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Philosophical

Quarterly

Jan

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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXVII, No. 4]

[January 1955

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
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
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The Correct Interpretation of the Definitions of the Absolute, according to Śaṅkarācārya and Saint Thomas Aquinas

by
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De Nobili College, Poona

1. Both Śrī Śaṅkara, the Vedāntic theologian, and St. Thomas Aquinas, the Christian theologian, have been confronted with the difficult task of interpreting either the *Brahmalakṣaṇas* (definitions of *Brahman*), which, according to the first, constitute the essential testimony of the *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, or the various designations of God, which are found in the Christian Revelation and Tradition. In their interpretation both have relied principally upon a specific element of the theories of the various meanings of words which they inherited from their respective culture, i.e., *lakṣaṇājñāna* in the Indian culture and *knowledge through analogy* in the Greco-Christian culture. And both, in applying these theories to their subject, have given them their full scope and perfection.

2. In realizing for the first time a complete synthesis of the *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, no longer from the standpoint of *dharma* but from the standpoint of *jñāna*, Śaṅkara had to adapt to his own purpose the exegetic rules of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Darśana* from the standpoint of which he was breaking away. His adaptation of these rules was what may be called, with an anachronism, a "Copernican revolution" in *Nimāṃsā*. Jaimini had classified the manifold texts of the infallible *Śabda* into two main categories: the first, being directly and independently authoritative, comprised all injunctions (*chodana* or *vidhi*) and, secondarily, prohibitions (*niśedha*); the second, being but dependently and therefore indirectly authoritative, comprised *mantras*, *nāmadheyas* and *arthavādas*, i.e., all the texts not included in the first category. Hence, according to Jaimini, the assertions of the *jñānakāṇḍa* were authoritative in so far only as they subserved injunctions. The revolution of Śaṅkara

consisted in reversing this classification and installing the *Vedānta statements*, as authoritative by themselves, instead of the dethroned *chodanas*, now reduced to the rank of mere *arthavādas* of these *Vedānta statements*.

3. After thus attributing primacy to the *Vedānta statements*, Śaṅkara had to determine which passages deserved this appellation and which were their respective *arthavādas*. This he did with the help of the six criteria (*pramāṇa*) and the sixfold indication (*ṣaḍvidhalingāni*) set forth by the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*.

4. Once he had singled out the *Vedānta statements*, he classified them according to their purpose: "*Vedānta* assertions have a twofold purpose: some of them aim at teaching the true nature of the supreme Self, some at teaching the unity with the supreme Self or the Self of Knowledge" (*Ved. Sūt. Bhāṣya*, 1.3.25). The second category comprises all statements of the type: *Tattvamasi* (*Chānd. Up.* 6.8.7), *Ahaṁ brahmāsmi* (*Br. Up.* 1.4.10), *Ayamātmā brahma* (*Br. Up.* 2.5.19), etc. They direct man to identify the Absolute correctly. The first category includes all definitions (*lakṣaṇas*) of the Absolute. Now such definitions are of two kinds: either essential (*svārūpa*) and non-relational (*nirapekṣa*), or non-essential (*taṭastha*) and relational (*upalakṣaṇa*). The first kind indicates the true nature of *Brahman*; it comprises all statements of the type: *Satyam jñānamanantaṁ brahma* (*Tait. Up.* 2.1). The second indicates the true *Brahman*, but through something indifferent (*taṭa*) to its true nature, as, for instance, its creatorship or its immanence to this finite world; (*Brahman* is, indeed, the same true *Brahman* whether it posits a world or not). Thus, since it is only with reference to an indifferent *upādhi* that such definitions point to the true *Brahman*, their teaching, though valid, is insufficient to illumine man perfectly.

5. All *Vedānta statements* are meant to remove man's ignorance concerning the Absolute. But since they are necessarily expressed in human language, they perform this task by the means of human words which signify human concepts. Now all human concepts are derived from man's experience of this world of finite beings, and therefore inadequate to express the Absolute. Direct experience (*anubhava*, *sākṣātkāra*) of the Absolute could alone remedy this inadequacy, but, as long as he is in *Brahmajijñāsā*, i.e., as long as he still inquires about the true *Brahman*, man, by definition, has not yet directly realized this Absolute. However, in spite of the limitations of human concepts, the *Vedānta state-*

ments are not unable to convey to man their proper meaning, provided he interprets them according to the principles of *lakṣaṇājñāna*.

6. Directly authoritative assertions, such as these *Vedānta statements*, ought always to be understood literally, i.e., according to the primary meaning of the concepts of which they are constructed. But the meaning of a concept can be primary in two ways: it is that meaning which is first according to our human way of knowing and this is generally called primary (*mukhyārtha*); or it is that meaning which a concept has when it is referred to the reality in which it is realized perfectly, and which therefore is first (*paramārtha*) with regard to all other realities in which the same concept is but imperfectly realized. Although absolutely first, this meaning is secondary with regard to our human way of knowing and is therefore called *gauṇa* (secondary). It is also called *lakṣya* or *lakṣita* (indicated, implied), because we have no right to assume such a meaning unless absolutely compelled by the impossibility of understanding a statement in any other sense; it is indeed the peculiar inter-relationship of the terms within that statement and the relation of the statement itself to its proximate and general concept which indicate or imply that all its terms have to be understood *paramārthataḥ* (absolutely), i.e., according to the second form of literality.

7. *Lakṣaṇā* or implication does not in every case lead us to a *paramārtha* or absolute sense, for *lakṣyārtha* is of three kinds: (a) *jahat*, i.e., exclusive of the primary (*mukhyārtha*), as in the case of 'dvirepha' (double r) which comes to mean 'bee' (*bhramara*) because *bhramara* contains twice the letter r; (b) *ajahat*, i.e., inclusive of the *mukhyārtha*, as in the case of 'red' in 'the red runs' for 'the red (horse) runs' ('red', while directly designating a particular horse, does not exclude the notion, expressed by its primary meaning, that this horse is red); (c) *jahadajahat*, i.e., both including and excluding the primary meaning, as in the case of 'cloth' in 'my cloth is burned' for 'a part of my cloth is burned'. Because in the interpretation of the *Vedānta statements* the *mukhyārtha* of their terms, i.e., their proper meaning (*svārtha*) according to us, is to be preserved, (for, otherwise, their *paramārtha* would have no contents graspable by us), while, at the same time, the limitations, which it connotes in our way of thinking, are to be removed, this interpretation is based upon *jahadajahallakṣaṇa* only i.e., this form of implication which both excludes and includes what we primarily understand through these terms.

8. A proposition such as 'Tattvamasi' makes no sense if we pretend to understand it according to that meaning of its terms which is usually called primary. To say, indeed, that "Thou, Śvetaketu, son of Uddālaka, art this universe" is mere absurdity. But the whole context compels us to rely upon *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* and to understand the sentence according to the *paramārtha* or supreme sense of its terms which alone is adequate to its implications. Indeed, "the term 'tat' means that which, in the immediate context, has been called Being (*sadākhyā*), the most subtle essence *anīmanubhāva*, the world's root (*jagato mūlam*)... This cause of the world is true, absolutely real (*paramārthasat*)" (*Br. Up. Bhāṣya*, 1.4.7). "It is the *Ātman* of the world, i.e., its inner proper form (*pratyakṣvarūpam*), its very reality (*satattvam*), its truth (*yāthūtmya*)" (*Chānd. Up. Bhāṣya*, 6.8.7). The *paramārtha* of 'tat' as pointed out (*lakṣya*) by the context, is therefore: "the absolute root-cause of this manifold universe" or simply, "the *Brahman*." Similarly, the context forbids us to understand the term 'tvam' in its primary sense, according to which "it designates directly that person (*Śvetaketu*) who had not, before he was taught by his father, reached the true nature of his own Self as Being, the Self of all, distinct from body and senses, which are only its reflections" (*Chānd. Up. Bhāṣya*, 6.16.3). But the only sense of 'tvam' which is consistent with the context is: "that person who, now, being enlightened by his father, has understood from the teaching 'That thou art', that, 'I am Being itself'... because the result brought about by the sentence is the setting aside of the notion that the Self is the actual doer and enjoyer... That the said notion is set aside by the sentence follows from the fact that the two are incompatible" (*Ibid.*). Indeed, "the same identity cannot really be both *Brahman* and *non-Brahman*, just as the sun cannot be both bright and dark, for these are contradictory features" (*Br. Up. Bhāṣya*, 1.4.10). Thirdly, the verb 'asi' cannot here be understood in any of the three figurative senses (*sampat*, *gauna*, *stuti*), but only as signifying the perfect actual identity of 'tat' and 'tvam' understood in their supreme sense as indicated by the context (*Chānd. Up. Bhāṣya*, 6.16.3). The true sense of 'Tattvamasi' is therefore: "Tat, the absolute root-cause of the universe, and tvam, the absolute principle of thy individual self, are (*asi*) one identical supreme Being" or "The *Brahman* and the *Ātman* are the one identical supreme Being".

It would be most enlightening to study the *lakṣaṇa method* as applied by Śaṅkara in the exegesis of all the *Vedānta state-*

ments, and particularly in *Tait. Up. Bhāṣya*, 2.1, (exegesis of the definition: *Satyam jñānamanantam brahma*), which is the most elaborate of its kind. But such a study would take us beyond the limits of this short paper.

Let us also notice that the *lakṣaṇa* method proceeds in three steps: 1) *adhyāropa* (false attribution), i.e., understanding the sentence according to the *mukhyārtha* of its terms; 2) *apavāda* (negation), i.e., rejection of this absurd meaning; 3) *lakṣaṇājñāna*, i.e., right knowledge of the sentence according to the *paramārtha* of its terms, as indicated (*lakṣya*) by the interrelationship of these terms and the relation of the whole sentence to the totality of its context.

9. The position of St. Thomas Aquinas concerning man's capability of knowing God can be summarized as follows: (1) short of the beatific vision, man cannot know the essence of God positively and expressly, but only negatively and through analogy; (2) knowledge of God through analogy is the result of a threefold process: (a) position of God as the supreme Cause of the universe, hence as possessing at least the whole perfection of his effect,, (b) removal from this notion of all finiteness and limitation, (c) elevation of the notion thus purified to its highest degree, which can consist only in absolute simplicity, transcendent unity and infinite perfection; (3) the terms of our definitions of God are therefore never to be understood in their primary meaning, but in that secondary meaning only, which is implied by their function as terms of a definition of the true God.

10. Terms, indeed, are either univocal or analogous or purely equivocal. Purely equivocal terms are ambiguous, because to one and the same term several different concepts correspond; they ought therefore to be excluded from our subject. Univocal terms are all terms which designate a class, (either generic or specific), and are therefore realized in all members of this class according to their full definition and the specific and finite way of being which it signifies. Any application of such terms to objects alien to their class is improper and can at the most be metaphorical. Now God is outside any class, either genus or species, and therefore outside any univocal application of any term, except by the way of metaphor which remains below the level of definition proper. Besides, as I have just pointed out, the definition of any univoca

term implies a definite way of being finite. But there exist other terms, the definition of which does not imply such a limitation, but abstracts from any way of being, either finite or infinite. Such are all terms designating "pure" perfections, such as being, one, knowing, willing, good, etc., and these are analogous terms, properly speaking. We, of course, derive them from our finite experience and from objects in which they are but finitely realized. But, since their notion does not imply this finiteness, they can be predicated of a subject which realizes them in a perfect and infinite way, if such a subject is ascertained from faith or from reason. According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, the existence of God is ascertained from both faith and reason, and it is therefore possible to define God with the help of such analogous terms. Such definitions of God, explains St. Thomas, are valid, (and are the only valid ones), because both "what" they signify and "how" they signify it are realized in God, but they remain irremediably negative, because, although we know "what" each term of the definition expresses, we have no adequate representation of the "how" according to which the definition affirms it of God. They are able to remove all errors regarding the true nature of God, but not to engender that perfectly positive knowledge which alone can quench man's thirst for the supreme Reality.

11. The possibility of using analogous terms, in order to know God depends, as we have seen, upon the fact that some of our concepts abstract from both limitedness and unlimitedness. Indeed, the definitions of pure or unmixed perfections do not include any specific mode or manner of realization and the finite representations which always accompany them in our mental experience can be distinguished and separated from them without at all impairing these definitions. Such separation is implicit in every true definition of God because, otherwise, the defining terms could not fulfil their function; but the same impossibility would arise if these terms could not be elevated to the mode of infinity; this elevation is also implicit in every true definition of God. Hence, because analogous terms lend themselves to the threefold process of position, negation, elevation, it is possible to designate the true God by means of terms derived from finite experience. But, in order to be valid, such designations must be based upon some ontological similarity between the objects of finite experience and God; otherwise the proper meaning of their terms would not be realized in both

God and the finite objects, hence these terms would be purely equivocal, not analogous. Anyone, therefore, who resorts to analogy (or *lakṣanā*) in order to know God, implies by the very fact some ontological community between creatures and God. St. Thomas established this ontological community on the fact that God is the supreme and total Cause upon which all other beings depend entirely in their very being. (His demonstration of this fact cannot be exposed in this short paper). As effects these beings must be similar to their Cause and, since it is as beings that they are effects, they must be ontologically similar to God, their Cause. A cause, indeed, whatsoever it be, can only produce effects similar to itself. For, on the one hand, the concept of a purely equivocal cause, i.e., of a cause whose effects would be entirely dissimilar from itself, is unthinkable; on the other hand, no effect can be entirely identical to its cause, for their complete identity would destroy the very meaning of both cause and effect and leave perfect unity only instead of the duality of cause and effect which the question itself presupposes. If, therefore, the fact of the ontological dependence upon God of all other beings has been validly established, the conclusion follows that these beings are neither entirely dissimilar from, nor entirely identical with, God, but ontologically similar to Him. Hence, whatever is positive in them is to be referred to him, and in particular, those perfections whose very concept abstracts from any limit and is therefore called transcendental and analogous.

12. In spite of the essential dissimilarity of their theological background, Śaṅkara and Thomas Aquinas have treated the definitions and designations of God or the Absolute according to a strikingly similar method and this is one of the main reasons of the large extent to which their respective theodicies are in agreement. But both have not been equal in following up all the rational implications of this method, which both considered as valid. Because there was nothing in his own conception of theology to prevent St. Thomas from trusting pure reason as well as his Christian faith, he has been able to develop, in connection with his theology, the philosophy of ontological participation which establishes the proper status in being of all knowable objects. The same philosophy is implicit in Śaṅkara's *Brahmalakṣaṇājñāna* and we naturally wonder why he did not derive it explicitly. I have elsewhere¹ inquired into this question and the conclusion of my re-

1. In my Ph. D. Dissertation about "*The Methodology of Śaṅkarācārya*" (not yet published). The paragraphs of this paper concerning *lakṣaṇājñāna* P. 2

search, based upon the explicit declarations of Śaṃkara about his intention and method, is that he considered all purely rational speculation as idle and misleading philosophizing. *Śabda*, i.e., *Śruti* and secondarily *Smṛti*, was the only *pramāṇa* or source of valid knowledge absolutely to be trusted, and in his view it ultimately contradicted all evidences of pure or unaided reason. All the antinomies of his teaching are rooted in this conviction, but it was so fundamental that he could not compromise about it. If his doctrine does not have the comprehensiveness and universal appeal of the doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas, it does not mean that the philosophical insight of the latter was greater than his own, but it means that Śaṃkara's faith was antinomic and not completely reconcilable with the full richness and extent of reality.

in the writings of Śaṃkara summarises a few pages of this work. I have also treated the same subject at length in "Langage et connaissance de l'Absolu chez Śaṃkara" *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, tome 52, (3e série, no. 33), Février 1954 pp. 31-74.

The main references concerning St. Thomas' doctrine of analogy are *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, 14; I, 29-36; III, 18-27 and 50; *Summa Theologica* I, q. 12, a. 12 and q. 13, a. 1-12; *Quaestio Disputata de Potentia*, q. 7, a. 5.

