birthday present which an American Right-wing millionaire could give his son one week after the son joined the Communist party. Lindsay comes close to making words hold to their meanings, despite the distortions of our "cold war period."

The fifteen chapters are much more a series of brilliant essays than a presentation of mere fact. It is possible to get good compendia of facts on China, thanks to W. W. Rostow and a few others. First-class thinking on China, combined with first-hand comment, makes this book first-rate reading for anyone who wishes to review China and Communism from the ground up.

The Korean War, the nature of Communism in general, Chinese Communism in particular, the chances of peace, a modest and rather British program for peace, the Communist "peace" campaign, and comments on the psychology of modern politics make up this brilliant and unusual book. Few American readers will agree with everything in this volume; all the intelligent readers will enjoy it thoroughly.

PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER
School of Advanced International Studies
of the Johns Hopkins University
Washington, D. C.

SSŬ-YU TENG and JOHN K. FAIRBANK, with E-TU ZEN SUN, CHAOYING FANG, and others. *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923.* Pp. ix, 296. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. $6.75.

For those who are interested in intellectual history this book is a brilliant combination of commentary and documents on nearly a century of Chinese thought. It is the first attempt to give a connected and illustrated account of a subject which has been far too long neglected. In doing so the authors have drawn upon most of the best scholarship in America, but they have themselves woven the contributions of others into a meaningful pattern.

The two main authors of this book, John K. Fairbank and Teng Ssŭ-yu, have selected for translation some sixty-five documents which they have spread over twenty-eight chapters. These documents are designed to bring out the main lines of thought of China's traditional and modern leaders in their efforts to understand and to adapt themselves to the West. The book covers a period which begins with the Opium War and ends with the entente between the Nationalist party and the Soviet Union in 1923. Communist China is beyond the scope of the volume but the authors rightly claim that "modern China, including the communist rise to power there, can be understood only against the background of its contact with the West." The first two chapters, which contain an excellent discussion of the main elements in the Chinese intellectual tradition, bring the reader up to date for the opening documents which deal with the recognition of China's need to know the West.

Short but highly useful introductions precede the other main sections of the book—the documents illustrating the desire for western technology, the efforts at self-

strengthening, the reform movement of the end of the century, reform and revolution (1901–12), and the ideological ferment (1912–23).

China was for long the center of the Far Eastern world and resisted change longer than any other part of it. When the old moral order collapsed it collapsed entirely. The reader of this book will see the process of change through Chinese eyes and Chinese social and political institutions. He can hardly fail to realize that it is as difficult as it is important for the members of one society to understand those of another.

GEORGE E. TAYLOR

University of Washington

MOHAMMED NAGUIB. *Egypt's Destiny.* Pp. 256. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955. $4.00.

Egypt's former President reveals more than his views on his country's destiny in this thoughtful book. He provides an "inside" view of the 1952 coup, which ousted King Faruk and established the régime of the Council of the Revolution, gives a detailed account of the work of the new rulers, and sets forth his own views on the causes leading to the conflict that resulted in his being deprived of his posts as Prime Minister and President.

General Naguib concurs with the opinion that the weakness of the royal regime was displayed for all the world to see in the Palestine war of 1948, after the establishment of the State of Israel. Knowing about the weakness of his country under the incompetent and utterly corrupt royal regime, Naguib did not wish Egypt embroiled in open warfare. He recommended Egyptian guerrilla operations in support of what he calls the Palestinian-Arab resistance movement. However, Farouk and his court *camarilla* decided on war. They made fabulous profits on buying inferior arms abroad and selling them to the government at high prices.

The King was mistaken in his belief that in Egypt the monarch was above the law of common decency. Officers who saw what was going on were paving the way for a coup. General Naguib was sympathetic with the aims of the young officers' group which needed him because of his more mature age and high reputation.

Faruk was so immersed in his dissolute ways that he had no inkling of what was going on in the young officers' quarters. Then, when the movement reached the boiling point, he hoped that the British would save him on the ground that a revolution might jeopardize foreign lives. Whatever Downing Street may have had in mind at first, it did not fall in line with Faruk's hopes. There is a strong hint in Naguib's book that the American Ambassador in Egypt, Jefferson Caffery, played a significant role in the revolutionary days. The Ambassador seems to have been in close touch with the British and he was also interested in saving Faruk's life. Only a few hours were available to the King to leave for exile, long enough for him to have more than 200 pieces of precious baggage collected.

Rid of the King, the council acted with dispatch. Two items headed its list of the most urgent tasks: the Suez Canal and land reform. The British were made to evacuate Suez and thus terminated a long period of foreign rule in the land of the Nile. The agrarian reform was urgent as an earnest of the government's intention to solve the peasants' problems. Because of the shortage of available land, however, not too many of the *fellahin* will be able to obtain land, Naguib states.

The conflict within the revolutionary council is described by the General as due mainly to disagreements on tactics rather than questions of broad policy. Abdul Nasser, who is at present Egypt's strong man, "believed, with all the bravado of a man of thirty-six, that he could afford to alienate every segment of Egyptian public opinion, if necessary to achieve our goals." On the other hand, Naguib wanted to keep the bridges open to the other side.

A comparison of this book with Nasser's slender volume, *Egypt's Liberation,* published simultaneously in this country, is rewarding. While Naguib has his biases, he does give the impression of a mature, even though not a strong, person. Nasser, on the other hand, appears to be more a philosophizing secondary school student than a statesman. The juxtaposition of these personal testimonies prompts at least one reader to wonder whether Egypt can be well served by the post-Naguib regime.

EMIL LENGYEL

New York University

EMANUEL RACKMAN. *Israel's Emerging Constitution, 1948–51.* Pp. xvi, 196. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $3.00.

Israel's Emerging Constitution, 1948–51 —written by one who has been trained in law, political science, and rabbinical studies —is the first comprehensive study of the constitutional developments in the State of Israel. It serves the useful purpose of providing, in summary fashion, the essential facts respecting the legal situation in Palestine before the establishment of the State of Israel; the complex, and in many ways obnoxious, partisan and ideological differences among the citizens of the new state; the reasons for the failure to adopt a written constitution, despite the United Nations General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947; the constitutional principles that seem to have emerged through legislation and other official actions since the organization of the Constituent Assembly early in 1949; and the problems relating to the role of religion.

Dr. Rackman finds that the religious issue is the principal cause for postponement of the drafting of a written constitution; for the extreme orthodox say there is no need of a constitution, since the Torah must serve as the law of the land, and the other religious groups "are neither united nor even notably respectful of each other's point of view." The religious differences are reflected in the rife partisanship that divides the voters into many parties. The author's conclusion is that most of the faults found with Israel's unwritten, emerging, makeshift constitution "are due to the multiplicity of political parties, the mutual hostility and suspicion of the parties, and the perpetual domination of the parties by their leaders." Many things in the book confirm the judgment of Macaulay that where factions predominate, a politician considers, not the whole people, but only his own section of it, and the rest are to him strangers or enemies.

The author writes with commendable restraint, and succeeds in giving a factual statement of the important events and issues. He grinds no partisan axe, though he must have been often tempted to take a position and to speak out hotly on one side or the other of a vexed issue. His book fills a real need.

MILTON R. KONVITZ

Cornell University

CYRIL S. BELSHAW. *Changing Melanesia: Social Economics of Culture Contact.* Pp. x, 197. Melbourne, England: Oxford University Press, 1954. $2.30.

Cyril Belshaw is both an economist and anthropologist by training. He has also served as a government administrator in the Solomon Islands. He has, therefore, an excellent background for the task undertaken in this book: an examination of economic change in Melanesian society as a result of European contact. The result is a valuable contribution.

For one thing, Belshaw presents us with an excellent review and analysis of the nature and effects of European contact on Melanesian life from the time of initial exploration in the Pacific on down through World War II. In doing so he is especially concerned with resulting changes in the wants of native Melanesians, in their relationship to their natural resources, and also in their capital equipment, incentives to labor, property organization, methods of production and distribution, and systems of exchange. He concludes that native economic life has changed less than might be supposed, and far more in the area of wants than in the structure of economic relationships.

Secondly, Belshaw outlines a tentative theory of socio-economic change, pointing up major problems for future study. He offers a useful framework within which to evaluate specific instances of such change. Indeed, he manages to combine economic and social anthropological concepts in a way which this reviewer finds very satisfying. Anthropologists can learn how economic theory can be applied with great force to problems of acculturation. Economists can learn how their concepts properly apply to so-called primitive societies

and discover implications for the future development of economic theory.

The book closes with some suggestions regarding the practical implications of Belshaw's theory for administration. In this regard, his discussion of efficiency (pp. 150–52) is an important contribution. He distinguishes between four not necessarily compatible types of efficiency: *technical,* which is the "relation between physical output and physical input alone"; *financial,* "which resolves into the ability to make a monetary profit"; *social,* which is the degree to which people are able to achieve the values which they happen in fact to hold; and *welfare,* "the degree to which, or the cost at which, the society achieves not its own existing ends, but its own ends plus a minimum standard of living defined by the welfare worker." Inasmuch as administrative programs are normally concerned with increasing what may be regarded as the efficiency of some aspect of local life, it is obviously important for administrators to keep clearly in mind just what kind of efficiency they are concerned with and how it relates to improvement in social efficiency as here defined.

While anthropologists, economists, and administrators will all find this an informative and readable little book, its usefulness suffers for the lack of a detailed analysis of change in any one society. This deficiency is remedied if one reads it in conjunction with Belshaw's short monograph *In Search of Wealth* (Memoir No. 80 of the American Anthropological Association, 1955).

Belshaw succeeds in approaching the subject of culture-contact in Melanesia without being carried away emotionally by its more sordid aspects. It is refreshing to find the effects on native life of sandalwooders, missionaries, blackbirders, and traders the subject of cool appraisal and dispassionate discussion.

WARD H. GOODENOUGH
University of Pennsylvania

C. GROVE HAINES (Ed.). *Africa Today.* Pp. xvi, 510. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. $6.00.

The wrapper advertizes this book as "up-to-date, comprehensive, authoritative." It may be redundant to say that Africa is a continent of diversity for "continent" connotes not only enormity of size, but variability of peoples and habitat. However, it is this diversity which is the stumbling block to a survey of the area, for no individual can know all regions intimately. There are two ways of meeting this problem; an individual author may strive to extend his understanding or a group of experts may be assembled to pool their knowledge in a single volume. On a journalistic level the first approach is possible, but on a social science level, the second approach is almost mandatory. *Africa Today* illustrates the difficulties of the second approach. It is mainly a problem of integration.

"Up-to-date" generally means inclusive of recent developments, but in Africa there are many things that are as yet unknown, so that it sometimes means to know the points on which the experts still have inadequate information. In the first sense the book generally fulfills its promise and the second is referred to by M. Henry and discussed by Miss Ady, in regard to her own specialty of economics, in what seems to me—a noneconomist—an excellent article.

"Comprehensive" likewise can have alternate meanings. Is the book intended to be comprehensive in regard to areas or topics? In the latter respect it is quite comprehensive, but in the former respect it is not completely so. Munger explicitly limits himself to "sub-Saharan" Africa and most of the other contributors do so implicitly, but Robinson's exhaustive article on French Africa includes the North. Only the Belgian Congo and the Union of South Africa have an article devoted exclusively to each; all other areas being considered either as parts of regional or administrative groupings or by implication under the various topics. As usual, the Portuguese, Spanish, and independent areas are the most neglected. The aspects that are considered are the historical, military, ethnological, political, religious, educational, commercial, and industrial.

The differences between these fields of specialization are so great that any comparison of articles would be largely personal and invidious, representing attitudes toward the different fields. However, it must be recognized that the caliber is uneven. The forty contributors comprise a large proportion of the American experts on Africa plus a sprinkling of overseas *conoscenti* (but there are a few whose reasons for being included are not clear). There is a courageous and laudable mixing of "practical" and "academic" people. Each article is followed by a commentary which is an excellent device that might have been used in several ways. Cross-discipline stimulation could have been provided by this means, but was apparently not sought, nor was it used to provide the assessment in social science terms of the other contributions; one might have expected, for instance, to have a sociologist comment on the missionary's account rather than a recapitulation of the same by another missionary. Sir Philip Mitchell's article also goes crying for comment.

The appearance of this book is another milestone in the growing interest of Americans in Africa and is certainly to be welcomed; its shortcomings are due to the immensity of the subject matter, and the former neglect in this country of African affairs.

DANIEL F. MCCALL
Boston University

OTHER BOOKS

BALSAN, FRANÇOIS. *Capricorn Road.* Translated by Pamela Search. Pp. 252. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $4.75.

BEACH, WALDO, and H. RICHARD NIEBUHR (Eds.). *Christian Ethics: Sources of the Living Tradition.* Pp. viii, 496. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $5.00.

BEMIS, SAMUEL FLAGG. *The United States as a World Power: A Diplomatic History, 1900–1955.* Pp. xi, 516. Rev. ed. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955. $6.95.

BERGEL, EGON ERNEST. *Urban Sociology.* Pp. xii, 558. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $6.50.

Bibliography of the Charter of the United Nations, A. (United Nations Headquarters Library, Bibliographical Series, No. 3.) Pp. viii, 128. New York: United Nations, 1955. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) $1.25.

BLODGETT, RALPH H. *Our Expanding Economy: An Introduction.* Pp. xv, 973. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1955. $6.00.

BOGARDUS, EMORY S. *The Development of Social Thought.* Pp. x, 660. 3rd ed. New York; London; Toronto: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1955. $5.00.

BONE, HUGH A. *American Politics and the Party System.* Pp. viii, 670. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $6.00.

BRAMELD, THEODORE. *Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective.* Pp. xvii, 446. New York: Dryden Press, 1955. $4.50.

BRAUN, KURT. *Labor Disputes and Their Settlement.* Pp. xvi, 343. Rev. ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. $6.00.

BRINTON, CRANE, JOHN B. CHRISTOPHER, and ROBERT LEE WOLFF. *A History of Civilization.* Vol. I: *Prehistory to 1715.* Pp. xvii, 686. Vol. II: *1715 to the Present.* Pp. xiv, 722. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955. $16.00 for two volumes boxed.

BROOKOVER, WILBUR B. *A Sociology of Education.* Pp. viii, 436. New York: American Book Company, 1955. $4.75.

BROOM, LEONARD, and PHILIP SELZNICK. *Sociology.* Pp. xvii, 660. Evanston, Ill.; White Plains, N. Y.: Row, Peterson, and Company, 1955. No price.

BROWN, GEORGE H. (Ed.). *Readings in Marketing from Fortune.* Pp. ix, 134. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955. $1.25.

BROWN, HARRY GUNNISON, and others (Eds.). *Land-Value Taxation Around the World.* Pp. vii, 216. New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1955. $3.00.

BUTTS, R. FREEMAN. *A Cultural History of Western Education: Its Social and Intellectual Foundations.* Pp. xii, 645. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $6.50.

CALVOCORESSI, PETER assisted by KONSTANZE ISEPP. *Survey of International Affairs, 1952.* Pp. viii, 473. London; New York; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955. $7.20.

CARLTON, RICHARD K. (Ed.). *Forced Labor in the "People's Democracies."* Pp. 177. New York: Mid-European Studies Center, Free Europe Committee, 1955. $1.00.

CARR, LOWELL JUILLIARD. *Analytical Sociology: Social Situations and Social Problems.* Pp. xii, 795. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $6.00.

CASSERLEY, J. V. LANGMEAD. *The Bent World.* Pp. ix, 286. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $4.00.

CAVAN, RUTH SHONLE. *Criminology*. Pp. xiv, 718. 2d ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $6.00.

CHARNLEY, JEAN. *The Art of Child Placement*. Pp. xxi, 265. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $4.50.

CHARVET, PATRICK EDWARD. *France*. Pp. 247. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $4.50.

CLARK, LEADIE M. *Walt Whitman's Concept of the American Common Man*. Pp. xiv, 178. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.75.

COTTRELL, EDWIN A., and HELEN L. JONES. *Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration*. Vol. XVI: *The Metropolis: Is Integration Possible?* Pp. ix, 116. Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation, 1955. $2.50 cloth; $2.00 paper.

CRONAN, EDWARD P. *The Dignity of the Human Person*. Foreword by His Eminence Francis Cardinal Spellman. Pp. xv, 207. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.00.

DAGGETT, STUART. *Principles of Inland Transportation*. Pp. xx, 788. 4th ed. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $6.00.

DAVIDSON, HENRY A. *Handbook of Parliamentary Procedure*. Pp. xviii, 292. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $3.75.

DE CONDORCET, ANTOINE-NICOLAS. *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*. Translated by June Barraclough. Pp. xvi, 202. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. 1795 first publ. $3.50.

EASTMAN, MAX. *Reflections on the Failure of Socialism*. Pp. 127. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1955. $2.75.

EBERSOLE, LUKE. *American Society: An Introductory Analysis*. Pp. x, 510. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $5.50.

ESSINGLER, WILLIAM. *Politics and Science*. Pp. xi, 167. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.00.

Evaluation in Mental Health: A Review of the Problem of Evaluating Mental Health Activities. Report of the Subcommittee on Evaluation of Mental Health Activities, Community Services Committee, National Advisory Mental Health Council. Pp. x, 292. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Public Health Service; National Institute of Health; National Institute of Mental Health, 1955. $2.00.

EVANS, JOSEPH W., and LEO R. WARD (Eds.). *The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain*. Pp. xiv, 348. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955. $5.00.

FIEDLER, LESLIE. *An End to Innocence: Essays on Culture and Politics*. Pp. ix, 214. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955. $3.50.

FOLLIOT, DENISE (Ed.). *Documents on International Affairs, 1952*. Pp. xvii, 529. London; New York; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955. $8.80.

FONTANILLES, JOSÉ CONANGLA. *Mirador Humanista*. Pp. 139. La Habana, Cuba, 1954. No price.

FOSTER, WILLIAM Z. *History of the Three Internationals: The World Socialist and Communist Movements from 1848 to the Present*. Pp. 580. New York: International Publishers, 1955. $6.00.

FRANCE, ROBERT R. *Union Decisions in Collective Bargaining*. Pp. 49. Princeton, N. J.: Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics and Sociology, Princeton University, 1955. $2.00.

FRIEND, IRWIN, MORRIS HAMBURG, and STANLEY SCHOR. *Pricing and Price Differentials on Over-the-Counter Markets*. Pp. vi, 121. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania, 1955. $1.25.

GLASER, ABRAM. *This World of Ours*. Pp. xiii, 492. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $5.00.

GOSNELL, CULLEN B., and others. *Fundamentals of American National Government*. Pp. vii, 490. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $5.00.

GREBLER, LEO. *Experience in Urban Real Estate Investment: An Interim Report Based on New York City Properties*. Pp. xviii, 277. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $9.00.

GUSTAVSON, CARL G. *A Preface to History*. Pp. ix, 221. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $3.75.

HALL, HARVEY P. (Ed.). *The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East*. Pp. 118. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955. $2.00.

HAMILTON, THOMAS H., and EDWARD BLACKMAN (Eds.). *The Basic College of Michigan State*. Pp. viii, 127. East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1955. $2.75.

HARRIS, RICHARD E. *Delinquency in Our Democracy*. Pp. 160. Los Angeles, Cal.: Wetzel Publishing Co., 1954. (For copies write: R. E. Harris, P.O. Box 8563, Los Angeles.) $3.50.

HICKMAN, BERT G. *The Korean War and United States Economic Activity, 1950–1952*. Pp. viii, 64. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955. 75 cents.

HOTTEL, ALTHEA K. *How Fare American Women?* Pp. xii, 70. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1955. $1.00.

HUNT, ELGIN F. *Social Science: An Introduction to the Study of Society*. Pp. xv, 741. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $6.90.

Input-Output Analysis: An Appraisal. (Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. XVIII.) A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York by the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth. Pp. x, 371. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $7.50.

JOHNSON, CLAUDIUS O. *American Government: National, State, and Local*. Pp. xvii, 1,004. 2d ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $6.50.

JOHNSON, CLAUDIUS O. *American National Government*. Pp. xvii, 750. 4th ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $5.75.

JONASSEN, C. T. *The Shopping Center Versus Downtown*. Pp. xviii, 170. Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Business Research, College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio State University, 1955. $3.50.

KELLER, FRANKON JEFFERSON. *The Comprehensive High School*. Pp. xv, 302. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. $4.00.

KENDRICK, M. SLADE. *A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures*. (Occasional Paper 48.) Pp. x, 102. Rev. ed. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955. $1.25.

KETCHUM, RICHARD M. (Ed.). *What is Communism?* Pp. 191. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1955. $2.95.

KIRK, GEORGE E. *A Short History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*. Pp. 292. 3rd ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $4.50.

KRAUSE, WALTER. *The International Economy*. Pp. x, 434. Boston; New York: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1955. $5.50.

LANGROD, GEORGES. *La Science et l'enseignement de l'administration publique aux Etas-Unis*. Pp. 185. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954. 500 *fr*.

LEE, MAURICE W. *Economic Fluctuations: An Analysis of Business Cycles and Other Economic Fluctuations*. Pp. xviii, 633. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1955. $6.00.

LILLIBRIDGE, G. D. *Beacon of Freedom: The Impact of American Democracy Upon Great Britain, 1830–1870*. Pp. xv, 159. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954. $4.00.

LØCHEN, EINAR, assisted by ROLF N. TOGERSEN. *Norway's Views on Sovereignty*. A Report Prepared for UNESCO. Pp. 102. Bergen, Norway: A. S. John Griegs Boktrykkeri, 1955. No price.

LOCKE, WILLIAM N., and A. DONALD BOOTH. *Machine Translation of Languages*. Pp. xii, 243. Published jointly by the Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and Sons, New York; and Chapman and Hall, London, 1955. $6.00.

LOMBARD, GEORGE F. F. *Behavior in a Selling Group: A Case Study of Interpersonal Relations in a Department Store*. Pp. xx, 359. Boston, Mass.: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1955. $4.00.

LOUD, HENRY KIMBALL. *Farewell to Boom and Bust*. Pp. vi, 170. New York: Pageant Press, 1955. $2.50.

LUSK, HAROLD F. *Business Law: Principles and Cases*. Pp. xviii, 1,061. 5th ed. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1955. $6.75.

MCHARGUE, DANIEL S. *Michigan Government in Brief*. Pp. 66. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1955. $1.50.

MCKEE, ELMORE M. *The People Act: Stories of How Americans Are Coming Together to Deal With Their Community Problems*. Pp. 269. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $3.50.

MACNAIR, HARLEY FARNSWORTH, and DONALD F. LACH. *Modern Far Eastern International Relations*. Pp. xiv, 777. 2d ed. Toronto; London; New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955. $10.00.

MANTOUX, PAUL (Ed.). *Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars–28 juin 1919)*. Vol. I: *Jusqu'à la remise à la delegation allemande des conditions de paix*. Pp. 521. Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1955. 1,800 *fr*.

MARK, JEFFREY. *The Modern Idolatry: Being an Analysis of Usury and Pathology of Debt*. Pp. ix, 230. Bombay, India: Libertarian Social Institute. No date. *Rs* 12.

MARKE, JULIUS J. (Ed.). *The Holmes Reader*. Pp. 282. New York: Oceana Publications, 1955. $1.00.

MASARYK, THOMAS GARRIGUE. *The Spirit of Russia*. (Volume II.) Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Pp. xix, 664. 2d ed. London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $14.00 the set.

MASON, EDWARD S. *Promoting Economic Development: The United States and Southern Asia*. Pp. 83. Claremont, Cal.: Associated Colleges, 1955. $2.75.

MATHIOT, ANDRÉ. *Le Régime politique britannique.* (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politique, No. 68.) Pp. 335. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1955. 850 *fr.*

OATES, WAYNE E. *Religious Factors in Mental Illness.* Pp. xv, 239. New York: Associated Press, 1955. $3.50.

O'KEANE, JOSEPHINE. *Thomas J. Walsh: A Senator from Montana.* Pp. 284. Francestown, N. H.: Marshall Jones Company, 1955. $4.00.

PINTAR, JOHN I. *Four Years in Tito's Hell.* Pp. 300. Buenos Aires: H. P. K., 1954. No price.

PODOLSKY, EDWARD (Ed.) *Management of Addiction.* Pp. xvii, 413. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $7.50.

POWELSON, JOHN P. *Economic Accounting.* Pp. xii, 500. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $7.50.

QUINN, JAMES A. *Urban Sociology.* Pp. xiv, 534. New York: American Book Company, 1955. $5.25.

RAIT, ROBERT, and GEORGE S. PRYDE. *Scotland.* Pp. 356. 2d ed. New York: Fredick A. Praeger, 1955. $5.50.

Readings in Fiscal Policy. Selected by a Committee of the American Economic Association. Pp. x, 596. Homewood, Ill.: Published for the Association by Richard D. Irwin, 1955. $5.00.

RIEGEL, ROBERT E., and DAVID F. LONG. *The American Story.* Vol. II: *Maturity.* Pp. x, 544. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $6.00.

WHELPSON, P. K., and CLYDE V. KISER (Eds.). *Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility.* Vol. IV: *Further Reports on Hypotheses and Other Data from the Indianapolis Study.* Pp. 802–1086. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1954. $1.00.

WHITE, LEONARD D. *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration.* Pp. xx, 531. 4th ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $6.00.

WOLINS, MARTIN, and others. *Welfare Problems and Services in Berkeley, California.* A Report of the Community Welfare Study. Pp. xxii, 117. Berkeley, Calif.: Berkeley Council of Social Welfare, 1954. $1.50.

YOURGLICH, ANITA. *The Dynamics of Social Interaction.* Pp. vi, 128. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954. $2.50.

INDEX

INDEX

Abrams, Frank W., 142
Academic freedom, 53, 75–85, 92, 108, 110, 184
  See also Independence, institutional
Academy of Political Science, 98
Accrediting, 28, 30, 54, 65–74, 110, 198
Adams, Arthur S., 5
Adams, John, 11
Adams, John Quincy, quoted, 44
Administration, college and university
  and educational policy, 47, 48–49, 50, 52–53, 56–57
  and fund raising, 126, 128, 130, 138
  and governing boards, 186–188
  and management, 110, 175, 178, 194, 195
  control over, 186, 189–191
  effect of accrediting on, 68, 69
  organizational development, 22–31, 186, 188–189
Admission requirements and standards, vii, 34, 46, 47, 55, 168, 176, 177, 182, 203
Adult education, 30, 35, 63, 86, 91–92
  See also Extension, university
Agriculture, schools of, 58, 88
  demand for graduates of, 20, 140
  experiment stations, 104, 113, 195
  extension services, 42, 43, 105, 121, 195, 210
  federal aid to, 113, 210
  government supported research in, 41, 43, 105, 210
  See also Land-grant colleges
Air Force (U. S.), 42, 114
Alumni
  association, first, 124
  influence of, 53, 138
  magazine, 128, 130, 134, 138
  services for, 91, 128, 130, 138, 195
  support of higher education, 123–139, 145, 169, 173, 174, 204, 209
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 93, 97, 99–100
  See also Methods of Financing Higher Education, conference on
American Alumni Council, 123, 134, 135, 209
American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, 65, 267
American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business, 65
American Association of Junior Colleges, 70
American Association of University Professors, 52, 75–76, 83, 85
American Association of University Women, 65
American Bar Association, 65
American Council on Education, 43, 53, 70, 87, 168, 182
  Commission on Student Personnel, 55
American Economic Association, 98
American Medical Association, 66
ANNALS, THE, 93, 97, 99
Annual giving, 123–139, 145, 174, 209
Aristotle, 84
Arizona, 34–35, 36
Armstrong, James E., quoted, 125, 128
Army (U. S.), 42, 114
  See also Veterans education
Arnett, Trevor, quoted, 170
Aron, Raymond, cited, 84
Association of American Colleges, 43, 67, 70, 168
Association of American Universities, 43, 48, 67, 70, 74, 77, 78, 82, 205
Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, 43, 67, 70
Association of Teacher Education Institutions, 70
Association of Urban Universities, 67, 70
Athletics, intercollegiate, 27–28, 120, 128, 129, 166, 188
Atomic Energy Commission, 114, 115
Automation, 60, 141, 197, 199
Aviation, 60, 99–100

Badger, Henry G., 157, 158, 159
Baker, John R., cited, 84
Bankhead-Jones Act, 103
Barden, Graham A., 120
Barnard College, 131
Beneš, Eduard, 100
Bequests, to higher education, 123, 124, 129, 131, 135, 146, 173
Berle, Adolf A., Jr., quoted, 141
Bestor, Arthur E., Jr., 15
Bill of Rights (1689), 11
Bill of Rights (1789), 83
Bird, Frederick L., 109
Birth rate (U. S.), 1930–1955, 1, 102
Bokelman, W. Robert, 148, 151–154, 156, 158–159, 161, 162, 163
Bowles, Frank H., quoted, 2
Brewton, John E., 36; cited 37
British Empire, 8–9
Brogan, Denis W., quoted, 43–44
Brown, Courtney C., quoted, 136
BROWN, FRANCIS J., Foreword, vii–viii
BROWN, FRANCIS J., A Long-Range View of Higher Education, 1–6

Brown, Francis J., cited, 2
Brown University, 125, 196
Brownell, Samuel, 3
Brownell, William C., 12
BRUMBAUGH, A. J., and REDDING S. SUGG, JR., Recent Developments in State and Regional Planning of Higher Education, 32–41
Bryan, William Jennings, 97
Buckley, William F., cited, 133
Budgets, college and university, 34, 58, 69, 73, 111, 136, 191–192, 195
Buildings, *see* Housing; Plant expansion
Burke, Edmund, 83
Bush, John Nash Douglas, 14
Business, and higher education, 20, 97–98, 140–141, 146
  See also Business schools; Corporations; Industry
Business management, of colleges and universities, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 194
Business schools, collegiate, 20, 62–63, 88, 97–98, 99

Cadbury, William E., Jr., cited, 47
California, 3, 5, 36, 109, 110, 114, 176, 182
California and Big Ten Conference Committee, 178–179
Capital funds
  gifts to, 123, 125–126, 143, 209
  need for, 105–106, 126, 141, 145, 208
  solicitation, 125–127, 131, 132, 136, 138, 208
  See also Endowments
Carleton College, 131
CARMAN, HARRY J., Campus Issues and Problems, 46–57
Carman, Harry J., cited, 47
Carnegie, Andrew, 204
Carnegie Corporation of New York, 4, 143, 205
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 86–87
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 53, 65
Central Association of College and University Business Officers, 148, 151
CHALMERS, GORDON KEITH, The Purpose of Learning, 7–16
Chamberlain, L. H., cited, 82
Cheyney, Edward Potts
  cited, 76
  quoted, 98
Church-related colleges, 5, 24, 107–108, 118, 142, 144, 202
Churchill, Winston, quoted, 14
Clemens, Samuel L. (Mark Twain), 135
Coeducational institutions, 23, 124, 164
College Scholarship Service, 170
Columbia University, 98, 112, 117, 124
  Columbia College, 56
  Graduate School of Business, 136, 140
Commission on Financing Higher Education, 119, 120, 121, 130, 166, 167, 202, 207, 208–209
Commonwealth Fund, 39
Communications, 19, 99–100
  See also Radio; Television
Communism, 8–9, 14, 41, 75, 76, 79, 81–82
Communist party (U. S.), membership, 75–76, 78–80
Community chests, 101, 107, 132, 134
Community colleges, 5, 30, 35, 176, 177, 182
Competition, institutional, in higher education, 32, 35, 44, 62, 108, 109, 122, 146, 164, 171, 203
COMPTON, WILSON, Corporation Support, 140–146
Compton, Wilson, quoted, 124
Conant, James B., 11
Condorcet, Antoine Nicolas de, 103
Congress
  and higher education, 17, 43, 44, 81, 82–83, 140, 166
  investigation of foundations, 81
Congress for Cultural Freedom, 84
CONRAD, HERBERT S., and ERNEST V. HOLLIS, Trends in Tuition Charges and Fees, 148–164
Conrad, Herbert S., cited, 162
Constitution (U. S.)
  Amendments
    1–10 (Bill of Rights), 83
    Eighteenth, 10
  and education, 44, 117, 122
  its conception of man's nature, 9, 11
Cooke, George J., quoted, 133
Cornell University, 101, 112, 114, 117, 124, 125
Corporations, support of higher education, 11–12, 17, 107, 119, 130, 140–147, 163, 166, 168, 172, 173, 178, 185, 202, 208–209
Couch, Mrs. Helen, quoted, 137
Couch, W. T., 75, 81; quoted, 77
Coulton, T. E., cited, 76
Council for Financial Aid to Education, 104, 127, 134–135, 140, 142–143, 144, 145, 209
Counseling (guidance), 38, 46, 55–56, 79, 91, 194, 195, 198–199
Courts
  and defense of freedom, 12–13
  decisions affecting higher education, 80, 101, 112, 140, 142
Craigie, S. C., 149, 150, 155
Curriculum
  and board of trustees, 186, 187
  and cost control, 179, 190–191, 195, 205
  and institutional objectives, 46, 201, 203
  and international relations, 88–90
  early standardization of, 22

Curriculum (*cont.*)
effect of accrediting on, 68–69
effect of fiscal needs on, 168, 201–202
effect of ROTC on, 113
expansion of, 28–29, 58–64, 89, 191, 203–204
of junior colleges, 177, 182
planning
and the faculty, 50, 61–62, 110, 199
librarian's participation in, 54
student influence on, 46, 47, 50, 53, 56–57, 62, 199
See also Elective system

Darden, Colgate W., Jr., quoted, 109
Dartmouth College, 112, 124, 125, 131, 136, 138, 173
DAVIDSON, CARTER, Government Support of Private Colleges and Universities, 112–121
Davison, George, 124
Day, Edmund E., 50
Declaration of Independence, 11, 44
Defense, national, and higher education, 17, 41, 42, 43, 114, 115, 120
Deficits, in educational institutions, 105, 124, 141, 144, 145, 146, 164, 185, 190
Degrees, 5, 48, 60, 200
Delaware, 107
Democracy, and higher education, vii, 4, 9–13, 33, 43, 44–45, 50–51, 68, 74, 83
Dentistry, 37, 38, 39, 74, 141
Department of Defense, 42, 43, 115
Department of State, 88, 114
Foreign Service, 86
Departments, college and university
and management, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 195
and the curriculum, 46, 58, 199
organization, 25, 28–29
Depression, 6, 101, 104, 106, 113, 120, 126, 135, 201, 203, 208
Desegregation, 8, 11
Dewey, John, 10, 11, 81; quoted, 9, 10, 14–15, 85
Diderot, Denis, 103
Diversity, institutional, in higher education, 43–44, 45, 67, 68, 70–71, 123, 146, 185–186
Dodds, Harold W., 101, 121
Douglas, William O., quoted, 80

Earlham College, 56
Education, philosophy of, 8–16, 44–45, 63–64, 102–103
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 20
Eisenhower, Milton S., 120
Elective system, 22, 63, 203
Elementary schools, 4, 32, 38
Eliot, Charles William, 125, 203; quoted, 130, 132, 197
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, quoted, 14
Empire State Foundation of Independent Liberal Arts Colleges, 104
Employment
and higher education, 17–21, 68, 71, 169, 202, 205
old-age, and education, 4, 5
See also Student employment
Endowments, of higher education, 23, 27, 101, 102, 103, 121, 123, 125, 126, 135–137, 144–145, 145–146, 167, 177, 194, 201
living endowments, *see* Annual giving
Engineering, 18, 19, 20, 21, 60, 88, 117, 118, 141, 207
schools of, 62–63, 105, 110
Engineers' Council for Professional Development, 65
Enrollment, 58
and withdrawals before course completion, 176, 177, 182
distribution between public and private institutions, 5–6, 102, 115, 117, 122, 146, 165, 175, 176–177
effect on administrative organization and management, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 194, 195
effect on state and regional planning, 32
in relation to quality, 35, 40, 102, 203, 208
See also Admission requirements and standards
prospective increase in, vii, 1–4, 5, 31, 33, 35, 37–38, 40, 47, 48, 101, 102, 106, 109, 118, 122, 161, 166, 167, 173, 175–177, 181, 194, 196, 207–208
recent increases in, 3, 102, 165, 207
veterans, vii, 5, 6, 102, 114–115, 116, 118–119, 161, 207
See also Tuition and fees—size of, and enrollment
Equipment
government surplus supplies, 116
needs, 145, 206
utilization of, 175, 180–181, 192, 194, 195
Examinations, 52, 197–198, 200–201
Exchange, educational, 41, 86, 91
Extension, university, 24–25, 65, 91, 104, 163, 179
See also Agriculture, schools of—extension services

Faculty
and accrediting, 68, 69–70, 72, 73
and community life, 50–51, 91–92
early administrative duties, 22, 23–24
faculty-student ratios, 169, 181, 183, 196, 200
fellowships for, 53
housing, 55
leaves, 52, 53, 86
recruitment, 5, 33, 46, 48–49, 52, 68, 144
retirement, 3, 52, 53, 68, 204
role in institutional policy and operation, 29–30, 47, 50, 53, 56–57, 110, 199

salaries, 34, 38, 42, 51, 53, 68, 70, 105, 106, 125, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 144, 145, 160, 161, 181, 185, 189, 204, 205–206, 209
size and composition, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30
teaching load, 46, 52, 53, 61–62, 110, 180, 181, 183
tenure and promotion, 46, 51, 52, 53, 116, 178, 182–183
See also Academic freedom; Counseling; Publications; Research; Teacher education; Teaching
Fairless, Benjamin F., quoted, 141
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 81
Federal government, and higher education, 41–45, 65, 74, 76, 86, 87–88, 101, 103–104, 108, 112–122, 208, 209–210
See also Government employees; Research—federally supported; Scholarships—federal government; Security program; States—and federal government; Tax exemptions; Taxes; Veterans education
Fellowships, *see* Scholarships and fellowships
Fine, Benjamin, quoted, 102
Florida, 35, 36, 106, 108, 109
Ford, Henry, 10
Ford Foundation, 136–137, 178–179, 181, 204, 209
See also Fund for the Advancement of Education
Ford Motor Company, 11, 119
Foreign Operations Administration, 86
Foreign policy (U. S.), 82, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92
Foreign Policy Association, 91
Foreign Service (U. S.), 86
Foreign students, 42, 47, 86, 90, 91
Foundations
and higher education, 87, 104, 119, 146, 147, 163, 172, 173, 185, 204, 209
See also names of foundations, as Ford Foundation
investigation of, 81
Franklin, Benjamin, 103
Fraternities and sororities, 54–55, 56
Frazer, Mr. and Mrs. George E., 94
Freedom, 12, 75, 80, 83–84, 141, 175
See also Academic freedom; Independence
Frost, Robert, 12, 14
Fullam, Mrs. M. G., 149, 150, 155
Fund for the Advancement of Education, 53, 143

Galileo, 18
Gardner, John W., quoted, 4
General Education Board, 126, 143, 166
General Electric Company, 130, 136, 174
General (liberal arts) education, 34, 63, 69, 84, 88–91, 102, 117, 121, 122, 141–142, 195, 201–202
See also Liberal arts colleges
General Motors Corporation, 11, 119, 142
Genocide Convention (U. N.), 196
George, Henry, 97
Germany, 7, 9
GIDEONSE, HARRY D., Academic Freedom: A Decade of Challenge and Clarification, 75–85
Gideonse, Harry D., 10, 13
cited, 77, 81, 83
quoted, 9
Goldsmith, Selma, cited, 148
Gompers, Samuel, 97
Governing boards, *see* Trustees
Government employees, training of, 41, 62, 86, 88, 92, 115
Great Britain, government aid to higher education, 108, 111

Haag, Ernest van den, cited, 79
Hamilton, Alexander, 11
Harvard University, 82, 91, 97, 101, 104, 112, 117, 124, 125, 195, 197, 203
Committee on the Objectives of General Education in a Free Society, Report, 12, 16
Hatch Act, 41
Haverford College, 56
Hawley, Allen, quoted, 134
Heald, Henry T., 102
Heath, Mrs. Aloise Buckley, 133
Hickerson, Loren L., quoted, 128, 129
Higher education, functions of, vii, 4, 7–16, 17, 55–56, 73–74, 86, 91–92, 102–103, 108–109, 169, 184
Hines, Duncan, 69
Holladay, Mrs. D., 149, 150, 155
HOLLIS, ERNEST V., *see* Conrad, Herbert S., jt. author
Hollis, Ernest V., quoted, 34–35
Hook, Sidney, 77
cited, 79, 81, 82, 83
quoted, 75, 77, 81
Housing, campus, 23, 41, 46, 54–55, 90, 101, 106, 116, 127, 166, 194, 201
Housing and Home Finance Agency, 114, 116
Humanities, the, 13–15, 28–29, 59, 89, 122
Hutchins, Robert M., 75, 81
quoted, 80–81, 82

Ibsen, Henrik, 8
Idaho, 107
Illinois, 106, 109
Independence, institutional, in higher education, 6, 25–26, 33, 43–44, 67, 68, 74, 101
of control by corporate donors, 140
of government control, 30, 42, 108–109, 111, 117, 120, 122, 146

Industry
and higher education, 20, 61, 62, 88, 140–141, 202
support of, *see* Corporations
wages in, 144, 205, 206
See also Technology
Inflation, 165, 167, 168, 185, 201, 205–206
Institutes, in educational institutions, 60, 62, 87–88
International Association of Universities, 86
International relations, and higher education, 47, 86–92
International Relations Clubs, 91
Ivey, John E., Jr., quoted, 37–38

James, Edmund Janes, vii, 93, 94, 97–100
quoted, 98
Jaracz, William A., cited, 162
Jefferson, Thomas, 11, 44, 81, 103; quoted, 83, 102
Junior colleges, 5, 30, 103, 114, 118, 124, 143, 149, 150, 151, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 175–176, 182

Kellogg, W. K., Foundation, 39
Kille, Frank R., 48
Kirk, Grayson, cited, 89
Kirk, Russell, 77
cited, 75, 83, 85
quoted, 77–78
Korean War, 8, 118–119, 207
veterans, *see* Enrollment—recent increases in—veterans; Veterans education

Labor, 10, 140
La Follette, Robert M., 10
LAMBERT, RICHARD D., Discussions, 111, 121–122, 138–139, 146–147, 164–165, 173–174, 182–183, 195
Land-grant colleges 41, 43, 102–104, 112–113, 117, 124, 195
La Rochefoucauld, François, duc de, quoted, 132
Lecture courses, 52, 54, 196–197, 198, 200–201, 203
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, quoted, 80
Liberal arts colleges, 28, 103, 105, 110, 135, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 160, 172, 201, 202
Liberal arts education *see* General (liberal arts) education; Liberal arts colleges
Liberalism, 9–10, 12, 79, 80, 81, 82
Libraries, college and university
educational significance of, 46, 53–54, 198
librarian, office of, 22, 24, 27, 54
management, 193, 194, 203
Lincoln, Abraham, 103; quoted, 46
Lind, C. G., 149, 150, 155
Lindsay, Samuel McCune, 99
Lippmann, Walter
cited, 7, 12, 16
quoted, 10–11
Literature, and education 13–15, 29, 59, 60, 89
Louisiana, 33–34, 36, 37
Lovejoy, Arthur O., cited, 76
Loyalty oaths, for ROTC freshmen, 42, 43
Lynd, Robert S., quoted, 83

McCabe, Thomas B., 110
McCarthy, Joseph R., 10, 82
McCord, David, quoted, 133
McGrath, Earl J., cited, 22
Madison, James, 44
Management, in higher education, 29, 110, 175–195
See also Business management
Marshall, John, 11
Maryland, 101
Massachusetts, 37, 101
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 112, 117, 124, 142
MECK, JOHN F., How Much—and How—Should Students Pay for Higher Education?, 166–173
Medicine
advances in, and lower mortality, 1
education and schools, 18, 37, 38, 39, 58, 60, 62–63, 88, 105, 110, 114, 116, 118, 122, 169–170, 202, 206–207
accrediting of, 66, 72, 74, 110
employment opportunities and earnings in, 20, 141, 144, 169–170, 207
research in, 41, 115
Meiklejohn, Alexander, quoted, 83
Mental health training and research, 39
Merson, Ralph D., 129
Methods of Financing Higher Education, conference on, vii, 93–94, 99, 100, 148, 175
papers and addresses, text of, 97–210
participating institutions and their representatives, 96
program, 95
Michigan, 106, 109, 182
Middlebury College, 138
MILLETT, JOHN D., Recent Developments in Financing Higher Education, 205–210
Millett, John D., cited, 166, 167, 169
Minnesota, 33, 114
Mississippi, 32, 35–37
MORRILL, J. L., Higher Education and the Federal Government, 41–45
Morrill, Justin S., 112; quoted, 103
Morrill Acts (1862, 1890), 103, 104, 112, 113
Motion pictures, 14
Municipal colleges and universities, 52, 76, 82, 102, 103, 144, 152, 153, 156, 160, 182

Nason, John W., cited, 172
National Association of State Universities, 67, 70

National Catholic Educational Association, 43
National Commission on Accrediting, 65, 67, 70–73, 74
National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, 74
National Council of Chief State School Officers, 74
National Education Association 21, 119
Association for Higher Education, 43
National Fund for Medical Education, 143
National Institute of Mental Health, 39
National interest, and higher education, vii, 17, 41, 42, 44, 102–103, 111, 114, 210
National Research Council, 43
National Science Foundation, 11, 20, 43, 115
National Student Association, 91
[National University Extension Association], 65
National Youth Administration, 113, 114, 120, 122
Nelson Amendment, 103
New England Compact on Higher Education, 37
New Hampshire, 112
New Jersey, 112, 118, 209
New Mexico 33
New School for Social Research, 79
New York (City)
municipal colleges, 52, 76, 82
public education, Communism and academic freedom in, 76, 77, 80, 82
New York (State)
Feinberg Law, 80
higher education in, 112, 114, 119, 120
Newton, Isaac, 18
Normal schools, 30, 157, 158, 159
North Dakota, 3, 107
Northwestern University, 97, 129
Nuclear science and engineering, 18, 19, 41, 60, 114, 115, 129
Nursing, 5, 20, 39, 119

Office of Education, 53, 65 (Bureau), 74, 105, 148, 150–151, 154, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162
Office of Naval Research, 122
Ohio State University 124, 129, 139
Ohio Wesleyan University, 56
Olds, Irving S., 142
Ordinance of 1787, 44
Oregon, 32
Ostheimer, Richard D., cited, 167, 168

PAGET, RICHARD M., Operating Costs and University Management: Methods to Effect Economies, 184–194
Patten, Simon N., 98
PATTERSON, ERNEST MINOR, The Career of Edmund Janes James, 97–100
Pennsylvania, 101, 114
Perjury, 79, 80, 82
PERKINS, JOHN A., Government Support of Public Universities and Colleges, 101–111
PINKHAM, FRED O., The Accreditation Problem, 65–74
Plant expansion (building), 116, 123, 126, 131, 145, 163, 190, 203–204, 208
needs, 105–106, 126, 145, 205, 208
See also Housing
Plant maintenance, 23, 180, 186, 190, 203–204, 206
Polanyi, Michael, cited and quoted, 84
Politics, and higher education, 41–42, 44, 76, 78–79, 83, 88, 107, 108, 111, 120, 121, 140, 176, 178
Pollard, John A., quoted, 123
Pope, Alexander, quoted, 14
Population (U. S.)
and higher education, comparative figures, 1–3
and technology, 18–19
and types of employment, comparative figures, 19
mobility, and higher education, 3, 66
President (U. S.), 140
Presidents, college and university, 38, 56
academic responsibilities, 189
administrative responsibilities of, 22–28 (*passim*), 48, 49, 69, 187, 189, 191
and fund raising, 125, 126, 127, 130, 135, 189
background of, 24
office staff, 29, 192
President's Commission on Higher Education, 105, 118, 120
Press, and higher education, 17
Pressure groups, 52, 106, 107, 111
Princeton University, 48, 56, 117, 124–125, 126, 131, 137
Procter and Gamble Company, 11
Professional organizations, and accrediting, 65–74 (*passim*)
Professional schools, 25, 28, 36, 38, 40, 62, 73, 105, 117, 143, 144, 149, 150, 151, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 172, 188, 202
Public Health Service, 39, 115, 116, 118
Public opinion
and congressional investigations, 82
influence of higher education on, 41–42, 91, 92
of education, 4, 17, 44, 82, 107, 121, 138
Public relations, college and university, 23, 26, 27–28, 92, 188, 195
See also Alumni—services for
Public schools, 13, 30, 32, 38, 207
Public Works Administration, 116
Publications, 48, 55, 87, 108
Publicly controlled institutions of higher education
admission standards, 176, 177, 182
and government (state and federal) control, 42, 43, 108–109, 111

Publicly controlled institutions of higher education (*cont.*)
corporation support of, 143
educational role of, 44, 102–103, 165
faculty salaries in, 105, 144, 160, 189
financial difficulties of, 101, 104–106, 109–110, 111, 145, 189, 195
private support of, 101, 129, 139, 177, 178
See also Enrollment—distribution between public and private institutions; Land-grant colleges; Municipal colleges; States; Tuition and fees—in public institutions

Radio, 100
and higher education, 60, 91, 197
Rapp-Coudert investigation, 76, 82
Raskin, A. H., cited, 209
Reed College, 56
Regional Accrediting Associations, 65, 70, 71–72, 73
National Committee of, 70, 71–72
Regional planning in higher education, 3, 32, 36–40
Research, 163, 184, 192, 193
corporation grants for, 61, 143
expansion of, 28, 61, 62, 129, 206, 207
federally supported, 20, 41, 42, 43, 61, 86, 87, 104, 106, 114, 115–116, 117, 121, 122, 163, 206, 209–210
in international relations, 86, 87–88, 91, 92
its relation to teaching, 42, 48, 49, 51, 61, 62, 105–106
privately supported, importance of, 177
state supported, 36, 43, 195
Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 41, 42, 113–114, 121
Rice, Mrs. Mabel C., 149, 150, 155
Richardson case, 75–76
Robin Hood, 81
Rockefeller Foundation, 205
Roman Catholic Church, 79
higher education, 43, 144
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 13
Rowe, Leo S., 99
Russell, Bertrand, quoted, 81
Russell, Jane, 197
RUSSELL, JOHN DALE, Changing Patterns of Administrative Organization in Higher Education, 21–31
Russell, John Dale, cited, 182
Rutgers University, 112, 124

Salk, Jonas E., 7
San Francisco State College, 89
Scholarships and fellowships, 162, 195
and alumni fund raising, 129, 131, 136
and institutional finances, 108, 122, 166, 168, 173
college and university distributed, 119, 144, 171, 172, 173
corporation, 11–12, 119, 146, 166, 168, 172, 173
extent and areas of need for, 6, 11, 118–120, 122, 145, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174
federal government, 11, 101, 108, 115, 118–119, 120, 121, 122, 173, 210
recent increase in, 119, 168, 170, 171–172, 209
relation to student loans and employment, 119–120, 172–173, 174
state, 114, 119, 120
United Kingdom national, 108
Woodrow Wilson Fellowships, 48
Schlagel, John N., cited, 119
Secondary schools, 2, 4, 32, 38, 62, 120, 124, 165, 175, 200, 207
Security program, and education, 42, 43, 76, 81–83
Severinghaus, Aura Edward, cited, 47
Seymour, Harold J., 133
Seymour, Thomas Day, 126
Shaw, George Bernard, 8
Shera, Jesse H., cited, 54
Sinclair, Upton, 8
Sloan, Alfred P., Jr., 142; quoted, 135
Sloan, Alfred P., Foundation, 143
Smith College, 124, 133
Snavely, Guy M., cited, 6
Social studies, 59
Social work, education in, 38, 39, 60, 118
Socialism, 41, 133, 142
Southern Regional Education Compact and Board, 36, 37–39, 40
Soviet Union, American reports of, 7–8
Specialization, effect on higher education, 17–18, 28, 29, 32, 41, 58–61, 62, 63, 65–66, 67, 68–69, 73, 86, 88, 92, 109, 112, 176, 182, 203, 205, 206
See also Regional planning in higher education
Stanford University, 91, 117, 124, 199
States
aid to private educational institutions, 101, 111, 112, 114
and accrediting, 67, 69, 74
and federal government, educational interrelations, 42, 103–104, 117–118, 122, 208, 210
educational planning, 32–36, 109
See also Regional planning
expenditures for higher education, 104, 110, 139, 142
governmental and political difficulties affecting higher education, 106–107, 111
operating deficits, 105
taxation, and higher education, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111, 118, 122, 145–146, 177, 178
See also Publicly controlled institutions of higher education
Steffens, Lincoln, 8

STEWART, ERNEST T., JR., Alumni Support and Annual Giving, 123–138
STOKE, HAROLD W., The Flowering Curricula of Higher Education, 58–64
Stout, Minard W., 75
Student counseling, *see* Counseling
Student employment, 113, 119, 120, 168, 171, 172–173, 174
Student government, 46, 47, 55, 56–57, 90–91
Student loans, 119, 120, 145, 171, 172–173, 174
Student personnel services, administrative organization of, 23, 26, 27, 28
Student placement, 25, 194
SUGG, REDDING S., JR., *see* Brumbaugh, A. J., jt. author
Sumner, William Graham, quoted, 125, 135
Supreme Court of the United States, 10, 11, 80, 112
Syracuse University, 114, 142

Tax exemptions, 101, 111, 114
for gifts to education, 116–117, 170, 174, 177, 200
for parents of college students, 108, 117, 122, 145, 166, 168–169, 170, 173, 177
on real estate held by educational institutions, 112, 121
Taxes, and higher education
effect on large gifts to education, 101, 145, 146, 185
federal, effect on state, 104, 106, 111
overlapping, 106
state, *see* States—taxation
See also Tax exemptions
Tax-supported institutions, *see* Publicly controlled institutions of higher education
Teacher education, 14–15, 88, 200
schools of (teachers colleges), 24, 74, 103, 110, 114, 118, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160
See also Normal schools
Teachers
demand for, 20–21, 48, 200, 205–206, 207
See also Faculty; Teacher education; Teaching
Teaching
centrality of, in higher education, 47–48, 138, 145, 181, 184, 203, 204
cost studies and management of, 181, 182–183, 190–191, 193, 195, 200–201, 203–204
quality of, 49–50, 51–52, 53, 61–62, 199–201, 203
See also Lecture courses
Technical schools, 37, 143, 144, 149, 150, 151, 155, 172
Technology, and higher education, 18–21, 122, 141–142, 202, 206
See also Technical schools
Television, and higher education, 6, 39, 60, 91, 120, 197
Tennessee Valley Authority, 81, 114
Tenure, academic, *see* Faculty—tenure
Textbooks, 68, 196, 199, 200
Thomas, Elbert D., 120
Thompson, Robert Ellis, 98
Thompson, Ronald B., cited, 3
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 83; quoted, 84
Totalitarianism, 41, 44, 77, 79, 83, 84, 85
Transportation, 19, 20, 97
[Trowbridge, John Townsend], quoted ("Darius Green"), 99
Trustees (governing boards), of educational institutions, 29, 52, 53, 75, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 136, 147, 179, 186–188
TRYTTEN, M. H., Meeting Manpower Needs, 17–21
Trytten, M. H., quoted, 4
Tuition and fees
as related to educational cost (institutional expenditures), 145, 148, 158, 159–161, 163, 165, 166–167, 169–170, 173–174, 191, 201, 202
in public institutions, 34, 103, 105, 122, 145, 148–165, 167, 169, 209
out-of-state (nonresident), 38, 115, 148, 155, 156–159, 161, 165
increases in, 4, 108, 122, 145, 149–165, 167–171, 173–174, 203, 209
in relation to faculty salaries, 160
in relation to income, 148, 152–156, 161, 163–165, 168, 209
methods of payment, 171, 173, 174
See also Scholarships; Student employment; Student loans
size of, and enrollment, 115, 164, 167–168, 171, 173, 174
Tulane University, 131
Tyler, Henry W., cited, 76

Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, 11, 119
Union College, 112, 124, 125
United Nations, 86, 90
Economic and Social Council, 87
Genocide Convention, 196
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 86
United Negro College Fund, 134, 143
United States Air Force Academy, 197
United States Military Academy, 113
United States Naval Academy, 113
United States Steel Corporation, 141, 142
University of California, 82, 115, 117, 124
University of Chicago, 26, 81, 82, 97, 115, 117
Press, 75
University of Florida, 91, 108
University of Illinois, 97, 117, 125
University of Maine, 101
University of Michigan, 102, 105, 117, 126, 129
University of Nevada, 75–76

University of North Carolina, 101, 102
University of Notre Dame, 124, 139
University of Pennsylvania
  alumni giving, 124
  and Edmund J. James, 93, 97, 98
  contract research in, 117
  state support of, 114
  Wharton School of Finance and Commerce (Economy), 93, 97–98, 99
  See also Methods of Financing Higher Education, conference on
University of Vermont, 112
University of Virginia, 44, 102
University of Washington, 76, 77
University of Wisconsin, 195
University presses, 91, 194

Vassar College, 124, 137
Veterans education, 41, 42, 107, 108, 114–119 (*passim*), 122, 164, 172
  See also Enrollment—recent increases in—veterans
Veterinary medicine, education in, 37, 38, 39, 74, 105
Virginia, 114
Vocational education, 17, 30, 35, 42, 89, 92, 117, 201, 203

Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act, 1935), 10
Wallace, Henry A., 10
War, effect on curriculum, 59
Washington, George, 103; quoted, 44
Washington and Lee University, 56
Waterman, Alan, cited, 20
Watson, Charles, quoted, 133
Webster, Daniel, 112
Wellemeyer, J. F., 3
WELLS, HARRY L., Standards of Service in University Management, 175–182
Wesleyan University, 124, 125
Western Interstate Compact and Commission for Higher Education, 36, 37, 39, 40
Wharton, Edith, 97
Wharton, Joseph, 98
Wharton School, 93, 97–98, 99
White House Conference on Education, 36, 109
Wilder, Thornton, 14
Williams College, 124
Williamson, E. O., cited, 56
WILSON, HOWARD E., The Role of the University in International Relations, 86–92
Wilson, Howard E., cited, 86
Wolfle, Dael, cited, 20, 21
Wood, Daniel W., 101
World Health Organization, 86
World War I, 59, 113, 126
World War II, 41, 59, 114, 164, 206, 208
  veterans, *see* Enrollment—recent increases in—veterans; Veterans education
WRISTON, HENRY M., How to Finance Higher Education in the Future, 196–204

Yale University, 112, 124, 125, 127, 129, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 142
Young Men's Christian Association, 126

1955

VOLUME 302 NOVEMBER 1955

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*

THE PUBLIC SCHOOL AND OTHER COMMUNITY SERVICES

69626

Edited by

THEODORE L. RELLER, Ph.D.
Professor of Education
University of California
Berkeley, California

3L

Copyright 1955, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

M13, N55
N55

PHILADELPHIA
1955

Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.

CONTENTS

PAGE

EARL GRANT HARRISON: 1899–1955 vii

FOREWORD viii

THE UNITED STATES

CHANGING SCENES—CHANGING ISSUES . . . . . *Theodore L. Reller* 1
THE CITY PLANNING PROCESS: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY EDUCATION *Francis Violich* 8
HOUSING POLICY AND THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM . . . . . *Catherine Bauer* 17
EDUCATION AND RECREATION . . . . . *Jackson M. Anderson* 28
EDUCATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH . . . . . *Dorothy B. Nysander* 34
EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE . . . . . *Kermit T. Wiltse* 44
THE SCHOOL AND THE PUBLIC LIBRARY . *Frances Henne and Frances Lander Spain* 52
THE SCHOOL AND DELINQUENCY CONTROL . . . . . *Bertram M. Beck* 60
OCCUPATIONAL EDUCATION IN THE SCHOOLS *William P. Loomis and Louise Moore* 68

THE EUROPEAN SCENE

TOWARDS CO-ORDINATION IN GREAT BRITAIN: A SURVEY . . *W. O. Lester Smith* 74
CO-ORDINATION IN GREAT BRITAIN: TRENDS AND ISSUES . *William P. Alexander* 82
LIVERPOOL: A CASE STUDY IN CO-ORDINATION . . . . . *H. S. Magnay* 88
EDUCATION AND OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN FRANCE 100
EDUCATION AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES IN THE NETHERLANDS *F. Th. van der Maden* 106
EDUCATION AND RELATED SERVICES IN SWEDEN . . . . . *Åke W. Edfeldt* 114
EDUCATION AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES IN SWITZERLAND *Robert Dottrens* 121

VIEWPOINTS ON CO-ORDINATION

A SOCIOLOGIST ON SCHOOL-COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS . *Gordon W. Blackwell* 128
CO-ORDINATION: THE VIEWPOINT OF A POLITICAL SCIENTIST . *Eldon L. Johnson* 136
SOME PATHS TO CO-ORDINATION . . . . . *Theodore L. Reller* 143

PAGE

BOOK DEPARTMENT

ALLEN, HARRY CRANBROOK. *Great Britain and the United States.* G. C. Osborn 153

ALLPORT, GORDON W. *Becoming.* Joseph B. Casagrande 171

ATAMIAN, SARKIS. *The Armenian Community.* A. O. Sarkissian 174

BAUER, RAYMOND A. with the assistance of EDWARD WASIOLEK. *Nine Soviet Portraits.* Charles B. McLane 191

BAUMONT, MAURICE, JOHN H. E. FRIED, and EDMOND VERMEIL (Eds.). *The Third Reich.* Louis L. Snyder 195

BEANEY, WILLIAM M. *The Right to Counsel in American Courts.* Henry S. Drinker 160

BECKHART, BENJAMIN HAGGOTT (Ed.). *Banking Systems.* Arthur Leon Horniker 164

BECKWITH, BURNHAM PUTNAM. *Marginal-Cost Price-Output Control.* Lewis H. Haney 169

BERMAN, HAROLD J., and MIROSLAV KERNER. *Soviet Military Law and Administration.* N. S. Timasheff 193

BERNSTEIN, MARVER H. *Regulating Business by Independent Commission.* Henry Reining, Jr. 156

BROWN, A. J. *The Great Inflation, 1939–1951.* Hans A. Adler 167

CARR, E. H. *The Interregnum, 1923–1924.* Frederick C. Barghoorn 190

CATTELL, DAVID T. *Communism and the Spanish Civil War.* Claude E. Bowers 194

CHAMBERLAIN, NEIL W. *A General Theory of Economic Process.* Sidney C. Sufrin 170

CLEGG, H. A. *General Union.* Adolf Sturmthal 188

CLEGG, H. A., and ALLAN FLANDERS (Eds.). *The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain.* Adolf Sturmthal 188

CURRENT, RICHARD N. *Daniel Webster and the Rise of National Conservatism.* Charles M. Thomas 162

DAHIR, JAMES. *Region Building.* Lee S. Greene 169

DEANE, HERBERT A. *The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski.* William Y. Elliott 186

EICHELBERGER, CLARK M. *UN: The First Ten Years.* Henry R. Winkler 154

ELLIOTT, WILLIAM, H. VAN B. CLEVELAND, THEODORE GEIGER, and others. *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy.* Oliver Benson 149

Ennin's Diary: The Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law. Translated by Edwin O. Reischauer. Derk Bodde 199

EVANS, F. BOWEN (Ed.). *Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities.* Joseph S. Roucek 192

FARMER, PAUL. *Vichy, Political Dilemma.* Joseph J. Mathews 194

FISHER, HAROLD H. *The Communist Revolution.* Sydney D. Bailey 193

FRAENKEL, MARTA, and CARL L. ERHARDT. *Morbidity in the Municipal Hospitals of the City of New York.* Louise E. Bollo 177

GRIMES, ALAN P. *American Political Thought.* Charles W. Shull 159

PAGE

HACHIYA, MICHIHIKO. *Hiroshima Diary.* Albert E. Kane 202

HARE, RONALD. *Pomp and Pestilence.* Henry E. Sigerist 177

HARTT, JULIAN N. *Toward a Theology of Evangelism.* Irl Whitchurch 185

HERRING, HUBERT. *A History of Latin America.* Arthur P. Whitaker 203

KIRK, RUSSELL. *Academic Freedom.* Claude E. Hawley 171

LARSEN, J. A. O. *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History.* Charles Edward Smith 183

LEVI, WERNER. *Modern China's Foreign Policy.* Earl H. Pritchard 200

LINK, ARTHUR S. *American Epoch.* Ralph Volney Harlow 158

LIPPMANN, WALTER. *The Public Philosophy.* Ralph H. Gabriel 181

MACCOBY, S. *English Radicalism, 1762–1785.* Mildred Campbell 187

MAO, TSE-TUNG. *Selected Works.* Vols. I–III. H. Arthur Steiner 198

MARTINI, WINFRIED. *Das Ende aller Sicherheit.* Herbert Moller 182

MENDÈS-FRANCE, PIERRE, and ARDAN, GABRIEL. *Economics and Action.* Henry H. Villard 168

MEYERSON, MARTIN, and EDWARD C. BANFIELD. *Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest.* Nathan D. Grundstein 172

MIKSCHE, F. O. *Atomic Weapons and Armies.* Eugene M. Emme 162

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. *Business Concentration and Price Policy.* J. P. Watson 164

NEWLYN, W. T., and D. C. ROWAN. *Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa.* Arthur Leon Horniker 164

NEWMAN, WILLIAM H., and JAMES P. LOGAN. *Management of Expanding Enterprises.* Robert N. McMurry 166

PERRY, J. HARVEY. *Taxes, Tariffs, and Subsidies.* James A. Maxwell 189

PRICE, HARRY BAYARD. *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning.* Percy W. Bidwell 154

REINHARDT, GEORGE C. *American Strategy in the Atomic Age.* Eugene M. Emme 162

REISCHAUER, EDWIN O. *Ennin's Travels in T'ang China.* Derk Bodde 199

RICH, NORMAN, and M. H. FISHER (Eds.). *The Holstein Papers.* Vol. I: *Memoirs and Political Observations.* Carl G. Anthon 197

ROBSON, WILLIAM A. (Ed.). *Great Cities of the World.* Wallace S. Sayre 173

RUSSELL, JAMES E. (Ed.). *National Policies for Education, Health, and Social Services.* C. Hartley Grattan 180

SALOMON, ALBERT. *The Tyranny of Progress.* Harry Elmer Barnes 178

SANDERSON, ROSS W. *The Church Serves the Changing City.* F. Ernest Johnson 185

SHAFER, BOYD C. *Nationalism: Myth and Reality.* Koppel S. Pinson 151

SIEGFRIED, ANDRÉ. *America at Mid-Century.* Translated by Margaret Ledésert. Robert E. Spiller 155

SMITH, HUSTON. *The Purpose of Higher Education.* Samuel S. Stratton 179

PAGE

SMITH, STANLEY HUGH. *Freedom to Work.* Arnold M. Rose 175

SPENCER, SAMUEL R., JR. *Booker T. Washington and the Negro's Place in American Life.* Frank J. Klingberg 176

STANDLEY, WILLIAM, and ARTHUR AGETON. *Admiral Ambassador to Russia.* Anatole G. Mazour 157

STROETZEL, JEAN. *Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword.* John W. Bennett 201

SUKHANOV, N. N. *The Russian Revolution, 1917.* Edited and translated by Joel Carmichael. Sydney D. Bailey 191

TANNENBAUM, FRANK. *The American Tradition in Foreign Policy.* Vera Micheles Dean 150

THORELLI, HANS B. *The Federal Antitrust Policy.* Broadus Mitchell 161

TIMM, HELGA. *Die deutsche Sozialpolitik und der Bruch der Grossen Koalition im März 1930.* Robert Mueller 196

VEVIER, CHARLES. *The United States and China, 1906–1913.* J. K. Fairbank .. 157

VON GRUNEBAUM, G. E. *Islam.* James A. Bellamy 183

WEINBERG, GERHARD. *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941.* H. H. Fisher 152

What Makes an Executive? Robert N. McMurry 166

WIECK, HANS GEORG. *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wiedergründung des Zentrums im Jahre 1945.* Robert Mueller 196

WOOD, ARTHUR EVANS. *Hamtramck Then and Now.* Stephen W. Mamchur ... 174

WRIGHT, CONRAD. *The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America.* Conrad Henry Moehlman 184

OTHER BOOKS 203

INDEX 208

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index.*

EARL GRANT HARRISON

1899-1955

On July 28, 1955, Earl Grant Harrison, member of the Board of Directors of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, was stricken suddenly by a heart attack.

Mr. Harrison had a distinguished career as a public servant and as a private citizen. He was director of alien registration, United States Department of Justice (1940–41); special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States (1941–42), and United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization (1942–44). Later, he served as the United States Representative on the Intergovernment Committee on Refugees (1945–46) and as vice-chairman of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization (1952).

In his home city, Philadelphia, he served his community in many ways. From 1936 to 1943 he was president of the Public Charities Association of Pennsylvania, and since 1939 he had been vice-chairman and then chairman of the Philadelphia Award Trustees. At the University of Pennsylvania, where he received the degree of bachelor of arts in 1920 and of bachelor of laws in 1923, he served at various times as instructor, professor, and dean of its Law School, as a vice-president of the University, and as a member of its Board of Trustees. Since 1948 he had been a partner of one of the city's most prominent law firms.

Mr. Harrison was an administrator of extraordinary ability, he freely gave of his time and effort to many worthy causes, and his friendship was treasured by all who were privileged to enjoy it. By his death the Academy has lost a warm friend and wise counselor.

FOREWORD

Public education has experienced a striking development in recent years. The increase in the number of children has necessitated large expansion. Development in other ways has been even more significant. Increasingly, as the problems of society have mounted, public education has been required to assume more responsibility for the growth of children and youth through an almost limitless variety of learning experiences. It is society's most consciously conceived instrument to strengthen the individual and to improve community life.

The problems of modern society—the unmet needs and tensions—have also demanded the provision and rapid expansion of other public services. Public interest in land use, housing, public health, social welfare, youth services, and other public services has increased sharply. In many of these areas there has been an awakening in recent decades comparable to that experienced in public education a century ago. Many of these developments have large significance for the development of children and youth.

It has been said that each child attends two schools: his home and his school. Perhaps it should be said that each attends at least three schools: his home, his school, and his community.

With the increase in the number of agencies concerned with children and youth, and with the growing size and complexity of schools, school systems, and other services, the problem of the co-ordination of effort emerges. It demands new approaches. The more adequate provision for the growth of children and youth is a major challenge to our society. It cannot be met by any one agency alone.

But how shall co-ordination be effected? Is there a danger that it may result in conflict and reduction in the exercise of initiative? How can various agencies come to understand the role which each can play most effectively? Can an agency serve its primary purpose as well (or better) while co-operating with another public service? Are changes in governmental policy, structure, and organization needed? Is the problem largely one of developing understanding among various professional staffs? What is the level of public opinion and action? Can the "conflict" among services be reduced or eliminated, to the desired enrichment of all through co-ordination? In the long run will the administrative "independence" which our society has granted to public education give it greater strength? In an increasingly complex society is such independence more necessary or less so? Should the agency which co-ordinates also administer?

To these questions, which concern men of many nations, this issue is addressed.

THEODORE L. RELLER

Changing Scenes—Changing Issues

By THEODORE L. RELLER

FOR more than a century, the people of the United States have been studying and experimenting with a variety of arrangements pertaining to the relations of public schools and other governmental departments and services. Practices have varied widely over the years and among communities at any given time. On the one hand, education has been seen as an integral part of local government. In New England, for example, the Education Committee was a committee of the town responsible to the town either through the town meeting or a town governing body. Under these circumstances, education was considered in relation to other town services and seen as one of the services without notably exceptional features. In fact, the construction and maintenance of buildings, the levying of taxes, the development and approval of the budget, were in many instances not the responsibility of the Education Committee but rather of the governing board of the town. This resulted in costly conflicts and delays. As the educational program developed, it became so large in many towns that the Education Committee was granted greater responsibilities and a greater measure of independence of action in regard to all matters pertaining to education. Education became the largest of the responsibilities of the town. At about the same time, there was a growing recognition of the importance of education in the society, with emphasis upon the desirability of having it set up in such a way that it would be in the direct control of the people, with little or no responsibility to other local governmental bodies.

Thus there developed the Board of Education with large responsibilities and powers conferred upon it by statute. In its "best" form, this Board of Education had no direct relationship to the city government or to any other local governmental body. It levied taxes, employed personnel, secured land, and constructed buildings, and under either direct or implied statutory powers did anything necessary to maintain schools. In many communities, education has never had this measure of independence. But educators have generally sought it while political scientists have tended to question its soundness. Various studies conducted in this field have not offered a conclusive answer to the issue. In the meantime, changes have been occurring in society as well as in education and in other public services, and it is therefore believed that the present is a most opportune time to re-examine the problem in at least some of its many phases.

At the present time, established administrative structure and the informal arrangements existing between agencies and their staffs vary widely from state to state. Mere fiscal dependence or independence of schools, for example, does not necessarily tell much of the story regarding the extent to which there is co-ordination of effort on the part of educational and other public service agencies. The problem of co-ordination to be considered here is, therefore, deeper than—though not unrelated to—such matters as established governmental structure and finance. It certainly involves, also, public opinion and the views of the professional groups involved.

PREMISES

This issue of THE ANNALS was not planned to cover all phases of this exceedingly large and complex problem. It concerns itself with: (1) education at the elementary and secondary levels; (2) governmental services directly related to individual and community development, such as health, welfare, libraries, land use and housing, and delinquency control; and (3) services provided rather than details of program and methods of any of the agencies involved. It does not explore directly or in detail such important problems as the relation of public educational services and the military; fiscal dependence or independence and related financial matters; the curriculum as it facilitates community development; the exact arrangements between the city or other local government bodies and the board responsible for education. The volume is fundamentally pointed toward the problem in the United States. Although it gives attention also to other societies, it does so primarily in an effort to find new, different, or additional possible approaches to a solution of the problem. It involves the viewpoint of educators but especially looks at the problem from the point of view of those who are students of or leaders in other areas. It aims to describe briefly better practices, to isolate and explain problems and issues, and to evaluate in broad terms. It does all of these things in an effort to stimulate further thinking and study concerning the problems of co-ordination and to point to potentially promising future developments.

In developing this series of papers a few general assumptions have been made, as follows: (1) The co-ordination or perhaps even the integration of the efforts of those responsible for public services which impinge directly upon the development of children and youth should contribute to the effectiveness of these services. (2) Each agency, organization, or service involved has certain responsibilities and competencies, some of which may not relate directly to children and education. (3) The co-ordination or integration which is achieved should not interfere with the discharge of the various responsibilities of the respective agencies but rather should facilitate meeting them. (4) Significant improvement can be effected in the working relationships of those public agencies in our communities which have a responsibility for the development of children and youth.

EARLY FORCES STIMULATING SEPARATISM

In order to understand the situation existing today it is necessary to look briefly at some of the forces or factors which influenced the developments that occurred through a century. Among the more important of these are the following:

Public education developed earlier and more vigorously than most of the related services. The great awakening in regard to public education occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century. This was almost a century earlier than the public awakening concerning such matters as land use, housing, and public health.

Public education was considered imperative if the new republic with a strong democratic faith was to carry forward. The early leaders of the nation emphasized the relationship between an educated people and a free government conducted by the people. The importance attached to education is shown also by the attitude of the federal government in the development of the great public domain—the land in the West. The policy which was established prior to the adoption of the Constitution and which persisted was to

set aside large acreages for the establishment and the endowment of public schools.