The Immortality of the Self *

by

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The problem of immortality is not perhaps a living problem of contemporary philosophy. Still it cannot be said that it has lost all interest. The vast majority of mankind are, even today, believers in some religion or other, and all religions, as far as we know, are committed to a belief in the immortality of the self in one form or another. Religion is predominantly an other-worldly interest, presupposing a belief in the existence of the self apart from the body. On the other hand, we are, to all appearance, wholly identified with our body and it appears difficult even to conceive that we can exist apart from the body. So those who are earnest in their religious beliefs can hardly fail to appreciate the importance of this problem. Even apart from all religious questions, one may be naturally interested in the question whether one's existence is limited by birth and death or extends beyond both. Thus the problem of immortality appears to be not without some permanent interest.

How shall we put the problem? The Westerners generally ask themselves whether one exists beyond one's death, taking it for granted that one cannot exist before one's birth. We in this country generally believe that a thing which has a beginning must have an end also, and if the self be immortal, it must exist both before our birth and after our death. In any case, if the self is to be immortal, it must exist apart from the body, for the body visibly perishes with death (or soon after it). So our question is—Does the self exist apart from the body?

How are we going to decide this question? Since what we wish to decide is a question of fact, it might seem proper to try to decide it by observation, for a matter of fact can be ascertained finally only by observation (and by legitimate inference based on it). But this question, although a question of fact, does not seem at all capable of being decided in this way. Nothing can possibly appear before us with the character of immortality writ large on its face.

* Following McTaggart I am using the term 'self' instead of 'soul' here.

That a thing exists now may easily be observed, but that it is going to exist for all time, no mere observation can ever reveal. Moreover if it is our intention to find out whether the self exists apart from the body, we should be able to observe the self apart from the body i.e. without a body. But unfortunately it is only bodies, i.e. things with physical properties, that can be observed, so that anything without a body is not even a possible object of observation. Furthermore, it is a matter of legitimate doubt whether the self is ever met with in an objective attitude. If the self, as some philosophers maintain, is to be realised only in subjective enjoyment, it is futile to try to find out anything about the self by objective observation.

Some people may claim that they see spirits or bodiless apparitions. But I must confess that I do not understand what they mean by seeing. In seeing, as we understand it, our eyes are physically affected by something external. A bodiless apparition, being nothing physical, cannot possibly affect our eyes physically and cannot therefore be seen in the ordinary sense.

I am here leaving out of consideration all kinds of spiritualistic phenomena which one might think quite relevant to our question, because I am quite unfamiliar with them and feel, perhaps unjustly, very sceptical about their evidential value.

Now, although we cannot directly find out by observation whether the self exists apart from the body, we may observe certain facts from which it is possible to infer reasonably that the self enjoys such existence. For instance if a person clearly remembers the experiences of his past life and relates facts about it which are independently verified through other evidence also, then we may reasonably think that he has existed beyond his last death and that during the interval between his last death and birth he existed without a body. A writer of a Socratic dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul in an issue of 'Mind' (1950) considers such a possibility. But to the question, 'Does this in fact happen' he definitely replies, 'No, it does not'. That is, he thinks nobody actually ever remembers his former life. In this country however the belief in the capacity of certain specially gifted persons to remember their past life is quite common. Such persons are called *Jatismara*. It is even believed that through certain spiritual discipline a person may acquire this capacity to remember his past lives. I do not personally know any such case nor can I confidently refer to any authenticated historical case. I am therefore inclined to think

that our question cannot really be decided by any empirical evidence. It thus appears that if any clear light is to be thrown on this question, it can come from philosophical considerations only.

Philosophers generally, both in the West and in the East, have believed in the immortality of the self and have advanced some arguments for it, although I cannot suppose that they have been uninfluenced in their philosophical arguments by their religious beliefs. The Greeks, like the Hindus, believed (if we are to judge from the Socratic dialogues of Plato) that our souls are, in our earthly state, in bondage to the body, that the body is perishable while the soul is imperishable and that according to his deeds in this life the soul of a man passes after death into the body of an animal or of a man. Plato has put certain arguments in favour of immortality in the mouth of Socrates and the guiding thread to these arguments seems to be provided by the above belief.

Dimly anticipating Hegel, Socrates says, in one of the arguments, that opposites are generated from opposites. It is from 'less' that a thing becomes 'more' and from 'more' 'less'. One 'wakes' up from 'sleep' and lapses into 'sleep' from 'wakefulness'. 'Life' and 'death' are recognised opposites and so, just as death follows life, life should also follow death. Whatever plausibility the argument possesses is derived from the supposition that life and death are two contrasted states of the self, and if death comes after life, life also must come after death. But I see no patent consideration in the idea that the self itself ceases to exist with death, so that there is no question of its enjoying further life after death.

Another argument refers to the Platonic theory of knowledge as reminiscence. All our knowledge, it is said, is a remembrance of what we knew already, and this leads to the idea that we must have existed before we were born i.e. came into our present bodies. Plato finds that absolute ideas (or Universals) are an essential element in our knowledge and all our particular ideas fall short of them. Even the most beautiful object falls short of absolute beauty or beauty as such. All our particular ideas may be derived in this life from experience but the absolute ideas cannot be so derived. No mind is without such ideas and since they were not acquired in this life, we must have acquired them before we were born, i.e. we must have existed before our birth. It appears that absolute or *a priori* ideas are taken to be real entities, for the knowledge of which we require previous life and experience. Would it not be more reasonable to suppose that these ideas are developed by the mind even in this life out of its own resources?

Simmiās, a participant in the Socratic dialogue, suggests that the self might be of the nature of a harmony which comes into being when the different elements of the body are compounded in right proportion and act in unison. Although harmony as such is distinct from the body or any bodily elements, it cannot be said to exist when the body perishes. The suggestion is certainly interesting and Socrates' answer is equally so.

Socrates argues that there can always be 'more or less' of harmony (according to the manner an instrument is tuned), but there can be no 'more or less' (i.e. degrees in the being) of the self, which shows that the self is not of the nature of a harmony. Secondly, we guide and control the body, even against our bodily inclinations, which would not be the case if we were, like harmony, a mere product of the body (i.e. of the arrangement or combination of the parts of the body).

It should be readily admitted that the self is not exactly like harmony. No simile is ever based on total or exact resemblance. But if the self is found to function only in the body and that, too, when the parts of the body are in a harmonious relation with one another, then in a sense it may be called a harmony. The idea of harmony is of course derived from a musical instrument. The parts of the instrument have to be attuned to one another, if the harmony is to be produced. The harmony manifests qualities which are never found in mere parts of the instrument, just as the self reveals many qualities (e.g. thinking, feeling, etc.) which are not found in bodily parts. So it may not be quite inappropriate to use the metaphor of harmony in connexion with the self.

It is true that we do not ordinarily speak of the self as 'more' or 'less', as we may do of harmony. But we certainly say that one man possesses greater or less personality than another. According to the degree in which a man has succeeded in integrating the vital and mental forces working in him, he may be said to possess more or less of selfhood or personality.

As to the objection that a mere product of the body cannot lead or dominate the body as the self does, we may point out that this is not quite unusual. The fire which is produced by two pieces of wood through friction is seen to consume them and reduce them to ashes. In any corporation the president who is elected by the members and is thus made by them is found to rule the members so long as he remains in his position.

It may be objected that harmony after all is a complex whole whereas the self should be a perfect or simple unity. Here we pass on to consider the dominant view of Indian philosophy on this point.

Gotama in his *Nyāyasūtras* (Chap. III, pt. 1) repudiates the suggestion that the self may be identified with the body. For Gotama, as for the most other Indian philosophers, the self is a perfect unity. Our experience, involving memory and recognition, would be unintelligible if we did not grant a self-identical element in it. This self-identical element, which is called the self, cannot be identified with the body or any thing in the body, first because everything in the body is in constant change and nothing remains self-identical with itself, and secondly, because the body is a composite (*Samghāta*) and is not really a strict unity which is demanded by our experience.

It is true that some kind of identity is needed for our experience, but it is also true that this identity cannot be abstract identity excluding all difference. The identical element must bear the burden of all experience, i.e. must be related to the different elements in experience. In some sense experience must be owned by the self and this would make the self into a unity inclusive of diversity. The conception of substance and quality, allowing self-identical, undifferenced substance with differences of quality, is merely a makeshift. Metaphysically the substance must be a unity with difference. (The different qualities must be in the substance). If the self must be a unity with difference, then that sort of unity is not absent in the body also. Our body is not a composite multiplicity but an organic unity. Since all our experiences are apparently gained through the body, it may be that the organic unity of the body is after all responsible for the unity of experience. Still we may readily admit that the organic unity of the body is different from the psychical unity of the self, although it is difficult to think that any kind of psychical experience is possible apart from the body.

The popular thought of mankind seems to be dominated by the idea that the self is a separate entity from the body and resides somewhere in the body and goes out of it at death when the body fails to support it. With the Cartesian division of mind and body, it seems an almost hopeless affair to understand and explain the apparently intimate relation between them. It appears certainly more reasonable to suppose that the body and the self do not exist as separate entities at all. With Aristotle we may suppose that the

self is the entelechy or perfection of the body. We may take the body to be the matter of which the self is the form, so that there is no question of one being available apart from the other. Once we begin to think earnestly in these terms, we shall cease to be interested in the fantasy that at the time of death the self is dragged out of the body and is led some-where else.

It is difficult to conceive the self except as an experiential unity, and we do not know how experience is possible apart from the body. One school of Indian philosophy at least explicitly recognises the body as the sole seat of experience (*bhogayatana*), and if experience is not possible apart from the body, it is reasonable to suppose that the self too does not exist apart from the body. At any rate I have failed to find any clear meaning for the existence of the self apart from its experiences, and since I have no evidence to show that experiences are possible apart from the body, I have no reason to think that the self exists even when there is no body.

It may be feared that when the self is denied (on the death of the body), nothing further will remain, since, as Fichte taught, the self must be posited before anything else is posited. The fear is hardly justifiable, because if one self dies, others remain. Even if all selves pass out of existence, and there is nobody to assert the existence of anything, it should not make any difference to the things themselves, because the absence of assertion cannot possibly affect their nature which is not in any sense constituted by it. The Fichtean form of idealism which makes the being of things hang on our assertion of them is hardly credible.

What I am trying to advocate is not sheer materialism. I do not think that matter alone exists, nor do I think it possible to give a satisfactory account of our life and experience purely in materialistic terms. I do not say that spirit is non-existent, but that it is inseparable from body or matter. With Schelling we may suppose that spirit is immanent in matter. It is at least present everywhere as a tendency towards life and consciousness. Selfhood is a particular form which spirit assumes in a certain appropriate medium (body), and it appears to be a transitory form which disappears when the medium proves unsuitable for its expression. We who are ever born are surely destined to die and pass away. Universal spirit (if there be any) which knows no birth may suffer no death. But its immortality cannot mean the immortality of the individual self with which alone we are concerned when we discuss the problem of immortality.

Theories of Consciousness and Liberation in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy and the Philosophy of George Santayana

by

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In a paper read at the 1953 meetings of the Indian Philosophical Congress¹ I discussed certain of the consequences for their respective theories of liberation, of the dominant aspects of the theories of consciousness in the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy and the naturalistic ontology of the late eminent American philosopher, George Santayana. It was my contention in that paper that both philosophies adopt an ontological dualism between consciousness² and nature³ (or matter)⁴ which is so absolute that a theory of liberation—the avowed aim of both philosophies⁵—is achieved only at the price of logical inconsistency. In both philosophies it is spirit (*Puruṣa*) that is to obtain release;⁶ yet in both, the apparently predominant characterization of spirit is such that it is impossible that it should either be bound or be released. Hence ambivalences in doctrine were noted in both philosophies, both in respect to the characterization spirit, and in respect to the question as to whether it is spirit or nature (or matter) that is to obtain release. I concluded that for each of these philosophies, it can be only the empirical

1. "The Theory of Consciousness in the *Sāṃkhya* Philosophy and the Philosophy of George Santayana and Its Consequences for the Theory of Liberation in Each." Read in the History of Philosophy Section, and to be printed in a volume of essays honouring the sixtieth birthday of Professor A. R. Wadia.


2. I shall use the term 'consciousness' interchangeably with the term "*Puruṣa*" in the *Sāṃkhya* and "spirit" in the philosophy of Santayana. I shall also use the terms 'spirit' and '*Puruṣa*' interchangeably.

3. I shall use the term "nature" interchangeably with the term "*Prakṛti*" in the *Sāṃkhya*.

4. The term is Santayana's.

5. Cf. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* I; *The Realm of Spirit Book Fourth of Realms of Being*. (New York, Chas. Scribners Sons, 1940), p. viii.

6. *The Realm of Spirit*, Ch. VIII, *passim*.



self, as comprising both spirit and nature (or matter), that can be bound, acquire saving knowledge, and achieve liberation. And that even this cannot be said without a radical recasting of ontological categories.

II

The *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* holds that it is the 'world-stuff' (*Prakṛti*), as evolved, that is bound, and obtains release.⁷ But this cannot possibly be the case, since the 'world-stuff' is held to be intrinsically insentient,⁸ and being bound and being released are conscious states. In bondage, consciousness is intimately related to an 'internal organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa*); in liberation, not. Hence it is at most correct to say that the 'world-stuff' (*Prakṛti*), as evolved, is bound only in the sense that, as evolved in a certain way, and as related to a spirit (*puruṣa*) in a certain way, it is taken by spirit and by itself to be a conscious, empirical, self-acting personality. And to say that the 'world-stuff' is released (as distinct from being enjoyed), is merely to say that, devolved, it stands in such relationship to spirit that the latter is unaware of its existence.

Yet when the theory is so articulated, it is clear that the functions of the concrete empirical personality cannot be performed. For in terms of the theory, there are no 'states of mind': spirit is eternal unchanging consciousness, and nature is insentient. On such a view there can only *seem to be* states of mind. The difficulty, of course, is that there *are* states of mind: to say that the various shades of feeling, willing, and thinking only seem to be conscious, or are really non-conscious, will not do. In order that an adequate account of the empirical personality may be given, either spirit, in the context of certain relationship to the 'world-stuff', as evolved, must take on the various states of consciousness, i.e., feel, think, and will; or the 'world-stuff' as evolved and standing in certain relationships to spirit, must actually, and not merely seemingly, become conscious. But neither of these alternatives is compatible with the dominant accounts of spirit and 'world-stuff' in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and the *Sāṃkhya sūtras*. What is minimally required, if the philosophy is to approach an adequate account of the concrete human personality, is a recasting of the conception of the 'world-stuff' in such fashion that, as evolved, it will actually possess

7. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, LXII.

8. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, XI.

the characteristics of empirical consciousness, though possess them only in the context of certain relationships to spirit. It would, then, be these conscious states of evolved 'world-stuff' that would initially take for granted their identity with Spirit, come to realize both that they are the seat of misery and that they are different from Spirit, and, finally, in consequence of a complete realization of these truths, resolve themselves back into the primal 'world-stuff'. Spirit would thus be released.

Such criticism of the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy is, of course, not novel. I make it here merely to emphasize the difficulties inherent in the attempt to work out a philosophy within the framework of rigid, presupposed ontological categories negatively defined in terms of one another. Evidently, the *Sāṃkhya* philosophers assumed that such negative categorical exclusion was necessary; and they saw that logically it precluded the possibility of attributing actual consciousness in any form to the 'world-stuff'.

III

A similarly difficult philosophical position is found in the efforts of Santayana to articulate a theory of the empirical personality upon the basis of an ontology which, like that of the *Sāṃkhya* involves an absolute difference and exclusion between the two categories of events—spirit and matter—which together constitute nature.⁹ The other ultimate categories of Santayana's philosophy, essence and truth (which is defined as that segment or range of essence which has been "exemplified" in existence)¹⁰ are not recognised by the *Sāṃkhya*, and need not particularly concern us here. According to the *Sāṃkhya*, consciousness, which is the nature of Spirit, is pure, unchanging eternal awareness.¹¹ Santayana rejects the view that spirit is eternal (only essences are eternal),¹² holding, on the contrary, that instances of spirit are natural events supervening upon material complexities when the latter have achieved the status of 'psyches' (biophysical organizations in matter).¹³ Nevertheless, spirit, with the *Sāṃkhya*, is held to be a mere witness, pure awareness focussed upon whatever essence may appear.¹⁴

9. Cf. *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 277 ff.

10. Cf. *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 280.

11. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, X and XI.