There was a strong desire to have the schools close to the people and not too readily responsive to those in positions of influence and power in government. The significance of education for the development of the state was not underestimated; rather, popular control was intended to ensure an educational program which would provide a basis for a more perfect union rather than for the enhancement of the power of any one group, including public officials. It was an early attempt to find an answer to such questions as: In whose interest shall the schools be operated? May schools be used to contribute to the improvement of the society and its government or are they the instruments of those who govern or of government? Probably partly as a result of European backgrounds but perhaps even more as a result of the independence men found in America, especially as they moved west, the people were desirous of keeping the schools directly responsive to them. The remoteness and relative security of our new continent also made it unnecessary for education to be a direct instrumentality of the state—and, of course, much less so of those governing. The "climate" encouraged belief in the perfectibility of man and of society, and education was among the leading instruments utilized in the pursuit of this faith.

Local government was believed to be "corrupt," and many people wished to remove the schools from this corruption. The last half of the nineteenth century was a period in which corruption was rampant in the governments of many American cities. "Boss" rule was widespread, and the only direct escape from it appeared to be the removal of vital services, such as education, from the control of city government. The elimination of corruption was seen as a task which would involve many years—years during which education should be carried on apart from local government.

Education came to be regarded legally as a function of the states. This was less true, formerly, of social welfare, health, recreation, libraries, and some other matters, which were viewed more generally as the responsibility of local government, since they were considered services less vital than education to the continued existence of the state. The legal concept that education was a function of the state supported those who were anxious to eliminate local governmental control of education because of corruption: it was argued that the state should establish separate and independent local Boards of Education to provide and maintain the educational service. Conceivably the local government could have served the state in the educational field—though this arrangement would probably have been more involved because of the many other powers of the local government. The creation of the local Board of Education ensured direct action within limits prescribed by the state.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS

In the early years of the twentieth century, the clear and complete separation of education from all general local government control was widely accepted in the educational world as a satisfactory solution to the question under consideration. Though separation in administrative structure did not deny the desirability of co-ordination of effort between the educational system and other agencies, there can be little doubt that it did not encourage co-ordination. Yet almost as this solution was coming to be accepted in theory, and increasingly also in practice, a series of new forces appeared to disturb some of

those who believed they had "found" an answer. Among the forces which challenged the pattern that had been developing were the following:

The society was characterized by increasing urbanization, growing complexity, and more governmental action. Urbanization and industrialization brought new and difficult problems. The interrelationships between various social and economic policies and practices became clearer. Governmental action was demanded and provided on an ever increasing front. Relatively, education may have commanded considerably less of the thought devoted to public-service issues than at an earlier date. It became increasingly doubtful whether any service could stand alone effectively in such a complex and interrelated society.

Schools came to be more concerned with their potential impact upon society. They gave more attention to the conditions under which people lived, and to the problems of individuals and of the society. One important test of the effectiveness of the school became the contribution which it made to the improvement of community living. Thus schools directed more attention toward problems of government, concerned as it was with housing, health, delinquency, employment. This movement or expression of interest raised the question as to whether schools should not work more closely with other governmental agencies concerned with the same problems. It was clear that the activities of schools were inevitably closely intertwined with those of other agencies.

The society was confronted with problems pertaining to children and youth with which no one agency could cope effectively. Juvenile delinquency, the result of a vast complex of factors, was obviously a challenge to the whole society and to many of its institutions. No agency alone could hope to prevent or eliminate it. The schools inevitably had a large role to play—as had other public services.

Expansion of social services

A number of the social services expanded in the first half of the twentieth century somewhat as education had in the nineteenth. Social welfare, health, land use and housing, were no longer solely or largely consigned to private action. They received public consideration. Programs of action by government at various levels were developed. While education continued to expand in the twentieth century, the "awakening" about it had occurred in the nineteenth. In the twentieth century a public awakening regarding other aspects of living led to public action—and correspondingly to an increasing "competition" for the tax dollar among the social services, and between the social services and the demands of preparedness resulting from international tensions.

Professionalization

With the expansion of the social services and in the light of the study of problems of local government, various governmental services were professionalized and greatly improved. The city manager contributed to the strengthening of local government as the city superintendent of schools had strengthened educational administration a half century or more earlier. Highly trained professional workers made their appearance in library service, social welfare, public health, and juvenile court service. Although schools and school people may well have hesitated to co-ordinate efforts with the earlier untrained "political" officeholders, this hesitation was now much less well founded. This is not to argue that all is well regarding the position of professional personnel in education or other service fields. It is, however, to recognize that the wide gap in professional standards of appointment and service was narrowing; in some cases even disappearing. The statements of the American Library Association on the need to defend freedom to read and to learn, the need to fight the book burners posing as superpatriots, might well have made educators proud to have been in their ranks. Professional development in a number of groups raised the question whether each could not achieve its purposes and responsibilities more significantly if it were working co-operatively with and supported by others who had common purposes and common problems. Too frequently various groups with common goals were unaware of each other's efforts and so could not strengthen one another in their common struggles as they should have. Professionalization tended to raise walls between groups.

How independent?

There was growing recognition of the fact that although formal organization was important, informal organization could be equally so, and that one type of organization had relatively little significance without the other. Thus it was clear that while schools were independent they were not nearly so independent as had been imagined. To preserve their independence, they sometimes avoided controversial or dangerous areas which they should have been considering. Their independence may thus have reduced their influence upon community living. Perhaps they were too far removed from the maelstrom of public debate for their own best development. Certainly many groups without legal control over the school system exercised large control over what was taught and how. Under the impact of congressional investigating committees, for example, some teachers avoided consideration of even such matters as the Bill of Rights, yet these committees have no formal organizational relationship to the schools. Here, then, was a difficult question. Was independence, though much less real than apparent on the surface, to be preferred to less formal independence and more public struggle regarding the place, character, and role of education in a democracy? Obviously not all had been gained through independence that had been hoped for. But did any other answer promise as much?

Difficulties of co-ordination

The principles of administration which were widely accepted led to difficulties in co-ordination of effort. Line and staff organization was generally accepted. The school administrator, as a result, saw the health and library service for the school child as his direct responsibility. The public health officer saw all aspects of public health, including school health if related to his department, as his direct responsibility. Thus, to have the lines of authority straight it appeared necessary to keep school health separate from public health—or worse, probably, to keep matters of school health, if under the public health officer, separate from health education. An organization that would fix responsibility upon the proper party, that would include the various interested parties, and that would not result in long delays in decision making was not to be formed readily. Was there a type of organization which could bring together essential resources in an effective service? Or was it necessary to continue to have a public library service and a school library service co-ordinated informally if at all?

Religious groups entered the field of education more than they entered other public service areas and sought limited

aid for their schools (or for the students in them) from noneducational services. The problem of achieving close co-operation among various publicly provided services was much complicated by this situation, for public schools were generally provided under laws specifying that the funds for them should not be used to aid private schools of any type, while funds for public health and social welfare, on the other hand, were allocated to these purposes and could be offered through private and parochial schools as well as through public schools. In some communities the city health department provided health services in the parochial schools while the public school health services were provided by the Board of Education. The co-ordination of these two health services, if effected, would have to be effected with care to avoid spending public education funds for private schools. Thus, the "aid follows the child" theory—or the desire to provide health services wherever needed—complicated the establishment of a co-ordinated or integrated school and public health service program.

State and local governments

The concept that education is a function of the state, and thus different from other public services, was held to less rigidly, and more attention was given to the partnership idea. Legally education remained a state function. In practice, however, probably as a reaction to the trend toward centralization which characterized many aspects of life, the view was held that the local education authority should be more a partner of the state and less a mere instrument of it. This development encouraged more local initiative and raised the question as to the manner in which the local partner could best play its role. It opened for consideration again the co-ordination of services at the local level. At the same time, state departments of education were attempting to develop programs in co-operation with a number of other state departments, such as highways, health, conservation, and libraries. Additionally, other services than education came to be more generally recognized as services for which the state had large responsibility.

Wider participation needed

Problems confronting the public schools and attacks made upon them awakened citizens to the need of having many more concerned and informed individuals give attention to public education. Merely to provide buildings and teachers for the greatly increased numbers of children and youth was an enormous problem. Even more difficult of solution were questions of curriculum arising from confusions in society itself on social and political issues, domestic and international. Under the challenge of Communism some wished to abandon traditionally democratic rights and procedures. In some instances groups sincerely trying to improve the schools were infiltrated by the insincere.

Many recognized that a promising reply to malicious and deliberate attack was the development of more fundamental understanding through wider participation in the planning of school programs and policies. This desire to include more people in educational planning raised again the question as to whether the independence of the schools facilitated the attainment of understanding and co-operation. Was it better to maintain the organization that had developed over the years and to provide by other means, such as citizens' committees, for the participation of more people? Or should the organization be examined with a view to developing a broader base and wider co-

operative action? Or were there other answers? Was it contradictory to be independent and separate and then to seek co-ordination of effort? Had the various other public services concerned with the development of children and youth played the role in the advancement of education that might properly have been expected of them? Or were they too often on the sidelines? If so, why?

FROM THIS EVIDENCE

These are some of the problems and issues which were the genesis of this issue of THE ANNALS. Answers to them are not to be found easily. Present forms of organization have developed through long years of experimentation and struggle. Are they adequate today? Do they need strengthening? Are there new roads worth exploration? In the chapters which follow, much evidence will be offered on present problems and the results of various attempted solutions. From this base, it is hoped, provision for the development of children and youth may be more effectively made—more soundly conceived and planned and more realistically financed. The values of a democratic society offer no alternative.

Theodore L. Reller, Ph.D., Berkeley, California, is professor of education at the University of California. He was for many years on the staff of the University of Pennsylvania. Among his writings are The Development of the City Superintendent of Schools in the United States (1935); Community Planning for Youth (1938); as coauthor, The Administration of American Education; and numerous articles in professional journals. He has served as consultant to or on the staff of commissions studying education in several states and in many cities.

The City Planning Process: A Framework for Community Education

By Francis Violich

THE city planning process is essentially a local governmental function which serves the purpose of co-ordinating and guiding the separate decisions which are made daily concerning the use of land in our urban areas. Its objective is physical growth in an orderly and functional arrangement reflecting the best interests and basic social-economic needs of the citizenry. Its principal instrument is the general or master plan, the community's own statement of a policy of development for the following decades.

Land as the Basis for All Community Activities

The very existence of this service and its rapid development during the last twenty to thirty years are based on a concept which should be clarified at the outset: that land is a basis for all community activities and that the way in which urban land is used has a direct effect upon the way a particular social group functions. The physical relationship between lands used for various purposes can limit or encourage most forms of human enterprise. Education is one of these activities, and it can be directly affected for better or worse through such physical factors as location of the facility in relation to users, the amount of land set aside, and the timing of construction in relation to other community needs. Without the land itself, and with any of these conditions lacking, the ability of the educational plant to serve human needs is impaired. Viewed in this light, city planning is essentially community planning. No other governmental service has this especial assignment.

Independent Decisions on Land Use

The basic problem behind providing land for needed community purposes in the proper physical relationship is essentially one of co-ordinating numerous independent decisions. We know how relatively simple it is to plan a home, or a school, or a church, where ownership is under one authority and where conditions are controlled by a unified group responsible for all policy questions. In planning a city, or even a small town, we have a far more complex situation. Each day many hundreds of decisions regarding physical change of the city have to be made by a wide variety of owners of land—private individuals and firms, semipublic organizations, government at various levels. Private owners of land, for example, decide to open and close shops and stores and to build whole new shopping centers; building firms decide that homes will be built in a certain area and initiate the subdivision of land; investment companies are at work deciding on the location of new industries and the provision of related utilities, railroads, and the like. Semipublic owners of land are likewise constantly in the process of making decisions regarding the location of churches, institutions, and similar community facilities for which they are responsible. In the public realm, city, county, state, and federal officials are daily considering what land to buy, what school, community center, recreation building, library, hospital, and the like to build. These officials are responsible for perhaps the most essential decisions, for they must decide on the routes for streets, highways, transit lines, and other lines of communication which serve to link the physical facilities built by private interests.

Key groups

Here are some of the key groups who are responsible for providing the physical components of our urban areas and whose daily decisions must be brought into a reasonable whole through the city planning process.

Private	*Semipublic*
Home builders	Church groups
Merchants	Institutions
Industrialists	Welfare agencies
Business firms	Hospitals
Banks	Improvement associations
Realtors	

Public	
Recreation and park departments	Schools
Public works	Fire departments
Public welfare agencies	Police departments
Public health departments	Traffic departments
Libraries	Housing, redevelopment, and renewal agencies

In any given community many more such groups could be added to the list. It is through the innumerable independent actions taken by these varied groups that our cities grow and are formed. As Miss Bauer points out in the article on "Housing Policy and the Educational System," this accumulative process is accentuated by the trend toward large-scale, long-term development fixing patterns of land use for all time with fewer but more significant decisions, and making advance planning by public bodies more imperative than ever before.

Growth of City Planning

City planning authority and techniques have developed steadily—and within the last five years rapidly—as a means of co-ordinating these many decisions which result in physical changes within and on the fringes of our existing cities. Most large cities now accept city planning as a function of municipal government, working under authorization by state enabling legislation in force in most states in the Union. These state planning acts were based on a Standard Enabling Act prepared by the United States Department of Commerce in 1928. The act [1] under which California operates, passed originally in 1929 and amended several times since, is one of the best in the country. This act permits cities to set up planning commissions and requires counties to do so; it provides the conditions under which city and county planning commissions may operate; it requires the preparation and adoption of comprehensive, long-term general or master plans; and establishes the general framework within which local planning may be done.

Municipal charters also provide enabling legislation and often establish more detailed or specific provisions related to the process of city planning. County planning is carried on in many states as an extension of county government, with authority only over the unincorporated areas. At the metropolitan regional level a few urban centers in the United States, such as New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles, have official or unofficial planning agencies. These, however, are generally inadequate, owing to the lack of a unified governmental base. At the federal level, legislation related to housing, redevelopment,

[1] Contained in State of California, Printing Division, Documents Section, *Laws Relating to Planning*. Sacramento (Calif.), 1953.

and public works recognizes local city planning processes and, in some cases, actually requires the existence of a planning program or master plan as a prerequisite for loans or grants.

Budgets for city planning in most large cities in the United States have been greatly increased over those of ten years ago. San Francisco, for example, which was spending some $50,000 per year in 1940 is now providing $150,000 for a well-staffed city planning department. Contra Costa County has increased its planning budget from about $60,000 to $175,000 per year during the past five years. The number of staff persons and consultant services has increased proportionately. The profession of city planning, which was established during the second decade of this century with the founding of the American Institute of Planners, has grown in size and strengthened itself in terms of city planning knowledge and experience. The Institute, which had about five hundred members just after World War II, now has a membership of about a thousand. California, long active in city planning, had some thirty-five members in this professional organization in the 1930's, about seventy-five in the early 1940's, and today has approximately three hundred members.

City Planning Procedures

These indications of the growth of the city planning profession suggest the increasing recognition of planning as a co-ordinating force in dealing with problems concerning the use of urban land. In this country the planning process is designed to reflect traditional democratic procedures in making important decisions affecting the public welfare. For this reason the work of a local city planning agency is basically advisory to the elected officials who hold final authority. A citizen commission is appointed by the city council, board of supervisors, or mayor for the purpose of advising them, and the commission is provided with a professional staff which offers technical study and formulates conclusions to serve as a basis for the lay commission's recommendations. Public hearings are required by law. Although this concept slows down the co-ordinating process considerably when urban growth is going on at a rapid pace and decisions have to be made in a hurry, the end result has many social advantages when it works. Obviously political factors may intrude.

The master plan

Assuming good local government and observance of democratic procedures, basic policy in this country is brought together by the city planning commission in the form of a general or master plan which shows the community's concept of the direction in which it should grow. The plan must look far into the future, yet relate to current needs; it must be based on study of the various alternatives which might be followed; and it must be broad, comprehensive, and flexible in order to meet all potential needs as they may develop. Specifically, the general plan would indicate a general pattern of land for residential, commercial, industrial, public, and other purposes, the network of circulation routes of various kinds, and the related terminals for them. The plan would provide a general range of population densities for the various residential areas and indicate limits for each area. In this way a total holding capacity for each portion of the community and for the city as a whole is established. The plan provides no specific program or schedule for the provision of facilities or the timing of development of particular areas, but rather presents the picture of the community as it might best develop—a large design the details of which can be developed little by little.

Since the general or master plan is to become an expression of public policy, it is essential that before the plan is finally adopted the wants and interests of the community be obtained and citizen participation secured through citizen advisory committees, public discussion prior to and during preparation of the plan, and the official public hearings required by law. In the past, adoption of the plan by the planning commission has been considered sufficient; more recent thinking, however, concludes that if the plan is not adopted by the legislative body it does not really become official community policy. In the City of Berkeley, for example, the first comprehensive master plan, completed in 1954, was adopted by the City Council in 1955.

Effectuating the Plan

Since the master plan is considered policy and not law, its effectuation must be brought about through various specific means. One of these is legislation in the form of zoning ordinances regulating in precise terms the uses to which private land may be put and the conditions under which it may be built upon, and subdivision ordinances which control the quality of land development for residential purposes as to lot and street pattern. Another means is the requirement that all public improvements, including acquisition and sale of land by any city department, be referred to the planning commission for its recommendation as to conformity with the general or master plan. This so-called "referral process" permits the legislative body to approve capital improvements only after having first received a recommendation from the planning agency. The plan is further effectuated through the urban development, public housing, and slum clearance programs described in the following article. Perhaps the most important factor in making the general or master plan a creative force in shaping the physical aspect of the city is public participation itself and the understanding it engenders. This fact is recognized in most planning legislation, which usually requires consultation with the public, calls for public hearings, and urges or makes mandatory public education programs related to the general or master plan.

The Long View

This brief review of the city planning process indicates the opportunity at hand to set forth community objectives as to the use of land, to determine the location and extent of such uses, and therefore to bring into focus community activities themselves. City planning has in this sense been playing a far more creative role in the last ten years than it did in the earlier periods, when the emphasis lay in making separate decisions on zoning and subdivision development without taking the long view of community needs as a whole. With this kind of planning proved inadequate, contemporary city planning has become a dynamic process.

Schools in the City Plan—Current Theory

Against this background of city planning practice, let us look at the way in which school planning fits into the picture. Most city planners base location of schools on the so-called neighborhood theory. This concept, put forth during the early thirties by Clarence Perry[2] and others, calls for the shap-

[2] *The Neighborhood Unit Plan: Its Spread and Acceptance.* Compiled by James Dahir. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947.

ing of residential areas so that an elementary school is located at the center of each subarea, which in turn is planned to hold sufficient population to support the elementary school. The size of the subarea is based on a walking distance to school of not more than one-half mile, approximately. This measure provides also a convenient guide in determining land-use patterns, spacing of major and secondary arteries, and location of related neighborhood facilities such as recreation centers and shopping facilities.

Opponents of this theory have argued that from a social point of view such precise functional planning of areas can lead to a too neat and inflexible patterning of residents according to income and race. Even worse, the pattern would be reflected in the elementary school itself.

As an outgrowth of the neighborhood theory, planners have developed the concept of the "community," made up of a series of neighborhoods, served by a single high school or junior high school, and bounded by such primary barriers as freeways, major arteries, railroads, or geographic elements. While the neighborhood idea is based on walking distances, the community concept is based on travel by public transportation or car; location of the junior high school or high school central to a cluster of neighborhoods means that such "community-wide" travel can be done without passing through other neighborhood areas. This arrangement provides a framework for locating major traffic ways, transit routes, and related community facilities and, in fact, offers some of the advantages to be obtained from the self-contained small town with a population of some twenty-five to forty thousand. It may be argued that this "community" concept broadens the neighborhood idea and offers a basis for greater heterogeneity of population types. Certainly the school is a key element in each system.

Facilities of higher education such as colleges and universities and adult education facilities serving the city as a whole or possibly even the region would, according to this general theory of planning, be located in places between or central to communities; here also will be found other major institutions which serve the whole urban area, the central commercial sections, and the major public facilities and civic buildings.

These concepts provide a convenient general procedure to follow in integrating schools into the residential pattern. Population densities can be predetermined and held in place through zoning, total holding capacity calculated, and sufficient land for the needs of the population set aside in advance of development. Related community and neighborhood facilities can be located to form "focal points" of social activities, and street patterns can be laid out to foster their use and accessibility and to discourage through traffic foreign to local needs.

OBSTACLES TO GOOD SCHOOL PLANNING

This straightforward, theoretical method of planning schools in relation to the city as a whole is less simple in application, owing to a number of obstacles to good planning. We shall attempt in this section to consider some of them, and to point out problems which are not being solved and which are blocking proper co-ordination. In the solution of these problems the assistance and close co-operation of educational administrators are essential.

Schools must be paid for

One fundamental problem is related to the economic base of the community and its ability to pay for needed school facilities. Too often members of school boards and particularly citizens at large fail to see the relation between planning of education facilities and land-use planning for commerce and industry in terms of the quality and quantity of these uses for taxing purposes. A typical situation is one to be found in many of the newer residential suburbs in California, where the residents want good new schools but do not want any intrusion of industry or "heavy" commerce. They fail to realize that industry and commerce, properly located and set up with proper restrictions, can provide an employment and tax base by which first-class schools can be financed. In Davis, California, an essentially agricultural university town of some ten thousand population, older residents have opposed setting aside land for industry because of their desire to maintain the semirural environment. Newer residents, particularly those with growing families, are convinced that a large area should be set aside for industry and appropriate types of industry brought in, because they know that this industrial development will lead to better schools and better education.

On the other hand, a similar problem often exists in reverse, when major industrialists or downtown commercial interests oppose bond issues for schools on the basis that thrift is good public policy. These groups overlook the significant fact that if school standards fall the attractiveness of the community as a place in which to live and raise families diminishes, and that population which serves as a stable labor force and as a market for the products and services of business may go elsewhere in pursuit of a more favorable total living environment.

In both these examples relating to economic results of land-use planning, co-ordination between all phases of the development of the physical environment, the essence of the city planning process, is the key to community welfare.

Too many of a kind

Unbalanced population makeup is another important obstacle to proper co-ordination. For example, in Santa Cruz, California, a bond issue for schools failed to pass even though an almost desperate need for school-plant development existed and one school had to be closed as a hazard. The reason for the failure was the large number of older persons in the community who were retired on limited pensions and who had no interest in paying for schools. Whenever the population is composed too much of one kind or another, problems are likely to arise. In many California communities where zoning and subdivision controls set a pattern of similar lot size and dwelling units, the net result in terms of population composition is uniformity. A similar pattern of age groups prevails throughout the community, placing a major load on the school for children of a particular school age. As the children grow older a hiatus is left below and another crisis occurs at higher grade levels. Had there been established a more rational land use and density pattern, permitting or encouraging a wider range of dwelling types—from single-family, detached residences, owned by their occupants, to rented row houses and apartments—a more normal range of population groups would have resulted.

Where is the school?

The basic problem of co-ordination in physical terms is that of space. We have become so completely casual and unconcerned about the shaping of our urban areas that we allow all the land in new areas to be filled up by houses and stores and streets without carefully

thinking through in advance what land is needed for schools and other community facilities. The houses are built, the families move in, and then comes the realization that space is needed for schools. One way or another space is found, but not without certain losses. In a recent new subdivision in San Mateo County, houses were built and occupied during one summer; with hundreds of school children waiting for a desk and a teacher, some of the brand new homes had to be withheld from sale and converted into an elementary school by linking them with covered walks. In this instance a substandard facility was used. In other cases, a small site must be accepted; in still others, a site poorly located in relation to the service area or to other neighborhood uses requiring extended bus trips. Generally, sites secured as afterthoughts cost more. Sometimes existing schools must be overcrowded to take care of the new population.

Built but not planned

When we add subdivision to subdivision, school site to school site, we are in effect building a new city. Yet the resultant product is generally lacking in the element most characteristic of a city—that is, the focal point at which may be obtained a variety of services unavailable in rural areas. We allow ourselves to take second-rate sites for schools while good sense would tell us to take only the best for this important function. We miss the chance to relate residential sections and street routes with neighborhood and community facilities in a logical and functional whole. We are building, not planning, new cities, and they are formless. We are neglecting opportunities to use the school itself as the core of the central area of human activities, relating to it such other facilities as recreation, welfare agencies, clinics, churches, libraries, civic buildings, police and fire departments, parks, and shopping centers. This lack of imagination, of creative concern for the design of the community as a whole and of its centers, is a major weakness on the part of city planners themselves, to say nothing of school planners. Exceptions can be found: we have outstanding examples of collaboration in San Francisco's redevelopment program on Diamond Heights and in the Sunset Community Center.

Establishment of standards for space and location should lead to a concept of grouping of community facilities so that they relate to each other, mutually reinforce each other, and together form a core of community services. A community lacking a focal point for the various community activities cannot function fully as a community. The school is essential to this focal point, both physically and socially. California is becoming covered with residential areas which resemble miles of wallpaper unrolled over the landscape, a sea of rooftops, telephone poles, and television antennas unbroken by a recognizable place where community activities can take place.

The school in the community

The school in its central location, its central role in community life, is one of "the intangible instruments of community creation" referred to by Dr. N. L. Engelhardt.[3] Juxtaposition of the school and other community facilities may be an important way of assuring many community gains. Some of these gains might be, for example, a greater knowledge of economic values on the part of school children through occasional exposure to shopping facilities near the school; frequent use of the church by both child and adult if it is within walking distance of the school site; a more mature self-reliance and initiative in children if schools are within easy access on foot rather than so far away that the family car or the school bus must be used; a sense of belonging to a somewhat loosely formed social group, developing from the use of common facilities.

[3] N. L. Engelhardt, Sr., Educational Consultant, New York, in an address on "The Future Community and Its Schools" given at the Conference on Schools and Community Planning, August 1953, sponsored by the School of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

School and local government

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to coordination is a political one—the independence of the school district in relation to other segments of local government. In Contra Costa County, California, there are 150 separate jurisdictions, many of which are school districts each with its own board. In a typical small city, the city planning department reports to the city council in the same way that a number of other city departments do—parks, libraries, health, and others; in this situation it is readily possible for the physical improvements proposed by these departments to be co-ordinated through the recommendations of the city planning department. But the school, a central and most important community facility and a key to the distribution of streets and other community facilities, stands outside the framework of co-ordination under a comparatively autonomous jurisdiction. Although the California State Education Code requires that all planning commissions review acquisitions of school sites, minimum use is made of this requirement, and in other states no such requirement exists, even on paper. Simplification of the school-districting pattern at the local level and on a metropolitan regional basis is needed to bring about more natural and assured integration with the other political jurisdictions responsible for decision making. Since city planners depend so much on school-planning criteria, the judgment, knowledge, and experience of school planners are needed in determining location, size, and land-use relationships of schools. To this end closer collaboration is imperative.

THE PARTS AND THE WHOLE

While we in the United States have not so far achieved any high degree of success in shaping our cities toward the maximum in convenience and functional qualities, as well as in beauty, many of the separate elements of our cities are exemplary in comparison to those in other parts of the world. One of these elements is the school plant as a building and site unit. With this as a major achievement during the first half of the twentieth century, we might well look forward to making the second half distinctive by reason of creative ideas concerning the location of schools in relation to the city as a whole. Let them be so placed that they not only serve the surrounding population in the best possible way as far as accessibility and space are concerned, but also help bring into being community centers composed of related facilities of which the school is a key element.

WIDER UNDERSTANDING NEEDED

In all of this, we must remember that the laws enabling city planning and the techniques developed are only as good and as effective as the people who use them. Therefore, our greatest need lies in fuller understanding by responsible officials and laymen alike of these complex problems of urban development and of the potentialities of the city planning process. School personnel, par-

ticularly, can be effective in working toward better co-ordination by using the city planning process in their own communities and by spreading through their own educational channels, to adults as well as children, greater knowledge of city structure and city planning. In fact, because of the central position of the school in the urban scene the future of our urban areas should be the joint concern of school planners and city planners. Techniques of preparing for the future, of analyzing expected needs, should be shared and thereby made more fully effective than they have been in the past.

Francis Violich, Berkeley, California, is associate professor of city planning and lecturer in landscape architecture at the University of California. He has served as acting chairman of the Department of City and Regional Planning; consultant to the California Committee on Planning Recreation, Park Areas and Facilities; lecturer and consultant to the Inter-American Housing Center, Bogotá, Colombia; planning consultant to Venezuela's National Commission for City Planning; and Consultant to the Pan American Union, whose Division of Housing and Planning he established in 1945–47. He engages in planning consultant practice in the San Francisco Bay Area. His publications include the book Cities of Latin America (1944), publications for the Pan American Union, and various reports for city planning agencies.

Housing Policy and the Educational System

By CATHERINE BAUER

EFFECTIVE planning can establish the general pattern for community development. But the force which actually creates neighborhoods in three-dimensional, flesh-and-blood terms is residential construction. Wherever new homes are built, people move in who will require schools and all essential community services, whether or not their needs have been fully anticipated.

In the postwar civic scene home building has been a very dynamic factor indeed, owing to the combined effect on housing demand of a long-standing shortage, high marriage and birth rates, general prosperity, and the rising desire to replace slums and blighted areas. At the beginning of 1955 almost ten million nonfarm dwellings, or more than 20 per cent of our total nonfarm housing supply, had been erected in the previous nine years. And this rate is likely to continue for some time to come. Indeed, if slum replacement is to move ahead at the hoped-for scale, an even higher rate of residential construction will be necessary.

More important, however, is the fact that this new housing tends to be produced by methods essentially quite different from the traditional system of home building in the United States. And these new methods pose some entirely new problems of community organization, servicing, and social structure. Enlightened community planning is more urgently needed than ever, but in some ways it is rendered much more difficult. Fundamental social questions are involved, for one thing, which the professional housing and planning administrators are hardly qualified to decide unaided, even if they had the power to do so.

In particular, the educational authorities are directly involved at many points, not only with respect to school plant but also in terms of basic educational philosophy and democratic community values. They should therefore understand these changes in the housing process and the implications for sound community development and responsible civic leadership.

THE REVOLUTION IN HOUSING

Until about twenty years ago, houses and even apartments were mainly built by individual initiative or small-scale private enterprise, with credit from various independent private sources, on land that had been previously subdivided and sold in small parcels. Since construction in any given area tended to be on a piecemeal basis over a period of years, schools and community facilities could be fitted in gradually as required, and ultimately most neighborhoods included a considerable range of dwelling types and income groups.

In terms of modern design, technology, and production methods, however, the home-building business was exceedingly backward. Urban homes were expensive, and costs were further increased by two additional factors: the rising standards of space, sanitation, and safety enforced by official ordinances, and the chaotic, highly speculative mortgage system. Together, these conditions tended to limit the effective market for new dwellings to upper-income families, forcing the vast majority either to pay too much or take whatever they could find among older, cheaper homes. The result was mounting slums and blight and, when the depression struck, almost universal bankruptcy and

paralysis in the whole field of residential construction and home finance. The evidence of failure and signs of impending change are spread throughout the numerous housing studies of the early 1930's. During the past generation, therefore, both the system of home building and its characteristic products have been greatly altered.

Larger-scale operations

In the first place, there is a basic trend toward bigger housing operations by professional building agencies. Individual consumer initiative is not dead by any means: owner-built houses still apparently accounted for about 18 per cent of the total home production in metropolitan areas in 1949.[1] But this included both tailor-made homes for those who could afford them and, at the opposite end of the housing spectrum, substandard shacks in areas where codes are not enforced. In between, the vast majority of new dwellings are provided on an increasingly mass-production basis. By 1949, 25 per cent of the new one-family homes in selected metropolitan areas were turned out by large firms building more than a hundred houses per annum. Moreover, with the tremendous increase in over-all volume, the total number of units built by relatively big operators was at least six times as great as a decade earlier. Today the scale of operations is undoubtedly still greater, above all in the ever expanding suburban fringe areas.

Following World War II there was a surge in large-scale projects that moved from raw land to complete communities within the very short time of two years. Thousand-acre projects such as Panorama City and Lakewood in Southern California, Park Forest southwest of Chicago, the Levittowns in Pennsylvania and Long Island, Fairless Hills in Pennsylvania and Lincoln Village near Columbus, Ohio, were built as single operations to meet local housing needs. The combination of warborn circumstances such as housing shortages in areas of great population growth, record family formation, inflation and easy mortgage payments make possible these mammoth, single phase community developments by the new kind of merchant builder.[2]

Since most of these factors still prevail, the trend continues. And meanwhile in central districts rental projects of unprecedented size are being developed by housing authorities and big institutional investors such as life insurance companies, as well as by large-scale speculative builders and, in a few cities, co-operative initiative.

Federal aid and responsibility

A more sudden and sweeping change in the housing process, however, with at least equally great civic implications, is the degree of federal intervention now taken for granted. Of the 9.4 million nonfarm dwellings constructed from 1946 through 1954, almost four million were financed with mortgages either insured by the Federal Housing Administration or guaranteed by the Veterans' Administration. This proportion was much higher in the major urban centers, amounting to 75 per cent of the "professionally built" one-family houses in certain sample metropolitan areas in 1949. In 1954 almost half the estimated total mortgage debt outstanding in the United States, or about 36 billion dollars worth, was underwritten by the federal government. Moreover, the home-finance terms, practices, and standards inaugurated by FHA and the Veterans Administration now tend to set the pace for the entire private housing market, which is also indirectly influenced by the operations of the Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal National Mortgage Association.

In addition, about 300,000 dwelling units have been constructed by direct public initiative during the postwar period, for the most part by local housing authorities for low-income families from slums, with annual subsidies from the Public Housing Administration. And finally, there is a separate network of federal aids and accompanying controls for the improvement of slum and blighted areas. The 1949 Housing Act provided substantial capital grants to local redevelopment agencies for the wholesale acquisition and clearance of substandard areas, in order to free such sites for suitable reconstruction. The 1954 Act broadened this program to include special aids and inducements for "renewal" in declining areas where modernization and code enforcement might turn the tide. These programs are now in the planning stage, at least, in some two hundred different communities in thirty-two states and territories. Federal grants are also available under certain conditions for state and metropolitan planning, and local public works programing.

Over-all results

All in all, the process of providing American families with homes and neighborhoods has been revolutionized. What was a small-scale, amateurish enterprise, almost wholly local in character and control, has become a highly organized, big-time affair, both at the operating level and in terms of powerful interest groups representing builders, lenders, and reformers of various types, continually jockeying for advantage in the national arena. Moreover, what used to be a strictly private business is now one of the largest and most complex forms of "mixed" private-and-public enterprise extant.

In many ways this complicated new machinery has proved effective. The rate of home construction has been both higher and steadier than at any time in the past, and the postwar shortage is therefore considerably eased (at least for upper- and middle-income white households of average size). Mass-production methods and cheaper financing have enabled millions of families of moderate means to purchase houses on easy terms. Indeed, many had no other choice, since both federal policy and builder practice greatly favor individual ownership, with little encouragement for medium-rental or co-operative initiative. The proportion of owner occupancy increased from 41 per cent of all nonfarm homes in 1940 to 53 per cent in 1950, and is doubtless still going up.

A major effort to tackle slums and blight is also under way for the first time in our history, although the powerful tools available for clearance are not yet matched by adequate machinery or resources to relocate displaced families. A commission appointed by President Eisenhower estimated that five million homes must be demolished and fifteen million homes rehabilitated.[3] But the low-rent public housing program is extremely limited in scope, most slum and blighted areas are fully occupied with no better homes available at comparable prices, and there is an acute housing shortage for minority families at all economic levels. Rehousing the aged, single workers, and other groups with special needs is likewise an unsolved problem. And in the field of rehabilita-

[1] The factual data in this section are from either the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the Housing and Home Finance Agency, in some cases as derived from these sources by Sherman Maisel in his book, *Housebuilding in Transition*, Berkeley (Calif.), 1953.

[2] Urban Land Institute, *The Community Builders Handbook* (Washington, D. C., 1954), pp. 17–18.

[3] The President's Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and Programs, *A Report to the President of the United States* (December 1953), p. 111.

tion, the current drive may yet produce substantial results but stronger incentives will probably be required sooner or later.

But however the balance sheet may be drawn up, one thing is certain. The new housing system is here to stay, by and large. It may be modified, expanded, or refined in the course of producing the next ten million homes, but there is no question of going back to small-scale laissez faire in the housing business.

Home building, moreover, has become an extremely dynamic factor in the organization and quality of everyday community life. The suburban tide is rapidly changing the shape and social-economic structure of metropolitan areas, creating problems that challenge the traditional concepts of local government, including school administration. The ultimate effects of decentralization and dispersal are not yet visible. Redevelopment, renewal, and public housing pose related issues for central districts. Enormous population shifts are fostered if not compelled by housing trends and policies, which tend to encourage the high rate of residential mobility that makes us the most nomadic nation of modern times. "Home ownership," under the present system, has little of the stabilizing influence that made it the symbol of solid middle-class achievement and settled community status. In short, urban society is in a state of flux.

Since housing practices tend more and more to shape the whole neighborhood environment and its social structure, everyone concerned with the quality of community life should therefore cast a critical eye on the results of the new system to date. For it is in this context rather than in national statistics that certain weaknesses and potential dangers are most apparent, with particular significance for school planning and perhaps the entire educational system.

Implications for the Community and Educational Policy

The opportunity to develop "complete communities" all at once has long been cherished and promoted by progressive planners and architects. As against the endless dreary grid of the land speculator and the chaos often resulting from scattered individual and small-scale initiative, the qualitative advantages of unified planning and design have been stressed quite as much as the potential economies of large-scale building operations. Housing, schools, roads, and all the other elements could be carefully plotted ahead to meet the most advanced standards, and properly integrated to form a community which might be beautiful as well as orderly, safe, healthy, and efficient.[4]

The "neighborhood unit" concept carried these principles of planning and design over into the realm of basic social values. A distinctive residential area, carefully designed and equipped to serve about five thousand people, would help to counteract the impersonality and *anomie* of mass metropolitan society by stimulating friendly contact and responsible participation at the "face-to-face" neighborhood level.[5]

Some of the most interesting and influential experiments in modern housing, from Radburn and the Greenbelt communities to Britain's current New Towns, including also many less ambitious schemes, have been developed on such principles; and at their best these pilot projects demonstrate many of the virtues claimed for this approach.[6]

[4] See Henry Wright, *Rehousing Urban America* (New York, 1935), for a persuasive early analysis; also American Public Health Association, *Planning the Neighborhood* (Chicago, 1948), for detailed technical standards and recommendations.

[5] See Clarence Perry, *Housing for the Machine Age* (New York, 1939); James Dahir (Compiler), *The Neighborhood Unit Plan* (New York, 1947); as well as many statements by Lewis Mumford and others.

"Community" housing: principles and problems

Clearly the present trend toward large-scale housing construction subject to national standards and policy controls, along with increased acceptance of local city planning, could favor the application of these ideas on a much wider basis. And a conscious effort has been made in many cases to translate the principles of integrated community development into ordinary policy and practice. City plans, as noted in the previous article, now tend to be based on school-centered neighborhoods. The HHFA has recently published a set of *Suggested Land Subdivision Regulations* for the guidance of builders and local governments, in which advance co-operation with the planning commission, city or county engineers, school board, and recreation and transportation authorities is stressed. Similar recommendations are made in the *Community Builders Handbook* issued by the Urban Land Institute (an affiliate of the National Association of Real Estate Boards) and in various publications of the National Association of Home Builders. The Federal Housing Administration issues detailed "Neighborhood Standards" for each region as criteria for mortgage insurance and takes pride in its encouragement of community planning.[7]

[6] See Clarence S. Stein, *Toward New Towns for America.* Chicago and Liverpool, 1951.

[7] "In 1934 the homebuilding industry was characterized by speculative land development, by land subdivided in excess of need and only partially improved, and by many small inefficient builders building on scattered lots and creating unstable, heterogeneous neighborhoods. Today the typical operative builder develops land as it is required for immediate building purposes, and constructs not only the dwellings but the utilities, streets, and other land improvements as an integrated operation. This method produces stable, completely improved neighborhoods that are more attractive to home buyers, better risks for lenders, and desirable additions to the communities in which they are located. The land planning service of the FHA has been a significant factor in the transformation that has taken place in the last twenty years in land development." —Byron R. Hanke, Chief, Land Planning Section, FHA Underwriting Division, "Two Decades of Land Planning," *Insured Mortgage Portfolio,* Summer 1954, p. 12.

The Public Housing Administration's standards are concerned with over-all site planning and community facilities, and renewal policy makes minute stipulations with respect to the comprehensive community plans which must be officially adopted before a project can be approved for federal assistance. In the Declaration of National Housing Policy which introduces the Housing Act of 1949, Congress dedicated the act to "the development of well-planned, integated, residential neighborhoods and the development and redevelopment of communities."

In actual practice, however, the results of large-scale housing development on a "community" or "neighborhood" basis often bear little visible relationship to the ideal principles thus set forth. In any case some new problems are increasingly evident in this type of development which were not always anticipated in community-planning theory or fully recognized in the early experiments.[8] Moreover these mounting issues

[8] Neighborhood planning issues have been debated extensively in recent years. General references include: Catherine Bauer, "Good Neighborhoods," THE ANNALS, November 1945; Reginald R. Isaacs, articles in the *Journal of Housing,* July and August 1948; and Svend Reimer, *The Modern City* (New York, 1952), Chap. XVII.

on the housing horizon are in some ways quite as closely related to basic educational problems and policy as they are to housing per se.

In general terms, three such issues seem to stand out:

1. "Community planning" is no longer merely a pleasant, enlightened civic ideal, to be attempted where conditions are favorable. With mass-production housing methods increasingly dominant, effective planning becomes absolutely necessary, if essential community facilities are to be reasonably well located and efficiently provided for the people who will occupy the homes. School programing, in particular, must now be integrated with over-all community planning well in advance of actual housing development.

2. Thus far the new housing system tends to promote a much greater degree of social segregation at the neighborhood level by income, age, and racial groups than has been traditional in the United States. This trend can readily be modified, but only by a conscious civic effort to reshape housing and planning policy in terms of basic community values. Race segregation, particularly, has become a major issue. Since school structure and the educational system are directly affected by neighborhood social structure, the responsibility for solving these knotty problems falls in part on educational leaders.

3. In the packaged neighborhood the home seeker comes in last, and the individual consumer has little real choice or influence with respect to his home and community environment. In redevelopment, moreover, families are forcibly uprooted on a wholesale basis, and their relocation raises fundamental problems of social justice. Effective machinery for bona fide citizen participation in the planning and housing process at the neighborhood level must therefore be created. But this is at base a problem of adult education in civic affairs, and therefore a problem to be shared with the community's educational system, broadly conceived.

SCHOOLS MUST BE PLANNED AHEAD

In another article in this volume, Professor Violich points out the close interrelationships between school planning and other aspects of city planning, emphasizing the need for greater foresight and stronger integration to guide the process of community development. A key factor is the trend toward large-scale housing operations which, along with its obvious opportunities, seems to make effective over-all planning both more difficult *and* more imperative.

It is all too evident that if a big builder (whether speculative or institutional, private or public) is allowed to pursue the economic benefits of mass production with single-minded zeal, housing is likely to blanket enormous areas, with no spaces left over for any other purpose whatever. And in the flood of postwar residential construction, housing initiative too often got ahead of planning, thus contributing to many of the emergency school problems now so universally rampant in suburbia. The homes, however, were badly needed. And if the provision of adequate community facilities, properly located, is now extremely difficult and costly it is not the home builders, by and large, who should be blamed. What was lacking was an equal degree of *civic* initiative, to overcome the anarchy of unrelated governmental agencies, special districts, and so forth which preclude effective land-use controls and advance planning in the burgeoning metropolitan fringe areas. The autonomous school district, as Mr. Violich suggests, is frequently one of the obstacles to better integrated development.

In the redevelopment of central slum areas it is also necessary to anticipate in the planning process changing school demands. The Stuyvesant Town project built by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in New York City accommodates 12,000 families but includes no school or other community facility. And in renewal or conservation schemes where an effort is made to stabilize declining areas by selected improvements, the provision of modern schools and playgrounds will often play a key role, if carefully related to an over-all plan.

Builders, investors, home seekers, and housing agencies are, it is true, gradually becoming more sophisticated about the need for schools and other community facilities, properly located in relation to homes. This is real progress, but it only reinforces the need for comprehensive development plans, officially adopted *before* housing enterprise gets under way in any given area.

Moreover, planning should facilitate the advance acquisition of sites for schools and other public uses, before development has enhanced the land values. And if the home builders ought to contribute, by land donations or otherwise, to the facilities required by the population they will bring into an area, then the necessary legal and administrative machinery must be solidly established as an integral part of the system of advance planning and subdivision control. This is a complex and controversial problem, for planners and school administrators alike.[9]

TREND TOWARD SOCIAL UNIFORMITY

The new housing system tends to turn out a highly standardized product unless there is a firm determination to achieve some degree of variety and balance. This standardization is due in part to the rationale of mass production but perhaps even more to bureaucratic influences and certain cherished real estate doctrines. The rigidly specialized system of federal housing aids and controls favors uniform results in any particular project or category, in terms of dwelling type, size, design, tenure, and price level. In addition, many local zoning ordinances still force absolute uniformity of lot sizes and dwelling types over enormous areas. And finally, real estate mythology has actively promoted the credo that any deviation from complete neighborhood homogeneity will undermine property values, an article of faith long embodied in minute detail in every handbook for subdividers, whether from private or public sources.

The combined effect of these influences is visible on every hand, in a high degree of social as well as physical standardization: vast suburban tracts of identical small houses wholly occupied by veteran families of almost equally identical age and income, firmly excluding nonwhites; equally enormous public housing projects in central areas consisting solely of many-storied structures limited to very low-income families of two or more persons (along with many additional strictures on eligibility), sometimes "mixed" as to race but quite often all white or all Negro or all Mexican. In the field of private redevelopment, similar homogenized schemes can also readily be found.

Of course there have long been "protected" upper-class districts on the one hand and equally well-defined slum areas and racial ghettos on the other. But the present housing machinery promotes neighborhood social uniformity to a much more refined and absolute degree than was possible earlier. And as the system is inevitably expanded to include more private construction for

[9] *Proceedings of the Conference on Schools and Community Planning* (August 28, 1953, sponsored by the School of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), pp. 11, 14.

nonwhites, housing for the aged, new types of rental, co-operative, or self-help initiative, and so on, this will simply mean new versions of the large, single-purpose standardized "project," unless there is a very firm and positive civic effort in the meantime to encourage more physical and social diversity in residential areas.

Schools for "project" children

When a community is entirely made up of young veterans, for instance, the sudden bulge in first graders will continue to create abnormal problems of school organization for years to come. But unbalanced age groups are only one small aspect of the educators' problem.

The peculiar social character of the one-class dormitory suburb has been explored from various viewpoints, often with conflicting judgments. But many would agree that there are likely to be heavy pressures for conformity, some degree of anti-intellectualism, a matriarchal social order, and perhaps (despite the frenetic mobility) a tendency to view the city and the world from a rather insular perspective. Moreover, at least two sharp observers have recently suggested that the educational system has a particularly important role to play in such communities. It can either reflect and rationalize the community's inherent limitations *or* try in some measure to compensate for them.[10]

The danger of a more paternalistic type of regimentation in big, high-density, one-class rental projects operated with a firm hand by public housing authorities and institutional investors has likewise been pointed out.[11] And where a school is destined to serve mainly (or often wholly) the children from such a project, it certainly has special responsibilities, both as a neighborhood community center and in the more formal aspects of education.

The whole question of school districting is likewise involved. Where the neighborhood social pattern is highly standardized, is it always a sound ideal for schools to conform to the same pattern? Clearly there are some difficult and controversial issues here, with conflicting values to be resolved. But if schools are supposed to train children to live successfully in a highly variegated world, this is a very real problem for the educational system.

New push for greater diversity

The standardized neighborhood pattern is itself being challenged, moreover, from various quarters. There are efforts to make zoning regulations more flexible, for a wide array of social, civic, economic, and aesthetic reasons. Some signs of a cautious shift in real estate practice and philosophy are visible, although hardly to the point of welcoming low-rent housing or nonwhite families in middle-class communities.[12] But redevelopment schemes in Philadelphia and Detroit, for instance, are designed to encourage small, varied projects, public and private, rental and ownership, to serve all racial groups. And at the political level, racial exclusion practices are becoming a major issue in housing policy, with direct implications for education as well.

[10] William H. Whyte, Jr., "The Transients" [a series of articles on suburbia], *Fortune*, May through August 1953; and Sidonie M. Gruenberg, "Homogenized Children of New Suburbia," *New York Times Magazine*, September 19, 1954.

[11] See particularly Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Housing and Social Structure*. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 1952.

[12] "Better balanced communities and greater stability may often be obtained by having houses of various prices in a single community. Similar opinion with regard to a reasonable diversity of housing types within the neighborhood is developing. A well balanced neighborhood plan containing a reasonable variation of housing accommodations will aid materially in stabilizing values and preventing decline by permitting the individual family to adjust its housing requirements to its age, marital status and size at any given time and still remain within the community of its choice."—Urban Land Institute, *op. cit. supra* (note 2), p. 57.

Race segregation: a critical issue

Since the Supreme Court decision on desegregation of schools, the frontier for race relations has been shifting more and more to the housing field. The sequence is obvious, since the degree of integration in the schools now depends very largely on the residential pattern. And the neighborhood pattern is shaped by housing policy and practices which are in a state of conflict, confusion, and potential change, sometimes promoting complete nondiscrimination (as with public housing and sometimes even private redevelopment, in many northern cities) but frequently enforcing a degree of absolute segregation hitherto unprecedented anywhere in the country (as in most new suburban communities). Housing and redevelopment policies can serve any kind of purpose with respect to race relations. They can even be used to get around the Supreme Court.[13]

With the continued urban migration of Negroes and their improving economic status and power, with public agencies involved in housing at a hundred points, and with large-scale operations tending to force a definite decision one way or the other over wide areas, residential segregation versus nonsegregation is certain to be a lively political issue, nationally and locally, for some time to come. Many civic groups, leaders, and officials, including educators, will have to share the responsibility for its successful solution.

Nondiscrimination has worked fairly well in northern public housing and is just beginning to be tested in some private redevelopment and co-operative projects. Minority families are also gradually taking up residence on a more scattered basis throughout most of the older districts of northern urban centers, and on the whole they are encountering somewhat less resistance and hysteria than formerly. Redevelopment, in breaking up the old concentrations, will inevitably speed up this process but perhaps at the price of more opposition. Most "conservation" or "removal" schemes involve areas of social and racial transition, and there is beginning to be some infiltration even in the suburbs, despite all the barriers.

Social readjustment and the educational system

Most cities and metropolitan areas are therefore confronted with widespread problems of social readjustment, perhaps one of the most vital adjustments that this country has to make in the visible future. And a large part of the responsibility will necessarily fall on the educational system—in the classroom, in the neighborhood, and at the broader civic level.

"CITIZEN PARTICIPATION": BUT HOW?

The final issue can only be suggested with a question mark. With home and

[13] "Although the school decisions in 1954 gave civil rights advocates cause for rejoicing, it may be expected that some local officials will now speed up slum clearance, public works, and urban redevelopment projects which will displace minorities from an area within a public school district and thereby sidestep the Supreme Court's mandate. Not only creation of new all-white sections will be encouraged in order to maintain white schools but abolition of presently mixed areas may be anticipated as well."—Charles Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbors* (New York, 1955), p. 305.

community shaped more and more by big-time decisions, does this inevitably mean another step in what C. Wright Mills calls "the transformation of a community of publics into a mass society"?

The net effect of the new housing system is a neighborhood environment created by forces over which the individual home seeker or resident has little direct control.[14] But if the consumer has little real influence via the traditional mechanics of market choice, what about his potential role as a citizen influencing policy? To what extent can he take part in the public decisions about housing, planning, and redevelopment that will determine how he lives?

Many efforts are being made to encourage democratic participation in the development process. Sometimes citizen groups form spontaneously to attack common problems, whether in unincorporated suburban communities or in blighted areas where redevelopment schemes bring the threat of mass eviction. Such groups may be weak or strong, ignorant or informed, narrow or enlightened. In Chicago, through such organizations as the Hyde Park–Kenwood Community Conference, citizen planning at the district level is being attempted, to deal with problems of social transition and race relations as well as physical improvement per se. But all these efforts are still highly experimental, and although federal policy requires "citizen participation" in renewal programs, there is no definite proven means of achieving it.

In the field of adult education, however, there seems to be a growing movement that may help to provide some of the answers. Although not focused specifically on housing and redevelopment issues, the views of three different leaders are directly pertinent in the most concrete sense.

The philosophy and social imperatives of the new adult education "movement" grow out of the recognition by many educators and sociologists of the declining importance of the primary face-to-face groups in American life, and the pervasive sense of uselessness or ineffectiveness of the individual confronted with the shift of power from the individual to larger and larger social units. . . . [The new role of adult education] is that of being "the handmaiden of community action programs" looking toward the improvement of living conditions of citizens.[15]

On the one hand, man as a human being and as a citizen is shaped by the industrialization and urbanization which have attended the developments of science and technology. On the other hand, as a citizen of democracy, man shapes his industrial and urban society when he understands it. His capacity to shape it will be in direct proportion to his understanding of it. It is not the knowledge itself but the art of using the knowledge that matters.[16]

Instruction for adults has until recently been thought of in terms of remedial education and traditional subject matter. . . . However it is recognized today that some of the most effective adult education takes place outside of the classroom when people come together to study and to do something about their common problems. Community improvement and development activities are in this category. . . . Three of the special activities in which adult education is an integral part of community development [are]: the community school; the community council; and the community development services of colleges and universities.[17]

[14] "Consumers' choice is constrained by a limited market, by factors of financing and price, and by the fact that they are offered only packaged products with a largely predetermined neighborhood environment."—Maisel, *op. cit. supra* (note 1), p. 258.

[15] Paul A. McGhee, "Three Dimensions of Adult Education," *The Educational Record,* April 1954, p. 119.

[16] John Osman, "A Call for Statesmanship in Adult Education," speech for the Ohio Association for Adult Education, March 13, 1953.

[17] Herbert C. Hunsaker, "A Review of Community Projects," *School Executive,* May 1954, p. 72.

Knowledge and *effective organization:* these are the basic requirements for democratic participation in the complicated process that shapes modern cities and neighborhoods.

Catherine Bauer is a lecturer in City and Regional Planning at the University of California in Berkeley. She has been a member of the Slum Clearance Advisory Committee of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, a lecturer at Harvard University, a consultant to the United Nations, vice-president of the National Housing Conference, and director of research and information in the United States Housing Authority. She is author of Modern Housing (1934) and many articles and pamphlets.

Education and Recreation

By Jackson M. Anderson

SINCE the turn of the century, there has been a vast increase in the amount of leisure time for people of all ages in our society. Accompanying this expanding leisure has been a significant increase in crime and delinquency, a higher divorce rate, and an alarming growth in the number of mentally ill. Educators and other community leaders, realizing the value of recreation in contributing to personal happiness and thus helping to prevent and alleviate these conditions, are giving increasing support to programs of organized community-recreation activities. Thus recreation is now recognized as an essential community responsibility.

As early as 1917, the National Education Association listed "preparation for the worthy use of leisure time" as one of the seven basic objectives of education.[1] Thus the school has long been charged with a strong responsibility for recreation. This responsibility is twofold.

First, the school is responsible for encouraging its students to develop interests and basic skills in a variety of wholesome leisure-time activities which may be enjoyed throughout life. Many of these desirable interests and skills will come from the learning experiences provided in physical education and other organized classes in the school curriculum. Others will grow out of the play activities, interscholastic athletics, and other extraclass activities and experiences provided by the school. These learning experiences must be constantly examined to make sure that they are really contributing to the development of leisure-time interests and skills. Failure to do so may deny the students in our schools the right to enjoy many types of recreational activities in later life.

The other aspect of the school's responsibility is provision of the necessary leadership, facilities, and programs to meet the recreational needs and desires of the entire community. Awareness of this second responsibility came with the new concept of the "community school." Of course the school is not alone in responsibility for the recreation program of the community, for many agencies both public and private have contributions to make. There is, however, a growing realization of the fundamental importance of the school as a community center for recreation and adult education. Not only is the school strategically located but, in many of our smaller communities, it is the only agency capable of supplying the leadership, facilities, and funds necessary to meet the recreational needs of the community. Since a great majority of the communities in our nation *are* small, the role of the school in recreation is an exceedingly important one.

With the growing realization that recreation is a fundamental human need, essential to the well-being of all people, there is more and more public demand for use of school facilities for community recreation during after-school hours and throughout the summer months. To permit an expensive school plant to lie idle while facilities are needed for community recreation is an obvious waste. The consolidation of schools into larger

[1] National Education Association, *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education*. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Education, Department of the Interior, 1917.

and more effective districts or administrative units and the construction of modern school plants with complete recreation facilities have greatly enhanced the school's ability to provide organized programs of community recreation. Thus it is not surprising that today the school is one of the primary agencies administering such programs.

One of the problems the secondary schools now face is the obvious necessity for half-day sessions because of the wave of young people now entering high school. This situation will surely have a tremendous effect on the school's responsibility for recreation.

Administration of Community Recreation Programs

Besides avocational instruction in classroom and extraclass activities, what recreational services are the schools providing? Although these services take many forms, they may, in general, be classified into the following groups: (1) community recreation programs wholly under the administration of the schools; (2) community recreation programs administered jointly by the school and the municipality or some other agency; (3) community recreation programs using school facilities but under the administration of public agencies other than the schools, or under quasi-public agencies. Some typical examples of these types of services will be discussed briefly.

School-agencies administration

Perhaps the best-known example of a municipal recreation program administered by a school agency is that of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which has long been known as the "City of the Lighted Schoolhouses."

The major recreation program in this city is provided by the Department of Municipal Recreation and Adult Education of the Milwaukee Public Schools. The program is headed by an executive of extensive and varied school and recreation experience, who has the rank of assistant superintendent of schools. In many instances, playgrounds and other recreation areas are acquired by the city and constructed by the Department of Public Works. When completed, however, these areas are turned over to the Department of Municipal Recreation for maintenance and operation. A supervisor with the title of general field assistant has charge of property maintenance and supervision.

Activities in the "lighted schoolhouses" include classes in many applied arts, group athletic activities, literary activities, dramatics, music and dancing, and a variety of civic, social, and patriotic events. The indoor centers are open to school-age children after school hours up to 6:30 P.M., and to others during the evening hours. Scout troops and similar groups of children may use the facilities during the evening hours by special permit from the principal. Highly organized sports for youth and adults are conducted on outdoor play areas during the daytime and under lights in the evening.

A distinctive feature of the Milwaukee program is that, even though it draws its financial support from a special school fund, it is integrated closely with the regular schoolwork, many of the evening program directors being also employed in part during the day. Lighted school centers come under the general supervision of the day-school principal or vice-principal. This creates a strong tie with the general schoolwork and minimizes administrative conflicts between the two programs.

The rapid increase in the number of school-centered community recreation programs is perhaps of greater significance to rural districts than to the cities. The incorporated city is a governmental device employed for the specific purpose of organizing governmental

services of local importance. The rural areas have no such device, except for education, which is administered through a system of local school districts and school boards. These boards are the only governmental agency having immediate contact with local community needs. They also control the main publicly owned facilities which might be utilized in a rural recreation program. Thus the school district offers the only immediate hope for public-sponsored community recreation programs in rural areas.

An excellent example of a rural recreation program is that administered by the County Board of Education in Allen County, Indiana. This county program is headed by a qualified recreation executive who has the title of supervisor of recreation. He reports directly to the County Superintendent of Schools and spends his entire time in organizing and conducting recreation programs throughout the county. These programs are conducted co-operatively with 4-H Clubs, Rural Youth groups, and other agencies. School facilities throughout the county are utilized during after-school hours for recreation activities.

Joint administration by schools and other agencies

The co-ordinated recreation plan of Long Beach, California, has attracted the attention of recreation leaders and educators from all parts of the country. This plan provides an effective method of joint administration of community recreation by school and city authorities. The program is administered by a recreation commission. Four of the nine commission members are the City Manager, the Superintendent of Schools, a member of the City Council, and a member of the Board of Education. Five citizens are appointed by these four and approved by the City Council. The Supervisor of Health and Physical Education of the Long Beach public schools is also Director of Public Recreation.

This co-ordinated plan brings the recreation resources of the school system and the municipality under central direction, thereby avoiding duplication of costs, facilities, services, and personnel. The significance of the co-ordinated plan in enabling the city to meet its increasing needs for recreation has been dramatically demonstrated within the past few years. Modern gymnasiums, swimming pools, school playgrounds, tennis courts, auditoriums, and athletic fields are among the school facilities available, when not needed for school purposes, to supplement the city facilities for community recreation. Thirty-five municipal and sixty-eight school areas are now utilized for the varied program of recreational activities for people of all ages.

A noteworthy plan for joint administration of recreation in a rural area is found in Monongalia County, West Virginia. The Monongalia County Consolidated Recreation Commission was established as a result of the passage of a state recreation enabling act making possible joint action by city, county, and school units. The County School Board, the County Court, and the City Council of Morgantown each appoint three members to make up the nine-member commission. The commission employs a full-time, year-round executive to head up the county recreation program. A budget of over $50,000 is provided by the County School Board, the Morgantown City Council, the county Community Chest, and the County Court. The commission operates seventeen daily playgrounds in the urban and industrial areas, three city parks, and twenty-one weekly and volunteer rural playgrounds. Two community centers, one for youth only and the other for all ages, are operated from five to seven days each week.

Administration by nonschool agencies

One of the finest examples of a community recreation program utilizing school facilities but administered by a nonschool agency is that of Oakland, California. This city was a pioneer in the field of public recreation, its first playground commission having been appointed in 1908. Since that time it has drawn wide attention for the quality and diversity of its program, which is administered by a five-member Board of Playground Directors. This board co-operates closely with the Board of Education and, under a provision of the city charter, is responsible for the operation of all recreation areas and facilities in the city parks and other municipal areas. The Recreation Department is headed by a qualified Superintendent of Recreation.

Because of the climate, the diversified program in Oakland, like that of many other California cities, consists for the most part of outdoor activities carried on throughout the year. Thus the core of Oakland's program is its playgrounds. The school playgrounds are operated after school hours, on Saturdays and holidays, and during vacation periods. Those playgrounds containing baseball diamonds are also open on Sundays. Although sports and games make up a major part of the program, especially during the school year, many school playgrounds also provide story-telling, dramatics, folk dancing, and simple crafts. At the end of each sport season for girls, district playdays are held in each neighborhood throughout the city. Scheduled athletic activities for girls include softball, tennis, batball, kickball, netball, bowl club ball, paddle handball, relays, and crew rowing. Sports days are also arranged for boys, and the more popular boys' activities include softball, basketball, touch football, track, crew rowing, and hahdball.

Recreation specialists are employed to assist the playground directors in conducting these activities. Organized clubs include hobby groups, junior leader groups, dramatics clubs, and swimming and tennis units. Special activities are held frequently to add variety to the program. These activities include doll shows, marble tournaments, soap-bubble contests, treasure hunts, pet shows, parades, kite-flying tournaments, and excursions away from the playground. In each district of the city, the children and playground directors join during the summer in observing a special day of social recreation, stunts, games, and refreshments.

In addition to its playground facilities, the Oakland Recreation Department operates a number of neighborhood centers. The recreation activities and facilities of the various districts in the city are co-ordinated and centralized around these centers. Several centers have gymnasiums, and each adjoins an outdoor playground, some of which are lighted. People of all ages are served at these centers through organized clubs. Interested groups take part in social activities, forums, hobbies, handcrafts, dramatics, social, creative, and folk dancing, music, sewing, cooking, and bridge.

An organized recreation program for employees of more than sixty business and industrial firms is carried on through the Industrial Athletic Association of Metropolitan Oakland. This association, which is sponsored by the city Recreation Department, was organized in 1919 and was one of the earliest industrial recreation associations organized in the United States.[2] Ac-

[2] Jackson M. Anderson, *Industrial Recreation—A Guide to Its Organization and Administration* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), p. 58.

tivities for both men and women include bowling, softball, basketball, tennis, golf, swimming, badminton, volleyball, bridge, and crew rowing. Intercompany leagues for men are also organized in golf, horseshoes, baseball, track, handball, and ice hockey. A spectacular spring sports carnival is the outstanding annual event of the association's program. Hundreds of men and women employees of the member firms take part in the colorful parade, with many floats depicting sports, stunts, contests, and demonstration games.

An interesting example of a rural recreation program utilizing school facilities but administered by a nonschool agency is found in Mason County, Kentucky. Here the central authority for the program is the Mason County Playground and Recreation Board, consisting of five members appointed by the county judge. The board employs a qualified full-time director and other necessary personnel, determines policies for conducting the county recreation program, controls all expenditures from the annual budget, operates and maintains playgrounds and community centers, and helps to interpret recreation to the general public.

Unless a community is willing to share the cost, it cannot obtain financial assistance from the county board to conduct a local recreation program. The board pays half the cost of the operation of a playground or community center; the particular community must pay the other half. The board discharges its financial responsibility by providing all paid leadership; the community by furnishing the areas, facilities, equipment, and supplies. If a community desires to expand its recreation program, it must be willing to match any increase allocated to it by the board. The key role which the schools have played in providing facilities is seen in the fact that twenty-seven of the thirty community centers now utilized in the county recreation program are school buildings.

PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTIONS

No one of the three types of administrative patterns for community recreation can be recommended as best for all communities. A pattern which works well in one community might fail miserably in another. The reason is obvious. Not only do communities differ widely as to type, size, and location, but the various agencies within the community differ in their ability to provide leadership, facilities, and funds for recreation. Thus a careful study should be made to determine the best type of community organization for the successful conduct of recreation in a particular community.[3]

Teamwork approach

In trying to determine what pattern of community organization will best meet the recreational needs of a particular community, a teamwork approach is essential. Experience has shown that the best way of achieving this approach is through the creation of a community interagency council or committee. In addition to a representative from the Board of Education, this council should include representatives of the various community agencies performing recreational functions or services. The primary purpose of the council should be to establish a co-operative relationship among the member agencies and to develop, through joint planning, a sound program based on the needs and desires of people of all ages in the community.

The schools and all other public and private agencies in the community should be encouraged to adopt the policy of planning jointly—preferably through the interagency council—any new construction of recreational facilities. Such a policy will reduce duplication and waste to a minimum. It will also ensure that new school plants or other community buildings be of maximum use for community recreation.

[3] Jackson M. Anderson, "Evaluating Community Recreation," *Journal of the American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation*, Vol. 24 (May 1953), p. 42.

Desirable legislation

One of the most serious problems in some states is the need for recreation enabling acts which will permit local communities to develop adequate programs of recreation. However, there are at least thirty-five states in which the Board of Education and the school district have broad legal powers for the conduct of community recreation.

Some states have passed laws assigning funds to assist school districts in providing recreation programs and services. The state of Florida has passed legislation adopting an "Eleventh and Twelfth Months Educational Enrichment Program." This law provides financial assistance to local schools to furnish leadership and supplies for recreational, educational, cultural, and social activities during the summer months when the schools are not in session.

Determining community needs

Any program of community recreation which is to be successful must be built around the needs and desires of the citizens of the community. Thus one of the most essential preliminaries to organizing a community recreation program is to conduct a community survey. In smaller communities, the survey may be made by a local college or university which has the resources for conducting such research. Larger communities, however, have experienced greatest success by employing the services of a professional research expert to do this important job.

TRENDS

There is a definite trend toward wider use of schools for community recreation. There is also a trend toward joint planning by all local recreation agencies serving the community. With so many co-ordinated departments of municipal and school recreation jointly financed and administered by co-ordinating bodies from the city and school district, our school leaders need to stress continually strong leadership in recreation as well as multiple use of facilities.

Jackson M. Anderson, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is assistant executive secretary and consultant in recreation and outdoor education of the American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation. He has served as associate professor of recreation at Purdue University, director of research of the National Industrial Recreation Association, director of recreation of American Airlines, Inc., city director of health, physical education, and recreation, Radburn, New Jersey, and instructor of physical education at New York University. He is author of Industrial Recreation—A Guide to Its Organization and Administration (1955) and numerous articles in professional journals.

Education and Public Health

By Dorothy B. Nyswander

IT is difficult to analyze accurately what has taken place as education and public health, sometimes singly, often together, have worked toward developing the school health program. The program is young in years, and the task, filled with complexities, is far short of accomplishment.

The discussion to follow will be developed around these questions: What are the backgrounds of present interrelationships? What kinds of administrative patterns have evolved? Are there differences in administrative philosophy? What values for children and the community are inherent in differing programs? What nagging problems are sources of conflict? Are present trends toward a solution of problems or amelioration of symptoms?

Backgrounds

The "father" of public health, Lemuel Shattuck,[1] in 1850 indicated the interest in the health of the school child and the potentialities for teaching health in the classroom that have been urgent considerations of knowledgeable public health workers since that time. In public school education at about the same period, Horace Mann was creating a new curriculum in which health was to be included. In 1848 he urged:

> Let human physiology be introduced as an indispensable branch of study into our public schools; let no teacher be approved who is not master of its leading principles, and of their applications to the varying circumstances of life.[2]

Throughout this early period (1850–1900), the influence of Europe was reflected in the health programs of the schools and in public health practice. Medical examinations for school children, individual mental tests, attention for children with handicaps in vision and hearing through special classes and clinics, the teaching of physiology—these were imported together with the theories of Pestalozzi, Montessori, and Herbart. But their appearance on the American scene was spotty.

Beginnings—1900–1930

Programs for health supervision of all children were needed, not hit-and-miss sporadic health services for a few. The cities of Boston and New York took the leadership. The "school nurse" came into being; medical examinations became part of the larger picture of disease prevention; unofficial health agencies focused efforts on the school child; and new societies were organized to improve the health of children. Looking back, it is clear that when *a need to do something* became obvious a pattern not unusual in solving new problems was followed. Each community recognizing the need moved ahead under the leadership of the agency taking the initiative. Thus by 1925 three types of leadership were evident. In some localities school systems were employing staff for health services and health instruction. In others, the health department was providing health services. And in many areas the only help in health instruction stemmed from two unofficial agencies, the National Tuberculosis Association[3] and an association which later became part of the American Child Health Association.[4] The Women's Christian Temperance Union[5] had played its part a bit earlier.

[1] Lemuel Shattuck, *Report of the Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts, 1850* (Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1850), pp. 178–79. Republished Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948.

[2] Twelfth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board of Education of Massachusetts for 1848, *in* Mary Mann, *Life of Horace Mann* (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1891), Vol. IV, p. 244.

Administrative principles

Dr. Thomas Wood[6] was the able interpreter of principles which today underlie administrative practice, with only minor changes introduced in implementing them.

1. The administrative responsibility for employing personnel to give health services to children in school may rest either in the school board or the Department of Health.
2. The administrative responsibility for health instruction of children rests with the schools.
3. The administrative responsibility for the control of communicable diseases and the sanitary environment of the schools belongs to the health department.
4. The unofficial health agencies and professional health associations may aid either official agency in promoting health services or health instruction but have no administrative authority.
5. Boards of Education do not have responsibility for providing treatment services.
6. Parents should be urged to seek advice from their family physician when they can afford to do so.

The myriad ways in which these principles have been developed into health programs have produced a patchwork quilt for the nation as a whole that confounds a foreign visitor seeking uniformity.

An active and productive period

The first three decades of this century were a period of intense activity. Programs were started. Research was conducted to improve techniques used in health appraisals of children. A powerful resource was found in the American Child Health Association,[7] which identified weaknesses in current practices and recommended changes. On some of the issues pinpointed twenty years ago there has been little progress. In the reorientation of health instruction, however, growth is evident. From an emphasis on knowledge of the human body (physiology and anatomy), the curriculum in health began to emphasize what students needed to know to live healthfully. From regarding health as an objective, apart and different from other educational goals, health teaching became part of the integrated approach to the teaching of "the whole child," a concept which at that time was new to many people.

School administrators also made basic contributions emphasizing the importance of the health of the school child. Health was first in the list of objectives offered in *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education.*[8] Health services

[3] Louise Strachan, *Fifteen Years of Child Health Education.* New York: National Tuberculosis Association, 1932.

[4] Philip Van Ingen, *The Story of the American Child Health Association.* New York: American Child Health Association, 1935.

[5] Mary H. Hunt, *A History of the First Decade* (Boston: Crosby and Co., 1891), p. 114.

[6] T. D. Wood and H. G. Rowell, *Health Supervision and Medical Inspection of Schools.* Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1927.

[7] American Child Health Association, *Principles and Practices in School Health Education.* New York: The Association, 1935.

[8] Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education of the National Education Association, *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education,* United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 35, Washington, D. C., 1918.

rated a thoughtful chapter in a publication by the Educational Policies Commission.[9]

Child health demonstrations were financed in rural counties by the Commonwealth Fund; other foundations supported experimental work in mental health and nutrition. The period culminated in 1930 in the third White House Conference on Child Health and Protection.[10]

This was the golden era in school health. It was marked by creativity in thinking about the problems; research, demonstrations, and pilot studies were fostered; the Joint Committee on Health Problems in Education[11] initiated its influential publications; health department personnel and educational leaders were concerned and did something about their concerns; voluntary agencies expanded their educational programs. It was an era of inquiry and productivity.

GROWTH AND CONFLICTS—1930–50

In the next period, health departments began to take on new functions. Proper sewage disposal and insect control had checked malaria, typhus, yellow fever, cholera, and typhoid; immunizations were available and in wide use against smallpox, diphtheria, hydrophobia, and typhoid. Diseases which had been scourges for centuries had been all but conquered. Tuberculosis, however, was still a threat and death rates of mothers and infants had to be lowered.

Specialists in nutrition, mental health, and education were brought in to supplement medical and nursing skills. The education of the public regarding the nature and prevention of disease became a priority for all health personnel. As Winslow had written in 1923:

> Education then is the keynote of the modern campaign for public health. Tuberculosis and infant mortality are pre-eminent among all the causes of preventable disease and death. . . . In each case the fight must be won, not by the construction of public works, but by the conduct of the individual life.[12]

Thus with health goals which could only be attained through the educational process, it was inevitable that public health personnel should become concerned with what was being taught in the schools and with the health of school children. School children would be the adults of the future. At the same time health departments reached out into the community through citizens' committees, participated in health councils, and intensified efforts, with methods borrowed from social work and adult education, to teach adults.

What was happening to educational systems during this period? They, too, were enlarging their vision as to their responsibilities to children. The needs of children and of the community in which the children lived became pivots for curriculum development. As a result the importance of the child's environment in home and neighborhood came to the fore. Schoolmen began asking parents and citizens to help in the education of the "total child." With broader concepts of child growth and development, new types of workers were needed on school staffs. Physicians, nurses, and a few teachers, all with postgraduate training in school health administration, were employed. The guidance personnel with its core of psychologists, psychiatrists, psychiatric social workers, and visiting teachers became part of school programs. Dentists, dental hygienists, nutritionists, and medical social workers were added.

Thus it appears that schools and health departments were following parallel lines of development. Both had enlarged vistas of what their jobs should be and because of this, for very different reasons, they needed new kinds of staff and greater support from the community. It is little wonder that with the same kinds of health workers employed in the two agencies, and with the need often to work with the same segments of the adult population, the parallel lines sometimes crossed—to the confusion of everyone.

Impetus to better services in health departments came through national legislation which, in 1935, made funds available to state health departments in the form of grants-in-aid.[13] It became possible to provide services in areas where, heretofore, none were available and to train personnel. The effects of this support were felt immediately. One of the results was the employment in many places of personnel trained in maternal and child health and in school health. It was not uncommon to find state health departments employing health educators only to assign them to state departments of education so that they could participate in planning the health curriculum and in teacher training. This influx of funds to state health departments seemed threatening to some of the health service personnel employed by schools.[14]

The conflict as to who should administer the school health service program reached a crisis during the years 1946–49. During these years several attempts were made to get bills through Congress to step up health services, health instruction, and physical education by providing funds to the states. The question was, Which agency in the state should administer the funds?

Opposite opinions were voiced by public health and school administrators. Naturally, the bills failed to pass, although the United States Office of Education, the federal Public Health Service, and one or two professional organizations did their best to get an acceptable compromise. On the local levels the conflict for power became intensified during and after this period. School personnel believed that health departments wanted to "take them over." And some health departments undoubtedly did.

PRESENT "COLD PEACE"

As usual, persons with level heads on both sides of the fence restored the peace, a peace of sorts. Two states, Indiana and Mississippi, worked out unique administrative patterns in which the state Departments of Health and Education have joint responsibility in financing and supervising the school health program. A résumé of the present status is given by Kilander.[15] Of 2,886 city school systems, administration of the school health service program is by the Board of Education in 60 per cent; by the Board of Health in 11 per cent; jointly by Boards of Education and Health in 23 per cent; and by other agencies in 6 per cent. Wil-

[9] Educational Policies Commission, *Social Services and the Schools*. Washington: National Education Association, 1938.

[10] White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, *The School Health Program*. New York: The Century Company, 1932.

[11] Joint Committee on Health Problems in Education of the National Education Association and the American Medical Association, *Health Education*. New York: National Education Association, 1925.

[12] C.-E. A. Winslow, *The Evolution and Significance of the Modern Public Health Campaign* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923), p. 55.

[13] Social Security Act of August 14, 1935 (49 Stat. L. 620, Ch. 531).

[14] Fred Moore and J. W. Studebaker, *Organization and Administration of School Health Work*, U. S. Office of Education, Bulletin No. 12. Washington, D. C., 1939.

[15] H. F. Kilander, *Health Service in City Schools*, U. S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Bulletin No. 20 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 11.

son [16] interprets these data as a trend toward joint administration and financing.

In 1951 a working basis was restored. This came about through a statement [17] of twenty-one principles for the conduct of school health service programs issued by the National Council of Chief State School Officers and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers. It was a statement long overdue but gratefully received.

Positive factors

In the school health program today, the following positive factors may be noted:

Interdepartmental relations are on a formal working basis as far as program responsibilities go.

Co-operative effort is evident in providing in-service training institutes for teachers.

Steady progress is being made in schools of education and departments of health and physical education to prepare teachers to include health emphases in their classroom work.

Health curricula and textbooks are improving rapidly, incorporating principles found currently in other fields of instruction.

Technicians to do routine vision and hearing testing and clerical workers to relieve nurses and teachers are gradually being introduced.

More study is being given to health services needed for handicapped children.

Public health nursing continues its efforts to educate schoolmen and parents to the professional use of nursing skills in schools.

Greater influence on health curricula and some changes in the health services are being introduced by those physicians, nurses, or directors of health and physical education who, with a public health point of view, are administering the health program in schools.

Needed improvements

There are also discomfiting features:

Although advances in health curricula are being made, there have been only a half dozen studies during the past fifteen years which have contributed to improving the conduct of the health service program. Many practices still in vogue are those advised by Wood and Rowell in the 1920's. There has been no testing of their validity. Studies are needed to validate the necessity or advisability of annual medical examinations, of annual dental examinations by school dentist or dental hygienist, of periodic medical examinations, and of the referral system of selecting children for medical attention and its effectiveness in different types of rural and urban areas. Dozens of routine practices by nurses and physicians need careful scrutiny.

Thoroughgoing investigations need to be made of the value of every health record and printed notice now in use.

No serious attempts have been made to evaluate the use made of health records by the staff. It is still possible to find schools with adequate nursing time where teachers, on being questioned about children with health problems in the classroom, have little or no knowledge about the health needs of a single child. "Oh, that is the nurse's job. She can give you the information." Or, "The nurse must have that information. She keeps the records in her office." Such remarks by teachers are symptoms not only of a breakdown in the communication system but also of lack of acceptance by school administrators and health personnel alike of the idea that *the teacher is a fundamental member of the "team";* that without the teacher, health services to children by other staff members are a fifth wheel which rolls along quite independent of the basic goals of education.

In many areas, the personnel administering the school health services lack qualifications for the job. Health departments lack medical staff with keen interest in the potentialities of the school program. A good pediatrician may be oriented only to clinical services with infants and preschool children. His training has not made him comfortable with the educational program of the schools. He has little skill in program planning. City schools often employ physicians with few qualifications for their task. Not able to think creatively in the field, they carry on in traditional ways. Not administrators, they fail to use opportunities to co-ordinate health services with the health instruction, physical education, and guidance programs which are within their own administrative framework. Their relationships with the health department are formal, distant, and stereotyped.

The most serious handicap in towns and rural areas, however, is the employment of nurses by school districts without provision for their supervision or professional growth. Many of these nurses have had neither training nor experience in public health nursing. Their vision of the job is limited to their clinical experience in hospitals and the expressed needs of principals and teachers. Their work is oriented to the child and the employer, not to the family or the community. School administrators in such situations isolate nurses from their own profession, and the health program in the school reflects this fact. Indeed, a health program may not exist at all, for the mere presence in the school of a physician, nurse, or dentist is no guarantee that the specialist is able to develop a plan which provides health supervision to every child in the school, education to teachers and parents, utilization of community resources, and integration of the different activities within the school contributing to the development of healthy children.

Where qualified nursing or medical supervision is lacking in both the schools and the health department, little can be done to remedy this situation. But in many instances a qualified and interested director of maternal and child health and a qualified director of public health nursing are found in the health department. These people sit on the side lines biting their fingernails. The school requests their services neither in program planning nor for supervision. The community is the loser.

THE ISSUES

What are the issues today that block better co-ordination between schools and health departments, that keep them from joining forces? There are several, different in kind and intensity.

Differences in orientation

Basic to many of the issues is the different orientation of personnel in schools and personnel in health departments. The schoolman is interested in the child. All his forces are focused on helping the child to learn. When a new staff member is added, his task is to add something of value to the child's experience. The child is the unit with which he works. When he asks for aid

[16] Charles C. Wilson, *School Health Services* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association and American Medical Association, 1953), p. 377.

[17] National Council of Chief State School Officers and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, *Responsibilities of State Department of Education and Health for School Health Services* (Washington, D. C.: National Council of Chief State School Officers, 1951), pp. 9–10.

from the community, he seeks it to enrich the learning of the child.

For the health department the unit is the family. The problem may be one of prenatal care, tuberculosis, nutrition, geriatrics, or mental health. The fundamental concern is the education of all members of the family; the thinking of the staff encompasses the interdependencies and problems of family members. The child's health is part of the constellation of the family's health. The particular health problem of the school age child is seen in relation to the problems the mother is having with an infant or to the father who has been diagnosed as tuberculous. Priorities of health problems as seen by the family are recognized.

The public health worker is disturbed because he cannot communicate to the schoolman the values which he sees in the family approach to health promotion. The schoolman feels as though he were beating his head against granite when he insists that the needs of individual children for attention must be met. Neither professional group comprehends the other's philosophy, and the "social distance" between them seems to have no bridge. Each group is oriented according to the philosophy of its professional schools, which have failed to include training in understanding other points of view.

Administrative responsibility

Administrators in their training learn that responsibility and authority should be inseparable, and in their work they soon find out that having "control" of services makes life much simpler. But in both public health and education new objectives have been accepted for which skills not possessed by one agency are needed. The development of a complex program using resources outside the agency demands a new dimension in administration, namely, administration by a committee or commission. The classes for children with cerebral palsy are an example of this kind of administration. Schools, health departments, medical schools, and voluntary agencies interested in the crippled child share in providing specialized staff, funds for operation and maintenance, and supervision. The program works.

Differences in financing programs

What effect does the autonomy of the school district have on its relationships with the health department?

Although the federal grant-in-aid program to state health departments gave considerable impetus to the school health field the picture on the local level is different. The budget of a city or rural health department is only part of the budget for all local governmental services; accordingly, to obtain funds for additional nursing staff to give increased school service is often difficult. The budget of the school board is another matter. The decisions regarding budget items are made by the school board itself, whose sole responsibility it is to provide the best schools that the community can afford. At the local level, therefore, Boards of Education find it easier to finance additional nurses and other health service personnel than do health departments.

Health officers recognize the greater ease with which health personnel can be added to the school payroll, and some of them, knowing the need of services within the school and convinced of the futility of trying to employ additional staff, are encouraging school boards to go ahead. At present, in many cities and counties of California where nurses are employed by school boards, the schools have for school children alone approximately the same number of nurses that local health departments have to serve the needs of the entire population.

Different methods of financing school health personnel have brought about differences in employment standards. Health personnel employed by schools have a salary scale at variance with that of health department personnel. The hours of work and vacation periods of personnel employed by schools are similar to those of teachers. Health department personnel naturally view with a jaundiced eye these discrepancies in salaries and working conditions. The last straw is added when health department personnel are asked to take over special school cases or meet emergencies during the summer because school personnel are on vacation.

Separate financing presents other problems. It produces multiple programs within cities and counties. Different school districts within a county may each have a different school health program. Some may have contracts for nursing services with the county health department; others employ their own health staff. In cities, with but few exceptions, the health department gives health services to parochial schools. Thus within cities there are usually two different school health service programs. And within counties there may be three or more. These variations are confusing.

Research and appraisal

The lack of significant studies in the field of school health may stem from the difficulties just presented. Or it may have its origins in complacency or in the stability which a "cold peace" brings. Whatever the causes, there is at present little evidence of administrators' seeking an answer to the question, "How well are we doing in the school health program?" Opinion is substituted for data. Old ways are easy ways. Data will not be forthcoming until willingness is expressed by administrators to appraise any and all parts of the school health program.[18] Health departments and schools alike are evading the issue of appraisal.

It is from community leaders on the outside that questions are coming. They ask where the data are showing to what extent community facilities for meeting the diversity of local needs are available to parents of every school child. What analyses have been made of the professional skills needed in the school health program, to point the way toward new types of workers or different training for those we now have? Is the assumption valid that the health services are educational? Research in these areas takes courage; some of the answers may threaten the status quo.

CONCLUSION

In most of the country there is still a hodgepodge of health services in schools which cannot merit the term *program,* if by program is meant planned sequences of activities toward accepted objectives. Efforts to bring programs into being, however, are not lacking. State co-ordinating councils in many states have done yeoman's work to improve the situation.

The crux of the difficulties is at the local level. Here is where the professional people live who do the work. It is not always easy for them to be objective about what they are doing. Here differences in philosophy, administrative policies, and ease of financing programs create situations which are tolerable but uncomfortable. Tensions are controlled but near the surface. All this would not be serious were it not for the fact that these two agencies, the

[18] New York City is an outstanding exception. The Department of Health and the Board of Education have during the past thirty years periodically secured funds for investigations of the health service program.

school and the health department, are agencies of the people created by them to serve them.

New patterns of working together need to be experimented with at state and local levels. One such pattern on the state level might be that of administration through a commission made up of representatives of health, education, and individuals outside the two departments with a demonstrated interest in the welfare of children. The functions of this commission would be in line with the philosophy of state services to localities. Where state employees give no direct services to localities the commission would have one type of co-ordinating service to render. Where direct services are given by one or both of the departments, a different approach would be needed. In either case the approach to localities would be that of a "team."

Administrators' responsibility

The complexity of the problem on the local level, especially in rural counties, will only be resolved by administrators themselves. It is to be hoped they will do so before the public insists upon it. At present there is no one solution. Situations are too varied to hazard a suggestion. Solutions will be found only through initiating a plan and evaluating it.

The school superintendent and the health officer are key figures. They need to understand better than they now do each other's responsibilities. This personal relationship between the two administrators cannot be overemphasized. It permeates the attitudes of their staffs; it will be reflected in the kind of planning for health care children in schools receive. Better understanding has in some instances been brought about by making the local health officer a nonvoting member of the Board of Education. In other communities the school superintendent and the health officer each attends the board meeting of the other agency.[19]

Another effort toward understanding has been the employment of a medical director by funds from both agencies. In the health department this physician serves as the director of maternal and child health; in the school department he is the co-ordinator of health services. In this plan, the nursing staff, dental staff, technicians for testing hearing and vision, and physiotherapists may be employed by either the Board of Education or the Department of Health.

Many variations of this plan are possible. A medical director or a public health nursing supervisor employed by either the health department or the schools, or by both, is accepted as a member of both departments and gives leadership to the staff under him irrespective of who pays his salary.


Co-operation is an empty word unless there is an investment in the job by the "co-operating" parties. There is little that staff members can do to develop significant patterns of work unless the framework has been built for them by the top echelon. Where this has been done some interesting ventures have been undertaken. School nurses and public health nurses have divided up the total area, and each nurse gives generalized public health nursing service. In other places district superintendents of schools, when employing health staff, make it clear that professional leadership will come from the supervisor of public health nursing or other professional staff of the local or state health department.

At present sharing skilled services in order to meet the health needs of the community waits upon the vision of administrators. It is no longer a question of who pays the salary for whom. It is a question of imagination in making full use of all personnel and facilities to improve life within the community.

How can administrative insights be heightened? Health officers in their training may learn little or nothing about school administration. The converse is also true. The conclusion should be obvious. Interdepartmental planning of common experiences for future administrators of schools and health departments should begin on the university level. Here is the place where divergent philosophies can be recognized if not reconciled; where respect for the contributions of each profession to society can be built; where practical problems can be debated without the heat which the job situation creates. Here, too, is the place for analysis of old procedures and the time for fertile invention of new.

[19] American Association of School Administrators, *Health in Schools* (Washington, D. C., 1951), p. 415.

Dorothy B. Nyswander, Ph.D., Berkeley, California, is professor of public health education in the School of Public Health, University of California. She has been a consultant to departments of education and institutions of teacher education with the Inter-American Education Foundation; co-ordinator of an international seminar in health education in Panama (Foreign Operations Administration); visiting consultant to Latin America (World Health Organization); member of the Expert Committee on School Health (World Health Organization); director of Health Education Demonstration, New York City Department of Health; director of the Astoria Study, New York City Board of Education and Department of Health; professor of educational psychology, University of Utah. She is the author of Solving School Health Problems (1942) and articles in educational and public health journals.



Education and Social Welfare

By Kermit T. Wiltse

OUR concern with achieving better co-ordination of the efforts of the educational and social welfare agencies of the community is grounded on the premise that these two types of agencies must work closely together if the children and youth of the community are to be well served. This would seem an obvious premise scarcely worth reiterating if it were not for the observable fact that such co-ordination of effort is nearly nonexistent in many of our American communities and approaches the ideal in none of them.

Co-ordination of the efforts of educational and social welfare agencies in meeting the needs of children and youth has two aspects. One is the relationship of the educational agencies of a community to the existing social welfare agencies as they collaborate in meeting the problems of individual children or groups of children and youth and work together toward improving the effectiveness of both the educational and social welfare services of the community. The second is the utilization of social-welfare-trained personnel within the schools themselves. This second aspect is commonly referred to as the development of school social work and results from an expanding concept of the purpose and function of the educational agency rather than a new concept of social welfare.

Definition of Terms

It is necessary first to state what is meant by the terms "educational agencies" and "social welfare agencies" of the community, as they are used here. For the purposes of this article, in speaking of the educational agencies of the American community, the focus is primarily upon the public elementary and secondary schools. Day schools located in the child's home community and supported by religious orders or private payments are included wherever they meet essentially the same educational need as the public schools. Social welfare agencies cannot be so precisely delineated. Again for the purposes of this article, in speaking of the social welfare agencies of the community, the focus is upon those agencies which are established by the community to help individuals and groups of individuals who are experiencing or evidencing problems in their social adjustment. Central to our consideration here are certain public agencies created by various combinations of federal and state laws and county and city ordinances. Of particular importance are the juvenile courts and the juvenile detention and probation services, the youth detention and parole services, state and local mental hospitals and mental health clinics, the child welfare services in the public welfare department, and that part of the public assistance program that provides financial aid to needy children and families.

Each community has its own constellation of services supported by local community chests and individual subscription, the number and type being generally larger and more varied in the urban communities than in the rural. Family and marital counseling agencies, institutions for the care and treatment of dependent and disturbed children, foster home placement agencies, mental health clinics, and a wide va-

riety of group-serving agencies that are more or less geared to helping children with identified or identifiable problems in their social adjustment should be particularly kept in mind. As we consider the variety of public and private agencies engaged in some type of service for the general good or improvement of the community, a line cannot be sharply drawn distinguishing agencies termed "social welfare agencies" from those that are not so designated. However, if we keep in mind the essential point that a social welfare agency is directed toward individuals who are experiencing a more or less identified or identifiable problem in their social adjustment, a line, albeit not a sharp one, can be drawn between such agencies and the innumerable institutions, agencies, and associations of every community that are aimed at meeting the normal needs experienced by everyone.

Types of Community

When we begin to talk about co-ordination and collaboration between the educational and social welfare agencies of the community in other than a vacuum, we have to visualize real people doing actual educational or social welfare tasks in various types of communities. We have to visualize the one-room school (of which there are quite a few still in existence) located, for example, on the plains of North Dakota. Let us take the example of a child coming to school poorly clothed and apparently neglected. What is the problem of co-ordination of the teacher's concern with the concern the public child welfare worker located in the county seat thirty miles away would have for any child in the county suffering emotional and physical deprivations? What similarity, if any, does the problem of co-ordinating their efforts bear to the problem of the principal of a junior high school in New York City who desires to relate the efforts of himself and his staff concerning individual problem children in his school to the multiplicity of community social welfare agencies and activities? As we attempt to visualize all the variations between these two selected extremes, each community presenting something of a unique pattern of both educational and social welfare activities, we may wonder what useful generalizations can be made that will apply in whole or in part to all situations.

Obstacles to Co-ordination

The most cogent generalization that can be made is that educators are by and large lacking in real knowledge of the purpose and nature of the welfare agencies of their communities and particularly lacking in understanding of the methods of the social workers that staff these agencies. By educators we mean real people—teachers, principals, and superintendents. Certainly there are many exceptions to this generalization, but proportionately their number is few. This assertion is based on a variety of observations—personal experiences of the writer and numerous written expressions of specialists in the educational field. It can also be asserted that social welfare agency personnel—by which is meant people primarily identified with the profession of social work—do not always appreciate the nature of the educational process and the nature of the tasks of the people who implement this process. Education, like social work, is a relatively new profession. Some who are identified with it have little preparation for their job. Perhaps many more, as is true also of social work, have little real sense of identification with their profession. All social welfare personnel, however, have themselves experienced the educational process and are in favor of the purposes of education if not always with a par-

ticular method, whereas very few educators have personally experienced a welfare service. They are likely to share the still prevalent misconception that grew out of the historical linking of welfare services with charity and relief giving and produced the stereotype of social workers as "uplifters" or "do-gooders." A more realistic conception of a social worker as a person with specific professional education implementing defined social welfare services, each of which is focused on certain types of problems in individual adjustment, is only beginning to emerge, and many social and psychological forces, plus the lack of sufficient professionally trained social workers to staff the welfare services of the nation, will retard the development of a new cultural concept for many decades to come.[1]

There is little that happens to the educator in the course of his professional training either to give him a real knowledge of the nature of modern welfare services in general and of the services likely to be available in a specific community or to change whatever stereotype he may have acquired about social workers. It is improbable that he took a single course devoted to a study of the resources likely to be available in the social welfare services of a typical community. As part of a social-problems course, perhaps in his sophomore year, he may have studied the community as a theoretical concept and briefly surveyed types of treatment for various classes of social problems. But this does not give him an adequate appreciation of how he himself as a teacher or administrator in a public school can more effectively utilize the social welfare resources of the community to meet the needs of children and youth. The specialized content of education, and similarly the specialized content of social work, have become so large that opportunities for a student of one to learn about the other in the course of his college work are minimal and often accidental.

[1] A study of the educational attainment of all personnel employed in positions classified as social work positions in 1950 showed that only one out of five had completed the master's degree in social work which is the standard requirement for full professional status.—*Social Workers in 1950* (New York: American Association of Social Workers, Inc.), p. 8.

PREREQUISITES TO CO-ORDINATION

True co-ordination and collaboration between two different professions identified with different agencies serving the community depend upon the existence of certain attributes in each, namely, (1) security of the members in their own profession, based on their having met specific educational requirements of a professional order; (2) knowledge of the purposes of the other profession and some understanding of its methods; and (3) an appreciation of how their respective roles complement and supplement each other.

Considering the total national picture, none of these three conditions is met to a substantial degree. Individuals, entering both teaching and social work without sufficient specialized training for the tasks they are to perform, are not professionalized. However, they are only a little less ready for teamwork with members of the other profession than those who have a sense of identity with their own profession but have had little opportunity to understand the purpose and nature of the other profession or to consider on what problems and in what ways members of the two professions must work together if their communities are to be well served.

Educators would be more likely to conceive of the schools as one of a number of agencies in the community engaged in serving the children and youth of the community if this perspective were consistently presented to them in the course of their professional preparation. It is a subtle point, but it often seems to persons from the outside that school people are prone to think of the school as the center of the community rather than as one of the many agencies serving the community, each of which must understand and relate itself to the others.

Most urban and semiurban American communities have some kind of community welfare council to co-ordinate, extend, and develop the various health, welfare, and recreational services of the community. The schools should always be represented on such co-ordinating and planning councils. In fact, educators should be in the forefront in leading toward more adequate social welfare services in their particular communities. A real concern for the total welfare of the children and youth they serve dictates nothing less. This is over and above their need for effective help with specific problems, such as the kind of service that can be given by a well-qualified juvenile court staff in dealing with the problems of the habitual truant.

It is difficult to discuss this whole matter of co-ordination between the educational and social welfare agencies without seeming either so general as to be meaningless or so specific that the ideas are not transferable. From the standpoint of social welfare, anyone who has worked in this field can cite numerous examples of fruitful collaboration with educational agencies and school people and, in the same breath, examples of inability to achieve communication and hence co-ordination, often with tragic consequences to children. The failures usually go back to a lack of bridges built during the professional preparation of educators and social workers across which communication could have been established. The successes can be attributed to individual educators and social workers who are able to make an imaginative analysis of the essential ingredients of the tasks before them, usually as related to specific problems obviously the concern of both the school and the social agency, and to go on from there to work out patterns of communication and collaboration.

TOWARD WORKING TOGETHER

A specific example of an imaginative effort to develop understanding and collaboration was the conference between educational and social welfare agencies conducted in Oakland, California, during the summer of 1954. This three-day, workshop conference was sponsored jointly by the Oakland Public Schools and the School of Social Welfare, University of California. The title of the conference was "Teamwork Between Teachers and Social Workers in Helping Parents, Children, and Youth with their Social Problems." The stated purpose was to bring teachers and social workers to consider their complementary roles in helping children in the public schools with their problems in social adjustment.[2] Some of the typical problems identified and possible solutions suggested are quoted here because they so well illustrate the basic problems of relationship between educational and social welfare agencies which have been the subject of this article.

Two basic problems were identified which were related to the organizational structure of communication between educational and social welfare services. One was the need for more specific information on the part of school people

[2] This material is drawn from the unpublished reports of the conference in the files of the School of Social Welfare, University of California, Berkeley.

about the actual services of the social agencies of the community, including those provided within the school system. The other was the need to develop or to define channels of communication between schools and social agencies, and among social agencies when more than one is related to a particular social problem of children in school.

Various aspects of these two basic problems were explored, but essentially each came back to these two fundamental needs—more adequate information about each other and better channels of communication in order to work together. Whether we are thinking of the one-teacher school on the plains of North Dakota or the huge school system and the complicated network of social welfare agencies of a large urban area, the problems of co-ordination and collaboration come down to these two fundamental issues.

Many different suggestions looking toward solution of these two basic problems can be listed. The Oakland conference developed such possible mechanisms as (1) some type of social service index to help teachers know when a child's family is already receiving help; (2) organized case conferences between agencies and including the classroom teacher; (3) a network of neighborhood councils in which school and various agency personnel would play an active part, these councils in turn co-ordinated into a city-wide system; (4) a more dynamic use of materials giving information on the functions of the different social welfare agencies and how to use them, with the school libraries playing a more active role in obtaining and disseminating such information; (5) a continued and dynamic use of city-wide conferences such as this one, plus smaller institutes and workshops dealing with specific problem areas.

Different communities would inevitably utilize different variations on these mechanisms of collaboration. Quite different things will work in different communities, because of the different type of community (rural, urban, etc.), the different agencies, and even the different personalities involved. If both school and social welfare people think of themselves as representatives of institutions complementing each other in the service of children and youth there will be more imagination displayed in developing mechanisms for co-ordination and collaboration.

SOCIAL WORK IN THE SCHOOLS

A different approach to the solution of these basic problems of collaboration between the professions of social work and education has been the development of what is commonly termed school social work. School social work began almost simultaneously in New York City, Hartford, and Boston in 1906 and 1907.[3] At first the service was provided by certain social welfare agencies responding to the need for co-operation between the school and the community for the benefit of the child. In New York City, two settlement houses, Hartley House and Greenwich House, assigned two workers to visit schools and homes and to work closely with school and community groups to bring about greater understanding between home and school in the interests of the child. In Boston, the Women's Educational Association established a home and school visitor in one school in 1907. In Hartford, the beginnings were made by a "special" teacher who

[3] For a more thorough statement of the development of visiting teacher services see U. S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, *The Place of Visiting Teacher Services in the School Program*, Bulletin 1945, No. 6 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 7–15.

was assigned to assist the school psychologist in securing histories and to carry out recommendations of the psychological clinic. Rochester, New York, where a visiting teacher service was established in 1913, was the first city in the country where the service from its inception was financed by the Board of Education. During the 1920's a demonstration project in thirty widely distributed urban and rural areas was financed by the Commonwealth Fund.[4] At the end of the demonstration period, the local community, if it felt that the project had been valuable, was to share the expense and take over full responsibility for the service. As a result, twenty-one communities incorporated the service into their school systems.

In 1944, the last date for which accurate figures are available,[5] full-time school social work services were in operation in 266 communities; the number has increased considerably since then. In 1919, the American Association of Visiting Teachers was formed and in 1945 was reincorporated as the National Association of School Social Workers. The present membership is approximately 650.[6]

In this brief history of the development of school social work, some important facts are apparent. Beginning as a service provided by social welfare organizations outside the school, the visiting teacher idea was rather quickly taken over by school departments as part of their regular program, and the number of school departments providing this service has grown steadily if not phenomenally. In a visiting teacher service which was part of the school system, the initial emphasis was naturally upon the visitor as primarily a teacher, a member of the educational profession, but emphasis has now shifted to recognition that he must be a qualified social worker as well as an educator. The interprofessional requirements of the job of school social worker pose a problem for personnel training as well as for the individual worker.

Function of the school social worker

The question of function has occupied the attention, and been responsible for a major part of the published opinions, of school social workers[7] since their emergence as an identifiable group. A perusal of back issues of the *Bulletin of the National Association of School Social Workers* reveals that the largest proportion of the articles are devoted to exploring various aspects of social workers' functioning in school programs and to interpretation of the results of their activity. This is to be expected when one profession—especially a new and self-conscious one such as social work—is endeavoring to find its way in relation to an older, more established institution, and a new member—the social worker—is trying to play on a team in which the roles of the teacher and the principal are traditional and those of the school psychologist and the school nurse well established. That with school social workers actually functioning in only a small number of American school systems a similarly

[4] A detailed description of the development of this project may be found in the Annual Reports of the Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1921 through 1926.

[5] U. S. Office of Education, *op. cit. supra* (note 3), p. 18.

[6] Florence Poole, "School Social Services," *in* American Association of Social Workers, *Social Work Year Book, 1954* (New York: American Book–Stratford Press, Inc., 1954), p. 469.

[7] The term "school social workers" is used loosely here to cover all who identify themselves professionally with social work though in their particular school system they may have various titles such as school social worker, visiting teacher, school guidance worker, or home and school counselor.

small proportion of school people have even glimpsed what social work may have to contribute to the educational process is also to be expected.

What auxiliary services must participate in the educational program if the purpose of the school is to be effectively carried out is one of the most urgent and pervasive issues facing educators today. The roles of the school doctor, the school nurse, and the school psychologist have been increasingly defined and accepted as an integral part of a modern and forward-looking educational system. Is the role of school social worker destined likewise to be increasingly defined and accepted as an integral part of the educational system, auxiliary to the main function, but an essential aid to the educational process? The steady increase in the utilization within the school program of personnel trained in social work would certainly suggest an affirmative answer.[8]

Social work in the school is not an independent enterprise but an integral part of the educational system. Helen Witmer[9] reminds us of this fact in describing the responsibility of the social worker in the school as one of contributing his skill to the fulfillment of the school's purposes. He is not a family welfare, child welfare, or mental hygiene worker who has an office in a school building and whose salary comes from school funds. He brings the knowledge, the skill, and the accumulated experience of another profession—social work—to teamwork with the teacher and other specialized personnel, such as the school psychologist, for the solution of the educational problems of individual children and youth.

[8] For example, since 1944, seven states and Puerto Rico have passed and implemented legislation on a state-wide basis.

[9] Helen Leland Witmer, *Social Work: An Analysis of a Social Institution* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1942), pp. 357–67.

A co-ordinating mechanism

The focus of this article has been upon the co-ordination and collaboration between two types of personnel, educators and social workers, representing two major social institutions, educational and social welfare agencies. The social worker functioning as an integral part of the educational agency represents a most significant and promising mechanism for linking these two professions in joint efforts to solve problems of school adjustment of individual children and youth. The social worker in the schools must be seen neither as an early case-finding and referral agent only (although referral to community resources is a very important part of his function) nor as a social welfare agency transplanted to the school system. His duties include direct help to individual children and parents, consultation with teachers and with other school personnel, and conferences with representatives of other community agencies. But the concept to be kept clearly in mind to bring these diverse activities into perspective is that he is applying the knowledge and skills of social work to the solution of educational problems of individual children and youth. A child is seen as a *child in school* and parents are seen as *parents of a child in school,* not simply as a child or parents who might be experiencing any one of a variety of difficulties in their social adjustment.[10]

[10] For a more thorough discussion of the rationale of social workers functioning within school programs and the nature of their tasks see Florence Poole, "An Analysis of the Characteristics of School Social Work," *Social Service Review,* Vol. 23 (December 1949), pp. 454–59. Also Mildred Sikkema, *School Social Work Practice in Twelve Communities* (New York: American Association of Social Workers, 1953), p. 27, for a statistical breakdown of a distribution of interviews.

The social worker's special skills

Out of his educational experience in preparation for his profession, the social worker brings to bear upon a child's individual problem in school adjustment certain specific knowledge and skills. His focus is upon the relationship of the individual to his social environment, and therefore he has particular ability to understand the meaning of the school experience as social experience for the child. He has given much time and study to the meaning of parent-child relationships and, therefore, has special understanding of the effect of parental attitudes and behavior upon the child as it may relate to his difficulties in school. He has learned to use his relationship to the person being helped as the medium through which help is given —specifically, help to parents in changing attitudes and responses that adversely affect their child's adjustment in school, or help to a child in changing his response toward the school experience. Finally, and of great importance, he brings specific knowledge of the social welfare resources of the community and can enter into quick and effective communication with the agencies which supply them.

When we examine this whole problem of achieving better co-ordination between the educational and social welfare resources in the interests of children and youth, we see school social work as one of the most important linking mechanisms to develop in our century.

SUMMARY

This brief analysis of the problem of co-ordinating the efforts of educational and social welfare agencies in meeting the needs of children and youth has identified the basic obstacles to co-ordination as insufficient understanding and appreciation of each other on the part of educators and social welfare personnel; a specific lack of knowledge on the part of educators of the purpose and nature of the welfare services of their community; and inadequacy of the channels of communication necessary if people are to work together. Solutions to these problems lie in three directions: (1) additional cross-fertilization between educators and social workers during their educational preparation; (2) imaginative efforts on the part of educators and social welfare agency personnel in the community toward developing additional structures for communication and co-ordination; (3) employment of social-work-trained personnel by school systems to contribute their skill to the solution of individual student problems and to link the school more directly with the social welfare agencies of the community in dealing with problems that go beyond the purpose and resources of the school.

Kermit T. Wiltse, D.S.W., Berkeley, California, is assistant professor of social welfare, School of Social Welfare, University of California. In addition to his academic duties, he has served in a consultative capacity to civic, state, and national governmental agencies and has participated in public lectures and forums. Recent publications of his include annotated case material on "The Tigner Family" in The Field of Social Work (1955 edition), and other articles on the subject of social casework in general public assistance and in the Aid to Dependent Children's program.

The School and the Public Library

By Frances Henne and Frances Lander Spain

In the history of public education for children and young people [1] in this country, probably no two social institutions have had a closer working relationship than the school and the public library. This relationship has had a variety of arrangements and practices—all emerging, in one way or another, from the belief that books form an essential element in the lives of youth and should be made easily accessible to them. From the start, making books easily accessible for all children and young people meant providing free public libraries and school libraries; not just because home libraries, church libraries, and bookstore facilities were relatively scarce and often meager in content, but primarily because the idea of a free society stood for free libraries as well as free schools. These concepts hold true today.

During the last seventy-five years, community library service for youth has consisted of three major types: (1) books and library services for youth in the public libraries; (2) books and library services for youth in both the public libraries and the schools, with the public library usually assuming the responsibility for partial or total library services in the schools; and (3) books and library services for youth in both the public libraries and the schools, with each of the two agencies assuming complete and independent administrative responsibility for its libraries. These three patterns may be considered as forming a sequence of developments in the history of library service for youth, in that the first type prevailed during the beginnings of library service for children and young people, the second type predominated during the intermediary or transitional stage, and the third type characterizes the existing situation.[2] Even though the third type represents accepted theory and approved practice, the first and second types are still frequently found today.

[1] In this paper, the term *children* refers to children who are thirteen years of age or younger; the term *young people* refers to the high school age group; and the term *youth* refers to children and young people collectively.

Types of School and Public Library Relationships

These patterns of library service brought into existence many relationships between the schools and the public libraries: some direct and involving formal agreements; others indirect or implied, and often resulting in informal co-operation between the two agencies. It is the purpose of this paper to indicate the kinds of existing relationships that schools have with public libraries and to note the types of co-operation and co-ordination that are desirable.[3]

[2] For details and bibliographic references, see Mildred Batchelder, "Public Library Influence on School Libraries," in Alice Lohrer (Editor), "Current Trends in School Libraries," *Library Trends,* Vol. 1, No. 3 (January 1953), pp. 271–85; Lucile F. Fargo, *The Library in the School,* Fourth edition (Chicago: American Library Association, 1947); H. L. Cecil and W. A. Heaps, *School Library Service in the United States* (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1940); C. B. Joeckel, *The Government of the American Public Library* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), and Effie L. Power, *Work with Children in Public Libraries* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1943).

[3] Although this paper is not concerned with library service for adults in general, it should be noted that there have been, and still are, numerous instances of public libraries sponsoring adult education programs.

The most important and significant relationship existing between the public libraries and the schools today is probably that of mutual approval and support. Those connected with the school recognize that in the public library there are materials of communication and advisory services that are available for and used by groups closely identified with the school—children, young people, teachers, school administrators, parents, and others. Similarly, the public library staff recognizes that a good school library and the services that accompany it form an essential and integral part of the school, without which the school cannot achieve its educational objectives and without which the public library objectives are distorted. Those responsible for the schools and those responsible for the public libraries, as citizens and educators, are desirous that their communities have good schools and good libraries, and lend support to each other in achieving that objective.

Library Service to Children

A variety of conditions and situations exists in the provision of library facilities for children of elementary school age. In terms of the accessibility of libraries, the following situations are those that are most commonly found today:

1. Communities that have good school and public library facilities. In these communities, the child has access to two complementary library services for children, with similar collections of books and other materials—one in his school and one in his public library. The child needs and uses both libraries, sometimes for books and other materials for academic work and at other times for books and other materials not related to school assignments.

2. Communities that have good public library services for children and either no libraries or some partial form of book service in the elementary schools. In communities of this type, libraries and library services are virtually nonexistent for the many children who do not use the public library.[4]

3. Communities that have good elementary school libraries and either poor or no public library service for children. In these communities, some children are deprived of very rich and rewarding experiences in their lives.

4. Communities that have neither good public library facilities for children nor libraries in the elementary schools.

Types of administration

The over-all pattern of library service for children becomes more complex when the number of arrangements employed for administering this service is considered.[5] In some communities, the school assumes full administrative responsibility for the school library, and the public library assumes full administrative responsibility for public library service to children. In other instances, the public library assumes full responsibility for library services in the schools as well as for children's library service in the public library. In still other

[4] Frances Henne, "The Basic Need in Library Service for Youth," *The Library Quarterly,* Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1955), pp. 37–46.

[5] Mildred Batchelder, "Rural Schools and the Public Library," in Carleton B. Joeckel (Editor), *Library Extension* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), pp. 108–25; Joint Committee of the National Education Association and the American Library Association, *Schools and Public Libraries Working Together in School Library Service* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1941); Alice L. LeFevre, "Administrative Control," in Alice Lohrer (Editor), "Current Trends in School Libraries," *Library Trends,* Vol. 1, No. 3 (January 1953), pp. 286–97.

situations, a co-operative form of administering the school libraries is maintained by the schools and public libraries—one agency may furnish the books for the school library and the other agency may provide the library staff, or some other variation of this co-operative agreement may exist. The administrative arrangements just noted apply to communities with separate school boards and public library boards. In addition, there are some communities where the public library is under the general administration of the local school board. Further variations in these existing patterns may be noted in those cases where the units of administration, either public library or school, are county units rather than municipal district units; and where materials, and sometimes services, are provided by the state library or state education agency.

Standards and needs

Despite these many variations in the extent to which library services and facilities are provided for children and in the ways in which they are administered, some common elements and basic facts that have specific implications for school and public library relationships emerge.

Most children of elementary school age do not have easy access to good library service and materials. This condition should be of the gravest concern to all educators and librarians. Although the number of elementary schools having libraries grows at a relatively encouraging rate, the typical elementary school still remains without a library. The school may have funds for band and athletic equipment, but not for library services. In innumerable communities, public library facilities for children are meager, in sharp contrast to those many highly developed and excellent children's departments that we erroneously tend to think of as being typical of all public library service to children.[6] Frequently, a community may have no elementary school library service and no or limited public library service, and thus the children in that community are entirely or almost wholly without books and library services. Probably the greatest gap in the total library picture today is the lack of library facilities and services for children in rural areas. Size of community and economic ability do not always account for existing conditions, however. Many public library units in large cities do not have what can be termed a good library for children; and, with a few notable exceptions, the development of elementary school libraries in large cities has been shockingly slow.

Educational objectives, national standards for school libraries,[7] the desirability of acquainting all children with the uses and pleasures of reading, the influence of accessibility, and many other factors dictate that elementary schools with two hundred or more students should have a school library. It is the responsibility of the school board to provide such services and not that of the public library or some other group. When the school board shirks this responsibility, the public library performs a social, cultural, and educational service of a very high order by giving partial or complete library service to the elementary schools. But such measures should be considered transitional in nature. There still remain, however, numerous situations in which the public library provides the school library service.

Other expedient practices utilized by schools as a substitute for full school library services should also be considered transitional and temporary measures. Such practices include the administering of school library service by members of the parents' association; substituting classroom collections for a complete library service that includes a school library as well as changing classroom collections; regularly scheduling classes in an adjacent public library for all books and library services; or depending entirely on bookmobile service that consists only of scheduled stops at schools, with the children entering the bookmobile for all their books.

The community has a responsibility to provide also public library services for children.[8] Good public library service for children means an adequate collection of books and other materials, the services of a librarian interested in and trained for this type of library work, a program of services, and easy accessibility for children. The concept of a public library free for the people means free for children, too. The public library's program enriches the child's experiences with books and libraries. In addition, the public library is often the only resource that children have for books and libraries, since limited library facilities currently characterize the elementary school scene. Even in places where the schools have good libraries, the public library is usually the only library resource available for children during parts of the year and parts of the day. Size of community, geography, or economic inability to furnish good public library service for children may, on occasion, justify having the schools undertake all children's library service in the community. But such situations constitute exceptions, and the reasons for their existence must be clearly understood and interpreted in terms of the conditions that they represent.

LIBRARY SERVICE TO YOUNG PEOPLE

The secondary school student uses the school library and the public library for both academic and nonacademic purposes. Although the school library will have most materials required by school assignments, as well as a wide variety of other materials, the high school student using a main library or a well-developed library branch has access to a wider variety of reference resources and a more inclusive general collection of books and other materials than he will usually find in the high school library.

Although the various combinations of complete, partial, and no library service, already noted in the case of children, may also be found in school and public library services for young people, certain distinctions should be noted. In the secondary schools, beneficial pressures exerted by state and regional accrediting agencies have long been implementing the development and improvement of secondary school libraries. The status of secondary school library facilities and services is superior to that of elementary school libraries. Even so, optimum goals are far from being reached. Some secondary school libraries fail to meet even minimal standards. Practically all school libraries are notoriously understaffed, a prevailing condition that limits the over-all effectiveness of school library service.

In the public libraries, young people have long had access to the collections and services of the adult department. For many years, however, no specialized services were provided for this age group.[9] In recent years, the public li-

[6] For statistics pertaining to public library facilities, see Robert D. Leigh, *The Public Library in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 53, 54–57.

[7] American Library Association, Committee on Postwar Planning, *School Libraries for Today and Tomorrow*. Chicago: American Library Association, 1945.

[8] American Library Association, Committee on Postwar Planning, *A National Plan for Public Library Service* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1948), pp. 10–11.

[9] For a historical and descriptive account of library work with young people in public libraries, see Margaret C. Scoggin, "The Library as a Center for Young People in the

brary's interest in and concern with young people and the special library programs for them that have emerged have constituted one of the major developments in library service. In many communities, particularly some metropolitan areas, public library service to young people has been extensively developed, with separate rooms or sections for them in addition to the total resources of the library, a wide program of varied activities, and the assistance of a young people's librarian.[10] The basic philosophy is that of making the young person feel welcome in his public library. Unfortunately, in some communities the high school student does not receive this welcome in the public library, and the typical public library does not have a staff member whose main interest and responsibility are concentrated on working with young people.

The same types of administrative relationships between school and public library agencies that may be found in library service for children occur also in the program of library service for young people, but to a far lesser extent. In all but a small fraction of instances, the Board of Education has assumed complete responsibility for administering and financing library services in the high school.

Library Services to Teachers and Parents

The school library is an indispensable resource for the teacher, not only as a means for the achievement of his teaching objectives but also in connection with the preparation of his teaching materials. Teachers use the public library, too, and in a variety of ways. Elementary school teachers, particularly those in schools having no library, withdraw children's books from the public library for use in their classrooms. In general, teachers will find more professional books and magazines in the public library than in the teachers' collections in the schools, and even in those localities where the Board of Education provides a central professional library, they will frequently find the public library more convenient and accessible. Nor is it unimportant that the public libraries provide teachers with most of the materials for their own personal reading—a service that contributes directly toward developing better teachers and good teaching in the school.

Although some schools have a special collection of books for parents, most parents depend upon the public library for books dealing with child and adolescent psychology and similar subjects. Many parents withdraw children's books from the public library for reading aloud in the home, for their children's own reading, and for other purposes. Some public libraries offer a series of discussion groups for parents, in which children's books are discussed and described; and in most children's departments, parents consult the children's librarians about the reading problems of their children.

Public Library Services to Other Groups

In addition to the services offered to school groups that have been described in the preceding sections of this paper, the public library provides services for other groups of special interest to the schools—preschool children and their parents, individuals associated in various ways with the field of children's books, and out-of-school youth.

Almost without exception, the public library provides the "reading" materials for preschool children. Not only does it make books available for parents to take home for reading aloud and for sharing with their children, but it also has picture-book hours and storytelling for children of preschool age. For the parents of these children, the public library has books and other materials on child care.

The children's department of public libraries are used by writers and illustrators of children's books, by individuals connected with radio and television programs, by staff members from social and welfare agencies, and by many others who are working in innumerable ways in the general field of children's books and reading.

The public library plays a unique and important role in the community as the library for those young people who drop out of high school before graduation and for those who graduate but do not go on to college. The public library does not offer a special program for these young people, but it is keenly aware of them and makes use of a variety of measures to encourage them to use the public library and its resources.

Standards of School and Public Library Relationships

Teachers and school administrators promote the cause of good public library service, and public librarians promote the cause of good schools. Generally, this type of mutual recognition, support, and promotion consists of no more than the behavior and attitude characteristic of responsible citizens interested in the welfare of their community. Some occasions or situations, however, require more direct action. In some locales, school officials should campaign actively for the development of good public library service in their communities; in like manner, public librarians should do everything possible to promote good school library services. Under any circumstances, school personnel and public librarians need to be familiar with the objectives, programs, and potentialities of good library service in both the school and public library.

Over and beyond mutual support and promotion, the school and the public library need close communication and co-operation. An exchange of information about what is going on in each agency is important. Since the public library provides services and materials for the school-related needs of children and young people, it should be kept posted on curricular requirements. In turn, the school should be interested in the extent and nature of the use made of the public library by students, and should receive some sort of report on the subject. The school librarian and the librarian working with children and young people in the neighborhood public library are the best channels of communication between the two institutions, but where there is no school librarian or no public librarian delegated to work with youth, other channels must be formed.

Another type of co-operative relationship existing between the school and the public library pertains to teaching children and young people how to use libraries and their resources effectively. Since the acquisition of this knowledge forms a significant part of the educational program, the school must assume responsibility for its inclusion in the curriculum. Most of the basic skills and types of knowledge needed to use a library and its resources can and should be acquired by students by the end of the eighth grade. The school library should contribute most to this learning process, but the public library plays no insubstantial part. Where there are no elementary school libraries, the public library is usually the only agency that gives library instruction to children.

Community" in Frances Henne, Alice Brooks, and Ruth Ersted (Editors), *Youth, Communication and Libraries* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1949), pp. 147–64.

[10] American Library Association, Committee on Postwar Planning, *The Public Library Plans for the Teen Age*. Chicago: American Library Association, 1948.

From using school libraries, children and young people learn how to use and to evaluate books and other materials for many purposes. That they should also be aware of the nature and services of the public library as a vital social institution in their community cannot be emphasized enough. They should be introduced to the public library when they are young and encouraged to use it, and they should know what public libraries represent in the lives of adults. Information about and discussion of the public library should be systematically provided for in the social sciences or other parts of the school curriculum.

The relationships noted above represent co-operative arrangements that are informal in nature.[11] At the present time, these informal co-operative measures seem to be the best type of relationship between schools and public libraries in communities that have both agencies. Deviations from this pattern that have been described in this paper as being transitional or intermediary in nature should be considered only as temporary expediencies. Those variations that exist in situations where all public library and school services are administered by law under one board will probably continue. Some additional variations, as previously noted, may be justifiable in terms of existing conditions in particular situations. There is no current evidence, however, to support adopting as standard policy certain propositions that are raised from time to time: that schools and public libraries should be administered by a single board; that all public and school library services for youth should be administered by the public library; that all library service for youth in the community should be provided by the schools; or that all library service in the community, for adults as well as for youth, should be provided in the schools. The parallel development existing between public and school library service seems the best plan for the demonstrable needs of the youth in the community. Children and young people make use of both services.

Quite a different problem exists for sparsely settled and economically substandard areas, where there is apt to be little or no public library service in the real sense of the the term and where school libraries tend to be poorly developed. For these areas, a good overall library program can be developed only by the closest co-operation and planning between the local school unit and the regional or state public library officials.

Continued co-operation between schools and public libraries to provide the best possible library service to youth will strengthen and expand the services each can give—thus making books available to children and young people, wherever they are, and giving them intelligent direction in their use.

[11] For a detailed listing of "Specifics of Co-operation," see Joint Committee of the National Education Association and the American Library Association, *Schools and Public Libraries Working Together in School Library Service* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1941), pp. 45–57.

Frances Henne, Ph.D., New York City, is associate professor, School of Library Service, Columbia University. She has served as librarian of the University of Chicago High School and as associate professor of the Graduate Library School of the University of Chicago. She has been president of the American Association of School Librarians and is currently co-chairman of that association's committee for the revision of national standards for school libraries. She is joint editor of Youth, Communication and Libraries (1949), joint author of A Planning Guide for the High School Library Program (1951), and a contributor to professional periodicals and books.

Frances Lander Spain, Ph.D., New York City, is co-ordinator, Children's Services, the New York Public Library. She has served as librarian and head of the library science department of Winthrop College and as assistant director of the School of Library Science of the University of Southern California. She has been the recipient of a General Education Board fellowship and a Fulbright award, the latter for teaching library science in Thailand. She has served on numerous professional committees, has been a member of the Board of Education for Librarianship, and is second vice-president of the American Library Association. She is a contributor to professional periodicals and books.

The School and Delinquency Control

By Bertram M. Beck

A REVIEW of the rather extensive literature pertaining to the school's role in dealing with the problem of delinquency brings two problems sharply into focus. One concerns the growing tendency to expect the school to do something about everything; and the other the tendency to use the term "delinquency" as if it were a diagnostic entity like diptheria for which there is a specific course of prevention and treatment.

As knowledge in the social and human sciences develops, the interrelationship of one body of knowledge to the other becomes increasingly apparent. Thus, we know that cultural attributes are as important in understanding child behavior as are parent-child relations; that the psychic factors in the production of disease are intimately involved with the physical factors; that the biologically rooted response of the infant colors the psychologically rooted response of the mother to the infant—and essentially we begin to perceive the complexity of all professions having their conceptual roots in the social sciences.

Out of such perception has come an increasing similarity in the articulated goals of many professions. The public health worker is no longer interested merely in preventing or treating disease but in total health maintainance—which, in essence, involves all facets of human adjustment. The teacher is no longer merely instilling knowledge but is interested in the "whole child." The social worker is concerned with the totality of experience as it bears upon his client. Even the psychoanalyst comes to realize that patients have families and live in communities.

As professional goals become broader and boundaries more difficult to perceive, pressure is placed on the individual practitioner to assimilate more and more knowledge so as to discharge his broader responsibilities. The teacher not only must know how to teach reading but must understand the social and psychological obstacles to the development of reading skills, and be able to do something about overcoming them. The public health nurse not only must be able to provide prenatal care but must know the physical, cultural, social, and psychological factors which influence maternal capacity and be able to deal with such factors.

Desirable as such one man interdisciplinary efforts are, the general effort seems to ignore the fact that the expansion of each discipline which has made it possible to perceive interrelationships also makes it increasingly difficult for one person to gain command of any one discipline. Consequently, there is more and more for the prospective teacher to know about how reading skills are imparted without also being required to master the content of professions related to teaching; and more and more for the public health nurse to know about the physical aspects of prenatal care without also being a sociologist, psychologist, and anthropologist.

Need of a Diagnostic Base

Failure to grasp these realities of teacher training and practice has given rise in education to a rich vocabulary having to do with meeting individual or group needs without the conceptual base of psychosocial dynamic structure that makes it possible to discern what these needs are and precisely how they can be

met. This is manifest in the literature having to do with the school's role in preventing delinquency, where the characteristics of the good school are enumerated in terms of plant, staff, and curriculum in the pious assumption that, by creating such schools, delinquency will be prevented. One looks in vain for attention in such writings to the nature of delinquent behavior and how or why it might be suppressed or repressed by the programs advocated. Small classes, teachers who like children and understand them, varied curriculum, guidance services, and the like can and should be defended as necessary to the maintenance of educational processes in a democracy. The attempt to advance them under the banner of delinquency prevention may well boomerang when incidents of delinquent behavior which the school could not prevent catch the morning headlines, despite improvements in the school system.

The effort to define the school's role in the prevention and treatment of delinquency must have a diagnostic base. While research in delinquency has not yet yielded an exact topology of delinquent behavior, sufficient work has been done to discern several major categories of delinquent behavior and to relate our school efforts to such categories. In this paper several such categories of delinquent behavior are described, and the school programs most appropriate to their prevention and treatment enumerated.

Types of Delinquents

In 1944, Dr. Richard L. Jenkins reported in the *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*[1] on a study of five hundred boys at the Michigan Child Guidance Institute. Dr. Jenkins merely reported his own observations, and no effort has been made to compare his subject with equivalent nondelinquents. Nevertheless, he discerned three different groups—the social delinquent, the asocial delinquent, and the neurotic delinquent. Since 1944, several substantial pieces of research have been reported which tend to confirm Dr. Jenkins' observations.

The Social Delinquent

The recent study by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*,[2] has shed much light on the characteristics of the social delinquent who comes to our schools from the urban slum areas. These youngsters are adventuresome, destructive, restless, aggressive, and rebellious. They have little capacity for relationship with adults and resent supervision and authority. They have a great deal of loyalty, however, to their own gangs and to their own form of social control. They evidence little guilt or anxiety about their delinquencies, and are relatively happy children until society interferes with their mode of behavior.

Beginning in the thirties, Clifford Shaw and his colleagues in Chicago began to discern this group of delinquents and attributed their conduct to the nature of the neighborhood in which they were reared.[3] Much more recently, Allison Davis has given new depth to Shaw's earlier study by pointing out that the concept of right and wrong is not the same on both sides of the tracks.[4] Children brought up on the wrong side of the tracks do not learn to

[1] R. L. Jenkins and Lester Heritt, "Types of Personality Structure Encountered in Child Guidance Clinics," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, January 1944.

[2] New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1950.

[3] Clifford R. Shaw and Maurice E. Moore, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. Also later works by these writers.

[4] Allison Davis, *Social-Class Influence Upon Learning*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1943.

suppress or repress aggression because the immediate environment in which they live is one in which aggressive acts are really not taboo. Children on the right side of the tracks tend to conform to the conventional behavior of their elders. Since society is stratified, the values of the larger community—the right side of the track—do not successfully permeate into the slum areas. The recent Glueck study to which reference has been made answered the question of why all children living in a slum are not delinquent. The Gluecks discerned, by comparing nondelinquents and delinquents in a slum area, that there was a measurable difference in the quality of family living between these two groups. The nature of the parent-child relationship made the difference, but once that relationship was impaired you did not usually get a neurotic child; instead you got a child who learned the lessons of the streets, and those lessons were there ready to be learned.

The school addressing itself to the problem of the social delinquent from slum areas is well advised to place emphasis on programs designed to enrich the neighborhood. The all-day neighborhood school, for example, can offer cultural and recreational opportunities of a constructive nature reducing the street-corner contagion of delinquency. The first years of operation of the all-day neighborhood school in such an area will undoubtedly be trying, since aggressive groups will disrupt the program, damage property, and tend to keep more passive youngsters out of the program. Expert supervision is required, making full use of male supervisors whose personal and social orientation is such that they can like the delinquent without liking the delinquency, can be firm without being hostile, and can be understanding without being sentimental. Where such supervision is not available, the all-day neighborhood school in the slum area would be well advised to operate for the first years serving adults and young children only, raising the age of youngsters admitted only as the preschool children and children of the early grade who come into the program at the beginning grow into their teens. Such a progression provides the operation with a core of youngsters having a long standing identification with it. Where the problem is social delinquency, the school's major preventative task is to extend its function so that it may meet certain of the legitimate needs of youngsters not met in depleted homes and communities.

The prevention of social delinquency in the slum area also necessitates a staff and curriculum appropriate to the particular problems presented by class and cultural differences. Teachers do, of course, have a responsibility for bringing their students toward the values of the larger society, but this responsibility cannot be discharged merely by superimposing the middle-class value system of the teacher on the students. The best teachers for the deteriorated area are often those who have come up out of the area themselves. To recruit such teachers special teacher-training scholarships might be offered to promising high school graduates in such areas. To hold good teachers in high delinquency areas there may need to be a premium paid over and above the regular salary scale.

Where teachers indigenous to the area cannot be found, special in-service training programs are needed to provide a realistic understanding of the particular ethnic groups within the area and their class and cultural values. In curriculum development, stress will be placed on motivating students, since there is often little value placed on academic learning in the homes from which they come. Opportunities for work-study and vocational training must be provided to meet the real needs of these children and their families.

Early signs of social delinquency can readily be detected by attention to two groups of children—those who truant and those who are retarded in development of reading skills. A history of reading retardation or truancy or both is characteristic of most social delinquents. Schools in high delinquency areas require, therefore, an extra supply of teachers qualified to do remedial reading work. They also require access to fully qualified social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists so that the underlying causes of persistent truancy can be understood. Where the truancy is school induced, remedy may be found in adaptation of the school program. Where the roots of the difficulty are in parent-child relations, responsibility rests with the school social worker or with the appropriate community agency. Unless such resources are available there is little the school can do. Unpleasant as this fact may be, facing it will conserve much time, energy, and money spent on the nonproductive efforts of unqualified persons to unravel the complexities of parent-child relations.

THE ASOCIAL DELINQUENT

The second group of delinquent children, asocial delinquents, are encountered much less frequently than the social delinquents. Jenkins, Lippman, Anna Freud,[5] and John Bowlby [6] have discerned this group, distinguished from that of the social delinquent in some of its characteristics only by their severity and in others by major differences. Like the social delinquent, these asocial children are extremely narcissistic, and their behavior has a primitive, instinctual quality to it. Unlike the social delinquent, they can neither give nor receive affection, with adults or with their peers. They know no loyalties, and there is often not a trace of guilt or anxiety about their conduct. In nature these children are very close to the classical definition of a psychopath.

These children come from the homes of both rich and poor. They have usually suffered some severe traumatic disturbance in the course of their growth. Frequently they are children born out of wedlock. John Bowlby in his early study, *Forty-Four Juvenile Thieves,* and more recently in *Maternal Care and Mental Health,*[7] has highlighted the frequency with which these children have been separated from their own parents during childhood. These are the children for whom we often get the truly pathological family case histories replete with alcoholism, crime, and other social evils.

When dealing with these children, teachers must give up clichés about keeping children out of court or freeing them from the stigma of a court record, for a delaying action with this type of delinquent is dangerous and socially improvident. Attempting to treat the child permissively makes the situation worse rather than better. He should be brought within the scope of the official agencies just as soon as the first real delinquency occurs. The prognosis for treatment is very poor. There is no problem here of resolving inner conflict because there is no inner conflict—that is the root of the difficulty. This type of child requires a basic personality reconstruction and is best treated in the controlled environment of an institution.

[5] "Psychopathic Behavior in Infants and Children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,* April 1951. A round-table discussion.

[6] John Bowlby, *Forty-Four Juvenile Thieves: Their Characters and Home-Life.* London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox, 1946.

[7] World Health Organization, 1951.

Obviously the school's role cannot be enlarged to include the treatment of the asocial delinquent. In most instances, these youngsters are too damaged to remain in the school system. Despite the obvious, however, schools that operate on a benign platform of verbalization about "needs of children," without a solid diagnostic base, do indeed put these youngsters through a mill of paper work, special classes, and well-intentioned but inept "counseling" which cannot benefit the child but can only impair the morale of teachers and pupils alike.

The contributions which the schools can make to the prevention of asocial delinquency lie in the field of education in family life. Discussion groups and material integrated into the curriculum at appropriate points can prepare junior and senior high school students for their roles as parents and, consequently, strike at the source of asocial behavior—deprivation of maternal care.

THE NEUROTIC DELINQUENT

Programs of education in family life as well as parent education will also help to prevent the third type of delinquency —neurotic delinquency. These children do not occur in large numbers, but as a result of the influence of psychoanalytic theory on educational practice most of our techniques and methods are vaguely or specifically related to the needs of the neurotic child.

The true neurotic delinquent often comes from the middle or upper classes. Subjected to the same parental influences in underprivileged areas, he is likely to become a social delinquent. His parents are usually beset by their own personal problems, and there is a lack of warmth in family relationships. Often there is a rigid and domineering father. The possessive mother is less frequent, since the child of such a mother is rarely openly delinquent. The behavior of the child has a compulsive quality to it. It is not "healthy" delinquency. Some aggression is open and manifest in the delinquent act, but a great deal of the aggression is turned inward, so that the child suffers guilt and anxiety. His problems are inside himself; he often engages in delinquent acts alone. He is responsible for the more sensational delinquencies—compulsive fire setting, sex offenses, crimes of great violence, and the like.

While teachers probably cannot "cure" a neurosis, they can often offer a neurotic child a kind of relationship and certain opportunities for personal development that will enhance the child's chances of functioning in an acceptable fashion, despite the neurosis. To increase the potential for such child aid, teachers need to have a basic fund of knowledge regarding child development and, what is more important, need to have a skill in using themselves in a constructive relationship to the child. These attributes are not easily attained by means of didactic instruction in psychological subjects. Practice teaching must incorporate help to the teacher in understanding how the personal needs of the teacher obscure perception of children's needs. Teachers currently employed require opportunities to come together in small groups to discuss individual children and, under the guidance of trained and qualified group leaders, develop self-awareness and gain additional knowledge of child development. Basic human needs of teachers must be met before they can meet the needs of their pupils. Adequate salaries and working conditions, a good school plant, small classes, modern teaching materials, proper curriculum development, and understanding, supportive, progressive school administrators furnish the climate in which teachers can do their best for pupils.

The emphasis in the school program needs to be on developing teacher potential rather than on a proliferation of adjunctive services. When the teacher has done her best and deviant behavior persists then help outside the classroom is needed. Such help may be sought from fully qualified therapeutic personnel in the school system or from appropriate community agencies. Without these resources little can be done. To reiterate a point previously made, schools are ill advised to maintain substandard counseling and guidance services that are more form than substance and primarily serve as recipients of the buck to be passed. If the choice is between such substandard services and nothing, schools are well advised to choose nothing and invest their funds in better classroom personnel.

ORGANIC AND "ACCIDENTAL" DELINQUENTS

In addition to the categories of delinquent children already mentioned reference should be made to a small number of organic delinquents, children whose behavior is due to actual brain damage. The school, of course, can neither prevent nor treat this type of delinquency. Knowledge of its existence, however, underlines the importance of utilizing the school health program not only in respect to general health maintenance of school population, but for special health appraisal of children with problems.

A somewhat dissimilar category is that of "accidental" delinquency—children behaving in a fashion normal to their development but contrary to our all-inclusive state statutes defining delinquency. Teachers and others who are overzealous sometimes enmesh such children in the machinery designed for the genuine delinquent.

Such youngsters may actually receive a push toward delinquency as their self-concept comes to be that of a delinquent. Teachers and others who deal with the young need to have a good working knowledge of the flexible limits of normality at different stages of child development. This is particularly true in reference to sex behavior. Because of the emotional overtones surrounding sexual behavior, great harm can be done by teachers who because of their own standards, beliefs, or upbringing see pathology where none exists. School personnel need to understand and accept the fact that one does not have "to do something" about everything. Many incidents of apparent misbehavior are best overlooked and quickly forgotten.

THE SCHOOL AND OFFICIAL AGENCIES

Bovet in his World Health Organization pamphlet noted the evidence for the syndromes discussed and went on to point out what he terms "a secondary homogeneity" amongst delinquent children.[8] He pointed out that all delinquents coming to the attention of the official agency have experienced a common psychological impact engendered by two factors: (1) Society has called them on the carpet because of their own behavior, not because somebody did something to them. This alters the public attitude towards them and alters their own concept of self; with rebellious children it may well engender greater hostility and cause heightened delinquency. (2) The official agencies that treat them have an element of authority, and implicit in their treatment is the threat of more severe consequences if the child does not conform. This is almost always true regardless of the language of treatment that may overlay these more severe consequences.

[8] L. Bovet, *Psychiatric Aspects of Juvenile Delinquency*. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 1951.

This, of course, does not mean that the official agencies have no role in treatment, for, as has been indicated, certain children need precisely the type of treatment offered by the official agency.

It does mean that schools must develop close working relations with police, juvenile courts, and institutions for delinquents. Special efforts need to be made to reincorporate into the school community youngsters who have had contact with these official agencies, lest they see themselves as segregated and rejected, and continue to strike out at that which rejects them.

DELINQUENCY IN SUBURBAN LIFE

One of the most recent and most significant studies of delinquency demonstrated that the essence of the failure of communities to induce social conformity arises from the prevalence of intergroup conflict which works against the development of the spirit of togetherness.[9] It has been demonstrated that those things commonly associated with delinquency, such as poor housing, poverty, and the like, do not necessarily cause delinquency if there is a collective strength among persons burdened by such problems, with that strength engendering positive group feeling.

Such studies make it possible to see how the so-called "better" communities constructed virtually overnight on yesterday's cornfields without community services or tradition may be limited in their capacity to promote acceptable social behavior. Because each family comes to such a new development separately, removed from contacts with kin or the sense of tradition that characterizes older communities, the lack of the spirit of togetherness may lead to delinquency bred of exclusion from the community of a kind comparable to that produced by the slums.

In such communities, these so-called better communities, teen-agers faced with problems of draft and military service find little support from adults, who are essentially uninterested in the basic cause for which the youngsters are asked to sacrifice. Lacking the reward of social advancement for good behavior and seeing the future as cloudy and problematical, such teen-agers may well band together in groups similar to the slum gang, with their own dress, their own language, and their own code of moral behavior quite different from the code to which the adults in the community give at least lip service.

With this type of suburban social delinquency schools cannot cope unless they are ready to act as centers of community mobilization.

Schools having contact with practically all children and their parents can bring citizens to an awareness of youth's needs and can stimulate the development of civic programs of study and action to meet those needs. To accomplish this task requires the leadership of a farseeing and courageous school administrator. The needs with which we are concerned include those which must be met through the schools as well as those which must be met through other community agencies, programs, and services. The school which attempts to give over-all vigorous community leadership, therefore, runs the risk of antagonizing many vested interests.

Nevertheless, the sum total of what we know about delinquency today makes it plain that it is a problem which cannot be solved short of a major effort to reintegrate the community around a positive concern of its members each for the other. While such an effort must have specific goals in terms of improved programs and services, its major import is in the process of adult leadership rather than in the specific goals. Out of such a process comes the community which cares and, because it cares, does not isolate young people, inducing a reaction of hostility against authority. The state of our public school system in most communities is ample evidence of a community that does not care enough to support programs concerned with the conservation of human values. In a community thus marked by materialistic values, young people, lacking the nourishment of positive group identity, are prone to act against the group.

By giving all-out leadership to citizen study-action programs to meet the needs of young people, the school begins to provide the necessary base of support for necessary programs and services. More important, however, it makes a contribution toward the creation of a social, ethical, and moral climate within the community in which delinquency and kindred ills will not flourish.

[9] Bernard Lander, *Toward an Understanding of Juvenile Delinquency*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.

Bertram M. Beck, Washington, D. C., was director of the Juvenile Delinquency Project of the United States Children's Bureau. Educated at Antioch College and the University of Chicago, he has served as a psychiatric caseworker in the Air Force and as a family caseworker, publicist, and specialist in public affairs and social legislation for the Community Service Society of New York. He has taught at the City College of New York and the Smith College School of Social Work. He is the author of several books, including Five States—A Study of the Youth Authority (1950) and Simple Arithmetic About Complex Children (1952), and of articles appearing in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1955), the Social Work Year Book (1954), and numerous journals and periodicals.

Mr. Beck has recently become associate executive director of the National Association of Social Workers, New York City.

Occupational Education in the Schools

By William P. Loomis and Louise Moore

MOST of the activities covered in this report concerning placement and follow-up are based upon operations of the schools in the field of trade and industrial education, which includes training for employment in manufacturing, construction, technical, and service occupations. However, many of those persons in public school systems who have responsibility for youths entering industrial occupations also assist youths who wish to enter other types of occupations.

Choosing and Entering Employment—Current Difficulties

The experience of a young person in selecting and entering employment today is a far cry from that of a boy or girl fifty or even twenty-five years ago. The present greater variety of employing establishments and of types of work available, legal requirements for employment, and the need for some evidence of specific abilities to obtain most desirable jobs seem like a maze and a barrier to the average young person. Especially is this true when, as in many instances, immediate relatives or friends do not or cannot offer, or have sufficient information to recommend as desirable, specific kinds of work opportunities.

Other factors contributing to the problems that face young people of today in selecting and obtaining a suitable career in certain localities include the desire of many rural youths to go to the city where greater opportunity is thought to exist; rapid changes in employment requirements due to new methods of work and new machines and devices; dislocation of industry resulting in an oversupply of labor in some areas; and the fact that pre-employment or apprentice training and technical knowledge are required to qualify for many of the most desirable jobs in industry and the personal service field.

Public School Preparation for Placement

Youth employment problems have brought about several significant changes and additions to public school services. It is obviously difficult to provide placement services for young people if they leave school without information or experience upon which to base their choice of occupation and upon which the school can recommend them for employment. To provide this foundation, many schools conduct the following activities and services:

Practical arts courses are provided in junior and senior high schools covering general career areas, such as commercial, homemaking, and industrial. Among the purposes of these courses is the development of appreciation of the types and standards of work in these fields. They are not of great importance as a specific preparation for actual employment but are of considerable value from the standpoint of vocational guidance. For example, an industrial arts course may include elementary experiences in metalworking, electrical work, automobile work, and woodworking.

Guidance services for youth are also provided in junior and senior high schools and include attention to the selection of courses that provide a foundation for adult life, keeping in mind both cultural and economic needs.

In the junior high school, vocational guidance may begin with the desire of the average youth of that age to engage in useful activities. Success at and consequent attraction to certain types of work during these experiences may have considerable influence upon future selection of an occupation, and on employment.

When the boy or girl is faced with the necessity of choosing a definite occupational aim, a course in occupations is often available. The characteristics and requirements of a variety of occupations are covered in these courses. Supplementing such courses are visits to industries and business establishments in the community. Informative talks by prominent local employers and by representatives of the local public employment service are often arranged. These talks deal with general and specific factors that have to do with work opportunities, obtaining employment, and ways to be successful and obtain advancement.

During this career-decision period, the school guidance counselor has responsibility for work with the individual youth. The counselor's success depends largely upon his ability to gain the confidence of the youth and to provide sound and realistic advice and information.

Vocational preparatory courses are offered in many senior high schools and special vocational high schools. These courses include commercial work, homemaking, and industrial work in skilled occupations; courses in agriculture are fairly common in high schools serving rural areas. The commercial and industrial courses are steppingstones to employment in wage-earning occupations. Ages of entrance into these courses vary from fourteen to sixteen years, and the length of full-time courses in school ranges from one to four years, with a considerable portion of the school time given over to occupational preparation through practical work in shops or laboratories that prepares for employment in occupations available in the locality. Determination of the types of occupations to be included in the program is usually made in co-operation with employers, labor organizations, and the local Employment Security Office.

Student's Selection of an Occupation

Enrollment in a vocational course requires a decision on the part of the youth with respect to the choice of a specific occupation. Prior to final decision, considerable attention is given to the adaptability of the youth to the requirements of the job. In one school system it was recently noted that the selection of courses is preceded by testing for mechanical or clerical aptitudes, mental ability, and achievement levels in reading and arithmetic.

In connection with counseling that precedes selection of an occupation, considerable weight is given to the occupational interests, attitudes, and previous school record of the youth. It has been found that a youth who is not interested in occupational preparation while in school, or whose abilities are not adapted to the requirements of the work done in the occupation, seldom succeeds either in school or after employment.

As an additional safeguard to occupational adaptability, a youth who enrolls for preparatory training in a school and whose achievement is not satisfactory after a fair trial period, is encouraged to enroll in another course more suitable to his interests, abilities, and aptitudes. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the shop, laboratory, and classroom teachers are an important element in the adjustment of high school students to the types of work in which they will be most likely to succeed. When the solution to prob-

lems of adjustment is sought, teachers confer together as a group, and with the counselors and youth individually. The guidance counselor may initiate or stimulate consideration of youth problems and serve as a central figure in the adjustment process, but he must have the co-operation and assistance of the teachers who have daily contact with the youth.

PLACEMENT OF YOUTHS IN JOBS

Under this heading, the report will be based largely upon methods of placement of youths who have been enrolled in high school vocational courses relating to employment in trades and in technical and service occupations. It can be assumed, however, that there may be much common ground with vocational courses in other fields. Placement of students who have been enrolled in college preparatory courses, or in other courses having no particular occupational objective, presents problems and requires methods that will not be specifically discussed here.

There are two types of vocational programs in which placement of youths in jobs is essential:

1. *Part-time co-operative programs.* In these programs, youths are trained for full-time employment in specific jobs after leaving school through part-time employment in those jobs while still in school. The part-time employment is confined to occupations that offer a real opportunity for training in job skills and for advancement.

In these programs, the student worker alternates between school and planned work experiences under the direction of the employer. Alternation between school and work may be on a half-day, weekly, or other suitable equal time basis. The youths usually work in pairs for one employer, although this is not a requirement if the assignment of one youth is satisfactory to the employer.

These programs usually begin in the eleventh or twelfth grade when the student worker is at least sixteen years old. The youth is paid current minimum wages by the employer during his working time. During the school period, he receives some technical and other instruction related to his work while employed, as well as instruction in other subjects usually required for high school graduation.

The youths in co-operative programs are always under the supervision of a co-ordinator, who may also teach subjects related to the occupation or occupations in which they are employed. A most important and invariable responsibility of the co-ordinator of these programs is to visit the youth while at work, interview the employer and immediate supervisor, obtain information on the student worker's progress on the job, and determine what should be particularly emphasized in the related technical and other instruction in school. Much attention is also given to the youth's job adjustment in the initial period of the program.

There is always an agreement between the school and the employer as to alternation between school and work, on-the-job experiences to be covered during the program, and the compensation to be paid by the employer. The employer is also familiar with the youth's school program.

Part-time co-operative programs may be conducted following preliminary vocational preparatory courses. Some programs are planned to admit qualified youths from any course in the high school who have determined that they desire this type of specific training. It is preferable that all youths who enroll in these programs have had, through industrial arts courses, at least a rather good sampling of types of work.

Placement of youths enrolled in part-time co-operative courses is arranged by the co-ordinator, with assistance from one or more of the following agencies or groups outside of the school organization:

Local public employment service. The youths register with the local office and are tested for job adaptability. The school is notified of employers who may be willing to co-operate and the types of work available.

Advisory committees for trades or occupations. Advisory committees are made up of employers and selected members of labor organizations representing specific occupations. They are a valuable adjunct in the placement of youths in these programs.

Individual employers. Since the school co-ordinator makes frequent contacts with employers, new opportunities for placing additional youths are discovered.

Labor organizations. Craft unions that maintain "hiring halls" are of considerable value in making placements in these occupations.

2. *Vocational trade preparatory courses.* The operation of vocational preparatory full-time school programs and the selection and adjustment of youths who are enrolled in such courses have been described previously.

In the trade and industrial preparatory program, the placement of youths after training is considered essential to the operation and success of the program. The reason for this is that if a youth spends a large part of his time in school preparing to enter a specific occupation, he should expect to obtain employment in this occupation or in an occupation very closely related to it.

If a large percentage of graduates go into other occupations, it may be concluded that one or more of the following conditions exist: provision for proper placement has been inadequate; there is not sufficient opportunity for employment in the occupations for which the youths are being trained; or employers have discovered that the school training is not of high quality. Under any of these conditions, expenditure of public education funds for a continuance of the training program cannot be justified.

Youths for whom placement assistance should be provided by the school fall into two categories: youths who leave school before completing the full course; youths who complete the full course and graduate, usually with a high school diploma.

Those who do not complete the full trade preparatory course, for one reason or another, may be able to obtain employment in a type of work to which their school training has a positive correlation. This is especially true if the student is assisted by the school in obtaining employment. Original placement of these youths, if in jobs related to the school training, is usually in semiskilled jobs that in themselves are not considered as desirable as all-around skilled occupations. However, the principal long-range limitations with respect to ultimate success depend largely upon the youth himself—his ambition and his inherent capacity.