12. Cf. *The Realm of Spirit*, Ch. II.

13. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15.

14. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18.

With such an ontology as the metaphysical background of his thought, Santayana develops his theory of liberation in ways which bear marked resemblances to the doctrines of the *Sāṃkhya*. It is spirit which is to obtain release; yet spirit, as witness, as pure consciousness or awareness, is not an agent, but a mere epiphenomenon.¹⁵ Hence the release of spirit is due, not to spirit itself, but to the underlying psyche whose movements call it forth: spirit does not choose its "way of life" but is a mere response to habitual patternings within the psyche.¹⁶ Thus according to Santayana, in a theoretic development strikingly reminiscent of the *Sāṃkhya*, it is the material psyche which is bound, seeks salvation, and is released. And in parallelism to the *Sāṃkhya*, bondage and release are states characterizing only those psyches which give rise to spirit, since psyches, as mere collections in the realm of matter, are insentient.¹⁷

Thus in the philosophy of Santayana, as in the *Sāṃkhya*, the burden of the "business of life" is thrown upon insentient matter: the latter is held to perform instinctively and non-consciously all those functions which are ordinarily attributed to the concrete empirical human personality. As Santayana once put it, it is the body which thinks; when an idea reaches consciousness the event has already happened. Thus different "ways of life": a life of reason, or a life of spirit, or a life of distraction, are but names for different integrations and adjustments of the psyche which are reflected in characteristically different sets of essences given to spirit. As the habitual adjustments differ, so the corresponding "states of mind" differ.¹⁸ Spirit, as pure awareness, greets whatever essence may appear; its is a sublime cognitive and moral neutrality.¹⁹ The principle of moral preference—of integration or lack of it—is of the psyche.

Yet this formulation does not satisfy Santayana, and at the price of inconsistency he delineates a theory of spirit which portrays the latter as mentally active, rather than as a mere passive witness.

15. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 51, 64, *passim*.

16. Cf. *ibid.*, Ch. III.

17. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15 ff.

18. Cf. my paper in the Wadia Volume. The parallelism with the *sāṃkhya* in this respect is obvious. For both philosophies there are no states of consciousness. In the *Sāṃkhya*, the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) seems to be conscious, but is not; in Santayana, 'states of mind' are really but characteristics of the essence given to pure spirit.

19. Cf. *The Realm of Spirit*, Chs. VIII and IX.

This latter view is closer in its account to the facts of our empirical consciousness, but runs counter to the basic tenets of Santayana's theories of consciousness and knowledge. But whichever of these views is adopted, it is still the case that for Santayana matter is the agent, and spirit a mere concomitant witness, as in the *Sāṃkhya*, *Prakṛti* is the agent and *Puruṣa* the passive observer. And both philosophies share the paradoxical position that what is ordinarily called mind or self is attenuated to a mere looking, and insentient nature is held to do mechanically what is thought from the standpoint of our ordinary empirical personalities to be through and through genuinely intelligent action.

IV

The fact that for the *Sāṃkhya*, *Puruṣa* is an eternal existent causally independent in its existence and nature from *Prakṛti*, whereas for Santayana, spirit is a name for a sequence of conscious events concomitant with certain biophysical complexities in matter, entails radical differences between their respective theories of liberation. For the *Sāṃkhya* liberation is achieved when the knowledge that *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are different ontological categories is fully realized. Upon such realization the 'subtle body' (*liṅga-śrīra*) disintegrates into its *guṇa* constituents, and the *puruṣa* stands free.

For Santayana, liberation is achieved when the material psyche is so oriented that the given essence constituting the 'state of mind' of which spirit is witness, is free from all distraction and animal intent;²⁰ spirit is reduced to complete absorption in sheer immediacy.²¹

V

The further question as to whether Santayana makes good his ontological distinction between spirit, and matter, or whether both categories are ultimately, in terms of his own analysis, to be considered but different types of events is a question which cannot be pursued within the scope of this paper. Nor the consequences, for his theory of liberation, of such a *denouement*. It must suffice to remark here that in the opinion of the writer Santayana does fail to maintain the distinction; and that this failure radically alters what are seemingly the main contentions of his theory of liberation.

20. Cf. my paper in the Wadia commemorative volume.

21. Cf. *The Realm of Spirit*, Chs. VIII and IX.

Intellectual and Mystical Intuition*

by

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W. H. Walsh¹ has reopened the oft-debated question whether the human intellect can function intuitively rather than discursively. The discussion has led him² to reconsider the even more important question whether a philosophy can be founded on mystical experience. Now there are those who shrink from the claim that mystical experience is literally opaque to the intellect and argue that the experience partakes rather of the character of an "intellectual intuition." Walsh himself does not regard the solution as probable or even plausible. Regretably though, he does not discuss the problem at great length, excusing himself for his lack of familiarity with mystical literature. I shall follow him in speaking of at least four different constructions which can be put on the term "intellectual intuition." Perhaps I may not consider them in quite the same order as he. I propose to show that, taken in any, or all, of these four senses, "intellectual intuition" is irrelevant to the most influential mystical traditions of the world. I shall be sampling these traditions in my short paper, since my principal object is to dwell on their peculiarities.

By "intellectual intuition" may be meant, in the first place, the apprehension, or the alleged apprehension, of certain self-evident truths which supply the premises of reasoning. The study of Descartes should have made us all familiar with the usage. The criterion of truth for him is clearness and distinctness: *Omne est verum, quod clare et distincte percipio*. Intuition is born of the "natural light" (*lumen naturale* or *la lumière naturelle*). Descartes appeals

*In drafting this paper, I received much encouragement from my correspondence with Dr. N. O. Lossky, formerly Professor of Philosophy at the Russian Universities of St. Petersburg and Prague, the Russian Theological Seminary at New York, and now residing in Los Angeles, U.S.A.

1. *Reason and Experience* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1947), Chs. IX and V.

2. *Ibid.*, Ch. X, pp. 223-229.

confidently to mathematics. A mathematical demonstration is complete when it is seen to follow from premises so clear and distinct that they cannot be questioned. To find an immediately self-evident truth or "intuition" is the first condition of any knowledge worthy of the name. In his *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, Descartes remarks that the essence of the true method is to proceed from the clear and distinct to the complex and obscure. Deduction (which, for Descartes, other than the Aristotelian syllogistic process) consists in taking a chain of intuitions and advancing from link to link by a continuous movement of thought. It may be noticed, in passing, that the claim that reason furnishes intuitively self-evident premises or first principles was lodged by rationalistic moralists like Samuel Clarke and Wollaston.

It may be suggested, in the second place, that intellectual intuition is not the apprehension of self-evident premises or first principles but insight into connections, relations of entailment, compatibility and incompatibility, etc., in thinking. A. C. Ewing, among others, has held that in whatever way the premises of an argument are established, the insight that they necessitate the conclusion can be attained only through an act of intuition. R. W. Browning³ too, in his critical examination of Radhakrishnan's philosophy, suggests that at least one kind of intuitive insight may be involved in all inferential reasoning. If this be so, a too generally conceived antithesis of reason and intuition would be misleading. It may even be that the factor contributing to great scientific discoveries is a rare "intellectual intuition" exercised by a gifted few.

In the third place, "intellectual intuition" may be construed as the awareness or contemplation of universals and relations regarded as referents ("subsistents", "abstracta", "cognita") of a unique kind. The Platonic theory of Ideas and the Aristotelian theory of universals existing *in re*, differently motivated though they are, commit us to some such general view. Likewise the neo-realistic theory of universals and relations worked out by E. G. Spaulding, C. E. M. Joad, M. E. Clarke and others. Joad, at one time, proposed to distinguish the "vicarious efficacy" of a "subsistent" whereby it makes itself cognizable from the "causal efficacy" with which we endow existents. Among Russian ontologists following their clas-

3. "Reason and Types of Intuition in Radhakrishnan's Philosophy" in *The Philosophy of Sarvepalle Radhakrishnan* (edited by P. A. Schilpp, Tudor Publishing Company, New York, 1952), pp. 186-195.

sical traditions, N. O. Lossky reaches, on independent grounds, more or less the same view. He has said: "Thought does not create relations but finds them in the object; it discovers them by means of intellectual contemplation. They form the structure of the object, the systematic aspect of it, which renders a knowledge of the object possible."⁴

Lastly, the term "intellectual intuition" may be reserved for a possibility hinted at by Spinoza and Kant and exploited by Hegel in his own way. Spinoza's *scientia intuitiva*, stripped off its mystical implications, would seem to suggest some union of the universal and the particular "perceived at a glance". Kant speculated on a possibly intuitive faculty which would at once posit the particulars and think them. He conjectured that, for a being possessing the faculty, everything possible (all that it thinks) would be at the same time actual (present for intuition) and all that appears contingent (arbitrarily or intentionally selected from several possibilities) would be necessary; the antithesis of mechanism and teleology would vanish. Hegel, availing himself of Kant's hint, argued that, on the purely discursive view of the human intellect, thought and sense would fall apart; any cooperation between them (of the kind postulated by Kant himself) would be nothing short of the miraculous. Hegel's Reason (*Vernunft*), unlike the merely discursive Understanding (*Verstand*), has an intuitive function curiously akin to that of sense.⁵ The Ideas of Reason are not abstract like the concepts of the Understanding; they are concrete universals. Ideally at any rate, Reason replaces, and not merely supplements, the work of sense and the discursive intellect. "Notion" and "Object", "Being-for-another" and "Being-in-itself," fall within the higher knowledge. "And to show that, in point of fact, there is a knowledge which advances neither by unmixed immediacy nor by unmixed mediation, we can point to the example of logic and the whole of philosophy."⁶

Let me now attempt to explain why the best in mysticism stubbornly resists assimilation to "intellectual intuition" understood in any, or all, of the four senses distinguished. Those who drank deep of the fountain of mystical experience were also those who

4. *Intellectual Intuition and Ideal Being* (Russian University, Prague, 1934), p. 7.

5. Cf. Walsh, *op. cit.*, p. 28; pp. 64-69; N. O. Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge* (Macmillan, London, 1919), pp. 174-180.

6. Cited by Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, p. 177.

were most firmly persuaded that Divine Truths, far from being self-evident to the human intellect, were quite unintelligible to it. I should like to show how widely different traditions converge in the general recognition. Plotinus, in his well-known letter to Flaccus, said: "You can apprehend the Infinite only by a faculty superior to reason. . . . Ecstasy."⁷ Lao Tsze confronts us with the paradox of *Tau*. "The *Tau* which can be expressed in words is not the All-embracing and Immutable *Tau*; the Name which can be uttered is not the Ever-applicable Name."⁸ From the "Conversations of Shen-hui" (8th century A.D.), it would appear that even the "Void" of Buddhistic philosophy is an attempt to make comprehensible what is utterly beyond comprehension. "One talks of the Void," said Shen-hui, "for the benefit of those who have not seen their Buddha-natures. For those who have seen their Buddha-natures, the Void does not exist."⁹ Tibet's Great Guru, Milarepa, confronted by a proud pundit, administered a gentle rebuff.

Accustomed long to meditating on the Whispered Truths, I have forgotten all that is said in written and in printed books.

* * *

May thou, O learned one, trace out these things in standard books.¹⁰ Jalalu'd-din Rūmi sang: "I shall become that which entereth not the imagination."¹¹ The Christian mystics but add the weight of their testimony. Ruysbroeck observed: "Reason and human seeing fail on this threshold, for the supernal light, eternal and limitless, . . . blinds all created light; and human intelligence depending on created light is like an owl in the splendour of the sun."¹² St. John of the Cross, proclaimed a Doctor of the Universal Church by Pope Pius XI on August 24, 1926, stressed the incom-

7. Cited by F. Max Müller, *Theosophy or Psychological Religion* (Gifford Lectures, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1892), p. 432.

8. *The Simple Way of Lao-Tsze* ("The Shrine of Wisdom", Acton, London, 1924), p. 10.

9. *Buddhist Texts*, edited by E. Conze (Bruno Cassirer, Oxford, 1954), pp. 299 ff.

10. W. Y. Evans-Wentz: *Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa* (Oxford University Press), pp. 244 ff.

11. *The Persian Mystics* by F. Hadland Davis ("Wisdom of the East Series", John Murray, London, 1907).

12. *Selected Works of John Ruysbroeck*, adapted from *Oeuvres de Ruysbroeck* (Bruxelles, 1920-1), translated under the English title "Flowers of a Mystic Garden" (John M. Watkins, London, 1912), p. 9 ff.

mensurability of "faith" and reason. He said: "Faith, according to theologians, is a habit of the soul, certain and obscure. The reason why it is an obscure habit is that it makes us believe the truths which God Himself has revealed—truths surpassing the light of reason, and beyond the reach of all human understanding. Hence it is that the excessive light of the faith is obscure darkness to the soul. . . the more it darkens the soul, the more does it enlighten it."¹³ Elsewhere, Juan de la Cruz says that "it is for this reason that S. Dionysius and other Mystic Theologians call infused contemplation a ray of darkness, that is, for the unenlightened and unpurified soul."¹⁴ Mechthild of Magdeburg proclaimed unequivocally:

The smallest truth
That there I saw or heard or knew
Bore no likeness
Even to the highest wisdom
Ever known on earth.¹⁵

I suggest that we should take these statements, not as edifying quotations with which we can adorn scraps of philosophical prose, but as an impressive consensus of testimony coming from those who could speak with authority of their own mystical experiences. Face to face with the consensus, I for one do not see how mystical intuition can exhibit any significant analogy either to an alleged intuition of self-evident truths from which we can reason deductively or to an alleged intuitive insight into connections and relations in inferential thinking. True; the mystics could think about their mystical experiences; but, as they were careful to point, that is not the experience itself; nor does it confer the least title to validity on the experience. And, when they did think about the experience, they insisted, in a fashion disconcerting to those who prize their intellect most highly, that no assertion relating to Soul and God formulated by the intellect is unambiguously true. Does an alleged "intellectual intuition" of universals regarded as "forms", "subsistents", "abstracta", "cognita", give us a hint of what to ex-

13. *Ascent of Mount Carmel* (*Complete Works of St. John of the Cross*, Longman, Robert & Green, London, 1864), Book II, Ch. III, p. 57.

14. *Obscure Night* (*Complete Works of St. John of the Cross*), Bk. II, Ch. V, p. 381.

15. *The Revelations of Mechthild of Magdeburg* (1210-1297), edited by Lucy Menzies (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1953), p. 63.

pect in mystical dialectic? Mystics like Meister Eckhart, who recognized a Platonic realm of intelligibility, sought the Godhead and the soul beyond that realm. In the Alexandrian language, Eckhart spoke of the logos, in the plural as well as in the singular, as pervading and permeating the world. Nevertheless, he taught that the *essentia* or *Wesen* of the Godhead transcends the world of determinations. Whereas the intelligible realm of Ideas is *Wort* (the *Word*), the Godhead is *Ungewortet* (*Wordless*). Eckhart's teaching about the soul is the counterpart of this strange doctrine. The soul is neither a universal contemplated by reason nor a particular intuited by sense. There is something in man transcending both: a spark, a synteresis, an imprint of divinity, something a-temporal and unextended. It is neither this nor that, but something else.¹⁶ In an illuminating article in the Indian *Philosophical Quarterly*,¹⁷ Dr. Mir Valiuddin has argued that the "latent realities" (*Al ā yān al thābitā*), in the mystical teaching of Ibnul 'Arabi, are not universal like Platonic Ideas, but curiously individualized without being degraded to the status of sensory particulars. They have a unique and uni-lateral ontological relationship (for which we have no analogy at all) of dependence on God (*Haqq*).