Youths who graduate from preparatory courses usually obtain employment as advanced learners, and the school training is followed by full-time work that provides training or seasoning on the job. For the skilled trades, the training period after high school is usually recognized as apprenticeship, which is an organized training system that assures a rounding out of skills in the various operations and techniques under actual working conditions. Post high school training for graduates from preparatory courses for technical and service occupations is not always organized as apprenticeship. Some technical course graduates, such as engineering technicians and mechanical or

chemical laboratory assistants, enter the occupations at existing pay scales for beginners and advance as their skill and competence increase through their daily work experiences.

PLACEMENT TECHNIQUES

Methods of placement and assistance from agencies outside of the school organization vary with almost every local school program. The following is a composite of the various methods used:

Registration with the local public employment service, with an indication of the type of work desired and the approximate date when employment can be accepted, may be required of the youth some time before leaving school. Qualified youths are referred to openings as they come to the attention of the local office.

Teachers of the shop or laboratory subjects in the school keep in close touch with plants and establishments that employ workers in their special fields, and recommend those youths who will be available and competent for jobs that come to their attention.

Special school-industry co-ordinators, employed by the school, or in smaller school districts the supervisor of the program, through their constant contacts with employers, gain knowledge of job openings and, through proper channels, see that qualified youths apply.

The school guidance department maintains a file of eligibles by type of job for which qualified and serves as a clearinghouse for requests coming into the school. Such requests and recommendations are always cleared with interested teachers and co-ordinators.

Trade advisory committee members provide a means of general information to employers with respect to types of beginning workers available from the school, and they frequently assist directly in the placement of workers.

Employers who have had satisfactory service from former students in the school call upon the school when they need new employees with specific skills and knowledge.

Youths are encouraged to obtain work with prospective employers in the summer months during the course, thus making personal contacts with employers prior to graduation.

It is not to be assumed that all youths need assistance in obtaining employment, or that the placement of youths who complete trade preparatory programs is always a problem for the school. Many youths, on their own initiative, select the places where they wish to work and obtain assurance of employment long before they graduate. Likewise, many schools maintain such close relations with the employing industries and are known to have such high standards of preparation that most or all of those who will graduate have been interviewed and promised employment long before the end of their last school term. Frequently, the demand for these new workers is so persistent that youths are permitted to go to work for their employer, either on a part-time or full-time basis, in April or May immediately preceding graduation.

AFTER-EMPLOYMENT FOLLOW-UP

A carefully planned and well-organized follow-up program adds much to the effectiveness of a school's trade preparatory courses. Too many schools neglect this important service. The effectiveness of a program of this kind is indicated when the school management and teachers keep in touch with former students and maintain the interest and support of leaders and workers in the local industries who got their start through the school program.

Many schools and community-wide trade and industrial education programs do keep in touch with former students and with the industries that employ them. The various methods used in follow-up include:

Apprenticeship after graduation fosters continued contact of the school with former students during the years they attend related instruction classes.

The birthday-card method of annual follow-up is used by some schools. This always includes an appropriate greeting, possibly an invitation to visit the school, and information is requested about place of employment, progress in the occupation, and so forth.

Periodical or occasional follow-up by the double postcard method contains a friendly greeting from the school and requests information on a form printed on the return card. The information requested will vary, but it nearly always covers employment status of the recipient, and in some cases asks for suggestions on improvement of the instruction offered by the school, and on types of adult extension training that might be beneficial to him or to others.

Surveys of graduates and employers of graduates through questionnaires are sometimes used for special purposes. These purposes always have to do with matters pertaining to the success of former students or the improvement of the school program. This method is rather involved both for the school and the respondent. The method is worth while only if returns are carefully analyzed and followed up with appropriate conclusions and actions.

A request for information from the school alumni association, especially where the school is strictly vocational in nature, usually brings good results. Alert school personnel take an interest in the activities and membership of these organizations.

Sending each former student of the school an announcement of the adult evening courses offered by the school is a follow-up device the value of which is frequently overlooked. When accompanied by a suitable communication, such personal interest is appreciated and will tend to keep and maintain continued interest in the school on the part of the former student. It may also increase the enrollment in extension courses.

William P. Loomis, Washington, D. C., is program specialist for trade and industrial education, Division of Vocational Education, U. S. Office of Education. He has served as chief of trade and industrial education in the Pennsylvania Department of Public Instruction, and professor of industrial education at the Pennsylvania State University, University Park. He is the author or editor of various state and federal publications in his special field, the most recent a bulletin entitled The Operation of a Local Program of Trade and Industrial Education with Emphasis on Improving Instruction through Supervision.

Louise Moore, Washington, D. C., is specialist in girls' and women's training, Trade and Industrial Education Branch, Division of Vocational Education, Office of Education. She is author of Girls' and Women's Occupations (1955), and of other bibliographies, books, and articles on vocational training for girls and women.

Towards Co-ordination in Great Britain: A Survey

By W. O. Lester Smith

"ADMINISTRATIVE chaos" was a phrase much used by reformers at the close of the nineteenth century to describe the educational landscape. Irrespective of their political sympathies, they recognized that constitutional reconstruction, both at the center and locally, was a prerequisite of advance. This reconstruction was accomplished by two Acts of Parliament, the Board of Education Act (1899) and the Education Act (1902); the former dealt with administration at the center, the latter provided the system of local administration that, with minor modifications, operates today.

The Board of Education Act established one central department for education in England and Wales, with functions and responsibilities previously discharged by three separate bodies. The Education Act abolished the 2,568 School Boards, and also the 788 School Attendance Committees which had functioned where there was no School Board, and it made the 62 County Councils and 69 County Borough Councils the local education authorities.

Both acts contained concessions and compromises which tended to make the new organization less orderly than it would have been without them. Many had hoped for a Ministry of Education and a Minister, but instead Parliament created a Board of Education. The effect, however, was much the same, for the Board, which was composed of the chief officers of state, never met throughout the forty-five years of its life. But the fiction of an active board was always retained in spite of the fact that presidents functioned without its advice. "Successive Presidents delighted to describe themselves as 'transient heads of a phantom Board,' and officials exercised their ingenuity in attributing to the Board anthropomorphic qualities. Thus the Board was 'pleased' or 'surprised'; it learned with 'satisfaction' or 'concern'; it is even alleged to have been 'unable to retain its composure' at some flagrant irregularity." [1]

No explanation of the government's preference for a "Board" was forthcoming at the time the act was passed; when asked later to account for it, the Duke of Devonshire, who steered the bill in the House of Lords, said that he had forgotten the why and wherefore. But it is reasonable to assume that in the laissez-faire mood of that time it was deemed better to have a board available to check any transient president with a tendency to interfere and intervene. And certainly that is the explanation of the provision in the act limiting the function of the Board to one of "superintendence" of matters relating to education in England and Wales. But this definition of its functions did not prevent the Board from usually getting local authorities to do what it wanted or from achieving some degree of co-ordination throughout the country.

Central Department and Local Authorities

The development of the relationship between the Board and local authorities makes an interesting story, in

[1] *Education, 1900–1950,* Report of Ministry of Education for 1950 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), p. 2.

which personal factors counted for much. There were two principal phases. The first can be attributed almost entirely to the first Permanent Secretary after the passing of the 1902 act, Sir Robert Morant, a co-ordinator by nature with a liking for power and a desire to dominate. A great administrator of the forceful kind, he stretched the limited authority of the Board to the utmost, and was largely responsible for the nationwide drive to provide new grammar schools which followed the passing of the Education Act of 1902. A recent Permanent Secretary, Sir Maurice Holmes, has described his methods:

> His attitude towards the newly constituted Local Education Authorities was far removed indeed from the spirit of friendly cooperation which characterises the present relationship between the Ministry and Local Authorities. He knew what he wanted done, and by a curious mixture of browbeating and persuasiveness he usually succeeded in getting it done.[2]

The second phase, which began when Morant left the Board of Education in 1911, has been described as a "progressive partnership between the Central Department, the local education authorities, and the teachers." [3] It has had its ups and downs, but it has grown into a relationship of genuine friendliness, the outstanding characteristic of the educational service in this country. These good relations have, more than any other factor, been the mainspring of co-ordination, making it a natural process based on good sense rather than on schemes and procedure. Reference will be made later in this article to the unevenness of the achievement, but considering the Board's limited powers, the degree of co-ordination accomplished has been remarkable.

[2] *The First Fifty Years* (University of London Press, 1947), p. 120.

[3] *Education, 1900–1950,* p. 1.

Checks to Co-ordination

There were, however, three features of the Education Act of 1902 which checked the progress of co-operation and co-ordination. Of these, one was an unfortunate compromise designed to allay the fierce opposition to the abolition of the School Boards. This opposition was strong in urban areas that were not county boroughs; their representatives objected vehemently to the proposal that their schools should be administered by the County Councils. So Parliament agreed that certain areas within the County Council area should be allowed to administer elementary education only; the areas accorded this concession were noncounty boroughs with a population of over 10,000 in 1901, and urban districts with a population of over 20,000 in 1901. Two consequences of this compromise were regrettable. In the first place, it was a mistake to make the census of one specified year the determinant of the concession. The second consequence was more serious; the existence of these separate authorities for elementary education blocked the road of advance towards a reorganization of education into primary and secondary stages and towards the goal of secondary education for all. It was not until Mr. Butler had the courage in 1944 to end this anomaly that the road to universal secondary education was opened.

Another aspect of the Education Act of 1902 which made a co-ordinated advance difficult was the permissive character of the clauses dealing with education other than elementary. Just as the laissez-faire temper of that day had led Parliament to limit the role of the central department to one of "superintendence," so it caused the legislature to leave the local authorities largely free to decide what provision they would make for secondary and technical edu-

cation. Such freedom encouraged progressive authorities to exercise initiative, undertake developments on a wide scale, and pioneer in particular directions. But it also led to wide discrepancies between one area and another, and children born in the territory of an authority making good use of its permissive powers had much better opportunities than had those born in areas that could with some justice be described as backward.

The third feature of the Education Act of 1902 that made co-ordination difficult was connected with the dual system. When the foundation of our national system were laid by the Education Act of 1870 it was agreed that there should be both school board schools and voluntary schools within the national system. Before 1902 the voluntary schools, mostly Church of England or Roman Catholic, received government maintenance grants and in the early days building grants. The 1902 act not only confirmed the dual system but fortified it by providing that the voluntary schools, like the council schools (as the board schools were now called), should be wholly maintained by local rates and national taxes, leaving the churches responsible only for expenditures on structure. This concession roused the bitter opposition of the Nonconformists, but it was soon found that this additional financial aid still left the churches unable to provide accommodation of a standard comparable to that in the council schools. Furthermore, the Hadow Report of 1926, which urged the division of elementary education into senior and primary stages, led to demands which the churches, unable to afford the cost of building and reconditioning schools, were unable to satisfy. Local authorities, when contemplating a co-ordinated educational advance, were always faced with the prospect that the managers of voluntary schools, even if willing to co-operate, might find themselves prohibited from doing so because they were unable to shoulder the capital expenditure involved. This greatly limited the programs for reorganization, especially in the rural areas where most of the voluntary schools were.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

A major weakness of early administration was the absence of a coherent system of finance. The state made grants to the School Boards and, after 1902, to the new local authorities, and the first grants to voluntary societies were made as far back as 1833. The School Boards and, later, the local authorities levied local rates. But not until 1918 was an attempt made to establish an organic financial relationship between the central government and the local authorities. The Education Act of that year, for which H. A. L. Fisher was responsible, effected a complete reform of the system of grants to local authorities. For the fifty-seven separate grants payable by the Board of Education, there was substituted a system of annual substantive grant related to local expenditure and dependent upon the maintenance of an efficient system of education by the local authority. Unfortunately there had to be two substantive grants, one for elementary and one for education above the elementary level, because of the existence (already referred to) of separate authorities for elementary education. The grant for elementary education was calculated on a formula which took into account the number of children in the area, the expenditure on their elementary education, and the financial capacity of the area to meet that expenditure as measured by assessable value. The grant for education other than elementary was calculated at a flat rate of 50 per cent of the net local expenditure.

Today, except for certain special services such as school meals, the grant payable by the Ministry of Education to local authorities for all their educational expenditure (within the province of that Ministry) is based on a formula similar to that adopted in 1918 for elementary education. The principle followed is that of relating the grant—to quote words used by Mr. Butler in 1944—"to the number of children in the area and the capacity of the area to pay for their education." But the point that should be stressed is that

> the finance of public education . . . has grown from a system of particular—and largely unrelated—subsidies to a system of joint finance based upon a real partnership between the central authority and local education authorities. It is, in fact, a story of progress from "contract" to "status" between the two in the pursuit of a common adventure.[4]

SCOTLAND AND WALES

In the gradual approach to a unified and co-ordinated system of education, traditions have been respected and diversity encouraged. Of this regard for distinctive tradition Scotland is the outstanding example, for although England and Scotland have shared one Parliament since the Union of 1707, the Scots have fully retained their separate educational system and traditions, the Secretary of State for Scotland being responsible for the central administration of Scottish education.

Wales, on the other hand, has conformed to the English administrative pattern, but since 1907 there has been within the Ministry (or, until 1944, the Board) a separate Welsh Department wholly sympathetic to the desire of the Welsh people to preserve and enrich their national culture and maintain their own language. In the nineteenth century it was the practice of English administrators—Matthew Arnold among them—to discourage the use of Welsh in schools, but during the present century there has been a complete reversal of this policy. The central government in its dealings with English counties and county boroughs has usually lent a sympathetic ear to local points of view, and recent experience suggests that co-ordination and diversity are not incompatible.

[4] *Education, 1900–1950,* p. 32.

EDUCATION ACT OF 1944

While the years before World War II saw the steady growth of an orderly system, two great obstacles stood in the way of effective co-ordination: one the restriction imposed by statute on the powers of the central authority—the Board of Education could still only "superintend"—and the other the inability of the voluntary schools to find money for school construction. The Education Act of 1944 removed both of these roadblocks. There is now a Minister with powers of direction and control, and by a substantial readjustment of the dual system voluntary school managers have been enabled and can be required to bring their buildings up to modern standards.

The spirit of partnership has survived the shift in the balance of power, but the Ministry is now indisputably the senior partner with a Minister able effectively to exercise a co-ordinating function. He can settle priorities, impose minimum requirements, ensure certain standards of staffing, and maintain a level in the scale of grants and awards to students and pupils; can also ensure that provision is made for particular needs, as, for example, the education of handicapped children. All this sounds dictatorial, but after more than ten years' experience of the working of the act one can say without hesitation that no Minister has shown any tendency to

use his immense powers unfairly or to excess. The largest local authority, the London County Council, has like others had its battles with the Minister, especially over secondary school organization, but as the following comment shows it shares the general view that the Minister has not encroached unduly:

> Each local education authority has a real measure of freedom and responsibility. The policies of different authorities vary considerably, for example, in the organization of secondary education, and the Ministry has not sought to discourage diversity.[5]

Especially notable is the fact that co-ordinating policy is never allowed to encroach on academic freedom. Universities are outside the province of the Ministry of Education and independent of the local authorities; government grants to universities, amounting to about two-thirds of their expenditure, are administered by a University Grants Committee operating on behalf of the Treasury, and although in the distribution of grants problems of co-ordination constantly arise, the respect for academic freedom is absolute. Grants made to universities by local authorities are unconditional, but the universities have the wisdom to see that authorities are represented on their courts and councils. A similar attitude prevails in regard to the curriculum of schools; this is recognized to be the responsibility of the teachers, and they in turn are careful not to abuse the freedom they enjoy in this respect. The Ministry never does more than "suggest," and although Ministry and local authorities determine the types of schools and sometimes argue fiercely in so doing, once the issue of type is settled they are careful to leave teachers free to develop the inner life of each school.

[5] *The London Education Service* (London County Council, 1954), p. 93.

CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY

Vital to the co-ordinating process is the consultative machinery set up by the Minister. Of this some existed before 1944. Under the Education Act of 1902 a Consultative Committee was established to advise the President of the Board of Education on questions which he referred to it, and it produced some of the most seminal reports in our educational history, notably the Hadow and Spens Reports. After World War I a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Burnham was constituted to act as a negotiating body to settle teachers' salaries; it is composed of representatives of local education authorities and teachers' organizations. A Secondary Schools Examinations Council was also created to co-ordinate the work of approved university examining bodies, which are responsible for the secondary school certificate examinations. With the passing of the Education Act of 1944 the existing consultative machinery was strengthened, and some important additions were made. The former Consultative Committee was replaced by Central Advisory Councils for England and Wales respectively, and they were empowered by the act not only to advise on matters referred to them but also upon "such matters connected with educational theory and practice as they think fit." Scotland has a similar council, which has issued some valuable reports. The Burnham Committee was given statutory status, and the Minister now has legal authority to see that the remuneration paid by local authorities to teachers accords with scales agreed upon by this negotiating body and accepted by him. The Secondary Schools Examinations Council was enlarged to make it more representative of the various interests concerned.

Of the consultative bodies set up since 1944 the most important are two

National Advisory Councils, one on Education for Industry and Commerce, and the other on the Training and Supply of Teachers. The first, widely representative of industrial, commercial, and teaching interests, serves as apex of a system of regional consultative bodies for further education. The second keeps under continuous review the supply of and demand for teachers, and studies the problems of teacher education, acting also as a clearinghouse of opinions that have already found expression in area organizations. There are, too, a few independent co-ordinating bodies aided by the Ministry, which include on their executive councils representatives of the Ministry, local education authorities, and teachers. Among these are the National Foundation for Educational Research, the Educational Foundation for Visual Aids, and the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges.

The problem of consultation is rendered much easier by the existence of well-established associations both of the local authorities and the teachers. The County Councils Association has an Education Committee, and so has the Association of Municipal Corporations, which speaks for the boroughs; and there is also an important Association of Education Committees which concerns itself entirely with the problems that confront local education authorities. Education Officers too have their association, which is able to offer expert advice on current problems of educational administration.

THE LOCAL AUTHORITY

It is important not to give the impression that co-ordination is more actively pursued at the national than at the local level. The Education Act requires every local authority to appoint a well-qualified Chief Education Officer, and upon his administrative ability and that of his staff the quality of local co-ordination largely depends. One of the most important functions of an education authority is to maintain close contact with school governors and managers, with the many voluntary bodies engaged in adult education, youth service, and social services affecting education, and by a system of advisory committees to ensure the interest of industrial and commercial experts in the promotion of technical education. In county areas, to counter the isolation that distance from headquarters may involve, the act requires a system of divisional executive committees. Another important requirement of the act is that every authority must have a detailed development plan or scheme for primary, secondary, and further education; approved by the Minister, the plan serves as a chart for every stage of advance. School governors know its contents and intelligent local citizens can by studying it acquaint themselves with the authority's intentions over a long term of years. This educational development plan is drawn up to harmonize with housing, road, and other projects as revealed in the city or county plan.

CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER SERVICES

Every County and County Borough Council has a wide range of functions, of which education is but one, albeit a very important one and the one which involves the largest expenditure. These councils are, under the Education Act, required to appoint an Education Committee with a majority of aldermen and councillors and a minority of co-opted persons, selected because of their interest in or special knowledge of education. Thus in London, where the Council consists of 150 members, the Education Committee's membership is 50, of whom 12 are co-opted. Although an Education Committee has considerable dele-

gated power, it reports regularly to the Council, usually each month. Thus its policy is almost automatically co-ordinated with that of the other committees of the Council. Moreover, as one of a hierarchy, the Education Officer is in constant touch with other leading officials—the Clerk of the Council, the Treasurer, the Chief Constable, the Medical Officer of Health, the Surveyor, the Architect, the Librarian, the Parks Superintendent, the Children's Officer, and others. As Dr. Alexander observes,

> In the education service not only the Chief Education Officer but also other principal officers of the Authority have important contributions to make. It is, for example, usual for the County or County Borough Treasurer to be principal finance officer of the Education Committee, and for the County or County Borough Architect to be architect to the Education Committee.[6]

At one time in both central and local government there was a tendency for departments to work in isolation; today the tendency is the reverse. It has been found, however, that interdepartmentalism has defects no less serious than those of isolationism. It can cause delay, and lead to procedures and compromises not in the best interests of education.

CO-ORDINATION IS NOT ENOUGH

Our empiricism leads us often to disregard logic or pattern. For example, while youth employment is administered centrally by the Ministry of Labour with the help of a representative Advisory Council, its local administration is in some areas performed by the education authority and in others by regional officers of the Ministry of Labour. Of the 181 education authorities in England, Scotland, and Wales, 121 have opted to administer this service; the largest authority, the London County Council, operates through nineteen Youth Employment Committees. Again, when in 1948 the National Health Service was instituted, it was widely believed that as an inevitable sequitur the school health service, which had for nearly fifty years been a most valuable integral feature of the local education service, would be absorbed.

> Fortunately [to quote Dr. Alexander], greater wisdom prevailed. . . . The advent of the National Health Service therefore merely strengthened the school medical service, since it made available the whole range of medical treatment to the school medical service.[7]

At the close of his *History of the English People* Élie Halévy observes that it is difficult to understand us unless you remember that this is essentially a free country with a vigorous group life. Even today with the state so active in education, there is a strong element of voluntary enterprise, especially in adult education, youth work, and that educational borderland, community centers and village halls. In all these spheres the local authority co-operates, and with deliberate unobtrusiveness seeks to introduce some degree of co-ordination. During the last war an attempt was made to establish a youth service, which was to be a system of partnership between local authorities and voluntary bodies engaged in the provision of youth clubs and other projects for youth. It was successfully launched; local authorities constituted Youth Committees and appointed Youth Organizers, while the voluntary bodies themselves established at the national level a Standing Conference of Voluntary Youth Organizations, which fulfills a co-ordinating function. But during these postwar years other urgent needs, particularly the building of new schools and the creation of a system of universal secondary education, have had to receive prior attention; and although there is no lack of co-ordinating machinery, feeling is growing that the time is ripe for another purposeful drive in the interests of youth. County colleges, included in the Education Act to supply continued education for young workers, have not yet been established, and it must be admitted that the youth service has in many areas lost some of its first ardor, while economic conditions and the claims of other services have limited the funds available for its development. When the wartime government introduced its scheme for the youth service, it was careful to say that "coordination is not enough."[8] That comment has now almost a prophetic ring as regards the youth service, and most will agree that in administering education it is a maxim of general significance.

[6] William P. Alexander, *Education in England* (London: Newnes Educational Publishing Company, Ltd., 1953), p. 19. (American edition, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954.)

[7] *Op. cit. supra* (note 6), p. 111.

[8] Board of Education Circular, No. 1486.

W. O. Lester Smith, M.A. (Oxon.), LL.D., Rhydymain, Dolgelley, North Wales, was professor of sociology of education, University of London (1949–53), chief education officer for Manchester (1931–49), and director of education for the county of Essex (1924–31). He is the author of To Whom Do the Schools Belong? (1942), Education in Great Britain (1949), and other books.

Co-ordination in Great Britain: Trends and Issues

By William P. Alexander

IT was as recently as 1870 that provision was first made in Great Britain to create a national system of elementary education, under School Boards established at local government level for that purpose. By the turn of the century that task had been largely completed. A growing consciousness that for brighter pupils there should be some opportunity beyond elementary school and, perhaps more important, that a more effective instrument was needed at local government level led to the Education Act of 1902, the significant terms of which have been discussed at some length in the preceding article. The war of 1914–18 gave further impetus to the development of the education service, as indeed wars inevitably do, heightening our consciousness of the importance of young people. The Act of 1918, later consolidated with other relevant statutes in the Act of 1921, assigned to local education authorities the duty of making further provision for education beyond the elementary school, and also expanded the scope of their work to include aid for recreational and social activities of young people. So the pattern grew in scope until the war of 1939. This tragedy in world affairs created a new atmosphere, in which there was a deep consciousness that the war would be won not by rich nor poor, not by country nor town, but by all, each contributing according to his capacity. In that setting, the Education Act of 1944 was born. Here was a statute embracing education from the earliest age into adult life and giving local education authorities powers and duties of an extremely wide nature. Their task was, in fact, to secure the education of all the people in their areas, and for this purpose education was conceived as the development of the individual according to age, ability, and aptitude. This was, indeed, a new concept; of its translation into actuality the local education authority was to be the effective co-ordinating instrument, bringing together all those who were concerned with the welfare of children and young people.

According to the present organization of the education service in Britain, the central government, through the Ministry of Education (in Scotland, the Secretary of State for Scotland), is concerned with national policy; the local education authorities, comprising County Councils and County Borough Councils, are responsible for the implementation of that policy; and the teaching profession is very largely responsible for matters of curriculum and method in the school. The powers of the education service include provision for health, through the school medical service, and for the general welfare of children, including the provision of clothing, school meals, or other things necessary to ensure the children's benefiting fully from education. Also included is provision for youth in its recreational or leisure time.

Government Departments Concerned with Youth

At central government level there are several departments concerned with services affecting children and young people. The Ministry of Agriculture retains powers relating to agricultural education; the Ministry of Labour and National Service still has powers relating to employment of young people; and the Home Secretary and Home Office have responsibility for children or young people who become delinquent. In this situation there has been a demand for closer co-ordination at central government level in order to secure effective operation at local government level. Let us look for a moment at what has so far been achieved.

Ministry of Agriculture

In agricultural education there is an ever growing tendency for the Ministry of Agriculture to act in consultation and co-operation with the Ministry of Education, in order that the local education authority, which covers agricultural education as part of its general duties, may act effectively. Thus we find officers of the Ministry of Education acting in an inspectorial capacity for agricultural education as well as for other forms of further education. But the effective co-ordinating instrument in this case is the local education authority, under whose care agricultural education is treated as a natural part of the pattern of education.

National Health Service

In the health service the problem has been dealt with more effectively. The creation of a National Health Service had full regard to the fact that under the Education Act it was the duty of local education authorities to provide or secure the provision of a full system of medical inspection and treatment, without charge, for all children and young people on the registers of educational establishments. The school medical service is therefore part of the education service and to a large extent carries the responsibility of looking after the health of children. The child is at home, of course, as well as at school and has a full right to the facilities of the National Health Service whenever these may be required. Co-ordination at the local authority level is secure in the fact that the local authority Medical Officer of Health is as a general rule also the Principal School Medical Officer and in collaboration with the Chief Education Officer secures the effective co-ordination of general medical practice with the school medical service.

Ministry of Labour

In the sphere of employment the Ministry of Labour joins with the Ministry of Education in a body called the Central Youth Employment Executive, which is charged with all matters pertaining to the employment of young people. The local education authority is given the opportunity to be responsible at local level for the youth employment service and in 90 per cent of the cases exercises that option. In the other cases the Ministry of Labour makes direct provision. The general pattern is one in which the local education authority is the responsible authority for youth employment and appoints an officer and staff charged with these duties. Government aid is secured through the Central Youth Employment Executive, in which both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labour are represented.

Home Secretary

Finally, let us turn to the responsibilities of the Home Secretary relating to children and young people who are delinquent. Remand homes and approved schools were in many cases controlled by the local education authority acting for the local authority as such. Recently the government reviewed this problem of children and young people under need of care and protection or guilty of offenses before the courts. After considerable debate it was decided to retain the responsibility for these children in the hands of the Home Office in

its Children's Department, and to create at local authority level a children's welfare department deliberately designed to be independent of the education authority as such, in order to ensure its acting, so to speak, in a parental capacity and using the services of the education department as other parents did. In particular, however, the responsibility for remand homes and approved schools passed to the hands of the Children's Committees. It is only fair to add that many of those concerned with the education service took the view that it would have been better to entrust this responsibility to the local education authority as such and to the Ministry of Education at government level. The arrangements work well, but again it is to be noted that the effective co-ordinating instrument is the local authority, which is the authority both for education and for children's welfare as defined under the statutes of the Home Secretary.

THE LOCAL AUTHORITY

It will be recognized, therefore, that in this total pattern the local authority (the County Council and the County Borough Council) is the most important single instrument in the co-ordination of all services which affect children and young people. It exercises powers for education and for children's welfare and acts as a police authority, a library authority, and a health authority, bringing together on the one hand whatever government departments may be involved and on the other whatever voluntary agencies may be operative in the area.

For this reason it will perhaps be helpful to look more closely at the relation between the local authority and the central authority, particularly as regards the education services and their significance in the total local authority pattern. First it should be made clear that education is by far the most important service of the local authority, involving at least half of its total expenditure for all purposes and in many cases a substantially higher proportion. In the education service the local authority has responsibility for all executive action: it builds schools, technical colleges, colleges for training teachers, schools for handicapped children, youth centers, medical clinics, and so on; it employs teachers and all other staff members. (At present, in the employment of a local education authority for every teacher there is also at least one other person, engaged in work such as the school medical service or the serving of school meals.)

Financial responsibility

In the education service the local authority on the average accepts financial responsibility for 40 per cent of the expense and the central government, through the Ministry of Education, for 60 per cent. This financial relationship is of the highest importance. It may be argued that in any service only when one partner accepts a substantial financial responsibility can it properly be trusted to make decisions involving the other partner. At the present time in a total appropriation of the order of £400,000 per annum the local authorities accept about £150,000, which they raise from local resources by what is essentially a property tax.

National associations

It is clear that 146 local education authorities in England and Wales, if they are to be effective co-ordinating instruments, must be in a position not merely to act in their own areas but to negotiate and reach agreements at national level. To that end there are national associations of local authorities, which must be regarded as an important part of the co-ordinating pattern.

The Association of Education Committees is a body in which the membership includes the Education Committees of all local education authorities in England and Wales, with the exception of the London County Council, which acts directly with the government departments concerned in these as in all other matters. The County Councils Association represents the Councils of the county authorities and is concerned with all matters with which they are concerned. The Association of Municipal Corporations acts similarly for the county boroughs. These associations jointly and severally undertake negotiations with the central government or with bodies of employees on salaries and conditions of service and act as the co-ordinating instruments for local government. If, for example, there is any legislation or administrative action proposed by the government which will affect local authorities in their relations with children and young people, the associations will be brought into consultation and as a general rule government action will be taken not merely after consultation with the associations of local authorities but in agreement with them.

In similar manner, employees of local authorities organized at national level are in constant consultation and negotiation with the associations on matters affecting their membership. For example, the National Union of Teachers, representing the teaching profession, is in continuous consultation with the Association of Education Committees, and in certain matters, as for example the salaries of teachers, the national body responsible in this field—the Burnham Committee—represents on the one side the national associations of teachers and on the other the national associations of local authorities. The decisions of the Committee are submitted to the Minister of Education, who may accept or reject but may not amend them. Since the establishment of the Burnham Committee thirty-five years ago its reports have always been accepted by the government; after acceptance the Minister makes an Order under which the approved salaries of teachers must be paid by all local education authorities.

It is, therefore, not unreasonable to regard the associations of local authorities as an important instrument of co-ordination not only between education and other governmental services appertaining to children and young people but in all matters which affect children and young people, for they are in constant consultation with national bodies representing voluntary organizations, with national organizations of the churches, and with national organizations of employees, as well as with the government departments concerned.

PRESENT TREND IN CO-ORDINATION

In summarizing the present trend in co-ordination, therefore, it is perhaps fair to say that the main instrument of co-ordination, as far as legislation for these children and young people is concerned, is the local authority, and the essential instrument securing the closest co-operation of central and local government is effective associations of local authorities. It should be added that the tendency over the years has been to strengthen and broaden the concept of education so that at central government level the great bulk of work pertaining to the welfare of children and young people falls within the ambit of the Ministry of Education. It would be even truer to say that it has been brought almost wholly within the ambit of the local authority at local government level.

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

This statement must not be interpreted as neglecting the very important

part which voluntary organizations play in the welfare of children and young people. Britain is particularly happy in the very great contribution which voluntary organizations have made to the welfare of the young, and while it may be true that that contribution becomes less important as public authorities increasingly accept their responsibilities in these matters, the fact remains that voluntary organizations still play a significant role. It is the local authority's task not merely to provide but also to secure the provision of appropriate services, and in many matters, particularly in recreative and welfare facilities for young people, the local authority co-operates with a wide range of voluntary organizations, aiding them financially and acting as an effective co-ordinating instrument.

FIFTEEN-TO-EIGHTEEN-YEAR-OLDS

At this stage the reader may well ask whether the implication of what has been recorded is that all is well in these matters in Britain. The answer is in the negative. There are several outstanding problems yet to be resolved. Perhaps the most important of these affects young people. At the present time the school-leaving age is fifteen years, and the services as they affect children up to that age are well co-ordinated. But from fifteen to eighteen there is a serious gap. The Education Act of 1944 included a provision for the establishment of county colleges, at which part-time attendance will be compulsory for all young people up to the age of eighteen after they have left school. The importance of this provision lies in the fact that county college students would receive health service and all other welfare services at present tied in with the education service in schools.

Unfortunately, this part of the act has not yet been implemented, for reasons which are fairly obvious: the greatly increased number of children after the war involved a very heavy building program, and other educational reforms that took precedence over the establishment of county colleges together with the building program have created a situation which makes it impracticable to tackle this provision until about 1960. There is, however, high hope that in the early 1960's county colleges will be established. They would constitute without doubt a most effective co-ordinating instrument for services to young people, enabling all youngsters up to the age of eighteen to have not only the continued benefit of regular contact with the education services but also effective medical inspection and treatment. They would, furthermore, enable all the voluntary organizations concerned with young people to work in even closer collaboration with the local education authorities than they do at present. Until these colleges are provided there is probably no really effective solution to some of the problems of youth welfare.

AN INCLUSIVE AND FLEXIBLE SYSTEM

It is to be noted, too, that co-ordination at central government level would undoubtedly be strengthened if some of the powers vested in the Ministry of Agriculture and in the Home Office were vested instead in the Ministry of Education, and such a transfer would seem to be in accord with the trend of the last few decades. The concept of the education service has been consistently broadening in scope to include not merely the instruction of children and young people but all aspects of their welfare—physical, mental, moral, and spiritual. In this pattern Britain believes that it is essential to maintain the basic principle of distribution of power. National policy rests with the central government; executive responsibility with the local authority, and both are concerned to secure within the education service freedom of action to the teaching profession in matters of content and curriculum. In this way the diverse needs of different areas can be effectively met, while at the same time, through national organizations of local authorities, teachers, and voluntary organizations, uniformity of action can be secured where it is necessary and desirable. It is perhaps not unfair to suggest that Britain has made a good deal of progress in achieving a system at once flexible enough to meet the diverse needs of individuals properly and at the same time closely enough co-ordinated to ensure corporate action by agreement at national level wherever such action is necessary.

William Picken Alexander, PhD., L.H.D., London, England, has been general secretary of the Association of Education Committees (England, Wales, Northern Ireland, Isle of Man, and Channel Islands) since 1945, and has served as secretary to the Local Authorities' Panel of the Burnham Committee and associated committees negotiating salaries of teachers. He was formerly schoolmaster in Scotland (1929–31); assistant lecturer in education, Glasgow University (1931–32); Rockefeller research fellow (1932–33); deputy director of education, Walthamstow (1934–35); director of education, Margate (1935–39); and director of education, Sheffield (1939–44). He is a fellow of the British Psychological Society. He is the author of Intelligence, Concrete and Abstract (1935); The Educational Needs of Democracy (1940); A Performance Scale for the Measurement of Technical Ability (1947); A Parents' Guide to the Education Act (1944); Education in England (1953); and coauthor of County and Voluntary Schools (1949).

Liverpool: A Case Study in Co-ordination

By H. S. Magnay *

THE county borough system, according to which a single council is responsible for all services coming within the province of local government inside the boundary of the town in question, is highly conducive to proper co-ordination between the various local government services. Co-ordination is, of course, effective in the counties also, where there is a two-tier system of local government, but more elaborate arrangements to bring it about are usually necessary.

Co-ordination of services is, however, not the only virtue to be expected of a system of local government, and there have always been advocates of the system of *ad hoc* elected bodies responsible for education, which prevailed in England from 1870 to 1902 and in Scotland until considerably later. These advocates have argued that an elected body, responsible to an electorate for education alone, is more likely to develop the education service vigorously and with enthusiasm, and to find the time to acquire an intimate knowledge of the system of education for which it is responsible, than a County Borough Council to which education is one among many responsibilities. There is unquestionably much force in this view, and it may well be that in some areas the School Boards, had they been continued in existence, would have achieved more than did the County Borough and County Councils.

This view, however, is a sectional one, and it is difficult to deny the validity of the argument that in each local government area there should be one body capable of taking an over-all view of the comparative needs of all the local government services and attempting to allocate resources in accordance with these needs. The members of such a body must assume a heavier responsibility, but, if they and their advisers perform their task well, the town ought to be better governed than it would be by a group of *ad hoc* boards.

Composition of the Education Committee

A County Borough Council functions through standing committees. The mere presence of councillors on more than one committee is a factor making for co-ordination. In Liverpool, the Education Committee contains fifty-three members, of whom thirty-four are members of the Council, and nineteen are co-opted because of their knowledge and experience of education. This year, of the thirty-four elected members of the Education Committee, ten are also members of the Health Committee, nine are members of the Libraries, Museums and Arts Committee, five are members of the Housing Committee, five of the Children's Committee, five of the Establishment Committee, four of the Highways and Planning Committee, four of the Economy Committee, three of the Finance and General Purposes Committee, and one of the Parks and Gardens Committee. The presence of members of the Education Committee on other committees at which particular matters of interest to the education service are discussed does at least ensure that the point of view of the Education Committee is voiced by persons who will usually feel that they have some responsibility for it. Too much reliance must not be placed on this factor, but it has unquestionably proved of value.

* In the preparation of this article I am deeply indebted to my friend and colleague Mr. C. P. R. Clarke, M.A., B.Litt(Oxford), Deputy Director of Education, Liverpool, for his assistance, and to my friends and colleagues Mr. Thomas Alker, LL.M., Town Clerk of Liverpool, and Mr. J. G. Murray, Assistant Town Clerk, Liverpool, for their advice.

Co-operation Among Chief Officers

Similarly, the fact that all the chief and subordinate officers are officers of a single council is an important factor making for co-ordination. The chief officers are constantly thrown together. In Liverpool, they are required to attend the monthly meetings of the City Council and of some of what may be described as its supervisory or regulatory committees. It is natural that a spirit of comradeship and partnership should develop among them and that they should make use of the opportunities for meeting thrown in their way to discuss and co-ordinate policies. When the chief officers set the tone their example is followed at all levels of the hierarchy, so that most fruitful co-operation in detail follows. Of course there have been examples of departments of a council which function as if they were separate organizations. Such anarchy is unusual in County Borough Councils and County Councils, but would almost certainly be more common if there were no single co-ordinating authority.

Co-ordination Through Regulatory Bodies

It is not enough, however, that an organization's general arrangements should be conducive to co-ordination. If the organization is to function as a streamlined unity, there must be actual arrangements for co-ordination, and it must be the business of some committee to bring them about. The need for such planned co-ordination is accepted in greater or lesser degree by nearly all Councils, but in Liverpool the detailed arrangements for it are exceptionally well-developed.

Finance and General Purposes Committee

The Finance and General Purposes Committee of the City Council, which includes among its members the chairmen of the other major committees, is recognized as the senior committee and has certain defined supervisory or regulatory powers over the other committees. It has, however, no general power of supervision over the other committees, which report directly to the City Council except on matters requiring the consent of the Finance and General Purposes Committee under the Council's standing orders. Thus any proposal to incur, for a particular project, capital expenditure to be financed by loan, or to make a grant to an outside organization, requires the approval of the Finance and General Purposes Committee. Disputes between committees are bound to occur occasionally, and in such cases the Finance and General Purposes Committee is authorized to arbitrate. But its main instrument of control is its power to advise the City Council about the sum of money to be voted for the purposes of each committee in the annual estimates. Policy and finance are inseparable, and each committee can develop a policy just in so far as the City Council votes it the necessary funds.

In advising the Council on estimates, the Finance and General Purposes Committee is co-ordinating the annual programs of the spending committees and

is relating them to the total sum of money which it thinks it reasonable to call on the ratepayers to pay during the year. Co-ordination inevitably amounts to an assessment of the relative priorities of the programs, which must compete to some extent with each other, unless no limit is set to the call on the rate. This is the point where acute differences of opinion will arise, and study of the local press all over the country at estimate time always reveals examples of tension between the co-ordinating Finance Committee and operational committees wishing to press on with their programs at a pace faster than the local community, in the opinion of the Finance Committee, can afford.

As education is now by far the largest spending service left to local government, the Education Committees of County and County Borough Councils are particularly apt to be involved in such tensions. In some places machinery has been set up to anticipate and avoid possible conflict. In Birmingham, for example, a subcommittee, composed of representatives of the Education and Finance Committees, is called annually with the object of reaching agreement about reasonable proposals before draft estimates are submitted to the Education Committee.[1]

Establishment Committees

Most County and County Borough Councils have felt the need for co-ordinating the actions of their various committees over the employment of staff, and have set up Establishment Committees for this purpose. In Liverpool, the Education Committee employs, in addition to teachers, a staff of administrative officers, clerks, caretakers, cleaners, groundsmen, and staff for the preparation and service of school meals. Obviously, similar servants of the same employer should have similar conditions of service. Any proposal of the Education Committee relating to the salaries, wages, or conditions of service of the categories of administrative and general staff just outlined requires the consent of the Establishment Committee.

It has become the almost universal practice in England and Wales to have salaries, wages, and conditions of service of most kinds of staff determined by national or regional joint negotiating machinery, representative of both employers and employed. Questions to be decided at local level have then tended to become those of interpretation of national and regional awards and of grading within these awards. Experience shows that the views of employing committees on such questions can differ so widely that it is essential to have an Establishment Committee to attempt the difficult task of ensuring fair treatment for all the Council's employees. In Liverpool, the Education Committee alone is responsible to the City Council for matters relating to the establishment of teachers and to the application and interpretation of the nationally negotiated Burnham scales of salaries for teachers. The Establishment Committee has no jurisdiction in such matters, as the question of co-ordination with the activities of the Council's other committees does not arise.

Liverpool Economy Committee

The Liverpool City Council has set up a third standing committee with supervisory powers—and in this its practice differs from that of most Councils—known as the Economy Committee. The function of the Economy Committee is to scrutinize all projects estimated to cost more than £1,000. It also has the task of examining the capital estimates of all spending committees, and has a general duty to promote economy throughout the City Council's service. The Economy Committee, like the Finance and General Purposes Committee, is therefore in a position to review the major proposals of all committees in relation to each other and to the capacity of the city to pay for them, and can curb anything it may choose to regard as a flight of extravagance on the part of a spending committee.

[1] *Education*, Vol. 105, No. 2719, p. 417.

CO-ORDINATING FUNCTIONS OF TOWN CLERK

The achievement of co-ordination at officer level throughout the City Council's service is one of the most important functions of the Town Clerk (or in a county area, the Clerk of the County Council), who is the senior chief officer of the Council. In Liverpool, the Town Clerk is secretary as well as legal adviser to all committees of the Council. This is now the usual practice in English local government, though there remain a few areas where the Chief Education Officer is secretary to the Education Committee. The Town Clerk, as secretary, is responsible for minuting the proceedings of all committees, and in that capacity he will obviously see that each committee is informed of any relevant decision of another committee or of any relevant argument which is taking place or is about to take place in another committee. He will also take the initiative in calling together chief officers on any matter requiring consultation between them. A number of Town Clerks and Clerks of County Councils have set up within their departments organization-and-methods branches for the purpose of advising the committees of the City Council or their chief officers about the organization of the departments for which they are responsible. In this way the Town Clerk is able to bring about much co-ordination in matters of administrative detail between departments.

CITY PLANNING

The greater part of Liverpool grew up unplanned long before Parliament was convinced of the need for town and country planning, so that the city carries a population far denser in relation to its area than would be tolerated in any new town today. It follows that there is an acute land shortage. All the local government services find that they need land in order to comply with higher standards, now defined nationally, and they tend to enter into competition with each other, since there is not enough land for all needs.

Education and Housing Committees compete for land

The education and housing services are the fiercest competitors. The Education Act of 1944 required all County and County Borough Councils to formulate their future programs in the form of development plans for primary and secondary education and schemes for further education. Regulations, having the force of law, defined the land requirements of the existing and proposed new schools and of establishments of further education described in these schemes and development plans. It is not difficult to observe these regulations in rural areas or in small towns, but in Liverpool and other big towns their effect is revolutionary. The sites of most schools in the congested inner areas are of microscopic size compared with the new standards, and few of those schools have any playing fields. Given Liverpool's conditions, it will not be practicable to provide more than about two-fifths of the land prescribed by national regulations, and provision of even

that amount has involved a demand for land for educational purposes on a scale to which the city has not been accustomed and which has not escaped some criticism.

At the same time the Housing Committee of the City Council needs even larger areas of land. The Housing Committee has a long waiting list of families in need of a house, and has a duty to rehouse tenants of condemned slum houses in central areas. Some limit must be placed to the spread of the town over the adjacent countryside, both to conserve good agricultural land and for other planning reasons, so that there is a strong and legitimate pressure to house as many persons as possible within the city boundary.

The development plan

The Education and Housing Committees search for land with all the eagerness of the nineteenth-century prospectors for gold and diamonds, while the much smaller claims of the other committees cannot be neglected. Some machinery for co-ordination was therefore essential; otherwise jungle law would have prevailed and the land would have gone to the earliest and most vigorous searcher. The Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 set up the necessary machinery by constituting the County and County Borough Councils as planning authorities and by requiring them to prepare within five years a development plan, showing in detail how they proposed that the whole of the land within their areas should be used. Thereafter, the development plans are to be reviewed at intervals of five years, since new needs are constantly arising and old ones altering, so that no determination of land use can be frozen for an indefinite number of years ahead.

The Liverpool City Council set up a committee, known as the Post-War Redevelopment Committee, to be responsible for the preparation of the development plan under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, and for its amendments, and generally to act as an arbitrator between Council committees on matters of land use. The development plan is its judgment of Solomon, which cannot please every committee but is recognized to be equitable. It is worth noting, as an illustration of the subtle interplay of the central and the local authority, that the City Council had not a completely free hand in determining the future use of land. The City Council as planning authority could not have decided that land which it owned as education authority, for use as a school playing field, should be turned over to the Housing Committee as a site for houses, without obtaining the consent of the Ministry of Education.

The administrative organization of the City Council is designed to ensure co-ordination between departments in planning as in other matters. The City Engineer and Surveyor, in addition to his engineering functions, is the City Council's planning officer, and also the officer responsible for land acquisition. The City Engineer and Surveyor's Department contains separate sections dealing with planning and with estates and valuation, each under a senior subordinate officer. These sections co-operate closely with each other and with all departments of the City Council's service which require the use of land.

Redevelopment projects

Town and country planning in most rural parts of Britain and in the outer districts of the larger cities is mainly the determination of the future use of undeveloped land. The inner districts of cities such as Liverpool present an

entirely different problem. Population grew so rapidly during the nineteenth century and the concept of town planning was so utterly remote from the ideas of the time that towns were allowed to grow up in a way that would now be regarded as intolerable. Houses and industrial premises are so jumbled up, and the people are so tightly packed together, that the only possibility is to scrap nearly all the standing buildings and begin again, working by better standards.

In Liverpool, redevelopment of this nature is taking place in the districts behind the north and south docks. Since operations on such a scale cannot be undertaken by a large number of individual developers, the City Council has to take responsibility for sponsoring the schemes. It has to have prepared complete plans for new "neighborhood units," similar to plans for entirely new towns on undeveloped sites. The City Engineer and Surveyor, as planning officer, remains responsible for advising the City Council on fundamental planning principles governing the schemes, such as the density of the population and the proportion of the total area to be reserved as public open spaces or for community buildings. The City Council has, however, entrusted the preparation of the plans for the redevelopment areas to another officer, the City Architect and Director of Housing, whose department contains a section specially for that work. Most of the development in these inner areas will consist of houses, and practically all the houses will be built by, and will come under the control of, the Housing Committee of the City Council. The Education Committee has, therefore, to state to the Housing Committee its land requirements for the educational needs of the population to be rehoused in the redevelopment area, any difference of opinion being settled by direct discussion, with the possibility of appeal to the Post-War Redevelopment Committee.

Housing estates

In making land available for educational needs on new City Council housing estates co-ordination between the committees responsible for education, planning, and housing has proved easier than on redevelopment areas. As a housing estate is an entirely new entity and there is no existing population on the spot, the Education Committee expects sufficient land to be made available to enable it to comply with statutory requirements, unless there are special reasons to the contrary. It is a comparatively simple matter on the basis of past experience to deduce from the number of houses to be built the number of school places required and the amount of land needed for them.

Thus the Liverpool City Council has obtained co-ordination between the education service and city planning through the Post-War Redevelopment Committee and by means of direct discussion between the Education and Housing Committees and between their officers.

Community centers

In one specialized territory, that of community centers, the Council has set up formal machinery to co-ordinate the activities of the Education and Housing Committees. The principle has been accepted that each large housing estate and redevelopment area should have a center which will serve as a focus for the cultural and recreational activities of the local neighborhood. The centers must have sites reserved for them, and in due course the City Council will have to build them or assist voluntary organizations to build them. The Education Committee has a legal power to

erect and maintain community centers, while the Housing Committee has concurrent powers under the Housing Acts relating to new housing areas. The Education Committee receives a grant from central government funds at the rate of 60 per cent of its approved expenditure, whereas no such grant is available to the Housing Committee. Not unnaturally, the City Council has assigned the responsibility for community centers to the Education Committee. To ensure agreement on the main lines of policy, the Council has constituted a joint subcommittee consisting of an equal number of members of the Education and of the Housing Committee. This joint subcommittee considers all matters of importance in connection with community centers before they are submitted separately to either the Education Committee or the Housing Committee.

SOCIAL WELFARE

In Liverpool, the Education Committee of the City Council gradually attained status as a major social welfare organization, as the Children and Young Persons Acts assigned social welfare functions to the local education authorities. The Act of 1933 placed on the local education authorities important duties in connection with the prevention of cruelty to, or neglect of, children and young persons and the regulation of their employment. It made the local education authorities responsible for taking into their care children committed by the juvenile courts as in need of care and protection, and for the establishment and maintenance of remand homes and of "approved schools," that is, boarding schools approved by the Home Secretary for the benefit of young people committed to them by the juvenile courts because of offenses or because they were in need of care and protection. In 1903 the Education Committee in Liverpool had taken over from the School Board a staff of attendance officers whose job was to visit the homes of absent pupils in order to insist on regular school attendance. It may seem a far cry from the semi-police function of the "School Board men" who had to enforce school attendance for the first time to the School Welfare Officer of today who is looked upon in many homes as a friend and adviser. The transition, however, has been easy and natural, since the officers soon found that social difficulties were at the root of the more persistent cases of irregular attendance and that to counteract these difficulties they had to co-operate with other social agencies. The organization of School Welfare Officers soon built up a rich experience which proved of great value to the new staff of special officers employed to carry out the Education Committee's duties under the Children and Young Persons Acts.

The Children's Committee

The Children's Act of 1948 required local authorities to set up a new committee, the Children's Committee, and to appoint a new officer, the Children's Officer, to be, with his staff, at the service of the Children's Committee. The act transferred from the Education Committee to the Children's Committee responsibility for children in need of care and protection and also for the management of remand homes and approved schools. Prima facie the act might seem to be a step away from unified conduct of the city's social welfare services. Two committees now function in what was the province of one, thus creating a new need for co-ordination. It was argued, however, that the Education Committee of a County Council or County Borough Council already had a very big job on its hands in its responsibility for the education service, and that it could not be expected in addition to lavish as much time and attention on the care of children as would be given by an independent committee specially formed for the purpose. Similarly, it was argued that there should be a separate officer, the Children's Officer, who should be in a position to give his whole time to the intimate human problems of deprived children.

Given the decision to set up Children's Committees, the question of co-ordination with the work of the Education Committee had to be faced at once. The need for co-ordination would have been less had the Children's Act of 1948 gone further and transferred more functions to the Children's Committees, for while the Children's Committee was given responsibility for children in need of care and protection, the Education Committee remained responsible for preventing neglect of, and cruelty to, children. It is not easy to draw the line between the two functions, and it is necessary for both committees to employ social welfare officers, with equivalent qualifications, for home visiting. The Liverpool City Council has not thought it necessary to set up special co-ordinating machinery, leaving co-ordination, instead, to the good sense of the two committees and their officers. Co-operation has been easier because the Liverpool children's department took over from the education department practically the whole staff which had done the work previously, and that staff remains a high proportion of the total staff of the children's department.

Variety of agencies in social welfare

Co-ordination in the social welfare field is particularly desirable and particularly difficult because so many agencies, both statutory and voluntary, are involved. The Health, Housing, and Watch (responsible for the police) Committees of the City Council are involved in addition to the Education Committee and the Children's Committee. Also in the field are governmental organizations, such as the National Assistance Board (which performs the work carried out before 1948 by the Public Assistance Committee of the City Council) and the Probation Service, and an exceptionally large number of voluntary organizations. Frequently, the statutory authority has the power and the duty to perform a function which is also performed by a voluntary organization. The voluntary organization will usually have done the pioneer work in the field, and in accordance with the English tradition every encouragement is given it to continue. Thus while the Education Committee is legally responsible for preventing the neglect of children and maintains an organization for the purpose, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children also operates in this field. In some areas the local education authority has handed over the whole job to the National Society. In Liverpool, there is an agreement precisely defining the spheres of action of the two bodies and providing for systematic consultation on casework. One object of the agreement is to ensure that under no circumstances is one home visited separately by officers of both organizations, since such unco-ordinated visits would be harmful to the interests of the children and young persons.

National government circular on co-ordination

The danger of lack of co-ordination in the social welfare field is so great that in 1950 three government departments, the Home Office, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Education, issued a

joint circular [2] urging co-ordinated use of the statutory and voluntary services to mitigate by social action the causes of neglect and so to avoid the need of removing neglected children from their parents. The circular asked County and County Borough Councils to designate an officer to be responsible under them for devising arrangements to secure full co-operation among all the local services, statutory and voluntary, concerned with the welfare of children in their homes; to arrange for the designated officer's holding regular meetings of officers of the local authority and other statutory services and of local representatives of the voluntary organizations; and to see that significant cases of child neglect and all cases of ill-treatment coming to the notice of any statutory or voluntary service in the area are reported to the designated officer and brought before these meetings.

Some councils have designated the Children's Officer as the co-ordinating officer requested in the circular. So far, Liverpool has not found it necessary to set up the recommended machinery. In my opinion there is real danger that meetings attended by representatives of a very large number of organizations may consume an inordinate quantity of staff time without achieving fruitful results. In a large city such as Liverpool, many cases cannot await submission to a regular meeting; action has to be taken immediately. It has, therefore, seemed better to continue to rely on organized bilateral agreements for co-operation. Faithfully carried out by both sides, these seem to work successfully and to avoid the obvious pitfalls.

SCHOOL HEALTH SERVICE

Co-ordination of the education and public health services has presented few difficulties. The Education Acts have placed on the Education Committees of County and County Borough Councils, not on the Health Committees, the responsibility for organizing and conducting a school health service for the medical inspection and treatment of school children. The school health service is, therefore, organized as an integral part of the education service. Many advantages flow from this integration. The cordial support of the teachers vital to the success of the service can be more easily obtained when teachers and school health service staff regard themselves as colleagues working together under the same committee. The influence of teachers on parents is often important, for example when a new technique is proposed, such as the use of the BCG (bacillus Calmette-Guérin) vaccine against tuberculosis. Medical inspections can be arranged with the least disturbance to schoolwork, and the medical staff is available for consultation on health matters, including the plans of new school buildings.

Questions of co-ordination in the work of the Education and Health Committees do not often arise. In Liverpool, some clinic buildings are used both by the school health service and by the maternity and child welfare service, which is the responsibility of the Health Committee; and the staffs of both services have the advantage of facilities organized by the health department for training and refresher courses.

The administrative arrangements are conducive to co-ordination. In Liverpool, as in most other areas, the Medical Officer of Health for the city is also Principal School Medical Officer. The Medical Officer of Health is assisted on the school medical side by a Deputy Principal School Medical Officer, whose staff of doctors, dentists, and so forth is distinct from the other staffs under the control of the Medical Officer. The headquarters of this staff of the school health service is in the education office, and the administrative and clerical staff is for all practical purposes regarded as part of the establishment of the education department. The Education Committee is advised on medical matters by the Medical Officer of Health and has set up a School Health Services Sub-Committee which considers all matters relating to the school health service. The Medical Officer of Health (or his representative) and the Director of Education (or his representative) attend meetings of the School Health Services Sub-Committee, so that it can hear the views of both officials in the event of a difference of opinion between them. The recommendations of the School Health Services Sub-Committee, before presentation to the Education Committee, are considered by the Special Services Sub-Committee, which is one of the five major subcommittees of the Education Committee and which has a general responsibility for co-ordinating the work of the school health service, the school meals service, the school attendance and welfare service, and the special schools for handicapped children.

[2] Circular 157/50 Home Office.

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

The youth employment service, like the school health service, is administered in Liverpool as an integral part of the education service. The central government department responsible for youth employment matters is the Ministry of Labour and National Service. The Employment and Training Act (1948) authorized but did not compel local education authorities to administer the youth employment service in their area; 115 out of 146 local education authorities, including Liverpool, exercised that option. In the areas of the other thirty-one local education authorities, the Ministry of Labour and National Service administers the service directly, and co-ordination between its activities and those of the local education authorities has to be worked out in detail. Where the local education authority is responsible for the service, the Ministry of Labour and National Service has to approve a scheme for the constitution of a Youth Employment Committee. In Liverpool, the Youth Employment Committee contains members of the Education Committee, who are in the minority, and representatives of teachers, employers, employees, and voluntary organizations. The Youth Employment Committee reports to the Education Committee through the Further Education Sub-Committee.

Functions

The primary function of the youth employment service is to give vocational guidance in schools. Such guidance includes both talks in the schools on careers by officers of the Youth Employment Committee and individual interviews with those leaving school. Guidance of this sort would have little effect unless backed up by the wholehearted co-operation of the teachers, particularly of those who have special responsibility for advising on careers, in schools where one member of the staff is assigned to this work.

Achievements in Liverpool

In Liverpool, the co-operation between teachers and the youth employment service is particularly close. One feature of the service is a group of officers who specialize in advising those who are leaving secondary grammar schools. They have acquired a knowledge and experience both of industry and of secondary grammar schools which enable them to be of the greatest possible assistance to school leavers, and their help is greatly valued by the heads and staffs of those schools.

Other specialist officers in the Liver-

pool youth employment service devote themselves to serving the needs of those leaving special schools for handicapped children. A sympathetic, individual approach is needed to these boys and girls, many of whom tend to lack self-confidence. It has been found that careful placing in suitable jobs, with close follow-up during the early years of employment, often makes a decisive contribution to the success of these boys and girls in their jobs, enabling them to earn their living as happy members of the community.

The Youth Employment Committee is in day-to-day touch with local industry and commerce, and is in a position to organize visits of school children and young persons to local industrial and commercial undertakings. It also maintains close liaison with the establishments of further education. The officers, when giving vocational guidance and doing follow-up work after employment, lose no opportunity of urging young people to qualify themselves further; in fact, the youth employment service is a leading recruiting agent for further education.

It cannot be doubted that the outstanding success of the youth employment service owes much to its organization as part of the education service. The teachers accept its officers as colleagues, and all necessary arrangements for vocational guidance are made on the authority of the Director of Education in the same manner as are other arrangements relating to school life.

YOUTH SERVICE

The Education Committees of County and County Borough Councils are also responsible for what is usually known as "youth service," the object of which is to provide opportunities for young people who have left school to spend their leisure in worth-while activities. The pattern of organization in this sphere is as infinitely varied as in that of social welfare. Voluntary organizations were everywhere first in the field and remain lively and vigorous in a sphere in which voluntary effort is peculiarly appropriate. In Birmingham, the Youth Employment Officer is also responsible for the youth service, but this combination is unusual. Many Education Committees have constituted Youth Committees which bring together representatives of the statutory and voluntary organizations working for the welfare of youth.

In Liverpool, the Liverpool Council of Social Service, a strong voluntary organization employing a full-time staff, has set up a committee known as the Liverpool Youth Organizations Committee; it contains representatives from the Education Committee and from all the interested voluntary and statutory organizations. The Youth Organizations Committee meets monthly and is an open forum for discussion on all youth matters. The Liverpool Education Committee does not itself organize youth clubs, but it sets aside annually a substantial sum of money to assist voluntary clubs which are doing the job. These grants are made on the advice of a joint subcommittee composed of members of the Education Committee and of the Youth Organizations Committee. It is generally agreed in Liverpool that this pattern of co-operation has been exceptionally successful.

UNDERLYING CO-ORDINATION

We have seen that though the county borough system of single-tiered local government in large towns is itself conducive to co-ordination of services, the actual forms assumed in co-ordination of the education service with other local services are many. They differ according to the services involved—their nature and their earlier history; they vary with variations in the local framework into which they fit. Often, too, strong-willed individuals, whether officers or members of committees, have molded patterns lasting after the reasons for them have been forgotten.

It is abundantly clear, in any case, that co-ordination does not come of itself, that it is likely to be conspicuously absent unless active steps are taken to promote it. And in the end, after the best possible machinery has been set up, co-ordination will be achieved only by the will to co-operate of the individuals who use the machinery.

Harold Swindale Magnay, M.A. (Cantab.), has been director of education in the City of Liverpool since 1946. He served as game ranger and district reclamation officer, Tanganyika (1925–27), as assistant master at the Royal Grammar School, Newcastle-upon-Tyne (1927–30), as assistant director of education in Newcastle (1930–34), and as director of education in Barnsley (1934–40) and in Leicester (1940–46). He is honorary treasurer and past president of the Association of Education Officers and honorary treasurer and past chairman of the Association of Art Institutions. He has been a member of various educational commissions, including the University Grants Committee and the Fulton Committee on Education in Sierra Leone.

Education and Other Public Services in France*

PUBLIC opinion and government in France have for the last few years given particular attention to the general problems of the younger generation. Indeed, various signs have made people realize that youth was undergoing a serious crisis.

Among the manifestations of this malaise, some might be considered normal in that they are to be found in all times and places: a taste for radical philosophical and political theories, systematic criticism of the older generation, a concern for having more voice in state councils, and so forth. But this disease of the ages is today particularly manifest in France, where time-honored institutions are little adapted to the needs of modern living.

Within its own jurisdiction, which includes most of the child's activities, the Ministry of Education has been able to maintain a certain cohesion. At the level of the transition from school to the working world, however, as well as on the social and judicial levels, government responsibilities need to be better co-ordinated.

The School World

Educational services do not escape the centralization which has long characterized French administrative life.

Metropolitan France and Algeria are divided into seventeen "academies," each of which embraces, on the average, five or six departments. Attempts are being made to give these districts a certain autonomy in the choice of their educational specialties, so that instruction may correspond more closely to the vocational needs of the area. Budgetary matters are left to the departments and communes, especially for primary education (six to fourteen years). It is known, however, that, contrary to the practice of numerous other countries, and in particular the Anglo-Saxon nations, the various academies are only a method of territorial division convenient for carrying out national provisions. Curricula, examinations, teacher training, and the regulations and methods in force are the same for the entire country.

All the services in the administrative offices of each academy and in the department depend more or less immediately on the central administration in Paris, which gives them all necessary directives. To know the structure and the objectives of educational public service in France, it will therefore suffice to examine the operation of this central administration.

At the head is the Minister, sometimes assisted by a secretary of state, who prepares the budget (almost 400 billion francs[1] last year), initiates all undertakings legally within the scope of administrative authority, requests parliamentary decisions, and regulates, in detail, the work of the service at the national level. He does this by decrees, orders, and circulars distributed to the rectors.[2]

The prerogatives of the Minister are not limited to the organization of instruction only: in addition to his school duties he is responsible for libraries, archives, arts and letters, museums, architecture, sports, and, under some governments, scientific research.

School and university questions come under the jurisdiction of four general departments: Education of the First Degree, Education of the Second Degree, Technical Education, and Higher Education. Preparation of the budget devolves upon the Department of General Administration. The Department of Youth and Sports unites all the services concerned with sport and with youth in the widest sense: popular education, recreation, youth movements, and so forth. Finally, for more than a year, all the services in the academies and the departments which relate, within the school system, to the health of youth have been under a Department of School and University Hygiene.

To these departments, there must be added, among the bodies directly dependent upon the Minister's Cabinet, the University Service for Relations with Foreign Countries and Overseas France, which is in charge of education outside the borders and in the French Union; the National Service Center for Students, which manages the numerous social institutions created since the war for students in the universities and professional and technical schools (student hostels, restaurants, and so forth), and, finally, the National Center of Pedagogical Documentation, which exercises the triple function of information center, pedagogical research center, and distribution center for educational material used in the schools, such as books, records, films, and scientific collections.[3]

The operation of this collection of departments and services is inspired by various advisory bodies where the opinion of school personnel is freely expressed. The most important is the Higher Council of National Education, a widely representative academic group whose advice the Minister requests whenever he deems it useful, especially in regard to bills and decrees which he has prepared.

This assembly, the interdepartmental commissions, and the numerous groups of specialists, assisted by the undeniable *esprit de corps* uniting all ranks of the state school system, give great cohesiveness to the public service of national education. Concern for the interest of the child has priority in the administration as well as among school personnel. And in the last analysis all are closely united in the secular ideal, that constitutional principle by which the state school, strictly neutral, must admit all the ideological families of the country, with no distinction as to doctrine or opinion.

It is in the name of this ideal, incidentally, that members of the state school system contest the right of private educational institutions to receive public aid. Defenders of the "free" (that is, independent, or private) school, on the other hand, and particularly of the "confessional" (i.e., Catholic) school, have at their disposal, in the present Assembly, a majority determined to vote subsidies for them. The old argument between the "two schools" is therefore not yet nearing its conclusion.

The Child Outside the School

In spite of certain imperfections and maladjustments to the necessities of modern times, which will be discussed further on, the institutions providing school and university life to French youth are relatively homogeneous and well co-ordinated on all levels. The same could not be said for the child when he is considered aside from his purely intellectual activities. As a student, the French youth is taken over by

* Information furnished by the Centre national de documentation pédagogique, Paris; Director, M. Louis Cros. The translation is by Theresa G. Munson.

[1] About 1,160 million dollars.—Editorial note.

[2] Each of the seventeen academies is headed by a rector, who resides in the university town of the area and has in his general charge all public education—primary, secondary, and higher—in the district.—Editorial note.

[3] For a further account of the Center, see the description at the end of the article.

a vast administrative machine; as a future worker, his "extra-scholastic" destiny is regulated by a great number of public services, all competent and attentive, but scattered among several ministries.

The rural youth who, upon leaving primary school, wants to pursue specialized studies, is dependent upon two different ministries: that of National Education, which organizes, as an extension of the public primary schools, after-school agricultural training, and that of Agriculture, whose producers' unions consider themselves capable of recruiting their own labor with the help of private organizations, often Catholic. This double jurisdiction, and the conflict in doctrine which accompanies it, have up to the present time seriously checked agricultural school development. Public opinion and political and educational circles are at the moment greatly exercised over this problem.

In the industrial and commercial field co-ordination of the school with employment is satisfactorily ensured. National vocational advisory commissions inform the Department of Technical Education of the needs of different branches of the country's industrial and commercial activities. Moreover, the union of these commissions into a higher council of vocational development is being contemplated. Liaison between the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Labor is likewise well ensured by specialized committees. Finally, there is an organic connection between the service of family allotments and the academic authorities, aid to families being dependent on school attendance from six to fourteen years of age. But the absence of labor inspection specialized in the control of working conditions for child labor still leads, in certain areas, to abuses which need to be corrected.

Centers of apprenticeship and vocational courses, established by state or municipalities, by business concerns or vocational organizations, enable children who have left the primary schools to serve their apprenticeships while receiving a complementary general training. Adults who wish to perfect themselves and to improve their vocational status can take evening courses, particularly in Paris those of the National Conservatory of Arts and Trades. This institution has also just established provincial centers for workmen and employees who, directed too soon toward the world of production, can by taking the courses planned for them improve their vocational qualifications and attain positions corresponding to their actual abilities.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM

In spite of this organization and the progress which it has made since the war, too many children enter active life without other intellectual baggage than what they have acquired in primary school between the ages of six and fourteen. Adults who have not had secondary or higher education seldom have access to the better positions in industry. Though one can point out such-and-such a philosopher who was a mailman before becoming a professor at the Sorbonne, and so-and-so, the well-known aeronautical engineer who, at the age of twenty, was still working in his father's pastry shop, these cases remain rare. Secondary and higher education, moreover, is developing only in too small a proportion the scientific and technical cadres necessary to a modern nation. Because of their concern for preserving a certain disinterested culture, these levels of education have not sufficiently adapted their organization and methods to economic and social developments.

Families and children, too, often disregard these needs. In spite of information distributed everywhere by school guidance services and the justly widespread belief that the scientific and technical fields are much less crowded than the literary or legal fields, careers in the latter are still chosen by an excessive number of young people. The infatuation with the nonspecialized "education of the second degree" produces an overabundance of more or less gifted students with no well-defined vocation heading for the overpopulated schools of law and letters while the country clamors for more average workers and qualified technicians.

Official services regularly warn the people against this serious lack of balance between supply and demand, which is dangerous for the country as well as the young people themselves. But prejudice against early specialization and technical instruction continues in France, and the structure of the present pedagogical organization, even amended, could not fully meet the needs of a country industrially inclined.

Therefore the governments which have succeeded each other since the war have considered fundamental reforms in the educational system. The latest project is to be submitted to Parliament before the legislature ends. Elaborated by important individuals belonging to various branches of the nation's activity, this project gives priority to vocational training and prolongs required schooling from fourteen to sixteen years of age. It foresees that the *baccalauréat* will no longer be indispensable for entrance to the advanced technical and professional schools and the traditional university faculties. Such a measure would make admission practices in these institutions more democratic and would permit young French people who have not attended the lycée to solicit, if they show themselves worthy, the highest public and private positions.

What fate awaits this project in the councils of the ministry and the deputies? Opinions as to the best way of renovating the state school system diverge too widely to make prediction possible.

HOUSING

A great problem in France today, which affects its youth in particular, is that of housing. Recent statistics have shown that, because of the lack of new buildings near developing industrial centers, one-third of the young workers have to live away from their families in solitary, uncomfortable rooms. Twenty per cent of them, for reasons already indicated, have been obliged to take employment other than that for which they had prepared in school; 8 per cent are unemployed and will remain so unless they consent to a cruel separation from their homes and families.

JUSTICE

Certain stirring news items from no less startling films have given cause to believe that there has been a growth of juvenile delinquency during the year 1954. Fortunately, however, actual figures give no foundation for this fear.

Great progress has been made in France by way of confirming the preventive and re-educational role of the law for children. A special tribunal functions in each judiciary district. Under the responsibility of a Department of Supervised Education in the Ministry of Justice, minors are placed in one of a dozen state institutions charged with their betterment or in similar private institutions. The coercive and rigorous methods of former times have entirely given way to educational and treatment methods with excellent results.

Preventive action is less effective, as in most countries. Official bodies safeguard the moral quality of publications destined for the young, and give advice

to the national commission for film control. These precautions, however, do not prevent the distribution of a very large number of films and newspapers of dubious moral value. At the request of parents' associations in the lycées, various campaigns have been launched to strengthen the control of publications and the criteria already in force prohibiting certain films to children under sixteen. It has likewise been recommended that lectures be given in the upper classes to permit students of the lycée who are at least seventeen or eighteen years old to attack sexual problems in a healthy way. In France as in other countries, however, these efforts are opposed by certain groups.

THE ARMY

From the age of twenty, and until the age of twenty-seven if a postponement has been granted for the completion of his studies, every Frenchman in good physical condition must spend eighteen months in the service. Efforts have been made by the military administration to utilize the skills of recruits in the best possible way. Within the means at its disposal, the army is at present opening psychological centers to determine, on induction, the aptitudes of the young men in the contingent and to give them corresponding assignments. Nevertheless, for each radio engineer sent into the signal corps there are many agrégés who become drivers and many mechanics who become office workers. Inversely, for each army driver who has become a truck driver in civilian life, there can be found a good number of cooks doing clerical work when they discard their uniforms. This poor utilization of resources is a waste not only for the army but also for the recruits themselves. As a general rule the qualifications obtained in the service do not continue to be used in civilian life. Many young men who served in the navy or air force succeed, it is true, in finding a place for themselves in the merchant marine or in civilian aviation after a period of adaptation. For the majority in the infantry, however, the eighteen months of military service still too often represent a kind of long enforced vacation. The government has recently expressed its intention of undertaking extensive reform of the present system, so that the term of military service may better serve the development of youth and the needs of the country.

THE SUPERIOR YOUTH COMMITTEE

In order to make the necessary coordination, to synchronize the efforts of the various ministries, and to arrange the activities of those under thirty in their and the country's best interest the Mendès-France government set up during the few months it was in power a "State Secretariat in Charge of Youth." Even though it was short-lived and commanded no budget, this State Secretariat did a valuable job. Under its leadership, commissions in each ministerial department studied the questions which interest the younger generation. Measures were recommended: educational reform; centralization of the councils of school and vocational guidance; development of the re-education of juvenile delinquents; elaboration of a child labor code; particular effort in the matter of housing; arrangements for military service; and so on. Last May, M. Edgar Faure, the successor of M. Mendès-France as President of the Council, announced the creation of a "superior youth committee" made up of representatives of the administration, of various educational institutions, and of youth groups and charged with coordinating governmental action in all "extra-scholastic fields"—housing, the army, labor, juvenile delinquency, and so forth—where the situation of young people is particularly disturbing.

A PERIOD OF TRANSFORMATION

To summarize, the fate of young people in France today depends on the one hand upon an educational system which is highly structured and sometimes progressive, and on the other upon a multitude of services which are without organic interconnection or whose recommendations are disregarded on the executive level.

There will be proposed to Parliament before summer a reform of education to adapt the state school system to current economic and social changes; and we may hope that the Superior Youth Committee, for its part, will soon present to the government a coherent program of measures designed to achieve in the interest of young people the coordination which is now lacking.

It is therefore indisputable that on these various levels France is entering a period of reform and rejuvenation. The general effects will of course not make themselves felt for a long time: the adaptation will be the slower, the more restrained, even, because the country intends to conserve in its new structure the spirit of the time-honored institutions. But the enterprise of some and the energy of all continue, as in the past, to mitigate structural defects and anticipate tardy reforms.

Le Centre national de documentation pédagogique, Paris, directed by Mr. Louis Cros, is a state institution which is part of the Central Administration of the Ministry of National Education. It contains the Pedagogical Museum, the Central Library of Public Education, the Central Repositories of Recordings and Films for Public Education, the services of study and pedagogical research, the audio-visual instruction services, the publication service of the Ministry of National Education, the International School Correspondence, and the Bureau of School Co-operatives.

The work of the Center has three aspects: (1) informational—to assemble and make available documentary material on education in France and abroad—organization, administration, methods, and results—and also documentary and illustrative material useful for teaching; (2) distributive—to supply the public schools with needed educational material such as books, artistic and scientific collections, films, and records; and (3) developmental—to test and appraise the effectiveness of instructional methods and materials, and in every possible way to encourage pedagogical improvement and utilization of the best educational techniques available.

Education and Other Governmental Agencies in the Netherlands

By F. Th. van der Maden

EDUCATION in the Netherlands cannot be understood without knowledge of its background—political, social, cultural, economic—and of the tasks that lie ahead. Some of the elements in the picture are as follows: (1) the loss of the colonies, immense war damage, and a catastrophic flood; (2) the unique demographic position of the Netherlands in Western Europe, with the highest national birth rate and the lowest death rate; (3) the high-speed industrialization necessary to create employment, especially in the agrarian districts which have a shortage of land and the largest population growth; (4) the need of stimulating emigration as a partial solution to the employment problem; (5) the general aim of giving youth a better education for life in a democratic society and in a fast-developing technological world, by promoting family life, school life, education outside school, and improved conditions of labor and leisure.