If the mystic intuits something quite other than a sensory particular (a "that") and a discursively grasped relationship (a "what"), no "intellectual intuition" which is a dialectical union, at a higher level, of sense and intellect can be adequate for the appraisal of mystical doctrine. When a Master of the Chinese *Dhyana* or Ch'an School, Wei-K'uan (8th century A.D.), was asked by a monk "What sort of a thing are you?", he gave the tantalizing reply: "No sort of thing."¹⁸ Vladimir Solovyov, a Russian philosopher-mystic of whose stature I have spoken elsewhere, distinguished the inner reality of anything both from the universal and necessary conditions making it thinkable and the particular and contingent conditions making it sensible or empirically discernible.¹⁹ In the mystically inspired ontologies of N. O. Lossky and S. L. Frank,

16. See my discussion of Eckhart's mysticism in *The Vedanta Kesari* (Ramakrishna Math, Madras), Vol. XXXVIII (November, 1951), pp. 257-261.

17. Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (April, 1950), pp. 31-36. See also my "Suffism: A Re-appraisal" in *Mash'el* (the Islamiah College Magazine, Vaniyambadi), Vol. 5.

18. *Buddhist Texts*, edited by Conze, p. 302.

19. *Kritika Otvletchoni natchal*, cited by Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, p. 212.

God and the Soul are "metalogical", not subject to the ordinary laws of logical determination.²⁰ Frank has even a category of the "Unfathomable" (*Nepostizhimoye*).

I submit that the claims of the mystics have to do with a domain of the uniquely *personal*, *interpersonal* and *transpersonal*.²¹ Mystical intuition is the awareness of the ultimate worth and destiny of selves. It provides an "ontology of faith" which the coherent constructions of reason can neither validate nor invalidate. In the exalted experiences of the mystics of all religions, the familiar "I-and-Thou" relationship is transpersonal as well as interpersonal; it is a "Beyond Me and Beyond Thee" relationship without becoming an impersonal self-relating "It". The transpersonal is the trans-definite. Mysticism precludes a definite ontology of selves. God-and-souls cannot be subject to the whole-part, one-many, identity-diversity, relations. Bradley's search for a Supra-relational Absolute must be a mystical, and not an intellectual, quest. Mystical dialectic, in every great religion has an "apophatic" (negative) and a "cataphatic" (positive) aspect. In neither aspect has it anything to do with the vague and metaphorical theology with which it is too often confounded.

Before concluding my paper, I shall institute a very brief comparison of the approach to mysticism I have sketched with the "existential" philosophies of Søren Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel. If I have understood Kierkegaard aright, it was the uniqueness of the personal-interpersonal-transpersonal domain that he asserted against the academic philosophies and theologies of his day. He challenged philosophers to derive the content of "faith" unambiguously from their "systems." What can be demonstrated by reasons can also be disputed and doubted by reason. Kierkegaard insisted that "faith" is not simply "beyond" the areas mapped out by successive efforts of reason; rather is it that which circumscribes each successive area marked out. What is for the human spirit the most certain of all truths can be for the human intellect the most incurably uncertain. Personality, with all that it implies (it is necessary to insist on the *all* to guard ourselves against psy-

20. See Frank, *La Connaissance et l'être*, (Aubier, Paris, 1937), the abridged French edition of the Russian *Predmet Znaniya*; and Lossky, *Mystical Intuition* (Russian University, Prague, 1938).

21. Cf. my paper "On the Dialectical Affinities Between East and West" in *Philosophy, East and West*, Vol. III, Nos. 3 and 4 (October, 1953; and January, 1954).

chological trivialization), cannot be just an object for rational speculation and enquiry or scientific demonstration. Kierkegaard wrote: "When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related. . . . When the question of truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed to the nature of the individual's relationship; if only the mode of relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth."²² Marcel has perhaps attempted to recapture something of Kierkegaard's emphasis on the Self-transcending Person as the ineluctable bearer of all truth and value. Our relationship to reality cannot be relationship to an object merely; it is rather the attitude of participation and communion. The world as an ontological reality is not a problem to be solved by the intellect but a mystery to be reverently approached. Marcel's *'métaproblématique'* must be viewed in the right perspective. In the "I-Thou" relationship, personality recognizes its "other" by "an act of faith". God is a "Thou" different from every other "Thou" in that He is not convertible into a "him". Death, for Kierkegaard and Marcel, is not a "sinking into the void" but an unfolding of personality.²³

The recognition that the language used by mystics all over the world displays the same puzzling peculiarities of syntax (perhaps the lack of an ordinarily recognizable logical syntax), and points to some "semantics" commensurate with the peculiarities is growing today. Walsh remarks that the seeming concordances of language are sufficiently striking to dispose at least of the objection that philosophy deals with what can be communicated by means of language and has, therefore, no concern with the incommunicable or the "ineffable". Kierkegaard contrasted the method of "direct communication" with an elusive "indirect communication". In their poetry, but most of all in their lives, mystics used the dialectic of "indirect communication". As accredited representative of the Catholic Christian Church, after admitting the "burning charity which characterizes and completes the mysticism of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda", and also the "profoundly Christian attitude of abandonment. . . . adopted by Spanish Mohammedan Sufis of the

22. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Eng. tr. by D. F. Swenson, with introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie (Oxford University Press, London, 1941), p. 178.

23. See the severely critical, yet useful, account of Marcel in G. de Ruggiero, *Existentialism* Secker and Warburg, London, 1946), pp. 40-44.

school Shâdhilî, particularly by Ibn Abbâd of Ronda", has recently remarked with profound insight: "Concentrating their gaze upon their own depths, leaving behind the world of sensations and images which cannot express the very essence of pure spirit, facing Nothingness, the Void, the Night, the Mystics came close to the inmost point of their being: and there met Him who is. In Him and the life flowing from Him, they live intensely, know the joy of Existence Itself—Existence Himself—open themselves wholly, love.²⁴ Mystical philosophy is not the philosophy of yesterday, today or tomorrow. It is ageless; for it is the quest of the Self. It is the "Measureless Way" to the "Immeasurable Height."

24. *Three Mystics*, edited by Father Bruno de J.M., O.D.C. (Sheed and Ward, London, 1952), p. 1. See, in this connection, my articles in the Special Sarada Devi Numbers of the *Prabuddha Bharata*, March, 1954; and *Vedanta Kesari*, July, 1954.

The Nature of Logical Laws

by

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It is usual to distinguish Logic from the other sciences by calling it a normative science. The positive sciences discover Laws of Nature, which are general statements of what actually happens. "A single exception to such a law," writes Mellone, "would make it no longer a law of Nature." On the other hand, he goes on to say, a normative law is "a precept or rule laid down by some authority," and "the authority remains independently of its violation by individuals." This distinction between positive and normative sciences seems, on the first look, an obvious one. In life we *find* many things and *desire* others, the former we call facts, the latter ideals; facts, we say, actually *are*, while ideals *are not*, at least not yet, and when they will come about we will not refer to them as ideals any more. Among other ideals there are ideals of thought, the ways in which we ought to think. But there is a great gulf between the 'ought' and the 'is', and the cynic will say that moral and logical laws are "more honour'd in the breach than the observance." This idea that normative laws can stand unaffected by exceptions, is the result of a confusion. We believe that the Law of Gravitation would be proved faulty if even a single heavy and unsupported body did not fall to the ground, but, on the other hand, even a million people committing contradictions would not disprove the Law of Non-Contradiction. But the comparison is unfair. Your positive law is "All unsupported bodies fall", and your exception would be an unsupported body which did not fall. But, then, if your logical law is "All truth is self-consistent", your exception would have to be an admitted truth which yet was not self-consistent. I am certain such an exception has never been produced, and if produced would destroy the law. But the supposed exception which you show is simply the fact of a false statement, which is not an exception at all, but merely irrelevant. It is like trying to refute the Law of Non-Contradiction by producing a body not unsupported, and showing it does not fall. Laws are hypothetical propositions, and to deny the antecedent will not constitute an

exception; a real exception must deny the connection between the antecedent and the consequent.

Mackenzie, in 'A Manual of Ethics', says normative laws "may be violated", but later has to admit that this "must be interpreted with some care, and not pressed too far. In a sense it is possible to violate a natural law....In a sense also it is not possible to evade a normative law." But he does not pursue these difficulties further. Now, in what sense can a natural law be evaded? A natural law does not give merely a record of facts; that would not constitute a law, and those parts of, say, History or Biology which merely give such records cannot, perhaps, be strictly called 'science'. A science is not concerned with particular events as particular, but states the general conditions under which certain types of events happen, and though its laws are expressed in categorical propositions, they are really hypothetical. "Donkeys have long ears" does not necessitate that donkeys should exist whenever and wherever that law is believed. It means, "if there was a donkey anywhere at any time, it would have long ears." The Law of Gravitation does not say there *are* bodies always unsupported and constantly falling, but that if there were any such, they would fall. Or, in other words, if certain facts and conditions were produced, certain results would follow. The law does not say whether they are produced, nor does it command you to produce them. You may not do so, and in that sense, and that sense only, natural laws are violable.

And a logical law is violable or inviolable in exactly the same way. It states that under certain conditions certain results will follow. If there is a problem to be solved and if there is a sane person who sees it and understands the evidence, a result will follow—he will draw a conclusion. Logic investigates the principles involved in coming to a correct conclusion and the nature of the evidence required. "Consistency ought to be maintained" means "if you are consistent, your conclusion will be correct; if you are not, it will be incorrect"; just as "All unsupported bodies fall" means "if there is one such, it will fall; if there isn't, no falling will take place."

Joseph appreciates this when, in a foot-note in 'An Introduction to Logic', he says that the phrase 'normative science' is "liable to create misunderstanding, as if it were the business of these enquiries to prescribe rather than to ascertain the principles which our rational thought exhibits" (p. 10n.). But the notion that

actual instances do not matter to Logic is too strong for Miss Susan Stebbing, when she writes, "The natural sciences are concerned with given regions of fact. Their field of investigation is the actual world. Logic, on the contrary, is concerned not with what is actual but with what is possible." The impression given is that there are two types of events, actual thoughts of real men (the subject-matter of Psychology), and ideal thoughts, thoughts which men dream about but which, alas! remain unthought out and "laid up in heaven". And then we get into all sorts of tangles as to where this mysterious region is, in the head or outside, subjective or objective, illusory or real—tangles which Miss Stebbing avoids by shutting her eyes and saying nothing more about it. The truth is there are no such ideal thoughts, which are events in this or any other world. Men do have ideals, but these exist only in their instances, and unless they did so exist, Logic or any other normative science could form no notion of them. This means that the data and material both of Logic and of Psychology is the very same, namely, actual thoughts; only (and here lies the difference) Logic concentrates on true or valid thoughts, ignoring others as irrelevant, while Psychology considers all thoughts, true and false, their truth-aspect being psychologically irrelevant. But such selection is not peculiar to normative sciences. From a variety of activities Physics studies only the mechanical, ignoring the purposive.

In the procedures of the inductive scientist and the Logician there is little difference. From among a large number of motley facts, the scientist, by a series of observations, experiments and hypotheses, distinguishes essential features from the accidental, and thus discovers a law. The Logician also compares and contrasts types of thinking, until the logical principle emerges. The examination of actual cases is indispensable. The law that donkeys have long ears does not say where donkeys are to be found, but if there never were donkeys we could never know this. Similarly, the logical law does not say who thinks or does not think correctly, but if nobody ever did, logical laws could never be formulated.

Connected with the idea of normative science is the question, Is Logic an art? Some logicians say it is an art and some say it is a science, and our 'text-book' writers say (like Mr. Doolittle when asked whether he was an honest man or a rogue) it is "a little of both"—it "seems to be that Logic is both a science and an art." That guardian angel of Logic students in India, Mr. Bhola Nath Roy, in his famous 'Text-book of Deductive Logic', writes,

"...men can live healthily so long as they are healthy, but as soon as they fall ill they have to avail themselves of the services of a man possessing medical knowledge. Similarly, so long as men do reason correctly, by the natural exercise of the powers of mind, they need not take the help of Logic, but as soon as they fall into error and confusion, a knowledge of Logic is indispensable to detect the cause of the error and to find out how correct reasoning can be attained." Our students seem to be entirely convinced by this amazing analogy, the absurdity of which a little reflection will make apparent. The man who is bodily sick has yet his mind in order and so sees the need to go to a doctor and is able to follow his instructions, but the man who thinks incorrectly does so precisely because he does not realize the need for correction. It is notoriously true that those who are most wrong are the last to admit it. And I for one have never heard of anybody who, upon finding he cannot solve a problem, say, in Politics or Chess, frantically studies his logic book (if he has one) or rushes for help to the nearest Logician. No student will deny that Logic is an extremely difficult subject, even for those who have (to quote Mr. Roy) "the natural exercise of the powers of mind"; it is therefore impossible that one who does have it and finds himself in error and confusion, would gain anything by appealing to Logic for help. The truth is that Logic makes no such fantastic claims to come to the succour of helpless thinkers, it is a *science* which consciously reflected on, and discovers, principles implicitly but nevertheless correctly used in all cases of sound thinking. When we think correctly many of us are not even aware of logical laws, and even those who know them never consciously apply them and get conclusions, for they are not rules, and in spite of knowing them we may not be able to apply them to the concrete case before us. In exasperation we often ask an opponent, "Don't you see the contradiction?" We do not ask, "Don't you believe in the Law of Non-Contradiction?" for we assume he does, but cannot see where the contradiction lies. Actually the premises are never conveniently *given*, but from a mass of facts we have to select the relevant ones. "The art of thinking must not be confused with Logic," says Stebbing, for "no one really understands the form of his reasoning... unless he can recognise this form when it is exhibited in different subject-matters." This we can do only if we have a sufficiently intimate knowledge of the subject in which we are thinking, together with a notion, however vague, of the conclusions we want to reach. The direction of our search for premises can never be determined

by Logic but depends on our interests, needs, knowledge and capacities. And even after we have obtained the correct facts and evidence, the task of marshalling them as arguments in a proof is no easy matter. An exposition that may make "one heart throb higher" may leave another unconvinced and cold. There are ignorance, prejudice, passions and intellectual incapacity to deal with, and against these Logic cannot help you to choose the arguments that will drive your point home. But once you have selected your premises and drawn the conclusion, Logic can examine the process, say whether you have carried out all the requirements of formal consistency, and bring into clearer consciousness the nature of the fallacy, if there is any. But this is different from giving rules and recipes for avoiding errors; a judge may make clear to the accused the nature of the law he has broken, but he may be quite unable to furnish him with rules for observing laws in the future.

The study of Logic, by demanding rigorous and accurate thinking, does perhaps create in the student a habit of exact and careful thinking in any subject he may tackle. But a training in any difficult branch of knowledge (like Mathematics or Economics) will do as much, and Logic, here, has no superior claims.

If Logic is not an art of avoiding errors, why should we study it? The answer is simple and short, and to those who can distinguish between ends and means, the useful and the valuable, the answer is entirely convincing. Thinking is one of the most important of human activities, and an investigation into its nature and principles is, for some people, an inherent need and must be satisfied. Such an investigation is called Logic, and that is the reason for studying it.

Changing Phases of Buddhist Thought

by

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The evolution of Buddhist thought, in its various phases from the Vaibhāṣikas to the Yogācāras, cannot be fully comprehended, if the psychology behind each school with its novel thesis of existence as a continuous series of births, deaths and rebirths, is not properly explained.

By introducing an intellectual scheme with an efficiency,¹ the Vaibhāṣikas² bring in a transcendental and objective tendency in Buddhist thought, and this is successively modified by superior psycho-moral interpretations of intellectuality of the later schools, culminating in absolutistic suggestions. The Vaibhāṣika-standpoint should not be summarily disposed of as dogmatic, it is critical enough in that it is a departure from the bare intellectual-ethical standpoint of the Upaniṣads. Its intellectuality is touched with a deep intuition in a phycho-moral sense.