Educational Policy

In the "Republic of the Seven Provinces" (1581–1795), a federalized commonwealth, education was the task exclusively of the local municipal and religious authorities, and Calvinism was its base. The more centralized Kingdom of the Netherlands, which arose as a new state after the Napoleonic wars, favored national public education. The political struggle over these conflicting policies lasted till 1917, when the "pacification principle" was introduced into the national constitution. The educational issue was for more than half a century a basic principle in party and cabinet formation. The left wing in Parliament claimed a monopolistic position for public (state and municipal) education, but permitted others the right to establish schools on religious principles; the right wing (Calvinists and Roman Catholics) claimed not only the right to establish private schools but also complete government support of them.

In 1917 government and Parliament agreed on a constitutional paragraph in which freedom of education is guaranteed, with total financial aid for both public and private primary education. The government has the obligation of securing adequate public primary education in each municipality. Private organizations when claiming a private primary school for a sufficient number of pupils—this number depending on the total population of the municipality —have a right to establish such a school. The state is to pay the total salaries and pensions of all teachers and other staff members according to nation-wide salary and pension scales, the municipalities being responsible for the total cost of building and other materials.

This arrangement, which is the basis of education in the Netherlands, guarantees education by means of a national policy, yet at the same time offers possibilities of freedom, of decentralization, and of self-government.

This is also the guiding principle in other work for the benefit of Netherland youth. It is in actual fact an adaptation of the general principles of subsidization, functional decentralization, and sovereignty in each peculiar sphere, according to which the responsibility for the executive work must be taken where possible by the authority

most closely connected with the interest in question. In this way the various government agencies are entrusted with a task which is more leading and co-ordinating than executive. Only in the case of a lack of private initiative have the government agencies an executive task.

This social philosophy has been shown to be necessary in obtaining essential co-operation, because of the deep cleavage in the Netherlands population caused by different ways of life. There is however an awareness of the danger for community life of too far-reaching a cleavage in social and cultural activities along lines of religious ideology.

Alongside unanimity with regard to the principle, there have arisen differences of opinion with regard to its practical application.[1]

Network of School Agencies

In the Netherlands the further elaboration of these principles has led to state laws in which school organization, programs, financing, and supervision are laid down.

The Ministry of Education, Arts, and Sciences is the national organization which has been given the responsibility of applying the legal decisions, thereby acquiring a strong co-ordinating position. As the Minister is responsible to Parliament, he has continual opportunities to consult it, especially in the thorough yearly discussion of the budget. The National Education Council is the highest permanent advisory organ; the members, being experts, play their part in forming the Education Acts. A large body of school inspectors attached to the Minister and controlling the application of legal rulings has intensive contact with the schools and is in a position to advise both Minister and school.

The majority of pupils attend government-financed private schools. State schools are the exception in the Netherlands, most of them belonging to secondary and higher education. All public elementary schools are organized by the municipality. The municipalities, in addition to this organization of their public schools, have legal and financial responsibilities to the private schools, and they usually possess a special administrative education department. The larger towns have their own experts, inspectors, and advisers.

Recent School Problems

Following the crystallization of the pacification principle for education in the national constitution and the guarantee of freedom and financial support given to private schools, public interest in education lapsed for a few decades. A renewed interest followed World War II.

Some of the main problems and criticisms were: (1) growing shortage of teachers as result of lessening supply and a greater demand for them, coupled with rapid population growth and a general desire for more education; (2) a resulting shortage of buildings; (3) stagnation of the educational system and insufficient adaptation to the changing needs of society—its greater complexity, and the necessity of a swift industrialization process; (4) insufficient attention to individual differences between children as a result of differences in home life and in natural ability and the difficulties of adequate differentiation of educational offerings under the legally required uniformity of school programs and examinations; (5) insufficient freedom for the centrally controlled public schools; (6) insufficient

[1] Recent discussions of the draft of a law on social work were concerned particularly with delegation questions. Preparation for emigration is also delegated for the most part to private associations. See "The Organization of Emigration from The Netherlands," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (April 1955), p. 413.

co-operation with parents; (7) insufficient integration into general national policy.

During recent years, there has been much discussion of these problems with considerable governmental activity. Investigations have been carried on by state, private, provincial, and local authorities. A number of Education Acts are in process of development, and some steps have been taken concerning such matters as a national plan for teacher education; temporary deferment of military service for teachers; reserving more land, money, and manpower for school buildings; more differentiated educational opportunities for industrial workers; more scholarships; greater freedom of management for public schools; stimulating parent-teacher co-operation; further co-operation among the universities; relating education more closely to developing economic and social needs; expanded further education; more extended co-operation between the Ministers of Education and of Social and Economic Affairs.

GOVERNMENT AND YOUTH WORK

Intensive governmental interest in youth work as an important educational agency dates only from recent years. Before World War II no direct contacts existed between the state and youth work. The more active role of the Ministry of Education led in 1945 to the formation within it of a well-equipped "Department for Education Outside School." Close contact and co-operation was formed with "The Netherlands' Youth Community," a private over-all organization in which the numerous confessional organizations, as well as youth organizations of a nonsectarian character, have united for joint activities. This co-operation led among other things to considerable state subsidies for youth work, the amounts being divided along lines set up by common consent. For all this financial, material, and moral aid given by the state to youth work, it retains a complete freedom.

Special attention is paid to the work of the associations active on behalf of unorganized youth (clubhouses, and so forth). This work is being supervised by an Interdepartmental Committee for Youth Aid in which several ministries and other state agencies are represented. Extension of this work for unorganized youth, those most vulnerable to the dangers of nihilism and criminality, has been facilitated by state grants, special grants being given for scientific research into "unorganized youth."

With one exception the work for unorganized youth is done by private associations. A number of state-owned camps and boardinghouses used during the crisis years of the thirties for social-cultural work among the thousands of young unemployed are at present used as reception centers for youths who appear, from police and school reports and other indications, to be heading toward crime. The stay is voluntary and lasts three to twelve months. The work is carried on in close co-operation with private organizations and it is intended ultimately to place this form of youth work entirely in their hands.

Most provincial authorities take an active interest in youth work outside school. This work is stimulated in various ways by semiprovincial "organizations." Youth work is also supported by the municipal authorities in many towns and villages, for example, by financial aid and by putting buildings and grounds at their disposal. In Amsterdam and The Hague well-equipped local Youth Action Committees have been set up with financial aid and office facilities from the municipalities.

EDUCATION, LAND USE, AND CITY PLANNING

A serious shortage of land for the farming population and a rapidly growing population demanding expansion of town and village, of industrial sites, and of grounds for recreational and educational purposes have led to the establishment of a "State Service for Town and Country Planning." This permanent body for research and advice, at the highest level, on national land use is assisted by a permanent commission on which the different ministries and other state agencies interested in land use are represented. Special attention is paid to the possibilities of preserving existing recreation areas and creating new ones.

Provinces have their own "Provincial Planning Services," while the large towns also have well-equipped institutes at their disposal for city planning. These local planning institutes, which have excellent information services, are able to pay special attention to educational aspects in their town planning. A well-known example is the Dudok plan, a most harmonious long-term development plan for The Hague.

As the Municipal Councils are in a position to give effective leadership in town development, the possibility of a satisfactory educational development through good co-ordination of the municipal services arises. There is the impression that this is generally successful as far as supplying school buildings is concerned, but that sufficient attention is not always paid to the needs of youth work, adult education, sports, and other necessary outside school activities. Local authorities must provide for school buildings but not for the needs of education outside the school.

EDUCATION AND HOUSING

A growing awareness of the role of housing in education has made the Netherlands conscious of serious shortcomings in this respect. Although slum districts are not as numerous as in many other countries, in a great number of cases dwellings must be termed insufficient. Too little space, light, and fresh air, inadequate plumbing, overcrowding and the necessary sharing of houses, are sources of spiritual and physical damage. The situation grew considerably worse during and after World War II. Thousands of houses were wrecked by acts of war; others were demolished by German occupants.

The immensity of the housing need led immediately after the liberation (1945) to the setting up of a Ministry of Reconstruction and Building, equipped with wide powers to combat the difficulties. Shortages of manpower and materials, however, caused serious delays, and even now necessitate reconstruction and new buildings in strict adherence to a balanced building plan which fixes the volume of building permitted to each type—housing, industry, education, churches, and so forth. The details of the building plan, which is determined each year, are worked out by the ministries concerned with building activities.

Because of the general shortage of houses and other buildings the granting of priorities causes great difficulty. A housing shortage is expected until 1965. Each year the extent of the total building plan and the share accorded the various types of building give rise to widespread public discussion. The criticisms are increasingly directed toward the volume, the equipment, and the finishing of the houses. In view of the serious need, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Building has laid down strict rules for the building industry, whereby building is to be largely concentrated on small, unpretentious dwellings intended to bring help as quickly as possible to those in need of homes.

Control of housing standards, building and upkeep, is in the hands of the municipal authorities, who may condemn dwellings as uninhabitable when they do not conform to minimum standards.

Scientific research in the housing field

deserves special attention. The Ministry of Reconstruction and Building recently published reports containing people's appraisals of different kinds of dwellings. The Building Center (private), the Netherlands Household Council, and other organizations are working together in the same field, endeavoring to fit floor plans and equipment of houses to the needs of modern family life. Educational aspects of housing should thus be given more attention than in the past.

EDUCATION AND RECREATION

We have already indicated the serious shortages of open-air recreation space in the Netherlands. The social scientists and social workers have for years been stressing the important educational role of good recreation. Provisions for recreation become more urgent in the Netherlands as forced industrialization shifts people into a sociocultural climate which might prove unconducive to the development of a sound leisure pattern. Therefore in the new schools planned for young male and female workers special attention is paid to leisure and recreational possibilities.

It is somewhat surprising that in spite of the importance of problems of leisure and recreation no general line of governmental policy could be traced. The fear continually recurring in the Netherlands of government intervention in matters where the hierarchy of values is immediately at stake has prevented foundation of recreational research centers. Meanwhile need for a central advisory body and for a more positive governmental policy becomes increasingly obvious. Recent discussions concerning the expected general five-day working week have stressed the urgency of the situation.

Governmental services do not of course altogether ignore recreation and leisure. The Ministry of Education pays active attention to camping, hiking, community singing, folk music and dancing, sports, and so forth. Considerable state subsidies have been afforded in recent years to these and other activities. Since World War II the fields of radio, television, films, and the press have also been given attention by the Ministry of Education.

During the last few years, much thought has been given to vacations as recreation periods, stimulated by the fact that they are now generally longer and that greater prosperity offers more opportunity to use them. Because of the limited availability of vacation facilities, spreading of summer vacations has been attempted, by agreement among governmental agencies, railways, hotels, schools, industry, and so forth.

The activities of the municipalities in the field of recreation are varied. Besides financial aid to private organizations, technical and material help is generally offered by making buildings and grounds available. Many municipalities are active in organizing vacation activities for youth and adults. Some provinces and municipalities have created, in close collaboration with private initiative, "Culturele raden" (cultural councils) or "Gemeenschappen" (communities) for their areas.

EDUCATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH

Close co-operation has developed in the Netherlands between education and public health services. The Ministry of Education, which pays strict regard to hygienic standards, must approve all school buildings. All teachers of primary education must have a periodic examination for tuberculosis.[2]

The vast majority of pupils of private and public primary schools are under regular medical control. The doctors are for the most part officers of the Municipal Health Service, with whom a good relationship exists. According to the advice given, children are directed to specialists, or they may be sent to sanatoria, open-air schools, and other health institutions. Weak city children in large numbers are sent to agrarian areas for a period of a few months. School dental organizations are fully developed, though complete service is regrettably hampered by the shortage of dentists.

Special care is given to mentally and physically handicapped children. A large network of special schools—also along religious lines—has been developed. The decision to place a child in a school for handicapped children is agreed upon by the parents and the medical and pedagogical specialists.

The relationship between the educational institutes for children, such as orphanages, and the public health service is extensive and varied. Here special attention is paid to mental health as well as to physical well-being. Based on scientific research in this field a great attempt is nowadays made at family (or pseudofamily) education.

It is impossible to give a complete survey of all the health work done for youth in the Netherlands, but the highly important work in mental health done by the Child Guidance Clinics and Pedological Institutes should be mentioned. Organizations for scientific research are the National Federation for Mental Health and the Institute for Preventive Medicine.[3]

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Some aspects of the relationships between education and social welfare have already been discussed. A few of the many others will be noted briefly.

Vocational guidance services

These services are occupying an increasingly important position. The work is being carried out to an important degree by state-subsidized, private institutes with a religious background, in the belief that an individual's religious alignment is of such importance that it must also play a part in the choice of further education and of a career. The private institutes which are responsible for about two-thirds of the advice given are affiliated with a National Institute which supplies the necessary documentation. State guidance services come under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health; there are also a few municipal services.

The visiting teacher

In recent years a number of visiting teachers have been appointed by municipal education authorities to work on difficulties arising from social causes.

Children of migratory workers

Arrangements have been made for the education of children of bargemen and caravan families and other children always on the move, through special schools in harbors and other strategic areas, with uniform programs, individual teaching, and a record book for each child which follows him from school to school.[4]

Re-education of problem families

Re-education of antisocial families, usually mentally subnormal, became a spectacular form of social welfare work during wartime, when large-scale evacuation from the western cities was necessary. Special camps proved to be the

[2] The Amsterdam municipal university requires of all students a yearly TB examination.

[3] A pamphlet by Dr. A. Querido, *Mental Health in the Netherlands* (The Hague: Government Information Service, 1954), gives a brief, clear summary of its field.

[4] Elisabeth B. Schlesinger, "Education on Dutch Canals," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1950).

only solution, as the families were unwelcome in decent homes. The good results of these camps led to their being continued after the cessation of hostilities. A team of social workers, homemakers, youth leaders, psychiatrists, and sociologists are working on a plan for readaptation of these problem families to community life. The work is financed and directed by the Ministry of Social Work.

In recent years some of the large municipalities have begun the re-education of problem families in their own areas. Special housing projects have been set up for this purpose, where social workers and group workers are carrying out a program of comprehensive re-education. One project is in an overcrowded area of Rotterdam. Amsterdam and The Hague began projects before World War II, The Hague making use of "control dwellings" where families start life afresh under fairly strict supervision.

EDUCATION AND DELINQUENCY

The growth of delinquency as a symptom of individual and social tension and maladjustment has attracted much attention in recent years. Delinquency is increasingly assuming the character of big-town criminality. The occupation of 1940–45, when moral and economic pressures caused a lowering of moral standards, is partly to blame. But we are beginning gradually to realize that this tendency has a deeper basis and demands special treatment, not only penal measures, but more preventive, pedagogical, and cultural activities.

Of the various governmental authorities that have a share in the struggle against juvenile crime, we shall mention a few.

Justice

Under the Child Laws of 1901 a somewhat pedagogical basis for judicial activities has been developed. Youth Judges are appointed to deal with youthful crimes. One of the "Family Tutors" is assigned to the family of the offender at the family's request or by judge's orders, and educational measures in the family are taken in conjunction with his advice. At his request the Youth Judge may take such radical measures as removal of the young person from the family circle for pedagogical and psychological examination and treatment. The Family Tutors are unpaid and work on a voluntary basis.

Houses of correction, prisons, and other institutions for youthful criminals have been thoroughly revamped over the years. There is a progressive Youth Prison in Zutphen, where young criminals are given a considerable amount of freedom, with the possibility of uncontrolled outside activities, and other far-reaching pedagogical measures.

Police

This institution also has modernized and humanized its fight against criminality among the young, with the accent on preventive work. The large towns have their own Youth Police, a force with high standards to meet various educational tasks.

Other agencies

We have already described the work of the Ministry of Education for pre-criminal youth in camps and boardinghouses. Some municipal authorities have also entered this field, by subsidizing analogous work of private organizations, by nominating officers for youth work, and by creating school gardens and other local spare-time activities. We have already indicated the consideration given in and around the large towns to making vacation periods as advantageous as possible.

People are growing more and more conscious of the close connection between crime and unhappy surroundings

and of the fact that some of the proposed countermeasures are superficial and inadequate for any real attack on juvenile delinquency. More and more notice is being taken of the backgrounds which seem to produce young criminals. We have already mentioned work with the problem family. Slum clearance and other measures for improvement in housing are also attracting attention. The stimulation of education, in and outside the school (more and better education and training), youth movements and clubhouses, and improvement of human relations in industrial and other occupations are also gaining interest with a view to combating crime. With no attempt to make an all-inclusive listing, we still must mention the activities of the State Labor Inspection and of various governmental housing and health services. The present longer term of military service also offers educational opportunities: psychological tests and psychological services are good points of contact.

RÉSUMÉ

It has naturally been impossible in the foregoing paragraphs to give a complete picture of the educational situation in the Netherlands and the coordination of the various governmental agencies in meeting the needs of children and youth. Only a rough sketch could be presented, to suggest important activities and their mutual relationships. We hope, however, that these outlines show clearly.

Educational activities in the Netherlands were largely brought into existence by private initiative. Government agencies are expected (1) to give leadership in the educational policy; (2) to carry out educational activities where private initiative is impossible or remains fragmentary; and (3) to give financial and other material support to the educational activities of private organizations.

Following a short period of rigidity between the world wars, a dynamic educational activity came into being, wherein the state and other governmental agencies play an important role. The submission of long-term plans, the Education Acts under consideration, and the many state commissions testify to educational vitality.

With the manner in which activities on behalf of young people are at present spread over various ministries, we cannot claim a completely successful coordination and integration. It is clear, however, that generally speaking we are on the right road and moving in the right direction.

F. Th. van der Maden, The Hague, the Netherlands, is head of the Sociocultural Sector of the Central Planning Bureau and secretary of the State Commission for the Investigation of the Possibilities of Youth Development. He has served as deputy head of the Division for Cultural Statistics of the Central Bureau of Statistics and investigator of the International Institute of Statistics and has published on educational and social topics.

Education and Related Services in Sweden*

By Åke W. Edfeldt

LEGISLATIVE measures for public aid and protection of children are of rather recent origin in Sweden. Up to the beginning of this century, children were treated in the same manner as adults in need of help, and poor law relief was the only public aid available. The first legislation for child welfare was passed in 1902; it provided for the care of foster children and the education and upbringing of delinquent and morally neglected children. Then came the so-called Children's Laws of 1917, with provisions for children born out of wedlock, adoption, and so forth.

For the most part, public care of children remained under the Public Assistance Administration up to 1926, when the Child Welfare Act of 1924 came into force. By this act, the responsibility for the care and protection of children was separated from public assistance and lodged with a new local authority, created by the act and known as the Child Welfare Committee. The Act of 1924 has been subsequently revised and extended, particularly by amendments in 1934 dealing with young persons between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, and in 1945 and 1946 in respect to child welfare institutions, foster care, and child and youth welfare schools. A Child Welfare Commission, appointed in 1950 by the government, is now reviewing the Child Welfare Act as well as public child welfare legislation.

Local Child Welfare Committees

The statutory members of the local Child Welfare Committee include a member of the local Public Assistance Committee, a clergyman, a man or woman teacher, at least two other persons known to be actively interested in the welfare of children, and, frequently, a medical officer. At least one of the members is to be a woman. The committee is empowered to delegate authority to voluntary or professional welfare officers.

The committee is charged with responsibility for promoting the welfare of children and young persons and to that end takes such measures as may seem desirable in the interest of children and young people, including the establishment of adequate child welfare facilities. It has the duty of providing for needy, sick, and unprotected children, who are given what is called "public care." The committee also deals with maltreated and neglected children, those exposed to dangers to life or health, vicious children or children in danger of becoming vicious, and juveniles leading a disorderly, idle, or immoral life or showing other signs of vice. This second group of children and young persons may be taken care of by "protective upbringing," if preventive measures are considered useless or have proved to be so.

Any private citizen or public authority may request the intervention of the Child Welfare Committee. Certain categories of public servants, such as medical officers and district nurses, are required to report to the committee any case which in their opinion requires its intervention.

The Child Welfare Committee is also charged with a number of other duties such as administering the general children's allowance scheme, supervision of children born out of wedlock, the approval and payment of maintenance advances, the administration of maternity assistance, and the recreational schemes for children and housewives.

* Many parts of this article are taken from papers prepared and published by The Swedish Institute, Stockholm, Sweden.

Arrangements for Young Children

The state-subsidized services which, under the supervision of the Child Welfare Committee, provide for the part-time care of preschool and older children operate along three lines: kindergartens, day nurseries, and afternoon homes.

Kindergartens

The kindergartens are intended for children between three and seven years of age; these children are taken care of a few hours a day and get an opportunity to take part in various social and educational activities under the guidance of trained personnel. Kindergartens must be located in hygienic premises, be sufficiently roomy to permit ample freedom of movement, and be suitably equipped with play material. Great attention is paid to the social development of the child. In communes where they have been established by local authorities, with low fees, the demand from all sections of society exceeds the accommodations.

Day nurseries

The day nurseries, which are increasing in numbers, provide all-day care for the children of working mothers. They receive children mainly between the ages and two and seven years. A small number of day nurseries also have departments for children between six months and two years of age. The children are usually left at the nurseries for eight to ten hours a day. In rural areas, day nurseries for farm children have been established to relieve parents engaged in seasonal farmwork. The service is still in the trial stage, and the nurseries are open only for brief periods in summer and autumn.

Afternoon homes

Afternoon homes receive school children of employed mothers after school hours and give them an opportunity for play and homework. The children are usually served one hot meal while there.

"Family day homes"

Owing to the shortage of day nurseries, a substitute service of "family day homes" has been tried in Stockholm and some other towns. These are private homes, providing part-time care for one or two children, subject to the same supervision by the local Child Welfare Committee as regular foster homes. Parents pay the same fee that they would in the regular day nurseries.

Special government committee

A special government committee has recently been studying a scheme for extended state support of these services. Its inquiries embrace the psychological, pedagogical, medical, social, and labor-market aspects of the services. Consideration is being given to the possibility of incorporating the kindergartens into the elementary school system.

General Children's Allowances

Since 1948, general children's allowances payable at the rate of 260 kronor per year have been granted all children under sixteen years of age (since 1952 the allowance has been increased to 290 kronor), regardless of the economic status of their parents or legal providers.

The children's allowance scheme succeeds the former deductions granted for children in the state income tax, and since 1952 also those in the communal income tax. Owing to the system of progressive taxation in force, the value

of these deductions varied considerably. Therefore it was felt that a scheme employing a uniform cash benefit would be more equitable, since the low-income families, which constitute the majority of the taxpayers, failed to profit from these deductions. The present rate of children's allowances far exceeds the average value of the former deductions, but above a certain income it becomes less than the tax deductions previously granted.

SCHOOL LUNCHES

School meals were known in Sweden as early as 1845, but not until the end of the century did they take on a wider scope. They were as a rule provided on the private initiative of such bodies as the Red Cross and housewives' organizations, or by local authorities. Beginning with the fiscal year 1937–38 state subsidies have been granted for this service, which now is administered by the local school authorities.

In the beginning, the meals served in school possessed the character of charity or public relief, but in many school districts, particularly in the northern sections of the country, the long distances to school created a common need for them. Another reason for public interest in this matter is the opportunity they present to counteract undesirable dietary habits, whether due to poor economic circumstances or simply to ignorance. A properly balanced school meal a day represents a substantial improvement in the diet of many children.

Since July 1, 1946, children in the schools are entitled to free, state-subsidized school lunches if so desired by their parents. However, owing to the lack of technical facilities prevailing at present, the local school authorities may reserve the available meals to children who live far from school, to ill and delicate children, or to children in poor circumstances.

SCHOOL MEDICAL SERVICE [1]

The management of school health work is in the hands of the State Board of Education; or, more specifically, it is under the direction of the Chief Medical Officer for Schools employed by this authority. It is to be noted that he is thus not in the employ of the highest medical authority, the Medical Board (*medicinalstyrelsen*), but on important questions he consults with this board.

Duties of the Chief Medical Officer for Schools

Among the duties of the Chief Medical Officer for Schools are the following:

To arrange, guide, and superintend the work of school hygiene in the schools.

To promote the development of school hygiene work among youth, and in doing so to further the holding of medical examinations of young people in the schools, in order to discover pupils in need of medical care or other measures related to school hygiene.

To secure the establishment of open-air schools, and classes or schools for pupils with weak sight or hearing.

To further measures concerning the education and teaching of pupils who diverge from the normal mentally.

To act as adviser concerning the teaching of gymnastics, the arrangements for school baths, school children's meals, and school holiday camps, and to further the development of dental attention in schools.

To advise the Board of Education on plans for new school buildings, or major rebuilding or additions.

Health cards

In every school where there is a school health service run or supported by the state, a health card, established by the Board of Education, is kept for every child. The health card is "valid" throughout the country. Begun when the child starts going to school at about seven it accompanies him from school to school and from one type of school to another, until school attendance ceases.

[1] This section of the article is taken from a paper prepared by Gösta Lindquist, Secretary, State Board of Education.

The school doctor and the school nurse

In the medical work of the schools close contact is maintained with the parents and guardians. This contact is established in different ways: (1) Parents are called to the school, when needed, for a conference with the school nurse or school doctor; (2) the school nurses visit the homes of pupils when such contact is considered desirable; and (3) at parents' association meetings information is given on matters of school health. The visits of the school nurse are made for the purpose of securing information needed by the school (such as the nature of a pupil's illness) and of giving advice on health matters, not with the intention of giving medical care.

An important principle in the operation of the school hygiene work is that teachers as well as medical personnel should participate in it.

In all the schools in the country at certain intervals so-called "general form examinations" must be made, that is, examinations which include all the pupils in a class. Such examinations are made at the beginning of the school year, about once every second year during the time the child spends at school, and in any case in the first class and the graduating class in both elementary and higher schools. In certain school districts with large schools, the general form examinations are held once a year. In all schools each child is examined by a dentist once a year.

Furthermore, there has been introduced into Swedish schools the provision that preliminary medical advice on choice of occupation shall be given by the schools.

Of course, the school doctors and school nurses visit the schools for other purposes than the general form examinations. During the rest of the school year they examine the so-called "control-children," that is, children who are ill, weak, or unusually subject to illness, and also children who are sent for an examination by doctor, nurse, parents, or guardians.

Mentally retarded children are gathered into special classes; abnormal pupils are sent to special institutions.

The school doctors are also called upon when school children for one reason or another want to obtain work during their leisure time. The law states that juveniles (that is, children under eighteen) may not be employed before they are fourteen. Except for work during the vacation period, the child must have completed the program for the elementary school. Exceptions may, in certain circumstances, be made, but only for light work which cannot be thought to have ill effects on his health or bodily development or on his schoolwork. The juvenile attending school must have the school's permission to take on work, and the school medical officer must give his opinion. All young people under eighteen in Sweden who take on jobs must have a juvenile work book, in which the school medical officer makes his remarks on the child's health and the employer notes the juvenile's work, hours, breaks, and so forth.

Dental work

The dental hygiene which every child enjoys as long as it goes to school may also be considered as a part of the general health program. It consists of a thorough examination each term, followed by the treatment which the den-

tist considers necessary. This treatment includes not only ordinary repairs but even such things as straightening the teeth.

HOLIDAY ARRANGEMENTS

During recent years the Swedish authorities have, through different measures, tried to give almost every child the chance to have a summer holiday. This was deemed especially desirable during the war.

First, a state subsidy was given for study and holiday travel for elementary school children from city families of small means. In the summer of 1940, when an evacuation of the larger communities was discussed, a public grant was made for the evacuation of children. From 1940 to 1946 considerable experimentation was carried on regarding the holiday program, and regulations as to the length of stay, the organization of camps, free travel of mothers who accompanied their children, and so forth, were developed.

In the winter of 1945–46 it was thought that this project had been tried out long enough to become a permanent institution. The committee of 1941 on population policies proposed in 1945 extensive measures by the state for the purpose of providing housewives and children with rest and recreation. The proposal was passed, with small alterations, by the Parliament, and since June 1946 the activity has been regulated through three royal proclamations. Certain alterations were made by Parliament in the period 1949–54.

The state now subsidizes: (1) travel for children and accompanying persons to a privately arranged holiday spot and for children, staff, and accompanying persons to summer camps; (2) travel for housewives to a privately arranged holiday spot, and for guests and staff to holiday centers for housewives approved by the Royal Social Welfare Board; (3) grants to housewives to facilitate their holiday arrangements; (4) operating grants to summer camps for children and to holiday centers for housewives and grants to special organizations who place children with private country families.

Holiday travel grants

Children are entitled to holiday travel grants who during the year when the travel is undertaken are at most fourteen years of age. There is no stipulation as to minimum age. The Child Welfare Committees who are responsible for the local administration of the activity, however, are requested to warn the parents of the risk of infection which railway travel involves for a very young child and of the fact that a change in the environment may prove harmful.

A person who accompanies a child younger than eleven years is also entitled to holiday travel. When there are special reasons, for example, if the child is mentally retarded or delicate or if the travel is especially complicated with many changes of trains, an accompanying person may get a holiday travel grant even if the child is older than ten years. The accompanying person may get two travel authorizations, in order to take the child to the vacation place and then to return to get him, or only one if he is to remain with the child at the holiday place. Only one travel grant is made to a child or housewife in a year.

As these travel grants also aim at giving housewives an opportunity to get recreation, the mother should, as a rule, accompany her child. If because of illness, employment, or other reasons, the mother cannot go, another person may take her place.

Since the purpose of the travel scheme is to give children and housewives a strengthening and stimulating stay in a new and healthy environment, the absence from home should not be too short. A minimum absence from home of four weeks for children and of ten days for housewives is stipulated, and exceptions are admitted only for very strong reasons. Absence shorter than fourteen days for children and seven days for housewives is never permitted.

As a rule the travel grant may be given to any place the applicant chooses, whether city or country, including even the frontier stations for Denmark, Finland, and Norway. When the travel cost is less than five crowns, no holiday travel grant is given.

The grants apply only to the cheapest means of travel. They may be used any time during the year except certain days around the more important festivals.

Summer camps

Summer camps for children are run by communities and by voluntary organizations. There is at present accommodation for about 38,000 children at the camps each year. In most cases the child's stay in the camp is provided without cost to the parents. Each child undergoes a medical examination before leaving for camp, and every camp must have an agreement with a doctor who is responsible for hygienic conditions in the camp and for care in case of illness.

The state subsidizes the children's camp activity partly by giving free transportation (regardless of income, though it is understood that only children from families of small means should be chosen for the camps) to children and staff going to camps, partly by giving a grant, varying from twenty-five öre to one crown per child per day, towards the running cost. The camps are subjected to the same inspection as other child welfare institutions.

Families take a "summer child"

Complementary to the summer camps activity is a scheme to procure private summer homes for children whose parents cannot arrange this themselves. The activity is undertaken by communities or by voluntary organizations, some communities and organizations having on their program both summer camps and placement in private families. The child's stay generally costs the parents nothing, though the family which takes care of a "summer child" is paid by the responsible organization.

This arrangement has proved to be a very valuable one, for children often get a more individual care in private families and come into a more intimate contact with the countryside than if they stay in a camp.

The activity is subsidized by the state, partly through cheap transportation of children and accompanying persons under the conditions prevailing for holiday travel grants for a privately arranged vacation, and partly by a small contribution—from fifty öre to one crown per child per day—to the organizations that undertake this activity. About 17,000 children get summer recreation in this way each year.

The teacher's role

In addition to what has been said about the administration of these services, it should be noted that the Swedish school system is very much involved in this work. Since the teachers all over the country have fairly good contacts with the parents, they are able to tell which children need help and which do not. The administration of holiday travel grants, summer camps, and so on is the business of the elementary school teachers, the local school administration, and the State Board of Education, in co-operation with the local welfare committee. Even if there are specially

trained social workers in most of the welfare institutions, the teacher is always applied to when there is a question about a child. The school administers the "summer child" activity. The teachers select the children to go to the country and also handle the financial aspects, they arrange for travel expenses, the payment of travel grants to accompanying persons, and the payment of the "summer parents." Before "summer children" are placed in summer camps and private families, the teacher has to do inspector's work. For all these duties teachers receive compensation.

Åke W. Edfeldt, Ph.L., Stockholm, Sweden, is assistant psychologist in the Department of Education of the University of Stockholm and research assistant in the State Institute of Educational Psychology. He was earlier a teacher of special classes. He has published in the fields of reading and achievement testing.

Education and Other Governmental Services in Switzerland

By ROBERT DOTTRENS *

SWITZERLAND is a Confederation of twenty-five sovereign states, which, within the limits set by the Constitution and federal laws, freely organize the life of the people.

If the cantons—the states—have no prerogatives in certain areas, such as national defense, the postal service, telegraph, telephone, customs, and foreign relations, there are others in which they enjoy great freedom of action. This is especially the case in the field of education and child welfare.

There could be no question in this short study of describing twenty-five different systems which, in the matter of public instruction, range from the most complete centralization (Geneva) to the greatest possible decentralization, in the cantons where school authority is divided between the communes and the cantonal administration.

ROLE OF THE CONFEDERATION

This article will therefore only explain the situation as it exists in Geneva at present, and will show one of the ways in which the government of a Swiss canton has applied the laws that are valid in all of Switzerland. The Confederation, in fact, establishes the principles and leaves to the cantons the task of putting them into practice. These general principles have been established:

1. By the federal Constitution in its article 34/5 which states that, in the exercise of the powers which are conferred upon it, and within the limits of the Constitution, the Confederation takes into account the needs of the family, and that the laws enacted by virtue of this article will be executed with the help of the cantons and the collaboration of public or private legal organizations.

2. In the Swiss Civil Code (1912), whose second book establishes family law: marriage, divorce, legitimate and illegitimate descent, guardianship, and inheritance.

3. In the Swiss Penal Code (1942), sixth section, whose provisions do not apply to children who have not reached the age of six.

4. Finally, in the federal laws which complement constitutional provisions when the need is felt to take for the whole territory of the Confederation measures to ensure defense of general interests; for example, the federal law concerning the fight against tuberculosis, and the federal law on vocational training.

As far as public instruction is concerned, the work of the Confederation is decidedly restricted: it sees first of all to the enforcement of the provisions of Article 27 in the Constitution, which states that in Switzerland elementary education is required, and that, in the public schools—freedom of education is guaranteed—every child must be able to attend classes without injury to his conscience or his beliefs. The management of the schools must be under the civil authority.

There is no federal department of education in Switzerland, and the other fields of public instruction in which the Confederation acts or can act are under the jurisdiction of various departments: the federal Department of the

* Translated by Theresa G. Munson.

Interior, which controls medical and veterinary studies, public and social hygiene, family and child welfare, and so forth; the federal Department of Finance, which controls subsidies to professional schools of engineering and domestic science, vocational training, social security, and so forth; and the federal War Department, which controls gymnastic instruction, physical education, and sports. The principal characteristic of all these measures lies in the decentralization of the organs charged with their supervision, application, and improvement.

This decentralization has also made it possible to adapt the necessary actions to limited areas and to take into account their historical evolution, traditions and customs, and questions of a religious, linguistic, or social nature.

GENEVA

The canton of Geneva, because it is a small urban state, has undoubtedly been able to establish more easily than others a co-ordinated extensive system of diverse organs working together on behalf of its children. The description of this system will permit the reader to gain a sufficient idea of the vigilance and perseverance with which the rights of the child are safeguarded in the city of Calvin and Jean Jacques Rousseau.

The cantonal Department of Public Instruction has the general management of and responsibility for the measures suitable to the various activities which will be discussed in this article.

THE CHILDREN'S BUREAU

On July 2, 1937, a law was promulgated creating a Children's Bureau, with the aim of ensuring the protection of the physical and moral health of children and youth, and, in a general way, of promoting their development. This bureau, connected with the Department of Public Instruction, co-ordinates and encourages the efforts of families and of public and private institutions, and assists judicial, educational, and administrative authorities in the execution of their mandate.

The Children's Bureau includes the following: the School Medical Service, the School Observation Service, the School Social Service, the Service for Vocational and Apprenticeship Guidance, the Service for the Protection of Minors, the General Guardianship Service. These last two services, moreover, in their activity springing from the Swiss Civil Code, are subject to the guardianship authorities, just as the juvenile court is subject to judicial authority. Parents or children are obliged to appear when summoned by these various agencies. If they refuse, small penalties can be imposed upon them, and if need be, force can be used.

The School Medical Service

This service has authority in all questions concerning school hygiene and the health of school children. Its duties are entirely practical, to the exclusion of all purely scientific research. It controls the hygienic conditions of public and private school buildings. It organizes the fight against diseases which can be contracted in school; it provides for individual health examinations and recommends measures with a view to improving the health of children. It proposes measures of disease prevention and necessary disinfection, and supervises the execution of these measures. It watches over the health of teachers and organizes the medical examination of prospective teachers.

From the time of admission to school, a health record is kept for each student, and from year to year, all comments made by the medical examiners are noted: the general physical examination and examinations by specialists (nose, throat, ear, nervous system).

A school dental clinic is specifically in charge of the improvement of oral hygiene and the preventive treatment of dental caries.

The federal law for the fight against tuberculosis has already been mentioned. At the present time, the School Medical Service is engaged in the application of measures ordered by a decree of the State Council of January 11, 1952, which made a medical examination obligatory for students, teachers, and school employees. This examination is repeated every three years. It includes a lung X ray and the Mantoux test (an injection of 0.1 cc. of tuberculin).

In conjunction with the Social Service and the school inspectors, it is the Medical Service which periodically designates those children who are admitted to a "Preventorium" or to one of the two permanent high-altitude schools which the canton of Geneva has established in the Alps in Valais and Vaud. It must be added that every teacher, and with greater reason every school principal, can, at any time of emergency or doubt, request by a mere telephone call the services of a nurse or a physician.

There remains one special institution: the Sick Benefit Fund which, in collaboration with private funds, supervises the application of the law concerning the required health insurance for school children in return for a small fee paid by their parents.

The School Observation Service

This service attends to those children who, because of problems of personality, intelligence, or family environment, are hindered in their development, cannot fully profit by instruction, and are a potential source of physical and moral danger to their schoolmates.

The Observation Service studies all the cases which are entrusted to it by official agencies or by the parents themselves. The director personally examines all reported children and takes appropriate measures, which may be any of the following:

1. A change of school or class for the child. The school system of Geneva includes: (*a*) regular classes for children of normal mentality and behavior; (*b*) classes for children presenting minor adjustment problems (intelligence and personality); (*c*) special classes for the mentally retarded; (*d*) observation classes for problem children; (*e*) outdoor classes (semiboarding) for sickly or nervous children; (*f*) high-altitude outdoor classes (boarding schools).

2. Admission to one of the "observation classes." These classes are organized for either boarding or semiboarding students. The teachers and the physician connected with the institution have the task of discovering the causes of personality problems and of ensuring their treatment on the pedagogical and medical level, so that the child may be permitted to return to normal school life, or, if it is deemed necessary, of providing for his placement in a training school. In the latter case the Social Service and very often the Service for the Protection of Minors intervene.

3. Admission to the special classes. These classes of special instruction are placed under the pedagogical management of the Service Director.

4. Admission to the home for children who are deaf or hard of hearing.

An orthophonic or voice-training service is also a part of the Observation Service.

Usually, social workers handle all cases which have warranted the intervention of the service, taking action concerning the family and making contacts with the other services of the Children's Bureau and the school authorities.

Lastly, the service may be charged with maintaining contact with those young people from fifteen to eighteen years of age who have been the object of repeated interventions while they were in school, or who have been students in training schools or special classes for backward or problem children.

The School Social Service

The School Social Service intervenes on behalf of needy school children. It gives sickly children the benefit of rest homes and cures necessary to their health. It manages the school clothing service. It co-ordinates the work of public and private social agencies such as day nurseries, school kitchens, open-air schools, or vacation camps. It also makes any investigations requested of it by the various other services of the Department of Public Instruction.

This service supervises the application of the law concerning the employment of school-age children (that is, under fifteen). This law (January 14, 1942) forbids the employment in a regular job of a minor less than fifteen years of age. Except for farm labor and other cases subject to special authorization, it is unlawful to employ outside the family, in any capacity, children less than thirteen years old. Between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, children can be hired for running errands or for other light work for a maximum of two hours per school day and five hours during vacations. This work cannot be in a theater or in an unsanitary place, nor between the hours of 12:00 M. and 2:00 P.M., or after 7:00 P.M.

The employment of these children is subject to the written consent of the School Medical Service, which can be withdrawn at any time. If the authorization has been refused on grounds of health, an allocation can be awarded to needy families thus deprived of financial assistance.

Service for Vocational and Apprenticeship Guidance

This service advises public school students and their parents on the sensible choice of a trade or vocation; it aids in the placement of young workers. It supervises the application of federal and cantonal legislation on vocational training and in the matter of the protection of nonapprenticed minors. It provides, in particular, the control of the vocational instruction, theoretical and practical, of apprentices.

As far as vocational guidance is concerned, the service has adopted two primary aims.

The first is to inform students and parents of the necessity of learning a trade, and of choosing it carefully. It utilizes all suitable means to this end: talks in the schools, films, visits to factories, visual material supplied to students and teachers, and so forth. For students who do not plan to continue their studies after the age of fifteen there are organized so-called "after-schooldays classes" which between the ages of thirteen and fifteen guide the school activities of students toward practical problems—manual labor in the shop, acquaintance with trades and skills, and ethical standards of work.

The second activity in vocational guidance is the examination of individual cases which the service conducts in strict liaison and in collaboration with private agencies (the Private Apprenticeship Bureau and the Private Bureau of Vocational Guidance) or with institutions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Instruction (the Bureau of Vocational Guidance of the University Institute of Educational Sciences and the Laboratory of Experimental Pedagogy of the same institute, which has in its charge the study of questions related to educational guidance).

Service for the Protection of Minors

Subject to the jurisdiction of the other agencies of the Department of Public Instruction, the Service for the Protection of Minors maintains a general surveillance over minors and takes every measure to protect children and young people.

Its work is above all of a preventive nature. It has the task of identifying children whose parents do not fulfill their obligations. Complaints, notifications, and accusations are directed to this service; the judicial, school, and administrative authorities of the canton and the commune are required to bring to its attention the cases of any children in moral or material danger.

When preventive action fails, the service then asks the authorities to apply the protective measures provided by law (removal from custody and the termination of parental rights). In this case, the Service for the Protection of Minors studies the child's situation and sends the accumulated information to the guardianship authority, whose duty it is to advise the court.

It also carries out the investigations requested by the juvenile court and the guardianship authority, according to their instructions. It watches over those minors whom the juvenile court has released on probation. All this work is accomplished in close co-operation with the schools, the Observation Service serving as an intermediary, since it generally handles most of the cases at the beginning.

The investigators and social workers of the Protection of Minors are more and more devoting their efforts to a humane understanding of their task: the destiny of the child, his emotional problems, and the conditions of his development are their dominant concerns.

The General Guardianship Service

This service facilitates the work of the guardianship authorities in the application of the laws concerning the appointment of guardians and trustees. It assumes the guardianship of those children who have been taken away from their parents by court decision.

OFFICIAL YOUTH FOUNDATION

Along with the Children's Bureau, there is good reason for mentioning the Official Youth Foundation and the juvenile court. The Official Youth Foundation has grown out of an old protective organization called "The Forsaken Youth," from which the present Service for the Protection of Minors also developed. This foundation manages the properties and administration of two schools for orphaned boys and girls and children whose parents have been deprived of their parental authority or their right of custody.

JUVENILE COURT

The juvenile court, composed of a career judge presiding and a doctor and a teacher acting as associate judges, handles criminal cases in which adolescents of fourteen to eighteen years of age are implicated.

In regard to children of six to fourteen years of age, the Penal Code primarily prescribes educational measures, application of which is entrusted to the Service for the Protection of Minors. Adolescents from the ages of fourteen to eighteen can be sentenced to imprisonment. If it is apparent that educational measures would be preferable, the Code allows the child to be sent to a correctional school or placed in a trustworthy family. The General Guardianship Service is then put in charge of his supervision.

CO-ORDINATION OF SERVICES

The work of the different services mentioned above is co-ordinated by the Advisory Committee of the Children's Bureau, which meets periodically under the chairmanship of the chief of the Department of Public Instruction. It is composed of the chiefs of services of the Children's Bureau, the presiding judge of the orphans' court, the presiding judge of the juvenile court, the Director of Elementary Education, a representative of the municipal authorities of the City of Geneva, and two representatives of private agencies interested in child welfare. This committee studies general questions related to various youth problems and ensures coordination of the various services of the Bureau.

ADMINISTRATIVE IDEALS

As can be seen from the description of this network, the administration of child welfare is particularly well organized in Geneva. As far as is possible, all precautions have been taken to defend the right of each child to live and develop normally in a community which seeks its own development in that of each of its members; to have action taken with a maximum of speed and efficiency while respecting as fully as possible the rights of the parents, whose sense of responsibility the authorities are trying to restore and develop; and finally to reduce to a minimum duplication and conflicts of jurisdiction.

PRIVATE INITIATIVE

This article would be incomplete if nothing were said about the role and the importance of private initiative in the field of child welfare, a role and an importance so well recognized by the authorities that they do their utmost to facilitate the work of these private agencies by aiding them financially and by resorting frequently to their good offices.

It is a Swiss policy, not confined to Geneva alone, to have citizen participation in the solution of all the problems of education and child welfare. This accounts for the flourishing development, in Switzerland, of private institutions and agencies devoted to public service, both Catholic and non-Catholic, working with generosity and devotion in the most varied fields such as day nurseries and kindergartens; school canteens; vacation colonies, youth hostels, outdoor camps, ski camps; leisure-time recreation and sports; libraries for children and adolescents (in particular the Swiss Reading Society for Young People); and temperance societies.

PRO INFIRMIS AND PRO JUVENTUTE

Two great foundations must be mentioned in particular, in view of their importance and their national character, Pro Infirmis and Pro Juventute.

Pro Infirmis, as its name indicates, is concerned with physically handicapped children and adults. It assists and cares for sick children placed in establishments of re-education and treatment. The foundation is composed of ten associations, each of which takes care of a particular type of illness. Its fifteen cantonal offices work in close collaboration with similar institutions, lending each other mutual aid on behalf of the children in their care. On the educational level, the Swiss Society for Difficult Children (a section of Pro Infirmis) seeks to combat the causes of educational and personality problems which certain children present, by improving educational conditions in the institutions though training specialized teachers, by contributing to a better organization of leisure activities, or by arousing public opinion and the authorities in favor of this category of children.

Pro Juventute, founded in 1912 by the Swiss Society for Public Service, which was from 1810 the first social service organization in Switzerland, has as its aim to arouse and cultivate a feeling of responsibility in regard to youth; to develop a taste for social work in young people; and to encourage private help for youth. Its practical work is carried on in most of the areas of child and youth welfare. The financial resources which the foundation needs are derived from the annual sale of "Pro Juventute" postage stamps; the profit on these stamps, which cost a little more than the regular stamps, goes to the foundation. The importance which these stamps have gained for collectors is well known. Their sale is principally promoted by Swiss school children. The foundation has regional secretaries in all the cantons. There are two hundred secretaries at the present time: clergymen, teachers, and people from all social and economic ranks, all working without remuneration and independently for the goals of the foundation.[1]

The foundations Pro Infirmis and Pro Juventute have each a journal which gives information on the activities of the organization. These publications bear the same titles as the foundations.

[1] In the following two works can be found useful complementary information on the institutions and activities to which this article has been devoted: Emma Steiger, *Manuel du Service Social Suisse,* fourth trilingual edition (German, French, Italian) prepared on behalf of the Swiss Society for Public Service (Zurich, 1948), and H. Kleinert and others, *Lexikon der Pädagogik* (3 vols.; Berne: Verlag A. Francke, 1950–53).

Robert Dottrens, Doctor of Sociology, Geneva, Switzerland, is professor of education at the University of Geneva, codirector of the Institute of Educational Sciences (Institut J.-J. Rousseau), and director of pedagogical studies in the Department of Public Instruction. He was formerly inspector of elementary education. He is the author, among other books, of Éducation et démocratie (1946), L'Apprentissage de la lecture par la méthode globale (1930; fourth ed., 1951), L'Enseignement individualisé (1936; third ed., 1953), Nos Enfants à l'école (1954), and, with others, of Lexikon der Pädagogik (3 vols., 1950–53).

A Sociologist on School-Community Relationships

By Gordon W. Blackwell

PRACTICAL proposals for more effective co-ordination of public education services with other state and local governmental services concerned with children and youth should be based on two bodies of knowledge: (1) sociological characteristics of the local community, and (2) experiences in the community organization movement in American society. This paper will explore these two topics and point up implications for school-community relationships.

Dimensions of Community [1]

Sociological analysis of the nature of the local community reveals at least seven factors operative in the dynamics of community structure and function. These we call sociological dimensions of a community.

Population characteristics

To illustrate the nature of these different dimensions, let us take as the first example a situation with which many public school officials are confronted in southern cities. They often find among the Negro population a high illiteracy rate, a loose type of family organization, and departure from middle class mores of sex behavior. Often the husband-father is not in the home. Such a situation has implications for teachers. Many reasons are given for it, but if the matter is studied carefully, one may find that a basic reason lies in the sex ratio of the Negro population, which in southern cities as a whole is about 90, meaning only 90 males for every 100 females. In some southern cities it is as low as 80 or a little less. Of course, such behavior may be expected in a population with a sex ratio as askew as that. This, then, illustrates the first dimension of community, namely, the population characteristics. Age, racial and ethnic composition, population trends, the various vital statistics, come into this first dimension of community.

Institutional structure

Let us take another example, a community of ten thousand people. A study will reveal that there are eighty-five to a hundred organized groups and formally established agencies operating in that community. We find among those agencies and organized groups twenty which are particularly concerned with children and youth, and we may find them getting into each other's hair a bit: some bickering and jealousies, a lot of misunderstanding as to what each is doing. The need, of course, is for some type of co-ordination and planning.

Perhaps the analogy is not too far-fetched to say that a community of that size is not unlike the River Rouge plant that Ford has in Detroit. Thousands of workers are there. The plant has a particular objective, the finished Ford car. It is organized into many departments, and the proper relationship between those departments in operation is vital if the industry is to be successful.

[1] This section draws upon the author's previous article, "The Social Scientist Looks at the Health Council Movement," *Public Health Nursing*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (June 1950), pp. 316–21.

Any part of the plant that does not do its job well, or gets behind, upsets the whole schedule of production. The efficiency we have achieved in large-scale mass production has been due to careful planning and co-ordination—in a dictatorial fashion, very largely, it is true, but it has worked. In contrast, most American communities have had little or no planning or co-ordination, often no machinery for it, and the result is that each is functioning as a community at perhaps 25 to 50 per cent efficiency. If we were competing as businessmen in the meeting of human needs, many of our communities would go bankrupt. The problem we face in this aspect of community life is how we can democratically work out procedures and machinery for planning and co-ordination.

This point illustrates the second dimension of community, which sociologists call the institutional structure.

Many organized groups touch only a few of the people in a community. Studies in cities reveal that 40 to 50 per cent of the people are members of these organized groups. In rural communities the percentage may be even smaller. So when we bring in representatives from these organized groups, we should not pretend that we are getting a complete representation of the community.

Value systems

For the next dimension of community, let us take the illustration of two communities side by side in Tennessee. They are both rural communities with the same climate and the same natural resources. But in one we find the typical picture of a southern sharecropping, cotton community—soil erosion, poor housing, low standards of living, poor school attendance, illiteracy, poor health —and in the other, right next door, we find well-kept homes, green fields, stable and healthy families, bright-eyed children.

What is the explanation of these differences? Inquiry would reveal that the second community was settled years ago by an immigrant group from Switzerland who brought with them values very different from those the southern plantation economy has developed. Thrift, love of the soil, careful farming practices, are a part of the value systems of the people in one community. There is all the difference in the world between the two communities.

The third dimension, then, is the value systems of a community, which involve the folkways, the mores—things that people hold dear. Here we find many of the motivating forces for what happens in a community. We should ask, "How highly is education rated in the community? Where does it really rank among the values of the people?"

Social stratification

If we look for another illustration, we might come upon a school superintendent who finds that the schools are not successfully meeting the needs of some segments of the population—perhaps the group from across the railroad tracks or a particular racial group—and inquiry reveals that what we call the social stratification of the community is functioning to the detriment of a community-wide program of public education. Numerous studies have shown that American communities are stratified into social classes—the rigidity of these classes may actually be increasing—and into minority groups, racial and ethnic. This social stratification dimension must be understood if we are to work effectively in the community setting. It presents a problem, too, as we attempt to co-ordinate the schools with other community agencies.

Interpersonal relationships

A newly formed council on youth services starts off with a bang. Americans are the easiest people in the world to organize if you just go out and talk something up a bit! In the beginning there is a great deal of enthusiasm, and the leaders are sure that a great deal can be done for the community's young people. If you look in on the community in a year or so you may find that the council has died. Nothing has happened, and you wonder why. It may possibly be because those developing the council failed to bring into the program many of the real leaders in the community. They have co-opted some of the nominal leaders and the officeholders but have failed to understand that the real leaders are those who have prestige and enjoy the confidence of the community whether or not they hold official positions. The relationships involved are not identical with social stratification along class or racial lines, although they influence each other and may coincide at some points. Techniques exist for locating the real leaders in the community, and failure to use them may be why this council did not succeed. Another dimension of community, then, which has to be considered is the pattern of interpersonal relationships.

In a small southern community we recently analyzed patterns of local leadership. Since the community is biracial in social organization, we asked the white people who they thought the Negro leaders were, and then we asked the Negroes who they thought were the leaders in their group. We got very different responses from the two sources. Often the majority group decides who will take part in the planning, who will make the decisions, and they fail to get the real leaders from a minority group.

This pattern, then, of interpersonal relationships and leadership constitutes still another dimension of community.

Power structure

In another situation we perhaps find the community aroused about a problem. It may be smoke control or rat control or narcotics control, or it may be enforcement of a housing code. Many of the groups in town go on record as opposing the undesirable situation and urging community action. The newspapers and radio support the movement, and there is a great hullabaloo. Yet nothing happens. We wonder why. If we look beneath the surface we may find that certain people of power in the community, whose vested interests are threatened, have, under cover, worked out a way to keep anything from happening.

A very important dimension of American communities, then, is the power structure. The locus of power may be found in the political organization of a community—but not always. Often it is in the economic organization of the community. Perhaps a labor union has become so powerful that it determines what happens in the community. More frequently it has been management of big business or industry that has pulled the strings behind the scenes and has determined what really happens in a community. In a company town we can see that situation clearly.

In other communities the locus of power may be the church. In a community near Milwaukee, the minister even decides to whom a family can sell its land. Here a single institution exercises almost all the effective means of controlling the actions of individuals in the community.

The man who owns both newspaper and radio station, as happens in some small communities, by controlling these media of mass communication may be of great importance in the power structure.

Ecological patterning

Finally, the seventh dimension of community is revealed when we look at something that can be seen in many communities—a fine old residential section gradually invaded by business or small industry. The old homes turn into boardinghouses. Prostitution, poverty, poor health, delinquency, and crime flourish—the combination we all know so well in many cities. What is happening is a change in the land-use patterns of the community, in what we call the ecological patterning of the community—a term designating the division of a community into many different kinds of land use, with different kinds of neighborhoods as a result. These neighborhoods or zones gradually invade each other, and sometimes social problems come in the wake of such changes. The implications for location of schools and other agencies dealing with children and youth are evident.

One answer to this situation is adequate physical planning, usually by an official city planning board, which can greatly alleviate the results of these changes in the land-use patterns. The question of the outer boundaries of the community—the real sociological community—is also involved.

Importance of dimensions of community

These, then, are seven dimensions of community. We do not understand the true nature of a community, we cannot work effectively in it, without considering all seven of these dimensions. We may not examine them as the sociologist does, with theoretical concepts and elaborate research techniques, although often that approach is needed. Through common sense, however, and through living in the community, we can arrive at a reasonably good understanding of these matters.

Communities differ tremendously in these seven variables, and that is one reason why local school-community relationships also differ so much. They should; they have to. There is no one blueprint of community co-ordination which can fit the American community in general. The community setting is the social medium in which services to children and youth function and in which local efforts at co-ordination are attempted.

THE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION MOVEMENT

The distinction between "social organization" and "community organization" [2] may be explained as follows: The first term is generally used in an inclusive sense to embrace the totality of continuing social relationships which develop in a society in a manner for the most part spontaneous rather than rationally designed. Using the term in this broad sense, one can speak of the social organization ("social systems" in the terminology of Parsons) [3] of a large society, of a region, or of a community. For our purposes we may view the community as a locus for a set of basic, interacting institutions through the functioning of which a majority of the residents find it possible to meet their needs and have developed something of a sense of togetherness, with a consequent potential ability to act together as an

[2] Gordon W. Blackwell, "A Theoretical Framework for Sociological Research in Community Organization," *Social Forces*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (October 1954), pp. 57–64. The discussion here draws upon this earlier article.

[3] Talcott Parsons, "The Position of Sociological Theory," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 13 (April 1948), p. 159; see also his *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951); and Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Editors), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951).

entity.[4] We think of community in its more restricted, local sense as compared with MacIver's more generalized concept.[5] Any community, then, has a social organization, or a set of social systems, which has grown up in large part spontaneously over a given time span.

But this is not what we mean by community organization. The two terms should not be confused if we are to think clearly about local co-ordination between the school and other youth-serving agencies. Clarification is needed at several points.

Whereas the social organization of a community is a product, albeit in constant, dynamic flux, community organization should be viewed as a *process*. Social organization has resulted largely from uncontrolled evolutionary processes, at least until recently in certain societies where the idea of planning has taken hold. Community organization, on the other hand, is itself a rationally directed effort to modify the social organization of a particular locality to achieve rationally designed co-ordination. It is utilitarian, purposive. While social organization embraces all of the complex structure of institutions and social relationships in their dynamic functioning and interplay, the process of community organization may be initiated within a selected segment of the social organization of a locality, such as education, or it may be comprehensive in its coverage.[6]

[4] Local areas inhabited by people in relatively close physical proximity do not always clearly exhibit the characteristics of community—particularly large urban agglomerations. Rather than classification of the local area as "a community" or "not a community," it may be designated as conforming "more" or "less" closely to the concept of community.

[5] Cf. R. M. MacIver, *Community: A Sociological Study* (London: Macmillan, 1920), pp. 22–23: ". . . any area of common life. . . ."

[6] Accordingly, in this article, the term "a community organization" is not used to indicate a local association or agency.

Further describing the process as it has developed in American society, we find that community organization is generally voluntary and advisory in nature. It usually involves a number of steps, although the order in which they are taken may vary and the distinction between each step may be more intellectual than real: (1) decision as to goals or wants of the community; (2) identification of needs (comparison of goals and present conditions); (3) analysis of resources (natural, human, institutional) for meeting these needs; (4) development of alternate proposals often involving co-ordination; (5) decision, or choice of a "solution"; (6) social action to put the "solution" into effect; (7) evaluation of degree of success or failure in meeting the identified needs.

Ideological bases

To a greater or lesser degree in various localities, community organization in American society may be found to rest upon the following culturally determined ideological beliefs or assumptions:

A belief in the values of local autonomy within limits consistent with the optimum development of the larger society—a sort of antidote for extreme centralization.

A belief in the folk—in folk wisdom guided by the expert, in contrast to belief in the infallibility of the expert.

A recognition of the important role of the specialist or expert in modern society.

A belief in the value of group processes—group decisions rather than one-man, dictatorial action.

A concern for the entire community—the development and co-ordination of natural, human, and social organizational resources to meet all the needs of all the people, rather than the vested-interest approach of one segment of the population, a particular agency, or a particular organized group.

An emphasis upon the long view of developing community resources, as contrasted with short-run objectives of meeting immediate community needs.

A willingness to make progress slowly on a firm basis as opposed to flash achievement which is not lasting.

A concern for means as well as ends—the opposite of the totalitarian philosophy.

Since the community organization process must take place within a given social organization, its ideological basis will be largely determined by the social organization and culture it seeks to modify and will vary accordingly. Community organization in a fascist state must rest upon a quite different ideological doctrine.

Summary definition

To summarize, then, by community organization we mean a rationally directed process seeking to modify the social organization of a locality so that the needs of individuals may be more satisfactorily met. Co-ordination is crucial in this process. For the next larger societal grouping—that is, region—the term regional planning is somewhat analogous.

TENTATIVE PRINCIPLES

We may now suggest certain tentative principles which may be helpful in guiding efforts to co-ordinate education with other community services. These principles grow out of analysis of the sociological dimensions of community and what has been learned from the community organization movement in American society; in a way they are sample hypotheses which need to be tested.

1. The more simple the institutional organization, social differentiation, and social stratification of a community, the more simple can be the administrative mechanism designed to facilitate the community organization process (for example, the community forum) and the more informal can the process be at all steps; correspondingly, the more complex the social structure, the more formal and complex must be the mechanism (for example, the council of youth agencies). By way of commentary on this hypothesis, it is perhaps significant that the Ogdens in their grass-roots community organization efforts in small Virginia localities have emphasized the importance of keeping social mechanisms simple and as informal as possible.[7]

2. To the extent that the areal base for community organization (for example, the area served by a school system) coincides with the real, sociological boundaries of the community, the chances for successful accomplishment of the objectives of the co-ordination process will be increased. Demonstration of the failure of various agency programs to operate over areas conterminous with real communities has been made by Lee Coleman for a Georgia county.[8]

3. Those aspects of social structure which are most closely related to the value systems of the people are of most functional significance in the community organization process, serving to facilitate or hinder the process depending upon whether their aims and methods are in accord or conflict with the value systems.

[7] Jean and Jess Ogden, *Small Communities in Action* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946); also *These Things We Tried* (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Extension, 1947).

[8] *Communities and Administrative Areas of Greene County, Georgia* (U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1941).

4. When the recommended patterns of social action in community organization require participation by a large proportion of the population, those aspects of social structure which are characterized by informal, primary, face-to-face relationships such as kinship, neighborhood association, and informal clique association will be more effective in securing the desired social action than will be the media of mass communication.

5. The *real* leadership of a community varies considerably from the *nominal* leadership (those holding public and private offices). Leaders of the two types have different functions in the community organization process.

6. When the mechanism for facilitating community organization (for example, youth services council) is used for operating a special program (for example, a teen-age center) or for providing special services to individuals (for example, education for handicapped children in their homes), it loses much of its effectiveness in the achievement of the original purposes of the process. Co-ordination should be kept separate from program operation.

7. Factors making for difficulty in community organization may include: (*a*) heterogeneity and complexity in the social structure of the community; (*b*) failure to enlist the participation and support of the real leaders of the community; (*c*) differences in value systems of various social groups or strata in the community; (*d*) lack of administrative know-how in the operation of a formal mechanism for community organization; (*e*) discrepancies between agreed-upon objectives for community organization and functional needs fulfilled by the existing social systems; (*f*) obstruction of the community organization process by elements in the power structure of the community; (*g*) discrepancies between, on the one hand, the objectives and methods of the community organization effort and, on the other, the value systems inherent in the social structure; (*h*) efforts to hurry the process faster than the understanding of the people can be developed and faster than modifications in a complex social structure can be attained on a lasting basis.

These are suggested, then, as tentative principles or hypotheses which should be tried out in community co-ordination efforts and subjected to research.


IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION

Finally, we turn to the possible implications of the foregoing remarks for those responsible for the public schools: teachers, administrators, school board members, parents.

The public schools in American society are among our most locally centered, indigenous social institutions. In spite of increasing state and federal financial support, the schools generally remain locally controlled and extremely sensitive to local public opinion. This has never been more evident than in the current consideration of racial integration in the public schools. The schools are part of and are affected by the social warp and woof of the community. It follows that the nature of the schools and their co-ordination with other services to children and youth will be directly affected by the several sociological dimensions of the community. Those responsible for the schools need to understand this in some detail.

In an abortive effort some years ago to develop a symposium on community organization, the hopeful editor designated the chapter on education by the title "Shall the Schools Take Over?" His bias against the public schools was revealed—he was in social work! It also reflected the fact that sometimes the public schools seem to be forever taking on new functions and on occasion are not so co-operative as one might hope they would be in efforts to achieve community co-ordination. This expansiveness may arise partly from the fact that the schools constitute a financial operation of considerable size, and take a large cut from the tax dollar. It may also be caused partly by a lack of understanding by school people of the essential nature of community organization—its co-ordinating functions—and its importance as a growing, vital movement in American society.

Gordon W. Blackwell, Ph.D., Chapel Hill, North Carolina, is Kenan professor of sociology and director of the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina. He previously served as head of the Department of Sociology at Furman University, where he was on the staff of the Greenville County Council for Community Development. He has conducted research for several federal agencies and for the Commission on Teacher Education. He is author of Toward Community Understanding (1943), coauthor of Church and Community in the South (1951) and Future Citizens All (1952), and has contributed articles to numerous professional journals.



Co-ordination: The Viewpoint of a Political Scientist

By Eldon L. Johnson

THE favorite educational dream of many political scientists—the complete integration of school administration and local government—will certainly not be realized in the foreseeable future, if ever. Public opinion, although perhaps indifferent at the outset, would be against it when aroused by fear of "politics," depressed standards, and impoverishment. Professional educators would be vociferously against it. Public officials could not prove clean hands if they were to take the initiative. But apart from all this, the average citizen has a special affection for education, a special conviction that it is a professional matter, and therefore a special resistance to tampering with accustomed methods of governing education. It may be accurate to say some of this is folklore and mythology, but that does not change the situation. It only helps to explain.

We are left, therefore, with the difficult problem of seeing that schools and other governmental services communicate, co-operate, and collaborate in more subtle ways, less officially and less formally. The task is to see that the schools and other governmental services, while maintaining their "territorial integrity," harmonize their related efforts on all public programs concerned with the development of children and youth.

In education literature, one gets the impression that the Constitution perhaps provided for the separation of school and government, just as of church and state. There can be no doubt that a good thing has been carried too far, just as the "merit system" has thrived negatively on the fear of spoils politics so long that the lingering psychology blocks much positive personnel administration. At present, in a similar way, we suffer from the negative fear of contaminating education and educators by having them rub elbows with other public officials, whereas the times clearly call for positive approaches of the mutual-aid variety. No evil flows from the separation of school and government when they have no, or few, problems in common. But that time is past. The barricades will have to come down, somehow. The trouble arises when problems are common but the attack is separate, if not indeed rival or competitive or possessively exclusive. Common problems call for common solutions, although the co-operators need not in any sense lose their identity. The evil of separation is the propensity to build rival power structures and to thwart the emergence, recognition, and service of the community of interest.

Citizen Opinion

No one has to demonstrate to the average citizen that schools and government need closer co-operation and co-ordination. The people who apparently do not understand this are, strangely enough, the school officials and the government officials—to a considerable extent, the professional educators and the professional political scientists. Textbooks in school administration often avoid civil government, while talking much about "the community"; textbooks in political science often ignore education, while talking much about public services. Educational books commonly do not mention

city government and municipal departments, even under the heading of "public relations," although there may be elaborate treatments of parent-teacher associations, clubs, teachers, and citizens at large. One author says public relations deal with "teachers, parents, general public, school children, and the individuals and groups of the larger communities of the state and nation." [1] He omits the whole parallel structure of local nonschool government.

However myopic the professional point of view may be, the average citizen wants public services efficiently performed, economically administered, and democratically controlled. He does not make nice distinctions between schools and government. He knows he pays for *all* public functions and that one function cannot expand except at the expense of the others. He is at least not surprised that "city rates" may apply to utility, sewage, and other public services when extended to the schools. He expects the city to hold school elections. And as a final testimony to his unconcern for the separatism which professionals so dearly prize, he blames local government officials for all public ills, including those school ills over which no jurisdiction is exercised. For example, the mayor of Minneapolis was blamed in 1948 for strike conditions among the teachers when he was actually trying hard, in an unofficial manner, to keep the school board and teachers' representatives negotiating.

Preconceptions and Misconceptions

The best hope for maximizing co-ordination of school and government, without complete integration, undoubtedly lies in the training of future school personnel, particularly school administrators. Hope lies in the direction away from the philosophy of extreme separatism: in the training of school superintendents to be more community centered and less school centered, more aware of the role of the schools as *a part of* the public rather than *apart from* the public, and more cognizant of the *problem* than of the doctrine or of the tradition. What can be done in this respect?

First, there needs to be a more realistic appreciation of the schools as a related part of the public enterprises of the community, not as a unique whole existing apart. There needs to be an appreciation that education as a public need and satisfaction is not fundamentally different from other public needs and satisfactions—welfare, recreation, health, protection, sanitation, and so forth. All call for knowledge, skill, integrity, efficiency, and responsibility in their administration. None lends itself to a Republican or Democratic way of doing the job. There is need, in other words, for the public schools to be regarded as genuinely public in the most comprehensive sense.

One basic misconception has been so often repeated, and the gloss so compounded over the years, that it will take herculean effort to end the damage—and damage it really does. The misconception is that the school boards and districts, being creatures of the state government, are somehow unique and somehow fundamentally different from all other civil government at the local level. Yet the fact is that *all* local government stems from the state—all city, county, or other local government. If there is "home rule," it was conferred by the state. The schools enjoy no uniqueness in this regard so far as legal theory is concerned. This is not at all to deny that states, for various reasons, including this distorted philosophy itself, have given schools special status in many cases; but it was

[1] Harlan L. Hagman, *The Administration of American Public Schools* (New York, 1951), p. 333.

not done because education had any prior rights or supragovernmental mandate. Neither is this to deny that the separate administration of the public schools, historically, has had its great merits. The point is that the independence of school boards is a matter of public policy, not a matter of fundamental or immutable law, and certainly not a matter of *requiring* operation at arm's length from all other government. There has been in this area, or so it seems to a political scientist, a great deal of strained logic and illogical catechizing.

This separation reaches its climax in the phrase "keep the schools out of politics." Exactly what this means is difficult to say. If it means to keep the schools out of the main stream of public policy, to divorce them from all other public affairs, to keep them unrelated to alternative uses of the tax dollar, or to reduce knowledge of and debate about what they are doing, then we have avoided one danger by embracing another—the danger of professionals responsible only to their profession, the danger of professional *control* and professional *policy making* as well as professional administration, the danger of making public schools less public. When an educational writer says that the schools are "the most responsive, most sensitive, and most locally activated system of government," [2] yet that they are governmentally unique and politically uncontaminated, he is using a vocabulary which makes no sense to a political scientist. There can be no question about what the described process is: it is political. The question, rather, is whether it really exists. Every school constituent should hope it does. When a commission of educators says the school must be independently governed and "set apart from the executive and legislative branches" to avoid changes "in personnel *and in policy* by the voters," although "the suggestion is not that the schools be removed from the control of the people, but rather that the people be enabled to act directly in this most important area of government," [3] the confusion is compounded.

It would help, therefore, if the training of future school administrators could include some more realistic treatment of political processes and the nature of "the public" and its controls. A *public* as well as a professional philosophy is needed. These are public schools run by public officials. Public processes need, therefore, to be understood and appreciated—not merely depreciated, or ignored, or denied to exist. Training along these lines would dispel from the minds of both administrators and the public the common impression that education is peculiarly and possessively the business of professionals. This impression has been well stated by the author of a careful state survey of intergovernmental relations, who said: "Despite the argument that independence permits among other things greater public scrutiny and control, the real desire apparently is to restrict control in so far as possible to professional educators." [4] To this impression the professional educators themselves unwittingly add by such well-intended pronouncements as, "Educational leaders should not only heed the expressed will of the people; they should also help the people to find their will and to express it." [5] Educators also give that impression by wanting maximum integration in education while resisting much of it with other civil government; by wanting to make the United States Office of Education "independent"; by removing state superintendents and state boards of education from the jurisdiction of the governors; and by seeking earmarked taxes. Something more seems to be at stake, the critics are thus permitted to say, than merely "escaping politics." In any case, says one student of this problem, "It seems fairly clear that organizational structure is not the determining factor in the existence of politics in the schools." [6]

[2] Hagman, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[3] Educational Policies Commission, *The Structure and Administration of Public Education in the United States* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1937), p. 7.

[4] Robert L. Morlan, *Intergovernmental Relations in Education*, Research Monograph No. 3, Intergovernmental Relations in the United States (Minneapolis, 1950), p. 204.

[5] Educational Policies Commission, *Citizens and Educational Policies* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1951), p. 10

[6] Morlan, *op. cit. supra* (note 4), p. 52.

CO-ORDINATION OF YOUTH SERVICES UNDER THE SCHOOLS

Since it is clear that co-operation and co-ordination, rather than integration, between schools and governmental agencies are the best we can hope for, and indeed sufficient if we can get it, the training of school personnel should also approach proposed organizational solutions with an open mind, keep attention fixed on the problem rather than on some general theory, and thus enable the fluid boundaries of government and schools to merge, fit together, and supplement in whatever ways the law of the situation will permit. This kind of training will respect the integrity of the governmental agencies and try to fit them into the co-ordinated whole, as it will also respect the integrity of the schools. Not all the adjustment can come from the nonschool side, nor can the schools expect merely to "take over," building a new entity at the expense of existing organizations. Some possible danger of this is implied in the Educational Policies Commission's proposal for "the ultimate unification" of all public education activities under a "public education authority" for the co-ordination of all social services and education pertaining to children and youth.[7] This is to replace the old, limited "school board" concept. It is "to co-ordinate public services on behalf of the child" and to give the needs of children one integrated treatment regardless of the number of agencies involved. Any other approach, this line of reasoning assumes, "leads to confusion, authoritarian policies, and lack of a unified approach to the educational needs of the individual." [8]

Such proposals for organization on the basis of persons—"youth" in this case—need to be examined carefully. They have their advantages for the persons involved but also their disadvantages for other persons, as do organizations for veterans, for labor, or for farmers. Also, while such a unitary organization might do better all things for all youth, it might also cease to do so well what had previously been at the center of attention: education in the more restricted sense. Care might have to be exercised to keep education from becoming increasingly custodial, for the relief of the homes and the labor market. Assuming that the custodial functions—looking after youth's health, welfare, delinquency, recreation, and so forth—are desirable, the question remains whether they can best be combined under the domination of the formal institutions of education. Organization according to persons always cuts athwart organization according to purpose; therefore, a "youth authority" conception, centered around the schools, really proposes the partial dismantling of existing local government, taking

[7] Educational Policies Commission, *Educational Policies for Community Recreation* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1940), p. 31.

[8] Educational Policies Commission, *Social Services and the Schools* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1939), pp. 20, 21, 24.

away certain of its health, welfare, recreation, and other social service functions. This is a new kind of integration, working toward the schools rather than toward the local government. Before this is done, careful attention should be given to whether this is the direction in which we ought to move, what the price to be paid will be, and whether this is the proper and best use of professional school personnel. Local government is not likely to take much more kindly to this kind of merger than education takes to merger with other local government. So we are likely again to be brought back to co-operation and co-ordination, rather than mergers and integrations.

EXPERIMENT IN TRAINING SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS

One of the most promising ways of training school superintendents who will be resourceful toward the achievement of these ends is a dual approach combining graduate education in the relevant social sciences and research experience in community studies. An experiment of this kind is now in progress under Kellogg Foundation auspices, through the Co-operative Program in Educational Administration, in several universities. One institution [9] has experimented with two interdisciplinary seminars for candidates for advanced degrees in education: one on the nature and problems of administrative behavior and the other on the scope and method of the social sciences. The professor in charge, normally a social scientist, is assisted by staff members representing other areas, including at different times political science, anthropology, business administration, psychology, sociology, economics, and education. All participate as required to bring into play the points of view of the different disciplines as focused on central problems. The case-study method has been used in part, with each student also required to prepare a case report from his own administrative experience. The scope and methods seminar deals with basic concepts and materials jointly explored by staff and students "in order to relate the problems of education and school administration to the social context" of the community. Student reports are subjected to reactions from the representatives of the several social sciences. Reading likewise extends into the several disciplines, drawing upon as much relevant diversity as possible. The prospective superintendent is thus expected to extend himself, to indulge in useful self-analysis, to get new insights and techniques, to feel at home with problems as well as with abstractions, and to develop understanding of social organization and social processes.

As a result, observers at doctoral examinations are struck by the fact that the candidates have new vocabularies and new interests. They introduce authors, titles, and materials from fields traditionally unknown to "education majors"—a point from a sociologist here, a concept from an anthropology reference there, an illustration from a study in political behavior somewhere else. This acquaintance and those habits, it is hoped, will enable the superintendent to see the problems of youth and schools as they spin in their specialized orbits, held in place by all the forces of the community; in other words, to see the schools in the context of the community.

In addition, doctoral candidates hoping to be superintendents serve a kind of research apprenticeship en route to their dissertations, concentrating again on studies of the community—for example, on leadership, on political behavior, on decision making, on social organization, on attitudes toward school administration, on growth factors, on school-community planning. While candidates may choose particular aspects of a major problem, attention has been focused on co-operative research on a community-wide study, with all participants sharing in the research design, the formulation of techniques, and the discussion and criticism as the project moves toward completion, with particular facets of the project becoming individual dissertations. This experience is shared with the supervising professors from the relevant social sciences. The purpose, again, is to develop the habit of seeing youth and schools in the community setting, in the midst of forces which inevitably play upon them, and in perspective with other governmental and social agencies and functions.

Experiments of this kind, while uncommon as yet, do give hope that the goals sought will somehow become more consciously held, and therefore that means to such ends will more likely be devised. These and other schemes and strivings may eventually make their permanent impact on school administration by becoming embedded in the curriculum and training plan for school administrators. Some such new plan would go a long way toward bringing about one of the most fruitful and solidly meshed types of co-ordination—co-ordination by ideas, rather than by pressure or by expediency; co-ordination by inner desire rather than by outer compulsion.

OTHER STEPS TOWARD CO-ORDINATION

But looking at the problem from the here and now, rather than from the ideal future, experience already suggests many worth-while ways of relating education and other governmental services more advantageously both for children and for community. Any discussion of hopes and desirable developments must look to the maximization of these promising trends.

The co-operation of health officers, county agricultural extension agents, social welfare personnel, and federal representatives on school lunch programs shows that frictions, particularly interlevel frictions, disappear as programs mature and routine patterns of relations develop. Schools and local governments have demonstrated the advantages and techniques of joining together for library services, as in Minnesota, where some co-operative county-city-school arrangements have successfully combined under a representative board named by the mayor.[10] More variations on this theme would be desirable. Something similar is possible, as often demonstrated, in recreation commissions representing schools and all other interested governmental units. The National Education Association has criticized the overlapping of library, recreation, and school functions, as represented by three circles lined up tandem with slight overlaps at the edges, and has proposed a unified and shared "authority" with library, recreation, and schools fitted as pie-shaped pieces into a single circle.[11]

Another of the crying needs which always appeal to the political scientist is the rationalization and reordering of the unbelievable hodgepodge of units of government, often specialized and unifunctional, possessing unique boundaries and resembling each other only in ability to tax, stacked one on another like a child's blocks in impossible-appearing stages of imbalance. Unless specialized districts are reordered in many areas, there can be little hope of co-ordina-

[9] University of Oregon. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful reactions from Donald E. Tope, Director of the Co-operative Project in Educational Administration there; Vincent Ostrom, Associate Director; John M. Foskett, Professor of Sociology; and their several doctoral candidates.

[10] Morlan, *op. cit. supra* (note 4), p. 133.

[11] Educational Policies Commission, *Social Services and the Schools* (note 8 *supra*), p. 26.

tion. There are too many vested interests, vested in too many different places, in too many different offices, and in too many different personalities. Districts without roughly similar boundaries face almost insuperable obstacles in significant co-operation. Here is an abundant field for reform and progress for schools and community together.

It would help also if schools and government could interrelate their activities through joint meetings and overlapping memberships on governing boards of social agencies, junior placement services, city and school planning, and libraries, and for health, recreation, and adult education. Community councils, broadly representative of community agencies, also offer insufficiently explored possibilities for co-ordination.

Another device found especially useful is a joint planning office and planning consultant, serving school district, city, county, and special districts together, focusing attention on community-wide problems. This is a means of making sure that the specialized interests are not exploited without at least having attention called both to the dangers of unilateral action and to the advantages of consultation and co-operation. The planning office, for example, can see that recreation and playground planning is co-ordinated, by telling each party what the other is aspiring to and getting all together when any unit is about to move on a common but many-faceted problem. Joint use of expert advice of this kind has the advantages of economy and freedom of operation, in addition both to an authorized ear and to an authorized voice for every party in the councils of every other party. No party is bound, yet every party is informed. The need for co-ordination is perceived before premature action is taken.

IN THE COMMON INTEREST

When the doctrinaire is removed from both sides—from the school's insistence that nothing less than complete and jealously guarded autonomy is tolerable and from the government's insistence that nothing less than complete integration can suffice—perhaps the common aspects and the common interests of the community can be recognized and reestablished. When city and local government becomes more professionalized, as it inevitably will, just as the schools have become more professionalized, co-ordination will be much simpler. The old fear of having the schools "in politics" will be assuaged, a more positive approach will be assured, and a combined effort of schools and government toward problems they face separately but must solve co-operatively will be, at last, both possible and politic.

Eldon L. Johnson, Ph.D., Durham, New Hampshire, is president of the University of New Hampshire. He has served as dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Graduate School (1947–55) and professor of political science and department head in the University of Oregon (1945–47); director of the Graduate School, United States Department of Agriculture (1941–45); and national academic director of the United States Air Forces Premeteorological Training Programs (1943–44).

Some Paths to Co-ordination

By THEODORE L. RELLER

THE growing complexity of society; the increase in population of metropolitan areas, combined with too little planning; the difficulty experienced by youth in finding opportunities for action comparable to its maturity; the chaos of local government units, representing as they too frequently do the needs of the past rather than the present; the confusion in values held by the people; the preoccupation of the nation with the world struggle and its failure to see the true significance of the home front in the conflict; inadequate financing and staffing; and attacks on education make even the formulation of an outline of realistic, desirable developments exceedingly difficult and hazardous. The base moves rapidly while upon it some structuring must be done.

The points of view offered in this concluding article are broad generalizations outlining directions which appear desirable. Important advances in co-ordination are not likely to be made unless these issues are widely understood, debated, and accepted or modified. It is not intended that the items constitute a complete list or that together they represent a "program." Rather, they should be regarded as suggesting desirable directions. To seek a "pattern" in this vast area would be most unfortunate—for a pattern has little likelihood of being effective in a problem both so immense and so intimate as this one, bearing as it does upon children and youth in their infinite activities. It should also be noted that the items offered are not new or original. They are drawn largely from experiences—satisfying and otherwise—which run through this issue of THE ANNALS. It is in light of the work which has been done in co-ordination, in some communities and in some countries, that the fuller realization of the goal may be conceived and more effectively sought.

IMPROVED COMMUNITY LIVING

Improved community living must become a more important, consciously sought end. Nondescript, ugly towns and cities are unnecessary. Blighted areas in cities and on the fringes of cities are avoidable. New cities do not have to be crowded—without public recreation areas and that touch of nature which might be considered reasonably adequate for children and adults. The achievement of assets such as attractive and satisfying communities in which to live is as worthy of planning and effort as the achievement of great industrial enterprises. The returns from investments in libraries, schools, public health centers, recreation areas, and well-planned communities while perhaps less tangible are no less real than those from any known investment.

How long can we recognize the conditions associated with delinquency and yet continue to permit the development of those conditions? How large a return is the prevention of one case of delinquency? the development of satisfying homes? the use of land in the interest of the people? the creation of a community which stimulates the development of children, youth, and men? Shall education prepare men only to earn a living, or also to live satisfying and creative lives? Those concerned with education have often spoken of education for improved community living—thinking of community in various

contexts—and of living in broad terms. Too often, however, they have not been able to help young people sufficiently in developing the essential knowledge of their own community, the ideals which they may strive for, or the know-how for achieving them. Perhaps all of us in our various roles need to look more carefully at the gap between our professed goals and our achievements.

CLARIFIED GOALS

The purposes or goals of the various public services must be clarified and their interrelationships (in goals) better understood. Each public service tends to see the achievement of goals sought by various services too largely in terms of its own structure and life. There is too little appreciation of the extent to which goals such as health, democratic citizenship, effective family and home life, creative individual and group living, are common to many of the public service agencies. Each agency sees too largely itself and its contribution to the job and fails to recognize the tremendous unrealized strength which might be unleashed were they all to stand together. Too frequently one service sees itself as a competitor of others rather than as a member of a team through which the strength of each could be greatly enhanced—for fuller realization of the purposes of the society and the dignity and worth of man.

SIZE OF PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

Local planning and administrative authorities or units must be large enough to be able to meet needs effectively and small enough to maintain and increase local interest and participation. Such authorities are not easily attained. Land use, fringe areas, traffic and transportation, research and planning, special education and other matters, demand larger units than are generally found. However, the larger units—which are generally cities—too frequently appear to be remote from the people. They have not stimulated local interest. The local administrative units for education and other purposes are too often to be explained by history, vested interests, compromise, and accretion rather than by any relation to the needs for which they are expected to make provision. Thus a metropolitan area not only has many different units of widely varying size, wealth, and community characteristics but also has many governmental units superimposed one on the other, though not necessarily covering the same area. This complex structure—chaos sometimes—makes it difficult for the citizen to be informed or to act. It also results in the need for extensive co-ordination of efforts and co-operation among the various governmental units.

A new development on the fringe of the city involves land use, housing, public health, transportation, water and sewage, education, recreation, and other services. How they are met is of concern inevitably to the people of the metropolitan area as well as to those of the small governmental district or even unincorporated area where the development is occurring. We are citizens of metropolitan or other large areas as well as of established governmental units—general purpose or *ad hoc*—even though this is generally not recognized in governmental structure. There would thus appear to be need for metropolitan area districts for certain over-all purposes such as planning and co-ordinaton. Wthin these districts a relatively simple, highly decentralized structure for administration and co-ordination of various services should be developed. The unit which does the planning need not carry through the administration of the services. Thus a local structure could be designed which would be competent to cope with the problems of the area, to ensure co-ordination, and to increase citizen understanding and participation. Those in education as well as in other fields must recognize that the problem of local district structure is a significant one for other public services as well as for their own—and that they have a measure of responsibility for it in all fields.

EDUCATION IS MORE THAN SCHOOLS

Education must be recognized as a service considerably broader than the school. Laymen and professionals interested in education must be interested in more than the school. How can they avoid a compelling interest in housing, in land use, in public health, in recreation, in youth services? Perhaps they need to ponder the view of those educators in England who held that during the twenties the greatest single educational advance was the development which had occurred in housing. Children who grew up in the new estates were not only taller and heavier than they would have been had they remained in their blighted slum areas; they also had a very different attitude toward life, a different understanding. The dependence of education upon public services other than the school speaks of the interdependence of other services in achieving their ends. Public health is not advanced only through the public health service. The library service and public adult education are inseparable. Improved community living can only result from a large co-operative effort. Participating in the improvement of community living is itself education of the highest order.

MANY AGENCIES ARE EDUCATIONAL

As a corollary, it must be understood that many public services are engaged at least in part in education and should therefore be contributing significantly to it. Although education of children and youth may not be the major responsibility of such agencies as juvenile courts, placement agencies concerned with the conditions of employment of youth and with the growth which occurs in such employment, city planning agencies, recreation departments, and public libraries, it remains nevertheless an important one, and they should be willing to co-operate in the development and provision of the educational service. The attainment of the goals of many public services is thus related to the quality of the co-operation among them.

FIXED RESPONSIBILITY FOR CO-ORDINATION

If educational ends are to be successfully achieved, responsibility for the provision of many related activities and the co-ordination of others must be fixed upon some one agent or agency—both when school districts and other *ad hoc* agencies exist and also when all local government services, including education, are the responsibility of a single local governmental authority. The responsible agent should be that charged with the provision of public education, the Board of Education or the Education Committee and its executive officers. Not all services, of course, will be rendered directly by the schools. But with many agencies involved someone must be responsible for co-ordination, lest agencies overlap or compete in one area while another problem equally important goes unregarded. This does not mean that the agent responsible for education dominates the other services which have a contribution to make to it. In this as in all administration, there are modes of behavior which facilitate co-operative action.

It should, of course, be recognized that equal responsibility for co-ordination will fall upon other agencies in

other spheres of activity. In many of these, public education will be one of the co-operating services. In cases in which the agency responsible for co-ordination fails to act or acts in an arbitrary manner, the others sharing responsiblity for the service should stimulate action. Provision for this contingency should be made in the planning and co-ordinating authority of the large area, considered above.

PERIODIC REVIEW

Provision should be made for periodic review of the necessity for and the adequacy of the various services provided and for determination of the need for further co-ordination or additional provisions. Such review and planning should be provided for both in the larger planning authorities and in the smaller units through which the services are actually administered. All interested services should be involved in this review and indeed should, in considerable measure, carry it through. Many unmet needs remain, many goals are inadequately achieved. Competition among agencies and unnecessary overlapping of services are therefore indefensible. The job to be done is far bigger than the combined resources of all parties.

STRUCTURE OR PROCEDURE

Although administrative structure is important, it is perhaps not as important as the actions of those who set policy and administer the services. Desirable co-ordination can be attained (or can be lacking) with fiscal dependence or independence. A satisfactory answer to the problem is not to be found in organization charts and definitions of responsibility. These are important, but the degree of their importance can only be determined when they are in use—in actual process of utilization. Attention must therefore be centered upon the parties involved and the manner in which they operate. This is true in all administration—but especially as regards co-ordination, for which a wholly satisfactory plan of organization never has been set up and remains unlikely unless a way of describing high-level co-operative effort in relation to fixing of responsibility can be found. It is not easy to assign effectively the responsibility of being co-operative—and of spelling out its true meaning under varying circumstances. For this reason a considerable part of the solution to our problem is probably to be found in informal organization—in the purposes, the tact, the mutual understanding and respect, the "know-how" of co-operation, on the part of those involved.

The difficulty of achievement through planned changes in structure has been well expressed by Leighton:

> No matter how good a plan or an idea hatched by an administration may be, it is of little value until it becomes part of the consciousness and activity of the people. The history of government and industry is littered with schemes that have been labelled failure, but which in reality were never tried because they were never understood by those who had to grasp them before they could become action.[1]

Perhaps we have attached too much importance to the dependence or independence of authorities responsible for various services and too little to the procedures for the co-ordination of effort which every community has a right to expect from its public bodies and officials.

Instead of seeking a "solution" to the problem of co-ordination through simple, straight-line administrative structuring which the complexity of the situation does not admit, we need to attack it from a wider base. Certain facts should be recognized: the various services are expressions of the same community; "independence," if it results in isolation of any service, in the long run may weaken rather than strengthen it and reduce achievement of its goals; "independence" is frequently not as real as it appears; struggle and competition among services can go on even within the same structure or organization; public knowledge of all services and informed action regarding them is imperative if the problems are to be met. Some points of approach then seem to be: to clarify our goals; to secure local units large enough to cope with the problems; to seek more effective co-ordination through legal structure or voluntary effort; to fix responsibility and ensure freedom to act on the part of various services; to seek to raise the level of citizen concern and action; and to stimulate professional co-operation and leadership. Simple solutions are not likely to be solutions.

[1] Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 364.

BREAKING DOWN SEPARATISM

Those interested in and involved in the different public services must be brought closer together—at the administrative, staff, and lay levels. Interdisciplinary understanding and co-operative action is essential. Pre- and in-service professional programs could contribute much here. It is difficult to justify the degree of "separateness" which in most of our universities characterizes the programs for the preparation of leaders for the various public service fields. Surely there are areas of study and experience which should be shared, provisions which could be made beyond suggesting a few courses in other fields. If as students public servants of various disciplines have had opportunity to work together, there is promise that in the field they may be more interested in co-operating—better able to co-ordinate activities, to lead the attack on problems, to seek together the achievement of common goals.

Teachers and the personnel of other services also need more common learning and experience than are generally afforded in their preservice education. The development of more in-service programs cutting across established lines are likewise essential—programs through which knowledge and understanding are developed and plans of attack co-operatively created.

In regard to lay citizen groups much can also be done by those who serve as policy makers in the various governmental bodies or agencies and also those who are active in the voluntary groups interested in one or another service. Much of this citizen co-ordination of effort should be effected at a rather decentralized unit or area level. In the metropolitan area broad lines of advance, of policy and planning, can be developed for the area as a whole—but much of the co-operative effort and understanding can be effected only at the level of the community or some even smaller unit. The area served by a secondary school might be a desirable unit in which thinking could be developed and action taken.

INVESTMENT IN LIFE

Co-ordination must be accompanied by a considerably larger and more realistic investment in children and youth of personnel and material resources. We have come to recognize the significance of large investments in our industrial enterprises. Through them we seek the advancement of the whole society. Is there any reason to believe that large investments in the interest of children and youth will not yield at least equivalent returns? Or that through them the whole society may not benefit? If the final evaluation of the worth of the industrial enterprise is

what it does for man, is there any reason to believe that investments of time, energy, and money directly or consciously in his interest are unwarranted or less defensible economically? What is gained through building homes and communities from which everyone wishes to escape?

Why do many children and youth grow up without adequate library facilities? minimum health services? attention to their social adjustment problems until it is "too late"? homes and communities which assure them that they have a place to win in this democracy? What is gained through crowded schools unable to offer the kinds of opportunities essential to the effective development of youth? When we build new factories we tend to build them as well as we can. It pays. But too frequently we still build "austerity" schools and unplanned communities—communities which are not the best we know how to build, communities which do not promise to yield the satisfactions and opportunities which men need and which can be provided. And as if we had not been seeking educational goals through "austerity" for years, there are those who suggest the "fuller" use of school buildings through a twelve-month school year—not for the ends of those already crowded in them, a purpose which could be justified, but to accommodate more.

No Lesser Goal

Effective co-ordination will result from clarification of aims through relating them to the central objective of ensuring reasonable opportunity for development to all children and youth; from the reorganization of governmental structure and the improved capacity of those responsible for it to work toward that objective; and from the investment of a larger proportion of our human and material resources toward that end. Our society cannot afford a lesser goal —nor long delay in its fuller attainment.

Book Department

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT 149
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY 155
ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY 164
SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION 171
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 181
SPECIAL TOPICS ABROAD
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 186
SLAVIC COUNTRIES 190
WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 194
OTHER COUNTRIES 198
OTHER BOOKS 203

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM Y. ELLIOTT, H. VAN B. CLEVELAND, THEODORE GEIGER, and others. *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy: Its Concepts, Strategy, and Limits: Report of a Study Group Sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association.* Pp. xv, 414. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955. $6.00.

For the international specialist or the layman who is not an economist, but who feels the need of an authoritative handbook on foreign economic policy, this work is a welcome aid. It will prove especially valuable if the reader is one who, like the reviewer, has difficulty finding his way in the bulk of government reports or in the neomarginalist apparatus of so many academic studies in the field.

Most of the nine authorities who constituted the joint-study group are men who have served in executive agencies, government commissions, or Congressional committee staffs, dealing both with foreign policy in general and with economic policy. They thus bring to their survey a wealth of practical economic engineering experience as well as technical expertness. The group was chaired by Mr. Elliott and the draft report prepared by Messrs. Cleveland and Geiger.

Chosen deliberately to indicate the focus of the study, the title aptly shows that the group has aimed at relating general foreign policy to the economic problems of the free world. The major premise of the work is that economic policy must serve our national security and our diplomatic and strategic objectives. The basic viewpoint is one of a hardheaded liberal internationalism, leavened with a healthy skepticism of any supposedly universally valid economic theory.

The study divides logically into two main parts—diagnosis and prescription. The first surveys the genesis of the contemporary international economy, the external economic problems and prospects for economic growth of the industrial sector of the free world outside the United States (that is, Western Europe and Japan), as well as problems of the underdeveloped countries. The second part deals with policy under such topics as criteria of a sound world economic order, economic organization of the western community, economic development policy, foreign economic policy administration, and the relationship of economic to general foreign policy.

If a minor criticism is in order, it would be that there is a little too much emphasis

on noneconomic factors, welcome as that emphasis is. At times familiar political points are covered so fully—even repetitively—that the central economic topics are obscured. The contrast with the usual economic study is so great however that this can hardly be deemed a fault.

OLIVER BENSON
University of Oklahoma

FRANK TANNENBAUM. *The American Tradition in Foreign Policy*. Pp. xiv, 178. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. $3.50.

In this compact volume, in which he pulls no punches, Professor Tannenbaum, best known for his books on Latin America and the labor movement, undertakes a task which had long been needed in our study of world affairs. He enters the lists to challenge the champions of *realpolitik*, notably Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan, contending that their philosophy goes against the grain of the American tradition in foreign policy. This tradition he defines as the association of co-ordinate states, illustrated by the development of federalism in the United States, by the experience of the Organization of American States, and by the structure of Switzerland and the Commonwealth of Nations.

The debate between the "realists" and the "idealists," Professor Tannenbaum rightly points out, "is of greater import to the future of the United States than the old argument between the 'interventionists' and the 'isolationists,'" and in his opinion is just beginning. The American people, he argues, cannot act on the advice of the *realpolitik* school "without ceasing to be either a Christian or a democratic people."

This is strong stuff, and those who, like the reviewer, agree with Professor Tannenbaum's general approach will welcome his cogent analysis, richly documented, of the way in which the concept of the co-ordinate state started and matured in this country. It is regrettable, however, that by concentrating almost exclusively upon American tradition, and by disregarding the traditions of other major components of the universe—Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the USSR—he plays right into the hands of those he challenges, and who can properly criticize him for presenting this crucial issue in too abstract terms. Other nations than the United States have sought, over the ages, a formula which would bring about a viable association of states, but their geographic position, their strategic vulnerability, their economic resources, and other factors, have placed them in a position far less favorable than ours, both internally and externally.

By extolling the American concept of an association of equal sovereign states Professor Tannenbaum begs a number of questions. Is the United States prepared today to subordinate its sovereignty to a federal international administration? The Bricker amendment, the reluctance of this country to consider supranational controls over armaments and economic policy, create legitimate doubts on this score. Or is the United States prepared to welcome all nations, large and small, on equal terms into such an association, irrespective of their ideologies? Washington's attitude toward the recognition of Peiping and its admission to the United Nations indicates a negative answer. And is it realistic to say that the United States does not seek to intervene in the affairs of small nations when this seems desirable in its national interest? How, then, can one explain our decision to check Communism in Guatemala, or to support and finance the government of South Vietnam? To say that the intervention of the United States is benevolent, and that its tradition precludes imperialism, is not to say that intervention does not occur and not in the dim past, but in our own times.

Professor Tannenbaum rejects the balance of power, and offers the co-ordinate state concept as an alternative consistent with the American tradition. He opposes any attempt to divide the world between the United States and Russia. But is this the issue today? The issue, if current events are any guide, is that the influence of the two superpowers is waning in a world where we see not one balance, but many, and that both Washington and Moscow now compete in proposing the principles of equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and independence within a larger community of nations which Professor Tannenbaum attributes primarily to Americans. In this new era of the "cold peace" the United States will have a notable contribution to make out of its past experience, but this contribution will have to be meshed with that of other nations in ways which the *realpolitikers* have explored with a much greater attention to the actualities of international relations than is apparent in this book.

In any case, must it be a question of *either/or?*—either *realpolitik* disconnected from ideals, or ideals disconnected from realities? For many years the study of foreign policy in the United States went on in a stratosphere, where it was assumed that Americans functioned uncontaminated by the considerations of survival which shape the lives of other peoples. When this was discovered, during World War II, to be remote from actual experience, the swing of the pendulum brought some of our commentators to accept uncritically the "tough" approach exemplified particularly by German geopoliticians. It is high time that we should seek a middle course, consonant, as Professor Tannenbaum suggests, with the American tradition, for surely life among nations, as among human beings in general, is compounded, in varying measure at various times, of both ideals and realities.

VERA MICHELES DEAN
Foreign Policy Association

BOYD C. SHAFER. *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*. Pp. xi, 319. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955. $5.00.

It is now just thirty years since Carlton J. H. Hayes published his *Essays on Nationalism*. At the time of the appearance of this epoch-making work of American historical writing the official custodians of American historiography did not see fit to include a review of the book in the *American Historical Review*. They considered it to be current "journalism" or "sociology" and not "real" history. As Dr. Hayes aptly observed, for many of our historians of the time, nationalism was part of the atmosphere they breathed and not the object of serious historical study. How much the climate of historical studies has changed since that time may be gathered from the fact that the latest historical study of the problem of nationalism comes from the pen of Boyd C. Shafer, newly designated editor of the *American Historical Review*. Largely as a result of the pioneering work by Hayes, and since 1932, by the presence in this country of that other great student of nationalism, Hans Kohn, even the most traditionally-minded of our historians have come to recognize the reality as well as the crucial significance of nationalism for the understanding of modern history and politics. Stimulated by the example and by the personal influence of Hayes and Kohn, a considerable body of literature on nationalism has been produced by younger American scholars to take its place with the continuing volume of studies by European scholars. Boyd Shafer conceived the worthwhile idea of providing a synthesis of this large and ramified literature in order to bring once again to our attention the meaning and significance of nationalism and problems created by it for our present society. As he indicates in his Preface, Dr. Shafer does not offer the volume as a "definitive work on nationalism" and his materials refer chiefly to France, Great Britain, and the United States. But he has read widely and discriminatingly, he has reflected on his reading wisely and critically, and he has set down his mature and meaningful reflections with an elegance of style and clarity of presentation that make the volume a pleasure for both scholar and layman.

Dr. Shafer's volume is divided into five sections. The first section deals with the elusive and tricky problem of definitions. Dr. Shafer quite properly takes the view that nationalism as such did not appear before the eighteenth century. He recognizes the fact that it is "a complex and dynamic" phenomenon which defies short and logical definition, and he wisely observes that "simple explanations of human institutions and actions are nearly always wrong, revealing only the naiveté or the interest of their authors." In the second section, dealing with what the author calls metaphysical, physical, and cultural "Illusions Concerning Nationalism," he brings

to bear healthy, rationalist, and illuminating dissection to expose the inflated unrealities of the various myths developed by historians, social scientists, journalists and, above all, political pamphleteers regarding the grandeur of their own nationalism and the viciousness or inferiority of the nationalisms of other people. The third and fourth sections are devoted to a description of the historical process of the development of nationalism from 1715 to the present. Here the materials on social and economic factors are particularly searching. The final section on "Delusions about Man and His Groupings" represents the author's own credo as developed from his historical investigations. His chief point is that the similarities of men are much greater than their differences, and that since nationalism is the product of historical conditions, "it could evolve in the future into some other kind of loyalty or dissolve into something quite new and unexpected" (p. 212). His final peroration is one that sane citizens of all nations might well take to heart: "If men are not brothers, it is not because they inherently differ. That sentiment of unity and exclusiveness which we have defined as nationalism now keeps them apart. This nationalism, however, does not mean that men could not be brothers, could not live in peace. For there is no basis, historical, biological, psychological, for believing this nationalism must be or will be permanent. Below the surface of their national peculiarities, men remain, so far as we know, more alike than different" (p. 237).

KOPPEL S. PINSON

Queens College

GERHARD L. WEINBERG. *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941.* Pp. 218. Leiden, Holland: E. J. Brill, 1954. Guilders 19.00.

Soviet propagandists have been remarkably successful in diverting attention from the years 1939–41, the period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration. They have done this partly by avoiding all reference to the Soviet-Nazi agreements with their secret protocols and partly by continuously denouncing Western policies. The few documents published under Soviet auspices have not been selected to help scholars like Mr. Weinberg to complete the story told in German documents about the 1939–41 period, but for other purposes that have nothing to do with scholarship.

Mr. Weinberg has scraped the bottom of the barrel of German sources. He has added to previous accounts of the period and has reached some new and significant conclusions.

He believes that the Nazis made their decision to make a political as well as an economic agreement with the USSR between July 10 and July 21. The agreements signed August 23 did not immediately produce cordial relations. The two totalitarian dictatorships began to adopt more friendly postures only after September 28, when they agreed on how to divide Poland and other territories. These settlements and improved relations were followed by Soviet economic aid that in Mr. Weinberg's opinion was much more important to Germany than the volume and monetary value seemed to indicate. The Nazis reciprocated by giving direct aid to the Soviet Union in the blockade of Finland during the winter war.

Mr. Weinberg gives convincing evidence that the Nazi decision to attack Russia was not the result of differences over Finland and the Balkans in the fall of 1940. The decision was made in July, three months before Molotov's historic November visit to Berlin. The decision was "Hitler's answer to the challenge of England—as it had been Napoleon's—and was elaborated into a blueprint for ruthless aggrandizement." As the German policy stiffened in the following months, the Russians became more conciliatory in the futile hope of averting the break they pretended not to expect.

Mr. Weinberg closes this thorough, well-organized, well-written study with an excellent chapter of "Conclusions." He does not believe that Germany had carefully plotted to destroy the Soviet Union and Communism or that the USSR had carefully plotted either to deliver Europe to Germany or destroy the Nazis. Instead, he sees ". . . two great powers plodding fitfully along the path of expediency; one motivated by vast schemes of conquest; the other by the hope of protecting what it has and adding what can safely be picked up."

H. H. FISHER

Stanford University

HARRY CRANBROOK ALLEN. *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations* (1783–1952). Pp. 1,024. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955. $10.00.

Not for some time has anyone written of the relations of Great Britain and these United States since 1783. There has been a growing need for revision of earlier expressed views and for bringing the relations of the two English-speaking people up to date. Admittedly Professor Allen has a bias. To his love of the English he has added an affection for the Americans. His obvious sympathetic treatment of the subject is easily explained.

Although this London professor did much reading before he began to write this long book, he studied only published sources. Thus it is not a definitive study, nor does the author claim such distinction for his efforts. On the contrary, he states that he wrote for the general reader. Possibly true in England, but very few general readers in America will have the sustained interest to read 1,000 pages on Anglo-American history.

This book is divided into four parts with a total of nineteen chapters. Seven of the chapters are grouped under Part I, The Relationship. Here the author analyzes the colonial background and develops the many sidedness of Great Britain's relations with her American cousins. Not until page 253 does Mr. Allen treat the period following the War of American Independence in a topographical or chronological way. If these more than 250 pages of analyses of the Anglo-American relations had been condensed into about fifty pages, the book would have been improved greatly.

Ample discussion is given to the period of adjustment, 1783–94, to the rise of tensions to the War of 1812, and to the restoration of peace following the Treaty of Ghent. Many Americans will be interested to learn that the responsibility for our second war with England rested on Jefferson primarily, Madison next and, finally, upon the War Hawks.

In Part III, Isolation, there are four chapters which begin with the background of the Monroe Doctrine and end with a quarter century of calm following the Alabama claims award. America's isolationism is attributed to her "absorption in opening up the West." The author concludes that it was "no coincidence that the closing of the frontier was followed almost immediately by the Spanish-American War." This is emphasizing the Turner frontier theory too much to the exclusion of such significant factors as absorption in developing the Industrial Revolution.

Finally Part IV, World Power, contains five chapters of 450 pages, the longest part of the book. This is probably the author's best contribution to his subject. But even here there are conclusions with which many Americans will disagree. For example, Wilson is blamed for all disputes between the American and the British delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. This, in spite of the vascillating opinions of Lloyd George.

In a very real sense World War II was the culmination of this narrative for never have two allied nations achieved such military union nor such political co-ordination as did Great Britain and the United States from 1940 to 1945. As the author points out, the fact that these two long-time friendly nations so intertwined during the recent crisis was due to the sincere efforts of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.

In their relations to other powers Great Britain and the United States since 1783 have, in many ways, exchanged places. Then England ruled the seas, now America; the financial capital has shifted from London to New York; and the political leadership has moved from Westminster to Capitol Hill and Pennsylvania Avenue. Whatever the future holds in store, concludes this writer, the continued friendly relations of these two powers will be decisive.

Seven maps in the text serve well their purposes. The bibliography is selective, the index accurate. On the whole, the au-

thor has achieved his objective and has written an interesting narrative.

G. C. OSBORN

University of Florida

CLARK M. EICHELBERGER. *UN: The First Ten Years.* Pp. xii, 108. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $1.75.

Clark Eichelberger's intimate connection with the League of Nations and the United Nations should assure this little book a careful and sympathetic reading. Scholars expecting to find a thorough and searching analysis of the problems of the United Nations will undoubtedly be disappointed. This study is not intended for them. It is a popular summary of UN achievements and failures in certain fields, and its purpose is obviously to stimulate popular support for the organization as the central instrument for the preservation of peace in the face of the difficult international problems of our times. Nevertheless, despite its brevity and simplicity, this is an important and rewarding survey. Eichelberger examines the promise and the performance of the UN over the last ten years—on issues of collective security, on the question of peaceful adjustment and settlement of disputes, in the field of technical assistance, and in a number of other areas. In so doing, he illuminates what all of us have known, whatever our points of view. Despite the failures of disarmament, the fiascos over the admission of new members, and the self-righteous verbiage which somehow squeezes every national action of every power into the framework of consistency with the UN Charter, the members of the UN have made that Charter work. It has worked not perfectly, often not even satisfactorily, and yet with more success than one might have anticipated since the start of the cold war in 1947 or thereabouts.

Basically, Eichelberger's hopes for the United Nations are those of a temperate and clear-headed idealism. For the most part, he does not blink reality. He recognizes the utopianism of the schools which plead for an immediate and drastic revision of the Charter in whatever way. He hopes for some change in the admission procedures for new members, but on the whole he recognizes that most difficulties are not structural but political; that an easing of world tensions, because it may lead to more loyal performance by all members of the UN, is the most realistic formula for the development of international organization, at least in the immediate future. And he emphasizes, quite rightly I think, that the chances for a peaceful world will be much brighter if governments increasingly regard the UN as the foundation of their foreign policy rather than as an instrument of policy to be used or bypassed as convenience dictates. It may be, indeed, that Eichelberger underrates the merits of "traditional" diplomacy. After all, the "open" diplomacy of our twentieth-century international conferences, whose purpose has as often been domestic propaganda as negotiation, can hardly be said to have had striking and remarkable success. But this is perhaps to worry a minor point. For it is clear, and Eichelberger understands, that if there is a reasonable amount of good will on all sides, governments, no matter how wedded they may be to more conventional techniques and attitudes, can and will use the UN with growing effectiveness for the purposes for which it was designed. This is, then, an excellent work of propaganda in the best sense, and deserves the attention of all of us who have not as yet given up hope in the face of man's new powers of destruction.

HENRY R. WINKLER

Rutgers University

HARRY BAYARD PRICE. *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning.* Pp. xvi, 424. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press under the Auspices of the Governmental Affairs Institute, Washington, D. C., 1955. $5.00.

It is still too early, as the Preface warns the reader, to attempt a "comprehensive historical appraisal" of the Marshall Plan. Only at a greater distance in time can we get a proper perspective on such a massive undertaking. The author, therefore, should not be blamed if he has failed to give the thoughtful student of world affairs a deeper understanding of the "meaning" of the Plan. (Perhaps that word should have been omitted from the book's title.)

Within his limited terms of reference, Mr. Price has done a capable job. His "evaluation" of the Plan, which occupies the latter half of the book, will be of interest particularly to students of administrative principles and techniques. As respects the significance of the Plan as an historical phenomenon, it adds little if anything to what others have already said and written.

Prepared under the auspices of the Governmental Affairs Institute of Washington at the request of the Economic Cooperation Administration, this book has all the merits but few of the defects of an official history. The author had access to a wealth of material in the ECA files, but at the same time his manuscript was not subject to official approval. Aside from ECA documents and memoranda, Mr. Price has relied heavily on interviews with "knowledgeable persons," some 300 in all, in this country and in thirteen European countries, who had either participated in, or closely observed, the Marshall Plan in action. His talks with leaders of the great enterprise: men like Secretary Marshall, Paul Hoffman, and Averell Harriman and Europeans of comparable stature, besides adding local color give fresh insights. But interviews with minor personalities unknown to the general reader—some of them quoted anonymously—are of questionable value. Moreover, the author's liberal use of verbatim quotation of the opinions of persons interviewed is dubious procedure. Unlike statements in printed documents, such interviews are not subject to verification by other workers in this field.

PERCY W. BIDWELL

Council on Foreign Relations

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED. *America at Mid-Century.* Translated by Margaret Ledésert. Pp. ix, 357. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1955. $5.75.

In 1927, André Siegfried, professor of economic geography at the Collège de France, applied his Gallic insight to the problem of American civilization in a book which his translator called *America Comes of Age.* His idea then was that the United States had reached the end of European domination and was entering into an era of mass culture which was genuinely her own. In *America at Mid-Century,* he has provided a sequel which attempts an analysis of that mass culture in its manifestations during the interval.

Once more in this book he proves himself a critic, by his own definition, in the Latin tradition, a dealer in sharp generalizations, and a destroyer of shams rather than a student for whom evidence is the essential of a sound conclusion. A sensitive observer and a frequent visitor to the United States, he is amazingly accurate in most of his statements and highly provocative in his conclusions and predictions. He is a journalist rather than a researcher, a maker rather than a prover of hypotheses.

His central thesis here is worthy of a book. It is that the United States has not lost its Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, idealistic, and isolationist character even though, since 1914, it has fundamentally changed in political, economic, social, and demographic respects. Now a world power with world responsibilities, inheritor and reshaper of the Industrial Revolution, inventor of mass culture and benevolent capitalism, creator of men of action rather than of contemplation, America shares the future with Russia; and Europe must discover a new balance in a world in which she has no real power. M. Siegfried is unhappy for himself, for France, and for Mediterranean and classical culture in general, but he is not unduly bitter. He merely exposes, as his countryman Tocqueville did before him, the problem of self-knowledge that America must face if she is to assume the place in the world that is obviously cut out for her. Although he speaks for the great destiny that is ending, he can also welcome a great destiny that is beginning.

A man of critical summaries, his last chapter is his best and should be read by every student of American civilization. By the same token, his first chapter is his worst. In it he stumbles into the pitfall of prejudice and misunderstanding which has caught so many European critics: the prob-

lem of minorities in the United States, specifically the Negro, the Jew, and the Catholic; and he succeeds in producing a result which is only laughable. But his book is redeemed by his chapters on the American economy, where he is most at home, and by those on the American social background and political life, where he reveals himself as an astute and open-minded commentator on the passing scene. Taken as a whole, his analysis of American civilization is as good a general summary as we have recently had, and it is written with the wit and charm that only a Frenchman could muster.

ROBERT E. SPILLER
University of Pennsylvania

MARVER H. BERNSTEIN. *Regulating Business by Independent Commission.* Pp. xi, 306. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $5.00.

The author of this comparatively brief volume states that it is his purpose "to evaluate critically the role of the independent regulatory commission, to develop a more realistic concept of the process of governmental regulation, and to appraise the independent commission as an agent of governmental regulation."

He adopts as criteria of judgment primarily four factors: (1) the commission's ability to develop political responsibility, involving the Congress and the President; (2) its capacity to operate in the public interest; (3) its competency administratively, especially in terms of expertness and continuity of policy; and (4) its strength to be independent of the interests to be regulated.

He classifies seven regulatory bodies as truly independent: for the transport field, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board; for other utilities, the Federal Power Commission and the Federal Communications Commission; and for specific economic practices, the Federal Trade Commission, the Labor Relations Board, and the Security Exchange Commission.

Following an historical evaluation, he suggests a number of conclusions which run quite counter to popular conceptions of the regulatory commission. It is far from the ideal mode of control. It is not "out of politics," but simply out of the spotlight. It has not been expert and quasi-judicial so much as it has been slow in keeping up with technological change, and rather less than impartial in dealing with the industries and enterprises affected. It is no longer the most important actor in the drama of regulation but is outstarred by the executive branch, as the result not so much of the recognition of its own inadequacies, but the alternating pressures of military emergency and economic depression.

Professor Bernstein, as a former consultant to the Bureau of the Budget on regulatory administration is intimately acquainted with the workings of the commissions he is analyzing. He diagnoses the "life cycle of regulatory commissions," pointing up four phases, *gestation, youth, maturity* which he identifies as devitalization, and *old age* which he characterizes as debility and decline. He conducts "a search for the public interest" in a review of the independence, on the one hand, and the responsibility, on the other, which commissions have shown in actual practice. He finds great need for the development of a coherent program of national regulation of economic affairs. As a result, he calls for more and better central planning and supervision of such regulation by the executive branch of the government.

The enforcement activities of the regulatory commissions he appraised as weak, poorly staffed, and inadequately supported; with little, if any, experimentation with new techniques and incentives of compliance or recognition of the need to plan compliance programs or to recognize the interdependency of the various controls which are and might be used. After an incisive analysis of the setting, scope and character of the regulatory process, in which he points out, among other things, that regulation is a two-way process in which the interests regulated work just as hard, if not harder, to influence the behavior of the commission and its staff as these work to carry out the regulatory program, the author reaches his concluding chapter in which he summarizes his findings and recommendations in the form of a baker's dozen of requirements of effective regulation. Particularly the author insists that regulation will be successful only as it has strong political leadership, popular support, and clear legislative mandate; will be effective only as it is integrated in policy and adept in administration.

This is an important book. Its brevity is a tribute to the author's ability to cleave to his objective while hewing through a jungle of both detail and preconception. Its clarity is unusual, especially in academic volumes. Its advent is a recognition of the new scholar who is practitioner as well. Such a book could not have been written without the intimate acquaintance which day to day contact with the problems gives. Yet the author avoids the pitfalls of the "expert" and keeps both his courage and his point of view as broad as the problem he is discussing.

HENRY REINING, JR.
University of Southern California

CHARLES VEVIER. *The United States and China, 1906–1913: A Study of Finance and Diplomacy.* Pp. ix, 229. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955. $5.50.

This is a competent narrative and critique of the American "dollar diplomacy" which centered around Willard Straight and Manchuria in the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty. The story was long ago outlined by Herbert Croly and has since been dissected by John G. Reid and others, in various aspects and from various points of view. But Mr. Vevier has been able to go to the Straight Papers, to the numerous collections of papers of Huntington Wilson, George Marvin and others in the Library of Congress and elsewhere, and to the National Archives; accordingly he is able to document and point up his analytic summary more cogently and definitively than earlier writers. The result is well-fashioned and readable, on the whole, although the reader may find that even an able summary of such a matter as the Chinchow-Algun agreement of 1909 becomes a bit tedious. The ineptitude of Philander C. Knox is once again confirmed, and Mr. Vevier concludes that the Taft administration was unable clearly "to draw the line between private and national interest."

Since this is as close to an inside account, based on the records of the Americans concerned, as we are likely to get, it may perhaps serve as the last word on Willard Straight's efforts and the American aspect of this phase of American diplomacy; at the same time it may stimulate future researchers to pursue further the context in which American Far Eastern diplomacy occurred. Mr. Vevier has made no independent study of this context. He refers to a total of five Chinese individuals by name, over the period 1906–13, and they all remain shadowy figures seen entirely through American sources. It is true that the diplomatic record among the powers gives short shrift to Chinese diplomacy, such as it was; but the fact remains that the railroads and banks contemplated by the negotiators would have functioned in China, and the negotiators were eventually in large part frustrated by revolutionary events there. More than that, one key figure in Mr. Vevier's account was Straight's chief point of contact in the imperial bureaucracy, the American-educated T'ang Shao-yi. The Chinese side of T'ang's negotiations and his mission to Washington in 1908 can be studied in Chinese sources accessible in the American libraries used by the author. The same is true of the entire Chinese approach to railroad financing. Dr. E-tu Zen Sun has recently demonstrated the value of a two-sided as opposed to a purely foreign based study of railroad diplomacy in her volume *Chinese Railways and British Interests, 1898–1911* (King's Crown Press, 1954). Let us hope that Mr. Vevier's able study is the last word in that school of diplomatic history which traces American policy formation from the inside but never gets outside.

J. K. FAIRBANK
Harvard University

WILLIAM STANDLEY and ARTHUR AGETON. *Admiral Ambassador to Russia.* Pp. 533. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. $6.00.

For some twenty months Admiral Standley served as United States Ambassador to

Moscow. How this difficult post happened to be assigned to him is not clear. His acquaintance with Russians, according to the author, dates back to his childhood days in Sonoma County, California. The schooling on the banks of the Russian River was hardly adequate. Small wonder when the Admiral had met Americans who were equipped with better knowledge, the Admiral-Ambassador was jealous and even exasperated when these, for reasons of their own, refused to co-operate with him. About some of these recalcitrant persons Admiral Standley writes with annoyance and regret that he had not met them in the navy; there he would have presented them with the choice of "damn it all . . . , do what you're told or else." And he sadly adds that unfortunately at the embassy "there just wasn't any 'or else.'"

As an autobiography the memoirs offer some interesting bits of reading; as a source of historical data the reader should be cautioned: much of the presented information calls for serious verification. Occasionally Admiral Standley demonstrated levelheaded judgment. Unfortunately, his Peglerian philosophy of history caused by his military background seriously handicapped him from being consistently successful. Steeped in his naval tradition the Admiral lacked diplomatic finesse, political sagacity, and economic vision badly called for at his post. He knew full well that Allied victory was the goal, but he knew less how to deal with an ally during these trying months.

The author's peppery remarks about Roosevelt reveal his dislike of the President whom he regarded as a man who always (!) preferred "appeasement or compromise in a political disagreement to an out-and-out fight"; who always engaged in the "venal trade of votes." Admiral Standley had other scores to settle such as that with the former head of the Lend Lease mission in Moscow, General Phillip Faymonville. Since the latter was directly responsible to the President he refused on occasions to divulge certain data sought by the Ambassador. This antagonized Standley further and deepened his resentment to a point that bordered on frustration. Other personages added little humor to the situation and explain his caustic references to them. Visits of former ambassador Joseph E. Davies and Wendell Willkie, who came with personal messages from the White House and therefore enjoyed special favors in the Soviet capital, taxed the Ambassador's patience beyond his endurance. After some twenty months of such experience he resigned from his post with some dour reminiscences.

Throughout the book there are a number of inaccuracies which call for correction in a later edition. Thus it is incorrect to refer to the "falling of Stalingrad to the Germans." Nor is it correct to state that the city of Ashkhabad is "on the Chinese Eastern Railway." One is equally puzzled by the reference to Peter I as the unifier of Russia and liberator of the serfs. There are a number of incidents such as the case of the wrist watch being requested by some Soviet engineer. The episode has been carefully verified and the version found badly garbled. Such carelessness might unwittingly cause grave unpleasantness to people who deserve more kindly mention.

In the end Admiral Standley recommends a military as well as an economic and moral "posture of strength." He is rather uneasy about our present prosperity which is based upon an "artificial foundation of war economy and a reckless and ruinous policy of deficit spending." The author senses keenly that the present critical era is more than a clash of military nature; it represents a conflict between two standards of morality. If our cherished ethical principles fail to stand up against those of our opponents, the military and economic "postures" alone will prove of little comfort. These are gratifying conclusions which we hope more men with "military posture" will come to realize before it is too late.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR
Stanford University

ARTHUR S. LINK. *American Epoch: A History of the United States Since the 1890's.* Pp. xxii, 724, xxvii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. $6.00.

This book is one more addition to a long and growing list of single volume works on American history in the twentieth century. As such it inevitably conforms to a standardized pattern: beginning with an analysis of American problems of the late nineteenth century, it proceeds with a comprehensive survey of recent American politics, social change, economic activities, and foreign policy. And yet the book differs from its competitors in providing illuminating chapters on demographic developments at various stages during the period under consideration. These make up what is perhaps the most significant contribution of the book. The author has brought together and organized an amazing mass of information.

To this reviewer it seems that Professor Link has a marked antipathy to American business enterprise and, at first, an equally marked sympathy for union labor. He might be described as an unreconstructed Rooseveltian New Dealer.

Professor Link provides an illuminating description of the American people before World War I, which he follows with a section on economic development from 1897 to 1914; and yet he does not supply the logical connection between these two sections: that had it not been for the business men the rapidly growing American population would have had no means of support. Admittedly business leaders in the United States fell far short of perfection, but they did provide a living for millions of people. And in the long run Professor Link somewhat grudgingly admits that big business men were no more of a menace to the general welfare than the irresponsible heads of some labor unions.

In line with his antipathy to business enterprise Link finds considerable fault with the economic views of conservative justices of the Supreme Court. About the Court in the years 1921–30, he writes, "So retrogressive, in fact, was the new Court that on occasion it tended to be blindly reactionary in cases involving economic and social policies."

In the account of Woodrow Wilson, the author is adversely critical. He makes it clear that in his domestic policy, Wilson wavered uncertainly from conservatism to progressivism. In foreign affairs Wilson does not seem to have been endowed with even a moderate degree of statesmanship. In fact those who believe that Wilson was primarily a phrasemaker will not be disturbed in their view by Professor Link's treatment.

This book makes no notable contributions to the accounts of the Harding, Coolidge or Hoover administration. But, as might be expected, Professor Link finds the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt particularly praiseworthy in its pursuance of progressive ideals. He even finds justification for Roosevelt's proposal to pack the Supreme Court.

In general, Professor Link's analysis of the diplomatic problems preceding World War II is objective and reliable. But in describing the Atlantic Conference of 1941, he asserts that Roosevelt "refused to make any commitments of a military or naval character." Winston Churchill states flatly, in *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 439–46, that in case the Japanese should make any further aggressive moves in the South Pacific, Roosevelt promised to send them a stiff warning or practically an ultimatum.

For the Truman administration Link finds that Truman "extended the frontiers of progressivism." He also records that Truman "had a capacity for descending to the lower level of political warfare," and that he "contributed to the deterioration of public morality."

Link's survey of the Korean War and the MacArthur episode is noncontroversial in tone.

This book has an excellent critical bibliography.

RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW
Westbrook, Conn.

ALAN P. GRIMES. *American Political Thought.* Pp. xi, 500. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955. $6.00.

Increasing interest in the thinking of Americans on matters political has brought a concomitant interest in publication in this field that is especially welcome and encouraging from the standpoint of scholarship and literate exposition and criticism. To this sequence of literature on American political theory, Professor Alan P. Grimes of Michigan State University has presently contributed a useful and effective treatment in his volume, *American Political Thought.*

At first glance Grimes' treatment and organizational pattern do not display singularity of concept nor foreshadow novelty in approach. Chapter headings are: "Rise of Protestantism"; "Puritan Political Thought"; "English Revolutionary Thought"; "American Revolution"; "American Constitutionalism"; "The Federalists"; "Jeffersonian Democracy"; "The Concept of the Common Man"; "The New Society (individualists and utopians)"; "Slavery and the Rights of Man from both the Anti- and Pro-Slavery Sides"; "The National Concept of Sovereignty"; "Manchester Liberalism in America"; "American Utopian Reformers"; "Progressive Movement"; "Modern Anti-Democratic Thought"; "Pragmatic Liberalism."

In many ways these sound traditional enough in the main, and are normally sufficient in description and character to indicate who may be treated as illustrative of these various movements in American political thought. While it may be perceived that most of the older favorites in the sense of their necessary inclusion are covered within this volume of Professor Grimes', it is true that he has not merely parroted any previous list of accepted American thinkers nor has he aped all of his predecessors. Traditionally conceived the work in review may be, but it has not delivered only the timeworn and historic figures and treatments. Less familiar by far to students of political theory are some of those whose analysis by the author constitutes an achievement of considerable magnitude.

Examples of this aspect of *American Political Thought* are the portions allotted to Orestes Brownson, Hinton R. Helper, William Harper, George Fitzhugh, E. L. Godkin, Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Laurence Gronlund, Lawrence Dennis, William James, and John Dewey. The sections on Henry George are an outstanding part of the volume, and represent a good presentation of George in relation to his own times and to American political philosophy as a body of knowledge. Likewise, the treatment of Laurence Gronlund and of Lawrence Dennis is a core summary in a field almost bereft of systematic and comparative analysis.

As a whole the volume is well written; it may not sparkle with a brilliant or scintillating style, but meaning can be extracted from the author's words without the expenditure of labor in an effort to mine sense from obfuscation. Grimes displays a fine sense of organization and of continuity in the historical perspective of his work and his acquaintance with American literature and with the development of ideas therein which lends strength to his work when that strength is needed. All in all, this is a serviceable volume for practical use in courses in American political thought, and as a general handbook.

CHARLES W. SHULL
Wayne University

WILLIAM M. BEANEY. *The Right to Counsel in American Courts.* Pp. xi, 268. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955. $4.50.

This book, dealing with that vital right upon which the other constitutional rights may often depend, has obviously been preceded by an extraordinary amount of very thorough, careful, and discriminating study, orderly thought, and systematic arrangement. The subject has been less treated by scholars than other civil rights. The author has not merely sat in the law library reading and digesting the many cases (fifty-four United States Supreme Court, one hundred seventy-two Federal and 344 state) and the scores of articles in the law reviews (many not referred to in the tables at the end) which he cites and comments on. In the important cases he has obtained and studied the briefs of counsel and the records. More than this, he has himself gone into the courts, personally observed the procedure, and interviewed many judges, prosecutors and lawyers in order to ascertain at first hand how the offer, appointment and assistance of counsel to those accused of crime actually works.

The book shows throughout the result of this practical approach. I venture the confident suggestion that any United States or state judge who reads it with an open mind will agree that his time was thus eminently well spent.

Mr. Beaney's analysis of the leading cases discussed (such as *Powell v. Alabama, Johnson v. Zerbst* and *Betts v. Brady*), although concise, is thorough and informative. His briefer references to other cases give just the fact or facts which we must know.

To me the most unusually satisfactory feature throughout the book is the summary at the end of each topic, section and chapter, sometimes so labeled and sometimes not. The classification from time of the decisions on different points is also very welcome and helpful.

I strongly protest against the practice (found also in many other text books) of referring to books and articles already cited as *"op. cit."* without the prior page where the full citation may be found. This annoying practice is never indulged in citing court decisions, which are always given in full, including S. Ct., L. Ed., N.W., etc. Mr. Beaney's notes are at the bottom of the pages and not inconveniently at the end of the book.

It is believed that the author has not given deserved attention to the practical difficulty of obtaining competent counsel by persons accused of politically unpopular causes.

I am disappointed in the absence of more definite suggestions and recommendations in the otherwise excellent "Summary and Conclusions" at the end. With Justices Murphy and Rutledge gone from the four "incorporators," the "fair trial doctrine" is no more vague and difficult than the "arbitrary and capricious" test which may ultimately be applied to state infringements of the four basic freedoms.

HENRY S. DRINKER
Philadelphia, Pa.

HANS B. THORELLI. *The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition.* Pp. xvi, 658. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. $8.00.

The curiosity in the United States about economic solutions in Sweden makes it appropriate that this Swedish scholar (like his countryman Myrdal in another area) should review a significant sector of our economy and culture. The title of this book, unless the subtitle is carefully noted, is more inclusive than the contents. This chronicle and estimate, except for necessary background and some reflections at the end, really deals with the years 1890 (when the Sherman Act was passed) to 1903, which, for reasons given, the author regards as having institutionalized our antitrust policy. Within this short span, the treatment of the phases which Dr. Thorelli investigated at first hand and in the original sources (such as relations of attorneys general with their subordinates in the field) is most illuminating. What he has taken from commentators, except as they represent public opinion at the time, is less valuable and, it may be, less valid. Incidentally, in the bibliography he lists as "primary sources" much that another would call distinctly secondary.

The book would have profited had the author's scaffolding been torn down so that his building could appear. Instead, he is constantly clambering about ladders, platforms, and ramps, telling the reader how and why he did this and that. The work that he did himself is good and does not need the explanations of method. The full footnotes would be easier to follow had the publisher put the numbering in larger type; as it is, what goes with what is difficult to know if you are past your sharpest eyesight.

On the whole, Dr. Thorelli feels the "ideological impact upon the economic environment" offers "the principal and lasting significance of the Sherman Act. Antitrust's is a mission of morale. Half a century after the policy became institutionalized it is still a living symbol of economic egalitarianism. . . . In an age when increasing emphasis seems to be placed on security and stability, on co-operation and organization in all fields, antitrust serves as a reminder that life is also dynamic, . . . that those who would rather compete than congregate are at least worthy of toleration. In a century prone to look to the advantages of centralization, antitrust boldly proclaims the advantages of decentralization. . . . "

That is to make it an article of national faith, accepted rather than acted upon, as vague as democracy itself. This is the truth, for the tides of technology, the concentrations in business due to wars and de-

pressions, and the magnified role of central government have flowed over the manes of Senator Sherman and his collaborators. This victory of consolidation and (quite within the law) economical large-scale production was foretold in the very effort to bolster competition. "Antitrust," used by Dr. Thorelli as a noun (meaning fulmination? or prosecution? or complacent rule of reason?), was, in theory, a confession from the first that an era of laissez faire was ending. What place is there in "antitrust" for the use of atomic power? If the federal government, or perhaps an international control agency, farms it out to "private enterprise," can the result be other than an illusion of free initiative?

BROADUS MITCHELL
Rutgers University

•

RICHARD N. CURRENT. *Daniel Webster and the Rise of National Conservatism.* (The Library of American Biography, edited by Oscar Handlin.) Pp. xi, 215. Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown, and Company, 1955. $3.00.

Daniel Webster attained a near apotheosis in popular imagination during the first fifty years after his death. In 1900, when a presumably knowledgeable group of electors first balloted on candidates for New York University's new Hall of Fame, Washington ranked at the top with ninety-seven votes, and Webster tied Lincoln for second place with ninety-six. After another fifty years Webster's memory was threatened with oblivion. School children learned less and less about him until at last a generation of Americans grew up that did not know him, except as a fictional character in Stephen Vincent Benét's story of "The Devil and Daniel Webster." In this delightful yarn Benét has Webster arguing against the sanctity of a contract. It is possible that Webster might have outargued the Devil, but in real life he would never have argued against the sanctity of contracts.

Mr. Current provides an incisive analysis of Webster's career. In 200 readable pages both the personality of the man and his contributions to the development of the nation are set forth. Twelve pages are devoted to Webster's boyhood, education, and the early years of his law practice. Perhaps another ten pages throughout the book deal with his marriages, family life, and farming activities. Webster's great strength in debate (the explanation of his contemporary fame) is best seen in the 20 per cent of this volume which deals with slavery and the other sectional problems of the period. Most enduring are his contributions as a diplomat while Secretary of State, to which Mr. Current devotes some twenty pages. The coverage of party battles and campaigns requires about twenty-five pages, an analysis of Webster's reputation and a note on sources, twenty pages. The remaining third of the author's emphasis, properly distributed through every chapter, is upon Webster's faithful representation of the merchants and industrial leaders who sent the Great Advocate to Washington in 1813 and kept him there almost without interruption until his death in 1852.

Perhaps the honorable and necessary bases of national conservatism are the same today as they were when Webster was sent to Congress. Methods have changed. In his day it was not considered improper for a statesman to be steadily and openly subsidized by his constituents and clients for an amount equal to ten times his official salary. There is little new for a biography of Webster, but there is merit in a clearly written interpretation for a generation that should understand the changing political mores of the nation.

CHARLES M. THOMAS
Air University

F. O. MIKSCHE. *Atomic Weapons and Armies.* Pp. 222. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $5.00.

GEORGE C. REINHARDT. *American Strategy in the Atomic Age.* Pp. ix, 236. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. $3.75.

Truly global-legged in range and "city-busters" in potential destructive effects, atomic weapons cast mushroomlike shadows over the daily decisions of responsible statesmen and military leaders. Willing or not, the Western democratic nations face the threat of utter devastation should a third world war begin without the restraint of possible punishment in kind upon the aggressor. The two volumes, briefly examined here, generate productive thinking on the basic problem of survival. They serve primarily, however, to pose a host of related thorny questions.

Armies today are challenged by a wholesale revolution in their traditional *raison d'être.* Lieutenant Colonel Miksche, former Czech officer and a well-informed student of European military history, argues that the mere existence of atomic weapons and the horrors implicit in them will probably neither avert a major war in the future nor prevent the use of atomic weapons. Reciprocal use of atomic weapons on a massive scale, he submits, may ordain a future war in which perhaps no atomic weapons or only tactical atomic weapons may be employed in its initial stages. Thus, Colonel Miksche states the dilemma facing the strategists and tacticians of armies: are atomic weapons "army-busters"? Have atomic weapons rendered ground forces ineffective as a combat force defeating decisively enemy forces in the field? After winning victories on battlefields (which may even exclude cities as such), must armies then occupy the enemy homeland before a war decision can be obtained?

Colonel Miksche on historical grounds sets forth a case for armies which can yet engage in concentrations, break-throughs and envelopments under atomic fire. But in his very last paragraph, he reverses his field by concluding: "Perhaps A-weapons will 'atomize' tactics to such an extent that the forms of ground combat will take on a completely guerrilla-like character." Here is the self-stated germ for a rebuttal of Colonel Miksche's present volume, one might hope the thesis for his next engaging book.

Concerning the achievement of the military decision in a future war by means of an army occupation, Colonel Miksche steps well forward from the ranks with the conclusion: "The question of whether it would be possible to decide a war without physical occupation can, at best, only be answered with a very weak affirmative." The late surrender of Japan, based upon a willingness evidenced long before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, seems unnecessarily slighted. Likewise, Colonel Miksche seems unsure of the effects of what he calls "strategic air warfare" upon the position of troops engaged in the so-called "battle area proper." He appears to share the common fallacious belief that decisive elements of air warfare are synonymous with the bombing of cities in unlimited warfare. Colonel Miksche does indicate bravely and usefully that the role of ground forces in war has been drastically, very drastically, modified by the advent of atomic weapons.

Colonel George C. Reinhardt, U. S. Army retired, has written a sequel to the informative volume, *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat,* which he coauthored with Lt. Colonel William R. Kintner. *American Strategy in the Atomic Age* is a plea for the determination of a "cold war strategy." Rejecting the extremes of exterminating or appeasing Communist imperialism, Reinhardt sets forth his blueprint for the stabilization of international conflict short of an all out third world war.

He substantiates our need for massive and ready military power so that enlightened American policies and actions can proceed with minimum risk. Colonel Reinhardt then examines at length the additional requirements for a strategy for peace, namely: (1) the political art of combat with the Communist ideology; (2) world leadership by the United States in creating effective collective security of the free world; (3) the beating of "atoms into ploughshares" with its potential economic and political benefits; and lastly, (4) the organization for and the implementation of an American "cold-war strategy." Colonel Reinhardt's ambitious plan was not fully attained. His volume may not become a classic. But it documents in timely fashion realities of the present world conflict which academic scholars may be too late in doing. That a professional military man can be a skilled literary craftsman broadly concerned with political and social aspects of military affairs is likewise self-evident.

EUGENE M. EMME
Air War College

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. *Business Concentration and Price Policy*. Pp. xxii, 514. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $9.00.

This is the report of a conference on business concentration and price policy, held in June 1952, under the auspices of the Universities—National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. At the time of publication, it was the fifth of seven numbers in the Special Conference Series of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the other conference subjects being: problems in the study of economic growth and stabilization (not published); business cycles; research in business finance; regularization of business investment; capital formation and economic growth (in press); and policies to combat depression (in press).

In this report, twelve topical papers are treated, each being discussed by one or more commentators. Papers and comments were highlighted for publication by the chairman's introduction.

Space limits prevent review in detail and make it unwise to distinguish among the thirty-six participants; but we should scan the general scope. An examination of the principles of classification in the census of manufactures helps to clarify usefulness and weakness of such data as bases for measuring concentration. Measures used in empirical studies of concentration are considered statistically and theoretically in four chapters, including one especially concerned with vertical integration. Some presumable reasons for the reach for business bigness are considered in studies of mergers, economies of scale, adjustments to taxes, maneuvers of conglomerate bigness, and types of price discrimination. There is a section on "full-cost" pricing policy, with divergence of views regarding what deliberate use of designated mark-up might suggest about extent or lack of competition. A section on the nature of price flexibility and the determination of relative price changes leaves one aware of the need for more knowledge of the linkage between business concentration and price determination.

Among the numerous questions likely to come to the many economists who will study this much-needed book, a few might be pitched in for a starter. If it is as nearly impossible as it often seems to be for an academic or a government agent to measure concentration in significant relation to behavior of quantities and prices, how can the oligopolist evaluate his own potential and hazard with the success implied in much of the prevalent discussion? If bigness as a result of merger or common control of separate corporations is important, why is not equal bigness similarly important even if it arise in a corporation grown wholly from stock subscription and retained earnings? If economies of scale be viewed as technological potential in relation to some given set of market conditions, what must be added to explain diversity of shops, plants, and firms, not only nationally and regionally, but even in the same industry in the same (freightwise) location? And how except by the conference method can we compel each other to face elemental questions? More such conferences!

J. P. WATSON
University of Pittsburgh

BENJAMIN HAGGOTT BECKHART (Ed.). *Banking Systems*. Pp. xviii, 934. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. $13.50.

W. T. NEWLYN and D. C. ROWAN. *Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa*. Pp. xiv, 301. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. $4.80.

Simply put, the first of the aforementioned books is a collection of chapters describing the financial systems and practices in sixteen countries with different industrial structures and types of economic organization: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, Western Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This "diversified group" of countries has been selected with the view of showing "the way in which the credit systems have adapted themselves to the economic organizations of the respective nations."

Evidently following a fairly rigid and standardized plan, each chapter sets the functioning of the banking and credit system against a survey of the social and economic background and describes the way in which it has assisted the economic growth of the country. It then discusses the role of the various financial institutions: commercial banks, savings banks, urban and rural mortgage banks, and others in financing the credit needs of the nation. This is followed by a review of the place of the central bank and its credit policies and objectives. A concluding section evaluates the banking and credit structure.

Most of the articles were written by experts in banking from the countries concerned. But as is to be expected, the contributions vary in quality. In this reviewer's opinion, the best chapters from the point of view of organization, treatment, and presentation of subject are those dealing with banking and credit in Australia (Torleiv Hytten), Canada (Donald Bailey Marsh), Western Germany (H. Irmler), Japan (Edna E. Ehrlich and Frank M. Tamagna), Mexico (Margaret G. Myers), and Switzerland (Eugen Grossmann). Least adequate is the description of the banking system of the United States.

As the editor, Dr. Benjamin Haggett Beckhart, Professor of Banking in Columbia University, states in the Preface, the book is "a successor volume to *Foreign Banking Systems*" which he and the late H. Parker Willis published in 1929. Apart from the selection of some countries (especially the inclusion of Cuba) with which one might disagree, a major defect of the volume is the absence of a general introduction surveying the changes that have taken place in banking and credit structures in the quarter century since 1929 as a result of the great depression, war, and political revolutions, and the failure in showing how these transformations have altered banking and credit theory. The editor indeed alludes to some of these changes in two brief paragraphs in the Preface; but it is a pity that he has not discussed the subject in sufficient detail to suggest the main lines of development which the individual chapters serve to expose. Such introduction would have bound together and given proper perspective to the sixteen disconnected contributions, and thereby enhanced the usefulness of the book. The work lacks balance as regards the allocation of space to individual contributions to a far greater extent than the earlier edition.

Perhaps the most notable deficiencies are in the treatment or in the omission of specific topics in various articles. For example: the discussion of the evolution of credit control in the Netherlands since World War II is inadequate; and while "open market operations" are mentioned among the principal functions of the Swedish *Riksbank*, the factors that led to the adoption and the method that facilitated the inauguration of open market operations in 1937 are nowhere elucidated. More, although the French capital market is mentioned in a number of places in the survey of the country's banking system, there is nowhere a discussion of it. Surprisingly, also, there is no mention of the United States money and capital markets. And the Amsterdam market is given three and one-half pages. In contrast, about three pages are devoted to the capital market in Cuba, and six and one-half pages to that in Mexico. Finally, it should be noted that the statement in the chapter on the USSR that "the banking reforms in the satellite countries have almost invariably reproduced the Soviet banking structure" oversimplifies the facts.

While the Beckhart volume provides descriptions of banking systems of relatively well known countries in Europe, Asia and the Americas, *Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa* brings to light the working of financial institutions in an area but little known here. Specifically, the book is the first comprehensive, comparative study of the monetary and banking structures of the eight major territories in the British colonies in Africa: Nigeria and the Gold Coast in the west; Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda in the east, and Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Central Africa. As such, it fills a gap in the

literature on colonial money and banking and constitutes an invaluable contribution to our knowledge of the subject.

The book is the result of a highly successful integration of research projects independently carried out by the authors, Dr. W. T. Newlyn (Lecturer in Economics, University of Leeds) and Dr. D. C. Rowan (Lecturer in Economics, University of Melbourne), through first-hand investigations in the African colonies.

Against the background of the economic and social changes in the areas over the past 40 or 50 years, (1) the book gives an admirable description and analysis of the advances in, but particularly the present functioning of the monetary and banking systems there; (2) it assesses the capacity of the institutions "to promote certain ends of policy which appears to command general approval and support"; and (3) it sets out "broad proposals designed to promote adaptation of the existing monetary and financial 'systems' of the several territories in order that they may more effectively contribute towards the attainment of the desired ends of policy." In all, the work is a superior scholarly achievement.

The two volumes make available a considerable body of interesting materials for a university course in comparative banking systems.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER
Washington, D. C.

WILLIAM H. NEWMAN and JAMES P. LOGAN. *Management of Expanding Enterprises.* Pp. viii, 134. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $2.75.

What Makes an Executive? Report of a Round Table on Executive Potential and Performance. Pp. xii, 179. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $3.50.

Both of these books are reports of round table discussions by groups of leading business and professional men on the topics indicated by their titles. Both projects were carried out under a grant from the McKinsey Foundation for Management Research. Twenty-one men participated in the discussions which served as the basis for the first book, and nineteen formed the second group. With the exception of two representatives of McKinsey and Company, the personnel of the two groups included no common members. The authors served as chairmen of the meetings and compiled the summaries of the conclusions reached from handwritten minutes or tape recordings made during the session.

Management of Expanding Enterprises is concerned with the problems which begin to develop in the period of a company's growth in which it is no longer possible for a single executive or a small group of top executives to run it as a closely integrated operation. Typical of the issues discussed are: how are the processes of planning affected by size? How does growth affect the standards used to measure executive performance? What patterns of departmental organization are best adapted to different stages of growth and size? What are the opportunities and limitations of "decentralization"? How does size affect employee morale? What is the place of staff functions in an expanding organization? What steps can be taken to insure clear channels of internal communication? How does size affect personal initiative in middle and top management? How can flexibility be achieved in large scale operations? To what extent can control be secured through the selection, indoctrination, and training of subordinates? How much autonomy should be given decentralized operating units? How does size affect the kind of executive required at different organization levels?

The conclusions which are presented in this book represent the pooled judgments of the participants in the round table as summarized and interpreted by the authors. Since the majority of the members of the group are or were top executives of businesses which have reached this stage of their growth, they discussed these problems on the basis of their own personal experience. This lends their conclusions a practical, down-to-earth quality which inspires confidence in their soundness. (This whole field is so new that relatively little has been written on these questions, so that much of what they conclude constitutes pioneering thinking.) The authors have done an outstanding job of organizing the subject matter and presenting a systematic series of conclusions and recommendations which will be of value both to the working executive and to the student of business organization. An Appendix is included which summarizes in a clear and challenging fashion the more important of the questions raised in the discussions since one of the principal aims of the project was to identify areas of management needing further research. These questions are posed with the thought that they represent a challenge and opportunity for men who believe that an improvement in a knowledge of management is a worthwhile endeavor.

What Makes an Executive? is a similar report presenting a distillation of the thoughts and opinions of a group of mature executives, university professors, clergymen, and a psychiatrist relative to the factors involved in the emergence of top leadership in business and other sectors of society. The paramount objective of this project was to develop key questions which, when answered, will lead to new knowledge. Typical of the questions raised are: how to pick young men who have the potential for eventual leadership, how to aid them in developing their potential to the fullest and how to use them to best advantage in key management positions. To provide some material which will be helpful in these areas, the participants discussed both their own experience as executives and the selection and training programs with which they were familiar. Specifically, the topics covered included: the origins of executive potential, the value of a college education, the recognition of potential executives, the development of future executives, the evaluation of executive performance, and the handling of the executive in the organization. There is also a summary which includes suggestions for future policy and research activities.

While this book also reflects the broad, practical backgrounds of the men participating in the discussions, the treatment of the material itself is not as satisfying as in *Management of Expanding Enterprises.* It appears more loosely organized. It sounds more like a typical round table discussion where many points of view are presented but no clear-cut conclusions are reached. (It was taken directly from tape recordings.) It is as though a moderator was needed to integrate the thinking of the group. The material is interesting, many of the questions are challenging, and there are many valuable comments and suggestions. Nevertheless, this treatment seems rather less conclusive than does the report of the other round table. In spite of this weakness, however, the book contains much that will be of value to the executive, to the personnel man, and to the student of executive development.

ROBERT N. MCMURRY
McMurry, Hamstra, and Company

A. J. BROWN. *The Great Inflation 1939–1951.* Pp. xiv, 321. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $4.80.

Professor Brown's *The Great Inflation* presents a broad panorama of the world-wide inflationary movement associated with World War II and its aftermath. It is not intended to be a detailed analysis of inflation in individual countries, except to the extent necessary for the broad picture, but it provides an excellent background for studies of individual countries.

Inflation is defined as an inordinate rise of prices. The author's general approach is to provide a certain amount of exposition of theory as a framework for the discussion of the factual situations. The exposition of theory is generally elegant and a great effort is made to bring in "realistic" considerations to which more traditional theory had given less emphasis. Nevertheless, the tie between economic theory and the analysis of an actual situation is frequently not very close; this is not the author's fault, but an indication of the underdeveloped state of economic tools even in the hands of a sophisticated expert.

Besides a detailed description of the inflationary movement from 1939 to 1951, the book gives special attention to the effects of war expenditures, the price-wage spiral problem, policies of controlling inflation—monetary, price control and rationing—hyper-inflation, and the international spread of inflation. In many of these areas the author's clear analysis represents an important step forward in our understanding of inflation. However, his description of the effects of sharply increasing Govern-

ment expenditures fails to take into account adequately the fact that the major effect of increased Government operations on the economy is not when expenditures increase, but much earlier, when commitments are increased. For example, military expenditures of the United States in 1951 were about 22 billion dollars; commitments, however, amounted to 50 billion dollars. The inflationary impact of much higher Government commitments is not very closely related to Government expenditures; their more immediate effect is to increase private expenditures. An analysis via commitments or obligations rather than expenditures would have been more relevant, and would probably have afforded even greater support for the author's basic conclusion that "the expenditure approach to the phenomena of inflation, so enlightening in most circumstances, turns out to be sadly inadequate during the period under review."

Professor Brown finds a bias towards inflation in most economies in times of fairly full employment, and he regards this as "the most persistent and troublesome inflationary threat facing the western world." While the relationship between full employment and rising prices is made quite clear, it is not at all obvious why the price rise must be so "inordinate" as to amount to an inflation. The author's sketchy but challenging remarks on this matter deserve to be expanded into a separate book.

HANS A. ADLER

McLean, Va.

PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE and GABRIEL ARDANT. *Economics and Action.* Pp. 222. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. (A UNESCO Publication.) $3.50.