The Vaibhāṣikas are not realists in any usual sense, their intellectual assertions have no empirical suggestions.³ They cannot

1. Efficiency here means 'kāritva-lakṣaṇa' Cf. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), pp. 26, 43, 55, and *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. 1932, p. 124.

2. The importance of the Vaibhāṣikas lies in their deviation from the Theravādins, one of the eighteen schools mentioned in the *Kathā-Vatthu* (Points of Controversy, translated by Aung and Rhys Davids, 1951). The Vaibhāṣikas are also known as Sarvāstivādins or Hetuvādins. For details vide Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy* (Second Edition, 1949, University of Hawaii), pp. 63, 81-84; Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 2-3; Raju: *Idealistic Thought of India* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953), pp. 208-218.

3. According to Stcherbatsky the Buddhist schools were idealists from the very beginning and they remained so throughout, for the 'whole system of elements is retained with slight variations in the store-consciousness (ālayavijñāna) of the Yogācāras' (*The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 66) This paper contends that the Vaibhāṣikas draw attention to the pre-logical aspect of intellectuality to account for the dual order of experience, empirical (saṃsāra) and supra-empirical (nirvāṇa), from a psycho-moral standpoint. There is no aim to establish any positivistic intellectualism. The

be compared with contemporary western neo-realists,⁴ who emphasise the directness of knowledge, or with Indian realists like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas or the Mīmāṃsākās,⁵ who have either a theistic or a ritualistic bias. The Vaibhāṣika-intuition is just a postulation of particularities, elements⁶ or bits of experience with their efficiency only in momentariness, or evanescence, keeping alive the reactionary tendency of early Buddhism.⁷ As Stcherbatsky says, these bits of experience are neither *substances* nor attributes, no intellectual categories are applicable to them.⁸ In this they appear in aspects like the *ideas* of Plato⁹ or the *essences* of Santayana.¹⁰ But whereas in Platonic ideas there is an implicit ideal construction, and in Santayana an imaginary construction in contrast to the realm of flux, in the Vaibhāṣikas, there is neither any positive ideal nor any imaginary construction. It is a discipline rather than a construction.¹¹ Only in this context can one understand

scheme of the Vaibhāṣikas, therefore, is neither dogmatic nor realistic, in any usual sense. It is critical and non-positivistic. The posterior schools extend the partial intellectual tendency of the Vaibhāṣikas to a fuller expression of intellectuality, eventually giving rise to phenomenalist, absolutist and idealistic trends, but throughout the evolution of the psycho-moral thought of the Buddhist schools, there is no aim at establishing any of these stand-points. From this standpoint it becomes very difficult to accept without qualifications Murti's statement of the Vaibhāṣikas as dogmatic and realistic or the reactions of the subsequent schools as absolutist and idealistic. Vide Murti: *The Metaphysical Schools of Buddhism in History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, Ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952-3, Vol. I. pp. 191, 195, 200; also vide Raju: *The Development of Indian Thought in Journal of the History of Ideas*, October, 1952, pp. 534-6, for his views about the Buddhist schools.

4. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 1-58.

5. *Ibid.*

6. These particularities (*svalakṣaṇas*) or elements (*dharma*s) are detached entities which are apprehended directly without any intermediate agency of the senses, vide Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 16, 44, 58.

7. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 30, 37, 53; Das Gupta: *Philosophical Essays* (University of Calcutta, 1941), p. 95; Murti: *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, Ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, Vol. I, pp. 195-6.

8. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 28, and *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 479, 500-501.

9. Vide Jowett's translation of the *Dialogues*.

10. *The Realm of Essence* (Constable & Co., 1928).

11. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 30, 31; Das Gupta: *Philosophical Essays*, p. 95. This paper does not accept Das Gupta's positivistic interpretation of the Vaibhāṣikas.

the development of the elements in two directions: (i) elements in association with a complex causal sequence and (ii) elements in dissociation from it. The causal sequence here is not a natural and temporal sequence of events, it is ultra-natural and psycho-moral, commonly known as *pratītyasamutpāda*¹² which suggests dependent origination or emergence of events. It stands for a complex sequence of relatedness, if A is B is (when stated positively) or if A is not B is not (when stated negatively).¹³ The root of this causal sequence may be traced to psycho-moral-cosmic basis, which is differently expressed as ideation (*bhāvanā*), desire (*vāsanā*), will (*cetanā*), or forces (*saṃskāras*).¹⁴ The elements subject to these root-causes are bound with a beginningless twelve-divisioned causal circle (*dvādaśabhāvacakra*), ground-consequent relationship, which involves the process of birth, death and re-birth in continuous cycles till a man by disciplined moral life of conduct (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*) and insight (*prajñā*) severs the causal connections. The elements in association with the causal sequence express or display a state of restlessness (*anītya*), commotion (*duḥkha*), and conjunction (*saṃskāras* and *skhandhas*), resembling the *guṇas*¹⁵ in operation beyond the state of equilibrium (*Prakṛti*), though not governed by any cryptic teleology as in Sāṃkhya thought. The elements in dissociation express a state of extinction (*nirvāṇa*)¹⁶ or suppression (*nirodha*) or calmness (*śānta*)—an escape from sorrow and cyclic existences. Stcherbatsky summarises the entire doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas as a scheme of commotion (defilement) and extinction (purification).¹⁷

12. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 39; and *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 121, 140, for details.

13. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 29, 32-5, and *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I., p. 5; also Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 42.

14. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 32, 34; Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, 30.

15. Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 12, 22-3, 45, 64; and *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I., p. 19.

16. 'Nirvāṇa means extinction of life and death extinction of worldly desire, and extinction of space and time conditions....Nirvāṇa....positively....is....perfect freedom, quiescence,' (Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 24; also Das Gupta: *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 97-98).

17. *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 25, 34, 35, 50, 53.

The Sautrāntikas¹⁸ extend the intellectual scheme of the Vaibhāṣikas in a different line suggesting that the elements are never intuited but inferred, and are experienced in a series, i.e. they are durational and not discrete. With their emphasis on experience as a flux (process), the Sautrāntikas exhibit a more critical attitude¹⁹ than the Vaibhāṣikas, though in all other aspects they stick to the Vaibhāṣika-psycho-moral scheme.²⁰

The Sautrāntikas seem to return to the original non-metaphysical standpoint of the early Buddhists.²¹ But while the early Buddhists refuse to intellectualise transcendental experience, the Sautrāntikas do not reject intellectuality altogether. According to them, intellectuality is limited in the sense that it can never reveal transcendental experience (elements and *nirvāṇa*) as it is always tinged with phenomenality. In setting limits to intellectual experience, the Sautrāntikas resemble Kant; and by insisting that experience is always mediated through *ideality* or *phenomenality*, they resemble the contemporary western critical realists.²² Das Gupta²³ aptly considers them as *transitional*, connecting the subsequent standpoints of Nāgārjuna and Asanga, leaders of Mahāyāna thought.

Nāgārjuna,²⁴ the exponent of the Mādhyamika standpoint, suggests an efficient transcendent dialectic scheme and proves that the Sautrāntika-expression of experience is relatively dogmatic and phenomenal. Nāgārjuna's is a demonstration of a more searching analysis of intellectuality into four forms of arguments: (i) *ens* (being),

18. For details, vide Das Gupta: Philosophical Essays, pp. 95-6; Takakusu: The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 62-79; Raju: Idealistic Thought of India, pp. 222-4, and Stcherbatsky: The Conception Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad, 1927), p. 25.

19. It is critical in so far as it does not restrict itself to a pre-logical state of reflection of the Vaibhāṣikas; it considers the conscious logical stage as a natural process.

20. Stcherbatsky: The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 41-3.

21. Vide Dialogues of the Buddha, Part I, pp. 26-30 (Translated by Rhys Davids); Takakusu: The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 74.

22. The Sautrāntikas, in some aspects, appear similar to Kant and the critical realists. But really they are different, their final aim being psycho-moral and non-positivistic.

23. Philosophical Essays, pp. 95-6.

24. Ibid., p. 104; Takakusu: The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 24, 96-99; Raju: Idealistic Thought of India, pp. 233-36; Bhattacharya: Historical Introduction to Indian Schools of Buddhism in History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, Vol. I. p. 184.

(ii) *non-ens* (non-being), (iii) *either ens or non-ens*, (iv) *neither ens nor non-ens*. He thinks that intellectuality in its dialectic process is an assertion of relativity, though it does not end with mere phenomenality; it is a rise to a negative disjunctive judgment—a superior transcendent stage in the sphere of argument where the alternatives are not *chosen* but *abandoned*. It is not a scheme of a cyclic continuity of intellectual process beyond anti-thesis as in Hegel.²⁵ It is a scheme of over-reaching the cycle of intellectuality abandoning all intellectual syntheses. It is a negativist method pointing to a transcendent experience beyond intellectuality, foreshadowing the scheme of the *absolute indefinite* of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, an eminent Indian thinker of this century.²⁶ Prof. Bhattacharya points out that behind all intellectual discernments, conceptual or dialectic, there is an ever-present or ever-manifesting *indefinite*, which cancels all specific discernments, but is not itself cancelled. It is a transcendent consciousness discovered through a thorough study of the eastern and western philosophy down the ages.²⁷ If Nāgārjuna is viewed from this transcendent standpoint, his negation of elements, causal law, *nirvāṇa* or Buddha has a meaning; therein he does not give expression to a merely mystic, sceptic, nihilistic or phenomenistic attitude;²⁸ his is an expression of a deeper insight or wisdom—a state of intellectual quietude—an outcome of a dauntless spirit and a fierce logic,²⁹ not deterred by any consequence however unpalatable. This superior dialectic of Nāgārjuna is finally realised by a disciplined moral life of conduct, concentration and insight along the usual Buddhist lines. Herein he agrees with the previous Buddhist schools, but his development of intellectuality to its utmost efficiency has its novel excellence.

The final phase of Buddhist thought is expressed in the Yogācāra³⁰ or Vijñānavāda school. The Yogācāra thought, as evolving

25. Mure: An Introduction to Hegel (Clarendon Press, 1940).

26. The Concept of Philosophy in Contemporary Indian Philosophy Ed. by Radhakrishnan and Muirhead (George Allen and Unwin, 1936) Nāgārjuna's supra-empirical tendency may be traced to his psycho-moral motive which is common to all the schools.

27. Datta: The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 124-34.

28. Raju: Idealistic Thought of India, pp. 254-5.

29. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929), Vol. I, pp. 655-7, 667-9.

30. For details, vide Stcherbatsky: The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 31-2; Raju: Idealistic Thought of India, pp. 256-78.

from Maitreya-nātha to Asanga and Vasubandhu and subsequently to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,³¹ expresses an ascent to an idealistic and transcendent standpoint and is very much different from the abstract intellectualism of the Upaniṣads.

The Yogācāras contend that empirical experience is not a mere intellectual assertion, nor a dialectical process; it is dependent on a cosmic superject consciousness, an abode of consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*)—in Takakusu's words, an ideational store—a field of infinite efficiency, manifesting and perfuming³² the individual consciousness and the existential orders of causal law (*pratītyasamutpāda*) of the Vaibhāṣikas, the phenomenal existence of the Sautrāntikas, or the superject-dialectic of Nāgārjuna. According to Vasubandhu, the *ālayavijñāna* is the first evolute or transformation (*pariṇāma* or *vipāka*) of the pure consciousness (*vijñāna*),³³ which is the final causal principle. According to Asanga, the *ālayavijñāna* is impure and less efficient in its character of subject-object relationship, but becomes supremely efficient by a moral discipline when it reaches the state of non-duality (*advaya*) or thusness (*tathāta*, *dharmadhātu*, or *dharmakāya*).³⁴ Takakusu thinks that the Yogācāra-idealism expresses a triadic series of causality, viz., (i) causality by action-influence (*pratītyasamutpāda*), (ii) causality by ideation (*ālayavijñāna*) and (iii) causality by thusness (*tathāta*).³⁵ The first two causal processes are dependent on the third, which is the supreme principle of causality of psycho-cosmic character.

Radhakrishnan seems to think that Nāgārjuna by his superior logic prepares the ground for the *advaita* philosophy of Śaṅkara³⁶ and suggests that Yogācāra idealism—'a middling ability'³⁷—is akin

31. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vols. I and II.

32. Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 90.

33. Raju: *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 271-4; 'According to Dignāga.... the Buddhas are the personification of pure consciousness undifferentiated into subject and object....' (Stcherbatsky: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, p. 35).

34. Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 92-5; Raju distinguishes the Yogācāra standpoint from that of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, and also from modern psychological standpoint. (*Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 273-6).

35. Takakusu: *Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness in Philosophy East and West*, Ed. by Moore (Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 79-82.

36. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 669.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 703.

to Hegelian idealism.³⁸ This paper confers a superior place to the Yogācāras and considers Nāgārjuna's stand-point, both historically and logically, as a stepping-stone to the Yogācāras.³⁹ As all the Buddhist schools interpret intellectual efficiency in a non-referential aspect, culminating in the doctrine of voidness (*śūnyatā*) in the Yogācāra-sense,⁴⁰ any positivistic comparison of these schools with the western philosophical reflections is improper. Again, the Yogācāra-scheme cannot be considered as a return to the search of the soul of the Upaniṣads, as Stcherbatsky⁴¹ thinks in his unguarded moments. This paper suggests that in the dynamic process and progress of Indian thought the role of the Buddhist schools is always an *advance*, and never a *return* to the past traditional reflections. The reactionary tendency of the Buddhist schools is not the anti-intellectualistic reaction of the western thought from the Sophists to the Existentialists,⁴² as the schools never ignore intellectual efficiency nor abandon the transcendental experience.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 640-3; this statement might have a truth, if the Yogācāras are interpreted from ordinary intellectual-empirical standpoint.

39. Takakusu: *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 11.

40. Raju: *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 258-9, 262-5, 267-8, 272.

41. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, pp. 35-7.

42. For a general idea of Existentialism, vide Marcel: *The Philosophy of Existence*, trans. by M. Harari (The Harvill Press, 1949).

Ethical Theory of Knowledge

by

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Ethical theory of knowledge deals with ethical determination of knowledge¹ as well as ethical significance of knowledge. Epistemology should concern itself with all that is connected with knowledge. Besides the usual questions that are discussed in Epistemology, the following questions appear to be not only relevant but also very important: What subjective conditions qualify a person to get knowledge? What different kinds of preparations are necessary for different kinds of knowledge? What is the correlation between the character of a person and the knowledge which he acquires? What part do values play in the acquisition and valuation of knowledge? What is the place of knowledge as a value in the system of values? Does knowledge possess an instrumental value or an intrinsic value? How is the value of knowledge correlated with other values?, etc.

Following the general ethical theories regarding the ideal, we may study as to what would be the hedonistic, formalistic and eudaemonistic conception of knowledge.

It is not the object of this paper to offer answers to these questions. That is not possible within the short space available. With reference to certain fundamental difficulties in epistemology, I propose, here, to show the possibility of an ethical theory of knowledge.

In the *Śāriraka-bhāṣya*, Śankara, in his introduction of *adhyāsa* discusses, in brief, the question: who is a *pramātā*? The self cannot be the knower, according to him, as it has nothing to do with the not-self to which the intellect, the mind and the senses belong; while the not-self being *Jaḍa* or insentient cannot by itself be the knower. The answer is that, it is the self under the influence of *adhyāsa* or superimposition, identifying itself with the not-self that becomes the knower. All human activities including his know-

1. See author's article in *Philosophical Quarterly Amalner*, March '52.

ledge whether practical, scientific, philosophical or religious are rooted in the fundamental ignorance. Śankara says: In this respect man is not very different from the beasts.²

Now the whole situation could be analysed thus. Pramā is right cognition. It is obtained in the relation between the pramātā and the prameya, when the pramātā by the use of the pramāṇas acquaints himself with the prameya. Who discovers them and makes them definite? Who judges their efficiency? Who guarantees their serviceableness? The only answer seems to be that pramātā is the substratum or the source of pramāṇas. But it has been decided already that pramātā is an ignorant being under the spell of superimposition or māyā. How can such an ignorant knower have the knowledge of the instruments of knowledge which are capable of leading to valid knowledge of the object? The knower is imperfect, his intellect is also imperfect, so are his senses. The instruments of knowledge or pramāṇas function only when these imperfect equipments are made use of, and they have originated from the imperfect intellect of the knower, with the result that these instruments themselves must be defective and their functioning too defective. Yet the claim is that they lead the ignorant knower to the right knowledge of the object. So that, it is a strange happening where the root of knowledge is in ignorance. But how can ignorance be the ground of knowledge or imperfection of perfection?

One of the points of criticism made by Rāmānuja against Śankara's doctrine of māyā or ajñāna is known as Āśrayānupapatti or inconceivability of the substratum of ignorance. Ajñāna can neither be in Brahman nor in jīva dominated by ignorance. But besides these difficulties, in the problem that we are discussing, there is quite an opposite type of difficulty. Just as the omniscient transcendental self cannot consistently be the substratum of nescience, the empirical self, who is ignorant, cannot be the substratum of knowledge.

The difficulty is not peculiar to Śankarā's system, but it is common to all systems of Indian philosophy in so far as the indi-

2. Cf. adhyāsam puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikā vaidikāśca pravṛtāḥ sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhi-pṛatiśedhamokṣaparāṇi tasmād-avidyāvadviṣayānyeva pramāṇāni. Paśvādibhīścāviśeṣāt.

Śākarabhāṣyam, 1-1, 1:

vidual self is regarded as in bondage or bandha due to ignorance which is variously termed as avidyā, ajñāna, aviveka or mithyā-jñāna. This ignorance is metaphysically regarded anādi or 'beginningless.' How can such an individual self in bondage liberate himself? The question needs more thought than is given to it. The question essentially is: How can the ignorant liberate himself of his fundamental ignorance which characterizes his finite nature? For whatever he does or knows is conditioned by his ignorance, finitude or bondage. The means of knowledge that he finds, the methods that he discovers and adopts, the attitude that he takes, the concepts that he uses,—all these have their origin in ignorance and imperfection, and must have the same imprint on them. Therefore, one who is in bondage cannot have any means that would lead to his liberation. The one who is really ignorant cannot develop instruments of knowledge that would make him know. Bondage can beget bondage, ignorance can beget only ignorance. There must be strictly a similarity in essence between the seed and its fruit, between the cause and the effect. It may even be said that, instead of there being a superimposition of ignorance upon the omniscient self, that an empirical self gets any knowledge at all is a superimposition on the ignorant self. That there is a possibility of knowledge is itself a claim made under adhyāsa.

Though such a conception of bondage and liberation with its peculiar Indian colouring is not to be found in Western philosophical thought, though, of course, similar ideas are there in the religious literature of the West, the problem is of universal nature. For, in no case can a philosopher start with the hypothesis that the individual knower is omniscient. He must be regarded as he is, and there could be no two opinions about this fact that, the knower is ignorant and aspires to attain knowledge. The question is: can the ignorant being be the basis of knowledge? The answer is very difficult to give.

Are we to fall back upon the doctrine of divine grace as found in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad? The ātman (which stands for ultimate omniscient reality), it is said, cannot be obtained by discourse, intellect, penance or wide learning, nor by one who is impotent and errant; the ātman could be obtained by one who is chosen by the ātman itself that discloses itself to such a chosen one.³ The

3. Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute ten labhyastasyaiṣa ātma vivṛṇute tanum svām. Muṇḍaka, 2-3, 4.

philosopher who realises the truth is only a chosen person. Rāmānuja however says that God's choice cannot fall on anybody without rhyme or reason. The divine grace is conditioned by human efforts, though in such a conception the grace has partly lost its charm.

Śankara interprets the line differently.⁴ Whosoever chooses to know the reality as it is, he would know the reality, the real would reveal itself to him who has a will to know it. No sheer grace. Initial human will and effort are necessary. The Muṇḍaka itself stands for human effort.⁵

The philosopher's is an ever-widening and perhaps unending effort of reaching perfection in all directions including that of knowledge. Ignorant and imperfect though he is, it is an assumption worth starting with, that he aspires towards perfect knowledge and that he is capable of attaining that. It is the first postulate of ethical theory of knowledge that knowledge is possible through human efforts. To deny this postulate is to make knowledge impossible. A human being who has no such aspiration to knowledge is not true to his own nature. His achievements would justify the assumption that we have made.⁶

If valuation of human knowledge in terms of truth is regarded as proper function of epistemology, then, I think that epistemology cannot fulfil that function.

Theoretical epistemology usually discusses the problem of the relation between knowledge and reality, in order to decide whether human knowledge is a true knowledge of reality. The discussion, however, appears to be meaningless, because, it assumes that we have a definite knowledge of truth as it stands in relation to reality. If we regard human knowledge as false or doubtful, we can do so only on the strength of the possibility of our knowing that reality is different from what we know of it. But this position is certainly absurd. Again, if our knowledge is regarded as true,

4. See the note above.

5. *Ētairupāyairyatate yastu vidvānstasyaiṣa ātmā viṣate brahmadhāma.* Muṇḍaka, 3-2, 4.

6. Prof. G. R. Malkani, in his brilliant article on "Methods of Knowledge or Pramāṇa" in the recently started Journal of the Philosophical Association, Vol. I, January-April, 1954, showing the imperfections in the various methods of knowledge has concluded that Word is the only method of knowledge of metaphysical reality.

it is true only because we believe that reality is revealed in our knowledge. It means that knowledge of truth that it is truth cannot be different from knowledge of reality. For if there is a difference between truth and reality, truth is not truth; and if there is no difference between them, there is nothing external to truth in terms of which truth could be measured. It means that we have to start with the further assumption that human knowledge is a true revelation of reality. If we doubt this assumption there is no possibility of any knowledge much less any possibility of evaluation of it.

Again, the whole process assumes that we have brought a standard of truthfulness with us and we can apply that standard to the knowledge that we acquire. Now, to possess the standard of truth is to *know* the definition of truth; to know already, *a priori*, as to what constitutes truth. And the task of evaluation of knowledge consists in applying that criterion or standard to the knowledge obtained.

The difficulty, however, in such a position is that, if all knowledge has to be evaluated, as it must be, then, the knowledge as to what constitutes truth also has to be evaluated in like manner. Otherwise, the whole procedure of evaluation of knowledge is only dogmatic. For we must know what value there is for the standard of truthfulness which we possess.

There are various systems of philosophy, both of metaphysics and epistemology; the profoundest of all questions is: By what test can we judge the validity of any philosophical system? Each philosophical system will claim that it alone represents reality; if it does not so claim, there is no justification for its existence. But there is evidently no criterion by means of which we can finally and decisively justify the truth of any philosophy.

Regarding the epistemological theories of truth themselves we may ask the same question. By what criterion can we decide once for all the truth of the theories of truth? It may even be asked: By what kind of correspondence can the knowledge that correspondence theory is true be proved to be true? And, by what pragmatic test the knowledge of pragmatic theory or truth could be rendered true? The question, it should be remembered, is not of applying these criteria of truth to any concrete experience or knowledge, and if found so applicable they are to be accepted as true; the real question is of applying these criteria singly to the

corresponding knowledge that these criteria are true. But this appears to be impossible. If these criteria could not be proved to be true on their own basis, they cannot be made the standard of evaluation of knowledge. Besides these difficulties the usual difficulties about these criteria also persist. It appears, therefore, that we do not need any criterion of truth to evaluate knowledge in terms of truth, only because all knowledge must be regarded as true. For, if knowledge is not inherently regarded as true, there is no procedure by means of which knowledge could be validated.

In considering, again, the various methods of knowledge like perception, inference, testimony etc. there has been much controversy, as to whether these are independent methods of knowledge. The discussion has been complicated by an unnecessary distinction made between a source of knowledge and a source of valid knowledge.⁷ Certain sources of knowledge (for instance, testimony) are not regarded as methods of knowledge because they do not yield valid knowledge by themselves, but they have to be validated by other methods of knowledge. But it could be easily seen that every source of knowledge, even perception and inference, requires validation by other methods and hence no method could be regarded as independent method of knowledge. But if every source of knowledge requires to be validated by another source of knowledge there is no final validation of any knowledge. Either then, no valid knowledge is ever possible by any method (or by a "federation of Methods")⁸ or every source of knowledge does give, independently and always, only valid knowledge.

But we must account for the plausibility of doubt against such position of self-validity of all knowledge, irrespective of the sources from which knowledge arises, and independently of the application of any criteria of truth.

It is obvious that all knowledge is not valid, otherwise we could not make a distinction between truth and falsehood, which is so fundamental for the growth of knowledge. Therefore, it appears that, from whatever source knowledge originates we should regard it as neutral so long as it has not been proved or disproved in some *external* manner. That is the position of the Naiyāyikas in general. Though it is well known that such a procedure logi-

cally involves an infinite regress, the feeling persists that all knowledge is not equally valid, that there must be some method of testing it and distinguishing between truth and falsehood.

Similarly the Buddhist view that all knowledge is originally doubtful is also plausible. Since we know that the growth of knowledge has been possible only by showing that whatever knowledge was regarded as true was later on proved to be false. And though the knowledge that we may possess now is not contradicted as yet, there is no guarantee that it will not be so contradicted. For, it is not sufficient to maintain that knowledge is valid so long as it is not contradicted as the Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins do, what is required for any genuinely true knowledge is the knowledge that it will never be contradicted. Evidently we never possess such knowledge. Hence all knowledge must be regarded as doubtful.

We can see that there is no essential difference between a Buddhist and an avowed sceptic. For while the former admits that originally doubtful knowledge may later on be proved to be true or false, the latter, following the Buddhist argumentation to its conclusion, says that there is no possibility of a doubtful knowledge being rendered absolutely true, and hence we never overcome the original doubtful character of all knowledge. Though scepticism does involve self-contradiction in so far as there is no possibility of arguing for scepticism without assuming the validity of the premises on which the sceptical inference is based; yet the nature of this self-contradiction is not altogether absurd. What the sceptic does is that he only points out that whatever knowledge is regarded as valid by *his opponents* leads logically to the impossibility of any knowledge. At the cost of his own consistency he only wants his opponent, the believer in knowledge, to see that the latter's position consistently leads to general scepticism. He is prepared to be self-contradictory only because he has no love for consistency, but is eager to show that those who love it must admit the sceptical conclusion. The fact is that the sceptic does not himself believe in any knowledge. His argument is only hypothetical. If such and such premises are true then such and such a sceptical conclusion does follow. He categorically believes neither in the premises, nor in the self-consistent process of thinking, nor in the conclusion. The believer in knowledge, therefore, exhorts that the consistent sceptic must keep silence. But to ask a sceptic to be consistent is not to respect his disbelief in consistency itself. That is

7. Cf. Dr. D. M. Datta "Six ways of knowing," p. 329.

8. Cf. W. M. P. Montague, "Ways of knowing," title of a chapter.

why the sceptic, apparently inconsistently to his position, does speak and thus proves his real disbelief in consistency.

The above discussion of the objections against self-validity of knowledge shows the plausibility of external determination of the validity of knowledge, as well as the doubtful character of all knowledge. The only legitimate escape from these positions is to make it an initial postulate of all knowledge that not only is knowledge possible through human efforts but that whatever knowledge is so obtained is a valid knowledge directed upon an object. Thus no epistemological problem of theoretical importance need take too much of our time.

But even though the valuation of knowledge cannot be done in terms of truth since all knowledge certifies its own truth, there is another way of valuing knowledge in terms of the values for which the knower stands, and which he makes efforts to realize. As a matter of fact, in spite of Śankara's proclaiming that human activity of knowledge is not different from that of the beasts, I think that there is a fundamental difference in their cognitive and other activities. The brutes do not have the consciousness of values and this makes a difference in kind between the human and the animal cognitive activity. As a human activity it is always attended by an immanent teleology and a sense of the realization of values. All cognition is followed by conation. All knowledge serves a purpose and makes for the realization of a purpose. As G. T. Laad⁹ puts it all knowledge involves 'ethical momenta.'

If epistemology is to escape from dry, abstract, hypothetical, and, to a certain extent, useless speculations, it must be reoriented in terms of values; for, values enter into the very texture of human knowledge. The problems involved in the Ethical theory of knowledge, as set in the beginning of the paper, provide a new branch of research in consistency with the general traditions of Indian philosophical thought.

9. Philosophy of knowledge, p. 500.

Two Different Traditions of Pure Philosophy

by

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Do we do pure philosophy in India to-day or a mixed variety, which is part philosophy and part something else, say religion. It is certain that any such mixed variety will be no philosophy at all. Philosophy must be pure, or it is no philosophy, but something less or something else. We cannot have pure philosophy as an ingredient of a larger whole, however that whole may be called.

There are persons who think that we do not do pure philosophy in India to-day. Prof. Raju in his book "Idealistic Thought of India" thinks similarly, but with a difference. He does not rule out the possibility of doing pure philosophy in India in the Indian way. He says that in India, philosophers are criticised not for what they themselves hold, but for interpreting a system or a concept one way or another. "The interest appears antiquarian, and not philosophical in the strict sense. We seem to have no philosophy separate from ancient Indian history and culture. The impression is created that there can be no pure philosophy in India except European", (p. 25). What is his remedy? "If we want to infuse fresh life into Indian thought, it should be presented as a particular method, so that we may catch it and develop it further. Then shall we have pure philosophy; and philosophical criticism, besides mere criticism of interpretations, will commence." (p. 25).

I do agree that the only pure philosophy that we at present do in India (and that in a meagre way) is of the European type. But my plea is that if we want to do pure philosophy in India, it would be wrong to imitate the European way and method. We are at present confused between the European tradition and the Indian tradition in philosophy. The result is that we want to make fruitless attempts at a synthesis of the two; and failing in that, we hold both in esteem and alternately, and as it suits our mood and the occasion. We are alternately Hindu metaphysicians (*tattva-jñānins*) and full-fledged European philosophers. The result is that we are not creative as philosophers. We are imitators, followers,—that is all. We must realize that there is choice before us; and on our decision depends the future of philosophy in India.

That our interest in Indian systems of thought is antiquarian cannot be doubted. We merely propound the ancient systems for a clearer understanding of them. What is lacking is imbibing the spirit of an ancient system and propounding it as a kind of personal philosophy. It is only when we do this that we can infuse life in Indian thought. At present, this thought is ancient and more or less dead. It has lost the character of pure philosophy or present-day philosophy,—modern in substance and outlook. It is natural that we should regard European philosophy as the only pure philosophy, for it is, by its very character of freedom, held and propounded as a personal philosophy. It meets the needs of the modern man for a world-view. It is no wonder that we are unconsciously drifting towards the European tradition in philosophy.

But is this right? If European philosophy is pure philosophy, why not encourage the drift? Can there be two forms of pure philosophy, one European and the other Indian? What are those forms? Are they antagonistic? Can they not be held simultaneously and even reconciled? These are some of the questions that quite naturally arise. We are told by Prof. Raju that Indian philosophy has a method of its own, which we can catch and develop further. But he has not told us what is that method. Can there be different methods in pure philosophy? If the only legitimate method of philosophy is the method of reason, can there be any fundamental distinction of method in Indian and European philosophy?

We regard European philosophy as pure, because it accepts the method of pure reason. This method assumes nothing dogmatically or on authority. It criticises every assumption. If it accepts anything, it accepts it because it is self-evidently true and cannot be questioned or doubted. But then what truths are thus unquestionable? Not the so-called principles of reason or the categories. They have been questioned. Not any piece of direct knowledge of objective reality. Reason, in its free poise, can accept nothing and accede to nothing unconditionally. What have we gained by reason alone?