In this slim volume Pierre Mendès-France and Gabriel Ardant undertake to present, to those who have received a good general education but no specific economic or financial training, the insight given by economics regarding action in practical affairs. Three-quarters of the book is devoted to "The Problem of Equilibrium" in the sense of the maintenance of full employment. There are chapters on the beginnings of economics, the classical theory of equilibrium and its shortcomings, the Keynesian general theory of employment, and the full employment policy to which it leads. This largely theoretical discussion is followed by examples of the application of classical theory to the problem of unemployment (including the policy pursued by the gold-bloc countries in the thirties and by Bruning in Germany and Laval in France), which are contrasted with the more Keynesian policies followed by Great Britain after 1931, by Germany under Hitler, and by the New Deal. A final group of chapters covers the advances in our understanding of what is required to fight inflation, forecasting and co-ordination, the problem of equilibrium under a collectivist regime, and the future of full employment policy.

There is little of interest to the specialist in this section. The extent to which it will be of interest to the general reader for whom it is designed is harder for a specialist to say. It is my impression that the theoretical material has been better covered elsewhere, but what is presented appears generally correct and the two chapters on practical experience demonstrate rather impressively that deflation by government is a poor means of eliminating deflation in the economy as a whole.

The remainder of the volume is harder to summarize. Entitled "The Problem of Choice," it deals with the economic allocation of resources. Although it suggests that there is much to be said for the "natural mechanism" of laissez-faire, it also concludes that Joan Robinson and Chamberlin between them have provided "one of the strongest arguments for either anti-trust legislation or a policy of nationalization or state control of large sectors of the economy" (p. 182). The emergence of monopoly or imperfect competition, the existence of unearned rents, the divorce between ownership and management, irrational behavior, and differences between social and private costs are among the factors making for state intervention in economic affairs. "[Once liberalism's intellectual framework] had been undermined by economic analysis, a kind of guilty conscience made it increasingly difficult to resist the 'encroachments' of the state" (p. 199). But where the government does intervene, the book goes on to argue that "considered mechanisms" should be established in place of "natural mechanisms" to enable the state to economize in a rational fashion.

The final section of the volume I can highly recommend to economists, but not to laymen, as a fascinating example of the confusion prevailing in our profession. What particularly bothers me is that, by and large, the authors have summarized what economics has to offer rather fairly. I happen personally to be quite convinced that the shortcomings of free enterprise, including the impact of monopoly on resource allocation, can be shown to be quantitatively rather trivial; but there is no body of literature on the practical performance of free enterprise economies to which I can refer Mendès-France and Ardant. Most basic of all, neither maintenance of full employment nor proper resource allocation is the solution for France's fundamental economic problem; what she needs most is a more rapid increase in productivity over time. Yet, despite the fact that Ardant was General Commissioner for Productivity, this whole matter is omitted—and quite properly so, as economics has as yet practically nothing to say on the subject!

HENRY H. VILLARD

City College of New York

JAMES DAHIR. *Region Building: Community Development Lessons from the Tennessee Valley.* Pp. xiv, 208. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $3.75.

Mr. Dahir believes that the present development of urban life is "unholy," and that the accompanying rural decline is "unhealthy." He suggests, at least as a partial solution, the development of regions together with the development of subregions and communities. Community and subregion development is now largely missing; he undertakes to discuss, in this popularly written volume, what goes on in the Tennessee Valley looking toward this development. He outlines the TVA's structure and activities and provides chapters on various community movements: the push towards industrial development, the relation of electric power to community development, and the successes and failures of regional planning in the area. Mr. Dahir is pro-TVA, and he puts his finger on one great intangible merit of TVA which is obscured by all the attacks on the Authority from the Roosevelt to the Eisenhower administration. The Authority represents a greatly conceived and imaginative approach to community living; it has struck foreigners in this way, whereas, all too frequently Americans have fallen for the vague and ill defined stamp of "creeping socialism." Mr. Dahir is also not unaware that the planning powers of TVA are limited, and he uses Knoxville as a sample to show what happens when planning is absent. The example is a good one, but it ought to be said that most of the examples of good planning induced by TVA are very meager indeed. TVA is not a city or community planning agency. It has been able to help some, but in Tennessee, at least, the big cities are making all the major mistakes previously made by cities in the Northeast and elsewhere. Such community planning as exists doesn't have much impact, for the governmental design is inadequate. Voluntary community action is no substitute for governmental authority.

LEE S. GREENE

University of Tennessee

BURNHAM PUTNAM BECKWITH. *Marginal-Cost Price-Output Control.* Pp. viii, 283. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $5.75.

The book, which fundamentally has an ideological thesis, illustrates a great thought cleavage. It stands for no "differentials," and therefore for equality in the sense of uniformity. Different incomes according to different location, availability in time, and individual ability, can and should be eliminated, is the argument. This goes with socialism and an attempt to generalize "monopolistic competition" (society becoming "the firm"). The main affiliation is with Lange, Lerner, and Sweezy, and some British socialists.

The "theory" is frankly "prescriptive." It states what prices ought to be. The author says it is the only valid theory for so-

cialism and is a significant new argument for socialism.

A disregard for the individual appears in that the harm done to some individuals by proposed policies is considered unimportant (p. 29).

The lack of scholarship and of interest in history as evolution is notable. After a dogmatic statement of the author's ideas about the nature of the economic problem, comes an account, largely secondhand, of early mentions and subsequent discussion of "marginal cost" as related mostly to railway and public utility rates. (Launhardt's *volkswirtschaftlich* is translated as "social"!)

The main logical characteristic is abstraction and assumption, marked by arbitrary, question-begging definition. We are told that either the price or the output of each reproducible good should be directly raised or lowered until the price becomes equal to the marginal money costs of production, defined as "current costs at the intensive margin of production" (pp. 173–74). This marginal cost, or outlay, is to include only (1) continuously variable and (2) directly measurable items with no allowance for depreciation, research, or advertising.

The author omits all nondirect or nonspecific costs, consumer surplus, economic rents, long-term fixed charges, and profits. No place is allowed for time preference or uncertainty.

He doesn't understand that a margin is the difference between two totals. His theoretical margins are illogically separate from totals and therefore from averages.

Finally, the fallacy of the dosing-method surplus appears in his notion of "only a single marginal unit" (p. 13). The interrelation between extensive and intensive margins seems not to be understood by him.

The main good in the book is its emphasis of the idea of allocating "joint costs" according to demand (but without adequate reference to other work done in the field.) Also good are the criticisms of the Marshallian separation of long- and short-run costs, and of price stabilization policies.

The publication of such works; however, emphasizes the need for greater scholarship and for more study of the history of economic thought, lest the time come when the science of economics will have to be learned all over again.

LEWIS H. HANEY
New York Unverisity

NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN. *A General Theory of Economic Process.* Pp. viii, 370. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $5.00.

Mr. Chamberlain has turned his back on industrial relations, for the time being, and busied himself with ordering the economic world at large. He accepts most of the traditional economic analysis, viewing the economic process as one which is concerned with maximizing the yields and conserving scarce resources. Chapter I is devoted to showing that the economic process is part of a greater cultural process. However, the impingement of noneconomic activity on the economic process is not the great burden of the book, nor is there any analysis integrating the economic process into a general culture process or any other partial social process.

The underlying philosophy of the *General Theory of Economic Process* is the notion that alternative costs are very significant in determining the direction and nature of economic activity. Indeed one might say that the doctrine of alternative costs becomes almost a psychological and socio-psychological theory in Mr. Chamberlain's hands. The result is a refinement in traditional doctrine in the light of Mr. Chamberlain's own vocabulary and interests.

This adherence to custom is especially noticeable in Mr. Chamberlain's use of static analysis. The role of time, historical change or adjustments of economic activity, including techniques and aspirations to noneconomic activity, are not considered at any great length.

A *General Theory of Economic Process* is a statement or restatement of traditional economic analysis by one who brings an expertise from one of the specialized, applied fields of social analysis. The book has many interesting and unusual insights, and so is provocative and stimulating.

SIDNEY C. SUFRIN
Syracuse University

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

GORDON W. ALLPORT. *Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality.* Pp. ix, 106. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955. $2.75.

In this slender and delightfully written volume, Gordon Allport, professor of psychology at Harvard University, eloquently calls for the more adequate study of the whole personality, its growth, and development. Based on the Terry Lectures which Dr. Allport delivered at Yale University in March 1954, the book is a testament of his psychological faith. Modern psychology, he feels, working mainly in the philosophical tradition stemming from Lockean empiricism and using predominantly mechanical, animal, and pathological models, has scaled down the image of man and drawn but half his figure. It has largely ignored, or denied, the autonomous, creative, rational, and individualistic components of personality that give man his full stature as a human being. Oversimplification may succeed only in caricaturing human nature, Professor Allport says, and asks that conceptual openmindedness and a reasoned eclecticism be brought to the psychological task.

The central problem for a psychology of becoming, the author states, is to account for the process of growth whereby an unsocialized infant is transformed into a fully socialized adult. In his view, this process is governed not only by the impact of the environment upon a modest endowment of drives common to the species, but also by the unfolding of inherent capacities and dispositions to structure experience and give it meaning in a manner that is self-aware, self-critical and self-enhancing.

Thus, Dr. Allport would admit as essential data in the scientific study of personality those psychological functions commonly ascribed to a self or ego. Taking off from William James's early notions, he distinguishes eight aspects of the self which together comprise what he calls the *proprium*—the person's own sense of what is intimately and peculiarly his. Included in the *proprium* are bodily sense, self-identity, ego-enhancement (the self-seeking and narcissistic component), ego-extension (identification with objects, persons, values), a rational agent (including the Freudian defense mechanisms), self-image (both assessment and aspirations), propriate striving (compelling and persistent motives as distinguished from peripheral and transitory drives), and emerging as a final and inescapable postulate, the self as knower. These propriate functions, developing over time and fusing in their operation, according to Dr. Allport, are what give personality its peculiar unity and distinctiveness.

The conception of human nature that emerges from these pages—in its rationality, self-objectivity, orientation to the future, in its very perfectibility—is strongly colored by Western Christian and democratic values. In so far as this is a conception of what man *can become* in a free society rather than of what human nature *everywhere is,* few would probably be disposed to quarrel with it. Psychology is a young science itself in the process of becoming. Perhaps it will gain the maturity Professor Allport asks of it however formidable the scientific task.

JOSEPH B. CASAGRANDE
Social Science Research Council

RUSSELL KIRK. *Academic Freedom: An Essay in Definition.* Pp. 210. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. $3.75.

Russell Kirk, author of *The Conservative Mind* and *A Program for Conservatives,* has taken a look at academic freedom that is refreshing whether one agrees with him or not. The theme of his essay is essentially in harmony with that of his other works. If academic freedom is to be preserved through this dark time, he says, the work must be done by men of a conservative bent.

The author does not mince words nor is he reluctant to name names. John Dewey is said to reflect a collectivism "which outdoes Marx." Sidney Hook "has done his share in pouring out sloppy rhetoric about democracy." Robert M. Hutchins, despite his many contributions to the cause of academic freedom, in one instance "aban-

doned his own championship of academic freedom, forgot the honor of his own university, [and] violated his own tenure-policies, . . . all for the sake of gratifying a wounded ego." The names of Robert Oppenheimer and Edward U. Condon suggest the type of "scholar in the physical sciences bent upon transferring (through a naïve analogy) power to manipulate nature into power to manipulate men."

Academic freedom, the author maintains, is the natural right of certain persons, usually few in number, to teach truthfully, to employ their reason to the full extent of their intellectual powers, to conserve truth, and to extend it. Academic freedom has never meant complete autonomy for teachers, or "the licentious toleration of a bewildering congeries of private fancies." Like other prescriptive rights, it has its boundaries and its corresponding duties.

An all-out attack is launched against the intolerance of doctrinaire levellers, doctrinaire secularists, and certain professed guardians of tolerance and liberal opinions. The levellers want to lower the academic standards of the colleges and universities so that the masses can charge in. Private institutions provide the sturdiest bulwark against such intrusions. Secularists fail to recognize that the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom, that educational institutions strongly influenced by religious dogmas are the greatest respecters of the dignity of the scholar, and that religious conviction remains an indispensable support to academic freedom.

Certain professed guardians of tolerance and liberal opinion are taken to task, by name, for speaking well of academic freedom but practicing it poorly.

A professor ought to be free to speculate aloud about politics so long as he does not indoctrinate his students. But professors are not alone among those who must restrain their indoctrinating tendencies. Trustees, alumni, and others should not try rashly to impose "loyalty oaths" on faculty members without careful consideration of the implications of the particular oath to be employed. Likewise the professor whose past associations are questioned should anticipate the probable adverse effects of any blanket use he may be impelled to make of protection under the Fifth Amendment.

It is in the nature of essays not to be comprehensive surveys, hence to leave many questions about their subject unanswered. This one is no exception. Yet it is well worth reading—and pondering.

CLAUDE E. HAWLEY
Washington, D. C.

MARTIN MEYERSON and EDWARD C. BANFIELD. *Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago*. Pp. 353. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. $5.00.

This volume is a noteworthy advance in the case study technique of analyzing public decision processes. It is characterized by disciplined analysis of its data, by perceptual sensitivity, by self-awareness regarding the validity of its evaluations, by skillful handling of analytical concepts, and by familiarity with social action theory. It is an advance over the prevailing case study technique in the field of public administration because it liberates that technique from the confines of historicism. The authors move on to relate the events they describe so effectively to social action theory and to a stimulating conceptual analysis of certain key processes involved in the making of the public decisions with which they are concerned.

The decisions governing the choice of sites for the location of public housing projects in the city of Chicago provide the subject matter for this volume. These decisions are the focal point for community-wide controversy because the location of public housing projects contains a potential threat to the existing, socially-maintained pattern of negro-white residential segregation. Thus the authors have written a case study of the characteristics of the decision processes in a modern, polyglot urban community which has to face diverse and variant social goals of an inchoate nature that are thrust upon it by diverse institutions with vaguely defined social roles and self-images of function and power.

In the development of their case study, the authors give special attention to "politics," "planning," and "the public interest,"

both as analytical ideas and as social processes. They do not devote a separate chapter to "strategy," although in their own story inter-organization strategy emerges as a process of decisive importance in decision making. Their treatment of the Chicago public housing controversy necessarily moves them into a discussion of politicians, bureaucrats, and reformers as social types and as personalities. They are hard on reformers, who symbolize rational social action (planning) on the basis of intelligence applied to social problems. Reformers emerge an impotent second best to politicians, and the ideology of reform cannot stand up to the nonideological realism of politics. Realistic machine politics is defended in terms of its social utility, and reform strategy proves no match for the strategy of machine politics when the chips are down. The public interest remains unidentifiable and unresolvable within a milieu of organized interest groups.

NATHAN D. GRUNDSTEIN
Wayne University

WILLIAM A. ROBSON (Ed.). *Great Cities of the World: Their Government, Politics and Planning*. Pp. 693. London; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $10.00.

This is a monumental work, the first to deal consistently and systematically with the large cities of the world in their governmental, political, and planning aspects. First conceived by Professor Robson in 1939 while he was writing *The Government and Misgovernment of London*, but interrupted by World War II, the volume now presented is intended by the editor to accomplish a twofold purpose: "First, that it should describe the local government of a representative group of great cities. Second, that it should show whether, and if so how far, these communities are confronting common problems; and what steps, if any, they are taking to overcome them."

The first purpose is the more successfully accomplished. Twenty of the great cities of the world are each the subject of an essay by an author who knows the city at first hand, and who is interested not merely in its legal aspects but also in its political forces and its governmental realities. Eight of these cities (Amsterdam, Copenhagen, London, Manchester, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Zurich) may be classed as Western European; five of them (Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Montreal, Toronto) are North American; four (Bombay, Calcutta, Sydney, Wellington) are in the Far East; two (Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro) are in South America; and Moscow represents the Soviet type. Another method of classification might note that eight of the cities are within the British Commonwealth system and tradition; and that, except for only two, or possibly three, cases, all the great cities discussed are within the democratic tradition. This is a sufficiently representative group of great cities to give us a comprehensive view of their basic governmental characteristics as a world-wide phenomenon; and, in addition, to serve as a testimonial to the editor's vision, ingenuity, and patience amid all the vicissitudes of a multinational research project.

The second purpose turns out to be more difficult of accomplishment. The identification of common problems among great cities is complicated by their marked variations in size, age, constitutional status, economic character, geographical factors, resources, and other important variables. It is further complicated by the differing values and preoccupations of the authors of the chapters on individual cities, despite the efforts of the editor to insure consistency of exposition and analysis. An additional difficulty flows from the necessity of appraising a great city within the limits of a single chapter (for example, London, 40 pages; New York, 38 pages).

The editor's second purpose is most fully realized in his own introductory essay, "The Great City of Today," which in eighty pages presents an admirable and perceptive synthesis not only of the whole volume, but of his own reflections on the great city as "a very modern phenomenon." He is convinced that "great cities all over the world are facing common problems which are mainly due to similar causes." These common problems he summarizes as five in number: (1) organization of areas and authorities, (2) popular interest and demo-

cratic participation, (3) efficiency of the municipal services, (4) finance, and (5) planning the metropolitan region.

This pioneering work should stimulate students of urban government and politics in many countries to move forward to full-length studies of individual cities and to comparative studies of various kinds, all useful to the improvement of the great city as a center of modern life.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Columbia University

ARTHUR EVANS WOOD. *Hamtramck Then and Now: A Sociological Study of a Polish-American Community.* Pp. 253. New York: Bookman Associates, 1955. $4.00.

Hamtramck is a city within Detroit, Michigan, with a 1950 population of 43,355, 75 per cent Polish-American. The elected officials are all Polish. The major industry is the Dodge-Chrysler auto plant.

This study is a colorful historical journalistic-style account of the city government and school issues centered around the Polish leaders. The data on the geographical and population aspects, Polish cultural background, crime and delinquency, organizations, and family life are meager.

The author, a retired professor of sociology at the University of Michigan, obtained the data from Detroit newspaper accounts, informants, some official governmental sources, and by "questionnaires" on some minor issues. There is no systematic citation of sources nor a bibliography, but there is an index.

There is no theoretical framework, unless it be the loose twin notion that Hamtramck "is a 'cultural island'" in process of "disorganization" (pp. 13, 10). One theme is that Hamtramck is not as "bad" as Detroit newspapers (recent exception, the *Detroit Times*) depict it to be (pp. 27, 69, 148, 165–66).

The political corruption described is attributed to the Polish cultural heritage and to American conditions (pp. 28, 232–45). The former attribution is not convincing, and in some cases comic, as when the author connects "coal-stealing" to "the predatory exploits in the manor forests of the old world" (p. 233).

The author's concern that "disorganized behavior" may be due to the Poles' "innate qualities as a people" (pp. 232–3) indicates some of the superficial thinking present. The solution indicated—"indigenous leadership, supported by sound community organization"—(p. 245) is not explained and is mystifying because Hamtramck has had "indigenous leadership," and because the most "constructive" leaders in the past—a school superintendent and a Board of Commerce official—were neither indigenous nor Polish (pp. 69, 72, 87, 88).

Sociologists interested in the theory of immigrant adjustment or assimilation will find no contribution here.

The author has the evaluative, not descriptive, notions of culture (pp. 173, 189), and of assimilation, as when he states that "there has never been any question but that the Poles have been exemplary Americans. They have helped to produce the wealth of our mines and factories and fought in our wars. What more could one ask?" (p. 10). Yet the author does ask "more" when he implies that there may not be "an 'adaptation' to the more wholesome features of American life" (p. 14), or when he deplores the activities of Polish organizations which are such as to "keep the people Polish rather than to make them Americans" (pp. 183, 178, 36).

In general, the author throws encomiums in the direction of the Poles and, at the same time, heaps jargonistic blame on them.

STEPHEN W. MAMCHUR
Wayne University

SARKIS ATAMIAN. *The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict.* Pp. 479. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $4.75.

There are fairly large Armenian communities in a number of metropolitan areas in at least three of which (New York, Boston and Detroit) citizens of Armenian origin number close to 40,000 each. There are others wherein their number varies from 10,000 to 25,000. The total number of such citizens in the country is close to 250,000, and probably half of that number belongs to the second generation, born and brought up in this country and whose ways of living and outlook on life differ considerably from those of their immigrant parents. Here we have a distinct case of conflict between the old and the new. And the study of such a conflict would be not only interesting but extremely valuable, especially for the sociologist. One would have assumed that the author of this ponderous work, a sociologist by training and at one time a member of the Sociology Department at the University of Rhode Island, has done just that. Actually and unfortunately, however, this is not so. Notwithstanding his explanatory subtitle the author has not made an adequate study of "the historical development of a sociological and ideological conflict." Instead of limiting himself to his specialized but proper field, he has wandered far into other areas, such as the organization of Armenian communal life in Turkey and in Czarist Russia, the relations of Armenians with Kurds and Turks, the Armenian Question, the rise of political parties among the Armenians, the birth and death of the short-lived Armenian Republic in 1918–20, the diplomacy of the Powers in the Near East, and so forth; and in all these he seems to be no more than a mere dabbler, a wayward amateur.

The book opens with a ten-page breezy Introduction by James H. Tashjian in which one finds a fairly adequate sketch of Armenian history. The next 175 odd pages deal with the Armenian community in Turkey where the clergy necessarily played the leading part. Since the early 1860's Armenian communal affairs there were governed under an "Armenian Constitution." The author claims that under this constitution the clergy usurped its authority and always favored the urban rich against the rural poor, and thus was instrumental in the birth of a sharp class conflict. But this is a broad, baseless assertion. The ill-treatment and the recurrent massacres of the Armenians, the rise of Armenian nationalism, and other events up to and including World War I are narrated in a somewhat desultory and repetitious manner. The next 150 pages (pp. 204–352) deal with the rise of the Armenian Republic in the Caucasus, the spread of Bolshevism there, the loss of Armenian independence, and "Communism, the nationalities problem, and the Armenian ideologies." Thus better than two thirds of the book precedes the chapter on "The Armenian Community in America" (pp. 353–74), followed by the two remaining lengthy chapters, one on the author's exaggerated "Pro-Communist Armenian Campaign," and the other on the Armenian Apostolic Church. The most this reviewer can say of Atamian's first book is that it is of uneven value: it offers some information, but there is a good percentage of misinformation throughout the book. Even allowing for the one-sided and the narrow viewpoint of its author, it does not live up to its claim as a study of "The Historical Development of a Sociological and Ideological Conflict."

A. O. SARKISSIAN
Library of Congress

STANLEY HUGH SMITH. *Freedom to Work.* Pp. x, 217. New York: Vantage Press, 1955. $4.00.

Case studies of the background, legislative development, and administration of specific statutes have long been subjects of doctoral dissertations in political science. The book under review is such a dissertation in sociology, and its topic, the Fair Employment Practices Law in the state of Washington, is of special interest to sociologists. The author does a passable job of defining his problem, surveying the literature, reporting on comparable laws in other areas, detailing the legislative history of Washington's FEP law, recording the types of cases that have been dealt with under the law, and suggesting further research. There is little that is unique in this story, except possibly for the early Communist association with the bill.

While the author performs a service in bringing together the varied relevant facts about FEP in *Washington,* he makes a claim to distinction which is scarcely justified. Numerous reports of the "inside"

legislative history of FEP laws in other states, of their applications and their effects on diminishing discrimination, of local patterns of employment discrimination, and so on, are available in published pamphlets or mimeographed memoranda. The author seems to have limited his search of the literature to books and general periodicals. Other defects are a limited conception of "evaluation" of a law, an identification of discrimination with concentration in lower occupational groups, the absence of an index, and a naive attitude toward scientific methodology (p. 23).

The campaign for an FEP law in Washington began in 1945. The "mass agitation" approach, especially when led by leftists, antagonized the legislators, and the bill was defeated after a promising start. A more representative group led the 1947 campaign but was poorly organized and failed to get many supporters outside of Seattle. Careful organization, an approach directed at the legislature itself, the information given to the legislature by the legal counsel of New York's State Commission Against Discrimination, won the day in 1949. The bill was passed by a Democratic House and a Republican Senate. The law has helped somewhat, but many minority persons do not know about it or are disinclined to use it. There are loopholes which permit employers to evade the law, at least temporarily. But Washington is participating in the gradual national trend toward decreasing discrimination, and Smith is to be commended for recording the facts.

ARNOLD M. ROSE
University of Minnesota

SAMUEL R. SPENCER, JR. *Booker T. Washington and the Negro's Place in American Life.* Pp. ix, 212. Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1955. $3.00.

It is appropriate that The Library of American Biography, edited by Oscar Handlin, should devote a volume to Booker T. Washington (1856–1915). Following his famous Atlanta address and the death of Frederick Douglass, both in 1895, Washington was the foremost American Negro and his people's most influential spokesman. Despite sharp criticism from William E. B. DuBois and other prominent Negroes, Washington was the leader in American Negro affairs until his death.

An account of Washington's slave childhood, his education at Hampton Institute, and the founding and development of Tuskegee Institute into a living monument to his educational philosophy provide a background for the balanced and factual appraisal of Washington's larger role as a Negro leader. This readable little book covers the available material including Washington's own best selling autobiography, *Up From Slavery*. A Note on the Sources directs the more interested reader.

Washington, the educator, stressed a practical education in agricultural and industrial skills to prepare the Negro for economic advancement and independence. At the opening of the Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition, he proposed that the Negro postpone social and political integration until his economic improvement made him worthy of the rights and privileges of full citizenship.

Washington was convinced that Southern whites and Negroes had a common destiny. In return for the co-operation of Southern whites in providing economic opportunities for the Negro, he was prepared to compromise on other issues until the Negro had achieved his sound economic foundation. The Atlanta address was misinterpreted as an endorsement of the separate, but equal principle and an acceptance of existing conditions and prejudices.

Any evaluation of Washington's gradual, evolutionary approach to the problem of the Negro's successful integration into American life and of the bolder approach of his critics must recognize that his primary responsibility was to Alabama's Tuskegee Institute. Much of his time was spent cultivating Northern philanthropists and foundations and maintaining good public relations. Expediency usually demanded his circumspect conduct although on occasion he worked undercover for the Negro.

Washington expected the Negroes to remain permanently in the South as members of rural communities. He did not reckon on Negro migration and urbanization, and he thought of industrial preparation in terms of the independent farmer, craftsman, or businessman. Nonetheless, the biographer may properly conclude that he "did what was possible, given the time and place in which he lived, and did it to the utmost."

FRANK J. KLINGBERG
University of California
Los Angeles

RONALD HARE. *Pomp and Pestilence: Infectious Disease, Its Origins and Conquest.* Pp. 224. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $5.75.

We may safely assume that disease is as old as life itself because disease is nothing else but life, life under changed circumstances, as Virchow defined it. It is obvious that man at all times suffered accidents that caused wounds and fractures of bones, and man reacted very much through the same disease mechanisms. Bacteria have been found in Algonkian rocks. We do not know whether these bacteria were pathogenic or not. In this fascinating book Professor Hare differentiates between symbiosis, when host and parasite operate to mutual advantage; commensalism, the eating at the same table; and a third form of parasitism which may be called pathogenesis, or ability to produce disease. Chapter II is devoted to what bacteriologists call endemic infection, that is infections which occur in the community more or less all the time. Epidemics occur when a parasite is imported into a population previously unacquainted with it and therefore without immunity. Some occur when a large number of susceptibles are brought into an area in which a parasite is found, that causes endemic infections among the native population. Some epidemics are due to a sudden change in the facilities of transmission of a parasite when a carrier of the parasite has a chance to infect water and milk supplies. Others are due to a sudden change in the virulence of the parasite, and some are due to a reduced resistance of the population.

The discovery of the bacteria makes a fascinating story. Anton van Leeuwenhoek was the first to describe bacteria, which he found in the scrapings of his tongue. Since he was perfectly healthy the idea did not occur to him that these microbes may cause disease. A Jesuit Father, Athanasius Kircher, also in the 17th century examined under the microscope pus and blood from plague patients and found tiny worms which made him believe that the contagium of the plague was an animated one. The German anatomist and pathologist Jakob Henle reasoned in a classical study *Of Miasmata and Contagia and of the Miasmatic-Contagious Diseases* that Miasmata and Contagia must be identical and must be animated, but his work remained without repercussion until Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch discovered the true nature of bacteria.

Professor Hare discusses in a brilliant chapter the reaction of the community. On July 20, 1377 the City Council of Ragusa ordered all incoming ships from plague ridden localities to be held on the island Mercana for one month *ad purgandum*. Six years later Marseilles ordered a quarantine on the island of Pornique. The great public health movement started in England because the country was industrialized first and health conditions were appalling. Professor Hare has a chapter on reaction of the individual and ends with a chapter on parasites and population.

Dr. Hare is Professor of Bacteriology at St. Thomas' Hospital in the University of London. He has produced a fascinating book full of most significant facts.

HENRY E. SIGERIST
Pura, Ticino
Switzerland

MARTA FRAENKEL and CARL L. ERHARDT. *Morbidity in the Municipal Hospitals of the City of New York: Report of an Exploratory Study in Hospital Morbidity Reporting.* Pp. 229. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955. $4.50.

In the last chapter, the authors evaluate the results of their findings in this exploratory study and recommend that a continuing morbidity reporting system be established in New York City, at first in the municipal hospitals only but gradually expanded to include all hospitals in the community. Problems are anticipated, but de-

tailed instructions are submitted as to how, by whom, and at what cost this may be accomplished.

In the Foreword, Leona Baumgartner, M.D., Commissioner of Health of New York City, and Basil C. MacLean, M.D., Commissioner of Hospitals, give due praise to the wealth of valuable information condensed in this distinguished work and state that steps have already been set in motion to start at the earliest possible date a program of morbidity reporting in the municipal hospitals of that city.

The Appendices describe other experience in hospital morbidity reporting and discuss methodology for processing diagnostic data. No small part of this pilot study was the work involved in the translation of the clinically detailed terms and codes of the *Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations*, in which the hospital discharge diagnoses are originally recorded, into the more mechanically practical groupings of the *International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries, and Causes of Death*. Appendix D, Table 54, lists 451 International Classification diagnoses accounting for 25 or more discharged patients—a useful presentation for persons studying the less frequent causes of illness requiring hospitalization. Appendix D, Table 53, gives the authors' abridgment of the International Classification into their summary list of 196 categories meaningful in relation to causes for hospitalization.

Tables 1–52 array the 121,952 inpatients discharged during the six-month study period, May–October 1952, according to age, sex, color, diagnosis, length of stay, condition on discharge, and in various other significant ways. Of special interest to students of chronic disease and aging are the chapters and tables concerning cancer, tuberculosis, circulatory, and other chronic diseases; psychiatric conditions with special reference to alcoholism; and the hospitalization of patients 65 years and over.

The authors ask and answer a question that may come to the minds of public health administrators: "To what extent will hospital reporting furnish data on specific illnesses for the entire population or for significant age and sex groups? By their very nature, the aggregate of the records from all hospitals in a community will provide a complete picture of certain serious diseases among the population concerned and a partial picture of other serious diseases. Most minor illnesses, however, are omitted."

LOUISE E. BOLLO
U. S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare

ALBERT SALOMON. *The Tyranny of Progress: Reflections on the History of French Sociology*. Pp. 115. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. $3.00.

Perhaps the foremost symptom of the degradation of the history of social thought in the last quarter of a century has been the exaggerated concentration on the social significance of totalitarianism and the even more fantastic search for its origins in past social thought, as though it were primarily an ideological rather than an operational product.

This has led to such absurdities as the discovery that Socrates, usually regarded as a martyr to intellectual freedom, was in reality the "first Fascist." French social thinkers have been lined up as putative "fathers" of bureaucratic tryanny: a respectable historian has finally decided that poor old Proudhon, whom historians of social thought had previously been unable to list decisively as a socialist or an anarchist, was actually the founder of fascism. Professor Salomon takes French social thought to task along this line of indictment far more comprehensively.

In his small book, he discusses the effective origins of the law of social progress in the *Discourses* of Turgot, and then seeks to demonstrate that this idea, when adopted by Saint Simon and Comte and both echoed and distorted by Hegel and Marx, led straight to the bureaucratic totalitarianism of Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco. This development naturally and obviously blasted the optimistic dream of orthogenic, cumulative, and unlimited social progress.

Sociologists are surely entitled to their own opinions, and Professor Salomon has expressed his in this book frankly and with virtually no qualifications. The reviewer can be equally candid. He believes it to

be utterly absurd to regard Saint Simon and Comte as, in any direct and effective sense, forerunners of contemporary totalitarianism. It seems even more preposterous to assign to their mild personal "bohemianism" causal significance along this line. The programs of these men, if they had been literally put into operation, would have led to utopias in which benign sociologists and industrial engineers would have dominated the public scene rather than commissars or gauleiters.

But the main error lies in regarding contemporary totalitarianism as an ideological rather than an operational product. It is obvious that there have been plenty of totalitarian strains in social thought from Plato onward, and even the right-wing totalitarians have developed *ex post facto* ideologies to embellish their bureaucratic systems, but these systems have been the product of contemporary social conditions —chiefly global and total war—rather than of social thought. Russian Communism, which did have a strong ideological background, was a child of World War I and gained its dominant position as a result of the second.

Modern total war is chiefly the outcome of the rise of mass communications and emotional engineering (systematic propaganda), and such books as Sisley Huddleston's *Popular Diplomacy and War* and Oron J. Hale's *Publicity and Diplomacy* throw more light on the rise, nature, and frequency of total war in our day than the whole body of social thinkers from Plato to Talcott Parsons. If one seeks two responsible Frenchmen, then Poincaré and Clemenceau were tenfold more influential than Comte and Saint Simon. And the same factors that led to total war and totalitarianism were the lethal forces that dealt the death blow to the dream of social progress.

The reviewer may be misguided in this view, but it is his opinion that, if one seeks an operational guide to the origin of the twin evils of our age: totalitarianism and "perpetual war for perpetual peace," it is more likely to be found in the writings of Lawrence Dennis (*Dynamics of War and Revolution*), James Burnham (*The Managerial Revolution*), John T. Flynn (*As We Go Marching*), and, above all, George Orwell (*Nineteen Eighty-four*), than in books like those by Professor Salomon. There is little point in blaming Turgot, Saint Simon and Comte for trends and developments they could not possibly have foreseen—indeed, were actually not anticipated by some of the most astute social thinkers at the end of the first decade of the present century.

HARRY ELMER BARNES
Malibu, California

HUSTON SMITH. *The Purpose of Higher Education*. Pp. xix, 218. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $3.50.

It may be questioned that this book is a "pioneering study" (as stated on its jacket), yet, the author has most certainly done more than to put old wine into new bottles. The volume is the work of a faculty committee of Washington University appointed "to crystallize a statement on the objectives of liberal education to be used as a basis for curriculum review." The author has, however, very successfully converted a committee report into a lucid and most readable exposition.

The book gains in clarity of presentation by its organization into two parts. Education Beyond Six Opposites is the novel title of Part I; The Aims of Liberal Education is the orthodox label for Part II. The greater portion of the book (137 pages) is a discussion of the value dichotomies listed under the six opposites as absolutism versus relativism; objectivity versus commitment; freedom versus authority; egoism versus altruism; the individual versus the state; and sacred versus secular.

It was Livingston, I think, who said that true education is impossible without the vision of greatness. Perhaps Professor Smith and his colleagues are asserting that there can be no vision of greatness in education without value judgments. In any event they affirm that it is possible and reasonable for educated people to agree, or to greatly minimize the areas of disagreement, with regard to basic values. Professor Smith's arguments against the cult of aloofness and indecisions with respect to value judgments are vigorous. "Suffice it to say that value judgments are as ines-

capable as judgments of fact. . . . Life requires direction, and in human beings no longer maneuvered by instinct this direction can be supplied only by a stable . . . nucleus of values and beliefs" (p. 36). There will be few educators or laymen who will question such statements. For the classroom teacher, however, the problem is how to recognize and label his own prejudices or predilections and eliminate their influence on his analyses and conclusions.

Fortunately the six chapters in this section of the book are in themselves worthy examples of how to be persuasive without resort to dogma or prejudice. They give evidence in thought and phrasing that disciplined thinking can resolve most of the difficulties that confront the teacher who strives for "objectivity" and yet has a distaste for "neutralism."

For faculty members and administrators constantly concerned with teaching in a liberal arts college, Part II of *The Purposes of Higher Education* is no more than a restatement, of, I assume, universally agreed upon aims and objectives of a liberal education. These aims include instruction in those areas of knowledge pertinent to the study of man and mankind; the acquisition of skills which mark the literate person; the development of discriminating appreciation to the end that cheapness, sham, and shoddiness can be readily detected. To this list of orthodox aims the author adds a chapter on "motivations" which summarizes all the hopes for the liberal education. "The chief task for education is . . . to sink the roots of aspiration deep enough to withstand the months and years of spiritual drouth when they come."

In general, it might be said that this book is a counsel of perfection with no blueprint for attaining the purposes of higher education. But it is inherent in liberal education that it is a counsel of perfection and perhaps it is well that there is no single path to be followed by all of the faculties dedicated to its propositions.

The Faculty Committee and Professor Smith have achieved the almost impossible. They have written another book on higher education sufficiently different and sufficiently stimulating to merit thoughtful reading. Particularly one would wish that it might be read by parents of college students and by the Ph.D. candidates now preparing to teach these students.

SAMUEL S. STRATTON
Middlebury College

JAMES E. RUSSELL (Ed.). *National Policies for Education, Health and Social Services.* (Columbia University Bicentennial Conference Series.) Pp. 550. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955. $7.50.

This formidable book passes in review the policies recently and currently in force in the several fields specified in the lengthy title (plus "Religion in Education"), together with discussions from the floor of some of the issues thus brought to light at the several conferences. By its very nature, or rather because of the fashion in which the material has been prepared for publication, this is not a book to be read (least of all straight through), but rather one to be consulted as whim or occasion require. Specialists will undoubtedly look here for what was said at Columbia, but the nonspecialists will, I am afraid, pick up the book reluctantly and lay it down hastily. The editor has made no visible concessions to the undedicated reader, and they in their turn will pass his volume by.

This is sad, for buried in the book are eminently readable papers which, in a less austere setting, would snare almost any serious reader. One may instance, in order of appearance: "Freedom, Security, and the University Tradition" by A. Whitney Griswold; "The Function and Opportunities of Higher Education in the United States" by Henry M. Wriston; "Financing Higher Education" by Robert D. Calkins (an especially provocative paper); "The Limits of Social Service" by Gordon W. Allport; "The Impact of Income Security Upon Individual Freedom" by Barbara Wootton; and the "Report" of the discussion of academic freedom.

From such a wide-ranging miscellany it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw any very useful conclusions. One general notion implanted in the mind of this reviewer was that, in spite of all discouragements, the "professionals" are still quite optimistic.

Really, what is urgently needed is a conference on how to make conference reports readable. *The Economist* lately remarked that as matters now stand, it is obviously more fun to attend conferences than to read about them. But a report like that on the Corning Glass conference shows that this need not necessarily be so.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN
Katonah, N. Y.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

WALTER LIPPMANN. *The Public Philosophy.* Pp. xiii, 189. Boston; Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1955. $3.50.

Mr. Lippmann has written one of the few important books to appear in the United States since World War II. Its strength lies partly in the fact that the author does not speak from a limited American point of view. His outlook is that of a citizen of the West—a West that has fallen in the nineteenth and particularly in the twentieth century dangerously into decline. The totalitarian mass movements that wrecked parliamentary government in Europe after World War I are only one type of phenomenon that illustrates and demonstrates the falling off. The decline of prestige of the West in the non-Western world is another. The United States is an extension of the culture area of Western Europe and the malady that affects Europe brings illness also to America. Mr. Lippmann in probing what he considers the crisis of our times finds no moral superiority in America. Western civilization is a single entity.

Mr. Lippmann finds the infection that has produced the present *malaise* to lie in the Jacobin philosophy that emerged as one of the products of the French Revolution. Determined to obliterate the authority of the hereditary rulers of the *ancien régime,* the Jacobins proclaimed the doctrine that the will of the sovereign people is right and must prevail. Its justification came from Rousseau who fathered the idea that human nature in its primal state is good and that its basic impulses may be relied upon to work for good.

The Lippmann interpretation of the history of Western democracy in terms of Rousseau is reminiscent of Irving Babbitt in the first quarter of the twentieth century who saw in Rousseau the archvillain of democracy in America. Babbitt's philosophy came to focus on the individual; Mr. Lippmann deals with society. The essential evil of Jacobinism lies in its implicit denial of the existence of principles, a law not made by men, that undergirds society and without obedience to which the good society is impossible. A belief in the existence of such a law is as old in Western tradition, as the ancient Greeks who formulated the idea of a natural law, and as the early prophets who taught the existence of a moral law of God. Mr. Lippmann has coined the phrase, "the public philosophy," to describe this ancient belief—public philosophy dealing with the needs and welfare of society as opposed to the private philosophies that emphasize the needs and welfare of individuals. The core of the public philosophy is the teaching that a fundamental law exists above the will of the sovereign people which they may deny, but only at the risk of such disaster as that which found expression in the totalitarian dictatorships of twentieth-century Europe. The decline of the West has been due to the ignoring of the public philosophy and the assertion of the primacy of the uncontrolled will of the sovereign people.

Mr. Lippmann not only traces the history of the public philosophy. Like the neo-Thomists, who are engaged in a similar enterprise within the framework of Catholic thought, Mr. Lippmann attempts by the use of reason to discover the characteristics of the public philosophy as applied to the theory of property and to the principle of the freedom of speech. These are among the best and most important chapters of the book.

In comment on Mr. Lippmann's interpretation of Western history it should be noted that the doctrine of the fundamental law or public philosophy has existed in American democratic thought since the beginning of the national period. Around the turn of the twentieth century the concept of natural law was frequently perverted to the support of antisocial practices in American industrialism. In the first third of the

present century the prevailing intellectual tendency was to deny altogether the existence of a fundamental law. In that period a philosophy of relativism had high prestige. The conditions of life since World War II have brought a reaction and a new search for the basic principles of a public philosophy. Mr. Lippmann's book is only one among many evidences of a mid-twentieth century renascence of the old doctrine of the fundamental law. Its wide popular sale is another. Paradoxically the phenomenon of the book and its reception is a strong argument, at least so far as America is concerned, against the pessimism with which Mr. Lippmann views the present Western world.

RALPH H. GABRIEL

Yale University

WINFRIED MARTINI. *Das Ende aller Sicherheit: Eine Kritik des Westens.* Pp. 376. Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954. DM 12.80.

This book is a German counterpart to the writings of our modern American conservatives. The title is derived from a pessimistic dictum of the conservative Swiss historian, Jacob Burckhardt: "Since politics has become founded on the internal ferments of the peoples, all security has ended." The major part of Martini's book is a provocative repudiation of democracy from the viewpoint of a liberal conservatism. It is not directed against "material democracy," but rather against the idea of the sovereignty of the people, and it is the thesis of the author that government for the people is jeopardized by government by the people.

Martini starts out with the historical fact that democracy was the unwanted child of Christian humanitarianism and Enlightened liberalism; this unwanted child now has become master in the house and endangers its parents. Montesquieu was defeated by Rousseau and the result was Robespierre. Nineteenth-century liberal democracy, according to the author, was still compatible with good government, since the sovereignty of the people was severely curbed by an effective division of powers, by constitutional monarchy, by a heavily restricted suffrage, and so forth. Modern mass democracy and totalitarian dictatorship, however, are not enemies but twin brothers, as the rise of Hitler in particular demonstrated. Martini advises the Germans to admit—"at least when we are among outselves"—that an impressive majority backed Hitler and that, long before 1933, leftist and rightist antirepublican parties had been working for the abolition of the *Rechtsstaat*. Postwar France and Italy provide similar examples of democracies on the verge of abolishing themselves exactly by democratic means. Since the coming of real democracy—in England, for instance, with the Second Reform Bill of 1867—the liberal element has been in continuous retreat.

Chapters IV and V form the core of the book's antidemocratic argumentation. The author tries to show that voters in a mass democracy are incompetent (samplings of voters' information from both sides of the Atlantic are quoted), that democratic organizations such as labor unions are automatically captured by dictatorial bureaucracies, that "education for democracy" must necessarily fall short of success, that the notion of politically mature and immature peoples is absurd (unless one assumes that maturity and immaturity of a nation can alternate every few years), and finally, that the democratization of foreign politics has led to the dislodgment of professional diplomacy, to nationalistic emotionalism, to a disastrous lack of military preparedness, but also to eschatological concepts of wars as crusades to make the world safe for impossible perfection. Democracy, conceived as the majority principle in modern mass society, is neither conducive to individual freedom within the state nor to the preservation of the freedom of the Western world in the face of totalitarian aggression.

Martini's book is persuasively written in its negative aspects, but is strikingly weak in its positve suggestions. To clinch the antidemocratic argument, a preferable and workable alternative would have to be offered. The author rightly asserts that the alternative between democracy and totalitarianism is not complete. But he himself has nothing better to recommend than a modernized Metternichism, that is, an authoritarian government which respects individual freedom in the nonpolitical sphere. Since in complex modern society the nonpolitical sphere has shrunk almost to nothingness, the author's conservative recipe is inapplicable. In the end he recommends Salazar's Portugal as a model state,—an underdeveloped country off the highroad of Western civilization which the author, after all, desires to preserve.

If the author does not seem to have analyzed his own fascination with authority figures, the merit of the book—beyond an able contribution to conservative ideology—consists in its realistic criticism of the mystique of democracy.

HERBERT MOLLER

Boston University

J. A. O. LARSEN. *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History.* Pp. vi, 249. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. $4.00.

This volume of Sather Classical Lectures is an esoteric work for accomplished students of classical antiquity. Its importance lies not in the presentation of new material, but in a cogent array of evidence that the institutions of representative government are of Hellenic origin.

The theory that the collective judgment of the masses was superior to that of representatives ultimately led to the transfer of decisive governmental functions to primary assemblies. Nevertheless the Achaean League, after c. 217 B.C., revived representative government, with referenda to the popular assembly on matters of great importance. By the period of the Macedonian Empire (167 B.C.), the term *synedriake politeia* had evolved to connote representative government.

The author reserves usage of the term "sympolity" to the federal state, wherein "citizens are under the jurisdiction of both a federal government and the government of a member state." The best example of this type of organization was the Boeotian League with its eleven units of representation, four of which were assigned to Thebes. Each unit had sixty councilors, and the *boule* of 660 members was divided into four groups of 165 each in an arrangement similar to the Athenian prytanies of an earlier era.

Alliances primarily of a military nature were "symmachies," and of these, the Peloponnesian, Delian, Second Athenian, and Hellenic leagues are discussed. The author points out that it was the principle of hegemony that was the primary distinction between the symmachies and the sympolities. Representative institutions were present in both types, however, and in the Hellenic League the apportionment of representation was fixed according to the size of the member state.

Although the fragmentary nature of much of the evidence precludes the definitiveness that characterizes the chapter on Greek institutions, the author persuasively argues for the survival of assemblies in the Roman imperial period, whose chief functions were the conduct of the imperial cult and the annual review of the administrations of provincial governors.

Besides the theory of the collective wisdom of the masses, the natural tendency of the capital to dominate a federation, the strengthening of democratic tendencies by common resistance to oligarchic Sparta, and the King's Peace of 387 B.C. which theoretically restored the freedom of all Greek states helped supplant representative government by primary assemblies.

In its broad outlines this volume is indispensable to the serious student of political theory. It is a notable contribution to classical learning and to the splendid Sather Lectures.

CHARLES EDWARD SMITH

Louisiana State University

G. E. VON GRUNEBAUM. *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition.* (Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations, No. 4. *The American Anthropologist,* Vol. LVII, No. 2, Part 2, Memoir No. 81, April, 1955.) Pp. xv, 260. Menasha, Wis.: American Anthropological Association. 1955. No price.

Mr. von Grunebaum has brought together in this volume twelve essays dealing with various aspects of Muslim civilization. The first essay traces in broad lines the religious and cultural history of Muslim civilization. The eleven succeeding studies are grouped under three general headings: Growth, Expressions, and Encounters.

Under "Growth," the essay entitled "The

Beginnings of Culture Consciousness in Islam" treats the early identification of Muslim with Arab and the later substitution of Islam as the unifying element in cultural diversity. Next, the author discusses the question of whether Arab culture should be defined on a basis of a common religion, language or historical experience.

The "Expressions" of Islam are found in the Koran, Arabic literature, science, and government, and in the Muslim town, to each of which an essay is devoted. The essential structure of Islamic government is set forth in a series of propositions; the Muslim town is contrasted with the classical concept of the city, and its physical structure and administration are described.

The "Encounters" of Islam are with Hellenism, Iranian culture, and Western influences. The Iranian reaction to Islam is expressed in "Firdawsī's Concept of History," and the author uses Westernization in Islam to support his disagreement with Arnold Toynbee's theory of cultural borrowing. In this section there is an excellent study of "Attempts at Self-Interpretation in Contemporary Islam," classified here because such attempts often reflect Muslim attitudes towards Western influences.

These essays cover a wide range of subjects, and students of history, literature, sociology, anthropology, and political science will find much to interest them here. This reviewer liked best the essays on "The Spirit of Islam as Shown in its Literature" and "Attempts at Self-Interpretation. . . ." The former treats the specifically Islamic elements in Arabic literature from the following points of view: content, outward form, inner form, and the attitude toward and expectations from literature. These are then illustrated by an analysis of the eleventh Assembly of Hariri. In the latter essay, Mr. von Grunebaum discusses with great insight the ideas of several modern Muslim reformers and apologists, among whom are Iqbal, Muhammad Kurd 'Alī, Taha Husayn, and 'Abdallāh 'Alī al-Qasimī.

These studies bear witness to the author's extensive knowledge of Arabic literature and his remarkable powers of interpretation. Mr. von Grunebaum states that they may be considered as prolegomena to a larger study on the rise of a Muslim culture consciousness on which he is engaged. This promised work will be eagerly awaited by all students of Islam.

JAMES A. BELLAMY

Philadelphia, Pa.

CONRAD WRIGHT. *The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America.* Pp. 305. Boston, Mass.: The Beacon Press, 1955. $4.00.

The book is an expansion of a Ph.D. thesis at Harvard under the direction of Perry Miller which won the Carnegie Award of the American Historical Association.

It does for the story of American Unitarianism what Whitley and Shakespeare did for the beginnings of the Baptists in England, namely, demythologizes it, thus providing a dependable basis for its true historical origins.

The terminal dates are the Great Awakening in 1735 and the election of Henry Ware to the Hollis Professorship of Divinity at Harvard in 1805. During these seventy years consistent Calvinism in Puritan New England slowly disintegrated under the persistent attack of a minority group of religious liberals known as Arminians who defended "supernatural rationalism" and anti-Trinitarianism. They were not Deists since they supplemented natural religion with special revelation which they found in the Bible. Trinitarian views were abandoned because unscriptural, but Christ was given far higher rank in creation than mere man. The simple humanity of Jesus was then rejected because they were men who did not lack the courage of their convictions. This American Arminianism with such leaders as Chauncy and Mayhew can be adequately understood only within the social structure of New England and the logical pattern of their theology.

Hence, the history of Unitarianism does not begin in Transylvania or Poland. Socinianism is not the geneological ancestor of Unitarianism. American Unitarianism is autochthonous and derives the Arminian name from its similar reaction to the Puritanism of New England.

Charles Chauncy at the first church, Boston, 1727–87, for sixty years, and Jonathan Mayhew at the west church, Boston, 1747–66, for nineteen years, with Ebenezer Gay, Hingham, 1717–87, for seventy years, all Harvard graduates, accomplished the transition from a rigid Calvinism to an Arminian interpretation and paved the way for the great explosion of the early nineteenth century.

Some special features are the maps, showing the separated and overlapping areas of Harvard and Yale men, and the biographical appendix listing the Arminians and the New Divinity Men—sixty of the former, Harvard men with the exception of one from Princeton and Yale and Brown; twenty-one of the latter, mostly Yale graduates with Princeton represented by three, Dartmouth by three, and Brown by one graduate.

The study rightly rebukes the confusion which has prevailed in identifying American Arminians with the Deists but discounts too much the widespread and undermining influence Deism had here before the Revolutionary War. Ezra Stiles was nearer right.

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

Rochester, N. Y.

JULIAN N. HARTT. *Toward a Theology of Evangelism.* Pp. 123. New York; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1955. $2.00.

Here is Evangelism in a new key. Stripped of a litter of methodologies, it means a proclamation of the good news of God and his Kingdom. After confronting men in respect and in love, the Christian community leaves results with human response and divine prerogatives. In a race with time the Kingdom comes as an eternal NOW, as a summons rather than a cause, an imperative invitation given out of inexhaustible patience and involving divine revolution for the world and personal transformation for participants in the divine community. The subject is therefore with theological foundations. Dr. Hartt writes with precision of thought and singularly expressive language. His medium of communication is so potent that convincement is not far behind.

A novelty of form now conveys a familiar content. The Christian community to which these ten compact chapters are devoted is a divine creation. In most respects it looks like a compensatory adventure on God's part. The first created edition had doubtful value. God, "the Almighty Father," is a kind of absolute authoritarian. He is "the formidable unbroken silence enshrouding the noises of ephemeral creatures." Either He commanded poorly, or something mussed things up. So now He is a Creator-Judge.

The human situation shows serious miscalculations. Ego and other ego, like Hobbes's presocial-contact creatures, are rock-bottom fact. Society trusses up its members rather tightly, but in the love community each knows himself as a loving personality. History spells fate, and also what man has done to himself. "Guilt pertains to the human situation as such. Sin is the individual person's appropriation and acknowledgment of this guilt." Somehow personal dignity survives all this. Cultures are false masks worn by differentiated units of society, because these units are bloated with pride. Jesus Christ, the "Incarnate Lord," as an act of God is the supreme witness to the Kingdom. He can only repudiate human ideals of good and evil, as a ten-ton truck crushes a childish toy. It is not a question of standards of "good" people, but that the crown prince of a feudal power replaces altogether Jesus who appears in the Gospels.

All this and more savors of another thrust of a current orthodoxy, one born in fear and nurtured in this worldly anxiety. Believing faith steals the spotlight, much as a rustic resents worldly power apparent in a large city. In times of crises believing faith swallows the believer and banishes the object of belief. Then, in order to reassure itself, faith clings to unshakable convictions, seconded by a highly select and socially approved tradition.

IRL WHITCHURCH

Kingfield, Me.

ROSS W. SANDERSON. *The Church Serves the Changing City.* Pp. 252. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $3.50.

Dr. Saunderson has brought a uniquely wide and varied experience in socio-religious research and rare gifts of analysis and characterization to the task of reporting case studies of churches and church agencies that are currently grappling with the "inner

city" problem in a number of urban communities. Attention is focused on eight parishes, but data are presented on more than a score of parish situations and, in all, thirteen Protestant denominations are involved.

The term "inner city" denotes the underprivileged residential areas—though they often have nonresidential features—which have been stranded, so to speak, as the centers of city life have shifted. Their "common denominator" is low income. The tendency of "downtown" churches to flee these areas and relocate in a "favorable" social climate has long been deplored by socially-minded church leaders. Dr. Sanderson's "cases" are examples of strategic, often heroic, and sometimes ingenious adjustment on the part of churches which chose the alternative of accommodation in preference to withdrawal.

The reader is struck by the close correspondence between this movement of accommodation to social need and the social settlement movement which a few decades ago created a new type of social effort among underprivileged city populations. Indeed the "group *ministry*" so strikingly typified by New York's East Harlem Parish is an embodiment of the settlement idea, with this distinctive element added: all activities are conceived as channels for a definite evangelical "outreach." Says Dr. Sanderson, "Whatever the denomination, whatever the pattern of churchmanship, here in these varied ministries to the changing city is a new ripple of the settlement tide, less secular, more theological, but in its motivation, attitudes, and dreams strikingly similar to those of the great founders of a vast social work movement now less conspicuous because so widely accepted."

Size is not a measure of the viability of one of these socially adapted parishes. Some very small churches are decidedly effective. The Puerto Rican small church in New York City is "indigenous, dynamic, self-starting, and self-supporting." But cultural and ethnic inclusiveness is an obligatory goal. Bilingualism should be regarded as "temporary and on the way out." Moreover, Protestantism will now "have to begin more seriously to mend its ways" in relation to segregation.

The problem of financial support is crucial. Membership giving is basic; endowment is a legitimate safeguard as "reserve" for specific needs; public contributions, by way of community chests, for example, may be "legitimately sought for social services rendered on a nonsectarian basis, but not at the price of unfair policy control."

F. ERNEST JOHNSON
National Council of the
Churches of Christ in
the United States of America

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

HERBERT A. DEANE. *The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski.* Pp. xii, 370. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $5.75.

Mr. Deane has done a very interesting and useful study of Harold Laski, who boxed the compass of political ideas about as completely as anyone on the stage of modern political theory has ever done.

It is a painstaking book and quite well worked out in details. It avoids the egregious flattery that some previous works like those of Kingsley Martin have reflected and comes as close as anything we are likely to have to a just appraisal of Mr. Laski's shortcomings and his manifest stimulation to his students as a teacher.

After tracing Mr. Laski's earlier period in which inadequate attention, it may be suggested, is paid to the influence on Laski of his New College training, particularly with Ernest Barker, the book takes up the earlier pluralist period of Laski and his attempt to reconcile it with what he felt was a basic loyalty to John Stuart Mill's liberalism. It became apparent, as Mr. Deane shows, that this was very difficult to reconcile with his rooted belief in socialism which Laski himself attributed to "the outcome of a Jewish upbringing, the sense it conferred of being treated differently from other people, and for no obviously assignable cause." Laski's rebellion against his father and family is noted, but his extraordinary admiration of his brother, who had made good as a king's counselor, is never quite understood as an offset.

The Oxford manner, his ability as a partisan speaker, and his own self-fulfillment, which one might unkindly call the gratification of a natural vanity, drove Mr. Laski into putting himself in the middle of the stage at every opportunity.

As a political theorist this somewhat mixed up his roles. His inherent leanings towards socialism, and in spite of his earlier critical writings towards Marxism, more and more pushed his earlier concern with individual liberty and with pluralism into the limbo of forgotten causes.

If there is an essential weakness in the treatment of Mr. Deane, it reflects the same weakness that he brings out in Laski's own boxing of the compass. There is no really genuine appreciation of the lack of a basic philosophy from which Laski could derive any coherence and systematic strength in attempting to build a body of theory that had more unity than the writings of a columnist.

Mr. Deane himself does not bring to this task much more background and philosophy apparently than Laski did later in his more polemic articles in *The Nation* and in *The American Democracy* in dismissing his earlier adherence to pragmatism as merely an "effort to persuade business men to cooperate in the accomplishment of social changes that would destroy their supremacy." The quotation is from Mr. Deane's paraphrase. Even pragmatism was too much of a philosophy to hold Mr. Laski, who preferred in the end the dogmatic premises of Marxism to the test either of experience or of logic.

There is only one serious omission in the development of Mr. Laski so far as the emphasis of this book is concerned. This was the period in which he followed the popular front line of Moscow by building up the League of Nations into a super state and demanding that it have all the powers of coercive sovereignty which he had denied to the nation state.

On the whole, however, this is a very useful book and it is likely to be enough said on the subject of Mr. Laski for some time to come. The puzzle of Laski was his influence in the United States which far outran his influence in England. Mr. Deane understands his lack of basic influence in the Labor party. One may suggest that the key to his success as a teacher was his enthusiasm and his willingness to praise all his students and stimulate them to further efforts. He was a first-class debater. The impact on political theory of people who have stated extreme and even contradictory positions has long been remarked by students of political philosophy and theory. It is likely to be quite disproportionate if the writer is prolific and has an ear to the currents of popular opinion and a great capacity for self-dramatization, always connecting it where possible with some crusading cause. It generally, of course, results as it did in the case of Mr. Laski in mistaking wishful thinking for facts and treating them as such; a point that on the whole is adequately made by Mr. Deane's book with elaborate documentation, for what it is worth, from the writings of a most prolific partisan.

WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT
Harvard University

S. MACCOBY. *English Radicalism, 1762–1785: The Origins.* Pp. 535. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955. (Distributed by The Macmillan Company, New York.) $10.25.

Students of nineteenth-century England have long relied on S. Maccoby's studies in Victorian radicalism. They will welcome this volume on "The Origins." And with the promise of still another to fill the gap between Tom Paine and Cobbett, we may look forward to a consecutive story of the British Left from 1762 to 1914.

Opening paragraphs make it clear that the author does not conceive the "Oppositionism" which he proposes to trace in narrow terms. He is fully aware that unruly mobs, "left wing" newsmen, pamphleteers, and juries who refuse to convict them, county associations of disgruntled "Freeholders," City "Interests," and personal cliques of friends and kinsmen over whose dinner tables is debated the strategy later used in Parliament, all play their part. And he does well by them all.

He does less well, it seems to me, at least in his arrangement of the social and economic "indications" which he admits are indispensable "if the basic factors condi-

tioning politics are to be better understood." True, the poltical effects of taxes for the American War and East India Company affairs are well noted. But they have been well recounted by others. Had the author earlier placed at his readers' disposal the excellent material on labor and industry, landlords and rents, prices of food and its distribution, and "important currents of thought making," instead of packing it into four admirable, but brief and entirely separate chapters at the end of the book, he would have gone farther towards realizing his own expressed aim. These matters all moved disaffected groups to add their strength to radical demands, and paying them earlier attention would have enlivened as well as added more meaning to the detailed narrative of *who said what and when* in the intricate parliamentary struggle which fills the first four-fifths of the book.

The author lets contemporaries tell much of their own story, drawing chiefly from the press: *The Gentleman's Magazine, Annual Register, Monthly Review,* and others; and to some extent from the writings of participants. They are not new sources; but no one hitherto has picked out the story of the "Oppositionists" with such thoroughness. Mr. Maccoby does not give to this volume, it seems to me, quite the degree of penetration and synthesis found in most of his earlier work. But it is unfair to make a good book suffer by comparison with its predecessors. This one was needed and will prove very useful.

MILDRED CAMPBELL
Vassar College

H. A. CLEGG and ALLAN FLANDERS (Eds.). *The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain: Its History, Law and Institutions.* Pp. viii, 380. $4.20.

H. A. CLEGG. *General Union: A Study of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers.* Pp. xiv, 358. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1954. $3.85.

These two books belong among the small but growing number of distinguished British works dealing with industrial relations whose tradition was started by the Webbs and continued by G. D. H. Cole (to whom Clegg's book is dedicated). Clegg and Flanders are highly promising pupils of these masters; their work is remarkably careful and detailed; they ask a number of highly pertinent questions and come up with interesting and illuminating answers. Yet, social scientists will wonder whether there is really so little to be done in this field beyond description, and economists in particular may express some surprise at the slight use of their theoretical apparatus which the authors make.

The first column combines essays by Asa Briggs, "Social Background," O. Kahn-Freund, "Legal Framework," J. D. M. Bell, "Trade Unions," H. A. Clegg, "Employers," Allan Flanders, "Collective Bargaining," Clegg and T. E. Chester, "Joint Consultations." This range is less ambitious than that of J. Henry Richardson's recent *An Introduction to the Study of Industrial Relations,* equally published in 1954. With one major exception such limitation has its advantages since it has permitted the editors to produce a shorter and, in some parts at least, more searching study. The one omission in the present book, which this reader regrets, is the lack of a thorough discussion and analysis of the British wage structure. There are of course many references to wage issues and Mr. Flanders does not fail to continue his well-known discussion of the case for a publicly guided wages policy. But all this, admirable as it may be, is no substitute for an investigation of the wages structure and the economic and other influences operating on it. An American reader will also be surprised at the little space given to issues of lay-offs, dismissals, seniority (mainly Pp. 303–5). Even full employment does not explain this relative disregard.

Space does not permit me to do more than to express admiration for the general level of this work and the real achievement of its editors in avoiding most of the usual pitfalls of symposia. It would be invidious to single out any of the contributions for particular praise. Nevertheless Asa Briggs has performed a major achievement in his brief essay and the book contains some of the most interesting material on union activity in the plant I have come across so far.

Mr. Clegg, a fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford University, devotes his book to the second largest British Union. The National Union of General and Municipal Workers is one of the two giant general unions in England, the other being the Transport Workers Union. Each of them really consists of a number of semi-industrial unions, which form a secure basis for the union, plus large aggregates of laborers working in many industries. This organizational device characteristic for British labor is the alternative to industrial unionism, a kind of giant "district 50" of the United Mine Workers of America.

American readers will be greatly interested in this study, not only because the Union is numerically significant, but also because of the peculiarities of the general union. The author examines the organization most carefully, again with the methods and limitations discussed above. The N.U.G.M.W. has been almost consistently a pillar of the right wing of British labor, and Mr. Clegg uses the American term "business unionism" in describing the spirit of the union leadership. Unfortunately—like many European observers—Mr. Clegg apparently believes that this term not only implies the absence of a philosophy of class struggle, but he also conveys (p. 256) that it is a less aggressive kind of unionism. Strike statistics do not confirm this view.

The general unions have produced some of the most outstanding and powerful British labor leaders such as Ernest Bevin. Mr. Clegg's study will greatly help understand why this is so. The size of the general unions tends automatically to give their leader a particular stature, but more important the system of organization endows the general secretary with an authority which few leaders of craft unions enjoy.

These are two books which no student of industrial relations can afford to miss.

ADOLF STURMTHAL
Roosevelt University

J. HARVEY PERRY. *Taxes, Tariffs, and Subsidies: A History of Canadian Fiscal Development.* Vol. I: Pp. xviii, 324. Vol. II: Pp. xi, 436. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1955. $25.00.

This two-volume work, sponsored by the Canadian Tax Foundation, was conceived as a preface to the author's *Taxation in Canada.* The material became so bulky that it led to "a book twice the length of the work of which it was originally intended to be an introduction" (p. vii).

The first volume deals with events 1867–1940. In its first two decades the Canadian federation had hard going and, partly as a result, adopted a protectionist program. In the 1890's the economic climate changed for the better, and Canada experienced a boom which continued almost to World War I. This allowed the Dominion government to rely upon revenue from customs and excises (chiefly liquor and tobacco). The provincial governments, however, had to enter—timidly—the field of direct taxation, and the municipalities the area of business taxation.

In Canada, even more than the United States, World War I recast the federal revenue system, despite federal tardiness in facing up to the issues of war finance. Taxation of corporate and individual income began, and, in 1919, a federal sales tax was added. Then in the 1920's the federal government retreated in response to the mood of the times, and to the fact that the important tasks, especially construction of highways, called for provincial and municipal action.

The great depression after 1929 struck with terrific force at provincial and municipal finances. It forced federal intervention, gradual at first and later with a rush, to lift some of the burdens from these governments. But the problems were so great and the solutions so obscure that, in 1937, the federal government appointed a Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (the Rowell-Sirois Commission) to give it advice. Its report, although coming after the start of the war, was of vast significance. For the first time a Canadian public document explained the significance of fiscal policy.

Volume II covers the period from 1940 to date. Perhaps because the author experienced events at first hand in the Department of Finance, it has more verve and force than Volume I. From its interesting pages I would particularly commend the exposition of the principles of war finance (pp. 331–33), chapter XXII on the excess profits tax, the brief exposition treating the

refundable income tax (pp. 363–64), and chapter XXVIII treating Dominion finance postwar. The events of the fifteen years 1940–54 are of great interest to students of federal finance. The impression emerges that the federal government did a good job, and yet at the present time no level of government is content. The provincial and local governments declare that centralization has gone too far and that they need more autonomy; the federal government is restive because of its heavy financial responsibilities to the other governments. If easier times lie ahead, a swing toward decentralization may be expected.

The two volumes are, then, a most welcome addition to the literature of Canadian public finance, and the Tax Foundation, as well as the author, deserve our thanks. Mr. Perry has, for fuller measure, provided nearly forty pages of bibliography and an appendix of useful tables. In these volumes he has chosen to be chiefly descriptive. At some future time he should give us a fuller measure of interpretation and analysis, because the brief samples provided this time are so sensible and convincing that one wishes for more.

JAMES A. MAXWELL
Clark University

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

E. H. CARR. *The Interregnum, 1923–1924.* Pp. 392. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. $5.00.

Mr. Carr maintains in this fourth volume of his history of Soviet Russia the impressive standards set in the first three. Despite some overlap with the earlier volumes, arrangement and structure are orderly and clear. As usual, the style is superb, though constant use of Russian abbreviations must present problems to those who do not know that language.

The content is the year 1923 in Russia. Economics, foreign affairs, and the first stage of the struggle between Trotsky and the "triumvirate" of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev furnish the main themes, each receiving roughly a third of the space. In each case, some attention is devoted to background extending to 1922 and to final developments in 1924. Much attention is given to the crucial Twelfth Party Congress of April, 1923 and considerable to the Thirteenth Conference, and Congress, of January and May, 1924. Throughout, the author relates events and issues, in a dispassionate but suspenseful narrative, to the tensions set in motion by Lenin's incapacitation.

Considering the magnitude and complexity of the subjects treated, this work must be acknowledged an outstanding success. Unlike in earlier volumes, Carr uses very extensively not only official Soviet sources, but also non-Soviet material, particularly the very important Menshevik organ, *Sotsialisticheski Vestnik.* Those who have accused him of confining his documentation to pro-Soviet sources may be pleased to note that Max Eastman, Ruth Fischer and Trotsky's posthumous biography of Stalin are among many anti-Stalinist sources effectively employed. However, some of the vital, or sensational—depending on one's point of view—contents of these sources are ignored. For example, though Carr brings out, at least by implication, some of the peculiarities of Lenin's last illness, he says nothing about Trotsky's strongly expressed belief that Stalin poisoned Lenin.

On the other hand, Carr's interpretation of the "interregnum" is in many ways similar to that of Trotsky, although his account is pale and bloodless in comparison with the vivid prose of Trotsky.

In this volume Carr shakes off some of the fatalism and doctrinaire bias in favor of "socialism" which are the chief defects of the earlier volumes. Yet it is curious that he attributes many of the characteristics of the Soviet economy of the early NEP period to "capitalist" policies. Since some of the most important of these, such as the ruthless exploitation of the labor force by the state, were deeply intensified after Stalin launched his more "socialist" policy in 1928, one is puzzled by the author's interpretation. In general, Professor Carr's series thus far has been much stronger as a factual record than as a work of interpretation. Mr. Carr's interpretation is usually implicit. This makes it difficult to appraise and often difficult to discern.

However, a basic pattern of analysis remains. Russia, according to Carr, lacked the prerequisites for "socialism." Consequently, the progressive descent into despotism was inevitable. Carr does not face the possibility that a state monopoly economy, among other factors, may have—I would say did—intensify the already existing Russian tendency toward a despotic type of government which, however, many Russians opposed, and which was being gradually overcome in the period after 1905.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
Yale University

N. N. SUKHANOV. *The Russian Revolution, 1917.* Edited, abridged and translated by Joel Carmichael. Pp. xxxvii, 691. London; New York; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955. $10.00.

Sukhanov's account of the Bolshevik seizure of power is a primary historical source. Sukhanov was a versatile, left-wing intellectual, a Marxist though never a Bolshevik. He knew everyone that mattered in St. Petersburg and had a remarkable knack of being in the crucial place when history was being made. His reminiscences of the revolution, first published in seven volumes in 1922, provide an honest and disinterested record of the critical months between the abdication of the Tsar and the assumption of power by the Bolsheviks. Trotsky made full use of these memoirs in his own inimitable *History of the Russian Revolution.* The memoirs are now published in an abridged English translation for the first time. About half of the original text has been translated, and the excisions have been wisely done. The translation is excellent; the editor's footnotes and Introduction are most valuable.

Revolutions, when described in college textbooks, are neat affairs. They have certain major causes (usually four) and certain consequences. The revolutionary process itself seems coherent and rational. Sukhanov reminds us that in real life revolutions are incoherent, chaotic affairs, and that revolutionaries are tired, hungry, puzzled men with stomach disorders who spend a great deal of time doing nothing. This is how Sukhanov describes Miliukov on the first day of the Russian Revolution (pp. 48–49): "Quite alone in the Catherine Hall P. N. Miliukov was walking around, the central figure of bourgeois Russia, the leader of the only official organ of power in Petersburg at the moment, and *de facto* head of the first revolutionary Government.

"He too found himself inactive. His whole appearance said plainly that he had nothing to do, that he did not in the least know what to do. Various people went up to him, asked him questions, gave him information. He replied with evident reluctance and vagueness. They left him, and he started walking around alone again."

Except for Lenin and Trotsky, the Bolshevik leaders in 1917 were quite unprepared for revolution. Sukhanov refers to "the complete shapelessness" of the Bolshevik movement (p. 14); the Bolshevik leaders were flatfooted and incapable of thought (p. 24), "primitive and badly grounded" (p. 44). *Pravda,* the paper edited at that time by Stalin, was "muddle-headed" (p. 224).

The consolidation of Stalin's power after Lenin's death led to a rewriting of history, and in particular the history of the revolution. Stalin's role in 1917 had been relatively undistinguished—Sukhanov refers to him as "a grey blur" (p. 230)—but history was revised to portray Stalin as Lenin's chief partner in 1917. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Radek, and the rest were shown as fools, cowards or traitors—or all three. Sukhanov's too honest account became heresy, and Sukhanov himself was one of the first victims of the Stalinist purges.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY
New York, N. Y.

RAYMOND A. BAUER with the assistance of Edward Wasiolek. *Nine Soviet Portraits.* Pp. viii, 190. New York: The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and Sons, 1955. $3.95.

Raymond Bauer has shown himself, in his *New Man in Soviet Psychology,* to be one of the more sensitive and sensible students of the Soviet Union. In his present study Mr. Bauer, who is a social psychologist, has selected fiction as a vehicle for expressing certain conclusions he has reached

concerning the behavior of Russian citizens. This project was undertaken, as the author tells us, on a "dare," and while much serious research went into the preparation of the book its casual origin is not easily forgotten.

Chapters in the lives of nine different Soviet types are presented here: the student, the collective farmer (quite typically, a woman), the doctor (also a woman), the District Party Secretary, the urban housewife, the writer, the factory director, the tractor driver (who is also a veteran returned from Germany), and, most speculatively, the secret police official. Mr. Bauer and his assistant, Edward Wasiolek, first listed methodically the characteristics of each of these types which they wished to stress; they then devised a narrative which would include these points. The results of their labors is a readable and very often engaging series of vignettes of Soviet life. The characters and the situations appear entirely plausible, and, with perhaps one or two exceptions, give every appearance of authenticity. Indeed, many of the episodes are adapted directly from the testimony of refugees.

It is an exceedingly grim picture of existence in the Soviet Union which Mr. Bauer depicts. While it may seem mild beside the lurid accounts given by some recent emigrés, it is a harsher portrayal than this reviewer considers warranted if the object is to render a well-balanced study of individual behavior and motivation in Russia. It would not occur to this reviewer, for instance, to lay such stress on the deceits which, Mr. Bauer alleges, each Soviet citizen consciously practices in his everyday relations with his associates. Unquestionably there is deceit in Russia today, as a necessary prerequisite to survival. It is easily detected by the social scientist observing Russia from the outside. But the subjective capacity to scrutinize his own behavior which the author ascribes to each of his main characters may be questioned. The very circumstances, it would seem, which have given rise to the practice of deceit among Soviet citizens must also prevent them from being as fully introspective about this practice as Mr. Bauer suggests.

The marriage of fiction and sociology is unlikely, under any conditions, to be an easy one. Mr. Bauer makes it clear (p. 171) that sociology is the dominant partner here, but he does not in this assure the harmony of the union. *Nine Soviet Portraits* remains to the end a *tour de force*, suspended somewhere between passable fiction and what, from Raymond Bauer, we would expect to have been less stereotyped and less transparent social psychology.

CHARLES B. McLANE
Swarthmore College

F. BOWEN EVANS (Ed.). *Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities.* Pp. xiii, 222. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. $3.00.