European philosophy, and in fact all occidental thought and culture, are based upon the apotheosis of reason. We have experience of reality and we have reason. We must be able to answer all questions about reality on that basis. We have certainly been able to answer empirical questions in this way. In any case, we know the method of answering such questions. It is the method

of observation and experiment proceeding most often on the basis of a hypothesis. But has any philosopher succeeded in answering his own special, and necessarily non-empirical, questions in that way? Because no-one has succeeded in answering metaphysical questions with the aid of reason alone, a doubt has arisen whether they are any legitimate questions at all. It has been argued that they are spurious questions or meaningless questions. The more important philosophical problem should be the problem of meaning itself. Meaning is determined by the use we make of words in a language or by syntactical rules; and these in turn depend upon our common experience in society, experience which is universal, and which can be communicated and also understood. This rules out all super-sensible essences and meanings, and so metaphysical knowledge in general.

It may now be said: "But all European thought has not taken this direction. Some philosophers at least have answered philosophical questions to their own satisfaction. They claim to have solved the riddle of being." That may be so. But unfortunately, no-one has done so to the satisfaction of other workers in the field. Every-one has a *personal solution* which is, so far as he is concerned, final and immune from criticism. What then happens of the method of reason, which is supposed to be a principle of universality? Evidently, it is a method of divergence here in philosophy. May be, this is inevitable, because of the difference in qualifications, such as the capacity to eschew imagination or understanding and see with the eye of reason. But then two can play at this game. The capacity in question becomes a hidden occult faculty. The simple ground of experience and reasoning based on it is left far behind. Plain and straight-forward argument based on accepted rules is divested of all its truth-value. In its place we have an incomprehensible and almost mystic faculty of reason.

We can now ask, is there any other method of pure philosophy apart from reason? In particular, what is the method of Indian philosophy? Is it a method which we can develop further as Prof. Raju says? I doubt it. The only method which I can think of and which is peculiar to Indian philosophy is the method of revelation (*srûti*) supported and vindicated by reason. But can revelation be a method of pure philosophy? The acceptance of any kind of authority is just opposed to reason, and so in a sense, to what is called pure philosophy. But authority may be the only means of raising experience to a higher level, where all other means

fail. In that case, it may be permissible even in pure philosophy. It is the claim of Indian thought that word or revelation is the only method of a direct or intuitive awareness of a higher or metaphysical reality. Are we prepared to accept this claim? If we are, then pure philosophy will have a new dimension. We shall no longer be rationalising our experience which we actually have, but raising or deepening our experience primarily through a new intuition, and only secondarily through reason. Revelation will be our method of knowledge, and reason will be a method of confirming and deepening that knowledge by removing all mental or intellectual impediments to its complete fruition. The process will involve every relevant form of rational analysis and argument.

The difference between European and Indian thought is not one of method only. It is also a difference of the goal and the ideal. If by pure philosophy we understand pure theory or an imaginative construction of reality, then it cannot affect our life in any material way, and it will not have much utility for us. But abstract theorising can be subordinated to a new intuition or vision of reality, and this is bound to affect life more intimately. Such knowledge takes the more concrete form of wisdom; and wisdom has a direct reference to life, its ultimate goal and the highest values. Wisdom ennobles life, and the highest kind of wisdom ennobles life to the highest limit. Philosophy for the Indian is this wisdom which achieves the highest ennoblement of life or its highest goal. This is described as freedom from the bondage of ignorance culminating in Absolute Freedom or *mokṣa*. For the European tradition, philosophy has nothing to do with the actual conduct of life, which is the concern of religion. It is the religion that sets the goal, such as salvation, and shows the way to reach that goal. Indian philosophy is thus more than mere philosophy or pure theory. It assumes the role of religion as well. It seeks to give that knowledge which is the consummation of the religious urge towards the highest freedom and the greatest joy. We have here a new ideal of philosophy, both in its method and in its aim. We cannot combine this ideal with the European ideal, and build up a synthetic notion of philosophy. The one is opposed to the other both in method and in intent. We have to choose; and having chosen, we are bound to give names. Those who opt for the European tradition are bound to call Indian philosophy as so much spiritual humbug. Those who opt for its opposite number may be inclined to regard European philosophy as so much trash or spinning of yarns. It is mere verbal jugglery and fanciful think-

ing. The term "pure philosophy" can thus have different senses opposed to each other. In my opinion, we must disentangle ourselves from the European tradition before we can appreciate the Indian.

What however is involved in this reorientation? Are we prepared to accept the Indian tradition in all its literalness? Is it in accord with the spirit of the times? Or does it require some modification? According to Prof. Raju, "the philosophical principles of our ancient systems will be carried on," but there will have to be less dependence upon *śrūti* and other texts. "Respect for tradition may be cultivated only so long as it does not become an impediment." (p. 26).

We shall naturally like to know the principles of our traditional thought that have to be carried on. We are not told anything about them by Prof. Raju. Acceptance of the revealed word or *śrūti* as a method of knowledge will evidently not be one of those principles. For, if there is going to be less dependence upon *śrūti*, the latter will cease to be authoritative for us and the sole method of a higher knowledge. What then are those principles which we want to retain and carry on? Perhaps the concepts suggested by *śrūti*, such as *Brahman*, *māyā*, *avīdyā*, *mokṣa*, *ātman*, etc., may be some of them and more acceptable to us. But either these concepts are validated by our ordinary experience like the concepts causality, substance, etc., or they are not. In the former case, they cannot be peculiar to the Indian tradition. They properly belong to the European tradition. Even European thought gives meaning to some of these metaphysical concepts in terms of ordinary human experience. By 'soul' we can understand the momentary "I". By 'God' we can understand a magnified man who can invoke the emotions of fear, awe and love in us. It can be argued that there is no principle particularly Indian and not to be found in European philosophy. In other words, we break away from Indian tradition altogether, and we accept the European tradition as the only worth-while tradition; for it accepts no authority higher than secular reason.

If anything distinguishes Indian thought from the European, it is the faith in the revealed word as a means of higher knowledge. This claim of Indian thought we are prepared to reject. What then is left of it which is peculiar to it? The acceptance of a *guru* seems even less rational. Moral and spiritual qualifications seem irrelevant. Secular reason demands none of these. For reasoning in

philosophy is only an extension of reasoning in science which is clearly a secular affair. The truth is that if we are to accept some of the principles of Indian thought, we must accept their validity not on the basis of our present experience, but on the basis of a possible experience. We accept them on authority. Only this authoritativeness must find its justification in a higher level consciousness to which it ought to lead. If this purpose is incapable of being achieved, the authoritativeness can be rejected. The truth-consciousness is yet to be, and revelation is only a means to it. This is the only justification of the Indian tradition. We are not free to play with it or seek to assimilate it to the superficialities of European thinking. Prof. Raju is really trying to play the game of accepting some of the principles of traditional Indian thinking, while scotching the source of their validity for us. We do not want *Śrūti*, but we do want the *products* of *Śrūti*. We accept Christ the Son, but we deny God the Father.

Prof. Raju however has a more lucid moment of thinking. In Andhra, there is a belief that "unless a *tārkika* turns a Vedantin, he will turn mad." The justification for this is somewhat as follows: "It was not impossible to argue endlessly and defend every philosophical position if we depended merely on logic. It is possible for the disputants to disagree even about logic, for every system of philosophy has its own logic. Every logic has its metaphysical presuppositions, the elaboration of which is its philosophy..... But then, if every logic has its own metaphysics and every metaphysics has its own logic, is the truth which the philosophers try to give us different for each?..... A mere logician therefore unable to find a hard fact on which to stand, doubts everything, feels that anything can be logically defended, and, in the despair that naturally follows such an attitude, may turn mad. The aim of the Vedanta is the direct presentation of reality, of a hard fact the truth of which cannot be disputed." (p. 28). "The Indian idealistic systems furnish an example of how the factuality of an ultimate reality which can never be doubted can be established." (p. 29).

If logic by itself is so powerless to establish the hard fact of the nature of the ultimate reality, what happens to the method of pure reason in philosophy? What happens to all European philosophy which is based on that method? We can go on constructing a variety of philosophical systems, and we can logically justify all of them. But then logic becomes merely a tool of our imagination. It proves nothing and disproves nothing.

The only way hard reality can be ascertained is by criticising experience, raising experience to a higher level, and ending with an experience which cannot be criticised because it is self-evidently, and so absolutely true. But in order to get at this experience logic by itself is powerless. It can only do the negative task of finding disparities and discrepancies. The positive task of raising experience to a higher intuitive level goes beyond reason, and takes the help of certain authoritative texts as interpreted and communicated by a *guru*. The *guru* stands for the person who has *seen* the truth and who can communicate what he has seen. Only this *guru* has come by the truth just in the same way with the help of the texts. The texts are thus higher than the person and may be said to be revealed to him from above. The *word* is the repository of eternal truth. And so in the beginning was the *word*. *Śrūti* is in this sense eternal and impersonal. This is Vedanta. Without Vedanta, mere logic will lead nowhere, or it may give the false conceit of a higher knowledge without real knowledge. There is no alternative to Vedanta in the region of *pure philosophical truth*.

We conclude that the tradition of Vedanta is the only tradition for us Indians, on the basis of which Indian philosophy can be renovated. We must imbibe the spirit of Vedanta and then face all the questions posed by modern European thought. This will enable us to reaffirm the ancient truth and also to deepen our insight into it. The ancient truth may thus be made to put on a modern garb and become a living truth once again.

The Logic of the Infinite

by

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In this paper I shall discuss the concept of the Infinite along with the question whether our logical postulates and categories require to be modified or re-interpreted in dealing with the Infinite, so that our logic becomes appropriate to its object. I shall begin with a summary of my standpoint in philosophy. I am both an Absolutist and a Theist. The ultimate Reality is infinite, self-existent and beyond all limitations. At the same time the Real is not a metaphysical abstraction, but the Supreme Person. My theism does not contradict the statement that Reality is impersonal, for the predicates 'personal' and 'impersonal' are not exclusive of each other, but reveal the many-sided perfection of the Real who is the Supreme Person.

As for the concept of Philosophy, I use the term Philosophy as equivalent to a reasoned system of ideas about Reality and distinguish philosophical knowledge from direct knowledge of Reality which is obtained in mystical experience. I further hold that in Philosophy we must make a critical use of reason, by which I mean that we can take nothing on trust and nothing for granted and that revelation (sruti) which is a record of spiritual experience cannot be taken as a *premiss* in reasoning. In this sense reason is autonomous, but it is not autonomous absolutely. As against Aquinas I would say that the metaphysical use of reason is not possible unless the natural light of reason is aided by the light of faith awakened through revelation. Reason is ontologically, not logically, dependent on revelation, which means that it is indebted to revelation not for any premiss, but for its basic datum. To explain; our acceptance of the Infinite is not the result of rational considerations; it is immediate and unconditional and therefore supra-rational. The starting point (not premiss) of philosophy is this supra-rational faith in the Infinite, and because it is supra-rational it cannot be awakened by the exercise of the natural light of reason. The awakening of faith can only be effected by revelation. That which is the soul's inmost certainty has still to be

revealed to it before it can become conscious of it and explicitly accept it. The common mistake made in European philosophy is to assume that what is not based on reason is therefore unreasonable or atleast unproved. Faith can be shown to be reasonable without being based on reason. This is so because reason is not anterior but interior to faith. Since faith is activated by revelation alone, the latter is the matrix of reason. Between reason and revelation there is a relation of ontological dependence, which relation, reason, in view of its logical self-sufficiency, is at liberty to deny. But if it does so it denies its only possible link with the Infinite and we are given a philosophy which is blind at its source and so not fully aware of its own significance and function. Such a philosophy is in danger of setting up an arrogant claim to self-sufficiency in knowledge and deny the title of knowledge to mystical experience. Whether we call philosophy knowledge or not will depend on whether we may extend the term knowledge to what is only a symbolic representation of direct knowledge contained in spiritual experience. Philosophy is merely the explicit statement of faith in the language of concepts, which are to spiritual experience very much as symbols in logic are to the thought process they symbolize. Faith is the substance not only 'of things hoped for', but of things to be known or realized. The question is often asked. 'Do mystics know?' and secular philosophy, fearing to lose its authority, may reply in the negative. No philosophy is in fact secular in the sense of being existentially independent of revelation, but it may be secular in its attitude if it forgets its origin and denies its sacred mission. If by knowledge we mean, as I think we should, the act of realizing our conceptual symbols, then not only is it true that the mystics know, but what is more important, it is true that none but the mystics know. As already explained, the mystic (the maker or instrument of revelation) does not impose his authority on the philosopher but merely makes available to him the basic a priori concepts (the datum) which, by means of the natural light, are matured into a full-fledged philosophical system. Nor is the distinction between philosophy and mystical experience merely a matter of degree, the latter being presumed to give more adequate knowledge of the same kind. There is an impassible distinction of levels in which the lower is ordered to the higher, and a felt *nisus* at the philosophical level—not felt by those who merely philosophise on a blind impulse—for a new orientation towards those super sensuous truths which philosophy merely reflects but cannot grasp.

With this long introduction, necessary to secure my position from the charge of anti-intellectualism, let us now explore the concept of the Infinite. After a very long association of Philosophy with Science, not always a happy one, science has succeeded in liberating itself from Philosophy and its sister Theology. I think that now the time has come when Philosophy should make a determined effort to liberate itself from the clutches of science. It is because Philosophy has not yet identified itself wholly with the axiological standpoint, but has approached its problems in the spirit of science with its emphasis on the Object outside the knowing subject that philosophers have not attempted, in full seriousness, to unfold the unimaginably rich potentialities of the concept of the Infinite. This, and an unfortunate separation between sacred Theology and secular Philosophy has given rise to the doctrine of the 'Mysteries' which are said to be revealed truths incomprehensible to the intellect. All divine mysteries are locked up in the notion of the Infinite which we come to possess with the aid of revelation. Our task as philosophers is not to apply the concept to a datum, nor merely to deduce consequences from it—to do this would be to imitate the inductive and mathematical sciences—but to mature the concept, to make it grow, to go on brooding on it till it is fully hatched. Metaphysics is one long, sustained attempt at defining, more and more clearly, our starting point, though not in the manner prescribed by formal logic. This intellectual penetration of the basic concept of philosophy will at one and the same time reveal the nature and mysteries of the Infinite and equip us with the appropriate logic to deal with it. Metaphysical reflection is the highest guarantee of the validity of our logical postulates, for logic in the last resort, depends on metaphysics, the science of truth and validity *par excellence*. Thus we can only evolve a logic of the Infinite by reflecting on the nature of the Infinite and not by laying down certain rules *ab initio* and compelling thought to follow these rules in dealing with the Infinite. An expansion or modification of logic on metaphysical considerations alone (if at all)—this is a condition which we may ignore only at the cost of permitting every possible kind of nonsense in the name of Philosophy.

This, however, is but one side of the truth, a side for which it is fairly easy to gain recognition. The complementary aspect of the truth also be insisted on, since it seems hardly to have been noticed except by Hegel and Sri Aurobindo. The latter more than Hegel has dwelt on it as an important issue in philosophy and this

paper which owes its inspiration to his conception of the logic of the Infinite is an attempt to argue the need for such a logic and develop some of its implications. For Sri Aurobindo the term 'Logic of the Infinite' stands primarily for the operations or modes of connection in the Divine Reason which are supramental, and secondarily for the workings of the human reason when it consents to take seriously the unique and integral character of the Infinite. Human reason, he suggests, should accustom itself to the Logic of the Infinite and should acquire as far as possible, the utmost plasticity in dealing with the Infinite, otherwise "our mental logic with its constant embarrassed stumbling around a false conception of contradictions" will regard "co-existent and concurrent" poises of the Infinite as "opposed to and incompatible with each other." In this paper I have used the term 'Logic of the Infinite' to describe human reason in so far as it attempts to deal adequately with its ultimate object.

The complementary aspect of the truth which holds logic in subservience to Metaphysics, is that the former comes to a full consciousness of itself only in the latter. Our logic, when it turns from the finite to the Infinite, from the scientific object to the metaphysical subject has yet to develop its full potentialities, in the course of which it may have to alter and enlarge its framework of categories. Operating within the limited field of science it becomes aware, through internal reflection, of certain presuppositions and postulates; it gives shape to its inherent form which acquires a definite cast or mould. The danger now is that under the impression that logic has grown to its full stature, this form may congeal and become so hard and rigid that the logic grown out of science, acquires a false sense of self-sufficiency and begins to dictate to metaphysics. It assumes as almost axiomatic that it can lay down, in advance of all metaphysical thinking, the pattern to which the latter must conform. It brings with it a narrow cage of concepts in which it tries to imprison the Infinite itself.

A striking example of this arrested development resulting in a truncated logic, which in its turn permits only a truncated Infinite (shorn of its Mysteries) to escape through its narrow confines is the uncritical application of the so-called laws of thought to Reality, particularly the law of contradiction. Thus it is regarded almost as axiomatic that if we describe God as personal and at the same time go on to describe him as impersonal, we are violating the law of contradiction, since 'personal' and 'impersonal' are incompatible predicates which cannot be affirmed of the same subject. Thus

the notion of incompatibility of opposition is taken as understood and the term 'impersonal' is equated with the negative term 'not-personal'. After this the logic of exclusion that regards affirmation and denial as co-ordinate takes its course and clips the Infinite of its many sided perfection. But this is a logic which has not advanced beyond the scientific level of thought.

It is not my intention to question the validity of the laws of thought, any more than it was Hegel's. They are, in the words of Joachim, basal ontological laws and formulate the barest and most indispensable character of Reality in the form of truth. The question is, what is the correct interpretation and proper content of these 'basal ontological laws'?

Let us consider how the law of contradiction operates within the sphere of finite objects and relations. An object cannot be white and not-white at the same time and in the same sense. If the term 'not-white' is not to be taken as a barren infinite term, it stands for any positive quality belonging to the same universe of discourse as 'white'. Thus the law forbids us to predicate white and, say, green of the same object. White and green are opposed and mutually repellent qualities in the universe of colour. But is their opposition relative or absolute? An absolute opposition between the two would mean that the presence of one quality anywhere in the universe would be sufficient to exclude the other from the universe. If anything were white then nothing could be green and vice versa. But 'white' and 'green' can and do enjoy 'peaceful co-existence' in the Universe; they do not clash absolutely but only under certain conditions, just as two trains moving towards each other in opposite directions do not collide if they are running on different rails.

The relative character of all opposition may be illustrated by another argument. Opposition implies relation and relation is not possible unless the related terms are somehow held together in a common ground which overcomes their opposition. Extremes must meet even in order to fall apart. Relatedness is a sign of a community of nature, for if two terms were absolutely opposed to each other then they could not get related by way of opposition. Since, however, the mere fact of relatedness does not immediately overcome the tension, it follows that we have necessarily to go beyond the opposing terms to discover the unity which they presuppose.

The logic of opposition thus itself reveals that there is an all-encompassing Reality which over-rides and reconciles all opposites. Conflict and tension are the mark of appearance—they are contained and resolved in the Whole whose harmony remains undisturbed.

If now we shift our attention from the finite to the Infinite, the laws which served us and guided our earlier inquiry cannot retain precisely the same character and form when the Infinite, the reconciler of opposites, emerging from its shadowy background, becomes the direct object of thought. Since the laws are ontological and reveal the general features of objects thought about, a radical difference in the nature of the two objects, the finite and the Infinite must be expected to make a difference to our Logic, when we pass from the one to the other. The postulate of the Logic of finite existence takes a specific form which is strictly relative to its object. It may be expressed in Spinoza's maxim. Determination is negation, provided we interpret it to mean that negation is an essential element in finite existence. More specifically, predication in the case of finite object presupposes a limited universe of discourse which contains qualities which exclude each other when we try to bring them to a common point. Affirmation implies denial. The object accepts a predicate only by excluding others belonging to the same universe of discourse.

In this and the preceding argument I have, I am aware, only repeated Hegel and endorsed his distinction between the logic of understanding and the logic of Reason. But it seems to me that Hegel did not follow up his discovery of the higher logic and explore its implications. In so far as he admits negation as an element in the Absolute he seems to have given up his search for a more adequate logic to deal with the Infinite.

The Infinite being the Whole, is not an object contained in any universe of discourse. It cannot therefore be a focus of conflicting predicates, unable to support any one predicate except through a rejection of others.

In the case of the Infinite the maxim, Determination is negation, in the sense given to it above is simply not true. There is however, another interpretation of this maxim which would make it applicable to the Infinite. On this interpretation, determination means an affirmation which implies denial and negation means limitation. Thus the maxim would read; to restrict the Infinite to one of a given set of predicates is to limit it.

Thus the basic postulate of the Logic of the Infinite takes shape: There is no negation in the Infinite. All negation is appearance. 'God', as Eckhart says, 'is the denial of all denial'. When we affirm something, it is said, there is something else that we wish to deny. This is precisely not true in the case of any affirmation about the Infinite. If any predicate is offered to the Infinite for its acceptance, it must be offered unconditionally and not with the proviso that the submission of this predicate entails the withholding of some other predicate. Every affirmation that has the Infinite as its subject is a pure affirmation without even an implicit denial. In the Logic of the Infinite every affirmation is self-contained and is not based explicitly or implicitly on denial.

It is meaningless to suggest that the ascription of a predicate to the Infinite implies the denial of the contradictory of the predicate. Either the predicate denied is the formal contradictory of the predicate affirmed or it is a contrary term. In the former case the denial is simply the affirmation itself stated artificially in a negative form. In the latter case, the objection begs the question by assuming that the Infinite is confronted with contrary terms, of which it must choose one to the exclusion of the others.

Predicates are contrary terms only in relation to finite portions of the Universe, and opposition itself loses significance in relation to the Infinite Ground of the universe. The proposition "God" is not not-A", is not implied in the proposition, "God is A", but is identical with it, while the proposition, "God is not B, since He is A", is false. Whether God who is A can also be B (where A and B would be contrary predicates in a finite universe of discourse) depends, not on the predicate A, but on the nature of God. Each predicate must be considered strictly on its own merit and if it is affirmed of God must be affirmed of Him absolutely. A predicate that is denied of God is itself an overt or implicit denial of God and thus the denial of the denial is tantamount to the affirmation that God is complete and self-contained.

There is thus no contradiction in affirming that God is both personal and impersonal. Whether the affirmation is true or not, is a separate question, but one which cannot be decided by the application of the formal rules of reasoning.

The proposition "God is personal", may be restated by an artificial change in mere verbal form as, "God is not not-personal," but not as "God is not impersonal". The predicate 'impersonal,'

though negative in form, is positive in content, and as a positive predicate is neither the contradictory nor the contrary of the predicate 'personal', in so far as these predicates are considered in relation to the subject term, God or Infinite being.

We are still at the fringe of the possibilities latent in the Logic of the Infinite. Some further implications may develop in discussing the concept of negation and its place in Reality. Prof. Raju in his "Thought and Reality" has argued against the view of Hegel and Bradley that negation is an aspect of Reality. I fully endorse his statement that "Negation ought to disappear in Reality" (Page 118), but I feel that the conclusion that he draws from it in the interest of Illusionist Advaita not only does not follow from "but even contradicts its premiss. It is true, as Prof. Raju says, that if Reality is suprarrelational and without differences there can be no negation in it; but I do not see how he passes from the proposition, "Negation implies differences and relations", to its simple converse, "Differences and relations imply negation". It seems that he is enabled to do so by combining together the following two premisses both of which he accepts from Bradley: 1) Negation appears only because we make selections. 2) To think is to make selections and so "in the Absolute thought has no place". The second premiss is precisely that which I have questioned in this paper. In affirming anything of the Infinite, thought does not "emphasize one aspect in abstraction from the rest", but affirms absolutely. But Prof. Raju may reject the thesis of this paper, in which case I must press against him the charge of contradiction. If what thought affirms is necessarily an abstraction, then Reality, in accepting what we affirm of it must necessarily contain negation. Thus P implies the absence of Q, then, if Reality is P it is *not* Q and so is partly negative. Prof. Raju's judgment "The real is the positive" would, like all judgments, be "double-edged", i.e. both affirmative and negative, and if it is true, then "negation would belong to Reality itself."

Besides what are we to do with differences and relations, since they are there? They are either contained in the real or not; if as Prof. Raju thinks they are not, then the Real negates differences and relations and this must lead to the conclusion that negation is ultimate.

Bradley it seems to me wavers between the view that negation belongs to Reality and the sceptical conclusion that all judgment is a falsification or misrepresentation and that in the end nothing

can be predicated of Reality. There are two considerations which lead him to raise ultimate doubts about our metaphysical knowledge: 1) judgment implies selection and therefore abstraction, and 2) 'thought creates a division in the felt whole, and we get the subject and predicate. Thus the original integrity of the whole is lost' (Raju, *ibid*, P. 119).

One would have imagined that if certain 'reasons' showed Reality to be an unknowable X of which nothing can be said without falsification then the proper course would be to re-examine the alleged reasons, rather than to accept the sceptical conclusion to which they point. Neither of these reasons is in fact valid and they only appear to be so because we ignore the utterly unique nature of the Infinite and treat it as just one object among other objects.

Judgment, as I have shown, does not imply selection or negation when it affirms a predicate of the Infinite; and if this point has been grasped then it is not difficult to show the falsity of the assumption that 'thought destroys the integrity of the whole'. In thinking of the Infinite, the predicate we affirm of it is not partial and not a fragment separated from the whole. The attribute is but absolute. It is an attribute of the Infinite in Spinoza's sense, and not a fragment separated from the whole. The attribute is the Infinite itself in one of its 'poises' and its affirmation leaves the Infinite free to reveal to thought other poises of itself. The term 'poise of the Infinite' is used by Sri Aurobindo to indicate a positive mode of being of the Infinite in which the Infinite is present indivisibly and integrally without being limited to it or any other positive mode of being. The Infinite is to him, the Indeterminable, not in the sense of being a featureless Unknown, but in the sense that in its unlimited freedom it cannot be restricted to any one determination. In a judgment about the Real the subject and the predicate do not fall apart, but remain indivisibly one, and thus thought does not lose its hold on the Real, though of course at the level of thought we can hold only the reflection of the Real and not its substantial presence.

So far I have used the terms 'attribute' and 'predicate' interchangeably, but a distinction must be made between the attribute as objectively present in the substance as a poise of its being and the attribute as 'what the mind conceives the substance to be'. The latter is the logical predicate in the judgment. In this distinction there is no suggestion of a Cartesian dualism between a

representative idea or mental picture and an extra-mental Reality. In judging Reality to be impersonal the attribute, or better the impersonal poise of the Infinite is present in the mind by way of an idea, but for that very reason it has an ontological as distinct from a merely logical status. The idea, it must be remembered is after all, 'an ideal content referred to Reality'.

Distinguishing between the real attribute or poise of the Infinite and the logical predicate in which the former is ideally contained, we may say that every predicate of the Infinite, in so far as it reveals 'that which expresses eternal and infinite essence' is a Leibnitzian monad. It has no windows; it cannot relate itself directly to any other similar predicate either by way of implication or exclusion. That affirmation does not involve denial in the case of the Infinite, has already been shown. What is now to be shown is that a predicate which reveals a poise of the Infinite, is incapable of implying or directly relating itself to any other similar predicate.

To monadic character of the logical predicate follows from the fact that in the judgment, subject and predicate do not fall apart. Thought does not destroy the indivisible character of the whole, since the predicate reveals a poise of the Infinite and not a partial and abstract aspect of it. The predicates of the Infinite, however, may be indirectly related to each other through Reality which is their common subject. Thus if reflection on the nature of the Real leads us to affirm simultaneously that the Real is A and B and C, then A, B and C can get related to each other only indirectly, as being predicates of the same Reality. There is no direct logical passage from any one predicate to any of the others. The judgment Reality is A, is a pure affirmation and therefore, the predicate A is *qua* predicate, self-contained. The predicates of Reality are, from the logical point of view, incommensurable.

There is, however, a danger of confusing logical with ontological self-sufficiency, alternative logical predicates with 'alternative forms of the Absolute', of abandoning the search for the ultimate synthesis of all predicates and replacing the integral view of Reality with the doctrine of "the manifoldness of Truth". (The reference here is to Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya. I would like it to be shown that my disagreement with that Master thinker is based on a misunderstanding of his views). Ontologically the attribute of the Infinite is the very antithesis of monadic existence. Each attribute contains within itself the other attributes and is contained

in each of the others. This is so because, if Reality itself as an indivisible whole, and not a fragment of it, is present in one attribute, it must be wholly present in it and hence all attributes of Reality are existentially contained in each. From the point of view of the logical predicates, however, we may distinguish between Reality as indivisibly present and Reality as integrally present. The logical predicate contains the Real indivisibility but not integrally, since the Real also accepts other predicates. From the point of view of the predicate itself which is a logical monad, the question of its containing or not containing the integral Reality does not arise.

The distinction between logically incommensurable predicates and a mutually implicative set of ontological attributes has great significance for a philosophy which recognizes spiritual experience as the goal of knowledge. Reality is to be thought about in order that it may be directly known. The idea that thinking is for the sake of thinking—leaving aside the very partial truth it contains—is the grand deception on which secular philosophy in the West has been based and which is responsible for the utterly disreputable state to which it has reduced itself today.

A spiritual experience, as the direct revelation of a poise of the Infinite, is, in contrast to the predicate affirmed by thought, not monadic, though in actual fact it may be self-contained. A revelation of God as impersonal is not unrelated to the revelation of God as personal, as the predicate 'impersonal' is to the predicate 'personal', but the one revelation may or may not contain the other.¹


This explains and reconciles the divergencies of the philosophical systems in India claiming to be based on spiritual experience. Each experience is an authentic revelation of the Infinite, but only in one of its poises.² The mistake of the Vedantic Achar-

1. I must repeat that the predicates are in the end related to each other, not directly, but through their common subject—God.

2. Sri Aurobindo has shown how a spiritual experience may pass beyond the limitations of relative existence and yet not be integral, in the sense of possessing the Infinite fully. According to him it is possible to contact the Infinite at different levels of consciousness in the sphere of manifestation. Of these levels he has revealed a hierarchy, starting from the pure mind and reaching to the super-mind. Our point of departure into the Infinite determines the character of the resulting spiritual experience. It is only at the level of the super-mind that the integral Brahman can be realized integrally.

yas lies in not recognizing the indeterminable nature of the Infinite. In giving rational expression to their spiritual experience they fall a victim to the half-fledged logic of exclusion and negation, arising from our reflection on finite objects, and in asserting one predicate of the Infinite are instinctively led to deny others.

The self-sufficiency of each predicate reflecting the indivisible Infinite in one of its poises is repeated in the metaphysical system that grows out of it. A school of Philosophy (Darśana) based on spiritual experience is the result of expounding the complexity contained in any one of the alternative predicates of the Infinite. This is responsible for the illusion to which founders and supporters of the different schools of Vedanta have succumbed that their particular system is internally complete and represents the whole truth. Each system must appear complete if by an initial act of commitment we confine ourselves to it and contemplate it merely from within; and hence we find that rational discussion and polemics do not bring the antagonists any closer together, but leave them more firmly entrenched in their original positions. A truly integral philosophy is one which recognizes that the self-sufficiency of rival systems is deceptive and at best relative, and that no single predicate, in spite of its monadic character, can really set at rest, even at the level of ideas, the nîsus inherent in the mind's search for truth. The only philosophy which can be said to be integral in the proper sense of the word is a philosophy of complete affirmation, a philosophy which is a negation only of negation and which contains no bias or one-sidedness that requires to be corrected or overcome. To my mind Sri Aurobindo has simultaneously laid down and fulfilled in his own philosophy the conditions of an integral approach to Truth. Apart from him I know of no thinker whose philosophy is not, partly atleast, based on denial.



Printed by G. Srinivasachari, B.A., at the G. S. Press, 21, Narasingapuram Street, Mount Road, Madras and Published by Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, E. Khandesh.

Q.M. N 23

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