The main aim of this book is to present a description of the nature, volume, and cost of the total Communist propaganda effort during 1954. It also seeks to provide perspective by putting the account within the framework of the historical development of Communist propaganda theory and practice by describing the worldwide organizational network through which Communist propaganda is disseminated, and by relating the strictly propaganda and ideological aspects of the Communist program to broader Communist objectives and strategies in the cold war. Chapter II is concerned with the central emphasis on propaganda in Communist theory and practice (particularly since Lenin) and points out the continuous, unremitting use of propaganda as an instrument for the propagation of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and for the promotion of foreign policies of Communist states. In addition, the development and present organization of the worldwide apparatus through which the Communists conduct a globally-co-ordinated propaganda is described. Chapters III, IV, and V examine the volume, themes, and media of Communist propaganda during 1952 on a worldwide basis; and Chapter VI treats briefly some of the activities of the major international Communist-Front groups during the year. Each of the remaining four chapters is devoted to the Communist propaganda developments during 1954 in a particular geographic region. In order that Communist propaganda activities may be seen in their proper context, each of these chapters begins with a description of Communist strength, objectives, and strategy in the particular area. The materials used here are from many sources. Some standard works have been used, and they are cited in the footnotes. However, by far the greatest amount of information was selected from a mass of published materials and eyewitnesses' reports obtained from United States government representatives and correspondents throughout the world.

The specialist will find this booklet quite useful not because the material presented here is new, but rather because it has been systematized and butressed by citing facts and figures. In this respect, we have here an extremely useful reference book. The nonspecialists will be overwhelmed with the mass of these facts and figures, and the fellow-travellers will keep on making fun of such "revelations," since the Soviet propaganda machinery has built its success on Hitler's famed principle: "the bigger lie. . . ."

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

HAROLD H. FISHER. *The Communist Revolution: An Outline of Strategy and Tactics.* (Hoover Institute Studies, Series A: General Studies, No. 2.) Pp. v, 89. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1955. $1.00.

In this manual Professor Fisher has provided an objective outline of Marxist theory and practice. He writes with the authority of one who for more than thirty years has studied the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath. He is evidently less at home in Chinese affairs, and his account of the rise of Mao Tse-Tung is less perceptive than other parts of the study. There is a full bibliography of works in English.

Some readers may be surprised by Professor Fisher's insistence that the shift in the Kremlin line to a policy of "peaceful coexistence" preceded Stalin's death by "six months or more" (p. 42). In the opinion of this reviewer, the evidence in support of this hypothesis is overwhelming; indeed, the shift can be fixed at almost exactly a year before Stalin's death.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY
New York, N. Y.

HAROLD J. BERMAN and MIROSLAV KERNER. *Soviet Military Law and Administration.* Pp. xiv, 208. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $4.00.

In the Preface, the authors promise the reader only an analysis of the administrative and legal structure of the Soviet military establishment. But they achieve more than this. First, they formulate a very plausible hypothesis about the type of integration of the armed forces of the Soviets into the total power structure. On the top level, they find a complete fusion of the armed forces with the other elements of the power machine, not so much on the institutional as on the personal level: the armed forces are headed by the same men who also head the technical apparatus of the government and the political police; this makes a *pronunciamento* rather improbable. But on the middle and lower levels, the armed forces are granted a large margin of autonomy which the authors correctly explain as the result of a cumulative experience of the leaders who learned that semi-autonomy is a functional prerequisite of the efficiency of any army. Second, on the basis of scattered data (systematic data are unavailable), they give some insight into the informal structures existing within the armed forces; here they come to the conclusion that the situation is ambivalent: discipline is strict and relentless; but there are also elements of "parentalism" which, in his earlier works on Soviet law, Harold Berman had given a probably exaggerated emphasis.

The major part of the book is devoted to a concise, but clear presentation of the structure of the military establishment, the regulation of military discipline, the law of military crimes and punishments, the organization and procedure of military courts, and military prosecution. Very interesting is the discussion of the history of the consecutive changes in the disciplinary code showing the steady de-emphasis of revolutionary ideas and re-emphasis of patriotism, but also of the duty of absolute obedience to the orders of the superiors. The book is concluded by an "appraisal" of the Soviet system of military law and administration which, perhaps, is not so much an appraisal as a summary. This summary includes

however a most illuminating digest of the impressions, on the subject, of M. Kerner who, from July 1, 1944 until the end of the war served as a colonel of the Czechoslovak unit on the Eastern front, and a summary of a few cases concerning the application of the military court procedure to essentially nonmilitary offenses committed by railroad workers, an awkward feature of Soviet law indeed.

N. S. TIMASHEFF
Fordham University

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

DAVID T. CATTELL. *Communism and the Spanish Civil War.* (University of California Publications in International Relations, Vol. IV.) Pp. xii, 290. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. $3.75 cloth; $2.75 paper.

Any book dealing with the first two and a half years of World War II in Spain is a welcome contribution to the truth. The truth about these lost years of that war is still being hidden behind an iron curtain of our own to hide the shame. Mr. Cattell's book, dealing with the part played by European Communists, with never more than 500 Russians among them, is well documented. It is not, as the title might imply, another effort in the doctoring of history to show that Hitler and Mussolini gallantly fared forth in the name of the Lord to save the Spaniards from the "Communism" of the Azana regime. The author undertakes no such fantastic task. He makes an honest effort to indicate the part the Communists actually played in the Spanish war against the Axis. These Communists were certainly not fighting for democracy, but they were fighting for selfish reasons against the Nazi aggression. Actually volunteers trained in fighting, their help was welcomed, just as the help of the Communist Government of Russia was hailed with enthusiasm by England, France, and the United States in the second phase of World War II. These Communists, trained fighters in the International Brigade, under the command of a German Communist, did save Madrid at a critical moment; but, when, taking advantage of natural gratitude, their commander tried to impose his views he was promptly dismissed.

The legal government bought such arms as it could from Russia solely because the three democracies from whom it preferred to buy had denied it its unquestionable right under international law to buy from them, and the gold it sent to Moscow was solely to pay for the material bought. It placed two Spanish Communists in the Ministry in the dark days for the same reason that de Gasperi in Italy placed Communists in his first Government to unify the people behind the regime in a crisis. Mr. Cattell accurately shows that in the darkest hours toward the close when the Government's sole hope for guns was on Russia, the Communists did force concessions through threats and blackmail. Based on intensive research, this book is a valuable contribution in these days of brazen attempts to so color "history" as to make it conform to the defence of our unhappy policy of unwitting collaboration with the Axis in its war on the gallant democracy of Spain.

CLAUDE E. BOWERS
New York, N. Y.

PAUL FARMER. *Vichy, Political Dilemma.* Pp. vi, 376. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $5.50.

As a thoughtful student of modern French history, Mr. Farmer is concerned with the political *malaise* that has come over the French nation. In fact, his original purpose in undertaking a study of the Vichy regime grew out of a desire "to discover what new light this might throw on both the history of France in the period 1918–1939 and on the course of affairs since 1944" (p. v).

To a degree, the work does throw light on continuing and basic French problems, but it would have been more accurate to state the purpose the other way around: the author's interests in the periods before and after Vichy, so far as the present study goes, are really directed toward an explanation of Vichy. This is valid procedure, but in following it Mr. Farmer assumes an importance for the Vichy period, and makes uses of it in his attempt to answer long-range questions, that other scholars may well question. There is no doubt that the principles and practices of the Vichy government derived in considerable measure from the evils of the prewar period; nor that the Vichy scars were deep and in some instances lasting; but Vichy was also a product of special circumstances of defeat and occupation and many of its aspects were unique rather than typical. These facts make it extremely treacherous hunting ground for the historian who seeks to explain France's basic ills. Mr. Farmer recognizes all of this, of course, but the recognition does not sufficiently govern this study. He continues to read into Vichy more than is warranted.

But one may question an author's perspective without denying the general value of his book. *Vichy, Political Dilemma* is the work of a skilled hand and bears evidence of patient, thorough research. Although there are no footnotes, which presumably means that the work was designed for the "general reader," there is an excellent "Note on Sources." Judgments of the Vichy leaders are notably temperate and enlightening. Although the author makes every effort to be fair to these leaders, it can scarcely be said that any one of them gains in stature as a result. There are too many occasions when the author, in an attempt to demonstrate his adherence to the basic tenets of the historian's faith, dwells on explanations of what questions may be properly asked and what answers soundly ventured. These may indicate the consistency of his position, but they are repetitious and make for periods of tedious reading in an otherwise well-written book.

JOSEPH J. MATHEWS
Emory University

MAURICE BAUMONT, JOHN H. E. FRIED, and EDMOND VERMEIL (Eds.). *The Third Reich.* Pp. xv, 910. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $9.00.

This inquiry into the methods and procedure of Nazism is published under the auspices of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies and sponsored by UNESCO. Twenty-seven European and American scholars have united to present a comprehensive account of the National Socialist movement from its philosophical origins in nineteenth-century nationalist thought to the political policies pursued by the Nazis in their twelve years of power.

The book is divided into three major parts. Prefaced by a long study by Edmond Vermeil on the background of German nationalist ideology, the first group of essays deals with the philosophical forerunners of National Socialism, including Constantin Franz, Paul de Lagarde, Nietzsche, H. S. Chamberlain, Stefan George, Moeller van den Bruck, and Adolf Hitler. Part II analyzes the political, social, and economic circumstances that brought the Nazis to power in 1933. Part III is devoted to examinations of the political methods and techniques of the National Socialist régime, such as the use of propaganda, the misuse of philosophy, anti-Semitism, racialism, the National Socialist vocabulary, the role of the Schutzstaffel (SS), and the position of the Catholic and Protestant churches. Among the excellent essays is Otto Klineberg's study of Nazi racialism.

This giant, encyclopedic volume shows in microcosm some of the difficulties encountered when scholars work on an international scale (British, French, American, Dutch, and Belgian historians contribute essays). The editors fixed only the subjects beforehand and made no attempt to determine the scope of the treatment, on the ground that there was to be no interference with the creative freedom of the authors. While this aim certainly is a most laudable one, the practical effect is that there is a serious amount of overlapping and repetition. Careful editing to avoid this result does not come under the category of "overstrict regimentation."

The Committee, preferring "sincerity and plain speaking to the impersonal neutrality of a lifeless report" (p. xv), allowed each author perfect freedom to adopt his point of view, even in the political sphere. This, of course, was to be expected under the circumstances. The discriminating reader can judge the varying viewpoints for himself and make his own choice. There is as yet no last word on the underlying causes of the Nazi movement.

The contributions of German historians are somewhat depressing. Wilhelm Grenzmann, agreeing with Edmond Vermeil, describes the Nazi "relapse into barbarism" as a poison that had been creeping through the organism for a long time, but hastily adds: "The Germans, of course, were not the only people to be contaminated" (p. 203). Gerhard Ritter echoes Meinecke's German "catastrophe": "It is important for anyone examining these conditions to realize how unprepared internally Germany was for the political events of 1932–33—the sudden rise to power of the Hitlerian party" (p. 384). Though fully one-third of the book is devoted to the intellectual precursors of National Socialism, Theodor Litt warns about labelling "pioneers" of National Socialism: "In every case we must be careful to examine whether, and in what degree, the affinities of which so much was made really existed, or were only part of the make-believe of those virtuosi of the lie" (p. 455). The implication is that Hitlerism was a sudden catastrophe without link to the sphere of ideas and theories. Far from being a bolt from the blue, National Socialism was the final link in a chain of disastrous events.

On the whole, however, this volume should be welcomed as a real contribution to the clarification of National Socialism. It should be of value in the vital task of the quickest possible identification of any similar movements that might appear in the future.

LOUIS L. SNYDER
City College of New York

HELGA TIMM. *Die deutsche Sozialpolitik und der Bruch der Grossen Koalition im März 1930.* (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Heft No. 1.) Pp. 216. Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste-erlag, 1952. DM 12.80.

HANS GEORG WIECK. *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wiedergründung des Zentrums im Jahre 1945.* (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Heft No. 2.) Pp. 247. Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste-Verlag, 1953. DM 12.80.

Recent German historiography is enriched by the first two volumes published by the "Kommission für die Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien" (Commission for the History of Parliamentarianism and Political Parties) which is sponsored by the West German Government. Its self-declared task, "to examine aspects of German political life from 1848 to the present," is auspiciously commenced by Helga Timm's competent treatment of the fall in 1930 of the Herman Müller cabinet over the issue of unemployment benefits. This was the last coalition cabinet anchored in the majority parties.

Helga Timm skillfully describes the deterioration of the governing parties into brawling interest groups and the political immaturity of large parts of the population, a process which was aggravated by the impact of the Depression. The Social Democrats faced the dilemma of satisfying their following with increased unemployment compensation and other benefits while balancing a hopelessly deranged budget. The German People's Party, the other wing of the coalition, demanded economy and had in fact shriveled from its broad middle-class basis to a core of economic die-hards.

The author also demonstrates by an exhaustive treatment of the bitter Parliamentary struggles over naval appropriations during August 1928 and the employers' intransigence in the Ruhr strike later that year that the threat to the Weimar coalition government was great even during relatively full employment.

The author labels the fall of the Müller government as the disruption of the tenuous democracy of the Weimar Republic. She ascribes this to the lack of a non-Marxist mass movement to which the petit-bourgeosie could have turned, and to the fact that consideration of social policy had become a subject of party polemics. This analysis gives inadequate weight to the deep cleavages of German society which became especially apparent in the depression. Yet the author deserves high tribute for making a scholarly effort at identifying and interpreting the interplay of forces which helped to determine the fate of the ill-starred Weimar Republic.

The second volume of this series, by Hans Georg Wieck, is an original study of the founding of the Christian Democratic Union and the revival of the Catholic Center Party in the British occupation zone of Germany, from May 1945 to March 1946. Drawing extensively from hitherto unpublished documents, party files, correspondence, and interviews with over a hundred leading participants, Dr. Wieck provides an informative analysis of the political climate in the war-ravished Rhenish-Westphalian industrial basin and in Northwestern Germany. Sensitive to pertinent details, he shows how in many large German cities in 1945 isolated small groups gathered under the leadership of Protestant and Catholic clergymen and of prewar democratic and nationalist party leaders. They were now united by the need for a Christian-oriented, liberal democratic party that was free of Socialist and Communist doctrines.

Considerable attention is given to the deeply rooted disagreement over the question whether the emerging political alignment should be denominational or nondenominational in character. The development of the Christian Democratic Union and the revival of the Catholic Center Party attested both to the irreconcilability of the two views, and to the common desire of all leaders to safeguard religious harmony and strengthen democratic political life. Although scant data are presented on the response of party leaders to the rank-and-file demands, this work represents the successful completion of a challenging task and undoubtedly is likely to remain for long the definitive treatise on the subject. A name index and short summaries on the growth of Christian liberal parties in Western Europe after World War II are appended.

Both works exhibit a degree of scholarship which, it is hoped, subsequent volumes of this series will maintain.

ROBERT MUELLER
New York, N. Y.

NORMAN RICH and M. H. FISHER (Eds.). *The Holstein Papers.* Volume I: *Memoirs and Political Observations.* Pp. xxvii, 216. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $5.00.

Historians have so far refrained from writing a full study of the "mystery man" on the Wilhelmstrasse, Baron Friedrich von Holstein (1837–1909), pending the reappearance of the Holstein papers. With the capture by the Allies of the massive archives of the German Foreign Ministry, these papers, formerly in private possession and confiscated successively by the Gestapo and by the Foreign Ministry, have now re-emerged. Their publication has been approved by their former owner as well as by the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State in their capacity as custodians of the German documents. The Holstein papers that have survived consist of political memoranda, diary fragments for the period 1881 to 1888, memoirs, and a large volume of letters. The present volume presents the memoirs, dealing loosely and fragmentarily with various stages and episodes of Holstein's career; subsequent volumes will consist of diaries and letters.

The editors make the rather exaggerated claim that these papers will lead to a complete rejudgment of German foreign policy, of Bismarck, and of Holstein himself. In particular, the editors assure us, these papers will explode the myth—if it is a myth—of Holstein as the sinister schemer behind the scenes. As everyone knows, Holstein acquired an evil reputation among contemporaries and succeeding generations as the "evil genius" of the Foreign Ministry and was regarded as a warped personality and social recluse. Although he never held a higher office than *Vortragender Rat* (Counselor), he was the most influential person in the Foreign Ministry by virtue of his long experience and Bismarck's confidence in him. After the latter's fall from office in 1890 Holstein virtually dominated foreign policy until in 1906 he was forced to resign because of his reckless policy during the first Morocco crisis.

As a historical source the Holstein memoirs are rather disappointing. They contain a good deal of society talk, petty affairs, and Holstein's observations and characterizations of contemporaries. Some of

this is illuminating and entertaining (illuminating especially the author's character), but it adds little or no new light on the major problems in this period. Holstein's part in the Arnim affair is in no way clarified by his disclaiming to have had anything to do with it beyond his admission of political differences existing between Arnim and Holstein. His venomous comments about Bismarck (in later years), his opposition to the Iron Chancellor's complicated alliance system, and particularly to the "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia are in no way surprising. That Holstein was violently Russophobic and Francophobic and to a considerable extent Anglophile and favored an Anglo-German alliance has been amply shown in recent studies by Helmut Krausnick, Peter Rassow, and G. P. Gooch. Holstein blames Chancellor Buelow and the Kaiser for the failure to reach an agreement with England at the turn of the century, but that Holstein, too, insisted on an exorbitant price for such an agreement he fails to point out. The Moroccan affair of 1905 is given scant attention.

It is perhaps unfair to expect significant revelations from these memoirs. As the editors point out, there are great gaps in the narrative and certain papers have been removed, lost, or destroyed by interested parties. Finally, it is at least probable that Holstein himself wrote as he wished to be remembered and edited his papers accordingly.

CARL G. ANTHON
American University of Beirut

OTHER COUNTRIES

MAO TSE-TUNG. *Selected Works.* Vol. I: 1926–1936; Vol. II: 1937–1938; Vol. III: 1939–1941. Pp. 336; 296; 260. New York: International Publishers, 1954, 1955. $3.00 each.

Mao Tse-tung's contribution to the formal literature of Chinese Communism began with the publication in March 1926 of a brief "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" (I, pp. 13–20). During the next fifteen years, through May 8, 1941—the period covered by the first three volumes of his *Selected Works*—Mao produced fifty-six other works which the editors of the present series thought useful to reproduce. The *Selected Works* do not include all of Mao's works of this period, although no works of significance are known to be omitted; and the present texts have been carefully edited to revise and omit portions of the early works which for one unexplained reason or another were thought to need revision or deletions. Consequently the professional student of the history of Chinese Communism must still rely on Chinese originals of an earlier date for his research. However, for the general reader whose attention has been drawn to China by recent events, and who is interested in the mental processes and perspectives of the man who has been the unchallenged leader of the Chinese Communist Party since 1935, the present texts will be found extremely valuable and representative. They offer insights into the nature and quality of Chinese Communist thought that cannot be had otherwise.

The present three volumes are the officially sponsored translation of the first two Chinese volumes published in Peking in 1951. They include a wide variety of materials: the shorter pieces include press interviews, official policy statements, and such pungent essays as "Combat Liberalism" (September 7, 1937; II, pp. 74–76); the longer pieces include theoretical expositions which were not widely known before 1950—such as "On Practice" (July 1937; I, pp. 282–97) and "On Contradiction" (August 1937; II, pp. 13–53)—and the most important political and tactical works, which have long served as basic guidance for party cadres and the rank-and-file.

Three of the political-tactical works have particular significance. (1) "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War" (I, pp. 175–253) is the unfinished analysis of the military lessons of the "Second Revolutionary Civil War" which Mao presented in December 1936, to familiarize his followers with military doctrines that would be applicable in the war with Japan. This central military analysis was the predecessor of many others, including "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" (May 1938; II, pp. 119–56), and "On the Protracted War" (May 1938, II, pp. 157–243). Out of this body of doctrine emerge explanations of the military victory over the Kuomintang and, to some extent, of the Communist military tactics in such other Asian countries as Viet-Nam and Laos. (2) "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (December 1939; III, pp. 72–101) is a Marxist-Leninist attempt to fit the Communist Revolution into the mainstream of China's revolutionary experience and to apply Leninist principles to the analysis of the revolutionary potential of the different classes of Chinese society. (3) "On New Democracy" (January 1940; III, pp. 102–56) was the authoritative pre-1949 guide to the political organization, methods, and objectives in Communist-controlled parts of China, and throws important light on the principles of public policy written into the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic of September 20, 1954.

Maoism—*Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang* (lit. "the Thought of Mao Tse-tung")—is the official doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party. It is not a philosophical system of very high order, suffering in this respect the weaknesses of other expressions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Nevertheless, Maoism emphasizes the special situation of China, and the special requirements of the revolution in China, and to that extent is the Chinese counterpart of Stalinism. Its basic tenets are found in the first three volumes of Mao's *Selected Works* and establish a tenuous distinction between Chinese and Soviet Communism.

H. ARTHUR STEINER
University of California
Los Angeles

Ennin's Diary, The Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law. Translated from the Chinese by Edwin O. Reischauer. Pp. xvi, 454. $7.50.

EDWIN O. REISCHAUER. *Ennin's Travels in T'ang China.* Pp. xii, 341. New York: The Ronald Press, 1955. $5.00.

Ennin was a Japanese Buddhist monk who went to China in the year 838 to travel and to study Buddhism, and who remained there until, falling victim to the great Buddhist persecution of 845, he was expelled from the country, and returned to his own homeland two years later. During these nine and one-half years he wrote (in Chinese) a lengthy diary, notable not only as the first great document of its sort in the Far East, but also as the first detailed account of China by a foreign visitor. Ennin was fortunate enough to have seen China during one of its peak periods of political and cultural glory—the T'ang dynasty—when Chinese Buddhism was at its apogee. Now, in these two handsomely printed volumes (each equipped with excellent maps), Professor Reischauer of Harvard has made this ancient Far Eastern record available for the first time to the Western world.

The first of the volumes containing a complete translation of the diary is a splendid piece of scholarship, primarily designed for the specialist, in which a host of difficult problems, linguistic and otherwise, has been successfully surmounted. The second volume, while equally scholarly, is on the other hand intended for a more general public. In it Reischauer has extracted the essential meat from Ennin's diary, added to it material drawn from other sources, and thus given us, in modern language, a coherent picture of what Ennin saw in ninth-century China. Some of its topics include Ennin's dealings with Chinese officialdom, everyday life in T'ang China, popular Chinese Buddhism, and the great Buddhist persecution of 845.

There is much in Ennin's diary, and even more in Reischauer's book based on this diary, that is fresh and interesting. For the 845 persecution, for example, the diary is our most detailed single source. Yet there is also a good deal in Reischauer's book that, to the general reader at least, will probably seem somewhat inconsequential or pedantic, even though it no doubt has significance for the scholarly specialist. The chapter on popular Buddhism, for example, while telling much about some of the formal aspects of T'ang Buddhism, conveys no idea at all of the qualities, spiritual or otherwise, which made Buddhism the great religious force it was.

No doubt these features of Reischauer's book reflect corresponding features in the

record of Ennin himself, who, as Reischauer points out (*Ennin's Travels*, p. 38), "apparently was not a man of creative imagination." As seen through his diary, Ennin appears to have been a sincere and devout, but nonetheless somewhat matter-of-fact person. He faithfully recorded the factual minutiae of everyday life, including texts of numerous letters and official documents, and, as far as Buddhism is concerned, was apparently chiefly impressed by its miracle-working and ritualistic aspects. It seems a pity that Reischauer has not chosen to tell us more specifically just what it was in Buddhism that Ennin took back with him to Japan and that made him such an important figure there. One interesting point, alluded to but not commented on by Reischauer, is that Ennin, devout Buddhist though he was, was enough of an eclectic to be ready to pray, in moments of emergency, to all sorts of Shintoist and other non-Buddhist divinities.

In the opening pages of *Ennin's Travels*, Reischauer interestingly compares Ennin with Marco Polo, pointing out that the former, as a Buddhist monk coming from a country culturally an offshoot of China, was far better equipped than the latter to enter into a sympathetic understanding of Chinese life, and that his diary is a much more detailed and accurate source of information. This is unquestionably true, yet it is equally true that, judged purely in terms of human interest and its ability to stir men's imaginations, the diary falls far short of Polo's famous narrative. Grateful though we are to Ennin for this record of China during one of its peaks of splendor, and to Professor Reischauer for now making it available to the West at a time when China has again become a world power, there is very little likelihood that it will ever rival in popularity the no doubt often superficial and misleading, yet always fascinating, account of the Venetian traveler.

DERK BODDE
University of Pennsylvania

WERNER LEVI. *Modern China's Foreign Policy*. Pp. xi, 399. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953. $5.50.

Professor Levi's book is an attempt to "analyze and interpret China's foreign policy" during "the past century or so," with China, and "not the countries with which she has had dealings," as "the focus of the study." This admirable objective is only partially attained because (1) the author has not used enough Chinese material to enable him really to get behind the scenes and see what the Chinese attitudes, motives, objectives, hopes and dreams actually were, and (2) his manner of organization and presentation fails to bring out clearly the major developments and trends.

The author attempted to meet the first difficulty by using translated Chinese documents, works by Chinese in Western languages, foreign newspapers published in China and Chinese news releases. He has also used German and French materials far more extensively than do most American writers. Despite this, however, his basic analysis has had to be based on the exterior record as shown in treaties, notes and public statements, and only now and then has his account been illuminated by a glimpse at the interior record—instructions to negotiators, interoffice memos, private letters, papers, and so forth, of those involved in policy making. A thorough understanding of China's foreign policy will only come after the large mass of this interior record now available to scholars has been laboriously studied.

The book of approximately 400 pages is organized into twenty-five chapters without dates or subheads. Chapter headings are only partially descriptive of policy. Fewer chapters, with headings descriptive of policy aims, characteristics or trends, with sub-topics dealing with specific developments illustrating how efforts to implement policy aims failed or succeeded, would have presented the analysis much more clearly and forcefully. Brief statements at the beginning or end of chapters pointing up the significant trends are also needed. As it is, many penetrating observations and significant trends are all but lost in the dead level of presentation. The really important points that the Boxer Settlement of 1901 played into the hands of the reactionary Empress and her clique when it could have easily assured the accession to power of progressive elements (p. 69), and that the failure of the Western powers to respond sympathetically and quickly enough to the upsurge of young progressive China from 1919 to 1922, epitomized by the ignoring of the appeal of Sun Yat-sen and the failure of the Washington Conference to take concrete steps to help China, threw Young China into a leftist tailspin from which it was never fully able to recover (pp. 157–63) are almost lost sight of in the welter of other facts and generalizations. The Sun-Joffe declaration of January 1923, which might have been used to highlight this shift, is not even mentioned (pp. 174–75), although the general shift is discussed.

Despite the amount of specific detail that one finds in the study it is written at a rather high level of generalization, and many of the remarks and statements will not be fully understood or appreciated by one who does not already have the basic details of Far Eastern developments well in mind. The final third of the book dealing with the period of the collapse of Chiang and the development of Communist policy is especially well done. The work as a whole is full of interesting and often challenging interpretations and suggestions, but it has to be read slowly and with care if these are to be noted and given the consideration they deserve.

EARL H. PRITCHARD
University of Chicago

JEAN STROETZEL. *Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword: A Study of the Attitudes of Youth in Postwar Japan.* (A UNESCO Publication.) Pp. 334. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.00.

This book is the outcome of a study planned by UNESCO in 1951 and 1952 to investigate the attitudes of Japanese youth in the 15–25 year age range, with special reference to the social reforms in Japanese society administered during the Occupation period. The objective was to determine how these reforms had influenced the attitudes of young people and to assess such attitudes in the light of known constants in Japanese social relations and cultural patterns. The study was directed by Jean Stroetzel, a French social psychologist, in collaboration with F. Vos, a Dutch specialist in Japanese ethnology and behavior. Many Japanese scholars and scientists assisted in the planning of the project and were instrumental in accomplishing the actual research operations. Special mention should be made of the National Public Opinion Institute of the Japanese Government, which did the national-sample attitude survey forming the nucleus of the study.

Methodologically this is a model research undertaking. It is the first major project to consciously employ socio-psychological, personological, and cultural anthropological techniques and knowledge in order to gain insight into the problem of attitudes in a sector of the population of a large nation-society. Recognizing the advantages and limitations of anthropological methods, the researchers successfully used anthropological knowledge of behavior and social patterns as a background against which attitudes influenced by contemporary events and experiences could be placed and ultimately interpreted.

The findings are extremely valuable, if not particularly surprising. Since it is impossible in a brief review to summarize a large quantity of specific data, one may hazard the impression that the attitudes and personalities of Japanese youth as revealed by this study provide the reader with a feeling that Japan is headed in very familiar directions. In Japanese youth, as in the youth of the West, a prevailing anxiety over contemporary historical uncertainties, and a willingness to reserve opinion on political matters (save for a special activist element in the universities, not fully acknowledged by the author) are in evidence—buttressed in the Japanese case by understandable economic and military insecurities brought about by Japan's ambiguous international position.

In spite of this "conservative" or withdrawal tendency *re* political matters, Japanese youth is predominantly prodemocratic and individualistic in the sphere of human relations. The Occupation period reforms, building upon latent liberalism due to industrialization and urbanization, and to

residues from the "liberal era" of the 1920's, have emerged among the majority of young people in the form of favorable views of love *vs.* arranged marriage; considerable personal ambition to "succeed"; discontent with the burdens of the family system; and numerous other "democratic" or egalitarian tendencies. These and other "modern" values are, of course, not symmetrically distributed. The sampling indicates that they vary by locality and region; the more isolated and traditional areas yielding more traditional responses.

Yet underlying this general modern cast of opinion go uncertainties which are interpreted as based on the prevailing functional character of the older institutions. While many young people reject family obligations, their personality analyses indicate that they still depend upon family ties for security to an extent probably greater than in Western countries, and their optimism and ambition are founded on images of an expanding society which the economic and political facts do not necessarily bear out. This is perhaps symptomatic of Japan's intermediate and dynamic position: while her modern history is best interpreted, as Reischauer has pointed out, in the broad categories and processual factors of Western society, her psychology, and the means she often uses to accomplish her "modern" ends, often remain traditional, and if not stereotypically "Oriental," at least "feudal" and "hierarchical," and adjusted to the facts of life in an overpopulated country which must depend upon foreign trade for a living. Japan is still at the crossroads, culturally, psychologically, and historically; her future is by no means certain, and the particular mixture of the traditional and the Western elements in her culture has not yet taken stable form.

JOHN W. BENNETT
Ohio State University

MICHIHIKO HACHIYA. *Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of a Japanese Physician, August 6–September 30, 1945.* Translated by Warner Wells and Neal Tsukifuji. Pp. xi, 238. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. $3.50.

Ordinarily one cannot review a book by quoting from its jacket but this is an exception. "This is a day by day eyewitness account of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the seven weeks that followed. Terrifying in its portrayal of the greatest man-made catastrophe in history, it is inspiring in its revelation of the heights of human heroism."

Not only is the book an important contribution to medical literature, but it is also interesting from a political science point of view. When the bomb exploded, a government employee, making his way through the darkened streets and fallen houses, ran to the fourth floor of the building where the Emperor's picture was hung, pried open an iron door behind which it was kept, and, with the help of others, carried it to safety ahead of the fire which broke out to the water's edge, the crowds of wounded and fleeing opening up, saluting and bowing to let it pass. The people of Hiroshima reflected the attitude of one old lady who said: "I'm sorry for the Emperor. He didn't start the war." The masses did not realize what had struck them and they were subject to all kinds of rumors including one that the city would be uninhabitable for seventy-five years. According to the author, the military authorities "had betrayed the Emperor and the people of Japan," and the ruthlessness of the army leaders and their stupidity knew no bounds. "Our personal rights were violated and we never knew when we might say something to provoke their irascible and vindictive natures." "The one word—surrender—had produced a greater shock than the bombing of our city." Contrary to the usual Japanese respect for law and order, the city was infested with burglars, looting was common and "the country was in the clutches of the mean and unintelligent." Yet despite all this criticism by Dr. Hachiya, his own exploits and heroism and those of his brave and conscientious staff make up a remarkable saga of Japanese courage and fortitude.

If the author ever entertained any harsh feelings toward the United States for the dropping of the bomb, he no longer seems to harbor them since his diary merely states that Buddhism taught him to be resigned in the case of adversity, and his 1952 postscript declares that when he thinks of the kindness of the American officers and doctors who subsequently took charge, "I think one can overlook thoughts of revenge." Everyone should read this short but fascinating and terrible story. Great credit is due to Warner Wells and Neal Tsukifuji for the lucidity of their translation from the Japanese.

ALBERT E. KANE
Washington, D. C.

HUBERT HERRING. *A History of Latin America: From the Beginnings to the Present.* Pp. xx, 796, xxvi. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. $6.50.

This is a lively and interesting history of the twenty highly diversified nations south of the United States which we lump together for convenience under the term "Latin America." Fulfilling the promise of the book's title, the author sketches their history "from the beginnings" more than two thousand years ago in Indo-America, Europe, and Africa—the three major areas from which the racially variegated population of modern Latin America was drawn. He has also done all that is humanly possible in this changing world to make good the promise of bringing the story down "to the present": for example, he discusses so recent an event as the overthrow of the "Communist-inspired" Arbenz government of Guatemala in June 1954.

Professor Herring has long been one of the most widely read writers on Latin America, but he has addressed himself primarily to the general reader in all his previous writings. These include *Good Neighbors,* one of the best of the World War II spate of books about Latin America, and numerous articles about Good Neighborland in *Harper's* and other magazines catering to what used to be called the carriage trade.

Now for the first time Herring has addressed himself directly to an academic audience, for the book under review is obviously a college text book—witness its numerous footnotes, its half-dozen statistical tables, and its thirteen-page reading list. In the main, however, he has adhered rather closely to the established pattern of text books in this field. The most striking illustration of this fact is provided by the section on the national period (pp. 243–772). Here, except for a twenty-eight-page group of chapters on "Latin America and the United States," each country is treated separately, with the result that this section, which fills more than two-thirds of the book, is not so much a history of Latin America as an aggregation of twenty national histories.

Although this is a text book, it is written in a style that should give it a wide appeal. The emphasis is on politics and personalities, though there is enough economic and social material to satisfy most readers who like to be provided with that kind of ballast.

Oddly enough in view of Herring's previous interest in cultural matters (see, for example, *Renascent Mexico,* which he coedited), the cultural aspect of Latin American history is rather neglected in this book. Thus, there is only a ten-page chapter on "The Formation of Spanish-American Culture" for the colonial period, and no corresponding chapter at all for the national period. The separate national histories do not fill the gap. For example, of Mexico's two outstanding writers in the past generation, one, José Vasconcelos, is mentioned only in connection with his political appointment as Minister of Education, and the other, Alfonso Reyes, is not mentioned at all. Herring surely knows a great deal about the cultural history of Latin America. Was it assumed that this would not interest either students and teachers or the general reader?

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER
University of Pennsylvania

OTHER BOOKS

ADENAUER, KONRAD. *World Indivisible With Liberty and Justice for All.* Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. Pp. xxx, 128. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $2.75.

ADY, CECILIA M. *Lorenzo dei Medici and Ranaissance Italy.* Pp. x, 176. New York: The Macmillan Company. No date. $2.00.

BARBASH, JACK. *Universities and Unions in Workers' Education.* Pp. xv, 206. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. $3.00.

BARTH, ALAN. *Government by Investigation.*

Pp. 231. New York: Viking Press, 1955. $3.00.

BOKSER, RABBI BEN ZION. *From the World of the Cabbalah: The Philosophy of Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague.* Pp. ix, 210. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. $3.00.

BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW (Ed.). *Political Controls in the Soviet Army: A Study Based on Reports by Former Soviet Officers.* Pp. viii, 93. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954. $1.00.

BURNE, ALFRED H. *The Crecy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $7.00.

CARTER, THOMAS FRANCIS. *The Invention of Printing in China and Its Spread Westward.* Revised by L. Carrington Goodrich. Pp. xxiv, 293. 2d ed. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. $10.00.

CLARK, KENNETH B. *Prejudice and Your Child.* Pp. 151. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955. $2.50.

COHN, GEORG. *Existenzialismus und Rechtswissenschaft.* Pp. 191. Basel, Switzerland: Kommissionsverlag Helbing and Lichtenhahn, 1955. No price.

Current Research in Human Fertility. Papers presented at the 1954 Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1955. $1.00.

DANKERT, CLYDE E. *An Introduction to Labor.* Pp. xvi, 605. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. $6.75.

DAVIS, RICHARD BEALE. *George Sandys, Poet-Adventurer: A Study in Anglo-American Culture in the Seventeenth Century.* Pp. 320. London: Bodley Head; New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $4.75.

DIESSLIN, HOWARD G. *Agricultural Equipment Financing.* (Occasional Paper, No. 50.) Pp. xvi, 95. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955. $1.25.

ENGEL-JANOSI, FRIEDRICH. *Four Studies in French Romantic Historical Writing.* Pp. 158, xii. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. $2.50.

ESSLINGER, WILLIAM. *Politics and Science.* Foreword by Albert Einstein. Pp. xi, 167. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.00.

FIORE, MICHELE. *Welfare of Nations.* Pp. 708. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $6.00.

FISHER, WALDO E., and CHARLES M. JAMES. *Minimum Price Fixing in the Bituminous Coal Industry.* Pp. xxxi, 523. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $10.00.

GLADSTON, IAGO (Ed.). *Society and Medicine: Lectures to the Laity.* (No. XVII.) Pp. xi, 131. New York: International Universities Press, 1955. $3.00.

Handbook of Private Schools. Pp. 1,264. Boston, Mass.: Porter Sargent, 1955. $8.00.

HANKO, CHARLES WILLIAM. *The Life of John Gibson: Soldier, Patriot, Statesman.* Pp. vi, 89. Daytona Beach, Fla.: College Publishing Company, 1955. $2.00.

HARRINGTON, JAMES. *The Political Writings of James Harrington: Representative Selections.* Edited by Charles Blitzer. Pp. xlii, 165. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955. $2.25 cloth; 90 cents paper.

HENSHAW, PAUL. *Adaptive Human Fertility.* Pp. xii, 322. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $5.50.

HERD, HAROLD. *Seven Editors.* Pp. 126. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955. (Distributed by The Macmillan Company, New York.) $2.00.

HIMES, NORMAN E. *Your Marriage.* Revised and Enlarged by Donald L. Taylor. Pp. xiv, 384. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1955. $4.00.

KETCHUM, RICHARD M. (Ed.). *What is Democracy?* Pp. 191. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1955. $2.95.

LEFTWICH, RICHARD H. *The Price System and Resource Allocation.* Pp. x, 372. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1955. $4.50.

MCMILLAN, MALCOLM COOK. *Constitutional Development in Alabama, 1798–1901: A Study in Politics, the Negro, and Sectionalism.* Pp. viii, 412. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. $2.50.

MANSERGH, NICHOLAS. *The Multiracial Commonwealth: Proceedings of the Fifth Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference Held at Lahore, Pakistan, 17–27 March 1954.* Pp. xii, 175. London; New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955. $4.00.

MANTOUX, PAUL (Ed.). *Les delibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars–28 juin 1919).* Vol. II: *Depuis la remise à la délégation allemande des conditions de paix jusqu'à la signature du Traité de Versailles.* Pp. 579. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1955. 1,800 *frs.*

NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL. *A Policy for Skilled Manpower.* Pp. xxv, 299. 2d ed. New York: Colombia University Press, 1955. No price.

NELSON, JAMES. *The Mine Workers' District 50: The Story of the Gas, Coke, and Chemical Unions of Massachusetts and their Growth into a National Union.* Pp. 158. New York: Exposition Press, 1955. $3.50.

NEUMANN, ROBERT G. *European and Comparative Government.* Pp. xiii, 818. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $6.50.

Papers and Proceedings of the First International Credit Conference. Vols. I–V. Pp. 659; 432; 474; 723; 477. Rome, Italy: Associazione Bancaria Italiana, 1953, 1954. $20.00 the complete edition.

PLAZA, GALO. *Problems of Democracy in Latin America.* Pp. vi, 88. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. $2.50.

POPLAI, S. L. (Ed.). *Asia and Africa in the Modern World: Basic Information Concerning Independent Countries.* Pp. 218. Bombay and Calcutta, India: Asia Publishing House under the auspices of the Asian Relations Organization, 1955. $1.25.

ROBBINS, W. DAVID, and THEODORE N. BECKMAN. *Consumer Instalment Loans: An Analysis of Loans by Principal Types of Lending Institutions and by Types of Borrowers.* Pp. xvii, 168. Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Business Research, College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio State University, 1955. $3.50.

ROBERTS, ELLIOTT. *One River—Seven States: TVA-State Relations in the Development of the Tennessee River.* Pp. vii, 100. Knoxville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee, 1955. $1.50.

ROSTOW, W. W. in collaboration with RICHARD W. HATCH. *An American Policy in Asia.* Pp. ix, 59. New York: Published jointly by the Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and Sons, 1955. $1.00.

ROWAT, DONALD C. *Your Local Government: A Sketch of the Municipal System in Canada.* Pp. x, 148. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1955. $3.25.

RUBENSTEIN, ALBERT H. (Ed.). *Coordination, Control, and Financing of Industrial Research: Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference on Industrial Research, June, 1954 with Selected Papers from the Fourth Conference, June, 1953.* Pp. xviii, 429. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1955. $8.50.

RUGG, HAROLD, and WILLIAM WITHERS. *Social Foundations of Education.* Pp. x, 771. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955. $6.75.

SAMUELSON, PAUL A., ROBERT L. BISHOP, and JOHN R. COLEMAN. *Readings in Economics.* Pp. xi, 488. 2d ed. New York; Toronto; London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955. $4.50 cloth; $3.25 paper.

SCHRIEKE, B. *Indonesian Sociological Studies.* Part One. Pp. vii, 313. The Hague, Netherlands: W. Van Hoeve, 1955. Guilders 9.50.

SCHUYLER, JACK (Ed.). *International Labor Directory and Handbook, 1955.* Pp. xix, 1,043. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. $25.00.

SEDURO, BLADIMIR. *The Byelorussian Theater and Drama.* Edited by Edgar H. Lehrman. Pp. xxii, 517. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1955. No price.

SHORT, LLOYD M., CLARA PENNIMAN, and FLOYD O. FLOM. *The Minnesota Department of Taxation: An Administrative History.* Pp. iii, 175. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. $3.00.

SMITH, G. KERRY (Ed.). *Current Issues in Higher Education, 1955.* Pp. xi, 343. Washington, D. C.: Association for Higher Education, 1955. $3.00.

SMITH, T. LYNN. *Social Problems.* Pp. x, 517. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. $4.75.

SMITH, WILLIAM A. *Ancient Education.* Pp. xii, 309. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.75.

SORENSON, ROY, and HEDLEY S. DIMOCK. *A Case Study in Institutional Change.* Pp. xiv, 365. New York: Association Press, 1955. $5.75.

Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence. (A Quaker Study of International Conflict.) Pp. vii, 70. Prepared for The American Service Committee. No date. $1.00 cloth; 25 cents paper.

SPIEGEL, HENRY WILLIAM. *Current Economic Problems.* Pp. x, 682. Revised ed. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1955. $6.00.

STAUB, H. ULRICH. *Reden schweizerischer und britischer Bankpräsidenten, 1927–1950.* Pp. 215. Zurich, Switzerland, 1953. No price.

SWARTHOUT, JOHN M., and ERNEST R. BARTLEY. *Principles and Problems of American National Government.* Pp. xii, 852. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. $6.25.

SZUNYOGH, BELA. *Psychological Warfare.* Pp. 117. Revised ed. New York: William Frederick Press, 1955. $3.00.

Tax Program for Economic Growth, A. Pp. 55. New York: National Association of Manufacturers, 1955. $1.00.

Territorial Kansas: Studies Commemorating the Centennial. Pp. xi, 205. Lawrence:

University of Kansas Publications, 1954. $3.50 cloth; $2.75 paper.

THISLETHWAITE, FRANK. *The Great Experiment: An Introduction to the History of the American People.* Pp. xiv, 335. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1955. $5.00.

TOOKER, ELVA. *Nathan Trotter: Philadelphia Merchant, 1787–1853.* Pp. xvii, 276. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $6.00.

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD, and VERONICA M. *The Realignment of Europe.* (Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946.) Pp. xv, 619. London; New York; Toronto: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955. 60 *s.*

TRUED, MERLYN NELSON, and RAYMOND F. MIKESELL. *Postwar Bilateral Payments Agreements.* Pp. 92. Princeton, N. J.: International Finance Section, Department of Economics and Sociology, Princeton University, 1955. 25 cents.

UNITED NATIONS. *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946–1951.* Pp. xi, 514. New York: United Nations, 1954. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) $5.00.

UNITED NATIONS. *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs.* Vol. I: *Articles 1–22 of the Charter.* Pp. xi, 742. New York: United Nations, 1955. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) $3.50.

UNESCO. *International Bibliography of Economics.* (Works published in 1952.) Pp. 429. Paris: UNESCO, 1955. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) $7.50.

VALENTINE, C. W. *Parents and Children: A First Book on the Psychology of Child Development and Training.* Pp. xi, 212. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.75.

VANDERBILT, ARTHUR T. (Ed.). *Studying Law.* Pp. viii, 753. 2d ed. New York: New York University Press, 1955. (Distributed by Oceana Publications.) $6.00.

VASQUEZ, LUIS OSPINA. *Industria y Protección en Colombia, 1810–1930.* Pp. xix, 531. Medellín: E.S.F., 1955. No price.

VERGNAUD, PIERRE. *Lidée de la nationalité et de la libre disposition des peuples dans ses rapports avec l'idée de l'état: Etude des doctrines politiques contemporaines, 1870–1950.* (Études d'histoire economique, politique, et sociale.) Pp. 258. Geneva, Switzerland: Librairie E. Droz, 1955. 18.00 *fr. s.*

VILELA, ARTURO. *Interpretación de la Historia sudamericana; El Fenómeno politico-cultural.* Pp. 220. Alcadia Municipal, Biblioteca Pacena, 1953. No price.

WACHTEL, HENRY I. *Security for All and Free Enterprise: A Summary of the Social Philosophy of Josef Popper-Lynkeus.* Pp. xi, 162. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. $3.00.

WARD, JOHN H. *Eternal Energies.* Pp. 286. Rindge, N. H.: Richard R. Smith, 1955. $3.50.

WARREN, ROLAND L. *Studying Your Community.* Pp. xii, 385. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955. $3.00.

WEBB, HERSCHEL. *An Introduction to Japan.* Pp. xvi, 130. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. $2.75.

WEIBEL, JAKOB. *Der Schweizerische Hypothekarkredit: Eine zins- und kredittheoretische Untersuchung.* Pp. xix, 218. Winterthur, Switzerland: Verlag P. G. Keller, 1954. No price.

WHITE, GERALD T. *A History of the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company.* Pp. xvii, 229. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. $5.00.

WHITTIER, CHARLES L. *Creative Advertising.* Pp. xviii, 585. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955. $6.00.

WILBER, DONALD N. *Iran: Past and Present.* Pp. xi, 276. 3d ed. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. $4.00.


WILLIAMS, EDGAR G., and JOHN F. MEE. *Cases and Problems in Personnel and Industrial Relations.* Pp. viii, 204. New York: Ronald Press, 1955. $3.00.

WILSON, JOHN T. and others. *Current Trends in Psychology and the Behavioral Sciences.* Pp. xvi, 142. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954. $4.00.

Yearbook on Human Rights for 1952. Pp. xii, 490. New York: United Nations, 1954. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) $5.00.

ZUCHER, ARNOLD J. (Ed.). *Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II.* Pp. ix, 357. 2d ed. New York: New York University Press, 1955. $5.00.

INDEX



INDEX

Abrams, Charles, quoted, 25
Academic freedom, 5, 78, 87
Adult education
  in England, voluntary enterprise in, 79, 80
  in France, vocational, 102
  in the Netherlands, 109
  in U. S., 36, 73
    and the library, 52, 145
    facilities for, in city planning, 12
    in civic affairs, 22, 26–27
    school and government co-ordination in, 142
    school as center for, 28, 29
Agricultural education and training
  in England and Wales, 82, 83
  in France, 102
  in U. S., 69
ALEXANDER, WILLIAM P., Co-ordination in Great Britain: Trends and Issues, 82–87
Alexander, William P., quoted, 80
Alker, Thomas, 88
Alumni associations (school), 73
American Child Health Association, 35
American Institute of Planners, 10
American Library Association, 5, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58
American Medical Association, 36
American Public Health Association, 20
ANDERSON, JACKSON M., Education and Recreation, 28–33
Anderson, Jackson M., cited, 31, 32
Apprenticeship, 68, 71, 73, 102, 124
Arnold, Matthew, 77
Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, 38
Audio-visual materials, 101, 105, 124

Batchelder, Mildred, cited, 52, 53
BAUER, CATHERINE, Housing Policy and the Educational System, 17–27
Bauer, Catherine, cited, 9, 21
BECK, BERTRAM M., The School and Delinquency Control, 60–67
Bill of Rights, 5
BLACKWELL, GORDON W., A Sociologist on School-Community Relationships, 128–135
Blackwell, Gordon W., cited, 128, 131
Board(s) of Education
  and community recreation, 30, 31, 32, 33
  and school health services, 6, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42
  and school libraries, 56
  and school social work, 49
  as co-ordinating agency for education and related services, 145
  development of, 1, 3
  powers of, 1
Boston (Mass.)
  school health services in, 34
  school social work beginnings in, 48
Bovet, L., cited, 65
Bowlby, John, cited, 63
Brooks, Alice, editor, 56
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 18
Burnham, H. L. W. Lawson, 1st Viscount, 78 Committee, 78, 85, 90
Business
  and vocational guidance, training, and placement, 69, 98, 102
  recreation programs for employees, 31–32
Butler, Richard Austen, 75; quoted, 77

California
  city planning, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15
  community recreation, 30, 31–32
  public and school health personnel, 40
Calvin, John, 122
Calvinism, in the Netherlands, 106
Cecil, H. L., cited, 52
Child labor
  in France, 102, 104
  in Sweden, 117
  in Switzerland, 124
Children's allowances, in Sweden, 115–116
Church, the, as a controlling community power, 130
Church-related agencies, 85, 108, 111, 126
Church-related schools, 5–6, 41, 44, 76, 101, 106
City planning (including community and county planning for land use)
  defined and explained, 8–9
  in England and Wales, 79, 91–94
  in the Netherlands, 108–109
  in U. S., 143–144, 148
    and schools, 11–16, 17, 21, 22–23, 131, 142, 145
    and the federal government, 9–10, 19, 21
    as a local government function, 8, 9–10, 15
    development of, 8, 9–10, 11, 21
    need for, resulting from large-scale development projects, 9, 17, 20–23
    procedure, 10–11
    public participation in, 10, 11, 22, 25–27
    state enabling acts, 9
    uniformity and diversity, 13, 22, 23–25, 26
Clarke, C. P. R., 88
Coleman, Lee, cited, 133
Colleges, see Universities and colleges
Commonwealth Fund, 36, 49
Community
  concepts of, 12, 131–132
  school as core of, 14–15, 66–67
  sociological characteristics of, 128–131
Community centers
  in England, 80, 93–94
  in U. S., 30–31, 32
    school as, 24, 28, 29–30, 32
Community chests, 44
Community councils, as planning and co-ordinating agencies, 26, 32, 47, 48, 133, 134, 142
Community organization, 17, 25–27, 128–135, 142
Community planning, *see* City planning; Community councils; Community organization; Land use—planning
Compulsory education
  in England and Wales, 86
  in France, 102, 103
  in Switzerland, 121, 124
Congress
  and school health services, 37
  investigating committees, 5
Constitution (U. S.), and education, 136
Cros, Louis, 100, 105
Curriculum, elementary and secondary school
  and community needs, 2, 4, 36, 62, 100
  and delinquency control, 61, 62, 63, 64
  and preparation for leisure time, 28
  central government responsibility for, in France, 100
  content, in a confused society, 6
  health instruction, 5, 34–35, 37, 38, 39
  library use, instruction in, 57–58
  public library correlation with, 57
  teachers' responsibility for, in England and Wales, 78, 82, 87
  See also Academic freedom; Physical education; Vocational guidance; Vocational training

Dahir, James, compiler, 11, 20
Davis, Allison, cited, 61
Democracy, and public education, 2, 3, 5, 6, 17, 61, 103, 106
Depression, effect on housing, 17–18
Desegregation
  in housing, 23, 24, 25
  in schools, 25, 134
Devonshire, Spencer Compton Cavendish, 8th Duke of, 74
DOTTRENS, ROBERT, Education and Other Governmental Services in Switzerland, 121–127

EDFELDT, ÅKE W., Education and Related Services in Sweden, 114–120
Educational Policies Commission, 36, 138, 139, 141
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 19
Employment, *see* Placement; Youth employment
Engelhardt, N. L., quoted, 14
England and Wales
  education and related services, 74–99
  housing, *see* Housing—in England and Wales
Enrollment, school, increases in, viii, 6, 29, 86, 107
Ersted, Ruth, cited, 56

Fargo, Lucile F., cited, 52
Faure, Edgar, 104
Federal government
  and city planning, 9–10, 19, 21
  and education, 2–3, 134, 139
  and housing, 9, 18–20, 21, 23, 26
  and public social welfare agencies, 44
  and vocational training, 69
  grants-in-aid to state health departments, 37, 40
Federal Housing Administration, 18, 19, 21
Federal National Mortgage Association, 19
Films, *see* Audio-visual materials; Motion pictures
Fisher, H. A. L., 76
Florida, community recreation, 33
Foskett, John M., 140
FRANCE, EDUCATION AND OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES IN, 100–105
French Union, 101
Freud, Anna, cited, 63

Geneva (Switz.), administration of education and other related services in, 121, 122–126
Glueck, Eleanor, cited, 61, 62
Glueck, Sheldon, cited, 61, 62
Great Britain
  Board of Education, 74–75, 76, 77, 78
  Home Office (and Home Secretary), 83–84, 86, 95–96
  Ministry of Agriculture, 82, 83, 86
  Ministry of Education, 77–78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 95–96
  Ministry of Health, 95–96
  Ministry of Labour and National Service, 80, 82–83, 97
  National Health Service, 80, 83
  See also England and Wales; Parliament; Scotland; Wales

Gruenberg, Sidonie M., cited, 24
Guidance (counseling)
and delinquency control, 61, 64, 65
and school health, 37, 39
placement services, 72
vocational, *see* Vocational guidance

Hagman, Harlan L., cited, 137, 138
Halévy, Élie, cited, 80
Handicapped children
in England and Wales, 77, 84, 97, 98
in Sweden, 116
in Switzerland, 126
in the Netherlands, 111
in U. S., 34, 38, 40, 134
Hanke, Byron R., quoted, 21
Harrison, Earl Grant, vii
Health education, *see* Curriculum—health instruction; Public health—education of public in
Heaps, W. A., cited, 52
HENNE, FRANCES, and FRANCES LANDER SPAIN, The School and the Public Library, 52–59
Henne, Frances
cited, 53
editor, 56
Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 34
Heritt, Lester, cited, 61
Holmes, Maurice, quoted, 75
Home Loan Bank Board, 19
Housing
in England and Wales, 20–21, 79, 91–94, 145
in France, 103, 104
in the Netherlands, 109–110, 112, 113
in U. S.
and the educational system, 17, 20–27 (*passim*), 145, 148
and the federal government, 9, 18–20, 21, 23, 26
co-operative, 18, 19, 24, 25
for minority groups, 19, 22, 23–24, 25
owner-built, 18
owner occupancy, 13, 19, 25
practice, changes in, 9, 17–20
public, 2, 11, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25
public interest and participation in, viii, 2, 4, 22, 25–27
rate of construction, 17
redevelopment projects, 9, 14, 19, 20, 22–23, 24–25, 26
relation to community planning, 9, 17, 22–23, 25–27
renewal programs, 9, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26
rental, 13, 19, 24, 25
shortages, 17, 18, 19
slum clearance, 11, 17, 19–20, 22–23, 25
See also above redevelopment projects
Housing Acts (1949, 1954), 19, 21
Housing and Home Finance Agency, 18, 21
See also Federal Housing Administration; Federal National Mortgage Association; Home Loan Bank Board; Public Housing Administration
Hunsaker, Herbert C., quoted, 27
Hunt, Mary H., cited, 35

Independence, of public school education, viii, 1–6 (*passim*), 15, 22, 136, 138, 142, 147
Industry
and city planning, 8, 9, 10
in relation to schools, 13
and vocational guidance, training, and placement, 68, 69, 71, 72–73, 97, 98, 102–103, 108
as a controlling community power, 130
recreation programs for employees, 31–32
Insurance, health, for school children, 123
Isaacs, Reginald R., cited, 21

Jenkins, Richard L., cited, 61, 63
Joeckel, Carleton B.
cited, 52
editor, 53
JOHNSON, ELDON L., Co-ordination: The Viewpoint of a Political Scientist, 136–142
Juvenile courts, 4, 44, 47, 66, 94, 122, 125, 126, 145
Juvenile delinquency
in England and Wales, 83–84, 94
in France, 101, 104, 105
in Sweden, 114
in Switzerland, 121, 125
in the Netherlands, 108, 112–113
in U. S., 2, 4, 131
and the official agencies, 44, 63, 65–66
community responsibility for, 28, 66–67, 143
in suburban life, 66
school's role in control of, 4, 60–67, 139
types of delinquents, 61–65

Kellogg Foundation, 140
Kilander, H. F., cited, 37
Kleinert, H., cited, 127

Labor unions and organizations, 69, 71, 130
Land
as basis of community activities, 8, 11
shortage of
in Liverpool (Eng.), 91–92
in the Netherlands, 106, 108–109
use of, *see* City planning; Land use
Land use, 2
changes in pattern, 131
multiple decisions concerning, 8–9

planning
in Great Britain, 92
in the Netherlands, 108–109
size of unit for, 144–145
See also City planning
public interest in, viii, 2, 4, 144
Lander, Bernard, cited, 66
LeFevre, Alice L., cited, 53
Leigh, Robert D., cited, 54
Leighton, Alexander H., quoted, 146
Leisure time
increase in, 28, 110
use of, *see* Recreation; Vocation arrangements; Youth services
Libraries
in England and Wales, County Council or County Borough as the library authority, 84, 88
in France
Centre national de documentation pédagogique, 100, 101, 105
under Minister of Education, 100–101
in Switzerland, private agency services for youth, 126
in U. S.
administrative agencies, 5, 52, 53–54, 55, 56, 58, 141, 142
bookmobile service, 55
instruction in use and significance of, 57–58
personnel, 4, 5, 55, 56, 57
public
administration, *see above* administrative agencies
and city planning, 8–9, 14, 15
as local government responsibility, 3, 15, 54
social and community significance of, 2, 52, 55, 58, 143, 145, 148
services to adults, 52, 53, 56–57, 58, 145
services to youth, 52, 53
elementary school children, 53–55, 56, 57
out-of-school young people, 56, 57
preschool children, 56–57
secondary school students, 55–56, 57
state departments, 6, 54, 58
rural and economically substandard areas, service in, 54, 55, 58
school
administration, *see above* administrative agencies
co-ordination with public library, 5, 52, 57–58
in elementary schools, 53–55, 57
in secondary schools, 55, 56
professional (for teachers), 56
role in disseminating information on social welfare agencies, 48
Lindquist, Gösta, 116
Lippman, Hyman S., cited, 63
Liverpool (Eng.), administration of education and related services in, 88–99
Local government
corruption in, 3
functions and services of, 3, 15, 139–140
city planning, 8, 9–10, 15
libraries, 52–58
See also Public health—as a local government responsibility; Recreation—in U. S.—as a local government responsibility; Social welfare—as a local government responsibility
personnel, professionalization of, 4–5, 142
public housing, 19
relation of schools to, 1, 15, 136
See also Independence, of public school education
relation to state government, 137
Lohrer, Alice, editor, 52, 53
LOOMIS, WILLIAM P., and LOUISE MOORE, Occupational Education in the Schools, 68–73

McGhee, Paul A., quoted, 26
MacIver, R. M., cited, 132
MADEN, F. TH. VAN DER, Education and Other Governmental Agencies in the Netherlands, 106–113
MAGNAY, H. S., Liverpool: A Case Study in Co-ordination, 88–99
Maisel, Sherman
cited, 18
quoted, 26
Mann, Horace, quoted, 34
Mann, Mary (Mrs. Horace), cited, 34
Mendès-France, Pierre, 104
Mental health care
in Sweden, 116, 117
in Switzerland, 123, 124, 126
in the Netherlands, 111, 112
in U. S., 36, 40, 44
See also Juvenile delinquency
Migratory workers' children, education of, 111
Military service
in France, 104, 105
in the Netherlands, 108, 113
in U. S., 66
Mills, C. Wright, quoted, 26
Minority groups, 129
leadership of, 130
See also Housing—for minority groups
Montessori, Maria, 34
Moore, Fred, cited, 37
MOORE, LOUISE, *see* Loomis, William P., jt. author
Moore, Maurice E., cited, 61
Morant, Robert, 75

Morlan, Robert L., quoted, 138, 139, 141
Motion pictures, 103–104, 110
Mumford, Lewis, cited, 20
Munson, Theresa G., translator, 100, 121
Murray, J. G., 88

National Association of Home Builders, 21
National Association of Real Estate Boards, 21
National Association of School Social Workers, 49
National Council of Chief State School Officers, 38
National Education Association, 28, 141
  Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education, 35
  Joint Committee (with ALA), 53, 58
  Joint Committee on Health Problems in Education (with AMA), 36
National Tuberculosis Association, 35
Netherlands, education and related services in, 106–113
New York (City), 9, 23, 34, 41, 48
NYSWANDER, DOROTHY B., Education and Public Health, 34–43

Occupational education, *see* Technical education; Vocational guidance; Vocational training
Office of Education, 37, 48, 139
Ogden, Jean, cited, 133
Ogden, Jess, cited, 133
Osman, John, quoted, 26
Ostrom, Vincent, 140

Parents
  and child welfare services in Switzerland, 122, 125, 126
  and school health services, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 111, 117
  education for parenthood, 64
  library services for, 53, 56–57
  parent-child relationships, 36, 47, 50, 51, 60, 62, 63, 64
  parent-teacher relationships, 96, 108, 119, 137
  request film and press control, in France, 104
  school library service administered by, 55
Parliament (Great Britain), Acts of, on education and related services
  Board of Education Act (1890), 74–75
  Children's Act (1948), 94–95
  Education Act (1870), 76
  Education Act (1902), 74–76, 78, 82
  Education Act (1918), 76, 82
  Education Act (1921), 82
  Education Act (1944), 77–80, 81, 82, 86, 91–92
  Employment and Training Act (1948), 97
  Town and Country Planning Act (1947), 92
Parsons, Talcott
  cited, 131
  editor, 131
Perry, Clarence, cited, 11, 20
Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich, 34
Physical education, 28, 30, 37, 38, 39, 116, 122
Placement
  in England and Wales, 97–98
  in Switzerland, 124
  in U. S.
    agencies, 69, 71, 72, 142, 145
    school services in, 68, 70–72
      follow-up, 72–73
Police, and juvenile delinquency, 66, 112
Political scientists
  on co-ordination of schools and government agencies, 139–142
  on independence of public education, 1, 136–138, 142
Politics, and the schools, 4, 136, 138–139, 142
Poole, Florence, cited, 49, 50
Population
  Great Britain, increase, and housing, 93
  the Netherlands, increase, 106, 107, 108–109
  U. S.
    composition, effect on the community of imbalance in, 13, 128
    increase, and housing, 18
    mobility, 20, 24
  See also Enrollment, school
Power, Effie L., cited, 52
Press, the, 104, 110, 130–131
Private (voluntary) agencies
  in Great Britain, 79, 80–81, 84, 85–86, 87, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98
  in Sweden, 119
  in Switzerland, 124–125, 126–127
  in the Netherlands, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113
  in U. S.
    and public health, 34–35, 36
    social welfare, 44–45, 48, 49
Private (voluntary) schools
  in England and Wales, 76, 77
  in France, 101
  in the Netherlands, 106, 107, 110, 113
  in U. S., 6, 41, 44
Pro Infirmis, 126, 127
Pro Juventute, 126, 127
Public health, 2, 145
  and state government, 6, 37, 40, 41, 42
  as a local government responsibility, 3, 6, 34–35, 36, 37, 40–41, 42, 139–140
  development of, viii, 2, 4, 34, 60
  disease control and prevention, 34, 35, 36, 60
  education of public in, 36, 38
  nutrition, 36, 40

  personnel, 4, 36, 37, 40–41, 42, 60
  See also Mental health care; School health services
Public Health Service, 37
Public Housing Administration, 19, 21
Public opinion, and the school system, viii, 1, 3, 6–7, 134, 136, 137, 138

Querido, A., cited, 111

Race relations, 25, 26, 130
  See also Desegregation; Segregation
Radio, 57, 110, 130–131
Recreation
  in England and Wales, 82, 86, 92, 93–94, 98
  in France, 101
  in Switzerland, 126
  in the Netherlands, 109, 110
  in U. S., 145
    administration of, 29–32, 140, 141
    as a community need, 28, 33, 137, 143
    as a local government responsibility, 3, 30–33
    facilities for, in city planning, 8, 9, 12, 14, 21, 23, 143, 144
    planning of, 32–33, 47, 141, 142
    schools' role in, 28–33, 139–140, 141
    state enabling acts for community programs, 30, 33
  See also Vacation arrangements; Youth services
Red Cross, 116
Redevelopment projects, *see* Slum clearance and redevelopment projects
Reimer, Svend, cited, 21
RELLER, THEODORE L., Changing Scenes—Changing Issues, 1–7
RELLER, THEODORE L., Foreword, viii
RELLER, THEODORE L., Some Paths to Co-ordination, 143–148
Roman Catholic schools
  in England and Wales, 76
  in France, 101
  in the Netherlands, 106
  in U. S. (parochial), 6, 41
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 122
Rowell, H. G., cited, 35, 38

Schlesinger, Elisabeth B., cited, 111
School administrators
  and city planning, 12
  and health services for youth, 35–36, 39, 40, 42–43
  and public libraries, 53, 57
  interdisciplinary training for, 43, 137, 138, 140–141, 147
School age, *see* Compulsory education
School dental services, 37, 38, 39, 42, 96, 111, 116, 117–118, 123
School health services
  in England and Wales, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 96–97
  in France, 101
  in Sweden, 116–118
  in Switzerland, 122–123, 124
  in the Netherlands, 110–111
  in U. S.
    administration of, 5–6, 34–35, 37–38, 39, 40–43
    and delinquency, 65
    appraisal of, 41
    health instruction, 5, 34–35, 37, 38, 39
    health records, 38–39
    medical examinations, 34, 38
    personnel, 34, 36–37, 38–39, 40–41, 42, 49, 50
  See also Handicapped children; School dental services
School library service, *see* Libraries—in U. S.—public—services to youth; Libraries—in U. S.—school
School meals
  in England and Wales, 77, 82, 84, 90, 97
  in Sweden, 116
  in Switzerland, 124, 126
  in U. S., 141
School plant
  in England and Wales
    construction, 76, 77, 81, 86, 96
    health supervision, 96
    land requirements, 91–92, 93
  in Sweden, health supervision, 116
  in Switzerland, health supervision, 122
  in the Netherlands
    construction, 106, 107, 108, 109
    health supervision, 110
  in U. S.
    construction, 1, 14, 15, 33, 148
    location, 11–12, 14, 15, 17, 23, 131
    used for recreation, 28–33 (*passim*)
School social work
  in Sweden, 119–120
  in Switzerland, 122, 123, 124, 125
  in the Netherlands, 111
  in U. S., 44, 48–51, 63
    personnel, 37, 49–51
Scoggin, Margaret C., cited, 55–56
Scotland
  administration of education in, 77, 78, 82, 88
  Union of 1707, 77
  youth employment, 80
Segregation
  in planned communities, 12, 22, 23, 24, 25
  in public housing, 23
  in schools, 12, 22, 25
  See also Desegregation

Shattuck, Lemuel, 34
Shaw, Clifford R., cited, 61
Shils, Edward A., editor, 131
Sikkema, Mildred, cited, 50
Slum clearance and redevelopment projects, 9, 11, 14, 17, 19–20, 22–26 (*passim*), 92–93, 113, 145
Slums, and juvenile delinquency, 61–63, 113, 131
SMITH, W. O. LESTER, Towards Co-ordination in Great Britain: A Survey, 74–81
Social welfare, 2, 148
  as a local government responsibility, 3, 44, 139–140
  funds, available for use in private schools, 6
  public interest in, viii, 4
  See also Juvenile delinquency; School social work; Social welfare work and agencies
Social welfare work and agencies
  in England and Wales, 79, 83–84, 86, 88, 94–96
  in Sweden, 114–115, 118, 119–120
  in Switzerland, 122, 123–124, 125–127
  in the Netherlands, 107, 108, 111–112
  in U. S.
    co-ordination with educational and other community agencies, 44, 45–48, 50–51, 139–140, 142
    definition of, 44–45
    in city planning, 9, 14
    personnel, 4, 45–46, 47, 48, 51, 57, 60, 134
  See also Juvenile delinquency; Mental health care; School social work
Social work, *see* School social work; Social welfare; Social welfare work and agencies; Youth services
SPAIN, FRANCES LANDER, *see* Henne, Frances, jt. author
State government
  and education, 3, 6, 134, 137–138, 139
  and public health, 6, 37, 40, 41, 42
  and public social welfare agencies, 44
  city planning enabling acts, 9
  functions and services, 6
    libraries, 54, 58
  recreation enabling acts, 33
  relation of local government to, 137
  state planning, 9, 19
Steiger, Emma, cited, 127
Stein, Clarence S., cited, 21
Strachan, Louise, cited, 35
Studebaker, J. W., cited, 37
Supreme Court of the United States, desegregation ruling, 25
Sweden, education and related services in, 114–120
Switzerland, 129
  education and related services, 121–127
Teacher education
  in England and Wales, 79, 84
  in France, 100
  in the Netherlands, 108
  in U. S.
    in health matters, 37, 38, 39
    need and difficulties of interdisciplinary training in, 46–47, 51, 60, 147
    psychological training in, 60, 64
    specialized content of, 46, 60
    textbooks, attitude toward local government, 136–137
  See also Teachers—in-service programs for
Teachers
  and school health services, 36, 38–39, 96, 110, 117, 122, 123
  associations of, in England and Wales, 79, 85, 87
  employment of, in England and Wales, 84, 90
  in-service programs for, 47–48, 62, 64, 147
  lack of knowledge of social welfare agencies and methods, 45–46, 47–48, 51
  library services for, 53, 56, 101, 105
  parent-teacher relationships, 96, 108, 119, 137
  professional philosophy, 39–40, 60, 101
  role in delinquency control, 62, 63, 64, 65
  role in school social work, 45, 47, 48, 50, 123
  role in vacation arrangements for children (Sweden), 119–120
  role in vocational training and placement, 69–70, 72, 97
  salaries
    in England and Wales, 78, 85, 90
    in the Netherlands, 106
  shortage of, 6, 107
  strike, in Minneapolis, 137
  visiting teachers, *see* School social work
  See also Academic freedom; Teacher education
Technical education
  in England and Wales, 75–76, 79, 84
  in France, 101, 102–103
  in the Netherlands, 122
Television, 57, 110
Tope, Donald E., 140
Town and country planning, *see* City planning; Land use—planning
Truancy, 47, 63, 94
Tuberculosis, 36, 40, 96, 110, 121, 123

Universities and colleges
  in England and Wales
    county colleges, 81, 86
    relation to central government and local authorities, 78
  in France, 101

  in the Netherlands, 108, 110
  in U. S.
    and community development, 27, 33
    location of, and city planning, 12
    training of school administrators, 43, 140–141
  See also Teacher education
University of California, School of Social Welfare, 47
University of Oregon, 140
Urban Land Institute, 18, 21, 24

Vacation arrangements
  in Sweden, 116, 118–120
  in Switzerland, 124, 126
  in the Netherlands, 110, 112
Van Ingen, Philip, cited, 35
Veterans
  housing, 23
  See also Veterans Administration
Veterans Administration, 18, 19
VIOLICH, FRANCIS, The City Planning Process: A Framework for Community Education, 8–16
Violich, Francis, cited, 22
Vocational guidance
  in England and Wales, 97–98
  in France, 103, 104
  in Sweden, 117
  in Switzerland, 122, 124–125
  in the Netherlands, 111
  in U. S., 68–69, 70
Vocational training
  in England and Wales, 79, 83
  in France, 102, 103
  in Switzerland, 121, 122, 124
  in U. S.
    on the job (postschool), 71–72
    part-time employment (school work-study programs), 63, 70–71
    preliminary testing, 69
    school courses, 69, 70, 71–72
    value of, 63, 68, 143
  See also Apprenticeship

Wales, education in, 74, 77, 78, 84, 85, 90
  See also England and Wales; Great Britain; Parliament
Wallace, Anthony F. C., cited, 24
Welsh, use in schools, 77
White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, 36
Whyte, William H., Jr., cited, 24
Wilson, Charles D., cited, 38
WILTSE, KERMIT T., Education and Social Welfare, 44–51
Winslow, C.-E. A., quoted, 36
Witmer, Helen Leland, cited, 50
Women's Christian Temperance Union, 35
Women's Educational Association, 48
Wood, Thomas D., 35, 38
World War I, 82
World War II, 18, 82, 106, 109, 111, 112
Wright, Henry, cited, 20

Youth employment
  in France, 102, 103, 105
  in Great Britain, 80, 82–83, 94, 97–98
  in Sweden, 117
  in U. S., 68, 145
  See also Child labor; Placement; Vocational guidance; Vocational training
Youth services (youth movements, youth hostels, etc.)
  in England and Wales, 79, 80–81, 84, 98
  in France, 101
  in Switzerland, 126
  in the Netherlands, 108, 109, 112, 113
  in U. S., viii
  See also Recreation; Vacation arrangements

Zoning, 11, 12, 13, 23, 24

69626
JL
M73,N55
1955

LIBRARY
30 JAN 1956
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE

Prentice-Hall
COLLEGE TEXTS

GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE, 2nd Edition

By JAMES M. BURNS, *Williams College*, and JACK W. PELTASON, *University of Illinois*

Recently revised to bring the dynamics of American national government to your students in a more compelling manner than ever, this widely adopted text now reaches well into the Eisenhower administration in its vivid examination and analysis of the workings of our government. The new edition offers tighter, more logical organization, more factual content, and new and improved illustrations, charts, tables, and appendices. The new (restricted) Teacher's Manual is packed with suggestions for class projects, discussions, lecture topics, and testing questions.

1070 pages . 6" x 9" . Published 1954

PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By ANDREW GYORGY and HUBERT S. GIBBS, *both of Boston University*

This new text is the first systematic application of the problem method to the field of International Relations. It presents twenty-five carefully selected cases which offer the student an unusual opportunity to analyze concrete situations and apply certain general principles of International Politics. Two-thirds of the problems were written specifically for this book and present new materials; the remaining cases were carefully selected and edited from leading publications.

352 pages . 6" x 9" . Illus. . Published February 1955

THE GREAT ISSUES OF POLITICS

By LESLIE LIPSON, *University of California, Berkeley*

This text offers a new analysis of the fundamentals of the political process. These are presented to the readers as a series of basic issues which arise in every political system, in any kind of state, in all forms of government. The book is original in its theme and approach, treating the subject in a novel way never before attempted. Designed as a discussion between the author and the reader, its aim is to help the reader think about the problems which are basic to politics.

431 pages . 5⅝" x 8⅜" . Published 1954

For approval copies write

Prentice-Hall, Inc. ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NEW JERSEY

Kindly mention THE ANNALS *when writing to advertisers*